Accession Number:

AD0706916

Title:

ON BEHAVIOR STRATEGY SOLUTIONS OF FINITE TWO-PERSON CONSTANT-SUM EXTENDED GAMES,

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

PURDUE UNIV LAFAYETTE IND SCHOOL OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1970-02-01

Pagination or Media Count:

40.0

Abstract:

Through the introduction of a concept called recall-sensitivity, it is demonstrated that perfect recall each player remembers all of its past actions and past knowledge of the other players and natures actions is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the existence of behavior strategy solutions and epsilon-solutions in finite two-person constant-sum extended games. A method is presented by which behavior strategies meeting a necessary condition for solutions or epsilon-solutions may be generated. Comments are made on the practical implications of the material presented. Author

Subject Categories:

  • Operations Research

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE