Accession Number:

AD0657332

Title:

THE KERNAL AND BARGAINING SET FOR CONVEX GAMES

Descriptive Note:

Memorandum rept.

Corporate Author:

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1967-08-01

Pagination or Media Count:

25.0

Abstract:

In game theory, a convex game is a competitive situation characterized by increasing marginal utility for coalition membership as coalitions grow larger. The core of any n-person game is the set of outcomes that cannot profitably be blocked by a coalition. For the case of convex games, two other solution concepts--the kernel and the bargaining set--prove to be closely related to the core. The kernel lies in the relative interior of the core, and the bargaining set coincides with the core. RM-4571-PR, which introduced the convex game, showed that the core is similarly related to two other solution concepts the value solution is the center of gravity of the extreme points of the core, and the Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set solution coincides with the core.

Subject Categories:

  • Economics and Cost Analysis
  • Operations Research

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE