Accession Number:

AD0655373

Title:

PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF FORCE: THE KOREAN WAR AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1967-07-01

Pagination or Media Count:

25.0

Abstract:

The Korean experience emphasized dramatically for all future administrations that it is the Presidents responsibility not merely to indicate the objectives to be pursued in a conflict, but also to set a limited ceiling on the acceptable costs and risks of pursuing those objectives. The Cuban missile crisis stands out as a case in which a small and carefully applied amount of force sufficed to secure an objective. There were extenuating circumstances that favored this. Conditions will differ from crisis to crisis. Still it is necessary to understand the conditions under which force can be employed so economically and in this case so effectively. Force, in the Cuban crisis, was used as a refined instrument of coercion and persuasion. There are bound to be severe limits to the use of force as a selective, controlled instrument of policy in future crises. But it is essential to discover these limits. Once military operations go beyond a certain point, the momentum of war can set off a chain of consequences neither fully anticipated or perfectly controlled.

Subject Categories:

  • Logistics, Military Facilities and Supplies
  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
  • Guided Missiles

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE