Accession Number:

AD0645490

Title:

ON BALANCED SETS, CORES, AND LINEAR PROGRAMMING

Descriptive Note:

Technical rept.

Corporate Author:

NORTHWESTERN UNIV EVANSTON IL INFORMATION-PROCESSING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS LAB

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1967-01-01

Pagination or Media Count:

26.0

Abstract:

L. S. Shapley has found a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core of a characteristic function n-person game stating that the core is non-empty if and only if a certain system of linear inequalities on minimal balanced collection of finite sets is consistent. Using some well known constructs of linear programming, the authors associate to any n-person game two dual linear programming problems in which the constraint set of the primal includes the core of the game, and characterize the non-emptiness of the core in terms of properties of dual optimal solutions of these problems. They then prove the Shapley conjecture on sharpness of the set of proper minimal balanced inequalities with respect to core feasibility of proper n- person games. Using the Farkas-Minkowski Theorem, they obtain a characterization of redundant inequalities with respect to core feasibility and express the rate of growth of the game as a sequence of lower bounds for successive game values corresponding to increasing subsets of the collection of N players, which vitiates the possibility of constraint redundancy. If all game values are non-negative, the characteristic growth rate induces a partial ordering on game values corresponding to subsets of N.

Subject Categories:

  • Operations Research

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE