Accession Number:

AD0641855

Title:

AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF ALLIANCES

Descriptive Note:

Memorandum

Corporate Author:

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

Personal Author(s):

• Olson, Jr., Mancur
• Zeckhauser, Richard

Report Date:

1966-10-01

Pagination or Media Count:

45.0

Abstract:

The report presents a new theoretical model of military alliances and other international organizations. The assumptions basic to the model are that nations act in their own best interests and that there is a public goods aspect to all joint undertakings. The main conclusions drawn from the analysis are that 1 a less than optimal amount of resources will be devoted to an alliance or other international organization 2 the burden of an alliance will be borne in a disproportional way, the larger members paying more than their proportional share. Empirical data from NATO and the United Nations are presented in support of these conclusions.

Descriptors:

• *ECONOMICS
• *MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS
• MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN)
• MILITARY BUDGETS

Subject Categories:

• Economics and Cost Analysis
• Government and Political Science

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE