Accession Number:

AD0617798

Title:

CONCESSION-MAKING IN EXPERIMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS

Descriptive Note:

Scientific rept.

Corporate Author:

HAWAII UNIV HONOLULU

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1964-11-16

Pagination or Media Count:

46.0

Abstract:

Two seemingly contradictory hypotheses about concession-making were considered that concession-making occurs only as a result of own failure experienced when opponent lowers his offers, and that it occurs only as a result of reciprocity as a reaction to opponents concession-making. A total of 87 five-man experiments, bearing upon these hypotheses, were conducted. The findings were somewhat unexpected in that they suggested that opponents behavior determines a negotiators behavior far less than one might expect by and large, a negotiators demands depended on his own previous demands. To the extent, however, to which opponents behavior was influential, the reciprocity hypothesis appeared to be more nearly correct than the failure hypothesis. It was found, furthermore, that concessionmaking tended to be a rather bad strategy, that a negotiator making few concessions tended to receive higher payoff than the negotiator who made many concessions. In accounting for the findings, it was shown that the deadline could play an important role in determining the final payoff, and that, were the time alloted for negotiation much shorter, concession-making might have been a more profitable strategy that it actually was.

Subject Categories:

  • Personnel Management and Labor Relations

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE