Accession Number:

AD0611871

Title:

COUNTERINSURGENCY: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES IN VIET-NAM

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1964-12-01

Pagination or Media Count:

25.0

Abstract:

The criteria and indicators used for measuring success in counterinsurgency are discussed. Three phases of guerrilla warfare are described. It is concluded that a military victory is not possible for the Viet-Cong in South Viet-Nam as long as the U.S. is supporting the government. U. S. financial contribution is compared to U.S. and French costs of the 1945-1954 Indo-China war, and technical assistance and direct military support measures and their effects on the scarce resources--trained manpower, communications, transportation, and government infrastructures--are described. The principles of Viet-Cong tactics are listed and illustrated. The paper suggests the problems of motivating the Vietnamese soldier to fight a war which he no longer feels will be won in the near future.

Subject Categories:

  • Unconventional Warfare

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE