Accession Number:

AD0609191

Title:

A THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1964-11-01

Pagination or Media Count:

14.0

Abstract:

In this paper an attempt is made to describe a theory of bureaucratic decisionmaking aimed at achieving predictability. The theory is based upon the fundamental hypothesis that bureaucratic officials, like all other agents in society, are motivated by their own self interests at least part of the time. Therefore, this theory follows the tradition of economic thought from Adam Smith forward, and is consistent with recent contributions to political science made by such writers as Simmel, Truman, Schattschneider, Buchanan, Tullock, Riker, Simon, and March.

Subject Categories:

  • Government and Political Science

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE