Accession Number:

AD0606928

Title:

FOR THE ABANDONMENT OF SYMMETRY IN THE THEORY OF COOPERATIVE GAMES

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1958-05-29

Pagination or Media Count:

31.0

Abstract:

The first part of this paper argues that the pure, moveless bargaining game analyzed by Nash, Harsanyi, Luce and Raiffa, and others, may not exist or, if it does, is of a different character from what has been generally supposed the point of departure for this argument is the operational meaning of agreement, a concept that is almost invariably left undefined. The second part of the paper argues that symmetry in the solution of bargaining games cannot be supported on the notion rational expec tations the point of departure for this argument is the operational identification of irrational expectations.

Subject Categories:

  • Operations Research

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE