Accession Number:

AD0604950

Title:

ON DIFFERENTIAL GAMES WITH SURVIVAL PAYOFFS

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1955-09-22

Pagination or Media Count:

20.0

Abstract:

A class of survival games is considered in an arbitrary n-dimensional region R, and with an arbitrary payoff function fx on the boundary. If the steps are uniformly decreased in size, the equations specifying the changes in the state of the game tend to approximate the equations of a differential game. A particular class of games is treated in which neither player can force the state of the game to proceed in any direction. It is shown that under certain conditions, the upper and lower values of the approximating games actually converge to the same function. The limiting value is given by the solution of LV O, with boundary value fx, where LV is a certain second-order differential operator associated with the game.

Subject Categories:

  • Operations Research

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE