Accession Number:

AD0601122

Title:

SOLVABLE NUCLEAR WAR MODELS

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

Personal Author(s):

• Dalkey, Norman C.

Report Date:

1964-04-01

Pagination or Media Count:

21.0

Abstract:

This report deals with an aggregated, two-sided war game, one of several designed to study the use of abstract models for strategic planning. A payoff function for the war game is defined making use of an assumption of increasing concern as a critical level of damage is approached. A very simple, oneweapon version of the central nuclear war game has an analytic solution, indicating the existence of a stable equilibrium point in pure strategies if each side has a nonegligible counterforce capability.

Descriptors:

• *GAME THEORY
• *NUCLEAR WEAPONS
• *STRATEGIC WARFARE
• COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
• COMPUTER PROGRAMMING
• DAMAGE
• MATHEMATICAL MODELS
• MATRICES(MATHEMATICS)
• NUCLEAR WARFARE

Subject Categories:

• Operations Research

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE