Lessons Learned 7-66, Operations Cocoa Beach and Happy Valley.
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE (ARMY) WASHINGTON D C
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This issue of Lessons Learned deals with the concept of pursuit as it pertains to operations in RVN. Special emphasis is placed on aggressive reaction to VC initiated attacks on friendly forces, to the end that the VC forces are destroyed as effective military organizations and maximum kill is obtained. To date, VC Main Force and North Vietnamese Army units have avoided combat with US and Free World units unless they have been able to engage isolated elements with superior force. Most of the operations which are scheduled have as their objectives finding and destroying VC forces. A number of these operations have not made significant contact with these forces, although other objectives have been attained. In short, the obtaining of hard, reliable and timely intelligence is one of the most difficult tasks facing all friendly forces in RVN. The VC, however, continue to attack isolated or semi-isolated friendly units and installations, to include US and Free World units as well as Regional and Popular Forces and ARVN units. By attacking a friendly force, the VC have solved a major portion of the intelligence problem -- contact has been achieved. Engagement and pursuit of VC forces which reveal their presence by offensive action must therefore receive the highest priority at all levels.
- (*ARMY OPERATIONS
- TACTICAL WARFARE
- ARTILLERY FIRE
- AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS
- CLOSE SUPPORT
- TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT
- ENEMY PERSONNEL
- RURAL AREAS (U) COMBAT INFORMATION CENTERS
- TRANSMITTER RECEIVERS
- COMMUNICATION AND RADIO SYSTEMS
- Unconventional Warfare