Accession Number:

AD0436768

Title:

PARETO OPTIMUM AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION,

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

PRINCETON UNIV N J

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1964-01-24

Pagination or Media Count:

24.0

Abstract:

This paper examines some of the hidden, though essential assumptions of the notion of the Pareto Optimum. It shows that there are implicit limitations placed upon the amounts or physical properties of the additions made to the possessions of an individual so that the others, whose position is not to deteriorate, will agree that such is the case. It is shown that bluff may occur and also cooperation among the participants in which case there is no maximum at all but an n-person cooperative game. In that case the objective observer too is involved in a game. Finally, it is asked how dynamic aspects could be taken into consideration, pointing up a further complication apparently neglected in the literature. Author

Subject Categories:

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE