Accession Number:

AD0404010

Title:

STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY, ASYMMETRY AND ARMS CONTROL: SOME BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

Descriptive Note:

Memorandum

Corporate Author:

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

1963-03-01

Pagination or Media Count:

34.0

Abstract:

This study investigates the conditions under which some types of arms control agreements, hen there is adequate inspection and verification, may be used as a tool by the Soviet Union to achieve strategic objectives that are un desirable or dangerous to the United States, given current U. S. strategic superiority and the asymmetries in the force structures of both nations. Sets of objectives and postures are examined in a dynamic context to determine those sets that could produce future arms agreements and the types of agreements that might be produced.

Subject Categories:

  • Government and Political Science

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE