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RACIC report

SUMMARY OF RAND INTERVIEWS OF CAPTURED NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT DEAL WITH THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR POWER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (U)

August 4, 1969

by

Walter H. Veazie, Jr.
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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: SEP 10 2015
Colonel John J. Rosenow  
Chief Research  
Spt. Branch  
Aerospace Studies Institute  
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112  

Dear Colonel Rosenow:  

In response to your request to Mr. Frank J. Barone, of RACIC, Battelle Columbus, during his visit to Maxwell, for information on the effectiveness of firepower in SEA, Mr. Walter Veazie of Battelle's Long Beach Facility has sampled the RAND Corporation interviews of captured North Vietnamese. Attached is a summary of the various interview series which RAND conducted over the past five years that have included questions and responses concerned with firepower in SEA and a sampling of the responses provided by captured North Vietnamese and NVA personnel. A list of selected RAND reports which may be helpful to your analysis is included. Mr. Veazie also included input from the South Vietnamese as to their attitude toward the bombing halt in North Vietnam. As he indicated in his telephone conversation with you on July 23rd, the RAND interviews do contain considerable input to your evaluation of the effectiveness of firepower in SEA.

For your information, RAND is in the process of microfilming the interrogation reports, however difficulties with the vendor performing the task have resulted in the lack of a firm date for completion of the microfilming. If you have specific questions concerning the attached summary or find that more detailed information would be helpful, it may be more expedient for you to contact Mr. Veazie directly at (213) 436-1242.

We hope that this information will be of value to your effort.

Sincerely,

J. Tuck Brown  
Project Director  
RACIC

Reference: R-3040  
August 4, 1969

Atch.
SUMMARY

In response to a request from Maxwell Air Force Base for reactions of North Vietnamese to the effectiveness of air power in Southeast Asia, RAND screened a sample of interviews conducted by RAND Corporation of captured or allied North Vietnamese or National Liberation Front members. The RAND interviews were conducted between December 1964 and the present. The following series of interviews were sampled based on their relevance to the use of air power in Southeast Asia: Confidential G, LX, G, AG, SF, SX, DT, and Bombing Halt. This report provides a sampling of the information secured in selected interviews that bears on the effectiveness of air power in Southeast Asia.

The following summarizes the effects of air attacks on North Vietnam and on military operations in the South as reflected in the interview series sampled:

1. Hindered communication
2. Slowed traffic and transport of supplies and personnel
3. Reduced efficiency in production due to disruption of work hours and decentralization of factories. Production was reduced by the destruction of factories and rice field dikes.
4. Increased determination on the part of North Vietnamese to side with Hanoi and increased hatred of Americans
5. Brought about rationing of food and fuel
6. Broke off or changed military operations in the South as a result of air power
7. Reduced tactical training. Training in the South by North Vietnamese troops had to be conducted at night or in the jungle. Fighter bombers were most frequently reported in the interviews sampled as the most feared aircraft. Heavy bombs, 500 or 250 kg, and rockets were more feared than strafing. Helicopter supply of ground reinforcements most frequently prevented the North Vietnamese and NLF from exploiting a tactical advantage.
The Confidential "C" Questionnaire was used by Leon Goure for an Air Force Special Activities study. Thirty-four interviews were included in the series which was conducted in the Spring of 1968.


Experience with air strikes and bomb damage: Source claimed to have witnessed in September-October 1967 air strikes on Haiphong which destroyed a chemical plant and a cement factory. In the raid which destroyed the chemical plant some 200 persons were killed, according to what the source heard from Radio Hanoi. He also knew of the bombing of a power station in that city. He had observed damage to the Niem bridge, Gia bridge, the "Mobile" bridge, and food storage facilities in or near Haiphong. During an infiltration trip through Laos, he observed damage to rice caches and heard from truck drivers concerning damage caused by mines and bombs on the Laotian truck roads.

Economic conditions in the North had not significantly changed from 1965 to October 1967. Everything had been rationed since 1964. Since the start of air attacks, urban families had a deteriorating standard of living. Source claimed the food shortage had an adverse effect on health of the youth and on the performance of workers. Morale had been reduced. In 1965-1966 Haiphong had electricity, but in 1967 only the factories had electricity. In December 1967 civilians used kerosene lamps.

Effect of air operation on harbor activities: The loading and off-loading of ships was frequently interrupted by air raid alerts. Dock workers took cover in trenches while security guards manned K-44 rifles. Ferries used on the Binh River were moored next to foreign ships during the daytime to protect them from bombing. Ferry operations were forced to be maintained at night due to the bombings.

Effects of bomb damage: The destruction of the cement plant interfered with military and civilian construction programs and reduced the construction of air raid shelters. Concrete was not rationed. Electric power was limited to factories and street corner lights. The bridge damage resulted in traffic jams. Pontoon bridges were erected to release traffic. Civilians did
most of the repair work. Repair units of five or six persons were stationed along infiltration routes to the South. Most of the work had to be done by hand. Bomb craters on the foot trails in the area of the National Route Number 9 made movement difficult. Aircraft circling overhead disrupted his unit's march numerous times.

(4) The interrogator commented that the source was eager to please and may have exaggerated the deterioration of living conditions in Haiphong.


(4) The source personally observed the following damage to bridges in North Vietnam:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bridge</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date Observed</th>
<th>Damage</th>
<th>Repair Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long Bien</td>
<td>Hanoi</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement Bridge</td>
<td>Haiphong</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niem</td>
<td>Haiphong</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1 Span</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad Draw Bridge</td>
<td>Haiphong</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Limited to pedestrian traffic only</td>
<td>Not to be repaired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rao</td>
<td>Haiphong</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>All but one span</td>
<td>Unusable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Source states that when he left North Vietnam in January 1968 the canned fish industry in Haiphong had been practically destroyed by air attacks and that large stores of rice had also been hit. Wheat flour had been imported to replace the rice. He observed bomb damage to industrial facilities in 1967 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industrial Facility</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Damage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power Plant</td>
<td>Vicinity Haiphong</td>
<td>Totally destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Plant</td>
<td>Haiphong</td>
<td>Totally destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thai Nguyen Steel</td>
<td>Hanoi</td>
<td>Production completely halted; repair facilities slightly damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar, power, and</td>
<td>Viet Tri</td>
<td>Damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chemical plant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power plant</td>
<td>Vong Bi</td>
<td>80% destroyed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Industrial Facility | Location | Damage
---|---|---
Coal mine | Hongay | 60% destroyed
All industry | Haiphong | Approximately 70% destruction overall.

The weapon most feared by the North Vietnamese in Haiphong was the "CBU" which the source called "marble bomb". It was most effective against personnel, but was generally ineffective against other (hard) targets. One CBU attack at Hong Bang in Haiphong accounted for one killed and 60 to 70 wounded. At an attack in September or October 1967 in the Boho section of Haiphong, 200 were killed or wounded.

The source reported that damage to anti-aircraft emplacements, even those damaged 100 percent, were returned to operation in 24 hours. This was accomplished by drawing from neighboring units. In some cases the emplacements were abandoned due to the fear that their position had been plotted.

In 1966 caves were dug around the Kien An airfield. The caves were used to conceal aircraft and crews. When only two U. S. aircraft attacked the field the MiG's would scramble. If a larger force was attacking, the aircraft were concealed. Only slight damage was observed at Kien An airfield due to its heavy anti-aircraft defenses.


His village had not experienced any air attacks. While doing road repair work after joining the army, he observed bomb damage on Road No. 1 on each side of the border between Quang Binh and Ha Tinh. During this period in October 1967 the road was bombed 14 times. The high altitude bombings were most effective. Craters 15 meters in diameter and 12 to 13 meters deep were created. The low-flying jet aircraft bombing created craters 6 to 7 meters in diameter and 5 to 6 meters deep. The larger craters required 15 men 5 to 6 days to fill. The smaller craters required 9 men 1 to 2 days to fill. By-passes were created around some of the craters. Such by-passes were made by 30 men in 2 to 3 hours. The repair crews worked 24 hours a day in shifts with only 4 to 5 hours rest a day.

The source stated that while the bombings caused the most severe damage, the villagers were most afraid of aircraft which shot at them. Only on one occasion had they actually been fired on. While at first the villagers had been terrified of the air attacks, they had gotten used to the idea of being bombed. This created greater hatred of the Americans.


Source had fought against the French in 1945-1954. He was a civilian teacher for a cell in Quang Tin. Twenty to thirty people were evacuated to his village in North Vietnam, which created economic problems. The dispersal of people to escape bombings angered the hamlet people. The Communist cells in Quang Tin, South Vietnam, were closed frequently by ground action. He had not participated in combat. Air attacks had not affected the activities of his cell.


The source knew of bomb damage to a bridge on Route Number 38 in Hoa Thanh caused by an air strike in 1965. Government engineers had built a new bridge to replace it. He had seen a bridge damaged on Route Number 1 across the Bun River in Dinh Chau, Nghe An. Air strikes on Route Number 38 near his village caused damage which was repaired usually in one night. Dikes and canals which supplied water to the rice paddies had the highest priority on repairs. The air strikes caused less travel, a shortage of food, and similar hardships for the village.


The bombings had caused some difficulties to his family. Fish were not distributed, so his hamlet started to raise them in 1967. In 1967 Hanoi was more deserted than ever because of the dispersal of residents. The air strikes had caused disruption of sleep and school schedules. Bus and transportation schedules were upset by alerts and air strikes.
While infiltrating to the South through Laos, his group encountered U. S. aircraft overhead every day. They could not be seen because of the heavy foliage. They were attacked once while on an open hillside. Five were killed and one wounded in this attack. The men were confused and discouraged for a few days after the attack. While in South Vietnam, enemy aircraft passed overhead every day, but never attacked.


(U) The interrogator questioned the reliability of some of the responses.


Source had observed an air attack on a gasoline bulk plant in Haiphong in mid-1966. The attack lasted 10 minutes. The six groups of three or four aircraft, F-105 or F-100, used rockets to cause 85 percent damage to the plant. As of March 1967, the source claimed the facility had not been repaired.

While infiltrating to the South, his group was bombed by B-52's, however, warnings were given that enabled them to hide in caves.

While on leave on February 6, 1968, he observed the destroyed Long Bien Bridge on Route Number 5. It was no longer being repaired. He also reported that the Gia Lam Railroad Station was completely destroyed. No repair work was taking place. This had caused the trains to stop at a new station 10 kilometers east of Hanoi at Phu Thuy. Trucks then carried supplies into Hanoi on a new dirt road. This resulted in a considerable delay in the shipment of goods.

The source said that the first air attack to the best of his recollection took place in Hanoi on June 29, 1967. At first the people were extremely frightened and many left the city. However, by late 1967 and early 1968 the people grew used to the attacks.

**LX QUESTIONNAIRE**

(U) This was part of a series on infiltration giving more emphasis toward discovering information on North Vietnam. This was an "in-depth" study consisting of five interviews and included in several cases over 400 questions. The interviews were conducted during August 1967.

(U) LX-1: Age 21, Rank: Private, First Class. Captured March 11, 1967.

(U) The source, while in North Vietnam, had observed an air attack in Thanh Minh, Nghe An Province on August 5, 1964. Houses, the power plant, and gasoline plants all were damaged. A number of civilians were also killed. The greatest difficulty which the attacks caused in the North was restriction on small business. The big factories were dismantled and moved to rural areas or transformed into smaller facilities. In Quang Binh Province trucks had to travel at night as a result of the air attacks. Air attacks on his military unit interfered with troop movements and bivouacking while traveling to South Vietnam. Movement was confined to night and off of the roads, hence greater time was needed to travel from point to point. Tactical exercises which had to be performed in the open could not be conducted during the day time. Cooking had to be done at night or else uncooked rice had to be eaten. In combat situations close combat had to be practiced to avoid bombs and artillery shells.

(U) Before he joined the army, his town in North Vietnam, Van Ho, Ninh Giang, Hai Duong Province, had been bombed. The Phu Luong Bridge was damaged. Since this was the bridge on the route between Hanoi and Haiphong, traffic and communications between these cities was reduced. No repair or replacement of this bridge was made. Farming had to be done at night. Rationing also had to be practiced. The people in the North have gotten used to airplanes flying overhead and continue working. In infiltrating to the South, trains were used for part of the trip in the North. Three times they had to change trains to get across rivers where bridges had been bombed out.


(U) The source was aware that Phu Ly, Ha Nam Province, North Vietnam, had been bombed. He had heard that the hospital and market had been hit, killing many children and civilians. The bombing attacks were known to have damaged roads and bridges, and people didn't go to market. The people didn't dare work in large groups in the rice paddies, hence production dropped. Also, because of fear of air attack, trucks and trains ran only at night. During his trip South the source saw no other bomb damage in the North. A shortage of trucks caused many of the military units to hike in the North. While causing swollen legs, the hiking actually strengthened and conditioned the men to walking.


(U) The source knew of bomb damage to the textile factory and railway station in Nam Dinh Province, North Vietnam, 15 kilometers from his home village. This bombing in 1965 destroyed more than half the textile factory. The railway station was completely destroyed with several dozen civilians killed. In 1965 the dike in the Hai Hoi area in Nam Dinh Province was bombed. The damage was slight as the water level was low. The source expressed fear that if the dikes were destroyed during the rainy season, the economy would be paralyzed.


(U) Experience with air attacks in North Vietnam by the source emphasized the exploitation of the killing of civilians for propaganda. The cadres do not miss opportunities to stir up hatred toward the Americans. On
infiltrating to the South, three days were required to get to Quang Binh from Hanoi as a result of bridges being destroyed.

G QUESTIONNAIRÉ

(U) This series of questionnaires was put into use in December, 1964, by Leon Goure and was used for approximately 45 interviews. The series was a study of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Questions concerning activities against the French by the Resistance (Viet Minh) were included in this series.


(U) While in school, the French bombings disrupted studies. The attacks contributed to the source's decision to join the Resistance. The French air attacks on the town school and market killed many people. This showed that they were cruel because they attacked such targets as the market where there were only innocent people. If they had attacked somewhere else, it would have been different. His battalion had not been exposed to air attacks by U.S. aircraft in the South or in the North, hence they had developed no fear of such weapons.


(U) In battles at Bau Sen, Vam Dam, and Kinh Muoi, An Xuyen Province, his battalion had been successful in defeating the ARVN forces. At a battle at Rach Gia in October 1962 a helicopter-supported ARVN force defeated their battalion and killed 15 men. The source stated that in principle they lost each time the ARVN fought with the aid of helicopter-borne troops. He cited, for example, that when they were in an advantageous position of encircling the ARVN, helicopters had landed troops behind and on their flanks, thus destroying their favorable position.

(U) Napalm is most feared, as it burns large areas. Aircraft, twin-tailed reconnaissance type, were credited with spotting his battalion and directing bomber attacks.

(U) The source was particularly afraid of fighter-bombers because she and her comrades could not hide from the bombs as they did from helicopter gun fire. The source felt the bombings were usually accurate, but not always. If the airplanes dropped napalm, the group had to change their position, but if the planes only strafed there was no need to change locations. The strafing was not very accurate. If airplanes or helicopters uncovered the military unit's attack, they would occasionally have to break off the encounter or change their target. If flares were dropped, they would sit down and wait until the illumination subsided and then continue fighting. If helicopters landed reinforcements, they would have to run away. Troop movements were seldom interrupted by planes. Troop movements were changed only when VC surrendered or were captured.


(U) The source was with the 261 Unit for one month during which he witnessed three air attacks; one by two fighter bombers, one by four fighter bombers, and one by two "American Cormorant" (Mohawks). The attacks took place in the daytime. The attacks were very effective as the bombs fell on houses where their guns were located. Each bombing killed 20 to 30 men. He once saw 15 men burned to death by napalm bombs.

AG QUESTIONNAIRE

(U) This series has over 600 interviews, with more scheduled. The questionnaire was an attempt to discover the influences which most affected the people and how the Viet Cong managed to motivate the villagers. It explored background, attitudes, military experiences and outlook on life.


(U) In conducting military operations the unit was most frightened by rockets. Rockets were felt to be more accurate than bombs. Flares dropped at night caused delay in attacks, but the lack of aerial gun fire cover permitted attacks to go on. Air attacks caused travel to be disrupted and required that camouflage be used routinely.
(U) AG-87: Age 30. Rank: Member of the village guerrillas. Captured February 16, 1965.

(U) The ARVN tactics or weapons which were felt to be most dangerous were aircraft. They were most afraid of the helicopters and Cormorant fighter bombers. The heavy 250-kg bombs were feared since they could destroy their shelters. Camouflage with leaves was always effective. During a fighter-bomber attack at Phat Da Pagoda in October 1964 six in the unit were killed.


(U) At the battle of Binh Gia the source reported that the VC stayed in their foxholes while aircraft strafed the area. The aircraft could have strafed all day without causing many casualties. The VC were afraid of bombs and the air support given to the ARVN at Binh Gia allowed the ARVN to stay at their posts. Fighter bombers were most feared as the 500- and 250-kg bombs wrought havoc in their camps. They could not sleep or enjoy meals during the day or night due to air and artillery shelling. The aircraft disrupted training efforts which had to be held during the day.


(U) Source most afraid of heavy bombs, which destroyed large trees, made big craters, and occasionally killed personnel. Bombing was accurate, but few were killed because the trees fell and formed a net above them. When they were detected in the open by aircraft or helicopters, they would lie down and usually did not sustain casualties.

SF QUESTIONNAIRE

(U) There were 149 interviews conducted using this questionnaire. The interviews were conducted during November 1966 through March 1967. The series tried to determine the different reasons these people had for leaving the Viet Cong.


(U) The village in which he lived, Hon Chong Hamlet, Binh Tri Village, was taken over by the ARVN 3 months before he rallied from the NGF. Prior to the
the take-over, the village had been bombed. The bombing ruined many houses and killed a lot of chickens and pigs. The bombings affected village NLF organizations by scattering them. The hamlet NLF organizations were not disrupted by the bombings.


(U) The source's village had been continually attacked by aircraft artillery and infantry the month before he rallied. Orchards, houses, and cattle had been damaged. Seven Viet Cong had been killed. The people had been forced to leave the village to escape the attacks. The NLF organizations moved elsewhere immediately after the first attacks.


(U) His unit was always threatened by aircraft during the last 6 months before he rallied. The aircraft didn't do much damage, but destroyed barracks which had to be rebuilt. Their Co Mi and Binh Nham bases had been bombed with napalm. After the attacks they had to leave the bases. The morale of the unit was very low at that time. They slept in tunnels to escape the bombs.

SX QUESTIONNAIRE

(U) Fifty nine interviews using the SX Questionnaire were conducted during August through October 1967. Strong emphasis was placed on questions concerning the different trails used by the infiltrators. It is the short version of the "IX Questionnaire".


(U) On the route to South Vietnam, while still in North Vietnam, the source reported that all the bridges in Nam Ha and Minh Binh Provinces along his unit's route had been destroyed. Underwater bridges had been built to handle river crossing. There were many piles of burned trucks along the route traveled from Thanh Hoa and Nghe An Provinces. He reported that six or seven trucks were piled together. The engines were removed for spare parts.

(U) On the trip to the South in February 1967, his unit passed through several bombed areas. Extra precautions had to be taken in these areas and the pace was slowed down. The source reported that they covered 2 kilometers an hour normally, but if the area had been bombed it required more time. For example, an area covered in 2 hours if not bombed, would require 3 hours to cover if bombed.


(U) The source had been wounded in an air attack on Ham Rong Bridge in Thanh Hoa in April 1965. After various assignments he was sent to South Vietnam. On the route south his unit had been bombed at Station 6 in Laos. Six were killed and four wounded in the attack by C-47's which dropped flares and "marble" bombs. Jets followed, dropping 36 bombs. The use of caves prevented greater losses. The source reported that at the battle of A Shau outpost, B-52's bombed their unit and all the men in one battalion were killed. The outpost was an obstacle to the infiltration route. If the B-52's had not arrived when they did the VC regiment would have taken the post.


(U) While infiltrating between Thanh Hoa to Vinh Linh, his unit was harassed by aircraft several times, but didn't suffer any losses. Flares were used at night, and the over-flights in the day forced the men into shelter trenches. They felt no worry as they were well camouflaged. In the Tuyon Hoa forest they found the area to be bombed every day. The bombs fell on the plains at the edge of the forest. Route Number 15 through the area was the most often hit, so they marched on a trail parallel to the route. Between Thanh Hoa and Vinh Linh they had to get into trenches 15 or 16 times due to aircraft flying overhead. At Bo Ian Slope the source saw some 100 burned-out trucks which he heard had been destroyed in May 1966. Along Route Number 15 he saw a burned-out truck every 1 or 2 kilometers.
DT QUESTIONNAIRE

(U) The DT series of questionnaire was designed to investigate the motivation of VC defectors and the factors which encourage or inhibit their defection. The series was initiated in support of psychological warfare studies and was limited to Dinh-Tuong Province in South Vietnam.


(U) The source's unit had been strafed two or three times while in Hung Thanh village. In his platoon, one was killed and two wounded by the strafings. The Front's activities diminished due to the aircraft over-flights. The source feared the fighter bombers more than any other type of aircraft.


(U) Aircraft strafing and bombing at Ba Beo was a contributing factor to the rallying of the source. At the battle of Ap Bac the source's unit was only a short distance from another platoon under heavy ARVN attack. His platoon did not come out of its foxholes to give aid because of fear of an air attack. Airplanes caused the most casualties to his unit. Fighter bombers and jet bombers were feared most when the unit was operating in orchards, while helicopters were most feared when they were operating in open fields.


(U) The source's antiaircraft unit was hit by an air strike at Ban Long. The strike was off target. They were not as afraid of jet fighters as they were of Skyraiders. HULA helicopters were feared as they hovered overhead and fired down on their unit, pinning them down. The U. S. helicopter assault and ground action at Ban Long was considered a defeat for his unit.


(U) At a battle to take Hoa Dinh village the ARVN message for air support was intercepted. This caused the 261st to break off the combat. Aircraft arrived in 10 minutes and dropped flares and strafed the area where the VC had been. The source reported that while attending a training course for platoon cadres, aircraft bombed the conference room in Rach Gon, Hiep Duc Village.
Cai Lay District. The session was disrupted, and attendees used automatic rifles to fire on the attackers. No one was killed or wounded; however, the conference room and several villagers' homes were destroyed.


(U) The source's position at Thanh My Village in Kien Phong Province was bombed periodically for one full day. The attack happened suddenly and during the first attack one was killed and two were wounded. The attack was made by an L-19 and jet aircraft. The target was the tree line along a rice paddy. After the first wave, the source's unit hid in the rice paddy away from the tree line. No strafing was used in subsequent attacks, hence their only losses occurred during the first wave.

(U) The intensification of bombings caused reduced morale. The cadres grew tired and wanted to return to their villages to help their families. The bombing reduced the time which the people could spend in the fields thus reducing crop production.

**BOMBING HALT INTERVIEW SERIES**

(U) Fifty four interviews were conducted during May and June of 1968. The series was conducted to determine the reaction of civilians in South Vietnam to the halt of bombings of North Vietnam. Questions concerning reasons for the bombing halt, interviewee's reaction to how he believed the halt would affect the war; its political implications, and the North Vietnamese reactions were included.

(U) Eleven of the 54 interviews were sampled on the basis of age, occupation, and location of the interviewee. All agreed that the halt was beneficial to the North militarily. It enabled a re-buildup of North Vietnam and increased the ease of providing weapons and men to the fighting in the South. Politically, some of the interviewees felt the U. S. and GVN would gain, others the North. All felt that the GVN war effort would suffer from the halt.


(U) The halt was to help in opening peace talks with the North. The people in the North would be pleased with the halt as the freedom from bombing and shelling is something everyone earnestly wants. The North Vietnamese government is not too pleased as it now has to meet with the U. S. to discuss peace.
the North Vietnamese really want is annexation of the South. Militarily the halt has been an advantage to the North. The Front's strength has increased due to addition of new men. The South Vietnamese armies will have difficulty in fighting against this strength.


(U) The halt was made so that the U.S. President's prestige will be increased. This may help him or his party win the elections. If the pause does not lead to negotiation, then he will be in a better position to carry out his own military plans. The people in the North are relieved as they have suffered a lot because of the bombing. The North's economy has been paralyzed by the air attacks. The halt will affect the war militarily, by the North sending increased aid to the Front in the South. This means that there will be increased turbulence and violence in the South. Politically, the halt will cause concern and fear among the anti-Communist people of the South. It will also make them doubt the U.S. determination to fight the Communists.


(U) The halt shows the U.S. aspirations for peace. The people in the North are satisfied as they don't have to pay anything in exchange for a halt to aircraft bombing that has been causing them the most difficulties. Militarily, North Vietnam is free to rebuild military installations, bridges, roads, to reorganize their troops, to restore their economy, thus contributing to a much greater extent to the supply in men and weaponry to the Front. This is increasing the pressure on rural areas in the South. Terrorist activities in the cities are also increasing. This will cause the South to mobilize for defense. Politically, the consequences could be disastrous. The U.S. is concerned only with a peace solution. The U.S. citizens are tired of war, which is a sign of weariness to the North. The reduced supply of U.S. men and old equipment hinder the GVN's war effort.


(U) The halt was made to show the U.S. desire for peace, from pressure of pacifist groups in the U.S. and to gain freedom for the U.S. to provide for her own defense against the danger posed by the Red Chinese. The halt has resulted in increased bombings in the South. A general mobilization in the South to handle mounting offenses is necessary. Politically, the halt has soothed
the U. S. pacifist faction and won approval of Free Bloc nations. In South Vietnam, the halt has had an adverse affect, causing a reshuffling of the cabinet. Economically, the halt has created a host of difficulties to the movement of goods and food supplies in the south. Prices have gone up since the halt.


(U) The people in the North desired to be free from air attacks, as they have already suffered much damage. Militarily it will not have much effect as the North Vietnamese have been able to avoid air raids aimed at their supply routes by using bicycles, small ferry boats, and foot trails. Politically, it is advantageous as it shows the good will of the Allied nations.


(U) The halt is more a political concession than a military one. Militarily, the halt has resulted in a greater flow of men and material into the South which would have great effects on the war.

(U) BH-17: Age 33. Occupation: ARVN Officer. Quartered in Saigon.

(U) The decision to halt was a trap. If the North doesn't agree with a peace talk, the U. S. will have a good reason to conduct larger bombings. Militarily, the North is free to produce weapons, to carry out transportation and supply operations and to recruit and train new soldiers for the South. The people in the North regain enthusiasm in doing production work and soldiers recover good morale and scarcely think of deserting or rallying to the GVN. The North becomes more arrogant, seeing the halt as the beginning of its successes. The people in the South begin to suspect the U. S. pledge to help.


(U) The people in the North are pleased as their economy is exhausted. Militarily, manpower has been released for service in the South. The reinforcements from the North are necessary to the Front due to the losses they suffered during the Jet attacks. It is harmful to the GVN effort because young men don't want to join the army since their homes and families are unsafe. The North has increased pressure and the ARVN troops have no time for proper training as formerly.
(U) BH-47:    Age 47. Occupation: Teacher. Living in Gia Dinh.

(U) The North is no longer paralyzed and the people are no longer disturbed or living in fear. Troop reinforcements are easier as they have free access to the South. The North can freely receive foreign aid from the outside by land and sea. Escalating the war in the South is made easier. The South had been more enthusiastically defeating the Front after the Jet offensive, but the halt has caused them to lose faith in the U. S.


(U) The halt enables the people in the North to live temporarily in peace. The North spreads counter-propaganda, saying the U. S. and the ARVN are defeated. It also enables them to train new draftees, to send more weapons south, and to deceive the people. The North gains peacefulness at home and strength in the South at the same time. Politically, the Free Bloc becomes skeptical of the U. S. determination to fight the Communists and thus the halt is favorable to the enemy. The Viet Cong gain more means and men to carry out sabotage and terror activities in the South. Their continuous attacks since the beginning of the year prove this.


(U) The halt was made as a means to escape from the Vietnam war which is getting bogged down and with a hope that the North would become less aggressive; this was an illusion. The halt frees the North to prepare for larger battles in the South. Politically, the halt is a mistake. The people of the South see it as a concession that profits North Vietnam a great deal. The Americans have too high a conception of democracy and humanism and wish those ideologies to be applied in Vietnam. The halt has caused the fighting in the South to become more ruthless and GVN morale to slip.
The following RAND reports provide an evaluation of some of the interview series and therefore should be helpful in evaluating the effectiveness of air power in SEA:


D-16584 "Vietnamese Civilian Reaction to Allied Attacks".


D-17760 "A Short Summary of the RAND Questionnaires", by Georgia Miller, September 10, 1968.
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JAN 28 2016

Subject: OSD MDR Case 14-M-1361

We have reviewed the enclosed document in consultation with the Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Department of the Air Force and have declassified it in full. If you have any questions please contact Mr. John D. Smith by email at whs.mc-alex.esd.mbx.records-and-declassification@mail.mil.

Sincerely,

George R. Sturgis
Deputy Chief, Records and Declassification Division

Enclosures:
1. MDR request w/ document list
2. Document ADC056343