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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

This is the second DAO quarterly assessment of RVNAF and is a result of the combind efforts of RVNAF, DAO-Saigon. US observers state that while the RVNAF is improving, so is the enemy, especially in the areas of construction of roads, pipelines; revamping of airfields; input of weapons and stockpiles are better equipped and positioned than before. Manpower for a major country-wide offensive in central/southern Vietnam is the only element the enemy lacks. This assessment reports that presently the RVNAF is capable of a stubborn defense of the territory they control against a limited enemy offensive, but it

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Item 19 Key Words Continued Military Construction Central Training Command; SIMS (Single Integrated Military (Telecommunications) System) System Reliability Desertions; Training; Regional Force/Popular Force(RF/PF); Equipment Status; Personnel Readiness; VNAF Bases; Air Logistics Command;Port Operations; Maintenance; Supply Logistics; Areas of Operation and Unit Locations; Modernization of Equipment, Joint JGS/DAO FY75 Structure Review.

Item 20 Abstract Continued

is doubtful that RVNAF could defend successfully against a major offensive without US airpower. A struggle is developing for control of the rice crop. The high price of rice, caused by increasing inflation, has had a serious impact on RVNAF morale. This has led to theft and pilferage by RVNAF troops from the GVN population resulting in anti-government attitude in some geographical areas. Lack of adequately qualified middle level leaders and managers continues to be a problem. Commanders of two ARVN divisions and one Corps Commander have been replaced because of poor field performance. The VNAF appears to be at 94% of its manning authorization but operational readiness rate is low and the airlift force lags behind because of poor supply and maintenance support. The VNN continues to demonstrate a satisfactory operational readiness and a Coastal Radar Improvement Program is underway. This assessment reports that the RVNAF communications systems continue to function effectively despite lack of centralized control and coordination of combat operations. The previously reported problem of lack of joint manning in senior headquarters is still assessed as a major flaw in overall ability to effectively use RVNAF resources. It is concluded that the rate of RVNAF improvement appears to be impeded by inflation, corruption and poor management, and that for the moment the RVNAF game-plan seems to be to continue to maintain the status quo brought about by the Cease-fire.

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MG JOHN E. MURRAY

RVNAF QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT

1st QTR FY 74

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AOSOP-OR 31 October 1973

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal - RVNAF Quarterly Assessment

Commander
U.S. Support Activities Group
Nakhon Phanom, RTAFB
Thailand

The attached assessment is forwarded in compliance with JCS Secret message, 072105Z Mar 73, subject: Continuing SEA Reports (U).

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GEORGE L. GRUBBS
Colonel, USAF
Deputy, Logistics and Administration

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FOREWORD

This is the second DAO quarterly assessment of RVNAF. It updates the first assessment. It is the combined efforts of RVNAF, DAO and the Embassy - particularly the Counsuls General.

The enemy continues construction of new roads, extending pipelines, and revamping airfields. Enemy forces with input of tanks, long range artillery and anti-aircraft weapons and ever-increasing stockpiles are better equipped, supplied and positioned than ever. The one ingredient for a major countrywide offensive is more manpower in the central and southern areas of South Vietnam. The enemy could have this manpower in place as early as year end.

RVNAF reinforced its efforts to straighten out its mediocre logistics, improve training, tighten its belt to budget cuts and cope with corruption. The maintenance offensive made some headway. Unit readiness is up. Most combat units have an assigned strength of 90% or higher. Middle level leadership is improving. But inflation has deflated morale. And all is plagued by spurious reporting, such as overstated readiness and understated ammo consumption.

The enemy has the tactical edge in the war. While ARVN, after three months, took the two villages west of Kontum, they lost the ranger camp at Le Minh, were driven from the heights of Bach Ma Mountain, had a battalion ravaged southeast of Tay Ninh, and another routed 15 kilometers southwest of Pleiku.

A struggle is developing for control of the up-coming rice crop. Commanders are campaigning to cut the supply flow from GVN controlled areas to the enemy. The ARVN is clearing the coastal lowlands of MRs I and II for resettlement. In MR II a drive reportedly initiated to attrit the 320th NVA Division and retake Le Minh Ranger Camp was thwarted by defeat of the 2/40th Infantry.

In MR IV the Rangers are severely punishing the 101D NVA Regiment in the Seven Mountains area and ARVN forces continue operations in Dinh Tuong and Chuong Thien Provinces to disrupt enemy LOC and eliminate enemy base areas.

Facing up to poor field performance, President Thieu has shaken the ARVN leadership in the nation's jugular area, by appointing two new division and one new Corps Commander (MR III).

The VNAF is in flux. It has reached 94% of its manning. However, half of their 65,000 are in either basic or skill up-grade training. The aircraft fleet reflects this training-dominated force by a relative low operational readiness rate. During September, the VNAF flew over 81,000 sorties. 62,000 of these were accomplished by helicopters and an additional 1,100 sorties were performed by the training squadrons. Operational ready aircraft exceeded their program rate by 13,000 hours. The airlift force is laggard. Limited by manning, supply and maintenance support. Bombing altitudes, usually over 10,000 feet, do not contribute to productive destruction. The attitude toward altitude is depressing in inter-service relationships, as well as results.

The VNN demonstrates a satisfactory operational readiness in both blue water and brown water fleets. Improvement is apparent in the material condition of the larger combatant blue water ships. Still lacking is an adequate defense against the NVN Komar threat. Coordinated planning and training with the VNAF is required. The post-MACV decline in the coastal radar system is checked. A concerted Coastal Radar Improvement Program is underway to restore the system to previous high readiness levels.

It appears, at this time, that neither side intends to start a major offensive. But to be tough, in sensitive places. That is: to be both aggressive and resistant, but not overwhelming.

So far the ARVN have only in one recent instance (and successfully) adopted the American penchant to make contact and then pile-on.

If it should recur, then despite an apparent mutual design to do no more than fence forcefully, the fragile balance could collapse. A mild collision could beget a wild convulsion.

John E. Murray

JOHN E. MURRAY
Major General, USA
Defense Attache

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A	Attack
AA	Antiaircraft
AAD	ARVN Associated Depot
AAD-LB	ARVN Associated Depot Long Binh
AAG	Army Advisory Group
AB	Air Base
ABF	Attack(s) by Fire
ABN	Airborne
ACA	Aircraft Clearance Authority
ACC	Army Calibration Center
ACFT-A/C	Aircraft
ACI	Analytical Critical Inspection
AC&W	Aircraft Control and Warning
AD	Air Division
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
A&E	Architectural and Engineering
AFDL	Auxiliary Floating Dry Dock
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFLS	Armed Forces Language School
AFLST	Armed Forces Language Screening Test

AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSD	Air Force Supply Directive
AFM	Air Force Manual
AG	Adjutant General
AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment
AGP	Auxiliary General Purpose
AI	Assistant Instructor
AIM	Air Intercept Missile
AIMI	Army Intensified Management Item
ALC	Air/Army Logistics Command
ALCC	Air Lift Control Center
ALO	Air Force Liaison Officer
AMA	Air Materiel Area
AMC	Air/Army Materiel Command
AMSF-V	Area Maintenance Supply Facility-Vietnam
ANGLCO	Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
AO	Area of Operations
AOB	Air Order of Battle
AOC	Air Operations Center
AOSAF-E	DAO Air Force Division Civil Engineering Branch
AOSOP-OT	DAO Operations & Plans Division Training Management Branch
APL	Auxiliary Personnel Lighter
APQ	Airborne Target Tracking Radar

AR	Accommodation Rate
ARDF	Airborne Radar Direction Finding
ARL	Auxiliary Landing Craft Repair
ARTY	Artillery
ARVN	Army Republic of Vietnam
ASB	Advanced Support Base
ASL	Authorized Stock List
ASPB	Advanced Support Patrol Boat
ATC	Air Training Command/Center
ATT	Army Training Test
AVGAS	Aviation Gasoline
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Integrated Network
AOTUSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communication
AWOL	Absent Without Leave
BCE	Base Civil Engineer
BCT	Basic Combat Training
BCM	Bulk Construction Material
BEMO	Base Equipment Management Office
BOH	Balance on Hand
BOM	Bill of Materiel
BN	Battalion
BS	Bachelor of Science
BUMED	Bureau of Medicine
BW	Boston Whaler

C	Cargo
CA/RL	Custodian Authorization/Receipt Listing
CCB	Command Communications Boat
C&GSC	Command and General Staff College
CBD	Contract Base Development
CEM	Communications Electronic Meteorological Equipment
C&E	Communications-Electronics
CE	Civil Engineer
CENCOM	Combined Central Highway and Waterway Committee
CEIMP	Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Program
CETS	Contract Engineering Technical Services
CEMP	Communications-Electronics Master Program
CEMT	Command Equipment Management Team
CF	Correlation Factor
CFST	Contract Field Service Team
CH-47	Cargo Helicopter
CHMAAG	Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group
CIC	Combat Information Center
CIO	Central Intelligence Organization
CINCPACFLT	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
CLC	Central Logistics Command
CLD	Central Logistics Detachment
CMA	Communications Management Agency

CMD	Command
CND	Chief, Navy Division
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COL	Colonel
COMNAVFORV	Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam
COMUSMACV	Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CONUS	Continental United States
COPARS	Contractor Operated Parts System
C&P	Care and Preservation
CP	Command Post
CPX	Command Post Exercise
COSAL	Consolidated Allowance List
COSVN	Central Office South Vietnam
CRC	Combat Reporting Central
CRI	Carrier Intensity Recorder
CRIP	Coastal Radar Improvement Plan
CRS	Coastal Radar System/Site
CSAF/LG	Chief of Staff, Air Force Logistics
CTC	Central Training Command
CTF	Commander Task Force
DA	Department of the Army
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DAME	Defense Against Mechanical Entry

DASE	Defense Against Sound Equipment
DCSPER	Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel
DER	Destroyer Escort Radar Picket
DGTS	Director General Technical Services
DI	Drill Instructor
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIFM	Due In for Maintenance
DIRCON	Director of Construction
DIV	Division
DLI	Defense Language Institute
DLIEL	Defense Language Institute, El Paso
DMJM	Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOD	Department of Defense
DODAC	Department of Defense Ammunition Code
DODIC	Department of Defense Identification Card
DRA	Dead Reckoning Analyzer
DRT	Dead Reckoning Tracer
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
DSP	Dependent Shelter Program
DSU	Direct Support Unit
DTC	Division Training Center
DTE	Dial Telephone Exchange
E/RC-47	Electronics/Reconnaissance
EBD	Engineer Base Depot

ECL	English Comprehension Level
ECCOI	Eastern Construction Company International
EDD	Estimated Delivery Date
ECM/EC	Electronic Countermeasures
ELST	English Language Screening Test
ELTP	English Language Training Program
EM	Enlisted Man
EOQ	Economic Order Quantity
EOSM	Emergency On-Site Maintenance
ESR	Equipment Status Report
ESS	Equipment Status Summary
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FAST	Field Assistance Support Team
FB	Fuel Barge
FM	Field Manual/Maintenance
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific
FPJMC/FPJMT	Four Power Joint Military Commission/Team
FPS	Azimuth Search and Height Radar
FSR	Force Structure
FTR/F	Fighter
FTX	Field Training Exercise
FWMAO	Free World Military Assistance Office
FY	Fiscal Year
GAF	Ground to Air Fire
GCA	Ground Control Approach

GOA	SA-3 Low Altitude Surface-to-Air Missile
GPWD	General Political Warfare Department
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HALO	High Altitude Low Opening
HAZCON	Hazardous Condition
HELO	Helicopter
HO-51	Computer System
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Hour
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
ICCS	International Commission for Control and Supervision
ICS	Integrated Communications System
ID	Intelligence Division
IG	Inspector General
IRAN	Inspect and Repair as Necessary
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JEIM	Jet Engine Intermediate Maintenance
JFO	Junior Foreign Officer
JGS	Joint General Staff
JLG	Joint Liaison Group
JMA-P	Junior Military Academy - Pleiku
JMS-VT	Junior Military School - Vung Tau
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JP-4	Jet Fuel

JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
KIA	Killed in Action
KM	Kilometer
LCM	Landing Craft Mechanized
LCMM	LCM Mine Sweeper
LCPL	Landing Craft Personnel Large
LCU	Landing Craft Utility
LCVP	Vehicle/Personnel Landing Craft
LDNN	SEAL Support Ships
LDPC	Logistics Data Processing Center
L/I	Line Item
LN	Local National
LOC	Line of Communication
LOGAIR	Logistic Air Support
LOX	Liquid Oxygen
LOG	Logistic
LQM	Link Quality Monitor
LRRP	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
LSB/ISB	Logistics Support Base/Intermediate Support Base
LSI	Lear Siegler Incorporated
LSIL	Large Infantry Landing Ship
LSM	Landing Ship Medium
LSMH	Landing Ship Hospital
LSSL	Large Support Landing Ship

LST	Landing Ship Tank
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
LTJG	Lieutenant Junior Grade
LTL	Interprovincial Road
LVT	Landing Vehicle Tracked
LVTC	Landing Vehicle Tracked Command
LVTP	Landing Vehicle Tracked Personnel
LVTR	Landing Vehicle Tracked Retriever
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MACV	Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funded
MATTS	Military Air Terminal Transportation Services
MBBLS	Thousand Barrels
MCAF	Military Construction Air Force
MCDEC	Marine Corps Development and Education Command
MCN	Military Construction Navy
MCP	Military Construction Program
MED	Materiel Exploitation Division
MEE	Mission Essential Equipment
MEW	Maintenance Engineering Wing
MG	Major General
MHE	Materiel Handling Equipment
MI	Military Intelligence
MIC	Military Intelligence Center

MID	Military Interrogation Division
MILSTAMP	Military Standard Transportation Movement Procedure
MILCON	Military Construction
MM	Millimeter
MOD	Modification/Mobilization Directorate
MOGAS	Motor Gas
MON	Monitor
MOND	Ministry of National Defense
MOS	Military Occupation Specialty
MP	Military Police
MR	Military Region
MRL	Materiel Requirements List
MRO	Manual Release Order
MRMC	Major Repair & Minor Construction
MRTTH	Military Region: Tri Thien-Hue
MS	Master of Science
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSRCO	Master Ship Repair Contract Office
MSS	Military Security Service
MT&P	Ministry of Transportation & Post
MT	Metric/ Measurement Ton
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MWV	Ministry of War Veterans

NAVAID	Navigational Aids
NILCO	Navy International Logistics Control Office
NAVEEACT-PHILL	Naval Shore Electronics Engineering Activity - Philippines.
NAVEEAPAC	Naval Shore Electronics Engineering Agency - Pacific
NAVSHIPS	Naval Ships System Command
NC	Not Carried
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NCOIC	Noncommissioned Officer In Charge
NDI	Non-Destructive Inspection
NDPS	National Defense Planning System
NEC	Navy Enlisted Classification
NICP	National Inventory Control Point
NIS	Not In Stock
NLT	Not Later Than
NMMA	National Materiel Management Agency
NMASF	Navy Military Assistance Service Funded
NORM	Not Operational Ready - Maintenance
NORS	Not Operational Ready - Supply
NRTD	Not Reparable This Depot
NRTS	Not Reparable This Station
NSC	Naval Supply Center
NSDM	National Security Decision Memorandum
NSRP	Non Standard Repair Parts
NTC	National Training Center
NVA	North Vietnamese Army

NVAF	North Vietnamese Air Force
NVN	North Vietnam
OB/GYN	Obstetrics/Gynecology
OCE	Office of Civil Engineer
OIC	Officer in Charge
OJT	On-the-Job-Training
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OM	Organizational Maintenance
OMA	Operations and Maintenance Army
OOAMA	Ogden Air Materiel Area
OPCON	Operational Control
ORPS	Overseas and Return Placement Staff
OR	Operational Ready
OR/TNG	Operational Ready/Training
OST	Order and Shipping Time
(P)	Province
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PA&E	Pacific Architects and Engineers
PBR	Patrol Boat River
PCE	Patrol Craft Escort
PCF	Patrol Craft Fast
PDM	Periodic Depot Maintenance
PE	Periodic Inspection
PF	Popular Force
PG	Post Graduate

PGM	Patrol Gun Boat Motor
PHOTINT	Photo Intelligence
PI	Photo Interpretation /Philippines
PLL	Prescribed Load List
PMEL	Precision Measuring Equipment Laboratory
PMS	Planned Maintenance System
POI	Program of Instruction
POL	Petroleum Oil and Lubricants
POLWAR	Political Warfare
POPAT	Protection of People Against Terrorism
PRB	Publications Review Board
PRC	Portable Radio Communications
PRG	People's Revolutionary Government
PSDF	People's Self Defense Force
QA	Quality Assurance
QBD	Quartermaster Base Depot
QL	National Road
QM	Quartermaster
QTR	Quarter
RAMMS	Republic of Vietnam Logistics Data Processing Center
RAV	Restricted Availability
RBD	Ranger Border Defense
RC-47	Reconnaissance C-47
RCMOD	Reconnaissance Modificatin

RCN	Reference Control Number
RECCE	Reconnaissance
REGT	Regiment
RF	Regional Forces
RF-5	Reconnaissance F-5
RHAW	Radar Homing and Warning
R&I	Recruitment and Induction
RLOW	Radar Lock on Warning
RO	Requisitioning Objective
ROH	Regular Overhaul
ROK	Republic of Korea
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
RVNAFLS	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Language School
SA	Surface to Air
SAAMA	San Antonio Air Material Area
SAFFO	Special Assistant for Field Operations
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SATP	Security Assistance Training Program
SBD	Signal Base Depot
SCD	Special Collection Department
SEA	Southeast Asia
SEAL	Sea Air Land
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SIGNINT	Signal Intelligence

SIMS	Single Integrated Military System
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SMAR	Special Mission Airlift Request
S/NFD	Secret/No Foreign Dissemination
SQ	Site Qualified
SRAS	Special Repair Activities
STCP	Sector Tactical Navy Missile
STD	Standard
STYX	North Vietnamese Navy Missile
SVN	South Vietnam
TACAIR	Tactical Air Support
TACAN	Tactical Air Navigation System
TACC	Tactical Air Coordination Center
TC	Training Center
TCTO	Time Compliance Technical Order
TDY	Temporary Duty
TF	Territorial Forces
TL	Total
TM	Training Manual
TMDE	Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment
TNG	Training
TO	Technical Order
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOW	Tube Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Guided Missile
TRAPAC	Training Pacific

TTB	Technical Translation Branch
(U)	Unclassified
UE	Unit Equipment
UMD	Unit Management Document
UNS	Unserviceable
UPT	Undergraduate Pilot Training
URN	Fixed Tactical Navigation System
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID/AID	United States Agency for International Development
USN	United States Navy
VAA	Vietnamese Army Arsenal
VARS	Visual Air Reconnaissance Search
VC	Viet Cong
VC-47	Very Important Person C-47
VCI	Viet Cong Infrastructure
VDA	Vietnam Dredging Agency
VIC	Vicinity
V-LOG	Vietnamese Logistics
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force
VNAFM	Vietnamese Air Force Manual
VNAF-ELS	Vietnamese Air Force English Language School
VNMA	Vietnamese Military Academy
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps

VNN	Vietnamese Navy
VNNDPC	Vietnamese Navy Data Processing Center
VNNSC	Vietnamese Navy Supply Center
VNNSY	Vietnamese Navy Ship Yard
VNOSEP	Vietnamese Navy Officer Special Education Program
WAC	Womans Army Corps
WHEC	High Endurance Cutter
WIA	Wounded In Action
WESTPAC	Western Pacific
WPB	Patrol Boat
WRM	War Reserve Material
YD	Floating Crane
YFR	Refrigerated Covered Lighter
YOG	Oiler
YR	Floating Repair
YRBM	Repair, Berthing and Messing Barge
YTL	Small Harbor Tug
YTM	Medium Harbor Tug
YW	Barge Water

DISTRIBUTION LIST

AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, SAIGON	1
EMBASSY STAFF, SAIGON	4
CONSUL GENERAL, MR 1	1
CONSUL GENERAL, MR 2	1
CONSUL GENERAL, MR 3	1
CONSUL GENERAL, MR 4	1
COMUSSAG	15
DEFENSE ATTACHE, SAIGON	1
DEPUTY DEFENSE ATTACHE, SAIGON	1
DEPUTY FOR LOGISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION	1
OPERATIONS AND PLANS DIVISION	54
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CHAPTER 1

THREAT ASSESSMENT

1. (C) BACKGROUND: Since the Ceasefire in South Vietnam, Hanoi has developed its strongest military position in the history of the war. The enemy's objective remains the complete takeover of South Vietnam. There is contradictory information, however, as to how and when the enemy plans to accomplish this objective. This DAO Quarterly Intelligence Summary and Threat Analysis reviews the enemy's capability, postulates the enemy's possible courses of action and analyzes each in light of current developments.

2. (C) ENEMY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE CEASEFIRE: Since the Ceasefire, Hanoi has improved its military position in South Vietnam by:

a. Deploying 9 AA and 1 SA-2 Regiments to MR-1, 2 AA Regiments to MR-2 and 1 AA Regiment to MR-3.

b. Deploying the equivalent of 3 armored regiments to South Vietnam.

c. Deploying the equivalent of 5 artillery regiments to South Vietnam.

d. Shifting some 20,000 rear service personnel to South Vietnam.

e. Extending and improving in-country Lines of Communication (LOC) toward primary objective areas.

f. Establishing new and expanding old base areas.

g. Prepositioning sufficient supplies inside South Vietnam to support and sustain a major countrywide offensive.

3. (S) ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION: We believe that the enemy has at least three courses of action which he can pursue in order to achieve his overall objective:

a. Political - Create a recognized government within South Vietnam capable of competing with GVN in economic and political struggles.

b. Limited Military Offensive - A phased military offensive to create a military, economic and political situation beyond capability of GVN to handle.

c. Major Military Offensive - To cause the immediate collapse of the government and the armed forces. The political-economic struggle will support either military course of action. The phased military offensive could develop into a major, decisive offensive.

4. (S) FACTORS AFFECTING HANOI'S DECISION: Several factors will critically affect Hanoi's decision on timing and which courses of action to adopt. A major consideration will be Soviet and PRC economic and military aid. Moscow and Peking are now emphasizing economic and reconstruction assistance rather than military aid. Pronouncements in Hanoi indicate, however, that although North Vietnam is giving priority to reconstruction and development at home, it is making it clear that national defense requirements must also be met. Although hard intelligence is lacking, the Soviets and Chinese are almost certainly continuing some arms deliveries, but probably at levels reduced from previous years. Any assessment of Moscow's and/or Peking's reactions -- in terms of materiel support -- to any future North Vietnam offensive is fraught with unknowns and uncertainties. Under present circumstances, it seems unlikely that the Soviets or Chinese would increase arms deliveries that would imply their support of a renewed offensive. Nevertheless, North Vietnam has sufficient stockpiles of war materiel in South Vietnam and border base areas now to maintain a major offensive. In addition, there are stockpiles in the north which cannot be estimated. In other words, it is possible that Hanoi could realize important gains or even achieve its final objective in the South without receiving any additional materiel support from its allies. If the enemy concludes that he can achieve his objectives in SEA through the use of military force, he will commit the necessary force--regardless of Chinese or Soviet influence or world opinion. Other factors that will

affect any Communist decision are the level and extent of U.S. economic and military support to South Vietnam, the threat of U.S. air and military support to the GVN in any future offensive, and the effectiveness of Communist proselyting of RVNAF and GVN officials.

5. (S) ENEMY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS:

a. COSVN guidance immediately following Cease-fire I emphasized the political struggle, while continuing to stress the need for a strong military alternative. The military, under this guidance, was responsible for protecting the "liberated" areas and conducting harassing attacks within government controlled areas. The Communists hoped to use the "liberated" areas as staging areas for a massive political campaign directed against the government. The goal was to create a political alternative to the GVN. The Communists planned to exploit internal problems within the GVN to the extent that the GVN would be forced to make major concessions. It was expected that the government would be forced to abdicate in the face of insurmountable difficulties and public pressure.

b. Since the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) is the main arm in this campaign against the GVN, high priority was given to rebuilding its strength and effectiveness. Reports from COSVN continue to indicate dissatisfaction with the performance of the VCI. For example, Communist Directive 5/73 stated that the lack of Communist success to date was due to the cadre's lack of confidence in the revolution and to their neglect in accomplishing political and troop proselyting objectives. In the past, a shortage of experienced local cadre, the isolation from the local populace due to past military offensives and more efficient GVN security programs directed at the VCI have had a detrimental effect on the performance of the VCI.

c. The Communists are striving to correct these problems by emphasizing the need for more ideological training, stressing the need to re-establish contact with the local populace, re-assigning experienced cadre down to local levels, and by infiltrating over 3,000 specialists and

cadremen from North Vietnam. These recent infiltrators, however, have probably been used primarily to support development in the "liberated" areas.

d. Rebuilding and upgrading of the VCI is a long, slow process. Immediate results are difficult to perceive but indications still point to continuing lack of success. There are indications now that the enemy does not expect the VCI to attain its objectives and that the role of the VCI in a future offensive will be to create an atmosphere of passivity among the populace so that it will accept the eventual take over by the Communists. This reported shift in emphasis lends credence to a shift from a policy of a popularly supported political struggle to a conventional military solution.

e. Furthermore, as the enemy continues to reevaluate the shortcomings of its current political struggle in the south, he has to come to grips with several problems. Despite serious economic, political and administrative problems within the GVN, the current ceasefire has enabled the GVN to improve control over the populace--especially in the lowlands of MR 1.

f. One of the primary Communist goals in the political campaign has been to develop and resettle the so-called "liberated" areas in South Vietnam. Major resettlement areas have been noted in northern Quang Tri Province, in the western areas of Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces; in the Dak To and Duc Co areas of the central highlands; in the Loc Ninh, Katum, and Thien Ngon areas in northern MR 3; and in several areas around the U Minh Forest in MR 4. By developing these "liberated" areas, the Communists hoped to add legitimacy to the PRG and to provide a population and logistic base. The enemy's primary effort in resettlement has been directed toward persuading civilians in GVN controlled areas to migrate to the so-called "liberated" areas. It also includes resettling Vietnamese from Cambodia in enemy controlled areas of MRs 3 and 4. In the north, over 30,000 civilians have been infiltrated from North Vietnam to resettle, mostly in Quang Tri Province.

g. Despite enemy efforts to develop and resettle these areas, in nearly every case these areas have a parasitic relationship with neighboring government controlled areas. Most of the enemy resettlement areas are situated in regions unfavorable for intensive agriculture capable of sustaining a large population base.

h. The settlers will have to rely increasingly on North Vietnam for their support, especially if the PRG hope to support a sizeable population. Over the long term, the PRG "liberated" areas -- the third Vietnam appears to have little chance of becoming viable and will probably be a sizeable drain on NVN resources.

i. The rice situation will be another factor in Communist planning and policy formulation in the coming months. Enemy self-sustaining rice production is of marginal value. His requirements are considerable and will increase with any expansion of his resettlement areas. Meanwhile, the various sources of enemy rice procurement have diminished.

j. Cambodian rice has traditionally been purchased by the enemy for elements in Cambodia and Vietnam. Recent reports reveal that KI Forces have become increasingly reluctant to sell rice to their Vietnamese counterparts; in some instances this practice has been terminated altogether and armed clashes have occurred. Within South Vietnam, enemy rice procurement programs in GVN controlled areas are costly, inadequate, and will become more so if the GVN is successful in its crack down on economic accommodation. The major remaining means of rice procurement, taxation and confiscation in the "liberated" and contested areas, have become more important.

k. The following, derived from a recent ARVN intelligence center assessment on the rice situation, shows the rice requisitioned by the enemy within the RVN during 1972:

MR-1	2400 Metric Tons
MR-2	2600 Metric Tons
MR-3	1800 Metric Tons
MR-4	58000 Metric Tons

It is evident that the enemy relies heavily on requisition of rice.

l. The significance of the upcoming harvest has not been lost on Communist leaders. COSVN has reportedly ordered enemy units to draw up combat plans to forcefully acquire rice during the coming harvest in order to provide rice to enemy units in the western highlands of MR-2 and the northern area of GVN MR-3.

m. The potential for conflict is magnified by the fact that GVN rice shipments from the Delta, as of 1 September, were 100,000 metric tons behind last year's schedule (1972: 465,500 metric tons; 1973: 326,500 metric tons). In addition, an early season drought disrupted planting and may result in a drop from last year's production in the Delta. For the crop year 1971-72 paddy production (not husked rice) was 6,324,000 metric tons for the 1972-73 year. USAID estimates paddy production at 5,900,000 metric tons and the GVN estimates 6,348,000 metric tons. In short, the GVN can less afford to lose rice to the Communists, who, if indications are correct, will rely on Delta rice more than ever. Thus, it is feasible that a "rice war" may erupt with the main thrust in MR-4 and secondary emphasis in and around the lowlands of MR-3 and Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai Provinces. It is doubtful that in-country rice procurement will be sufficient to support any significantly expanded enemy population base without a corresponding seizure of productive land.

6. (S) <u>ENEMY MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS</u>:

a. Although Communist directives have been emphasizing the primacy of the political campaign, the enemy has strengthened his military option considerably. The Communist successes during the 1972 offensive provided them virtual control of great

portions of western South Vietnam. Subsequently, the major Communist forces have been able to deploy closer to strategic areas in South Vietnam than ever before. Within this "liberated" area, the Communists have upgraded existing bases and have created new logistical supply areas, such as Khe Sanh, Dong Ha, A Shau Valley, Dak To, Tan Canh, Loc Ninh, and Katum-Thien Ngon areas. These areas provide the Communists with forward supply areas to support future offensives.

b. Since the Ceasefire, the Communists have infiltrated large quantities of armor and artillery, especially to the COSVN area. A comparison of RVNAF and enemy armor and artillery is shown below:

NVA Armor Total		RVNAF Armor Total		
			M41	M48
DMZ-MRTTH *	175-245			
MR-5 *	95-110	MR-1	85	56
B-3 Front *	100-115	MR-2	68	56
COSVN *	190-200	MR-3	61	56
Total In-Country	560-670	MR-4	-	-
		TL In-Country	382	

NVA Artillery Totals (122-130MM)

DMZ-MRTTH *	180-200	B-3 Front	40-50
MR-5 *	70- 80	COSVN	80-90
Total In-Country	370-420		

*Communist Military/Political Regions in RVN

See Figure 1

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Figure 1

RVNAF Artillery Totals

	150MM	155MM	175MM
MR-1	212	72	36
MR-2	288	54	12
MR-3	282	72	12
MR-4	334	72	-
VNMC	54	-	-
ABN	54	-	-

In-Country Totals 1,544

The Communists have more tanks than RVNAF. Although the GVN has numerical superiority in artillery, the increased infiltration of 122MM and 130MM artillery provides the NVA/VC with greater range and an increased ability to mass fire. The NVA's large arsenal of heavy rockets and mortars must also be considered.

c. Since the Ceasefire, the Communists have undertaken a large-scale road construction and improvement program. The major efforts have occurred in northern MR-1, in the B-3 Front, and in northern MR-3. The most significant enemy road construction activity has been the development in western South Vietnam of the Route 14 complex which consists of a series of previously existing routes that have been upgraded, plus newly established connecting links. The Communists are currently using Route 14 as their prime avenue for the movement of men and materiel through northern MR-1. At least 5 engineer regiments have been detailed to continue construction and improvement of this route. The latest addition to this complex is the section being constructed from southern Pleiku Province, through western Darlac to the vicinity of Bu Prang. From that point the Communists will be able to use other

existing routes which connect with the significant enemy LOC's in MR-3. The Route 14 complex, using by-pass 615 in the highlands, now provides the enemy with a LOC network within South Vietnam extending from the DMZ to northern MR-3.

d. Within the Republic, improvement of the network of secondary roads, trails, and inland waterways that augment the major enemy LOC's has also been noted. These networks facilitate distribution to forward units, a serious problem in the past. In waterway activity, the enemy has developed the Cua Viet Estuary and port of Dong Ha as a major logistics complex. An estimated 6,000 tons are now being shipped into Dong Ha monthly with a greatly expanded capacity indicated.

e. The dry season will begin shortly in Laos. The NVA plans to accelerate the construction on the new 300 mile, dual-lane, all-season road through Laos. The monsoon rains slowed construction and the road remains in poor to fair condition. By November the road network should be fairly dry with heavy vehicle movement possible. In preparation for increased movement, the Communists are improving the existing housing facilities and bivouac areas, installing communication lines, and relocating AAA positions in S. Laos along the new road.

f. To support his LOC improvements, the enemy is continuing to extend his POL Pipeline System. Since July, the Communists have extended the pipeline from Ba Long into the A Shau Valley. The present southern terminus of the pipeline is now at a newly-constructed petroleum storage area near A Luoi. The NVA is probably working to extend this pipeline further south along Route 14 to the Kham Duc area, where it will probably join the pipeline extension through Laos. This interlinked parallel system provides the enemy great flexibility in supporting his logistics along Route 14 and the new Laos Highway.

g. The Communist LOC system developed since the Ceasefire provides these advantages which did not exist previously:

(1) Complimentary Laos road and Route 14 will provide an all-weather capability to move men and materiel to and within South Vietnam.

(2) LOC network facilitates the movement and distribution of materiel from base areas to forward units.

(3) LOC network facilitates the movement of supplies obtained via illegal trade activities with merchants in GVN controlled lowlands areas.

h. Taking advantage of the Ceasefire, the enemy was able to deploy elements of two infantry divisions -- the 308th and 312th Divisions -- back into NVN to reconstitute a strategic reserve. Both divisions have had sufficient time to refit and could be redeployed back to South Vietnam if needed. The estimated deployment strength of each division is 8500 men. Additionally, the Ceasefire in Laos could free over 18,000 NVA Infantry Forces for redeployment back to NVN and/or SVN, as the 312th Division did last year.

i. In the air defense field, the Communists have doubled the size of the force within the Republic, added new weapons and expanded the air defense system into new areas. Prior to the Ceasefire, the Communists had 11 AAA Regiments in northern MR-1 and one in MR-3. Since that time, 9 AAA and 1 SAM Regiment have deployed into SVN. The introduction of the SA-3 GOA in NVN has increased the capability up north, while the introduction of new and improved weapons such as the SA-3, SA-7M and possibly the ZSU-23-4 into SVN has increased the capability in the south. The effect of these deployments has been to increase the AA threat in Quang Tri to such an extent that it is doubtful that VNAF could survive an attempt to destroy enemy supply and military bases in this area. Extension of this coverage into the A Shau Valley, along internal LOC's and major resettlement areas, has forced VNAF up to altitudes where interdiction is of questionable effectiveness.

j. Available intelligence also indicates that the Communists have been emphasizing increased training, especially in tank/infantry tactics. Continued training by armor, artillery and AAA units should be expected.

k. Regarding logistics, we currently estimate logistics is no longer a limiting factor in North Vietnamese planning. In June the intelligence community estimated that the enemy had prepositioned sufficient munitions to sustain a 6-month general offensive. DIA estimated that the enemy had, during September, shipped over 10,000 tons of all types of supplies to SVN by land and over 6,000 tons by sea. Current expenditure and consumption rates are about 8,000 tons per month. Approximately 4,000 tons are believed to be procured locally. This indicates that the Communists continue to stockpile increasing amounts of supplies. In addition, the NVA is now marshalling enough munitions in southern NVN to sustain an offensive of the 1972 intensity for an additional 10 months. These munitions have been stockpiled in southern NVN for probable movement through the Ban Karai Pass. With Route 14 in RVN mostly supplying MR-1, we believe the munitions being stockpiled in North Vietnam are for future shipment to Communist forces in southern Laos, Cambodia and MR's 3 and 4.

l. Since mid-September, over 8,700 personnel have been accepted into our 1973 infiltration estimate. Our comparison of infiltration totals for this year, as compared with a comparable period last year is:

Total Infiltration (January through September)

1972	1973
131,300	73,900

m. COSVN bound groups have not yet been detected; however, COSVN bound groups traditionally use the S. Laos infiltration corridors. The approaching dry season in Laos and the presence of the new highway, probably mean that COSVN groups will be

moving south in the near future.

n. Since 1967 the Communists have sent an average of 52,000 infiltrators down to SVN per dry season. This year, the numbers can go as high as the 1967-1968 pre-Tet effort, when nearly 96,000 men were infiltrated into SVN.

7. (S) MAJOR OFFENSIVE OPTION:

a. Although it is still too early to assess enemy intentions, it can be said that within the general military option, the enemy has the alternatives of maintaining a defensive posture of "liberated" areas, launching a major offensive in an attempt to force a decisive outcome of the war, or initiating a series of limited, phased offensives. We believe that as the ultimate failure of the political course of action becomes apparent, the enemy will be forced into a military solution to the problem. The primary objective of a major decisive offensive would be the Saigon area. A major push on Saigon would probably require at least one more division in MR-3. Secondary objectives would probably be Hue, the Kontum/Pleiku area and northern Binh Dinh to capture or isolate major cities and immobilize ARVN forces. Secondary objectives in the Delta would expand enemy control, capture a significant portion of the rice harvest, and immobilize ARVN forces.

b. Aside from the obvious results of a successful offensive in the Saigon area, attainment of these secondary objectives would probably cause the collapse of the GVN. Major enemy successes in MR-2 would accomplish a long-standing enemy goal of dividing RVN and would yield considerable population and agricultural resources to the enemy. Major enemy successes in the Delta would give the enemy control of significant percentages of the GVN population and rice production.

c. We believe that infiltration and unit deployments remain the key to assessing whether or not Hanoi will launch a major offensive. In 1972, Hanoi deployed

152,000 replacement personnel in the infiltration system and 70,000 personnel in integral units. To date in 1973, Hanoi has deployed 74,000 personnel in the infiltration system and an additional 38,000 in units. Another factor in analyzing the Communist effort to rebuild the order of battle is the significant drop in reported and estimated enemy losses. From January to September 1972, enemy losses were estimated at 230,000 while from January to September 1973, enemy losses were only 46,000.

d. The following is a review of the enemy force structure by military region and our estimate of the enemy's manpower needs in order to conduct a major offensive.

e. In Military Region 1, the current enemy strength is:

Divisions	6
Regiments	35 (Plus 18 AA)
Combat Personnel	75-85,000
Guerrillas	5-10,000
Admin Services	30-35,000
Total Personnel	110-130,000

We believe that this force is sufficiently manned and equipped to conduct a major offensive. However, Hanoi would probably deploy two divisions (the 308th in Hanoi and the 312th in the NVN panhandle) to the area if the objective was the destruction of RVNAF and the seizure of the northern two provinces.

f. In Military Region 2, strength of enemy forces is:

Divisions	3
Regiments	12 (Plus 2AA)
Combat Personnel	27-32,000

Guerrillas	5-10,000
Admin Services	15-20,000
Total Personnel	47-62,000

The enemy would deploy at least 20,000 replacements to the central highlands to bring enemy units up to strength and provide a replacement pool prior to conducting a major offensive.

g. In Military Region 3, the strength of enemy forces is:

Divisions	3
Regiments	20 (Plus 2AA)
Combat Personnel	20-25,000
Guerrillas	2-5,000
Admin Services	30-35,000
Total Personnel	52-65,000

Although major enemy forces are in forward positions, we estimate that the enemy needs approximately 15,000 replacements for a major offensive. In addition, if Saigon is the objective, we believe Hanoi would reinforce the MR with one division.

h. In Military Region 4, current enemy strength is:

Divisions	1
Regiments	15
Combat Personnel	15-20,000
Guerrillas	8-10,000
Admin Services	10-15,000
Total Personnel	33-45,000

To increase the enemy's strength to an offensive combat level, Hanoi would have to deploy some 10,000 replacements to the Delta. If control of the Delta were the major objective we believe that he would need at least three additional divisions.

i. In summary, shown below is a recapitulation of DAO Saigon's estimate of what the enemy would have to do in order to be manned for a major offensive designed to topple the GVN.

Infiltration*		Forces**
MR-1	-	2 Divisions (17,000)
MR-2	20,000	-
MR-3	15,000	1 Division (8,500)
MR-4	10,000	3 Division (25,000)

* Needed to raise combat forces strength for an offensive.

** Needed to conduct a major offensive with the primary objectives in that particular region.

The shifting of combat divisions from one area to another, or from NVN, would highlight the enemy's primary area of effort.

8. (S) PHASED-LIMITED OFFENSIVE OPTION:

a. The overall strategic objective of a phased-limited offensive is to cause the collapse of the government and its armed forces by creating a military, economic, and political situation beyond the capability of the government to manage. Such an offensive would probably be conducted in four phases:

Phase I - Elimination of outposts

Phase II - Attacks on main LOC's

Phase III - Attacks on major province capitals

Phase IV - Major attack in MR-3

These phases would overlap in time and some actions are already in evidence.

b. Phase I entails the elimination of some or all of the 26 isolated ARVN outposts, most of which are tenuously held and currently require or would require aerial resupply to exist under any pressure. The reduction of these outposts would eliminate some of the threat to the security of the enemy's LOC's and base areas. The Government Ranger Outpost at Plei Djereng in Pleiku was recently overrun in such an operation.

c. Phase II would entail attacks on main government-held LOC's to establish permanent blocking positions in order to facilitate continued enemy logistics development, to pin down RVNAF forces and to isolate population centers. Principal targets would be critical passes in MR-1, QL-1 in Binh Dinh, QL-19 in Binh Dinh and Pleiku, QL-14 in Pleiku and Phuoc Long, and QL-4 in MR-4. There have been recent indications that the enemy intends to secure QL-14 in Pleiku and QL-19 in Binh Dinh. The enemy now has the capability to interdict and hold major LOC's for at least a short period of time.

d. Phase III entails conducting attacks to isolate and capture major province capitals in order to destroy the confidence and morale of ARVN forces. Primary targets would probably include Hue, Da Nang, Kontum, Pleiku, Tay Ninh, My Tho, and Can Tho.

e. Phase IV would be a major attack in MR-3 to capture a key province such as Binh Duong. Rapid success in this effort would be exploited by continuing the attack toward Saigon. In all these phases, large-scale, mainforce warfare would be supported by local forces and widespread terrorist activity.

f. Within the framework of this option a phased-limited offensive could lead to a decisive confrontation. Success in the initial stages of the offensive, especially in securing the rice harvest, could provide the impetus to move to the next stage. As the enemy moves through successive military stages of a phased offensive, the following political and economic activity would continue:

(1) Saturation operations conducted in major rice producing regions to secure control of the harvest.

(2) Attempt to circulate counterfeit and occupation currency in order to destroy confidence in the legal tender and contribute to existing inflationary tendencies.

(3) Move more civilians from NVN and Cambodia into contested areas of RVN to re-establish villages and hamlets.

(4) Increase agricultural production.

(5) Trade with GVN-controlled populace.

(6) Contribute to a breakdown of local government control.

(7) Conduct proselyting.

(8) Rejuvenate local forces.

(9) Generally attempt to diffuse the distinction between GVN and PRG-controlled areas.

All of these various activities have already begun.

9. (S) CONCLUSIONS:

a. DAO Saigon believes that Hanoi has all the armor, artillery and logistics in South Vietnam necessary to pursue any of the three possible courses of action. Further, we believe that the enemy is preparing to commit the manpower to raise his combat forces to levels that will permit initiation of either military option.

b. Although we have seen several reports alleging that the enemy has already decided to resume the military offensive early next year, and although we consider his actions to reinforce his military capability strong indications that these reports may be valid, we have not received enough information to permit us to conclude that such a decision has, in fact, been made. The political

and economic offensive continues. The military reinforcements are moving into South Vietnam and Southern Laos. Improvements in the logistical infrastructure are proceeding apace. The enemy's most likely course of action is a phased military offensive, supported by the political and economic offensive, keeping open his option to attack with concentrated force to seize the decisive objective.

CHAPTER 2

FRIENDLY SITUATION

1. (C) CEASEFIRE OVERVIEW:

The second ceasefire accord has not been as effective as was hoped, although overall activity remains below Ceasefire I levels. Real estate control is essentially the same. The enemy has overrun some ARVN outposts but withdrawn under pressure. Activity in MRs 1, 2 and 3 was characterized by ARVN/enemy main force element contacts. Kidnappings, assassinations, and other terrorist incidents highlighted MR 4 activity. Major ABF increased significantly in MR 1 and MR 4. MR 3 activity declined but recent reports indicate a major enemy offensive in the near future. Infiltration of men and equipment by the enemy continued unabated. Airfields in MRs 1, 2 and 3, and roads are being constructed throughout RVN.

(Figures 1, 2, 3, 4,

5, 6, 7 & 8)

2. (C) MILITARY REGION 1:

The Ceasefire II accord brought on an initial lull in military activity in Military Region (MR) 1. However, by 15 July incidents were on the increase and by the end of September were at a level comparable to most of Ceasefire I. Activity north of the Hai Van Pass was concentrated in the 1st Division AO as ARVN and Territorial Forces were subjected to constant harassing ground probes and attacks by fire. The Bo River Valley was extremely active as the ARVN 3d Regiment attempted to retake outposts lost to the Communist forces. Activity was also intense as the 54th Regiment attempted to consolidate control over the area between Highway QL-1, east of the Ta Trach River, to the mountains in southern Thua Thien Province. Road building efforts were abandoned in the Bach Ma Mountain Area south of Phu Loc and aerial resupply was discontinued due to intense ground fire. On 9



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Figure 1



Figure 2

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

Figure 3

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

Figure 4

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

Figure 5

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

Figure 6

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

Figure 7

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

Figure 8

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August, sappers attacked an Airborne Fire Support Base west of Hue, killing ten and wounding nine. Security has since been strengthened by intensified patrols. The 3d Division AO was generally quiet with scattered sporadic activity occurring principally during the latter part of August and September. ARVN and Territorial Forces were deployed in the lowlands to prevent NVA/VC access to the rice harvest. A national railroad locomotive and 12 meters of rail was destroyed by sappers on 25 August. This incident took place northwest of Danang, along the route furnishing scheduled service between Danang and Hue. Quang Ngai Province in the 2d Division AO was the most active province, as ARVN and Territorial Forces continued their attempts to force the NVA/VC from the coastal lowlands and to expand and consolidate their control in the rice producing areas of Binh Son and Son Tinh Districts of Quang Ngai Province.

(Figure 9)

3. (C) MILITARY REGION 2:

Since the beginning of Ceasefire II, the level of activity in MR 2 sharply increased. This increase was attributable to ARVN attempts to retake the villages of Polei Krong and Trung Nghia, northwest of Kontum City. The villages were encircled and subsequently captured 8 June, prior to CF-II. During July and August, ARVN forces of the 22d and 23d Divisions, along with Territorial Forces, made repeated attempts to retake this lost territory. Massive artillery and TACAIR support was employed in these infantry attacks. However, no progress was made. In early July, elements of the 44th Regiment were successful in retaking a small section of eastern Trung Nghia Village. During this period, positions remained unchanged and casualties continued to mount on both sides. During the middle of August, a Ranger Task Force was formed in the Plei Mrong area of Pleiku Province with the mission of advancing to the north, clearing the area south of Trung Nghia, and relieving the pressure on ARVN units to the north. This operation was conducted with no noticeable success as the enemy immediately brought stiff resistance to their advance. The situation remained stalemated until 7-8 September, when elements of the 42d Regiment were successful in retaking Trung Nghia, unopposed. The 42d Regiment occupied Polei Krong 16 September. Dak Rocot


MR 1
MAJOR ABF
MINOR ABF
MAJOR CONTACTS
MINOR CONTACTS
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Figure 9

Village, a strong point northwest of Kontum City, fell 17 September. ARVN forces were successful in forcing the NVA/VC from Ngoc Bay Mountain, also northwest of Kontum City, on 24 September. Ngoc Bay Mountain was the major observation point for artillery against GVN forces in the Trung Nghia area. ARVN now claims control of the area west of Kontum City to the Poko River and north of the Dak Bla River. At the end of the quarter, ARVN had not been able to dislodge the enemy from the high ground (Hill 727) south of Trung Nghia. The military situation in Pleiku remained stable until 22 September when the outpost camp manned by the 80th RBD Bn, located at Le Minh was overrun. A regimental size enemy force, supported by intense artillery fire and tanks, attacked the isolated outpost. The attack was well coordinated, as the enemy simultaneously launched attacks against the camp, manned by one company, and pinned down the remaining two companies that were patrolling outside the camp perimeter. The ARVN has committed elements of the 21st RBD Group and 42d Regiment to retake Le Minh Camp at Plei D'Jereng. Movement of GVN forces along Route 509 has encountered resistance and is progressing slowly. Activity in Binh Dinh Province has continued at a moderate level as GVN forces continued their attempt to expand and consolidate areas under their control, east and west of QL-1. Enemy forces have offered only light resistance to these operations and this trend will continue unless new enemy units are introduced into the area. The southern sector of MR 2 was comparatively quiet. Principal activity was in western Quang Duc Province where elements of two RF Battalions commenced an operation designed to retake three RF outposts in the old Bu Prang Area (YU5856). These outposts are being used by the NVA to guard an important link in their supply route, Province Road 309. After several days of fighting, the RF operation was repulsed and the battalions recalled to positions in the vicinity of the RF Camp at Bu Bon (YU6650). In the southern coastal provinces, the enemy concentrated on interdiction of lines of communications. The National Railroad was cut several times during the quarter but repairs were made in a short time.

(Figure 10)


MR2
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Figure 10

4. (C) MILITARY REGION 3:

In MR 3 the first four weeks of Ceasefire II saw a drop of 35% in enemy initiated incidents from the previous period. After this lull, a sharp increase was reported due to ARVN efforts to reopen LTL-1A, both northeast and southwest of Phu Giao in Binh Duong Province. The 5th Division made the primary effort and suffered heavy losses. Elements of the 18th Division were moved into the area and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy in securing the route southwest of Phu Giao. Elements of the 5th Division abandoned the effort and the level of activity returned to that of the first four weeks. Song Be became another isolated outpost primarily resupplied by air. Rotation efforts of the 92d RBD Bn from Tonle Cham by helicopter have been unsuccessful. Several attempts have been made and three helicopters landed, one of them with extensive damage. Total effort resulted in ten replacements and five rangers, four crewmen, and one POW extracted. The camp continues to receive supplies by HALO using C-130 aircraft. [illegible] personnel within the camp were promoted one grade [illegible] presidential proclamation. In Long An Province, territorial elements encountered an infiltration unit moving across QL-4 toward the Parrots Beak Area of Cambodia, and inflicted heavy casualties during mid-August. LTL-23 in Phuoc Tuy Province has been contested on several occasions, as the enemy apparently wishes to add Xuyen Moc to the isolated outpost list. The road was closed and reopened many times during this quarter. For most of the period, the situation remained the same, i.e., open to civilian traffic, some of which moved through VC/NVA checkpoints and traveled periodically by heavily armed military convoys. During late September the NVA 101st Regiment ambushed the 2/49th Bn, 25th Division, in the rubber plantation north of QL-22 in Tay Ninh Province. This battle resulted in heavy casualties on both sides and, at the close of the period, ARVN had three Inf Bns and five RF Bns sweeping the area to force the 101st Regiment out of the area. GVN efforts to extend the active railroad have been partially successful. However, the repair crews, as well as the units guarding them, have been the constant target of ABF, light ground contacts, and periodic propaganda attacks. The RR line was extended 10 KM during this period.

(Figure 11)


MR 3
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MINOR ABF
MAJOR CONTACTS
MINOR CONTACTS
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Figure 11

5. (C) MILITARY REGION 4:

In MR 4 the level of activity during Ceasefire II remained constant. Terrorist activity increased, with a concerted enemy effort to assassinate village and hamlet officials. Restaurants and open air TV viewers have also been targeted. LTL-20 in Dinh Tuong Province was interdicted several times. Various other LOCs were temporarily interdicted. Numerous incidents were reported in Dinh Tuong Province--mainly contacts and ABF in northern Cai Lay and Cai Be Districts. The contacts could possibly be the result of ARVN massing troops in the area and the ARVN interest in the Tri Phap area of southern Kien Tuong Province. Elements of the 7th Division reported several large contacts, predominantly favorable to ARVN. A change in the area of responsibilities increased those of the 44th STZ and the 9th Division and substantially reduced the 21st Division area. All available Ranger and RBD Bns are attempting to uproot the 101st NVA Regiments from Nui Giai, Seven Mountains Area, Chau Doc Province. This effort has been in progress for two months. Casualties reported have been moderate. No progress was realized and an impasse has been reached.

(Figure 12)

6. (C) SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS:

Overall activity in RVN has remained essentially constant. The sharp decline at Ceasefire II was short lived and the intensity of the current fighting is above that of late June/early July. Except for the Marine AO, MR 1 is reporting relatively high levels of activity in every province. In MR 2, enemy offensive efforts have been concentrated in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces. ARVN efforts to expand control were centered in northern Binh Dinh Province. MR 3 was relatively quiet after ARVN ceased road clearing operations. Activity in this region is expected to flare up as major enemy moves are reportedly in the offing. Dinh Tuong and Chau Doc Provinces were the areas of increased activity in MR 4. Chuong Thien Province, the usual hotspot, has been sporadic with "on again-off again" clashes over the quarter.

(Figures 13, 14, 15 & 16)


MR 4
MAJOR ABF
MINOR ABF
MAJOR CONTACTS
MINOR CONTACTS
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Figure 12

SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE
MR I

WEEK	JUN 15 - 21	JUN 22 - 28	JUN 29 - JUL 5	JUL 6 - 12	JUL 13 - 19	JUL 20 - 26	JUL 27 - AUG 2	AUG 3 - 9	AUG 10 - 16	AUG 17 - 23	AUG 24 - 30	AUG 31 - SEP 6	SEP 7 - 13	SEP 14 - 20	SEP 21 - 27	SEP 28 - OCT 4	OCT 5 - 11	OCT 12 - 18
INCIDENTS	93	59	57	40	51	69	83	132	81	125	138	161	155	85	118	153		
MAJ/MIN ABF	22/30	6/25	11/25	4/15	10/18	13/29	10/30	23/63	8/38	29/32	25/45	49/43	29/67	19/31	20/56	35/65		
MAJ/MIN CTX	1/40	0/28	1/20	0/21	0/23	2/25	0/43	2/44	3/32	1/54	2/66	2/67	3/56	2/33	3/39	5/48		
EN ARTY INCOMING	2,210	346	543	253	442	845	606	1,715	539	2,894	2,521	2,853	1,659	1,850	1,727	1,823		
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	5,580	1,238	1,567	1,603	1,700	1,987	2,847	6,878	4,731	6,543	8,560	8,865	6,868	4,017	6,213	7,940		
SCH/FLN VNAF SORTIES	68/3	126/16	154/21	126/4	126/0	126/37	126/56	126/55	126/0	126/24	122/0	98/22	100/30	110/22	126/8	124/31		
K/W FRD CAS	38/114	5/30	15/58	9/2	8/47	13/72	23/78	42/140	25/53	33/106	48/183	37/182	22/124	8/59	31/117	64/181		
K/D EN CAS	79/1	39/0	29/1	36/0	41/1	69/4	21/1	72/0	53/0	44/1	95/4	70/4	38/0	41/0	70/1	175/10		
K/W CIV CAS	15/11	9/12	2/30	0/0	2/25	0/0	1/8	9/28	3/1	0/0	21/44	4/10	12/77	19/41	20/24	5/21		

Figure 13

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Figure 14

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE
MR 2

WEEK	JUN 15 - 21	JUN 22 - 28	JUL 29 - 5	JUL 6 - 12	JUL 13 - 19	JUL 20 - 26	JUL 27 - AUG 2	AUG 3 - 9	AUG 10 - 16	AUG 17 - 23	AUG 24 - 30	AUG 31 - SEP 6	SEP 7 - 13	SEP 14 - 20	SEP 21 - 27	SEP 28 - OCT 4	OCT 5 - 11	OCT 12 - 18	OCT 19 -
INCIDENTS	70	113	121	131	100	126	113	130	143	150	116	115	154	121	148	118			
MAJ/MIN ABF	10/16	4/31	13/19	9/25	8/22	12/24	9/28	18/31	23/41	14/41	12/35	15/25	19/39	9/33	23/27	14/20			
MAJ/MIN CTX	3/41	2/76	8/81	6/91	2/68	5/85	4/72	10/71	6/73	6/89	6/63	2/73	4/92	5/74	8/90	2/82			
EN ARTY INCOMING	528	315	633	351	566	583	329	631	1,402	1,096	751	695	860	840	871	526			
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	11,144	15,908	19,991	21,235	9,571	18,677	12,592	22,784	27,361	26,681	26,091	24,027	23,996	29,188	30,917	23,105			
SCH/FLN VNAF SORTIES	232/49	280/217	315/224	280/94	280/70	280/214	362/327	532/415	450/216	450/249	448/230	478/396	440/346	454/258	384/277	384/298			
K/W FRD CAS	18/123	38/162	50/214	44/227	25/116	52/219	35/141	59/245	77/287	61/178	41/142	42/159	45/196	46/219	48/185	47/175			
K/D EN CAS	127/1	85/0	250/0	253/6	121/0	157/0	149/0	269/3	520/2	385/7	179/1	196/0	411/11	310/0	293/3	171/1			
K/W CIV CAS	2/1	1/5	4/12	2/6	0/0	2/0	3/23	5/24	2/19	1/5	12/30	0/3	1/7	6/13	3/31	2/3			

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE
MR 3

WEEK	JUN 15 - 21	JUN 22 - 28	JUL 29 - 5	JUL 6 - 12	JUL 13 - 19	JUL 20 - 26	JUL 27 - AUG 2	AUG 3 - 9	AUG 10 - 16	AUG 17 - 23	AUG 24 - 30	AUG 31 - SEP 6	SEP 7 - 13	SEP 14 - 20	SEP 21 - 27	SEP 28 - OCT 4	OCT 5 - 11	OCT 12 - 18
INCIDENTS	97	84	67	86	147	146	123	133	96	84	86	71	71	53	63	64		
MAJ/MIN ABF	6/33	9/19	5/11	7/27	20/64	13/65	9/48	11/60	8/27	8/27	7/33	6/21	2/19	3/7	4/8	4/9		
MAJ/MIN CTX	0/58	1/55	0/51	1/51	3/60	2/66	3/63	5/57	0/61	3/46	3/43	1/43	0/50	4/39	3/48	4/47		
EN ARTY INCOMING	327	328	302	339	1,418	959	547	690	423	406	444	333	140	125	110	256		
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	3,712	5,781	5,100	18,658	17,683	15,993	12,189	9,778	7028	7,796	9,578	7,228	6,122	4,143	6,096	12,005		
SCH/FLN VNAF SORTIES	285/0	216/4	200/6	266/30	614/217	614/174	600/196	560/274	432/190	356/100	324/121	332/152	328/107	304/74	332/60	448/276		
K/W FRD CAS	4/46	18/91	17/53	14/102	22/163	24/108	32/113	39/79	7/60	12/72	21/54	11/56	19/48	12/71	17/56	59/172		
K/D EN CAS	31/2	66/0	30/1	37/6	98/2	131/2	195/2	49/3	49/4	134/13	33/1	56/0	50/2	41/0	18/4	220/4		
K/W CIV CAS	2/7	4/4	0/1	1/1	1/9	1/4	1/13	0/9	0/4	0/1	2/1	1/5	2/10	5/15	6/24	4/10		

Figure 15

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE
MR 4

WEEK	JUN 15 - 21	JUN 22 - 28	JUN 29 - JUL 5	JUL 6 - 12	JUL 13 - 19	JUL 20 - 26	JUL 27 - AUG 2	AUG 3 - 9	AUG 10 - 16	AUG 17 - 23	AUG 24 - 30	AUG 31 - SEP 6	SEP 7 - 13	SEP 14 - 20	SEP 21 - 27	SEP 28 - OCT 4	OCT 5 - 11	OCT 12 - 18
INCIDENTS	267	199	225	138	172	210	279	258	200	192	222	264	292	232	247	238		
MAJ/MIN ABF	25/125	15/93	13/113	7/77	11/88	16/95	25/153	25/150	15/119	21/97	27/116	27/142	33/164	23/112	24/100	25/90		
MAJ/MIN CTX	2/115	8/83	3/96	3/51	2/71	6/93	6/95	5/78	4/62	7/67	2/77	5/90	2/93	8/89	14/109	6/117		
EN ARTY INCOMING	1,428	1,036	873	635	876	785	1,463	1,514	1,005	975	1,404	1,480	1,352	1,167	1,161	1,016		
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	22,038	16,511	19,054	15,790	14,027	15,156	20,635	25,418	14,723	15,256	15,602	20,378	18,272	13,804	15,320	16,686		
SCH/FLN VNAF SORTIES	94/30	154/54	146/82	154/30	154/89	154/52	154/86	154/118	154/56	154/46	154/16	154/84	154/70	154/42	162/44	178/52		
K/W FRD CAS	70/270	93/243	69/180	46/157	56/186	73/266	51/251	62/251	39/209	68/264	59/295	82/298	48/281	46/321	74/251	103/334		
K/D EN CAS	133/0	113/6	50/1	103/11	112/1	173/0	113/0	61/1	112/0	172/1	61/0	129/0	83/0	81/0	135/1	273/24		
K/W CIV CAS	15/12	8/21	5/15	5/16	0/5	5/15	8/58	5/7	7/23	2/45	4/27	32/60	17/29	17/47	5/34	12/20		

Figure 16

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CHAPTER 3

Removed and Replaced

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John Duffey
HQSOP-OR
Dec 5, 1973

CHAP 3

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CHAPTER 3

ASSESSMENT OF RVNAF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

1. (S) J-2/JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

a. Organization.

(Figure 1)

b. Personnel. The J-2 staff has a shortage of 65 personnel, as indicated below, and similar shortages also exist in subordinate elements:

	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL
Officers	175	135
NCOs	111	88
EM	34	32
TOTAL	320	255

c. Operational Effectiveness.

(1) Despite withdrawal of major US support assets, the operational effectiveness of the Office of the J-2 continues at a high level. A contributing factor is the personal integrity and professional competence of the J-2. He has effectively organized his staff and manned it with experienced, competent personnel who perform in a highly professional manner.

(2) However, in addition to the personnel shortages noted above, the following weaknesses exist:

(a) Inadequate Communications. Since secure US communications networks are no longer available, the RVNAF must rely on its own channels, which have proved to be insufficient. Also, a great deal of the equipment is outdated. Thus, much of the field reporting must be sent to Saigon by pouch which reduces its timeliness. J-2 is planning to partially alleviate this problem by revising its TOE.

J-2, JOINT GENERAL STAFF, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES



Figure 1

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(b) Dependence on US Funding. Although US funding has been curtailed, it continues to provide for in-country operations and limited activity in Laos and Cambodia. Without this assistance, RVNAF collection operations would have to be reduced drastically.

(c) Reporting and Production Deficiencies. Field reporting is sometimes distorted and inaccurate because of political or personal reasons. For example, enemy KIA statistics may be inflated while the opposite holds true for reports of friendly losses. Due to the continuing high level of hostile actions, the J-2 has placed emphasis on tactical intelligence production to the detriment of strategic production. Intelligence on North Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos is limited despite the serious threat which these countries pose to RVN. However, the past quarter has seen more attention focussed on production of political and socio-economic studies.

(d) Management Weaknesses. The J-2, although highly competent, does not exercise firm technical control over Corps G-2s. Corps commanders have sometimes encouraged and occasionally directed their G-2 to ignore directives received from J-2. Poor coordination, particularly among the services, results in duplication of the collection, reporting, and analytical functions. While the J-2's control over field elements is weak, he holds a very tight rein over his subordinates at the staff level. By closely guarding his decision-making authority, he tends to stifle the initiative and growth of his subordinates.

2. (S/NFD) MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CENTER (MIC).

a. Organization. (Figure 2) The MIC was established on 1 July with five divisions replacing the former centers. The Divisions are as follows: Intelligence Division, Document Exploitation Division, Materiel Exploitation Division, Military Interrogation Division, Support Division. The Chief of the MIC is the Deputy J-2. The MIC was ostensibly reorganized to centralize management functions and reduce the supervisory overhead and personnel layering which existed in the former centers. However, it has been reliably reported that the reorganization resulted from a power play between J-3 and J-2, with the latter losing out. Although the reorganization has had no impact on operations

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CENTER ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE



*ALSO SERVES AS DEPUTY J-2

Figure 2

and appears to be chiefly a paper exercise, it has adversely affected morale. The J-2/J-3 political in-fighting has become known to the staff. Furthermore, their positions have been downgraded and the possibilities of promotion reduced.

b. Personnel.

	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL
Officers	169	159
NCOs	164	133
EM	124	119
TOTAL	457	411

c. Operational Effectiveness.

(1) The Intelligence Division (ID). The Intelligence Division is one of the most effectively managed and productive elements of the MIC; its Targets Branch is particularly outstanding. The Chief of the Targets Branch is a hard-working, aggressive, and technically qualified individual who inspires and motivates his subordinates. However, the Branch is largely dependent on US photographic missions and coverage, which have been drastically reduced. The lack of US photomission support and photography also has had a negative impact on the productivity and effectiveness of the Imagery Interpretation Section. Although the Chief is technically qualified, he lacks managerial and leadership skills. However, his subordinates are well-trained, competent and motivated. The weakest element in the Division is the Area Analysis Branch, and this is due to the personal shortcomings of its Chief. To overcome this deficiency, the Division Chief personally devotes a great deal of time to this Branch. As a result, their finished products meet professional, high-quality standards.

(2) Document Exploitation Division. Since the decrease in the level of enemy activity, the overall volume of documents available for exploitation has naturally decreased. Furthermore, with the withdrawal of US advisory personnel, ARVN field elements have been giving less priority to the acquisition and transmittal of documents to

higher headquarters for exploitation. However, there has been a substantial increase in the number of documents available during this quarter in comparison to the last reporting period. This is attributable to an increase in the number of documents captured during this period as well as the assignment of officers specifically to the task of document collection.

(3) Materiel Exploitation Divison (MED). The MED is one of MICs least effective elements due to poor supervision by its Chief, who is frequently absent from his office. MED personnel are well-trained and technically qualified. However, the Division reflects the lack of motivation and dedication of the Chief. Field elements frequently hold captured materiel without thoroughly exploiting or forwarding it to higher headquarters. This factor, along with the indifference of the Branch Chief, has had an adverse effect on the MED. The MED will move to the JGS compound during the next quarter, and hopefully this will bring it under closer scrutiny and control.

(4) Military Interrogation Division (MID). The MID is effectively led and managed and has competent, experienced personnel. However, no prisoners of war have been processed through the MID interrogation facilities since the ceasefire. The Division has no funds or other means of providing subsistence for PWs. Furthermore, the Military Regions have the capability to handle their own interrogations, and they are reluctant to transport PWs to Saigon. However, two or three-man MID interrogation teams are dispatched to the regions to pursue special J-2 requirements or to assist centers with heavy workloads.

3. (S/NFD) CORPS AND DIVISION G-2s.

a. Organization. The Corps G-2 organization consists of three sections: Intelligence, G-2 Air and Interrogation plus a Military Intelligence Detachment. The Division G-2 has a similar organization but without an Interrogation Section.

b. Personnel. The authorized strength for the Corps G-2 is 54 officers and 125 enlisted men. The Division G-2 is authorized 20 officers and 48 enlisted men.

c. Operational Effectiveness.

(1) The Corps G-2s have intelligence backgrounds and exhibit a high degree of integrity and professionalism. The key staff positions are filled with experienced and fairly well-trained personnel. On the whole, the files and holdings are complete, accurate, and maintained on a timely basis. Insufficient liaison and communication with tactical elements has been a long-standing problem. It still exists but not to a major degree.

(2) At the Division level, the collection and analytical functions are fairly well coordinated. Intelligence is disseminated to tactical consumers on a timely basis and it is accepted with due credibility. Briefing and situation rooms are well equipped in comparison to other staff offices. Files and holdings in general are accurately and competently organized and maintained. Additional networks and equipment for secure communications are needed to decrease the reliance on courier mail which adversely affects timeliness. A shortage of funds to pay for agents is another problem faced at Division level.

4. (S/NFD) MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS).

a. Organization. The MSS is commanded by Brigadier General Vu Duc Nhuan. It is subordinate to the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) of the Joint General Staff (JGS). In spite of MSS subordination to a staff element within the Ministry of Defense, it reports directly to, or receives tasking directly from, the highest levels, including the Office of the President and the Prime Minister. The Headquarters element (Military Security Directorate) is located in Saigon and is composed of 662 officers and men. The remainder of the personnel are assigned to either military units or to regular MSS units throughout South Vietnam. There is a detachment of 50 officers and men at the Headquarters of each Military Region and in the Capital District. A field office of 30 personnel is maintained in each province and in the major cities. There is a contingent of six personnel who make up the sub-field offices within each district. Also, organic units of 20 and 25 officers and men are assigned to Corps and Divisions, respectively. MSS personnel are attached to regiment, battalion, company and platoon level.

b. Personnel.

	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL
Officers	1,107	1,035
NCOs	2,455	2,126
Enlisted	1,263	1,225
TOTAL	4,825	4,386

c. Equipment and Facilities. The recent construction of a new Central Records facility has enhanced MSS capabilities in the field of counterintelligence. Most of the communications equipment which it obtained from the 525th MI Bn is not in operating condition. Specific details as to type of communications equipment involved, quantities, and condition of the equipment are not known at this time.

d. Operational Effectiveness. MSS efforts have been successful in assisting the incumbent government in maintaining a level of political stability. Through its field components, it has greatly enhanced internal security through overt as well as covert counterintelligence operations. In furtherance of the counter-subversive mission, MSS has provided valuable information concerning identification of the VC infrastructure. It has the capability to detect and report imminence of hostility information in any of the four Military Regions. The MSS is in fact co-equal in power and prestige with both the National Police and the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO). Its good will is essential for successful bilateral operations by US military intelligence elements in RVN. In addition to supplying information, the MSS has provided many special services to US intelligence, including the issuance of MSS passes, performance of national level file checks, and coordination in clearances of indigenous personnel. Some key MSS personnel (excluding the Commander) have been reluctant to delegate authority. This has impeded the flow of papers and slowed production. Also, the effectiveness of MSS has been somewhat hindered by personality and rank considerations among its personnel. In addition, operational personnel do not always recognize the importance of fully answering "who, what, when, where, why and how" in their investigative and collection reporting.

5. (S/NFD) UNIT 101.

a. Organization. Unit 101, under the operational control of J-2, JGS/RVNAF, organizes, directs and controls in-country and cross-border military intelligence collection operations. The unit consists of a Headquarters in Saigon which has a Command Section headed by a Colonel, an Administration Section, and Operations, Support and Political Warfare Branches. Unit 101 has six operational field detachments and a total of 27 teams operating throughout the country which control 92 agent nets and 272 coded assets. Approximately one-third of the coded assets are VC/NVA defectors-in-place who supply considerable information. Detachment 60 with headquarters in Saigon is responsible for coverage of the Central Office of South Vietnam. Detachments 65 and 66, with headquarters in Danang and Dalat, cover MR I and MR II, respectively. Detachment 67, Saigon, provides coverage for MR III with the exception of the Capital Military District. Detachment 68 has headquarters in Can Tho and is responsible for MR IV. Detachment 69, with headquarters at Thu Duc, provides coverage for the Capital Military District and conducts cross-border third country operations where the military/political situation has a direct bearing on RVN security.

b. Personnel.

	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL
Officers	429	330
NCOs	255	198
EM	236	198
TOTAL	920	726

c. Equipment and Facilities. The unit obtained a substantial quantity of equipment from the 525th MI Group when the latter departed in March 1973. The majority of the Unit's equipment is serviceable and replacement spare parts are available through ARVN supply channels. The Unit has second echelon maintenance capability for all its commo-equipment in addition to its normal equipment. Maintenance above that level must be obtained through ARVN support channels. Unit facilities both at headquarters level in Saigon and at detachment and team locations throughout the country are excellent.

d. Operational Effectiveness. With withdrawal of the 525th, the 101st Unit became counterparted with Special Activities, Thailand. One Project Officer from that unit is assigned at the headquarters level. All planning and implementation of operations have reverted back to the unit with technical and financial assistance provided by the US Project Officer, as required. This opportunity to "go it alone" has improved morale. Morale also has been helped by the availability of additional dependent housing which has been made possible by the use of office and billet spaces formerly occupied by US counterparts. The Unit's monthly production of intelligence reports is approximately 1,500, all of which are passed to the US Project Officer. Their reports consistently receive high usability evaluations from DAO, USSAG, USARPAC and DIA. The unit is extremely responsive to requirements from all of these elements. A recent example of unit effectiveness was its ability to cover targets for Bomb Damage Assessment in the intensified bombing of Cambodia in August 1973. The Unit organized coverage for all targets levied on extremely short notice and responded with a high degree of accuracy in 72 hours or less in most cases. The Unit produced 53 separate reports on this coverage alone. The Unit receives financial assistance through US Military Intelligence Contingency Funds which amount to approximately $6,000 monthly. Cost effectiveness is excellent. However, Unit 101 could not continue to function without this US financial assistance.

6. (S/NFD) VIETNAMESE NAVY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (P-2).

a. N-2.

(1) Organization. The N-2 is mainly an operational staff for the Chief of Naval Operations and has four main branches: Administrative/Personnel, Hydrographic Mapping, Intelligence, and Exploitation. Their mission is to analyze information received from the Special Collection Detachment, naval forces at sea, naval coastal zone headquarters and other RVN intelligence agencies and to provide estimates of communist intentions.

(2) Personnel.

	ACTUAL STRENGTH	PROPOSED*
Officers	20	48
Petty Officers	19	42
Seamen	13	10
TOTAL	52	100

*Not yet authorized.

(3) Equipment and Facilities. The N-2 lacks the required equipment for professional photo interpretation (PI). Their hydrographic chart section is well supplied.

(4) Operational Effectiveness. Most of the individuals in PI work are poorly trained and lack the necessary equipment. Adequate aerial photography of such targets as port installations is lacking. One PI officer from N-2 works at the Military Intelligence Center in an effort to make up for the loss of the US Naval Advisory Team support. The N-2 organization has continued to produce good quality briefings, reports, and studies.

b. Special Collection Detachment (SCD).

(1) Organization. The headquarters element of the Detachment consists of a command section and three branches: Operations, Signal, and Support. It has two field elements. The covert element has six collection teams composed of agent handlers and informants. The overt element consists of 28 Naval Intelligence Liaison Officers who are assigned to the various military regions, sector and/or sub-sector headquarters. However, in many cases, the Liaison Officers function in a dual capacity. In addition to contact with official intelligence collection sources, they also work as covert collection officers and manage the agent handlers in their area. The covert activities will be taken over by Intelligence Collection Officers when SCD has sufficient trained personnel. This should improve the effectiveness of the collection activity and operational security.

(2) Personnel.

	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL
Officers	--	50
Petty Officers	--	88
Seamen	--	21
TOTAL	121	159

During the remainder of FY 74, 25 additional officers and 60 petty officers will be assigned to SCD. This will increase the total strength to 234 personnel.

(3) Equipment and Facilities. The Detachment's main requirement in the technical support field is for communications and photographic equipment. At present, there are 16 locations in the internal SCD communications system and only nine are equipped with proper communications equipment. The Detachment is expected to receive the needed equipment during the next quarter.

(4) Operational Effectiveness. The Detachment has reacted quickly to requirements levied by US intelligence, but in some cases, the intelligence has lacked detail and proper sourcing. As indicated in para 6b(1), the assignment of trained collection personnel to the field should improve the quality of intelligence reporting. Plans are now underway to terminate low-level informants with limited access to information on communist infiltration and order of battle. Emphasis will be placed on recruiting new and better sources, such as VC cadre. A plan recently has been approved by the CNO and the JGS which would place petty officers in the countryside under civilian cover. They would live in fishing villages and coastal areas and collect information on infiltration of war materiel and enemy personnel. Identification of smugglers also would be part of their responsibilities.

7. (S/NFD) VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE.

a. HUMINT Collection.

(1) The VNAF Director of Intelligence and the Chief of the VNAF Special Collection Unit are strong, capable leaders and have shown a keen interest in the direction and development of their collection assets. The majority of the VNAF officers have developed skills to a point where they can successfully operate on a unilateral basis.

(2) The unit has an authorized strength of 15 and an assigned strength of nine.

(3) The US provides all of the Unit's operational funds. The scope and number of collection projects would be drastically reduced if it were forced to rely upon its own financial resources.

b. PHOTINT.

(1) VNAF's photo intelligence is limited by the number of aircraft and their susceptibility to ground fire. Six RF-5s and four of the 12 authorized RC-47s are assigned to photo collection. These aircraft provide minimum coverage of MRs II, III, and IV. For example, no advantage was taken of a recent opportunity to utilize aerial photography to exploit the enemy's use of tanks. On 22 September, three NVA battalions supported by T-54 tanks overran the Le Minh (Plei Djereng) outpost, located 38 kilometers west of Pleiku City. Photography was not taken until almost a week later, and no tanks appeared in the photos. The RF-5 operates under the major handicap of its 70mm camera; a system suited only for bomb damage assessment. There is little or no coverage of MR I due to the high threat posed by the NVN air defense systems deployed within the MR. The RVN continues to rely on US reconnaissance resources for photo coverage of MR I.

(2) VNAF has the capability to produce photo materials such as duplicate positives, select prints and photo mosaics. Their capacity to produce paper prints is limited. Although the quality of laboratory work has deteriorated in recent months, it remains satisfactory. Imagery interpretation by VNAF is considered to be advanced and up to US standards.

(3) No VNAF aircraft possesses Radar Lock On Warning (RLOW) gear, thus severely hindering capabilities in high threat areas. Operationally, VNAF recce could function in Cambodia and possibly the Laos Panhandle.

8. (S) SIGINT.

a. The J-7, Directorate General of Technical Services (DGTS), is responsible for VNAF SIGINT. This staff agency is capable of providing relatively timely tactical

intelligence through the use of its 11 ARVN Special Technical Detachments assigned to the 11 ARVN Infantry Divisions. SIGINT support teams have been assigned to Ranger, Airborne, and Marine units. The DGTS controls 33 EC-47 aircraft in its Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) program. Twenty-three aircraft are based in Saigon and are flying an average of eight missions per day against enemy units in RVN Military Regions III and IV. The full potential of the remaining ten EC-47s based in Danang has not yet been attained due to a shortage of front end crews. Maintenance difficulties due to the age of the aircraft will be a continuing problem. At present, Danang based aircraft are flying four missions per day in MRs I and II.

b. The RVNAF SIGINT capability is continuing to make progress. While the overall experience level is low, some success has been achieved in the area of collection. Progress is also being made in analysis and reporting. However, existing limitations include a shortage of DGTS personnel, the need for additional secure communications systems, and major problems in the ARDF program, particularly in the northern part of RVN.

9. (S/FND) INTELLIGENCE TRAINING.

a. The Cay Mai school is directly under the RVNAF Central Training Command and consists of three divisions: Administrative/Support, POLWAR and Training. The school moved from Saigon (Cho-Lon) to Thu Duc, Gia Dinh in May 1973. The school is not yet completely organized at the new location. An annex is located in Vung Tau, Phuoc Tuy Province, where Advanced Course students are given intelligence collection training. The school has a student capacity of 550 personnel. Student enrollment is currently 320 (of whom 200 are officers). The 1974 officers' Advanced Course will be extended from 14 to 20 weeks to permit the inclusion of general subjects in the program of instruction. Twenty-six different courses are available. The Commander of the school appears competent and has an intelligence background. The instructors also seem capable and display enthusiasm for their subjects. They are sent to the field (regimental level) once a year to familiarize themselves with the problems encountered in the field and to keep abreast of new techniques and tactics.

b. The VNAF is desirous of establishing its own school designed to meet the intelligence needs peculiar to air operations. Plans called for the school to be located at either Nha Trang or Saigon. However, it appears most unlikely that the school will be established in view of opposition and lack of support from the J-2/JGS and the VNAF Training Command plus lack of funds.

c. In the past, Unit 101 personnel received out-of-country training. With the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972, the Intelligence School moved to Hawaii and established mobile training teams. These teams were to conduct two courses for Unit 101 personnel: one in January and the second in May 1973. As a result of the cease-fire, only the first course was conducted. There are approximately 50 Unit 101 officers who have not received formal intelligence training.

d. Despite training which is being conducted within RVN, a requirement still exists for out-of-country training in counterintelligence subjects. For example, technical proficiency and expertise in the areas of counter-intelligence collection, DASE, DAME, photography and polygraph remain virtually nonexistent.

10. (S) SUMMARY.

RVNAF intelligence services benefit from personnel who, on the whole, are highly competent, dedicated professionals. However, the progress of RVNAF intelligence services is greatly hindered by insufficient, outdated communications, the inadequacy of the RF-5 camera system, and the age of the EC-47s.

CHAPTER 4

RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE

1. (S) JOINT JGS/DAO FY 75 FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEW.

a. RVNAF JGS established a joint JGS/DAO Force Structure Review Committee on 1 September 1973 to conduct a review of RVNAF FY 75 force structure. Committee members were appointed from JGS J1, J3, J5, J6 and representatives from Training Directorate, Central Logistics Command, Directorate of Finance and Inspector of Defense Budget. DAO appointed a co-chairman and two members from Plans Branch, Force Structure Section to serve as permanent committee members.

b. The committee received guidance from the President of the Republic of Vietnam and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCSM 331-73, dated 27 July 1973) to maintain the RVNAF Force Structure at 1,100,000 level through FY 75 to counter the high-level enemy threat. It was jointly agreed upon by the committee that no reductions in RVNAF force levels would occur during FY 75. However, the MOND four year plan is expected to reflect planned strength reductions of 100,000 men per year.

c. RVNAF JGS received recommendations for force structure changes from subordinate commands with justification for proposed changes. Recommendations for changes in force structure requiring additional men and/or equipment were not received by the committee unless accompanied by full justification, to include an itemized list of personnel and equipment. Joint committee meetings commenced on 6 September 1973.

d. It should be noted that many of the proposed force structure changes are still under active discussion and are yet to be resolved. Final decision on proposals for force structure changes and rationale therefore will be reported in the results of the FY 75 Force Structure Review scheduled for submission to CINCPAC on 16 November 1973. Following is a recapitulation of proposed FY 75 RVNAF Force Structure changes:

REDUCTIONS

Army Units	Military Spaces	Civilian Spaces
3 Armored Infantry Platoons	270	0
4 POL BN (Type A)	80	8

Army Continued	Military Spaces	Civilian Spaces
1 POL BN (Type B)	16	2
LOG Reorganization Plan	85	68
Logistic Technical Manual Center	4	0
Personnel Training Service/CLC	5	0
Tango Water Supply Team	21	0
LOG Management School	50	0
Ranger Reorganization Plan	9	0
TOTAL	540	78

Regional Forces

3 Sector Tactical CP (MR IV)	126
1 RF Company (from Dinh Tuong, Vinh Long and Chau Doc)	119
TOTAL	245

INCREASES:

Army

National Defense Planning System (NDPS)	302
Military Property Directorate MOND	10
Armor Branch	25
Marine Division Maintenance Company	92
TOTAL	429

Regional Forces

3 Sub-Sector HQ 1/	132
3 MI Squads	36
3 Sub-Sector Dispensaries	45
3 MSS Detachment	18
TOTAL	231

1/ Sub-Sector HQ at Chuong Thien Province, Hung Long District; Dinh Tuong Province, Hau My District; Kien Hoa Province, Phuoc Long District.

INCREASES RESULTING FROM FY 74 FSR:

Army

Free World Military Assistance Office (FWMAO)	28	
MACV Translator Interpreter Pool	100	
TOTAL	128	

REJECTED FSR CHANGE PROPOSALS

Army (new activations)

J1/JGS		+ 27
Army Arsenal		+335
POLWAR Academy	+475	
3 Sector Artillery Sections	+ 12	
105mm Bn for 1st Infantry Division	+500	
Central Administration Center	+ 90	
Audit & Finance Branch	+587 2/	

VNN

Increases in Strength of Medical Sections at 10 Navy Bases	+289	

VNAF

Conversion of 6 F5A Sqadrons to F5E	+474	
Establish Air Defense System	+ 98	
Improve Maintenance Support Defense of Air Base.	+3,328	
Improvement of Air Traffic Control	+114	
Establish Spare Radar Site	+164	
Establish at TSN/Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory (PMEL)	+ 30	
TOTAL	+6,161	+ 362

REJECTED FSR CHANGE PROPOSALS (Continued):

2/ Includes 170 spaces for MOND/ADP, 28 spaces for National Defense Planning Section (at Directorate for Finance & Audit). 272 spaces for Inspection Team and 117 spaces to activate nine Disbursing Centers.

REGIONAL FORCES (new activation):

Qui Nhon Special Sector Hq	+ 47

RECAPITULATION:

Reductions (Army)	+540	
Increased (Army)	-429	
Balance	+111	
Reductions (FY 74 FSR)	+128	
Sub- Total	+239	awaiting distribution
Reductions (RF)	+245	
Increases (RF)	-231	
Balance	+ 14	awaiting distribution

e. Significant force structure change currently being implemented as a result of the approved FY 74 FSR and on-going studies is the reorganization of the Ranger Command initiated on 1 September 1973. The reorganization plan is to be conducted in two phases. Phase I (1 Sep - 31 Oct 73) - 15 Ranger Group Headquarters will be activated or redesignated and three Ranger Border Defense Battalions (RBD) in MR IV will be deactivated. Phase II (1 Nov- 31 Dec 73) 24 RBDs in MR III will be deactivated and two reorganized Ranger Groups will be redeployed from MR IV to MR II. The designation Ranger Border Defense Battalion will be changed to Ranger Battalion during Phase II. Currently, redeployment of ranger units to MR I and II from MR IV has been postponed due to increase in enemy activity in MR IV. This reorganization will standardize the size and composition of all ranger groups and

battalions. The new organization provides for a 2,186 man group with three 683 man battalions. Net change will be from the current seven Ranger Groups and five Tactical Commands with 54 battalions to 15 Ranger Groups with 45 battalions with three of the Groups in JGS General Reserve. Concept of employment is to employ all ranger units in a series of border defense bases along enemy controlled areas to impede enemy infiltration, expand GVN areas of influence, harrass enemy rear areas and establish GVN control of MR borders.

f. Reorganization of the Ministry of National Defense (MOND) has been proposed to provide for a National Defense Planning System (NDPS) and obtain an approved TOE for MOND. The proposed TOE added three new units to MOND: Management Analysis Unit, Program and Plans Bureau and Economic Affairs Bureau. The rank of each Bureau Chief was upgraded from Colonel (06) to Major General with a Brigadier General as Deputy. The proposed strength increased from 264 military spaces and 99 civilian spaces to 412 military spaces and 111 civilian spaces. Reorganization is on-going and results will be submitted in the next RVNAF quarterly assessment.

2. (S) RVNAF RESERVE: On-going studies are being conducted by RVNAF/JGS, MOND, Mobilization Directorate (MOD) and DAO on developing an effective Reserve Plan and Mobilization Plan. A draft TOE of a "Frame" (Cadre) Infantry Division has been developed and is being staffed for approval. Two Reserve Plans have been developed by the combined committee and are being studied by MOND for recommendation to the President of Vietnam on which plan to be implemented.

3. (S) MODERNIZATION OF EQUIPMENT: Recommendation has been made by DATT to Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Washington, D.C., to keep current RVNAF authorized levels of both M48A3 and M41A3 tanks.

CHAPTER 5

VIETNAMESE ARMY

1. (C) AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTH.

Depicted authorized and assigned troop strengths of combat units do not include support and service assets.

(Figure 1)

2. (S) AREAS OF OPERATION AND UNIT LOCATIONS.

a. MR 1 is subdivided into five AOs. From north to south, AOs are assigned as follows: VNMC Division, Airborne Division, 1st Division, 3d Division, and 2d Division.

b. MR 2 is subdivided into two AOs. From east to west, the AOs are assigned to the 22d and 23d Divisions. Neither of the divisions have subordinate elements located in the southern portion of MR 2.

c. MR 3 is subdivided into four AOs and the Capitol Special Zone (the area encompassing Saigon). Combat units assigned to AOs are as follows: Ranger Command, 5th Division, 18th Division, and 25th Division.

d. MR 4 is subdivided into three AOs and the 44th Special Tactical Zone which is occupied by Ranger units. Combat units assigned to the AOs are as follows: 7th Division, 9th Division, and 21st.

(Figure 2)

e. The locations of tactical units down to the regimental level are depicted for each MR.

(Figures 3, 4, 5, & 6)

AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTHS

AS OF 15 SEP 73

DIV	AUTH	OFF	NCO	EM	ASSGN	% AUTH
1st	17102	1082	3243	11481	15806	92.4
2d	14159	895	2551	9891	13337	94.2
3d	14159	966	2879	9963	13808	97.5
5th	14159	901	2538	9228	12667	89.4
7th	14175	897	2632	9573	13102	92.4
9th	14175	871	2525	8298	11694	83
18th	14159	873	2585	9696	13154	93
21st	14175	900	2708	8331	11939	84.3
22d	17095	1035	3159	11767	15961	93.3
23d	14168	842	2493	8262	11597	82
25th	14220	901	2576	11103	14580	103
Abn	13684	941	2823	11202	14966	109.3
Rgr	35027	2248	6358	26450	35056	100
Mar	14438	1005	2272	11912	15189	105
TOTAL	224895	14357	41342	157157	212856	95

Figure (1)

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AREAS OF OPERATIONS



Figure 2

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

Figure 3

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ARVN

MR 2



Figure 4

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

Figure 5

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

Figure 6

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3. (C) COMBAT ARMS.

a. Combat Divisions.

(1) The Airborne Division has maintained its elite reputation and is recognized as the best ARVN division. The division has assumed a total defense posture. However, active patrolling continues and division units are active in the Song Bo valley to maintain outposts and deny observation posts to the enemy. Contact has been light. Artillery positions are moved frequently and are well camouflaged. Additionally, the division is constantly adjusting ACs toward building a brigade reserve reinforced with a tank battalion. The division overall, and individual units are well led and aggressive. The CG is alert to the possibility of a decrease in aggressiveness due to the current defensive posture. Unit refresher training and R&R unit rotation programs continue. At present, morale remains high despite a recent increase in the desertion rate.

(2) The Marine Division is a highly motivated combat ready force. The division has maintained its status as one of the best in the RVNAF. Well-disciplined and aggressively led, units have prepared excellent defensive positions along the major avenues of approach. A refresher training program and a rotating unit leave policy continue, enhancing high morale. However, protracted deployment on the northernmost front, and maintenance of a defensive posture are a matter of concern to the CG. An active civic action program has returned promising initial results and has solidified relationships with the local populace. The division is reinforced with the 51st ARVN regiment.

(3) The 1st ARVN Division, once recognized as the best of the ARVN Divisions and ranked overall, only behind the Airborne and VNMC Division, has suffered from a variety of problems. Some were continuing from the past, and others of more recent origin. One of the most significant problems was the requirement to provide many company level leaders to the 3d ARVN Division in an effort to rebuild that division after the defeat it sustained in Quang Tri during the Spring of 1972. More recently a semiresistant strain of malaria has caused a higher rate of non-battle casualties in the 54th Regiment, and the 3d Regiment has suffered a high rate of casualties in the Song Bo valley. The 1st Regiment, considered an

effective combat unit, has not been involved in much contact with the enemy during the period. The division AO was reduced, but the 51st Regiment was detached and moved to Quang Tri Province to reinforce the VNMC Division. The 1st Division is now above 90% of its authorized strength. A refresher training program is helping to overcome a deficiency in experienced combat leadership at the company level. Progress has been achieved during the quarter, but there is a long way to go before the division again achieves the past reputation for combat proficiency. The division is considered combat effective.

(4) The 3d ARVN Division has made positive strides during the period in upgrading its overall capability and is considered a combat effective unit. The CG, an aggressive commander, has instituted an effective training program. The division's most significant weakness was the poor quality of filler personnel provided at the troop level after the defeat in Quang Tri Province last year. The division has experienced only minor contact with enemy forces during the period, while executing the assigned tasks of securing the lowlands and protecting the major avenues of approach. Morale is on the upswing and division units have sustained only minor casualties while slowly gaining valuable combat experiences.

(5) The 2d ARVN Division has experienced the highest incident rate of all MR-1 units during the quarter. The division has continued to made positive improvement, exploiting the confidence gained in the recapture of the Sa Huynh area of Quang Ngai Province earlier this year. More progress has been realized in clearing the lowlands in preparation for further resettlement. The division has been able to set and maintain the tempo of activity, and has thus gained valuable time for rebuilding and training its battalions. The division is well led; has improved its morale, and has responded with initiative to intelligence information. The 2d Division is combat effective.

(6) The 22d ARVN Division has never been an aggressive or strong division. The division is tasked with securing the lowlands east and west of Route 1 in northern Binh Dinh to permit refugee resettlement. However, less than two kilometers on either side of the highway has been secured against only token NVA resistance. Units have a poor relationship and reputation with the local

population. Defensively oriented, few offensive operations have been conducted to expand control of the division's AO. Units are rotated through the division training center at An Son prior to deployment to the highlands of MR 2. Some of the division's problems appear to be connected with the heavy casualties sustained while committed to operations in the highlands south of Pleiku and west of Kontum. The most significant deficiency, however, is poor discipline and poor middle level leadership.

(7) The 23d ARVN Division sustained heavy casualties in operations to recapture the villages of Polei Krong and Trung Nghia, west of Kontum City. Frontal attacks for two months against a well-entrenched enemy supported by artillery failed. A shift to small unit actions, supported by artillery and air strikes, finally permitted recapture of the two villages virtually unopposed in mid-September. The operation demonstrated a capability to sustain a major offensive effort. Having suffered heavy casualties, the division needs retraining. There appears to be a reluctance on the part of some subordinate units to stand and fight, causing some morale problems. Desertions have been high and the division is plagued with leadership and discipline problems. The division is considered marginally combat effective but strong enough to resist any new enemy initiative in Kontum long enough for reinforcements to arrive from Pleiku.

(8) The 25th ARVN Division is only marginally combat effective. The division has successfully maintained territory under its control in Tay Ninh Province along Routes QL-1 and 22. The division's only significant confrontation with the enemy during the period occurred at the end of September. The 2d Battalion of the 49th Regiment was ambushed and rendered combat ineffective in Khiem Hanh District. The entire regiment has a poor reputation with the civilian populace and is known for its sloppy field procedures and poor discipline. Over 100% of authorized strength is assigned. The division has maintained essentially static positions, moving only to rotate between the fixed positions. Little aggressiveness or initiative has been demonstrated. The 46th and 50th Regiments are considered more effective but not first-class troops.

(9) The 18th ARVN Division is generally recognized as the best of the MR 3 divisions. The division has not demonstrated a high degree of initiative but can be depended upon to accomplish assigned missions. Morale is high and units enjoy a good reputation with the local population. The division has maintained dispersion and mobility in the AO. The mobility provides a capability to reinforce other MR 3 units. The division enjoys good leadership and conducts rotational training among all units. The division is considered combat effective.

(10) The 5th Division is considered the poorest of the MR 3 units and only marginally effective. Having failed in an attempt to reopen QL-13 in June, the division again failed in July to reopen LT 1-1A. Heavy casualties were sustained in each attempt. The 5th is the only understrength division in MR 3. The division's elements are routinely located in static base camps rather than dispersed tactically. As a result of retirements and casualties, the division is reportedly short of experienced NCOs. The CG is aggressive and competent, but inexperienced in command of a large unit. The division is currently just below 90% of its authorized strength. Morale is considered poor. The division has shown little if any improvement during the period.

(11) The 21st ARVN Division is still considered the weakest of the three divisions in MR 4. Although its AO has been reduced during the period and additional territorial forces have reinforced, the division has failed to make significant progress in reducing enemy presence. BG Hung, who assumed command early in July, has as yet been unable to transform the division into an aggressive fighting force. The division has been slow to recover from the heavy casualties sustained in MR 3 during the 1972 Spring Offensive. Leadership at all levels appears to be deficient, unimaginative, and inexperienced. A poor relationship exists between division troops and the local populace. Division units seems to be satisfied with maintaining static positions while territorial forces and reinforcing units from other MR 4 divisions bear the brunt of enemy contacts. With the assistance of other MR 4 units, the initiative appears to have been taken from the enemy but little progress has been made in opening new territory for resettlement or closing enemy supply and infiltration routes.

(12) The 7th ARVN Division has continued to effectively harass the enemy forces but has been unable to eliminate any of the major forces in its AO. The division, including the currently attached 14th Regiment, 9th Division, is an effective combat unit and is still recognized as the best division in MR 4. Two of its regiments, the 10th and 11th, are highly mobile units which have demonstrated the capability to respond rapidly to intelligence. These units are primarily involved in security missions. The other organic regiment, the 12th, has been engaged in a generally stationary role since Ceasefire II. The 14th Regiment, 9th Division has performed somewhat better than the 12th in a similar role. The division is well led and possesses adequate leadership throughout all levels of command. Staff coordination appears good, inspections and staff visits are frequent and a real concern for the welfare and problems of the men is apparent. Morale is generally good, although the constant movement of the regiments contributes to the desertion rate.

(13) The 9th ARVN Division has had its AO increased with the addition of Long My District of Chuong Thien, had two of its regiments sent to aid the 21st Division and has had the remaining regiment detached to the 7th Division since April. The division, with two regiments, has faced a well-disciplined and entrenched enemy in Long My. Although one battalion was defeated three times, the division has improved its combat effectiveness since the move into Long My and has shown itself to be highly mobile. However, frequent moves and contact with enemy forces have increased the desertion rate. This increase, coupled with the difficulty of obtaining replacements, has resulted in many of the battalions being below strength. General Di is well respected but too lenient with his subordinates. The division has been assigned difficult missions and training has been barely adequate. The CG spends much of his time visiting division units. The 9th Division is considered combat effective and rated just behind the 7th Division in MR 4.

(14) Ranger Command is in the midst of reorganization. A two-phase JGS plan was initiated 1 September and is scheduled for completion 31 December 1973. Presently, ranger battalions vary in size between 461 and

683 men. The new organization will provide for each group to be composed of three 683 man battalions. The net change, upon completion of phase two, will provide for 15 ranger groups vice the current seven groups and five tactical commands with 54 battalions. The concept for employment of these forces is to deploy the ranger units along enemy controlled areas to impede infiltration; expand GVN areas of influence; harass enemy rear areas; and eventually reestablish GVN control of international borders in MRs 1, 2 and 3. Within each MR, the commander will develop plans for deployment of the rangers into a series of battalion size bases. In each base, one company will defend while the other two companies conduct patrols and operations within a ten kilometer radius of the base camp. Each MR will retain one ranger group in reserve as a reaction force should deployed battalions require assistance. The designation border defense battalion will be changed to ranger battalion during phase II of the reorganization. The authorized total strength of the Ranger Command remains 35,027 men. The 33 present border defense battalions will be reorganized into 24 standard ranger battalions; and the present 21 ranger battalions will receive a 22-man medical platoon so that all ranger battalions are manned with 683 total personnel. The ranger battalions will be employed only in MRs 1, 2, and 3. Thus, all but nine of the battalions (i.e., 3 groups) will be under the MR Commanders. The rangers will, at the completion of phase two, be employed in a role more suitable to their organization and training throughout the country. The following deployments will result at the completion of the reorganization:

(a) MR 1 - 4 groups.

(b) MR 2 - 5 groups.

(c) MR 3 - 3 groups.

(d) JGS General Reserve - 3 groups.

b. Artillery.

(1) Visits to artillery units revealed many of the same deficiencies which were noticed last quarter continue. Some of these were failure to register, to use metro, to adjust registrated fire by observation, and to calibrate properly. Additionally, improper supply procedures have created equipment shortages which preclude fire data acquisition in some units.

(2) Maintenance float assets have been determined to reflect total on-hand assets.

(Figure 7)

c. Armor. Maintenance float assets have been determined to reflect total on-hand assets.

(Figure 8)

UNIT	HOW 105MM			HOW 155MM			GUN 175MM		
	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS
MR 1									
10th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	2			
20th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	1			
30th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	1			
44th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	1			
20 Arty Plts How 105mm	40	40	1						
8 Arty Plts Bor.Def Ranger	10	13	Ø						
3 Arty Bns/1st Inf. Div	54	54	4						
3 Arty Bns/2nd Inf. Div	54	54	8						
3 Arty Bns/3rd Inf. Div	54	54	9						
101st How. 175mm Bn							12	12	Ø
102nd How. 175mm Bn							12	12	Ø
105th How. 175mm Bn							12	12	Ø
SUB. TOTAL	212	215	22	72	72	5	36	36	Ø
MR 2									
103rd How. 175mm Bn							12	12	2
37th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	Ø			
220th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	Ø			
3 Arty Bns/22nd Inf. Div	54	54	5						
63rd How. 105mm Bn	18	18	Ø						
69th How. 105mm Bn	18	18	2						
20 Arty Plts How. 105mm	40	40	2						
230th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	Ø			
Arty. School	14	14	Ø	6	6	Ø	2	2	Ø
National Military Academy	2	2	Ø						
3 Arty Bns/23rd Inf. Div	54	54	Ø						
29 Arty Plts How. 105mm	58	58	2						
12 Arty Plts Bor.Def Ranger	18	18	1						
SUB. TOTAL	276	276	12	60	60	Ø	14	14	2

Figure (7)

UNIT	HOW 105MM			HOW 155MM			GUN 175MM		
	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS
MR 3									
130th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	1			
50th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	Ø			
250th How. 155mm Bn				18	17	2			
46th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	Ø			
Ordnance School	2	3	Ø	1	1	Ø	Ø	1	Ø
3 Arty Bns/5th Inf. Div.	54	54	1						
3 Arty Bns/18th Inf Div.	54	54	1						
3 Arty Bns/25th Inf Div.	54	54	1						
3 Arty Bns/Airborne Div.	54	54	9						
3 Arty Bns/Marine Div.	54	54	7						
61st How. 105mm Bn	18	19	Ø						
44 Arty Plts How. 105mm	88	88	7						
9 Plts Arty Bor.Def Ranger	14	14	Ø						
104th How. 175mm Bn							12	12	Ø
SUB. TOTAL	392	394	26	73	72	3	12	13	Ø
MR 4									
70th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	Ø			
90th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	Ø			
210th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	Ø			
47th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	1			
67th How. 105mm Bn	18	18	1						
68th How. 105mm Bn	18	18	2						
3 Arty Bns/7th Inf. Div	54	54	1						
3 Arty Bns/9th Inf. Div	54	54	5						
3 Arty Bns/21st Inf. Div	54	54	7						
64 Arty Plts How. 105mm	128	128	3						
8 Arty Plts Bor.Def Ranger	8	8	0						
SUB. TOTAL	334	334	19	72	72	1			
MAINTENANCE FLOAT/REPAIR		75			54			11	Ø
GRAND TOTAL	1214	1294	79	277	330	9	62	74	2

Figure (7) Continued

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	APC. M113			TANK M41A3			TANK M48A3		
	AUTH	O/H	UNS	AUTH	O/H	UNS	AUTH	O/H	UNS
I Armor Brigade	6	6							
4 Armor Cav.	40	40	2	17	16	1			
7 Armor Cav.	42	40	2	17	14	3			
11 Armor Cav.	42	40	2	17	15	1			
17 Armor Cav.	42	40	2	17	13	2			
18 Armor Cav.	42	38	4	17	15	3			
20th Tank Sqd	12	12					56	53	1
(MR 1) Sub. Total	228	216	12	85	73	10	56	53	1
II Armor Brigade	6	6							
3 Armor Cav.	42	35	6	17	15	1			
14 Armor Cav.	42	38	5	17	16				
19 Armor Cav.	42	36	6	17	16				
8 Armor Cav.	42	41	1	17	10	2			
21st Tank Sqd	12	12					56	47	7
(MR 2) Sub. Total	186	168	18	68	57	3	56	47	7
III Armor Brigade	6	6							
1 Armor Cav.	42	41		17	17				
5 Armor Cav.	42	38	2	17	17				
10 Armor Cav.	58	53	2						
15 Armor Cav.	42	44	1	17	15	1			
Armor/Ord School	20	19		10	10		11	11	
22nd Tank Sqd	12	12					56	54	2
(MR 3) Sub. Total	222	213	5	61	59	1	67	65	2
IV Armor Brigade	6	6							
2 Armor Cav.	58	51	1						
6 Armor Ca..	58	48	6						
9 Armor Cav.	58	42	11						
12 Armor Cav.	58	53	4						
16 Armor Cav.	58	52	4						
(No Tank Sqd)									
(MR 4) Sub. Total	296	252	26						
MAINT FLOAT/REPAIR					145			88	
TOTAL	932	849	61	214	334	14	179	267	10

Figure (8)

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4. (C) TRAINING.

a. Army of Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Offshore Training Program.

(1) Objectives of the ARVN Fiscal Year 1974 Offshore Training Program are:

(a) Upgrade the Vietnamese Military Academy Faculty by improving the quality of instruction in furtherance of attaining the announced goal of self-sufficiency.

(b) Strengthen the training base by improving the qualifications of instructor personnel, particularly in the area of combined arms training.

(c) Improve the management capabilities of ARVN by providing management training in the command and staff skills, logistics and personnel areas.

(2) The following is a brief summary of the ARVN FY74 Security Assistance Training Program (SATP) as of the end of 1st Qtr:

FY74	SPACES	COST
Beginning Program	509	$2,058,006
Additions	3	
Deletions	17	
Current Program	495	$2,004,532

(3) ARVN operational requirements necessitated making 3 additions to the program during FY 1/74 as follows:

ADDITIONAL TRAINING REQUIRED	ADDITIONAL SPACES
Command and General Staff	1
Senior Officer Preventive Maintenance	1
Observer Logistics Training	1

(4) The spaces originally programmed and the additions made to the program produced a total figure of 512. Seventeen of these spaces were deleted from the program as follows:

REASON	DELETED SPACES
DA 2 year limitation University Students	6
Medical disqualification	6
University students early graduation	2
ARVN unit operational requirements	1
DA cancellation	1
English Language disqualification	1

(5) The following offshore training courses were attended by ARVN personnel during FY 1/74.

TYPE TRAINING	COURSE	SPACES/STUDENT CODE
Operations	Harbor Craft Deck Officer	3/0
Comm/Elec	Observer Communication Electronics Training-CONUS	5/0
Comm/Elec	Tandem Switch Repair	2/0
Comm/Elec	Marine Radar Observation	3/0
Maintenance	Senior Officer Preventive Maintenance	5/0
Maintenance	Fire Center Instrument Repair	3/E
Maintenance	Parachutist Pack/Maintenance Airdrop	1/0
Logistics	Basic ADP System Analysis	2/0
Logistics	Advanced ADP System Analysis	6/0
Logistics	Logistics Executive Development	1/0
Logistics	ADP Plans/Operations Officer	4/0
Logistics	Computer Programming	2/E
Logistics	Substation Storage Specialist	2/E
Logistics	Stock Control & Accounting Specialist	2/E
Logistics	Petroleum Officer	2/0
Logistics	OJT Logistics Training CONUS	2/0
Professional	Command & General Staff Officer	5/0
Professional	Language Instructor Refresher	17/0
Professional	International Defense Management	10/0
Professional	Observer Medical Health Hygiene CONUS	1/0
Professional	AG Officer Advanced	2/0
Professional	MP Officer Advanced	4/0
Professional	Language Instructor	2/0
Professional	Armor Officer Advanced	4/0
Professional	Financial Management	12/0
Professional	Signal Officer Advanced	2/0
Professional	Civilian University Training	70/0 *
Professional	QM Officer Advanced	2/0
Professional	Ordnance Officer Advanced	3/0
Orientation	Orientation Tour-CONUS	14/0

* Includes 57 carryover students from FY73
NOTE: Student code O=Officer, E=Enlisted men.

(6) The number of students sent to CONUS for training in FY 1/74 is as follows:

MONTH	QUANTITY	COST
July	54	301,905
August	45	144,440
September	21	42,960
TOTAL	120	489,305

(7) Satistical summary of FY74 ARVN offshore training for 1st QTR is as follows:

COURSES COMPLETED	COURSES IN PROGRESS	TOTAL
3	102	105

(8) The fact that only 1 space during FY 1/74 was cancelled due to inability of candidates to attain the required English Comprehension Level (ECL) reflects the progress ARVN is making in providing qualified students for offshore training, as the 1st QTR normally bears the brunt of attrition due to language deficiency. Department of Army has determined that language training is the major stumbling block for most countries in maintaining an efficient offshore training program that is capable of utilizing all training available. Another reflection of ARVN's increasing ability to effectively plan for offshore training is seen in the fact that only 1 space during 1st QTR FY74 was cancelled due to unit operational requirements.

(9) Significant developments during 1st QTR FY74. Stringent monetary controls which would accompany the funding shift from MASF to MAP expected to take place at the start of FY75 would seriously jeopardize the continued funding of university students requiring additional years toward completion of training. In an effort to protect the investment of funds already made and salvage what would be the last of the university training program, a priority request was dispatched to Department of Army recommending total funding in FY74 of the remaining years of all civilian university students currently in CONUS. Advance indications are that this proposal will be favorably considered.

(10) Type of training to receive priority during FY74 is as follows:

(a) Civil Education. Support of Vietnamese Military Academy, Training Research Branch, Signal and Engineer departments.

(b) Management Training. Command and Staff skills, logistics management areas at upper and middle management level.

(c) Technical Training. Skills required to support introduction of new items of equipment and to operate Logistics/Support facilities transferred to ARVN.

(11) With the successful conclusion of the 1st QTR, continued success during the remainder of FY74 is anticipated and no major problems are expected for the ARVN FY74 SATP.

b. ARVN In-Country Training Program.

(1) General. The ARVN main force training program is generally coming of age. The national training centers are becoming more self-reliant and can be considered equal to the task of providing adequate training to the new recruits and other trainees that are needed to replenish and maintain the fighting strength and capability of the eleven ARVN divisions. The loss of on site US Advisors has forced the training centers to work through their own supply and support channels instead of taking the easy approach of asking the advisor to get it or do it for them. In some cases it reopened a support system that had reached an advanced state of atrophy. Action was taken to develop the support or learn to live without it by curtailing less important activities. All the problems have not been solved. Overly centralized administration and decision making, lack of funds for maintenance and repair, an unresponsive and slow support system, inadequate pay, corruption, and lack of fuel for vehicles and generators all present obstacles that detract from proper handling of training. To the US Army, the above problems would be disasterous: to the Vietnamese, who are used to them, the problems are considered bearable.

(2) National Training Centers.

(a) General. The National Training Centers (NTCs), in spite of the lack of support being received, are striving to continue to make improvements in training Self-help projects are being used to improve trainee living quarters, facilities and ranges. A greater emphasis is being placed on recruit morale. Patriotic and marching songs are sung to improve esprit. Programs of Instruction are being reviewed and revised to improve instruction and to meet changing conditions. Overall, the progress at the NTCs is upward. However, lack of support retards the rate of progress.

(b) Recruit Training. Recruit training continues to flow smoothly and should meet or exceed the annual programmed figure of 203,500 (revised 193,500 for the NTCs and 10,000 for the Division Training Centers (DTCs). As of August 142,660 recruits had been trained at the NTCs and 23,900 at the DTCs as compared to a 9 months programmed figure of 145,200 for the NTCs and 7,500 for the DTCs or a total of 152,700. July and August recruit input figures for the NTCs were 14,800 and 40,300 respectively. All recruit training was to switch completely over to the NTCs from the DTCs by April but this has not yet happened. Part of the reason for this is that if an individual volunteers for a certain division near his home and goes through recruit training at the DTC he is assured of being assigned to that division. He has no such assurance if he is sent to a NTC. However, as the DTCs start receiving their own battalions in increasing numbers for Period II unit training, their capacity to train recruits will drop. In August three divisions took in no recruits and the total input for August was 2,248, the second lowest of any month during the this calendar year.

(c) Other Courses. Other courses conducted by the NTCs include PF training and other advanced and specialized infantry courses. A special introductory and refresher course in the TOW missile system anti-tank weapon is taught at three of the NTCs Quang Trung, Pleiku, and Hoa Cam. At Duc My Training Center, Ranger training is conducted to include long range reconnaissance patrolling and ranger battalion refresher training. In addition, the NTCs have provided all the RF battalion unit refresher training. Because of the enemy situation in MR I, the two NTCs of Dong Da and Hoa Cam have been

providing a two weeks' battalion refresher training program for the Marine and Airborne Divisions. Duc My and other training centers are providing refresher training for ranger battalions. In addition, training cadre are provided to the DTCs to help with unit training and to lend individual expertise where needed.

(3) Unit Training and the Division Training Centers

(a) General. While there are still many problems, the unit training program is progressing and must be considered the most outstanding accomplishment of the 1973 training program. Most of the 105 ARVN division infantry battalions have received some unit training, either as a two week refresher or as part of Period I and Period II training. Period I training, which provides for in place training from individual up through company level based on a POI of 315 hours ,is a very flexible and well designed concept. It allows the units to fulfill their operational requirements and still conduct necessary training that reestablishes their operational and combat readiness. While moving steadily forward, unit training is not equi among the divisions. Some have done quite well while others have done very little. Part of this can be explained by operational commitments. However, most of the difference is probably due to differing command emphasis being placed on the training. For example, the 22nd Division Commander highly encourages the unit training program whereas the Commander of the 1st Division does not. The unit training program is still a very new concept and it will take time to gain total acceptance and to work out the problems that were certain to develop. Training areas had to be designated and developed by the units for Period I. Development of some of the DTCs was needed for Period II battalion training. POIs had to be distributed and lesson plans developed or tailored to each unit's need and situation. Probably the most difficult task has been to develop training cadre out of soldiers who have been mainly fighters. In spite of all the obstacles, unit training is progressing and through this process of teaching and learning will develop not only better trained individual soldiers and units but a more solid unit leadership/cadre.

(b) Period I training is a 315 hour program of instruction, individual through company, conducted in the unit area of operation by unit cadre. As no set time period is established for Period I, it is extremely flexible and can be easily scheduled around operational requirements. Units cannot start Period II training until satisfactory completion of Period I.

(c) Period II is a five week program conducted by the battalions at the Division Training Centers. During Period II the battalions review key areas covered in Period I to include battle drill, formations, etc., fire their organic weapons if they were not able to do so in Period I, conduct company ATTs and conduct a battalion Field Training Exercise controlled and supported by the parent regiment.

(d) Period III training consists of a regiment and division Command Post Exercise (CPX) which will be conducted if the operational situation permits. The following chart presents the present status of the infantry battalions of the ARVN divisions by MR as of the end of September:

	PERIOD I		PERIOD II	
	Entered	Completed	Entered	Completed
MR I*				
1st	6	-		
2nd	9	8	2	2
3rd	5	2	2	1
MR II				
22nd	8	6	3	2
23rd	3	3	1	1
MR III				
5th	9	1	1	-
18th	9	9	2	1
25th	9	9	2	1
MR IV				
7th	3	3	2	1
9th	6	6	2	1
21st	6	6	1	1
	73	53	18	11

* Combat requirement precluded the units in MR 1 from initially participating in the unit training program. In

lieu of this, the units were sent to the DTCs to receive a two week refresher course which was to serve as booster to be followed by the units conducting their own Period I training. While the 2nd and 3rd Divisions have followed this plan, the 1st Division has not completed its own Period I in place training for any of its units.

(e) Infantry Training. Of the 105 infantry battaions of 11 ARVN divisions, 73 have now entered or completed Period I training as opposed to 43 that had entered or completed Period I as of the second calendar quarter. Those battalions having entered or completed Period II total 18 as opposed to 9 last quarter. As the unit training program was officially launched last April, there is still six months remaining for completion of the unit training cycle.

(f) Airborne and Marine. The Airborne and Marines, who are totally committed to the northern defense perimeter in MR 1, have not as yet undertaken any unit training on their own but have cycled six battalions each through a two week refresher course at Dong Da Training Center. This two week refresher training includes combined arms training with infantry, artillery, and armor. However, in a conversation on the 18th of September with the Dong Da Training Center Commander, it was learned that fuel shortages are curtailing or eliminating the use of armor, the M-41 tank, in the combined arms training. He stated that ammo has not been a problem for the artillery.

(g) Rangers. Four Ranger battalions have received 5 week refresher training at Duc My and Van Kiep Training Centers. Four other battalions have received two week refresher training at Hoa Cam and Chi Lang Training Centers. Four of the eight ranger battalions that have undergone training were border ranger units. As the ranger groups do not have training centers of their own nor are they as closely organized as the divisions, a problem devlops as to where Period II training would be conducted and who would be in control. As there is only one ranger training center, Duc My, either the NTCs or the DTCs would have to fill this void. The Corps Commanders have been reluctant to release the Ranger units for unit training as they are heavily committed.

(h) Armor. All the 20th Armored Tank Battalion units have completed Period I training. Six armored cavalry squadrons have also completed Period I. The 21st Armored Tank Battalion and six armored cavalry squadrons are presently undergoing Period I training. In addition, the 21st Armored Cavalry has undergone a refresher course as directed by JGS/CTC. The 11th and 14th Armored Cavalry Squadrons are currently undergoing Period II training at their respective DTCs.

(i) Artillery. Of the division artillery battalions all except the eight of the 1st and 7th Divisions have completed Period I training. In addition, seven separate mobile artillery battalions and three anti-aircraft battalions have completed Period I. Four artillery battalions in MR 2 and two in MR 3 plus the four artillery battalions of the 22nd Division are undergoing Period II training.

(j) Summary. Progress in unit training continues to accelerate, with accent shifting from the Period I program to greater emphasis on Period II training. Period II training should be of a higher quality as it is concentrated into five weeks and not conducted piecemeal as Period I is allowed to be. In addition, conducting unit training at the DTCs will offer better training facilities and better qualified training cadre.

(4) Service Schools. Input through the end of August for the twenty eight service schools amounted to 33,769 as opposed to the 1973 programmed figure of 73,600. Input for July totaled 7,198, the highest month yet, but fell back to 3,436 in August. The low August figure was largely caused by the alerted status of the armed forces during the election period of 26 August. It appears certain, with a need for an average input of 10,000 per month for the last four months, that programmed levels will not be attained. The following chart lists the programmed figures by school along with their input, output and in training figures as of the end of August. (Figure 9) From the listing, it can be noted that serious shortages have developed in inputs to such necessary schools as the Armor and Artillery Schools and support areas such as the Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal and Administration & Finance Schools. These shortages do not bode well for the future. Since the 1973 Service School Program was developed late in 1972, many things have changed including the loss of US advisors and support. This has

Input From Jan-Aug 1973
28 Service Schools

SERVICE SCHOOLS	PROJECTED	INPUT	OUTPUT	IN-TRAINING
National Defense College	40	0	0	37
Command & General Staff College	400	397	206	191
National Military Academy	1200	0	0	957
POLWAR College	2100	983	628	1164
Infantry School	7555	4908	5709	5000
NCO School	4800	2772	3851	5777
Armor School	4445	2106	1353	900
Artillery School	3504	1535	1227	1132
Women Armed Forces Corps School	1520	766	495	197
Junior Military Academy/Vung Tau	1400	0	121	1526
Junior Military Academy/ Highland	400	0	22	307
Ordnance School	2610	1516	1680	531
Quartermaster School	1765	496	500	172
Medical School	3216	939	1342	1266
Intelligence School (Cay Mai)	2783	1017	906	195
Military Police School	2320	1032	1392	339
Military Band School	719	325	97	169
Transportation School	6955	4427	4233	792
Signal School	6147	1773	2923	1864
Engineer School	6289	4015	3031	663
Administration and Finance School	1250	264	285	233
Adjutant General School	4940	1617	1456	615
Armed Forces Language School	3000	1674	2612	1276
Logistic Management School	610	488	262	86
Social Service School	857	197	0	38
Martial Arts & Physical Training School	410	69	100	50
Dog Training School	508	165	169	10
POLWAR Training Cadre	1920	288	449	287
	73663	33769	35049	25774

Figure 9

necessitated some cut back in the number of POIs and the consolidation of courses and facilities. While some of the slippage can be eliminated by a greater use of OJT, it's becoming apparent that ARVN will have to operate at lower technological and support levels than existed with a greater US presence. The 1974 training program has not been unveiled yet but it will be interesting to compare what changes take place in service training.

(5) Branch and Leadership Schools.

(a) The National Military Academy enrolled 312 new cadets for 1973 bringing current enrollment to 957. The senior class of 179 cadets should graduate in December. A goal of 260 new cadets has been set for 1974 which should bring total enrollment above the 1,000 student capacity of the school. The training and education received at VNMA is considered quite good and a decree has been signed by the Prime Minister that would grant graduates a Bachelor Degree in Applied Science. However, the Minister of Education has yet to act on this decree.

(b) The Reserve Junior Officer Program for 1973 is designed to produce 9,955 junior officers. Junior officer training is broken down into two phases. Phase I is a mixture of basic training with additional advanced training. All phase I training is conducted at Quang Trung NTC. First, second, and third quarter figures of CY 73 were 4,842; 859; and 4,154; respectively for a total of 9,855. Programmed phase I input was originally scheduled to be 5,155. Phase II training, because of the expanded requirement for 1973, is being conducted not only at the Infantry School but at the NCO Academy as well. The table below shows officer output so far for 1973:

	1st QTR	2nd QTR	July	Aug	Total
Infantry School	526	2,002	2,180	-	4,708
NCO Academy	-	1,090	551	1,131	2,772
					7,480

The large input into phase I at Quang Trung NTC for the 3rd quarter portends a large input for phase II training in the 4th quarter, which should allow the programmed figure of 9,955 to be met or exceeded.

(c) NCO Training took a huge jump in CY 3/73 as Quang Trung was no longer saddled with phase I training for officer candidates. This allowed Quang Trung to take in almost 6,000 NCO trainees in August and September alone. Lam Son NTC also took in a large number of trainees. It is hoped that in 1974, the NCO Academy will be able to again conduct NCO training which it has had to forego to help train ARVN's junior officer requirements. The following table outlines NCO training for the year so far"

	CY 1/73	CY 2/73	July	Aug	Sep
Quang Trung NTC	2,697	1,175	-	3,059	2,887
Lam Son NTC	1,765	2,491	339	3,280	1,480
Dong Da NTC	-	-	-	-	285

(d) POLWAR College graduation for the present 207 officer candidates will not take place until February 1975. In November, another 200 cadets will enter the two year course after attending phase I officer training at Quang Trung. There are plans to extend the officer cadet course beyond its present two year length but nothing is firm as yet. Input for the two month basic POLWAR officer course has been 823 against a programmed level of 1,000 for the year. The intermediate course has been lengthened from three months to five months to include 9 weeks of additional military training. Input this year so far has been 397. The advanced officer course, which is currently a four month course will also be extended by 9 weeks next year. Input for the advanced course is programmed at 100 for 1973 with 77 already having attended the course.

(e) The Armor School input, with less than four months to go, is still less than half of the 1973 programmed requirement; 4,445 programmed as opposed to an eight month figure of 2,106. However, inputs of 357 and 361 for July and August were 50% above any other month except January. The present student load is at 900 and is expected to remain at that level for the remainder of the year. Not only has the School not received enough input, but serious problems developed also with practical training due largely to fuel shortages. This has effected both M-41 and M-48 tank training but

M-48 training more so, as the greatest shortage has been in diesel fuel. For example, with 20,000 liters of diesel fuel available in July (The M-48 tank is programmed to consume 100 liters of fuel per hour) this would amount to a total of 200 hours of operation or only 20 hours per month (less than one hour per day for each of the ten M-48 tanks). This is hardly enough to get the tanks out to the training ranges and back. In addition, there are ten other armored and tracked vehicles plus 19 two and one half ton trucks that must use some portion of the 20,000 liters of diesel for the School's normal operation, and support.

(6) Evaluation Exercises and the Inspection Program.

(a) Evaluation exercises, as outlined in the previous Quarterly Assessment, continue to focus on Period II of the Unit Training Programs. Squad, platoon and battalion tests and FTXs are conducted at the DTCs during this training and evaluations are made by the parent units assisted by the DTC. While Period III training has yet to be conducted, regiment and division CPXs are to take place during that time.

(b) An adequate inspection program is conducted by the Central Training Command (CTC) to insure that proper training is being conducted. The CTC Commander continues a rigorous personal weekly inspection schedule which allows him to keep close tab on the NTCs and DTCs. Under his tutelage the NTCs continue to perform their mission in a satisfactory manner, considering the lack of logistical support and inadequate budgets they are forced to operate under.

(7) Sister School Program. The Sister School Program has really taken hold. Ninety one boxes of POIs and lesson plans have come in from fourteen various branch and technical schools in the United States. This volume of material will provide a ready reference for the various schools and CTC, much of which will be incorporated into the ARVN training program.

(8) Problem Areas.

(a) Fuel continued to be a major problem for the training centers during the third quarter. An increased allocation in August was starting to trickle in to the training centers but its full effect has yet to be felt. It is certainly an unnecessary lessening of their national defense capability when ARVN can not provide fuel for tank training or for their use in combined arms training.

(b) Maintenance budgets, insufficient to begin with, continue to be eroded by rampant inflation. Continual evaluations have to be made by the training centers to determine what facilities are absolutely necessary and what facilities can be allowed to deteriorate without causing a detriment to training. More reliance is being placed on self-help projects to compensate for lack of funds. A good example is at Pleiku Training Center where, through self help and with all native materials except for some nails, a jungle survival training area is being built.

(c) Training Ammo, which in the second quarter was a major source of complaint from training center commanders, no longer appears to be a problem. Several NTC and DTC commanders have been queried over the last couple months and all stated that they had sufficient ammo for training.

(d) Support. The support system for the training centers, being second priority compared to the divisions, is fast approaching nonexistence. Spare parts for vehicles are unobtainable. Generators are being shut down for lack of spare parts as much as for lack of fuel. Batteries for TOW Missile training are taking one to two weeks for recharging when the 4 hour procedure should take only one or two days at the most. Support appears to be hampered by a lack of sound management and responsive attitude as much as a lack of parts and material.

5. (C) SUPPLY/LOGISTICS

a. Data Processing and Logistics Management.

(1) RVNAF has 51 programmer/analyst personnel now assigned to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Automated Materiel Management System (RAMMS). This is an increase of 13 personnel since the last report. This increase is significant in view of the on-going conversion of RAMMS from the IBM-360-40/20 to IBM 360-50 equipment. Although these programmers/analysts generally understand basic Automatic Data Processing (ADP) logic and programming of subsystems, they are not adequately trained in supply logic. Also, their reaction time to changing requirements is much too slow to permit the discontinuance of contractor support at this time in the more complex programming and analytical areas.

(2) Review of National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA) logistic management capabilities reveals a continued reliance on US contracted expertise. Advances have been made in the management of Nonstandard Repair Parts (NSRP), and financial management. NSRP section will have the capability to operate with very limited contractor technical assistance by the next contract period.

(3) In the area of financial management there has been good progress considering that the staffing was completed with exception of one officer, late in May 73. Personnel assigned are completing work sheets required to justify future year expenditures, and are becoming aware of financial constraints they must deal with in the future. Recently, medical accounting has been added which includes entering the Reference Control Number (RCN) Matrix into the RAMMS system. Preparation of Vietnam defense budget accounting and establishment of manual accounting system for technical service chapters of the budget have also been added.

b. Depot Operations.

(1) There are currently 154 ARVN personnel on temporary duty (TDY) to the 1st ARVN Associated Depot (AAD) - Long Binh. These personnel will assist in the depot moves as of 17 October 1973, along with an expected addition of 50 personnel by the same date. By the end of October another 150 will be added for a total addition of 354. This will assist greatly in completing the move of the 40th Engineer Base Depot (EBD), the 10th Quartermaster Base Depot (QBD), and the 60th Signal Base Depot (SBD).

(2) Contract DAJB04-74-0018 with Eastern Construction Company, Incorporated (ECCOI) provided 17 technicians to 1st AAD. They reported for duty 15 September 1973. They are assisting in Care and Preservation (C&P) in order to get C&P equipment operational; maintenance and operation of Materiels Handling Equipment (MHE); preparing to conduct formal training classes on MHE operation and maintenance; and preparing Programs of Instruction (POI) and Lesson Plans to implement formal training in Depot Operations.

(3) A team consisting of 14 Department of Army Civilians has been furnished by Army Materiel Command (AMC) to provide technical assistance and On-the-Job Training (OJT) at mid-management level for a period of 90 to 120 days. Four of these team members are providing assistance to the 2nd AAD at Da Nang. The remaining 10 have conducted the initial survey of the 1st AAD operations, prepared a plan to overcome the deficiencies identified and have discussed their recommendations with the 1st AAD depot commander. The team members plan to align themselves with their depot counterparts and provide day-to-day technical advice and assistance at that level. The close relationship and constant contact between the team members and their depot counterparts is expected to be of extreme value for improvement of depot operations and development of middle management capabilities.

c. Status of Ammo: (July to September 1973)

(1) Available beginning of Quarter:

Short Tons: 141,816

Dollars: $267,109,108.00

(2) Expenditure during quarter:

Short Tons: 41,049

Dollars: $74,049,458.00

(3) On Hand end of quarter:

Short Tons: 131,519

Dollars: $267,131,532.00

(4) Requisitions:

Short Tons: 41,284

Dollars: $75,173,451.00

(5) Stockage Levels:

Short Tons: 132,894

Dollars: $241,047,015.00

d. Shortfall.

(1) Logistics/Management. Middle management in both the Logistics Data Processing Center (LDPC) and logistics operation at NMMA remains deficient. Tradition, culture, and class differences limits communication from top management through the working level to the operator who must keep RAMMS operational. Additionally, there is little motivation for self-improvement based on financial gain potential. The numerous supply people who have been trained at US supply activities, as well as the Central Training Institute, are accustomed to wages paid by the US Government and are still looking for those wages. Command action is being initiated recommending an overall upgrading of supply positions in an attempt to acquire these qualified personnel. In addition, the following management actions will be emphasized:

(a) Continue technical assistance in the area of requirements and distribution, with RVNAF personnel performing all operations, thereby gaining the experience needed to be self-sufficient.

(b) Training on subject matter that is required for future program needs, i.e., excess, conversion to National Stock Number System, computation of supply control studies, etc.

(c) Continue training on the use of the advance computer systems from the standpoint of programmers and system analysis.

(d) The importance of contractor employment of qualified Vietnamese who have leadership potential, in order to establish a nucleus of trained supply management personnel who can remain in the employ of ARVN thus providing continuity of Logistics expertise.

(2) Depot Operations. The entire operation is understrength and undertrained. Current operational status follows:

(a) US School trained personnel: One officer, Chief of Issue/Receiving Branch.

(b) Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE): Fifty-three pieces of MHE are operational from a total of 80 assigned 1st ADD-LB. The training course in MHE maintenance and operation, initiated by the 1st ADD Element in August 1973, is now conducting its 2nd session. The 1st session added 16 MHE operators to the work force. Ten ARVN civilian personnel are enrolled in the current class. A minimum of four weeks will be required for this class due to low mechanical aptitude and experience of the group.

(c) Care & Preservation (C&P): One officer trained in C&P with 44 assigned personnel. Although the C&P backlog has been accumulating during the past two months, the progress made by the ECCOI technicians in getting the C&P equipment operational since 15 September 1973 holds promise for improvement in this area.

(d) Storage Operations: There were 21,534 line items not on location from the 40th EBD alone. This condition has resulted in an excessive number of warehouse denials and caused unnecessary requisitioning. The combined efforts of the AMC Technical Assistance, the ECCOI Technical Assistance, the 1st AAD Element, and the personnel at 1st AAD-LB have reduced the number of Line Items (L/I) of the 40th EBD move not on location, from 21,534 to 3,850.

(3) *Ammunition Deficiencies: (Term usages: DODAC-Department of Defense Ammunition Code; BOH-Balance on Hand).

(a)	DODAC	A071 Cartridge, 5.56 Millimeter
	BOH	131.9 Million Rounds
	STOCKAGE	193.3 Million Rounds
	% STOCKAGE	83%
(b)	DODAC	B568 Cartridge, 40 Millimeter M-79
	BOH	2.2 Million Rounds
	STOCKAGE	4.1 Million Rounds
	% STOCKAGE	56%
(c)	DODAC	B627 Cartridge, 60 Millimeter, Illuminating
	BOH	103.6 Thousand Rounds
	STOCKAGE	199.4 Thousand Rounds
	% STOCKAGE	52%
(d)	DODAC	C256 Cartridge, 81 Millimeter Mortar
	BOH	399.7 Thousand Rounds
	STOCKAGE	677.1 Thousand Rounds
	% STOCKAGE	59%

(e) DODAC G911 Grenade, Hand MK3

BOH 384.0 Thousand Rounds

STOCKAGE 600.0 Thousand Rounds

% STOCKAGE 64%

(f) DODAC N335 Fuze, Point Detonating M557

BOH 2,676.8 Thousand Rounds

STOCKAGE 3,461.0 Thousand Rounds

% STOCKAGE 77%

*None are below safe level.

(4) Critical Shortages. The 155MM Howitzer is no longer on the critical list. Concerning the 105MM Howitzer tubes and cannon assemblies, airlift data has been received for tubes and cannon assemblies that will clear the majority of dues-out in October, but the delivery schedule will not clear this weapon from the critical list for several months. The M16 barrel and sight assembly problems are clearing up and current information is that in October the dues-in will exceed usage. The 175MM Self-Propelled Gun engines are scheduled for delivery October 1973.

6. (C) MAINTENANCE

a. Field Maintenance

(1) An assessment of the current state of maintenance during 1st Quarter FY74 in 100+ ARVN units reveals certain deficiencies in the maintenance and logistic support fields that limits ARVN progress in achieving self-sufficiency at the level necessary to support combat operations.

(2) Principal factors hindering progress toward this objective follow:

(a) Organizational maintenance is not effective.

(b) Prescribed load lists (PLL's) and Authorized Stockage Lists (ASL's) are not adequate to support an aging fleet. There is a shortage of regular consumption items such as tires, batteries and filters.

(c) Direct Exchange items are not available in quantities to satisfy minimum requirements.

(d) Tactical wheeled vehicles in use with high priority units are not suitable for sustained operations and are in need of cyclic overhaul. Although the combat vehicles are in much better condition, there is not an effective program for "mid-life" overhaul of these items.

(e) Maintenance floats have not been established at the direct support level.

(f) Medium maintenance centers are bogged down with residual workload from Keystone transfers and cannot provide required support to the user.

(g) Shortage of skilled technicians restricts proper diagnostic work on defective components and prevents the establishment of an effective maintenance program.

(h) Shortage of proper tools.

(3) Overall readiness rates reported by ARVN do not include items in repair status that are not assigned to using units. Of the issued items requiring repair, for return to users, the following average deadline rates are being experienced:

Materiel Handling Equipment:	45%
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles:	35%
Combat Vehicles:	20%
Artillery:	5%
C&E:	6%

(4) Actions to correct conditions noted above are underway. Commander, Central Logistics Command was informed of these shortcomings with recommendations for corrective action in each instance.

b. Depot Maintenance.

(1) Engineer Equipment. Considerable progress is being made by ARVN to achieve a satisfactory state of self-sufficiency in the rebuild facilities and technical supply operation. The primary problems that still exist in achieving a satisfactory state of self-sufficiency are: limited number of personnel with ability to fully interpret US Technical Manuals, lack of ability to establish comprehensive training programs necessary for modern equipment, lack of middle management skills and ability to expedite solutions and take advantage of available resources. Technical assistance continues to be provided in those areas where ARVN personnel have not achieved a satisfactory state of self-sufficiency.

(2) Maintenance Facilities. The present facilities used for depot maintenance are adequate for a bay type repair program. Plans are being made to expand the present rebuild facilities to permit the establishment of production lines, the addition of new test equipment and accommodating items new to the Depot Rebuild Program. The plans for expanding the rebuild facilities have been somewhat delayed due to the lack of floor space but it is anticipated that the required area will be available by early January 1974.

(3) Technical Supply. Intensive efforts in identifying, locating and inventorying technical supply stock, coupled with a detailed and comprehensive review of Bill of Materiel (BOM) requirements for the 3rd and 4th Quarters FY74 program, has allowed reduction in requirements of more than $550,000.00. Requisitions were adjusted accordingly. In addition, 4,000 lines of repair parts have been declared as excess and reported to the National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA) for disposition instructions. Shortages of warehouse storage space is hindering the warehousing of repair parts and is causing a backlog. It is anticipated that adequate warehouse space will be available during the early part of January 1974. All of the technical supply stock will be rewarehoused when the additional space is made available.

(4) Arsenal Equipment.

(a) Vietnamese Army Arsenal (VAA). Self-sufficiency in terms of skills and equipment required to perform depot rebuild of ordnance major items continues to increase towards the October 1974 complete self-sufficiency goal. Total self-sufficiency has been attained during 1st QTR FY74 for commodities, small arms and batteries. Upgrading of facilities in support of self-sufficiency for combat vehicles by October 1974 has slipped about 30 days; however, efforts to recover and meet the October 1974 target date continue.

(b) All shop supply stocks at VAA have been inventoried and are recorded on the VAA asset balance file. Initial review of inventory versus FY74 program requirements indicate substantial excesses are on hand. During the current quarter a final review of stocks on hand and due-in versus program requirements for next 12 months will be made. Excesses will be returned to 1st ARVN Associated Depot (AAD) for redistribution or other action. Dollar value of excesses at the VAA are estimated to approximate 10-15 million.

(c) Maintenance facilities. Plans to expand present facilities from predominately bay type repair method to production line are progressing satisfactorily. Shop layout in the Power Train Shop has been completed during this period and rearrangement should result in a 25% increase in production capability. In addition, new layout has generated excess operating equipment that will be moved to other areas to achieve greater equipment utilization. Method studies and shop layouts present an "on-going" program.

7. (C) PETROLEUM, OIL, AND LUBRICANTS (POL).

a. The baseline being used for the RVNAF POL program is peace time consumption factors applied to equipment densities. Procurement to meet originally computed requirements for the first half of FY74 was met with no shortfalls.

b. RVNAF contested reductions of mogas and diesel allocations imposed by DAO by submitting their own requirements study for consideration. The quantities requested could not be justified. Justifiable increases of mogas by 9% and diesel by 38% were allowed. These revised allocations of ground product became effective

on 1 August 1973. With these increases from original computations additional requirement of 10 million gallons of diesel was required for the period ending December 1973.

c. Because of Comptroller General rulings on acceptance of petroleum products from commercial contractors, it will be necessary to retain six US DoD employees in RVN. These personnel will be required for acceptance of petroleum products as long as the Defense Supply Agency contracts for its delivery.

8. (C) PORT OPERATIONS.

a. On 29 March 1973, RVNAF assumed responsibility for military port operations, less Military Standard Transportation and Movement Precedures (MILSTAMP) documentation functions, that are accomplished by US contractor (Alaska Barge and Transport Company). Stevedore services are provided by ARVN military personnel and Vietnamese under contract with ARVN. Total tonnage handled through ARVN operated ports during period 1 Apr 73 through 30 Sep 73 amounted to 189,667 metric tons (MT) inbound and 7,602 MT outbound for RVNAF; and 19,326 MT inbound, 50,181 MT outbound of US interest cargo.

b. Shortfall.

(1) ARVN cargo handling operations aboard vessels remain substandard when measured against the Military Sealift Command (MSC) standard of 1500 MT per day that is used to determine vessel lay time. The daily average cargo handling rate of 773 MT for the 1st quarter FY74 shows improvement over the 558 MT rate attained during the 4th quarter FY73. This improvement is attributed to the direct involvement of both DAO and ARVN personnel in port operations through frequent liaison visits. These visits and the subsequent reporting of findings to the Commander, Central Logistics Command appears to have resulted in increased attention toward efficiency in port operations by terminal supervisory personnel.

(2) Unsatisfactory conditions still existing include lack of experienced ARVN supervisors, improper types of equipment utilized: e.g., rough terrain forklifts

used where a smaller capacity commercial type would suffice; shortage of electric forklifts to handle ammunition due to lack of repair parts; assignment of stevedore gangs not in proportion to the work to be accomplished; and disrupted cargo operations on deep draft vessels caused by the use of commercial stevedores to handle cargo only, with military personnel used for cargo shoring and vessel cleaning. These problem areas are continually being brought to the attention of ARVN supervisors and CLC staff officers. There is a need for an ARVN senior operations officer who is available at all times to insure efficient utilization of equipment and personnel. Command action is being pursued to implement this requirement.

(3) Port operations throughout the country must continue to be a subject of prime concern for the appropriate CLC staff elements.

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CHAPTER 6

VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF)

1. (U) INTRODUCTION: The VNAF strengths, weaknesses, training, logistics, equipment status, OR rates and the DAO assessment are presented in the following paragraphs.

2. (S) AUTHORIZED STRENGTH AND ASSIGNED PERSONNEL READINESS:

a. Current overall VNAF manning is 96 percent, officer manning is 74 percent, enlisted manning is 99 percent, and civilian manning is 76 percent of the authorized level.

(Figure 1)

b. VNAF pilot manning, which largely reflects manning of other crew positions, is considered sufficient to fly available VNAF aircraft on a sustained surge basis. The 2,378 squadron pilots represent 52 percent of the authorized manning. Figure 2 reflects the current manning by type of aircraft/mission. The special air mission unit figures have been omitted.

c. Personnel readiness of the rated force can be roughly determined by reference to Figure 2 column labeled assigned OR/TNG. This figure, however, refers to aircrews which are in continuation/upgrade training. The majority of them are capable of performing basic combat missions.

(Figure 2)

3. (S) AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY: The authorized Air Order of Battle (AOB) is shown by military region. The AOBs closely represent the areas of operation with the exception of the support aircraft in the 5th Air Division which operate throughout the country.

(Figures 3, 4, 5, 6)

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VNAF PERSONNEL BY ORGANIZATION

UNIT/BASE	OFFICERS (1)AUTH	OFFICERS ASGD	ENLISTED (1)AUTH	ENLISTED ASGD	TOT MIL (1)AUTH	TOT MIL ASGD	CIVILIANS (1)AUTH	CIVILIANS ASGD
HQ VNAF	894	475	2036	1774	2930	2249	99	35
ACA	19	13	66	50	85	63	0	0
AC&W	136	107	815	725	951	832	1	1
ALC	391	189	5858	5488	6249	5677	98	347
AMC	51	27	112	92	163	119	9	5
AOC	342	263	667	600	1009	863	0	0
ATC	390	250	921	881	1311	1131	23	7
Air Admin Unit		11		97		108		5
Bien Hoa - 3d AD	1298	830	7539	5082	8837	5912	137	66
Binh Thuy - 4th AD	853	520	4758	3506	5611	4026	74	19
Da Nang - 1st AD	1133	675	6403	4564	7536	5239	150	96
Nha Trang - 2d AD	803	428	3977	3399	4780	3827	70	20
Phan Rang	329	186	2481	1787	2810	1973	0	0
Phu Cat	524	243	3248	2052	3772	2295	0	0
Pleiku - 6th AD	632	360	3346	2324	3978	2684	47	5
Soc Trang	492	279	2833	1711	3325	1990	46	0
Tan Son Nhut - 5th AD	1234	952	6274	4908	7508	5860	163	92
Sub Total	9521	5808	51334	39040	60855	44848	917	698
Pipeline Tng		1282	3469	15624	3469	16906		
Total	9521	7090	54803	54664	64324	61754	917	698

Note:
(1) Authorized manning for VNAF CY 1973

Figure (1)

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VNAF PILOT/COPILOT MANNING

TYPE A/C	AUTH	ASSIGNED OR/TNG	TOTAL ASSIGNED	%
A-37	350	174/48	222	63
A-1	123	86/0	86	69
F-5	197	98/21	119	60
Total Ftr/Attack	670	348/69	417	60
C-7	135	107/54	107	79
C-130	118	107/53	107	90
Total Cargo	253	214/107	214	57
UH-1	1983	890/254	1144	57
CH-47	180	88/71	159	88
Total Helo	2163	878/325	1303	60
Liaison (U-17, 0-1, 0-2	324	258/0	258	79
AC-119K	59	54/27	54	91
AC-119G	59	66/23	66	111
AC-47	53	56/20	56	105
Total Gunship	171	176/79	176	102
RC 119 L	43	9/4	9	20
EC 47	95	82/38	82	86
RC 47	44	36/26	26	59
U 6	10	9/0	9	90
Total Recce	192	136/68	126	65
T-37	31	22/0	22	70
T-41/01	27	35/0	35	62
UH-1	16	8/0	8	50
Total Training	74	65/0	65	74

Figure (2)

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

Figure 3

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

Figure 4

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MR 3



VNAF

BIEN HOA
3rd AIR DIVISION

23 WING	43 WING
112 25 O-1	221 38 UH-1
7 U-17	223 38 UH-1
124 25 O-1	231 38 UH-1
7 U-17	245 38 UH-1
514 24 A-1	251 38 UH-1
518 24 A-1	237 16 CH-47
63 WING	259E 12 UH-1
522 23 F-5A/B	
7 RF-5	
536 17 F-5	
540 17 F-5	
542 17 F-5	
544 17 F-5	

TAN SON NHUT
5th AIR DIV

33 WING
314 4 VC-47
4 UH-1
2 U-17
716 12 RC-47
2 EC-47
2 C-47
8 U-6
718 20 EC-47
431 16 C-7
259G 12 UH-1
53 WING
819 18 AC 119G
821 10 AC 119K
435 16 C-130
429 16 C-7
437 16 C-130

Figure 5

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

Figure 6

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4. (S) EQUIPMENT STATUS.

Current aircraft status rates are depicted in Figures 7 through 10. Since their receipt, the C-130A fleet has had an excessive out-of-commission rate. The OR rate averaged about 46 percent in August and September. Primary causes have been wing cracks, fuel leaks, engine problems, parts shortages, ground equipment deficiencies, limited repair capability, lack of sufficient maintenance, and over flying individual aircraft flying hour authorizations. Most of these problems have been overcome with spare parts, and extended time in phase inspections as being the biggest constraint?

5. (C) AIR LOGISTICS COMMAND.

a. Materiel Management Center:

(1) The Materiel Management Center of the Air Logistics Command (ALC) is currently 74.4 percent manned, which represents an increase of 11.4 percent during first quarter of FY 74. The goal of 90 percent manning by 30 September 1973 has slipped due to non-completion of formal training by some VNAF airmen. As formal training is completed, additional personnel will be assigned.

(2) Formal supply training by PA&E contractor, to provide basic supply management knowledge is underway and will continue through June 1974.

(3) VNAF-ALC is still experiencing shortages in competent top-level middle management personnel; however, this condition is being alleviated to some extent through the assignment of junior grade officers and OJT. More officers and NCOs are required.

(4) The overall ALC manning is at approximately 92 percent; however, this figure includes personnel who have not completed their initial formal training and remain to be assigned to specific organizations. Formal training has been scheduled for completion during November 1973. Personnel will be assigned to various organizations for specialized training upon completion of the basic training program. The training program will continue with additional on-the-job training.

FIGHTER TYPE ACFT A-1 A-37 RF/F-5

VNAF OR System based upon squadron possessed A/C rather than UE; eg, when in Field or Depot maintenance, A/C is not possessed.



O/R RATE — VNAF STD 71.0%

NORS RATE — VNAF STD 5.0%

NORM RATE — VNAF STD 24.0%

Figure (7)

TRANSPORTS

EC-47, C-7, C-119, VC-47, E/RC-47, C-130

VNAF OR System based upon squadron possessed A/C rather than UE; eg, when in Field or Depot maintenance, A/C is not possessed.



O/R RATE — VNAF STD 71.0%

NORS RATE — VNAF STD 65.0%

NORM RATE — VNAF STD 24.0%

Figure (8)

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

Figure (9)

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C-130 AIRCRAFT

VNAF OR System based upon squadron possessed A/C rather than UE; eg, when in Field or Depot maintenance, A/C is not possessed.



O/R RATE — VNAF STD 71.0%

NORS RATE — VNAF STD 5.0%

NORM RATE — VNAF STD 24.0%

Figure (10)

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(5) Facilities: An additional 3,000 square feet of office space was obtained by relocation of contractor personnel from Building 1779, which satisfied 90 percent of Materiel Management Center's office space requirement. The computer facility review has been completed, new building site selected, and drawings for the new building have been finalized. CINCPACAF has approved the project and invitations for bids will be released prior to 12 October 1973.

(6) Requisitioning Control and Funds Management: Procedures required for requisition control including funds management have been developed and implemented. Training of VNAF to use the developed procedures has also been initiated. A special computer program, designed to remove all invalid Record Control Numbers (RCN) from the ALC computer RCN table and item records, was tested and applied to both the "E" and "B" computer systems. This action should eliminate problems caused by assignment of invalid RCN. Further actions are being planned to train the VNAF in development and submission of funding requirements taking into account accumulation of data necessary for making realistic projections for required funds.

(7) Not Operationally-Ready Supply Reconciliation: Final analysis of the one-time reconciliation of VNAF ALC outstanding Not Operationally-Ready Supply (NORS) requirements, initiated 26 June 1973, was completed 21 July 1973. The reconciliation was necessitated by the large number of VNAF NORS requisitions reflected in the "no" status. Firm supply visibility and validation of VNAF NORS were accomplished; however, review actions are required continuously. Problems identified as a result of the review include local VNAF work processes which have been or are being corrected. Also, instances of VNAF requisitions being lost in the system or not properly routed were identified, particularly requisitions to the U.S. Army. Approximately 50 percent of the total VNAF NORS problem was found to be related to the U.S. Army supply support of UH-1H and CH-47 aircraft.

(8) Requisitioning Objectives: A change from 365 to 179 (90 + OST) days Requisitioning Objectives (RO) was completed in September 1973 and all stock levels

adjusted accordingly. This action reduced the dollar value of outstanding ALC requisitioning from 35.6 to approximately 17.5 million dollars.

(9) Seek Point: Bench stocks for the operating sites were established, as well as items to be stocked at the forward supply points at Da Nang and Tan Son Nhut Air Bases. The weapon system management function for Seek Point was transferred to the VNAF, with technical assistance provided by a DAO-ALC weapon system manager.

(10) Engines: The approved FY 74 contractor engine overhaul program for T-53, J85-13, J85-17/17A was inadequate to support requirements. Re-programming action has been initiated to fulfill requirements. A study was initiated for lay-in of spares for JEIM and depot overhaul for J-85 series, J-69-25, T-53 and T-55 engines. Study and requisitioning will be completed during October 1973.

(11) NORS Analysis: In-depth NORS analysis has been expanded to include all aircraft, on a weekly basis, with a VNAF fleet NORS rate exceeding 10 percent. Intensive ALC management of the C-130 aircraft is being effected by a three-man team assigned to monitor the program. VNAF-ALC weapons systems managers have shown much progress during this reporting period. To supplement the VNAF, DAO is hiring seven local national management analysts with maintenance, supply or weapon system background to be trained as weapon system managers and to be hired by the VNAF in the future.

(12) Aircraft Repair Contract Input: The following aircraft were input to contractor programs during the past quarter:

AIRCRAFT	PROGRAM	INPUT	TOTAL PROGRAM FY 74
C-47	ACI	1	5
C-7	Corrosion Control	5	24
C-119	ACI	1	5
A-37	Wing Mod	4	77
UH-1H	2200 Hr PE	7	39
CH-47	Life Extension	1	18
CH-47	ACI	0	2
C-130	PDM (IRAN)	3	12

(13) Air Force Supply Directives: There have been no Air Force Supply Directives (AFSD) or push-type packages received since 15 June 1973. Information received from card decks submitted by Air Material Areas has been updated to computer records.

(14) Equipment Inventory:

(a) The DAO-USAF/VNAF Equipment Inventory Team has completed the inventory of Mission Essential Equipment (MEE), excluding administrative items, at all the active VNAF Air Bases. MEE assets in each shop and/or Custody Receipt Account, were identified, inventoried and adjusted computer file inputs initiated. Upon input completion the computer files shall reflect required accountability of actually possessed items and their consequent dollar value.

(b) Command Equipment Management Team (CEMT). On 19 October 1973 a PACAF/DAO-USAF/VNAF 28-man team, experienced in equipment management and application, commenced an equipment utilization, authorization and requirement survey of Da Nang AB VNAF/RVN. This team was fragmented into sub-teams, to cover Ground Communications, FM/OM/AGE, Shops, Armament, Avionics/PMEL, Civil Engineer, Transportation and BEMO/Computer Records. The CEMT is programmed to complete its work NLT 26 October 1973, concluding with a written report, containing supporting statistics, recommendations and summary of on-the-spot actions taken. This report supplemented with an exit briefing, will be presented to DAO-USAF and HQ VNAF officials. It is expected the report will sustain the following premises:

1 Too much equipment on hand for assigned and programmed base support mission.

2 Many AGE items non-operational for lack of parts.

3 Care preservation, safeguarding and control of AGE/Special Tools/Test Equipment/Individual Weapons and Special Purpose Vehicles, as minimum satisfactory.

4 Many authorizations, as in the record, not valid due to improper/incorrect or misunderstood application of authorization source codes.

5 Equipment on hand not on currently issued Custody Receipts.

6 Dual custodial accountability for some equipment items.

7 Excess, Disposal and Redistribution programs ineffectual.

8 Powered AGE items not truly controlled by AGE shop.

9 Principles of Controlled Cannibalization not practiced.

10 Little evidence of pride in maintaining an acceptable in-commission rate for possessed equipment.

(15) Aerospace Ground Equipment:

(a) The out-of-country VNAF equipment repair contract is awaiting a decision from CINCPACAF as to whether or not Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) will be repaired in the RVN or out-of-country. An in-country contract is considered more feasible and would enhance the economy, through use of a Vietnamese contractor or a joint Vietnamese/American contractor.

(b) In-country field level repair is in progress since completion of the VNAF AGE inventory and condition survey. Currently the US contractor (LSI Team #1) is at Tan Son Nhut and (LSI Team #2) at Bien Hoa Air Bases. Some problems are being experienced in obtaining parts for repair; however, aggressive action is being taken to provide the required items.

(16) Common Service Item Support: The fill rate of common items requisitioned from the National Material Management Agency (NMMA) increased to approximately 60 percent during the quarter; however, cancellations remained at a high level. Joint VNAF, DAO, NMMA and ARVN action is being taken to improve common item supply support. Procedures are being developed for special management of vehicles down for parts and common recoverable items. Funding guidelines have been established, and excess retrograde programs are being reviewed.

(17) Release of VNAF Requisitions: The VNAF has released all due-out requisitions under $200 in value, and are currently reviewing requirements for due-out requisitions over $200. Some Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) depot replenishment stocks have been released with a dollar value under $200. The depot replenishment recoverable item requisitioning is being held in abeyance pending completion of the VNAF base inventory. EOQ stock levels have been reduced to 90 days, plus order and ship time, at ALC and bases. Continuing action is being taken to review dollar value of requisitions prior to entry into HO-51 system. AIMI items procedures have been established for immediate release of negotiated levels.

(18) Computer Downtime:

(a) Excessive downtime and linkage errors on the ALC depot computer system resulted in utilizing the mobile computer at Clark AFB for in-line processing. This operation ran from 20 July 1973 through 6 September 1973. In-line products and tapes were airlifted to the ALC for running mandatory reports. During this period, a total of 590,263 card inputs were processed creating a total of 406,593 transactions. Normal operations were resumed on the ALC computers on 7 September 1973.

(b) Computer downtime has decreased drastically during the last part of this quarter. The majority of downtime was caused by hardware malfunctions, unreliable contractor computer maintenance, and marginal computer components. As a result of corrective actions additional computer maintenance personnel were obtained, computer components (file loader, printer, punch) received and spare parts for inoperative components acquired.

(c) At the end of July 1973, the "E" primary system experienced over 528 hours downtime and was averaging over 70,000 cards of computer input backlog. For the month of September, the downtime was 49.5 hours, with a zero backlog.

(19) Reparable Generations to CONUS: Intensive emphasis continues to be placed on identification and retrograde of items Not Reparable This Station (NRTS) to CONUS for repair. The average monthly number of

items NRTS over the past quarter was 2,500 items compared with the 1,730 items per month average during the first half of CY 1973. The VNAF has initiated a complete inventory of all DIFM assets. Target date for completion is 21 October 1973.

(20) C-7/CH-47/UH-1H Supply Support: VNAF/DAO weapon system managers reviewed NORS requirements during the weekly briefings. Actions are as follows:

(a) NORS requirements are being reconciled with bases to establish firm requirements.

(b) P-11 (Item Management Analysis) is used to determine specific corrective action for each valid NORS and determine in coordination with supply sources status and support effectiveness of outstanding orders.

(c) An item card file has been established, which is updated quarterly to reflect releveling and follow-up actions with supply sources. Additionally, a management review of each item responsible for NORS during the past six months is scheduled for completion by 15 October 1973.

b. Supply and Transportation Center.

(1) Four of the five new warehouses have been moved from Cam Ranh Bay to Bien Hoa and are being utilized by ALC. The need still exists for a material processing facility.

(2) Manning is currently 65 percent in the Supply and Transportation Center; of the 714 positions authorized 465 personnel have been assigned as of 30 September 1973.

(3) Training: PA&E trained Vietnamese civilians are being utilized along with VNAF training specialists to train VNAF airmen.

(4) COPARS: Requirements have been computer processed and stocks purchased from AID are being received.

(5) Air Freight Terminal/Surface Terminal: The PA&E OJT contract has been extended to cover the third Quarter of FY 74.

(6) Packaging, Crating and Preservation Section: Instapak machines located at all nine VNAF bases have been completed on 1 September 1973. Storage building for the storage of packaging, crating, and preservation material has been started with a scheduled completion date of 30 November 1973.

c. Quality Control Section. The Quality Control Program has been implemented.

(1) Validation and Inventory Program: Validation completion date has been slipped to 20 October 1973. A wall-to-wall inventory has been started at ALC with a completion date of 28 February 1974.

(2) Centralized Packing Program: The Centralized Packing area is operational as of 26 July 1973.

d. Base Support Group.

(1) There are two primary civil engineering organizations at Bien Hoa Air Base:

(a) The 3d Air Division which has a combat flying mission.

(b) ALC which has a logistics mission.

Within the Air Logistics Command, maintenance and repair of real property is the joint responsibility of VNAF Base Civil Engineers (BCE) and a contractor.

(2) In July 1973, the VNAF BCE moved into the Base Maintenance Contractor's Compound. Additional tools and equipment became available, but the ability to perform is still hampered by the lack of trained personnel. Seven officers and 288 enlisted men are authorized; however, only four officers and 176 enlisted men are assigned. There are seven 9-level sergeants authorized, but none of the spaces are filled. The assigned strengths by skill levels is as follows:

SKILLS	ASSIGNED
7-Level	19 percent
5-Level	49 percent
3-Level and 1-Level	106 percent

(3) In August 1973, the CE Contractor became responsible for VNAF BCE training, minor maintenance, management assistance, and VNAF BCE work forces support. Support buildings such as dormitories, dining halls, administration offices and civil engineering maintenance shops were constructed as temporary facilities with an economic life of approximately five years. In a dry climate, with adequate maintenance, these buildings could have been serviceable for ten to twenty years. Most of the support buildings at Bien Hoa Air Base have outlived their usefulness and should not be scheduled for Civil Engineering maintenance. Air-conditioners, lighting fixtures and plumbing have deteriorated beyond repair because of inadequate maintenance. Due to the construction and current maintenance practices, the base support activities will collapse in the next one or two years and will be unable to support the mission of Bien Hoa Air Base.

(4) Of the 15 Engineering projects listed in the VNAF Logistics Guidance (V-Log March 1973), two have been completed, two are 31 percent complete with a scheduled beneficial occupancy in October, three are 20 percent complete scheduled for completion in November, and eight are 7 percent complete scheduled for completion in December 1973. All of the 15 projects were originally scheduled for completion by 1 October 1973. This slippage has caused rescheduling of Installation and Checkout work and re-evaluation of the training program.

(5) Augmentation by contractor personnel to support the BCE function during the training phase is being evaluated. The complex nature of the industrial function, which comprises ALC, requires that immediate response be provided to CE problems. Performance of OJT personnel to correct industrial type problems is too slow. Augmentation personnel must be highly skilled and operate independent of the training program. The type of construction utilized at Bien Hoa AB, coupled with the degree of deterioration that has developed, may require the use of a large supporting force for an extended period of time. Supplies for this force will be critical and must be available either through formal supply channels or obtainable from the local economy, with funding provided in the augmentation contract to meet emergency demands.

(6) Training of BCE personnel is of utmost importance. Presently, the skill level of assigned personnel is very low. To correct this deficiency, a major training program is being instituted. The program should consist of formal classroom training, and an intensive OJT program. Amendments to the existing contract are required to incorporate this requirement. The lack of technical personnel will continue to be a problem until graduate engineers can be brought into the VNAF. An alternate solution to this action would be to hire technical personnel, by civil service, or contractual methods.

e. Vehicle Squadron.

(1) The unit is adequately manned based on the UMD established for the squadron. It has the most adequate facilities and is only lacking in middle management. The lack of sufficient qualified officers and NCOs accounts for the management problem. The low skill level of the enlisted men accounts for a training need. Equipment available is in accordance with the Vehicle Allowance Listing and sufficient to support projected ALC requirements.

(2) Vehicle Squadron's problems can best be solved by the addition of officers and NCOs trained in the proper AFSCs. Since this is unlikely to occur, it will be necessary to upgrade available personnel by extensive OJT efforts. The placement of a DAO counterpart within the organization may provide some relief in this area. The rate at which personnel are being trained and the duration of the training being provided by Commando Wheels will keep this an area of concern for some time to come. In addition to the basic or formal training required, continuous OJT should be accomplished by the augmentation team. Charting of this unit shows progress toward the low Vehicle Deadlined Rate objective.

(3) Parts supply and availability of tools are additional areas which could continue to impact this squadron performance. Establishment of an adequate bench stock within the Vehicle Squadron is a must to totally overcome the high vehicle down rate due to parts. In addition, a more realistic preventive maintenance program is needed at all echelons of command. Action is underway to improve the bench stock.

f. Maintenance Engineering Wing.

(1) Industrial Engineering Division consists of three Branches: Service Engineering, Work Measurement and Plant Services. Service Engineering is manned by two engineering officers and three draftsmen. To reach authorized strength, five additonal trained industrial technicians or engineers are required. The Branch has the necessary equipment, technical data, directives and procedures necessary to support the MEW, but additional trained engineers and technicians are required to accomplish its functional responsibility. The Branch is augmented with four U.S. contractor engineers. The Work Measurement Branch is manned by one engineering officer and ten trainees. The trainees completed formal training on 1 October 1973 and receive OJT training from contractor engineers to accomplish assigned tasks. The Branch has directives and procedures to support the MEW, but since this is a production shop, most of the work is being accomplished by U.S. contractor personnel, who are giving the VNAF personnel OJT in skills necessary for Plant Services operations. The Branch is authorized ninety-five personnel, and seventy-eight are assigned. Additional Vietnamese must be assigned and trained in specific skills to make the Branch capable of supporting the MEW. Presently, the contractor effort augmenting the Division is scheduled for phase out 1 December 1973, but a new phase out date of 1 July 1974 has been requested due to slippage of some construction programs and the need for continued training.

(2) Production Control: Presently 124 VNAF personnel are undergoing Production Control training. Upon training completion, many months of experience will be required for individuals to become self-sufficient.

g. Aircraft Repair Group.

(1) Training: Formalized training by LSI on the UH-1H 2200 hour PE is being conducted. The Northrup F-5 aircraft Crash/Battle Damage and Corrosion Control training team is in-country and in the initial stages of the training program. The F-5 ACI training program experienced considerable delay due to inadequate NDI (Nondestructive Inspection) capability at ALC. These delays, coupled with the forthcoming phase out of the

majority of F-5A aircraft, led to the decision to cancel the F-5A ACI training Program. The Cessna A-37 ACI, Crash/Battle Damage and Corrosion Control teams are scheduled to arrive and begin training programs in the immediate future. Efforts to obtain OJT training of 3-level VNAF personnel on UH-1H helicopters, by LSI production personnel, has been unsuccessful. Accordingly, the decision has been made to discontinue the massive OJT training program by all LSI production personnel on UH-1H helicopters. The 2200 hour PE and crash/battle damage training programs, with a limited number of selected LSI personnel, will continue on a more formal basis.

(2) Facilities: Delay in obtaining contractual coverage for construction of the three cargo aircraft nose docks has resulted in reprogramming the availability of this critically needed space until 8 December 1973. The nose docks are to be used to expand work areas for F-5, A-37, A-1 and UH-1H helicopters and all programs will be required to function under crowded conditions until the additional facilities are available. The continuing influx of additional VNAF personnel has added to the existing poor conditions. A proposal for expansion of the wash rack facility has been submitted to higher headquarters for approval.

(3) Manning: Aircraft Repair VNAF personnel assigned strength is now approximately 67 percent of the authorized level. The majority of newly assigned personnel is 3-level; therefore, the requirement for training in all areas has increased. VNAF personnel are being assigned upon completion of formal training schools.

(4) Equipment: Approximately 95 percent of the known equipment requirements have been received; however, as training teams, become more involved in in-depth work additonal requirements are being discovered. A listing of special tools and equipment requirements for each aircraft has been compiled and not available items have been requisitioned.

h. Propulsion Group.

(1) Of the 493 authorized VNAF personnel, 347 have been assigned to the Jet Engine overhaul facility. Of those assigned, 126 have completed training in the assigned skill areas.

(2) The VNAF are making progress in the self-sufficiency program with training completed in the following areas: Engine Mechanics, Cleaning, Inspection, Machining, Welding, Balancing, and Testing. The high speed motors have been received and a concentrated training program has been established in the parts rework area. It is hoped this effort will help relieve parts shortages, which are hampering the training in other areas in the Engine Shop.

(3) The fuel test component area is not yet operational. The flow meters were sent to Clark AFB, PI, for calibration. The Clark AFB PMEL has supported the VNAF with optimum effort in all areas requiring assistance; however, the time required to transfer the meters to and from Clark has caused slippages. New target date for completion of Fuel Test is 1 November 1973.

(4) The Rotor Blade Shop is producing blades; however, lack of parts continue to slow production. The contractor has been requested to procure the full Material Requirements List (MRL) and ship requirements directly to the Rotor Blade Shop. Parts consumption data will be computerized to assure compiling of a demand history.

i. Armament and Electronics.

(1) Instrument Repair Capability: TDY team from OOAMA assists VNAF in the installation and checkout of the depot-level AGE. Assistance is scheduled for completion by 15 October 1973.

(2) Airborne Communications: A new statement of work for the Page Communications Engineers contractor has been provided and should resolve all technical training problems.

j. Manufacturing and Repair Group:

(1) Manning: The authorized strength is 798 military and 65 LN civilians. Assigned strength is 552 military and 126 LN civilians. Total VNAF personnel strength has increased to 78 percent which reflects an increase of 23 percent since the last report. Contractor personnel strength has increased to the authorized

level, enabling the group to maintain production capabilities, and increase the number of students in training.

(2) Training: Formal training and over-the-shoulder training is being conducted by contract. Presently 133 trainees receive Airframe Repair, Plastic/Fiberglass, Welding/Heat Treat, AGE, Plating and Machine Shop training. A training package has been prepared for diesel generator repair and is presently being reviewed by VNAF personnel. Approval is expected prior to 1 November 1973. Limited training is being accomplished in the Plastics/Fiberglass career field, due to construction slippage of project BNH 12-3V to 1 November 1973.

(3) Equipment: The group presently has 78 percent of authorized equipment on-hand, which represents an increase of 7 percent over last reporting period. An inventory has been completed and follow-up action initiated to obtain shortage.

(4) Technical Data: The group presently has 79 percent of required technical data on hand, and additional data requirements have been placed on order.

(5) Production: Production capability has been maintained in the Sheet Metal Shop during this period. Additional capability is being developed in other group shops.

k. Commando Wheels.

(1) The approved VNAF strength for this facility is seven officers, 238 airmen, and 60 civilians. Assigned, as of 30 September 1973, are one officer, 136 airmen, and 22 civilians. The contractor has 236 LNs employed. Personnel are integrated into all phases of the vehicle overhaul facility and receive OJT and assistance from 32 US contract personnel. During this reporting period 103 vehicles and 771 components, such as engines, transmissions, starters, and alternators were overhauled.

(2) Commando Wheels graduated 280 formal training students. These students will return to their respective air divisions.

e. Accessories Repair Group.

(1) Facilities: Contracts for projects 16-3V and 19-3V, scheduled for completion 15 September 1973, were awarded 23 June 1973 and are now scheduled for completion 15 November 1973. These buildings will house the Fuel Systems Shop and Pneudraulics Shop now situated in small temporary locations. The slippage compounds not only the training programs and production output, but extends the modifications project of Building 2700 (Expansion of the Electric Shop). The project of Building 2700 experienced similar slippages due to the moving of shops temporarily located therein into the new Pneudraulics Building. Studies to determine the total requirements for the Environmental and Electrical Shops are now nearing completion and layouts are in process with completion scheduled for 1 November 1973.

(2) Equipment: Studies to determine total equipment requirements are nearing completion. The process employed assures accuracy and follows a course emanating from each aircraft TO 01 index. The total equipment on hand relates to approximately 71 percent, with the receipt of 25 percent since 1 April 1973. Problems exist in determining receipt and location of equipment previously received, which will be solved upon completion of the inventory currently conducted.

(3) Manning: Manning is now 91 percent complete with the receipt of 33 percent of the manning requirement since 1 April 1973.

(4) Training: The training program in the Electrical Shop was initiated in early April 1973. A total of 51 students are now in various levels of training. Training plans have been completed for five shops and lesson material is being written, translated and typed for presentation.

6. (C) VNAF BASES.

a. Intermediate Aircraft Maintenance.

(1) Material support manning and skill levels are still the primary limiting factors hampering maintenance operations. Limited technical knowledge, management

ability and availability of middle managers inhibits the effective utilization of maintenance personnel.

(2) Aircraft Inventory: Action was initiated to verify the accuracy of the VNAF aircraft inventory. Site surveys were completed on 29 September 1973 and data compiled which reflects aircraft status by location, type, and condition. Data is being prepared for computer application and a card deck file is to be completed by 12 October 1973. Additional data is being developed to reflect inventory by serial number sequence, location, squadron and coded to identify ACI/PDM, Crash/Battle/Weather damage, salvage, major/minor maintenance, and 2200 hour phase inspection. Completion target date is 15 October 1973.

(3) Estimated manhours for return of crash/battle/weather damaged aircraft is expected to be complete by 1 November 1973. Recommendations and plans for returning identified aircraft to a serviceable condition will be provided by 15 December 1973.

(4) Plans for Jet Engine Intermediate Maintenance (JEIM) Sites have been completed and equipment requirements identified for each location. A survey of jet engines by location and condition will be completed by 4 October 1973. Aircraft engine data will be prepared for computer application with completion target date of 15 October 1973. SAAMA has provided recommended stock levels for bench stock and rotables. Items are in process of being requisitioned. Action is expected to be completed by 10 October 1973. Requisitions for items to support 179 day stock level required for depot overhaul were submitted on priority II request to respective AMAs prior to 24 September 1973. This stock level should be adequate to support both JEIM and overhaul for a short period of time until JEIM bench stocks are received.

(5) Survey of the UH-1H fleet reveals that 297 2200 hour phase inspections will be required in FY 74. Currently, 39 inspections are scheduled at Air Vietnam and 42 at ALC, leaving a deficit of 216 inspections. Air Vietnam has agreed to increase production to a maximum output of 168 inspections. Plans are being made to

augment the ALC work force to accept the balance for a total ALC output of 129 inspections. Request for amendment to increase Air Vietnam contract to cover the 168 inspections will be forwarded for approval by 15 October 1973.

(6) EC-47 Electronic Surveillance Equipment (Bravo Equipment) has been a continuing problem. In addition to the normal supply support and maintenance manning and skill level problems, difficulties are being experienced in identifying malfunctioning systems. This is primarily caused by failure of flight crews to write up and accurately identify malfunction symptons of the Bravo (rear end sub-systems). One area that has caused repeated problems is C-12 compass calibration and maintenance. Contractor engineering technical services type personnel have been requested to provide technical assistance and training on this sub-system. The additional contract requirement is currently under evaluation by PACAF and AFLC.

(7) The C-7 fleet maintenance continues to be a major problem due to the extremely low level of material support available for this weapon system. Maintenance manhours to meet mission requirements are magnified beyond reason due to cannibalization of major and minor components including engines and major aircraft flight surfaces. Normal day-to-day organizational and intermediate maintenance must be neglected to meet the urgent mission requirement, thus the total fleet is deteriorating. Considerable management effort has been applied to the C-7 during this reporting period. It is hoped the material support will improve in the next reporting period as a result of the emphasis placed on the C-7 by the General Officers Logistics Vietnamization review and actions taken by VNAF and DAO.

(8) Aircraft corrosion seems to be a problem throughout the VNAF fleet. Increasing emphasis has been placed on improvement of corrosion treatment and control. Improved wash rack facilities and corrosion control training is required at all bases. DAO Civil Engineering is developing facilities improvement projects which include wash rack facilities. Corrosion control training requirements are being reviewed and will be included in the revised FY 74 contractor training program.

b. VNAF Base Civil Engineering (BCE) Training.

(1) Training of VNAF-BCE personnel is of utmost importance. Presently, the skill level of assigned personnel is very low. Further training of BCE skills is required to attain a position of self-sufficiency.

(2) Power Production: The follow-on VNAF training program for the power production contract with Kentron has been extended through 31 December 1973 for training of 84 students. A proposal was submitted to extend the contract through 30 June 1974. The current contract provides training and power plant O&M at Da Nang, Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa Air Bases. The contract includes provisions for a technical advisor to assist the VNAF-CE in the operation of power plants at all bases.

(3) Facility Maintenance: O&M training and maintenance of facilities at Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, and Da Nang is provided by PA&E contract 73-C-0072. Kentron Contract 73-C-0043 provides the same at Phu Cat and Phan Rang Air Bases. Proposals have been submitted to add Pleiku, Nha Trang, Binh Thuy and Can Tho to these programs plus extension of contracts through 30 June 1974. The additional six months' training at all VNAF bases is required to accomplish progress toward the required degree of self-sufficiency in base civil engineering functions.

(4) Fire and Rescue Equipment.

(a) The VNAF and LSI contractor are working together to upgrade equipment. Present operational status of assigned equipment is 50 percent. The program will be completed 30 March 1974. We are currently proposing lateral support from 13th AF for critical components/parts required for the immediate in-service restoration of VNAF crash vehicle equipment.

(b) Fire Fighting Evaluation Survey: PACAF and 13th AF provided a Fire Protection Evaluation Team and a survey of all VNAF bases was made, ending on 25 September 1973. The overall general conditions were evaluated very poor. VNAF Headquarters is taking steps, with the assistance of AOSAF-E, to correct fire fighting, rescue equipment and supply deficiencies. Training of VNAF fire

fighting personnel has been intensified and a more equitable distribution of chemicals is being made. Tan Son Nhut is awaiting delivery of 100 drums of foam which is available for emergencies from the Civilian Air Port Fire Department. Procurement of spare parts is to be given a high priority. Both LSI and VNAF have provided two specialized mechanics at each base to repair and maintain fire crash and rescue equipment. Check lists for use of driver-operators to perform preventive maintenance are being translated and will be furnished VNAF upon completion.

(5) Preventative Maintenance: The VNAF BCE at each base have been contacted and have agreed to establish a preventative maintenance program. Provisions for this program will be incorporated in the modification to the existing contracts and may extend some contracts to 1 July 1974.

(6) Housekeeping: Housekeeping conditions of the base facilities have been discussed with the VNAF and corrective action to alleviate this problem will be taken immediately.

(7) Translation of AFM 85-1: A simplified version of AFM 85-1 was received from PACAF on 1 October 1973 and is presently being translated. This task should be completed by 22 October 1973 for submittal to VNAF for their evaluation and use in BCE operations.

(8) Local National Personnel: Recruitment of DAO local national engineers and administrative support personnel is progressing. Problems are being experienced in attracting qualified engineers due to the low pay scale for Vietnamese civil servants. Of the initial 24 LN personnel requirements, 17 have been selected, eight are presently in place and receiving OJT, by U. S. counterparts, and nine are being processed for Tan Son Nhut base clearance. Referrals by CPO for interview and selection for the remaining seven spaces are pending. Estimated date for completion of all LN recruitment is 1 November 1973.

(9) Facility Utilization Survey: Three PACAF representatives are scheduled to arrive 9 October 1973 to assist DAO/AOSAF-E and VNAF representatives in conducting

a facility utilization survey. The survey is scheduled from 24 October 1973 to 8 December 1973. Disposing, sterilizing and pickling of those facilities not needed is scheduled for completion by 1 September 1974. A plan to consolidate into smaller areas will be completed and one-time projects submitted for PACAF approval by 15 December 1973.

(10) Manning the VNAF-DE is currently reviewing their BCE manning requirements and, when completed, will be reviewed by AOSAF-E. Manning is presently being augmented at five bases and by 1 January 1974 the four remaining bases will be up to strengths.

(11) Certification of VNAF OJT Trainees: Sixty-four trainees (48 power house operators and 16 high voltage linemen) are scheduled for certification by the VNAF-DE, AOSAF-E and contractor personnel on 1 October 1973. The 48 operators are assigned to the power plant in which they were trained. The 16 high voltage lineman were distributed throughout the VNAF Air Bases, RVN.

(12) Military Construction Program Status:

(a) The Military Construction Program (MCP) includes thirty projects. of which three have been completed__BNN 35-3V. 36-3V and SCT 10-3V. One project. SCT 11-3V, has been cancelled due to relocation of Soc Trang mission to Can Tho. Project PLK 8-3V, Construction of POL tanks, has been approved and is being advertised for contract award. Twenty-five projects are under construction. Nineteen new projects for 1974 have been identified by VNAF at an estimated cost of 5.7 million dollars.

(b) Maintenance Repair and Minor Construction Program Status: The FY 73 Maintenance Repair and Minor Construction (MRMC) Progra- consists of sixty-eight projects, of which eight have been completed--four projects at Soc Trang and one at Nha Trang were cancelled

and forty-seven are under construction. Eight projects are in design status. Two FY 1974 projects, BNH 60-4V and BNH 61-4V, have been approved for funding, Project BNH 62-4V is pending approval at CINCPACAF. A total of 38 projects are proposed for FY 74 at an estimated cost of 1.2 million dollars.

(c) Construction Slippages: Numerous slippages in construction projects have occurred due to late design completion, advertising and award dates, and the inability of Vietnamese contractors to meet US work standards and scheduled completion dates. Lack of necessary equipment and primitive work methods, plus a shortage of personnel required to accomplish the scope of work contracted, are proving to be major contributing delay factors. Difficulties have also been encountered by the contractors in obtaining base passes for their employees. In critical situations, assistance has been provided in these areas by the Air Force Division and/or DIRCON.

(d) 1971 Dependent Shelter Program Status: The 1972 Dependent Shelter Program consists of 2,000 units. Construction has commenced on 1,850 units, of which 1,640 have been completed and 984 unit are occupied. The use of contractor effort has expedited the program and also provides better construction as well as appearance.

c. Communications-Electronics.

(1) Navigational Aids (NAVAID) and Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) Facilities: Excessive outages being experienced with the NAVAIDs and AC&W facilities are a major concern. Air Defense and Safety of Flight dictate the need for reliable Flight Facilities throughout the RVN. The condition of NAVAIDs and AC&W systems have gradually deteriorated over the years. Several factors have contributed to the present condition. The equipment is old (1950 State of the Art) and has been in a harsh environment for some five to seven years, generally without Depot type overhaul or upgrade. Preventive maintenance has not been effective in stopping deterioration. A shortage of experienced VNAF technicians has compounded the problem. A systematic approach that

provides for both short and long-range benefits is required. A DAO recommended program has been forwarded for CINCPACAF and Air Staff consideration. The program has been developed for three phase action.

(a) Phase One: Immediate action to return CEM facilities to fully operational status. This action includes intensive material management program for all NORS K and L requisitions and In-country movement of NORS items by air. Post techniques will be used to insure accurate accounting of assets.

(b) Phase Two: Consists of a program to change out VNAF mobile CEM systems and major assemblies of AC&W radars with serviceable items. This could be satisfied from worldwide USAF excess, depot resources, and/or WRM assets. A cyclic exchange program would be established with Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC). A joint DAO/PACAF/AFLC team is proposed to perform an immediate inspection/analysis of each VNAF NAVAID and AC&W facility. Based on the finding of the team, a firm program would be developed to accomplish the required restoration. In-country resources, offshore contract, or CONUS AFLC facilities would be utilized. Selected, highly critical assets would be changed out by 1 January 1974.

(c) Phase Three: TRN-6 TACAN systems should be converted to URN-3 configuration housed in a permanent structure. This would enhance maintainability and improve reliability of equipment. The feasibility of replacing obsolete equipment with more modern sets would be evaluated during the Phase Two analysis.

(d) Personnel augmentation will be required in specific specialties to inspect equipment and develop an exchange program. Specialties that will be required are GCA, TACAN, AC&W, a CEM oriented logistic specialist, and a PACAF representative to direct the team efforts. Specialists would be placed on two teams. One team working the North and the other working the Southern RVN bases.

(e) The existing Page Communications contract Statement of Work expires on 30 September. An extension has been approved through 31 October, while a new Statement

of Work is prepared and negotiated. As a result of a joint DAO/PACAF/VNAF survey of NATAID and AC&W sites, continued contractor manning requirements were determined. The survey also indicated that the new Statement of Work must define Contractor Personnel Qualifications and allow on-site contractors to perform production/OJT as well as Emergency On-site Maintenance (EOSM). The new Statement of Work will provide contractor support through 31 March 1974. A re-evaluation of manning requirements will be made in February 1974.

(f) VNAF site technicians, in general, are able to accomplish normal day-to-day maintenance. However, assistance is still required for complex problems, and to maintain certain system components. Solid state type circuitry continues to be a weak area for nearly all the technicians. Both site and Depot personnel require solid state training. This has been addressed to the VNAF and DAO/AF Division will continue to press for the training. VNAF motivation and initiative have improved considerably. Overall, training efforts and programs are well received. Re-alignment of some VNAF site maintenance personnel has contributed considerably toward improved operation. Supply and test equipment calibration/repair problems, however, continue to plague all sites in varying degrees. The VNAF is still experiencing a shortage of qualified NCOs in the management areas, and seven level supervision. As a result of the various training programs, this situation is gradually improving.

(2) Communications-Electronics Master Program (CEMP) --Custodian Authorization/Receipt Listing (CA/RL): A VNAF conducted inventory of equipment is nearly completed. A DAO/Air Force Division/VNAF Inventory Team completed a separate equipment inventory at all bases on 30 September 1973. Data has not yet been correlated. When the compilation of inventory data is completed, VNAF will compile a new machine listing of the CEMP. The importance of this document and its accuracy has been, and is continually stressed to the VNAF. It has been pointed out that future programming, proper distribution of CEM assets and effect-control/monitoring of all assets is dependent upon the CEMP-CA/RL.

(3) Precision Approach Radar (PAR) II Project: The estimated completion date for support construction remains 30 October 1973. However, a possible slippage to 15 November is indicated, due to problems in construction design. Inclement weather has also been a contributing factor for the anticipated delay.

(a) Pacific Communications Area Flight Facilities engineers have conducted a detailed on-site inventory of all equipment items, support material and spares. Primary system components were on-hand; however, two items were damaged and require replacement. Scheme support items could not be located at Tan Son Nhut or the ALC Depot. The VNAF supply inventory is currently being screened to determine if common item support is available locally. A civilian team from the Air Force Communications Service is scheduled to install PAR II system equipment. Concurrently, an FAA team will arrive to monitor the equipment installation and provide OJT for ninety days to the VNAF technicians.

(b) During a discussion with the Directorate of Civilian Aviations-Vietnam, VNAF and FAA representatives installation of the PAR II system was addressed. The system equipment is over twenty years old. and it may not be advisable to install the system. The unit is no longer in production; consequently. replacement items must come from other systems. with the exception of common use components and parts. A second PAR II system was shipped to the ALC Depot to provide parts and component support for the primary system; however. the system has not been tested to establish its current condition. Presently. a Ground Control Approach (GCA) system is utilized at Tan Son Nhut which has a range of sixty miles as compared with the PAR II range of ten miles. The GCA system was overhauled at a CONUS depot during 1971 and is in good condition. If the PAR II system is installed as scheduled, the VNAF will require training in operation and maintenance of the equipment.

(4) AC&W Site Radome Refurbishment: CENTEL Corporation personnel completed the caulking and painting of the radomes at Son Tra Mountain and Tan Son Nhut Air Base AC&W sites. VNAF personnel were instructed by the contractor team to perform installation of scaffoldings, slings, ladders and trained to accomplish interim repairs at the facilities.

(a) The radomes are scheduled for refurbishment on a two to three year basis. However, emergencies such as leaks and damage to the equipment and given immediate attention to preclude further damage and maintain antennas in an operational status. The possibility of awarding a maintenance contract to a local contractor is being investigated. Materials required to perform maintenance services are available through the VNAF supply system.

(b) 302A Key System: A mock-up of the 302A system has been installed at the VNAF Air Training Command School (ATC) at Nha Trang. Twelve VNAF C&E technicians are enrolled in the program which is scheduled for completion on 31 December 1973. The training will provide the VNAF units with a nucleus for establishing an in-house training program, and the necessary expertise to support to key systems at each of the NAVAID facilities.

d. Air Transportation.

(1) VNAF has assume full responsibility for airlift and MATT operations with a minimum of skilled personnel. The contractor is providing guidance and assistance in the operation of the Military Air Transportation Terminals (MATT) at Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa only. VNAF became self sufficient at 7 of the 9 major cargo ports in RVN on 1 July 1973. All operational responsibilities including mobility, pallet build-up, and special cargo handling, were assumed at those ports, at the time.

(2) VNAF is currently 100 percent manned according to the present UMD; however, it is expected that substantial manning increase will occur within the early part of the 2d Quarter FY 74. This increase in the UMD will enable the VNAF to effect complete contractor MATT performance phaseout. The following schedule gives target dates for VNAF input and contractor phaseout:

Tan Son Nhut

DATE	VNAF INPUT	PHASEOUT
1 Nov 73	8	
15 Nov 73		8
15 Dec 73	30	
1 Jan 74		30
1 Mar 74	20	
15 Mar 74		20
30 Jun 74	22	22
	80	80

Bien Hoa

1 Nov 73	8	
15 Nov 73		8
15 Dec 73	10	
1 Jan 74		10
1 Mar 74	6	6
	24	24

(3) 463L Maintenance: Repair of MHE pertaining to cargo port operations is the weakest area of the TSN aerial port. VNAF has assigned one airman to the 463L maintenance shop during this quarter. Future plans include a transfer of this function to LSI on 1 November 1973 and a definite input of VNAF OJT personnel with a VNAF takeover programmed before the end of FY 74 as the ultimate goal.

(4) General Transportation: Although the following subjects do not impact directly on VNAF development, they are addressed as current informational topics and possible future use:

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(a) A dedicated C-141 service has been proposed to operate between Clark AB in the Philippines, Bien Hoa and Saigon. The airlift will provide a direct delivery service and eliminate a large part of the current over-the-road line haul requirement between Saigon and Binh Hoa/Long Binh. Approval of the service is expected momentarily.

(b) Positive action has been taken to develop and implement procedures for compliance with drug, anti-smuggling, anti-hijacking and retrograde cargo decontamination programs. Meeting were held with appropriate Vietnamese Air Force personnel to discuss possible locations for the activities and implementation procedures. A metal detection device is now in use for passenger and baggage inspection. Procedures were implemented whereby all baggage is searched for unauthorized items. A request to renovate the DAO passenger terminal has been initiated and estimated date of completion is 1 December 1973. Baggage search and handling procedures will be improved; inconvenience to passengers will be minimized.

(c) Buildings and areas which would provide suitable space for implementation of a retrograde cargo decontamination program have been identified. Action is being taken to obtain the required building facilities and equipment. The estimated implementation date for the program is 15 December 1973.

(d) It is planned that Vietnamese personnel under American supervision will complete the decontamination process. There will be a requirement for a decontamination program as long as retrograde cargo is shipped from Vietnam to US terminals or on US aircraft. To ensure continuation of the program after departure of American personnel, Vietnamese will be trained to complete all of the duties involved.

e. VNAF Air Munitions Status: The Air Munitions pipeline is now fully operational and resupply is being accomplished on a regular basis. The desired stockage objective has been accomplished. The following schedule shows the current munitions status:

(1) Available Beginning of Quarter 75,251 ST

(2) Expenditures During Quarter 8,862 ST

(3) On-Hand End of Quarter 66,389 ST

(4) VNAF AIM-9 Missile Status: There are currently 302 AIM-9 missiles authorized and in-country. One hundred sixty-four are fully serviceable and 138 are short components such as contact fuzes, serviceable guidance and control units. Action is being taken to replace the reparable units with serviceable units in accordance with the one-for-one replacement criteria for controlled restricted material. The current AIM-9 inventory is made up of B model missiles. Modification to provide AIM-9E capability has been scheduled for thirty-three F-5 aircraft; twenty-seven have been completed. Of the authorized forty-eight E missiles, twenty-four have been called forward to equip twelve aircraft for self defense.

f. Aerial Resupply:

(1) There are 26 isolated RVNAF outposts and bases totally dependent on aerial resupply for continued operation and effectiveness. The approximate locations of the aerial resupply sites in MR 1 (14), MR 2 (5), and MR 3 (7) are shown.

(Figure 11)

(2) VNAF flies 628 sorties per month to deliver 1,110 tons of assorted supplies. This effort supports over 100,000 military and civilian personnel located at the sites. A variety of aircraft including CH-47, UH-1, C-7A, and C-130 are utilized to conduct the resupply. An aerial resupply summary is shown.

(Figure 12)

(3) Unique among the 26 aerial resupply sites is the 92d Ranger Border Defense Battalion Camp at Tonle Cham in Tay Ninh Province of MR 3. This camp is totally dependent upon parachute drop because of enemy activity and antiaircraft capability located in the immediate camp area. The camp itself, measuring only 150 by 130 meters at the widest point, is the drop zone. Due to the enemy antiaircraft threat, the release altitude for


ANNE
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CHUONG NGHIA
MO TAU
DEO HAI VAN
BACH MA
HAU DUC
LAM SON
NUI TRON
SON HA
KHAI HOANG
GIA VUC
PLEI ME
DA M'RONG
DUC PHONG
SONG BE
AN LOC
TONLE CHAM
NUI BA DEN
DON LUAN
(DONG XOAI)
CHON THANH
AIR RESUPPLY
POINTS

figure 11

AERIAL RESUPPLY SUMMARY

	SITES	POPULATION MIL	POPULATION CIV	TOTAL	SORTIES PER MONTH	TOTAL TONS PER MONTH	TYPE DELIVERY
MR - 1	14	5,726	7,925	13,651	264	397	12 HELO 2 FIXED WING
MR - 2	5	2,952	17,269	20,221	196	204	5 HELO 2 FIXED WING
MR - 3	7	13,650	52,863	66,513	136	479	3 HELO 3 FIXED WING 1 AIR DROP
COUNTRY-WIDE		22,328	78,057	100,385	596	1,080	

Figure 12

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parachute bundles is above 10,000 feet. The Seek Point radar system is utilized for guidance. The initial recovery rate of bundles dropped from C-123 aircraft was 18%. This increased to 50% as proficiency improved. In July, when VNAF transitioned to utilizing C-130 aircraft, the recovery rate dropped to 35%. However, this is expected to improve as aircrews gain experience.

g. Contract Management.

(1) Contract Administration Services are provided for 50 contracts (27 firms) with an estimated value of $38.2 million. With the minor exception of some individual programs, the major effort under all of the aforementioned contracts is directed toward training. The objective of these various training programs is to assist the VNAF in becoming proficient in the various skills required to attain self-sufficiency. While some problems still exist with regard to such areas as training facilities, supplies and VNAF student input, these are being overcome as rapidly as possible. A training seminar in Contract Administration is presently being conducted by the Air Force Contract Management Branch. This course is being attended by DAO (US and Vietnamese) employees and VNAF staff personnel. Objective of the course is to train VNAF personnel in contract administration procedures.

(2) A study has been initiated to determine if our present system of utilizing part-time government representatives is adequate to provide the required visibility and responsiveness in key functional areas. The findings from this study will be evaluated and weighed against current years contractual requirements and availability of qualified personnel. The study will be expanded to include an investigation into the possibility of utilizing contracting officer representatives on a full-time basis in lieu of part-time representatives on selected contracts.

7. (C) TRAINING.

a. Vietnamese Air Force Offshore Training Program.

(1) Objectives of the VNAF FY 74 Offshore Training Program are:

(a) Continuation of fixed and rotary wing pilot training within the capability of the VNAF to provide qualified candidates in order to achieve 100% manning of all squadrons.

(b) Provision of training necessary to support new equipment and systems peculiar to VNAF.

(c) Revitalization of the in-country schools by training replacement technician level instructors.

(d) Improvement of managerial efficiency by supporting professional and resources management training.

(2) To achieve the above objectives, the following offshore training was programmed for FY 74:

	Aircrew Training	Students Programmed	Total Cost
(a)	Rotary Wing Aviator	432	$10,847,520
	UH-1 Instructor Pilots	16	252,320
	Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) - T41/T37	396	11,337,480
	F5E Instructor Pilots	38	1,300,920
	T-37 Instructor Pilots	5*	50,100
	A-37 Combat Crew Training School	89*	2,411,010
	Undergraduate Navigator	12*	187,080
(b)	Operational Training CONUS	67	217,400
(c)	Communications-Electronic Training CONUS	57	301,770

*Filled by students already in CONUS.

		Students Programmed	Total Cost
(d)	Maintenance Training CONUS	126	$ 233,540
(e)	Logistics Training CONUS	38	87,690
(f)	Administrative Training CONUS	10	46,870
(g)	Professional/Specialized Training CONUS	86	2,814,860
(h)	Orientation Training CONUS		302,500
(i)	Field Training Services		255,340
(j)	Extraordinary Expenses		36,010
(k)	Other Training Support		38,810
	TOTAL	1266	$30,721,220

(3) In FY 1/74, 324 students were programmed and 320 students processed for CONUS training. The cancellation of only 4 spaces in 1st Quarter FY 74 indicates more realistic programming and VNAF emphasis in the selection, preparation and processing of candidates for offshore training. Following is a list of training spaces programmed/filled during FY 1/74:

		Programmed	Filled
(a)	Aircrew		
	Rotary Wing Aviator	108	108
	UH-1 Instructor Pilot	12	12
	UPT-T41/T37	60	60
	F5E Instructor Pilot	8	8
(b)	Operational Training CONUS	22	22
(c)	Communications-Electronics Training CONUS	30	26

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		Programmed	Filled
(d)	Maintenance Training CONUS	50	50
(e)	Logistics Training CONUS	10	10
(f)	Professional/Specialized Training CONUS	24	24

(4) A major effort of the FY 74 offshore training program is CONUS training for a cadre of VNAF pilots and maintenance personnel to support the introduction of the F-5E aircraft into the weapons system inventory. During FY 74 38 F-5A qualified pilots will receive F-5E instructor pilot training and return to Vietnam to conduct the transition and combat crew training. Two additional F-5A qualified pilots, for a total of 40, will be trained in FY 75. Fifty-four maintenance personnel will also receive CONUS F-5E technical training in 12 hard-core skill areas. This training will provide VNAF with an instructor capability to initially work with the 14-man Contract Field Service Team (CFST) scheduled to begin in-country F-5E maintenance training on 1 November 1973. Class one, 8 weeks duration, will be conducted by the CFST with VNAF personnel acting as interpreters and observing the teaching methods and techniques of the CFST personnel. Class two, same duration, will be conducted by VNAF instructors with the CFST personnel monitoring and evaluating the instruction. Class three and subsequent classes will be conducted by VNAF. The Commander of VNAF has placed the highest priority on both CONUS and in-country training in support of the introduction of the F-5E aircraft. The training plan, if followed, should assure a successful introduction of the weapons system from a training viewpoint.

(5) The in-country English language training requirement continues to be a minor problem for the VNAF in providing candidates for the FY 74 offshore training program for nonflying personnel. Because of operational commitments, VNAF division commanders are reluctant to release candidates for in-country language training with sufficient lead time to qualify them for CONUS training. This results in a requirement to cancel or reschedule

training. Progress is being made in this area as only 4 spaces were cancelled in FY 1/74.

b. VNAF In-Country Training Program.

(1) VNAF formal in-country training. On 30 September 1973 there was a total of 6,858 VNAF personnel in all types of VNAF conducted training in RVN. During FY 1/74, 3,432 VNAF personnel entered formal in-country training and 2,707 personnel graduated from training. One hundred twenty-eight personnel were eliminated from formal training courses for medical, academic or disciplinary reasons. During the same period of time, 877 personnel entered into formal VNAF on-the-job training (OJT) programs producing 621 graduates. A total of 877 personnel is currently in OJT. In addition, there were 709 basic military recruits entered in Basic Military Training and 727 graduates. There are presently 1,491 basic recruits in training as of 30 September 1973.

(2) The formal VNAF training is being conducted at HQ VNAF, the Air Training Center (ATC) at Nha Trang, the Sub-Technical Schools located at Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut and at four of the Air Divisions. The jet UPT flying program is conducted at ATC Nha Trang and Phan Rang. The UH-1 helicopter flying program is conducted at Binh Thuy and Bien Hoa. During the next quarter the UH-1 training will expand to a third location at Da Nang. The VNAF OJT is being conducted at each of the six Air Divisions.

(a) The following is a summary of personnel in formal training as indicated for the quarter ending 30 September 1973:

PILOT TRAINING	ENTRY	ELIM	GRAD	IN TNG
T-41, T-37	34	1	0	90
UH-1	127	4	0	123
Advanced O-1	10	0	10	10
Liaison Pilot	0	0	0	27
TOTAL	171	5	10	250

TECHNICAL SCHOOLS	ENTRY	ELIM	GRAD	IN TNG
ATC, Nha Trang	[illegible]	27	382	1125
3d Air Div, Bien Hoa	[illegible]	0	29	34
5th Air Div, Tan Son Nhut	20	1	38	35
ALC, Bien Hoa	237	0	12	233
Sub-Tech Sch, Tan Son Nhut	671	15	741	1024
Sub-Tech Sch, Bien Hoa	156	0	94	257
TOTAL	1676	43	1296	2708
COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS SCHOOLS				
ATC, Nha Trang	239	25	256	325
HQ VNAF, Tan Son Nhut	0	7	24	61
TOTAL	239	32	280	386
GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOL				
ATC, Nha Trang	336	19	311	133
3d Air Div, Bien Hoa	55	9	36	110
5th Air Div, Tan Son Nhut	303	14	151	140
6th Air Div, Pleiku	0	0	52	0
ALC, Bien Hoa	263	2	279	253
TOTAL	957	44	829	636
CIVIL ENGINEERING SCHOOL				
ALC, Bien Hoa	285	1	103	369
3d Air Div, Bien Hoa	32	0	0	32
TOTAL	317	1	103	401
CREW TRAINING AND AERIAL GUNNERS				
Sub-Tech Sch, Tan Son Nhut	0	3	117	37
AIR COMMAND & STAFF SCH, TSN	72	0	72	72

(b) In addition to the above training, four Air Divisions, ATC Nha Trang and Tan Son Nhut conducted Basic Military Training for VNAF NCOs and basic recruits from 1 July through 30 September 1973, as indicated below:

	ENTRY	ELIM	GRAD	IN TNG
BASIC MILITARY TRAINING (NCO)				
ATC, NHA	64	0	0	380
Sub-Tech Sch, TSN	0	0	0	466
5th Air Div, TSN	78	0	0	78
6th Air Div, PKU	152	0	0	152
BASIC MILITARY TRAINING (RECRUIT)				
ATC, NHA	0	0	318	0
2d Air Div, NHA	117	0	0	117
3d Air Div, BNH	298	0	0	298
5th Air Div. TSN	0	0	346	0
TOTAL	709	0	727	1491

(3) OJT (Other than by contractor) is being conducted at each Air Division and VNAF facility. This training has a low priority by VNAF Commanders and reporting procedures are lax and result in inaccurate and incomplete assessments. It is estimated that it will be several years at best before a comprehensive and thorough OJT program will be operational throughout VNAF due to the tendency of command to rely on offshore and contractor type training for its critical skills and in-country formal training for their lower skill level requirements and skill level upgrading. also, the historic fact that VNAF commanders consistently give priority to operational and duty requirements over OJT continues to keep the VNAF OJT programs very low key. Continued emphasis at all levels of command will be required by VNAF if the program is to have any major impact on the VNAF training requirements.

(4) The C-130 training program initiated during Project Enhance/Enhance Plus to train flight crews and maintenance personnel for 32 C-130s continues. The training program required that 32 complete flight crews, including 12 instructor qualified crews be trained. Supply support and critical maintenance problems continue to inhibit the availability of aircraft and has impacted on the programmed training of the crews as well as the ground maintenance personnel. During quarter just ended,

current status reflects that there are now 20 Phase II qualified crews (air drop and short field landings), an increase of 9 crews during this reporting period. There are 55 aircraft commanders, 60 co-pilots and 44 flight engineers qualified for airlift missions. Because of the shortage of operational aircraft, it has been necessary to rotate crews in order to maintain crew proficiency. Even though steady progress continues, the C-130 flying training program is still considered less than satisfactory.

(5) The Air Training Center (ATC), Nha Trang has the responsibility for flying and technical training for VNAF and formal training in most VNAF career fields. The Center is subdivided into six schools: the Flying School, Technical School, Communications and Electronics School, Military School, the General Service School and the English Language School. ATC instructors have the technical and specialized skills required by VNAF to train students but are hampered in their mission by fragmentation of some of the training effort to other locations, lack of realistic logistic support, lack of coordination on training goals and objectives from HQ VNAF and totally inadequate VNAF funding for maintenance and repairs of their facilities. Coupled with these problems are some very real, yet subtle political intrigues and pressures between HQ VNAF, the 2d Air Division and ATC. This problem manifests itself by the two Sub-Technical Schools located at Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut and the VNAF Command and Staff School which are theoretically a part of ATC, but are actually under the direct control of DCS/Training, HQ VNAF. The deployment of the UPT T-37 program to Phan Rang and the relocation of the VNAF Command and Staff School to Tan Son Nhut and the Civil Engineer School to Bien Hoa represent recent examples of the fragmentation of the ATC training efforts.

(a) The Flying School at ATC consists of 21 T-41 training aircraft and 11 O-1 trainers. This school historically has produced liaison pilots at an average rate of 80 per year. The program for liaison pilots consists of 8 weeks of Ground School, 80 hours in the T-41 and 70 hours in the O-1 and requires a total of 40 weeks for completion. At graduation the pilots are assigned to

operational units where they undergo tactical training. The quality of training is excellent and the attrition is only 9%.

(b) The new T-37 UPT program consists of 18 weeks of the T-41 ground school and T-41 flying training at ATC, Nha Trang. The cadets are then moved to Phan Rang where they begin 24 weeks of T-37 flying training. The T-37 school has a total of 24 T-37 aircraft of which 22 have been transferred to Phan Rang. The first class which was to begin 1 July 1973 was delayed until 1 August due to the delay in preparing the T-37 aircraft. The first class was scheduled to have 20 cadets, but due to the shortage of training aircraft, the initial class has only 15 cadets. There have been numerous difficulties in establishing this first jet UPT program due to the lack of spare parts for the T-37 and the move and establishment of the new training squadron to Phan Rang. The program has been further hampered by the lack of life support equipment and trainers. The life support equipment for the T-37 program was not requisitioned far enough in advance to be available when the program started. There is normally a 14 month lead time required for this equipment and, while it is reportedly on the way, the items are not scheduled to be in-country before the middle of 1974. At the present time, the T-37 training squadron at Phan Rang has only 8 flying helmets and oxygen masks and no parachutes. The instructor pilots are resorting to borrowing parachutes from the A-37 squadrons in order to fly training missions. Oxygen has also become a limiting factor during the month of September 1973. The oxygen is issued to the 2d Air Division at Phan Rang and is subsequently allocated equally to the 3 A-37 squadrons and the T-37 squadron and the shortage during this reporting period has resulted in the cancellation of some training. Missions. During this reporting period 216 training missions out of 364 scheduled have been cancelled due to lack of life support equipment, (some is available at ALC but issued, controlled and maintained by VNAF HQ) lack of oxygen and maintenance problems peculiar to the T-37. The program is now 60 days behind schedule.

(c) Although all of the training aids for the T-37 program were requisitioned by Air Force Advisory Group

prior to the ceasefire and subsequently delivered to RVN, none of the trainers or training aids have been located except the T-4 instrument trainer which was delivered to ATC, Nha Trang. This instrument trainer is vital to the T-37 flying training program, but cannot be installed because, (1) the installation kit is missing and cannot be located and (2), the building scheduled to house this trainer has not been refurbished to receive the trainer. The other system trainers and training aids also vital to the program simply cannot be located even though all indications are that they have been delivered in-country.

(d) As the T-37 and A-37 are somewhat dissimilar, the use of the T-37 has produced a requirement for retraining of maintenance personnel to maintain the T-37 aircraft as well as the introduction of new supply items into the supply system. The beginning of this program constitutes an important contribution to the VNAF pilot training program and as a result of the competence of the instructor personnel and Flying School Director, this program is in progress and is expected to improve as experience is gained, trainers installed and equipment issued.

(e) Another highly important first for VNAF is the inauguration of the UH-1 Undergraduate Pilot Training program. The program is designed to train 357 UH-1 co-pilots by 30 March 1975. The course started as scheduled with the first 41 cadets completing their ground school at ATC, Nha Trang in July. The flight aptitude screening consisting of 20 hours of U-17 training at Binh Thuy and UH-1 training started on time at Bien Hoa in August. The second UH-1 class began flying training at Binh Thuy in September and the next class is to begin UH-1 flying training at Da Nang in October. This program is off to an excellent start and could easily set the standards for a total in-country effort to train all UPT pilots in-country. The program is totally lacking in training aids and instrument trainers, but the superior competence of the instructor pilots and the school personnel has resulted in an excellent beginning of a vital program.

(f) The Technical School at ATC Nha Trang trains in 23 aircraft maintenance AFSCs and has an extensive and impressive program. The school produces in excess of

2000 graduates per year and is currently operating at maximum capacity with 1125 students in training. The school is excellent and the only major problem is the shortage of printed student materials and the gradual deterioration of the buildings due to lack of VNAF funds for repairs and maintenance. This school has produced 382 graduates this quarter.

(g) The Communications and Electronics School, ATC Nha Trang trains in 23 electronic AFSCs and is excellent. It trains almost 1,000 students per year and is operating near capacity at this time. The facilities are better than average for ATC because of two large Butler type buildings constructed for the school by the USAF in 1968. This school has produced 256 graduates this quarter.

(h) The two Sub-Technical Schools located at Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut are designed to train at the 3 and 5 skill level in a total of 8 AFSCs. The school at Bien Hoa is marginal at best due in part to a total lack of training aids. The Tech School at Bien Hoa has produced 94 graduates during this quarter. There is a plan to transfer this school to Tan Son Nhut in the near future, at which time it will be merged with the Sub-Tech School at Tan Son Nhut. The Sub-Technical School at Tan Son Nhut teaches to the 3 and 5 skill level in 4 AFSCs and has a capacity of 1000 students at any given time. The TSN school facilities are marginal, crowded, poorly lighted and maintained. The training aids are in disrepair and in most cases not usable. The school has graduated 741 students this quarter. This Tech School is also scheduled to relocate in the near future and will combine with the Bien Hoa school when adequate facilities are located on Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The evaluation of this school is considered marginal.

(i) There are two General Service Schools: one at Nha Trang and one at ALC Bien Hoa. The General Services School at ATC Nha Trang trains to the 3, 5 and 7 level in the Personnel and Administrative AFSCs and has an annual capacity of 1200 students. The ATC school has graduated 311 students this quarter and is rated satisfactory. The General Service School at ALC Bien Hoa

trains in 6 AFSCs in the supply and general maintenance administrative fields. The school has an annual capacity of about 700 students and has produced 279 graduates this quarter. The school at ALC Bien Hoa is rated satisfactory. The 3d, 5th and 6th Air Divisions also conduct General Service Training and have collectively graduated 250 students this quarter.

(j) The Civil Engineer School. Again there are actually two of these schools: one at ATC, Nha Trang and one at ALC, Bien Hoa. HQ VNAF plans to consolidate the school at Nha Trang with the school at ALC, Bien Hoa because of the reported inadequate classroom facilities at Nha Trang. The school at ALC, Bien Hoa reported 103 graduates during the quarter.

(k) The Basic Military School at Nha Trang trains not only basic recruits but conducts basic cadet and NCO training as well. This school has an annual capacity of about 1,000 students and has graduated 381 students this quarter. This school is rated excellent.

(6) Conclusions: The VNAF in-country training program covers most of the spectrum of specialized and general training required for a modern Air Force. While the various training programs are fraught with deficiencies in training materials for students and training aids, most training goals are being met, if somewhat delayed. The fragmentation of effort and lack of planning and preparation is disconcerting to an outside observer, but VNAF seems barely aware of the inconveniences. there are deficiencies in logistical support, Civil Engineering support and planning coordination, all of which interfere with efficient training programs, but the training continues and the ambitious flying programs look encouraging at this point. Barring a major enemy offensive which would preempt training priorities, VNAF training can conceivably become self-sufficient within the next few years.

8. (S) CONCLUSIONS.

a. Significant progress has been made in the Vietnamization program; however, many actions are yet to be accomplished before the VNAF attains the desired degree of logistic self-sufficiency.

b. Construction slippages of [illegible]tinent ALC facilities, from 2 to 6 months, will im[illegible] on both programmed training and production. Although the ALC has some of the finest facilities in SEA, maximum utilization by the VNAF is many months in the future. This deficit can only be filled by VNAF, at the conclusion of extensive training, and after several months/years of practical experience.

c. Manning at ALC has increased significantly since February 1973 (from 49% to 91%). Currently the ALC is authorized 6618 personnel and has 6053 assigned. The increases have prediminately been with unskilled personnel, which imposes an intensive training requirement for approximately 3000 personnel. Although the current manning figure is impressive, the officer manning remains constant at 50 percent, and the NCO manning is equally bad. There are significant voids in both top and middle management, which can only be rectified by months and years of development, or by drastic reductions of operational units. The DAO and contractor personnel are presently helping to fill the management voids, but many areas are lacking due to US personnel complement constraints.

d. Concepts for developing the ALC changed during the past year, particularly production and training. At the beginning of this year, emphasis was on production from the VNAF and the various contractors. With the realization of the total training requirement, contracts were rewritten to emphasize training, resulting in limited production derived from that training. Subsequently, adjustments were made to gain more production, effecting hands-on training, rather than solely over-the-shoulder training. The training needs are great and production from the ALC is extremely important to support the VNAF. Due to US manpower limitations in RVN, and phaseout objectives, the in-country complement of DAO and Contractors is inadequate to train, produce, and fill the voids in VNAF top and middle management. In order to attain programmed self-sufficiency within suspect time constraints, training must be accomplished with production. Contractor strength should consist of sufficient personnel to achieve mission required

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production from available facilities. The DAO complement should be increased sufficiently to accomplish objectives within an acceptable time frame.

e. Through the VNAF, two basic problem areas can be observed:

(1) The lack of adequately trained middle management personnel.

(2) The logistic support effectiveness to operate/maintain and sustain the 66 squadron force.

In both areas, numerous actions are underway to try to overcome these limitations.

f. An analysis and evaluation of the VNAF self-sufficiency progress is conducted every six months by a Board of U.S. Air Force General Officers. Results of the board's analysis will dictate the required actions and tasks to be accomplished by priority in the succeeding six month period. The periodic progress analysis of the board will continue as long as the Republic of Vietnam is Military Assistance Service Funded in lieu of the Military Assistance Program.

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CHAPTER 7

VIETNAMESE NAVY (VNN)

1. (C) PERSONNEL:

a. Authorization. The 30 September 1973 VNN total authorization was 40,181 with 5,714 officers, 13,643 NCO's, and 20,824 enlisted.

b. Strength. The personnel strength as of 30 September 1973 was 40,207. This figure includes 5,509 officers and 391 midshipmen, 13,308 NCO's and 20,999 enlisted personnel. The latter figure includes pipeline and recruits.

2. (C) PERSONNEL READINESS:

a. The VNN has continued training activities, including fleet exercises, and demonstrated their capabilities by providing Naval Gunfire Support to ground operations on 43 days of the quarter, as well as actual involvement in a number of fire fights in the Riverine area of operations, which are discussed under paragraph 7 below.

b. On 14 and 15 July a VNN WHEC, HQ-6, conducted a rescue of seven Nationalist Chinese fishermen from a reef in the Spratly Island Group after their fishing boat had gone aground and sunk in heavy seas, and the incident was reported by a USN patrol aircraft from Cubi Point. Upon reaching the scene, HQ-6 experienced extreme difficulty in effecting the rescue due to the rough sea. One whaleboat was swamped, dumping the crewmen into the water and causing the loss of a PRC 25 radio. Fortunately, the remaining whaleboat was launched successfully and was able to retrieve the crewmen of both the first whaleboat and the sunken fishing boat. The Chinese crewmen were brought to Saigon and turned over to the Chinese Embassy. This operation was a graphic illustration of the courage, seamanship and willingness to undertake personal risks of a representative unit of the VNN and is another indication of the state of personnel readiness.

3. (C) EQUIPMENT STATUS OF SHIPS AND CRAFT:

a. Authorized Strength. The authorized number of ships and craft as of 30 September 1973 was 1,547.

b. Current Strength. The VNN authorized strength of ships and craft as of 30 September 1973 is 1,547. The actual inventory figures vary from month to month due to a combination of factors--losses, successful salvage of previously reported losses, and faulty reporting from field units. A program has been undertaken by VNN Logistics Bloc (N4) to purify the records and reconcile the actual number on hand with inventory records by HQ hull number. It is anticipated that this project will be completed prior to the next quarterly report. The following breakdown by operational category is considered to be accurate in the aggregate within plus or minus two percent and to represent the most meaningful grouping by mission and class:

(1) Coastal Surveillance		408
Outer Barrier (DER, WHEC, PCE)	17	
Inner Barrier (PGM, WPB, PCF, LSIL, Coastal Raider, Junk Force)	391	
(2) Harbor Defense (Pickett, PBR, LCPL, Boston Whaler, Vedette)		110
(3) Riverine (ATC, ASPB, CCB, PBR, LCM, LCMM, MON, LDNN)		755
(4) Logistic Support		274
Repair (YR, YRBM, AFDL, YD, ARL)	17	
Long Lift (LST, LSSL, LSM, YFR, YOG)	24	
Short Lift (LCU, LCM, LCVP)	133	
Utility/Tug (LCM, YTL, YTM, BW, Utility)	69	
Miscellaneous (APL, AGP, FB, YW, etc.)	31	
		1,547

4. (C) LOGISTICS:

a. General. The joint Navy Division DAO/VNN Logistics Development Plan for resolution of 19 major logistics issues pertaining to the attainment of VNN self-sufficiency, promulgated jointly by the VNN CNO and Chief, Navy Division, DAO on 30 June 1973, is progressing satisfactorily. These major issues have been further divided into sub-issues totalling 72. Status of the 72 sub-issues as of 30 September 1973 was as follows:

Resolved	1
Cancelled	3
Progressing on schedule	52
Disposition not yet decided	16

Future assessments will track the progress of these issues until all have been resolved.

b. LSB/ISB/ASB Technical Management.

(1) A Coastal Radar Improvement Plan (CRIP) was developed by a team from Naval Shore Electronics Engineering Agency, Pacific (NAVSEEAPAC) and Naval Shore Electronics Engineering Activity, Philippines (NAVSEEACT-PHIL), and presented to the VNN in August. The VNN CNO accepted the plan and promulgated it for implementation by a joint VNN/DAO team under the direction of a VNN Commander assigned as Project Officer. To date 87 fact sheets have been prepared delineating a wide range of problems affecting the system. After screening of the fact sheets has been completed an Action Officer will be designated in each problem area to initiate detailed investigations and develop necessary remedial plans. As an immediate remedial action, interim antenna pedestal overhaul facility plans have been prepared and submitted to Mare Island Naval Shipyard for review. Development of overhaul parts loading requirements are approximately 60 percent complete. Further progress is awaiting input data from Mare Island. A Bill of Materiel for tools and general supplies has been prepared. An inventory of materiel on-hand has been conducted and requirements identified, and requisitions are being prepared to meet these requirements. In conjunction with this activity, a plan has been developed to provide overhaul capability at the Electronics Repair Center, Nha Be for the AN/TPS-62 Radar System. Overhaul procedure documentation for this system is being collected, and supply loading requirements are also being determined. It is anticipated

that two buildings with a total floor space of approximately 3,600 square feet will be made available for the facility.

(2) A plan is under development to enable the VNN to absorb all 3d and 4th echelon maintenance of approximately 465 ARVN watercraft concurrently with the termination of the present Vinnell contract on 31 December 1973. Preparations have been made to provide overlap and phase-in of VNN action as the contractor phases out. A finalized agreement between the ARVN and VNN for this effort remains to be worked out to delineate the scope of work and responsibilities of each for the program. Present plans are for the contractor to stop accepting ARVN craft into the repair facility on 1 November 1973 and to complete all in-process work orders by 1 December 1973.

(3) VNN has had responsibility for 5th echelon maintenance of the ARVN craft since termination of the U.S. Navy Master Ship Repair Contract Office (MSRCO) on 28 February 1973. Seven of the 13 LCM-8's scheduled for overhaul were completed. Six scheduled for September were delayed due to preparations for VNN Navy Day. With the concerted attention now being applied, the schedule is expected to recover within the next reporting period.

(4) A continuing program is underway by DAO to assist the VNN to attain self-sufficiency in the area of shipboard Planned Maintenance Systems (PMS). Technical teams from Navy Division have been visiting various bases to pinpoint weaknesses. Various discrepancies were found to exist. The more significant of these were as follows:

(a) PMS training has not been properly implemented at the base level. Some bases have not formed PMS teams.

(b) Conflicts of interest are arising whereby members of an inspection team are assigned to inspect sections to which they have primary assignment. PMS inspection teams should be relieved of all other duties in order to avoid this situation.

(c) Unqualified officers are being assigned to head PMS inspection teams.

(d) VNN personnel trained in PMS continue to be transferred to unrelated assignments. This generates a

need for undue PMS training and hinders the capability of VNN commanders to effectively manage the maintenance of their ships, small craft, and industrial plant equipment.

(e) PMS maintenance requirements have not been developed for some equipment in the VNN inventory.

(5) Installation of 20 and 40mm mounts has been completed on five WHEC's (HQ-5, 6, 15, 16 and 17) and two DER's (HQ-1 and 4), and will be completed on HQ-2 and 3 on a "when available" basis. All of these weapons were in-country prior to the effective date of the ceasefire agreement. Also, a program for installation of MK19 MOD 1 automatic grenade launchers on various craft is well underway, with 200 of 252 planned installations already completed.

(6) A Diesel Engine Overhaul Training School operated under a contract awarded by the Naval Ships System Command (NAVSHIPS) was organized at Logistic Support Base (LSB), Nha Be, to consist of four six-week courses. The first class graduated on 27 July 1973 and the second in mid-September. The VNN has now announced plans to continue this school for at least two years. Navy Division is continuing to stress to the VNN that the school should be retained as a permanent training facility, and has recommended that transmission overhaul be added to the curriculum and the course be lengthened by two weeks. The VNN is studying this recommendation but has made no decision. VNN instructors have been trained concurrently with the first two classes and responsibility for instruction is being transferred to them beginning with the third class. Involvement of US instructors will terminate at the end of the fourth class.

(7) Deterioration of the antenna field and excessive down-time of teleprinter conversion equipment has occurred at the VNN Communications Station, Cam Ranh Bay. Probable causes of this problem are inadequate maintenance of antennas, which are exposed to salt air corrosion, and repetitive failure of high-to-low level teleprinter converters. Corrective action now underway includes investigation of the feasibility of converting teleprinter equipment to high level keying, and elimination of the requirement for converters, which were formerly required for low-level keying to comply with USN cryptographic security requirements when this was an USN Communications Station. Determination of level of effort

and DAO assistance required to effect restoration of the antennas is also underway. Preliminary planning data, including availability of cable and antenna rigger assistance, has been requested from NAVSEEACTPHIL.

(8) Support base craft overhaul comparisons for 1972 and 1973 showed a slightly higher percentage of scheduled overhauls completed thus far in 1973, as follows:

Completion	19 AUG-16 SEP 72	18 AUG-15 SEP 73	JAN-16 SEP 72	JAN-15 SEP 73
Scheduled	76	72	635	575
Actual	46	42	525	507
% Completed	60%	58%	83%	88%

(9) The VNN Salvage Report indicates that 143 craft have been sunk since 30 March 1972, of which 107 have been salvaged and 30 are now awaiting salvage. Seven craft were sunk this reporting period while nine were salvaged. The VNN has an outstanding record of salvaging sunken craft, as illustrated by the fact that 74% of all craft lost during the past 18 months have been salvaged and an additional 21% have been determined salvageable and are awaiting salvage, for an overall salvage record of 95%.

c. Vietnamese Navy Shipyard (VNNSY).

(1) VNNSY personnel are not trained to maintain and repair equipment for Navigation and Fire Control Auxiliary Input Systems installed in ship/craft transferred to the VNN. This equipment and systems includes Dead Reckoning Tracer (DRT), Dead Reckoning Analyzer (DRA), Pitometer Log Speed Transmitter Indicators, and Wind Intensity Transmitter Indicators. A limited training course on DRA/DRT commenced on 19 September 1973 with six trainees. The lack of materials in-country for alignment and test procedures presently limit training to the theoretical aspects of this equipment. Material has been ordered from Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard to enable construction of a mock-up for practical training.

(2) The VNNSY is having difficulty determining actual status of work accomplished on ships under overhaul and repair. Ship Superintendents and Progressmen surface problems and reasons for delay too late. This causes unwarranted slippage in scheduled completion dates. These actions indicate cognizant personnel are not utilizing work schedules, or monitoring work in progress as

they should. A need also exists for better communications and coordination between the various levels of commands, within the VNN, concerning ship repair and overhaul status and reporting. Recommendations for improvement offered by DAO and now under consideration by the CO, VNNSY, include:

(a) Initiation of a second shift in the inside machine shop to increase productivity and machine time utilization.

(b) Establishment of a VNNSY-wide radio communication net to improve materiel and transportation dispatching. In addition, ship superintendents have begun coordinating more closely with the VNNSY Supply Department personnel to apprise them of specific items which, if not provided, would jeopardize completion of a ship RAV or ROH.

(3) VNNSY Capital Improvements are underway. These include seawall repairs, for which a contract was awarded on 22 September 1973 and is scheduled for completion by 3 December 1973, and a pier extension for which preliminary design has been completed.

d. Construction and Base Maintenance.

(1) Dependent shelter construction lags behind schedule. The goal is completion of 113 units per month, but only 287 units have been completed during the last nine months for a monthly average of 32 units. Efforts are underway by DAO Navy Division to determine how the completion rate can be improved.

(2) A program for replacing all 60KW generators at 15 Coastal Radar Stations is being prepared. The 29 new Libby Welding Co. generators required to implement this program have been received in-country and are in possession of the VNN.

(3) The Coastal Radar Stations at Poulo Obi and De Gi remain inoperative due to power system failures. The VNN Construction and Base Maintenance Bureau has arranged to issue and transport emergency 30KW generators to these sites to alleviate the problem until permanent repairs can be effected.

(4) Construction projects completed and accepted by the VNN operating elements during the reporting period include:

(a) Erosion Control at Ben Luc.

(b) Ferro-Cement Boat Launching Crane Pad at VNNSY.

(c) Sewer System Repairs at LSB Cat Lo.

5. (C) SUPPLY:

a. Work has begun to establish a VNN Supply Corps School at the VNN Training Center, Saigon. All mock-up materials, lesson plans and training aids have been shipped from the U.S. Naval Supply Center (NSC), Oakland, and are expected to arrive in Saigon the last week in October. Classes are scheduled to commence early in November. In the meantime 53 graduates of the two classes conducted at NSC Oakland have been well distributed within the VNN. Each major ship and base in the VNN has at least one of these trained officers. An important bonus gained from conducting the first two classes at Oakland was that the English language requirement resulted in selection of cream of the crop Vietnamese Navy junior officers. Initial reports indicate these officers have quickly assumed their new duties and are performing effectively. Their superior officers have stated that the new officers' knowledge of supply procedures is impressive.

b. A program to identify items and services currently procured from out-of-country sources which are or might be procurable in Vietnam was pursued on an urgent basis during August. The VNNSC initially reviewed individual items with high annual demand quantities and dollar value. A total of 136 line items with an annual demand value of $860,000 were selected as candidates for possible in-country procurement, consolidated with other RVNAF requirements and submitted to the Export Development Department, Ministry of Economy, for review.

c. Order and Shipping Time (OST), CONUS to Vietnam. OST for materials received in July averaged 111 days, dropped to 91 days in August, and rebounded to 111 days in September. Analysis of the transportation time element of OST has shown the average time Sea Land vans were in the company's custody during June, July and August was 42.2 days, 44.6 days and 43.6 days respectively. This time is computed from the day Sea Land received vans in Oakland until delivered to the VNNSC. It appears the high OST for July was attributable to CONUS supply system time elements. The increase in September, however, is due primarily to increased receipt

take up time by the VNNSC. The VNNSC will continue to use 90 days OST in its stock replenishment formula for materials requisitioned from CONUS.

d. A project for relocation of the VNN Supply Center storage element to the Newport area is underway. A number of prefabricated buildings, suitable for use as warehouses, have been identified and reserved at Cam Ranh Bay and elsewhere in RVN. A request for Military Construction funds in the amount of $1,6000,000 to cover the cost of relocating these buildings, erecting them at the Newport site, and providing other facilities at Newport has been prepared and forwarded to CINCPACFLT.

e. Field Assistance Support Team (FAST) Operations. During September 1973, VNN FAST inspected Logistic Support Base Binh Thuy, Intermediate Support Bases Ca Mau and Vinh Long, Coastal Radar Sites at Con Son and Ta Kou, and the Repair Ship HQ-9612 at Ben Luc. The October schedule of FAST inspections includes one LSB, two ISB's and six CRS's.

f. August LSB/ISB Supply Effectiveness.

	Demands	Issues	NIS	NC	Effectiveness Net	Gross	AR
LSB's	11,496	7,372	2,157	1,967	77.4%	64.1%	82.9%
ISB's	3.051	1,925	589	537	76.6%	63.1%	82.4%
Total	14,547	9,297	2,746	2.504	77.2%	63.9%	82.8%

September data not yet available.

g. Vietnamese Navy Data Processing Center (VNNDPC). The VNNDPC is now self-sufficient. The U.S. DOD civilian ADP consultant position is being phased out. In September, the U.S. consultant was on leave for three weeks. During that period, VNNDPC personnel successfully worked through some difficult tasks of trouble shooting, systems analysis and programming, entirely without U.S. assistance.

6. (C) TRAINING:

a. Vietnamese Navy (VNN) NMASF Offshore Training Program.

(1) Objectives of the VNN Offshore Training Program

continue as follows:

(a) To provide advanced professional training for both officers and petty officers to reduce the VNN resources management and middle-management shortfall.

(b) To provide advanced technical training beyond the in-country capability and to train VNN instructors, thus improving the technical training capability and quality of the VNN.

(c) To support the up-grading of VNN medical and dental care in both quality and quantity, thereby enhancing combat effectiveness and, perhaps even more important, nation building by providing medical care for the Vietnamese people.

(d) To enhance the proper utilization of U.S. materials and assets transferred to VNN by providing qualified personnel through proper training and indoctrination.

(2) Resources Management training remains the major deficiency and the major priority of the offshore training program. Increased numbers of trained personnel in the field of logistics are required to improve procurement, maintenance, and transportation of materials, facilities and personnel. Although the Vietnamese Navy has reached its maximum strength, the rapid expansion has resulted in increased demands for trained middle management personnel. Progress has been made, but additional training is necessary to increase the Vietnamese Navy junior officers' management/technical expertise.

(3) Copies of the Planning Guide to be used in developing the FY 75-80 VNN Security Assistance Training Program (SATP) were provided to VNN. Close coordination with VNN counterparts is being maintained to ensure that all essential training that cannot be accomplished in-country is requested. Input for this program also will include training aids, devices, books, maps and publications for FY 75-77.

(4) The following offshore training courses were attended by VNN personnel during 5th Quarter FY 73 (training commencing between July 1 and September 30 as a means of increasing course scheduling flexibility during 1st Quarter).

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NAME OF COURSE	QUANTITY (O=Officer, E=EM)
English Language Training/Electronics Engineering, Advanced PG MS	01
Foreign Officer, Naval Intelligence	04
Naval Staff Course	01
Electrical Engineering BS	02
School Administration Class-C	01
Foreign Officer Supply	02
Math Refresher/Management PG MS	01
Electronics Technician Class-B	E1
Engineman Class-A/General Motors Diesel Technician	E1
Machinery Repairman Class-B	E2

(5) The following offshore training courses were attended by VNN personnel during 1st Quarter FY 74.

NAME OF COURSE	QUANTITY
Destroyer Department Head (Junior Foreign Officer)	02
Special Junior Foreign Officer Supply	054
Observership Medical Officer (OB/GYN)	01
Personnel Management (Non-US)	01
English Language Training/Communication Engineering Basic PG	01
English Language Training/Engineering Electronics Basic PG	01
English Language Training/Naval Engineering Basic PG	01
English Language Training/Ship Salvage Diving Officer	01
Misc TRAPAC Officer Course (Weapons Package)	02
Navy Supply Management (Senior Foreign Officers)	02
Prospective Engineering Officer	01
Hull Technician Class-A, Phases 1 & 2	E2
Machinery Repairman Class-B	E2
Internal Current Electrician's Mate Class-A	E2
Hospital Corpsman Class-A/Preventive Medicine Technician Class-C	E1
Electronics Technician Class-B	E1
Engineman Class-A/General Motor Diesel Technician	E2
Electronics Technician Class-A (Radar), Complete Course	E1

NAME OF COURSE	QUANTITY
Language Instructor	E1
Hospital Corpsman Class-A/Medical Equipment Maintenance, Advanced	E1
DP Basic Computer & IBM Systems	E2
Fire Control Technician Class-A, Phases 1 & 2	E1
Hospital Corpsman Class-A/Phys/OCS Therapy Technician Class-C	E1
Gunner's Mate Class-A, Phases 1 & 2	E1

(7) Problems encountered during the quarter follow:

(a) Six CONUS courses and six spaces were cancelled for 5th Quarter FY 73 and one CONUS course and two spaces were cancelled for 1st Quarter FY 74 due to inability of VNN candidates to pass the English language requirement. Courses cancelled were:

NAME OF COURSE	QUOTA
5th Quarter FY 73	
Transportation Management	01
Landing Force Staff Planning (Junior Foreign Officer)	01
Finance Officer Advanced	01
Hospital Admin (Misc BUMED Officer Course)	01
Electronics Technician Class-B	E1
Engineman Class-A/General Motor Diesel Technician	E1
1st Quarter FY 74	
Naval Shipyard Procedures/Operations	02

(b) A problem developed in the orderly processing of VNN offshore SATP students in that security clearances by the VNN Security Division were not furnished on a timely basis. This in turn delayed completion of other necessary processing actions which resulted in difficulty in getting students to CONUS in time for training. Training Management Section staff members met with Captain Phong, Assistant Chief of Staff for Training (N7), VNN Headquarters, for discussion of this problem. A letter to the Vietnamese Chief of Naval Operations requesting assistance in correcting the problem resulted from the meeting. Some improvement has been noted; however, the problem still

exists and follow-up action is being taken to ensure timely processing of students.

(c) A fund ceiling of $140,000 for 1st Quarter FY 74 Navy Military Assistance Service Funded (NMASF) Training for Vietnam was received on 8 August 1973. Total NMASF costs of training courses scheduled for 1st Quarter FY 74 exceeded this amount by $37,000. Coordination with Chief, Navy Division, USDAO resulted in reduction of VNN MASF material fund ceiling by $37,000 and increase in VNN MASF training fund ceiling by $37,000. This action concurred in by CINCPACFLT allowed full implementation of 1st Quarter NMASF training program.

b. VNN In-Country Training Program.

(1) General

(a) VNN formal individual training for 1st Quarter FY 74 has proceeded well under an extremely austere budget. No major shortfalls have been experienced and training requirements as planned have essentially been met.

(b) VNN continues to make broad use of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) service schools in a number of areas where common training is practicable and desireable. This indicates that the Joint General Staff and VNN are alert to avoid duplication of effort and expense. VNN, additionally, utilizes in-country civilian institutions for advanced training in certain disciplines.

(c) Currently, formal individual in-country training is adequate, well-planned and flexible, within the framework of in-country capability. There are, however, continuing problems in funding for deteriorating training aids, devices, equipment and supplies, and for facility maintenance.

(2) Officer Training. VNN Training Bloc reports that 139 officers completed formal individual training during FY 1/74. This training was conducted at various Naval training facilities, RVNAF service schools, and civilian educational institutions. Training completed at VNN facilities (82 officers) consisted of Navy Command and Staff courses, and Riverine (Boat Captain) training. Fifty-seven officers completed courses at RVNAF service schools as follows: Language School, Logistics School,

Adjutant General School, Political Warfare School, Intelligence School, and Cryptography. Civilian educational institutions were utilized for training in the disciplines of Engineering and Architecture; however, no officers completed such training during this reporting period.

(3) Midshipman Training. Two hundred and fifty-six midshipmen graduated from the two-year course at the Vietnamese Naval Academy on 1 September 1973 and 186 remain in training.

(4) Enlisted Training. VNN Training Bloc reports that a total of 1,166 enlisted men completed formal individual training during FY 1/74. Training completed at VNN facilities (929 enlisted personnel) was in the specialties of Boatswain's Mate, Commissaryman, Damage Controlman, Disbursing Clerk, Electrician's Mate, Electronics Technician, Engineman, Gunner's Mate, Quartermaster, Radar/Sonarman, Radioman, Storekeeper, Yeoman, and Boat Captain. Two hundred and twenty-six enlisted men completed training at RVNAF service schools in the following areas: Adjutant General, Engineer, English Language, Intelligence, Music, Ordnance, Quartermaster, (Army definition), Sensor, Signal, and Transportation. Further, 11 enlisted men completed two-year courses in Engineering and Architecture at civilian educational institutions. VNN trained no recruits during this reporting period.

7. (S) OPERATIONS:

a. Coastal Surveillance System.

(1) VNN reported boarding 194,766 craft during the period, resulting in 216 craft and 644 persons being detained for various reasons.

(2) The readiness rate of the Coastal Radar Stations averaged 73.3% for the quarter, which is a definite improvement over the previous quarter. Improvement is primarily attributed to the activities of the joint NAVSEEAPAC/NAVSEEACTPHIL team which was tasked to develop a plan to upgrade the system and which has been in-country since July. Total radar contacts detected during the Quarter were 7,382 of which 4,208 were tracked and 3,049 identified. Filter King exercises to test the Coastal Radar System numbered 50 during the quarter, of which 49 were considered satisfactory, for a 98% detection rate. There were an average of 3.6 of the 16 radar stations down daily during the quarter. It is noted

that CTF 233 and CTF 235 have conducted no Filter King exercises for the past four months. Although the lone radar station in CTF 235 area has been down most of the period, CTF 233 has four stations, all of which were up the majority of the time.

(3) Visual Air Reconnaissance Search (VARS) Flights. Number of VARS flights requested during the quarter was 179, of which 97 were actually flown. Nine of those requested and seven of those flown were air support rather than coastal surveillance.

b. Operational Readiness. Operational readiness rates for ships and craft were 74% for Blue Water Fleet and 80.5% for the Brown Water craft. Both of these rates include ships and craft that are in restricted availability (RAV) and regular overhaul (ROH).

c. Naval Gunfire Support. VNN units provided gunfire support for tactical operations on 43 days during the reporting period, expending 1,257 rounds of 5", 583 rounds of 3", 863 rounds of 81mm and over 17,000 rounds of various smaller size ammunition.

d. Combat Operations. During the reporting period the VNN was involved in 61 fire fights and three mining incidents, and suffered seven personnel killed and 79 wounded, with 22 craft sunk or damaged. These incidents were initiated by both sides and included unprovoked attacks by enemy forces as well as enemy reaction to joint RVNAF security operations in which VNN units participated.

e. Mekong Convoys. Nine regular and four special convoys were escorted to the Cambodian border with no incidents in RVN territory. This is the fifth successive month in which there was no enemy harassment of Mekong convoys on the RVN side of the border.

8. (S) <u>SHORTFALLS</u>:

a. Threats from KOMAR gunboats and MIG aircraft of the DRV. No significant progress has been made in improving VNN/VNAF coordination or in developing and practicing joint exercises for defense in this area. The situation remains essentially as described in the last report.

b. Newport Expansion.

(1) Progress has been made since last report. As

noted in paragraph 5, above, 55 buildings have been earmarked for relocation from other areas and $1.6 million has been requested through CINCPACFLT for accomplishment of the project.

(2) Fencing of the proposed complex has commenced, and further activity is awaiting approval of funding.

9. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. The VNN is in a satisfactory position with regard to combat capability. With the exception of a strong defense against the KOMAR gunboats and MIG aircraft of the DRV, its assets are still considered adequate to meet major mission requirements in both blue water and brown water combat environments. The capability of the Coastal Radar System to detect enemy infiltration is below the desired standard, but definitive plans have been formulated for improvement and it is anticipated that reversal of the trend toward deterioration can be accomplished in the near time frame.

b. The broad problem areas listed in the previous report are still extant. The problems of shortage of middle management personnel and technical skills, weakness of maintenance procedures, and lack of headquarters level engineering and design capability are being addressed and some progress is being made. These problems, however, can be resolved only gradually as experience is gained by the VNN and no particularly significant improvement will be noticeable at any given point in time.

c. Specific problem areas addressed in the last report have been addressed elsewhere in this report and, for the most part, show satisfactory improvement. A notable exception is the lack of any progress in the development of VNN/VNAF coordination.

CHAPTER 8

VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS

1. (C) PERSONNEL:

a. Authorization. The total VNMC personnel authorization for the month of September is 14,438 with 964 officers, 2,490 NCO's and 10,984 enlisted. This reflects an increase of thirty-six additional billets. Thirty of these billets are for the Electronics Combat unit under the Headquarters Battalion and the remaining six are to augment the Inspector General's office.

b. Strength. The personnel strength as of 30 September 1973 was 14,878. This figure includes 939 officers, 2,263 NCO's and 11,676 enlisted of which 1,057 are recruits in training. Deducting the recruits the on-hand strength of the VNMC as of 30 September 1973 is 13,670. The personnel authorization and current strength of the VNMC is shown by grade below:

GRADE	AUTHORIZED (30 SEP 73)	CURRENT STRENGTH (30 SEP 73)
B. General	2	1
Colonel	9	5
LtCol	32	23
Major	75	29
Captain	264	104
1st Lt)		269
2nd Lt)	582	167
WO)		341
Master Sgt	49	55
Gunnery Sgt	325	209
Staff Sgt	788	803
Sergeant	1328	1196
Corporal	2211	1087
Lance Corporal	1757	1909
Private 1st Class	2898	2804
Private 2nd Class	4118	5876
	14438	14878

2. (C) PERSONNEL READINESS:

a. The VNMC remains a highly effective, well trained and combat-ready force which has not allowed the relative calm of the ceasefire to degrade its capabilities.

b. Development of amphibious capability is still a major concern of the VNMC Commandant, but no progress has been made in this direction during the reporting period due to continuing necessity of utilizing the limited Vietnamese Navy (VNN) sealift assets for higher priority missions. Negotiations between the VNMC and VNN in this regard are continuing.

3. (C) EQUIPMENT STATUS:

a. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific has advised the VNMC Logistic Support Branch of Navy Division that USMC spare parts for the LVT-5 series amphibian tractors may be made available but that the supply will be limited due to previous commitment to the Republic of China. A "buy list" in priority order has been prepared by VNMC in anticipation of parts and funding availability. Inquiry to Republic of China (ROC), mentioned in the previous report, has disclosed that the parts are not presently available.

b. The VNMC has evacuated 42 trucks, 2 1/2 ton, for major 4th and 5th echelon repair by ARVN since January 1973, none of which have been returned, nor have replacements been provided from the Maintenance Float. Research into this problem by DAO personnel is continuing. If results are not obtained during October, a DATT letter to the Commander, Central Logistics Command, requesting appropriate support for VNMC, will be prepared.

c. The majority of VNMC equipment was procured at about the same time so that the useful life or stage of uneconomical repairability will also be reached at the same time. The VNMC has initiated measures to extend the life expectancy of the equipment by rotating items between forward and rear units, but this procedure is only as effective as the spare parts and maintenance support provided by ARVN.

4. (C) LOGISTICS:

a. A serious situation regarding POL allocation developed during July with CLC reducing the VNMC allowance far below the amount necessary for effective operation. A VNMC program was implemented which progressively cut back on fuel use to a point exceeding the goals of the DAO Fuel Study, which were 46% reduction for MOGAS and 12% for diesel fuel, but each self-imposed reduction by VNMC was met by a further reduction imposed by CLC resulting in reductions which were not only disproportionate

to the DAO goals but actually threatened to seriously impair operations. The situation was eased after the VNMC Commandant advised the Commander of CLC of his intention to close the VNMC hospital due to his inability to provide fuel for the generators. The full allocation of gasoline recommended by the DAO Fuel Study was provided for the last half of August and the month of September, although the diesel fuel allocation is still being reduced by the amount required for operation of 100KW generators, which is being retained by CLC. Negotiations are continuing to obtain release of this amount also.

b. The VNMC Records Reconciliation program is on schedule. A physical inventory of on-hand assets, comprising 906 pages, was completed on 20 July 1973. Comparison of items on hand with those listed in Equipment Status Reports (ESR) and Equipment Status Summary (ESS) disclosed 442 items on hand which were not shown in these listings. These items are now being screened against the VNMC TO&E's. Target completion date for the overall records reconciliation is 1 November 1973.

c. VNMC requisitioning procedures have been carefully examined during the reporting period and appear to follow prescribed RVNAF procedures to the letter. The fill rate, however, remains unsatisfactory. Outstanding spare parts requisitions required to support the organic VNMC maintenance program constitute the major problem area. NMMA/CLC has been queried in an endeavor to ascertain the reason for this lack of support, and arrangements are being made to station a VNMC liaison officer at NMMA to ensure processing of VNMC requisitions.

d. TOW Missile System. A visit by representatives of the Army Division DAO, Hughes Manufacturing Company, Central Training Command, and RVNAF Service School to the VNMC Division on 18 September 1973 concerned the maintenance and operation of the TOW Missile System. The VNMC was cited as one of the few RVNAF units that have been able to adequately maintain their systems. General Lan (Commandant VNMC) recommended that TOW Teams be issued aircraft type headsets for hearing protection. Storage conditions in forward areas for the complex missile rounds is a serious problem; however, the VNMC appears to be in excellent condition in that regard. Battery chargers for the system are in critical supply; the VNMC only has one charger for its 12 systems. Two additional chargers will be requested for priority issue to the VNMC

based upon recommendations by the Hughes representative.

e. Structural failures and excessive roof damage were noted at the Song Than Base Camp dependent shelter area. The shelters were constructed during the 1971-72 time frame under a contract administered by ARVN with materials provided by ARVN. Inspection disclosed that the concrete blocks used in the construction contained a very low percentage of cement and there was inadequate nailing of roof sections. The VNMC Commandant has written a letter of protest to the JGS requesting that the contractor be required to correct all deficiencies prior to warranty expiration.

f. A project to provide commercial power within the Di An Camp complex has been completed and accepted. Utilization of the new power lines is being held in abeyance pending completion of financial arrangements between ARVN and the commercial power company for payment of utility charges.

g. A MILCON project for rehabilitation and construction within the Di An-Song Than Training Center and Base Camp complex, in three phases, is underway. Portions of Phases I and II have been completed. However, in an effort to reduce costs the remainder of the project was temporarily halted pending completion of a study undertaken at the request of Navy Division to determine availability of relocatable buildings. A total of 55 buildings have been identified as available for this project. Procurement action has been initiated to obtain the buildings and the project is being resubmitted.

5. (C) OPERATIONS:

a. The VNMC continues to occupy its broad-front defensive positions in northern MR-1. The withdrawal in August of two battalions of the 51st ARVN Regiment, which had been attached to the VNMC Division, necessitated the Division altering its posture to fill the gap. It is interesting to note that, although significant enemy activity has continued against the ARVN and Airborne positions south of the VNMC area, only light activity has been experienced during the reporting period in the VNMC Zone of Action, although the obvious enemy buildup in the Dong Ha area to the north is causing some concern. VNMC casualties during the quarter were 4 KIA, 32 WIA and 12 non-combat deaths.

b. With the slackening of combat activities, the Division has increased emphasis on the Civic Action Program, with good success. The Division has organized and employed 12 civic action platoons, each of which is assigned to a specific village or hamlet and lives full-time in the area. Excellent rapport has been established between the VNMC units and the local populace. This atmosphere is also conducive to intelligence-gathering activity and results in some notable success in this area. In the event the enemy decides to mount an all-out or limited offensive, these listening posts should afford adequate advance warning.

6. (C) TRAINING:

a. Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) Offshore Training Program.

(1) The following offshore training courses were attended by VNMC personnel during FY 5/73 (training commencing between July 1 and September 30 as a means of increasing course scheduling flexibility during 1st Quarter). No VNMC personnel were sent for CONUS training and none returned in FY 1/74.

NAME OF COURSE	QUANTITY
Command and Staff College, USMC	01
Basic Course USMC/Field Artillery	02
Basic Course USMC/Embarkation for Amphibious Operations	02
Landing Force Staff Planning (Junior Foreign Officer)	01

(2) Copies of the Planning Guide to be used in developing the FY 75-80 Security Assistance Training Program (SATP) were provided to VNMC. Close coordination with VNMC counterparts is being maintained to ensure that all essential training that cannot be accomplished in-country is requested. Input for this program also will include training aids, devices, books, maps and publications for FY 75-77.

(3) Four CONUS courses and eight spaces were cancelled for 5/73 and one CONUS course and one space were cancelled for FY 1/74 due to inability of VNMC candidates to pass the English language requirement. Courses cancelled were:

NAME OF COURSE	QUOTA
FY 5/73	
Basic Course USMC/Training Methods, Weapons	04
Communications Officer, USMC	01
Amphibious Warfare School, USMC	02
Observership Medical Officer (General Surgery)	01
FY 1/74	
Dental Assistant Basic Class-A/Dental Laboratory Technology Class-C	01

b. VNMC In-Country Training Program.

(1) General.

(a) Vietnamese Marine Corps formal individual training during FY 1/74 has proceeded well although the training budget has been extremely austere. Planned training requirements have been met without major shortfall, with the exception that VNMC continues to lose offshore training spaces because of lack of language qualified candidates.

(b) Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) service schools, with the exception of the Armed Forces Language School, are well-utilized by VNMC. Duplication of effort and expense is thus avoided in the many areas where common training is directly applicable.

(c) Formal individual in-country training is currently adequate to meet the needs of VNMC within the framework of in-country capability.

(2) Officer Training. HQ VNMC reports that 128 officers completed the Officer Refresher Course at the VNMC Training Center, and 14 officers completed courses in Air Support, English Language and Long Range Reconnaissance (LRRP) at RVNAF service schools.

(3) Enlisted Training. HQ VNMC reports that the number of enlisted men who completed training at the VNMC Training Center was 1,657, including 1,215 recruits. Enlisted training at the center consisted of the following courses: Squad Leader, Team Leader and Recruit.

Additionally, 180 enlisted men completed training at RVNAF service schools in the following areas: Instructor, Adjutant General, Administration and Finance, Artillery, Engineer, Jungle Warfare, LRRP, Military Police, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, Supply, and Transportation.

7. (C) SHORTFALLS:

a. Amphibious assault training is still a shortfall area, due to both the shortage of VNN sealift assets for amphibious training and the lack of spare parts for the LVT-5 series amphibian tractors.

b. The Maintenance Company requires additional technical personnel in order to effectively accomplish its assigned maintenance mission. A request for force structure realignment which would increase the strength of this Company by some 82 personnel, has been submitted and is under consideration by the JGS. If approved, the additional personnel to be assigned will be a significant step toward solution of this problem.

c. Maintenance and spare parts support provided by ARVN continues to be unsatisfactory, but continuing efforts are underway to resolve this problem as mentioned above.

8. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. In spite of the shortfalls enumerated above, the VNMC Division remains one of the most effective and combat-ready units in the RVNAF. Although enemy contact has been minor in recent months, this is attributed to the Marine Division's reputation as a tough, implacable adversary with high morale and esprit de corps as much as to the ceasefire agreement. Enemy harassment continues in the area but is mainly directed at ARVN units to the south rather than at the Marine Division.

b. Continuing efforts and support of DAO will be necessary to obtain and retain adequate spare parts and maintenance support from ARVN.

c. Amphibious assault training is essential to a properly trained Marine force. To this end efforts must continue to persuade JGS to make required sealift support available to enable an amphibious training program to get underway. In addition, current efforts to obtain parts

support for the amphibian tractors must continue so that a training program utilizing these vehicles can commence.

CHAPTER 9

TERRITORIAL FORCES

1. (C) REGIONAL FORCE/POPULAR FORCE (RF/PF):

a. This chapter presents an updated view of the Republic of Vietnam Territorial Forces (TF), and significant changes and/or modification in their organization, mission and employment, that reflects progress or regression since the previous quarterly assessment. This assessment is based upon a combination of staff and field activity reports from RVNAF, the Defense Attache Office, and a reduced US Embassy field operations staff, to determine whether or not the RF/PF have, or are, effectively adjusting to the ceasefire situation, militarily, politically, and psychologically.

b. General Background (RF/PF). The RF/PF continue to constitute more than half of the manpower in the RVNAF. Under the territorial security system the Regional Force is Province/District (sector/subsector) oriented while the Popular Force is village/hamlet oriented. The following amplifies as well as modifies the previous assessment concerning this paragraph: "the principal objective of RF/PF is to provide adequate security to the rural populace while the Government of Vietnam (GVN) carrys out its national goals in support of rural reconstruction and rehabilitation, return-to-village, land reform, and village self-sufficiency and self-government; the essential elements and ingredients of "nation building." Protective security of the rural populace provided by RF/PF frees the ARVN regular forces to conduct operations against Communist main force units, particularly in those areas of South Vietnam where progress in national programs has been severely hampered or limited as a result of continuing enemy initiated ceasefire violations.

2. (C) REGIONAL FORCES (RF):

a. Under Presidential Decree reorganizing the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces in 1970, the RF was transferred from the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to the Joint General Staff (JGS), where it became an integral part of the ARVN Infantry Branch.

(Figure 1)

Present RF strength is over 312,000 men; an increase

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MONL and RVNAF Reorganized by Presidential
Decree No. 0614-a/TT/SL, [illegible]



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Figure1

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of 9,000 over that reported in the previous assessment. This increase most likely is the result of an influx of basic recruit trainees returning from the National Training Centers and a significant number of soldiers transferred from the Popular Forces.

(Figure 2)

b. Organization. No significant change from previous assessment.

c. Mission. This paragraph is modified as follows: The RF support the GVN national goals and nation building programs at the rural level by providing and maintaining adequate territorial security, and conducting mobile offensive, reconnaissance and intelligence operations against enemy main force and VC local force units. JGS has directed MR Commanders to continue to place command emphasis on intelligence collecting, effective and improved reconnaissance and analysis of enemy movements, to be used as a basis for attacking the enemy when he is moving into GVN controlled areas, or to organize nighttime patrols and ambushes.

d. Ceasefire Situation. Enemy forces continued to violate the ceasefire agreement and have intensified their efforts at applying moderate to heavy pressure against Territorial Force units, outposts, lines of communications, static defense lines, and subsector headquarters, as reflected in MR field reports. Infiltrations of and harassing attacks against rural populated areas resulted in increased civilian casualties, as the enemy increased his efforts to subvert GVN control at the village/hamlet level. As a result, the Chief/JGS, continued to direct Sector Commanders to place increased emphasis on maintaining a strong defensive posture in all areas under GVN control and on borders of contested areas where it is either known or suspected that the enemy is infiltrating, conducting logistics operations, or conducting agent-intelligence operations. Continuing enemy initiated ceasefire violations coupled with increasing enemy offensive operations against ARVN regular forces have forced MR Commanders to redeploy significant number of Regional Forces outside their previously assigned sectors to reinforce ARVN forces, to interdict enemy LOC's, to conduct blocking and security operations, and to brunt the enemy's infiltration of ARVN's areas of operations.

(1) Indications are that ARVN tactical commanders

Figure 2

CURRENT STRENGTH STATUS OF REGIONAL FORCES

DESIGNATION OF MR's	AUTH				ASSIGNED				UNIT		
	OFF	NCO	EM	TOTAL	OFF	NCO	EM	TOTAL	Com-pan-ies	Sep Com-pan-ies	BNs
MR 1	3682	8841	31301	43824	3065	7582	30056	40703	200	60	50
MR 2	5965	14409	50671	71071	5093	12144	47626	64863	328	92	82
MR 3	5901	14482	51963	72346	5314	12695	52850	70859	336	95	84
MR 4	9473	23332	84006	116811	7717	17772	74765	100254	576	125	144
CENTRAL AGENCY	1378	2392	2165	5935	336	973	1440	2749			
TOTAL OF ORGANIZATIONS include 166 OFF + 389 NCO's + 249 EM = 964 scheduled)	26565	63845	220541	310951	21525	51166	206737	279428	1440	372	360
REPLACEMENT	1242	2312	10294	13848	1647	2863	287	33282			
GRAND TOTAL	27807	66157	230835	324799	23172	54029	235509	312710	1440	372	360

continue to misuse and maldeploy RF outside their home sectors without coordination nor concurrence from respective MR Commanders, but most likely MR Commanders are condoning this practice. This widespread problem continues to adversely effect overall operational capabilities of the RF, and will undoubtedly have a degrading effect on territorial security of the rual countryside, essentially leaving the rural populace open to increased VC terrorism.

e. Concepts of Employment. No significant change from previous assessment.

(1) The customary role of the RF is to man and maintain an integrated series of outposts, interdict enemy lines of communication , prevent VC land grabbing and proselyting of villagers, prevent infiltration of enemy forces into rural populated areas, and to assist the people in improving their state of existence. Their overall performance in meeting these objectives ranges from poor to good with a few spottings of excellent and higher. The latter rating normally occurs when MR Commanders and tactical commanders allow the RF to operate within the parameters of their established missions, rather than attaching them to ARVN for unspecified periods of time.

(2) RF field operations employ 45 Sector Tactical Command Posts (STCP), 360 battalions which include 1,440 RF rifle companies, and 372 separate companies, throughout all 44 provinces of the four military regions. This provides some idea of the complexities and problems associated with command and control of an organization of this size.

(3) Malemployment and misuse of RF by field commanders continues to be a significant problem, and there is little reason for optimism that this trend will be reversed, until correction is initiated from the Central Government down to the tactical command level. No such corrective action is foreseen at present.

(4) Two significant examples in the use of RF to reinforce ARVN occurred during this quarter. In Kontum, the MR 2 commander redeployed several RF battalions and supporting elements in an area south and southwest of Kontum City for interdicting and blocking operations. These RF units are still deployed in those locations. In MR 3 in late September, enemy forces inflicted heavy casualties on a battalion of the 25th ARVN Division at Khiem Hanh

District, Tay Ninh Province. Upon the order of the MR 3 Commander, RF units were ordered into the area to link up with ARVN forces to reinforce in the area and to contain the NVA unit. The MR 4 Commander continues to shift RF to reinforce ARVN, particularly in provinces bordering Cambodia, in an effort to block infiltration into the rice belt area.

(5) Sufficient directives have been published by JGS to assist MR Commanders and Sector Commanders in improving and upgrading RF performance and capabilities. However, actual application and implementation remains slow.

3. (C) POPULAR FORCE (PF):

a. The PF like the RF, had their management shifted from the Ministry of Interior to JGS in 1970, where it became an integral part of the ARVN Infantry Branch. The most significant change in PF was a reduction in strength which has dropped from a June total of 212,000 to a little over 200,000 in September 1973. Effective 1 July 1973, PF authorized strength was reduced from 223,000 to 206,000, a reduction of 600 platoons or approximately 17,000 men. The total number of PF platoons will remain at 6,699.

(Figure 3)

b. Similar to the RF, more than one-third of PF assigned strength is employed to man, maintain and defend a total of 4,493 various size outposts throughout the country. As a result their mission to defend the village/hamlet periphery, to prevent internal VC infiltration, to protect resources, lines of communications and installations has been severely limited. Static defense of outposts, as opposed to the more proper role of mobile defense by patrol and ambush, only invites increased enemy subversion and infiltration in the rural areas. This fact is borne out by the increasing number of enemy attacks on villages resulting in higher civilian casualties during the past quarter. Overall PF performance generally remains poor to marginal with only isolated cases of excellent performance against the enemy as enemy attacks against PF positions increased this quarter. Admittedly, there has been a steady decline in their performance since the ceasefire, as compared to their many acts of bravery during the 1972 General Offensive. JGS staff elements have stated that increased command emphasis is being placed on MR

Figure 3

CURRENT STRENGTH STATUS OF POPULAR FORCES

DESIGNATION OF MR'S	AUTH				ASSIGNED				PLA-TOONS
	PLT LEADER	SQUAD LEADER	PF	TOTAL	PLT LEADER	SQUAD LFADER	PF	TOTAL	
MR 1	1175	3525	29375	34075	1119	3279	28366	32764	1175
MR 2	1575	4725	39375	45675	1562	4418	38517	44497	1575
MR 3	1130	3390	28250	32770	1116	3125	27352	31953	1130
MR 4	2819	8457	70475	81751	2811	8007	69834	80652	2819
SCHEDULED									
TOTAL OF ORGANI-ZATION	6699	20097	167475	194271	6608	18829	164069	189506	6699
REPLACEMENT			11730	11730	243	939	10151	11333	
GRAND TOTAL	6699	20097	179205	206001	6851	19768	174220	200839	6699

(x) Effective 1 July 1973, the authorized strength of the PF was reduced from 223, 401 to 206,001 to bring the RVNAF Force structure in line with the agreed strength of 1.1 million. The means that PF was reduced by 600 PF Platoon, or approx 17,000 men.

Commanders to step up their programs to upgrade and improve PF performance. Hopefully, the next assessment will indicate that MR Commanders are in fact implementing established directives toward this end.

c. No significant change since previous assessment.

4. (C) EQUIPMENT STATUS AND MAINTENANCE:

a. Since the previous assessment, there appears to be significant improvement and progress in this area, according to reports from the five Area Logistics Commands (ALC) and JGS Central Logistics Command (CLC) monthly overviews. Tactical logistics support of Territorial Forces is on a slow upward trend and although it is too early for optimism, if this trend continues it is most likely because command emphasis, directed by the Chief, JGS, is beginning to pay dividends. CLC reports indicate some improvements are being made at correcting administrative and logistical inadequacies, and that many critical shortages in TO&E equipment are either being filled or replaced, i.e., CLC reports that in September 1973 the PF have received 95% of their authorized weapons, 78% of their vehicles, and 94% of their signal equipment. JGS/IG reports, to a great degree, confirm this information.

b. Although there is no significant change in this paragraph since the previous assessment, command emphasis in more frequent equipment and maintenance inspections, is being directed by JGS/CLC and JGS/IG.

5. (U) LOGISTICS:

a. No significant change since previous assessment. However, to illustrate one example of progress in the logistics area, the five ALC's are authorized 15,481 TF soldiers, while reporting an assigned strength of 15,314, or 98.9%. Of the assigned strength, 9,042 are logistics specialists, of which 8,385 have graduated from logistical training centers, 35 are in training, leaving a balance of 662 that are scheduled for training. There is a continuing effort by CLC to upgrade the TF logistical system, and there are indications that this effort is prompted by close monitoring by the Chief, JGS.

b. There is additionally, noticeable progress being made by JGS/CLC and MR ALC's in providing increased logistical support to sectors and subsectors

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locations. This support was severely inadequate several months ago. During this quarter the five ALC's supported the STCP's and the TF with the following tonnages: 22.3 tons in July, 27.6 tons in August, with a slight slippage in September to 25.7 tons, resulting primarily from bad weather. This commodity support consisted primarily of TO&E equipment, subsistence, ammunition, medical supplies, and miscellaneous support items.

c. One area in the logistics field that was not covered in the previous assessment, but does relate directly to troop morale and combat efficiency, is the commissary program. JGS/CLC has authorized 248 commissaries at the subsector level and 43 at the sector level. As of September 1973, 158 and 31 respectively, are operational or near completion. Completion of the remaining depends largely on the availability of funds.

d. There is no significant changes in pages 9-9 and 9-11.

6. (C) TRAINING:

a. The Central Training Command (CTC), under the JGS, is responsible for standardizing and conducting training for all military forces.

b. Pages 9-13 and 9-15 of the last assessment should be deleted, as these charts are under modification by CTC.

c. RF/PF units are still required to undergo 24 hours of inplace training each month, as prescribed by JGS/CTC Directive 300-24, 1 Dec 70. Normally, RF/PF units are allowed to stand down from operational missions to conduct training and maintenance of equipment up to three days per month. (This is a restatement from previous assessment).

d. During the previous quarter it was reported that Sector and Subsector Commanders were making infrequent inspections of RF/PF units. However, as a result of recent JGS/IG inspections and other command visits, there are efforts being made to correct this shortcoming. More frequent inspections by MR staffs and Sector Commanders of RF/PF units can be expected, to insure that RF/PF units in rotational stand downs are conducting in-place readiness training as directed by JGS.

e. No significant change since the previous assessment.

f. No significant change since the previous assessment.

7. (C) DESERTIONS:

a. Desertions and absenteeism among the Territorial Force continue to be major problems. However, there has been a significant reduction in their numbers since the previous assessment, as depicted in Figure 4.

b. Effective 1 August 1973, the RF/PF were included in the increased rice allowance (from 1,700 piasters to 3,000 piasters) for all regular forces. The PF were previously drawing only 25 piasters per day (750 piasters/month). However, even with a slight reduction in desertions and absenteeism, and the significant increase in the PF subsistence allowance, most of the major causes for this problem, as stated in the previous assessment, still exist. There is little evidence at this time that this trend will be quickly halted and reversed.

c. JGS and the Ministry of National Defense (MOND) are hopeful that through improvement programs designed to upgrade the RF/PF, and applicable at all command levels, the gap that has long separated the regular forces from the Territorial Forces will begin to narrow, resulting in eventual reduction in desertion rates.

8. (C) RF/PF RECRUITMENT:

No significant change from previous assessment.

9. (C) MORALE:

a. No significant change from previous assessment, and it is still too early to ascertain whether or not the JGS improvement and upgrading programs are having impact.

b. Discussions on this subject have been held with appropriate officials of JGS, General POLWAR Department (GPWD), and the Ministry of National Defense to determine what action is being taken to attack this problem. These officials admitted that this problem has long been overlooked because of an extended shopping list with higher priorities. But


DESERTION RATES
REGULAR FORCES
REGIONAL FORCES
POPULAR FORCES
18000
16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP
1972
1973

Figure 4

they also stated that appropriate corrective measures are now being taken that should improve the situation. The next quarterly assessment should reflect in detail what form these measures have taken. There is no reason to disbelieve the sincerity of these officials, as they were open in these discussions and candid in their remarks.

10. (C) SHORTFALLS:

a. Inadequate and inequitable logistical support of RF/PF continues to be a pressing problem, although there has been a noticeable breakthrough in this problem and the logjam of previously reported deficiencies has somewhat diminished. Prevalent deficiencies and inadequacies in logistical support are largely felt by those RF/PF units that man and maintain more than 6,000 interlocking outposts, many of which are extended outside their normal sector AO's. Sector Commanders are hard pressed, because of extremely limited surface transportation and dedicated air assets, to furnish essential and adequate tactical logistical support. JGS and CLC/ALC's have made some recognizable progress to assist since the previous assessment, and efforts are continuing to bring the TF in line with their ARVN contemporaries.

b. The RF/PF continue to be plagued by many of the same problems as previously stated: a high rate of desertions and absenteeism, poor morale, inadequate subsistence allowance (although this was recently increased), ineffective leadership, inadequate and unimproved training, inadequate and often inconsistent equipment and maintenance support. These problems have all, in varying degrees, contributed to mediocre RF/PF performance and a low state of combat readiness. The one optimistic point is that the Chief, JGS, is now placing increasing command emphasis on upgrading and improving the TF program. Statistics and reports throughout the next quarter should reflect the results.

c. Inconsistent and ineffective command and control of the RF/PF at all levels still remains a problem, as field commanders continue to override authority of Sector Commanders in employment and distribution of TF assets. Improvement in this situation is not expected unless authorities at the national level recognize the problem and get tough in correcting it.

11. (C) SUMMARY:

a. The previous assessment of Territorial Forces remains substantially unchanged, with the exception that there has been some degree of improvement in overall logistical support furnished by JGS/CLC and the regional ALC's. This is a large step in the right direction, and if present JGS command emphasis continues toward upgrading the RF/PF, improvement across the board in operational effectiveness can be expected. One way of looking at it is, there's no way to go but up.

b. RF/PF continues to represent a significant and viable fighting force for South Vietnam when employed and supported properly. Their principal and legitimate role of defending the rural populace is essential to ensuring that the GVN can successfully carry out national policies toward rehabilitation and reconstruction, village self-development, self-defense and self-government. Long term maldeployment of RF/PF away from their designated base areas for the principal purpose of defending ARVN perimeters, LOC's, installations, outposts, etc., continues to cause extensive deterioration in RF/PF program objectives. This has been an on-going problem that must be corrected quickly at all command levels, if Territorial Forces are ever to reach their full potential. The absence of adequate territorial forces in contested as well as high-impact, vital rural areas, could threaten the credibility and eventually the political and military existence of the national government among the rural population. The GVN must make a rapid, concerted effort at improving the lot of RF/PF if this force is to help create and maintain the image that, through the RF/PF, the GVN is the true representative of the rural population.

c. The Chief, JGS, is continuing to direct increased command emphasis on upgrading and improving the Territorial Forces to bring them in line with their ARVN contemporaries. Progress admittedly has been slow and meager, but the problem seems to have been recognized, and the beginning of pressure to resolve the problem is evident.

CHAPTER 10
ASSESSMENT OF RVNAF COMMUNICATION ELECTRONIC CAPABILITY

1. (U) BACKGROUND: This chapter addresses the background and status of RVNAF Communications-Electronics (C-E) Self Sufficiency Program (Vietnamization) - Tactical and fixed systems.

a. The overall plan for Vietnamization of communications-electronics systems and facilities involved timely completion of several interrelated actions. These actions included the equipment and facilities to be transferred to the RVNAF component services, and extensive personnel training (including both formal schooling and on-the-job training). Additionally, a viable system was developed to insure continued logistic support for the C-E facilities once they were turned over to the RVNAF. All of these actions were closely monitored and time phased so that when a C-E facility was transferred to the Vietnamese, they had the necessary equipment, personnel skills, and spare parts to keep it fully operational. Initial estimates were to accomplish turnover of facilities to RVNAF by 1975. This schedule was compressed so that the final facility was transitioned to complete operation and maintenance by RVNAF on 21 May 1973. (See Figure 1).

b. To give a somewhat more detailed explanation of this program, the following will provide a short historical background to explain the program, a description of the communications systems involved, and the present status of this task:

(1) The basis of the C-E Vietnamization Program was the joint US/RVNAF Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Program (CEIMP). This program, developed by MACV, addresses the disposition of US Communications-Electronics equipment in Vietnam. The Director of Communications-Electronics, acting for COMUSMACV. was the primary manager for this Vietnamization Program. The C-E Division, DAO has assumed this responsibility. Because of an urgent national level requirement to simplify transfer procedures and accelerate the schedule, a Memorandum of Understanding between MACV and the Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS), signed



Figure 1

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in September of 1971, provided an orderly, accelerated, phased transfer of US communications-electronics facilities involved were title transferred to the Vietnamese with final transfers completed on 10 November 1972. The transfer of O&M responsibility was a longer term element of the program and was accomplished in three phases. During Phase I, the US retained control and continued operation and maintenance of the site. RVNAF personnel participated extensively in OJT and, within their capability, performed some maintenance, security, and support functions. In Phase II, the US personnel at the site were reduced in numbers; they monitored US critical command and control circuits through this phase; and they provided assistance to the RVNAF. In Phase III, all US personnel were withdrawn from the site and RVNAF assumed all operation, maintenance, security and support functions. US contractor personnel are available to send to communication sites as needed for emergency assistance. As previously stated, the CEIMP identifies the equipment and facilities designated for transfer to the RVNAF. Coincident with development of the CEIMP, MACV was working with USAID in promoting the formation of a commercial Vietnam Telecommunications Organization. A formal agreement between the US and the Government of Vietnam called for the establishment of the Vietnam Telecommunications Organization by April 1971. This organization would direct and manage a single integrated telecommunications system which would be designed to satisfy all military and civilian requirements. Legislative action to establish the organization began in October 1970. It was not until February 1972 that the President sent the proposed law to the National Assembly for consideration. After considering the lack of progress in the civilian sector, and its impact on the Vietnamization Program, MACV, in March 1971, received approval from the JGS to reconfigure US communications into a network to satisfy RVNAF military and quasi-military needs. This system became known as the Single Integrated Military (Telecommunications) System (SIMS).

(2) To explain how SIMS developed into its present configuration, it is necessary to consider communications as they existed in the Republic of Vietnam in 1969. There were:

(a) 124 ICS wideband system.

(b) 6 automatic tandem switching centers.

(c) 34 dial telephone exchanges.

(d) 2 satellite terminals.

(e) 2 AUTODIN switches.

(f) 78 AUTODIN terminals.

(g) 218 AUTOSEVOCOM terminals.

(h) 126 tactical wideband radio systems.

(i) 7 submarine cable links with 5 cablehead terminals.

With the drawdown of US involvement in SEA many of these facilities, not slated for transfer to RVNAF, were taken down and returned to US. Shown on Figures 2 thru 5 is the residual equipment which consisted of the following:

(a) 34 ICS wideband systems.

(b) 87 RVNAF area systems.

(c) 4 tandem switches.

(d) 27 dial telephone exchanges (including 5 exchanges previously RVNAF operated in the Saigon area).

(e) 112 manual telephone exchanges.

(f) 4 submarine cable links with 5 cablehead terminals.

(3) The final facility was transitioned to Vietnamization on 21 May 1973.

2. (U) TRAINING:

a. The training status of RVNAF hard skill MOS personnel now operating the SIMS, as of 25 September



Figure 2

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Figure 3

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

Figure 4

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

Figure 5

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1973, is portrayed on Figure 6. These personnel operate the Integrated Communications System (ICS) sites, dial telephone exchanges (DTE), tandem switching centers and oversea cablehead sites. Personnel are considered site qualified (SQ) upon completion of formal and on-the-job training at the facility when the required degree of proficiency is obtained.

b. The status of training,as of 25 September 1973, in support of the SIMS is reflected on Figure 7. The chart shows the overall training objective; the personnel who have completed training and are site qualified; those who have completed training and are awaiting qualification testing; and the number in training as of 25 September 1973. The scheduled completion dates of training are shown in the last column. Quality assurance (QA) had originally been omitted from the training program. The requirement was recognized and training began on 27 June 1973. Initial training of cadre personnel will be completed 20 October 1973. The cadre personnel will then disseminate the training within the SIMS system. It is the responsibility of the Signal Department to disseminate this QA training down to the Area Signal Groups and Battalions. The operational evaluation reports will be studied by DAO C-E personnel and the surveillance visits program will be expanded to insure that the quality assurance program is effective.

c. A training program on link quality monitor/carrier intensity recorder (LQM/CIR) repair, calibration and alignment commenced on 24 September 1973 at AMSF-V. There are 14 ARVN personnel in training. This training is scheduled for completion on 8 December 1973.

d. Follow-on training, placing emphasis on more completed understanding of complex electronic equipment and management is required to satisfy the Vietnamization Self-Sufficiency Plan. RVNAF Operational evaluations, performed by Communication Management Agency (CMA), JGS/J6, indicate a gradual deterioration of the system due to inadequate maintenance of the equipment and management of the system. Typical findings of the evaluation team inspections of selected sites are:

(1) 39% of ICS circuits checked failed to meet specifications.

(2) 46% of DTE batteries checked had low specific gravity of electrolyte.

Figure 6

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RVNAF TRAINING
FOR SIMS, ICS, DTE, TANDEM AND CABLEHEAD SITES
(AS OF 30 SEP 73)

MILITARY SPECIALTY	NUMBER AUTHORIZED	NUMBER ASSIGNED	SITE QUALIFIED	SQ%OF AUTHORIZED	SQ%OF ASSIGNED
26 V	300	303	230	76.5	75
32 E	201	229	211	105	92.2
32 D	265	303	268	101	92
36 H	245	285	195	79.6	68.4
TOTAL	1,011	1,120	904	89.1	81.3

NOTE:
26 V - AN/FRC-109 AND REL-2600 RADIO EQUIPMENT
32 E - MULTIPLEX AND CARRIER EQUIPMENT
32 D - TECHNICAL CONTROL-ICS
36 H - DIAL TELEPHONE EXCHANGE AND TANDEM SWITCH CENTER

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SIMS TRAINING PROGRAM

TRAINING COURSE OBJECTIVE (PERSONNEL)	COMPLETED TRAINING AND SITE QUALIFIED	COMPLETED TRAINING AWAITING SITE QUALIFICATION TESTING	PERSONNEL IN TRAINING	SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE
1. ICS				
26V 300	230	70	0	
32E 201	211	0	0	
32D 265	268	0	0	
36H 245	196	49	0	
2. ICS 172			172	ON GOING
DTE 38			38	AS REQUIRED
3 AMSF-V				ON GOING
ICS 22			22	AS REQUIRED
4. QA				
26V 7			0	8 SEPT
32D 6			0	8 SEPT
36H 15			8	20 OCT
26L 6			0	8 SEPT
5. CABLE COURSE 77	77		0	21 JULY
6. CMA 8			3	31 OCT
7. LQM/CIR 15			14	8 DEC

Figure 7

UNCLASSIFED

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(3) 57% of primary trunks in a DTE were defective and failed to meet specifications.

(4) 70% of the connections on a combined distribution frame were not soldered.

3. (C) SIMS SYSTEM RELIABILITY: The reliability of the integrated communications system (ICS) is shown on Figure 8. The reliability criteria under US contractor operation is 99.98%, which is still considered the threshold under the Vietnamization Program. The RVNAF does not have technical capabilities which measure up to US proficiency standards. On this basis, the reliability has dropped significantly below the 99.85%, while in July it increased to 99.92%. The reliability for August and September was 99.87 and 99.48%, respectively. The very low reliability for September is primarily due to a 10.5 hours station failure at Monkey Mountain ICS which prevented 960 channels from traversing the ICS; and a station failure at Vung Chua Mountain ICS which lasted 100.3 hours and effected 216 channels. The ICS was further plagued with link, radio and power outages which collectively reduced the reliability.

4. LOGISTICS:

a. Maintenance.

(1) Area Maintenance Supply Facility Vietnam (AMSF-V). To effectively handle SIMS site maintenance and repair problems, which are beyond the capability of site personnel, Technical Assistance Teams were established at the AMSF-V, Long Binh. These teams are composed of the best qualified ARVN who have completed training, assisted by highly skilled US Contractor technicians. Typically, the assistance provided is as follows:

(a) Site personnel report problems to AMSF-V Customer Assistance.

(b) Customer Assistance discusses the problem with site (usually bilingually) to pinpoint the defective area, and determine the technical skills and materials required to solve the problem.

(c) AMSF-V forms a team with the required skills. This typically includes a contractor technician who is familiar with the site.

(d) The team discusses the problem and determines probable causes and items required for site repair, such as direct exchange modules, special test equipment and tools.



Figure 8

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(e) AMSF-V requests transportation from VNAF.

(f) Team departs to site and effects necessary repairs. If additional repair parts are required, the team calls AMSF-V and parts are dispatched by courier.

(g) Team returns to AMSF-V and submits a report of activities.

(2) A problem which exists is the low per diem paid to ARVN when TDY to sites. This tends to discourage rather than encourage their desire to travel on TDY.

(3) The concept of employing Technical Assistance Teams composed of ARVN and contractor technicians has proved to be a highly successful method of coping with site problems which are beyond the capability of ARVN site personnel. These teams have been overcommitted since the phase-down of contractor "on site" personnel.

(4) The monthly receipt of unserviceable components from units for repair by the maintenance shop at AMSF-V and the monthly accomplishments of repaired components is depicted on Figure 9. Because of an increasing trend in the number of callouts by AMSF-V personnel, a reduced number of completions were accomplished, since the same group of personnel who perform the callouts also perform the repair of unserviceable compenents. AMSF-V has requested additional personnel from ARVN's signal dept to correct this problem. No significance should be attached to the minor variations of receipts which show no marked trend and only represent failures of items in the system. AMSF-V is currently responding to many callouts for repairs which the sites should be accomplishing. As the sites gain experience a reduction in callouts will result, permitting additional time for repair of unserviceable items.

(5) AMSF-V maintenance deadline backlog. The monthly backlog at the AMSF-V maintenance shop is shown on Figure 10; and includes those items deadlined for parts. Many of parts ordered for deadlined components are NSN items which are not stocked in the US Army inventory; and are procured directly from manufacturers as required. C-E Division is currently reviewing supply activities in depth, which will reduce the number of items deadlined for parts. In addition to the supply problems cited


AMSF MAINTENANCE RECEIPT OF
UNSERVICEABLE AND COMPLETIONS
NUMBER OF ITEMS
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
CY-1973
COMPLETED
RECEIPTS
812
665
537
437
543
449
523
486
472
453
428
408
587
518
567
415
492
384

Figure 9



Figure 10

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above, a reduction in the number of repaired items as discussed earlier has contributed to an increase in backlog.

(6) 60th Signal Base Depot.

(a) The 60th Signal Base Depot, located near Saigon, is the only ARVN repair facility tasked to perform depot rebuild of signal equipment.

(b) The technicians have not reached the level of competence to produce material which meets the criteria of 5th echelon rebuild. Technical assistance will continue during this fiscal year to raise the level of competence of technicians.

(c) Temporary installation and failure to install some maintenance equipment prevents support facilities from attaining full operational capability. Continuing shortages of tools and operational supplies hampers all depot operations. US assistance is being provided to solve these problems.

(d) The depot has not achieved self-sufficiency because technical and middle management abilities have not been sufficiently developed. Middle management training is being provided by National Material Management Agency (NMMA) and ARVN has requested further US assistance.

(e) The current Bill of Materials (BOM) system for depot maintenance has proven much too complicated. Requisition rejections and failure to monitor the accepted requisitions has resulted in continual shortages of operational supplies. NMMA has developed a less complicated BOM system which will be implemented in the near future.

(f) The current rebuild projection appears attainable. However, management has attempted to reduce the forecast rebuild schedule without adequate justification. Action is being taken to maintain a current or higher production rebuild program (Figure 11 and 12).FY 74 Depot Rebuild Program(Figure 13)indicates the percent of the years program accomplished during the first quarter. The low percentage in wire, audio-visual and


SIG EQP IN & OUT COUNTRY REBUILD PROGRAM 73-77
MODULES & SUB ASSYS
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
800
600
400
200
0
73
74
75
76
77
38,463
46,581
40,267
28,105
14,176
244
11,260
21,588
54,576
69,235
IN COUNTRY REBUILD
OUT OF COUNTRY REBUILD

Figure 11



Figure 12

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FY-74 DEPOT REBUILD PROGRAM

TYPE EQP.	QTY SCHED	QTY COMP.	% PROGRAM COMPLETE
RADIO	4,615	992	22.0
UHF CARRIER MICROWAVE	1,257	240	20.0
WIRE	1,025	1	0
AUDIO-VIS	130	4	3.0
PHOTO	40	0	0
TMDE	493	73	15.0
TELETYPE	210	39	18.0
MODULES	22,355	3,889	17.0

Figure 13

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photo programs is due to a lack of reparable assets coming in from the field. Action is being taken to correct this problem by scheduling equipment from the units.

(g) Obsolete and excess equipment at 60th Signal Base Depot. Figure 14 shows a partial list of excess and obsolete equipment at 60th Signal Base Depot, Saigon. This represents a small portion of the total excess equipment on hand. ARVN is making an effort to identify, classify and place this equipment in conex containers. DAO technicians at 60th Signal Base Depot are working with NMMA, Major Items Branch, to obtain disposition instructions and clear the records of this obsolete and excess material. To date, some of this equipment has been identified, classified and placed in conex containers for shipment and disposition.

b. Supply:

(1) Supply support for tactical communication equipment is controlled by the National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA). All requisitions are funneled into NMMA where the Materiel Release Order (MRO) is cut and forwarded to a supply depot for shipment to direct support unit. The NMMA system is not responsive for the following reasons:

(a) The time required to process requisitions is extensive.

(b) Up to date inventories of equipment and spare parts have not been established.

(c) Meaningful, on-hand, due-in and due-out records are difficult to develop.

(d) Excessive requisition rejections are being experienced.

(e) Inadequate computer time (about 50 requisition processing cycles were run between Jan 73 and Jun 73 compared to 6 times daily in CONUS NICP).

(2) The Direct Support Units (DSU) maintain a card record system and generally their records are excellent. The main problem areas are:

OBSOLETE AND EXCESS EQUIPMENT AT 60TH SIGNAL BASE DEPOT

LINE	TYPE	QTY	UNIT COST*	TOTAL COST	
1	AN/GRC-4	35	1,454	50,890	
2	AN/GRC-5	247	1,744	430,768	
3	AN/GRC-26	21	15,600	327,600	
4	AN/PRC-6	1,057	190	199,690	
5	AN/PRC-9	62	284	17,608	
6	AN/URC-4	30	157	4,710	
7	AN/VRC-6	9	1,738	15,642	
8	AN/VRC-9	45	811	36,495	
9	AN/VRC-10	169	856	144,664	
10	AN/VRC-14	3	1,026	3,078	
11	AN/VRC-15	133	1,071	142,443	
12	AN/VRC-17	5	1,112	5,560	
13	AN/VRC-18	53	1,155	61,215	
14	AN/VRC-24	37	2,960	109,520	
15	AN/VRQ-2	48	1,842	14,736	
16	AN/VRQ-3	10	1,853	18,530	
17	R-109	70	298	20,860	
18	R-110	5	252	1,260	
19	RT-67	93	651	60,543	
20	RT-68	122	586	71,492	
21	RT-70	103	323	33,269	
22	RT-175/PRC-9	45	284	12,780	
	TOTAL	2,360		1,783,353	
	SCR-188	24			TO BE SALVAGED
	SCR-193	68			" " "

* UNIT COST BASED ON DATA IN SB-700-20

Figure 14

(a) Obtaining accurate due-in data.

(b) The DSU's have no editing capability. Action has been taken to develop this capability.

(3) Single Integrated Military Telecommunications. Single Integrated Military Telecommunications (SIMS) system and the Army Calibration Center (ACC) are supported by the AMSF-V. AMSF-V Supply Effectiveness, Figure 15, shows the demand objective is 85% fill of ASL items for AMSF. The drop to 50% in April resulted from frustration of shipments from CONUS, resulting from US withdrawal of troops. The decline since June 73 is attributed to the change of direct supply support from air lift to surface shipments. Zero balance ASL items increased to 1134 in September. Requirement objectives were increased to compensate for lag time. Expediting action was initiated to CONUS in Sep. The forecasted get well date is December 73. Summary of SIMS supply status for in-country support:

(a) Monthly requisitions averaged approximately 2500 per month for the past nine months.

(b) The ASL items averaged approximately 3400 items for the past nine months.

(c) Due-outs increased from March through August for two primary reasons. First the support of TMDE repair parts transferred from contractor support to AMSF support without available assets. Second, the elimination of Direct Supply Support airlift and substitution of surface transportation and late action to increase Order Ship Time to compensate for the changeover.

5. END ITEM SURVEILLANCE: End item surveillance visits are limited due to insufficient personnel. Typical findings are as follows:

a. Surveillance visits to tactical units employing radar revealed the following factors which contribute to an existing high deadline rate;

(1) Insufficient number of trained operation and maintenance personnel. Approximately 50% of the school trained maintenance personnel are not assigned to radar maintenance duties.


AMSF SUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS
PERCENT
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
88
95
97
96
94
97
95
100
97
92
83
75
67
50
88
95
58
54
39
DEMAND ACCOMMODATION
DEMAND SATISFACTION
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
CY-1973

Figure 15

(2) Maintenance is inadequate at all echelons. There is a lack of spare parts in the maintenance channels. Extended delays are common in evacuating equipment for repair.

b. It has been suggested to the RVNAF J6/JGS that the following actions be considered in a program to improve and maintain a high level radar readiness posture.

(1) Establish unit contact teams consisting of highly skilled radar operator and maintenance personnel. These teams would provide OJT training for unit operating and maintenance personnel and concurrently provide on-site repairs.

(2) Identify graduates of the Signal School Radar Maintenance Course and insure they are assigned to radar maintenance duties.

(3) Establish a formal radar operators course at the Signal School and insure that operator maintenance is included in the course of instructions.

(4) Isolate and correct logistics problems so that repair parts will flow to the appropriate maintenance organizations.

c. Observation during surveillance visits to SIMS sites revealed the following problems:

(1) Preventive maintenance is inadequate.

(2) Conditions were found where equipment redundancy was lost without a hazardous condition (HAZCON) report being submitted.

(3) Defective components are removed from the equipment and not sent to the AMSF-V for repair.

(4) Sites maintain an inadequate supply of spare parts and are lax in having TMDE calibrated when due.

d. The following recommendations were made to the RVNAF J6/JGS for consideration in determining corrective courses of action:

(1) That top priority be given to clearing deficiencies noted in quality assurance (QA) visits to prevent further deterioration of SIMS.

(2) That JGS command emphasis be placed on selecting the best qualified QA personnel to give additional on-site training to assigned personnel in diagnosing, isolating and repairing of equipment.

(3) Establish procedures to insure that local commanders and site supervisory personnel are continually aware of the operating condition of their sites.

e. Surveillance visits to SIMS site to evaluate the status of air conditioning and power generating equipment revealed the following:

(1) Many site OIC's and NCOIC's are not placing adequate emphasis on supervising the preventive maintenance program.

(2) Generally, 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance is not being performed.

(3) Insufficient emphasis has been placed on daily routine preventive maintenance.

6. MORALE:

a. Morale in the ARVN Signal Corps is generally satisfactory. However, considerable discontent exists regarding the prevailing wage structure and time between promotions. TDY allowances are extremely low. A review of the existing wage structure and promotion schedule should be conducted with the objective of bettering the economic posture of RVNAF personnel.

b. A significant reduction in ARVN Logistics Support personnel is anticipated which will impact adversely on communications operations and degrade capability. Possibly, the effect of a selective personnel reduction will also adversely affect morale. A review of the proposed reduction schedule should be conducted to determine the impact on the RVNAF Communications-Electronics capabilities.

7. CONCLUSIONS:

a. The primary objectives of the Communications Electronic (CE) Division are to increase the ARVN's capability to attain and maintain:

(1) SIMS reliability at 99.98%.

(2) Effective tactical communications-electronic systems.

(3) Supply effectiveness at 80% or higher.

(4) Effective and efficient maintenance capability.

b. Analysis of surveillance and operation evaluation reports indicate that the following major problems are associated with attaining these goals:

(1) SIMS sites OIC's and NCOIC's are not placing adequate emphasis on supervising preventive maintenance programs. Generally, 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance capabilities exist. However, it is not performed mainly due to insufficient management.

(2) Middle management abilities are not adequately developed to achieve maintenance self-sufficiency. Depot technicians have not reached the level of competence to produce 5th echelon rebuild maintenance. The current rebuild projections appear attainable. Management has attempted to reduce the projected rebuild schedule without adequate justification. Action is being taken to maintain current or higher rebuild projections. Training of ARVN personnel is continuing in management and technical rebuild technique.

(3) The responsiveness of the supply system is inadequate. A contributing factor is the lack of an ARVN break point for consolidated shipments which is preventing supplies from reaching the requestor. Current action should correct these problems.

8. SUMMARY:

a. The Single Integrated Military (Telecommunications) System (SIMS) is the backbone of the RVNAF Com-

munications. The ARVN personnel are becoming technically competent. Although management is lagging in technical competency, an acceptable level of operational standards is being maintained. These operational standards will increase with added experience and training. Programs currently in progress will improve the reliability of communications and increase self sufficiency of both management and technical personnel. Limited technical assistance will remain a continuing requirement.

b. An effective management program for the ARVN tactical communications-electronics is attainable. Additional training of management and technical personnel will increase the operation and maintenance capability.

CHAPTER 11

RVNAF PROGRAMS, PLANS AND MORALE

1. (U) INTRODUCTION. This chapter contains information relating to all military services. Topics are unrelated and include the following:

a. In-Country English Language Training Programs (ELTP).

b. Central Training Command/DAO Technical Translation Branch (TTB).

c. Lines of communication.

d. Military Construction (MILCON).

e. Dependent Shelter Program.

f. RVNAF Retirement Plan.

g. Reduction Program-Bulk Petroleum.

h. RVNAF Morale.

2. (C) IN-COUNTRY ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING PROGRAM (ELTP).

a. Intensive ELTP.

(1) The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Language School (RVNAFLS), Saigon, entered 849 students from all three services into the intensive ELTP during FY 1/74. The students attend classes 34 hours per week, six hours per day, Monday through Friday, and four hours on Saturday. The average training load during this quarter was 1580. Plans are to maintain this average load to fulfill the requirement to qualify 1200 VNAF students for CONUS training spaces. These students receive their intermediate English language training here after initial qualification at Nha Trang.

(2). The Vietnamese Air Force English Language School (VNAF-ELS), Nha Trang, receives students from basic training and teaches them English on a full-time basis of 30

hours per week, six hours per day. The average training load was 410. It is anticipated that this load will drop in the third quarter when most of the students will have attained the English proficiency level required to enter the RVNAFLS.

(3) Intensive ELTP Data Covering FY 1/74:

(a) Number of Students: 1635.

	RVNAFLS	VNAF-ELS
ARVN	157	0
VNN	91	0
VNMC	1	0
VNAF	888	498
TOTAL	1137	498

(b) Number of Lab Positions: 515.

RVNAFLS	320
RVNAF	195

(c) Number of English Comprehension Level (ECL) offshore tests given by Defense Language Institute (DLI) personnel: 1063.

Experimental	150
Regular	913

(All ECL testing is carried out at the Armed Forces Language School, Saigon.)

(d) Number of students sent to the Defense Language Institute, English Language Branch, Lackland AFB, Texas: 248.

ARVN	0
VNN	0
VNMC	0
VNAF	248

(e) Number of students sent direct entry to CONUS: 201.

ARVN	120
VNN	9
VNMC	0
VNAF	72

(f) Total sent to US for training: 449.

ARVN	120
VNN	9
VNMC	0
VNAF	320

b. Nonintensive ELTP.

(1) There are four Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces academies which have nonintensive ELTPs. The schools and locations are:

(a) The Vietnamese National Military Academy (VNMA), Dalat.

(b) The Political Warfare College (POLWAR), Dalat.

(c) The RVNAF Junior Military School (JMS-VT), Vung Tau.

(d) The Highland Junior Military Academy (JMA-P), Pleiku.

(2) Nonintensive ELTP Data:

(a) Number of students: 3419.

VNMA	952
POLWAR	959
JMS-VT	1315
JMA-P	193

(b) Number of Lab Positions: 262.

VNMA	110
POLWAR	52
JMS-VT	60
JMA-P	40

c. It can be assumed that the enrollment in English classes will be maintained until the end of the school year. Then, depending on the ultimate planned total number of personnel enrolled at VNMA and POLWAR, English classes may drop. A recent survey by DLI personnel discovered a low morale of the English teaching staff because of high cost of living in Dalat, low pay and uncertainty about possible cuts in personnel.

d. Accomplishments:

(1) Defense Language Institute (DLI) training specialists regularly monitor, counsel, and evaluate some 250 host-country instructor personnel at RVNAFLS and VNAFLS. The professional assistance consists of classroom visitations, discussions with instructors of their particular teaching problems, occasional practical demonstration or illustration of specific teaching techniques, and evaluations of teaching performance.

(2) Host-country administrative school staff personnel have been temporarily assigned to the classroom in order to alleviate a shortage of instructors. Some of these staff members have pressing needs for professional assistance since they have not been teaching for a long time.

e. The Armed Forces Language School is endeavoring to meet all training requirements and goals. However, morale problems do exist. The continued devaluation of the piaster and the increased cost of living have thrown a heavy financial burden on personnel of this school. Moreover, during the past three months, most public and private schools were closed making it impossible for instructors to augment their salaries by off-duty teaching. The morale problems of personnel at the RVNAFLS lead to concern about their future, causing uncertainty whether to apply for a CONUS course now with subsequent military obligation or whether to leave the military service. For morale purposes, personnel have been given leave when requested, but this has thrown additional burdens on the personnel carrying the load. In FY 1/74 up to 14 students per class have been taught by one instructor. DLI experience has shown that this is counter-productive and leads to extensions and washouts. The school commanders

have been apprised of this, but they have not seen fit to increase their teaching staffs. The Testing Section, both Vietnamese and DLI, also has an unnecessary increased workload when inadequately taught students are tested, washed back, are re-tested, etc. The work increases as far as testing is concerned, but the final product, the CONUS-ready number of individuals, does not increase.

f. With the planned decrease in the offshore training program for VNAF in FY 75, a gradual decrease in number of students at the Saigon school can be anticipated with a commensurate reduction of the present teaching staff.

3. (C) CENTRAL TRAINING COMMAND/DAO TECHNICAL TRANSLATION BRANCH (TTB).

a. The Technical Translation Branch (TTB) has provided continuous translation support to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) since 1955; however, TTB's demise is set for 1 January 1974, marking the end of an 18 year, U.S. funded operation. In its place, the Central Training Command (CTC) plans to assign 50 RVNAF Officers/NCOs to carry on this critically needed military translation work.

b. Primarily, the TTB is structured for the translation of Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force Field and Technical manuals. The military expertise of TTB's civilian translators, illustrators and typists has never been matched for accuracy, speed or cost. Translation production in the past five years has increased more than 100 percent. Currently, at the TTB, it is possible to have a moderate size technical manual translated within a 24-hour period.

c. The TTB is the only US funded group which translates US field and technical manuals into Vietnamese for the Joint General Staff, Central Training Command. TTB translators and illustrators are capable of translating 2000 pages per month and preparing a similar number of camera master pages containing the accompanying art work and illustrations. Personnel resources are 107 local nationals with an Operation and Maintenance Budget (O&M) of $100,672 for nine months of FY 74. TTB's average cost per FM/TM publication of $400 for translation and preparation for printing has been proven to be the most cost-

effective means of providing translation services to the Central Training Command. Throughout the past decade, numerous other technical translation attempts have been made by American and Vietnamese organizations, but their results always have been substandard, too costly and slow.

d. TTB production is regulated through the RVNAF Publications Review Board (PRB). This board was re-organized in January as a regulatory body to plan and program all of RVNAF translation requirements for a calendar year. The PRB now determines annual translation and printing requirements and establishes priorities based upon workload, capabilities and funding of the TTB. In turn, the TTB is responsive to translation and offshore printing requirements of this board which is chaired by the Chief of the Central Training Command. Members of this board are from CTC, Central Logistics Command, J-6, Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) and Vietnamese Navy (VNN). In January the PRB had forecast the need for TTB to translate 226 TM/FM publications during the calendar year. Workload status as of 30 September is as follows:

TM & FM Translation Required (CY 73)	226
TM & FM Received from PRB	138
Translations sent to PRB	110
Translations of Service School's Programs of Instruction, etc., Received from PRB	66
Publications Reviewed by PRB and Returned to TTB for Printing	81
Translations in Progress of being Reviewed by PRB members 30 Sep 73	318
Publications sent to offshore printing	67
Publications sent to VN printing	38

e. As a regulatory body, the PRB is highly efficient in monitoring the scheduled output of the TTB, but does not police its own members for timely review of completed products. On two occasions, within the past six months,

CTC has been asked by letter to return the majority of backlog translated publications (318) to the TTB. CTC's replies have been weak, giving the impression that the Chief of CTC is reluctant to pressure PRB board members, to comply with the Training Management Section's request. The outstanding TTB translations awaiting review by the PRB represent 18 months work and have a time and effort value of more than $200,000.

f. As a part of reducing US expenditures, the TTB moved 15 September into a rent-free building, at a savings of more than $2,000 a month. CTC has asked permission to use approximately 30 million piasters of the Joint Support Budget Training Funds to purchase printing equipment. The Training Management Section has countered this by suggesting that CTC use three printing machines readily available (one from each service), plus the necessary sundry equipment which is available and establish its own FM/TM printing facility.

g. Conclusion: Continued CTC interest and control of publication review for all services is necessary. CTC must develop an in-house translation capability within 90 days to facilitate an orderly transition of the DAO TTB to RVNAF on 1 January 1974.

4. (U) LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

a. The Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Lines of Communication (LOC) network is primarily comprised of the highway system and to a much lesser extent the railway system. The Government of Vietnam (GVN) is placing considerable emphasis on reconstruction and expansion of the LOC network for both military defensive and economic development purposes. Extensive efforts are being made to coordinate planning and consolidate assets of the various GVN offices, with greater reliance on the RVNAF to share in the responsibility of improving the LOC.

b. The RVN now has a road network of approximately 21,000 km, of which 4,063 km have been designated as essential LOC by the Combined Central Highway and Waterway Committee (CENCOM) in 1968. Figure 1 displays the road network from Dong Ha, near the DMZ in the north, to Cau Mau, near the southern tip of the Republic, passing through Saigon and interconnecting the major population centers. Classification of the network is as follows:

RVN ROAD NETWORK AND ARVN - LOC



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Figure 1

Primary Highways	6,400 km (30%)
Secondary Roads	12,900 km (62%)
Urban Streets	1,700 km (8%)
TOTAL	21,000 km (100%)

(1) The GVN, through the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) and in conjunction with associated agencies, e.g., the Vietnamese Highway Administration and ARVN Engineers, has developed and begun implementation of an extensive four-year plan to reconstruct and improve the highway system. The plan aims at improving 4,900 km of roads (continuation of 1,300 km of primary highways and 3,600 km of secondary roads) and rebuilding approximately 20,000 meters of bridges. The ARVN Corps of Engineers has been assigned 695 km of LOC for accomplishment. The ARVN program began in 1969 and is scheduled for completion in December 1975. As of 1 September 1973, ARVN has completed 358 km of LOC (Figure 2) and 1,497 meters of the 3,906 meters of bridge construction assigned (Figure 3).

(2) Primary Highways--2,700 km of the 6,400 km, have already been upgraded, while an additional 800 km are scheduled to be upgraded, totaling 3,500 km. The improvement of 3,500 km may be considered as adequate for economic development. The remaining 2,900 km (6,400 km less 3,500 km) of primary highways serve more logistic and strategic purposes rather than economic development.

(3) Secondary Roads--almost all of the secondary or rural road network of 12,900 km have been damaged either by the war or because of insufficient management. An estimated 70% of the rural road network (about 9,000 km) is considered necessary for the country's economic development. While the secondary road system comprises 62% of the entire network, only 8% of the country's road expenditures were spent on it in recent years.

(4) Disadvantages to the highway system are the high cost of maintenance and the relative ease with which it can be interdicted.

c. After a long period of preoccupation with the highway system, GVN and RVNAF attention is being refocused on the waterway systems. There are over 5,000 kilometers of navigable waterways in RVN, including rivers, channels, primary, secondary and tertiary canals;


ARVN - LOC
ROADS
(KILOMETERS)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150
LTL 7B
QL 14
QL 20
QL 1
TL 2B
LTL 2
LTL 8A
LTL 7A
QL 4
22
55
36
145
49
94
115
20
10
38
7
45
24
31
75
116
TOTAL PROGRAM 659 KM
COMPLETED AS OF 1 SEP 358 KM
WORK IN PLACE (COMPLETED)
WORK TO PLACE (SCHEDULED)

Figure 2



Figure 3

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most of which are in the MR 4 Delta area. The vital interests are obvious when considering all that the waterways provide, i.e., irrigation, drainage, a fresh water supply, a food source and most importantly a cheaper more easily managed and maintained transportation system (as compared to the highway system; it is estimated that maintenance and freight costs are 75% less). The disadvantage to the waterway system is the fact that it is not reliable for year-around or night operations due to weather, tides and obstructions.

(1) In 1971, 15 hydraulic dredges were moving less than one-half million cubic meters of silt and debris. Presently the dredges are moving four million cubic meters, an 800% increase to near total capacity. An estimated 20 million additional cubic meters will have to be moved to enable navigation by the available 400 metric ton barges. (A 400 MT barge has approximately the equivalent capacity of 50 5-ton trucks.)

(2) In 1971 the Vietnam Dredging Agency (VDA) was created to address and meet dredging requirements within RVN. Thia autonomous agency was formed as a corporate enterprise on a pay-as-you-go basis. The various ministries and agencies of the GVN are now required to plan and budget for dredging, according to their projected needs, then to negotiate contracts, through the VDA, in coordination with the Director of Navigation and the Ministry of Plans. Examples of interested offices are: the Ministry of Agriculture, Directorate of Irrigation, Directorate of Fisheries, the various port authorities and, of course, the RVNAF.

(3) In addition to GVN and RVNAF support, other outside interests have developed. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has had a team working to help improve the waterways system since December 1972, and most recently, the World Bank has expressed great interest in assisting the GVN, particularly with facilitating a more timely dredging operation.

d. An aspect of LOC that is increasing in importance is the railroad. During the last quarter, RVNAF has displayed an increased interest in railroads as a cheaper

means of transporting materiel. Emphasis has been placed on improving railroad operational capability by national and regional commanders. Based on recommendations by the Central Logistics Command, RVNAF assets are being utilized, in conjunction with the Ministry of Transportation and Post (MT&P), in the preparation, or repair, of subgrades for side tracks to depots and military bases.

(1) The traffic on the railroad during the last quarter was reported as follows:

July - 2,000 Metric Tons/346,000 Passengers

August - 4,000 Metric Tons/435,000 Passengers

September - 3,000 Metric Tons/405,000 Passengers

(2) There are approximately 614 kilometers of fully operational track with an additional 187 kilometers of operational but "insecure" track. There are 118 kilometers of track and bridges under repair or scheduled for repair as of 30 September. Track locations and distances are illustrated in Figures 4 through 7.

(3) An inventory of rolling stock is listed in Figure 8.

5. (C) MILITARY CONSTRUCTION.

a. The Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)/ Military Construction (MILCON) Program provides for construction and major rehabilitation of RVNAF facilities and is financed by VN funds provided through the GVN defense budget.

b. Projects under construction are administered by the Director of Construction (DIRCON). All work is done by lump sum contractors. Problems arise for Vietnamese contractors when offshore procurement is required due to long lead times and complicated importing procedures set by the GVN.

c. The present program consists of the following:

Figure 4

RAILWAY SYSTEM DISTANCES

LOCATION (City/Km-marker from Ha Noi/Province) FROM:	TO:	DISTANCE (Between Cities in km)	REMARKS (Status) MAIN LINE
Saigon (1749 thru 1739) (Includes Cholon)	Xuan Loc (1648)/ Long Khanh	81 (+19)	Fully operational
Xuan Loc	Gia Huynh (1613) Binh Thuy	35	Rebuilt-not functioning due to lack of security
Gia Huynh	Naa Lam (1530) Binh Thuan	83	Inoperational-scheduled for repair starting 1 Oct 73
Naa Lam	Song Long Song	68	Rebuilt-operational for service runs only, due to lack of security

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FROM:	TO:		
Song Long Song	Phu Cat (1072)/ Binh Dinh	390	Fully operational
(Includes: Nha Trang (1314)/Khanh Hoa, Tuy Hoa (1192)/Phu Yen)			
Phu Cat	Da Nang (791)/ Quang Nam	279	Inoperational
Da Nang	Hue (688)/Thua Thien	103	Fully operational
Hue	My Chanh (651)/ Quang Tri	35	Under reconstruction, including bridges
My Chanh	Dong Ha (620)/ Quang Tri (17°N)	31	Inoperational
			BRANCH LINES
Saigon	Loc Ninh/Binh Long	141	Inoperational
Go Vap/Gia Dinh	RVNAF Depot	5	Fully operational

Figure 5

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Figure 6

FROM:	TO:		
Phan Rang (1407)/ Ninh Thuan	Dalat/Tuyen Duc	84	Operational - not functioning due to lack of security & possible other (political) considerations
Muong Man (1550)/ Binh Thuan	Phan Thiet/Binh Thuan	12	Inoperational
Nga Ba (1363)/Cam Ranh	Ba Ngoi/Cam Ranh (Bay)	5(+.7)	Fully operational. A 700m extension was built onto the causeway by ARVN
Dieu Tri (1095) Binh Dinh	Qui Nhon/Binh Dinh	10	Fully operational
Ba Ren (821)/Quang Nam	An Hoa/Quang Nam	20	Inoperational

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

Figure 7

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INVENTORY OF RAILWAY ROLLING STOCK IN RVN

UNIT	TYPE	ORIGIN
Power Units:	48 Diesel-Electric Locomotives	U.S.
	6 Diesel-Electric Locomotives	European
	6 Diesel-Hydraulic Switchers	U.S.
Passenger Cars:	165 1st, 2d & 3rd Class	Mixed
Box Cars:	220 40-Ton, 4 axel	U.S.
	224 30-Ton, 2 axel	European
Flat Cars:	110 40-Ton	U.S.
	168 40-Ton	European
Gondolas:	45 40-Ton	U.S.
	65 Flat bottom drop	U.S.
Tank Cars:	28 8,500 gallon	U.S.
Refrigerator Cars:	20 Automatic-mechanical	U.S.
Hopper Cars:	93 40-Ton	U.S.
Wrecking Cranes:	6 75-Ton	U.S.
Others:	350 Utility, service, misc.	Mixed

Figure 8

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(1) Projects Under Construction:

	No.	$ Value*
Hospital	1	2387
Ammo Depots	2	100
Communications Facilities	3	133
Logistics Depots	2	581
Training Facilities	1	3911
TOTAL	9	7112

(2) Projects Under Design:

Logistics Depots	2	1177
Construction Battalion	1	210
TOTAL	3	1387

(3) Projects Funded, on hold by SECDEF & sponsor:

Ammo Depots	5	4401

*Thousands of dollars.

d. Vietnam does not produce a sufficient quantity of cement for its own use. It must depend upon imports to make up the difference, mainly from Taiwan and Korea. This has and will continue to affect the MILCON Program. A dependable supply of cement is not assured and the price has jumped from 610$VN to 1,100$VN per bag.

6. (U) DEPENDENT SHELTER PROGRAM.

a. Since 1961, the Government of Vietnam (GVN) has engaged in an effort to provide dependent housing for families of RVNAF personnel. Originally, the program was wholly sponsored by the GVN but as its extensive nature became more apparent, the United States began to assist with aid in the form of construction materials.

By 1969, about 85,000 housing units had been completed but many had been destroyed by enemy action during the TET Offensive and by weather. At the beginning of 1970, only 49,000 usable shelters remained.

b. DAO is currently committed morally through Presidential promise to aid the GVN financially in the construction of 100,000 Dependent Shelter Units during the period CY 1971 through 1975. Funding for this program is:

(1) $4.8 million OMA which is and can only be used for purchase of materials.

(2) $600 thousand MCAF and $600 thousand MCN that may be used either for labor or material, but is currently being used for material.

Additionally, the GVN Defense Budget has allocated an average of $3,972,670 per year during CY 71, 72, 73, and 74. Fifty percent of this amount ($1,986,335) was funded by the U.S. Government from Joint Support Funds. These funds are used for the contractor portion of the program for which all materials are supplied by U.S. Government funds cited above.

c. The Navy and Air Force sponsored independent programs prior to the 1970 Presidential commitment that is additive to the 20,000 units per year in the Program; the Navy will build 5184 units, and the Air Force 400 units. These do not form a part of the basic program and will retain present sponsorship through completion.

d. The total program is now 28% complete. This program was initially constructed by military engineers and occupant self-help. Little contractor effort was used. Local contractor participation and local materiel purchases have increased each year to the point that in the CY 74 program, 61.85% of the total effort will be by local VN contractors and 36% of the materiel will be locally purchased, thus enhancing both the construction and materiel industries. Although this program is currently intended for use by military dependents, it should be considered as a potential source of housing for Rural Development Cadres and for refugees.

e. To date, approximately $2.9 million of FY 73 funds have been obligated for materiel purchase. Approximately $2.3 million of this amount was for purchase of CY 73 materials and the remaining $600 thousand was used to make up CY 71 and 72 material shortfalls. On 3 April 1973, the release of $2.5 million was requested from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the second phase (1,000 buildings) for CY 73. These funds were not released.

f. Presently, Phase I material is on order with approximately 37% of the material being procured locally in Vietnam in order to facilitate faster delivery with less loss in shipping time and to stimulate the Vietnamese economy. Planning includes procuring even more materials locally when the Phase II money is released, but again a major stumbling block to local procurement will be cement.

g. With the introduction of NSDM 210, it became apparent that the remaining shelters in the program should of necessity be constructed 100% by local contractors using local materials.

h. Legal prohibitions on the use of OMA funds preclude this approach. Believing the original considerations and timetable for the program to be still valid and recognizing the economic importance of adherence to NSDM 210, the following plan of action has been derived:

(1) Create a design to enable local procurement that will also eliminate the current 9-month lead time for offshore supply delivery. An A&E firm has been contracted to perform this service, with joint analysis of the design to be completed in early November 1973.

(2) Supplement the on-going program immediately with supplies from BCM to be paid back upon ultimate receipt of supplies from DSP. Cement will be the primary borrow since BCM recently made a bulk buy. This borrowing action has been recommended to Chief, OCE.

(3) Increase the contractor participation immediately through use of the withheld $1.2 million MILCON funds. DA has been requested to consider early release of these funds.

(4) Transfer funds to BCM recently made available through our gross reduction in barrier material purchase. This will overcome the material shortfalls on requisitions which have been cancelled and funds lost.

(5) Transfer the final 50% of the program to the sponsorship of USAID, thereby allowing 100% contractor participation and local purchase through an inspection and reimbursement upon completion of program. This approach will eliminate the shortcomings noted in the legal prohibition of the use of OMA funds.

7. (C) RVNAF RETIREMENT PLAN FOR CY 73.

a. The RVNAF demobilization plan for CY 73 is based on Law #13-CT/LDQGQL/SL, signed by MG Duong Van Minh on 20 October 1964. There are two new Laws (#58 and 59) on the books, signed by President Thieu on 26 December 1972. The new laws were signed too late for implementation during CY 73. Plans are to implement the new laws 1 January 1974 which will then modify demobilization requirements, by lowering the age limits by 1 to 3 years.

b. The last assessment reported 71,753 personnel to be demobilized during CY 73. This was a planning figure. After reviewing the records, it has been determined that 55,569 will be demobilized during CY 73. The breakout is at Figure 9.

c. There has been no change in the military pension regulations covered in the previous quarterly assessment. Not mentioned in last reported table of Monthly Pensions Rates and Allowances is the fact that the program at present contains no provisions for cost-of-living increases. Seniority pensions are granted to all service personnel who complete 25 years of civil and military service. Extra credits toward the 25-year eligibility can still be obtained for the special category service or circumstances formerly enumerated.

d. The scope of responsibility of the Ministry of War Veterans (MWV) as outlined in this portion of the last assessment remains unchanged. Of the 33 provincial city service centers the MWV was authorized to open, 21 were opened during this quarter. Adding the

DEMOBILIZATION OF RVNAF CY 1973

1. (C) Personnel demobilized during period 1 Jan - 30 Jun 73.

a. Over Age Personnel.

	OFFICER	NCO	EM	TOTAL
Army/Marine	556	2,510	1,870	4,936
VNAF	15	21	3	39
Navy	13	26	11	50
RF	163	762	2,105	3,030
PF	0	51	1,142	1,193
TOTAL	747	3,370	5,131	9,248

b. WACs Contract Expires and Retirement 135

c. Category #2. Physically unfit. 7,948

d. Category #3. Disabled. 4,592

TOTAL 21,923

2. (C) Personnel scheduled to be released during period 1 Jul - 31 Dec 73.

a. Over Age Personnel

	OFFICER	NCO	EM	TOTAL
Army/Marine	673	4,277	7,781	12,731
VNAF	46	105	1	152
VNN	18	47	24	89
RF	424	2,253	4,549	7,226
PF	0	74	1,314	1,388
TOTAL	1,161	6,756	13,669	21,586

b. WACs (included w/Army) -

c. Category #2. 4,616

d. Category #3. 7,444

TOTAL 33,646

Figure 9

11 which were in operation prior to the beginning of the quarter a total of 32 are now functioning throughout the country. Office space is available in the remaining 12 provinces, however, qualified personnel to staff and operate these service centers are not available at this time.

8. (C) REDUCTION PROGRAM - BULK PETROLEUM.

a. Effective 1 April 1973, a reduction in the quantity of Mogas and diesel fuel was imposed upon the RVNAF. Using as a basis the average monthly consumption for CY 72 and considering equipment density, the following factors were used in estimating bulk POL consumption for FY 74:

(1) Consumption rates per mile were obtained from FM 101-10-1 and FM 55-15 (peacetime operation).

(2) Equipment densities were compiled from inventories.

(3) Except for generators and some water pumps, equipment assumed to be 70% operational.

(4) Wheeled vehicles operated 20 miles per day on a 20-day month.

(5) Track vehicles operated 25 miles per month.

(6) Except for generators, hourly consumption rates are based on 8 hours per day, 20 days per month. Generators were computed on a 30-day month.

b. The results of this analysis were as follows:

Comparison of POL Requirement
(in thousands of barrels)

	MOGAS	DIESEL	AVGAS	JP-4
CY 72 Average Monthly Consumption	166.3	253.6	62.9	132.2
Based on Equip Density	97.2	308.6	57.0	200.0
Difference	-41%	+21%	-9%	+51%

c. RVNAF continues to complain about what they consider a shortage principally of diesel. To have the greatest impact on DAO, RVNAF manifests their displeasure by shorting allocation in areas which are noticed very quickly, such as road and bridge construction, supply depots, critical power generators for hospitals and training centers, and critical communication networks.

d. The on-going emergency crisis and MASF budget limitations are going to force further reductions of POL effective December 1973. Preliminary data indicates the following allocations will be allowable:

QUANTITIES IN THOUSANDS OF BARRELS

	MOGAS	DIESEL	AVGAS	JP-4
Requirement based on equipment density	97.2	308.6	70.1	242.4
Available product under MASF limitation	95.0	224.0	52.0	123.0

9. (C) RVNAF MORALE.

a. RVNAF morale as reported in the previous assessment has remained reasonably stable during this quarter. The following table shows a slight decline in desertions during the past three months.

DESERTION RATE IN RVNAF (%)

Branch	1st and 2d Quarter	3d Quarter	Change
ARVN	2.83	2.25	-.58
VNAF	.44	.28	-.16
VNN	.57	.30	-.27
VNMC	2.48	1.74	-.74
RF	1.55	1.45	-.10
PF	.90	.78	-.12

(1) Continuing inflation causes the inadequate military pay to become a greater source of discontent.

(2) As always, cultural traditions and family obligations cause considerable hardship on military personnel who are forced to relocate. Unit moves are often accompanied by increased desertion and AWOL rates.

(3) The unstable economy aggravates the tendency toward corruption among personnel at all levels. This situation also results in favored treatment for those who can afford it at the expense of those who cannot.

(4) Inadequate dependent housing continues to be a source of irritation.

b. The RVNAF high command is very aware of morale problems and has a standing committee (Central Committee for Desertion Control, Eradication of Narcotics and Social Evils) to overcome them. This committee is chaired by LTG Tran Van Trung, Chief of the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD), with representatives from the following offices: JGS/J1, J3, J5, AG, IG, SJA, the Mobilization Directorate, MP Command Central Training Command, Military Security Department and Central Logistics Command. This committee meets monthly to study morale problems and make recommendations to all levels of command.

c. The following are some of the steps that have been taken by the high command to improve morale throughout RVNAF:

(1) Effective 1 September 1973 each member of the Armed Forces received a monthly rice allowance of 3,000$VN. This will purchase approximately 21 kilos of grade III rice which is an adequate monthly allowance for one person. Surprisingly, PF were included.

(2) During CY 73, for the first time in five years, members of the Armed Forces have been authorized annual leave. This leave was awarded in two increments. The first increment was a seven-day leave and the second an eight-day leave. As soon as all individuals had completed the first increment, the second round of leaves began. Approximately 50% have had their second leave.

(3) The GPWD sponsored troop programs listed below are also considered noteworthy:

PROGRAM	COST
Daily news bulletins	VN$ 1,119,000
Programs for Armed Forces holidays (parades, awards, etc.)	3,645,000
Magazine for enlisted personnel (printed bimonthly)	240,000
Monthly Magazine (for Officer personnel)	360,000
Prize for Battlefield News Report (Designed to encourage individuals to submit personal combat experiences.)	500,000
Prizes for Organizations' Athletic Programs	2,500,000
Support of Military Athletic Associations	1,000,000
Entertainment of Front Line Troops	1,000,000
Production of Military Newsreels	10,600,000
Troop Library (issued down to Bn level)	9,075,000
Musical Instruments for Troop Units	7,140,000
Entertainment of Oustanding enlisted personnel (Accommodation and meals for approximately 200 outstanding enlisted personnel selected during the year to attend Armed Forces Day Parades)	120,000

d. Figure 10 displays the RVNAF desertion rates since January 1973.



Figure 10

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1. (C) CHAIN OF COMMAND:

a. In the previous quarterly assessment, this chapter outlined the organization for national defense within the Government of the Republic of Vietnam from the President as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, down to the Military Regions/Corps (MRs/Corps). (Figure 1) Nothing substantial has changed in the structure of command and control since the last assessment, although changes in the organization of the Mobilization Directorate of the Ministry of National Defense have been signed into law by the President in Decree #309/TT/SL, dated 29 September 1973. The Mobilization Directorate is now titled the Directorate General for Manpower. The Directorate will actually consist of two co-equal directorates, the Directorate of Conscription and the Directorate of Reserve Service. The reorganization also creates a Study Service, an Administrative and Public Relations Service and a Statistical Center. There will be one Manpower Service located in MRs 1, 2 and 3, and two in MR 4. In addition, there will be 45 Manpower Offices in Saigon and one in each province, for a total of 89. The J-1 of the JGS retains the responsibility for overseeing the RVNAF recruiting programs.

b. The Joint General Staff (JGS), which is "joint" in name only, but not in either composition or operational command and control concepts, was the focal point of the preceding assessment. The rationale was, that while the JGS is primarily an Army Staff (with minimal liaison representation from sister services), the Chief/JGS-RVNAF is tasked with command of the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) and the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) in the established chain of command. Actually, the JGS is concerned almost exclusively with day-to-day ground force management while the VNN and VNAF maintain separate and distinct headquarters and staffs physically apart from the JGS Compound, functioning almost entirely independently. The VNN and VNAF command those forces retained under their control, providing administrative and branch support to those forces designated under operational control of the MR Commanders. As before, significant command

NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF)



(a) Chief, JGS is also Commander of all ARVN Forces.
(b) Infantry Branch also includes Regional Force/Popular Force.
(c) Logistically subordinate to Arms concerned, OPCON to JGS/RVNAF

Figure 1

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matters between the services of RVNAF continue to be directed personally and, more often than not, verbally between commanders at the highest levels, and staff interaction is minimal or nonexistent. Day-to-day joint operational command and control of the VNN and VNAF by the JGS does not exist. Therefore, this assessment will address the VNN and VNAF organization and exercise of command and control in greater depth and detail than previously to complete the RVNAF command and control picture.

c. As shown in Figure 1, the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) has a position in the RVNAF structure that is equivalent to the four Corps (Military Regions), the Vietnamese Navy, and several other specialized military units such as the Ranger Command or the Artillery Command. The VNAF status as a component of the RVNAF is reflected also in the fact that the VNAF representation on the JGS is insignificant. This representation consists of a few offices scattered throughout the staff. The senior of these representatives is a VNAF Colonel who is assigned to the Central Traffic Control Section of the Joint Operations Center. The J-3 Air Section whose function it is to monitor air operations is run by ARVN personnel. The organization of the VNAF is shown in Figure 2. All functions shown with the exception of the Air Training Command and the Air Divisions are centralized at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Saigon.

The Air Operations Center monitors the daily activities of the VNAF; its organization is shown in Figure 3.

(1) The Air Lift Control Center (ALCC) monitors fixed wing transport aircraft and helicopter operations. The request net is outlined in Figure 4.

(a) Fixed wing requirements are transmitted from the MR G4 to JGS Central Logistics Command (CLC). CLC transmits daily airlift requirements to the AOC and ALCC. The ALCC frags airlift missions through the Military Region Direct Air Support Centers (DASC). In cases of conflict due to insufficient aircraft, priorities are established by CLC.

(b) Helicopter requirements are established by the military region and communicated through the MR DASC to


VNAF ORGANIZATION
JGS
Commander
Vice Commander
Inspector General
Chief of Staff
Headquarters SQDN
Command Post
Finance Center
Plans & Program Division
Correspondence Division
Assistant for Security
Surgeon General
Assistant for Air Defense
Asst. for Safety
DCS POLWAR
DCS Training
DCS Logistics
DCS Personnel
DCS Operations
Aircraft Control & Warning Group
Air Division 1
2
3
4
5
6
Air Training Command
Air Operations Center

Figure 2



Figure 3

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

Figure 4

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the ALCC. The ALCC in turn frags the missions back through the MR DASC. Requirements for inter-region use of helicopters are coordinated through the J-3/J-3 and J-4.

(2) The Air Operations Division monitors the activities of strike aircraft, air defense activities, and search and rescue missions. This division performs the monitoring functions normally associated with a Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). The nominal air request net is shown in Figure 5.

(a) For routine operations of attack aircraft, the MR establishes a requirement with the MR DASC. The supporting Air Division is contacted by the DASC to determine how many sorties can be generated. When the number of sorties is established, the DASC informs the TACC who, in turn, publishes frags for that number of sorties.

(b) Aircraft can be diverted within a region by sending the approved divert request from the MR Tactical Operation Center (TOC) to the MR DASC. The DASC contacts the controlling AC&W site who then diverts the flight.

(c) Virtually all attack sorties are preplanned. The only operational flexibility is in determination of takeoff time. Little use is made of the concept of "immediate requests."

(d) The daily scheduled sorties have little relationship with operational requirements. The daily schedule is quite stable within most MRs. The number of sorties scheduled is a function of the negotiations necessary to consider operational requirements, maintenance capability and unit training. Once a convenient sortie rate is established, it is rarely changed except to meet drastic changes in the tactical situation. Wide differences occur between the number of sorties scheduled (fragged) on a daily basis and those flown. The difference is generated by the policy (established independently in each MR) that missions are not flown unless required.

To describe the function of the VNAF in the total RVNAF military capability, a general analogy can be made with the U.S. concept of Unified and Component Commands. Each of the MRs act as a Unified Command. As the component


JGS
J-3
AIR OPERATIONS CENTER
AIR OPERATIONS DIV (CONTROL CENTER)
PLANS DIVISION
MILITARY REGION
TOC
(COORDINATION)
DASC
AIR DIVISION
REGIMENTAL TOC
(COORDINATION)
REGIMENTAL ALO
BATALLION AIR REPRESENTATIVE
INTRA REGION REQUESTS
INTER REGION REQUESTS

Figure 5

command, the VNAF is responsible for training and equipping the air arm of the Military Region. Virtually all operational concept and doctrine is established and implemented by the MR Commander. The Air Force combat resources in each MR respond only to requests made by the MR Commander or his operation staff. The MR Commander has absolute authority over his available forces and therefore determines the extent of joint operations as well as establishing the interfaces between the component services within his region. The usefulness of the "Unified Command" analogy ceases at the concept of joint staff employment. MR staffs are dominated by ARVN personnel. The DASC Commander (normally a COL or LTC) is responsive to the MR G-3. Informal relationships exist between the MR Commander and the Air Division Commanders in each region.

The ALO/FAC System in the VNAF is a victim of personnel shortages due to the pilot requirements created by the Enhance Plus Program. ALO's are assigned at each province, division and Military Region. ALO's are not employed at Battalion level. Each Battalion is supposed to have designated ARVN officers who have been exposed to a one-month course on the employment of aircraft, strike request procedures, etc. The ALO's across the board are young inexperienced officers. Only one MR ALO is a rated pilot. The rest of the ALO's are officers who have received some training as observers. The result of this situation is that the Air Force representative, upon whom the ground commander is to depend for advice, is relatively inexperienced and considerably junior in military rank to the man he is to advise. In practice, any joint use of air power is entirely dependent upon the background, qualification and attitudes of the ground commander.

VNAF Headquarters does not command or control the Air Force resources. As shown above, command and control of strike aircraft and helicopters rests with the ARVN Corps Commander. The monitoring of air operations by VNAF Headquarters personnel is tempered by the quantity, quality and timeliness of data reported. There are no standards established to insure consistent data reporting in a timely manner. Like the other component commands and the JGS itself, the VNAF Headquarters staff gets the information the Military Region Commander wants them to have, when he wants them to have it.

The one exception to the above command and control comments is in the area of Air Defense. The VNAF Aircraft Control and Warning System, consisting of five sites, is a well-trained active organization limited primarily by the performance of the existing radar and its maintenance status. VNAF Headquarters (through the Air Operations Division of the Air Operations Center) exercises complete control over air defense situations. Authority to scramble on an unknown track presently rests with the Combat Reporting Centers (CRCs) at Da Nang and Tan Son Nhut. Once scrambled the decision to exercise the rules of engagement lies with the AOC Commander. The CRCs have the authority to scramble additional aircraft or divert Airborne resources as the situation dictates without regard to MR requirements. The VNAF AOC Commander is the only person authorized to permit a VNAF intercepter to fire on an unidentified aircraft.

d. The June 1973 assessment made little mention of the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) command and control because the JGS staff element day-to-day activity is usually focused on the more frequent and intense ground combat operations. In the RVNAF chain of command, as depicted in Figure 1, the Vietnamese Navy is commanded by the Chief, Joint General Staff. However, as previously mentioned, the VNN has its own separate headquarters and staff, physically removed from the JGS Compound. The VNN Headquarters and staff administers and supports its own forces, and has minimal liaison with the JGS. The VNN Chief of Naval Operations, a Vice Admiral, is usually directed personally in command and policy matters by the Chief, JGS. Direct command and control of special selected units such as the Navy Military District, naval training and support elements, however, is retained by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). VNN units in the field, the Riverine Forces, for example, operate in coordination with the Army Military Region Commanders. Riverine Zones are set up to coincide with the Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) of ARVN Divisions (Figures 6, 7 & 8), to coordinate with ground operations, secure the rivers and provide security escort of convoys up the Mekong to the border.

(1) In the organization of the VNN, the Chief of Naval Operations, under the JGS, has a Vice CNO or Deputy,



Figure 6

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MR 4
RIVERINE ZONE



Figure 7

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

Figure 8

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two Deputies for Riverine and Sea Operations, a Chief of Staff and Deputy Chiefs of Staff for all the VNN Headquarters units. As depicted in Figure 9, Commands include the five coastal zones, two Riverine Zones, General Reserve and Fleet Command, Amphibious and River Patrol Force, Naval Training and Logistical Support. Within JGS there is VNN representation in some staff sections. One Captain works in the J-5 Section. One other VNN officer, ranging from Commander down to LTJG works in the J-2, J-3, JOC, J-6, J-7, Central Logistics Command, Central Training Command and the Combat Development Test Center. Such token representation prohibits joint planning, staff actions and coordinated joint staff operations within JGS.

(2) To accomplish the VNN mission of protecting the coast and intercepting enemy infiltration efforts, coastal zones are set up to coincide with the Military Regions as shown in Figure 10. Offshore gunfire support is approved by the Coastal Zone Commander upon request from the Division or MR Commander and reported to VNN HQ "after-the-fact." Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies (ANGLCO) of six teams of Marines, OPCON to JGS/RVNAF, give support from the following locations:

Team 1 - MR 1 HQ

Team 2 - 22d Div - Phu Cat

Team 3 - Bien Hoa unassigned

Team 4 - MR 4 - Can Tho

Team 5 - Marine Div HQ

Team 6 - Airborne Div HQ

Because of the threat of high speed enemy gunboats and MIG aircraft in MR 1, the MR 1 Commander has taken preparatory steps to employ more realistic "joint" operations including the VNN and VNAF. To intercept and destroy this threat, if and when it intervenes, F-5 aircraft on standby at Da Nang have been given the mission of responding to VNN interdiction requests.

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

Figure 9

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COASTAL ZONES



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Figure 10

e. The absence of an authoritative, active and effective Joint Operations Center at the highest military level denies the Chief/JGS-RVNAF the ability to closely monitor and control daily operations throughout the Republic and react in a timely manner. Re-allocation or shifting of forces between MRs, formation of reserves, employment of special task groups and unit reorganizations are slow and lengthy processes. Given the present autonomy of MR Commanders, the absence of firm and mandatory reporting requirements on the MRs to the JGS and the rapidity with which the enemy has massed and launched attacks in the past, the danger exists that JGS response will be an after-the-fact reaction rather than a series of preparatory or pre-empting moves. This lack of authoritative and clear reporting requirements on the MRs to JGS continues to be a major roadblock which inhibits the Chief/JGS and staff from maintaining the day-to-day, timely in-depth grasp of the tactical situation upon which active, effective command and control rely.

f. There is a Joint Operations Center (JOC) at J-3/JGS, but it does not fill the function its name implies. However, it does contain the fundamental organization and facilities which could be reshaped into the type of joint control center required by the Chief/JGS. At present, the JOC receives reports and operational information which is sent into the JGS almost entirely at the discretion of the MR/Corps Tactical Operation Centers, regarding time and content.

(Figures 11 & 12)

g. Should the decision be made to give the Chief/JGS the mission, power and authority to exercise true operational command and control of RVNAF through the MR, VNN, and VNAF Commanders, the J-3/JOC contains the nucleus upon which to build an organization to help him carry out that mission. To become a JOC in the true sense of the term, the present JOC requires expanded participation by qualified VNN and VNAF officers and forceful directives providing authoritative muscle to deal directly with subordinate operations and control centers. At present, it is relegated to the function of compiling and reporting statistics and "after-the-fact" incidents. Infrequently the JOC is directed to initiate requests to subordinate centers.


JOC/JGS ORGANIZATION CHART
AUTH
51 OFF
33 NCO
28 EM
TOTAL 112
DIRECTOR (BRIG. GEN. AUTH INCUMBENT IS COL)
DEPUTY
SIGNAL COMPANY
TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTRAL COMMITTEE
ADMIN. SECTION
PERMANENT ADMIN SUB. SECTION
PERS. SUB. SECTION
TRANS. ADM. SUB. SECTION
ROTARY ADM. SUB. SECTION
A
B
C
COMBAT DIVISION
STATISTICS BRIEF-ING SECTION
NEWS & INFO. SECTION
ROTARY OPNS. SECTION
A
B
C
MIL. INTEL. DIVISION
FIXED MIL. INTEL SECTION
ROTARY MIL. INTEL SECTION
A
B
C
SUPPORT DIVISION
NAVAL OPNS. SECTION
AIR OPNS. SECTION
ROTARY SPT. SECTION
A
B
C
See Note #1
MISSION: See Figure 12
NOTE 1: See Figure 12

Figure 11

MISSION.

a. Monitor all combat operations relative to both friendly and enemy situations and all combat support provided for these operations.

b. Report to higher authority all important operational events, establish and publish daily, weekly and monthly combat reports.

c. Report and brief, on a periodical basis (daily, weekly, monthly and yearly), on the combat situation.

d. Report friendly and enemy casualty statistics on personnel, and weapons and equipment losses.

e. Control traffic and maintain security for movements between military regions.

f. Supervise all signal communications and maintain liaison between MR's, Military Service HQ, Combat Arms Commands, etc.

NOTE #1:

The Support Division provides one Navy and one Air Force Officer to each Rotating Operation Team to assist in the receipt and processing of operational reports and messages.

Figure 12

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2. (C) SHORTFALLS AND ASSESSMENT:

The present context and framework of the national defense chain of command contains factors which mitigate against the bulk of RVNAF command and control emanating from the Chief/JGS and the JGS. The most important factor is that MR, VNN and VNAF Commanders, and those in the chain of command above the Chief/JGS, can and do go around him on operational matters which are often driven by political as well as military concern or consideration. The MR Commanders in particular, receive missions (not necessarily from the Chief/JGS) and the resources to accomplish those missions, then run their own show. As a result, the Chief, JGS and the JGS organization have become primarily the managers of RVNAF, exercising little day-to-day command and control, involved instead in allocating resources and publishing and monitoring operational, logistical and administrative policy and directives. As the system presently exists, compounded by the absence of timely and accurate MR reporting requirements, operational blunders, resource mismanagement and problems come to the attention of the Chief/JGS and JGS after-the-fact, and more often than not, without any sense of urgency.

CHAPTER 13

DEFENSE ATTACHE ASSESSMENT

1. (S) GENERAL. The RVNAF improves. However, enemy forces also improve, with better equipment, more closely located to population centers, and lines of communication.

2. (S) The RVNAF is capable of stubborn defense of the territory they now control against limited enemy offensive operations of type conducted since 28 January 1973. The RVNAF is, however, doubtfully capable of defending the territory they control against a country-wide major offensive. The GVN would probably lose a significant amount of territory in such an offensive and possibly be defeated, if not supported by US airpower. At the end of the quarter both sides continue military operations to reduce enemy influence in the areas where they claim control. The RVNAF made some progress in clearing the coastal lowlands of MRs I and II and in reducing the area controlled by the enemy in MR IV. GVN forces were also successful in recapturing Trung Nghia and Polei Krong in Kontum Province, but were not successful in reopening LTL 1A to Phuoc Long Province in MR III. Le Minh Ranger Base in Pleiku Province and the RF base on Bach Ma Mountain in Thua Thien Province were lost to the enemy.

3. (S) MORALE. Inflation, especially the increase in the cost of rice, continues to impact deleteriously on RVNAF morale. This is particularly true for those forces assigned to areas away from their normal bases, such as the Marine and Airborne Divisions and RF battalions serving in other Provinces. Probably the most serious trouble caused by these economic conditions is the theft and pilferage by RVNAF troops from the GVN population. This condition has created an anti-government attitude in some areas. Desertion rates appear to be more affected by leadership, family separation and economic problems than by the level of combat.

4. LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT: Common to all services is the lack of adequately qualified middle level leaders and logistics resource managers. Continued emphasis has been placed on enrolling qualified individuals in training schools; however, time and command stress are essential. Middle level leadership is improving as combat leaders gain experience and losses remain relatively low.

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL. RVNAF communications systems continue to function fairly effectively. However, there is still very little centralized control and coordination of combat operations. Each Corps Commander controls military operations in his area with only broad guidance from the highest levels of the GVN. Lack of joint manning at all levels of senior headquarters is a major flaw reducing senior commanders' ability to effectively use available resources. Coordination between services at division and lower levels is practically nonexistent. Improvements have been noted in tactical control of ground combat operations. Corps commanders have made more frequent use of task forces and forward command posts to provide better control and unity of command.

6. PROGRESS. The rate of RVNAF improvement is slow and problems such as inflation, corruption, and poor management continue to put a drag on progress. Combat operations make accelerated training programs difficult to implement, Familiarity with tanks and weapons to destroy them is a pre-eminent training need.

DATF ASSESSMENT LEDGER

POSITIVE	NEGATIVE
1. Enhance and Enhance Plus	1. Strategic Position of Enemy as a Result of '72 Spring Offensive
2. Turnover of US and ROK Equipment	2. New Roads, Pipeline and Airfields in Enemy Territory
3. Readiness	3. Input of Added Enemy Weaponry
4. FSE Input (Begins in Jan '74)	4. US Bombing Halt
5. Supply	5. Corruption
6. Log Support Streamlining	6. Inflation (Cost of Rice)
7. In-Country Procurement	7. Air Defense Capability (GCI Radar)
8. Reduction in US and TCN Contractor Presence	8. Intelligence and Operation Report (Sparce Since Departure of MACV)
9. Improved Unit Training	9. VNAF Computer (Performance Erratic)
10. Maintenance Offensive	10. Command and Control at JGS (Lack of VNN and VNAF Reps)
11. TACAIR	11. Poor Aerial Photography
12. Basic Ability/Desire to Learn	12. RVNAF More Inhibited by Cease-Fire Agreement (One-for-One Replacement)
13. Increasing Technical Competence	13. Aircraft Maintenance-Skill Deficiencies
14. CONUS Schooled Leadership	14. Middle Management
15. Standardization (Elimination of C-123, Certain Models of 119's and C-47's)	15. Nepotism
16. Computer Self-Sufficiency (Hardware and Capacity)	
17. Country-Wide Communications Net	
18. Stretch-out of Contractor Support	

16. Susceptability to Tank Attacks

17. Aircraft "Catch-Up" Maintenance Problems

18. Coastal Radar (65% Operational)

19. Motivation (Lack of Aggressiveness)

20. POL (Management and Control)

21. Komar Threat (Lack of VNN and VNAF Coordination)

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