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To Support and Defend: An Evaluation of the Requirement for A Specialized MOOTW Force

MONOGRAPH
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TO SUPPORT AND DEFEND: AN EVALUATION OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR A SPECIALIZED MOOTW FORCE

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

TO SUPPORT AND DEFEND: AN EVALUATION OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR A SPECIALIZED MOOTW FORCE by MAJ John C. DeJarnette, USA, 46 pages.

This monograph discusses the contemporary calls for a specialized unit to conduct Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW is an interagency affair, in which the military serves to support civil government organs and non-governmental relief agencies. Successful MOOTW requires the military to possess martial proficiency, an awareness of the dynamics of the physical, social, political, and military dimensions of the operation, and leader skills that are different from those used in war. The Army’s “Just-in-Time” method of preparing units for MOOTW is effective, but not efficient. The “Just-in-Time” methodology induces risk to the Army’s ability to execute the United States’ two Major Theater of War (MTW) strategy.

This monograph begins with an examination of the US Commission on National Security/21st Century (also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission) report. That report advocates development of forces optimized for MOOTW. The recommendations of the Hart-Rudman Commission are compared to the Army’s Title X responsibilities for the conduct of land warfare. These differing approaches to national security present the framework for evaluating the research question.

Using historical examples from Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the 1994 intervention in Haiti, this monograph presents a framework for evaluating the MOOTW environment. The physical, social, political, and military dimensions of MOOTW determine the operational and tactical level tasks that a MOOTW force must execute to accomplish the strategic purpose. The low-level tactical tasks required in MOOTW are essentially the same tasks that are required in war. However, the leader tasks are substantially different because of the increased importance of civil-military interaction inherent in MOOTW.

This monograph concludes that the “Just-in-Time” approach to preparing MOOTW remains valid, but should be modified to improve its effectiveness and mitigate the adverse effects MOOTW have on MTW readiness. Leaders must develop increased proficiency in negotiation and mediation skills as well as a more complete understanding of the interactions of the dimensions of MOOTW. To reduce operational tempo for low-density skill specialties, the Army must exercise discipline in task organizing units for MOOTW.
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Introduction

"The primary purpose of US Armed Forces is to deter threats of organized violence against the United States and its interests, and to defeat such threats should deterrence fail. The Armed Forces' core competence is the ability to deter or defeat aggression and achieve our national security objectives."

- United States National Military Strategy

Background

Since the end of World War II, the United States has structured its military forces to deter or defeat aggression by the Soviet Union and its clients. This orientation led to development of a large Army organized, trained, and equipped for large-scale warfare in Europe, which easily defeated the larger Iraqi Army during the 1991 Gulf War. However, the military decline of the Soviet Union couple with a substantial increase in US participation in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) has raised debate over the purpose and structure of the Armed Forces of the United States. A central point of contention in this debate is whether or not the United States should maintain a standing force optimized for constabulary and humanitarian assistance operations. The logic behind the argument for a standing force tailored for MOOTW is articulated in the United States Commission on National Security Strategy/21st Century (also referred to as the Hart-Rudman Commission) report Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom.2

Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom

outlines a set of five principle military capabilities required to support the national security strategy. These capabilities, explicitly addressed later in this paper, arise from perceived changes in the international security environment and reflect increased US involvement in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations outside the continental United States.

The Hart-Rudman Commission offers a compelling argument for changing the structure and focus of portions of the Army to more effectively support the National Security Strategy, however the Army prefers to provide general-purpose forces to conduct both MOOTW and war because of broad statutory responsibilities for the conduct of land warfare. Essential factors in assessing the validity of the current Army approach to MOOTW are: understanding the changes in the international security environment and assessing any fundamental differences between MOOTW and war. The central issues in determining if the US Army needs a MOOTW force structure are:

1. Do Army wartime skills and equipment apply to MOOTW?
2. Can conventional forces simultaneously provide strategic responsiveness for MOOTW and Major Theater War (MTW)?
3. Are the consequences of employing conventional forces in MOOTW significant enough to justify creating a specialized MOOTW force?

A core assumption of this monograph is that the Army budget will not increase to accommodate an additional force tailored for MOOTW, therefore creating units organized, trained and equipped

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3 United States Congress, Title X United States Code, (Washington, D.C., 1995). 10 USC 94 §3013 establishes the responsibility to organize, train, equip, and administer the Army to meet current and projected national security requirements; making it possible for the Army to organize as it sees fit, within the discretion granted by the Secretary of Defense. However, the Army relies heavily on the provisions of 10 USC 84 §3062 which establishes Congressional intent that the Army prepare for land combat: “Congressional intent for the Army...[is] preserving peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States; supporting the national policies; implementing the national objectives; and overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States... It [the Army] shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.”
for MOOTW will require a proportional reduction in conventional Army Major Theater of War force structure.

**Methodology**

To answer the research question, it is necessary to assess the international security environment and the US *National Military Strategy* for supporting US interests abroad. If the international security environment is sufficiently stable and MOOTW are more likely than interstate warfare, then it is necessary to determine if the nature of MOOTW and its supporting military tasks are sufficiently different from military wartime tasks to warrant creating a specialized force to conduct MOOTW. Next, it is necessary to establish if it is possible to optimize a MOOTW force to address all of the likely situations that might emerge during an operation. Finally, it is necessary to assess the consequences of employing inappropriately trained conventional forces in MOOTW. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the US-led intervention in Haiti to restore the democratically elected Jean Bertrand Aristide, is used as the principle case to evaluate US Army performance in permissive MOOTW and is supplemented by insights from UNOSOM II to assess the risks of escalation in MOOTW. Evaluating these factors leads to the conclusion that creating a specialized MOOTW force will neither reduce operational tempo for conventional units nor will it create an optimized force structure to address all of the potential variations of MOOTW.

**MOOTW defined.**

At the outset, it is important to define the term Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* defines MOOTW as “Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before,
during, and after war. In practice, MOOTW represents a complex set of activities including peacetime military engagement, peace operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and preventing proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). MOOTW are best considered in their interdisciplinary context as "complex contingency operations", a set of issues that are not sufficiently addressed solely by military means, yet retaining a significant military component in the solution. Because the scope of MOOTW is quite broad, this monograph will address only the facets typically supported by conventional Army units – peace operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. These three MOOTW missions lie at the heart of the force capability debate. The characteristics of MOOTW and the political military environment that surrounds it will be presented later in the monograph.

The Humanitarian Assistance and Constabulary Capability Debate.

The US Army's view of its purpose is articulated in FM 3-0, Operations, "Fighting and winning the nation's wars is the foundation of Army service; it is the Army's non-negotiable..."
contract with the American people and its enduring obligation to the nation". Success in JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM validated the Army’s ability to perform its essential task, warfighting. However, since the demise of the Soviet Union, a sharp increase in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations, has called the Army’s ability to successfully support US foreign policy goals into question. During the Cold War, the Army supported the US containment policy with a deterrence strategy – maintaining credible forces capable of defeating the Soviets in large-scale war. The 1989 collapse of the Soviet Union signaled a dramatic shift in both the international security environment and US foreign policy. First, the United Nations became more influential in crisis intervention because the inherent stability associated with superpower competition ended. The end of competition between Soviet and US spheres of influence and the associated threat of nuclear war, allowed regional interstate conflict to increase in both scope and scale. In response to decreased regional stability, the United Nations intervened more frequently to resolve humanitarian and military crises, evidenced by the sharp increase in deployment of UN personnel – from 9,570 in January 1989 to 73,393 in December 1994.9

Second, US foreign policy emphasis shifted from deterrence to global economic, political, and military engagement.10 The policy of engagement resulted in increased US military involvement in both unilateral and United Nations sponsored MOOTW.11 The performance of US Army units in Somalia (UNOSOM), Haiti (UNMIH), and Bosnia (IFOR and SFOR) has

in complex contingency operations.

8 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations (DRAG Edition), (Washington, D.C., 2000), 1-1. The doctrinal focus on warfighting found in FM 3-0 is rooted in 10 USC 94 §3062.


11 Niblack, Szayana, and Bordeaux. Increasing the Availability and Effectiveness of Non-US Forces for Peace Operations, 2. During the Cold War, United Nations Peace Operations generally excluded military forces from both the United States and Russia as a means to maintain impartiality and minimize potential for broader conflict. US forces represented a substantial portion of the United Nations forces deployed to peace operations during the period 1989-1994. On going US commitment to United Nations operations in Bosnia indicates that US forces will continue to participate in MOOTW for the foreseeable future.
drawn a great deal of public scrutiny. The deaths of US soldiers during UNOSOM II in Somalia, inability to stop violence in Haiti, and the perceived detrimental effects to MTW readiness caused by continued participation in the United Nations Stabilization force in Bosnia have led to recommendations to tailor Army forces to better to meet these employment scenarios.

**US Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission).**

The US Commission on National Security/21st Century (referred to as the Hart-Rudman Commission) has prepared a series of studies on the emerging global security environment. The purpose of these studies is to provide a relevant framework for development of an integrated national security policy and outline required national defense capabilities. The first report, *New World Coming: American Security In The 21st Century* correctly assesses that the international security environment is substantially different than before the demise of the Soviet Union. Threats to national security arise from variety of quarters: transnational terrorism, organized crime, weapons of mass destruction, and interstate conflict that rises from economic and cultural sources. The Hart-Rudman Commission asserts that the United States will remain the principle world military and economic power, and this leadership role will require increased US intervention abroad to address these diverse threats to US national security interests. The US can no longer rely in deterrence alone to provide security for its' interests.

The most recent report, *Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom* asserts that US military forces are neither sized nor organized to meet the most likely requirements of the next quarter-century:

This Commission believes that the two 'major theater wars' yardstick for sizing U.S. forces is not producing the capabilities needed for the varied and complex contingencies now occurring and likely to increase in the years ahead. These contingencies, often calling for expeditionary

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interventions or stability operations, require forces different from those designed for major theater war. We believe these contingencies will occur in the future with sufficient regularity and simultaneity as to oblige the United States to adapt portions of its force structure to meet these needs. The overall force would then have the ability to engage effectively in contingencies ranging from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to peace and expeditionary combat operations, to large-scale, high-intensity conventional warfare.\textsuperscript{13}

This assessment of the security environment led the Hart-Rudman Commission to present five major military concerns: “nuclear capabilities to deter and protect the United States and its allies from attack; homeland security capabilities; conventional capabilities necessary to win major wars; rapidly employable expeditionary/intervention capabilities; and humanitarian relief and constabulary capabilities”.\textsuperscript{14}

Providing the nuclear deterrence, homeland defense, and MTW capabilities outlined by the Hart-Rudman Commission does not require significant change to the current Army organization and training. Nuclear deterrence is generally the province of the Air Force and Navy. National Guard units, operating in support of civil police and disaster relief agencies, provide homeland defense against natural disasters and many types of terrorist attacks.\textsuperscript{15} As previously stated, the Army organizes and trains to fight and win major land wars, so no significant conceptual changes are required to maintain conventional combat capabilities. However, the increased emphasis on MOOTW directly affects the structure and training of the Army precisely because it is optimized for sustained land combat rather than humanitarian assistance or constabulary operations.

\textsuperscript{15} There is substantial discussion about the scope of homeland defense capabilities that will be required in the near future. Implementation of a strategic ballistic missile defense program may potentially expand the role of active military forces in homeland defense. Both these issues are beyond the scope of this monograph.
In general, proposed MOOTW forces are modeled on existing military organizational structures with modifications to equipment density and soldier skill training. Two credible proposals capture the essence of a force tailored for MOOTW. The first, offered by Geoffrey Demarest, recommends a division consisting of a military police brigade, a military intelligence brigade, an aviation brigade, an engineer brigade, and a combined arms maneuver brigade. He recommends that this organization be placed in a sub service of the Army, analogous to the Coast Guard’s position in the Department of Transportation. Demarest states that this structure would force hard strategic choices about intervention in MOOTW and prevent conventional forces from MOOTW duty.  

Another alternative MOOTW force structure is presented in the Rand study *Meeting Peace Operations Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness*. This study addresses tailoring the existing Armored Cavalry Regiment for MOOTW by augmenting the Armored Cavalry Regiment’s (ACR) combat support, combat service support, and command and control structures. Improving the ACR’s non-combat capacity begins to address shortfalls in delivering humanitarian aid, safeguarding food distribution sites and providing constabulary services in MOOTW, however it does not address operational durability and flexibility required for peace keeping or peace enforcement actions.

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16 Geoffrey Demarest, “Expeditionary Police Service”, *Military Review*, (June 1993), 50-56. Demarest’s emphasis on urban operations tactics and language training begins to address constabulary skills requirements, however his assumption that the remaining conventional forces would be immune from MOOTW is unlikely to be true. Demarest’s model provides interesting insights into improving overall MOOTW skills and task organization procedures of conventional forces.

17 Jennifer M. Taw, David Persselin, and Maren Leed, *Meeting Peace Operations Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness*, (Santa Monica: Rand, 1998), 60. Taw, et al are critical of this proposal because it doesn’t adequately address the interagency nature of MOOTW. The C4ISR structure of the Cavalry Regiment is insufficient to perform simultaneous planning and execution of interagency operations. The authors conclude that the Cavalry Regiment is unlikely to be large enough to address MOOTW without augmented military police, civil affairs, psychological operations, logistics, and communications capabilities. The large augmentation requirements are unlikely to be permanent additions to the organization because they are scarce across the active force structure and expensive to maintain. Therefore, *Meeting Peace Operations Requirements* concludes that creating effective units specialized for MOOTW is not feasible.
These two proposals illustrate the general lines of thought behind the Hart-Rudman initiative and seem to provide viable strategically responsive forces optimized for MOOTW. Hypothetically, forces tailored to MOOTW would also be useful in conducting conflict termination operations after an MTW is completed. However, because each MOOTW is different, no single force can be optimized to meet the set of likely contingencies. The varied conditions surrounding MOOTW interventions supports the Army’s focus on maintaining general purpose forces.

An Alternative View

Hart-Rudman’s emphasis on developing a MOOTW-based force structure conflicts with the Army’s focus on its statutory responsibilities for wartime operations provided in 10 USC 94 § 3062:

It [the Army] shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

The principle purpose of the Army, established by law, is to fight and win wars. Yet it must also provide appropriate military force to implement national policies. Given fixed budgets and manpower ceilings, the Army has elected to support MOOTW by employing general-purpose forces that are principally trained for war. UPHOLD DEMOCRACY demonstrated both the strengths and weaknesses of this approach to MOOTW. The 10th Infantry Division effectively established control of major Haitian population centers, allowing the return of President Aristide, yet its performance was criticized because soldiers initially failed to stop Haitian-on-Haitian violence.18 UPHOLD DEMOCRACY is a case in which a conventional US Army division,

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18 Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, Invagination: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy, (Fort Leavenworth: CGSC Press,
commanded by a conventional corps headquarters, did not fully appreciate the operational
environment and initially responded inappropriately. To determine if conventional forces are
appropriate for MOOTW, the political-military context of MOOTW and the role of military
forces in this environment must be examined. The first step in examining the political-military
context is to understand the history of US MOOTW in Haiti.

A Brief History of US MOOTW in Haiti

First US Military Intervention 1915-1934: Backdrop to UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

Haiti began as a European agricultural colony, with an economy fueled by African slave
labor. In the colonial years, slavery was the core of Haitian social and governmental institutions.
French colonial masters instituted a segregated hierarchy that excluded native Haitians, blacks,
and mulattos from any significant influence in local government and continued to exploit the
population. Haiti ultimately emerged as an independent nation after a violent and bloody revolt
from French domination, but the new government retained its segregationist tendencies. The
mulattos who rose to power after independence continued to oppress and exploit the former
slaves, keeping them at subsistence levels and denying them meaningful participation in
government.

In 1915, the US Marine Corps conducted the first American intervention in Haiti to
suppress local insurrection and to prevent increased German influence in the western
hemisphere. During this intervention, the Marines used force to crush rebellious natives and
installed a military government to rule the island until suitable native institutions could be
established. Throughout the 1920s, the military government established by the US Marines did

1998), 97, 253-254.
19 Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, Intervasion: A Concise History of the U.S. Army
in Operation Uphold Democracy, 7.
not effectively prepare the Haitian people for democratic self-rule. Rather than develop a concept of democracy consistent with Haitian societal values, including the voodoo religion, the military government simply attempted to superimpose the American model of government. The 19-year US Marine intervention in Haiti set the conditions for the rise of a series of despots and the 1994 MOOTW, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. 20

The first US intervention in Haiti concentrated on stabilizing the major population centers and eliminating open revolt in the countryside. This intervention was militarily successful but it did little to address the underlying causes of conflict in Haitian society and to prepare the Haitian people to conduct a peaceful transition of power between administrations. 21 Haitian economic and social inequity were aggravated by: harsh geography with few natural resources, poor transportation and communication infrastructure, widespread illiteracy, and the lack of a common language between the ruling faction and the broad population. Social and physical isolation of the masses, caused by geographic and language barriers, reinforced the perception of powerlessness among the former slaves. Isolation and exploitation of the population, intricately woven into the Haitian society, allowed the rise of despotic governments characterized by endemic corruption and driven by the desire to retain the personal prestige and power of the ruling class. The US military government did not adequately remedy these principle deficiencies. Failure to improve the transportation network and educate the appointed leaders and the population in the basic functions of representative government and free market economies preordained the failure of subsequent Haitian regimes. From the first US military intervention,

the Haitian people learned that force is used to consolidate and maintain power among the ruling class and little effort is to be expended assisting the powerless population.22

The US Marine Corps established the Garde d' Haïti, a national paramilitary police force intended to quell internal dissent and conduct normal policing functions within the country. Led initially by American officers, the Garde d' Haïti became the enforcement arm of the increasingly heavy-handed American presence. The Garde was used to enforce harsh work gangs to create a crude road network for Marine Corps counterinsurgency operations in the countryside and to maintain order among the population. Experience with the US Marine Corps led military government firmly established the modern Haitian tradition of using military force to maintain political control and to completely disregard the needs and desires of the population.23

In 1958, Haitian president Francois Duvallier ousted all Garde officers who had been trained by the Marine Corps occupation leadership, renamed the army the Forced Armes d' Haïti (FAd'H), and closed the national military academy. Duvallier’s action ended all hopes of a professional Haitian paramilitary force and ensured that the FAd'H would be loyal only to the president. Duvallier effectively used the FAd'H to maintain control through a campaign of terror against his opposition. His son, Jean Claude “Baby Doc” Duvallier, ascended to power in 1971 and increased his father’s campaign of terror to maintain control in an economically devastated and corrupt Haiti. Jean Claude Duvallier’s inability to implement economic reform and curb emigration to the United States created a politically undesirable situation for the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations.24 In the United States, the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), the


World wide economic recession that accompanied increased oil prices in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war reduced the level of international aid to Haiti and increased the cost of imported products to the island nation. Duvallier responded to the increased economic stress by increasing extravagance in his personal expenditures and imposing harsher taxes and repression on the Haitian people. The disenfranchised masses became more despondent and began to flee the nation and seek refuge in the United States. The refugee flow peaked in 1992 following presidential candidate William J. Clinton’s
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other smaller interest groups placed great pressure on the Reagan administration to stop "Baby Doc" Duvallier's violent repression of opposition demonstrations in the streets of Port au Prince. In February 1986, the Haitian Army ousted "Baby Doc" Duvallier with tacit approval of the US government. The end of the infamous Duvallier regime did not end corruption and violence in Haiti. The FAd'H continued to manipulate elections in the 1980s, ensuring the economic and political repression of the Haitian People. The end of international tolerance of governmental repression and corruption in Haiti coincided with two watershed events, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the United Nations influence in the post-Cold War world.

As the world watched the US led coalition build for decisive action against Iraqi aggression in Kuwait in December 1990, the Haitian people elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide as their president by a wide margin. His ascendancy promised dramatic change in the Haitian tradition of violent transition of power and corruption. Aristide was a popular priest who preached his reform agenda to a receptive audience throughout his impoverished nation. His message spawned a loosely organized political movement known as LAVALAS, Creole for "we will wash away." Aristide enjoyed a broad political mandate, 85 percent of the popular vote, in an election monitored by the international community. Aristide's ascendancy was popular with the American administration and the powerful US constituencies of the CBC and NAACP.25

Unfortunately, Aristide lacked both political acumen and practical experience in running the machinery of government. Many people viewed Aristide's proposals to redistribute wealth as communistic and a direct threat to the Haitian elite. His inability to create an effective government and implement economic reforms led directly to the Cedras coup in September, announcement of a policy that opened American shores to oppressed peoples of the world.

1991. The Cedras coup led to increased international pressure for restoration of Aristide and severe economic sanctions.26

US President George H. W. Bush ordered the US Navy to implement the Organization of American States embargo of non-humanitarian supplies to the island. Increased economic turmoil in Haiti prompted more illegal emigration to the United States, and US Navy and Coast Guard vessels were ordered to rescue the Haitian “boat people” from the sea. These Haitian refugees were classified as economic refugees and forcibly repatriated, rather than being allowed to enter the United States and apply for political asylum. International media attention to the plight of Haitian émigrés fleeing both political and economic repression increased demands from the CBC and NAACP for US government intervention in Haiti to restore Aristide to power.

US policy toward Haiti remained generally unchanged early in the Clinton administration. Diplomatic efforts seeking to restore Aristide to power resulted in the July, 1993 Governor’s Island Accord. Cedras and Aristide agreed to terms that placed Aristide back in power by October 30th, 1993. Following the Governor’s Island Accord, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 867, authorizing a Haitian Advisory Group (HAG), to monitor and ensure the peaceful transfer of power between the Cedras-backed president Jonnissant and the democratically elected President Aristide. Behind the scenes, US Atlantic Command (USACOM), the geographic CINC responsible for Haiti, began planning for combat operations to unseat Cedras and install Aristide. The United Nations HAG, composed of US and Canadian soldiers, sailed for Port-au-Prince aboard the USS Harlan County on October 6th, 1993.

Emboldened by the October 3rd, 1993 firefight in Mogadishu, the FAd’H and FRAPH staged

26 Ballard, Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997, 48-50. Lieutenant Colonel Cedras was handpicked by President Aristide to serve as the Haitian Army Chief of Staff. The close relationship between Cedras and Aristide supports claims that the true instigator of the coups was Michael Francois, head of the Haitian Police Force in Port-au-Prince.
demonstrations to prevent the *Harlan County* from docking in Port-au-Prince. On October 8th, 1993, the *Harlan County* departed Port-au-Prince without debarking the HAG.\(^{27}\)

Responding to Cedras' defiance, the United Nations authorized a naval blockade of Haiti and froze all Haitian foreign assets.\(^{28}\) Diplomatic efforts continued to seek an acceptable settlement and Haitian emigration again began in earnest. US military planners refined Operations Plan (OPLAN) 2370 for combat operations. In July 1994, USACOM simultaneously implemented Operation SAFE HAVEN, a program to collect Haitian refugees in Cuba and Suriname, and began developing OPLAN 2380, permissive entry interagency operations to restore Aristide to power. Cedras' consistent refusal to cooperate with international efforts made it seem unlikely that peaceful entry of an intervention force would be possible. Permissive entry under OPLAN 2380 envisioned the 10th Infantry Division as the military force to establish a safe and secure environment for a follow-on United Nations organization that would install Aristide and begin to rebuild the Haitian government and economy. OPLAN 2380 was developed primarily by the 10th Infantry Division staff at Fort Drum, New York. XVIII Corps, and USACOM planners visualized OPLAN 2370 and OPLAN 2380 as separate and distinct operations, not nested branches of a single campaign plan. This perception, coupled with the distributed planning arrangement between Fort Drum and Fort Bragg, resulted in significant inconsistencies in the operational, legal, and logistical arrangements of the two plans. Failure to integrate the operational concepts of these two OPLANs contributed to tactical level confusion during execution and limited the initial effectiveness of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.\(^{29}\)

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On September 17th, 1994, a delegation consisting of former US President Jimmy Carter, US Senator Sam Nunn and former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Colin Powell went to Port-au-Prince to present Cedras and Jonnissant with a final option for peaceful resolution. Meanwhile, JTF 180 prepared for combat operations to eliminate the FAd'H and remove Cedras. At Fort Drum, New York, JTF 190 prepared for permissive entry into Haiti to assist with a peaceful transition of government. On September 19th, 1994, CJCS General Shalikashvilli directed execution of OPLAN 2380 PLUS, an ad hoc merger of OPLANs 2370 and OPLAN 2380, using the 10th Infantry Division augmented by elements of JTF 180. From September 19th, 1994 until March 31st, 1995, US military forces participated in a complex contingency operation to establish a safe and secure environment for the return of President Aristide and to introduce a United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).

Lessons of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY highlights the complexity of contingency Military Operations Other Than War. The strategic aim, to restore President Aristide to power, remained consistent, but the operational tasks were fundamentally altered by the Carter-Jonnissant agreement that precipitated execution of OPLAN 2380 PLUS. At the beginning of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Haiti was effectively a failed state, with no functioning government services or structures. This required JTF 190 to execute unanticipated tasks to restore order and establish a functioning government. JTF 190’s rules of engagement and psychological preparation for the operation were inappropriate for the operational environment. The soldiers of 10th Infantry Division entered Haiti with the perception that the FAd’H was a dangerous adversary and should not be trusted. Changing the status of the FAd’H from opponent to partner caused significant confusion at the small unit level – leaders simply did not know how to respond to episodes of


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Haitian-on-Haitian violence. At the operational level, JTF 190 was not well integrated into an effective interagency campaign to establish a functioning government in Haiti. The difficulties executing Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY provide fertile ground to explore the environmental context that shapes MOOTW and defines the military role in complex contingency operations.

**MOOTW Environment.**

"This is messy kind of stuff – you can’t ignore it and you can’t get away from it."\(^{31}\)

General Anthony Zinni, CENTCOM Commander

MOOTW are a set of complex interactions between military organizations, governmental agencies, and non-governmental relief organizations (NGO).\(^{32}\) From the military perspective, the difference between war and MOOTW is that in war, the military operation is the primary effort and in MOOTW the military action is a supporting effort for other government agencies.\(^{33}\) The relationship between the military commander and other agencies is articulated through the authorizing mandate and the supporting rules governing use of force.\(^{34}\) The military commander’s most significant issue in MOOTW is fulfilling the mandate in concert with other agencies, rather than the cognitively simpler purpose destroying enemy forces in war. In MOOTW, the military commander is tasked to establish a secure environment for civil relief and political reconciliation activities; the tactical military tasks of war apply relatively well to

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\(^{32}\) Tim Laurence, *Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping: An Uneasy Alliance*, (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1999), 13. Non-Governmental Organizations are defined as “A wide range of primarily non-profit organizations motivated by humanitarian and religious values, and that are usually independent of government, United Nations, and commercial sectors.”


\(^{34}\) Ideally, the mandate articulates what tasks the military commander is to perform and the relationship between the military commander and other agencies participating in the operation. Rules of Engagement
MOOTW. However, the operational level conceptual skills for MOOTW are different than those required for war.

From the military perspective, MOOTW, like war, are interventions into the affairs of other nations to pursue US national interests. The background surrounding these interventions shapes the type of military intervention that is acceptable. The military options must be proportional to the interests that precipitated intervention. MOOTW intervention can result from desire to mitigate the effects of a natural disaster, from the obligation to prevent genocide or any range of conditions between these extremes. Yet, the common thread that links all MOOTW is that the martial capabilities are needed to resolve the crisis — no other organization can respond in time with the right capabilities. Unlike war, MOOTW demands that the military perspective change from “massive response to minimum force... joint, combined and interagency operations” seeking change rather than victory. MOOTW contingencies must be planned and executed in an appropriate context, consistent with the interests that precipitated the intervention. This contextual planning must be based on a clear understanding of the operational environment.

Four dimensions best describe the MOOTW environment, physical, social, political, and military. Each of these dimensions influences the military actions and force structure required to accomplish the desired ends. These dimensions are all variable across the spectrum of MOOTW; therefore no single organization can provide an optimal solution for all the permutations of the variables. To be successful, the military commander and his units must possess the correct skill set and understand the impact of military actions in each of these dimensions. The physical dimension, determined by geography and the infrastructure in the area

are established by the military commander to guide employment of force consistent with the mandate.

36 Ibid., 42.
37 Pirnie, and Simmons, Soldiers for Peace: Critical Operational Issues, 92-108. The authors outline the social, political, and physical dimensions of the operational environment. The military dimension is added to explain the underlying element of conflict that exists in MOOTW, regardless of category of the
of operations, is static for the duration of an operation and dictates the equipment and personnel
required to conduct the operations. The physical environment influences both MOOTW and war
equally, so it will not be addressed further in this monograph. The remaining dimensions are all
dynamic, possessing variable potential for influence on operations, because they depend largely
on human interaction and perception. The impacts of each of these environmental dimensions are
now addressed in greater detail.

**The Social Dimension of MOOTW.**

The social dimension of MOOTW encompasses the underlying behavioral norms of the
indigenous population in a region. It is defined by the existing culture, language, government,
and economic systems\(^3\) in the area of operations. The social dimension of the MOOTW
environment determines the local populations’ expectations about the services that will be
provided by the MOOTW force and it establishes the realm of acceptable and feasible actions that
the MOOTW force can implement. Nuances of language and culture are significant factors that
shape the social dimension of MOOTW. An appreciation of language and culture is important to
successful MOOTW because of the high degree of interaction that military forces have with the
local population. Developing and maintaining a working knowledge of local culture and
language for a large force is difficult and expensive. US Special Operations Forces (SOF)
commit a great deal of time and money to maintaining language and cultural skills for very small
organizations. Conventional Army divisions do not have the training time or money to
adequately train all soldiers to address the social dimension of MOOTW and are forced to rely on
SOF augmentation for these skills.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY provides illustrations of the complexity of the
social environment of MOOTW and the attendant implications for MOOTW force structure and

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\(^3\) Pirnie and Simmons, *Soldiers for Peace: Critical Operational Issues*, 92-96.
operations. First, the Haitian people viewed intervening US forces as liberators, expecting that 10th Infantry Division soldiers would remove the FAd'H from power and eliminate the influence of the FRAPH, ending years of violent repression. When the 10th Infantry Division did not intervene to stop FAd'H and FRAPH abuses, the Haitian people took matters into their own hands, violently removing FAd'H members from their positions.39 The 10th Infantry Division was not intellectually prepared to assume interim policing functions after the FAd'H ceased to function, resulting in localized sporadic anarchy.40 The resulting unrest prevented the 10th Infantry Division from rapidly establishing a safe and secure environment for the transfer of power from General Cedras to President Aristide.41

Following this civil unrest, the Haitian judicial system completely collapsed. Despite attempts by US forces in Haiti to expedite trials of jailed Haitians, judges and attorneys feared retribution from unruly crowds and simply refused to come to work.42 JTF 190 was slow to address factors of the social dimension because it lacked the intellectual flexibility to perceive issues from the Haitian perspective. JTF 190 leaders lacked an appreciation of the Haitian culture and how the endemic sense of hopelessness would precipitate collapse of the government.43 Misunderstanding the social dimension of MOOTW in Haiti resulted in increased violence and complicated the transfer of power to the Aristide government.

41 The 10th Infantry Division formed the nucleus of JTF 190’s ground security element under OPLAN 2380 PLUS. A contributing factor to the initial intellectual inflexibility of 10th Infantry Division is the fact that the division had been involved in UNOSOM II at the time of the 1993 Mogadishu firefight. Soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division were sensitized to the potential for MOOTW to rapidly escalate to violent confrontations. Consequently, 10th Infantry Division employed stringent force protection measures and rules of engagement that limited interaction with the Haitian population. These policies were subsequently revised in the wake of the September 24th, 1994 shooting in Cap Haitien.
42 Shacochis, *The Immaculate Invasion*, 164.
43 Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, Intervasion: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*, 103-116. Special operations forces fared better than the 10th Infantry Division in accomplishing their assigned missions because they possessed basic language skills and applied Foreign Internal Defense doctrinal principles that encourage SOF soldiers to assist the Haitian population.
The social dimension of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY highlights the fact that the 10th Infantry Division possessed the physical and martial capability to establish order through occupation. JTF 190 lacked unity of effort to address the social dimension factors necessary to achieve police and judicial reform necessary to ensure successful transfer of power to the Aristide government. Failure to achieve unity of effort between JTF 190 and US government cabinet level organizations was manifested in the political dimension of MOOTW.

The Political Dimension

The political dimension of MOOTW is bounded by international legitimacy of the intervention and local acceptance of the intervention. Military ways and means are limited by the mandate authorizing intervention and the local population’s acceptance of that mandate. Commander Tim Laurence, Assistant Commandant at the British Command and Staff College, describes the interaction between military actors, political actors, and humanitarian actors as an “Eternal Triangle,” in which the actions of one party are inextricably linked to the actions and perceptions of other parties. This analogy to Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity of warfare illustrates the complexity of MOOTW, and the strategic impacts of tactical actions by the MOOTW actors.

The political dimension is more important at the tactical level of MOOTW than the tactical level of war because persuasion, rather than destruction, is the currency of success in MOOTW. The consent of the parties to MOOTW intervention is determined in the political dimension and the level of consent defines the range of acceptable military actions and required organizational structure, tasks and capabilities. Consent of the parties is a complex phenomenon to establish functioning government and defensive structures at village level.

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45 Pirnie and Simmons, Soldiers for Peace: Critical Operational Issues, 97-107.
46 Laurence, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping: An Uneasy Alliance, 32.
and consent can be withdrawn by any of the parties at any time.\textsuperscript{48} It is important for the MOOTW military commander to understand that formal consent to intervention is quite different from actual consent. Actual consent is manifested in the behavior of the parties to the intervention, the NGO’s, the local population, and the international community. Assessing and maintaining consent is essential to accomplishing the military tasks in the mandate and requires a substantial political-military interface to maintain unity of effort among the parties involved.

Political-military interface becomes an essential part of all tactical level MOOTW operations. Unlike in war, small unit commanders are required to interact with host-nation government agencies and NGOs during normal operations. Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOC) are established as a centralized place to plan and coordinate military support to interagency operations during MOOTW. Below the CMOC, small unit leaders must coordinate with non-military organs to ensure unity of effort in daily operations. Junior and mid-level military leaders are not trained for routine interaction with civilian leaders. Unfamiliarity with basic negotiation skills and the normal operating procedures of civil organs has been a cause of friction in MOOTW.\textsuperscript{49}

Part of the low-level friction between junior military leaders and civil organizations is cultural. Military leaders are taught to “impose their will”\textsuperscript{50} to accomplish an assigned mission. The military notion of controlling all actions within their area of responsibility is diametrically opposed to the mores of NGOs and civil organs. To be effective, civil government organs need to exert autonomy so the population perceives the civil government to be legitimately in control.

\textsuperscript{48} Pirnie and Simmons, \textit{Soldiers for Peace: Critical Operational Issues}, 33-35
\textsuperscript{49} Robert B. Oakley, and David Tucker, \textit{Two Perspectives on Interventions and Humanitarian Operations}, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), 22. During UNOSOM II Ambassador Oakley identified the need for a Civil-Military Operations Center to integrate operations in each relief sector of Somalia. He observed that formal coordination at the CMOC level was essential to effective operations and that detailed coordination between small unit leaders, local village chiefs and NGOs was required to ensure relief supplies were distributed to the intended recipients. Ambassador Oakley stated that diplomatic advanced visits to village chiefs were essential to preventing violent resistance to the United Nations Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance operation.
\textsuperscript{50} This perception derives from a doctrine steeped in Clausewitzian theory and authoritarian leadership
Non-governmental organizations seek autonomy from military interventions for different reasons than civil government agencies. Non-governmental organizations frequently conduct humanitarian assistance and relief actions in the absence of military forces or functioning local government,\(^{51}\) the local population in which they work must perceive them as independent and neutral or their mission, and perhaps their safety, is jeopardized. These divergent aims, military quest for control, civilian desire for autonomy, and the NGO need for neutrality, can only be resolved through negotiation and cooperation.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY illustrates the tension associated with the political dimension of MOOTW interventions. The recalcitrance of General Cedras and President Jonnissant throughout the summer of 1994 created a perception that the Haitian government and the FAd'H would actively resist a US led United Nations intervention. This perception reinforced the concept that military force would be required to restore President Aristide to power. Military leaders in both JTF 180 and JTF 190 prepared for the “worst case scenario” of violent confrontation with the FAd'H and paramilitary FRAPH.\(^{52}\) The Carter-Jonnissant agreement, signed only after the US invasion force was enroute to conduct a parachute assault into Haiti, drastically altered the political dimension of the intervention. Neither JTF 180 nor JTF 190 was intellectually prepared to deal with the FAd'H as partners in the transition of government. Existing operational concepts and rules of engagement were inconsistent with the level of actual and stated consent of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.\(^{53}\)

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\(^{51}\) Laurence, *Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping: An Uneasy Alliance*, 40. On going NGO relief operations in Sudan and Somalia are examples of NGOs operating in the absence of military protection. \(^{52}\) The parallels of the OPLAN 2370 for UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti and the 1989 invasion of Panama during Operation JUST CAUSE are quite strong. In both cases, the failure of diplomatic efforts to restore the democratically elected president led to military intervention. LTG Shelton, commander of XVIII Corps during UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was also involved in the planning and execution of JUST CAUSE. It is likely that JUST CAUSE was used as a model for UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, preventing unbiased analysis and planning of the intervention. \(^{53}\) Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, Intervasion: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*, 70-78.
Leaders of the 10th Infantry Division were not confident that Haitian formal consent reflected actual compliance because of the strong anti-US rhetoric surrounding the *Harlan County* affair. As a result, junior and mid-level leaders did not effectively interact with Haitian police and government officials. Rules of engagement and tactical plans were adapted to correct this initial cognitive bias and establish civil-military coordination.\(^5^4\) The political dimension of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY also reinforces the interagency nature of MOOTW. There was little effective coordination of non-Department of Defense operations in Haiti or the NGO participation in UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. As late as September 11, 1994, the US Department of Justice was unprepared to support the training of a vetted Haitian Police force.\(^5^5\) The International Organization for Migration, an NGO supporting public works projects in Haiti, established a twenty-five dollar funding limit on infrastructure development projects.\(^5^6\) These two examples highlight the lack of interagency coordination for UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Failure to coordinate the efforts of non-military organizations decreased the effectiveness of the initial intervention and led to the conclusion that “civil order, short of occupation, is now an interagency task requiring active participation of several government departments”.\(^5^7\) Factors in the political dimension of MOOTW adversely affected military efforts during UPHOLD DEMOCRACY demonstrating that the military dimension of MOOTW does not act in isolation from other factors.

**The Military Dimension.**

The military dimension of MOOTW establishes limits to the acceptable level of coercion and violence that can be used to accomplish the mandated tasks. In MOOTW, the military


\(^{56}\) Shacochis, *The Immaculate Invasion*, 256.

purpose is to establish a secure environment for the larger interagency operation. Because the level of coercion required is inversely proportional to the actual level of consent, the amount of force applied is highly variable. Additionally, the risk of casualties to the intervening military force depends heavily on the level of consent of the parties. An uncertain and variable level of consent demands a robust military force to maintain a secure environment.

Maintaining a safe and secure environment is difficult to define in concrete terms because the threats are manifested in many ways, ranging from peaceful protest demonstrations to open inter-factional violence. It is difficult to clearly distinguish between protagonists and antagonists in MOOTW operations. Assessment of the social and political dimensions of MOOTW, the expectations of the population, competency of the host government, and the interests of the international community, determine how the military commander addresses issues such as criminal activity and domestic political unrest. These ancillary threats to stability exist in all MOOTW. Even when the purpose of the operation is predominantly humanitarian assistance, clashes can occur over the distribution of aid to different factions. Accurately assessing the military dimension of MOOTW and its interaction with the social and political dimensions determines appropriate military response and prevents undesired mission creep.

Mission creep accurately describes JTF 190’s operations in Haiti. US interests in Haiti were to stop the flow of refugees to the United States and to reinstate the democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. However, Haitian history demonstrates that the national military is the de facto instrument of power. This factor, above all others, precipitated mission creep for JTF 190. In Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997, John Ballard references this conflict of means and ends:

58 Pirnie, and Simmons, Soldiers for Peace: Critical Operational Issues, 29-35.
59 Oakley, and Tucker, Two Perspectives on Interventions and Humanitarian Operations, 39. Mission creep is defined as “the unconscious or deliberate assumption of policy goals or operational objectives that commit resources beyond what our interests call for.” Blamed for perceived military failure in Somalia, the concept of mission creep emphasized that clear analysis of the intervention environment and supporting
any military success in Haiti would be measured in part by the longevity of President Aristide and functional democracy, the effort to develop security by Haitians in Haiti was an early priority. Such Haitian security was based upon three elements—the return of the legislative process, judicial and police reform, and reduction of threats to security.60

In preparation for the return of President Aristide, JTF 190 favorably set conditions for interagency operations to implement Ballard’s conditions of success. JTF 190 successfully vetted the FAd’H and ended organized FRAPH resistance to a reformed national police force. JTF 190 also limited lawlessness in the major population centers in preparation for the introduction of a United Nations sponsored international police training task force. JTF 190’s mission creep occurred when it became responsible for Department of Justice tasks such as encouraging judges and attorneys to return to work and recruiting members of the forming Haitian national police.61

Throughout UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the military dimension evolved in response to events in the political and social dimensions. JTF 190 adapted its tactical patterns and rules of engagement in response to increased cooperation from the Cedras regime and improved understanding of the overall MOOTW environment in Haiti.

Implications of the MOOTW environment.

The interactions among the physical, social, political, and military dimensions define the MOOTW environment. The consequences of these interactions are often difficult to predict, therefore it becomes difficult to optimize an organization to address them. MOOTW demands that the military effort remain subordinate to the actions of governments and NGOs to accomplish the terms of the mandate. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY demonstrated the complex nature of MOOTW, the need for a coordinated interagency approach to MOOTW and the requirement for intellectually versatile military commanders. The military component of interagency

military tasks is essential to success.

MOOTW demands robust martial capabilities to address a wide range of tasks in the physical, social, political, and military dimensions.

The military tasks required in MOOTW can be quite varied, from open combat sanctioned under United Nations Charter Chapter VII, to distribution of humanitarian relief supplies and services in response to a natural disaster. The complexity of the MOOTW environment requires military organizations capable of conducting a wide variety of tasks. The similarity between combat and MOOTW tasks indicates that, in the context of the US National Security Strategy, general-purpose forces are better suited to perform these tasks than would be a specialized MOOTW contingency force.

**MOOTW Military Operational and Tactical Tasks.**

"The dilemma lies in peace operations unpredictability and changeability over time." 

- *Meeting Peace Operations Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness*

The operational level tasks conducted in MOOTW depend largely on the mandate of the operations and the level of consent of the parties to the intervention. The tactical level tasks that support operational objectives fundamentally differ from wartime tactical tasks only in the degree of force employed to execute those tasks. Likely operational missions for MOOTW, listing in increasing level of coercion might include disaster relief, preventive deployment, security for humanitarian assistance, support transition of government, separate and control belligerents, disarmament, peace enforcement.

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65 Pirnie and Simmons, *Soldiers for Peace: Critical Operational Issues*, 30-47. Peace Enforcement refers
Each of these operational missions requires the military intervention force to possess fundamental martial competence to ensure compliance. The MOOTW military commander must possess the capability to detect, interdict, and punish violations of the mandate governing the intervention. As previously stated, the potential for escalation of violence exists in all MOOTW, therefore the MOOTW intervention force must be robust enough to credibly deter or actually defeat all threats to stability. All belligerent parties must also perceive the intervention force as both willing and capable of employing its military potential to ensure compliance with the mandate. Thus, forces conducting MOOTW must first be proficient in the application of military force, and this martial proficiency cannot be developed with part-time combat training.

The collective tasks supporting these MOOTW missions are listed in Table 1. Most of these tasks are readily accomplished using conventional military units executing current wartime military tasks. However, the task of restoring law and order, which supports the operational mission Support Transition of Government, is generally difficult for conventional military units to support because the US policy establishes the constabulary function as an interagency issue, rather than a military task. Conventional Army units possess all of the tactical skills and capabilities to conduct MOOTW, though some of these can be slightly adapted for MOOTW to coercive action to compel recalcitrant parties to comply with an existing mandate or peace agreement.

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66 Pirnie and Simmons, *Soldiers for Peace: Critical Operational Issues*, 73.
The inherent command, control, and communications capability resident in an Army Division is sufficient to support most MOOTW operations. The logistics support structure provides appropriate transportation and distribution control to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Physical security is well provided by ground combat units that possess the ability to deter and defeat violence. Specialty skills found in engineer, intelligence, communications, and civil affairs units are well suited to most MOOTW.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1 – Military MOOTW Tactical Tasks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrolling</td>
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<tr>
<td>Broker Agreements</td>
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<td>Communicate Among Parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implement Demobilization And Disarmament</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clear Mines and Unexploded Ordnance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assist With Food Distribution, Water Production And Basic Sanitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alert NGOs of High Threat Areas</td>
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<td>Negotiate with Warring Factions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide Physical Security for Aid Delivery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide Physical Security for Refugee Camps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Restore Law and Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct Forcible Separation of Belligerents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish Safe Areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guarantee or Deny Freedom of Movement</td>
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<td>Enforce Sanctions</td>
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Conventional military forces are optimized for combat operations, not MOOTW. However, they are capable of accomplishing the military component of complex contingency operations.

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69 Niblack, Szayna, and Bordeaux, Increasing the Availability and Effectiveness of Non-US Forces for Peace Operations, 7-14. For example, combat patrolling skills emphasize stealth to avoid detection, while patrolling in MOOTW is designed to demonstrate presence; interaction with civilians is avoided in combat training but is desirable in most MOOTW. Providing and enforcing appropriate Rules of Engagement for the use of force and clear instructions for the conduct of operations can make conventional forces more effective in MOOTW.

70 Laurence, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping: An Uneasy Alliance, 50. One caveat to this assertion is that an Army Corps level staff best conducts MOOTW planning because divisions lack the staff depth to adequately coordinate joint and coalition operations.

71 Oakley, and Tucker, Two Perspectives on Interventions and Humanitarian Operations, 22.

72 Laurence, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping: An Uneasy Alliance, 50-61. Strange, Capital “W” War: A Case for Strategic Principles of War, 248-250. United States Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni echoes these tasks in his discussion of military tasks in Somalia (UNOSOM II) and Northern Iraq (PROVIDE COMFORT). The tasks he highlighted include: installing a national police force, resettle refugees in a culturally sensitive manner, negotiate with factional leaders, control the spread of illness and...
operations addressed in an appropriate interagency context. The four dimensions of the MOOTW contingency environment describe the boundaries of feasible and acceptable MOOTW operations and tasks. The immediate consequences of employing conventional Army divisions in complex contingency operations are a sub-optimal solution to a complex problem because these units lack adequate civil-military operations education and training. The employed division or task force will require preparation time to develop an adequate understanding of the operational environment and adjusts its tactics as that environment evolves. The principle benefit of employing military forces in MOOTW is that they possess appropriate martial abilities to limit violence and logistical capabilities to ameliorate human suffering. However, using conventional military units in MOOTW has adverse impacts on MTW readiness.

**Adverse Effects of Employing Conventional Army Units in MOOTW.**

"When viewed through historical precedence, operations other than war are indicative of business as usual for the US military, whereas combat operations are the exception."\(^73\)

General George Joulwan, Commander-in-Chief, US Army Southern Command

The Army approach to MOOTW is driven by the need to mitigate risk to national security. Army units are not optimized for MOOTW because the risk of failure in MTW is substantially higher than the risk of sub-optimal performance in MOOTW.\(^74\) Consistent with this strategy of optimizing for war, the Army uses a "Just-In-Time" methodology to produce units trained and organized for MOOTW. This "Just-In-Time" approach has precipitated the alert-train-deploy\(^75\) preparation system for MOOTW. Alert-Train-Deploy preparation is quite


\(^75\) Niblack, Szayna, and Bordeaux, *Increasing the Availability and Effectiveness of Non-US Forces for*
functional for standing interventions such as the on-going Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. These types of standing commitments can be integrated into the normal peacetime training and deployment system, with optimized units arriving in theater on schedule. However, "Just-In-Time" production of MOOTW task forces has several associated costs to MTW readiness. These costs generally fall into the following four categories: the increased frequency and duration of deployment for personnel, commonly referred to as high personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO); reduced effectiveness of non-deployed units caused by split deployment of units; increased resources required to regain proficiency in MTW tasks after redeployment; and sub-optimal performance during no-notice MOOTW deployments. Most of these consequences are manifested in peacekeeping operations because of their long duration as compared to the duration of humanitarian assistance operations.

Ad hoc task organization for MOOTW significantly increases PERSTEMPO across the Army. Cross-leveling personnel to fill the deploying units increases the likelihood that an individual will deploy more frequently than if units deployed only their assigned personnel. This effect is particularly pronounced for personnel with low-density Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), such as military police, communications, intelligence, and supply specialties. Increased PERSTEMPO is not limited to the active component of the Army. Heavy reliance on reserve component units for echelons above division combat support and combat service support capability ensures that increased PERSTEMPO will migrate to the reserve components.

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_Taw, Persselin, and Leed, Meeting Peace Operations Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness, 13._ Units conduct MOOTW skill training in three distinct phases. The first is unit level proficiency training in martial skills that is part of normal MTW preparation. The second is mission specific pre-deployment training focused on ROE, language, and culture in the area of operations. The third is in-country training centered on adapting skills required in the MOOTW mission. When practical, units also conduct MTW skill proficiency training while performing MOOTW tasks. In-country MTW proficiency training helps maintain skills while providing the added benefit of demonstrating martial capability.

_Taw, Persselin, and Leed, Meeting Peace Operations Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness, 40._

_Taw, Persselin, and Leed, Meeting Peace Operations Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness, 14-17._
Just as “Just-in-Time” MOOTW preparation increases PERSTEMPO for low-density MOS personnel, operational tempo (OPTEMPO) is increased for low-density units. MOOTW demands a higher proportion of combat support and combat service support units than war. As a result, Army divisions and corps must deploy their proportionally smaller combat support and combat service support units more frequently than combat units. More frequent commitment of these units to MOOTW adversely affects their morale and MTW readiness. Fortunately, MOOTW tasks conducted by combat support and combat service support units are very similar to the wartime missions of these units. Supply units transport supplies in both war and MTW, Military Police perform policing functions in both operational environments, communications units establish and operate radio and telephone systems regardless of the level of hostility and engineer units perform the same types of construction missions in all environments. Employing these units in MOOTW erodes a relatively small portion of their wartime skills, those that pertain to close combat operations.\textsuperscript{78}

Increased PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO for both combat support and combat service support units have a larger impact on MTW readiness of the portion of the division not employed in MOOTW. Removing the habitually associated combat support and combat service support “slice” from a division has a disproportionate effect on that division’s wartime readiness because of the leadership and experience that deploys with the slice. Limited command and control capabilities are generally deployed in support of the MOOTW operation, leaving a leaderless organization at the home station. This effect cascades up through the Army as echelons above division organizations deploy the appropriate higher-level headquarters “plugs” that allow the deployed unit to function. Augmenting the deployed MOOTW unit with contracted civilian logistics and communication support can mitigate these effects, however it is more difficult to mitigate the effects of reduced intelligence and policing capabilities.

\textsuperscript{78} Taw, Persselin, and Leed, \textit{Meeting Peace Operations Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness},
The MTW readiness of combat units is also degraded by deployment to MOOTW operations. PERSTEMPO increases due to the additional training requirements for developing MOOTW skills before deployment and for honing combat skills following redeployment. Individual level close combat and gunnery skills as well as collective maneuver and planning skills atrophy during MOOTW. It is commonly accepted that it takes between three and six months to regain MTW proficiency after an extended MOOTW deployment. This estimate is based on the time required to hone combat skills, repair equipment, and assimilate replacement personnel.79

There are clear MTW readiness costs associated with employing conventional Army units in MOOTW, however there are also benefits to this approach that improve MTW proficiency for an expeditionary combat force.

"As British Experiences [sic] in peacekeeping and counter-insurgency operations over the years show, soldiers involved might temporarily become less proficient in some specialties, but this is more than compensated by experience gained in the field and added leadership skills, especially among junior and non-commissioned officers."80

Junior and mid-level leadership skills improve because small units generally operate autonomously in MOOTW. Junior and mid-level leaders also develop improved negotiation and mediation skills through on-the-job experience. Finally, all deployed units gain experience in deploying and operating in unfamiliar physical environments. These benefits improve the depth and breadth of experience that leaders can leverage in MTW operations.

These factors demonstrate the costs and benefits that employing conventional units in MOOTW have on MTW readiness. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY demonstrated the effect

32-34.
79 Taw, Persselin, and Leed, *Meeting Peace Operations Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness*, 19, 35. Retraining time depends on the length of the MOOTW deployment, the size of unit deployed and the training infrastructure available at home station. Personnel replacements are required by the normal Permanent Change of Station cycle.
that deploying a sub-optimized conventional force has in the outcome of MOOTW interventions. UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was both a success and a failure. It accomplished the strategic purpose of restoring the legitimate government, but it was not accomplished elegantly and the underlying conditions in Haiti remain unchanged after the end of UNMIH.\textsuperscript{81} Difficulty in planning and executing UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and other MOOTW looms large as the Army grapples with increasing MOOTW commitments.

Despite the problems experienced in UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, a MOOTW force must be first and foremost an effective combat force to gain and maintain the respect of the belligerents. Marital skills, deployability, and robust combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities are the principle reasons that military forces are employed in MOOTW rather than using contracted private services. A dedicated MOOTW intervention force would not be able to maintain adequate proficiency in combat skills by training those skills on a part time basis. A dedicated MOOTW force is not unlikely to have the capability to address the full range of tasks required without interagency support, nor is it likely to be large enough to eliminate conventional unit participation in MOOTW.\textsuperscript{82} On balance, creating a dedicated MOOTW contingency force increases the MTW risk because it would necessarily reduce the MTW force structure without providing supplementary benefit or ending conventional unit commitment to MOOTW.

**Recommendations For Improving Army Readiness For MOOTW.**

The uniqueness and complexity of MOOTW contingencies make it unlikely that any single MOOTW organizational structure can be optimized for all the possible contingencies.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{81} Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, Intervasion: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy.*

\textsuperscript{82} Taw, Persselin, and Leed, *Meeting Peace Operations Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness,* 60.

MOOTW contingencies will continue to be met with conventional units, task organized and trained for the environment consistent with the amount of available preparation time. Developing a specialized MOOTW contingency force is neither likely because of budget constraints nor desirable because of adverse impacts on national readiness to respond to MTW contingencies. Therefore, the current approach to MOOTW must be improved.

Field Manual (FM) 3-0 (DRAG Edition) is draft doctrine scheduled to replace the current operational doctrine found in Field Manual 100-5, Operations. FM 3-0 establishes the concept of full spectrum operations as a conceptual framework behind the employment of Army Forces across the spectrum of conflict. The concept of full spectrum operations provides four classifications of operations: offense, defense, stability, and support. Every contingency operation will contain some proportion of each. The proportion will be determined by the level of hostility in the area of operations and by the strategic importance of obtaining the stated operational goals. For example, MTW emphasizes offense and defense, yet stability or support operations will occur in smaller proportion as Army units provide support to refugees and help re-establish functioning government for the indigenous population. In contrast, support or stability operations dominate MOOTW, yet to enforce the established mandate, offensive and defensive actions may occur within the MOOTW area of operations. The doctrine of full spectrum operations provides a broad intellectual framework that encourages commanders to shape their tactical actions based upon the underlying nature of the operational environment.


85 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations (DRAG Edition), (Washington: 2000), 1-14 to 1-16. FM 3-0 (DRAG Edition) provides the following definitions of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. "Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating the enemy. Their purpose is to impose US will on the enemy and achieve decisive victory. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop offensive operations. Stability operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis. Support operations employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or
Full spectrum operations doctrine is useful in preparing commanders for MOOTW because it helps them visualize the amounts of effort required to conduct stability or support operations while retaining awareness of the potential for escalation of the importance of the offense and defense component of MOOTW. Full spectrum operations doctrine acknowledges the dynamic nature of MOOTW and allows for the proportion of offensive, defensive, stability, and support actions to vary in response to changes in the political, social, or military dimensions of MOOTW. Full spectrum operations doctrine provides the profoundly different logic that General Zinni advocated after UNOSOM II and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Full spectrum operations provide a useful logical construct that appropriately represents both war and MOOTW.

In addition to providing a useful operational doctrine, FM 3-0 (DRAG Edition) provides the conceptual underpinning for more robust leader education and training. Leaders must develop the skills and knowledge that are applicable across the spectrum of operations and that allow them to implement full spectrum operations. As previously discussed, martial proficiency is the single most important task for leaders. Their education and training must continue to cover the theory and practice of war. However, education programs must also improve leader awareness the complex nature of MOOTW. Increased understanding of the interactions between the four dimensions of MOOTW can improve leader judgment and performance in full spectrum operations. Additionally, Army leaders at all levels should be proficient in the fundamentals of negotiation and mediation. Finally, Army leaders must possess a working knowledge of interagency operations, particularly the role of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in both war and MOOTW.

Revising doctrine and leader education can greatly improve Army performance in MOOTW. To mitigate the adverse impact that MOOTW deployments have on MTW readiness, the Army must adopt a more disciplined approach to task organizing for deployment.

domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crises and relieve suffering.”
PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO can be reduced for low-density MOS soldiers and units by placing strict command attention to duration and frequency of deployment. Tracking how frequently individuals and units deploy for MOOTW, complemented by selected use of reserve component units and judicious commercial contracting, can reduce the negative impacts that MOOTW has on MTW readiness.

**Conclusion.**

The Hart-Rudman Commission has correctly assessed that the international security environment has drastically changed following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. US participation in humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations has increased since 1989 and is likely to remain high for the foreseeable future. However, the demise of the monolithic Soviet threat does not imply that the Army should optimize a portion of its force structure for MOOTW. MOOTW are the military component of a complex interagency activity. The military force serves as a supporting force to a larger civil program to restore stability and ameliorate human suffering in the affected area. The military commander is responsible for establishing a secure environment in which the civil organs can operate.

Martial proficiency is of foremost importance in establishing a secure environment in MOOTW. The martial skill required in MOOTW exists in conventional Army units because they are trained organized and equipped for combat. Part-time combat training will not allow a MOOTW tailored force to maintain adequate combat skill to deter or defeat escalation of violence in MOOTW operations. However, MOOTW demands more than martial skill. Military commanders must understand the complexity of the physical, social, political, and military dimensions of the MOOTW environment. These dimensions bound the range of feasible, suitable and acceptable military actions needed to accomplish the mandate governing intervention.

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In MOOTW, military forces may be required to conduct a wide variety of non-combat tasks, such as negotiate with the parties, support distribution of humanitarian relief, provide interim law enforcement, and assist in the establishment of functioning government. The soldier level tasks that support these operational tasks are generally the same as the tactical level tasks that are used during combat operations. However, conducting MOOTW requires different cognitive reasoning paradigms than combat. MOOTW requires frequent interaction with the local population, government officials, and NGO’s. This increased interaction demands that soldiers and leaders use judgment and reasoning to appropriately respond to the tactical situation. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY illustrated the need for leaders to interpret and adapt the rules of engagement and tactical priorities to a dynamic MOOTW environment. Failure to appropriately respond to MOOTW environmental circumstances can result in an escalation of violence and can prolong mission duration.

There is a tension between readiness for MOOTW and readiness for MTW. Existing small unit combat skills generally apply to both environments. However, MTW readiness is reduced because low density MOS combat support and combat service support units are deployed to MOOTW in higher proportion than in war. The MTW readiness of unemployed combat units is reduced because essential non-combat skills committed to MOOTW are unavailable for use in MTW. Two factors prevent a specialized MOOTW force from eliminating this operational tempo readiness issue. First, MOOTW commitments are likely to exceed the capability of the dedicated MOOTW structure, forcing commitment of conventional units to MOOTW contingencies. Second, an Army MOOTW force structure draws on the same echelons above division combat support and combat service support organizations as do conventional Army divisions. MOOTW stresses the combat support and combat service support readiness for MTW in the same ways that Smaller Scale Contingency (SSC) combat operations degrade MTW readiness. While MOOTW affects readiness to conduct simultaneous MTW, Army units benefit from experience gained in MOOTW. Relatively autonomous operations improve small unit leadership and decision making.
skills. Leaders also gain experience in deploying and employing their units in unfamiliar terrain. These benefits can improve small unit performance in MTW and SSC.

Conventional Army units are organized, trained, and equipped for combat. The Army’s focus on war, mandated by US law, is the correct choice from the perspective of the National Security Strategy. Training for war provides many of the small unit skills required for MOOTW, however MOOTW remains intellectually challenging for Army leaders. JTF 190’s performance in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY demonstrated that the Army units are not optimized for MOOTW and that their performance will improve as understanding of the operational environment improves. Despite any deficiencies in the current approach to MOOTW, employing conventional Army units and full spectrum operations doctrine serves the National Security Strategy better than changing the Army’s force structure to accommodate a specialized contingency force organized, trained, and equipped for Military Operations Other Than War.
**Appendix 1 – Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Key Events**

**Timeline**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 August 1990</td>
<td>Iraq invades Kuwait</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 December 1990</td>
<td>Aristide Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January – March 1991</td>
<td>Operation DESERT STORM liberates Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-30 September 1991</td>
<td>Cedras Coup ousts Aristide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 November 1991</td>
<td>President George Bush directs US Navy to enforce OAS embargo against Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1992</td>
<td>Haitian refugee flow to US peaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 May 1992</td>
<td>Bush administration issues executive order preventing Haitian émigrés from applying for asylum. This slows refugee flow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 January 1993</td>
<td>William J. Clinton takes office as US President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 July 1993</td>
<td>Cedras and Aristide sign the UN -brokered Governor’s Island Accord agreeing to restore Aristide to power not later than 30 October 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 July 1993</td>
<td>UN imposes oil embargo and freezes Haiti’s foreign assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 September 1993</td>
<td>UNSCR 867 authorized Haitian Advisory Group (HAG) and International Police Monitors (IPM) to deploy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1993</td>
<td>US Atlantic Command begins deliberate planning for military intervention in HAITI (OPLAN 2370 – forced entry option). This plan was approved by the CJCS in August 1994, 10 months after initially conceived.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4 October 1993</td>
<td>US Special Operations Forces fail in an attempt to capture Aideed in Mogadishu, Somalia, leaving 18 dead US troops. International media declares this a US military failure. Clinton administration declares US will unilaterally withdraw from Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-8 October 1993</td>
<td>USS <em>Harlan County</em> arrives in Port-au-Prince harbor to deploy HAG and IPM. Haitian FAd'H supports FRAPH demonstrations and resistance, preventing <em>Harlan County</em> from docking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 October 1993</td>
<td>UN authorizes naval blockade of Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1994</td>
<td>USACOM begins planning for permissive entry, interagency operations to restore Aristide. Designated OPLAN 2380, this plan identified JTF 190, commanded by 10th Infantry Division, as the principle military force to establish a “safe and secure environment” for transition to a UN led force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July 1994</td>
<td>UNSCR 940 authorizes “all necessary means to restore democracy to Haiti”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 September 1994</td>
<td>President Clinton briefed on UPHOLD DEMOCRACY concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 September 1994</td>
<td>Carter delegation arrives in Haiti to present final offer to Cedras for peaceful resolution to the crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 September 1994</td>
<td>Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY begins with execution of OPLAN 2380 PLUS, an unsynchronized plan that merged aspects of</td>
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</table>
OPLAN 2370 and OPLAN 2380. Entry of US forces in Haiti was by permission of President Jonnissant under terms of the Carter-Jonnissant agreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 September 1994</td>
<td>US Marines involved in firefight with FAd’H garrison in Cap Hatien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 October 1994</td>
<td>President Aristide returns to Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 January 1995</td>
<td>MG Meade, MNF Commander, declared stable and secure environment exists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 January 1995</td>
<td>UNSCR 975 authorizes transfer of Haiti operation to from MNF to UNMIH control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 1995</td>
<td>Gen Kinzer assumes command of UNMIH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June –September 1995</td>
<td>Local and national elections in Haiti are secured by UNMIH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Dec 1995</td>
<td>Renee Preval elected to succeed Aristide as Haitian President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1996</td>
<td>US passes control of UNMIH to Canadian military command and control; withdraws all US troops</td>
</tr>
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Mr. Jackie Rike
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Author: John C. DeJamette
Report date: 01 Jan 2001
Accession Number: ADB 278540

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