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AUTHORITY
THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN PEACE OPERATIONS

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CENTER FOR DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES
SPRINGFIELD MISSOURI

MAY 13, 1994
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INTRODUCTION

In the post Cold-War era, the United Nations is taking on a larger role in maintaining global "order". This effort has manifested itself in the form of Peacekeeping and Peace Support operations, the number, size, and cost of which have grown dramatically over the past three years following the breakup of the former Soviet Union. The number of U.N. sponsored peacekeeping operations has tripled since 1990, while the cost has more than doubled. There are presently 19 Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) in effect today, 12 of which commenced after April 1991\(^1\). U.S. military forces are involved in some of these on-going U.N. operations, as well as numerous other unilateral Peacetime Contingency Operations (PCOs) of a peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance nature.

Concurrent with the growth of U.S. military participation in PKOs and PCOs, is the largest drawdown of U.S. military strength since World War II. Of the U.S. Armed Services, the Army is the largest participant in recent PKOs and PCOs and is also the hardest hit service in the current drawdown resulting from the Bottom Up Review conducted by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin.

The newly published Presidential Decision Directive on peacekeeping (PDD-13) has increased emphasis on U.S. participation

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in PKOs conducted under UN auspices and clearly puts the Pentagon "in the peacekeeping business to stay". The Clinton foreign policy has emphasized strengthening UN peacekeeping and the role of U.S. Military forces in support. Thus, while the Army downsizes, its increasing role in PKOs is likely to continue

Given these unique circumstances of increased emphasis on participation in PKOs and PCOs on the one hand, and decreasing means as a result of the Bottom Up Review (BUR) driven draw down of the U.S. military on the other, what are the implications for U.S. Army war-fighting readiness? To what extent should the roles and missions of the U.S. Army be defined by peacekeeping operations as collective security? This leads us to the issues that will be explored in this paper. Specifically, this paper will address two issues:

1. Is the current Army force structure, evolving under the BUR draw-down, sufficient to meet the needs of PKOs and to meet the stated objective of being able to "Win in 2 nearly simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts"?

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2. What effects would a new emphasis on PKOs have on unit and soldier readiness? How will these effects impact on our war-fighting capability?

Regarding the first issue, this paper will explore the impact that an increased emphasis on PKOs could have on force structure development. Given the strategy of being able to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts from the BUR, does the BUR force structure have sufficient forces to meet that strategy while pursuing ambitious PKOs and PCOs as is currently anticipated? This section will look to historical experience and will analyze the BUR force structure and budget to determine if it is sufficient to meet its stated strategy, and will attempt to gauge to what extent our commitment of forces in PKOs and PCOs negatively impacts on our ability to carry out that strategy.

The second issue addressed is the effect that an emphasis on committing and training forces to be able to support and successfully execute PKOs and PCOs will have on individual soldier and unit readiness for conventional combat. What effect does training for, and participation in PKOs have;

1. On the war fighting ethos and spirit of our professional Army?

2. On the Army’s level of combat readiness as measured by individual and collective training proficiency in conventional war fighting tasks associated with a unit’s Mission Essential Task List
DEFINITIONS

The terminology associated with peace-related operations is still evolving to the point where common definitions are associated with each term. There are still some differences, between the UN and the U.S. Armed Forces for example, in interpretation of terms.

In this paper, I will use the definitions from the most recent draft version of the U.S. Army doctrinal manual FM 100-23: Peace Support Operations, which reminds the reader that "since peace operations is an evolving field of military activity, doctrine and terminology will change."\(^7\)

**Peace Operations** is a comprehensive term encompassing military support to diplomacy, observers and monitors, traditional peacekeeping, preventive deployment, security assistance to a civil authority, protection and delivery of humanitarian relief, guaranteeing rights of passage, imposing sanctions, peace enforcement, and any other military, paramilitary, or nonmilitary action taken in support of diplomatic peacemaking operations. Peace operations encompass three types of activities: diplomacy; (including preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace building); observing and supervising the terms of an existing peace, truce, or cease-fire (peacekeeping); and the application of limited military force (peace enforcement).

**Preventive Diplomacy** involves diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis, aimed at removing the sources of

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conflict before violence erupts, or limiting the spread of violence when it occurs. Military support to diplomacy may, for example, take the form of a show of force [eg. Operation Golden Pheasant, Honduras 1988].

**Peacemaking** is a process of arranging an end to disputes, and resolving issues that led to a conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that may include military peace operations. Military activities that support peacemaking include military to military relations, security assistance operations, preventive deployment and shows of force.

**Peacekeeping** (PK) involves noncombat military operations (exclusive of self-defense) that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) operation in the Sinai provides a classic example of a force conducting a peacekeeping operation.

**Peace Enforcement** (PE) involves the application of armed force or the threat of armed force, normally pursuant to international license authorizing coercive use of military power, to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolutions - the primary purpose of which is the maintenance or restoration of peace under conditions broadly defined by the international community.

"Peace Operations," are, in many circles, also referred to as "Peace Support Operations," the term of art in use before the recent rapid expansion of peacekeeping into the arenas of aggravated peacekeeping and peace enforcement.¹

"Peacemaking" has achieved a common understanding with both the United Nations and the U.S. Armed Services as a diplomatic process, "but it was not so long ago that the United States and NATO used the terms "peacemaking" and "peace enforcement" almost interchangeably, and that confusion still exists today in the press.

and public speeches." 9

"Peacekeeping" has been widely used to describe the entire range of peace operations conducted by military forces, thus adding to the confusion. Peacekeeping operations can be separated into the traditional (such as the MFO example) and aggravated peacekeeping operations, where PK forces are required to use force to enforce an agreed upon truce that is being violated. "Aggravated Peacekeeping" as it appears in U.S. Joint Doctrin- fits the UN Secretary General’s definition of Peace Enforcement in "Agenda For Peace," and the United States Institute of Peace’s (USIOP) definition of "Enforced Peacekeeping" 10. Following are the DOD definitions of the two types of peacekeeping:

Traditional Peacekeeping: Deployment of a UN, regional organization, or coalition presence in the field with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN regional organization, or coalition military forces, and/or police and civilians. Non-combat military operations (exclusive of self defense) that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute. 11

Aggravated Peacekeeping: Military Operations undertaken with the nominal consent of all major belligerent parties, but which are complicated by subsequent intransigence of one or more the belligerents, poor command and control of belligerent forces, or conditions of outlawry, banditry, or anarchy. In such conditions, peacekeeping forces are normally authorized to use force in self-


defense, and in defense of the missions they are assigned, which may include monitoring and facilitating implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement, or supporting or safeguarding humanitarian relief efforts.12

The "Peace Enforcement" mission had been known until recently in the U.S. Armed Services as "Peacemaking," a term preempted in use and meaning by the UN which already had selected that term to cover diplomatic efforts at achieving peace.13 The U.S. Military's definition of "Peace Enforcement" has come to supplant what was recently known as "Truce-making" in JTP 3-07; "An operation conducted to establish peace between two warring parties without their consent would be termed a trucemaking operation."14 As understood by the U.S. Army, Peace Enforcement does not include the Chapter VII authorized combat actions in Korea (1950-53) and Kuwait and southern Iraq (1990-91), which were undertaken to defend the borders of those nations.15 However, many do refer to those operations as examples of peace enforcement.16


14 Joint Staff, JTP 3-07: Doctrine For Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, p. IV-1.


CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND

Peacekeeping operations were not envisioned by the drafters of the United Nations Charter.¹⁷ These operations evolved out of a need for action from a United Nations hindered by the Cold-War confrontation which deadlocked the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), where members could and did exercise their right to veto resolutions calling for stronger actions. "The UNSC supported peacekeeping on the understanding that it bridged the gap between non-military measures to resolve conflicts outlined in Chapter Six of the Charter, and the military enforcement actions authorized in Chapter Seven."¹⁸ Chapter Six of the Charter gives the UN the power to mediate international disputes and recommend the terms of a settlement. Under this action, the UN relies on the involved nations to comply voluntarily with the decisions of the Security Council. Chapter Seven of the Charter is more powerful, and Article 42 of that chapter authorizes the UN to use military forces of member states to "maintain or restore international peace and security."¹⁹ During the Cold-War, UN sponsored peacekeeping operations were important tertiary actions that offered


international stability without inflaming the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The former Soviet Union was deeply suspicious of UN sponsored peacekeeping and fought against it from its position on the Security Council. In 1964, Izvestia, the official Soviet news agency, delivered a "rambling, gruff censure of the plans [to increase UN peacekeeping capabilities],...and castigating peacekeeping, present and past as a Western connivance and circumvention of the United Nations Charter." This position ensured that UN operations remained generally small-scale in the shadow of the Cold-War. This position began to change under Gorbachev: the Soviet Union took a more activist policy towards UN peacekeeping and stopped casting vetoes in the UN Security Council to block UN peace operations. The Russian attitude towards peacekeeping has changed dramatically with Russia now urging the UN to enhance and improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and seeking to participate in all UN peacekeeping operations "without exception."

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With the increased cooperation in the UNSC, the UN is in position to pursue more aggressive peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, as outlined in the Secretary General's "An Agenda For Peace" which calls for more "muscular peacekeeping," or "peacekeeping with teeth," to maintain collective security."

The break-up of the former Soviet Union and concurrent demise of the bi-polar world has also resulted in ethno-nationalism rising to the surface igniting conflicts across the globe. These conflicts may impact the interests of other powers, even as they fail to impact on the vital interests of any great powers. The situation in the former Yugoslavia is an excellent example of such a conflict. Inaction by the major powers has passed the buck to the United Nations to provide for collective security to solve these difficult situations.

In the post Cold-War, post Soviet Union era, the United Nations has taken on a more aggressive role in international diplomacy, with the UNSC moving towards greater interventionism.25 This increased role has manifested itself in the form of Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations, the number and size of which have grown dramatically over the past three years following the break-up of the Soviet Union. In the first 43 years of UN peacekeeping (1945


- 1988), 13 peace operations (not including Korea) were sponsored. Since 1988, 20 new peace operations have been launched (See Table 1). There are presently 19 UN supervised peacekeeping, or observer operations in effect today (See Table 2), 12 of which commenced after April 1991.

"The 1990's have seen what many are referring to as the renaissance of peacekeeping." The zenith of UN PKOs occurred in 1993, when the UN was supervising 23 separate operations. These operations involved more than 70,000 soldiers, as compared to 10,000 in 1987. The financial costs have increased 500% during

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29 Shashi Tarhoor, p. 10.


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<tr>
<td><strong>TABLE 1</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization)♦</td>
<td>UNAVEM I (UN Angola Verification Mission)♦</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan)♦</td>
<td>UNTAG (UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia)♦</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNEF I (UN Emergency Force I)♣</td>
<td>ONUCA (UN Observer Group in Central America)♦</td>
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<td>UNOZIL (UN Observer Group in Lebanon)♦</td>
<td>UNDOPO (UN Department of Peacekeeping Ops)♣</td>
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<td>ONUC (UN Operations in the Congo)★</td>
<td>UNIKOM (UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission)★</td>
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<td>UNTEA/UNSF (UN Temporary Executive Authority and UN Security Force, West New Guinea)♣</td>
<td>UNAVEM II (UN Angola Verification Mission)♣</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNYOM (UN Yemen Observer Group)♦</td>
<td>ONUSAL (UN Observer Mission in El Salvador)♣</td>
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<td>UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)★</td>
<td>UNTAC (UN Transition Authority in Cambodia)★</td>
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<td>DOMREP (Representative of the Secretary General in the Dominican Republic)★</td>
<td>MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara)★</td>
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<td>UNIPOM (UN India/Pakistan Observer Mission)♦</td>
<td>UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force)♣</td>
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<td>UNEF II (UN Emergency Force II)♣</td>
<td>UNISOM I (UN Operation in Somalia I)♣</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNDOE (UN Disengagement Observer Force)♣</td>
<td>UNITAF (UN Interim Task Force)★</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNIFORM (UN Interim Force in Lebanon)♣</td>
<td>UNISOM II (UN Operation in Somalia II)♣</td>
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<td>UNGOMAP (UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan)♣</td>
<td>ONUMOZ (UN Operation in Mozambique)♣</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNIIMOG (UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group)♣</td>
<td>UNOMUR (UN Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda)♣</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL 15</strong></td>
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★ = Peace Enforcement Mission  
♦ = Observer Mission  
♣ = Peacekeeping Mission  
† Although begun as an observer mission, it has evolved into an aggravate peacekeeping, see The Associated Press, "Rwandans Targeting UN With Shells," The News Leader, Springfield, MO, May 5, 1994, p. 1A.  

SOURCES:  
1. United Nations, The Blue Helmets, App II.  
2. John M. Lee, To Unite Our Strength, Appendix.  

TOTAL 21
that time, rising from $850 million to $3.5 billion\textsuperscript{32} (Figure 1). As the number and frequency of these operations has grown, so too has their complexity, size, and scope. The second UN sponsored peacekeeping operation UNTSO in 1948 involved a maximum strength of 572 soldiers\textsuperscript{33} whereas the recent peace operations in Somalia involved up to 29,209 soldiers.\textsuperscript{34}

Presently, there are 26,947 UN soldiers in just one operation in the new nations born out of the former Yugoslavia, attempting peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations with UNPROFOR.\textsuperscript{35} When a peace accord is reached in the former Yugoslavia, it is expected to require a 60,000 man force to keep the peace.\textsuperscript{36} Operations planned for 1994 by the UN Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali, would bring the total above 100,000.\textsuperscript{37} Another basic factor explaining this surge in UN interventionism in the form of UN PKOs is that the many weaker nations are increasingly looking to the UN for assistance in resolving long-


\textsuperscript{34} Les Aspin, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, p. 68.


\textsuperscript{36} Steve Vogel, "NATO in Bosnia: 'All or Nothing'," Army Times, Sep. 20, 1993, p. 3.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN PEACE OPERATIONS</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>TABLE 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPERATION</td>
<td>YEAR STARTED</td>
<td>TOTAL UN PERSONNEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO (Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP (India and Pakistan)</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP (Cyprus)</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF (Israel and Syria)</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL (Lebanon)</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>5,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOM (Iraq and Kuwait)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM II (Angola)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>81</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUSAL (El Salvador)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO (Western Sahara)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN DPO (New York)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR (Former Yugoslavia)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>26,310†</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMOZ (Mozambique)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>6,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMLT (Cambodia)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>20‡</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMUR (Rwanda and Uganda)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR (Rwanda)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1,700*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIL (Liberia)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMH (Haiti)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0*</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMIC (Georgia)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM II (Somalia)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>29,209</td>
</tr>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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† The UN has requested an additional 10,700 troops for the missions under the current mandate.  

* US forces include 125 Army soldiers in the 212th MASH in

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Zagreb, Croatia in support of Operation Provide Promise, 315 from 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, and an additional 177 reinforcements deployed 16 Apr. 1994, from the 3d Infantry Division, in Macedonia as part of Operation Able Sentry. The remainder of forces support the JTF headquarters, enforcement of the No-Fly Zone, and other missions.

‡ As of February, 1994. UNMLT replaced UNTAC (UN Transition Authority in Cambodia) concluded in 1993, which at its height, it included 21,000 military personnel.

* In the preceding operation, UNTAC, U.S. military participation included 52 U.S. officers.

* As of May 1994.

‡ Commenced in September 1993, the authorized strength was 1,327 military and civilian personnel. This operation floundered on the shores of Haiti, as uncontrolled angry mobs, demonstrating at Port Au Prince, the seaport of disembarkation, thwarted the landing attempt. The military mission was aborted 10 Oct., 1993, and the forces aboard the Tank Landing Ship, USS Harlan County.

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steamed away from Haiti two days later.\textsuperscript{48}

\begin{itemize}
\item The United States had planned to deploy 600 soldiers with the UN contingent which never landed. The commander of this operation was an American, COL James Pulley.\textsuperscript{49}
\item American forces in operation Restore Hope, supporting UNITAF, the mission which, reinforced and succeeded UNOSOM I, paved the way for UNOSOM II. UNITAF began with the deployment of some 29,209 American soldiers,\textsuperscript{50} U.S. forces withdrew from Somalia in March and April 1994.
\end{itemize}

standing problems such as the restoration of democracy, civil strife, and internal and external threats to security. This position was echoed by the United States delegate to the United Nations, Madeline K. Albright, who stated that the growth of peacekeeping operations reflects the aspirations of a majority of nations to put the UN at the center of global security.\textsuperscript{51}

Combined with these increased expectations from the supplicant nations is the public opinion of the modernized nations, which, due to live television coverage, have witnessed the harsh human realities of conflicts and famines broadcast directly into their living rooms. "Consequently, they have increasingly demanded that their governments urgently do something about the abominations of ethnic cleansing, the endless killing, the mass rapes, the

\begin{itemize}
\item Central Intelligence Agency Report, Feb., 1994.
\end{itemize}
mutilations, the concentration camps, the starving, the abandoned orphans, and the destitute refugees which they daily witness and about which they feel guilty." From this guilt emerges a public opinion galvanized by the "Do Something Syndrome" for their governments to take some kind of action." Many are now calling for


UN military intervention into the situations described above, with or without the consent of the government of the target nation, on humanitarian grounds based on "internationally recognized human rights."

CHAPTER TWO

THE UNITED STATES AND PEACEKEEPING

The United States has been extremely supportive of the UN's past PKOs and is presently supporting the UN's current expansion of peace operations. Historically, the U.S. has always played a role in UN PK efforts, although this role has generally been limited to providing financial and logistic support. This support has included financial support for equipment and for contingents from other nations that would actually conduct the operations. Logistic support may take the form of providing U.S. equipment and supplies and/or the sealift/airlift of equipment, personnel, and supplies to support a peacekeeping operation. The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (Public Law 72-264) authorizes the President to provide reimbursable logistic support to UN peacekeeping forces. U.S. participation in UN sponsored PKOs has generally not included ground troops for reasons recently articulated as the "Principles of Peacekeeping" by the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Kofi Anan. The fourth of these principles "...maintains that in order to appear evenhanded, UN operations should not have an obvious superpower presence, but should use

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volunteer units of the so-called "middle nations."57 This is now changing with the end of the zero-sum nature of superpower diplomacy, and with both the current and previous administrations being more bullish on American military participation in UN sponsored peacekeeping.

Former President Bush promised in an address to the United Nations on September 21, 1992 to enhance international peacekeeping through US military participation,58 promising that the United States would train its forces for "...the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian relief..." activities which will be coordinated with the United Nations.59 The support President Bush offered in that address was followed with a directive to the Secretary of Defense to initiate several actions, including:

* Training of U.S. combat, engineering, and logistics units for future peacekeeping operations;
* Working with the United Nations to "best employ" U.S. lift, logistics, communications, and intelligence capabilities;
* Offering combined simulations and exercises to other nations interested in peacekeeping;
* Providing military expertise to the United Nations to help strengthen its planning and operations capabilities for peace-


keeping; and

* Establish a permanent peacekeeping curriculum in U.S. military schools."60

President Clinton, in his 27 September, 1993, address to the United Nations, hailed the promise of UN peacekeeping and pledged continued U.S. support.41 Clinton was more enthusiastic about U.S. military participation in UN sponsored peacekeeping as a presidential candidate, than as President,42 but his signature on PDD-13 has codified the U.S. commitment to supporting peacekeeping. The Clinton administration's foreign policy has emphasized strengthening the abilities of the United Nations and other multilateral organizations to provide collective security via peace operations.43 The Clinton administration seeks to lessen American military commitments abroad, in order to cash-in on the elusive "Peace Dividend" and focus on the politically sensitive and cash starved domestic agenda.

In response to the previous and current presidents' directives to increase emphasis on peace operations, numerous offices and bureaucratic bodies have been created to support the new tack in


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policy towards UN peace operations. A Peacekeeping Management Office has been created within the Department of State, and an Ambassador has been appointed at our UN Mission to oversee US involvement in peacekeeping. At the Department of Defense, Les Aspin created the new position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping. Within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a new division has been established within the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate to address UN issues, and a UN division has been created within the Joint Staff J-5. Former Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, set out three critical tasks for the department:

1. To organize the DOD so it can effectively participate in decision-making about peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and respond when the President orders us to contribute resources or forces to an operation.

2. To contribute to strengthening the UN's capacity for planning and conducting peacekeeping and enforcement operations.

3. To ensure other forces contributed to an operation are

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capable of effective combat.  

Within the Department of Defense, the Army has been designated the Executive Agent for Peacekeeping. As the executive agent, the Army is tasked to provide administrative, personnel, operational, logistic, intelligence, and command, control, and communications support for committed U.S. forces. It may also assist forces of other nations when such support is in accord with diplomatic agreement. As the Nation’s Land Power service, the Army is the logical choice for Executive Agent. Air power can threaten warring parties with reconnaissance and airstrikes, naval forces can limit belligerent operations to land, seal off the targeted nation to outside assistance, and deny belligerents use of sea lanes and waterways, but only land forces can project sufficient combat power to create the conditions necessary for establishing a peace. The majority of UN issues are land oriented and military solutions therefore require land forces. The Army has become "America’s force of choice for operations other than war, which are growing in


69 Joint Staff, JTP 3-07: Doctrine For Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, p. IV-4.


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Organizational core competencies qualify the Army to serve as the executive agent for peacekeeping. "The Army provides the Nation with the ability to put a trained and ready force anywhere in the world, on short notice - a force capable of decisive victory, because only the Army can seize, hold, and control territory...We are the force the Nation calls to bring order and stability and to reestablish civil infrastructure." 

Concerning peace operations and national interest/national policy, Secretary of Defense, William Perry, stated;

"Many of the peacekeeping, peace enforcement operations of the United Nations we see as being in our national interest. Given that they’re in our national interest, having the United Nations conduct them instead of having the United States having to unilaterally conduct them is a great benefit to us."

From the U.S. perspective, peacekeeping operations are one of the five components of the U.S. Security Assistance Program. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for PKOs that further U.S. national security interests. The United States participates in UN PKOs in accordance with the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (Public Law 72-264) and Executive Order 10206, "Support of

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72 Togo West Jr., Secretary of the Army, remarks to the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Defense Subcommittee, as quoted in Katherine McIntire’s article; "Money to Fight, Not Much Else," Army Times, #35, p. 8.


Peaceful Settlements of Disputes."⁷⁵

Although peacekeeping missions are considered a secondary mission for the U.S. Military, they will "...in all likelihood occur more frequently"⁶ (See Figure 2). In anticipation of U.S. Military support to peace operations, the FY 1994 defense budget allocated $398 million for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance (eg. Operation Restore Hope [UNITAF] in Somalia) and disaster relief operations (eg. hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Iniki relief operations).⁷⁷ "The United Nations will spearhead our efforts to manage these new conflicts and to bring about workable solutions that protect the peace and continue the powerful movement around the world toward democracy, freedom, and economic prosperity."⁷⁸

Our military and civilian leadership has espoused a larger role for the U.S. Military in peace operations. The Land Power forces of the United States, the Army and The Marines,"should not be surprised if the list of PKOs it is called upon to lead, or at

⁷⁵ Joint Staff, JTP 3-07: Doctrine For Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, p. IV-4.


⁷⁸ GEN Colin L. Powell, remarks made in a speech to the United Nations Association of the USA, Apr. 21, 1993, Department of the Army, Speech File Service.
least participate in, increases in the coming years." President Clinton has already committed the United States to providing one third of the forces required, up to 15,000 soldiers, to a NATO-commanded, UN sponsored peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia, once a mutually agreed to settlement is reached.

The UN is now facing a set of operations in the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) or Operations Other Than War (OOTW) end of the spectrum. These operations are, by their nature, protracted, requiring land forces of staying power. "Such [peace] operations require special training, detailed planning, and vigorous execution. Historically they last on average three years, with many - such as the Multinational Force of Observers in the Sinai - lasting much longer. Only the Army has the staying power for this type of commitment." United States participation in peace operations can be expected to continue and the Army's institutional interest in UN peace operations is rising rapidly. Currently, among the Services of the DOD, the Army is providing the "lions share" of forces to peace operations worldwide: upwards of 81% of

79 LTC Karl W. Eikenberry, p. 17.
all S. forces dedicated to UN operations, are Army soldiers."
As the Executive Agent for Peacekeeping, and the likely provider for forces to proposed and future UN peacekeeping operations it seems inevitable that the Army’s involvement in PKOs will increase."

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CHAPTER THREE

PEACEKEEPING AND THE BOTTOM UP REVIEW ARMY

The purpose of the Bottom Up Review (BUR) conducted by former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, was to define the strategy, force structure, modernization programs, industrial base and infrastructure needed for the National Defense Strategy in the face of changing conditions brought about by the end of the Cold-War. The BUR began with an assessment of new threats and dangers to United States interests. This assessment developed four categories of dangers:

1. Dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction, including their proliferation and the dangers associated with the large stocks of these weapons that remain in the former Soviet Union;

2. Regional dangers, posed primarily by major regional powers with interests antithetical to our own, but also by smaller, often internal, conflicts based on ethnic or religious animosities, state-sponsored terrorism or subversion of friendly governments;

3. Dangers to democracy and economic reform, in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere;

4. Economic dangers, to our national security, which could result if we fail to build a strong, competitive and growing economy.86

Military forces are central to combatting the first two: peacekeeping operations fall under the second category.

Several strategies were developed to meet these new dangers (see Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGY</th>
<th>WIN ONE MRC</th>
<th>Win One MRC With Bold in Second</th>
<th>Win Two Nearly Simultaneous MRCs</th>
<th>Win Two Nearly Simultaneous MRCs, Plus Conduct PCOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>8 Active Divisions &amp; 6 Reserve Division Equivalents</td>
<td>10 Active Divisions 6 Reserve Division Equivalents</td>
<td>10 Active Divisions 15 Reserve Enhanced Brigades</td>
<td>13 Active Divisions 6 Enhanced Equivalents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>8 Carrier Battle Groups</td>
<td>10 Carrier Battle Groups</td>
<td>11 Carrier Battle Groups</td>
<td>12 Carrier Battle Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>5 Active Brigades 1 Reserve Division</td>
<td>5 Active Brigades 1 Reserve Division</td>
<td>5 Active Brigades 1 Reserve Division</td>
<td>5 Active Brigades 1 Reserve Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>10 Active Fighter Wings 6 Reserve Fighter Wings</td>
<td>13 Active Fighter Wings 7 Reserve Fighter Wings</td>
<td>13 Active Fighter Wings 7 Reserve Fighter Wings</td>
<td>14 Active Fighter Wings 10 Reserve Fighter Wings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The possibility that a major regional threat country would attempt to take advantage of the United States while it was engaged in one MRC to attack U.S. interests and achieve a fait accompli and the possibility that a future adversary or coalition of adversaries might one day confront us with larger than expected forces, led policy makers to decide on a strategy of being able to win two nearly simultaneous MRCs.

Strategy number 4, Win Two MRCs Plus Conduct Smaller Operations, such as peacekeeping or peacetime contingency operations, recognizes that these operations require additional forces if they are to be carried out simultaneously with the two MRC fights. The DOD also recognizes that current emphasis on peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and other intervention operations mean that U.S. forces are more likely to be involved in such operations...
operations. The question is then, is the current Army force structure, evolving under the BUR draw-down, sufficient to meet the needs of anticipated PKOs and to meet the stated objective of being able to win in 2 nearly simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts?

Historical experience indicates that the BUR force may not be sufficiently sized to meet the challenge. During the draw-down preceding the Korean War, the U.S. Army leadership felt that a minimum force of twelve divisions was necessary to meet the threat at that time, but acquiesced to a ten division force in the face of budgetary pressures resulting in a hollowed out force that was totally ill-prepared to deal with the impending war with North Korea. In that conflict, the United States eventually deployed nine divisions - six Regular Army, two ARNG, and one USMC division. At the outbreak of the conflict, these forces were assisted by forces from twelve other nations, totalling 254,000 soldiers, comprising the forces of the United Nations Command-Far East Command. This combined force fought under six Corps headquarters and two Army headquarters.

At the height of American involvement in the Vietnam War, U.S. troop strength in Vietnam totaled ten divisions - eight Army and two USMC, controlled by four corps headquarters. These forces were

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supported by ten South Vietnamese divisions, two-plus Korean divisions, and other allied forces comprising five more brigade sized units."

During Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. ground forces consisted of seven Army Divisions, two USMC Divisions, two armored cavalry regiments, and a separate armored brigade. In each of these conflicts, the United States was supported by forces from other nations, each was a multinational coalition effort, and in each U.S. troops fought alongside divisions of soldiers of other nations. These conflicts required nine, ten, and eleven U.S. division equivalents, respectively. "Considering this historical experience, the United States should plan on being able to field, at a minimum, a ten division force for regional contingencies, while still maintaining sufficient combat power in reserve to meet other commitments around the world." The BUR strategy seems to lack a sufficient reserve for these other commitments.

With the drawdown almost complete, can the United States now fight another Desert Storm (ie. one MRC) with the BUR force? This question was posed to former Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, his response;

"The cuts [in the DOD] proposed by President Clinton are dangerous. Could we win another Desert Storm after them? I think so, but I don’t think we could do it as effectively as we did in 1990 and 1991. The cost and casualties would be higher. It would

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take us longer to finish the job...if the Clinton budget cuts are
ultimately approved...we'll end up with a force that's not ready to
deploy on short notice, that's not capable of carrying out the
missions we assign it. It's the kind of force that would cause us
to suffer much higher casualties than necessary in the next
conflict, because we didn't maintain adequate peacetime
capability."

Asked the same question, General Downing, Commander, United States
Special Operations Command, replied in part "It would take us
longer now to generate the forces than it did in the Gulf War...The
challenge now will be to activate the reserve component forces and
train them to the standard that is required." Current reductions
in military forces will make it physically difficult for the United
States to operation similar to Desert Storm in the future. "In
order to do so, the Reserves would have to be mobilized, which the
American public is not likely to support for long."

The service chiefs in testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing, 15 March 1994, were unsure if they have
adequate forces to handle two nearly simultaneous MRCs as
envisioned in the BUR. "I have a tough time thinking we could
fight two Koreas or two Vietnams," said Air Force Chief of Staff,
General Merrill A. McPeak. House Representative Jim Talent, (D-

92 Dick Cheney in an interview conducted by Adam Meyerson,
"Calm After Desert Storm," Policy Review, No. 65, Summer 1993,
p. 16.

93 GEN W. A. Downing, "The Role of Special Operations in U.S.

94 Donald M. Snow, Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict and
the New International Order, St. Martin's Press, NY, Sep. 1993,
pp. 210-211.

95 Neff Hudson, "Chiefs: Ready Force Needs More Cash," Army
MO), has gone on record as saying that the BUR drawdown is repeating the hollowing out of the Army which occurred in the 1970's drawdown. He also stated that "It is not possible to argue seriously that the Army can fulfill its stated mission at this [the BUR] level of troop strength."

Former Army Chief of Staff, Carl E. Vuono, testified before the joint panel that the Army needs 12 or 13 divisions, 560,000 soldiers, and an overall budget of $68 billion to meet its worldwide commitments and to continue current modernization programs." Military analyst, COL Raul Alcala concurred with that estimate, saying "At 560,000 and around $68 billion a year of 1994 money, the Army can maintain its current edge. It can sustain peacetime engagement. It can perform credibly in one MRC, and it can get started on a second." However, with the Army's 1994 budget set at only $60.4 billion," and the target force end strength at 495,000, there appears to be a gap between ends, specifically the BUR strategy of two MRC victories and the Clinton foreign policy emphasis on peacekeeping, and the military means available to do the job.

When the draw-down is completed, the United States will rank


"John G. Roos, p. 17.


33
8th of the largest Armies of the world, behind China, India, Russia, North Korea, Vietnam, South Korea, and Pakistan (see Figure 3). Following the Allied victory in World War II, it took the United States several years to come to grips with the new threat environment. A similar process of redefining threats and developing appropriate defense policy is again underway. The experiences of Task Force Smith in the opening phase of the Korean War show how rapidly a well-trained and equipped force can fall into ruin. Recent successes in Grenada, Panama, and Kuwait have raised expectations on the part of the American people on how war will be waged, but there are trade-offs involved in achieving and maintaining this standard, and these standards cannot be maintained without appropriate resources.

According to General Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff, the Army under the BUR has been cut to the "lowest levels possible" given the 2-MRC mission and increased emphasis on involving the Army in peacetime operations (a broad category which includes peace operations).\footnote{Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-7: The Army in Theater Operations, Coordinating Draft, Headquarters, TRADOC, 24 Dec. 1991, pp. 5-1 and 5-13.} He went on to say that "There is little, if any, margin for error when considering the Army's requirements for supporting the national security and military strategies" indicating that there is not a sufficient reserve for contingencies, including peacekeeping, beyond the 2-MRC
The 10 largest armies in the world

Figure 3, Source; Army Times.

scenario.\textsuperscript{101}

To some, an Army of 495,000 soldiers\textsuperscript{102} might seem sufficient to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. "However, these forces are spread across the globe fulfilling treaty obligations, conducting nation-building and humanitarian assistance missions, and deterring attack (South Korea), most of these forces would have to remain in place, or be replaced by

\textsuperscript{101} GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, \textit{United States Army Posture Statement FY 95}, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{102} Sean D. Naylor, "Army Hints At Shape of 10 Division Plan," \textit{Army Times}, #31, Feb. 28, 1994, p. 3.
activated reservists, which would be a time-consuming process."  

On 27 October, 1993, members of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee sat with members of the House Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel to hear testimony on the potential effects on Army readiness that may be caused by proposed budget and personnel cuts resulting from the BUR, specifically, as they relate to the increasing demands of peacekeeping operations. Rep. Ike Skelton (D-MO), Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel, "using what he called 'Missouri third grade math,' and 'doing the arithmetic with people, not divisions,'...presented a cogent case for why the Army would need a force of about 679,000 active duty soldiers to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts." Rep. Skelton pointed out that the 679,000 man force did not include forces that might otherwise be committed to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, which could amount to as many as 100,000 more soldiers. The consensus of both the panel members and witnesses was "...that either the proposed end strength of the future Army must be raised, or the Service's peacekeeping commitments drastically curtailed" in order to solve the ends-means imbalance.

The National Military Strategy concedes "that the United

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105 Ibid, p. 17.
States would probably have to abandon some international peacekeeping missions, a cornerstone of Clinton’s foreign policy, if it had to fight another Desert Storm-type war.” If only one MRC erupted, it would likely impact on our ability to carry out peace operations, as active forces deployed to those operations would likely be redeployed to deter a second MRC from occurring.

The demands for Army participation in peacetime contingency operations, many of which are of a peacekeeping or humanitarian nature, has increased. "From 1975 to 1990, our Army participated in 147 contingency operations involving 50 or more soldiers, an average of just under 10 per year. From 1990 to 1993, we have been in 47 of these types of operations, an average of 15 per year. That’s more than a fifty-percent increase." While at the same time, the Army has its smallest budget, as a percentage of GNP, since the 1930’s, and the smallest active duty military since before the Korean War.

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109 Ibid, p. 4-4.

Already, reduced budget levels are negatively impacting maintenance and training operations even at a reduced level of manning with fewer active units. "Deep O&M [Operations and Maintenance Budget] cuts make it difficult to provide training required to keep our troops at the necessary high readiness levels."¹¹¹ The Army is starting to feel the pinch in spare parts shortages, an indicator that the BUR budget levels are impairing readiness (See Figure 4), according to Lieutenant General Johnnie E. Wilson, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.¹¹²

In the face of fewer resources the Army has increased the emphasis on computer-driven simulations training as funds have waned.¹¹³ This approach is fine for machine systems such as helicopters, where fantastic cost savings can be realized, but cannot take the place of live ammunition fire and maneuver training to prepare soldiers for combat.¹¹⁴ As realistic as any simulation training can be, it can never replicate the emotional and physical reactions to the dangers of live ammunition, and the complexities of fire and maneuver in difficult conditions.

Recognizing the impact the new budget cuts were having on readiness, the DOD has place more emphasis on the O&M portion of


¹¹³ GEN John M. Shalikashvili, p. 4.

the budget for FY 95, to correct this deficiency which negatively affected operations in FY 93 and FY 94 by earmarking nearly one-third of the Army’s FY 95 budget to O&M.\textsuperscript{115} However, the budget is a finite amount, so the renewed emphasis on O&M can only come from de-emphasizing other competing priorities such as modernization, which impacts on future readiness. "The Army is struggling to protect its training and readiness with some semblance of a sound modernization plan. It cannot afford any more tinkering at the moment. The idea that armed forces will always be there, fully trained, ready and prepared to do whatever the nation wants - no matter how much the people are jerked around or how much arbitrary juggling of structure and budget resources takes place - just isn’t so!"\textsuperscript{116}

In following the force structure recommendations of the BUR, America may be following a recurring, almost traditional, historical pattern of serious decline in military effectiveness after each major conflict. "Since the birth of our nation, America’s Army has replayed the same scene, as if by rote, in every military drama - a first scene of unnecessarily costly battles.\textsuperscript{117}


\textsuperscript{117} For an in-depth analysis of this phenomenon, see Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, America’s First Battles: 1776-1965, University of Kansas Press, 1986. A very good brief summary of this same phenomenon is Lee Ewing’s article, "Manpower Always an Issue," Army Times, Feb. 7, 1994, p. 16.
Spending in several key areas

Total spending per soldier

Operations and Maintenance per soldier

Operations tempo per division

Schoolhouse training per soldier

Maintenance and supply per division

Depot maintenance per division

Authorized 1994 spending per soldier is down 14 percent from the 1985-89 average of $119,000 per soldier.

Spending on operations and maintenance per soldier has dipped even more sharply (36 percent) from 1985-89 average.

Source: Department of the Army

Figure 4: Source; Army Times.
Our nation's tradition indicates that when the threat is ill-defined and resources are scarce - as is the case today - the military atrophies. However, the current ends vs. means dilemma facing the Army might well result in an Army ill-prepared to win the first battle of the next war, as it was able to do in Desert Storm. "The United States currently appears to be headed for an interventionist foreign policy supported by an isolationist military force structure." According to Colonel Karl Farris, Director, Peacekeeping Institute, Army War College, the BUR is based on "the rationale...that the extra lethality provided by the United States technological edge compensates for having fewer units," but, he points out that the likely missions facing the Army ranging from peacekeeping to nation-building to humanitarian operations are "...rather labor intensive missions, that can be longer lasting as well."

The implications are that the BUR force structure cannot meet the stated BUR strategy of winning two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts while pursuing an increased role in UN sponsored peace operations. Indeed, many doubt the ability of the BUR force
to win two MRCs even without the distraction of peace operations. In developing a force structure to meet the emerging and as yet unknown threats to American interests, we should heed the words of soldier-statesman, General George C. Marshall: "We have tried since the birth of our nation to promote our love of peace by a display of weakness. This course has failed us utterly."\textsuperscript{121}

CHAPTER FOUR
IMPACT ON INDIVIDUAL/UNIT/NATIONAL READINESS

What effects will an increased emphasis on peacekeeping have on the readiness of individual soldiers, units, and the Nation to meet the challenges of 2 nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, while engaging in peace operations? The previous section highlighted some of the shortcomings of the BUR force to meet its stated objective; this section will examine the impact that participation in peacekeeping could have; on the Army's ability to provide forces to fight the MRCs while engaging in PKOs; on individual and unit training readiness; and on the Army's warrior ethos.

As America downsizes its military forces, the possibility that its reduced military establishment may become overcommitted to peace operations has fueled legitimate concern. Even if the Army's contributions to future UN peace operations are small, such missions will present a significant challenge to the way it currently plans and trains for the type of coalition warfare associated with fighting in an MRC.

When forces are deployed to peace operations, the options for

\[\text{122} \text{ LTC James H. Baker, p. 16.}\]

\[\text{123} \text{ William H. Lewis and John O. B. Sewall, United Nations Peacekeeping: Ends Versus Means,} \text{ Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 1, Summer 1993, p. 48.}\]

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responding to new contingencies are reduced. Once committed to a peace operation, these forces cannot be withdrawn on short notice and are essentially unavailable for other contingencies. Worse, the force committed is actually only the tip of the iceberg in sustained operations. Units participating in peacekeeping operations are usually rotated at four to six month intervals, with two other similar units "fenced" from participating in combat contingencies at any given time - one a replacement force, conducting preparatory training for peace duties and an extended deployment, the other, in recovery from the peace operation, conducting block leave, post deployment personnel shuffles, and necessary retraining for combat missions. This phenomena is commonly known as the "Three for One" rule, which states that "for every unit involved in a peace support mission, one is training to take its place, and another is retraining on its primary mission after having been replaced." Following this rule, the commitment of only one brigade could effectively tie up an entire division. When one considers the numbers of trainers needed to prepare one force, as well as continual logistic and other enabling supporting units and assets such as Military Police, Military Intelligence, Special Operations Forces, Psychological Operations forces, Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, CSS units, etc., the impact could be up to four times the actual number of troops on the ground.

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124 LTC James H. Baker, p. 22. See also; COL Steven R. Rader, p. 57.
125 Dennis uinn, p. 29.
in the peace support area of operations.\textsuperscript{126}

When the 10th Mountain Division (Light) deployed one brigade to Somalia, it sent most of its command, intelligence, and aviation assets and troops as well. This significantly reduced the ability of the division minus, remaining at Fort Drum to deploy and operate elsewhere as a combined arms force.\textsuperscript{127} Even in operations where the U.S. does not commit large numbers of ground combat forces the Army's readiness for other operations is affected, because the Army traditionally provides sustainment support to joint and multinational force operations. This support often comes in the form of "very scarce, very expensive communications and logistics capabilities that would be among the first to be deployed to a major regional conflict."\textsuperscript{128} As the Army downsizes, the impact of peace operations on warfighting readiness grows in significance.

Using volunteers from the Reserve components would leave the active duty forces free to respond to contingencies, and would require only one other reserve component unit to train up for the peace operation, as the unit returning from this operation would go off active duty status.\textsuperscript{129} The Army is currently building an Infantry Battalion composed almost entirely of Army Reserve and Army National Guard soldiers for the Multinational Force and

\textsuperscript{126} COL William Allen, et al., p. 58.


\textsuperscript{128} GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, \textit{United States Army Posture Statement}, FY 95, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{129} LTC James H. Baker, p. 23.
Observer mission in the Sinai in January, 1995. Whether or not enough volunteers could be found to support all peace operations in this manner is difficult to predict.

Units preparing for, participating in, or recovering from a peace support operation may experience a drop in their training readiness as measured by performance on METL warfighting tasks. Many see peace operations as a distraction from preserving warfighting proficiency in a time of declining resources: peace support operations "demand time and money needed to retain warfighting skill." These critics find it "simply unrealistic to expect a soldier to be both effective warfighter and talented peacemaker." Essential time spent training for peace operations is time not spent training for war, underlying the concern that peacekeeping duty in itself generally has little relevance to a unit's wartime role.

The senior leadership of the Army recognizes as one of its most severe challenges the task of maintaining the quality and level of training that produced victory in the Gulf War in the face of declining resources: "The ability of the Army to remain trained, ready and capable of conducting its most challenging mission -

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fighting two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts - is increasingly threatened by the pace of peacetime operations.”

The Heritage Foundation sees a clear and negative relationship between efforts devoted to pursuit of peacekeeping readiness and conventional war readiness, with the bottom line being that "...peacekeeping training or involvement of any sort competes in zero-sum fashion with warfighting.”

Traditional peacekeeping is passive in nature, and does not require the type of tactical training currently emphasized in the U.S. Army today.

General Maxwell Thurman, former commander of the U.S. Southern Command, gave the following testimony on Capitol Hill before the joint House Subcommittee panel on October 27, 1993, on the "non-tactical" nature of peacekeeping operations;

"The [US Army peacekeeping troops] in the Sinai today ... are not conducting battalion-level activities. They're on stationary outposts where 8-12 people are located. They’re not doing the kind of duty that you’d want them to do if they were [getting ready] to go to war. And I would submit to you, there will not be any platoon, company, or battalion live-fire operations in Bosnia or Herzegovina, if we put a division in there.”

This position is seemingly disputed by the experiences of the 10th Mountain Division (Light) in Somalia as recounted by Major General S. L. Arnold, former commander of the division during its deployment to Somalia in Operation Restore Hope, which indicated

133 GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, United States Army Posture Statement FY 95, pp. 9 & 20.


that Combat Arms units may still execute their warfighting tasks from their Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) in support of peace operations:

"Infantry battalions, companies, platoons, and squads conducted their mission essential tasks daily in Somalia, conducting full-scale combat operations at night and in urban environments. Units provided security for humanitarian agencies, operated checkpoints and roadblocks, conducted cordon and search missions, and performed convoy security operations. Patrolling, defensive operations, and offensive operations were all conducted by infantry units during Restore Hope."\(^{136}\)

However, Restore Hope is seen by most as an example of a peace enforcement operation and not as peacekeeping. As such, it required application of combat power to achieve results. "Peace Enforcement is in essence, combat operations - or at least requires the deployed force to be able to perform combat operations."\(^{137}\)

"Units conducting peace enforcement operations attempt to find, fix, and maneuver against belligerent forces."\(^{138}\)

Traditional peacekeeping operations emphasize non-use of force. Soldiers participating in peacekeeping operations must appear to be non-threatening and militarily non-provocative.\(^{139}\)

"Unlike combat units, peacekeeping forces are not designed to


\(^{139}\) William H. Lewis and John O. B. Sewall, p. 49.
create the conditions for their own success on the ground; those conditions must pre-exist for them to be able to perform their role. In short, theirs is essentially a non-military mission, carried out by military personnel."  PK is at the least a non-traditional mission for the combat forces tasked to perform them.

Reflecting concerns that tactical units employed in peace operations will lose their tactical edge, Colonel Karl Farris, Director, Peacekeeping Institute, Army War College, stated "extended peacekeeping will impact on the training of the Army ...to fight the nation's wars." "If [a soldier] is there just manning an observation post at a crossroads...what he's not doing is going to the gunnery range...nor is he working with his entire platoon [collective training]...those are skills that decay if they're not trained."  

Operations in the Sinai and Macedonia are examples of the non-tactical nature of peacekeeping which erodes the individual soldier, and hence the unit, of the fighting edge. Observation posts and checkpoints in the Sinai are as non-tactical as possible. They are not camouflaged, but are instead on prominent open terrain. They usually consisted of two huts, one to billet the squad, the other containing a kitchen equipped with a refrigerator, freezer, electric stove, a kitchen table and chairs, and running

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141 GEN S. L. Arnold and MAJ David T. Stahl, pp. 21-22.

water. "The refrigerator and freezer were usually stocked with fruit and other foodstuffs. Both huts were air conditioned." The living and working conditions in Operation Able Sentry, the preventive peacekeeping operation under UN command, follows similar patterns and has similar luxuries for the soldiers. Prolonged exposure to this kind of environment surely erodes a soldier's "field sense" and warfighting spirit.

The procedures and mindset required to conduct peacekeeping operations are completely opposite from those needed in warfighting, and military forces supporting peace operations "require a fundamental change in attitude, since trained warfighters must understand that the ultimate objective of peace operations is not to seize, defend, or deter, but to save, sustain, and comfort".

Peace operations would require also a change in practice of common operations, for example, patrolling. In US Army training doctrine, squads and platoons moving tactically (patrolling) should always use "...a covered and concealed route, when available."

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143 Jesse J. Harris and David R. Segal, "Observations From The Sinai: The Boredom Factor," p. 237.

144 See SSG Douglas Ide, "Backing Peace in the Balkans," p. 15 for an excellent photograph of the modern kitchen range at Task Force 1/6's Observation Post #60.


146 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ARTEP 7-8 MTP: Mission Training Plan For The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA, Feb. 1987,
Yet in PKOs, "stealth and concealment are not so important."\textsuperscript{147} In fact, the PK patrol goes out of its way to be seen, travelling on roads and trails, and primarily only in daylight.\textsuperscript{148} Worse, the PK patrol must carry the UN flag, as though on parade, and wear easily recognizable uniform items, such as the "blue helmet" or "a distinctive (iridescent) item of clothing that is also recognizable at an adequate range."\textsuperscript{149} "A soldier trained for the single task of war can be expected to react in the same prescribed way in any given situation,"\textsuperscript{150} unlearning immediate action drills may be a difficult task in transitioning from a warfighting focus to a peacekeeping one.

When a squad receives enemy fire, Army doctrine calls for the following: "Soldiers immediately take up the nearest covered positions and return fire in the direction of contact," the squad attempts to achieve fire superiority in order to maneuver against and destroy the enemy force, or break contact.\textsuperscript{151} Compare this

\textsuperscript{147} LTC Charles M. Ayers, \textit{Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures}, p. 71.


Infantry Battle Drill to the peacekeeping version: "Use only small caliber weapons, shoot high [in order to intentionally miss the target], and use less ammunition than the other party." The primary "weapon" to aimed directly back at the opposing force in peace operations is the VHS video camera.

Danish peacekeepers are taught not to react to fire when conducting peacekeeping patrols by "hitting the dirt," because the locals and belligerents will "think that the patrol is going into position to return fire," which would eliminate the perception of impartiality. The Danish response, or battle drill to react to contact for peacekeeping patrolling is "negotiate, don't retaliate."

The react to contact drills outlined above are totally correct for peace operations where restraint is necessary, but they are so completely opposite of what soldiers are trained to do instinctively. "Ingrained soldier skills; battle drills,...will be

152 Fire is intentionally directed to "miss" the target in order to "send a signal" to the opposing force in order to dissuade them from using force. See; Gustav Hägglund, "Peacekeeping in a Modern War Zone," Survival, Vol. XXXII, #3, May/Jun 1990, pp. 238-239.


154 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 7-98: Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, p. 4-22.

counterproductive" to success in peace operations. A soldier who has not been properly prepared for his [peacekeeping] role is likely to find himself disoriented and out of his depth..." in a difficult peacekeeping situation. The converse of that is also true, that a soldier trained primarily for peacekeeping will probably be disoriented, out of his depth, and dead in a warfighting situation. "There is a greater chance of having higher U.S. casualty rates in limited operations than in ones in which decisive use of force can be employed." 

Lieutenant General Gary E. Luck, writing on the trade-off between developing warfighting skills versus peacekeeping skills said it this way:

"History tells us we will go to war the way we are today, not the way we want to be. We cannot expect to have the luxury of time to transition to a warfighting disposition. So, we work to eliminate peacetime detractors that degrade our readiness. It means first and foremost inculcating a go-to-war mentality - a contingency culture to maintain our edge and to reinforce our warfighting style. We do not advocate ad hoc relationships and methods in war; things do not 'sort themselves out' on the battlefield, hence we abolish them in time of peace."

The Current emphasis on, and non-tactical nature of peace operations could be seen as a detractor to our maintenance of


warfighting skill. Concern that repeated participation in PKOs will over time, erode the Army's ability to wage the highly complicated mid to high-intensity warfare effectively is not misplaced.¹⁶⁰

Looking to historical experience, the Canadians, who have for years actively supported UN peacekeeping almost unconditionally, say that it takes about four months to retrain a unit back to its original level of proficiency in combat skills following a tour of duty in a peacekeeping mission.¹⁶¹ The British, during the Falkland Islands War in 1982, found that they had a significant training problem with the forces that had been pulled out of constabulary operations in Northern Ireland.¹⁶² The Israeli Defense Forces suffered deleterious effects on combat motivation as a result of its efforts to police the West Bank and Gaza Strip.¹⁶³ American experience in the Sinai MFO mission indicates that soldiers and units lose their edge rapidly in a contest with boredom and monotony, where each day was a carbon copy of the one before.¹⁶⁴ American soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division

¹⁶¹ GEN Wayne A. Downing, p. 12.
¹⁶³ LTC Charles J. Dunlap Jr., p. 12.
supporting UNITAF in Somalia also reported that periods of boredom and inactivity negatively affected their morale.¹⁶⁵

General Wayne A. Downing, Commander of United States Special Operations Command, voiced his concerns that in adding an entirely new class of operations, peace operations, dealing with mass migrations (eg. Rwanda), humanitarian assistance (eg. Provide Comfort), disaster relief (eg. Hurricanes Andrew, Iniki, etc.), counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and even protecting the environment;

"There is a very intense debate going on about how far we can go into these non-traditional missions. There's a real concern that non-traditional missions are going to dilute our military core competencies."¹⁶⁶

Soldiers trained for peacekeeping are soldiers not ready for warfighting. The ability of a unit to execute its warfighting METL tasks is a function of its soldiers’ abilities to perform their combat skills correctly. Units will lose their fighting edge and training readiness if training time is spent preparing soldiers for peace operations. The Army needs to focus on doing the most important tasks right. The consequences of losing an MRC seem to outweigh those of a peace operation on the rocks.

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dunlap, in his recent award-winning


article, warns that increased participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations will result in soldiers, sailors, and airmen who will no longer perceive themselves as warriors, but instead "...as policemen, relief workers, educators, builders, health care providers, politicians - everything but warfighters." As stated previously, most peace operations emphasize restraint from using force to accomplish the mission. The question is "exactly how much restraint can be instilled into a soldier until he becomes mainly a relief worker and ceases to be an effective warfighter?" In the words of Admiral Charles A. Larson, Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet, "Warfighters can be humanitarians: but humanitarian organizations cannot win our wars." A warning not to lose sight of our primary mission.

Military analyst, Colonel Harry Summers USA (Retired) warned that when militaries lose sight of their primary purpose, catastrophe results. Citing a study of pre-World War II Canadian military policy and its subsequent impacts on that Army’s performance on the battlefield, he observed that the senior leadership of that Army was corrupted by eagerly accepting new peacetime roles that eroded the warfighting spirit and skills, and this Army subsequently suffered outrageous unnecessary casualties (18,444) on the D-Day landings at Normandy through sheer

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168 MAJ Brantley O. Smith, p. 16.

incompetence.\textsuperscript{170}

Peacekeeping is a worthy mission for soldiers and nations, and shows great promise for maintaining peace and order in the future. However, an increased emphasis in peacekeeping is not without costs to the Army's primary mission of fighting and winning the nation's wars. In the examples provided for the infantry squad in peacekeeping, the gulf between warfighting and peacekeeping is obvious. This is not only true for the Infantry, but for the Army as well. We must continue to emphasize warfighting training and doctrine in order to be true to our mission.

The costs of a peacekeeping mission, struggling along with second rate troops from other nations is insignificant when compared to the cost of losing in a major regional conflict, because prolonged over-commitment of "fewer forces...doing increased work" to support peace operations dulled the Army's fighting edge.\textsuperscript{171} With fewer forces and dollars to do the job, an increased emphasis on peace operations training, preparedness, and participation will undermine the Army's primary mission, along with its capabilities to carry out that mission.\textsuperscript{172}

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\textsuperscript{171} Rick Maze, "Readiness: Trouble Ahead?" Army Times, May 9, 1994, p. 8.

American Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline K. Albright, in a talk before the Council on Foreign Relations, identified some of the weaknesses of the UN Command System. Pointing to the "programmed amateurism" of the United Nations, she cited a "near total absence of contingency planning," a "lack of centralized command and control," and "lift arrangements cobbled together on a wing and a prayer." She also observed that military and civilian staffs are "hastily recruited, ill-equipped, and often unprepared." The Ambassador's criticisms have been echoed by a number of field commanders, the majority of whom have concluded that post Cold-War demands on the organization have outdistanced its capabilities.

The generally agreed to shortcomings with UN controlled peacekeeping are the following:

1. Lack of command, control, and communications (C³).
2. Lack of standard doctrine.
3. Lack of military expertise and manpower to plan and execute missions.
4. Lack of logistical base to support operations.

The UN's ability to control peace operations is hampered by a lack of command and control suitable for military operations.\(^{174}\) The UN Office of Peacekeeping Operations, headed by an Under Secretary General, has only a small coordinating staff to advise the Secretary General. This element lacks sufficient C\(^4\) (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence) structure. Despite having 19 operations on-going around the world, the UN has no independent intelligence gathering system and no 24-hour intelligence or operations center to follow UN operations for the Secretary General.\(^{175}\) This lack of intelligence gathering and analysis capability "can lead to mistakes in planning and guidance to military operations in the field."\(^{176}\)

A lack of a modern communications network makes communication between New York and field operations "slow, unreliable and frustrating, and must be improved if UN headquarters is to better support deployed forces".\(^{177}\) An operations center with secure voice and data communications capability with all PKOs in the field is currently under construction at UN headquarters in New York to


\(^{175}\) LTG Barry McCaffrey, p. 6.

\(^{176}\) United States Institute of Peace, The Professionalism of Peacekeeping, p. 33.

\(^{177}\) Ibid, p. 32.
correct this deficiency. Field communications are also poor, and no significant steps are underway to improve tactical communications in the PK areas of operations.

The UN does not have a standard doctrine for peace operations, outlining acceptable techniques, procedures, and methodologies to guide commanders conducting peace operations. Standard warfighting doctrines, which drive Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), Battle Drills, and standards, do not dovetail well with peace operations. U.S. warfighting doctrine, as demonstrated in operations Desert Storm and Just Cause, and defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are "antithetical to standard UN peacekeeping practice: the decisive comprehensive, and synchronized application of preponderant military force to shock, disrupt, demoralize and defeat opponents." This doctrine of using "overwhelming combat power to achieve victory at minimal cost" is not generally suitable to guide commanders in peace operations. The U.S. Armed Forces and the U.S. Army are developing new doctrinal and "How To" manuals specifically for peace operations, for example, FM 100-23: Peace

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179 John G. Ruggie, p. 28.


Operations, due in June 1994 and The U.S. Army Infantry School Draft White Paper; The Application of Peace Enforcement Operations at Brigade and Battalion,\textsuperscript{182} and have established guiding principles, tactics, techniques, procedures, planning factors, and training requirements for OOTW missions, to include peace operations, in chapters of \textit{FM 100-5: Operations}, \textit{FM 100-20: Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict}, and \textit{FM 7-98: Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict}.\textsuperscript{183}

Canada and the Nordic countries have taken the lead role as articulators of peacekeeping doctrine,\textsuperscript{184} and traditional peacekeeping is well documented in UN publications and Scandinavian military schools and manuals,\textsuperscript{185} however, this is not the case for all militaries providing forces to UN peace operations and for the new types of peace operations that fall under the grey area between Chapter VI and Chapter VII that are already underway across the globe. Although the US has made significant progress in developing


\textsuperscript{184} Larry L. Fabian, pp. 94 & 142.

\textsuperscript{185} Dennis J. Quinn, p. 39.
its peace operations doctrine, a UN Doctrine for combined operations planning and execution needs to be developed to allow forces to achieve inter-operability and common focus. NATO, an alliance of 13 nations and 12 languages, has often been pointed out as a model for the UN to use as a template in building its own doctrine.\textsuperscript{186}

The lack of military expertise in the UN Secretariat is striking. "Only a handful of UN officials have any experience with the military aspects of peacekeeping operations and none is familiar with modern high-technology warfare."\textsuperscript{187} Even though the UN has been conducting PKOs for years, its capabilities to execute such missions is inadequate. The lack of military expertise cripples the UN's ability to plan for the new types of peace operations. Traditional peacekeeping did not present too great a challenge, but the UN is not staffed to plan and execute the more aggressive brand of operations that are currently being run.\textsuperscript{188}

"From an organizational perspective, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations is undermanned and overworked in its


management of the many complex missions around the world."\textsuperscript{189} This busy department comprises less than thirty personnel, including secretaries.\textsuperscript{190}

The UN's lack of ready manpower in the form of standing or standby forces means that it must rely on voluntary contributions of member nations to build task forces to support UN operations. Since the UN has no army of its own, each PKO has had to be "cobbled together" on an ad hoc basis. Nations contribute required forces, supplies, and logistics assets, while the UN "pays the bills." Historically, Australia, Austria, Canada, Fiji, Finland, Ireland, and the Scandinavian countries have been the largest contributors of soldiers.\textsuperscript{191}

UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and others have suggested the creation of a standing UN Army, or at least the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force of about 3,000, under the command of the UNSC. This is seen by many as the natural evolution of Article 43 of the Charter: "The ultimate vision of Article 43 is a standing UN international army that can be called up by Security Council action

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and commanded (at the top) by the Secretary General." The French Foreign Legion has been pointed out as the proposed model of a larger UN Army. The Legion is international in nature, with volunteers from more than 100 countries among its 8,500 officers and men, yet despite its diverse backgrounds, it is an effective and disciplined fighting force.

However, with all of the UN's C³, logistics, doctrine, and experience problems, many nations would hesitate at putting forces under UN control until it could demonstrate capability to meet the task, so that prospect is a long way off at best. Retired Major General Indar Rikhye proposed that a peacekeeping reserve force should be established, and member countries should earmark forces for this reserve. A more broadly accepted proposal is to build the C³ capability, logistics base, and doctrine for standby forces dedicated by member nations, or for forces to be contributed in support of specified UN operations.

The UN does not have a logistics support base to support field operations. Each operation begins anew a process of identifying sources of equipment and services. Past UN operations have been marked by an inability on the part of the UN to provide

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the kind of equipment to contributed forces that western armies would consider basic and necessary to meet the minimum standards for effective military activity. The UN system is slow and ineffective. Pakistani soldiers deployed to UNISOM I did not have telephones, radios, body armor, riot control agents (CS gas) or batons. This gear was eventually provided by other countries, but not before some of these troops were killed in ambushes.\textsuperscript{196} Lack of equipment delays operations, inhibits aggressive deployment, and threatens the lives and safety of peacekeepers. It takes an average of 120 days to fill a request for supplies from peacekeeping units in the field at the UN. By comparison, the average in the US Army, for similar operations, is 14 to 21 days.\textsuperscript{197}

The UN does not have any equipment of its own: "To this day we have no reserve stock of standard peace-keeping equipment. We have no collection of jeeps, radios, tents, generators, or prefabs, other than a very limited stock in Pisa, Italy" - Shashi Tharoor, Special Assistant to the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping.\textsuperscript{198} After suggesting the creation of a call-up system to provide up to 3,000 troops to rapidly respond to peace operations

\textsuperscript{196} Marguerite Michaels, "Blue Helmet Blues," \textit{TIME}, Vol. 142, #20, p. 66.


requirements, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali acknowledged that such forces that would likely comprise the force would lack the equipment necessary to counter an army equipped with modern weaponry.\textsuperscript{199} Indeed, third rate military foes have snubbed their noses at UN peacekeepers and their efforts to supervise a peace.\textsuperscript{200}

As these deficiencies persist, the UN DPKO is contemplating new missions, while it is stretched thin meeting its current operations.\textsuperscript{201} Presently there are seven proposed UN operations under consideration.\textsuperscript{202} As the Background section of this paper demonstrated, the UN is increasing peace operations at a rapid pace. "As the United Nations continues to expand its role of a global mediator, its member nations will surely become embroiled in more peacekeeping operations."\textsuperscript{203} These deficiencies which currently impede performance in PKOs must be corrected if peace operations are to be successful. What America can do to help will be addressed in the next section.

\textsuperscript{199} Lynn E. Davis, \textit{Peacekeeping and Peacemaking After the Cold War}, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1993, pp. 15-16.

\textsuperscript{200} LTC Timothy L. Thomas, p. 48.


\textsuperscript{202} UN operations have been proposed for Sudan, Sri Lanka, Solomon Islands, Zaire, Burundi, Afghanistan, and Bosnia. See Directorate of Intelligence, United States Central Intelligence Agency, \textit{Worldwide Peacekeeping Operations, 1994}.

CHAPTER SIX
U.S. UNIQUE CAPABILITIES IN PEACE OPERATIONS

As the only remaining superpower possessing the best trained and equipped military fighting force, and global reach, the United States has many capabilities to bring to bear in support of expanded peace operations. Some of these capabilities are uniquely related to superpower status. The major categories of military capabilities that are required in peace operations are shown in Table 4. Those capabilities unique to superpower status revolve around the characteristics of global reach, superior training, and technological advantage.

Some have argued that the United States ought only provide those capabilities, that other nations cannot, those that are unique to the United States, while others contend that the United States must lend support in all areas, to include the participation of combat forces. The United States Army can provide support in seven of the ten categories of military capabilities to peace operations shown on Table 4, with the Air Force and Navy providing the other three.

Although the word "intelligence" is not generally used in peacekeeping organisations, due to the fact that belligerent forces

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may perceive information gathering as a hostile act, the majority of the work of military staffs involved in peace operations is
directed with this goal in mind. Timely intelligence enables the PK force commander to conduct his mission more effectively and to protect his forces.\textsuperscript{205} The intelligence staff officer of a PK force focuses his collection efforts, both strategic and tactical, on military assessments of the opposing sides' intentions and capabilities in relation to the possible impact on the mission of the peace operations force.\textsuperscript{206} U.S. intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities include satellite imagery, aerial photography, remotely piloted reconnaissance vehicles (RPVs), Ground Surveillance Radars (GSRs), remote sensors incorporating seismic and magnetic detection means (eg. Platoon Early Warning System, REMBASS, etc), thermal imagery systems, Special Operations Forces, and Long Range Reconnaissance Companies.\textsuperscript{207}

U.S. DOD C\textsuperscript{3} capabilities include;

1. systems and platforms, such as the C-130-E airborne command post, satellite communications, and JSTARS radar.

2. Advanced communications gear such as digitized fire direction/fire control radio nets, encrypted radio communications systems.


4. Regional expertise in Special Operations Commands CA, PSYOP, and SOF forces, as well as Foreign Area Officers (FAOs).

5. Regional and Deployable Command Structures (eg. CENTCOM, CENTCOM).


\textsuperscript{206} LTC Charles M. Ayers, Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{207} Mats R. Berdall, p. 18.
EUCOM, etc), and combat experienced, rapidly deployable, Army, Corps, Division, and Brigade Staffs. Deployable C³ facilities and standardized operating procedures.

6. Training Support in the form of exportable U.S. military training programs, for example; mobile training teams for new equipment training, and SOF "to organize, train, equip, and advise" indigenous forces,²⁰⁸ and CONUS and OCONUS training facilities JRTC, CMTC, NTC, JOTC, which are state of the art.

Airpower and seapower capabilities, as well as strategic mobility, are provided by the Air Force and Navy. Both services have missions to perform in support of peace operations. Presently, the USAF is enforcing No-Fly Zones in the former Yugoslavia (in support of UNPROFOR), and Northern and Southern Iraq (Operation Southern Watch), while the USN has challenged 11,000 ships in the Adriatic Sea, and halted and boarded, or diverted to a port for inspection, over 1,000 merchant ships in enforcing UN sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro as part of Operation Sharp Guard.²⁰⁹

Naval involvement in peace operations may come in the form of sealift, assault from the sea by Marines, submarine and surface forces, and individuals.²¹⁰ Naval forces have a significant mission in enforcing maritime trade sanctions or embargoes to achieve political results for the UN. "Additionally, naval forces are less susceptible to political constraints on international

²⁰⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5: Operations, p. 2-20.


²¹⁰ LTC Charles M. Ayers, Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, p. 43.
Naval missions include:

1. Surveillance by naval air and surface assets.
2. Interdiction.
3. Coastal Sea Control
7. Assist in Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
10. Search and Rescue.\(^{212}\)

Air Force missions include;

1. Surveillance
2. Reconnaissance
3. Air Traffic Control
4. Air Space Management
5. Intelligence
6. Aerial Refuelling
7. Air Lift.\(^{213}\)

The Army of course has special capabilities in the category of forcible entry. As operations Urgent Fury (Grenada 1983), Golden Pheasant (Nicaragua 1988), Just Cause (Panama 1989), and Desert Shield (Saudi Arabia 1990) show, the U.S. Army can rapidly deploy significant forces worldwide on short notice. Our worldwide deployability is supported by a global logistics system, strengthened by forward deployed contingency stocks (eg. Diego Garcia, and POMCUS stocks in Europe). Additionally, the Army has


\(^{213}\) LTC Charles M. Ayers, Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, p. 55.
a variety of Combat Support and Combat Service Support units and soldiers ranging from port operations and stevedores, to water purification units, to shower and bath units.

In the category of Unconventional Warfare the Army has a proven capability to conduct small-scale special operations with SOF, or to train local forces to conduct their own military operations. In Nation-Building, the Army has accumulated years of experience in Central American nations, and in disaster relief missions in creating or rebuilding infrastructure, supporting the creation of governmental systems, and providing civil services. Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations (PSYOPs), and Public Affairs forces are in high demand for peace operations, in regards to their unique capabilities to support such Nation-Building tasks as legitimizing the government, providing civil services such as medical/ dental/ water purification/ food distribution/ resettlement/ etc.215


For the role of CA in OOTW, see Center for Army Lessons Learned, Newsletter No. 92-6: Operations Other Than War, Volume I; Humanitarian Assistance, Dec. 1992, p. 15. See also, Steve Vogel, "Caught in the Crossfire," Army Times, #35, Mar. 28, 1994, p. 3.


For the role of Public Affairs (PA) see, Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-23: Peace Operations, DRAFT Version
"When [U.S.] forces are deployed for protracted periods, Army forces provide for the majority of command, control, communications and intelligence support, operate port facilities, transportation networks and supply distribution points. They provide medical and dental services, enemy prisoner of war [or Displaced Civilians (DCs)] control and reconstitute civil infrastructure with engineers and civil affairs capabilities."²¹⁶

Another unique capability which the U.S. Armed Forces can offer in support of peace operations is found in its personnel. U.S. officers filled key staff positions in field headquarters in early UN PKOs and have been in demand ever since. Lieutenant Colonel Herman Palmer, a military observer team leader in the UNTAC mission recounted; "Americans...were in great demand as team leaders. The United Nations Military Observer Group in Phnom Penh was inundated with calls from sector commanders trying to get Americans as team leaders. They knew they could put an American [officer] in there and not have to worry about him. We train our guys to be autonomous and independent. A lot of nations don't do that."²¹⁷

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²¹⁶ GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, Army Focus 1993, pp. 6-7.

CHAPTER SEVEN

PK CAPABILITIES HISTORICALLY PROVIDED BY U.S.

Peacekeeping Operations are one of the five components of the U.S. Security Assistance Program. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Part II, Chapter 6, as amended (22 USC 2348) authorizes assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for peacekeeping operations that further U.S. national security interests. The United States participation in UN PKOs is governed by the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (Public Law 72-264, as amended, 22 USC 287 et seq) and Executive Order 10206, "Support of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes."^218^ Historically, the United States has provided its special military capabilities in support to UN operations, and allied nations' military operations. Both Britain in the Falklands Islands War of 1982, and France, during its intervention in Chad in 1983, relied on U.S. logistical, communications, and intelligence support to complete those operations. ^219^ The United States has provided relatively few troops to UN peacekeeping endeavors, but has however, provided supplies, money, and transportation in

^218^ Joint Staff, Joint Test Publication 3-07: Doctrine For Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, p. IV-4.

support of about two-thirds of all UN peacekeeping efforts.\textsuperscript{220}

The United States provided nearly all airlift, communications systems, and other major support items of equipment to the UNFICYP mission during its early days.\textsuperscript{221} During the Indonesian operation (UNTEA), the United States provided the communications net for the entire operation, loaning portable radios to observer forces and using a USN communications vessel as the C\textsuperscript{3} headquarters for that operation.\textsuperscript{222}

United States support to the UN operation in the Congo, took the form of C-130 and C-124 transport aircraft, used for the insertion and subsequent support of Belgian paratroopers, close air support aircraft (B-26 fighter-bombers), and C\textsuperscript{3} in the form of an airborne command post (CP), aka the "Talking Bird, and the USAFE (US Air Force Europe) single-sideband radio net, aka "Twilight Net."\textsuperscript{223}

In the first Somalia operation, UNISOM I, American assistance was in the traditional form of airlift (C-130s to remote areas) in support of UN forces. Of the 27 nations that participated in UNISOM II, 24 relied on American ground Combat Service Support units for logistical support, including, food, water, aircraft, and

\textsuperscript{220} LTC Charles M. Ayers, Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, p. 2.


\textsuperscript{222} Larry L. Fabian, Soldiers Without Enemies, p. 71.

ground transport.224

In Operation Sea Angel, in Bangladesh, 7,500 Marines and sailors provided 700,000 pounds of relief supplies in nine days. This force established water purification sites that produced potable water, and assigned medical units treated the injured and infirmed and restored local medical facilities. "The operation assisted over one-half million Bangladeshis over a five week period until local and federal civilian authorities could resume control."225

Military personnel have been provided as observers to numerous UN PdOs with U.S. officers serving since the very first two UN operations; UNTSO and UNMOGIP.226 American combat troops participated as peacekeepers in UN operations (see table 2, p. 14), unilateral actions, and multilateral efforts outside the framework of the United Nations. As part of the Camp David Peace Accords, American soldiers maintain the peace between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai, with the Multinational Force and Observers mission (MFO).227 In April 1982, over 1,200 U.S. Marines joined a multilateral effort to maintain peace in Lebanon, with the


226 COL Steven R. Rader, p. 50.

establishment of a Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut to oversee the evacuation of PLO guerrillas from that country.\textsuperscript{228}

In our own hemisphere, the United States contributed 11,935 troops to the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) established by the Organization of American States in 1956-1966 to restore order in the Dominican Republic following U.S. intervention there.\textsuperscript{229} The United States established a multinational Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF) to maintain order in Grenada, until local authorities could resume control, following the liberation of that island nation in Operations Urgent Fury.\textsuperscript{230}

Currently, American military personnel comprise about 5.4% of all UN sponsored peacekeeping operations roles. However, the United States has been paying for 30% of the UN's peacekeeping budget.\textsuperscript{231} The United States military has incurred high costs in readiness and funds in supporting peace support operations; operations in Somalia have cost $424 million and the Bosnia relief supplies air drop mission; $277 million, and the "No-Fly Zone" implementation over Northern and Southern Iraq; $450 million.\textsuperscript{232}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{228} MG Indar J. Rikhye, et al, \textit{The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping}, p. 75.
\bibitem{229} Ibid, p. 147.
\bibitem{232} Army Times Staff Writer, "Fast Track," \textit{Army Times}, #31, Feb. 28, 1994, p. 22.
\end{thebibliography}

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The DOD received an additional $1.2 billion in emergency funding to pay for the costs of peace support operations for 1994.\textsuperscript{233}

An increased role for U.S. military forces in peace operations would have its greatest impact on the Army among the services. Even with Americans comprising only 5.4% of the UN forces, peace operations are making an impact on readiness and funds. This and the preceding section reviewed America's unique capabilities and her historical support of peace operations. As we have seen, there are costs associated with participation in peace operations. What actions can the United States pursue to support peace operations at the least cost to readiness of its military forces to perform their primary missions? This question will be discussed in the following chapter.

\textsuperscript{233} Rick Maze, "Peacekeeping Funds Score For Clinton Defense Pledge," \textit{Army Times}, #30, Feb. 21, 1994, p. 3.
CHAPTER EIGHT

UNITED STATES PK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States Army and the U.S. Armed Forces must keep their focus on warfighting. The Weinberger Doctrine which evolved from our experiences in Vietnam and the second Lebanon operation, specified that U.S. combat troops should not be deployed without "well-defined objectives and a consistent strategy."\(^\text{234}\) We have already seen that well defined objectives in peace operations are difficult to articulate and understand (Somalia). No opposing force can challenge the Army on its terms, but "...a military force constrained by UN limitations and restrictive rules of engagement cannot be expected to produce the kind of decisive results we like to associate with victory."\(^\text{235}\)

"The Army exists to fight and win the Nation's wars. The Army's primary mission is to organize, train, and equip forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat operations. Although the Army can accomplish other missions such as disaster relief and peacekeeping...winning the Nation's battles remains the Army's true reason for being."\(^\text{236}\) The Army is a "blunt instrument, as


\(^{236}\) GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, United States Army Posture Statement FY 95, p. 23.
students of warfare repeatedly point out...it is not a Peace Corps with side arms."\textsuperscript{237} The Army's unique capabilities can, and should, be used in support of humanitarian assistance and peace operations, but the Army "should not be organized or prepared or trained to perform such roles. A military force is fundamentally anti-humanitarian: its purpose is to kill people in the most efficient way possible."\textsuperscript{238}

With the limitations imposed by the BUR drawdown, it is critical that the Army not lose sight of its primary responsibility to win in battle. A peacekeeping operation that is on the rocks will not have near the repercussions as losing a Major Regional Conflict, because the Army as a military force was not prepared to fight and kill the enemy. Two simultaneous conflicts would prevent us from pursuing other missions. "A deeper concern is that peace operations could 'strategically fix' the Army and severely limit its ability to respond to a major regional conflict."\textsuperscript{239}

The United States retains the right under Article 51 of the UN Charter to use force unilaterally and retains the right to act in concert with its allies when its interests are threatened.\textsuperscript{240}

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  \item \textsuperscript{237} Woody West, "Uncle Sam Is Getting Wobbly on When to Use His Sword," \textit{Insight}, Nov. 8, 1993, p. 40.
  \item \textsuperscript{238} Samuel P. Huntington, "New Contingencies, Old Roles," \textit{Joint Forces Quarterly}, No. 2, Autumn 1993, p. 43.
  \item \textsuperscript{239} GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, \textit{United States Army Posture Statement FY 95}, p. 50.
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When America's national interests are endangered, its military forces would participate in peace operations as appropriate to protect those interests. When the challenges of peace operations are less central to its interests, the United States will be more selective in whether and how it decides to participate in peace operations.\textsuperscript{241}

Studies have indicated that most UN missions can be accomplished with little or no U.S. participation.\textsuperscript{242} So far, there has been little difficulty in raising the necessary forces from member nations for UN PKOs.\textsuperscript{243} Other nations can, and do, assume responsibility for these missions and execute them successfully. Presently, France holds the global mantle of leadership in PKOs, contributing over 10\% of all UN peacekeeping forces.\textsuperscript{244} Former great powers like France, Great Britain, and Russia seek to participate in UN sponsored Peacekeeping as a means to continue playing a global role on the world chessboard.\textsuperscript{245}


Many smaller nations participate on the global stage through their participation in peace operations, for example, Fiji, which has been a steady supplier of peacekeeping forces. Additionally, the military forces from these nations often receive more pay, equipment, and logistical support while on UN duty. Forces from the smaller armies get cross-training with armies from other nations. For the United States Armed Forces, this is not the case. Americans participating in peace operations see their warfighting readiness diminished as a result of peacekeeping duties.

"The Army should take the lead to support the notion of primary assistance to international peacekeeping operations through our immense enabling capabilities in airlift, sealift, helicopter support, PSYOP and Civil Affairs assistance and medical and logistic augmentations, while holding fast to the notion that US combat forces are the least favorable option for use as peacekeepers."\(^{246}\) It would be foolish to squander the American public’s tolerance for the acceptance of casualties in peacekeeping operations that others can successfully perform and thereby "constrict America’s unique warmaking capacity, which is a vital pillar of world peace."\(^{247}\) A true peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia has not yet begun (ie. there is no agreed upon peace settlement to keep) and that operation has sustained 850 KIA


and WIA. The loss of 250 Marines in mission of peacekeeping in Beirut should serve to provide caution to the potential human costs in operations where American military force is constrained.248

If the answer is not more American soldiers in peace operations, what should America provide? Looking to the four areas of deficiencies of UN peacekeeping operations (page 58) gives us the perspective to determine appropriate U.S. policies. U.S. contributions to UN peace operations should serve to make that body more effective in peace operations, thereby lessening dependence on American military assistance.

Regarding C³, the United States should assist efforts in improving C³ of UN PKOs, by improving strategic and tactical communications capabilities. United States should also continue providing intelligence to UN operations,249 and should be ready to provide command and control assistance from its pool of trained officers, of which there is presently an excess supply (one of the drawdown’s side effects).

Concerning Doctrine, the United States Army should continue to work on its own peace operations doctrine and work to influence UN doctrine to ensure it dovetails with its own doctrine. The Army should ensure its peace operations doctrine effectively guides and prepares our soldiers and leaders if they are committed to supporting peace operations. Warfighting doctrine should continue


its primacy, and the primary role of U.S. forces in peace operations should be the peace enforcement role, which requires application of combat power, our strong suit. Development of doctrine is primarily an academic pursuit which stimulates the officer corps and professional military thought. Work in this area will not negatively impact on readiness and will prepare U.S. forces for such operations if necessary.

On the issue of military expertise and manpower, the United States can assist by utilizing excess facilities to improve the training of forces selected by other nations for peacekeeping duties, Special Operations Forces training teams, PSYOPs, and Civil Affairs can perform their primary missions, without degradation to their METL task proficiency, in support of peace operations. The Army already conducts a peacekeeper observer course for U.S. personnel designated to support peace operations at the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAFJKSWCS). This could be expanded, or duplicated by the UN with Army assistance.

It is in the area of logistics support that the United States

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can make its greatest contributions. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on peacekeeping concluded that the UN needed an increased logistics capability. The report suggested expansion of the UN supply depot in Pisa Italy "to ensure that there are sufficient back-up supplies to meet the immediate needs of peacekeeping operations."\textsuperscript{252} The Secretary General has proposed multiple storage depots with prepositioned supplies around the world on the U.S. model.\textsuperscript{253} If the UN had a greater capability to sustain the forces volunteered, there would be less of an outcry for U.S. military involvement in UN peace operations. Stockpiling peacekeeping equipment around the world would speed up the UN's ability to respond to developing situations using those forces already committed to the UN on a standby basis by member nations.\textsuperscript{254}

As the United States, former USSR, and Warsaw Pact, as well as other Western European and NATO nations draw down their forces, surplus equipment is becoming available. As a result of troop withdrawals from US Army Europe in conjunction with the BUR drawdown, there are 213,000 tons of ammunition and 48,000 combat vehicles located in four storage sites in Germany "waiting for a

\textsuperscript{252} United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations Staff Report, Reform of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Mandate For Change, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{253} Ibid, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{254} United States Institute of Peace, The Professionalism of Peacekeeping, p. 51.
The Army has reassessed the retrograde of material from Europe, ( RETROEUR) and determined that the baseline is excess 55,000 vehicles for redistribution. "Of these, 13,000 will remain in Europe to fill other in-theater requirements or return to the United States for redistribution. The balance of the excess, (34,000) will be redistributed through the Foreign Military Sales Program, the NATO Equipment Transfer Program, the United Nations, or will be disposed of through the Defense Reutilization Marketing Office. To date, we have transferred nearly 2,900 vehicles to Foreign Military Sales; 2,700 to NATO; 600 to the United Nations; and 5,700 to the Defense Reutilization Marketing Office."

These wheeled and tracked vehicles could form the equipment pool for future UN operations. Additionally, as part of the drawdown in Europe, the Army is redeploying and demilitarizing more than one half million tons of ammunition.

Russia and other successor nations to the former Soviet Union also have "mountains of metal" in tanks and other fighting vehicles slated for destruction (in accordance with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty [CFE Treaty]), museum exhibits, and foreign

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256 GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, United States Army Posture Statement FY 95, p. 57.

257 Ibid, p. 25. 
The United States also is destroying some of its surplus equipment. A General Accounting Office report published in March 1993, stated "To comply with its [the CFE Treaty] arms limits, the United States is currently transferring 2,809 tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery to five other NATO member countries. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transferring the equipment is less expensive than destroying it."259

"Our moth-balled fleets of M113 armored personnel carriers provide an excellent source of "battlefield taxis," affording simplicity [in maintenance], survivability, and some firepower [.50 cal.];"260 out of date for mid to high intensity warfare, but perfect for peace operations. These fully functional surplus vehicles from the Cold War could form the worldwide logistics capability and force projection capability the UN needs.

Storage sites should also include equipment of a general purpose nature packaged in standardized "modular kits" or packages to support units arriving in theater. Contemporary peace operations would suggest the following;

- radio equipped trucks and jeeps
- portable shelters for C3
- communications equipment
- medical supplies and water purification systems
- food rations
- basic surveillance equipment (including binoculars, night vision equipment, and possible ground sensors)


260 LTC Karl Eikenberry, p. 18.
Forward based pre-positioned equipment storage sites built from these stocks of US and CIS nations would also lessen the requirements for U.S. and Russian airlift and sealift. With all of its present internal domestic problems, Russia might not be able to provide the airlift capabilities that its Soviet predecessor provided to previous UN operations. That would mean the UN would look increasingly to the United States for such support.

This policy has had somewhat of a trial run in Somalia, where prior to the pullout of U.S. troops, the United States ensured that the remaining UN contingents (primarily soldiers from India, Pakistan, and Malaysia) will have sufficient firepower to continue operations. The United States is leasing to the United Nations, thirty M60A3 main battle tanks, eighty M113 armored personnel carriers, and eight AH-1S Cobra attack helicopters, for use by Pakistani troops.

The emphasis on, and increase in the number of Peace operations will impact Army readiness and warfighting capability. If the nation chooses to pursue peace operations, the Army must support that decision. The policy recommendations I have made are those which strengthen UN capabilities and have the least impact on

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our Army's ability to complete its primary mission, To fight and win the Nation's wars. The consequences of losing in an MRC are too far-reaching in impact, and the challenge of fighting two of them nearly simultaneously too great for any other democracy to accept, that the Army has no choice but to continue to put warfighting first. The United States should support peacekeeping by improving the UN's capability to perform that mission, not by stepping in to shoulder the burden on its own.
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