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THE LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION REGIONALLY FOCUSED FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

LAUREN STEVE DAVIS, JR, MAJ, USA
B.S., Old Dominion University, 1978
M.S., Florida Institute of Technology, 1987

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1990

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This study examines the utility of regionally focusing a light infantry division to maximize its effectiveness for low intensity conflict (LIC). The light infantry divisions (LID) are the US Army's most strategically deployable divisions and train for contingencies worldwide. This study first explores why the light infantry division currently exists within the US force structure and its relationship to the spectrum of conflict, especially low intensity conflict. This study concludes that the light infantry division should be tied directly to CINCs who are involved in low intensity conflict. CINCs could ensure that mission essential training tasks for the specific region are the priority conditions, and standards for training tailored to the region, and distractions that are not regionally LIC related are eliminated. The end result is a light infantry division that is better prepared to support complex political-military contingencies.

Keywords: Division level organizations, Army operations, counterinsurgency, low intensity conflict, strategic capabilities plan, combatant commanders, Latin America.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (Reference to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION REGIONALLY FOCUSED FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, By Major Lauren Steve Davis, Jr., USA, 313 pages.

This study examines the utility of regionally focusing a light infantry division to maximize its effectiveness for low intensity conflict (LIC). The light infantry divisions (LID) are the US Army’s most strategically deployable divisions and train for contingencies worldwide. The light infantry division’s primary mission is preparing for low intensity conflict; however, it also trains for employment across the spectrum of conflict.

This study first explores why the light infantry division currently exists within the US force structure and its relationship to the spectrum of conflict, especially low intensity conflict. Of the four types of military operations in LIC, counterinsurgency and peacetime contingency operations are reviewed in depth. This study then reviews the doctrinal and theoretical framework for LIC, examines the unique nature of conflict at the low end of the operational continuum and the distinctions between LIC and mid-high intensity conflict. Next, the joint strategic planning system is examined to show how and why the light infantry division is apportioned to geographical CINCs in global war and during contingencies. Responsibility and accountability for a region is fixed under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The multi-agency nature of the LIC environment that a CINC and LID must operate in is also examined.

Analyzing the United States Southern Command’s area of responsibility using the Command and General Staff College regional force planning model establishes regional military requirements for Latin America so that resource deficiencies, risk assessment, and plans for future joint combined operations may be determined. Finally, the light infantry division’s battlefield operating systems, mission essential training tasks, and other LIC specific requirements provide a distinctive look at conflict at the low end of the spectrum.

This study concludes that the light infantry division should be tied directly to CINCs who are involved in low intensity conflict. CINCs could ensure that mission essential training tasks for the specific region are the priority, conditions, and standards for training tailored to the region, and distractors that are not regionally LIC related are eliminated. The end result is a light infantry division that is better prepared to support complex political-military contingencies.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Army, much more than its sister services, can ill afford to be preparing for the wrong war; it simply does not enjoy their freedom of choice in time, venue, and instruments for coming to grips with the enemy. The Navy and Air Force can suffer another Korean or Vietnam experience; the Army cannot, if only for its institutional self-esteem.

Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War*, 1989

The United States Army has two broad based areas of responsibility: It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war, and military operations short of war.¹ Military operations short of war are part of an operational continuum in the strategic environment that occurs within three general states: peacetime competition, conflict, and war. While war is the most dangerous and demanding challenge, the senior Army leadership realized in the early 1980's that of these military operations, conflict was becoming the most probable scenario for the Army. After reviewing the Army's force structure, it became clear that the Army was trained, organized, and equipped to fight and win the battle in Central Europe.

However, the probability of the next conflict being fought in a different part of the world, particularly the third world, was becoming apparent. The
Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1984 stated: "low intensity conflict may be the most likely challenge to US military forces" and that the third world "is becoming more heavily and lethally armed." \(^2\) Encounters at the low end of the spectrum of conflict would be below conventional war, but would fall within the larger category of conflict. Figure 1 illustrates the spectrum of conflict.

Low intensity conflicts require new strategies, doctrine, force structure, and equipment to fight and win in this environment. Rapidly deployable Army contingency forces would be the most effective Army or military response to the pervasive and persistent low intensity threats. As a result, the light infantry division was conceived. This chapter will examine the concept, mission, and
fielding of the light infantry division and its relationship to low intensity conflict.

The Light Infantry Division and LIC

In April 1984, the Chief of Staff of the US Army published the "Light Infantry Division, Army of Excellence White Paper" directing the development of light infantry divisions. General John Wickham states,

Army leadership is convinced, based on careful examination of studies which postulate the kind of world in which we will be living and the nature of conflict we can expect to face, that an important need exists for highly trained, rapidly deployable light forces. The British action in the Falkland Islands, Israeli operations in Lebanon, and our recent success in Grenada confirm that credible forces do not always have to be heavy forces.3

The White Paper was a result of guidance that had been issued to the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in August of 1983 to design a light infantry division.4 In October 1983, the Chief of Staff approved the Light Infantry Concept and Organization presented by TRADOC. The key guidance factors for design and capability were:

The LID (Infantry Division Light) must possess high strategic mobility and combat potency within austere parameters.

The LID must be designed for low intensity but have a "plug-in" capability for mid- and high-intensity scenarios.

The LID is to be transportable with 500 sorties (C-141B) and will have an aggregate strength of approximately 10 thousand men, half of which must be infantry.

The LID must have utility in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO.
The functions and assets that are always needed must be organic and functions and assets that are only occasionally required must be at corps or echelon above corps.

To minimize the types of equipment, supplies, ammunition and organizational structures while maximizing the use of additional duties, dual training, and multiple-mission individuals and units.\(^5\)

The main reason stated for the formation of the light infantry divisions was the need for a rapidly deployable force capable of operating in a LIC environment. Political factors, manpower reductions, interservice rivalry for budget shares, and strategic lift shortfalls contributed to the organization of the light infantry division. A great deal of speculation and analysis has been undertaken about its creation; the results remain controversial within the Army in general and the infantry in particular. Debating all the factors is beyond the scope of this paper. Since these light divisions have been fielded, the focus will be on their best use in a low intensity conflict.

One factor that influenced the design of the LID more than any other was the lack of strategic airlift. The LID was to be built around 500 sorties of the C141B. This division was built around constraints as well as capability. The Army is the only service that is totally dependent upon another service to get it where it has to go and sustain it. This affects the Army's ability to reinforce forward deployed forces or intervene in contingency scenarios.

In most low intensity contingency crises there is a narrow critical response window. If forces from the division can reach the contingency area in that response window, the crisis may be defused reducing the possibility larger
forces may be required. This deployability gives the NCA the ability to achieve strategic surprise. Figure 2 depicts the prospects of crisis abatement by reacting quickly with the right force mix to a contingency crisis. But in order to attain this strategic surprise, one must have strategic mobility.

"Our strategy of deterrence and forward defense with minimum of active-duty forces in peacetime, particularly forces stationed abroad, requires an ability to mobilize and deploy forces rapidly in the event of a crisis or conflict."6 "The "cornerstone" of our military strategy, strategic mobility, should be thought of in terms of a triad: sealift, airlift and pre-positioned equipment."7 To determine the mix of airlift, sealift, and prepositioning required to provide an acceptable

---

**Operational Keys**

- **First Days of Crisis Are Critical**
- **Small Force Rapidly Deployed Is High Risk—Crisis Could Elevate**
- **Large Forces Rapidly Deployed Defuse Crisis**
- **After Window, Much Larger Forces Required For Success**
US response capability for military contingencies in the 1990s, the Defense Authorization Act of 1981 studied the overall US mobility requirements. This study, entitled the Congressionally Mandated Study (CMMS) and published in April 1981, was an extensive effort supervised by a steering group chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and included representatives from all the services, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Defense. Based on the CMMS the Air Force must be able to move 66 million ton-miles/day. It presently can move only two-thirds of this amount using its assets and the Civil Reserve Airline Fleet (CRAF). Moving an Army division by air during a contingency would require substantial Air Force airlift assets. Figure 3 gives a comparison of the

Figure 3. Sorties Required to Move an Army Division
Source: CGSC LID Course Briefing Slides, 1989.

Deputy Secretary of Defense and included representatives from all the services, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Defense. Based on the CMMS the Air Force must be able to move 66 million ton-miles/day. It presently can move only two-thirds of this amount using its assets and the Civil Reserve Airline Fleet (CRAF). Moving an Army division by air during a contingency would require substantial Air Force airlift assets. Figure 3 gives a comparison of the
Army's strategic deployability by divisional organization.\(^6\)

In addition to mobility, the LID needs to have a high foxhole strength. Foxhole strength includes soldiers who would engage the enemy in a direct-fire mode. This definition includes members of the infantry platoon such as riflemen, drivers and dedicated gunners. At the battalion level it includes antiarmor platoons, minus drivers and gunners; maneuver battalion scout

![Graph showing foxhole strength by type of division](image)

**Figure 4.** Comparison of Foxhole Strength by Type of Division
Source: CGSC LID Course Briefing Slides, 1989.

platoons, minus drivers and vehicle gunners; and company-level 60mm mortar sections. High foxhole strength gives the division "Soldier Power" as described by General Wickham.

The LID comes close to the design goal of half the 10,000 soldiers being
Background

The missions assigned the light infantry division are:

Rapidly deploy as a light infantry combined arms force to
defeat enemy forces in low intensity conflict and, when properly augmented, fight and win in a mid-high intensity conflict.\textsuperscript{10}

Examining this mission statement, one can see that the light infantry divisions operational concept was to create a versatile force designed primarily for low-intensity conflict and, after augmentation, be capable of combat in mid-high intensity scenarios. Operational concepts are critical because they describe how the Army will fight and sustain the force. They usually evolve after being refined from broad concepts, and cover both short and long periods of time. However, the light division was developed in a timeframe of only a couple of months.

Design of the division would maximize technology to enhance performance and reduce manpower. Lightweight systems for soldiers would reduce loads and the support structure required to sustain. The Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth working with other TRADOC schools, developed the following constraints for the light infantry division:

Ensure commonality of equipment, supplies, ammunition, and organizational structure.

Optimize designs for low to mid intensity conflict by retaining usefulness in NATO.

Reduce noncombat soldiers to a minimum.

Make organic those functions and assets that are always needed.

Pool those functions and assets that are only occasionally required at corps or echelons above corps.

Eliminate unneeded links in the chains of command, supply and
administration.

Minimize support requirements.

Identify augmentation units required to facilitate rapid integration of forces.

Maximize the use of additional duties, dual training, and multiple mission individuals and units.

Minimize the types of materiel required in the division.

Units need not be self-sustaining.

Ensure compatibility of the support system with the division's foot mobility.

Increase the leader-to-lead ration.  

The initial design included 10,220 soldiers, but has subsequently risen to 10,778. The details of each of the battle field operating systems (BOS) will be covered in subsequent chapters, but figure 6 compares selected major items of equipment to show the light division's relative poverty in terms of firepower.

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Figure 6. Light Division Equipment Comparison.  

Firepower in a LIC scenario can be counterproductive to accomplishing the mission. Now that a concept and organization has been developed for the
LID, it has to be tested and validated to ensure viability.

Testing and validating the LID requires a lot of planning and preparation. The concept and organization for the light infantry division was validated in 1986. The certification consisted of small unit Army training and evaluation programs (ARTEPS), one command post exercise (CPX), and one divisional-level field training exercise (FTX). The FTX comprised one light division opposing a brigade sized task force. Both units received extensive augmentation for the FTX that would probably not be available in many scenarios. As with most ARTEPS and assessments of this nature, it was subjective and hard to quantify.

The subjective and unquantifiable nature of the data collected left the argument open as to whether or not the data collected was valid and, thus, did not lead to clear and concise conclusions. The final report was compiled by the TRADOC Combined Arms Test Activity (TCATA). The recommendations and findings did not necessarily agree with what was reported by either the test evaluators or other TRADOC schools. Recommendations to further fine-tune the light division were proposed. The executive summary to the report:

... confirmed that the basic organizational design and operational concept of the LID [sic] is sound. If the proposed changes in the division design and concept are incorporated the capability will be increased, but not necessarily optimized. Certification should not be construed as a guarantee that the LID will be able to perform all missions in all type terrain, weather conditions, or scenarios. The LID [sic] must be doctrinally employed within its documented capabilities and limitations. A detailed METT-T analysis is necessary to ensure that the division is properly augmented for each particular area of employment.
All divisions regardless of type, perform "a detailed METT-T analysis" prior to employment. The light division, because of numerous contingency in LIC situations throughout the world, would require different augmentation dependent on the situation. All Army divisions are designed to have a self-sustaining capability of 48 or 60 hours. Any type of division may or may not be augmented based on METT-T analysis. The LID can accommodate the special challenges presented by a LIC scenario.

Little has been written on the issue of using the light infantry division in the low intensity spectrum. The primary orientation of evolving doctrine for the light infantry division has been mid-to-high intensity conflict in Europe. Heavy-light force mix is a topic that is easier to comprehend than the nebulous and unconventional challenges posed by low intensity conflicts in the Third World. Low intensity conflicts have four operational categories: insurgency/counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations. Each of these subcategories require separate understanding and approaches, and in some cases specialized forces. This study concentrates on two of these subcategories, counterinsurgency (COIN) and peacetime contingency operations, thus narrowing the scope of the study and concentrating on the most difficult and important feature of the low intensity conflict environment. Counterinsurgency is the most dangerous form of LIC because it is the most persistent, the most pervasive, and the most disruptive of
the forms of conflict short of conventional war that threaten US interests.  

The term "low intensity conflict" reflects a US perception and perspective of existing conditions. To the peoples of the country or region more directly affected, the term could be a misnomer. FM 100-20 dated 1 December 1989 defines LIC as:

Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.

The threat to the affected nation may be immediate and critical; the threat to the United States may be subtle, indirect, and long-term with potentially serious implications for US national security interests. Combatting the potential threat to US interests requires a balanced and integrated application of the political, economic, informational, and military instruments of US national power.

This balanced approach is integrated into US defense strategy. United States defense strategy is based on deterrence to preclude nuclear or major conventional war. Unlike nuclear war or a major conventional war, LIC is an ever present state of world affairs. The most significant threat to US interests in the LIC environment is not found in the individual cases of insurgency, economic instability, or in isolated acts of terrorism and subversion. Rather, it results from the accumulation of unfavorable outcomes from such activities.
General Fred Woerner, the former SOUTHCOM commander has called LIC "high probability" conflict. The recent US invasion of Panama, "Operation Just Cause," makes this a prophetic statement. The dilemma as a nation is to determine for which type of conflict to prepare. Strategic nuclear war and conventional war pose the greatest risks to the nation. Conventional and nuclear war are at the mid-and-high end of the spectrum of conflict, and are the least probable to occur. LIC, on the other hand, is less threatening to the survival of the nation in the short term, but has a high probability of occurrence. This problem will not go away, but military professionals must try to better understand it. Understanding LIC requires some background on its origin as a concept.

The term LIC and the spectrum of conflict have been around since the mid-1950's. A former SOUTHCOM commander, General Paul F. Gorman, developed several paradigms that are invaluable when trying to understand LIC. In figure 1 (previously cited), LIC occupies the left sector, where probability of occurrence is high, but intensity, referring to the use of weapons of mass destruction, relatively low. "Low intensity conflict" then includes both terrorism and guerrilla warfare, as the diagram suggests. Guerrilla warfare, by definition, does not fall under LIC. It comes under mid-high intensity combat and will be explained in greater detail in chapter three.

Looking at the figure 1, appropriate conditions should exist to employ the military in a LIC. Examining President Reagan's National Security Strategy of
the US, one of the principal national security objectives is:

To resolve peacefully disputes which affect US interests in troubled regions of the world. Regional conflicts which involve allies or friends of the US may threaten US interests, and frequently pose the risk of escalation to wider conflagration. . . .

. . . Specifically: To aid in combatting threats to the stability of friendly governments and institutions from insurgencies, subversion, state-sponsored terrorism and the international trafficking of illicit drugs.¹⁸

The most appropriate application of US military power (in LIC) is usually indirect through security assistance-training, advisory help, logistics support, and the supply of essential military equipment.¹⁹ In other words, the collective security of America is enhanced by helping others defend themselves,
and combat the reasons for the insurgency in the first place. Figure 7 shows where US military forces could be employed if called upon in a LIC situation.

General Gorman stated in testimony before Congress:

I believe that adroit use of US forces capable of performing [security assistance, intelligence, and communications] non-combat functions in third world countries might obviate the need to proceed beyond logistical support of indigenous forces to use of US general purpose forces for fire support and maneuver. I regret to say that professional colleagues have obscured this issue by justifying the Army's new light division on the grounds of utility for low intensity conflict." He goes on to say that once US combatants are introduced it is no longer a LIC situation. When an infantryman dies in combat anywhere, the US will be impelled to wage mid- or higher intensity warfare, to use ordnance in quality and quantity which will almost surely escape the definition of LIC.20

Among most military professionals, determining where LIC ends and Mid intensity conflict (MIC) starts is enigmatic. Using fire support and maneuver moves along the curve into the MIC area. However, discussions in chapter 3, will show that it is not that elementary. If the LID is employed in a scenario where defeating the enemy force ensures victory, it may then be a MIC scenario. If however, the enemy's center of gravity is political and not military, the road to victory may not be so clear. This leaves the soldiers in the LID with the unenviable mission of appropriately responding in a coalition relationship that has ambiguous political and political-military objectives in which the political legitimacy of the host nation is threatened.

The specter of war in the low intensity arena has continued to grow while war in central Europe has become more unlikely because of initiatives
between the United States and the Soviet Union. In Europe, peace is breaking out all over. However, despite improved superpower cooperation, the Soviet Union continues to support insurgencies throughout the third world that threaten regional security. In the third world worsening socio-economic conditions portend increased violence and instability. Moscow may even be losing its control over its proxies in regions like Cuba and Nicaragua. As insurgency movements in third world areas continue to manifest themselves, the capabilities of the light infantry division will provide the National Command Authority (NCA) the flexibility to counter them and assist foreign governments in the support of national objectives.

PURPOSE

This thesis will determine if a regional focus is required for a light infantry division to effectively operate in a LIC environment. The advantages and disadvantages of a geographic alignment will be explored along with the implications of this alignment. This study looks at why the light infantry division was conceived; and investigate if the rationale for why it was conceived is still valid and whether that should influence the division’s training and employment. The light infantry division’s place in the rubric of LIC will also be examined.
PROBLEM STATEMENT

Is a regional focus required for a Light Infantry Division to operate effectively in a LIC environment?

ASSUMPTIONS

a. NATO will remain the first out-of-homeland strategic priority.22

b. Restricting the scope of the analysis to the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) will not bias conclusions.

c. Defense spending will continue a downward trend.

d. Congressional emphasis on LIC will continue.

e. Economic, political, and social instability will continue in Latin America.

f. Third World military capability will increase.

g. US forward deployed forces will withdraw from Panama NLT December 1999.

h. Illegal drug trafficking to US will continue to cause major problems for some regional governments and frustration to the US.

i. Greater emphasis will be placed on Army non-combat missions to support national security objectives and project US influence.

j. US will not invest systematically in the research and development of technologies responsive to the security requirements of third world friends and allies.
k. Operational and tactical sustainment in a conflict will be over greater distances than normally encountered in war.

DEFINITIONS

The definitions have been placed in annex A to assist the reader for easier reference. Many key definitions are changing rapidly as joint doctrine is updated monthly.

LIMITATIONS

a. Some of the available information is classified and may not be used.

b. The light infantry division is a new organization and doctrine on its employment is still evolving.

DELIMITATIONS

a. The study will focus on the 7th Infantry Division (Light)

b. This study will be limited to SOUTHCOM Area of Operation.

c. The contributions of the reserve and national guard will not be addressed in depth.

d. The role of the Air Force and Navy will not be examined in depth.

e. The term region and theater are used interchangeably.
SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

a. Approximately one-third of Army forces are light forces. Publications and war planning have focused on light forces in mid-to-high intensity scenarios. This thesis will demonstrate the need or lack of need to concentrate the light infantry division on low intensity conflict in the Third World.

b. The results may assist planners in preparing for operations in a LIC environment.

c. Lessons learned may be learned from other countries through exposure rather than experience.

d. Add positively to the body of literature and doctrine of the light infantry division in a low intensity conflict.
ENDNOTES

Chapter I


5Ibid., p. i.


8A figure of 510 sorties is on the CGSC briefing slides. The figure of 548 C-141B sorties to move the 7th ID (L) with basic load was provided during a lecture at CGSC by the present commanding general of the 7th ID (L), MG Carmen J. Cavezza.

9There are 570 soldiers in a LID battalion. There are nine infantry battalions in a LID. 570 multiplied by 9 equals 5,130. With 10,778 total soldiers authorized in a LID, 5,130 is 48 percent of that total.


18The same definition is also listed in FM 100-20 Military Operations in LIC, dated 1 December 1989.

19Ibid, p.35.


21Douglas Waller and Charles Lane, "A Soviet Missile Mystery: Was Moscow meddling in Central America on the eve of the summit-or was it someone else," Newsweek, 11 December 1989, p. 35.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Among the greatest enemies of the next revolution are the academic theorists who write about the last one. . . . Lessons which are too neat and principles which are too vague are generalized from the exploits of some revolutionary hero, whose failures are explained away. Models of revolution are produced. Thus we have a Leninist, a Maoist and a Guevarist model whose contemporary Western adherents indulge in abstruse and often irrelevant arguments.


To determine if a LID should be regionally focused to operate effectively in a LIC environment, investigation must be conducted in four separate areas that are not necessarily distinct. These areas center on low intensity conflict, the light infantry division, DOD unified commands, and the Southern Command area of operation. Available information primarily addresses only two of these areas, low intensity conflict and light infantry operations. Information on unified commands is more limited. Information on SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility is available by country and region, Central and South America. Until recently EUCOM/NATO has been the traditional focus for military writers while SOUTHCOM received little attention from the conventional army as a whole. The foundation of this paper is based on information from these sources. The components must be linked to show
their cause and effect relationship.

The Department of Defense has increased its interest in LIC in recent years as evidenced by creation of the US Special Operations Command and elevating the US Army 1st Special Operations Command to a three-star major command. This attention has been as a partial result of Congressional pressure and the realization that probable scenarios in the future to protect US interests and project US influence will be in Third World areas. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act established the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and required the President to report to Congress on principal LIC threats to US interests and deficiencies in US capabilities. These threats will require more subtle application of military force than the traditional European scenarios used in the past. The Army's preoccupation with mid-and-high intensity conflict is changing based on the shift in the heterogeneous rivalry between the US and Soviet Union. Low intensity conflicts will continue irrespective of direct or indirect Soviet involvement, and debt, drugs, and the fragility of democratic institutions will be continuing exacerbants of regional instability. This is demonstrated by the recent flurry of articles in professional publications, the inclusion of LIC operations into Army manuals, in increased emphasis in TRADOC schools, and the conduct of LIC operations in Panama, Honduras, El Salvador and the Philippines. The following discussion of literature and sources is not an all inclusive review. Chapter endnotes following each chapter will provide more details.
Primary Sources - LIC

The Army and Air Force's capstone manual for LIC is FM 100-20/AFM 2-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Final Draft 7 Mar 89)*. It establishes Army and Air Force doctrine for planning, coordinating, and executing LIC operations and provides operational guidance for military operations in LIC from which implementing doctrine can be developed. FM 100-20 complements the Army capstone manual, FM 100-5, *Operations*. However, some AirLand battle imperatives such as "press the fight" and "move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly" may be counterproductive in a LIC operation. FM 100-20 is the place to start when studying LIC and provides a framework for LIC operations. Other Army FMs address LIC operations. FM 71-100, *Division Operations (Final Draft 15 Mar 89)*, the capstone manual for division operations, applies to all types of divisions and includes an appendix on LIC. It is not however, detailed and the guidance could be more definitive. FM 7-20, *The Infantry Battalion*, includes an appendix on LIC. FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, includes two appendixes that are applicable to LIC. These manuals include how to do IPB in counterinsurgency and urban situations. These are particularly valuable because of the primacy of intelligence in LIC operations. Different approaches to the IPB process are critical and these appendices provide a good start to the intelligence process.

FM 90-8, *Counterguerrilla Operations*, provides excellent operational information and techniques on countering insurgencies, but falls short in linking the political dominance imperative to all aspects of a LIC.
The 193d Infantry Brigade in Panama has created an excellent publication, PAM 381-3, *How Latin American Insurgents Fight*. The pamphlet is designed to provide common information on guerrilla organizations and contributes superb small unit technical and tactical techniques.

The USMC recently reprinted the 1940 *Small Wars Manual*. Some aspects of the book are obviously dated but much of the information is relevant today. There are many good insights on tactics, training, and techniques that units having contingency missions in LIC areas will find useful.

While the US Army's interest in LIC has been cyclical, the British have maintained a consistent and sustained approach to LIC. They are past masters and have the greatest amount of experience. Their operations are used as models in most staff colleges. The best single source on LIC operations is the British Staff College, *Counter Revolutionary Warfare and Out of Area Operations Handbook*. The terminology in this manual is different from US standards, but its comprehensiveness and detail are superb. This manual is classified "restricted" by the British, which is FOOU in US classification.

The British compiled their extensive collective experience in various locations such as Northern Ireland, Malaya, Cyprus and the Falklands. This experience provides valuable lessons that would not have to be learned through American experiences of trial and error. They emphasize the political nature of the operation and indicate that long term commitments are required to be successful in LIC.

The capstone manual to this handbook is the British Army's, *The Army Field*
Manual: Volumes I through Volume V. It places counter revolutionary warfare and out-of-area operations in context of the spectrum of war from the British perspective. It is also classified restricted or FOUO.

Another excellent British source for small unit tactics and techniques is the Royal Marines Commando Training Centre, Counter Revolutionary Operations (Northern Ireland) Precis (FOUO). All the above British manuals have drawn heavily on three books: Defeating Communist Insurgency by Robert Thompson, Low Intensity Operations and Bunch of Five by Frank Kitson. These are not primary source documents by definition but are excellent primers on LIC. Most writers on LIC refer to these books when formulating doctrine. British doctrine on LIC is evolutionary and stresses not trying to apply a "cookie cutter" approach to each situation.

Secondary Sources - LIC

An extensive number of US government studies have been developed on LIC. The Air Force/Army Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC), organized in 1985, publishes studies covering applicable LIC subjects. Some studies are original research and some are a compilation of articles and speeches by many military and civilian personnel. CLIC papers of particular interest: Key LIC Speeches 1984-1989; Operation Considerations for Military Involvement in LIC; Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, American Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals; LIC Overview, Definitions, and Policy Concerns; and A Theater Approach to LIC. An
excellent CLIC paper, *Joint Operational Concept for Tactical Force Protection in LIC*, develops evolving doctrine and provides a detailed checklist in a survey format that might be useful in planning force protection for a unit.

The Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College has produced several strategic level approaches to LIC. Dr. W.J. Olson's *LIC and the Principles and Strategies of War, 1986*, addresses how the principles and strategies of war apply to LIC. This paper lays an excellent foundation for LIC and presents national and regional strategies for dealing with US involvement in counterinsurgency. Dr. Olson discusses an American War Paradigm on the Army's perception of itself and its ability to respond to LIC situations. The American War Paradigm is based on analyzing FM 100-5 *Operations*, and *The American Way of War*, by Russell F. Weigley. He also comments on using local police forces, rules of engagement, and force tailoring for LIC. William Johnson and Eugene Russel in *US Army Strategy for LIC in Central America* develop a strategy for the US Army fighting LIC in Central America scenario. Both authors are experienced in LIC and present Army programs for implementation of their strategy that have a heavy special operations forces (SOF) flavor.

and exhaustive, *Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in LIC Conflict: Preconflict Case Study 1 through 8: Philippines, Columbia, Iran, Greece, Kenya, Malaya and Vietnam* cover the preconflict periods of the above conflicts.

Besides these studies, many excellent books have been written on the subject of LIC. One of the most contemporary sources on the Army and strategy is Carl Build's, *Mask of War*. He talks about each service's concept for the next war and present image of itself. He says that although the Army is focused on Central Europe for the next war, the likelihood of the next war being fought in Latin America or Southeast Asia is more probable. The Army is poorly prepared in almost all aspects for a war in either region. He also says the Army must be ready to intervene effectively in these areas rather than deter war as with the Soviets. He also suggests that if the Army performs poorly in a conflict for which it is unprepared, the Army as an institution may be in mortal danger. This concept will be expanded in great detail in chapter III.

No discussion of LIC is complete without looking at the US Army's role in Vietnam. Much has been made about Harry Summer's analysis of the Vietnam War, *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context*. This book provides arguably the Army's institutional view of its performance in Vietnam. In Korea, according to the author, the US Army fought the external threat and left internal security to the Republic Of Korea. In Vietnam, the US Army assisted the Republic of South Vietnam in combating both the external threat (North Vietnamese Army), and the internal threat (Vietcong). The principles of war are articulated both in respect to
US successes and failures. If one accepts the arguments in this book, then a case for the Army's failure in Vietnam is clear.

Complementing this book is General Bruce Palmer's, *The 25 year War*. General Palmer commanded Field Force II and was later deputy to General William Westmoreland. He believes the Vietnamese allies could have been bolstered by appropriate aid but were instead overwhelmed by the massive American military presence. Flawed civilian and military chains of command added measurably to our eventual loss of this war along unclear objectives and strategies.

Taking a much different approach, Andrew Krepinevich's, *The Army and Vietnam* provides another view that is not so congenial. He shows how the Army failed as an institution to prepare for the war it found in Southeast Asia. But even worse, the Army's failure had little or no impact on the preparation for its next war outside Central Europe.

Books on strategy and revolutionary warfare by Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Mao Tse-Tung and Che Guevara are numerous and will be used to lay out a theoretical framework for LIC to put today's doctrinal framework in perspective. Robert Asprey's *War in the Shadows, The Guerrilla in History* is a comprehensive study to guerrilla war from ancient times to 1975.

Primary Sources - Light Infantry

The US Army Command and General Staff College Field Circular 71-101, *Light Infantry Division Operations* incorporates the major aspects of operational
concepts for the light infantry division. The information on how to fight a LIC is lacking. The manual is presently being revised. The 7th Infantry Division (Light) capabilities book produced by the 7th ID (L) provides more detailed information on the organization, equipment, capabilities and mission essential tasks for the division.

Secondary Sources - Light Infantry

Edward Luttwak's *Strategic Utility of US Light Divisions. A Systematic Evaluation*, is an enlightened view on light infantry. Many ideas are controversial, but provide excellent "food for thought." Major Scott McMichael's *A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry*, explores the employment of light infantry in several wars and compares regular infantry to light infantry. The US Army Combined Arms Center Independent Evaluation Report (IER) for Certification of the Light Infantry Division, reviews the performance of the 7th ID (L) during Celtic Cross IV and identifies issues, and combines front-end analysis, field certification reports, and other assessments conducted for the certification of the LID. Numerous unclassified after action reports from recent 7th Infantry Division (L) deployments on contingency operations such as Golden Pheasant to Honduras and Nimrod Dancer to Panama provide excellent information on recent LIC operations. Most of the information on operation Just Cause is still classified.

Methodology and Study Layout

In order to answer the research question, this study will be based on a synthesis of case studies, conceptual-analytical works, and revolutionary and
counterinsurgency doctrine. This study will bring together relevant material to provide a coherent picture of a LID operating in a LIC environment. There is no lack of material on this subject; the difficulty comes in drawing relevant conclusions from accumulated experience, both the successes and failures. This paper cuts across the structure of modern war. One cannot conveniently breakdown LIC into broad divisions of strategy, operational, and tactical levels of war. LIC will be addressed in terms of the environment, essential characteristics of a response, and an outline of things that must be done in order for the LID to operate successfully in a LIC environment. This is covered over seven chapters.

Chapter one briefly provides background information on the LID, such as why it was organized, its mission and doctrinal roles. Some of its capabilities and limitations are discussed with a bent toward employment in a LIC environment. LIC is then addressed in terms of the spectrum of conflict in order to provide an idea of where US forces fit in. From this broad understanding of the LID’s capabilities, limitations and vulnerabilities of employing the LID in a regional low intensity conflict can be assessed.

Chapter two reviews available literature on LIC and light infantry to provide an overview of previous efforts. Many excellent works have been written on both subjects, and are listed in the bibliography. Chapter two is divided according to the specific topics that are discussed in chapter one and in succeeding chapters.

Chapter three provides a framework for LIC. Chapter 3 establishes a theoretical and doctrinal perspective of LIC. US national policy in terms of LIC is
briefly reviewed. Other nations such as Britain have conducted successful LIC operations. Some countries such as France in Indochina and Algeria have not fared as well. The key elements to success and failure are outlined.

**Chapter four** provide a regional focus based on the unified command, State Department, and host nation. The paper will concentrate on SOUTHCOM. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is examined in terms of how the LID is apportioned for general war and LIC. This involves both the deliberate planning procedures and crisis action procedures. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols act and its impact on unified CINC's and their available forces will be discussed.

**Chapter five** uses the Regional Force Planning Model to determine the specific regional requirements for SOUTHCOM. Requirements for joint and combined operations are analyzed. This analysis will result in an assessment generating the requirements the light infantry division needs to operate and survive in a low intensity conflict to include long-lead time items and short term considerations. This will be contrasted against current activities and requirements.

**Chapter six** analyzes the light infantry division, its battlefield operating systems, political dominance, training, augmentation, shortcomings, etc., in terms of supporting the designated CINC in the regional force planning model. After action reports from recent operations are also reviewed to provide current information.

**Chapter seven** will answer the problem statement, provide conclusions, and recommendations. With the problem statement answered, the purpose of this paper will be accomplished.
CHAPTER III
FRAMEWORK FOR LIC

This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin-war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. . . . It requires in those situations where we must counter it . . . a whole new kind and wholly different kind of military training.

President Kennedy, West Point 1962

The new administration [Kennedy] was oversold on the importance of guerrilla warfare.

General Lyman Leminitzer, USA Chairman JCS, 1960-62

NATIONAL POLICY

In 1961, President John F. Kennedy tried to get the army to take counterinsurgency (LIC) seriously. Despite presidential guidance, the army continued its own agenda and was poorly prepared to fight the "other war" in Vietnam. With the cold war now apparently ending in Central Europe, the army is again preparing for LIC. This time, the army is approaching LIC with sincere vigor. The LID will be a major component in the army's approach to future low intensity conflicts. In order to determine if a regional focus is
required for a LID to operate effectively in a LIC environment, a conceptual framework for LIC must be established. To find where the LID fits into LIC, one must look at the basics of LIC. These basics form the theoretical basis of national policy and how the army's sees its itself in relationship to its mission and LIC. The problems begin defining LIC. Chapter one of this paper provided a definition which is the DOD definition provided by President Ronald Reagan in his 1987 National Security Strategy of the United States. Even getting a consensus on this definition was difficult. Many well meaning professionals in the defense community still do not agree on this definition, nor do they agree that America has a comprehensive policy on LIC.

The genesis for a coordinated strategy for LIC was reflected by Congress in two key pieces of legislation: The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act and the Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987. These bills contained five key provisions:

a. Required the president to create a board for LIC within the National Security Council (NSC).

b. Recommended that the president designate a deputy assistant to the president for National Security Affairs for LIC.

c. Required the president to submit to Congress a report on principal low intensity conflict threats, interests, deficiencies in US capabilities, and corrective actions being taken.
d. Established the position of assistant secretary of defense for special operations and LIC.

e. Established a Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations (CINCSOC).

In a January 1989 letter to Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft USAF (retired), assistant to the president for National Security Affairs, the four top members of the Senate Armed Services Committee expressed their 'disappointment' that only a small fraction of the above potential of the 1986 legislation had been realized. The clear intent of Congress was to urgently improve US capabilities for dealing with the unconventional threats that dominate the Third World. President Reagan addressed LIC as part of the overall national security strategy in his reports to Congress in 1987 and 1988.

In January 1988 President Reagan released the second National Security Strategy of the US. It showed a significant evolution of thought regarding LIC. In the 1987 version, LIC was discussed as a portion of US defense policy, but in the 1988 version it became an integrated element of national power within national security strategy. Additionally, in the 1988 version, strategies for dealing with LIC were refined and more emphasis placed on helping friends and allies to help themselves. In March 1990, President George Bush published his National Security Strategy of the US.

The national security strategy of the US seeks to assure and protect US national interests that encompass much more than the military defense of the

The United States national policy and strategy for LIC have been established in a National Security Decision Directive and expressed in the president’s annual report to Congress in the National Security Strategy of the United States. Policies and strategies seek to assure and protect American national interests that are:

- The survival of the US as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
- A healthy and growing US economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad.
- A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions.
- Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

Low intensity conflicts continually threaten US interests. For example they can:

a. Threaten access to raw materials and resources.


c. Create governments and political systems openly hostile to the US.

d. Provide strategic opportunities for the Soviet Union and its proxies.

The above examples are only a sample of conflicts that can endanger US interests. In order to meet the threats to US interests, "the balanced application
of the various elements of national power is necessary to protect US interests in low intensity conflicts. The elements of national power include political, economic, informational, and military instruments. The use of these elements highlights the qualitative difference in the use of the military instrument for LIC and conventional war.

In war, the military instrument is the primary instrument of national power. Nonmilitary instruments are employed in a supporting role. In situations short of war, the nonmilitary instruments of national power are the primary means by which national security objectives can be realized. The military instrument is employed in a supporting role. Figure 8 illustrates this using the "Greek temple look".

A coordinated and balanced combination of all the instruments of

Figure 8. Nation Instruments of Power.
national power are paramount to understanding LIC. US armed forces operate within an operational continuum of three states in a strategic environment:

a. Peacetime competition is a state wherein political economic, informational, and military measures, short of US combat operations or active support to warring parties, are employed to achieve national objectives. Within this state, forces may: conduct joint training exercises to demonstrate US resolve; conduct peacekeeping operations; participate in nation-building activities; conduct disaster relief and humanitarian assistance; provide security assistance to friends and allies; provide support of interagency counter-drug operations; or, execute shows of force. Competition among foreign powers is inevitable in peace.6

b. Conflict is an armed struggle or clash between organized parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. While regular forces may be involved, irregular forces frequently predominate. Conflict is often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. In this state, military power in response to threats may be exercised in an indirect manner while supportive of other elements of national power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force. Military operations in conflict generally fall into the categories of counterterrorism, the early stages of insurgency, counterinsurgency, and contingency operations. LIC falls within the larger category of conflict.7

c. War is sustained armed conflict between nations or organized groups within a nation involving regular and irregular forces in a series of connected battles and campaigns to achieve vital national objectives. War may be limited, with some self-imposed restraints on resources or objectives. Or, it may be general with the total resources of a nation or nations employed and the national survival of a belligerent at stake.8

The United States must maintain credible and practical military options to protect its national interests across the strategic continuum. Strategic success requires a balanced force structure of strategic (nuclear) forces, general purpose
forces, and special operations forces (SOF). These forces must deal with the full range of global threats--from the certainty of peacetime competition and conflict to the unlikely but potentially devastating threat of strategic nuclear war.9

President Reagan appointed a Bipartisan Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy that included many distinguished members. In 1988 the commission published a report entitled Discriminate Deterrence. The report proposed an integrated national strategy for the long term. Since 1961 the US has relied on a national security strategy of flexible response and deterrence in containing Communism and threats to US interests around the world.

The report emphasized a wider range of contingencies than the two extreme threats that have long dominated American alliance and force planning: a massive Warsaw Pact attack on Central Europe, and an all-out Soviet nuclear attack. By concentrating on these extreme cases, planners tended to neglect attacks that required discriminating military responses. In extreme situations, some allies may decide to sit on the sidelines because of the potential for an "over" response. By not having an effective military response that limits destruction, the US will destroy what it is defending.

With recent events in Eastern Europe and the apparent decline of the Soviet empire, several aspects of the Discriminate Deterrence report become more pertinent. The report recommends that a constituency needs to be developed to build a national consensus on both means and ends to protect US
interests and allies in the third world. These recommendations include higher levels of security assistance with fewer legislative restrictions to maximize effectiveness. More versatile, mobile forces, minimally dependent on overseas bases will be needed to deliver precisely controlled strikes against distant military targets. It continues:

The equipment, training, uses of intelligence and methods of operation which have developed mainly for contingencies involving massive worldwide attack by the Soviet Union do not prepare us very well for conflicts in the third world. Such conflicts are likely to feature terrorism, sabotage, and other "Low Intensity" violence. Assisting allies to respond to such violence will put a premium on the use of some of same information technology were finding increasingly relevant for selective operations in higher intensity conflicts. The need to use force for political purposes and to discriminate between civilians and legitimate targets is even more evident here.10

Six basic propositions for building a US strategy recommended by the Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy related directly to Third World interests and US interests. They include:

a. US forces will not, in general, be combatants.

b. The US should support anti-Communist insurgencies.

c. Security assistance requires new legislation and more resources.

d. The US needs to work with its Third World allies at developing "cooperative forces."

e. In the Third World, no less than in developed countries, US strategy should seek to maximize our technological advantages. High technology is not always the answer (either). Some Air Force transports and Army helicopters
are far too big, expensive, and complex for many allies. Providing canned field rations and a means of manufacturing boot soles may be more important to the mobility of a Third World army than advanced aircraft.

f. The US must develop alternatives to overseas bases.\textsuperscript{11}

Reviewing the above recommendations, and US national security strategy and policies concerning LIC, it becomes clear that the US has a great deal of trouble coming to grips with a coherent, effective, long term strategy. This difficulty in responding to conflicts across the operational continuum is conditioned by American historical experience. US national interests and national security strategy are shaped by the way Americans see the contemporary world security environment. If the US government and the US Army are going to safeguard the nation’s interests in a changing world, and respond effectively in the Third World, the US must come to terms with its own perceptions of the situation. The foundations for these perceptions are described in Russell Weigley’s book \textit{The American Way of War}. How these perceptions affect how Americans, and in particular the US Army, sees conflict will be examined.

DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK

As the US Army prepares for the future, it must understand how it views war and its mission. Accordingly, this future is shaped by the events of the past. This preparation draws part of its inspiration from the habits of US
military life developed over the years, and from a dynamic interaction with American society as a whole. This experience and thought is formalized in doctrine and the resulting training system. Certain characteristics and attitudes fall out as essentials to successfully fighting a war. The resulting characteristics form the "American war paradigm."

**American War Paradigm**

The elements of the paradigm are implied in the Army's keystone document for warfighting Field Manual (FM) 100-5 *Operations*. This manual includes principles of war, tenets of airland battle, airland battle imperatives, dynamics of combat power, and key concepts of operational design. The ideas of the American war paradigm are simple. The essential characteristics are:

a. A belief in the value of firepower.

b. A faith in quantification. [A reliance on correlation of forces, firepower, and conventional forces.]

c. A tendency to prefer the use of firepower over the direct commitment of soldiers.

d. A belief in the need for an eminent cause for US involvement.

e. A belief that war suspends politics.

f. An emphasis on conventional tactics.

g. A belief that political cognizance undermines combat efficiency.

h. A tendency to concentrate on the "big war."
i. A faith in technological solutions.

j. A belief in the value of offensive operations.\textsuperscript{12}

This is not an all inclusive list; moreover, it has several other names such as "The Traditional Conflict Paradigm." The army leadership and rank and file have grown up with these elements of the paradigm.

The problem with this paradigm and the resulting doctrine is that it concentrates on European war conditions, and applies the concepts to all levels of war in all environments. When a situation does not fit this paradigm, circumstances are changed to make it fit. In other words, one ends up fighting a different war than the enemy is fighting, such as was the case in Vietnam. LIC, because of its enigmatic nature, does not always fit the paradigm.

Relying on a paradigm is not unusual in trying to come up with a world view. However, relying on this paradigm and not realizing it is there, presents problems in a rapidly changing world.

The persuasive power of the paradigm and the cohesion of shared values and points of view, may be more influential in shaping a response that the weight of contradictory or new evidence. In the view of Ambassador Robert Komer, such a position forms the background for institutional repertoires, for the playing out of familiar solutions to problems even after the circumstances have changed. The tendency is to prefer and continually reaffirm the existing paradigm. In part, this assures that ephemeral ideas and fads will not simply seep away accumulated wisdom; but it can create difficulties in responding to new or unique situations. This is true for LIC. The essential requirements and characteristics of LIC do not fit comfortably with the war paradigm. In responding to LIC this creates a problem, for the necessary responses fall outside the familiar terms of reference. This can and does lead to inappropriate
responses. It is no easy matter for an individual, much less an institution, to adjust or change a paradigm. Yet, effective response cannot begin until the realization is reached that a change in the world view is necessary.13

One of the best examples of the US attempting to fit the situation to the paradigm that it does not fit is Vietnam. In Colonel Harry G. Summers book On Strategy he tells of his comment to a North Vietnamese colonel, "You know you never defeated us on the battlefield." The North Vietnamese colonel responded, 'That may be so, but it is also irrelevant."14 What this oft quoted conversation demonstrates is that the US did not allow for the existence of a war whose central feature was not combat between armed forces. The failure to adapt elements of the American war paradigm are pointed out in several other sources. Andrew Krepinevich in his book The Army and Vietnam asserts that the military services interpreted the events during the Vietnam War in a way that made them fit the paradigm.15 In other words, the US was not fighting the same war as the enemy. The current paradigm needs expanding to include an appreciation for LIC.

For the US, and in particular, the Army to be successful in LIC, the European-Fulda Gap big-war mentality requires adjusting. Appreciating LIC and adjusting responses will be required to overcome built-in prejudices and institutionalized bias. As the nature and type of war change, the American war paradigm should be adjusted to include the following "Evolving Conflict Paradigm":

46
a. A political focus on the nature of war.

b. Self-restraint toward firepower oriented operations and a propensity to operate within complex constraints.

c. A commitment to a long-term effort with few time tables that transcend political changes.

d. An emphasis on simplicity and reliability.¹⁶

If these adjustments are absorbed, the Army will understand the nature of LIC better and the American war paradigm will not be a constraint. FM 100-20, Military Operations in LIC, incorporates the elements of the evolving conflict paradigm. However, getting consensus from the overall army may take years.

The Army, combined with the American war paradigm and its propensity for large conventional forces operations, is struggling with developing coherent doctrine on LIC. Following Vietnam, the Army and the nation returned to the perceived threat of large Soviet conventional forces in Europe. LIC and SOF doctrines were neglected until about 1981 because of the army's preoccupation with conventional war. SOF disasters like Desert One in Iran, and US involvement in Grenada, combined with on-going insurgencies in Latin to America, re-awakened interest in LIC.

Conceptual Coherency

Three manuals in the US Army set the pace for outlining how the Army will accomplish its stated mission. The first, Field Manual (FM) 100-1 The
Army expresses the Army’s fundamental role in helping to secure US national policy objectives. It is the Army’s capstone document for describing the broad roles and missions which, in concert with sister services and allies, are the essential underpinnings for national security.\textsuperscript{17} The second, FM 100-5 Operations, is the Army’s keystone warfighting manual.

It explains how Army forces plan and conduct campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements in conjunction with other services and allied forces. It furnishes the authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrine, force design, materiel acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training. It applies to Army forces worldwide, but must be adapted to the specific strategic and operational requirements of each theater.\textsuperscript{18}

The third, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict FM 100-20, establishes Army and Air Force doctrine for planning, coordinating and executing operations in LIC. One would think they are conviently dovetailed to provide a clear picture of fighting a war or prosecuting a conflict, they are not.

FM 100-1 is not sophisticated enough in its present state to clearly articulate war and conflict and is not in stride with current White House National Security Strategy. For example, FM 100-1 says, in expounding on the Army’s role, that the ability and will to wage war are essential to deterrence, and that the current Army force structure gives the NCA a full range of options. This is suppose to influence an adversary that America has conventional and nuclear warfighting ability and the resolve to fight wars in defense of vital interests.\textsuperscript{19} However, in referring to LIC President Bush stated, "It is not
possible to prevent or deter conflict at the lower end of the conflict spectrum in the same way or to the same degree at the higher. American forces therefore must be capable of dealing effectively with the full range of threats, including insurgency and terrorism. Conventional and nuclear forces have deterred the Soviets, but their effect on insurgents is dubious. An article in Parameters recently underscored, "The threat of immolation, not US tanks, keep the Soviets in their own neighborhood. Nukes do not scare Soviet surrogates in the bushes at all." FM 100-5 builds on FM 100-1.

FM 100-5 describes the Army's concept for fighting AirLand Battle. AirLand Battle doctrine was designed primarily to fight conventionally and outnumbered heavy armor forces in Europe and arguably in its present form is not well suited to LIC operations. FM 100-5 has achieved a logical consistency by dealing with a single activity, essentially warfighting at the theater level. FM 100-20 wraps a set of fundamentally dissimilar activities under a single title and definition [LIC].

FM 100-5 divides war into three broad divisions of activities: strategy, operational art, and tactics. In LIC the distinctions among the strategic, operational and tactical levels of conflict are nearly meaningless. "To put it more precisely, counterinsurgency [one of four types of military operations in LIC] compresses strategy, operations, and tactics into a single level of conflict. The result is a predictable confusion." Based on the definitions of conflict and war and national strategy, LIC is
the application of military resources to resolve conflicts supporting other
instruments of national power. Combat operations can take place in conflict;
however, they should parallel other levels of national activity. The tenets of
AirLand Battle are supposed to characterize successful military operations at the
appropriate levels in LIC. A tenet, according to the Webster Dictionary, is a
principle, belief, or doctrine generally held to be true. The four tenets of
AirLand Battle are initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. When applied
to LIC these tenets are presumed to have a broader meaning with a different
application.

One author recently provided a less than convincing argument that FM
100-5 could be expanded to include LIC, thus removing the need for FM 100-20.
He continued to say that the tenets of AirLand Battle could be expanded and
adapted to accommodate both conflict and war. FM 100-5 is the Army’s basic
doctrinal manual; however, within the Army community there is not universal
agreement over what FM 100-5 says. The Army sometimes takes years to
institutionally synthesize and accept new doctrine. Adding expanded definitions
for LIC would only further confuse the issue.

FM 100-20 doesn’t provide any additional tenets to add to the four
tenets of airland battle for LIC. However, it does provide additional principles
of counterinsurgency and operational imperatives for LIC. These were
developed from analyzing past US conflicts. A static characteristics paradigm
was developed to show the differences between conflict and war. Figure 9
below lists these characteristics.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONFLICT AND WAR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONFLICT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primacy of Political Objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Versus Non-State Conflict</td>
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<td>Terminated by Damage to Political Structure</td>
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<td>Military Effort Limited by Political Consideration</td>
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<td>Interagency Directed</td>
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<td>Decisive Tactical Engagements by Smaller Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collateral Damage Controlled</td>
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<td>Cost-Resource Limited</td>
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Figure 9. Static Characteristics Paradigm

Looking at the definitions of conflict, LIC, and war, the primacy of the political objective over the military objective is evident. Carl von Clausewitz, whose book *On War* has had a significant effect on American contemporary military thought, particularly on the development of AirLand battle doctrine. Clausewitz defines war as:

War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. Force, to counter force, equips itself with the inventions of art and science. Attached force to force are certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it.  

War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. We, see, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. . . . The political object is the goal, war is
the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.\textsuperscript{27}

War is a clash between major interest, which is resolved by bloodshed—that is the only way in which it differs from other conflicts.\textsuperscript{28}

One may deduce several things from these Clausewitzian pearls of wisdom. First, the political objective is obtained through the conduct of war. Second, war differs from other types of conflicts because it is settled by spilling blood. Finally, that war can be identified and separated from peace. In a conventional war setting, Clausewitzian principles are clear and understandable. When applied to LIC or unconventional situations, they muddy the water.

The political objective is the desired end-state for both war and LIC. However, LIC does not rely on military force as the primary instrument to obtain the desired political objective. Parallel instruments of national power are used to obtain the desired results, thus the primacy of the political objectives over the military objectives.

There are other significant differences between conflict and war. For example, determining what will bring about the defeat of one's adversary is difficult to discern in LIC. Clausewitz talks about a "center of gravity" which, in essence, is military destruction and defeat of the enemy armed forces.\textsuperscript{29} According to FM 100-5, "The center of gravity of an armed force refers to those sources of strength or balance."\textsuperscript{30} However, this definition applies to war in the conventional sense. The problem in LIC is determining what and if the enemy has a center of gravity. The center of gravity can be the political organization
of the enemy and not the armed force. "In LIC, the center of gravity is not based so much on armed might, as it is on the ability of one of the opponents to marshal political, economic, and social support [informational], thus undercutting the adversary's cause in a much more sophisticated battle . . . "31

Military planners will have to consider other means to defeat an opponent besides firesupport and maneuver. The battlefield operating systems (BOS) will support other aspects of military operations. Traditional combat multipliers such as civil affairs and psychological operations may become the elements in which plans are developed around. Psychological operations (PSYOPS) is listed as non-lethal fire support under the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) blueprint of the battlefield. A blueprint of the LIC battlefield might list PSYOPS as maneuver instead of fire support. Traditionally, fire support supported the maneuver plan. Non-traditional thinking will be required to determine the enemy's center of gravity in LIC. Sam Sarkesian, a distinguished professor of political science (Loyola University of Chicago), said it best "This type of conflict [LIC] is not necessarily ruled by Clausewitzian principles, which place the center of gravity within the armed force of the State."32

Differences in Doctrinal Focus

Differences like the concept of center of gravity between a conflict and war lead to differences in doctrinal focus between conflict and war. FM 100-5
states, "the tenets of AirLand Battle equally apply to the military operations characteristics of low intensity war." Attempting to roll up mid-high intensity warfare with LIC with a few adaptations makes comprehension more perplexing.

Military operations in LIC and war require different orientations. Figure 10 portrays some differences.

Looking at figure 10, one notes that the focus of military operations is different for LIC. The dynamics of combat power are more subtle in a LIC environment. Traditional objectives of military power have been to generate combat power at the decisive time and place. However, when the LIC environment has no clearly defined battlefield and nonmilitary aspects dominate military aspects, the military planner must influence rather than dominate his environment. This will create favorable politico-military conditions for accomplishing and safeguarding US interests.

To create the previously mentioned favorable politico-military conditions
FM 100-20 provides five additional operating imperatives to "blend with the tenets of conventional war."

Imperatives are defined by FM 100-5 as key operating requirements. AirLand Battle and LIC imperatives are listed in figure 11.

Trying to harmonize the tenets and imperatives of AirLand Battle with the imperatives of LIC to assist an on-going counterinsurgency operation may cause confusion for both the planner and executor. For example, the AirLand Battle imperative to move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly will most assuredly be counterproductive in a LIC environment. FM 100-5 states, "Engagements must be violent to shock, paralyze, and overwhelm the enemy force quickly." In an environment that requires a discriminate and indirect application of military force, this type imperative is much easier to apply than a LIC imperative such as patience. Patience to date has not been part of the "American way of war." The principles, tenets and imperatives for LIC are based on being applicable to different theories or mind

<table>
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<tr>
<th>IMPERATIVES OF AIRLAND BATTLE AND LIC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIRLAND BATTLE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ensure Unity Of Effort</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anticipated Events on the Battlefield</td>
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<td>Concentrate Combat Power Against</td>
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<td>Enemy Vulnerabilities</td>
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<td>Designate, Sustain, and Shift the</td>
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<td>Main Effort</td>
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<td>Pr ease the Fight</td>
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<td>Move Fast, Strike Hard, and Finish</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rapidly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Use Terrain, Weather, Deception,</td>
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<td>and Operations Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conserve Strength for Decisive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combine Arms and Sister Services</td>
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<td>to Complement and Reinforce</td>
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<tr>
<td>Understand the Effect of Battle</td>
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<tr>
<td>on Soldiers, Units, and Leaders</td>
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Figure 11. Imperatives of ALB and LIC

Sources: FM 100-5, 1986 and FM 100-20, 1989
sets in revolutionary war. All of these mind sets have been based on successful revolutions and will be adapted to revolutions in the future.

European Classical Mindset

The classic European theory on guerrilla and revolutionary warfare is based on some limited writings on the subject by Carl von Clausewitz. As previously mentioned, his impact on contemporary American military thinking is great. Marx, Engels, Lenin, T.E. Lawrence, and Mao Tse-Tung, to name a few, also studied Clausewitz. Clausewitz's ideas on "the people's war" were further developed by these individuals, and the course of modern history was changed. Nevertheless, Clausewitz was the first to attempt to synthesize the characteristics of guerrilla warfare and insurgent war.

However, Clausewitz was not comfortable with trying to define "people's war." The origins of Clausewitz's writings on guerrilla war are believed to have begun with his study of the Peninsula War (1808-1814) when Spanish irregulars and civilians rose up to fight the forces of Napoleon Bonaparte. The term "guerrilla" or "little war" originated at this time. The French defeated Spanish regular forces, forced the abdication of the king, and attempted to dominate the country. The Spanish, not happy with French intruders whom they regarded as atheists, aligned with the British and formed a resistance movement to combat the French. Spain, mountainous, densely wooded country, had poor roads, primitive communication, and little infrastructure.
The Spanish, with no other viable option, organized into small bands of fighters who constantly harassed French forces. Spanish tactics included ambushing wagon trains, small patrols and couriers. Eventually the French were forced off the Iberian Peninsula. As a result of studying the Spanish victory, Clausewitz deduced the advantages of employing guerrilla techniques.

However, Clausewitz's best known writings are on "conventional" war. In the book On War, he admits in reference to guerrilla war, "this sort of warfare is not as yet very common; those who have been able to observe it for any length of time have not reported enough about it." In 1812 this was a controversial issue. He did not live long enough to expand this subject. While his thoughts on this subject are not fully developed, he provided some guidelines that others have followed.

Clausewitz identified the techniques of guerilla warfare as mobility, dispersion, and speed of action with emphasis on attacking the enemy's flanks and rear. He ascertained that during revolutionary war the government-in-being would probably have technical superiority over the insurgent. Usually the insurgent would have the advantages of fighting on familiar terrain, greater flexibility, and the support of the people. Clausewitz also identified the need for an all encompassing, coordinated plan placed within the framework of a regular army. He noted conditions which must be present for an insurgency to be effective:

a. The war must be fought in the interior of the country.
b. It must not be decided by a single stroke.

c. The theater of operations must be fairly large.

d. The national character must be suited to that type of war.

e. The country must be rough and inaccessible, because of mountains, or forests, marshes, or the local methods of cultivation.\(^{35}\)

Clausewitz goes further:

By its very nature \([\text{people's war}]\), such scattered resistance will not lead itself to major actions, closely compressed in time and space. Its effect is like that of the process of evaporation: it depends on how much surface is exposed. The greater the surface and the area of contact between it and the enemy forces, the thinner the later have to be spread, the greater the effect of a general uprising. Like smoldering embers, it consumes the basic foundation of the enemy forces.

They are not supposed to pulverize the core but to nibble at the shell and around the edges.\(^{36}\)

The use of this concept can be seen in T.E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. Lawrence stated that small forces would operate as "an idea, a thing invulnerable, intangible, without front or back, drifting about like gas."\(^{37}\)

While Clausewitz provided good suggestions for conducting an insurgency or guerrilla war, he provided little in the way of countering an insurgency. He recognized that the military force of the revolutionaries could not be readily identified from the general population. If one tried to destroy the insurgents he would then destroy part of the population. This conflicts with Clausewitz’s principle of destroying the enemy’s army to achieve the nation’s goal. The problem for a soldier involved in counterinsurgency is that firepower and force
are usually counterproductive to winning the people. The military's responsibility in counterinsurgency is internal security which, when accomplished, will enable the other aspects of the counterinsurgency program to operate. Clausewitz's call for the destruction of the enemy military forces as the precondition for military success will ultimately doom the operation to failure in a LIC environment.

Asian Classical Mindset

Sun Tzu

Although Clausewitz is the first western military writer to expound on "low intensity conflicts," the venerable Sun Tzu wrote about the nature of this type of war around 450 B.C. Sun Tzu's treatise The Art of War is important because of its effect on many revolutionaries such as Mao Tse-Tung, Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap and Che Guevara. Sun Tzu advocated a strategy of indirect approach to subdue the enemy without fighting. Spies and agents should be used everywhere to gather information, to sow dissension, and to nurture subversion. In this way the enemy could be isolated and demoralized and the enemy armies taken over without every being able to fight a battle.

The strength of Sun Tzu's strategies and theories is that they are general in nature and could be tailored to a country specific. While Clausewitz is probably the most quoted, least read, and least understood of the great philosophers of war, the application of Sun Tzu's principles can be clearly seen in the Chinese and North Vietnamese victories in World War II, First Indochina
and, the Vietnam War. The basic thesis of Sun Tzu's *Art of War* is:

To try to overcome the enemy by wisdom, not by force alone. Sun Tzu believed that a military struggle was not only a competition between military forces, but also a comprehensive conflict embracing politics, economics, military force, and diplomacy.

... Sun Tzu said: "One should appraise a war first of all in terms of five fundamental factors and make comparisons of various conditions of the antagonistic sides in order to assess the outcome. The first of the fundamental factors is politics; the second, weather; the third, terrain; the fourth, the commander; and the fifth, doctrine."

In terms of politics, he meant that the sovereign should use political pressure or other means to bring the people into harmony with him.\(^\text{38}\)

Sun Tzu's guidance will be readily seen as each revolutionary strategy is studied. If Sun Tzu were alive today he might conclude that the pluralistic and democratic governments of the West are the ones most susceptible to the art of warfare as he envisioned it.\(^\text{39}\)

**Mao Tse Tung**

The concept of revolutionary war that has given the American and French governments the greatest trouble is the classic concept of revolutionary war developed by Mao Tse Tung. Mao's principles reflect the writings of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Lenin, and T.E. Lawrence. Mao combined both a political and military strategy into a comprehensive philosophy that guides revolutionaries today. The formulation of Mao's concept of revolutionary warfare is based primarily on a peasant based agrarian society. It is a product of the Chinese Civil War and the Sino-Japanese War during World War II. The Soviet model
for revolution was patterned on an industrial society, proletariat, and a bourgeoisie. Mao's theories were cultivated by trial and error from 1924 to 1949. The North Vietnamese improved on them during the First IndoChina War and Vietnam. The protracted nature of Mao's theory, combined with the emphasis on the political organization, make it the most difficult to counter.

Maoist type insurgencies usually have the best chance for success because of better long-term organization. They have usually been Communist inspired, supported directly or indirectly by the Soviets, and directed at US interests. The Maoist insurgents aim is to replace an existing government and social system with a new one. The leadership is generally an educated, political elite that has spent considerable time organizing for a protracted struggle before the first signs of an armed conflict appear.40

Mao maintains that there are four basic elements necessary for victory in a "people's war." The first is organizing a party following Lenin's pattern of into a highly organized, indoctrinated, and disciplined party of revolutionaries who take charge of the revolution. The second is mass support and a united front. Most support will come from the poorer peasants, but an effort will be made to "win over" or "neutralize" other important classes or groups. The third element must be a professional army, organized by the party. The fourth element is a secure base area system of rural revolutionary bases or strategic bases of operation. The bases should be located in rough terrain with poor communications, and located in isolated border regions between jurisdictions.
The bases must be capable of supporting the party, the army, and the local population.

To provide these elements, a study of Mao's writings leads to an identification of five strategic principles of revolutionary warfare: preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy, establishing strategic bases, mobilizing the masses, seeking outside support, and unifying the effort.\textsuperscript{41}

Mao saw the protracted war being fought in three successive stages that are not time dependent. In his work, \textit{On Protracted War}, Mao called these phases strategic defensive, strategic stalemate (preparation for the counteroffensive), and strategic counteroffensive.\textsuperscript{42} The three phases can be generally described as:

\begin{center}
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\hline
\textbf{Mao's Three Phases} \\
\hline
PHASE I: Latent and Incipient Insurgency. Insurgents actively recruit, establish their organization at the village level, place emphasis on gaining popular support, and demonstrate that they can provide a better alternative to the existing government. \\

PHASE II: Guerrilla Warfare. Emphasis is on establishing insurgent-controlled areas and providing an alternative government structure. While building their own strength, insurgents wage guerrilla war to tie down government security forces.

PHASE III: War of Movement. The insurgents' objective is to overthrow the existing government. Insurgents are strong enough to begin mobile conventional war against security forces.

NOTE: A smooth progression of the above phases is not necessary. Any major setback may cause the insurgents to revert to an earlier phase.
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Figure 12. Mao's Three Phases of Revolutionary War. 
Source: CGSC P 552, Insurgency Counterinsurgency, 1990

Mao's three phases have been expanded to provide a more detailed breakdown of an insurgency's phases. The schema shows various elements that
comprise a "typical" insurgency, moving from initial organization to ultimate victory. Movement along the insurgency continuum is not necessarily in one direction. Revolutionary strategies and tactics (the phase) vary to the degree of success or opposition. Protypical phased insurgency program/protracted war model is shown in figure 13. Thus, an insurgency that fails in phase V, for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Organizational Phase</td>
<td>Organization, Education, Proselytization, Infiltration, of Other Organizations, Party Formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Probation Phase</td>
<td>Infiltration of Government and Other Organizations, Local Cells Created; National Cells Expanded/Armed Group Trained, Political Activity Begun More Openly, Labor Organization, Front Groups/Political Organization, Strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Initiation Phase</td>
<td>Low-Level Violence, Sabotage, Terrorism, Propaganda; Psychological Operations; Political Mobilization of &quot;Masses&quot;; International Support Sought, Base Areas Created/Low Level Guerrilla Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Insurrection Phase</td>
<td>Base Areas Established/Expanded, Guerrilla Attacks Expanded, Proclaim Counter-Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Consolidation Phase</td>
<td>Expand Attacks, Expand Political Activity, Enlarge Forces, Enlarge, Link Base Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Confrontation Phase</td>
<td>Conventional War Begun, Guerrilla War Continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Coup De Maitre Phase</td>
<td>Establish National Government, Eliminate Political Front Allies, Consolidate Military/Political Dominance</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Figure 13.** Protypical Phased Insurgency Protracted War Model.  
example, may have to retreat to phase IV, or lower. The goal is survival and ultimate victory; the means is protracted effort.\footnote{43}

The Maoist model is incorporated in FM 100-20 \textit{Military Operations in LIC} and FM 90-8 \textit{Counterguerrilla Operations}. However, FM 90-8 does not place enough stress on the political aspect of revolutionary war, especially the Maoist model. As stated previously, the primary characteristic of revolutionary war is political control of military operations. Mao said:

\begin{quote}
Every Communist must grasp the truth, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Our Principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party. Yet, having guns, we can create Party organizations, as witness the powerful organizations \ldots{} in northern China. We can also create cadres, create schools, create culture, create mass movements.\footnote{44}
\end{quote}

To defeat a Communist inclined threat requires a thorough understanding of the political-military organization, or infrastructure, which controls and sustains the insurgency. All aspects of the counterinsurgency effort must be directed at "attacking" the political organization using appropriate responses. Figure 14 below portrays a simplified representation of a highly complex system. The response should attempt to identify the significant linkages in the chain and break them.

Mao realized the protracted nature of revolutionary warfare. Since the initial balance of forces will be on the side of the government, the political cadre must prepare for protracted war. The insurgents initial problem is to survive long enough to build up their infrastructure. Mao clearly demonstrated this
against the Japanese in World War II and the Chinese nationalists in the ensuing civil war. One of Mao's disciples, Ho Chi Minh, understood this in defeating the French in the First Indo-China War (1946-1954). After consolidating their victory, the communists again persevered against the US in the Vietnam War (1961-1975). In a speech in 1947 on the second anniversary of Independence Day for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh said:

> Experience of other countries and of our national history shows us that: The American Revolution for national liberation was successful after eight years of struggle; the French Revolution lasted five years, the Russian Revolution six years and the Chinese Revolution fifteen years.\(^{45}\)
Maoist principles of revolutionary warfare have been applied directly in movements throughout Asia and Africa. Only in Latin America have Mao's concepts not been directly applied. There are some insurgencies that have developed their own versions of Maoist theory such as the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) guerrillas in Peru, but overall insurgencies in Latin America have developed a character of their own.

Latin Mindset

Poorly coordinated peasant uprisings and military coups were the revolutionary tradition in Latin America prior to the Cuban Revolutionary War. Many countries had ineffective Communist parties organized along Soviet Marxist-Leninist lines. Fidel Castro and Che Guevara in November 1956 starting waging a guerrilla war in Cuba, and by 1959, they had overthrown the ruling regime. The lessons of the revolution yielded the "FOCO Theory."

FOCO Theory

FOCO Theory is a model of revolution developed for Latin America by Che Guevara and Regis Debray based on their Cuban Revolution. Guevara's first book, Guerrilla Warfare, was a primer on tactics and techniques of guerrilla warfare based primarily at the tactics level. He proposed three fundamental lessons (conclusions) to the conduct of revolutionary movements in America. They are:

a. Popular forces can win a war against the army.
b. It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.

c. In underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.46

These conclusions provide a basis for Guevara's and Debray's concept of revolutionary war that stress the military over the political. Guevara argues that the guerrilla army is the revolution. It is not necessary to develop a parallel political and military structure. Guevara and Debray break their strategy into three stages: stage of establishment, stage of development, and stage of revolutionary offensive. These stages sound similar to Mao's three phases of revolutionary war, but they are not. In the stage of establishment, a small force of guerrillas (30 to 50 men) moves into a suitable area and begins operations. This force will conduct combat operations and act as a "political vanguard from which a real party can arise." This force provides a "focus" for the masses to rally around.

The Spanish name for focus is "foco." Essentially, foco strategy is that a small group of armed men can begin mass rebellion if the environmental conditions are favorable and a lack of government legitimacy exits. This theory suits the Latin temperament because it places a reduced emphasis on organization and promises quick results. Since 1959 more than 200 attempts to launch a guerrilla foco have occurred.47 The Soviets have been highly critical of FOCO, contending that the absence of strict political control was ideologically
unsound, and that revolutionary focus would rapidly be identified and destroyed by military forces, trained, equipped, and supported by the US. However, modifications of foco can be expected with more emphasis on political-ideological factors and long-term organization.

**Urban Strategy**

The second type of Latin strategy is basically an off-shoot of foco strategy that is urban based. The "urban strategy" was developed by Carlos Marighela. Marighela's theory centers on the idea of generating a political crisis by the initiation of violent actions which are designed to force the government to retaliate against the masses. This situation would alienate the masses and cause them to revolt against the army and the government. The modern urban environment is highly vulnerable to the terrorist.

The major thing that distinguishes the urban guerrilla from the terrorist is that the guerrilla has a plan for armed insurrection or political victory. The urban guerrilla usually selects an individual who is linked to the government and tries to avoid hitting "innocent personnel." It is hard to distinguish between the urban guerrilla and the international terrorist. Beirut could be an example of this strategy inducing a state of anarchy especially since it has not progressed beyond stage 3. In 1972 Brian Jenkins (Rand Corporation) developed the model of an urban insurgency (figure 15). "At that time he could not cite an example of an urban insurgency that had progressed past stage 3. . . . The fall of the Shah of Iran, which, at least in its later phases, pretty well followed the
FIVE STAGES URBAN INSURGENCY

Stage 1: Violent Propaganda
Emphasis on Symbolic Targets (Symbool of Economic and Political Repression, the "Robin Hood" image)

Stage 2: Organization
Recruiting and Cellular Organization Established
Government Infiltration Continued
Demonstrations of Potency Via Selective Terror

Stage 3: Control Of Streets
Extended Campaign (Security Forces Become Main Targets)
Focus on Demoralizing Citizenry, Forcing Repression, and Reacting to Countermeasures
Controlling Areas
Providing Alternate Government

Stage 4: Mobilization of Masses
Government Repression Now Successfully Provoked
Martial Law and Civil Liberties Suspended
Mass Arrests
Popular Discordant Manifested In Strikes, Marches, and Rioting Organized by Covert Insurgents

Stage 5: Urban Uprising
Tactics of the Few and Tactics of the Masses Combined
Widespread Rioting
Large-scale Desertion From Security Forces
Government Collapse (Power Vacuum)

Figure 15. Five Stages of An Urban Insurgency
Source: Rand Paper P-4607/1, 1972

Support to Counterinsurgency

While there are four operational categories of LIC, this paper concentrates primarily on counterinsurgency (COIN), the most persistent and pervasive form of LIC that threatens US interests. Insurgencies are all unique. FM 100-20 describes four general patterns that have emerged. Insurgencies can be classified as subversive, critical-cell, traditional, and mass-oriented. The mass-oriented pattern runs along Maoist lines. To counter an insurgency the US advocates an integrated strategy that a host nation works with known as internal defense and development (IDAD).
Internal Defense and Development

IDAD assumes that the host nation is responsible for the development, growth and the execution of programs to defeat insurgency. IDAD attempts to build viable political, economic, military, and social institutions to preempt conditions that invite an insurgency. If an insurgency does develop, IDAD becomes a strategy for counterinsurgency. IDAD has four functions: balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization. Figure 16 illustrates the IDAD model.

Figure 16. Internal Defense and Development Strategy Model
Source: FM 100-20, 1989
Balanced development uses political, economic, and social programs to achieve national goals and address the root cause of the insurgency. Balanced development addresses the long term nature of correcting the problems that caused the insurgency in the first place. Security includes all activities to protect the people and resources and provide a safe environment for national development. Neutralization involves separating the insurgents physically and psychologically from the population. Mobilization entails all activities to organize popular support, manpower, and resources to support the host nation's government. The army will be extensively involved in the security and neutralization functions.51

The IDAD functions are achieved through the application of four IDAD principles of unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, minimum use of violence, and responsive government. Based on the above functions and principles, the US military in support of a counterinsurgency should be part of a coordinated blend of available instruments of national power, designed to achieve clearly defined political objectives. US forces will complement diplomatic, economic, and informational initiatives. Their combat role will be an exception. The normal role of US forces is to augment US security assistance programs. Direct use of US military forces to combat an insurgency should not be ruled out. US military forces provide support to a host nation's counterinsurgency operation in the context of foreign internal defense (FID).
Foreign Internal Defense

US FID operations are a subset of the IDAD strategy work on the same principle that it is the responsibility of the threatened government to take the political, economic, social, and military actions necessary to defeat the insurgency. When asked for by a host nation and deemed in the US security interests, more direct forms of US military support may be provided. The principles in figure 17 apply to FID.

The operations that can be conducted by US forces cover the entire spectrum of the use of force (figure 7, chapter 1). Among possible types are intelligence operations, joint-combined exercises, civil-military operations (civil affairs, psychological operations), humanitarian or civic assistance, logistics support operations, populace and resources control operations, drug interdiction operations, and tactical operations.

The problem for US military forces conducting FID operations is the coalition relationship that must exist. The US cannot force a country to undertake changes it does not want to make. By the mere existence of US forces in a host country legitimacy of the present government may be undermined. It is important for US forces to maintain a low profile so the
difficulties will not be aggravated. When an insurgency is in a mature phase the country is probably already in crisis and the remedy required may be too difficult for the ruling government to take.

US military forces must work through the existing system within the host country. This will often be extremely frustrating and require such un-American virtues as patience and modesty. US military forces must not be distracted from combating the political efforts of the insurgency by an over-reliance on superior technology. In conducting its operations the military will demonstrate to the host nation the importance of being subordinate and responsive to civilian control. The military role complements balanced development for a country threatened by insurgency. Countering insurgencies is only one of several types of military operations in LIC. While counterinsurgency operations are based on the long-term commitment, the category of peacetime contingency operations reflects operations of short duration.

Peacetime Contingency Operations

Peacetime contingency operations are undertaken in crisis avoidance or crisis management situations requiring the use of the military instrument to enforce or support diplomatic initiative. In a crisis the situation is dynamic, with the body of knowledge growing hour by hour from the latest intelligence reports. An adequate and feasible response in a crisis demands flexible procedures keyed to the time available, to communications that are rapid and effective, and to the
amount of previous planning, whenever possible.

Peacetime contingency operations focus on a specific problem that requires rapid and decisive solutions. They are usually designed to have a strong psychological impact on the attitudes and behavior of domestic and foreign audiences. America has long tried to rely on the psychological dimension of power, the use of force without war. Sun Tzu said, "For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." Figure 18 above lists potential peacetime contingency operations.

Edward Luttwak, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, writing about the Roman empire, explains:

In the imperial period at least, military force was clearly recognized for what it is, an essentially limited instrument of power, costly and brittle. Much better to conserve force and use military power indirectly, as the instrument of political warfare. . . Above all, the Romans clearly realized that the dominant dimension of power was not physical but psychological-the product of others’ perceptions of Roman strength rather than the use of this strength. And this realization alone can explain the sophistication of Roman strategy at its best.

"As in the past, recent favorable results [1982] occurred far more
frequently when the objective was to reinforce behavior than when it was to modify behavior. 

Military forces involved in peacetime contingencies missions will be operating under severe restraint and restrictive rules of engagement. US doctrine for counterinsurgency operations and peacetime contingency operations resulted from US experience and study of the potential threat. US success in counterinsurgency has been mixed. The country that has arguably had the greatest success in counterinsurgency operations is Great Britain. Key elements in its success will now be examined and compared to American policy.

**BRITISH APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY**

British success in counterinsurgency operations is well documented. British success in Malaya and Oman are textbook examples used to study counterinsurgency in staff colleges around the world. Many of their methods and techniques used in the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) were attempted by other countries such as the US in Vietnam. The relocation of Chinese squatters in Malaya to separate them from insurgents corresponds with the US strategic hamlet program in Vietnam. But, the British won in places like Malaya and Oman. The US Army defeated the North Vietnamese Army in battle but America lost the war. The French Army defeated the Army of National Liberation (ALN) in Algeria but France lost Algeria. Both America and France failed to realize the political nature of the war and mobilize mass support.
Superior tactics, firepower, mobility, and logistics proved to be fruitless in the protracted war against a determined enemy.

An examination of the British experience in counterinsurgency will show that while tactics and techniques were important, victory lay in three broad principles ingrained in the thinking of British soldiers and colonial civil servants. These broad principles are:

a. English common law dictated that disorders had to be suppressed with minimum force.

b. Successful counterinsurgency depended on close cooperation [unity of effort] between all branches of the civil government and the military.

c. The military had to dispense with conventional tactics and adopt a highly decentralized, small-unit approach to combatting irregulars.

These principles and British strategy resulted not from some brilliant new concept of operation, but from experience in internal-security operations comparable to counterinsurgency, many years earlier during the Boer War, (1899-1902) Anglo-Irish War (1919-1921), and Amritsar Massacre (1919) in India. The British public reaction to these events compelled the government to develop a strategy that minimized military force and featured social, economic, and political reform. However, some Western analysts attributed British victory in Malaya to unique circumstances that would be difficult to duplicate today.

British campaigns against insurgents and irregulars traced back to the
above internal-security operations and the interwar period have been largely ignored by Western analysts. This is the result of two factors: First, the "West has defined insurgency as a Communist phenomenon, a decision which has tended to limit discussion to the postwar period." Second, "British methods in the prewar period were never formalized into a coherent scheme that could be easily studied." 

During the interwar period between World War I and World War II, little attention was given to capturing past experience in writing. Experience and "traditional wisdom" was passed informally within the army and the colonial administrations. Since the chain was relatively unbroken until World War II, the system worked. The British Army had always been small and played second fiddle to the navy. The army’s mission had traditionally been an imperial police force except for a brief period during World War I. During World War II, the survival of Britain was at stake. Britain had to move from a decentralized, unconventional (irregular) imperial police force to a centralized conventional army.

When the counterinsurgencies developed during the postwar period, the British army had some difficulties (as in Palestine) adjusting to situations that required the opposite of what they had trained for in World War II. Fortunately, numerous officers, many high ranking, moved the army back toward its more traditional role. Officers such as Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs and General Sir Gerald Templer had extensive experience in irregular warfare,
in both prewar counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare against the Japanese.

Conventional war is generally firepower intensive and one seeks to apply maximum force at the critical time. Due to the British colonial experience and its extended territories it learned some valuable lessons on the limits of firepower and the use of force. The first was the Boer War. During the Boer War the British used a combination of scorched earth tactics and resettlement of inhabitants to defeat small bands of highly mobile, mounted infantrymen that had been the Boer regular army. While the tactics eventually worked, many of the European inhabitants died as a result of disease during the resettlement (concentration camps). This outraged liberal public opinion in Britain. These methods were acceptable against natives but not acceptable when applied to Europeans.

As a result, the army became more sensitive to use of force. With most of Africa and Asia (except the Northwest Frontier of India) being colonized, Britain’s next conflicts would be within the British Empire. Conflicts with natives within the empire were considered civil unrest rather than war. The army’s restrictions were much different when dealing with civil unrest.

English common law requires every citizen to come to the aid of the civil power when called upon to do so in the event of disturbances. Acting in such a capacity, an individual could use only the minimum force necessary to restore order. Significantly, the law made no distinction between civilian or soldiers, though it would of course be the latter who would be called out to aid the civil power. The King’s Regulations and various specialized handbooks instructed officers concerning this difficult duty. Soldiers were constantly reminded that their task was "not the
annihilation of an enemy, but merely the suppression of a temporary disorder, and therefore the degree of force to be employed must be directed to that which is essential to restore order, and must never exceed it.3

While the army had been more sensitized to using force, the Anglo-Irish War (1919-1921) transpired. Numerous political organizations within Ireland were attempting to gain independence for Ireland. Some of these groups turned to using terror tactics and the Royal Irish Constabulary was augmented with special auxiliaries and eventually regular soldiers. The special auxiliaries, many of whom were demobilized army officers, were equipped like an army but supposed to act like police. They had little training in police methods. When the terrorists started using hit and run ambush techniques, the police and the army used harsh reprisals. The army and police thought they were in a war.

The reprisals eventually turned into excesses of violence and the Irish Republican Army eventually was able to focus world opinion against the British. The excesses had organized both liberal and moderate Irish people against the British. This separated the people from the security forces and discredited the established government. The excessive use of force and some unity of command problems eventually resulted in the Irish establishing a separate republic. The British had failed to recognize the complex military and political threat; the first true insurgency was won by the Irish.

The most formative event that established the British minimum force principle deeply within the British approach to revolutionary war was the
massacre at Amritsar, India, in April 1919. Rioting began in Amristar, Punjab, India around 11 April 1919. After two days of disturbances, Brigadier General Reginald Dyer arrived with soldiers and posted a proclamation forbidding meetings and imposed a curfew. Despite these warnings, one group decided to hold a meeting. General Dyer moved in with soldiers and without warning fired into the crowd. The net result was 1,000 people wounded and 200 dead. This incident enraged people both in England and in India. After an investigation by General Sir Archibald Hunter, a report (Hunter commission) was published that impacted on future internal security operations. Much clearer guidelines were now available to the army in using minimum force in these type of operations.

The guidelines of the Hunter report would continue to affect operations of this type of environment well into the future. A parallel could be drawn between Amritsar and the British and Kent State or My Lai for the Americans. A survey of Britain's experience in irregular warfare suggests that the principle of minimum force has solved far more problems than it has created. Whatever minimum force cost the British in initiative, it gave them back in moral advantage. The American use of excessive firepower in Vietnam and the French use of excessive force in Algeria put the insurgents on the moral high ground. America has a cowboy, frontier tradition that places great faith in solving problems with force. In other words, the principle of minimum force is not enshrined in the "American way of war."

When the airplane and armored car became available as weapons of
war, the British were careful in employing them. Because it was difficult employing these weapons selectively and maintaining the minimum force principle, they were used only in situations where collateral damage would be at an absolute minimum. For example:

No matter how careful pilots tried to be, bombing and strafing [Palestine 1936] could never be selectively used against individual riflemen without injuring innocent bystanders. Significantly, the British were willing to forego the military advantages of the airplane in order to preserve the principle of minimum force, perhaps because they realized that military action was not the most important part of counterrevolutionary warfare. The only piece of equipment capable of meeting the exacting demands of minimum force was the rifle in the hands of an individual soldier or policeman who could exercise good judgement in using it. The British thus never fell into the trap of over reliance on technology to combat insurgency.85

The British learned previously that the airplane was effective against tribesmen in the Northwest Frontier (India), Aden, and the trackless wastes of Mesopotamia (Iraq). In urban areas, bombing and strafing alienated innocent bystanders and proved politically sensitive. The military gains were not worth the political controversy.

Since military action and force was to be minimized in combating insurgencies, the British had to approach their counterinsurgency strategy using other elements of national power. The Malayan emergency is the best example of applying all the elements of national power to terminate the insurgency. Civil-military cooperation was vital to address the grievance of the people that started the insurgency in the first place. This included political, economic and
social reforms. The military would provide security so changes could take place in other areas. Until about 1960, this was accomplished primarily on an ad hoc basis.

In Malaya military and civilian cooperation was vital for success. The police and military would have to cooperate and share information in order to combat the insurgency. Insurgencies were primarily police functions backed up by the army. At the same time an effective "hearts and minds" campaign would have to be waged to address the people's needs. Economic and security requirements would have to be met. After some initial unity of effort problems, military and civil power in the country was vested in General Sir Gerald Templer. He was able to coordinate civil-military operations.

Malaya at the time was a British colony, and achieving this type of command arrangement was possible. This is one of the few times that total power was vested in one man. Reviewing past British experiences in counterinsurgency shows that creative solutions to the problem of civil-military cooperation and joint command were usually found. Palestine was one of the only examples where the British failed to achieve unity of effort. As a result, they eventually lost Palestine.

The cornerstone of counterinsurgency is the civil-military administration rather than the military. Prior to the Malaya campaign, the British knew that defeating an insurgency depends on winning the "hearts and minds" of the people and on the creation of an effective civil military cooperation that can
produce information on the insurgents. While French and American generals would say "turn us loose," British generals would repeat, "Give us a political solution and a good police force."

The principle of minimum force, combined with a mechanism for civil-military cooperation led to identifying the insurgents, locating them, and defeating them in the field. Even with good intelligence, insurgents are hard to catch. They are small, highly mobile, loosely organized groups with a short logistics tail. They conduct hit-and-run operations, ambushes, and usually fade away immediately afterwards. To effectively counter these type tactics requires small unit actions combined with decentralized execution. Conventional and special forces are used to complement each other to maximize effect.

As previously mentioned, the British Army, except for major wars, had been a small, decentralized force that conducted imperial policing of the empire. This provided a good basis for conducting counterinsurgency operations. The army had generally been resource constrained and relied on general purpose troops and not in the creation of large special forces. The British Army relied on the individual rifleman led by a competent lieutenant. The British regimental system, combined with imperial duty, weeded out the unsuitable ones. Junior officers required considerable initiative to survive a tour on the frontier.

After World War II, a lot of the experience gained in conducting small unit operations against guerrillas was temporarily lost. As a result of World War II experience, large scale conventional methods were applied to unconventional
threats in places like Palestine and Malaya. The informal chain of knowledge had been broken. The loss of Palestine by 1948 to insurgents and temporary setbacks in Malaya would bring back a return to more traditional missions of the British Army.

During the first two years of the Malayan emergency, large scale operations (battalion or larger) were conducted with poor results. It is hard for battalions thrashing around in the bush to find elusive guerrillas.

The important transition from large to small scale operations usually coincided with the establishment of an efficient military civil intelligence gathering apparatus and liaison-committee system. Acting on hard intelligence, small patrols can begin to beat the guerrillas at their own game. When the vital transition to small-unit operations was made too late in the day (Ireland, 1919-1921) or was never made at all (Palestine, 1945-8), the British were defeated. When the transition was accomplished as part of a comprehensive strategy linking military with civil action, the result was victory.67

Large scale operations showed that officers who are committed to conventional tactics do not adapt well to the demands of revolutionary warfare.

In going back to the interwar experience of the British, a method of decentralizing operations back to the small unit was again employed in Malaya. General Briggs implemented a plan known as framework deployment. Battalions were given specific areas of operation and companies were further deployed in subareas. This system allowed liaison between police and soldiers in an area over a sustained period of time. It also allowed soldiers to get to know
the people in their assigned area. Soldiers were able to develop rapport with the people and an effective intelligence system with the police. In the first two years of the Malayan emergency, units were frequently moved and did not get to know an area very well.

Framework deployments and close liaison with the police allowed commanders to act on information in a timely manner. Great latitude was allowed to officers at every level. Since information on insurgents is time sensitive, commanders at every level became adept at collecting, processing, disseminating information themselves. A couple of hours could mean finding a guerrilla at a certain location or a vacant hut. Framework deployment allowed commanders considerable tactical flexibility in maximizing the capabilities of his unit. Commanders were given broad principles from which to operate.

Allowing subordinates to operate with great latitude requires trust in one’s subordinates. This extended down to corporals. Commenting on latitude given to junior officers, Ian Wight said, "The battalion commander’s main role was to ensure that his platoon commanders were up to scratch, and to act with great speed when some hot information was received." General Templer toured the country extensively to ensure that everyone was following his basic guidance and did not try and tell people how to do their job. He let them take initiative and adapt to local conditions. Thus, the British had developed their experience and expertise in counterinsurgency over an extended period of time starting with the Boer War.
Based on this experience the British Army warfighting doctrine for LIC is found in their capstone series of manuals Land Operations, volumes one through six. This series covers the entire spectrum of war. Volume three Counter Revolutionary Operations [1985] is presently being rewritten. The British Staff College at Camberely has published a Counter Revolutionary Warfare Handbook 1989. Some major variations between the British approach and the US approach will now be addressed.

The US Army, in its approach to LIC, relies on general principles of war, tenets of airland battle, imperatives of airland battle, imperatives of LIC, and principles of counterinsurgency. The British have 10 main principles for counter revolutionary warfare (CRW). Figure 19 lists the present principles of CRW.

The CRW handbook also list previous principles of CRW going back to 1945. Previous CRW principles are listed below. Some principles have been in more than one manual under different names, to simplify comparison, these are underlined.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRITISH PRINCIPLES OF CRW</th>
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<tr>
<td>Clear Political Aim</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long Term Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Plan</td>
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<td>Coordinating Machinery</td>
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<td>Popular Support and Favorable Political Atmosphere</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Law and Minimum Necessary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secure Base Areas First</td>
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<tr>
<td>Separate Insurgents from their Support</td>
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<td>External Support</td>
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</tbody>
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Figure 19: British Principles of CRW
Source: CRW Handbook, 1989
IMPERIAL POLICING 1949

- Relationship with Civil Government (1977)
- Background to Unrest (1977)
- What are the Dissident Elements?
- Sound Intelligence (1963, 1969, 1977)
- Topographical Knowledge
- Prompt and Vigorously Pursued Actions (1963)

KEEPING THE PEACE 1963

- Provision of Adequate Force
- Concentration of Force (1963)
- Adaptability (1963)
- Training (1977)
- Intercommunication

LAND OPERATIONS 1977

- Police/Military Cooperation (1963)
- The Law
- Minimum Necessary Force
- Political Awareness (1963)
- Intelligence and Security (1949, 1963, 1969)
- Cooperation with Civil AU
- Administration and Logistics (1963)
- Training (1957)
- Research and Development

The evolution of the principles provides interesting insight into the British approach; however, one of the major differences between their approach and the US approach is the prominence accorded to psychological operations (PSYOPS). The chapter on psychological operations comes before maneuver, intelligence, and training. Only the chapters on principles of revolutionary war and CRW precede it. This is done intentionally to stress the importance of PSYOPS in CRW. Two statements in the manual are key:

"Revolutionary Warfare is a battle for minds." 69

"Psychological dimension is at the core of the campaign." 70

A full chapter is devoted to PSYOPS, and detailed information to include worksheets is provided to assist the planner. It is mentioned that trained PSYOPS officers may only be available part-time. Three weaknesses exist in applying the NATO definition of PSYOPS to CRW:

The 'enemy', or insurgents, are members of one's own population. The aim of psychological operations must be to 'weaken the will' of these people to the point that they are so convinced of the justice and effectiveness of the government cause that they leave the revolutionary forces and return their allegiance to that cause.

PSYOPS are seen to be in support of military operations. In CRW the psychological dimension is at the core of the campaign.

In CRW all these categories may be used by the civil authorities, who inevitably retain overall control of all PSYOPS activities. Consolidation and battlefield PSYOPS may be planned, prepared and implemented by the security forces themselves as part of operations, but always under the control of civil authorities. 71
The next major difference between the British approach and US approach to CRW is use of intelligence. In conventional operations maneuver usually drives the overall plan, including intelligence. In CRW, searching for and exploiting intelligence may drive the operational plan. Examining case studies of Malaya, Oman and others, this is certainly true. Background information also plays a more important role in developing contact information to develop the operational plan than in conventional operations.

In some of the previous British CRW campaigns, a colonial administrator was in charge and this allowed him to centralize all intelligence activities with little problem. The manual CRW handbook suggests that British forces will more likely supplement an existing organization if deployed, rather than set up their own. If possible they want to centralize all intelligence under one organization to prevent duplication of effort, enhance OPSEC, and enhance mutual coordination. They suggest setting up a committee system at every level with the host government which facilitates handling of information. The intelligence committee will work closely with an operations committee to determine future operations.

Operations are divided into two categories: defensive and offensive. Defensive operations consist of three categories: protective measures, control of movement, and crowd dispersal. Protective measures include personnel, small convoys, large road movements, picketing routes, guarding installations, and rail movement. Control of movement include: road blocks and check points,
control points, and curfews.

Offensive operations consist of four categories: patrols, ambushes, cordon and search, and urban operations. Patrols are divided into three types, reconnaissance, standing, and framework. Standing and framework patrols have a definite Northern Ireland flavor. These approaches to patrolling are gained after 20 years of experience in Northern Ireland, and have application to urban operations the US may have to conduct in FID operations. The American equivalent of the fire-team is the basis for most patrols.

As part of FID, the US will be working with indigenous forces. Training and working with indigenous forces has been and probably will stay a special forces mission. However, as the US Army force structure gets smaller, the need for regular troop units to work with indigenous forces may become necessary by design or by necessity. The CRW handbook provides some excellent pointers on effectively employing indigenous forces as scouts, home guards, and counter-guerrilla units. Working with these forces and teaching them the proper conduct of war helps the overall effort in combating insurgents.

The dilemma when fighting insurgents is always how much force to use. An entire chapter is dedicated to this issue. The handbook states, "The study of the military role in CRW is essentially the study of the selective application of force to a political situation." Political and military decisions in CRW are based on whether to use force, how much, and in what way should it be applied. The use of force according to the British includes handling prisoners and
prisoners of war. The CRW Handbook goes into detail into what one can do to a prisoner and what one cannot do. Much is devoted to the adverse affects of torturing prisoners and they detail the treatment of prisoners of the French during Algeria. This chapter on use of force complements the next chapter on the soldier and the law.

Since the British have been involved in Northern Ireland for twenty years, they have gained a lot of experience in rules of engagement (ROE), especially in an urban environment against an insurgent. The techniques and heavy emphasis on this area is critical. American forces generally operating in a LIC situation will have significant restrictions imposed on the use of firepower and dealing with locals. However, US manuals have major shortcomings in this area. This is a nebulous area in which generally only police or military police are trained.

Examples of ROE and the consequences of not following ROE are illustrated so as not to leave doubt concerning a soldiers responsibilities. The overall CRW handbook is an excellent reference to review in providing insight into counterinsurgency operations. Since Americans have a common heritage with the British, an understanding of US strengths and shortcomings, combined with applicable British principles will help America win its next LIC campaign, save lives, and not repeat past failures.

America has worldwide responsibilities in which regional implications are substantially dissimilar. The previous discussion has established the unique
nature of two types of low intensity conflict: counterinsurgency and peacetime contingency operations. The next chapter examines the methods employed by the United States to manage its security interests by geographic region and in particular, theaters affected by LIC. Planning for potential contingencies around the world challenges the military to tailor an appropriate response.
Chapter III

1Congress, Senate, Senator Nunn of Georgia, Senator Warner of Virginia, Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts, and Senator Cohen of Maine in a letter to LTG USAF (ret) Brent Scowcroft, January 25, 1989. A reprint of this letter can be found in the March 1989 Armed forces Journal, pp. 66-67. The requirement for a unified combatant command for special operations was not included in this letter but was part of the legislation.


7JCS PUB 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, pp. 1-6--1-7.


9FM 80-1, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, p. 1-10.

11Ibid., pp. 16-22.


13Ibid., pp. 32-33.


19FM 100-1, p. 10.

20Bush, p. 28.


24Ibid, p. 34.

25Barry Crane and others, Between Peace and War: Comprehending Low Intensity Conflict. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 19. This study validate the characteristics of the paradigm by comparing it with several LIC and MIC conflicts such as Vietnam, Libya, and 10 other instances.

Ibid, p. 87.

Ibid, p. 149.

Ibid., p. 597.

FM 100-5, p. 179.

Barry Crane, p. 69.


FM 100-5, p. 10.

Clausewitz, p. 483.

Ibid, p. 480.

Ibid, p. 480.


Low Intensity Conflict and the Principles and Strategies of War. Final Report, p. 17.


Mao Tse Tung, pp. 274-275.


51 FM 100-20, p. 2-15.


53 FM 100-20, p. 2-35.


57 Philip D. Zelikow, p. 48.


59 Ibid., p.33.
6Ibid., p. 40.
61Ibid., p. 33.
64Ibid, pp. 61-62.
65Ibid, pp. 84-85.
66Ibid, p. 301.
67Ibid, p. 312.

70Ibid., p. 4-3.
71Ibid., p. 4-3.
72Ibid., p. 7-1.
CHAPTER IV

REGIONAL FOCUS

All of war is a gamble and its chief rewards go the player who, weighing the odds carefully as he moves from situation to situation, will not hesitate to plunge when he feels by instinct that his hour has arrived. The commander who follows no better rule than caution, playing his cards close to his midriff, will be nickeled-to-death in combat as certainly as penny-ante. This is a game (war) not for fools and suckers but for those who have the courage to dare greatly.


**Combatant Commanders**

In the 1990's and beyond, the strategic security environment is rapidly changing. To meet the requirements of a dynamic new environment, the military must find new ways to meet the challenges. First, the change must be acknowledged and analyzed; and second, forces must be ready to operate effectively in the new environment. Meeting the challenge of LIC requires doctrine and a force structure that can measure up to the task. The LID was designed to be employed in a LIC. The LID gives the NCA one tool out of many in tailoring a response to a LIC in a variety of theaters. LIC in each
theater is unique. Geographic, economic, historic and ethnic diversity greatly influence each theater. The person responsible for military operations in a theater is the combatant commander.

These combatant commanders are accountable and responsible to the NCA for assigned theaters. They have also been given the authority and some capacity to carry out assigned responsibility. This chapter looks at how the combatant commanders with a geographic area responsibility carry out assigned missions in respect to statutory authority and its relationship to the joint strategic planning system (JSPS). The JSPS formally ties the nation’s military capacity and potential to combating threats to US interests around the world. Interagency relationships among US government agencies and combatant commanders will also be examined to show the alliances that must be forged to secure US interests. Combined, joint, and interagency operations are critical to successful LIC operations. The LID working for the combatant commander, must be ready to operate in the complex politico-military environment characteristic of LIC.

In peacetime or war, the combatant commander is the link in the operational chain of command between the NCA and the theater of operation. The commander of a combatant command is designated commander-in-chief (CINC). The term combatant command refers to a unified or specified command. The following are the definitions for unified and specified commands:

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A unified command is a command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Services, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A specified command is a command that has a broad continuing mission and that is established and, so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from but one Service.¹

The term combatant command was defined in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Goldwater-Nichols Act

The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, mandated that all forces under the jurisdiction of the military departments (Army, Navy, Air Force) be assigned to unified and specified combatant commands with the exception of forces assigned to perform the mission of the military departments (recruiting, supply, etc.).² This act profoundly changed the way business is conducted by the services and DoD. The present system of unified and specified commands directly resulted from this legislation. Congress instituted this legislation because of dissatisfaction with the operational effectiveness of CINC as demonstrated by joint operations in the Iran Hostage Rescue, Beirut, and Grenada.

The operational chain of command is clear, running from the President through the secretary of defense to the combatant commander. Goldwater-Nichols fixed responsibility for mission performance and command preparedness
to the secretary of defense and his subordinate CINCs. Congress wanted to make clear who was responsible for operational success as well as being accountable for operational failure. "The framers of the law wanted no excuse available to a commander who failed to have his command ready -- either for the specifically foreseen missions such as an assigned contingency, or for the unplanned situation covered by a commander's overall mission, such as a Pearl Harbor or Beirut."

The CINCs now operate from a much stronger position within DoD. CINCs have the authority under Goldwater-Nichols to:

- give authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions to the command.
- authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.
- prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command.
- organizing [subordinate] commands and forces as he considers necessary.
- employing forces as he considers necessary.
- assigning command functions to subordinate commanders.
- coordinating and approving those aspects of administration and support (including control or resources and equipment, internal organization, and training) and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- selecting subordinate commanders, selecting combatant command staff, suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial.

Figure 20. The CINCs Authority Under The Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the services dominated the military community. Congress realized that the source of many problems was found in service parochialism. Figure 21 below summarizes Goldwater-Nichols' (G-N) effect on the CINCs.
The service's influence resulted from their control of resource support and personnel assignments. The CINCs did not have the clout required to have effective operational command of apportioned service forces. Additionally, the chairman, joint chief of staff (CJCS) was an equal among equals with the other service chiefs. Before the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the CJCS responsibilities were unclear. Now the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) is the senior military advisor to the NCA and is in the communications chain of command between the CINCs and the NCA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CINCs</th>
<th>BEF ore G-N</th>
<th>AFT ER G-N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Could only be inferred</td>
<td>Stated explicitly and very clearly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Implied only</td>
<td>Explicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
<td>Explicit, strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
<td>Spelled out in some specifics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 21. Goldwater-Nichols Act Effect on CINCs
Source: LTG (ret) John H. Cushman, 1988

The new law gave the CJCS responsibility for strategic planning, direction, and oversight of unified commands. The CJCS was now personally responsible for performing net assessments, preparing contingency plans, advising the secretary of defense on critical deficiencies in force capabilities, evaluating unified command preparedness, advising on the military departments, budget proposals, recommending spending priorities and alternative budget proposals, and assessing military requirements for defense acquisition programs. Figure 22 below summarizes Goldwater-Nichols' (G-N) effect for the CJCS. As a result of
the Goldwater-Nichols Act significant changes were made to the JSPS. The JSPS provides the CJSC, CINCs, and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a mechanism to carry out some their statutory responsibilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chairman, JCS</th>
<th>BEFORE G-N</th>
<th>AFTER G-N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Implied only</td>
<td>Explicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Questionable</td>
<td>Clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Moral only, weak</td>
<td>Statutory, strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 22. G-N Effect on JCS
Source: LTG (ret) John H. Cushman, Carrying out G-N, 1988

Joint Strategic Planning System

The JSPS gives the CJSC, CINCs, and service chiefs the opportunity for substantial and timely participation in developing JSPS documents that affect their respective fiefdoms. Selected JSPS documents and other key documents will be examined to determine how they affect the ability of the CINC to carry out assigned missions. In particular this will include the unified command plan (UCP), joint strategic capability plan (JSCP), base case planning, and the joint operations planning system (JOPS).

The CINCs responsibilities are established in public law and expressed in JCS Pub 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). The primary responsibilities follow on the next page.
a. Maintain the security of the command and protect the US, its possessions, and bases against attack or hostile incursion.

b. Maintain the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the command.

c. Carry out assigned missions, tasks, and responsibilities.

d. Assign tasks to, and direct coordination among, the subordinate commands to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the assigned missions.

Figure 23. CINC Responsibilities.

CINCs execute these responsibilities within the strategic environments of their respective theaters. The UCP gives basic guidance to the CINC on general responsibilities and identifies the geographic or functional areas of responsibility (AORs) and directs the use of the UNAAF. The UCP is a classified task assigning JCS document that specifies the authority granted to the CINCs by the Secretary of Defense. The UCP is approved by the President. In broad terms, the UCP assigns the CINCs to be prepared to:

Conduct "normal operations" within the assigned geographic and functional AOR. "Normal operations" is a broad category that includes responsibility for planning and executing operations in contingencies, limited war, and general war; planning and conducting operations other than contingencies; planning and administering the security assistance program; and maintaining the relationship and exercising authority prescribed in JCS Pub 0-2 (UNAAF). . . .4

Planning from a CINCs theater perspective is based on national security policies that are articulated in numerous documents such as the president's national security decision directives (NSDD), the secretary of defense's defense
planning guidance (DPG), the national military strategy document (NMSD) and their own assessment. The CINC's provide input to these documents through the JSPS. The one JSPS document that defines the forces a CINC will be apportioned during a contingency or war is the JSCP. The DPG and NMSD contribute heavily to the strategic guidance articulated in the JSCP. The following provide brief explanations of the NMSD and the DPG:

The NSMD provides the advice of the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINC's, the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense on the national military strategy, the national military objectives it is designed to attain, and the fiscal constrained force structure and support upon which its successful implementation depends. It is designed to assist the
Secretary of Defense in his preparation of the DPG, contingent on NCA approval of the national military strategy.

The DPG furnishes the Secretary of Defense's planning guidance and fiscal constraints to the military departments for developing their program objective memorandums (POM) for the defense planning period. The DPG includes major planning issues and decisions; strategy and policy; strategic elements; the Secretary's program planning objectives; the defense planning estimate; the illustrative planning scenario; and a series of studies.5

The NMSD and DPG advocate a strategy based on deterrence. The essence of US national military strategy is deterrence through the collective efforts of Continental United States (CONUS) based and forward-deployed forces and the capability to augment and sustain those forces.6 To make this strategy effective, it must be resourced. Based on the defense planning guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense, the services program forces, and other resources within the DoD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). The resulting forces are apportioned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) to the CINCs. From a CINC's perspective in terms of forces and strategic airlift and sealift he will get in time of contingency or crisis, the JSCP is the key document.

The JSCP is a biennial document that directs preparation of specific contingency plans to the unified and specified CINCs. The JSCP is the principal vehicle by which the CINCs are tasked to develop global and regional OPLANs.7

The JSCP assigns the CINCs the task of preparing operations plans in complete format (OPLANs) or in concept, or abbreviated, format (CONPLANs).
The OPLAN identifies specific combat forces with movement schedules for deployment that are required to accomplish an assigned mission. The CONPLAN does not have specific forces identified, nor unit movement schedules calculated.

The JSCP base document provides:

a. Strategic direction required to coordinate the efforts of the CINCs in attaining national military objectives.

b. Planning guidance to the CINCs governing the development of plans and security assistance recommendations to support the national military strategy.

c. Planning guidance to the services and defense agencies for supporting the CINCs in the execution of assigned objectives and tasks.

d. Strategic tasks to the CINCs specifying, where appropriate, the plans required for contingencies.

e. A listing of major combat forces expected to be available during the planning period under various conditions of mobilization and apportionment of those forces to the CINCs for planning.

f. Service and force unique information and limitations on the use of specific forces as required to meet planned taskings.

g. An intelligence estimate for planning.

The JSCP identifies major combat forces and strategic transportation for the operations plan. These are called apportioned resources since they
represent the CINCs share of the total US military capabilities that are expected to be available during the planning cycle for a plan. A priority is established based on global conflict, with the majority of the forces apportioned to the European, Pacific, or Southwest Asian scenarios. This concept is called base case planning. Sometimes, based on the scenarios, these apportioned resources conflict. Apportioned forces may include any limited, crucial asset, such as combat forces, support forces, supplies, or strategic and theater transportation units.

The base case concept was implemented by the 1987/1988 JSCP as a new planning concept that had significant advantages over the previous concept. It attempts to base CINC's OPLANs against the most demanding situations and remain flexible enough to accommodate both deterrence and warfighting needs, as well as a variety of specified execution options or "excursions." All these plans collectively make up the national military strategy for global conflict. Planning focus on capabilities rather than purely on requirements. Examining the previous system (theater of origin concept) provides insight into base case planning.

The theater of origin concept (1982-1986) consisted of three global sets of plans based on potential wars in Europe, the Pacific, or Southwest Asia. Major forces and strategic lift were apportioned for each situation and CINCs developed a plan for each case. These plans were developed by each CINC independently. The JCS then attempted to integrate and de-conflict the plans.
Although measurably better than previous systems, the theater of origin concept had built-in deficiencies.

For example:

a. The process was too time consuming. The CINCs were required to produce so many plans that the planning process was stretched out over two years.

b. The plans were inflexible. Once executed, they were extremely difficult to alter or reverse.

c. The plans had little deterrence utility and were essentially an all or nothing proposition.

d. Although reduced, multiple tasking of support forces still existed.

e. No significant reconciliation of sustainment requirements had been achieved.

f. The concept proved to be strategically unsound in that predicating national response on the basis of the location of origin could malposition [sic] forces in relation to the ultimate area of primary concern.10

The theater of origin concept was replaced by the base case concept as the basis for global planning with the 1987/1988 JSCP. Four fundamental objectives serve as the foundation of the base case concept: a single set of global plans oriented on the most demanding circumstance; built-in flexibility; deconfliction of all forces and resources; and refinement of the base case set of plans as a single entity.11

The combatant commanders' plans make up the base case family of global operations plans. Global war with the USSR defines the base case. It is the most challenging situation and OPLANS are deconflicted to allow OPLANs
to be simultaneously, sequentially, or incrementally executed. The construction of the base case allows the NCA options in arraying forces to enhance their deterrent utility. Emphasis can be shifted from Europe to the Pacific or Southwest Asia (excursions). The base case also tries to match sustainment with forces, identify shortfalls, set priorities, and offer a risk assessment. This process ensures that national level resources are compatible with plans.

The base case defines the operational continuum from peacetime competition through conflict and war. Forces and resources are apportioned to combatant commanders by three types of categories: assigned, deterrent augmentation, or warfighting augmentation. These categories complement the operational continuum by defining the resources available to CINCs at each stage of a crisis. Assigned forces belong to a CINC on a permanent basis. Deterrent augmentation forces are apportioned forces that reinforce assigned forces under different options, and belong to a single CINC under all conditions of global crisis. Warfighting augmentation forces reinforce assigned and deterrent augmentation forces based on the base case and excursions. Under the base case, the CINCs know what forces they will have in global crisis initially, and it gives the NCA time to decide which theater will get priority.

The CINCs build a time-phased force deployment and data (TPFDD) for their base case and preconflict options within their plan. Some CINCs build a second TPFDD to support excursions from the base case to their theater. Within the individual TPFDDs, extensive use of force modules provides
flexibility. Preconflict options usually require rapid execution so single force modules are built for extraction from the basic TPFDD. The building block apportionment preserves flexibility in construction of the TPFDD, and disciplines the planning process to ensure synchronization of resources.

Since the implementation of the base case concept, the planning cycle has been reduced from eighteen months to between eight and twelve months. Forces and strategic lift have been harmonized with an on-going effort to integrate sourcing of sustainment. A lot of improvements need to be made, but the system in its present state is performing well. A strategy/resources balance needs to be achieved to eliminate shortfalls with the plans.

The global plans under base casing have been identified; however, regional plans were exempted from the capabilities planning requirement. Regional plans are defined as those that do not extend beyond the theater of origin. As the potential for global conflict with the USSR decreases, the need for regional plans to deal with low intensity conflicts increases. The forces apportioned to CINCs for global conflict, especially with a European emphasis, are trained and equipped for these theaters and mid-high intensity combat. Applying forces equipped and trained for this type of warfare may become counterproductive when responding in a LIC environment. Now that the base case has been defined in regard to how apportioned forces are applied to it, the planning process for best accomplishing assigned tasks will now be examined.
Joint Operations Planning System

The planning process for military operations is a complex endeavor. The JOPS provides an orderly and thorough process based on the amount of time to select the best option to accomplish the mission. The two time dependent procedures are deliberate planning and crisis action planning (CAP). When time is not critical the deliberate planning procedure is used. When time is in short supply, CAP is used. The JSCP initiates the JOPS planning cycle by directing CINCs to prepare OPLANS and CONLANS for their theaters. These plans fall under the category of deliberate planning.

Deliberate planning procedures are used generally in peacetime with the participation of the commanders and staff of the joint deployment community. This allows developing, coordinating, disseminating, reviewing, and approving joint operation plans by supporting commanders and joint staffs. Shortfalls in forces, logistics, and transportation are identified by supported and supporting commanders during the process. Deliberate planning consists of five phases:

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**PHASE I  INITIATION**

CINC receives planning task and guidance from JCS. Major forces and strategic lift assets available for planning are apportioned.

**PHASE II  CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT**

Mission statement is deduced. Subordinate tasks are derived. Alternative courses of action are analyzed. Concept of Operations is developed and documented.

THE PRODUCT: A CONCEPT OF OPERATION

**PHASE III  PLAN DEVELOPMENT**

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Forces are selected and time-phased. Support requirements are computed. Strategic deployment is simulated. Shortfalls are identified and resolved. Operation plan is documented.

THE PRODUCT: A COMPLETED PLAN

PHASE IV PLAN REVIEW
Operation plan is reviewed and approved by JCS. CINC revises plan in accordance with review comments.

THE PRODUCT: AN APPROVED PLAN

PHASE V SUPPORTING PLANS
Supporting plans are completed, documented, and validated.

THE PRODUCT: SUPPORTING PLANS

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**Figure 25. The Deliberate Planning Process**
Source: JCS PUB 5-02.1, JOPS Volume I, Deliberate Planning Procedures, 1988

OPLANS and CONPLANS result from the above deliberate planning process. OPLANS fully develop the CINC's concept of operation. The documentation includes annexes that describe the concept and explain the theater-wide support required in the subordinate commander's employment plan. The OPLAN concentrates on deployment of the resources and contains a TPFDD. The CONPLAN is less detailed in documented presentation of the CINC's plan. Annexes and TPFDD are not required but may be included.

CONPLANS generally do not go beyond phase two of the deliberate planning process. CONPLANS include a summary of all standard elements of an OPLAN except for fully developed situation, assumptions, mission, and concept of operations sections. JOPS is based on a planning cycle that corresponds with the JSCP of about 24 months. Plans usually stay effective until
cancelled or superseded by an approved plan. However, situations arise that are not foreseen within the existing set of plans or are so time sensitive that the NCA must go from a plan or no plan to execution of an operations order within hours or days.

The procedure for developing joint operations plans in emergency or time-sensitive situations is called crisis action procedures (CAP). CAP allows applicable existing plans to be expand or modified to fit the situation. If no existing plan applies, CAP can be used to develop an OPLAN or OPORD. These procedures assist the joint chiefs of staff, CINCs, services, and defense agencies in producing timely recommendations and implementing the decisions of the NCA concerning the deployment and employment of military forces. CAP ensures:

a. Logical and rapid exchange of pertinent information.

b. Timely preparation of feasible courses of action (COA) for consideration by the NCA.

c. Decision making to select the best COA.

c. Timely relay of NCA decisions to the CINCs.

Crisis situations are dynamic requiring military responses tailored to the time available. The following provides a JCS definition of a crisis:

A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the US, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated.
to achieve national objectives.\textsuperscript{14}

Crisis procedures must be flexible because little or no warning will require accelerated decisions and sometimes other crises may arise elsewhere.

Crisis action planning consists of six phases:

\begin{tabular}{l}
\textbf{PHASE I} SITUATION DEVELOPMENT  \\
Event occurs with possible national security implications.  \\
Reported to NCA and JCS. \\
\textbf{PHASE II} CRISIS ASSESSMENT  \\
CINC assessment received.  \\
NCA or JCS decision to develop possible military COAs. \\
\textbf{PHASE III} COA DEVELOPMENT  \\
CJCS publishes warning order.  \\
CINC publishes commander's estimate with recommended COA.  \\
COA presented to NCA. \\
\textbf{PHASE IV} COA SELECTION  \\
CJCS presents refined and prioritized COA's to NCA.  \\
COA selected by NCA.  \\
CJCS publishes COA selection by NCA in alert order. \\
\textbf{PHASE V} EXECUTION PLANNING  \\
CINC receives alert order or planning order.  \\
CINC publishes OPORD.  \\
Decision by NCA to execute. \\
\textbf{PHASE VI} EXECUTION  \\
Decision to execute transmitted by JCS via execute order.  \\
CINC executes OPORD.  \\
Crisis resolved. \\
\end{tabular}

\textbf{Figure 26. The Crisis Action Planning Phases}  \\
Source: JCS PUB 5-02.4, JOPS Volume IV, Crisis Action Procedures, 1988

To resolve a crisis many different organizations within the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) must work against the clock to come up with a viable plan. The JPEC includes: joint chiefs of staff, supported and service components, supporting commanders, services, US CINC Transportation
Command (USTRANSCOM), and other agencies. The supported commander, usually a CINC, has the primary responsibility in responding to the crisis. The supported commander is designated by the CJCS and develops COAs and determines the assets required to resolve the crisis. He coordinates with subordinate components of his command and supporting commanders.

Supporting commanders are also designated by the CJCS. Supporting commanders determine their ability to support each of the proposed military COAs and identify the actual units and associated movement data. JCS Pub 0-2 designates supporting commanders responsibilities. USTRANSCOM, as a supporting commander, is responsible for the transportation aspects of worldwide strategic mobility planning. This includes developing and operating the deployment elements of the crisis action planning and execution system. On many occasions, forces are available for crises but transportation assets are in short supply.

The CAP allows for single crisis planning or multiple crises planning. Multiple crises may occur in more than one theater. The CAP, combined with the deliberate planning process, provides a comprehensive system to plan and conduct joint operations. JOPS provides a crucial part of the JSPS. The JSPS assists the secretary of defense, the joint chiefs of staff and the CINCs in achieving national security objectives. The military element of national power is blended with the other elements of national power to secure American interests. A CINC operating in a designated theater operates as part of the bigger picture.
The CINC is responsible for the military instrument of national power in his theater. He integrates this element with the other elements of national power. During peacetime and conflicts short of war, the state department, through the ambassador, is usually in charge of US efforts in respective countries.

State Department

For DoD agencies operating in a LIC environment, working closely with the State Department is an imperative for ensuring unity of effort for the US. The ambassador heads the diplomatic mission that includes representatives of all US government agencies present in the country. As a general rule, the ambassador has "direction and control" over US in-country government personnel. Though not directly controlled by the ambassador, the CINCs, their subordinate elements, and other international agencies coordinate with the diplomatic mission. The security assistance office (SAO) is an exception. The ambassador as the chief of mission coordinates all in-country activities through the country team.

The country team is the ambassador's major tool in ensuring that all in-country efforts best serve US as well as regional and international objectives. He promotes positive program direction by seeing that all activities are needed, efficiently and economically administered, and effectively interrelated. The country team should promote the process of in-country, interdepartmental coordination among key members of the US diplomatic mission.
The composition of the country team depends on what the ambassador desires or directs, the in-country situation, and level of US effort. The defense attache and the chief of the SAO provide military advice to the country team. The CINC whose area of responsibility the country falls under may participate in the meeting of the country team even though he is not a member of the diplomatic mission. The team coordinates many activities under the CINCs control because of their political and military implications. Figure 27 illustrates a typical country team.

The majority of US programs for developing nations are economic, political, and/or humanitarian in nature. Coordinating team efforts helps
continuity of effort and prevents politically counterproductive initiatives. One of the major programs the DoD and CINC's participate in is security assistance.

Security Assistance

"Supporting friends and allies throughout the world is a cornerstone of US national strategy."\(^{16}\) Providing economic and military assistance help ensure independent political and economic development of countries that are in the interest of the US to support. Security assistance includes both economic and military aid. The DoD provides primarily military assistance. "Military assistance supports some of the most basic and enduring elements of our [US] national strategy: collective security and forward defense."\(^{17}\) The "Nixon Doctrine" which the US has subscribed to since 1969 emphasizes economic and security assistance to less developed nations to promote stability and prosperity instead of direct involvement of US forces.

"Security assistance provides the principal policy instrument for assisting nations engaged in LIC."\(^{18}\) Key appropriated components of this program are foreign military sales financing (FMSF), military assistance program (MAP), the economic support fund (ESF), international military education and training (IMET), and peacekeeping operations (PKO).\(^{19}\) US military assistance programs of the security assistance program include four main components:

a. Foreign military financing program (FMFP): provides direct credits or grants to countries for the purchase of US military goods and services.

b. Military assistance program (MAP): provides grant funding that
assists allies and friends in financing government-to-government procurement of defense articles and services to help strengthen their self-defense capability.

c. International military education and training (IMET): provides grant aid, and low-cost program that brings foreign military personnel to the US for military education and training.\textsuperscript{20}

d. Foreign military sales (FMS): enables eligible governments to purchase defense equipment, services, and training from the US on a cash, credit, or MAP-funded basis.\textsuperscript{21}

Effective use of security assistance plays a vital role in assisting a CINC

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{security_assistance_budget.png}
\caption{Security Assistance Budget.}
\label{fig:security_assistance_budget}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Figure 28. Security Assistance Budget.} \\
\textsuperscript{Source: JCS US Military Posture, FY 1989}
with his responsibilities. Security assistance improves the strategic position of
the US when integrated into regional US military plans. CINC's are uniquely
positioned to influence the quality and quantity of security assistance within their
theater. The CINC has both a country-specific and regional focus that when
applied with resources can achieve desired policy goals. Proper application of
resources may minimize the prospect of involving US combat forces directly.
However, several problems exist that limit the influence of the CINC in using
security assistance to improve the US position within assigned AORs.

The first problem is one of inconsistent and/or under funded security
assistance. It is a low-cost investment in both US defense and foreign policy. Assisting a country to defend itself and promote economic and political change
increases the stability of the affected region. Figure 28 above illustrates the
downward trend in security assistance funding. Many countries that need
security assistance funds do not have constituencies in Congress. During budget
cuts those funds are a favorite target despite it having been proven that military
assistance typically represents only about one-half of one percent of the federal
budget.

Coupled with such cuts, Congress has been earmarking funds for
particular countries, often above the levels requested for or by those countries.
In fiscal year 1987, fifty percent of security assistance resources were earmarked
by Congress. In fiscal year 1989, ninety-three percent of funding was earmarked
for only fourteen countries. Earmarking security assistance funding leaves
CINC's little opportunity to efficiently integrate resources into a cohesive and balanced plan for the region. Figure 29 illustrates FMS and MAP credits earmarked by Congress from 1981 to 1989.

Another problem with security assistance funding, even if it is earmarked, is the lack of consistent long term funding. Congress appropriates funds on a yearly basis as required by the Constitution. This causes difficulties for the ambassadors, CINC's, and other US officials. Conveying American long term commitment from the point of view of a third world country expresses itself in dependable funding. Gradual buildup of third world country
infrastructures, logistics, and training is often hampered by on-again, off-again US funding. This leads to a "spend-it-while-you-got-it" wasteful attitude.

The Commission on Long-Term Strategy recommended that Congress provide multi-year appropriations for developing nations facing low intensity conflict, at a level that could remain constant over several years that would provide for both present and unforseen threats. With consistent funding, US country teams and CINCs could encourage nations receiving security assistance to develop a sound, long-term strategy of their own. With adequate and consistent funding, the process by which CINCs participate in recommending funding for each country in their region would need to be changed.

Currently, each US ambassador establishes his initial military assistance program recommendations for his host country in the annual integrated assessment of security assistance (AIASA) document. The country team then sends the AIASA to the state department and the defense security assistance agency (DSAA) while concurrently sending a copy to the respective CINC. The DSAA is the primary coordinating agency for US security assistance and maintains a close liaison between DoD and the Department of State. By the time the CINC sees the AIASA, it is too late for him to significantly influence the plan. If the CINCs gets in the planning process earlier with the SAO, country team and ambassador, unity of effort would be greatly increased.

CINCs have the OPLANs and intelligence assets at their disposal to aid in security assistance planning and crisis response. Since the AIASA ends up...
being a tool for requesting funding from Congress, the CINC needs input into the process. Beyond security assistance there are a wide variety of military relations tools which provide training and establish military contacts with foreign nations. These tools can make up for a lack of security assistance funds in certain countries. These include combined exercises, deployments for training, humanitarian civic action (HCA), and training host nation police.

The first, and most important, consideration is that they provide training benefits for US military personnel in theaters of potential conflict. Second, these exercises are a cost-effective way to provide economic, humanitarian, and military assistance to allies and friends among the developing nations. It also helps establish interoperability between US and foreign forces. Both forces can learn from each other. Combined exercises are generally JCS directed or JCS coordinated.

Deployments for training which as small exercises are conducted by individual units so they can train in a foreign environment. Engineer and medical units particularly benefit from working in primitive, austere environments. The people of the respective areas also benefit from the construction of roads and medical attention from trained personnel. These conditions are difficult to duplicate in the US. The goodwill created for the US by low visibility, positive actions coordinated through the host nation are invaluable.

Conducting the above type of exercises requires creative solutions
because of US laws. For example:

The anti-deficiency provisions of law mandate that security assistance cannot be funded from money appropriated for US military operations and training. The law has been interpreted to mean that in the course of an exercise, DoD can provide assistance to a foreign nation only if that assistance is incidental to the original purpose of which the exercise was funded. Disputes have arisen about what constitutes assistance about the definition of incidental, and about how much the host nation should be charged for assistance that is a marginal addition to the exercises. The controversy centered on whether a country's participation in combined exercises with US forces should be paid for by DoD exercise funds, or out of the country's security assistance funds, or both.25

Besides the anti-deficiency provisions of law, US security assistance is also hampered by the legal prohibition against training, advice, or financial support to foreign police. In a LIC, police constitute an important aspect of counterinsurgency. Police are the essential infrastructure for responding to terrorist and insurgent threats because they can carry out investigative and protective operations for which military forces are seldom well-trained.26 As a result the law should be changed to allow security assistance for training foreign police.

If the US is to successfully provide military assistance to friends and allies in the third world, support must be tailored for LIC. Conventional US training, equipment, and doctrine in many cases is not relevant to third world situations. Expensive, complicated, and highly lethal systems may be counterproductive in LIC. Developing countries conducting a counterinsurgency campaign need:
a. Intensive help with intelligence.
b. Cheap, reliable, and secure communications.
c. Transportation that is affordable and supportable.
d. Help in organizing and running their logistic system.
e. Help in informing their people.
f. Medical support and training.
g. Help with civic action and civil engineering projects.
h. Help in organizing local enterprises that can manufacture military goods.
i. Aid in finding non-US sources of materiel. (LIC related equipment may be non-standard, obsolete, or in small numbers. The DoD supply system can be unresponsive to small user demands.)
j. Relevant military training.²⁷

Relevant military assistance combined with economic assistance helps America's collective security around the world. Balanced development of third world countries help ensure stable political and economic development. The DoD must work closely with the State Department and other government agencies to maximize the United States' unity of effort. Security assistance tied with the proper military capability apportioned by the JSPS provides CINCs some of the resources to accomplish assigned missions. However, American forces must be trained and equipped to operate effectively in foreign theaters. Forces trained and equipped for mid-to-high intensity conflict may be
counterproductive in a LIC theater.

To determine the specific regional requirements for selected theaters, several approved planning models can be used. Regional planning models assist military planners in deciding joint and combined requirements for specific theaters.

The regional forces planning model will be used in the following chapter to determine what type of forces would be needed to operate in a specific theater.
ENDNOTES

Chapter IV


6JCS PUB 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, p. I-3.

7Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. MOP 7, p. 40.

8Ibid., pp. 40-41.

9Ibid., p. I-1.

10Ibid., p. 5.

11Ibid., p. 6.


14Ibid., p. I-1.


Ibid., p. 63.

Ibid., p. 63.


Carlucci, p. 63.


Carlucci, p. 66.


Ibid., p. 42.

Ibid., p. 42

Ibid., p. 47.

Ibid., p. 49.
CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS MODEL CRITERIA

The unified command plan (UCP) is approved by the NCA and establishes unified/specified commands and defines respective areas of responsibility. CINC's with a geographic area responsibility have the challenge of planning across the operational continuum in assigned theaters. This includes balancing the national military strategy with US military capability, and integrating the elements of national power with regional circumstances. The CINC's planning must incorporate the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war with the operational continuum for his theater. Planning for an area of responsibility starts by analyzing and evaluating the assigned theater to determine the forces that may be required to protect national interests. One of the tools available to a CINC for regional force planning is the Command and General Staff College regional force planning model (RFPM).

The RFPM assists military planners in determining combined and joint requirements for specific regions. "The CGSC methodology for regional forces planning was originally developed at a Chief of Staff of the Army contingency planning seminar at the Army War College in 1980." Where modified to adapt to specific requirements for combined and joint operations in a region, the
RFPM looks at the unique aspects of the theater being examined to assess deficiencies, corrective programs, and risk. The RFPM provides a systematic framework for analyzing a region, but the results should not be considered solutions. Conceptual, analytic, and wargaming tools should be used to refine potential shortcomings.\(^2\)

The RFPM has three basic steps:

---

**STEP I: Regional Analysis in Terms of Mission, Forces, Area, and Command and Control (C^3).**

A. Mission
B. Forces
C. Area
D. Command and Control

**STEP II: Development of Regional Military Requirements in terms of essential functions and elements of capabilities.**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Organization</th>
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<td>B. Deployment</td>
<td>C. Training</td>
<td>D. Sustainment</td>
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<td>E. Mobilization</td>
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Note: Theater functions analyzed in step II are employment, sustainment, deployment, training, and mobilization as they relate to equipment, personnel, doctrine, and organization.

**STEP III: Regional Force Development Planning compares the requirements developed in step II with current capabilities. The analyst then identifies existing deficiencies, corrective programs, and the level of risk associated with current deficiencies.**

A. Regional Requirements
B. Current Capabilities
C. Identified Deficiencies
D. Corrective Programs
E. Risk

---

Figure 30. CGSC Regional Force Planning Model.

To determine if a regional focus is required for a light infantry division to operate effectively in a low intensity conflict environment, the RFPM will be used to examine the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of
responsibility. SOUTHCOM has been described as a "living laboratory for LIC."
The analysis conducted using the RFPM will provide insight and specifics into
the types of forces (training, logistics, intelligence, etc.) needed to operate in
SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. This chapter establishes the regional
requirements, current capabilities, identifies deficiencies, corrective programs, and
deduces risk for SOUTHCOM. Chapter VI will compare the results of the
RFPM analysis to current light infantry division capabilities and training. The
remainder of this chapter, starting on the next page, will follow the regional
force planning model format. This format will not be the standard format that
the paper has followed to this point. On completion of the RFPM, there is a
conclusion and endnotes.
I. REGIONAL ANALYSIS IN TERMS OF:

A. MISSION: US SOUTHCOM promotes US policy and contributes to the defense of the North American continent by:

1. Combatting narcotrafficking and insurgencies.

2. Guaranteeing the secure and open operation of the Panama Canal.

3. Encouraging economic and political modernization.


B. FORCES

1. Forces by Country

a. US Forces - SOUTHCOM

(1) Panama - 10K personnel

1 Light Infantry Brigade
1 Special Forces Battalion
1 Tactical Airsupport Squadron
1 Naval Special Boat Unit
1 Unified Cmd HQ
16 Military Groups

(2) Honduras

1 JTF Bravo - Support TF - 1200 personnel

(3) EL Salvador

Trainees - 55
b. Central America

(1) Belize - Armed Forces 7K Personnel

UK Forces = 1.5K Army; .3K RAF

(2) Guatemala - Armed forces 40.2K personnel

ARMY
40K Personnel
44 Mechanized/Motorized Inf Bn's
10 RECCE Vehicles
70 Pieces Towed Artillery

AIR FORCE
1K Personnel
17 CBT ACFT
10 Armed Helicopters
20 Transport ACFT
15 Transport Helicopters

NAVY
1.9K Personnel
9 Patrol Ships
1 Amphibious Ship

PARA-MILITARY
10.7K National Police
2.1K Treasury Police

(3) El Salvador - Armed forces 57K personnel

ARMY
40K Personnel
40 Mechanized/Motorized Inf Bn's
5 Light Tanks
12 RECCE Vehicles
66 APCs
54 Pieces Towed Artillery

AIR FORCE
2.2K Personnel
32 CBT ACFT
19 Armed Helicopters
21 Transport ACFT

NAVY
1.3K
6 Patrol/Coastal Ships
3 Amphibious Ships

PARA-MILITARY
12.6K Personnel

(4) Nicaragua - Armed forces 80K+ personnel

ARMY
10 Mechanized/Motorized Inf Bn's
12 Counterinsurgency Inf Bn's
180 Reserve and Militia Bn's
150 T-55's
250 Other Armored Vehicles
90 Artillery (122/152)
36 BM-21
400 Anti-tank weapons
625 81 mm mortars
42 120mm mortars
500 SAM's (SA/7/14/16)

AIR FORCE
50 MI-8 HIP (Transport Helicopters)
12 MI-25 HIND D (Attack Helicopters)
16 Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft

NAVY
21 Patrol Boats
8 Mine Sweepers

SOVIET\CUBAN ADVISORS
1500 Cuban Advisors
100 Soviet Advisors

(5) Costa Rica - Armed Forces 8K personnel
4500 Civil Guard
3200 Rural Guard

135
5 Patrol Boats
3 Helicopters
8 Fixed Wing Aircraft

(6) Honduras - Armed Forces 17K personnel

ARMY
20 Infantry Bn's
12 Scorpion Light Tanks
72 Scout Cars
28 Artillery (105/155)
218 Anti-tank weapons
400 60/81mm mortars
60 120mm mortars
80 20mm AD guns

AIR FORCE
39 Transport/recce helicopters
13 A-37B
12 F-5
8 Super Mystere B2

NAVY
11 Patrol Craft

(7) Panama - Armed Forces 15.5K Personnel

ARMY
3.5K Personnel
11 Mechanized/Motorized Inf Bn's
29 RECCE Vehicles

AIR FORCE
.5K Personnel
4 CBT ACFT
No Known Armed Helicopters
8 Transport ACFT
17 Transport Helicopters

NAVY
4K Personnel
6 Patrol Ships
4 Amphibious Ships
1 Support Ship

PARA-MILITARY/NG
11K Personnel

c. South America

(1) Colombia - Armed Forces 130K+ Personnel

ARMY
111.5K Personnel
40 Mechanized/Motorized Inf Bn’s
12 Light Tanks
20 RECCE Vehicles
171 APCs
50 Pieces Towed Artillery
60 AD Guns

AIR FORCE
7K Personnel
54 CBT ACFT
46 Armored Helicopters
58 Transport ACAFT
23 Transport Helicopters

NAVY
12K Personnel
2 Submarines
4 Frigates
15 Patrol/Coastal Ships
5 Support Ships

MARINES
(6K Personnel)
7 BN Marine Inf
No Known Heavy Equipment
(2) Venezuela - Armed Forces 70,500+ Personnel

**ARMY**
- 34,000 Personnel
- 44 Mechanized/Motorized Inf Bn's
- 81 MBTs (AMX-30)
- 35 Light Tanks
- 82 RECCCE Vehicles
- 211 APCs
- 120 Pieces Towed Artillery
- 30 Pieces SP Artillery
- 25 MRLs
- 4 SMAs (Rolland)
- 110 AD Guns
- 6 ATK Helicopters
- 13 Transport Helicopters

**AIR FORCE**
- 6,500 Personnel
- 147 CBT ACFT
- 26 Armed Helicopter
- 24 Transport ACFT
- 25 Transport Helicopters

**NAVY**
- 10,000 Personnel
- 3 Submarines
- 6 Frigates
- 13 Patrol/Coastal Ships
- 5 Support Ships

**NAVAL AIR FORCES**
- 2,000 Personnel
- 4 CBT ACFT
- 6 Armed Helicopters
- 4 Transport ACFT

**Marines**
- 4,000 Personnel
- 5 Marine Inf BN's
- 51 APCs
- 18 Pieces Towed Artillery
(3) Ecuador - Armed Forces 42K Personnel

ARMY
35K Personnel
20 Mechanized/Motorized Inf Bn's
45 Light Tanks
35 RECCE Vehicles
20 APCs
60 Pieces Towed Artillery
10 Pieces SP Artillery
34 Transport Helicopters

AIR FORCE
3K Personnel
82 CBT ACFT
No Known Armed Helicopters
23 Transport ACFT

NAVY
4K Personnel
2 Submarines
1 Destroyer
1 Frigate
18 Patrol/Coastal Ships
2 Amphibious Ships
5 Support Ships

MARINES
(1K Personnel)
No Known Heavy Equipment

(4) Peru - Armed Forces 120K+ Personnel

ARMY (Soviet Equipment)
80K Personnel
15 Mechanized/Motorized Inf Bn's
350 MBTs
110 Light Tanks
60 RECCE Vehicles
300 APCs
226 Pieces Towed Artillery
24 Pieces SP Artillery
SAM SA-7s
11 Transport ACFT
45 Transport Helicopters

AIR FORCE (Primarily Soviet Equipment)
15K Personnel
8 CBT ACFT
12 Armed Helicopters
62 Transport ACFT
54 Transport Helicopters
1 Tanker (B-707)

NAVY
25K Personnel
11 Submarines
2 Cruisers
8 Destroyers
4 Frigates
6 Patrol/Coastal Ships

NAVAL AIR FORCES
8 CBT ACFT
12 Armed Helicopters
11 ASW ACFT
12 ASW Helicopters
9 Transport ACFT

MARINES
(2.5K Personnel)
40 APCs

PARA-MILITARY
70K Personnel

(5) Bolivia - Armed Forces 28K+ Personnel

ARMY
11 Mechanized/Motorized Inf Bn’s
36 Light Tanks
24 RECCO Vehicles
113 APCs
22 Pieces Towed Artillery
6 Transport ACFT (Small)
AIR FORCE
4K Personnel
69 CBT ACFT
10 Armed Helicopters
25 Transport ACFT (Medium)

NAVY
4K Personnel
10 River Craft
1 Support Ship

MARINES
1 Bn

(6) Chile - Armed Forces 101K+ Personnel

ARMY
57K Personnel
25 Mechnaized/Mororized Inf Bn's
171 MBTs
157 Light Tanks
20 RECCE Vehicles
20 AIFV
330 APCs
108 Pieces Towed Artillery
12 Pieces SP Artillery
SAM Blowpipes
10 Transport ACFT
26 Transport Helicopters

AIR FORCE
15K Personnel
112 Ci.T ACFT
No Known Armed Helicopters
24 Transport ACFT
2 Transport Helicopters

NAVY
29K Personnel
4 Submarines
1 Cruiser
8 Destroyers
2 Frigates
11 Patrol/Coastal Ships
3 Amphibious Ships
6 Support Ships

NAVAL AIR FORCES
6 CBT ACFT
No Known Armed Helicopters
11 Transport Helicopters

(7) Paraguay - Armed Forces 16K+ Personnel

(8) Argentina - 95,000+ Personnel

ARMY
55K Personnel
30 Mechanized/Mortorized Inf Bn's
4 Counterinsurgency Bn's
460 MBTs
60 Light Tanks
845 Other Armored Vehicles
278 Towed Artillery (105/155)
24 SP Artillery (155)
UNK SAMs (Blowpipe, Roland, SAM-7)
38 Helicopters

AIR FORCE
15K Personnel
200 CBT ACFT
20 Armored Helicopters
2 Tankers (KC-130H)
43 Transport Aircraft

NAVY
25K Personnel
4 SUBMARINES
1 ACFT Carrier
6 Destroyers
7 Frigates
13 Coastal/Patrol Ships
6 AMWS
9 SPT Ships

142
MARINES
5k Personnel
12 RECCe Vehicles
75 APCs
40 Pieces Towed Artillery
7 SAMs

PARAMILITARY
GENDARMERIE 18K Personnel
40 APCs
10 Helicopters

(9) Uruguay - Armed Forces 24K+ Personnel

ARMY
17K Personnel
30 Mechanized/Motorized Inf Bn’s
67 Light Tanks
65 APCs
42 Towed Artillery Pieces
8 AD Guns

AIR FORCE
3K Personnel
24 CBT ACFT
No Known Armed Helicopters
12 Transport ACFT

NAVY
4.5K Personnel
2 Frigates
8 Patrol/Coastal Ships
1 AMWS
3 Support Ships

(10) Brazil - 324K + Personnel

ARMY
223K Personnel
70 Mechanized/Motorized Inf Bn’s
630 Light Tanks
160 RECCe Vehicles
770 APCs
570 Pieces Towed Artillery (105-155)
6 Pieces SP Artillery
4 SAM Systems
50 Helicopters

AIR FORCE
50.7k Personnel
287 CBT ACFT
8 Armored Helicopters
71 Transport ACFT
54 Transport Helicopters

NAVY
50.3K Personnel
7 Submarines
1 ACFT Carrier
9 Destroyers
7 Frigates
24 Patrol/Coastal Ships
6 AMWS
2 Amphibious Ships
17 Support Ships

MARCINES
(15K Personnel)
6 RECCE Vehicles
16 APCs
16 Pieces Towed Artillery

(11) French Guiana (Overseas Department of France)

(12) Surinam - Armed Forces 3.3K Personnel

(13) Guyana - Armed Forces 5.5K Personnel
2. Force Comparisons (in thousands):

**CENTRAL AMERICA MILITARY FORCES**

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Note: See Para I.B. FORCES for other country forces in SOUTHCOM AOR.
C. AREA

1. SOUTHCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY: The CINC SOUTHCOM divided his AOR into three subtheaters called: Centam (+); Andean Ridge (+); and the Southern Cone (+). Figure 31 below portrays the CENTAM objectives and area of operation.

Figure 31. CENTAM (+) Objectives.
Figure 32 depicts the Andean objectives and area of operation.

**ANDEAN RIDGE OBJECTIVES**

- Narcotic traffickers defeated.
- Stable Governments friendly to US, secured with democracy, strengthened & institutionalized.
- Stable economy with growth promoted.
- Access to raw materials maintained.

Figure 32. Andean Ridge (+) Objectives.
Figure 33. Southern Cone (+) Objectives.
Source: SOUTHCOM Briefing Slides.

Figure 33 illustrates the Southern Cone objectives and area of operation.
**Percent of Urban Population**
**Central America**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Urban Population</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>58</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>Honduras</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 34. Urbanization of Central America.**

Figure 34 depicts the percentage of the population that live in urban areas in Central America.
Figure 35. Urbanization of South America.

Figure 35 depicts the percentage of the population that lives in urban areas in South America.
Figure 36. US Oil Production and Imports for 1988.

Figure 36 illustrates the importance of Latin America as a source of crude oil for the United States. US production of oil dropped in 1989 and 1990, thus making America more dependent on foreign imports.
Another major factor to consider in Latin America is the "debt crisis."

Lack of economic development, mismanagement, and social problems have contributed to the enormous debt. The United States and other developed countries have lent billions of dollars to countries in Latin America. Figure 37 shows what portion of a country's GNP must go to servicing debt owed to foreign banks. The US ratio provides a comparison for the other countries. In 1985, 10 Latin American countries listed in figure 37 accounted for eighty percent of the Third World debt.
CENTRAL AMERICA

2. Belize

a. Geography

(1) Location: Located on the east coast of Central America, with Mexico on the northwest, Guatemala to the southwest and the Gulf of Honduras to the east.

(2) Area: 8,865 sq. miles. Arable land: 2%. 2% cropland; 2% permanent pasture; 44% forests and woodland; 52% other. Coastline: 240 miles. Land Borders: 320 miles.

(3) Capital: Belmopan

(4) Time: 1 hour later than EST.

b. Hydrography

(1) Climate: The Belizean climate is subtropical. Temperatures generally range from 70°F to 90°F, while a rainy season occurs from June through November.

(2) Health Precautions: Precautions should be taken against hepatitis, malaria and typhoid. Tap water is not potable.

c. Transportation


(2) Railroads: None.

(3) Ports: Total 8. Major: 2 (Belize City, Belize City Southwest).

(4) Airfields: Total airfields: 40; usable: 35; permanent surface: 4; runways over 8,000 ft: 0 (1988).

d. Telecommunications

(1) Radio: Stations: 11. Receivers: 90,000; per
1,000 pop.: 523. (1987)

(2) Television: Stations: 11. Receivers: 90,000; per 1,000 pop.: 523. (1987)


(4) Telephones: Sets in use: 8,650; per 1,000 pop.: 45 (1985). Subscriber lines in service: 5,920; business: 2,327, residence: 3,593. (1982)

e. Politics

(1) Executive: The head of state is the British monarch, who is represented by a Governor General appointed by the Crown. The Governor General must be a Belizean citizen, and makes decisions on the basis of recommendations by a Cabinet. A Prime Minister heads the Cabinet.

(2) Legislature: The bicameral National Assembly consists of a Senate, with 8 members appointed by the Governor General, and the House of Representatives, whose 28 members are elected for a term of 5 years. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives are subject to dissolution.

(3) Judiciary: There is an independent judiciary, whose members are appointed by the Crown.

(4) Local Government: For administrative purposes, Belize is divided into 6 districts. Each district has a council, which oversees local development.

(5) Political Parties: From the time Belize assumed autonomy over its internal affairs in 1964 until the most recent election in 1984, the People’s United Party was the dominant political force. However, the United Democratic Party gained a substantial majority in the 1984 elections.

(a) The United Democratic Party is a conservative grouping formed by the merger in 1974 of three opposition parties. A center-right party, led by Prime Minister Manuel Esquivel, the UDP receives strong support from the country's Creole ethnic group.

(b) The People’s United Party, founded in 1950, had been the ruling party for over 30 years when it was defeated in the
1984 elections. A labor-oriented, center-left party.

(c) The Belize Popular Party is a right-of-center breakaway group from the PUP that was formed in 1985.

(6) Political dissent. Right wing: Anti-Communist Society and Belize Action Movement.

f. Sociology

(1) Religion: Roman Catholic 60%; Protestant 40%.

(2) Language: English is the official language, but Spanish is widely spoken. Other languages are Maya and Gariguna (Carib).

(3) Education: Illiteracy: 7%.

(4) Ethnic Composition: Creole 39.70%; Mestizo 33.10%; Maya 9.5%; Farifuna 7.6% East Indian 2.1%; other 7%.

3. Guatemala

a. Geography

(1) Location: Located in Central America, bounded by Mexico to the north and west; Belize, the Caribbean Sea and Honduras to the east; El Salvador to the south; and the Pacific Ocean to the southwest.

(2) Area: 42,040 sq. miles. Arable land: 17%. 16.65% cropland; 12.3% permanent pasture; 39.75% forests and woodland; 31.3% other. Coastline: 250 miles. Land Borders: 1,010 miles.

(3) Capital: Guatemala City.

(4) Time: 1 hour earlier than EST.

b. Hydrography

(1) Climate: The climate is moderate in the mountain regions and tropical in the lowlands. During the rainy season, from June to October, rainfall averages 52 inches. The average temperatures in
January range from a low of 53°F to a high of 73°F.

(2) Health Precautions: Precautions should be taken against hepatitis, tetanus, typhus, paratyphoid, and typhoid fever. Tap water is not potable.

c. Transportation


d. Telecommunications


e. Politics

(1) Executive: Executive power is vested in the President, who is assisted by a Vice President and an appointed Council of Ministers (Cabinet). The President is responsible for national security and defense, and is elected to a 5-year non-renewable term.

(2) Legislature: The National Congress holds legislative power. 100 members: 75 directly-elected and 25 chosen on the basis
of proportional representation. Members may serve a maximum of two non-consecutive 5-year terms.

(3) Judiciary: The 7-member Supreme Court supervises a system of 10 Civil Courts of Appeal and two Labor Courts of first instance. Supreme Court Justices are appointed by the National Congress for 4-year terms.

(4) Local Government: The country is divided into 22 administrative departments (each headed by an appointed governor), which are further subdivided into 331 municipalities. The National Congress has proposed the establishment of 8 regions.

(5) Political Parties: Guatemalan political parties are often seen as vehicles for the politicians who lead them, as opposed to groupings representing ideological positions.

(a) Christian Democratic Party of Guatemala is a moderate, reformist party, founded in 1968; it is the party of President Vinicio Cerezo.

(b) Union of the National Center is a moderate, center right party. The party opposes Guatemalan participation in any US military plans in Central America.

(c) National Liberation Movement is an extreme right-wing group that is anti-Communist and supports the Roman Catholic Church.

(d) Revolutionary Party is a center party that is allied with the Democratic Party of National Cooperation. The coalition favors agrarian reform and increased development.

(e) Democratic Institutional Party is a right-wing party that represents the business sector and other conservative groups.

(f) Democratic Socialist Party is a socialist, center-left party.

(g) National Renewal Party is a right-of-center party that broke away from the MLN in 1979.

(h) National Authentic Central is a right-wing group that emerged from the CAO in 1980. During the 1984 elections, it
formed a coalition with the MLN.

(6) Political dissent.

(a) Left Wing: Christians for Respect for Life; Commando of the Popular Forces of the People; Committee of Peasant Unity, Democratic Front against Repression; Democratic Socialist Party; Federation of Guatemalan Workers; Guatemalan Committee of Patriotic Unity; Guatemalan Labor Party; Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity; Guerrilla Army of the Poor; People's Revolutionary Movement-Ixim, Rebel Armed Forces; Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms; 31st January Front; and the Yuxa Shona Front.

(b) Extreme Right Wing: Armed Action Forces; Death Squad; Secret Anti-Communist Army; The White Hand; Armed People's Organized Youth, and the Band of the Hawks.

f. Sociology

(1) Religion: The majority of the population is Roman Catholic, the minority Protestant. Some people practice indigenous beliefs.

(2) Language: Spanish is the official language, but a large percentage of the population speaks at least one of the more than 20 dialects derived from ancient Mayan languages.

(3) Education: Illiteracy: 50%.

(4) Ethnic Composition: Mestizo, 90%; Indian 7%; Black 2%; Caucasian 1%.

4. El Salvador

a. Geography

(1) Location: Located on the Pacific coast of Central America, El Salvador is bordered on the west by Guatemala and on the north and east by Honduras.

(2) Area: 8,260 sq. miles. Arable land: 35%. 34.99% cropland; 29.44% pasture; 5.89% forest; 29.68% other. Coastline: 339 miles. Land Borders: 191 miles.
(3) Capital: San Salvador.

(4) Time: 1 hour earlier than EST.

b. Hydrography

(1) Climate: Tropical on the coastal plain, but cooler in the mountainous regions inland. The average temperature for San Salvador is 73°F while the average along the coast is in the 80's. Light rains occur in the dry season from November to April while the rest of the year has heavy rains, especially on the coastal plain.

(2) Health Precautions: Good medical services are available in the capital. The most serious diseases include typhoid fever and amoebic and bacillary dysentery, which can be averted by careful handling of food. Influenza, malaria, and hepatitis are problems as well. Tap water must be boiled, and potable bottled water is available.

c. Transportation

(1) Roads: Total miles: 7,548; paved miles: 1,056. (1986)

(2) Railroads: Total track miles: 374 (1986)


(4) Airfields: Total airfields: 166; usable: 138; permanent-surface: 6; runways over 8,000 ft: 1 (1986). La Mesa (5); Palmerola (5); Tocontin (2); Goloson (5); and El Salvador (5). Numbers are for maximum on ground restriction for C-130.

d. Telecommunications

(1) Radio: Stations: 5 (1986). Sets in use: 2,100,000; per 1,000 pop.: 439 (1986)

(2) Television: Stations: 5 (1986). Sets in use 455,000; per 1,000 pop.; 95. (1984)

(3) Newspapers: Major dailies: 6. Combined 159
circulation: 321,580; per 1,000 pop.: 62.99. (1986)


e. Politics

(1) Executive: Executive power is held by the President, who is assisted by a Vice president and a Council of Ministers. The President and Vice President are elected by direct popular vote for 5-year terms.

(2) Legislature: The National Assembly, a unicameral body, holds legislative power. Composed of 60 members directly-elected for three years, it is also responsible for choosing the President if no candidate gains a clear majority in presidential elections.

(3) Judiciary: The Supreme Court of Justice, composed of 14 magistrates elected by the National Assembly, is divided into 4 chambers: Civil Law, Penal Law, Constitutional Law and Litigation.

(4) Local Government: The nation is divided into 14 departments, each headed by governors who are appointed by the President.

(5) Political Parties: El Salvador has several legal political parties, but opposition is centered in leftist guerrilla forces, although a number of right-wing "death squads" are also active.

(a) The ruling National Republican Alliance is an extreme right-wing party founded in 1981 by an Army major. The party favors private enterprise, the strengthening of national security and a vigorous campaign against leftist insurgents, although the party has pledged to continue negotiations with the rebels.

(b) The Christian Democratic Party is a moderately left-of-center party, with the announced purpose of establishing a democratic society. The PDC favors land redistribution, nationalization of banks and Government control over major exports.

(c) The National Conciliation Party ruled from 1961 to 1979 and is a strongly anti-Communist party that is supported by the military, the Church and a large portion of the peasantry. It advocates
substantial economic and social reforms.

(d) The Democratic Convergence is a left-wing opposition alliance formed in 1987. It was formed to legitimize formerly clandestine groups.

(e) The Revolutionary Democratic Front was set up as the political arm of the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN).

(6) Political dissent.

(a) Left Wing: Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN); Revolutionary Democratic Front; Armed Forces of National Resistance; Farabundo Martí Popular Liberation Forces; People's Revolutionary Armed Forces; People's Revolutionary Army; Popular Liberation Army; Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers; February 28 Popular Leagues; Popular Revolutionary Bloc.

(b) Right Wing: Anti-Communist Political Front; Eastern Anti-Guerrilla Bloc; New Death Squad; Organization for Liberation from Communism; Salvadorean Anti-Communist Army; White Warrior's Union.

f. Sociology

(1) Religion: About 80% of the population is Roman Catholic. Other Christian religions are practiced.

(2) Language: Spanish is the dominant language though some Indians speak Nahuatl.

(3) Education: Illiteracy: 35%.

(4) Ethnic Composition: Mestizos are 89% of the population; Indians 10%; Caucasians 1%.

5. Nicaragua

a. Geography

(1) Location: Lies in the Central American isthmus bounded on the west by the Pacific Ocean, on the east by the
Caribbean Sea, to the north by Honduras, and to the south by Costa Rica.

(2) Area: 46,430 sq. miles. Arable land: 11%. 50% forest; 7% prairie and pasture; 7% cultivable; 36% urban, waste or other.

(3) Capital: Managua.

(4) Time: 1 hour earlier than EST.

b. Hydrography

(1) Climate: Tropical, with a rainy season from May to October. The average annual temperature is 78°F.

(2) Health Precautions: Malaria is present, especially in the beach areas. Intestinal diseases are common. Vaccinations for typhoid, polio, tetanus, diphtheria, and yellow fever are all advised, and since infectious hepatitis is endemic, gamma globulin is also recommended. The standard of health care has reportedly substantially improved in the last 5 years.

c. Transportation

(1) Roads: Total miles: 14,656; paved miles: 1,028. (1986)


(4) Airfields: Total airfields: 296; usable: 261; permanent surface: 8; runways over 8,000 ft: 2 (1986).

d. Telecommunications


(3) Newspapers: Major dailies: 3. Combined circulation: 147,000; per 1,000 pop.: 50. (1982)
(4) Telephones: Sets in use: 51,000; per 1,000 pop.: 16.66.

e. Politics

(1) Executive: Executive power is vested in the President, who is assisted by a Vice President and an appointed Cabinet. He has broad discretionary powers and is elected for 6-year term. President Ortega has suspended most of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

(2) Legislature: Since elections in November 1984, a 96-member National Constituent Assembly has held legislative power.

(3) Judiciary: The revolutionary junta appointed 6 judges to the Supreme Court, which deals with both civil and criminal cases, acts as a Court of Cassation, appoints judges to courts of first instance, and oversees the legal administration of the country.

(4) Local Government: For administrative purposes the country is divided into 16 departments and Managua (a National District), each headed by an official appointed by the President.

(5) Political Parties: The dominant political organization is the Government party, FSLN.

   (a) Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), founded in 1961 to wage a guerrilla war against the Somoza regime, has publicly disavowed its original extreme-left Marxist orientation, and since 1977 has gathered support from a broad spectrum of political groupings.

   (b) National Liberal Party, held a monopoly of power during the Somoza era.

   (c) Democratic Conservative Party, founded in 1979, is a rightist party that has often served as a channel for messages from contra representatives to the Government.

(6) Political dissent.

   (a) Left Wing: Communist Party of Nicaragua; Workers' Front.
(b) Right Wing: Anti-Communist Armed Forces; Democratic Armed Forces; Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, National Liberation Army; Nicaraguan Armed Revolutionary Forces, Nicaraguan Democratic Force, Nicaraguan Democratic Union.

f. Sociology

(1) Religion: Roman Catholic 95%; other 5%.

(2) Language: Spanish is the official language. There are English and Indian speaking minorities on the east coast.

(3) Education: Illiteracy: 34%.

(4) Ethnic Composition: Mestizo 69%; Caucasian 17%; Black 9%; Indian 5%.

6. Costa Rica

a. Geography

(1) Location: Located in Central America, Costa Rica is bordered by Panama on the south and Nicaragua to the north, and lies between the Caribbean Sea to the east and the Pacific Ocean to the west.

(2) Area: 19,730 sq. miles. Arable land: 13%. 12.55% cropland; 42.78% permanent pasture; 31.56% forests and woodlands; 13.11% other. Coastline: 802 miles. Land borders: 397 miles.

b. Hydrography

(1) Climate: The lowlands are warm and damp. The Central Plateau, where the majority of the population lives, is cooler, with an average temperature of 72°F.

(2) Health Precautions: Precautions should be taken against typhoid and malaria when traveling outside of the capital. In some places the tap water is not potable.

c. Transportation

(1) Roads: Total miles: 9,570; paved miles: 4,368. (1988)
(2) Railroads: Total track miles: 497.


d. Telecommunications


(3) Newspapers: Major dailies: 5. Combined circulation: 307,900; per 1,000 pop.: 113. (1987)


e. Politics

(1) Executive: Executive power is vested in the President, who is assisted by two Vice Presidents and an appointed Cabinet. The President is elected to a 4-year term and may not be reelected.

(2) Legislature: The Legislative Assembly has 57 members who are elected to 4-year terms by direct popular vote at the same time as the President. Members of the Assembly may not serve two terms in succession.

(3) Judiciary: Judicial powers are vested in the Supreme Court and criminal courts, civil courts, appellate courts and special courts.

(4) Local Government: For administrative purposes, Costa Rica is divided into 7 provinces, each headed by a Governor appointed by the President. The provinces are further divided into cantons (a total of 81), which are subdivided into districts.
(5) Political Parties: Costa Rica has a modified form of a two-party system.

(a) National Liberation Party has been the leading political organization since its founding in 1948. It is a moderate-left social democratic party that works toward the elimination of a "rift between the classes."

(b) Social Christian Party is a loose confederation of conservative parties advocating strong legal action against strikers the implementation of an economic austerity program and the severing of diplomatic relations with Nicaragua.

(c) People United is a coalition of leftist groups that has a significant influence in the trade union movement through the United Confederation of Workers.

(6) Political dissent: left wing; Carlos Argüero Echeverría Commando, and Simón Bolívar International Brigade.

f. Sociology

(1) Religion: Roman Catholic 95%; other 5%.

(2) Language: The official language is Spanish. A Jamaican dialect of English is used around Puerto Limón.

(3) Education: Illiteracy: 7%.

(4) Ethnic Composition: Caucasian and mestizo 96%; black 3%; Indian 1%.

7. Honduras

a. Geography

(1) Location: Located in Central America, with a long Caribbean coastline to the north, Guatemala to the west, El Salvador to the southwest, and Nicaragua to the southeast.

(2) Area: 43,277 sq. miles. Arable land: 14%. 15.84% cropland; 30.39% permanent pasture; 34.05% forests and woodland; 19.72% other.

(3) Capital: Tegucigalpa
(4) Time: 1 hour earlier than EST.

b. Hydrography

(1) Climate: The climate is temperate in the mountain regions and tropical along the coast; the rainy season lasts from May to November.

(2) Health Precautions: Water in not potable. Rabies is a threat, especially to children, and malaria is prevalent in some outlying areas. Intestinal diseases of bacterial, viral, and parasitic origin are endemic.

c. Transportation

(1) Roads: Total miles: 5,562; paved miles: 1,056. (1988)


d. Telecommunications


(2) Television: Stations: 22 (1988). Sets in use: 280,000; per 1,000 pop.; 64. (1985)

(3) Newspapers: Major dailies: 6. Combined circulation: 236,000; per 1,000 pop.; 56. (1984)

(4) Telephones: Sets in use: 35,100; per 1,000 pop.: 7. (1988)

e. Politics
(1) Executive: A popularly elected President, who holds executive power and is assisted by a Cabinet, serves a 4-year term. No President may serve a second successive term. The actions of the President may be approved or disapproved by the National Assembly.

(2) Legislature: The National Assembly is chosen every 4 years through a system of proportional representation for a term concurrent with that of the President.

(3) Judiciary: A Supreme Court composed of 9 judges heads a system of 5 courts of appeal and local departmental courts.

(4) Local Government: There are 18 departments, each with a centrally-appointed governor, which are further subdivided into autonomous municipalities (283 in total governed by an elected mayor and municipal assembly.)

(5) Political Parties: Honduras is essentially a two-party system, with the Liberal party of Honduras and the National party being the main parties.

   (a) Liberal Party of Honduras has existed in one form or another since 1890, is an urban-based, center-right organization favoring democratic political standards, social reform and Central American integration.

   (b) The National Party is a traditional right-wing party with strong military ties. Though historically supported by rural land-owners, the PN has recently favored programs directed at economic and social development and internal reform. The PN also favors Central American integration.

   (c) National Innovation and Unity Party is a centrist group with a social democratic orientation.

   (d) Christian Democratic Party of Honduras is a small centrist party that opposes the PLH Government, having accused it of attempting to systematically exterminate its opposition.

(6) Political dissent.

   (a) Left Wing: Honduran Revolutionary
Movement; Communist Party of Honduras; Chinchoneros National Liberation Movement; Honduras Patriotic Front; Honduran Peasants’ National Unity Front; Lorenzo Zelaya Popular Revolutionary Forces; People’s Guerrilla Command; Popular Front against Repression, and the Revolutionary People’s Union.

(b) Extreme Right Wing: Honduras Anti-Communist Movement and The White Hand.

f. Sociology

(1) Religion: An overwhelming majority is Catholic, with a small Protestant minority.

(2) Language: Spanish is the national language, though some Indian dialects are spoken.

(3) Education: Illiteracy: 44%.

(4) Ethnic Composition: Mestizo 90%; Indian 7%; black 2%; caucasian 1%.

8. Panama

a. Geography

(1) Location: Situated at the southern end of the isthmus separating North and South America, Panama is bounded by the Caribbean Sea to the north, Colombia to the east, the Pacific Ocean to the south and Costa Rica to the west.

(2) Area: 29,762 sq. miles. Arable land: 7%. 7.40% cropland; 15.28% permanent pasture; 53.69% forest and woodland; 23.63% other. Coastline: 1,547. Land Borders: 391 miles.

(3) Capital: Panama

(4) Time: Same as EST.

b. Hydrography

(1) Climate: Tropical climate with little variation in temperature, with coastal areas averaging between 73°F and 81°F. The rainy season lasts from April until December.

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(2) Health Precautions: The water is potable and health conditions are generally good in Panama City, but the usual health precautions should be taken in rural areas. Inoculations against yellow fever, typhoid, and paratyphoid are recommended for longer visits.

c. Transportation

(1) Roads: Total miles: 5,301; paved miles: 1,706. (1987)


d. Telecommunications


(2) Television: Stations: 14 (1987). Sets in use: 300,000; per 1,000 pop.: 135. (1986)


e. Politics

(1) Executive: The executive branch is composed of a President and two Vice Presidents, with all three members being popularly elected for 5-year terms. The President appoints Cabinet ministers and other important officials. The President is nominally the head of state, but actual executive power is held by the chief of the armed forces.

(2) Legislature: Legislative authority is vested in the unicameral Legislative Assembly composed of 67 representatives who are
elected by universal suffrage to 5 year terms.

(3) Judiciary: 9 member Supreme Court to which judges are appointed for 10 year terms. There are also circuit, high and municipal courts.

(4) Local Government: There are 9 provinces, each headed by a popularly elected governor, and three autonomous Indian Reservations. Corregimientos, the smallest administrative units, form the basis of the electoral system.

(5) Political Parties: Panamanian politics are currently dominated by two broad-based coalitions. The ruling National Democratic Union is a center-right alliance consisting of 6 parties, including the PRD and Pala. The Opposition Democratic Alliance is a right wing opposition grouping consisting of the PDC, PPA and Molirena.

(a) The Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) is a Government-supportive party made up of Marxists, Christian Democrats, and some business interests, espouses a variety of nationalistic and revolutionary policies.

(b) The Pala-Labor Party is a right-of-center organization that was founded in 1982.

(c) The National Liberal Party (PLN) is a conservative and pro-government.

(d) The Authentic Panamanian Party is a nationalist, anti-Communist party.

(e) The Christian Democratic Party is a centrist group that supports private enterprise and social reforms.

(f) The Liberal Republican and Nationalist Movement is a conservative party.

(6) Political dissent: Right Wing; Panamanian National Front.

f. Sociology

(1) Religion: Roman Catholic 93%; Protestant 6%; other 1%.
(2) Language: The official language is Spanish, which is spoken by 86% of the population. Many Panamanians are bilingual, with 14% speaking English as their native tongue.

(3) Education: Illiteracy: 10%.

(4) Ethnic Composition: Mestizo 70%; West Indian 14%; Caucasian 10%; Indian 6%.

SOUTH AMERICA

9. Colombia

a. Geography

(1) Location: Lies in the northwest of South America, with the Caribbean Sea to the north and the Pacific Ocean to the west. It is bordered on the east by Venezuela and Brazil, and on the south by Peru and Ecuador. Panama links Colombia to Central America.

(2) Area: 439,737 sq.miles. Arable land: 5%. 72% forest and savannah; 5% crop and fallow; 14% pasture; 6% forest, swamp and water, 3% urban and other. Coastline: 1,500 miles. Land Borders: 3,750 miles.

(3) Capital: Bogota

(4) Time: Same as EST.

b. Hydrography

(1) Climate: While the coastal climate is that of a tropical rain forest, the plateaus enjoy temperature weather. Areas of the Andes mountains are under permanent snow.

(2) Health Precautions: Personnel should be inoculated against typhoid, tetanus, polio, yellow fever and infectious hepatitis. All foods should be washed thoroughly before being eaten.

c. Transportation

(1) Roads: Total miles: 46,885; paved miles:
(2) Railroads: Total track miles: 2,214 (1986)

(3) Ports: Total: (not available). Major: 6
(Barranquilla, Buenaventura, Cartagena, San Andes, Santa Marta, Rumaco).

(4) Airfields: Total airfields: 634; usable: 618;
permanent surface: 65; runways over 8,000 ft: 11 (1986).

d. Telecommunications

(1) Radio: Stations: 404 (1986). Receivers:
3,025,000; per 1,000 pop.: 107.80 (1984).

(2) Television: Stations: 85 (1986). Sets in use:
1,8000,000; per 1,000 pop.: 64.15 (1984)

(3) Newspapers: Major dailies: 28. Combined
circulation: 54,324; per 1,000 pop.: 44. (1984)

(4) Telephones: Sets in use: 1,890,000; per
1,000 pop.: 65 (1986). Subscriber lines in service: 1,145,145; business:

e. Politics

(1) Executive: Executive power is vested in the
President, who is elected by universal adult suffrage for a 4-year term and may
not serve consecutive terms. The Congress appoints a presidential deputy,
subject to biannual reappointment. The President is assisted by a Cabinet,
which he appoints. The President also appoints heads of local government units.

(2) Legislature: Legislative power is exercised by
a bicameral Congress, composed of the Senate and the House of
Representatives. The 114 Senate members and 199 House members are elected
on the basis of proportional representation for a 4-year term, which runs
concurrently with the presidential term.

(3) Judiciary: Judicial power is exercised by the
24-member Supreme Court, which is divided into 4 chambers.
(4) Local Government: Colombia is divided into 23 departments (which are further divided into municipalities), the federal district of Bogota, three territories without local legislatures. Department governors are appointed by the President and are agents of the national Government. Mayors of municipalities are appointed by governors.

(5) Political Parties: Two major parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, have dominated Colombian politics; they joined in a National Front between 1958 and 1974. Both parties have been plagued by factionalism.

(a) The Liberal Party represents business interests and favors gradual social and economic reforms.

(b) The Conservative Party originally represented agrarian aristocracy. It takes positions somewhat to the right of liberals.

(c) The New Liberalism Party is an independent faction of the Liberal Party. The center-left party was formed prior to 1982 elections.

(d) The Patriotic Union was established as the political arm of the Colombia Revolutionary Armed Forces, a Moscow-line paramilitary group. It advocates agrarian reform and trade union and political freedom, and opposed US interference in Latin America.

(6) Political dissent.

(a) Left Wing: April 19 Movement; Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, National Liberation Army; ORP: People’s Liberation Army; Workers’ Self-Defense Movement and the Pedro León Abroleda Brigade.

(b) Extreme Right Wing: Death Squads and Death to Kidnappers.

f. Sociology

(1) Religion: Roman Catholic 95%; Protestant, Jewish and other 5%.

(2) Language: Spanish
(3) Education: Illiteracy: 20%.

(4) Ethnic Composition: Mestizo 58%; Caucasian 20%; mulatto 14%; black 4%; mixed black-Indian 3%; Indian 1%.

10. Venezuela

a. Geography

(1) Location: Located on the northern coast of South America; Colombia lies to the west, Brazil to the south, Guyana to the east and the Caribbean Sea to the north.

(2) Area: 352,150 sq. miles. Arable land: 4%. 4.26% cropland; 19.67% permanent pasture; 36.51% forests and woodland; 39.56% other. Coastline: 1,750 miles. Land Borders: 2,600 miles.

(3) Capital: Caracas.

(4) Time: 1 hour later than EST.

b. Hydrography

(1) Climate: The climate varies according to region, but ranges from tropical to moderate. The rainy season lasts from May through November. The average annual temperature in Caracas is 69°F.

(2) Health Precautions: Precautions should be taken against typhoid, tetanus and hepatitis. The water is not potable.

c. Transportation

(1) Roads: Total miles: 48,335; paved miles: 14,155 (1987)

(2) Railroads: Total track miles: 273 (1987)


d. Telecommunications


(2) Television: Stations: 62 (1987). Sets in use: 2,750,000; per 1,000 pop.: 155. (1986)

(3) Newspapers: Major dailies: 8. Combined circulation: 1,082,000; per 1,000 pop.: 61. (1986)


e. Politics

(1) Executive: Executive power is exercised by the President, who is head of state and is elected for a 5-year period term by universal suffrage. The President appoints a Council of Ministers (Cabinet) to aid in Government functions.

(2) Legislature: Legislative power is exercised by a bicameral Congress consisting of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies.

(3) Judiciary: Judicial power is based on the Napoleonic code and is exercised by the Supreme Court of Justice and various specialized tribunals.

(4) Local Government: Venezuela is divided into 20 states, a Federal District of Caracas and two Federal Territories, each administered by a Governor who is appointed by the President. The country's 72 Caribbean islands constitute Federal Dependencies. The states are further subdivided into districts headed by elected municipal councils.

(5) Political Parties: Venezuelan politics have in recent years been dominated by two main parties: the Democratic Action and Christian Social Party.

(a) The Democratic Action is the left-of-center party headed by the President. A social democratic, populist party, it seeks increased national development, opposes foreign intervention in Latin American affairs, and provides support for trade unions.
(b) The Christian Social Party/Independent Political Electoral Organization Committee is a moderately conservative Christian Democratic party. The party favors land reform and a more equitable distribution of wealth.

(c) The Movement of Socialism is a socialist party advocating "Eurocommunist" positions. The party split from the Communist Party of Venezuela and seeks to adapt socialism to Venezuelan conditions.

(d) Communist Party of Venezuela is pro-Soviet and finds support among the trade unions. It now advocates political solutions rather than violence but has been linked to guerrilla attacks.

(e) The Radical Cause is an extreme leftist organization.

(6) Political dissent.: Left Wing; Argimiro Gabaldón Revolutionary Commando; International Movement of the Proletariat; Ramón Emeterio Betancourt Commando; Red Flag, Zero Point, and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left.

f. Sociology

(1) Religion: Roman Catholic 96%; Protestant 2%; other 2%.

(2) Language: Spanish is the official language. Indian dialects are spoken by some of the 200,000 Indians in the remote interior region.

(3) Education: Illiteracy: 14%.

(4) Ethnic Composition: Mestizo 67%; caucasian 21%; black 10%; Indian 2%.

11. Ecuador

a. Geography

(1) Location: Located on the west coast of South America, Ecuador is bordered by the Pacific Ocean to the west, Peru to
the south and east and Colombia to the north.

(2) Area: 14,500 sq. miles. Arable land: 9%. 9% cropland; 16.52% permanent pasture; 51.47% forests and woodland; 23.01% other.

(3) Capital: Quito.

(4) Time: Same as EST.

b. Hydrography

(1) Climate: Temperatures vary with altitude from the Andes Mountains to the tropical rain forests on the coast. The rainy season lasts from October to May, during which time an average of 43 inches of rain falls.

(2) Health Precautions: Inoculations against typhoid, paratyphoid, yellow fever, tetanus and hepatitis are recommended. Tap water is not potable.

c. Transportation

(1) Roads: Total miles: 17,400; paved miles: 2,240. (1987)


d. Telecommunications


(2) Television: Stations: 285. Sets in use: 1,900,000; per 1,000 pop.: 197. (1986)

(3) Newspapers: Major dailies: 8. Combined

e. Politics

(1) Executive: Executive power is vested in the President, who is elected to a non-renewable 4-year term by direct popular vote. The President appoints a Cabinet to assist in the exercise of executive powers.

(2) Legislature: The unicameral National Chamber of Representatives exercises legislative authority. It has 71 members, 12 of which are elected nationwide for 4-year terms, with the remaining 59 elected provincially for two-year terms.

(3) Judiciary: The Supreme Court oversees a system of superior courts, which in turn supervise provincial and cantonal courts.

(4) Local Government: Ecuador is divided into 19 mainland provinces and the Galapagos Islands. The provinces are further subdivided into municipalities. Provincial governors are appointed by the President, while cities are governed by elected mayors.

(5) Political Parties: Ecuador has a multi-party political system by which the parties form electoral alliances to win elections. The political alliances have classically been divided between liberal groupings of the coastal areas and the conservative parties of the highlands.

(a) The Democratic Left is moderately leftist and seeks social change, including agrarian reform, redistribution of wealth, and Ecuadorian self-determination.

(b) The Social Christian Party is the right-of-center party.

(c) Concentration of Popular Forces is a left-of-center party that advocates social and economic reform, including land reform.

(d) Radical Alfarista Front is a popular,
center-left party formed in 1972 by members of the former Liberal Party.

(e) The Democratic Party is a progressive liberal party, also founded by members of the former Liberal Party.

(f) The Conservative Party is the country's oldest party. It is a conservative party, opposed to the separation of church and state, that finds its base of support in the highlands.

(g) The Popular Democracy is a center-left, Christian Democratic party founded in 1978. It favors social change, democracy, freedom, and individual rights.

(h) The Ecuadorean Socialist Party is a Marxist, moderately socialist party.

(i) The Left Broad Front is a coalition of 6 leftist, socialist, and Marxist-Leninist parties that banded together in 1977.

(j) The Democratic Popular Movement is a Maoist party that follows the policies of the Chinese Communist party.

(k) The People, Change and Democracy Party is a center-left party.

(6) Political dissent: Left Wing; Astra 18th October Movement of Revolutionary Action and the Liberation Front of the Poor.

f. Sociology

(1) Religion: Roman Catholic 95%; other 5% (mainly Christian).

(2) Language: Spanish is the official language, but indigenous languages such as Quechan and Jivaroan are widely spoken.

(3) Education: Illiteracy: 10%.

(4) Ethnic Composition: Mestizo 55%; Indian 25%; Spanish 10%; black 10%.

12. Peru
a. Geography

(1) Location: Lying in western South America, Peru is bordered by Ecuador and Colombia to the north, Brazil and Bolivia to the east, and Chile to the south. On the west is the Pacific Ocean.

(2) Area: 496,225 sq. miles. Arable land: 3%. 55% forest; 14% meadow and pasture; 2% cropland; 29% urban, waste, other.

(3) Capital: Lima.

(4) Time: Same as EST.

b. Hydrography

(1) Climate: Varying with altitude, the climate includes a rainy season from October to April, with heavy rainfall in the tropical forest. Temperatures are about 20°F lower in the Andes mountains than on the coastal plain.

(2) Health Precautions: New arrivals should be protected by gamma globulin every 4 months. Immunization for typhoid, tetanus, measles, mumps, polio, German measles, and yellow fever should be kept current. High altitudes may bring on headaches and nausea due to the lack of oxygen; visitors to the high Andean regions should prepare to rest 12 hours or more the first day.

c. Transportation


(2) Railroads: Total track miles: 1,166 (1986).


(4) Airfields: Total airfields: 246; usable: 228; permanent surface: 32; runways over 8,000 ft: 27 (1986).

d. Telecommunications

2,225,000; per 1,000 pop.: 1,158.85 (1984).


(3) Newspapers: Major dailies: 36. Combined circulation: 1,103,890; per 1,000 pop.: 59. (1983)

(4) Telephones: Sets in use: 544,000; per 1,000 pop.: 29 (1986). Subscriber lines in service: 489,121; business: 437,984; residence: 51,137 (1982).

e. Politics

(1) Executive: Executive power is vested in the President, who is head of state, and two Vice Presidents. They are each elected to a 5-year term by universal adult suffrage. The President appoints the Council of Ministers and Supreme Court.

(2) Legislature: The bicameral Congress consists of a 60-member Senate and a 180-member Chamber of Deputies. Elections are held every 5 years. Senators are nationally elected on a regional basis, while deputies are elected by constituencies on a system of proportional representation.

(3) Judiciary: The Supreme Court, consisting of a President and 12 members, and a special 9-member Constitutional Court head the judicial system. There are also departmental superior courts and provincial courts of first instance.

(4) Local Government: Peru is divided into 12 regions, consisting of 24 departments and one constitutional province. The departments are further divided into provinces, which in turn are divided into districts. Each region has an assembly which consists of elected representatives, provincial mayors, and representatives of certain institutions.

(5) Political Parties: Enjoying at most a semi-legal status during the last military regime, political parties returned to full activity when a civilian government was restored in 1980.

(a) The American Popular Revolutionary Alliance is a democratic left-wing party. It is a middle-class group with a strong labor base. There has been long-standing antagonism between the military and
(b) The Popular Action is a moderately rightist, pro-US party which was founded in 1956 and split into two factions after a 1968 military coup. Prior to the split, the party was nationalist, democratic, and concerned with the extension of social services.

(c) The Christian Democratic Party advocates reforms similar to those desired by the Roman Catholic Church.

(d) The Democratic Convergence is an electoral coalition of the Christian Popular Party and the Hayista Bases Movement.

(e) The Nationalist Left Party is a left-wing coalition.

(f) The Socialist Workers' Party is a Trotskyist group.

(g) The Democratic Left is an alliance of several left-wing groupings, including the following groups: The Peruvian Communist party; The Peruvian Communist Party-Red Homeland and the Peruvian Communist Party-Red Flag.

(6) Political dissent.: Left Wing, National Liberation Army; Peasants Patrol; Red Fatherland; Shining Path; and the Tawantinsuyo Liberation Front.

f. Sociology

(1) Religion: More than 90% are Roman Catholic.

(2) Language: The official languages are Spanish, Quechua and Aymara.

(3) Education: Illiteracy: 20%.

(4) Ethnic Composition: Indian 45%; mestizo 37%; Caucasian 15%; black, Japanese, Chinese, other 3%.
13. Bolivia

a. Geography

(1) Location: Bolivia is a landlocked country located in South America; bordered by Brazil to the north and east, Chile and Peru to the west and Argentina and Paraguay to the south.

(2) Area: 424,164 sq. miles. Arable land: 3%. 3% cropland; 25% permanent pasture; 52% forests and woodland; 20% other. Land Borders: 3,780 miles.

(3) Capital: La Paz (administrative); Sucre (legislative and judicial).

(4) Time: Same as EST.

b. Hydrography

(1) Climate: Depending on the altitude, the climate varies from cool and cold in the Andes mountains to humid and tropical in the eastern and northern lowlands.

(2) Health Precautions: Due to the altitude, newcomers should rest the first three days and eat lightly, avoiding alcohol and cigarettes the first week. Drink plenty of liquids because of the low humidity. Sanitation conditions are poor. Avid tap water, unwashed fruits and vegetables, and undercooked meats and fish.

c. Transportation

(1) Roads: Total miles: 24,133; paved mil. 808. (1987)


(3) Ports: Total: 0.

(4) Airfields: Total airfields: 711; usable: 643; permanent surface: 9; runways over 8,000 ft: 7 (1987).

d. Telecommunications


(4) Telephones: Sets in use: 144,300; per 1,000 pop.: 26 (1987). Subscriber lines in service: (not available).

e. Politics

(1) Executive: The President is elected for a term of 4 years and is not eligible for immediate reelection. He is empowered to appoint diplomats, archbishops and bishops from a Senate-proposed panel, to issue decrees, and initiate legislation. The President shares executive power with a Cabinet he appoints.

(2) Legislature: A bicameral Congress, comprising a Senate of 27 members and a 130-member Chamber of Deputies, hold legislative power. Both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies serve a 4-year term.

(3) Judiciary: The 12-member Supreme Court resides over a court system that is divided into 4 chambers with three justices each. There is a District Court in each of the 9 departments and lower courts in the provinces.

(4) Local Government: Bolivia is divided into 9 departments, each of them headed by a centrally appointed prefect who has supreme administrative, political and military authority within the department. The departments are subject to direct control by the central government. They are further subdivided into 94 provinces.

(5) Political Parties: Bolivia has a multi-party system, with a marked tendency for new parties to proliferate and old parties to splinter. Effective political action usually requires the formation of electoral alliance and other arrangements for the cooperation among parties.

(a) The Nationalist Revolutionary Movement-Historic is a center-right party that stands for an independent and
strong national state and an alliance of social classes. It is led by President Victor Paz Estenssoro.

(b) The Nationalist Democratic Alliance is an ultra-right nationalist party. Its slogan is "peace, order, and work."

(c) The Leftist Revolutionary Movement is a non-Communist Marxist party, that arose from various left-wing groups. The Leftist Revolutionary Movement seeks to unite the middle class, working class and peasantry to achieve "the national and social liberation of the Bolivian people."

(6) Political dissent.: Left Wing: Bolivian Workers; Revolutionary Party; Che Guevara Brigade; National Liberation Army, and the Revolutionary Anti-imperialist Front.

f. Sociology

(1) Religion: Roman Catholic 95%; the remainder includes an active Protestant minority, especially Methodist.

(2) Language: Spanish, Quechua, and Aymara are the official languages.

(3) Education: Illiteracy: 37%.

(4) Ethnic Composition: Quechua 30%; Aymara 25%; Mestizo 31%; European 14%.
D. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Command Relationships

![Command Relationships Diagram]

*Situation Dependent. Based on JOPS and JSCP.*

Figure 38. Command Relationships.

2. Command and Control Communications

a. Automatic Secure Voice Communication (AUTOSEVCOM)

b. Automatic Digital Information Network (AUTODIN)

c. Single Channel Satellite (Voice/Facsimile)

d. Organic Communication Assets
3. Administrative Communications
   a. Local Telephone System
   b. Organic Communications

4. Communications Intell
   a. Vinson
   b. Stu II/IIIs

5. Communications Support for Combat Operations
   a. Joint TAC Air Operations: Organic communications include TACSAT; FM; and UHF.
   b. Air to Ground Operations (CAS\BAI): FM/UHF/HF.
   c. Naval Gunfire: FM/UHF/HF.

E. US Collective Defense Agreements - Members of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty): Argentina, The Bahamas, Boliva, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba (suspended), Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
### II. DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

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| **D. SUSTAINMENT** | | | |
| SeaLift | Host Nation Contracting | Combined | Country Team |
| Intertheater Airlift | InterAgency | Joint | Combined HQ's |
| Intratheater Airlift | Combined | SLOC/ALOC | Joint HQ's |
| MHE | Joint | AirLand Battle | JTF HQ's |
| Line-Haul Transport | Replacements | Host Nation Agreements | APOE |
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III. REGIONAL FORCE DEVELOPMENT PLANNING:

A. Regional Requirements

1. Command and Control: Unity of Command and interoperability among all services, State Department, non-DoD agencies, and host nation.

2. Deployment:
   a. Lodgement areas.
   b. Airfields for buildup.
   c. Port facilities, lighterage and landing craft.
   d. Combat service support personnel for transportation, medical, logistical, and finance (script) in deployment and sustainment.
   e. Acclimatization capability for troops deployed into areas of responsibility.
   f. Troops for deployment in a variety of terrain.

3. Operations
   a. Proper mix of light infantry, airborne, air assault and amphibious troops to deploy to a variety of locations. Some anti-tank capability required.
   b. Limited armored forces.
   c. Naval escort for convoy protection and landing support.
   d. Sufficient naval power to protect lines of communication and amphibious assaults.
   e. Air interdiction capability.
   f. Air defense systems, fighters and SHORAD to protect the perimeter and key locations.
   g. Search and rescue.
h. Protect sea lines of communication from interdiction 
(submarines).

i. Early warning protection system for SLOC's and ALOC's.

j. Select number of SOF personnel and equipment.

k. Ability to conduct riverine operations.

l. Capability to conduct sustained PYSOPS operations.

4. Sustainment

   a. Transport capability for cargo and personnel movement 
inland (line-haul, short transport, utility helicopters, POL tankers, and fixed wing for 
rough strip).

   b. Engineer personnel and equipment to build or improve 
harbor facilities, road networks, troop facilities, airfields, etc.

5. Training

   a. Combined training for MOUT, jungle, mountain, 
amphibious and riverine operations.

   b. Instruction on low intensity conflict doctrine.

   c. Area trained LNO's for coordination with host nation 
personnel and intelligence collection.

B. Current US capabilities:

1. One light infantry brigade.

2. One SF battalion.


4. Limited patrol craft for riverine opns available in theater.

5. Sufficient air and naval forces could be made available to 
dominate area of operation (except in case of general war).

7. Contingency forces which include.
   a. 1 infantry division (airborne)
   b. 1 infantry division (air assault)
   c. 1 infantry division (light)
   d. 1 tactical fighter wing
   e. 1 carrier task force
   f. 1 Marine Amphibious Force
   g. SOF

C. Identified Deficiencies:

1. Shortage of ground forces.
2. Shortage of inter-theater airlift for rough strip runways.
3. Lodgement area(s).
4. Ports and airfields for buildup and sustainment.
5. Shortage of lighterage and ship to shore discharge equipment (LOTS).
6. Airlift capability.
7. Combined training and doctrine in SOUTHCOM AO.
8. Joint training and doctrine in LIC.
9. Coordinating mechanism with non-DOD agencies.
10. Shortage of cargo vessels for equipment and personnel transport.
11. NEO will put a drain on airlift capability.

12. Lack of sufficient training in MOUT, jungle, mountain, riverine, and air assault operating.

13. Shortage of adequately trained civil affairs and PSYOPS personnel.

14. Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras lack the ability to defend against Nicaraguan aggression.

15. Neither Panamanian nor US Forces can defend the Panama Canal against all sabotage.

16. Complex command and control arrangement.

17. Undeveloped combined command and control arrangement.

D. Corrective Programs

1. Theatre specific training for LIC (MOUT, jungle, mountainous, riverine, etc.).

2. Initiate more combined/joint operations.

3. Request limited reserve component civil affairs and PSYOPs mobilization.

4. Establish SOUTHCOM regional crisis action team.

5. Initiate a strategic and regional PSYOPs campaign.


7. Approve interdiction of civilian economic targets i.e. key buildings and facilities in Managua.

E. Risks

1. No well-defined objectives and measures for success.
2. Political diversity of opinion will make objectives nebulous. Lack of focus on political objectives will cause problems for military planners in LIC situation.

3. Lack of strategic and operational OPSEC.


5. Joint C³ interoperability may cause delays and problems in operations.

6. Logistics and force buildup may precipitate negative regional or world opinion.

7. Limited availability of sea and air transport.


9. Support operations in SOUTHCOM will require allocating forces projected for other theaters. Reinforcements may be committed to EUCOM/NATO and PACOM.

10. US Congress may not support regional combat operations.

11. Keeping the Panama Canal open in all contingencies may be impossible.

SOUTHCOMs AOR has been analyzed in terms of the CINC's mission, friendly and indigenous forces, geography, and C³. This analysis provides a detailed look at Central and South America so that regional military requirements can be developed to determine resource deficiencies, assess risk, and plan for future operations.

As a result of the analysis conducted using the RFPM, the SOUTHCOM AOR is characterized by severe economic, political, and social discontent. From a US perspective, the region doesn't present a significant military threat in terms of
large indigenous conventional forces; however, the underdevelopment of the region challenges American interests there. Insurgencies, illicit drugs, and terror undermine many of the struggling democracies in the region.

Balanced development of the region is key to a prosperous hemisphere. American forces deployed to Latin America need to understand the unique cultural and geographic considerations of the region. As a contingency theater, the support bases in most cases will be austere.

The light infantry division is capable of operating in austere environments. Operating in a LIC theater such as SOUTHCOM requires a greater appreciation of the local conditions and empathy for the people. The imperatives of LIC are keys to effective operations. The ability of the LID to operate effectively in the SOUTHCOM LIC environment will now be examined.
ENDNOTES

Chapter V


2Ibid., p. 152.


5International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance*. London: Brassey's, 1989. Except where noted, the military information for Central and South American countries came from *The Military Balance* and will not be cited again only by exception.


7These forces represent the Panamanian Defense Force prior to the US invasion 'Just Cause'. The PDF is being retrained as a police force. Final numbers were unavailable at the time this paper was written.


11Kaleidoscope, *Current World Data*, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1990.) Except where noted in this section, the information for Central and South
American countries came for Current World Data by Kaleidoscope. Kaleidoscope is an information service that provides monthly updates to referenced data.

12Degenhardt, Henry W., Political Dissent: An International Guide to Dissident, Extra-Parliamentary, Guerrilla and Illegal Political Movements. (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983.) Political Dissent in this reference refers to political opposition outside the legal structure of the state concerned. Except where noted the political dissent information came for Political Dissent and will not be cited again only by exception.

13Guyana, Suriname, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay were not included.
CHAPTER VI

LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION

Be extremely subtle
Even to the point of formlessness
Be extremely mysterious
Even to the point of soundlessness
Thereby you can be the director
Of an opponent's fate

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 450 B.C.

In previous chapters, low intensity conflict, joint strategic planning system, and SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility were examined to establish a foundation for the environment in which a light infantry division could be employed if called upon by the National Command Authority. Latin America is clearly a region confronted by serious economic, social, and political strife creating the conditions for LIC. The region is strategically important to the US in terms of its proximity to North America, sea lines of communication (Panama Canal), strategic raw materials (oil, bauxite), and commercial trade. The light infantry division provides the NCA one of many military tools in answering challenges to American interests in the region.

The light infantry division's mission is to rapidly deploy as a combined
arms force to defeat enemy forces in LIC and, when augmented, fight in a mid-
high intensity conflict.¹ This means the LID should focus on LIC while retaining
utility for mid-high intensity conflict. The LID's austere organization was
designed to be flexible and rapidly deployable in order to get to trouble spots
quickly and terminate problems immediately. In this chapter, the light infantry
division will be examined in terms of the battlefield operating systems (BOS) to
determine combinations that are the most pragmatic for LIC, and other areas
(civil affairs, legal, rules of engagement, training, and political) that synergistically
affect the success of the LID in a low intensity conflict. First, a brief look at a
LID's organization will provide a foundation for a more detailed analysis.

In the US Army, all divisions are organized around the same base. The
LID is a light combined arms force of maneuver, combat support (CS), and
combat service support (CSS) consisting of a division headquarters and
headquarters company; three brigade headquarters and headquarters companies;
an aviation brigade headquarters company; division artillery; a support
command; a cavalry squadron; an air defense artillery battalion; an engineer
battalion; a signal battalion; a military intelligence battalion; and a military police
company.² Figure 39 below depicts the organization of the LID. "Maneuver
battalions and additional units are placed in a command relationship to this base
to provide the division the ability to accomplish its mission in an anticipated
operational environment."³

The division's three brigades are task organized based on the factors of
METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available) to perform major maneuver missions. The brigade headquarters provides:

the command and control facilities necessary to employ attached and supporting units... The necessary combat, CS and CSS units to accomplish the brigade mission are attached, OPCON [operational control], or placed in support of the brigade.⁴

![Diagram of 7th ID (L) Command Structure]

Figure 39. 7th ID (L)
Source: 7th ID (L) Capabilities Book (draft), 1989.

The light infantry division is organized to fight independently in a LIC environment.⁵ Nine infantry battalions, three light field artillery battalions (105mm), one medium field artillery battery (155mm), one attack helicopter battalion, and one assault helicopter battalion provide substantial combat power for the division in a LIC environment. These units can be tailored in different combinations to meet assigned missions. The division support command adjusts to the mission and units assigned. The LID's command and control structure
allows for augmentation based on METT-T. In LIC, augmentation can include civil affairs, psychological operations, engineer, and medical support units.

Augmentation for mid-high intensity conflict is METT-T dependent and usually includes additional artillery, armor, engineer, chemical, transportation, and antitank support.

Combat elements other than infantry, CS, and CSS habitually operate under division control so they can be concentrated based on division priorities. Each of the three light field artillery battalions normally operate in direct support of a maneuver brigade. The one battery of medium field artillery routinely remains in general support to the division. The air defense artillery (ADA) battalion of the LID includes Stingers and Vulcan. In contrast to the normal employment of ADA in heavy divisions, ADA in the LID protects high-priority assets, not the normal area protection provided by the more robust heavy ADA units. The LID's engineer battalion provides sapper companies to support maneuver brigades, and one assault and barrier platoon for use in general support of the division. The engineer battalion has no construction capability, or assault boat capability. The military intelligence battalion is normally placed in GS to the division, but can task organize to support maneuver brigades.

The LID's aviation assets are consolidated in the combat aviation brigade (CAB), which provides reconnaissance, tactical mobility for combat forces and materiel, antitank capability, and fire support to infantry units. The
combined assets of the division's two assault helicopter companies can move the combat assets of two infantry battalions in a single lift. The military police company provides general support to the division, but has no DS platoons for the maneuver brigades. The LID's signal battalion furnishes support on an area basis. The division tactical multichannel satellite communications system is established to support the division main command post (CP), three brigades, and the division support command (DISCOM). The tactical multichannel communications system supports the division main CP, division tactical CP, DISCOM, three maneuver brigades, ADA, and the military intelligence battalion. The aviation and artillery headquarters are located in proximity to one of these units to receive signal support under the area system.

The light infantry division can sustain itself for 48 hours. The DISCOM is organized into forward area support teams (FASTs), supervised by a forward area support coordinator (FASCO). One FAST provides direct support to each maneuver brigade, and the remaining support is provided in the division support area. The division maintenance concept depends on exchange of items and passback for repair. Supply depends heavily on throughput from corps and aerial resupply because of limited organic transportation. Preconfigured unit loads (PULs) of multiple items are configured in the corps support command area and requisitioned with a single stock number. With the above support organization, the LID requires specific support when augmented by corps. Now that the organization of the light infantry division has been synopsized, the integration of
combat, CS, and CSS into the seven battlefield operating systems will be examined in terms of LIC.

**Battlefield Operating Systems**

The concept of battlefield operating systems visualizes functional areas that must be horizontally and vertically integrated by commanders. The LID is a combined arms light infantry team where each combat arm and service combine to maximize effectiveness and survival. The BOS are derived from the TRADOC Blueprint of the Battlefield. Each blueprint defines a number of operating systems that integrate all combat, CS, and CSS activities by function, rather than by mission, branch, or unit. The Blueprint of the Battlefield for the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war are the strategic operating system, operational operating system, and battlefield operating system respectively. The LID is incorporated in the tactical level blueprint-BOS. Each function of BOS is clearly distinguished from the other and appears only once. The blueprint is intended to apply to military operations across the full spectrum of conflict including high-, mid-, and low-intensity. It does not apply to military actions short of war although many activities related to military actions short of war are contained in the blueprint.

However, FM 71-100 Division Operations and FM 7-20 The Infantry Battalion require that the BOS be synchronized to support the commander’s intent and no distinction is made between LIC and mid-high intensity conflict
and the employment of the BOS. The division must coordinate the [battlefield] operating systems and synchronize their activities in time, space, and purpose. Mission planning and execution, to ensure that the capabilities of the total force are addressed and fully integrated are among the purposes of the Blueprint of the Battlefield.

The following are the seven elements of the BOS: maneuver, fire support, air defense, command and control, intelligence, mobility and survivability, and combat service support. The division commander coordinates the following operating systems and synchronize their activities in time, space, and purpose. Figure 40 on the next page illustrates the battlefield operating systems and gives a brief description of the seven functional areas. The problem with conducting military operations in a LIC environment (COIN, contingency operations) is the use and arrangement of the BOS in terms of time, space, and purpose. In mid-high intensity scenarios, time is the critical factor. Time constrains both sides. In counterinsurgency, time is usually on the side of the insurgent and, because of the protracted nature of counterinsurgency, it may not be relevant to the insurgent. Time to the government, on the other hand, is a precious commodity, because the longer the insurgency persists the greater the challenge to the legitimacy of the ruling regime. In mid-high intensity conflict, moving over terrain (space) requires time.

Space, in terms of synchronizing BOS, encompasses the organization of the battlefield framework in mid-high intensity conflict. An offensive or
**FUNCTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MANEUVER</th>
<th>Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage with respect to the hostile force. Includes engagement of the hostile force with direct fire -- in close combat.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FIRE SUPPORT</td>
<td>Employment of target acquisition data, indirect fire weapons, armed aircraft (less attack helicopters), and other lethal and nonlethal means against ground targets in support of maneuver force operations. Includes artillery, mortars, naval gunfire, close-air support, smoke, PSYOP, and electronic countermeasures. Does NOT include target acquisition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR DEFENSE</td>
<td>Employment of all lethal and nonlethal measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air attacks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMAND AND CONTROL</td>
<td>Exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Includes planning and communication functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTELLIGENCE</td>
<td>Collection, processing, and dissemination of information concerning the hostile force’s capabilities, intentions, vulnerabilities and the operational environment. Includes target acquisition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY</td>
<td>Enhancement of the friendly force’s freedom of movement relative to the hostile force. Protection of the friendly force from the effects of hostile weapon systems and natural occurrences. This includes countermobility, OPSEC, and deception.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT</td>
<td>Sustainment of the friendly force, primarily in the fields of logistics, personnel services, and health services. This includes civil affairs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 40. Battlefield Operating Systems
Source: FM 31-20, Special Forces Operations, 1539.
defensive framework as described in FM 100-5 Operations or FM 71-100 Division Operations does not exist for LIC. The clandestine nature of the insurgent and the lack of traditional geographic\political borders may leave no
definable boundaries. LIC is usually non-linear and the traditional objectives such as taking or holding high ground may take another form such as winning the "hearts and minds" of the people of the respective country. This will necessitate that the BOS elements be arranged in a different order than conventional operations to successfully accomplish the purpose depending on the mission.

In synchronizing the BOS, the purpose is the desired result. Purpose may also be described as the mission and commander's intent. Figure 41 above illustrates a sample arrangement of the BOS in MIC. However, this arrangement can be counterproductive in LIC where the military plays the supporting role to economic and political elements of national power. When planning revolves around maneuver and lethal fire support, the principle of minimum use of violence can be compromised. PSYOPS in the *Blueprint of the Battlefield* comes under non-lethal fire support. A potential arrangement of the BOS for LIC is proposed in figure 41. This arrangement would be METT-T dependent. Intelligence could precede civil affairs and PSYOPS. Figure 7 (US Force Functions in LIC) in chapter one compared with figure 41 illustrates a plausible relationship. The BOS systems have been extensively covered in appropriate field manuals concerning mid-high conflict. Low intensity conflict has received less attention.

The unique environment for LIC in Latin America requires adapting the BOS of LID to maximize effectiveness. The proposed BOS arrangement for LIC in
figure 41 provides an order for analysis. PSYOPS as part of non-lethal fire support BOS will be the first area examined.

The benefits of effective PSYOPS are frequently over looked when conventional units plan military operations in LIC. PSYOPS is at the core of successful LIC campaigns. Frequently, the battle for minds and winning the information war are key ingredients to effective operations. Neglecting PSYOPS planning at division level happens for two reasons. First, the LID is not authorized any PSYOPS specialists or PSYOPS units. Eighty-seven percent of PSYOPS units are in the reserve. Support comes from either the one active duty PSYOPS group at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, or the reserve unit that supports the division under the reserve CAPSTONE TRACE, an alignment of reserve units with regular army units based on wartime missions. With such a large percentage of PSYOPS units in the reserve, it is difficult to get support for field training exercises, command post exercises, and unit training. Without PSYOPS specialists available full-time, PSYOPS is not well integrated into planning.

The second problem in planning for PSYOPS is that PSYOPS is not fully understood by most operations and intelligence officers. Branch schools do not cover the subject in great depth and its importance in mid-high intensity conflict is minor in comparison to other combat multipliers. Failure to understand PSYOPS can put US forces at a serious disadvantage.

The recent operations in Panama provided some valuable lessons on the
enemy's use of PSYOPS. The deposed leader of the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF), Manuel Noriega, was a master of PSYOPS. US actions were constantly taped, edited, and used as propaganda to support his on-going harassment of US forces and attempts to gain support of the Panamanian people. Military operations had to plan and train to expect that their actions could be closely scrutinized. Behavior had to be "cold and correct" to ensure that actions were not misinterpreted.²¹

For PSYOPS to be effective it must be planned from the beginning in operations and just not as an after thought, and it must be tailored to the specific region/target. With the budget axe looming over the entire Army, getting additional personnel added to the force structure for PSYOPS units or the LID is highly unlikely. However, personnel within the division's planning and intelligence cells could receive additional PYSOPS training. Presently, brigade and division assistant operations officers (S3/G3) are coded for additional skill identifiers (ASI) to attend courses for air operations (5U) and electronic warfare (5M). Selected personnel could receive additional training in PSYOPS to ensure trained personnel in this area. In addition, some brigade and division S3/G3 positions could be coded for officers with an infantry primary and a functional area of PSYOPS (39). With no addition to the force structure, units with a primary focus in LIC could have personnel school trained in PSYOPS.

There are other advantages of having personnel trained within the
division in PSYOPS instead of relying on specialized PSYOP units. Since
PSYOPS is a special operations force, there are significant policy restrictions on
using PSYOPS and PSYOPS units. PSYOPS is an integral part of LIC.
Military courses of action must be considered in terms of their psychological
impact, and must be planned based on their psychological effect. Mao Tse
Tung said the army is "an armed organization fulfilling the political tasks of the
revolution.... The Red Army does not make war for war's sake: this is a war of
propaganda in the midst of the masses."22 Working closely with PSYOPS in
winning the people in a LIC environment is civil affairs.

Civil affairs falls under the greater umbrella of civil-military operations
(CMO). In mid-high intensity conflict, civilians of a country have been
traditionally looked at by a military commander as a source of labor and
supplies to sustain the military effort.23 Keeping civilians out of the way and
preventing interference with military operations was delegated to civil affairs
officers, with only lip service paid to real CMO. As in true with PSYOPS units,
eight-seventy percent of the US Army's civil affairs units are in the reserve.24
"They are primarily trained to provide military government in occupied
territories [European scenario] rather than to assist host nation militaries in the
performance of civic-action and other counterinsurgency programs."25 The LID
working in a LIC environment such as Latin America should take another
perspective.

In a LIC environment, the people of the host nation are the key to
success. Getting them to support the military and the government is the principle to success in revolutionary warfare. This is done by reversing traditional military priorities and assisting the indigenous population through the government of the host nation in meeting their needs and aspirations and denying support to the opposition. CMO is defined in FM 100-20 as:

All military efforts to support host nation development, undermine insurgent grievances, gain support for the national government, and attain national objectives without combat. They include, for example, medical, engineer, communications, transportation and logistical activities undertaken incident to the combined operations. Successful CMO reduce or eliminate the need for combat operations. This minimized destruction of life and property.

The normal role of the US military in civic assistance and civic action is to advise and assist host nation military forces. US military units rarely enter into direct action civic action programs. Civic assistance in FID is to improve the host governments capability to perform the various governmental functions. This usually requires specialized CA personnel. Military civic action primarily involves the participation of host nation military forces in projects that enhance economic and social development. US military forces advise and assist host nation military forces. Units as small as a battalion task force may be assigned CA elements to assist in enforcing CA plans.

Engineers and other branches in conventional wars have always had to be ready to fight as infantry. In LIC, infantry, artillery, and other branches may have to assist in other ways besides their primary combat specialties to support
the CA effort. Soldiers must have discipline, courtesy, and honesty in dealing with the people in the host nation. The conduct of effective CMO operations will be essential if military operations in Third World countries are to be successful. Combined arms teams for LIC, composed of engineers, medics, public affairs, CA and other combat support and service support specialists lead the fight in LIC. An effective CA program also leads to additional sources to obtain intelligence.

Intelligence in counterinsurgency and most LIC operations, should provide the the basis for all operations.\textsuperscript{31} The focus of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is different than the IPB process in mid-high intensity conflict. The "key terrain" in LIC is people, not the traditional factors of cover, concealment, observation, fields of fire, etc. The effect of operations on the people of a host nation is a key consideration. Maintaining moral high ground is decisive terrain. What this means is that operations and actions must remain within the letter and spirit of existing treaties and law. The judge advocate general officer must be consulted to determine legal ramifications of contemplated actions.

Along with the IPB process, recent operations in Panama highlighted the continual problem with getting human intelligence (HUMINT).\textsuperscript{32} LIC is HUMINT intensive and everyone could be a source of information. A lack of collection by the intelligence community and the enemy's relative lack of sophistication in electronic means and reliance on human means for command
and control often negate the effectiveness of US technical collection efforts.

Defined as all information derived through human sources, HUMINT is represented tactically by exploitation of enemy prisoners of war and civilian detainees, translation of captured enemy documents, long-range surveillance operations, patrols, observation posts, liaison with local military, paramilitary and civilian intelligence forces, and most importantly, reports from friendly troops. All soldiers are considered collectors of information. Military police, when conducting routine patrols, should be given intelligence requirements.

Interrogators are one of the tools available to the commander to obtain intelligence requirements. Interrogators are specially trained linguists and intelligence analysts. Their job is to screen and interrogate enemy prisoners of war (EPW), detainees, and refugees and to translate captured enemy documents. However, there may not be enough trained interrogators to meet requirements. Alternate personnel may be trained to supplement collection of information requirements. Alternate teams are trained in the "tactical questioning process." These teams are not a substitute for trained interrogators, but they conduct a quick examination of EPWs/others, and provide immediate feedback to battalion and brigade intelligence officers. The EPWs are then forwarded to collection points to be interrogated by trained teams. The tactical questioning process can provide valuable information quickly for commanders to act on. In LIC, valuable intelligence can be obtained from a variety of sources such as combat support and combat service support personnel.
The combat service support requirements for the LID in LIC are substantially different than the CSS requirements in mid-high intensity conflict. LIC usually requires a modification of the traditional concepts of logistics support because of the nation-building role of US forces in Third World countries. CS and CSS units greatly bolster humanitarian, CA, and PSYOP programs. Conventional echelons of logistic functions are not responsive enough to sustain a LIC force in an austere area of the world. Direct contact by units, whether a joint task force (JTF) or the LID, with the wholesale logistics community may be required for responsive support to remote areas. Tailoring support packages to sustain forces and political objectives requires careful planning.

Austere, remote locations typically do not have developed infrastructures that can receive, handle, and store large amounts of supplies and equipment. In Central America, only about 40 of 1,600 airfields (three percent) are capable of supporting a C-130. South America is a little better with 500 of 8,600 airfields (six percent) capable of supporting a C-130. Supply handling would have to be kept to a minimum. Short duration conflicts (less than 90 days) should be supported by carefully tailored, preplanned resupply packages when possible. Transportation and storage constraints must be taken into account within the area of operation. Transportation modes may include water, air, and land. Depending on the situation, strategic and theater airlift may be required to move supplies and forces until surface transportation can be
made available.\textsuperscript{40}

Operation Nimrod Dancer (May 1989-December 1989) provided some valuable lessons. One must keep in mind that the area of operation was Panama which has several large fixed airfields and an existing US military infrastructure. However, the lessons provide excellent insight into future operations. CSS lessons learned were:

\begin{itemize}
\item[a.] Arrival and departure airfield control groups are critically important.
\item[b.] Transport requires water, air, and land modes.
\item[c.] Movement control center operations coordinated by S3, S4, and provost marshal.
\item[d.] Food service requires careful considerations. Consolidated messes are used, transport must be planned. Meals-ready-to-eat (MRE) have shortened shelf life and must be rotated.
\item[e.] Medical supplies must be appropriate to environmental conditions and protected against deterioration.
\item[f.] Doctors and medical personnel must be prepared to deal with tropical diseases and environmental hazards.
\item[g.] JP-5 fuel does not work in mechanized vehicles.
\item[h.] Water supply and reverse osmosis water purification units are important.
\item[i.] All maintenance is complicated by saltwater corrosion. Material must be covered.
\item[j.] Forward area support teams are used, rather than forward support bases, because of treaty limits on access to land areas.
\item[k.] Personnel policies must be planned, including leave, PCS, rest and relaxation, and a rotation scheme.
\item[l.] Personal financial affairs must be planned. Direct deposit of pay is insufficient for soldiers who do not maintain a checking account.\textsuperscript{41}
\item[m.] Ammunition handling and accountability is a major issue. The troops and systems must be fully loaded for operations. Ammunition is accounted for after each operation.\textsuperscript{42}
\item[n.] Combat support troops are involved in local security operations. LIC is personnel-intensive and there are not enough infantry and military police to provide everyone security.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{itemize}

While the above list is certainly not all-inclusive, it shows some of the unique aspects of CSS in a LIC environment. Conducting LIC operations in Third World countries requires special considerations that are normally not a
problem in a mature theater. The economies of Third World countries are generally fragile and a large American presence may impact unfavorably on local economies. Conventional logistics concepts attempt to use host nation support as much as possible when supporting military operations. This reduces the logistics burden on US forces. Particular care must be exercised in limiting adverse effects on the host nation economy by overloading its capacity to accommodate the required logistical support. President Bush, in his 1990 National Security Strategy of the US noted: "The logistics 'tail' of deployed forces will also have to be kept to a minimum, as an overly large American presence could be self-defeating."

Use of local procurement, contracting, equipment rentals, and large amounts of US dollars may have dramatic unforseen consequences on local economies. If non-standard procurement actions are anticipated, an analysis of their impact on local economies should be made. Procurement specialists will have to be on advance parties. LIC requires time-sensitive, discrete deployments. Reducing the "footprint" of US forces also enhances operational security. Logistics build-up is one of the first indicators to the press and potential adversaries that something is about to happen. For example, the Washington Post deduced that something was about to happen in Panama prior to the execution of Operation Just Cause. H-hour for Just Cause was 0100 hours on 20 December 1989. The morning edition of 20 December 1989 Washington Post had an article titled, "U.S. Reported Airlifting Troops to
Panama Base. While Manuel Noriega may not have figured out an invasion of Panama was imminent, the *Washington Post* figured it out at least one day prior, on 19 December 1989. In the future, operations security may require modifying normal predeployment coordination.

Tailoring of established readiness SOPs may be required so as not to be different from day-to-day operation signatures. Figure 42 provides a comparison of MAC operations in Panama before and during Just Cause. Command and control procedures also influence how a force is deployed.

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**Figure 42. MAC Comparisons**

*Source: Armed Forces Journal, February 1990.*

The command and control (C³) system of the light infantry division
enables commanders to prioritize and allocate assets to accomplish assigned missions and obtain timely information, facilitate responsive decisions, communicate orders, and ensure compliance. The LID will normally be committed in a LIC as part of a joint effort with other services, agencies, and allies involved in the operations. Political constraints and stringent rules of engagements are the norm for military involvement in LIC. Command and control must support objectives that are not wholly military. One of the tools available for mission analysis and planning is METT-T.

The planning process for the LID in LIC follows the normal mission analysis process. Major differences when planning military operations in LIC and mid-high intensity conflict are the political and economic situations that will be encountered. To assist in ensuring that political considerations are incorporated in planning, METT-T has been modified to add the political factor. Its importance was realized early during Operation Nimrod Dancer in Panama. METT-TP includes factors that have not traditionally been incorporated into the planning process. Political objectives and strategies must be directly supported by military objectives and strategy.

The ramifications of poorly executed military operations will be immediately exploited by the use of anti-US propaganda by American enemies to weaken friendship and cooperation between the US and the host nation. Political goals must permeate military planning and execution. Concern for noncombatants and collateral damage is expressed in terms of rules-of-
engagement (ROE). The following table provides a list of some planning considerations for METT-TP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
<th>TERRAIN/WEATHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Operations</td>
<td>National &amp; Region Origins</td>
<td>Effects of Seasons, Phases of Moon, and Coastal Tides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Suitability of Terrain and Road Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populace &amp; Resource</td>
<td>Strength, Moral, and Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Operations</td>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-Civic Action</td>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Operations</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisory Assistance</td>
<td>Leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROOPS/RESOURCES</td>
<td>Relations with Civilians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat/CS/CSS</td>
<td>Status of Supplies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realistic Appraisal</td>
<td>Effectiveness of Intell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities &amp; Assets</td>
<td>LOC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give Flexibility to</td>
<td>Vulnerabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate Leaders</td>
<td>External Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 43. Planning Considerations for METT-TP.

Planning for the political factor is difficult because political objectives are nebulous when compared to traditional military objectives such as taking a hill or defeating an enemy force. Personnel must be trained in how to think and not what to think. Knowing and understanding the commander's intent is critical. Situations arise where there are no easy solutions. Decision making resides at the level where political sensitivity and tactical expertise co-exist.51
This means that operations are centrally planned and executed through the use of radios and command presence at decisive points; however, when this is not available, the leader on the scene must make a decision based on an understanding of the commander's intent. Communications may go from a squad leader to a CINC in a matter of seconds. Relying on the discipline and knowledge of small units requires trust in junior leaders. Leaders must master ROE as well as tactics. METT-TP, ROE, and communications contribute in determining how the maneuver elements of the light division will be employed.

In LIC, indirect use of military force is the rule rather than the exception. Much has been written on the tactics and techniques of employing infantry, aviation, and mechanized forces in LIC environments. Defining at what point a conflict has moved from LIC to MIC is still being debated. JCS Pub 3-07 says "If the situation requires US forces to take the initiative, the transition to war has begun. Such operations cannot enhance the legitimacy of the host nation government and cannot be considered LIC operations." US forces, if used, will probably be used in strategically defensive operations. They will be used in LIC primarily to enable the host nation government time to regain the initiative and control. FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Operations and FM 7-98 Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict provide a considerable amount of information on tactics and techniques of small unit operations that predominate in LIC. Recent operations in Panama and the great migration of people to cities in Latin America suggest that future operations there will be military
operations in urban terrain (MOUT).

When one thinks of Central America and South America, jungle and mountains come to mind. One of the problems in operating in a MOUT environment is collateral damage. Many innocent civilians may be in an area of operation and indiscriminate use of firepower, whether it is rifles, anti-tank missiles, or mortars can quickly alienate the people of the host nation. The rifle in the hands of a trained soldier is the only weapon that can discriminate. Anti-tank weapons such as an AT-4 may reduce a building, but also may penetrate through more than one building and cause extensive damage. Other weapons that are less destructive, depending on the situation, may be more effective. Military initiative must be assessed in terms of the political impact.

As illustrated in the RFPM, Latin America is a theater with many terrain constraints. Lack of airfields, inland waterways, undeveloped roads, poor bridges, and generally poor trafficability abound. Employment and sustainment for forces will be heavily affected by terrain. Cultural considerations such as religion and the Latin "machismo" provide additional constraints on the employment of forces. Motorcycles, all terrain vehicles, Boston whalers, zodiac rubber boats, and other non-standard means of transportation should be considered for maneuver forces.54

The M113 armored personnel carrier demonstrated its ability for evacuating civilians and its shock effect on enemy soldiers not accustomed to seeing tracked vehicles.55 However, the adverse affect of a tracked vehicle on
the surface of poorly maintained roads and bridges can be substantial. Figure 42 provides some considerations on employing heavy and light forces to achieve an optimum force mix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCE</th>
<th>ADVANTAGES</th>
<th>LIMITATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armor/mechanized</td>
<td>Show of Force-Shock</td>
<td>Highly Visible, Easy to Track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armor Protection</td>
<td>Vulnerable to Short-Range Anti-tank fires.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobility/Agility</td>
<td>Limited by Terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Firepower</td>
<td>Collateral Damage, noncombatant casualties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Surprise</td>
<td>Vulnerable to Automatic/Indirect Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobile in all Weather/Terrain.</td>
<td>Speed of Terrain Movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quickly Deployed.</td>
<td>Limited CSS Assets.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 44. Force Mix.

Maneuver combined with fire support has conventionally been the way US forces achieved positional advantage over a hostile force. Operations in LIC are characterized by the limited use of lethal fire support means. The application of firepower must always reflect the LIC principle of minimum use of violence. "Artillery is certainly not a subtle instrument for winning the hearts and minds of a people, even when used by the host nation's military. If it doesn’t always hit the intended (legitimate) target, then it's [artillery] working against us, not for us."

Tailoring the appropriate force mix for the contingency is based on the regional threat assessment and degrees of acceptable risk.
Figure 45 illustrates one author's conception of artillery roles in LIC and MIC. Line "a" defines where the actual introduction of a US artillery force package happens. Short of that line, there is no role for a ground force (line d1). Prior to d1, political, economic, and the informational elements of national power dominate. Line "b" indicates the regular artillery skills and knowledge needed by the artilleryman. Line "c" indicates the specialized skills and knowledge (language, regional awareness, security assistance) needed by an artilleryman.

Figure 45. Skills and Knowledge Artillerymen Need in LIC and MIC. Source: "What Role for Artillery in LIC or MIC?", Field Artillery, April 1990.

The cross-hatched area illustrate that military planners have difficulty
defining the demarcation line between LIC and MIC. The cross section taken at line d2 of figure 45 illustrates the introduction of a contingency force with an unspecified artillery package. Figure 45 is not regionally specific and would vary. This illustration could be expanded to include other combat arms that habitually play a supporting role in LIC.

Operation Nimrod Dancer provided some excellent lessons on the successful employment of artillery units in a LIC environment. The first is that artillery units must be ready to conduct non-standard artillery missions in support of objectives such as non-combatant evacuations. An artillery battalion headquarters was designated as a task force and given infantry, military police and signal elements to conduct operations because of restrictions on sending down additional maneuver command and control headquarters. Some of the other lessons learned were:

- Precision weapons are required to avoid collateral damage.
- Position and azimuth determining system locates target precisely.
- Counterbattery required at brigade and battalion.
- Q36 radar designed for linear battlefield. Not as useful when the enemy is everywhere.
- Mortars are restricted by jungle canopy.
- Illumination is valuable. Gives PSYOP edge by demonstrating that enemy is vulnerable to fires.
- Planning for sustained operations required.
- Artillery routinely operates in split battery, independent platoons.
- Firebase construction is a lost art that needs to be revived.
- Assault skills required. Some areas could not be traversed by surface transportation because of legal restriction.

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Fire support planning, both lethal and non-lethal, include engineers, army aviation, military intelligence, military police, signal, PSYOPS, CA, and NBC operations. Field artillery can support maneuver commanders and is effective in accomplishing or supporting security posts, checkpoints, roadblocks, patrols, deception plans, populace and resources control, and psychological operations. Artillery personnel, when not performing artillery specific missions, can be used for security and CA operations. While fire support planning usually receives a lot of attention, other areas such as defending against hostile air threats receive less attention.

The air threat to US forces involved in LIC will probably be less than in a MIC environment. However, many potential Third World countries have a growing inventory of sophisticated aircraft. LIC presents some special problems in defending against an enemy air threat. The area of operation for units will probably be widely separated based on the insurgent or guerrilla threat.

Traditional air defense deployment principles of mutual support, overlapping fires, integration, and getting a mix of ADA weapons may by difficult. To supplement ADA protection, maneuver and associated support soldiers will have to be prepared to employ small arms in air defense. The LID's ADA assets are designed to protect critical assets versus providing area coverage based on the commander's concept of operation and ADA priorities.

Environmental conditions such as high humidity have an adverse affect on missiles. Storage and transport of missiles must be considered. In areas
that have large bodies of water or inland waterways the Vulcan 20mm is an effective precision direct fire weapon against boats and ships. The TOW anti-tank missile system has reduced capability when fired over water. The Vulcan does not. Many potential US adversaries have access to American technology. Identification of enemy aircraft by IFF (identification friend or foe) may be hampered by countries that have this capability.

The LID is equipped with the Stinger missile and the Vulcan 20mm gun. If the LID is deployed on a contingency operation, it will probably be part of a joint task force. Depending on the situation and the threat, certain contingencies may require ADA weapons for medium and high altitude air defense. The problem is that contingencies theaters have Hawk missile units assigned to support them. The Hawk missile cannot defeat tactical ballistic missiles, but the Patriot missile can in some instances.

The proliferation of tactical ballistic missiles to countries with money to buy them is well documented. The LID would be highly vulnerable when occupying a lodgement area to a strike from a tactical ballistic missile. In Latin America, Brazil and Argentina manufacture and sell tactical ballistic missiles. Passive measures can be taken to reduce vulnerabilities, but the lack of an active defense capability should be considered. ADA, combined with the six other battlefield operating systems, must be coordinated and synchronized if the LID is to be effective. Learning to coordinate and synchronize the BOS is only accomplished through training.
"Training is the Army's most important peacetime mission. The ultimate measure of readiness is whether soldiers, leaders, crews, and teams can perform together as a unit to synchronize their efforts and project combat power at the decisive place and time in battle." The US Army derives its peacetime training requirements from analyzing its wartime mission requirements prescribed in the JSPS, specifically the JSCP. The concept called "battle focus" enables commanders at all levels to structure training programs that will help ensure that the Army can accomplish assigned missions and unforeseen contingencies.

To do this, limited resources must be effectively organized to train units as they are going to fight. Recognizing essential and non-essential tasks is critical to an effective training program. Units do not have the time or the resources to train for every possible contingency. However, by focusing on mission essential task list (METL), a unit will be able to achieve and sustain proficiency in required tasks.

The most critical inputs to METL development are the organization's wartime operation and contingency plans. A commander identifies specified and implied mission essential tasks from all possible tasks based on war plans and directives. The seven battlefield operating systems are used to systematically ensure that all elements of the organization are incorporated into the METL. The result is a METL developed by each commander for his respective level within an organization. Appendix D provides a list of possible missions for a LID in LIC.
The following is a list of METLs for the 7th Infantry Division (L):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIVISION</th>
<th>BRIGADE</th>
<th>BATTALION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rapidly Deploy by Air</td>
<td>Rapidly Alert, Assemble, Plan Under Time Constraints, Deploy</td>
<td>Rapidly Alert, Assemble, Plan Under Time Constraints, Deploy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish and Expand a Lodgement</td>
<td>Establish and Expand Lodgement</td>
<td>Conduct Air Assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Offensive Operations in Close/Urban Terrain</td>
<td>Conduct Offensive Operations in Close &amp; Urban Terrain</td>
<td>Conduct Relief In Place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Defensive Operations in Close/Urban Terrain</td>
<td>Conduct Defensive Operations in Close &amp; Urban Terrain</td>
<td>Conduct Passage of Lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)</td>
<td>Conduct NEO</td>
<td>Conduct Link-Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Passage of Lines</td>
<td>Conduct Link-Up</td>
<td>Conduct Link-Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct River Crossings</td>
<td>Conduct Passage of Lines</td>
<td>Defend in Sector (Defend)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Link-Up</td>
<td>Conduct Relief in Place</td>
<td>Defend a Perimeter (Defend)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct Movement to Contact (Move Tactically)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct Hasty Attack (Fight a Meeting Engagement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct Deliberate Attack (Assault)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct Infiltration/Exfiltration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct Stay Behind Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct Hasty River Crossings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Attack in Built-Up Area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commanders establish supporting conditions and standards which provide a clear statement of expected training performance. The desired level of warfighting proficiency is defined in mission training plans (MTPs) published basically for each type of unit. To determine if a unit meets the required level of warfighting proficiency, evaluations are conducted. Evaluations can be informal, formal, internal, external, or any combination of these. The problem
in conducting evaluations is that combat conditions can only be simulated. The real test of a unit's proficiency is its performance in actual combat. The initial assessment of Operation Just Cause validated the above mission essential tasks.67

One of the major lessons to be learned, however, is that the conditions and standards of each task should be changed measurably to reflect the environment. Changing the conditions and standards in which training is conducted and evaluated will enhance the effectiveness of units when employed to specific theaters. One thing that should be considered is the name given to the tasks. In an environment where the intrusive media will be present, task names such as "conducting offensive operations in an urban area" may conjure up to references to terms such as "search and destroy" that caused the Army a lot of consternation in Vietnam. Perceptions rather than reality sometimes affect public opinion adversely.

Examining the battlefield operating systems of the light infantry division in a LIC environment have shown the distinctive nature of war at the low end of the operational continuum. Planning and execution of operations in a LIC environment require a different mindset than operations in mid-intensity conflict. Failure to recognize the political nature of military operations in low-intensity conflict can be disastrous.

The French experience in Algeria provides a vivid reminder. The French Army's overt military response achieved military success, but alienated the Algerian people. "The combination of mobility and firepower achieved
spectacular military results [against the insurgents]. In a conventional war, the degree of destruction against the insurgent force would have constituted victory, but in a politically motivated insurgency it was irrelevant. The use of firepower and violence, and the failure of the French Army to understand the political nature of the war, all but destroyed the reputation and effectiveness of the Army. Roger Trinquier, a highly decorated French officer, wrote of the French Army's experience in Algeria:

Our military machine reminds one of a pile driver attempting to crush a fly, indefatigable persisting in repeating its efforts. The inability of the army to adapt itself to changed circumstances [revolutionary war] has heavy consequences. It gives credence to the belief that our adversaries, who represent only weak forces, are invincible and that sooner or later, we shall have to accept their conditions for peace. It encourages the diffusion of dangerously erroneous ideas, which eventually become generally accepted.

The light infantry division, if properly employed in a low intensity conflict, can measurably protect and advance US interests.
ENDNOTES

Chapter VI


3Ibid., p. 2-1.

4Ibid., p. 2-1.

5Ibid., p. 1-3.

6Department of the Army, Draft 7th Infantry Division (Light) Capabilities Book, (Fort Ord: Headquarters, 7th Infantry Division (Light), 10 April 1989), p. 9-1.

7Ibid., p. 5-1.

8Ibid., p. 10-1.

9FM 71-100, p. D-3.

10Ibid., p. D-3.

11Ibid., p. D-3.


20See Appendix A for a detailed explanation of the CAPSTONE program.


22Mao Tse Tung, p. 274.


24Defense 89 Almanac, p. 16.


27FM 100-20, p. 2-38.


29FM 41-10, p. 3-2.


31FM 100-20, p. 2-17.

32William McDaniel and Randy Bell, p. 3.


37JCS Pub 3-07, p. VII-5.


"Dave Buckley, "Summary of Lessons Learned, Operation Nimrod Dancer," USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS (DJCO/LIC PRO, ATZL-SWJ-CL), ca., [November 1989], p. 6. All the above items came from this report.

42William McDaniel and Randy Bell, p. 4.

43Ibid., p. 4.


45Bush, p. 27.


48FM 100-20, p. E-40.

49FM 71-100, p. 1-3.


51Ibid.
The British Staff College *Counter Revolutionary Warfare Handbook* provides some excellent examples of ROE, handling and interrogating prisoners, and the legal implications of soldiers actions. It is based on British operations in Northern Ireland, but the lessons are applicable almost anywhere.

*JCS Pub 3-07, p. II-24.*

*Buckley, p. 4.*

*William McDaniel and Randy Bell, p. 3.*


*Ibid., p. 13.*

*Ibid., p. 14.*

*Ibid., p. 15.*


*Buckley, p. 5.*

*Buckley, p. 5.*


*Ibid., p. 2-1.*

*Ibid., p. 2-6.*

*Dave Buckley, interview by author, 27 April 1990, Ft. Leavenworth, KS., Center for Army Lessons Learned. Major Buckley has conducted numerous interviews with personnel directly involved directly in Just Cause in his capacity as a researcher for the Center for Army Lessons Learned. In a telephone interview with Major Michael Barbero, 27 April 1990, Asst. G3, 7th Infantry Division (L), Ft. Ord, CA, he stated that Just Cause validated the 7th IDs (L) METL, but the river crossing tasks have been dropped.*

Ibid., p. 67.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

A good soldier, whether he leads a platoon or an army, is expected to look backward as well as forward; but he must think only forward.

General Douglas MacArthur, West Point, 1933

The purpose of this thesis was to determine if a regional focus was required for a light infantry division to operate effectively in a low intensity conflict environment. The preceding chapters provided an in-depth look at the conception and capabilities of the light infantry division, a framework from which to understand low intensity conflict, the joint strategic planning system, unified commands, and an analysis of the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. This study concludes that the light infantry division should be regionally focused to operate effectively in a low intensity conflict environment.

The light infantry division's primary mission is to defeat enemy forces in a LIC conflict and, when augmented, fight in a mid-high intensity conflict. The light division is organized and equipped for LIC. The unique nature of LIC requires a different approach for the DoD and the US Army than the usual
fixation on mid-high intensity conflict. The way American's view war must be modified to incorporate fundamental changes in the global environment.

The shift of emphasis from preparing for conventional war in Europe has been dramatic. Military power, while an essential underpinning of national strategy, figures less prominently and in different ways in the global balance among nations. President Bush in the 1990 National Security Strategy of the United States said, "We see that the more likely demands for the use of our military forces may not involve the Soviet Union and may be in the Third World, where new capabilities and approaches may be required."1

In an environment where operations short of war are becoming the norm, the DoD and the US Army should ask whether or not it is organized, structured, equipped, and trained to perform effectively in that arena. There is no question that the DoD should maintain a credible force to meet its NATO commitments in Central Europe; however, the conventional fixation on a heavy firepower-attrition orientation must be altered to be successful in low intensity conflict.

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was a realization by Congress that the way in which business was conducted in the DoD had to be altered if the military were to remain an effective element of national power. The essence of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to provide unified commanders the resources, forces, and equipment needed to support US national interests in their area of responsibility. The CINCs now had the authority fully commensurate with their responsibility for assigned missions.
Services were assigned the responsibility for the recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, and mobilizing for their respective branch of service. The warfighting responsibility was left to the CINC. The CINCs forces are apportioned to him through the joint strategic capabilities plan (JSCP) which is part of the joint strategic planning system. The apportionment is based on global war with the Soviet Union.

Although apportioned, there are not enough forces to cover every contingency, so forces are allocated to CINCs based on the worst case of global war. Forces prepare for war based on their primary war plan which is oriented on mid-high intensity warfare against the Soviet Union. The preparations for mid-high intensity conflict (and associated mindsets) do not make US forces equally prepared to cope with low intensity conflict. The result is forces that could be counterproductive in LIC.

The sophisticated nature and unique requirements of LIC in each theater now indicate that units generally trained for MIC anywhere in the world will be ineffective when applied to LIC against region specific threats. The political and cultural nature of regional and specific LIC makes specialization a necessary. Tying CONUS based LIDs to CINCs actively involved in LIC would help ensure that the LIDs trained on the appropriate mission essential tasks, based on the conditions and standards within a specified region. A combatant commander, while not involved in the day-to-day activities of the CONUS based division, could ensure that the overall training program was focused on LIC for his
Field training exercises, command post exercise, and trips to combined training centers would reflect the realities of conflict in their assigned regions. Units whose mission is assisting with national building or combatting insurgents in jungle or urban environments do not need to be fighting Soviet motorized rifle regiments in the California desert.

If a LID were tied directly to a specific regional CINC, the CINC and his staff would become familiar with the capabilities and limitations of the respective LID and its personnel. The LID would be experts in the region, the nature of the threat, and specific peculiarities of local geography. Regionally focusing a LID would not negate its utility for mid-high intensity conflict. President Bush made that point clear in his guidance, "As we make fundamental changes in our military forces, we will preserve a capacity for reversibility." Many of the mission essential tasks remain the same, it is the conditions and standards that are measurably different.

The estimated 30 to 60 days warning of a conventional war with the Soviet Union would provide enough time for the LID to reorient its training program. The real difficulty for soldiers is in changing the mindset from the maximum use of violence to a minimum use of violence. Many of the tasks for light infantry in LIC are the same as the tasks for mid-high intensity. It is the application that is fundamentally different.

President Bush has realized the necessity of fundamental changes with
the following statement, "We will develop the weaponry and force structure
needed for the special demands of the Third World even if it means that some
forces are less optimal for a conflict on the European central front." The
changing world environment mandates a major reorientation of how light
infantry divisions are apportioned if they are to remain an effective military tool
to the CINC and the national command authority.
ENDNOTES

Chapter VII


DEFINITIONS

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

Army CAPSTONE Program. A peacetime organizational structure based on wartime contingency requirements which allows for effective management and interface of the Total Force. Both active component and reserve component units are placed into a wartime organization designed to meet mobilization requirements in a CONUS and OCONUS contingency. The Army CAPSTONE program implements wartime planning alignments in coordination with the peacetime chain of command. (FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, USA)

civil affairs. Those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship among military forces, civil authorities, and people in a friendly country or area or occupied country or area when military forces are present. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorists acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)
**Country team.** The senior in-country United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, usually an ambassador, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency. In JCS Pub 1-02, see United States country team. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

**Crisis.** An incident or situation involving a threat to the US, its territories, citizens, military forces and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (JCS Pub 3-07, DOD)

**Foreign internal defense.** Participation by civilian and military agencies of government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

**Guerrilla warfare.** Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous, forces. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

**Host nation.** A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies or allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, or to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

**Instruments of national power.** The means (political, economic, informational, and military) available for employment in the pursuit of national objectives. (JCS Pub 3-07, DOD)

**Insurgency.** An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

**Internal defense and development.** The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. (JCS Pub 3-07, DOD)
**joint task force.** A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these services, which is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a unified command, a specified command, or an existing joint task force. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

**logistic intelligence.** The strategic, operational, and tactical information required by the logistician to develop and execute the logistic support plan for a specific concept of operations. (JCS Pub 3-07, DOD)

**low intensity conflict.** Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

**military assistance advisory group.** A joint-Service group, normally under the military command of a commander of a unified command and representing the Secretary of Defense, which primarily administers the US military assistance planning and programming the host country. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

**national command authorities.** The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

**peacekeeping.** Efforts taken with the consent of civil or military authorities of the belligerent parties to a conflict to maintain a negotiated truce in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve and maintain peace. (JCS Pub 3-07, DOD)

**peacemaking.** A type of peacetime contingency operation intended to establish or restore peace and order through the use of force. (JCS Pub 3-07, DOD)

**peacetime contingencies.** Normally, the short-term, rapid projection or employment of military forces in conditions short of war. Such employment can also require a large, highly visible buildup of US military forces over extended periods of time. (JCS Pub 3-07, DOD)
**Psychological Operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign government, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

**Resistance Movement.** An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist legally established government or an occupying power to disrupt civil order and stability. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

**Sabotage.** An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises or utilities, to include human and natural resources. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

**Security Assistance.** Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, credit, or cash sales, in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

**Security Assistance Organization.** All DOD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. For instance, it includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense/military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attache personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. (JCS Pub 3-07, DOD)

**Subversion.** Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, political strength, or morale of a regime. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

**Terrorism.** The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)

**Theater.** The geographical area outside the continental US for which a commander of a unified or specified command has been assigned military responsibility. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)
Third World. Those developing countries characterized by limited industrial, technological, economic, social, or political development. These characteristics may manifest themselves in many forms; most notably, rapid population growth, limited occupational alternatives to agriculture, failed agrarian reform, rampant inflation, wide-spread poverty, inequity in the concentration of land holdings, weak civilian authority, or dependence on one of the superpowers or their allies for economic development. (JCS Pub 3-07)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of low visibility, covert, or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by (an) external source(s) during all conditions of war or peace. (JCS Pub 1-02, DOD)
STRATEGIC AIRLIFT

The purpose of this appendix is to provide a basic understanding of strategic airlift and the impact the new Air Force strategic aircraft the C-17, will have on deploying the light infantry division.

The Defense Authorization Act of 1981 required a detailed study of US mobility requirements. The result was the Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS) that determined the mix of airlift, sealift, and prepositioning which would provide an acceptable US response capability for military contingencies in the 1990's. Published in April 1981, the study was chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and included the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹

The CMMS developed four scenarios: individual invasions of Saudi Arabia, Iran, NATO and finally an invasion of Saudi Arabia followed by an invasion of NATO. These scenarios were developed for the 1986 time frame, but were used as a basis for force deployments in 1982, 1986, and 1990. The lift demand was restricted to include only programmed forces and materiel on hand for each of the three periods.² The CMMS gave both the Congress and DoD a goal to work for in terms of lift resources needed to meet global requirements. The result for airlift requirements was a minimum goal of sixty-six
million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) of strategic cargo airlift capability. In FY 1989, the Air Force has the capability to move forty-seven MTM/D of strategic cargo. Figure 46 illustrates present capabilities. The shortfall between sixty-six MTM/D and forty-seven MTM/D will be made up by the C-17 that has an initial operational capability scheduled for FY 1992.³

![US Intertheater Cargo Airlift Capability](image)

Figure 46. US Intertheater Cargo Airlift Capability.
Source: JCS Military Posture, FY 89.

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The following aircraft are available for strategic mobility requirements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>NUMBER** (Active/Reserve)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-5</td>
<td>66*/44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-141</td>
<td>218*/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>206/296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KC-10</td>
<td>56*/0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*C-5, C-141, and KC-10s are jointly operated by Active and Reserve Associate Units.

**Full Activation.

Figure 47. MAC Airlift.
Source: US Military Posture FY 1989

The C-17 is critical to the Army's strategic mobility. The aircraft is designed to support Army requirements, and the Army fully supports its fielding. The C-17 will significantly reduce the time the light infantry division needs to reach a contingency theater. As illustrated in figure 3 (page 6), the LID requires 548 C-141B sorties to completely move the LID. The C-141B load planning factor is 26 short tons for a 3,000 nautical mile route. The C-17 load planning factor is 46.3 short tons for a 3,000 nautical mile route. The LID needs only 304 C-17 sorties to deploy the entire division. The capabilities of the C-17 greatly enhance the potential force projection capabilities of the United States.

A hypothetical scenario follows to demonstrate the potential impact of the
C-17 on deploying US forces to meet potential contingencies. Figure 48 on page 255 postulates a Nicaraguan attack into Honduras toward the capital at Tegucigalpa with forces which, through a continued Soviet-supported buildup, have become vastly superior to the Honduran forces. The primary Nicaraguan attack route is the road from Somotillo to Choluteca with a supporting attack driving southwestward from Somoto along the Pan American Highway to join forces at Choluteca. A secondary attack route is in the mountains north from Ocotal toward Danli.

Rapid reinforcement is necessary to halt the invasion and prevent destruction of the Honduran Army. A US LID with its corps augmentation, a total of 31,101 tons, is airlifted from the CONUS to assist the Hondurans.

There are few airfields in Honduras with parking to support a large flow of airlift aircraft. However, there is sufficient aircraft parking at two rear airfields (La Mesa and Palmerola) to accommodate an airlift flow using the C-5 or C-141 aircraft. In this scenario the C-5 aircraft was used exclusively to deploy forces optimizing the use of available offload parking areas. Unfortunately, neither the C-5 nor the C-141 can use Toncontin, the airfield at Tegucigalpa (Honduras' capital) due to the steep approach required to avoid high terrain. Therefore, the C-5 airlifted units must road-march a longer distance to Choluteca than units airlifted into Toncontin.
In the above scenario, two options are explored. First, a "pre-C-17" option using just C-141s and C-5s. The second option uses C-17s in conjunction with C-5s and C-141s. The result is a significantly reduced reaction time for US forces. In the pre-C-17 option, the maximum number of aircraft that would fit into the airlift flow, as constrained by parking at La Mesa and Palmerola airfields, was employed. In this option, the last of the airlifted units are not ready to enter combat until daybreak on day 7 as illustrated in figure 49 on page 258.

When the C-17, with its ability to use Toncontin airfield, was added to the C-5 airlift flow, the deployment time from CONUS was cut in half. In this option, the last US units are ready for combat early on day 4 as depicted in figure 49.

Even though restricted to daylight operations at Toncontin, the C-17's rapid turnaround (onload, offload, servicing, etc.) characteristics enable it to maintain a high flow rate and results in it delivering a majority of the total units and resupply tonnage directly into Toncontin.

Figure 50 on page 259, presents three potential conclusions to the scenario that has been presented. As President Bush said "They [US forces] must be able to respond quickly, and appropriately, as the application of even small amounts of power early in a crisis usually pays significant dividends." The C-17 can operate on 3000 foot runways that the C-141 cannot, which means the C-17 can deliver personnel and cargo directly to many forward area operating bases.
The C-17's unique capabilities: direct delivery, ground maneuverability, small austere airfield capable, combat off-load, and strategic/tactical airlift provide America new potential in responding to global contingencies.
Figure 49. Deployment Time to Honduras, "Pre-C-17" and With C-17.
Source: McDonnel Douglas Information, n.d.
- Airlift deployment completed in half the time
- Honduran forces remain viable
- U.S. presence limited

- **With no U.S. forces**
  - Choluteca captured on Day 7
  - San Lorenzo falls on Day 15
  - Honduran forces decimated
  - Capital threatened

- **Pre C-17 airlift**
  - Counterattack begins on Day 7
  - Invasion halted on Day 9
  - Honduran forces heavily attrited
  - Long U.S. presence required

- **With C-17 in fleet**
  - Counterattack begins on Day 4
  - Invasion halted on Day 6
  - Honduran forces remain strong — can regain lost territory
  - Limited U.S. presence needed

Figure 50. Potential Conclusions to a Nicaraguan Invasion of Honduras.
ENDNOTES

Appendix B


2. Ibid., p. III-3.


7. Bush, p. 27.
APPENDIX C
### APPENDIX C

Tactical Differences Between Light and Regular Infantry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regular Infantry</th>
<th>Light Infantry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employs conventional tactics</td>
<td>Employs unusual tactics, uses the environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass and firepower are the primary tactical principles</td>
<td>Surprise is the primary tactical principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons and equipment oriented</td>
<td>People and terrain oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low mobility in close terrain</td>
<td>Excellent mobility in close terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently conducts frontal assaults</td>
<td>infiltrates in order to attack the enemy's flank and rear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrols to maintain contact</td>
<td>Patrols relentlessly in all situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engages the enemy at maximum range</td>
<td>Engages the enemy at close range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follows the path of least resistance</td>
<td>Chooses the path of least resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieves shock through mass</td>
<td>Achieves shock through surprise, speed and violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normally emphasizes firepower over maneuver</td>
<td>Emphasizes maneuver over firepower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defends from forward slope</td>
<td>Defends from reverse slope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics conform to a general pattern</td>
<td>Tactics have an unpredictable form, time and space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusts to available technology</td>
<td>Adjusts technology to available tactics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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APPENDIX D

The Total Environment of Military Operations Short of War¹

(A Laundry List of Missions in Peacetime)

Security Assistance (Training, Equipment, Combat Support)

- Humanitarian Aid (Chap 20, Title 10)
- Civic Assistance
- Mobile Training Teams
- Foreign Military Sales
- Foreign Internal Defense
- International Military Education Training
- Military Assistance Programs
- Disaster Assistance
- Indirect (vs Direct) Action
- Support National Defense (of other countries)
- Support National Development (Nation Building)
- Combatting Terrorism (Counterterrorism/Antiterrorism)
- Support Insurgency/Counterinsurgency

Peacekeeping Operations

- Military to Military Relations (Bi-/Multi-Lateral or Inter-/Intra-Service, Ergo Joint and Combined "Operational" Interoperability)

Joint and Combined Training and Exercises/Simulations/Wargames

- Conus Basing (TPFDD Forces, COHORT, ETC.)
- OCONUS Basing/Forward Deployments (Forces at All Echelons)
Operate Within Alliance and Agreements Constraints and Restraints

Basing/Overflight/Maritime Rights
Access to Land/Sea/Air--Transit Rights
Regional Security System

Psychological Operations

Civil Affairs Operations

Special Operations

Escort Operations

Rescue Operations (As Opposed to Search and Rescue or SAR Operations)

Search and Rescue Operations

Space Operations (C\textsuperscript{3}, COMMS, Aerospace Defense, SDI, ETC)

Military Advisory Operations

Intelligence Operations (Peacetime IPB, Establishment of Intelligence Architecture, Collection, Processing/Dissemination, Analysis/Production, Imagery Exploitation/Storage)

Demonstrations/Presence Operations

Siting of POM/CUS/Theater Reserves/Prepositioning of Ships/Storage Facilities/Military Construction/Protection and Maintenance

Mobilization (Airlift/SEALIFT/CRAF/C-17/RRF/EUSC Ships/Army LOTS)

Reserves (Manning/Training/Readiness/Equipping)

Combatting Organized Crime (Search and Rescue, Drug Interdiction, Customs, Immigration, Fishery, Pollution, Coast Guard--Inter-/Intra-Agency Cooperation)

Quarantine Operations

266
Blockade Operations

Non-Combattant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

Refugee Control Operations

Act Through Other Agencies (Outside DoD)

Act Through/with Other Host Countries (Host Nation Support/Combined Operations)

Policing a Cease Fire Agreement (Peacekeeping)

Joint Operations Planning (OPLAN, CONPLAN, OPORD-CAS, TPFDD, CAMPAIGN)

Peacetime Contingency Operations = Most NonTraditional Missions Assigned to the Military) (Normally Major Operations)

Lines of Communications Establishment/Maintenance

Maintain Political, Economic Cohesion

Marshalling and Synchronizing Resources

Setting Priorities for Use of Resources (PAPR, LRP, CINC IPL, BUDGETS)

Sustainment/Communications Zone Operations (Logistic/Admin Support)

All Echelons
Strategic Sea/Air Lift
Balancing/Distribution Stocks, Amnino, Petroleum, Medical, Etc.
Transportation Operations (Road, Rail, In-Land Waterways, Ports to Include Air and Sea, TRANSCOM TOAs Down to Trucks)
Reconstitution and Replacement Operations
Throughput Operations
Battlefield Damage Assessment and Repair (BDAR)
Military Construction of Facilities (Hangars, Storage, Bases, Etc.)
Lines of Communication into and out of Area of Operations (Temp/Perm)

Creation of Forces (Forward Deployments, Mobilization, Sustainment, Reconstitution, Force Structures Process)
Field Forces and Equipment In-Theater

Security (of FORCES) OPERATIONS (OPSEC, DECEPTION, PHYSICAL, ETC)

Establish C², COMMS, Computers (ADP), WWMMCS, Telephones, MSG, TV, Radio, DCS, Etc--Ensure Interoperability (Joint and Combined)

Medical Operations (Hospitals, Dr/Nurses/Corpsmen, Blood Flow, Aeromedical, Evacuation, Surge Operations--NBC, Mass CASualty, Etc)

Cross Leveling Programs (Army Peculiar)

Electronic Countermeasures and Counter-Countermeasures Operations

Reconnaissance Operations (Ground, Sea, Air, Space)

Inter-/Intra Theater Lift (Sea, Air--Strategic Lift)

Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises

Aerial Refuelling

Chemical and Biological Defense Operations

Air Defense, Counterair, Ballistic Missile Defense, Etc Operations

Early Warning Operations

Mine Clearing or Countermeasures (Minesweeping) Operations

Show of Force Operations

Unit Exchange (Partnership) Programs

Contain Threat

Eliminate Threats

Threat Reprisals

Preemptive Attacks

Deep Penetrations

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Direct (VS Indirect) Action

- Attack, Destroy, Disable (Direct)
- Delay, Defend, Dissuade
- Protect, Secure, Stabilize
- Deploy, Employ, Sustain, Redeploy

Consolidate (Economize Forces), Fine Tune, Do more with Less

Contribute to Regional Stability

Fund and Execute Security Assistance Programs

Monitor, Assist in Coalition Preparedness (Minimize Turbulence in Funding)

- Security Assistance
- Low Intensity Conflict
- Mid-High Intensity Conflict

Military Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Developments

Military Organization/Force Structure Developments

Military Training Developments

Military Materiel Development
ENDNOTE

Appendix D


Cable, Larry E. *Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War*.


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- January 1988
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