<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>UNCLASSIFIED</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AD NUMBER</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB125460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEW LIMITATION CHANGE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FROM</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies only; Administrative/Operational Use; 6 May 88. Other requests shall be referred to Hq.s., CAC and Ft. Leavenworth, Attn: ATZL-GOP-SE. Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUTHORITY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACGSC ltr dtd 28 Feb 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES
WORLD WAR II AND VIET NAM
BATTLEFIELD IMPLICATIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DANIEL G. KARIS, MAJ, MPC
B.S.C.J., University of Nebraska, 1976
B.A., Thomas Edison College of New Jersey, 1976
B.S.B.A., University of the State of New York, 1978
M.S.B.A., Boston University, 1983
M.A.J., Wichita State University, 1983
M.A., Central Michigan University, 1983

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1988

Distribution limited to U.S. Government agencies only:
Date: 6 May 1988. Other requests for this
document must be referred to HOS., CAC and Ft. Leavenworth.
ATTN: ATZL-GOP-SE, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
**Title:** Criminal Investigative Activities, World War II and Viet Nam Battlefield Implications

**Type of Report:** Master's Thesis

**Date of Report:** 1988 June 3

**Page Count:** 145

**Abstract:** (See reverse side)

**Field Group Sub-Group:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Sub-Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Subject Terms:**
- Criminal Investigation
- CID
- Provost Marshal
- Military Police
- World War II
- Viet Nam

**Distribution/Availability of Abstract:**
- UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED
- SAME AS RPT.
- DTIC USERS

**Abstract Security Classification:** Unclassified
3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT (CONTINUED)

Other requests for this document must be referred to HQS., CAC and Ft. Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-GOP-SE, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-5070

19. ABSTRACT (CONTINUED)

This study analyzes criminal investigative activities during World War II and the Viet Nam conflict to determine if there were similar patterns in the framework of command and control, organizational development, support, and investigative operations which have contemporary implications. The analysis uses historical records and archival material from both conflicts.

The findings reveal that command and control in both conflicts concerned whether or not it would be centralized or decentralized in the theater of operations. The centralization issue also influenced the organizational development of CID in the theater of operations. Patterns emerge in regard to the lack of organic support capabilities in administration, maintenance and laboratory support in both conflicts. In investigative operations CID maintained responsibility to investigate crimes in general, but blackmarketing crimes were a significant challenge in both conflicts.

The study concludes that there were similarities in CID activities in these wars. The fact that these similarities existed suggests that they will surface again in any future conflicts that CID is engaged in and thus have contemporary implications.
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES
WORLD WAR II AND VIET NAM
BATTLEFIELD IMPLICATIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DANIEL G. KARIS, MAJ, MPC
D.S.C.J., University of Nebraska, 1976
B.A., Thomas Edison College of New Jersey, 1976
B.S.B.A., University of the State of New York, 1978
M.S.B.A., Boston University, 1983
M.A.J., Wichita State University, 1983
M.A., Central Michigan University, 1983

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1988

Distribution limited to U.S. Government agencies only; operational use: 6 May 1988. Other requests for this
document must be referred to HQS., CAC and Ft. Leavenworth.
ATTN: ATZL-GOP-SE, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

88-3178
Name of Candidate: DANIEL G. KARIS

Title of Thesis: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES WORLD WAR II AND VIET NAM BATTLEFIELD IMPLICATIONS

Approved by:

MAJ ALLEN OHLSTEIN, M.P.A., Thesis Committee Chairman

MAJ STEPHEN A. BOURQUE, M.A., Thesis Committee Member

MAJ ERNEST M. PITT, JR., M.D., Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 3rd day of June 1988 by:

PHILIP J. BROOKES, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (Reference to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES, WORLD WAR II AND VIET NAM, BATTLEFIELD IMPLICATIONS, by Major Laniel G. Karis, USA, 145 pages.

This study analyzes criminal investigative activities during World War II and the Viet Nam conflict to determine if there were similar patterns in the framework of command and control, organizational development, support, and investigative operations which have contemporary implications. The analysis uses historical records and archival material from both conflicts.

The findings reveal that in both conflicts the issue of command and control concerned whether or not it would be centralized or decentralized in the theater of operations. The centralization issue also influenced the organizational development of CID in the theater of operations. Patterns emerge in regard to the lack of organic support capabilities in administration, maintenance and laboratory support in both conflicts. In investigative operations CID maintained responsibility to investigate crimes in general, but blackmarketing crimes were a significant challenge in both conflicts.

The study concludes that there were similarities in CID activities in these wars. The fact that these similarities existed suggests that they will surface again in any future conflicts that CID is engaged in and thus have contemporary implications.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is only fitting that I recognize those who were instrumental in the start and completion of this project. My MMAS Committee must stand at the top of the list. They gave freely of their time to read, correct, and reread this thesis. I am grateful for their effort, but take responsibility for any errors that may be uncovered. My committeemen were Majors Al Ohlstein, Steve Bourque, and Ernie Pitt.

I am also indebted to the staff and faculty of the Command and General Staff College and the Combined Arms Research Library, especially Mrs Meg Williams, MAJ Kurt Weiland, Mrs Helen Rutledge, and Mrs Mary Crowe.

Assisting me with the research were CW4 Larry Drayton, CW4 Harvey Andrews, Mr. Bob Brisentine, and Ms. Alice Russell of the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command.

The officers who assisted me in my apprenticeship as a CID Supervisor are COL (P) T.C. Jones, COL Al Simpson, CCL Dan Perry, COL Richard Mosko, (ret.), LTC (P) Tommy Tucker, LTC Pete Cottrell, (ret.), LTC Bob Ezell, LTC Rich Parham, LTC Jim Anderson, MAJ George Kinoshita, MAJ Dennis Woest, MAJ Tim Byrne, MAJ Rich Engel, CPT Floyd Williams,
and CPT Dave Bunch.

The CID Agents are the men who carry the blue and gold badge, who do what has to be done on a daily basis to make a good Army better, and who have always answered the call. They are CW4 Dick Wazeter, CW4 Bill Ambrose, CW4 Larry Gadberry, CW4 Charlie Underwood, CW3 Danny Riley, CW3 Lee Blasingame, CW3 Jeff Kaufman, CW3 Bill Arnone, CW3 Jim Gray, CW3 Larry Broadwell, CW3 Brad Borden, CW2 John Runnberg, CW2 Phil Rodokanakis, and CW2 Bruce Bartels, (ret.). These agents, and their families, know the sacrifices that go with being a member of the "Brotherhood of the Badge."

Finally, in my long association with CID agents two men have made a special impression on me by their professionalism, leadership, and personal support. I am greatly in their debt. It is for them that I have undertaken this project and it is in their name that I dedicate it: CW4 Marvin P. Parker and 1SG Gary L. Ratliff.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TITLE PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPROVAL PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER

### I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1

- Thesis Purpose ............................................................... 1
- Thesis Question ............................................................... 2
- Thesis Background ............................................................ 2
- Thesis Assumptions ........................................................... 9
- Thesis Terminology ........................................................... 7
- Thesis Restrictions ............................................................ 11
- Thesis Methodology ............................................................ 13
- Significance of the Thesis ................................................ 15
- Thesis Organization ........................................................... 16
- Endnotes ................................................................. 17

### II. REVIEW OF THE CID LITERATURE ......................................... 19

- General Review ............................................................... 19
- Technical Intelligence Reports ........................................... 20
- General Board Studies and Observer Reports ......................... 23
- Historical Reports and Summaries ....................................... 25
- Staff Studies ................................................................. 28
- Operational Reports - Lessons Learned .................................. 30
- Military Literature ........................................................... 32
- Doctrinal Literature and Regulatory Guidance ......................... 33
- Gaps in the Literature ........................................................ 36
- Conclusion ................................................................. 38

### III. CID in World War II ..................................................... 39

- Overview ................................................................. 39
- Command and Control ....................................................... 41
- Organizational Development ............................................... 53
- Support ................................................................. 57
- Investigative Operations .................................................. 61
This project is designed to inform interested military professionals of the conditions encountered and the lessons learned by military criminal investigators (CID) in wartime. The study will examine criminal investigative activities during World War II and the Viet Nam conflict in order to determine if there are contemporary implications for criminal investigative support on the battlefield. In so doing, it will determine the characteristic patterns which emerge as common threads from these conflicts. These common threads will then serve to focus further analysis.

This study will identify the problems that CID investigators and their supervisors experienced during wartime circumstances and the impact of those problems on CID activities. The focus of this research is on the patterns which arise in command and control, organizational development, support, and investigative operations. As a
result of this analysis, CID commanders and investigators on the future battlefield will have a reference, based on an historical perspective, which they can use to analyze potential problems and shortcomings in wartime investigative support.

Thesis Question

Do CID activities in World War II and the Viet Nam conflict reveal similar patterns in command and control, organizational development, support, and investigative operations which will have implications for contemporary criminal investigative support on the battlefield?

Thesis Background

AirLand Battle doctrine is the United States Army's basic approach to generating and applying combat power at the operational and tactical levels of war. This doctrine has been in existence since the publishing of the 1982 edition of U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations. This capstone document on the Army's combat doctrine has been revalidated and amplified in its May 1986 update version. Since 1982, the various military branches of the U.S. Army have reevaluated the roles that they will play on the
battlefield and have published the results of their efforts in various field manuals.

Field Manual 19-1, *Military Police Support to the AirLand Battle*, dated 27 December 1983, is the key manual for the Military Police Corps. FM 19-1 addresses the issue of criminal investigative support to the AirLand Battle in Chapter 11, "U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Support on the Battlefield." This manual states:

The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command is responsible for investigating felony crimes. USACIDC detachments support commanders at every echelon... USACIDC personnel investigate offenses committed: against U.S. forces; against U.S. property; by military personnel; by civilians serving with U.S. forces. They investigate violations of international agreements on land warfare. They provide forensic science support to other USACIDC units in the theater of operations. And, at the direction of the commanding general of USACIDC or higher authority, they conduct special investigations. (1)

CID agents provide U.S. Army commanders with reports of investigation which are used by commanders as the basis for disciplinary actions, courts-martial and other corrective action. Basically, CID has been doing this throughout its history.

One of the striking features about FM 19-1, the keystone document on how the military police will support the army in battle, is the brevity of its guidance for the criminal investigative supervisor. There are but a few
This lack of doctrinal information and guidance was examined in 1984 at Headquarters, Second Region, United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC). At that time Colonel T.C. Jones, the Region Commander, collected together his staff and asked a number of salient questions. "How will Second Region, USACIDC, fight the next war? What investigative support will it render to the United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army? What role will it play on the AirLand Battlefield?"

Based on a preliminary research of the files of Headquarters, Second Region, the staff determined that there was no historical documentation available on the role that criminal investigators played on past European battlefields. A decision was then made to gather together key personnel from the major subordinate units of Second Region, USACIDC, in order to study the problem and recommend solutions. The results were hammered out during a series of brainstorming sessions and forwarded by Colonel Jones to Major General Eugene R. Cromartie, Commanding General, USACIDC for review and incorporation into the USACIDC Interim Operational Concept for Criminal Investigation Command Battlefield Support. (2)

One of the concerns that the participants of this conference expressed was the fact that the recommendations
were made without access to historical information pertaining to the CID experience in either Viet Nam or World War II. (3) It was not known if documentation on CID's participation in World War II even existed. Thus, the perceived requirement for this study came into being.

Thesis Assumptions

An assumption is any underlying proposition or statement accepted as true in order to undertake a research project. In this thesis there are a number of basic assumptions that should be addressed at the outset.

First, the study of history is a fruitful endeavor for those who are concerned about future outcomes. If you want to prevent a recurrence of past mistakes, then you must study the past and take actions to prevent those mistakes. Otherwise you run the unnecessary risk of experiencing the same problems over again. The basic assumption here is that there may be certain characteristic patterns, or constants, which are present in history. An awareness of these constants may ease the solution of future problems.

Second, throughout history, the military has been involved in both war and crime. There is also a nexus between these two forms of behavior in that where you have
war you have crime. Regardless of their best intentions, soldiers have and will continue to fall victim to these two, sometimes violent forms of behavior. Therefore the assumption is made that the future battlefield will come complete with a crime problem.

Given this assumption, if crime is present, then the Army will need some manner for dealing with it. The American criminal justice system is the vehicle by which our society deals with crime. The investigation of crime, using accepted legal techniques, is an integral part of that criminal justice system. Although our system has deep roots in the British common law, our criminal justice system is a uniquely American institution. The American military justice system finds its origin in the U.S. Constitution and the American criminal justice system. Our military justice system requires the investigation of crime prior to prosecution.

Our assumptions disclose that one must know history and that war and crime occur together. We can conclude that an historical study of the role of the military criminal investigator during World War II and the Viet Nam conflict will reveal certain similar patterns. These patterns will be traced under the topical headings of command and control, organizational development, support, and investigative operations. From these patterns, we may learn
information which will be helpful in solving the criminal investigative support problems of the future battlefield.

Thesis Terminology

The following terms and concepts are defined to establish a common understanding between writer and reader of this thesis. These definitions should be applied to key terms during a review of this document.

**Advance Section.**

During World War II the Theater of Operations was divided into a "Combat Zone," where the fighting occurred, and the "Communications Zone (COMMZ)," where the logistical base was located to support the combat zone. The COMMZ was further divided into two parts. The forward portion of this zone was called the Advance Section and the rear portion was called the Base Section. On occasion, the COMMZ was divided into three sections, with an Intermediate Section between the Advance Section and the Base Section. (See Appendix A) (4)

**AirLand Battle Doctrine.**

The U.S. Army's basic fighting doctrine. It reflects the structure of modern warfare, the dynamics of combat power, and the application of the classical principles of war to contemporary battlefield requirements. (5)

**Area of Responsibility.**

A defined area of land in which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander of the area for the development and maintenance of installations, control of movement and the
conduct of tactical operations involving troops under his control along with parallel authority to exercise these functions. (6)

**Army Criminal Investigation Program.**

The overall military police criminal investigation program of the Army, under the staff supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), including criminal investigation procedures, techniques, and resources as employed by commanders and their criminal investigation staff divisions, branches, or criminal investigation units, as authorized. (7)

**Base Section**

The rear portion of the COMMZ, located behind and contiguous to the Advance Section. The COMMZ was divided into the Advance Section and Base Section in order to facilitate centralized control with decentralized execution. (See Appendix A) (8)

**CID (Criminal Investigation Division).**

Used descriptively to refer to procedures, techniques, and personnel of the Army Criminal Investigation Program, e.g., CID Report, CID Agent, CID Program. (9)

**Command.**

The authority that a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. (10)
Communications Zone.

The rear part of a theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communication, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. (11)

Control.

Authority, which may be less than full command, exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations. (12)

Crime Prevention Survey.

A formally recorded review and analysis of existing conditions within a specified facility, activity, or area for the purpose of detecting crime, identifying conditions or procedures conducive to criminal activity, minimizing or eliminating the opportunity to commit a criminal offense or engage in criminal activity. It seeks to determine the nature, extent, and underlying causes of crime, and provides the commander with information for use in the crime prevention program. (13)

Criminal Intelligence.

Any information collected, analyzed, or disseminated pertaining to alleged or real criminal activity. (14)

Host Nation.

A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, or to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (15)

Lines of Communications.

All the routes, land, water, and air, which connect an operating military force with a
base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. (16)

**Operation.**

A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (17)

**Operational Control.**

Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training, except when a subordinate commander requests assistance. (18)

**Report of Investigation.**

An official written record of all pertinent information and facts obtained in a criminal investigation. (19)

**Staff Supervision (Responsibility).**

The process of advising other staff officers and individuals subordinate to the commander, of the commander's plans and policies, assisting such subordinates in carrying them out, determining the extent to which they are being followed, and advising the commander thereof. (20)

**Staging Area.**

A general locality established for the concentration of troop units and transient personnel between movements over the lines of communications. (21)
Theater.

The geographical area outside the continental United States for which a (unified or specified) commander has been assigned responsibility. (22)

Theater of Operations.

That portion of an area of war necessary for the administration of such operations. (23)

Thesis Restrictions

The historical perspective of this analysis is limited to the role that criminal investigators have played on the battlefield during World War II and the Viet Nam conflict. This study does not focus on the peacetime employment of criminal investigators in a non-tactical environment. It includes those events prior to World War II which are necessary to establish the historical background of criminal investigative support to the United States Army. It also includes those incidents which occurred in the United States which had an impact on the CID forces in the theater of operations.

Although all theaters of World War II were considered during the research, the emphasis of the presentation is placed on the European Theater of Operations (ETO). The European Theater of Operations was
chosen for emphasis for three reasons. First, this theater was the primary effort of Army activities during World War II. Second, the bulk of the documentation available on CID activities overseas during World War II concerns this theater. Finally, the largest contingent of forward deployed CID agents is currently located in Europe, in support of the United States Army, Europe, which has the largest contingent of forward deployed U.S. soldiers in the world.

The CID experience during the Korean War is not included in this analysis. Based on a search of the literature, an insufficient amount of information was found on CID's experience in the Korean War to draw any conclusions. The inclusion of this war in the analysis would increase the scope and magnitude of this project beyond the time limitations given for its completion. A strong argument can be made that the Korean War experience also has implications for what the U.S. Army can expect to experience in the future. Its omission in this study in no way argues the contrary.

An analysis of the experience of foreign powers in regard to the use of military investigators on the battlefield will not be included. This omission is due largely to the uniqueness of the American military criminal justice system.
Thesis Methodology

There are several research methodologies that are useful in a thesis of this nature. Among these methodologies are cause and effect, comparison and contrast, spatial order, chronological order, or any combination of the above. An analysis of methodologies reveals that a combination of spatial order and chronological order are highly appropriate to the subject matter being researched.

The analysis will have an historical focus. An examination of history reveals situations in the past from which we can extrapolate and project into the future. There are a number of questions that arise from an historical analysis. Does history show us any patterns? Does the present perspective show us what was not apparent in the past? Is the projected future, as predicted by past events, what we want? If not, what actions must we take in the present in order to alter future events? Do we have the mechanisms of control needed to impose our will on future events?

Historical research requires the systematic search for documents and other sources of factual information relating to the subject. In historical research, the best source of information is primary source data. A
considerable effort was made to obtain as many primary source documents as possible. Secondary sources were resorted to only when there was a gap in the information provided from primary source material. The bibliography at the end of this project has extensive primary source listings. It is hoped that this bibliography may serve as a foundation for future research on CID in World War II and the Viet Nam conflict.

Research on this project took place at the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This library provided a wealth of original source documents on CID activities in World War II. Research material was also obtained from:

1. The United States Army Criminal Investigation Command, Falls Church, Virginia.
2. The United States Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, Alabama.
3. The Center for Military History, Washington, D.C.
4. The Military History Institute, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
5. The National Archives, Suitland, Maryland.
7. The United States Army Crime Records Center,
Baltimore, Maryland.

Significance of the Thesis

Based on the research conducted during the course of this project, no other study was found which takes the historical approach to determine what the CID experience was during World War II and the Viet Nam conflict. In recent years there have been a number of excellent research papers completed by members of the Military Police Officer Advanced Courses, the Advanced Investigative Management Courses, and the Criminal Investigative Warrant Officer Advanced Courses, given at the United States Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, Alabama. The work done by the officers and noncommissioned officers in these courses has broken new ground in regard to the role that CID will play on the AirLand Battlefield. A listing of their work is also included in the bibliography of this thesis.

The approach taken by this paper will add to the body of knowledge by compiling a baseline historical reference document. It will examine the characteristic patterns of CID activities within the framework of command and control, organizational development, support, and investigative operations which have implications for criminal investigative support on the future battlefield.
This examination should favorably complement the work which has thus far been done at the United States Army Military Police School. Of secondary significance is the fact that it may be used as a reference for future research on the development of CID battle doctrine and procedures.

Thesis Organization

The organization of this thesis focuses on the activities of CID during World War II and Viet Nam. Following the introduction in chapter I and the review of literature in chapter II, the third chapter analyzes the World War II experience of CID in command and control, organizational development, support, and investigative operations. Chapter IV discusses these same topics from the perspective of the CID experience during the Viet Nam Conflict. Chapter V contrasts the findings of the previous two chapters, ascertains any implications by analysis, and determines conclusions and recommendations for future research.

The review of the literature follows this chapter. It establishes the academic foundation of the research and sets the stage for the following chapters on World War II, Viet Nam, and battlefield implications.
CHAPTER I

ENDNOTES


2. The author participated in the Second Region, USACIDC planning conferences.

3. The members of the brainstorming group were concerned about World War II and the Viet Nam conflict. There was no concern for the Korean War as that war was apparently not as similar to the circumstances expected in Second Region, USACIDC as that experienced in World War II and, unlike Viet Nam, it was not within the memory of any of the conference participants. This does not diminish the relevance of CID participation in the Korean War, either then or now, it only reflects the focus of the participants at the conference.


8. FM 100-10, pp. 21-23.


10. JCS Pub. 1, p. 76.

11. Ibid., p. 81.

12. Ibid., p. 87.


16. Ibid., p. 211.

17. JCS Pub. 1, p. 262.

18. Ibid., pp. 262-263.


20. JCS Pub. 1, p. 343.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 370.

23. Ibid., p. 370 & 34.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE CID LITERATURE

General Review

The objective of the review of CID literature is to examine and discuss the current state of knowledge within the field of criminal investigative activities during both World War II and the Viet Nam conflict. The review will provide an informational background upon which the analysis of criminal investigative activities can proceed. The fundamental reasons for this review are to provide an historical and theoretical framework for the project and to isolate previous research so as to provide a basis to more sharply focus future research.

Based on a review conducted using the facilities of the Combined Arms Research Library, I determined that there are no published works which analyze CID support to the U.S. Army during World War II, or the Viet Nam conflict from the historical perspective.

A review of the Defense Technical Information Center files reveals a wealth of information on the employment of the military police in battle, but not on the employment of the CID. As previously stated, there are a
number of valuable studies completed by officer and noncommissioned officer students in residence at the United States Army Military Police School which address the issue of how CID will most likely be employed in the next war. These studies are primarily based on contemporary doctrinal concepts and are not derived from historical experience.

A search of the archives of the Combined Arms Research Library revealed a number of pertinent documents for our purposes. These documents are categorized under the headings of technical intelligence reports, observer reports and General Board studies, historical reports and summaries, staff studies, operational reports - lessons learned, military literature, doctrinal literature and guidance.

Technical Intelligence Reports

Due to the fact that there are no published books on CID, a visit to the local library for research material would prove to no avail. Therefore, to find information required a search of the military archives. In the archives of the Combined Arms Research Library are a number of declassified Technical Intelligence Reports prepared at the close of World War II. These reports are debriefings of personnel who fought in the war in various capacities and
who were in the process of returning home to the United States.

Nine reports were found which are germane to this study. A review of these reports reveals a number of issues on the subject of CID support during World War II. The benefit of these Technical Intelligence Reports to the student of CID's role during the war is the fact that they relate first hand information by participants in the action, relatively close to the events in time. The disadvantage of drawing conclusions from these reports is the possible bias of the interviewer's questions, as well as the possibility of bias on the part of the interviewee in responding to the questions. The interviews included participants from both the European Theater of Operations and the Pacific Theater of Operations.

Interviewees were officers, noncommissioned officers, uniformed military policemen, CID agents, and infantrymen. Their areas of concern covered a wide range of topics. Concerns included disappointment over the Spanish .32-caliber automatic pistol issued to CID agents, the lack of individual criminal investigative kits, the compromise of the identities and ranks of CID agents and their supervisors, and the unavailability of nonmilitary vehicles. In one Technical Intelligence Report an agent laments that driving a Jeep in civilian clothes was a dead
giveaway that he was CID.

These reports also reflect opinions about the centralization or decentralization of command and control of CID and about the use of investigative resources on less significant offenses involving the military status of the individuals concerned. It was commonly felt that the seriousness of the offense should be the sole criteria in determining whether or not a CID investigation should be conducted.

The nine Technical Intelligence Reports cited above serve the purpose of this research paper. While the information imparted in these reports cannot and should not stand alone, they are a good source of adjunct information that renders support for other documents reviewed. A significant aspect of these reports is that they give the reader a greater feeling for the problems faced by individual soldiers in the performance of their duties. The frustrations experienced come out vividly and are a refreshing contrast to the more formalized historical reports completed by the headquarters staff officers of the time.
General Board Studies and Observer Reports

The Observer Reports completed by various CID Military Police officers and the studies conducted by the General Board, Office of the Provost Marshal, United States Forces, European Theater exhibit a different perspective from that of the Technical Intelligence "debriefing" Reports. The General Board studies are particularly useful because of the experience level reflected in the membership of the Board. The conference included provost marshals, the military equivalent to a chief of police, and military police officers representing two armies, three corps, eight divisions, the air force, two base sections, ten military police battalions, and one harbor company.

The purpose of the General Board was to obtain a wide scope of opinion on military police activities in the European Theater of Operations from officers with operational experience. The Board met on 3, 4, and 5 December 1945, while many of the major issues from World War II were still fresh in the minds of the participants. The General Board Studies examined the broad spectrum of military police support rendered to the theater of operations. Pertinent to this thesis is their analysis of the organization, equipment and activities of criminal investigation units in the European Theater of Operations.
Areas specifically addressed in the assessment were issues relating to supply, billets, messing, uniforms, credentials, assignment and distribution of personnel, investigative duties, and criminal investigation laboratories. The General Board used committee reports and questionnaires to develop conclusions and make recommendations deemed appropriate. Responses provided to the questionnaires were completed by the attendees as representatives of their respective commands.

Observer Reports fell into two categories. The first category included observation reports completed by commanders and chief agents of CID detachments. These reports read like exit debriefings of today's army. They were a method by which key, outgoing personnel could recommend changes that they felt would be beneficial to the organization. An evaluation of these observation reports tend to reinforce the information discussed in the review of the Technical Intelligence Reports. These documents give insights about the criteria for the selection of CID agents, command and control of criminal investigation detachments, and the inadequacy of the CID Table of Organization.

The second category of reports under this classification are the Observer Reports written by Colonel Ralph Wiltamuth. His assignment was to give on site
evaluations of various aspects of military police and
criminal investigative support carried out in the European
Theater. Colonel Wiltamuth had served as a provost marshal
in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations and was
operationally familiar with CID. His reports covered the
pros and cons of centralization versus decentralization,
CID and provost marshal working relationships and
responsibilities, the problem of excessive pretrial
confinement, and the value of criminal investigative
laboratories in theater. He also discussed some of the same
topics previously mentioned in the Technical Intelligence
Reports, the observation reports and the findings of the
General Board.

Historical Reports and Summaries

The historical reports and summaries provide a
picture of CID from the official perspective. The histories
were generally written by staff officers in the Provost
Marshal General's Office in the particular theater of
operations concerned. A good example of this type of
history is the 1946 document entitled Office of the Provost
Marshal General, World War II: A Brief History. This
report examined criminal investigations within the Army
Service Forces and within the military establishment. It
captures the early history of CID during World War II, the move to decentralize criminal investigative responsibility, the coordination of cases involving customs violations, and the establishment of the Crime Laboratory at Fort Sam Houston, Texas on 1 May 1945. The importance of this brief history is that it exposes the researcher to background information on CID activities in the United States.

Another document of equal benefit in this research is the 1946 History of the Provost Marshal, European Theater of Operations, United States Army. This document explains the establishment of CID in the European Theater of Operations in some detail. This was the best source found on CID activities in Great Britain prior to the D-Day invasion and captures some pertinent data on the centralization versus decentralization issue.

A third, very valuable document is the Semi-Annual Report, Criminal Investigation Branch, Office of the Theater Provost Marshal, European Theater of Operations, June 1944 - 31 December 1944. This rare document highlights the activities of the Provost Marshal’s Office during one of the most critical periods of the war in Europe. It explains the CID experience in the United Kingdom, the similarities of experience between conditions in London and Paris, the situation in field operations, organizational and operational history, pertinent orders, procedures, and
statistical data. A gap in the literature exists as the semi-annual report for the period 1 January 1945 through 30 June 1945 was not uncovered.

There are a number of other historical reports and summaries listed in the bibliography that prove informative. Though short in length, Alice Russell's article, "USACIDC September 17, 1971-1987" in the Shield newspaper is very useful. Written to commemorate USACIDC's 16th year of existence, this article gives a brief history of the command. Special interest items include the World War II case involving the theft of the crown jewels of Charlemagne; the Secretary of the Army directed study on the centralization of the Army's CID assets - Project Security Shield; and, finally, General Order No. 47, signed by General Westmoreland, which established USACIDC as a separate major army command in 1971.

The final historical paper of note is by Col Henry H. Tufts, the first commander of USACIDC. Entitled The Development and Organization of the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command, 1969-1974, this monograph addresses the evolution of an awareness on the part of the Army concerning the need to improve its employment of CID resources. It highlights the concern of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army for a better use of criminal investigative skills, the worsening crime
conditions of the mid and late 1960s, the establishment of
the U.S. Army CID Agency in September 1969, and finally,
the creation of USACIDC on 17 September 1971. The
significance of this report lies in the fact that it
captures the perspective of one of the key officers
involved in the creation of USACIDC.

Staff Studies

The staff studies for this review of literature
were obtained from the U.S. Army Military Police School and
reflect an analysis of CID's role on the contemporary
battlefield. These studies were compiled by officers,
warrant officers, and enlisted personnel who were
completing a CID related training course at the Military
Police School.

Foremost among these works was that compiled by the
Criminal Investigation Warrant Officer Advanced Course
1-82. The efforts of J. W. Gee, et al, is entitled A Staff
Study on the Role of USACIDC in a Rear Area Combat
Operations Environment. This document gives an overview of
the investigative role that CID will likely play in rear
area combat operations. It provides vignettes covering
economic crime, protective services, drug suppression, war
crimes investigations, polygraph examinations, the U.S.
Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory, evidence handling, criminal information, personnel and administration, logistical considerations, and the development of combat survival skills for special agents. It is one of the most comprehensive contemporary documents on the subject of CID support in combat.

Grayling D. Forehand’s *CID Support in a Tactical Environment* expresses the view that the question of CID supporting the Army in combat has ceased to be a valid question. CID agents will continue to provide normal investigative support to combat units. Forehand’s thesis is that agents are well trained in professional skills but are not proficient in combat survival skills. This document presents a methodology for the problems of training, equipping, and supporting CID agents so that they can survive in the “come-as-you-are” war.

Wilmer D. Snell, Peter Mroczkiewicz, Dave Marquith, George W. Stanley, and Joseph Herron collectively wrote *The Role of the Investigator in a Combat Environment* in 1982. This study starts with a cursory review of CID’s history covering its establishment in 1918, its participation in World War I with the American Expeditionary Force, centralized control at theater level commands during World War II, and decentralized control to area commands after the war. The report proceeds to evaluate the team concept
of organization for combat, recommends training and support requirements, and evaluates special considerations in the areas of blackmarketing, enemy prisoners of war, interpreters, joint investigations with intelligence units, and crime laboratory support.

The research done by the students at the Military Police School reveals a great deal of effort in trying to grapple with what CID will do on the future battlefield. What the future war may bring is conjecture, but these studies go a long way in trying to comprehend and address the problem.

Operational Reports - Lessons Learned

The information available on CID's role in the Viet Nam War is sparse. Problems encountered in trying to assemble a reasonable amount of research material will be discussed at the end of this chapter. Currently, the best available documents are the Operational Reports - Lessons Learned submitted by major military police organizations in Viet Nam on a quarterly basis. There are several documents in this category, three of which are key.

First is the Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation), 18th Military Police Brigade, dated 3 May 67. This document
discusses command and control of the group, the reorganization, geographical location of units, problems of coordination, centralized control, quality control of CID reports, lack of experienced supervisory personnel, transportation problems, and concerns over the need for automatic weapons, photographic equipment, and safeguarding evidence. It is a valuable document, perhaps one of the most comprehensive primary reports on CID to come out of the Viet Nam conflict.

The second document is the Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Military Police Group (CI) (PROV), 19th MP Brigade, Period Ending 31 January 1968. It provides further insight on the problems encountered with providing CID support in Viet Nam.

The final report is of value because it describes the problems encountered in the area of administrative support. This information is reflected in Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Military Police Group (CI) (Provisional), 18th Military Police Brigade, Period Ending 31 July 1968.

The Operational Reports - Lessons Learned capture the problems encountered by the CID personnel of the Viet Nam era. A gap in the literature is the fact that the reports from the 8th Military Police Group (CI) are not complete. What is available contributes immeasurably to an
understanding of CID's role in that conflict.

Military Literature

The combat role that CID played in World War II and Viet Nam is treated sparingly, if at all, in published works. The fact that criminality existed in the military is well documented. How the military coped with the problem is virtually ignored. Lee Kennett's, _G.I. The American Soldier in World War II_, describes blackmarketing in North Africa, bartering in France, venereal disease in Naples, nonfraternization in Germany, and alcohol abuse throughout. But no mention of CID.

In _The Procurement and Training of Ground Troops, The Army Ground Forces, United States Army in World War II_, Palmer, Wiley, and Keast at least state that in classifying civilians for military jobs, "Detectives were thought to be peculiarly suitable for the Provost Marshal General's Office, and 'vice-squad patrolmen' for the Military Police." No other mention is made of CID in the military literature of either wars.
Doctrinal Literature and Regulatory Guidance

Doctrinal literature and guidance is published by the Army in the form of field manuals, Army regulations, major command regulations and circulars, and standing operating procedures. These documents explain the way the Army conducts the business of war.

A source that should be reviewed to give a contemporary perspective on the U.S. Army's current doctrine is the 1986 version of FM 100-5, Operations. FM 100-5 is the key warfighting manual of AirLand Battle Doctrine and serves as the authoritative foundation of the U.S. Army's concept for waging war.

FM 29-5, Basic Field Manual, Military Police, the first of many manuals on military police operations, was published on 8 December 1941. This document included guidance for the conduct of criminal investigations and investigative operations. What is remarkable about this document is that much of what CID does today can be found between the covers of this booklet. The chapter on criminal investigations is a "must read" for the serious researcher.

War Department Field Manual 19-5, Military Police, printed in 1944 sets forth the principles governing military police activities both outside and within the United States during a portion of World War II. It presents
information on the organization, operation, and mission of military police and criminal investigators. It was the capstone field manual used by the military police of the time.

An important manual for the criminal investigator was the War Department Field Manual 19-20, Criminal Investigation, dated 1945. The purpose of this manual was to provide army criminal investigators with the fundamental information necessary to conduct successful investigations. This manual sets out important information on the basic procedures and general guidance in force for CID during the latter part of World War II.

CID Regulation 195-18, CID Support to the Army in the Field was published in 1976. This regulation prescribes the policies and procedures for criminal investigation support rendered to the Army in the field during tactical operations and selected field training exercises. It describes responsibilities, general planning guidance, field training exercises, and references. Although dated, this document demonstrates that CID has traditionally identified a combat role for its special agents.

A more current document is the 1988 U.S. Army Operational Concept for the Criminal Investigation Command Support on the AirLand Battlefield which outlines the role of U.S. Army criminal investigators in support of current
doctrine. It discusses the limitations of criminal intelligence, an explanation of the operational concept, and the various assigned missions, including Logistical Security (LOGSEC), criminal intelligence and terrorist counteraction operations, law and order operations, investigative networks, coordination, and command relationships.

The successor of War Department Field Manual 19-20 is Department of the Army Field Manual 19-20. The 1971 version is entitled Criminal Investigations and the 1985 edition is called Law-Enforcement Investigations. Both manuals give guidance for military police investigators (MPI) and USACIDC Special Agents operating at all levels in tactical and garrison environments. These manuals discuss the investigative process, the offenses investigators are called upon to work, and the techniques that will result in a successful inquiry. Both of these field manuals are useful references for understanding how a criminal investigation is completed by army investigators. Although the 1971 edition has been superseded by the 1985 version, both are often referred to by investigators.
Gaps in the Literature

One of the fundamental purposes of this thesis is to research all of the historical material available on CID participation in both World War II and the Viet Nam conflict. There was a certain anticipation that there would be more than enough material available on CID activities in the Viet Nam conflict but very little on World War II. A glance at the bibliography, however, reveals that a significant amount of information was found on CID's participation in World War II. The bulk of this material is stored in the Archives Section of the Combined Arms Research Library, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. There was considerably less information found on CID activities in Viet Nam.

Some information on CID's involvement in Viet Nam is available through the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, and the Defense Technical Information Center, Washington, D.C. The information is minimal, amounting to the previously mentioned Operational Reports - Lessons Learned for the CID Group. All of the Operational Reports - Lessons Learned for this period were not uncovered. If and when these documents are discovered, this study should be reevaluated in light of the additional information.
The Public Affairs Office of the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command provided Colonel Tufts' study on the creation of the command as well as articles of a general historical nature. USACIDC does not have files on the employment of CID in Viet Nam, as the creation of this command came toward the end of the conflict.

In an attempt to bridge this gap coordination was made with the Resources Branch, the Southeast Asia Branch, and the General Records - Military Police Branch of the U.S. Army Center for Military History, Washington, D.C. The Center for Military History does not have information on CID in either World War II or Viet Nam. This coordination revealed that the Center does have about 1100 uncataloged, tape recorded debriefings of officers leaving Viet Nam. Although there may be debriefings of personnel involved with CID on these tapes, the fact that they are uncataloged prohibits their use for this research project. The cataloguing and eventual transcribing of these tapes by the Center for Military History will expand the possibility and direction for future studies of this nature.

Coordination was also made with the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, which has on file only ten Operational Reports - Lessons Learned and five debriefing reports from commanding officers of the 18th Military Police Brigade.
Some of these same reports are on file and available at the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth. Two leads for additional information on the role of CID in the Viet Nam conflict were pursued. A files search of the National Records Center (National Archives) at Suitland, Maryland, proved to be of only marginal value for the purpose of this thesis. It could, however, prove to be a source for future research efforts, especially pertaining to CID's involvement in Viet Nam. Likewise, a search of the documents on file at the U.S. Army Military Police School was conducted by their historian. Some excellent material was provided as a result of that search.

Conclusion

The collection of research material for this thesis and the development of the extensive bibliography were done in order to serve as a source document for future research. This chapter provided a review of some of the material obtained. It also provided the informational background upon which the development of characteristic patterns of criminal investigative activities during World War II and Viet Nam can proceed. The characteristic patterns in World War II will be examined in the following chapter.
CHAPTER III

CID IN WORLD WAR II

Overview

The activities of CID during World War II reveal patterns that have contemporary relevance. In support of the original thesis, we will divide these patterns into the four general headings of command and control, organizational development, support, and investigative operations.

Command and control of CID activities during World War II were characterized by a struggle between the proponents for centralization and decentralization. Centralization is the control of CID activities by the Provost Marshal General, or a CID director appointed by him. Decentralization, on the other hand, implies that command and control over CID would be exercised by installation or field commanders, without any outside interference. The issue over centralized or decentralized control of CID was a struggle, particularly in the European Theater of Operations (ETO).

Directly related to command and control, but treated independently, is CID's organizational development.
for combat during World War II. The focus is on the European Theater of Operations. A review shows that organizational development appears to have been disjointed and deficient. It was disjointed by the shifts in command and control and the consequent disruptive reorganizations they entailed. These reorganizations adversely impacted on the planning and direction given to the development of CID organizations in theater. It was deficient because there were an insufficient number of CID detachments available, and those initially available were under manned.

Based on their organizational structure, CID detachments were hindered by a lack of administrative support, maintenance capability, and crime laboratory support. During World War II, CID detachments were organized solely to complete their functional mission and were without an organic support capability.

Finally, criminal investigative operations during World War II were especially concerned with blackmarket operations. The mission of CID was the prevention, suppression, and investigation of crime among military personnel and civilians subject to the Articles of War. (1) CID Agents investigated the full gamut of crime, but an evaluation of their activities during the period reveals that particular attention was paid to blackmarket cases.

Given this overview, we will now examine those
characteristics which pertained to command and control.

Command and Control

Command and control of CID activities during World War II were characterized by a struggle over centralization versus decentralization. There are three aspects of this situation that will be addressed under this topic. First, the U.S. Army did not have a command and control structure for CID at the outbreak of World War II. (2) Second, the Provost Marshal General in the United States appeared to endorse decentralized control of CID. Third, the Provost Marshal General, European Theater of Operations was very much in favor of centralized control of CID at his level. (3)

The CID did not exist in the force structure during the years between World War I and World War II. The conduct of criminal investigations during this time frame was considered a function of command. If an investigation was required it was up to the commander to see to its accomplishment. He could conduct the investigation himself, appoint an investigating officer on orders, or have local civil law enforcement officials conduct the investigation. (4) The U.S. Army did not perceive a need for CID in peacetime and therefore CID did not exist in the force...
during the interwar years.

At the outbreak of World War II, the U.S. Army did not have a command and control structure for CID. This was a result of the position taken by the U.S. Army at the close of the World War I era. Basically, CID was not considered necessary in the peacetime Army, only during times of military mobilization. (5) The CID companies (6) which had been activated during World War I by General John J. Pershing, had been demobilized concurrently with the American Expeditionary Force. (7)

When CID emerged at the beginning of World War II, the Provost Marshal General apparently advocated decentralized control. He did not come outright and state that he was against centralization, but the evidence in his policies indicate that he felt that installation and service commanders were in a better position to supervise local CID investigators than he was.

To start with, the Provost Marshal General did not have command or control authority over Army-wide CID. He was not a War Department General Staff Officer, but rather a member of the Army Service Forces (ASF) Staff. (8) The Army Service Forces, previously known as the Services of Supply (SOS), (9) was one of three major subordinate commands of the Army, along with the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces. (10) The Army Service Forces provided
general administration, transportation, supply, evacuation, and other services to meet the requirements of the Army.

(11) It was a catch-all organization for the assignment of all offices which logically could not go elsewhere and this included the Provost Marshal General's Office. (12)

This situation placed the Provost Marshal General in a position where he had to defer to the War Department General Staff on any CID activities which had an impact outside the Army Service Forces. Correspondence requiring action on the part of other commands had to be reviewed by the War Department General Staff and transmitted under the authority of the Adjutant General. The Provost Marshal General did not have this authority by virtue of his office. (13) Likewise, policy recommendations had to be staffed through, and approved by, the War Department General Staff. (14)

In the same vein, the Provost Marshal General could not influence CID activities by establishing CID doctrine. At the beginning of World War II, CID doctrine was published by the War Department in FM 29-5, *Basic Field Manual—Military Police*. FM 29-5 was not published by the Provost Marshal General, but rather by the Chief of Infantry in collaboration with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. (15) The rationale for this circumstance was the fact that doctrinally, criminal investigations were a
function of command, and not a function of the Provost Marshal General. (16) The doctrine published concerned the technical aspects of conducting criminal investigations and did not go into a detailed explanation of CID's command and control or organizational structure.

Another factor impacting on this situation was the fact that the Provost Marshal General was heavily involved in loyalty investigations and forfeited any control he might have had over criminal investigations. On 29 October 1941, the War Department G-2 had transferred responsibility for loyalty investigations from the Counter Intelligence Branch to the Provost Marshal General. (17) Loyalty investigations were background checks on civilians employed by the War Department, in war industries, and on certain military personnel, in the interests of the national defense. (18) To accomplish this mission the Provost Marshal General formed and maintained a corps of investigators which became known as the Security Intelligence Corps (SIC). (19) He also established a subordinate staff element, the Investigations Division, to assist him in monitoring investigative matters. (20)

Basically, the Investigations Division was involved in two missions, security intelligence-type loyalty investigations and the processing of those few criminal investigations which had been referred to it. The World War
II military and industrial mobilization was of such magnitude, that by June 1942, the Investigations Division could not accomplish both missions. Action had to be taken to remedy the situation. (21)

Instead of requesting the War Department G-2 to reassign responsibility for loyalty investigations back to the Counter Intelligence Branch, the PMG refused to process the few criminal cases which had been referred to his office. He did this by closing whatever cases were in the hands of Provost Marshal General agents and referring all other criminal investigations to field commanders. This reinforced the concept that criminal investigations were a function of command, meaning that each commander was responsible for seeing that crimes committed within his area of responsibility were investigated. (22) At the same time the Provost Marshal General, ASF strengthened his control over the Security Intelligence Corps investigators by restricting their activities solely to the conduct of loyalty investigations and not allowing them to conduct criminal investigations. (23)

Ironically, the Provost Marshal General’s centralized control over the SIC was eventually eroded as well. During the first quarter of 1944, installation and service commanders were unable to manage their investigative workload as CID agents were being shipped
overseas in large numbers. These commanders requested permission to use SIC agents in criminal investigations, which up until that time had been prohibited. Based on their request, the Provost Marshal General, Army Service Forces, consented to service commanders using SIC investigators on criminal investigations. (24)

Even with the Provost Marshal General's orientation toward decentralized control of criminal investigations, he had to ultimately assume staff responsibility for them. The reason for this was the fact that the War Department did not exercise staff supervision over CID matters. Installation and service commanders with a problem involving criminal investigations routinely turned to the Provost Marshal General for assistance. Whether it was tracking down criminal suspects who were transferred out of their jurisdiction (25) or requesting funding support for criminal investigations, they had no other point of contact to turn to. (26)

The funding of investigations eventually led the Provost Marshal General, ASF to seek limited staff supervision over Army criminal investigations. Basically, the Provost Marshal General had no authority over CID funds. But neither did anybody else. There was a void in staff supervision over this area as the War Department had not assigned responsibility for this activity to any other
staff agency. To correct this situation, the Provost Marshal General requested staff supervision over criminal investigations in the Army. On 8 December 1943, his request was approved but his staff supervision over CID was limited to within the jurisdiction of the Army Service Forces. (27)

The scope of the Provost Marshal General's staff supervision over U.S. Army criminal investigative matters gradually expanded. By 11 August 1945 the War Department was requiring its subordinate commands to submit monthly reports on criminal activities to the Provost Marshal General for consolidation and evaluation. Even though he was the logical point of contact, the Provost Marshal General never exercised command and control over CID activities during World War II. (28)

The command and control experience of the Provost Marshal General, European Theater of Operations over CID activities was in contrast to that of the Provost Marshal General in the United States. The Provost Marshal General, European Theater of Operations strongly advocated centralized control of CID at theater level.

The Provost Marshal General, European Theater of Operations was familiar with the World War I History of the Provost Marshal General, Department American Expeditionary Force and stated that he experienced the same difficulties in World War II as his World War I predecessor. (29) Not
surprisingly, in World War I, the number one difficulty involving CID activities was the absence of centralized command. (30)

In brief, CID was founded as an organization during World War I, by order of General John J. Pershing. (31) Control of CID was initially decentralized to the local provost marshals, who reportedly experienced difficulties in recruiting, training, and controlling CID personnel. The Provost Marshal General of the American Expeditionary Force was in opposition to this situation. (32) His position on decentralization was, "The deficiencies (of CID) were many, but chief among them was the absence of centralized command." (33) By November 1918 he had taken control of the CID away from the local provost marshals, formed the CID investigators into 100 man companies, and placed these investigators under the direct supervision of an Assistant Deputy Provost Marshal General, American Expeditionary Force. (34)

The Provost Marshal General, European Theater of Operations in World War II, familiar with the problems of the Provost Marshal General, American Expeditionary Force, of World War I, established centralized control over all in-theater CID on 20 November 1942. (35) Centralization was modeled after the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with the CID Chief Agent in the field reporting to a CID
Director on the Theater Provost Marshal General's staff.

(36)

Controversy arose because base section (37) (See Appendix A) and field commanders wanted to control CID at their level. They fought centralization as not being in their interests. (38) Combat commanders were particularly concerned about having CID support deployed up front and ready, as opposed to being in the rear and on call. (39)

Base section commanders were opposed to centralized control of CID assets. They advocated decentralized control of CID for three primary reasons: first, they wanted to maintain the integrity of their commands without the threat of outside interference; second, they felt that centralized direction of CID at theater level was too removed from the crime problems faced by the base section commanders; finally, these commanders wanted organic CID to deal with the crime problems of base sections. (40) The stage was thus set for the controversy between the advocates of centralized versus decentralized control of CID in the European Theater.

In general, CID personnel wanted centralized control under a theater level director. From their perspective, this would simplify the accomplishment of their mission. CID Field Section Chiefs, in particular, saw advantages to reporting to a CID chain of command.
"Investigation of cases could be made without interference and would be completely unbiased when freed from local direction." (41) Centralization would simplify the movement of agents from one base section to another, when required, to meet either surges in case load or to conduct covert operations. Centralization also facilitated the conduct of investigations which crossed base section boundaries. Finally, centralization would establish a single point of contact for CID matters and would raise the level of visibility of CID activities. (42)

The arguments in favor of decentralized control included the fact that criminal investigations, along with unit discipline, was a command function, and local provost marshals were required to keep their commanders informed on the status of these investigations. (43) The fact that the theater CID Director could shift investigative assets to meet needs, meant that he could take agents from one base section to reinforce another base section and the losing base section commander would have no recourse in the matter. (44)

In the final analysis, the controversy was decided in favor of the base section commanders, with command prerogative apparently being the deciding factor. On 4 November 1943, LTG John C. H. Lee, Commanding General, Services of Supply and Communications Zone, European
Theater of Operations, decided in favor of the base section commanders. (45) The Chief, CID Detachment, relinquished control of CID units to base section commanders and was relegated to the role of a technical adviser with limited responsibilities for coordinating, administering, supplying, and inspecting the detached CID units. (46)

Just as there were strong forces at work in regard to centralized versus decentralized control of CID at theater level, there was also a controversy in regard to control of CID in support of tactical operations, once the fighting began. Specifically, the concern was whether or not CID agents were going to be controlled from the rear, in the Communications Zone, or forward by the maneuver units. (47)

During the Allied invasion of Europe, which commenced on 6 June 1944, the Provost Marshal General, European Theater of Operations wanted CID support to originate out of the Communications Zone (COMMZ). (See Appendix A). According to the plan, CID detachments were to be assigned to the Advance Section of the Communications Zone and sent forward to support the army group and its subordinate field armies as required. Thus, between 7 June – 4 July 1944, a total of 12 CID detachments landed in northern France and were assigned within the Communications Zone. (48)
Combat commanders, on the other hand, wanted CID support to be forward with their maneuvering units. The Twelfth Army Group, consisting of the First U.S. Army, the Third U.S. Army, and the Ninth U.S. Army, was particularly concerned about the situation. (See Appendix B) (49) The Twelfth Army Group Provost Marshal reported that the original plan for "Operation Overlord," the invasion of Europe, called for the assignment of one CID detachment per field army, as opposed to support emanating from the COMMZ. (50) The Provost Marshal of the Advance Section, COMMZ was solicitous of the position the combat commanders were in. By 7 July 1944 the Advance Section, COMMZ had augmented the First U.S. Army with two CID detachments on a full time loan basis. (51)

The Third U.S. Army also lacked sufficient CID investigators to meet requirements. It was augmented by two CID detachments from the Advance Section, Communications Zone, in addition to the one officer and five enlisted investigators it already had available in its assigned military police battalion. (52) By the close of hostilities, CID detachments were being assigned down to corps level and controlled by CID field offices located at the corps headquarters (53) as well as at the rear and forward echelons of the field army. (54) During the General Board hearings after the war, the maneuver
divisions criticized the policy that they did not have organic CID detachments assigned down to division level. (55)

In summary, during World War II installation and field commanders wanted to control CID at their level and fought centralization as not being in their interests. Centralized control of CID was more of an issue in the European Theater of Operations than it was in the United States, particularly with base section and combat commanders. Finally, combat commanders wanted CID deployed forward, down to division level.

Organizational Development

CID's organizational development during World War II was influenced by the command and control controversy. The development of CID during World War II exhibited two characteristic patterns, it was disjointed and deficient. It was disjointed in that shifts in command and control and its consequent disruptive reorganizations adversely impacted on planning and direction. It was deficient, lacking sufficient manpower there were initially too few CID detachments available in theater and those that were available were undermanned.

To start with, the need for CID support in the
European Theater was identified by Headquarters, Service of Supply, ETO in May 1942. (56) Just as the CID requirements identified during World War I originated with the theater commander, so did the World War II CID requirements originate in theater. The requirement to provide CID agents to support the theater commander was not identified by War Department General Staff planners despite the fact that the need for specialized teams of investigators in a theater of operations had been doctrinally acknowledged since the publishing of FM 29-5 on 8 December 1941. (57)

CID's development in World War II was disjointed due to a number of factors. First, CID agents arrived in the United Kingdom piecemeal starting on 10 June 1942. (58) Second, because an insufficient number of CID agents arrived from the United States, agents had to be recruited from within the command. Third, the lack of CID officers to supervise investigative units required the direct appointment of enlisted agents to commissioned officer ranks. These officers were deprived of the benefits of pre-commission officer training. (59) Finally, CID detachments did not arrive in Europe as fixed strength TO&E units until December 1943. (60)

The organizational structure of CID in Europe underwent frequent changes. The first CID unit was the Criminal Investigation Section, London Base Command,
established on 18 July 1942. (61) The 20 November 1942 decision of the Provost Marshal General, European Theater of Operations, to centralize CID, caused the Investigation Division, Provost Marshal General Detachment (Provisional) to be established on 1 January 1943. (62) Another reorganization occurred on 11 October 1943, when the Investigation Division was formed into the CID Detachment Headquarters, Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations. This organization lasted until 4 November 1943, when LTG John C. H. Lee, ordered the decentralization of CID in the European Theater. (63)

The implementation of LTG Lee's decision involved the disbanding of the CID Detachment, HQ, SOS, ETO. Its personnel were assigned to TO&E CID detachments. These TO&E detachments were, in turn, assigned to base sections. (64) To maintain staff supervision over the CID at theater level, the Criminal Investigation Branch, Military Police Division, was formed as a staff section in the Theater Provost Marshal General's Office. (65)

Overall, these frequent reorganizations tend to support the belief that the development of CID in the European Theater of Operations was disjointed. The reason behind these frequent changes and reorganizations are basically twofold. First, there appeared to be little planning for CID support at the War Department level.
Instead of a push situation, there was a pull situation, with the theater identifying the requirements and then trying to fulfill them with stateside shipments and internal recruitment. Second, there was the disruptive influence of the centralization versus decentralization decisions and the numerous reorganizations which were a result of that issue.

CID's organizational structure also revealed deficiencies. Planners had underestimated the optimum size of the TO&E CID detachment. The Type II (BJ) units composed of a lieutenant, ten enlisted agents, and 3 vehicles proved to be inadequate to cope with the geographical dispersion of supported units and the crime situation. Based on the recommendations of the 12th Army Group these units were upgraded in December 1944 by the Type III (BK) unit composed of a captain, fourteen enlisted agents, and eight vehicles. (66)

Planners also underestimated the number of CID units required in the ETO. On D-day, there were 26 Type II (BJ) detachments in the ETO, which provided a total of 26 commissioned officers and 260 enlisted agents. On VE-day there were 39 Type III (BK) detachments in the ETO providing 39 officer and 546 enlisted agents. (67) The reason for this increase was the fact that CID detachments were assigned further forward and in support of smaller
military units than was initially anticipated. In the beginning planning factors to determine the agent per troop ratio were not used. However, by war's end the planners had determined that the planning factor for in-theater agent strength should be 75 agents for every 200,000 troops. (68)

Two patterns are revealed in regards to organizational development. First, CID's development was disjointed due to the command and control controversy and its disruptive influence on planning. Second, it was deficient in that planners underestimated the optimum size of fixed strength CID detachments, and underestimated the number of CID units required in the ETO. These factors necessitated frequent reorganizations of CID to meet the changing circumstances.

Support

Another characteristic pattern that emerges from World War II was that CID detachments supporting the maneuver forces in the European Theater of Operations were hindered by a lack of organic support in the areas of administration, maintenance, and crime laboratories. CID detachments did not have any assigned support assets. Detachments consisted of criminal investigators and a detachment commander.
CID thus lacked an administrative capability. The absence of a clerk to type reports made it necessary to pull agents away from investigative duties to complete administrative details. The fact that there was only a single portable typewriter per team aggravated the situation. (69) Likewise, the lack of interpreters complicated investigations when foreign nationals were involved. (70) Agents either did not have a language capability or if they did, were assigned without regard to that capability. (71) This problem was somewhat alleviated in France by the attachment of English speaking French police detectives to CID detachments. (72) But the use of host nation local nationals without security clearances to translate sensitive investigations was generally prohibited.

CID also lacked a maintenance capability. The absence of a mechanic forced the detachments into the position that they had to depend on other units if there were a maintenance difficulty. CID vehicles thus received a lower maintenance priority than the vehicles of the supporting unit. Ordnance units, with maintenance specialists, were difficult to locate in a fast moving combat situation. Bad roads in the forward areas further aggravated the maintenance problem with CID vehicles. (73) With the limited number of vehicles available to the Type
II (BJ) unit, the loss of even one vehicle due to maintenance problems cut the unit's mobility by a third.

Finally, CID initially lacked a crime laboratory capability in-theater. This resulted in a delay in the conduct of forensic examinations of evidence required at trial. Pending lab examinations unnecessarily lengthened the time spent in pretrial confinement by suspects.

A CID crime laboratory provides forensic support to field elements. Its importance lies in the technical advice that forensic examiners can give to field CID agents in the collection of trace evidence pertaining to fingerprints, chemistry, serology, photography, documents, ballistics and firearms. Oftentimes the evidence provided by the laboratory examiner is the deciding factor which proves guilt at a court-martial.

U.S. Army crime laboratories were not available to the CID until the latter stages of the war. A decision had been made that laboratory services would be provided to the CID by foreign police laboratories. (74) Except for Scotland Yard's laboratory, the use of foreign crime laboratories proved less than satisfactory. (75) The specific reasons for this dissatisfaction were not given, but probably involved the failure to secure and safeguard evidence to the standards of the Articles of War and the responsiveness of the foreign laboratories to the needs of
CID, given the language barrier and its associated problems.

A crime laboratory detachment was activated to support the CID on 26 June 1944. (76) Forward support was provided by a mobile laboratory placed in operation in Germany during April 1945. This mobile laboratory was placed on the back of an ordnance small arms repair truck which was modified with crime laboratory equipment. (77) The mobile lab was justified in order to cut down on agent travel time between crime scenes and remote, stationary crime labs. The mobility of this crime lab allowed it to displace with the front line units. The relative proximity to the front of the mobile lab cut down the distance that CID agents in support of the front line units had to travel to get laboratory support. (78) It was standard procedure in the ETO for case agents to personally bring physical evidence to the crime laboratory for examination. (79)

The characteristic lack of organic support assets for CID detachments during World War II had an adverse impact on administration, maintenance, and laboratory examinations. Each deficiency diverted agents from their primary mission of investigating crime to correct the support problems when they arose.
Investigative Operations

Wartime criminal investigative operations were particularly concerned with crimes affecting the loss of military assets. Although CID had to deal with the Army's overall crime situation, it is noteworthy that blackmarketing became a major challenge.

CID's responsibility for the conduct of criminal investigations included homicide, rape, larceny, assault, unlawful disposition of government property, and other serious crimes. These investigations were the reason for its existence. Shortly after the D-day landings, a determination was made that whenever the tactical units went into a static situation the crime rate increased. This occurred because the static situation allowed the preparation and development of underworld contacts needed for the unlawful disposition of government property crimes, and specifically blackmarketing. (80)

The scope of the blackmarketing problem in the European Theater of Operations during World War II cannot be determined with exacting precision. As previously mentioned, the War Department did not require monthly statistical reports on criminal activities from its subordinate commands until 11 August 1945. Fortunately however, the Twelfth Army Group did collect and tabulate
statistical crime data and that information is available for the period August through November 1944.

A comparative chart for the Twelfth Army Group during the move across Northern Europe in 1944 gives an impression about the scope of the crime problem and the increase in blackmarket cases, reported as unlawful disposition of government property (UDGP):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDGP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 125 80 143 154 502

An analysis of this chart reveals that blackmarketing related offenses were 22.3% of all the crimes investigated by CID in 12th Army Group. But note the increase from no UDGP cases in August 1944 to 54 cases in November 1944 which equates to 35.1% of the cases for that month. (81) Although this does not look like a significant case load.
it should be recognized that the Twelfth Army Group contained only a small portion of the total CID agents in the ETO during this time frame. It had to cope with this case load with roughly 50 agents.

Blackmarketing activities became a major challenge for CID during World War II. The supply lines of communication and staging areas were most vulnerable. Two cases are illustrative. The largest investigation of the war involved the 716th Railway Operating Battalion in Paris and was an example of a supply lines crime. The staging for Seventh Army's invasion of southern France was an example of the problems in staging areas.

The 716th Railway Operating Battalion terminated its supply run in Versailles and Paris. Based on their mission, the unit had both access and opportunity to pilfer U.S. supplies for the blackmarket. The soldiers were manipulated by French criminals with the lure of easy profits. A case of cigarettes sold for $1,000 and 20 pounds of coffee earned $200. Between September and December, 1944 an investigation was conducted which ended with the apprehension of 183 enlisted men and 2 officers. (82) This secret, carefully coordinated plan, under the direct supervision of the Theater Provost Marshal, ran for several months using roughly a sixth of the CID agents available to the theater. Agents were covertly assigned as replacements
to the unit in order to obtain information on pilferage operations and to be in a position to present evidence at trial. Several months were necessary to prepare and present the case at courts-martial, and individual convictions ran as high as 50 years. (83)

The security of supplies and equipment was a problem prior to the 7th Army's invasion of southern France in mid August 1944. The emphasis was on staging instead of security and the losses due to pilferage were difficult to control. Combat units being staged could not provide guards and the service troops mounting the operation could not spare personnel. There were not enough military police units to handle the situation. As a result, tons of needed supplies did not reach the front lines because of pilferage by both U.S. troops and the French. In addition to the pilfering at the ports of southern France, the theft of supplies along the lines of communication from the ports to the front line was also significant. (84) To combat situations such as this the CID used both criminal investigations and crime prevention surveys.

CID crime prevention surveys were a tool to uncover crime conducive situations in staging areas and along lines of communication. Surveys to protect materiel were completed on the ports of Naples, Marsala, Bizerte, Bari, and Marseille. The crime prevention surveys pointed out
that the failure to adhere to the provisions of property accountability complicated criminal investigations. Lax security measures in regards to asset protection was another significant problem uncovered by crime prevention surveys. (85) Crime prevention surveys and criminal investigations were used to aid the commander in coping with the challenge of the blackmarket situation. The crime prevention surveys not only identified the crime problem for the responsible commander, they also recommended corrective actions as well.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have examined CID activities during World War II. We determined that they revealed patterns in command and control, organizational development, support, and investigative operations. Command and control of CID activities were characterized by a struggle between the proponents for centralization and decentralization. CID’s organizational development for combat during World War II was disjointed and deficient. The CID detachments in support of maneuver forces were hindered by a lack of support in administration, maintenance, and crime laboratories. Finally, as evidenced
by the fact that over one sixth of theater CID assets were
tied up in just one criminal investigation during World War
II and the statistical information provided, gives an
indication of the extent to which the CID also had to deal
with the blackmarket problem.

This brings us to the next phase of this thesis.
Were there any characteristic patterns revealed during the
Viet Nam conflict?
CHAPTER III

ENDNOTES


11. ST 63-1, Fundamentals of Combat Service Support, p. 6-85.


20. Ibid., p. 2.

21. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

22. Ibid., p. 3.


24. Ibid., pp. 350-351.

25. Ibid., p. 355-356.


27. Ibid.


31. CID Pam 360-1, United States Criminal Investigation Command, p. 3.

32. Provost Marshal General’s Department, History of the Provost Marshal General’s Department, American Expeditionary Forces, p. 282.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., p. 283.

35. Office of the Provost Marshal General, "Criminal Investigation Division" History of the Provost Marshal, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, p. 3.


37. The base section commanders discussed in this section were that part of the COMMZ located in Great Britain prior to the D-day invasion. In contemporary terminology a base section is similar to a Theater Army Area Command.


41. COL Claude E. Stadtman, CPT F. E. Mulvany, LTC. J. A. Lewis, and MAJ. S. B. Paine, Provost Marshal Study
42. Ibid., p. 1-2.
43. Ibid., p. 3.
47. Stadtman, Provost Marshal Activities, p. 5.
48. Ibid.
49. The 12th Army Group, under General Bradley was directly subordinate to the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower; the 1st, 3rd, and 9th U.S. Armies were commanded by Generals Hodges, Patton, and Simpson, respectively. For more information see - Dennis Geoffrey, ed. The World at War, IV (London, England: The Caxton Publishing Company Limited, 1951), p. 263.
50. Stadtman, Provost Marshal Activities, p. 5.
52. Ibid., p. 7.
53. Stadtman, Provost Marshal Study Number 102, Criminal Investigation, p. 7.
55. Stadtman, Provost Marshal Study Number 102, Criminal Investigation, p. 5.
56. Office of the Theater Provost Marshal, "Criminal
57. FM 22-5, Basic Field Manual, Military Police, p. 140.


61. Ibid., p. 1.

62. Ibid., p. 4.

63. Ibid., p. 5.

64. Office of the Theater Provost Marshal, Semi-Annual Report, Exhibit A.

65. Ibid., p. 4.

66. Ibid., p. 7.

67. Stadtman, Provost Marshal Study Number 102, Criminal Investigation, p. 4.

68. Ibid., p. 5.

69. Ibid., p. 11.


76. Ibid., p. 5.


79. Ibid.


85. Playe, p. 34.
Overview

Like in World War II, CID activities in the Viet Nam conflict also reveal patterns. Centralized command and control was firmly established and organizational development of the CID in Viet Nam was a function of the command and control decisions made in the United States. Support deficiencies in administration and maintenance occurred and the crime laboratory was not established in Viet Nam until well into the war. Finally, criminal investigative operations had to deal with the special challenges of blackmarketing and narcotics offenses.

Command and Control

Centralization and decentralization was an issue both in the United States and in Viet Nam. The activities in the United States had a definite impact on events in Viet Nam.

In the United States the CID transitioned from being decentralized at installation level, to being
controlled centrally at numbered army level. The Military Police Corps had been wrestling with the pros and cons of centralized and decentralized control of criminal investigative resources since World War II. In 1964, the Secretary of the Army directed that the structure of criminal investigative organizations of the Army be examined under "Project Security Shield." (1) This study was an outgrowth of the "Dunlap Spy" case which was investigated by CID agents. The purpose of the study was to determine the desired level of centralization of the criminal investigative and counter intelligence functions of the U.S. Army. In regards to CID the final recommendation was,

Criminal investigation elements would be controlled by the Provost Marshal General of the Army and would operate through CID Groups which were also to be assigned at Continental U.S. Army level... Investigative elements assigned to tactical formations would continue to be controlled by the tactical commander, both in the United States and overseas. (2)

Based on the Security Shield Study, criminal investigation units which were formerly assigned to installations and activities, were consolidated into military police groups (criminal investigation) which were created in each numbered army area. This was influential in the formation of the criminal investigation group in Viet Nam, which controlled all in-country investigators except
those assigned to division military police companies and to U.S. Army Headquarters, Area Command in Saigon. (3)

Meanwhile, the Secretary of Defense directed that the investigative structuring of all the services be examined under the "Department of Defense Personnel Security Survey" of 1965. In May 1966, the Army Staff report, "Army Counterintelligence - Criminal Investigative Structure Study" was forwarded to the Department of Defense by the Secretary of the Army. It proposed that the Army criminal investigative resources be consolidated into a single, worldwide command. (4) No action on this recommendation was taken until 12 January 1968, when the Deputy Secretary of Defense stressed the absolute need for centralized control of investigative efforts. His stance was prompted by a concern for procurement frauds, bribery, and conflicts of interest. (5)

On 23 August 1968, the Army Chief of Staff directed the development of a plan to establish a centralized CID command. (6) This led to the formation of the U.S. Army CID Agency (USACIDA) which was activated on 2 September 1969, as part of the Office of the Provost Marshal General. USACIDA was to provide monitorship, coordination, and overall direction of the Army CID Program. However, USACIDA did not have command and control authority over worldwide CID units. (7)
On 29 April 1970, USCIDA was removed from under the Office of the Provost Marshal General and placed under Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. In early 1970, a number of investigations into the activities of military police officers, who had served in Vietnam during 1968-70, placed the USACIDA in an untenable organizational position under the Office of the Provost Marshal General. On 29 April 1970, the Secretary of the Army, on the recommendation of the Army Chief of Staff, directed transfer of the USACIDA to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. (8)

On 16 March 1971, the Secretary of Defense requested the Secretary of the Army to develop a CID agency with vertical control of CID worldwide. (9) Key crime issues which impacted on this decision included the alleged widespread corruption of the nonappropriated fund system by Command Sergeant Major of the Army William O. Woolridge and his cronies, the "Khaki Mafia;" the alleged corruption of high ranking military police officers in Viet Nam; the My Lai 4 war crimes trial of 1LT William Calley et al.; and other crimes which drew significant adverse media attention.

The results of the Secretary of Defense's request was the activation of the U.S. Army CID Command (USACIDC) on 17 September 1971, to exercise centralized command and
control of Army CID activities worldwide. (10) Thus, in the United States the CID transitioned from decentralized to centralized command and control.

The CID also transitioned from decentralized to centralized control in Viet Nam. Doctrinally, command and control of CID support in combat was normally decentralized. Decentralization was accomplished by attaching or assigning the CID to a subordinate headquarters of the command. (11) Conforming with doctrine, CID was initially decentralized with elements in tactical units, the 69th Military Police Group, (12) Saigon's Headquarters Area Command (HAC), and individual CID detachments. (13)

The establishment of the Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation) (Provisional), 18th Military Police Brigade on 3 November 1966, was a direct move toward centralized control of in-country CID assets. (See Appendix C). The 18th Military Police Brigade commander was the senior military policeman in Viet Nam, and therefore was the theater Provost Marshal General for the United States Army, Viet Nam (USARV). From this point until the close of the Viet Nam conflict, the Provost Marshal General, USARV controlled the largest proportion of the CID agents in Viet Nam.

Initially, the 18th Military Police Brigade
anticipated that the Military Police Group (CI) (Prov) would control all criminal investigation resources within Viet Nam. This was accomplished to the extent that the 40th, 87th, 147th, and 252d Military Police Detachments (Criminal Investigation) and the CID cells of the 504th and 720th MP Battalions were placed under Group control. (14)

Centralization was resisted by Headquarters, Area Command. The CID elements of 90th Military Police Detachment and 716th Military Police Battalion remained under the operational control of the Headquarters, Area Command and did not become a part of the Military Police Group (CI) (PROV). This was a significant failure in the effort to centralize CID control as these units had responsibility for Saigon, the major metropolitan center of the country. (15) Headquarters, Area Command did not release its CID units to the operational control of the Military Police Group (CI) (Prov) until 25 September 1967. (16)

In May 1967, Headquarters, Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation) (Provisional) recommended a TO&E Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation) be activated in the theater of operations to assume responsibility for all non-tactical CID units in Vietnam. (17) Tactical CID elements would remain under the control of its parent unit, the division military police companies. The establishment
of a TO&E Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation) occurred on 24 August 1968, when the provisional group was reorganized into the 8th Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation), 18th Military Police Brigade. (See Appendix D). The mission of this unit was to provide planning, direction, and supervision for CID units assigned to the U.S. Army Viet Nam. (18)

USACIDC was established in 1971. It did not establish the Viet Nam Field Office as its subordinate element in Viet Nam until the following year. The 8th Military Police Group (CI) was deactivated on 23 June 1972. The Viet Nam Field Office was activated from the remnants of the 8th Military Police Group (CI) and assumed its missions. (19)

When the Viet Nam Field Office was activated, Headquarters, USARV requested an exception to policy to exercise operational control of CID in Viet Nam. This request was justified by the Provost Marshal General USARV, based on,

The unusual demand in a combat zone, and particularly under conditions of stability operations dictate that the top army commander have authority to direct the efficient and responsive conduct of criminal investigations. (20)

The request was approved and USARV continued to exercise control over CID in Viet Nam. (21)
In summary, the Viet Nam era witnessed the transition of CID from decentralized to centralized control. The situation in regards to centralization in the combat zone was directly influenced by initiatives in the United States. It is worthy of note that even after the establishment of USACIDC, the operational control of CID in Viet Nam remained with USARV.

Organizational Development

The organizational development of CID in Viet Nam was influenced by stateside outcomes on the command and control issue. Three major reorganizations of CID occurred in Viet Nam which were directly related to events in the United States.

As previously stated, the initial organization for combat of CID was under tactical units. When the Military Police Group (CI) (Prov), 18th Military Police Brigade was activated on 3 November 1966, (22) and reorganized into the 8th Military Police Group (CI), 18th Military Police Brigade on 24 August 1968, it was in response to actions taken in regard to CID centralization in the United States. (23) Likewise, the Viet Nam Field Office, USACIDC was activated on 1 July 1972, as a result of the establishment of USACIDC in the United States. (24) It was subsequently
deactivated on 10 May 1973, coinciding with the troop pull-out resulting from the Paris Peace Accords. (25)

The organizational structure of the CID Group in Viet Nam demonstrated both flexibility and adaptability to change. The individual detachments had no set manning levels. (26) The doctrinal planning factor for manpower purposes was determined to be one criminal investigator per 1,000 military personnel. (27) A U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Study verified that this was an appropriate figure. (28) Personnel and equipment were assigned based on the work load and the geographic dispersion of the troop units. Manpower was redistributed among the subordinate detachments on a quarterly basis. (29)

Field offices were used as a tool to meet geographical demands. They were small units consisting of a few agents and were relatively easy to activate, deactivate, or shift from one location to the next. (30)

The organization of the CID in Viet Nam included functional teams to support field operations. Initially, Detachment A, 8th Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation) was the Group's special investigative unit and conducted specialized investigations in narcotics suppression, illegal currency transactions, club investigations, and procurement contract investigations.
To combat the growing drug problem a Joint Narcotics Investigation Detachment was established in November 1970 as an augmentation to the 18th Military Police Brigade. A tri-service unit designed to work with the Vietnamese authorities, its mission was to collect intelligence and conduct narcotics investigations. The 8th Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation) exercised command and control of the detachment. This team was considered one of the most effective tools used in the war against drugs, but was disbanded in 1972 with the activation of the Viet Nam Field Office, USACIDC.

A Crime Suppression Team (Logistics) was organized in October, 1970 in order to develop a unit with the required expertise to investigate complex white-collar crime. This seven man team countered supply diversions by conducting criminal investigations and crime prevention surveys involving logistical activities. These teams worked with logistics system managers and the Vietnam Open Mess Agency to minimize losses in these areas. BG Wallace K. Wittwer, the USARV Provost Marshal General, stated that these teams were formed too late, with too few people of the right capabilities: trained investigators in logistics, business management, accounting, and the law.

To summarize, the organizational development of the
CID in Viet Nam was influenced by stateside initiatives toward centralization. As opposed to the World War II era fixed strength detachments, the CID detachments in Viet Nam were flexible and adaptable. An analysis of the organizational structure also reveals the existence of functional specialization with the establishment of teams to conduct narcotics and logistics investigations.

Support

As in World War II, the CID also experienced support deficiencies in the Viet Nam conflict. The support provided by the Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation) was influenced by its provisional status during the early years of the conflict. Its provisional status meant that personnel and equipment had to be obtained from assets available within the resources of the 18th Military Police Brigade and its assigned CID detachments. (36) Thus, the Group had an insufficient number of personnel to render adequate support to subordinate units. Subordinate detachments, in some cases consisting of fewer than 20 investigators, still had to take care of administrative burdens, such as the unit fund, morning report, and other personnel, logistical and administrative reports. (37) These requirements, normally

- 83 -
handled by company sized units of over 150 personnel, added to the difficulties encountered by the detachments.

There was a deficiency in administrative capability which impacted on the quality control of CID Reports of Investigation. A shortage of military clerks required the use of local national typists to prepare written correspondence. Most local national administrative personnel had only a rudimentary knowledge of the English language, and were able to type only what appeared on the draft copy of the report. Consequently, typing of draft CID Reports was done without regard to format, spelling or punctuation, resulting in frequent mistakes that required a document to be repeatedly retyped. (38) The impact of this was that in some detachments, over 100 completed reports of investigation were held up as a result of the typing backlog. (39) Delays of this sort would disrupt the flow of reports to action commanders, complicate the timely disposition of evidence, delay the distribution of reports to controlling headquarters, and delay corrective actions.

There is a strong organizational pressure to render final CID Reports of Investigation in as perfect a manner possible. This stems from the fact that these reports remain on file for forty years or more, and can be used in litigation long after they are closed. As recently as 1984 the Private Slovik investigation, which ended in his
execution during World War II, was still being litigated in the courts.

Reduction of the typing backlog proved to be impossible in many units because of the necessity to retype completed work a number of times and the inability to work local national typists for more than 50 hours per week. The lack of sufficient military clerk typists was identified as a problem which could not be corrected by employing local national typists. A recommendation was made that a military clerk typist be assigned on the basis of one for every three CID agents. This ratio was recommended as each agent was supervising up to three non-CID investigators, who were military policemen assisting with the workload and receiving on-the-job training at the same time. They were also generating investigative reports and allied documents. (40)

Lack of administrative support placed a burden on agents-in-charge of CID offices. They had to have a thorough knowledge of Army administrative procedures, to include how to implement a workable suspense system, prepare routine endorsements, and maintain a basic filing system. Experience revealed that most investigators were inadequately prepared to meet these requirements. (41) This further aggravated the situation in regard to administrative support.
Language difficulties were also a problem. Vietnamese nationals with English language skills were unavailable for employment as interpreters by CID units. The results were that CID efforts to conduct investigations involving Vietnamese nationals were often stymied. The ability to develop and maintain reliable sources of information and establish productive relationships with Vietnamese law enforcement agencies were difficult, time consuming, and often unrewarding because of the interpersonal communication problems generated by the language barrier. Lack of language trained investigators proved to be an obstacle to combined investigative operations with the Vietnamese police authorities. (42)

There was also a deficiency in maintenance capability. Once again, second echelon and higher vehicle maintenance tasks were a problem. Second echelon and higher maintenance included those maintenance activities which were beyond the scope of operating personnel. (43) It was a problem because the CID units lacked mechanics. To obtain maintenance support the CID units had to satellite onto the nearest military police unit or, if one was not available, another unit which had mechanics. (44) Although the extent to which this circumstance was an obstacle to mission accomplishment is not described, it was significant enough to be reported as a problem area in the operational reports.
CID in Viet Nam operated without an in-country crime laboratory until well into the war. Evidence had to be sent to the United States or Japan for analysis. This proved costly as quite often the examining lab technician had to be flown into Vietnam in order to testify at the court-martial in regard to the evidence he examined. The workload was large enough that the U.S. Army Crime Laboratory in Japan experienced a backlog in just processing the evidence into the laboratory, which was further complicated by a 10 day delay in the mail, 5 days each way. (45)

The activation of the U.S. Army Crime Laboratory by the 8th Military Police Group (CI) on Long Binh Post occurred in July, 1968. (46) It saved time, while providing the quick analysis of evidence, and contributed to the speedy administration of justice. The crime laboratory at Long Binh contained six divisions: chemistry, fingerprinting, document analysis, firearms, photography, and the polygraph. This in-country lab reduced the processing time for marijuana examinations from over two weeks to four days. (47)

In conclusion, support deficiencies were a characteristic pattern in Viet Nam. The lack of support capabilities adversely impacted on the quality of the
administration and maintenance, as well as on the
timeliness of laboratory examinations.

Investigative Operations

The characteristic pattern of investigative
operations in Viet Nam also emerges. Although CID continued
to investigate crimes over which it had jurisdiction,
special attention was given to those crimes involving the
degradation of combat power, especially blackmarketing or
narcotics. The focus was on the more serious crimes, where
the penalty under the Uniform Code of Military Justice was
confinement for a year and a day.

As in World War II, increased attention was again
given to the crimes of blackmarketing and pilferage. One
report on the activities of the 8th Military Police Group
(CI) states that in 1969 most of the investigations opened
up by the Group concerned blackmarket activities, currency,
and customs violations. (48)

The most vexing crime problem, according to
Brigadier General Karl W. Gustafson, the USARV Provost
Marshal General, was the pilferage of government supplies
and equipment in transit in the Saigon-Long Binh area and
along Highway 19 between Qui Nhon and Pleiku. The extent of
the problem was such that during just three months in 1968,
31 investigations of diversions of United States contract hauled cargo were opened in the Saigon - Long Binh areas alone. (49) Crime prevention surveys were conducted on depots, ports, retail outlets and the land transportation system and were important in further identifying the problem. (50)

On 24 January 1970, the 8th Military Police Group (CI) was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation for its efforts in "Operation Overtake." This operation was specifically designed to curtail truck diversions and the blackmarketing and pilferage they entailed. (51)

Extensive U.S. Government construction projects in Vietnam also generated ample opportunity for procurement and contract frauds, bribery, and the manipulation and diversion of supplies. Bribery was considered a normal commercial practice in Viet Nam and the local police were not trained, experienced or motivated to suppress it. Detection and investigation of these offenses were accomplished by covert CID operations. These operations were difficult to establish and required sizeable numbers of investigative personnel. (52)

Combat effectiveness was also degraded by the incidence of narcotics offenses. The extent of the degradation is revealed by a comparison between World War II and Viet Nam. During World War II, infantrymen in combat
carried morphine syringes in their first aid kits but in Vietnam the drug problem was such that morphine was not generally issued to the individual soldier. (53)

The use of marijuana by U.S. military personnel in Vietnam increased from .25 per 1,000 troops in 1967, to 1.3 per 1,000 troops in June 1968, and rose to 4.5 per 1,000 troops in December 1968. "There was a continued rise in the drug use rate in 1969, with 8,440 apprehensions. During 1970 there were 11,058 arrests of which 1,146 involved hard narcotics." (54)

Brigadier General Wallace K. Wittwer, in his debriefing report as the Provost Marshal General in Vietnam, stated that there was a lack of command interest in the narcotics problem in 1967. The problem was treated as belonging to the military police and not the command as a whole, and this complicated dealing with the marijuana situation. In the latter part of 1970, the heroin problem took on similar proportions, but it was recognized as a command problem, with every commander and staff section directly involved. (55)

For the month of June 1969, LTC Kenneth E. Buzzell, the Executive Officer of the 8th Military Police Group (CI), discussed the efforts of the narcotics suppression team. The drug seizures for that month produced 62,223.5 grams of marijuana, 4,270 grams of dry opium, 44 cubic
centimeters of liquid opium, 13.5 grams of morphine, 560 tablets of barbiturates, and various drug paraphernalia. Also obtained during the drug apprehensions were two M-1 carbines, one M-16 rifle, the apprehension of three U.S. soldiers, 29 Vietnamese nationals and two certified Viet Cong. This gives a general idea about the extent of the drug and contraband problem in Viet Nam during this period.

There were other significant crime problems during this era. Included were the Khaki Mafia, the My Lai 4 massacre, and military police corruption. Although two of the three could be classified as white collar crime, they are not covered in this study as their significance rests primarily in the adverse media attention that they gained. These crimes did involve significant investigative effort on the part of CID worldwide.

In conclusion, investigative operations in Viet Nam reflect a characteristic concern for crimes involving blackmarketing and pilferage. Narcotics offenses also emerge as a significant challenge for CID agents to cope with.
Conclusion

CID activities in the Viet Nam conflict reveal characteristic patterns in command and control, organizational development, support, and investigative operations. Centralized command and control over CID was firmly established. Organizational development was revealed to be a function of the command and control decisions. Support deficiencies in administration and maintenance occurred and the crime laboratory was not established in-country until well into the war. Finally, criminal investigative operations had to deal with the special challenges of blackmarketing and narcotics offenses.
CHAPTER IV
ENDNOTES


5. Tufts, pp. 4-5.

6. Ibid., p. 5.

7. Ibid., pp. 9-11.

8. Ibid., pp. 15-16.


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.


20. BF Paul M. Timmerberg, Senior Officer Debriefing Report, (APO SF 96375: United States Army Vietnam, 1972), p. 14. The accuracy of this statement has been questioned by a key member of the USACIDC staff during the 1972-73 era. It was pointed out that while the PMG, USARV may have exercised operational control of the Viet Nam Field Office, the commander, LTC Eugene E. Siegel was in daily telephonic contact with COL Tufts, the USACIDC commander.


25. Ibid.


27. Department of the Army, FM 101-10-1, Staff Officer’s Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data, (1956) p. 4-21 thru 4-22.

29. Buzzell, pp. 11-12.

30. Ibid., p. 1.

31. Ibid., p. 11-12.


34. This information was provided from the files of the U.S. Army Military Police School Historian.


40. Ibid., p. 3. See also *Operational Report - Lessons Learned*, (26 February 1968), p. 3.


43. United States Army Command and General Staff College, *ST_63-1, Fundamentals of Combat Service Support,*
(Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: USAC&GSC, 1987), p. 6-85.


45. Buzzell, p. 2.


47. Buzzell, p. 2-3.

48. Richens, p. 11.


50. Ibid., p. H-1.


55. Wittwer, p. 8.

CHAPTER V

BATTLEFIELD IMPLICATIONS

Overview

Patterns in criminal investigative support in both World War II and Vietnam have been examined in the previous two chapters. The question is: do these patterns have implications for future criminal investigative support on the battlefield?

In both conflicts, the question about command and control was whether it would be centralized or decentralized in the theater of operations. This issue, in turn, influenced the organizational development of CID. Patterns also emerge in regards to the lack of organic support capabilities. Administrative and maintenance deficiencies existed and crime laboratory support was initially not available in-theater in either war. An analysis of the investigative operations reveals similarities between World War II and Viet Nam. CID investigated all crimes, but in these two wartime situations, certain crimes were more significant. Blackmarketing crimes took on significance in both wars and in Viet Nam the CID also had to deal with the challenge of
drug offenses.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Centralized command and control was not clearly established at the beginning of either conflict. At the start of World War II there was no Army-wide centralized control structure for CID. This situation was never remedied during the war. However, when the ETO was established, command and control of CID was initially centralized in the Theater Provost Marshal General's Office but then became decentralized. In Viet Nam, the Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation) (Provisional) did not gain control of in-country CID assets until September 1967, but then retained it until the close of the war.

At the start of World War II, there was no centralized control, no doctrinal guidance, no organizational guidance; and little understanding of how the CID battle would be fought in support of the overall war effort. The War Department provided little direction and restricted the authority of the Provost Marshal General, Army Service Forces to do so. The burden fell on the shoulders of the theater commander, who was actively engaged in prosecuting a war. There were inherent problems.
In World War II, CID agents did not know, up front, who was in charge. In the European Theater they didn’t know if it was the ETO Provost Marshal General, base section commanders, advance section commanders, army group commander, field army commander, or corps commander? Unity of command was lacking. Why?

The CID doctrine of that era did not address whether command and control would be centralized or decentralized. The doctrine was emerging and focused on the technical aspects of conducting criminal investigations. Technically oriented, it gave little attention on how CID was to organize for combat. Doctrine did not clearly define who was in charge or at what level, nor did it address what to do when investigations transcended command boundaries. There was little guidance for CID in the doctrine of World War II, and as previously stated, the War Department did not fill the doctrinal void.

Lacking doctrine and guidance, the Provost Marshal General, ETO, had to draw on experience. The only CID combat experience prior to World War II was that of the Provost Marshal General of the World War I American Expeditionary Force. He clearly stated that the number one problem he had with CID was the lack of centralized command. But the Provost Marshal General, ETO, lost centralized control to both the base section commanders,
and once the fighting began, to the field commanders. The lesson learned in 1918 was lost on the decision makers of World War II.

In contrast, at the start of the Viet Nam conflict the CID had doctrinal guidance, had guidance on organizational structure, and had a concept on how support would be rendered. CID was kept in the force structure after World War II and thus maintained a continuity of operations by its mere existence.

The significant characteristic about command and control in Viet Nam was the establishment of the Military Police Group (CI) (Provisional) based on the concepts in the "Project Security Shield" study. Its activation steered the control of CID toward centralization at the theater level, albeit over the initial objections of the combat commanders.

The findings reveal that command and control of CID were not clear at the beginning of either conflict. Centralized command and control of CID assets in a theater of operations is not in question during peacetime. War changes the situation. Command and control relationships of CID detachments must be clearly understood prior to combat. Otherwise, a conflict over who is in charge will arise between the CID and field commanders.
ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The organizational development of CID in these wars reveals two factors. First, organizational development was a function of whether command and control was centralized or decentralized. Second, the CID organization needed a flexible structure to meet changing requirements.

The organizational development of CID in World War II clearly lacked coherence. Based on the World War I decision to demobilize, the development of CID during the Second World War had to start from scratch. The lack of an already in place force structure made it a hit-or-miss affair. Because there was no recognized and accepted organizational structure, frequent reorganizations were the norm. The lack of centralized planning at the War Department level and the failure to clearly affix responsibility for CID activities on a U.S. Army Provost Marshal General further aggravated the situation. The frequent reorganizations usually revolved around the command and control issue: centralization or decentralization.

During the Viet Nam conflict, organizational development also revolved around the command and control issue. But the CID in this conflict had the advantage of an already in-place force structure with tactical units.
Unlike the dissolution of CID after World War I, CID remained in the active Army after World War II. In 1968, the reorganization of the Military Police Group (CI) (Provisional), 18th MP Brigade into the 8th Military Police Group (CI), 18th MP Brigade, marked the end of the provisional status of CID and the beginning of a permanent command and control structure in Viet Nam.

In both World War II and Viet Nam, there were too few agents in theater to handle the mission. In World War II, the CID authorities tried to recruit new criminal investigators from the Army at large. Anyone in the Army—from cook to combat infantryman—who had any investigative experience, was offered a job. In Viet Nam, the CID authorities recruited investigative assistants from the military police ranks. Then the CID gave these converted military police on-the-job training to hone their investigative skills.

Were either of these solutions totally satisfactory? It is clear that both were compromises to offset the short ge of trained CID agents. The best response would have been to determine exactly what the requirement for agents was and then to levy and train that number of agents. CID agents who have been properly screened through the application process, who have received formal CID training at the Military Police School, and who
have entered the accreditation process, are better able to accomplish the CID mission than untrained military policemen receiving on-the-job training. The current U.S. Army doctrine calls for one agent for every thousand troops. There was nothing in the literature which refutes this ratio, therefore it should be used in determining the number of agents required for future conflicts.

In both wars, the CID coped by establishing small field offices as a sub-element of the CID detachment. These field offices met the need and compensated for the geographical dispersion of troop units which existed in both conflicts. Also used were specialized investigative teams, set up to investigate logistics and narcotics offenses. As crime became more complex and criminals more specialized, the trend was for CID to specialize. The results of their efforts received high praise in both wars.

**SUPPORT**

The support system for CID operations during these conflicts encountered problems. The lack of centralized command and control and the lack of a clear-cut organizational structure did not add to the solution.

In both wars, CID officials made it a matter of
record that there were not enough support personnel - typists and file clerks, mechanics and interpreters - to allow the agents to do the investigative work. Agents were either forced to do the work themselves or do without.

In manning, the focus was on agents and not on support personnel. In the theater of operations, CID agents had one function - to investigate crime. The detachments were organized along functional lines and this detracted from the ability to cope with non-investigative tasks. What was the impact? The results were that trained criminal investigators spent non-productive time on non-investigative tasks for which they were not trained. To organize CID detachments solely on a functional basis, without adequate administrative, maintenance, and other support capabilities was counter productive. History indicates that CID units in a combat zone will not be provided with enough clerks or any mechanics. This being the case, agents should be oriented on accomplishing the mission with support shortfalls.

The fact that there were insufficient agents to accomplish the mission further aggravated the matter. CID supervisors and agents had to meet the support needs in administration and maintenance internally, or tap into the overall combat service support system of the Army, which was not always in a position to be responsive.
Likewise, the establishment of a crime laboratory in-theater occurred in both wars. The laboratories were activated to save both agent and laboratory examiner travel time and to reduce the turn around time of lab examinations. It does not appear that the decision to establish an in-theater crime laboratory was done based on any systematic method. Rather, it appears that the decision was a subjective one. Using economic analysis or some similar method to trigger the economic deployment of crime labs in theater should not be difficult.

INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS

In both wars, CID continued to investigate general crimes.

Control of blackmarketing was a challenge in World War II. This was highlighted by the establishment of a special task force to deal with the problems of just one case, the criminal operations in the 716th Railway Operating Battalion. In Viet Nam, blackmarketing and logistics offenses were again a problem. These were complicated by an ever growing drug problem.

In both cases specialized teams were set up to deal with the situation. The establishment of trained specialty
teams was a solution for the problem.

CONCLUSIONS

What conclusions can we draw from the information presented? As case studies, both conflicts are instructive. They both reveal patterns that exhibit a remarkable similarity. The environment, the nature, and the scope of both wars are arguably different. Yet the similarities in CID activities were there. The conclusions arrived at indicate that CID activities in World War II and the Vietnam conflict do reveal characteristic patterns in command and control, organizational development, support, and investigative operations. Further, these patterns have implications for future criminal investigative support on the battlefield. The experiences of the previous wars, even as far back as World War I, demonstrate lessons to be learned.

Perhaps the most significant lesson is in regards to pre-conflict planning for CID support on the battlefield. The command and control, the organizational structure, and the required support should be planned for prior to the commitment of U.S. forces on the battlefield.

Command and control of CID assets in today's
theater of operations will be under the direct control of the Commanding General, USACIDC. This concept was designed to insulate CID agents from unwarranted influence. This requirement is doctrinally sanctioned. In both Viet Nam and World War II the command and control of CID was either at theater level or below. Not until the very final stages of the Viet Nam conflict were CID assets in theater controlled by USACIDC.

If the theater commander is held responsible for all operations in his theater, he will want to be responsible for criminal investigative operations as well and have authority to influence CID activities. As a minimum, this would involve operational control. Therefore, it should be anticipated that the next conflict will bring with it an effort on the part of the responsible theater commander to gain control of the CID assets in his theater. To expect otherwise is to disregard the lessons of history.

Control of CID assets at theater level will work as long as high standards of investigative integrity are enforced and maintained. Will centralized control of CID tactical units by USACIDC from a stateside command post work? Command and control will prove difficult unless a major USACIDC subordinate unit, such as a region headquarters, is located in close proximity to the action. In the absence of a region headquarters, procedures to
implement centralized control will need to be clearly outlined and implemented. Operations procedures clearly understood by the leadership of the deployed CID unit to be workable.

If command and control cannot be effectively implemented from Headquarters, USACIDC, then a provision should be incorporated into doctrine allowing for the attachment of CID units to the theater commander for purposes of employment. The theater commander may be in the best position to influence the proper employment of CID assets. The key is to retain enough flexibility to provide quality and responsive support to the field commanders, while at the same time retaining enough control at USACIDC level to ensure compliance with CID investigative standards. This should be easy enough to arrange by message traffic and other forms of communication.

A key element to providing responsive CID support is to have an organizational structure that is flexible enough to meet the needs of the various situations that will be encountered in a theater of operations. Tactical unit commanders maintain flexibility by tailoring their force and maintaining a reserve with which they can influence the situation.

An organizational structure for CID should be adaptable to the situation. In both World War II and Viet Nam small field offices, consisting of 2-3 agents, were
effectively used. The CID was able to provide investigative support to units dispersed over a large battlefield area. It also provided a means to tailor the force without wasting personnel assets. If detachments consist of nine or more members, then augmentation of one detachment by another may be wasteful. Why provide nine additional personnel, when all that is needed are two or three additional agents. An augmentation cell of three agents should be designed into the force structure to provide flexibility to meet unanticipated requirements.

The assignment of adequate agent support to the theater should be addressed in the war planning process. Agents should be assigned to the theater in numbers adequate enough to get the job done. The current doctrine is one agent for every thousand troops. Until proven invalid this formula should be used when estimating CID support to a theater of operations.

The one agent for every thousand troops assumes adequate investigative support personnel. This brings up the question of how will CID be supported on the battlefield? What word processing system will be used? Will it be military clerk typists, civilian local hire, a system of dictation using hand held recorders, the agents typing their own reports, or accepting hand written reports from CID units in the combat zone. The best solution is to use
military clerk typists. They are trained soldiers, add a degree of flexibility to deployed units, and can greatly ease the administrative burden on agents so that the agents can concentrate on investigative activities. If this solution is not feasible, then increasing the typing proficiency of CID agents is an interim solution pending the acquisition of local hire personnel.

Currently, the senior noncommissioned officer in a CID unit is responsible for the administrative and logistical support of the unit. In the larger CID units this NCO holds the title "Chief of Investigative Support." This agent plays a key role as the detachment commander's logistical advisor. He needs to be trained in the combat service support provided on the battlefield and how to utilize that system for the benefit of the detachment. How well he does his job will be the key factor in determining the adequacy of administrative, logistical, maintenance and other support received by the detachment.

Addressing the need for crime laboratory support is simple. Both wars demonstrated the need for a laboratory in the theater of operations. Thus, the need exists for a deployable crime lab. If the conflict is one involving mobile warfare over large geographical areas, then there will be a need for a mobile crime laboratory.

Blackmarketing operations were prevalent in both
World War II and Viet Nam. The U.S. Army in Viet Nam also experienced a problem with illegal drugs. The prediction of the nature of crime in the next war is conjecture at this point. It is likely, however, that investigative operations in a future conflict will again experience increased activity in these two criminal areas. The solution used in the past to combat crime in these areas was investigative teams which specialized in blackmarket operations and drug suppression activities. The development of functional teams was highly praised by the leadership in both conflicts and these teams should be employed in theater at the earliest possible time.

CID detachments were effectively employed in both World War II and Viet Nam. Both conflicts demonstrated similarities in CID activities. Given the similarities in these contrasting wars, perhaps a judgment can be made that there will be similarities in the next war as well?

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are many recommendations for future research. One recommendation is to compare and contrast the findings of this historically based project with the current USACIDC operational concepts for wartime support. Another recommendation is to obtain documentation
on CID activities in Korea and analyze that experience in the same manner as this project.

There is also a need to determine how the CID will deal with the combat service support structure of the AirLand Battle. What support can CID expect to receive and more importantly, what support will it not receive?

Finally, from an academic point of view, further research can be done to determine which means of control - either centralized or decentralized - works best. This is an underlying question throughout this whole study but one never fully addressed in terms of "which is best?"
APPENDIX A

Overlay depicting the relationship of the Combat Zone, Communications Zone, Advance Section, and Base Section.
APPENDIX B

Organizational chart depicting the 12th Army Group, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces.

[Diagram of organizational chart with SHAEP at the top, branches labeled 6, 12, 21, and sub-branches labeled 1, 3, 9.]
APPENDIX C

Organizational chart depicting the Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation) (Provisional), 18th Military Police Brigade, and other major subordinate units of the 18th Military Police Brigade.
APPENDIX D

Organizational chart depicting the 8th Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation), 18th Military Police Brigade, and other major subordinate units of the 18th Military Police Brigade.
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS


- 122 -


GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS


Bird, George R. *Observation on the Operation of a Mobile Military Criminal Investigation Laboratory*. APO 408: Office of the Theater Provost Marshal, General Board,


Department of the Army. *Military Police Team, Squad*.


the Adjutant General, 10 Oct 1966


Dermody, Edward S. Observations and Recommendations Relative to CID Organization and Operation. APO 408:


Evans, Vernon. Criminal Investigation Division. APO 885: Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma, India. 25 Sep 1944.


Holland, LTC J. P. Filing System in Criminal Investigation Section or Provost Marshal Office. APO 501: Headquarters, USASOS, 1 Jul 1943.


Holland, LTC Jeremiah P. Memorandum 
Preservation and Handling of Scientific Evidence. APO 
501: Headquarters, United States Army Services of 
Supply, 4 Apr 1944.

Johnson, COL A. B. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, ASF. 
Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Army Service Forces, 
13 Jul 1945.

Johnson, COL A. B. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, ASF. 
Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Army Service Forces, 
9 Aug 1945.

Johnson, COL A. B. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, ASF. 
Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Army Service Forces, 
17 Aug 1945.

Johnson, COL A. B. Memorandum for the Commanding General, 
ASF. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Army Service 
Forces, 12 Jan 1945.

Johnson, COL A. B. Memorandum for the Commanding General, 
ASF. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Army Service 
Forces, 29 Dec 1944.

Johnson, COL A. B. Memorandum for the Commanding General, 
ASF. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Army Service 
Forces, 19 Jan 1945.

Johnson, COL A. B. Memorandum for the Commanding General, 
ASF. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Army Service 
Forces, 26 Jan 1945.

Johnson, COL A. B. Memorandum for the Commanding General, 
ASF. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Army Service 
Forces, 1 Feb 1945.

Johnson, COL A. B. Memorandum for the Commanding General, 
ASF. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Army Service 
Forces, 8 Feb 1945.

Johnson, COL A. B. Memorandum for the Commanding General, 
ASF. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Army Service 
Forces, 15 Feb 1945.

Johnson, COL A. B. Memorandum for the Commanding General, 
ASF. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Army Service 
Forces, 1 Mar 1945.
Forces, 15 Mar 1945.


Landon, COL C. R. First Endorsement. APO 408: The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, 12 Dec 1945.


McHugh, Thomas J. and Thomas A. Tucker. Evaluation of the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command's Criminal Information and Informant Program. Fort


Ostrander, COL L. S. Memorandum No. 117 -- Field Agents, Investigation Division, Provost Marshal Section, U.S. Army, APO 501: Office of the Commanding General, United States Forces in Australia, 12 Jun 1942.


Ostrander, BG L. S. USAFFE Regulations No. 80-25, Provost Marshal Investigations. APO 501: Headquarters, United States Army in the Far East, 10 Nov 43.

Ostrander, BG L. S. USAFFE Regulations No. 80-50, Protection of United States Army Supplies and Equipment. APO 501: Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Far East, 8 Jan 1944.


and Staff College, Air University, 1981.


S.O.P. **Military Police Desk.** APO 600: Headquarters, Law Enforcement Group, Mediterranean Base Section, undated.

Sparks, LTC M. S. *Activation of Criminal Investigation Sections (I/O and E-19-50C-I).* APO 501: Office of the Commanding General, United States Army Services of Supply, 2 December 1943.

Stadtman, COL Claud E. *Provost Marshal Activities Report for the Month of November.* APO 655: Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, 1944.

Stadtman, COL Claud E. *Provost Marshal Activities Report for the Month of October.* APO 655: Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, 1944.

Stadtman, COL Claud E. *Provost Marshal Activities Report for the Month of September.* APO 655: Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, 1944.

Stadtman, COL Claud E. *Summary of Status of Military Discipline, Twelfth Army Group, for the Month of November, 1944.* APO 655: Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, 1944.

Stadtman, COL Claud E. *Summary of Status of Military Discipline, Twelfth Army Group, for October, 1944.* APO 655: Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, 1944.

Stadtman, COL Claud E. *Summary of Status of Military Discipline, Twelfth Army Group, for September, 1944.* APO 655: Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, 1944.


Stadtman, COL C. E., W. D. Fowler, and J. A. Lewis. *Provost


Swift, Innis P. Military Police Activities. APO 201: Headquarters First Cavalry Division, 1944.


United States Army Command and General Staff College. Low Intensity Conflict. FC 100-20, 1986.


United States Army Military Police School. Criminal


War Department. Field Service Regulations — Administration. FM 100-10, 1949.

War Department. Field Service Regulations — Operations. FM 100-5, 1941.


War Department. War Department Staff Officer's Field Manual—The Staff and Combat Orders. FM 101-5, 1940.


Wiltamuth, Ralph. Observer's Report. Provost Marshal's


Zaniewski, 1LT F. J. Military Police Platoon, 1st U.S. Infantry Division, Unit History for Month Ending 30 June 1944. APO 1: U.S. Army, 30 June 1944.


PERIODICALS AND ARTICLES


"New Manuals For M.P.s." The Bulletin, I No. 6 (March 1943) p. 5.


Richens, CPT Brant L. and SP4 Russell B. Shor. "18th MP Brigade, Three Years in Vietnam." *Military Police Journal,* September 1979, pp. 5-17


"U.S. Military Justice on Trial." *Newsweek,* 31 August 70, pp. 18-23.


UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS


- 141 -
Development of the CID through World War II. Unpublished, undated notes.


Unit History, 8th Military Police Group (CI). Unpublished, undated notes.
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

2. Defense Technical Information Center
   Cameron Station
   Alexandria, Virginia 22314

3. MAJ Allen Ohlstein
   Center for Army Tactics
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

4. MAJ Stephen A. Bourque
   Center for Army Tactics
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

5. MAJ Ernest M. Pitt
   2618 Holt Street
   Ashland, Kentucky 41101

6. MAJ George J. Kinoshita, Jr.
   Headquarters, USACIDC
   Baileys Cross Roads, Virginia 22041

7. Commander
   United States Army Criminal Investigation Command
   ATTN: CIPA-ZA (Ms Alice Russell)
   5611 Columbia Pike
   Falls Church, Virginia 22041

8. Commander
   Second Region, USACIDC
   ATTN: CIRB-ZA
   APO NY 09102-5211

9. Commander
   Nuernberg Field Office
   Second Region, USACIDC
   ATTN: CIRBN-ZA
   APO NY 09696-5214

10. Operations Officer
    Nuernberg Field Office
    Second Region, USACIDC
    ATTN: CIRBN-OP (CW4 Wazeter)
11. Chief of Investigative Support  
   Nuernberg Field Office  
   Second Region, USACIDC  
   ATTN: CIRBN-CIS  
   APO NY 09696-5214

12. Historian  
   U.S. Army Military Police School  
   Fort McClellan, Alabama  36205
MEMORANDUM FOR Defense Technical Information Center, ATTN: DTIC-OMI (Bill Bush), 8725 John J Kingman Rd, STE 0944, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

SUBJECT: Distribution Statement Change


2. The distribution statement change (line 22), effective January 2000 per Daniel G. Karis, Author, Land Warfare Activity, should read the following: (A) Approved for public release: Distribution unlimited.

3. POC for this request is Mary Light, Documents Cataloger, DSN 585-3116 or COM 913-758-3116 or FAX: DSN 585-3014 or COM 913-758-3014.

Encls

Martha A. Davis
Director
Combined Arms Research Library

Received 3-7-00