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Mobilization of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve: Historical Perspective and the Vietnam War

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MOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND THE VIETNAM WAR

by

Colonel John D. Stuckey
Colonel Joseph H. Pistorius

Final Report

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FOREWORD

This document has been prepared in response to a study request from the Secretary of the Army. Members of the study team were Colonel John D. Stuckey and Colonel Joseph H. Pistorius. This is a final report prepared by the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, and is approved for publication as meeting the requirements of the initiating directive. As such it does not reflect the official position of the Army War College or approval of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, or Department of the Army. The findings of this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position.

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SUMMARY

The United States has relied extensively on its Militia/National Guard and Reserves in every major war in its history, except for the Vietnam War. That only a diminutive mobilization occurred for the Vietnam War was a remarkable departure from past policy and an aberration in US military history.

This study provides an examination of the mobilization and use of Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve (USAR) forces for the Vietnam War. The study first reviews (Chapter 2) the historical mobilization experiences of the United States in order to gain an appreciation and perspective of the mobilization and use of the Militia/National Guard and Reserves throughout US history. Then, the study examines (Chapter 3) the extent to which the President and his civilian and military advisers considered mobilization during the first 3 years of the Vietnam ground war and the rationale behind the nonmobilization during this period. The examination then focuses (Chapter 4) on the 1968 mobilization for the Vietnam War and addresses in detail what happened regarding the Army Reserve Component forces involved. The study ends (Chapter 5) with conclusions and interpretations relative to mobilization in general and to the partial mobilization for the Vietnam War.

Historical Mobilization Perspective

The United States has never maintained, nor thought seriously of maintaining during peacetime, a Regular Army of sufficient size to meet the needs of war. The United States has engaged in nine major wars, and extensive reliance has been placed on the Citizen-Soldier in the first eight of them. In addition, the Citizen-Soldier Army has been utilized in numerous minor wars and domestic disturbances throughout history.

The proposition that the National Guard and Reserves would be called into active Federal Service had been proven in every major war (and the Berlin Crisis of 1961) involving US Army forces. Because of this historical perspective, and because the US Army was organized and functioned based upon a mobilization precept, there was, during the beginning of the Vietnam War, an unquestioned belief that mobilization of the Guard and Reserves would, of course, occur.

1965-67 Nonmobilization for the Vietnam War

The first momentous year of the Vietnam War regarding manpower was 1965, when 44 combat maneuver battalions of the United States and its allies were deployed to RVN beginning 8 March 1965. When this buildup of ground combat forces began, the ARNG and USAR had a Reserve paid strength of 695,000 organized into 23 divisions, 11 separate brigades, and some 8,000 units.

During the first 3 years of the Vietnam ground war (1965-67), mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves was a major topic of consideration by the President and his military and civilian advisers. From the onset of the buildup of ground combat forces in South Vietnam,
mobilization was favored by the Secretary of Defense, the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Advisor, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, many members of Congress, the National Guard and Reserve leadership, and others.

On 1 January 1960, the total US Army strength in Vietnam was 800. On 1 January 1965, the number totaled 14,700. Calendar year 1967 ended with a Presidential decision of a troop ceiling of 525,000.

President Johnson refused to declare a national emergency, to seek congressional legislation for a mobilization, or to seek a declaration of war. During the period 1965-67, the President rejected all recommendations for a mobilization. The principal reason for these decisions was his overriding concern for the domestic political arena. Never before in US history had a President declined to use in war military forces whose very purpose was for such utility.

1968 Mobilization for the Vietnam War

When calendar year 1968 began, American Army combat units had been fighting in Vietnam for 34 months. The Regular Army structure in January 1968 included 19 numbered divisions, with a total Army strength of 1.5 million. The divisions were stationed in CONUS, RVN, Korea, and FRG, with only 4 2/3 divisions remaining in the Strategic Army Reserve.

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve had, in early 1968, a combined Ready Reserve unit strength of 660,000, plus an Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) of over 540,000. The unit force structure of the ARNG and USAR included 8 combat divisions, 13 training divisions, 21 separate combat brigades, 2 engineer brigades, 7 support brigades, 250 separate combat battalions, and other units. The Selective Reserve Force (SRF) had evolved, since its inception in 1965, into a balanced three-division force, and had attained the highest level of mobilization readiness in the history of the Reserve Components (RC).

On 25 January 1968, President Johnson directed, by Executive Order, a partial callup of the RC as a result of the USS Pueblo incident of 23 January. Twenty-eight units with 14,801 unit members were mobilized: 6 units and 593 members of the Navy Reserve, 14 units and 9,340 Air National Guard, and 8 units with 4,868 Air Reserve. No Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, or Coast Guard Reserve units or individuals were called. Although the 25 January mobilization was not ordered specifically for Vietnam, four of the Air National Guard units (tactical fighter squadrons) were deployed to RVN in May 1968. All six of the activated Naval Reserve units were demobilized by the end of calendar year 1968, as were seven of the eight Air Reserve units. By December 1968, all of the units mobilized under the 25 January 1968 order were deactivated.

Only 8 days after the Pueblo was seized by the North Koreans, the Vietnamese TET Offensive began (31 January), with a strength and intensity that caught the US command and the American public by surprise. General Westmoreland requested reinforcements on 12 February. The JCS again recommended a mobilization, but Secretary McNamara (and others) were opposed.
On 13 March, the President decided to deploy additional forces to Vietnam and also approved a partial mobilization of the RC.

The actual mobilization order for the Vietnam War was dated 11 April 1968, directing the mobilization to occur on 13 May. The legal authority for the mobilization was not based on a declaration of emergency nor a declaration of war, but rather on authorizing language contained in the 1967 DOD Appropriations Act (Public Law 89-687). Seventy-six units of the ARNG and USAR entered active duty on 13 May 1968 with a strength of 20,034. In addition, 2,752 members of the IRR were mobilized.

The 13 May 1968 mobilization had two objectives: (1) provide troops for actual deployment to Vietnam, and (2) provide troops to build up the strategic reserve in CONUS. Forty-three units were deployed to Vietnam and 33 units were nondeployed. The mobilization had two unique features relative to the US experience: it was the smallest mobilization for a major war and was the most delayed mobilization in US history.

The 1968 mobilization had many nonunique characteristics—features which had occurred during earlier mobilizations, including the following:

- Mobilization planning was completely inadequate.
- Unit selection criteria were ill-advised and ill-applied.
- Alert messages and the public information program were ill-timed and poorly prepared.
- Personnel actions were poorly planned and problems were numerous.
- Stationing plans were developed late and with considerable difficulty.
- Equipment shortages were many, distribution was chaotic, and logistics requirements were based on faulty assumptions.
- Unit training requirements exceeded DA assumptions.
- Unit integrity was widely violated.

The 76 units mobilized on 13 May served on active duty from 14 to 19 months. Demobilization of all units was accomplished by 12 December 1969. The Army's demobilization was characterized by disinterest, and poor planning, policy, and execution.

Three grand conclusions stand out among those regarding mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces throughout US history (including the Vietnam War): (1) extensive initial reliance on the Reserve Components has prevailed throughout all of US history (except the VN War), and early mobilization has been a factor on which has depended the successful prosecution of US wars; (2) the Militia/National Guard and Reserves have never been properly equipped during peacetime; and (3) mobilization has never been adequately planned. The amazing truth of history is that these three arrangements are contradictions, rather than mutually supporting mobilization dogma.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

The United States has relied extensively on its Militia/National Guard and Reserves in every major war in its history, except for the Vietnam War. That only a diminutive mobilization occurred for the Vietnam War was a remarkable departure from past policy and an aberration in US military history.

Lyndon B. Johnson was the fourth consecutive US President committed to battling Communists in Southeast Asia. When he took the oath of office on 22 November 1963, there were 16,536 US military personnel in Indochina, and when he departed the presidency on 20 January 1969, US military personnel in South Vietnam numbered 542,400. In 1965, when the first ground combat troops were deployed to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), the President declined to mobilize the Reserve Components. He refused again in 1966 and 1967.

Two miniature mobilizations were finally ordered in 1968. The first occurred on 25 January, a reaction to the USS Pueblo incident, involving a callup of 14,301 unit members of the Navy Reserve, Air National Guard and Air Reserve. The second mobilization occurred on 13 May, specifically for the Vietnam War in reaction to the TET offensive. It involved 20,034 unit members in 76 units of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and US Army Reserve (USAR), plus 2,752 members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

Purpose

The major purpose of this study is to examine what occurred with respect to the mobilization and use of Army National Guard and Army Reserve forces for the Vietnam War. The purpose is both with knowledge for its own sake and with knowledge for its contribution to practical concerns in future mobilizations.

Scope

The study first reviews previous American mobilization experiences to gain an appreciation and perspective of the mobilization and use of the Militia/National Guard and Reserves throughout US history. Then, the study examines the extent to which the President and his civilian and military advisers considered mobilization during the first 3 years of the Vietnam War and the rationale behind rejections of that option. The examination then focuses on the 1968 mobilization for the war and addresses in detail what happened to the Army Reserve Components (RC) forces involved. Last, the study provides conclusions relative to mobilization in general and to the partial mobilization for the Vietnam War in particular.
Methodology

Primary research for this study was conducted using official reports, studies, and books. Other relevant facts were acquired by telephone and personal interviews with members and former members of ARNG and USAR units mobilized in 1963.

Limitations

This study, a history of mobilization with primary focus on the mobilization for the Vietnam War, does not address current mobilization plans or evaluate their status. Any individual's writing will be determined not only by the facts as discovered by research but also by his values, which determine the import of the facts for him.
CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL MOBILIZATION PERSPECTIVE

In studying the history of the decision not to fully mobilize the National Guard and Reserves during the Vietnam War, and in assessing the significance of what did occur, the mind's eye needs a clear picture of the US historical mobilization experience.

A simple but grand arrangement is discoverable amidst what has been a commanding feature of America's early wars, namely that the history of the US Army is a history of two armies: a citizen army (known as Militia, National Guard and Army Reserve) and a Regular Army. This chapter briefly summarizes the reliance on and use of the Citizen Soldiers throughout the first eight major US wars. This historical overview will shed light on the significance of the decision not to fully mobilize during the Vietnam War in the 1960's. Foregone conclusions are that the arguments and the decisions regarding mobilization during the Vietnam War were directly related to the experiences of the partial mobilization during the Berlin Crisis in 1961; and that the greater historical mobilization experience of the United States influenced the military and public attitudes and expectations about mobilization for the Vietnam War.

The Roots of Mobilization Tenets

The military manpower doctrine of the Colonies, inherited from the German and English background in Europe, provided the roots of mobilization philosophy in the United States. The word Militia embodies that dogma. This Militia foundation began in America at Jamestown in 1607, and the noun "Militia," with various adjectives, recurs again and again in American history. The Organized Militia System developed by the Colonies, from which the National Guard is a modern outgrowth, is the military institution that the American people have relied on extensively—and sometimes exclusively—to raise military manpower for their wars.

During the colonial period, military preparedness and use were based entirely on the Militia concept, which meant that every able-bodied man, within prescribed age limits, was required to possess arms, to be carried on muster rolls, to train periodically, and to be mustered into service (mobilized) for military operations whenever necessary. The draft laws of World War I were based upon these common law principles and thereafter became the law of the land. Selective Service laws and mobilization authority merely extended the local Militia responsibilities from the State to the Federal Government, although this development evolved slowly.

Each colony had, from its inception, a deep concern and interest in its own defense, even though the collective defense of all colonies was not part of colonial thinking. Each of the independent colonies carefully established and maintained its own civilian control over its Militia. There was considerable fear of and aversion to a "standing
Army." The value of a prompt mobilization was thoroughly respected, as was a prompt demobilization following hostilities. There were several partial mobilizations for specific incidents and campaigns, but never a full mobilization of the Colonial Militia for a war outside the colony.

**Revolutionary War**

The Revolutionary War was fought and won by the Militia, the Continental Army, and French forces. The Massachusetts Militia (the Lexington Company of the Massachusetts Volunteer Militia) clashed with the British garrison of Boston at Lexington and Concord on 19 April 1775. The American Regular Army, begun by the Continental Congress on 14 June 1775, consisted of a Continental Army of 10 companies of riflemen. General Washington's Continental Army was composed of Militia units from the Colonies and of volunteers and draftees. General Cornwallis was opposed at Yorktown by a mixed force of 5,700 Continentals, 3,200 Militiamen, and 7,800 French soldiers (and a French fleet). The Colonies had approximately 500,000 men engaged during the 8 years of war, with a peak strength of 35,000, against a British force of about 42,000 soldiers.

With independence won and a peace treaty signed on 3 September 1783, the Continental Congress ordered the Continental Army disbanded (except for 80 men). The Organized Militia continued in the states. The new Federal Government became operative under the Constitution on 30 April 1789. (The Articles of Confederation governed the new nation from 1781 to 1789.) The first session of the First Congress passed an act on 29 September 1789 establishing a Regular Army in the service of the United States in which the officers were appointed by Federal authority and swore allegiance only to the United States.

The Organized Militia, with its origins in the earliest colonial settlements of North America, provided the root and foundation of our mobilization experience. The United States never has maintained a sufficient active military establishment to satisfy the manpower needs of war. Throughout US history, following the establishment of active services, the Organized Militia has been relied on to reinforce our active forces in time of war. (Reliance on the Organized Militia—specifically the National Guard—has also occurred for purposes other than war, as will be addressed later in this chapter.) A brief review of the reliance on and use of the Organized Militia in the major wars of the United States and during the Berlin Crisis of 1961 follows.

**War of 1812**

The period between the successful conclusion of the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 saw several Federal laws of direct importance to mobilization. The First Congress passed an act which established the President's authority to call (requisition) the Militia into Federal service in emergencies. However, proposals for establishing a well-regulated, well-trained Militia under Federal supervision with Federal standards were not adopted by this Congress, nor any other, for over 100 years.
The Second Congress passed the Militia Law of 1792, which, as amended, remained the basic mobilization measure in the United States for 111 years (until 1903). This law reaffirmed the Common Militia principles, established by the Colonies, of a compulsory military obligation for all free white males between the ages of 18 and 45 and the obligation of the Militia to arm themselves. The law also prescribed organizing the states' Militia into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies, to be officered by the respective states. Service was limited to 3 months in any one year. Standards and procedures were left to the individual states, with no Federal finance, supervision, uniformity, or enforcement. The 1792 Militia Act did not create, or cause to be created, a well-organized or well-equipped Militia.

Various laws were enacted between 1798 and 1812, all having the major mobilization characteristic of reliance on the volunteer Militia, rather than the common Militia, in the event of needed manpower. The Militia system continued largely unchanged. The most significant new law was the Act of April 1808, which, for the first time, provided Federal financial support ($200,000 annually) to arm and equip the Militia.

In January 1812, the 12th Congress passed legislation authorizing the President to accept 30,000 Federal volunteers from Militia companies, and on 10 April 1812, Congress increased the callup authority to include 100,000 State Militia for a period of 6 months. The Militia were to be raised by state quotas, although several governors refused to comply, maintaining that the law was unconstitutional. In any event, the Militia call relied upon Militia members volunteering for Federal service.

The War of 1812 (18 June 1812-24 December 1814) against Great Britain was partly fought in Canada; thus a major issue at that time (and subsequently) was the legitimate use of the Militia outside the United States. The historical use of the Militia was as a home defense force, and the language in the Constitution heeded that fact by stipulating that Congress could "provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the union, to suppress insurrection, and repel invasions."

The Regular Army was authorized an aggregate strength of 35,603 at the beginning of the War of 1812, but was short of this number by 28,859—having an actual strength of only 6,744. At its highest point, at least half of the Army was composed of volunteer Militia organizations on extended duty. An estimated 458,000 Militia served during the War of 1812.

One of the principal manpower issues in this war was the term of enlistments, which had plagued General Washington earlier, and was to confound the United States thereafter—even during the Vietnam War. Of the individual enlistments, 398,000 were for 6 months or less, and another 60,000 served a little more than 6 months. Only 10,000 men enlisted under terms of one year or longer. Nevertheless, the most significant fact about mobilization in the War of 1812 was that the Militia was indispensable to the war effort.
Mexican War

The next Federal call that went to the states was caused by the war with Mexico—the third major US war. Between the end of the War of 1812 and the war with Mexico (April 1846–March 1848), mobilization planning received scant emphasis. Even the little attention given to mobilization during this period by Secretary of War Calhoun did not include provisions for the improvement or use of the Militia. Nevertheless, the war with Mexico was fought by the United States with the Regular Army, volunteers, and with Organized Militia Units.

The Act of 15 May 1846 (the day that war was declared by Congress and signed by the President) provided for a maximum of 50,000 volunteers (men from units of the Organized Militia) to serve 12 months or to the end of the war. In addition, the President was authorized to call the Militia into Federal service for 6 months, rather than the 3 months provided by the Militia Act of 1792. This later provision was not invoked, since the war was fought entirely on foreign soil, and therefore it was thought impossible to call the Militia who might claim constitutional immunity against being used as an invading force. Rather than use the Militia Act of 1792, or even the Militia clause of the Constitution, volunteers were sought, and Congress understood that the volunteers would be acquired by enlisting formations of volunteer Organized Militia into Federal service. Elene Galloway sums up the Mexican War by stating "That enlistments should be for the duration of a war is a lesson that might have been learned, but 13 years later the country became involved in the Civil War and began with enlistments of only 3 months." Over half the soldiers served in the Mexican War for one year or less, a practice that forced General Scott to halt his campaign in enemy territory for months while he awaited new soldiers to replace those whose enlistments had expired.

When the Mexican War began, the Regular Army numbered 7,365. During the war, 42,374 men served in Regular Army formations and 73,532 served in state-provided Militia Units. Since many short-time volunteers served more than one tour, names were duplicated on various unit rosters. The total number of volunteers in service at a given time probably never exceeded 50,000. Nevertheless, major reliance was placed on the Militia, as had been true in all of US history to that point.

Civil War

The manner of raising manpower during the American Civil War (1861–65) can be summed up by stating that the initial reliance was on mobilizing the Citizen–Soldier. Interestingly enough, both the North and South based their mobilization authority on the same law—the Militia Act of 1792, as amended in 1795. The significant manner of raising manpower during the Civil War was to use conscription. The first Conscription Act in American history was passed by the Confederate States on 16 April 1862. The North also adopted this method with its Enrollment Act of 3 March 1863. The Army of the United States numbered 16,367 at the beginning of the war. At least 2.5 million men served in the Union Army, while the Confederate Army employed approximately one million soldiers.
Spanish-American War

During the period between the end of the Civil War and the sinking of the battleship Maine in Havana Harbor on 15 February 1898, no Federal legislation was enacted regarding manpower for mobilization. The Militia Acts of 1792 and 1795 continued. During the Spanish-American War (24 April-12 August 1898), manpower procurement was not a problem, because the war lasted only 103 days. The Regular Army was supplemented by a Presidential call to the States to provide Organized Militia (National Guard) units for Federal service, to serve for 2 years or for the duration of the war, whichever was shorter. The Militia organizations were accepted as units, but since the volunteers were intended for overseas service, the Guardsmen were sworn in as individual volunteers to obviate constitutional controversy. On 1 April 1898, the Regular Army totaled 28,131. When the war ended, the Regular Army totaled 58,688 and the Volunteer Army numbered 216,129. Of this number, the National Guard provided 8,207 officers and 162,747 enlisted men.

Between Wars

Between the Spanish-American War and World War I, Federal legislation significantly changed the manpower mobilization readiness which had existed since the Militia Act of 1792. The first of these new laws improving the Militia program was the landmark Militia Act of 21 January 1903 (popularly known as the Dick Act after its sponsor, Congressman Charles F. Dick of Ohio). The 1903 Act was the first Federal law ever passed which attempted to implement the Constitutional mandate for Congress "to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia." Thus the Militia Act of 1792 was ended after 111 years. The Dick Act, as amended by the Militia Act of 27 May 1908, provided for Federal support to the states for their Militias; established the same organization, armament and discipline for the Organized Militia (National Guard) as the Regular Army; limited Federal service to 9 months; and removed the restriction limiting service of the Militia to the Continental United States. This latter provision was subsequently abrogated by the US Attorney General who declared in 1912 that service of the State Militia outside the United States would be unconstitutional. The Act also provided for regular inspection of the Militia by the Regular Army, authorized joint maneuvers by the Organized Militia and the Regular Army, and required training standards to be achieved. The Organized Militia continued to be state forces by this legislation.

The Army Reserve—later designated the Regular Army Reserve and still after the US Army Reserve—was established by the Reserve Act of 24 August 1912. The law, which continued until the Mexican Crisis in May 1916, provided for an Army Reserve which consisted of men furloughed to it after 3 years of active service. After 2 years of operation, this Act resulted in 16 men being transferred to the Army Reserve.

In 1914, Congress established by law what had evolved as the prevailing military mobilization concept: the Regular Army was the first line of defense, the State Militia (National Guard) the second line, and a Volunteer Army the third. This new law, the Volunteer Act of 1914 (The
Hay Bill), permitted the President to call for volunteers only after congressional authorization to do so and required the President to accept Militia units (National Guard) which volunteered with three-fourths of their enlisted strength before calling for volunteers. Only after the Militia were afforded the opportunity to volunteer could other units be raised. The President retained the authority to call out the Militia and use it within the Continental United States, but he could not use the Militia, or the volunteers, outside the United States without congressional authorization.

The most comprehensive military legislation passed by Congress during its first 127 years was the National Defense Act of June 1916, which remained the foundation of Reserve planning until 1955. Many of its concepts remain in force today. Even before its passage, President Wilson stated before Congress on 8 December 1914: "We must depend in every time of national peril . . . not upon a standing army . . . but upon a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms." Among other notable provisions, this law made the National Guard (the name adopted as the official designation in the Act) a component of the Nation's defense establishment and, when in Federal service, a part of the Army of the United States. This act required that National Guardsmen agree in their enlistment contract to obey the President and defend the US Constitution. Guard units were to have 48 drill periods a year plus 15 days of field training, with Federal funds to pay for drills. The act also reaffirmed the traditional doctrine of universal military obligation, but clearly nationalized the obligation, as opposed to limiting the obligation to the state.

The National Defense Act of 1916 also created an Organized Reserve Corps, to consist of the Officers Reserve Corps (ORC) and the Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC). These two categories were intended to make immediately available in wartime a large number of officers (up to the grade of Major) and enlisted men in five branch specialties: Engineer, Signal (including Aviation), Quartermaster, Ordnance, and Medical. The National Defense Act of 1916 was a triumph over the Continental Army Plan, which was strongly influenced by the writings of General Upton and advocated by much of the Army. With this law, the historical limitation on the use of the Militia/National Guard was finally resolved; the National Guard when "in service of the United States" was part of the Army, and therefore could be used anywhere with the Regular Army.

The 1916 Mobilization

On 9 May 1916, the National Guard of three states was called into Federal service and assigned to duty on the US-Mexico border to bolster Regular Army forces under General Pershing's "Punitive Expedition." On 18 June, most of the remaining of the National Guard (coast artillery units were not called) also was nationalized for the same purpose. The Guardsmen mobilized on 9 May were called as "Militia" under the Constitution's Militia clause to "repel invasion." The terms were as volunteers for 3 months under the Dick Act of 1903. On the other hand, the mobilization of 18 June occurred under the authority of the new National Defense Act of 1916, with those called serving not as Militia
but as men obligated to Federal service. The 1916 mobilization of the National Guard brought 158,664 men into Federal service. Approximately half of the Guard members who were mobilized for border duty were still on active duty at the time the United States entered the first World War. About 3,000 members of the Regular Army Reserve were mobilized on 28 June 1916. The border was stabilized during the fall of 1916 and General Pershing's forces were withdrawn from Mexico during the period 28 January-5 February 1917.

World War I

The United States declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917 (Europe had been at war since July 1914, and the Lusitania was sunk in May 1915). The Army forces which were established at that time (governed by the National Defense Act of 1916) consisted of the Regular Army, National Guard, Officers' Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps, Regular Army Reserve, National Guard Reserves, and ROTC. In addition to mobilizing these forces, manpower initially was secured through voluntary enlistments. A draft subsequently was implemented as authorized by the Selective Service Act of 18 May 1917, which also authorized calling the entire Guard into Federal service and defined the terms of service for everyone (Regulars, Guard, and draftees) as being for the duration of the war. This act and the National Defense Act of 1916 provided a legislative basis on which to raise an Army at the beginning of a war for the first time in US history.

The troop allocation program established cadres for new Regular Army regiments by drawing men from old Regular Army regiments and then finally filling both the old and new units with volunteers. National Guard units were filled by National Guard recruits and by draftees.

The strength of the Regular Army was 127,588 on 1 April 1917. Additionally, National Guard forces in Federal service at that time (mobilized for the Mexican border) totaled 80,446. On 5 August 1917, the balance of the National Guard (101,174 in state service) was mobilized. The Army Reserve was mobilized on 1 May 1917 and 30 June 1917, providing 8,355 men. The Officers' Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps contributed 7,957 and about 10,000 respectively. The Selective Service System brought 2,801,373 men into the Army during its 18 months of activity (18 May 1917-11 November 1918), and voluntary enlistments totaled 877,438. In sum, the Regular Army started (1 April 1917) with 127,538, and the mobilized National Guard and Reserve provided about 208,000 at the war's beginning. During World War I, the Guard provided the AEF with 382,000 men and with 17 divisions. The Army totaled 3,685,458 on 11 November 1918. Forty percent of the 43 divisions in the American Expeditionary Force were National Guard Divisions, and the Guard Divisions had more total combat days than either the Regular Army Divisions or the National Army Divisions.

Between World Wars

Mobilization planning between World Wars I and II was intense. Debates in 1919 and 1920 centered on the choice between a large standing
army backed up by a draft, or a small standing army backed up by a large National Guard and Reserve. The choice, made by Congress in the National Defense Act of 4 June 1920, was for continuation of the system that had evolved during US history. In brief, the Army would be composed of a small Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves.26

Between 1920 and 1940, numerous mobilization plans were developed.27 Central problems faced by all the planners during this period were force structure and associated manpower availability. The fact that all mobilization plans assumed that the Guard and Reserve would be mobilized on M-Day was particularly significant. There were no serious challenges (if any) to this assumption. Little significant mobilization legislation was enacted between the two World Wars, beyond the Act of 1933 which amended the National Defense Act of 1916 and established the "National Guard of the United States" as a Reserve Component of the US Army. This law gave the Guard a dual status as Militia of the states, under the Militia clause of the Constitution, and as a permanent Reserve Component of the US Army, under the Army clause of the Constitution. The law also assured that Guard formations would be used in war as units, rather than its members serving as individuals.28

World War II

World War II began in Europe when Germany attacked Poland on 1 September 1939. Two days later, England and France declared war on Germany. On 8 September 1939, President Roosevelt declared a "limited national emergency" by Executive Order and directed a small increase in the manpower authorization of the Regular Army and the National Guard. The President's Order also authorized placing Reserve Officers on active duty to expand the Regular Army's Officer Corps. In addition, National Guard drills were increased from 48 armory drills per year to 60, and annual field training was increased from 15 to 20 days. The Regular Army was authorized an increase of only 17,000, to bring its strength to 227,000. The National Guard would be increased by 43,000 for a total of 235,000.29

These changes to authorized strength of the Regular Army and the National Guard were surprises to Army mobilization planners because every mobilization plan had assumed mobilization would begin on a specific day (M-Day) when the entire national manpower would become available. There were no plans for a partial mobilization. Contrary to this basic mobilization plan, the Army and National Guard modestly increased their strengths through late 1939 and 1940 without the United States being at war. In effect, a premobilization period was occurring for which there were no plans.

On 9 April 1940, Germany invaded Denmark and Norway, and on 10 May attacked the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Italy entered the war against England and France on 10 June. France signed an armistice on 22 June. In that brief period from 9 April to 22 June 1940, much of Western Europe had fallen to German control.

During this time period, President Roosevelt requested legislative authority (on 31 May 1940) to bring the National Guard into Federal
service. The President had at the time the legal authority to federalize
the Guard by Executive Order without any congressional action, but that
authority prohibited use of the mobilized National Guard outside the
United States. Interestingly, Chief of Staff Marshall urged the
Secretary of War and Congress not to mobilize the Guard prior to the
outbreak of war.

Mobilization of the National Guard and the Reserves was approved by a
Joint Resolution of Congress on 27 August 1940, and on 16 September 1940,
Congress enacted the first peacetime draft in the nation’s history. Both
measures prohibited employment of Reserves and draftees beyond the
Western Hemisphere (except in US territories and possessions), and both
the mobilization authorization and the draft limited the term of service
to 12 months.30

In late 1940 and early 1941, a major problem faced by Army planners
was the possible concurrent mobilization and demobilization which would
eventually occur because the National Guard and the Selective Service men
were limited to one year of service. The whole basic concept of
mobilization had been predicated on the belief that mobilization meant
all-out war and that no restriction would affect length of service during
the war. Service extension were also a matter of high interest to
Guardsmen, their families, the Congress, and the general public. On 7
and 12 August 1941, the Senate and House approved an extension of service
of the National Guard, draftees, and Reserve Officers (the House carried
by a vote of 203 to 202). Later, on 31 December 1941, Congress extended
the obligation of the 1-year tour to the duration of the war plus 6
months.

When the United States entered World War II at the end of 1941, the
nation was better prepared for war than any time in its history.
Nevertheless, despite the prewar preparedness, rapid deployment of Army
forces overseas was not possible because of many limiting factors,
including training, transportation, and acute shortages of equipment for
the Guard and Reserves.

At the beginning of the war in Europe in September 1939, the Regular
Army totaled 137,393. Mobilization of the National Guard occurred in 22
increments beginning September 1940 and ending 6 October 1941. The Guard
brought 300,033 men into Federal service and, by Pearl Harbor day, more
than 77,000 Reserve Officers had been assigned to active duty. By
December 1941, the Army had grown to 1,686,403. The Army’s strength at
the end of the war (on 31 May 1945) was 8,291,336, including those in the
Army Air Force.31

When the United States entered the war in 1941, 36 divisions were
available (on paper): 16 Regular Army, two Army of the United States
(Reserve) and 18 National Guard.32 During 1942, 37 new divisions were
created, through a cadre system, whereby experienced officers and
enlisted men were withdrawn from existing divisions to form the
organizational and training nucleus of new divisions. Enlisted men were
shipped directly to the new divisions from reception centers. The War
Department envisioned 10-12 months as the time required from activation
of a new division to its being combat ready. By the end of World War II, the Army had formed 91 divisions, but twice demobilized one of them (2d Cavalry Division), having 89 divisions in fact. 33

The first American division to deploy overseas against Germany (to North Ireland in January–March 1942) was the 34th Infantry Division—a National Guard division composed entirely of Guard units from Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Iowa. The first division to be sent overseas against Japan (to Australia in April 1942) was the National Guard's 41st Infantry Division from Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington. The first Army division to engage in hostile operations (against the Japanese in New Guinea in September 1942) was the 32d Infantry Division, which consisted exclusively of National Guard units from Wisconsin and Michigan. 34

Following World War II and demobilization, the Army's thoughts returned to the historic preoccupation in peacetime of the manpower question: how to prepare to quickly acquire adequate numbers of capable soldiers in the event of war. By this time, the concept had been widely accepted among Army leaders to rely on Citizen-Soldiers through units of the National Guard and Army Reserve, and through universal military training. However, despite the active support of President Truman for universal military training, an unwilling Congress rejected the notion and instead extended Selective Service in 1945.

Korean War

On 25 June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. The United Nations Security Council established a UN Command on 7 July 1950, under a US commander. At first, the American government anticipated a very limited need of US Army combat forces, but because of the strength of the North Koreans and casualties suffered by ROK and US forces, the Regulars could not alone field sufficient forces. A mobilization became necessary. Unlike the two World Wars, time was limited for mobilized forces to be equipped, trained, and employed in combat.

When the Korean War began, the US Active Army had a strength of 591,487 with an organization of 14 divisions: four were stationed in Japan (1st Cav, 7th Inf, 24th Inf, and 25th Inf); one was in Germany (1st Inf); and the remaining nine divisions were in the United States (2d and 3rd Armored, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 9th, and 10th Inf and 11th and 82nd Airborne). 35 The four divisions in Japan "had less than 70 percent of authorized strength, were short of supporting weapons, and had light tanks only." 36 Only the 82nd Airborne Division was at full strength in equipment and personnel. All other divisions were manned at 65 to 75 percent of their authorized TOE strength. Nondivisional units were inadequate to provide combat support due to their personnel and equipment status. Mobilization stocks, which consisted of World War II items, were unbalanced, below planned level, and in a poor state of maintenance. 37

At the start of the Korean War, the Army National Guard was organized into 27 divisions, 20 regimental combat teams (RCT), and other units for a total of 4,863 Federally recognized units. The total strength was
324,761, which was 93 percent of its authorized strength. Only 72 percent of its officer positions and 25 percent of its warrant officer positions were filled.\(^{38}\)

When the Korean War began, the Army Reserve consisted of both units and manpower pools. The units, called "Active Reserve," had a strength of 184,015, and were the only elements of the Army Reserve that were authorized paid drills. The two manpower pools were the Volunteer Reserve, with a strength of 324,602, and the Inactive Reserve, with 91,800 members. The strength of the two manpower pools was about 75 percent of that authorized.\(^{39}\)

The Selective Service Extension Act of 1950 (Public Law 599, 81st Congress) authorized the President to order the Guard and Reserve to active Federal service for not more than 21 months (extended to 24 months by the 82d Congress). President Truman delegated to the Secretary of Defense, by Executive Order 10271 signed in 1951, the authority to order individuals and units of the Reserve Components into Active Federal service. The method of raising manpower for the Korean War was by a limited mobilization, a draft, volunteers, and by extending enlistments (for one year). During the first year of the war, more than two million men and women entered active military service, of which more than one-third came from the National Guard and Reserve Forces. Another one-third were voluntary enlistments and less than a third were draftees.\(^{40}\)

The selection of units for the limited mobilization was partially based on a recommendation by General Mark Clark, Commander of Army Field Forces. He recommended activating one or more of the following six ARNG divisions: 28th (Pennsylvania), 29th (Virginia-Maryland), 31st (Mississippi-Alabama), 37th (Ohio), 45th (Oklahoma), and the 50th (New Jersey). Clark considered these divisions to be the best trained, best equipped, and most ready. This recommendation was not adopted because the units were not evenly distributed geographically, and because their selection would aggravate the already serious transportation problems of the Army. The final selection included divisions from each of the CONUS Army areas.\(^{41}\)

Beginning 14 August 1950, 1,457 ARNG units were mobilized, including eight of the 27 Guard divisions (28th, 31st, 37th, 40th, 43rd, 44th, 45th, and 47th) and three of the 20 RCT’s (196th, 278th, and 296th). The induction strength of the eight divisions, as a percent of the full TOE of 18,800, varied from 37 percent to 55 percent. In addition to these units, 43 AAA battalions and 714 company-size units of the Guard were also mobilized. In all, 138,600 officers and enlisted men of the National Guard were federalized during the Korean War—which was 34 percent of the Guard’s strength.\(^{42}\)

Two of the mobilized Guard divisions were deployed to Korea (40th and 45th) while two divisions (28th and 43rd) were sent to Germany to strengthen allied forces there. The remaining four divisions were retained in the United States, and were used exclusively as training divisions and as sources for individuals, into and out of which
Guardians, draftees, and volunteers were shuttled to Korea and elsewhere to supplement the Army's rotation policy. The Secretary of the Army reported on this Guard mobilization: "... the Army National Guard was called upon to fulfill its traditional role as a vital emergency military force. It has carried out that duty capably and earnestly."

The Army Reserve provided 934 units (out of 6,687 units) during the 1950 mobilization. A total of 46,920 officers and 150,807 enlisted persons were called, of which 41,424 officers and 121,500 enlisted were mobilized as individuals. Thus, the majority of the Reservists called to Federal Service had not been undergoing unit training, and were used (as were many Guardians) as individual fillers and replacements. The Army Reserve contributed a total of 244,300 officers and men during the war, not including 43,000 Reserve officers who were on active duty at war's beginning. This number represented about 71 percent of the ORC strength as of June 1950. During the first year of the war, Reservists had won 6 of the 27 Medals of Honor presented, and one-fourth of the other top combat decorations.

The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 decreed that all male citizens between 18 1/2 and 26 years of age who either joined or were drafted into the Active armed services also incurred an obligation in Reserve service. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 created three categories of Reserves to which the Guardians and Reservists might be assigned: The Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The President was authorized to call up to one million Ready Reservists without congressional action, but congressional action was required for calling the other two categories. This 1952 Act also established seven Reserve Components (which continue to the present time), and included the new term "The US Army Reserve," which replaced the term "Organized Reserve Corps" (ORC).

The most perplexing Army manpower problem during the Korean War was the question of who was to serve. Not all of the National Guard and Army Reserve were needed, nor were all eligible men of draft age. The question of distributing fairly the burdens of war was never satisfactorily answered, and this issue was to occur again during the Berlin Crisis and the Vietnam War.

The most vital and immediate need at the beginning of the war was for trained personnel to fill units, train recruits, and provide replacements. The mobilization concepts and plans in effect immediately prior to Korea all called for full mobilization, based on World War II experience, and thus the limited mobilization of 1950 caused considerable difficulties. The decision was, as expressed by the Secretary of the Army, "to leave the Organized Reserve virtually intact while calling up men from the Volunteer and Inactive Reserve."

The result of this policy was to call first those Reservists who were World War II veterans and who had not been paid to train (nor had been trained) since the previous war. At the same time, large numbers of men who had never served in the Armed Services were deferred from the draft. This double jeopardy of veterans and inequity were very controversial.
The Armed Forces Act of 1952 attempted to redress this problem by assuring that those persons who had done the most in earlier wars would not have to carry the major burdens in the future. It also reaffirmed priority of the National Guard to be called ahead of the Reserves. A paradox was that persons who had performed no duty at all in the war incurred no obligation whatever, while those inducted (if they survived) had 6 more years in the Reserve after active duty.

When the Korean War ended (27 July 1953), the number of US divisions had grown to 30 (including the 8 Guard divisions). One division was stationed in Japan (1st Cavalry Division); 5 were in Germany (2d Armored, 1st, 4th, 28th, and 43rd Infantry Divisions); 7 were in Korea (2nd, 3rd, 7th, 24th, 25th, 41st, and 45th Infantry Divisions); and the remaining 17 were in the United States (5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 17th, 44th, 47th Infantry Divisions, 11th, 82nd, and 101st Airborne Divisions, and 1st, 31st, 5th, 6th, and 7th Armored Divisions). 48

The Korean War was a time of half-peace, half-war; of mobilization and demobilization. During FY 52, for example, the net strength of the Army increased 65,000. Yet, in that period, 465,000 men entered the Army, and 400,000 were released, so it went for the duration of the war.49 Before the signing of the Armistice on 27 July 1953, the United States had raised 5,764,143 officers and enlisted personnel. Serving in the US Army during the war were 2,034,000 with a maximum strength on 30 June 1953 of 1,538,815.50

The Korean War had an immense impact on military strategy and on concepts of war. It proved that absolute naval superiority, the most massive air force on earth, and atomic bombs were unable either to prevent the war or to win it. Conventional forces were required.

The Korean War was our first limited war in the 20th century; limited in its objective, in geographical boundaries, in use of weapons, and in use of manpower. Indeed, the very term "limited war" was introduced by General George Marshall (Secretary of State) during 1951 congressional hearings, which appears to be the first use of the term by a high level official.51 The Korean War also caused the United States to reaffirm the historical notion that mobilization of National Guard and other Reserves was necessary in war and that reliance on Reserve Forces was as essential in the nuclear age as it had been in the past. However, there were two amendments to the mobilization principle: (1) full mobilization might not be necessary; and (2) hasty mobilization might be needed with little time to prepare mobilized forces for war.

Between the Korean War and the Berlin Crisis

In his first semiannual report following the Korean War, Secretary of Defense Wilson stated: "... trained Reserve units must be available for deployment immediately, not 6 to 12 months later. We are not satisfied with the present capacity of our Reserve forces to meet these requirements. A greater state of readiness for our Reserve forces is essential ... ."52 This concept of immediate deployment of the Guard or Reserve was new as a defense requirement, and later became known
as the Total Force Policy. The lack of readiness of the Guard and Reserve was not new. Two conditions have historically impeded readiness of the Militia/Guard and Reserves: inadequate manning levels and equipment shortages. Prior to the Dick Act of 1903, the colonies/states were responsible for these conditions, but since then Congress and the War (Defense) Department have been responsible for these readiness impediments.

The state of readiness of the Regular Army for immediate use in war also appears worthy of investigation. At the time that President Truman authorized General MacArthur to use ground forces in Korea (30 June 1950), the four US Regular Divisions in Japan were woefully understrength and deficient in supporting weapons. The Regular Army has, since its birth, experienced readiness frustrations due to manning and equipping restrictions.

The equipment status of the Guard and Reserve improved significantly following the Korean War but, nevertheless, remained inadequate. Facilities for operations, training, maintenance, and storage remained far short of requirements. These facts and others were reported by the Reserve Force Policy Board (RFPB) in 1953, and subsequently.

An historically significant event to the US military was the absence of a large demobilization following the Korean War. The kind of huge demobilization that occurred following World War II (and all previous wars) was avoided. For the first time, a military manpower posture of peacetime preparedness for the Regulars was established.

Following the Korean War, the Active Forces obtained manpower by volunteers, the draft, and requests for Guard and Reserve volunteers. For example, during FY 54, the Guard and Reserves provided 54,000 men of the 708,000 enlisted personnel entering active duty. At the end of FY 54, 334,000 members of the Guard and Reserves were still serving with the Active forces.

The period between the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the Berlin Crisis of 1961 was extremely sedulous for the National Guard and the Army Reserve. Reorganization of the Guard and Reserve into the three distinct categories—Ready, Standby, and Retired Reserves—continued, in accordance with the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. All members of the National Guard and members of Reserve units belonged (and still belong) in the Ready Reserve. In addition, the Ready Reserve included (and still includes) individuals who were not members of units and who were not in a training pay category. It is important to realize that the terms "Ready Reserve" and "Standby Reserve" actually represent the degree of liability for call to Active duty and do not represent readiness. For example, on 1 July 1953, 1,749,208 members of the Ready Reserve were not on active duty, but only 575,377 of them were actually in training. It is also important to note that the Ready Reserves in 1954 had the objective of being ready to fight "within a year" of mobilization.

During FY 54, the Army National Guard began to integrate its antiaircraft artillery units into the defense of the Continental United
States (CONUS). This air defense mission was a dramatic change in the history of the Army Guard, because the participating AAA units were performing a full-time, 24-hour duty Federal mission while under State status. By 30 June 1954, 10 Guard AAA batteries had taken over Active Army sites.\(^5\)

The Guard's Air Defense Program continued successfully for 20 years. After its start with antiaircraft guns in 1954, the Guard adopted the NIKE-AJAX missile system in 1957, and then the NIKE-HERCULES missile system in 1962. As of 30 June 1973, 4,491 officers and men of the Guard were in the program, located in 27 batteries and 11 battalions in 10 states. This program constituted over 50 percent of the total commitment of the Army Air Defense Command.\(^5\) In 1974, the Secretary of Defense directed the phase-out of the Army portion of the CONUS air defense, and by October 1974 all the Guard’s Air Defense Program units had been deactivated.\(^5\)

During the post-Korean War period, many reorganizations of Guard units occurred (and many were still occurring a decade later during the Vietnam War). On 30 June 1954, the Army Guard was organized into 5,003 units, not including 722 units that were still on Active duty (which included the 44th and 47th Infantry Divisions). The troop list at the end of FY 54 included 27 divisions (25 Infantry and 2 Armored), 19 regimental combat teams, 112 antiaircraft battalions, and 50 field artillery battalions.\(^6\) Just 5 years later (end of FY 59), the ARNG structure included 27 divisions (21 Infantry and 6 Armored), 54 air defense artillery battalions (NIKE), 28 air defense artillery automatic weapons battalions, 32 air defense artillery gun battalions (75 mm and 90 mm), 58 field artillery battalions, one regimental combat team, 8 armored cavalry regiments, and 10 Infantry battle groups.\(^6\)

Numerous reorganizations and branch changes resulted. For example, in FY 54, the 40th Infantry division and elements of the 111th Armored Cavalry were converted to an Armored division, and the 114th Regimental Combat Team converted to an Armor group;\(^5\) in 1955, 60,000 Guardsmen shifted from Infantry to Armor; in FY 56, the 149th, 150th, and 157th Regimental Combat Teams converted to an Armored group, a Cavalry group, and an Artillery group.\(^6\) At the same time, many changes were occurring to the type of weapons being issued, such as conversion to M48 tanks.

The Army Reserve had a total strength of 798,026 at the end of FY 53. That year marked the beginning of the implementation of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, necessitating a complete revision of the Army's Reserve program, policies, and regulations. On 30 June 1953, about 4,800 company-sized units were in the Army Reserve, organized into Infantry divisions, and separate battalions for combat, combat support, and combat service support.\(^5\) At the end of FY 57, the Army Reserve portion of the Ready Reserves totaled 1,008,438 members. Their units included 10 Infantry divisions, 12 Infantry Training divisions, 3 maneuver area commands, 156 combat battalions, 1 separate Infantry regiment, and 5,569 company-sized units. The number of Reservists in units totaled 229,848.\(^5\)
At the end of FY 59, the Army Reserve structure included 10 Infantry divisions, 13 training divisions, 2 maneuver area commands, 1 Infantry battle group, 2 Engineer amphibious support brigades, 63 combat battalions, 53 noncombat type battalions and 138 major headquarters. The strength of the Army Reserve at the end of FY 59 was about the same as two years earlier (1,008,837), and the number of Reservists authorized drill pay status was 298,642.66

During the first Eisenhower Administration, Congress passed the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, which placed increased reliance on the Reserves, and projected enlarging the Ready Reserve to 2,900,000 men by 1970. The Act attempted to correct the manpower acquisition problem, which had caused much resentment during the Korea War, by curbing the possible recall of combat veterans in future mobilizations. The Reserve Forces Act of 1955 was also important to the readiness condition of the National Guard and the Reserves. Among other provisions dealing with enlistment obligations, the Act permitted 6 months of active duty for basic training by Guardsmen and Reservists. Subsequently, 6 months of active duty for training became mandatory for nonprior service enlistees in the Guard and Reserves.67

Berlin Crisis

In the summer of 1961, the Soviet Union precipitated a crisis over the status of Berlin. The United States elected to respond by conventional means, in lieu of the "massive retaliation" strategy of the time. The reaction required an increase in US general purpose forces.

The Kennedy strategy of freedom of choice (which was deemed the fundamental principle of war by Marshal Foch) was made clear by the President in his address to the nation on 25 July 1961: "We intend to have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear war." The new strategy of "flexible response" implicitly recognized the probability of limited wars and a wide range of threats from nuclear war to guerrilla insurgencies. This preamble led to the October 1961 partial mobilization of the Guard and Reserve. The historical significance of that mobilization for the Berlin Crisis should not be overlooked: for the first (and only) time in US history the Reserve forces were mobilized not to fight a war but as a pure instrument of foreign policy (as distinct from military policy).68

At the time (30 June 1961), the Regular Army numbered 839,000 (11,000 below authorized level) and had 14 divisions, 11 of them combat-ready. Five of the Regular divisions were in Europe, three were in the Pacific region (two in Eighth Army and one in Hawaii), and the remaining six divisions were in CONUS (three of which were engaged primarily in training functions). Throughout the active Army a significant shortage of personnel and equipment existed.69

At the time of the Berlin Crisis, the Army National Guard had a force structure of 27 combat divisions, 11 separate Infantry battle groups, 8 Armored regiments, 11 medium tank battalions, 91 missile and Air Defense Artillery battalions, 57 Field Artillery battalions, and hundreds of
The Army Reserve structure included 10 Infantry divisions, 13 training divisions, 1 Infantry battle group, 2 Engineer brigades, 63 combat battalions, 53 noncombat battalions, and other headquarters and units. Like the Active Army, the ARNG and USAR had critical shortages of equipment.70

The strength of the Army Reserve in June 1961 was 1,893,747, of which 1,028,168 were in the Ready Reserve, but only 301,796 were in paid drill status. At the same time, the Army National Guard numbered 400,455, all in the Ready Reserve, and 393,807 in a paid drill status.71

Rather than declaring an emergency, after which the President could have mobilized up to one million Reservists in accordance with the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, President Kennedy requested Congress to enact a Joint Resolution authorizing the mobilization of up to 250,000 men. The mobilization was deemed necessary by defense planners to satisfy three requirements: (1) additional manpower for the Berlin Operation itself; (2) additional manpower as fillers; and (3) additional units in the Strategic Reserve to counter possible Soviet military operations elsewhere in the world. In effect, the mobilization was not a declaration of war, but a declaration of Kriegsgefahr: a Danger of War.

It is important to note that the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 was in effect, and was being used to draft about 8,000 men per month prior to the Berlin Crisis. The draft was increased to approximately 12,000 in August and to 22,000 in September 1961.72

The text of the 1961 mobilization resolution was as follows:

**JOINT RESOLUTION.** To authorize the President to order units and members in the Ready Reserve to active duty for not more than twelve months, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that, notwithstanding any other provision of law, until July 1, 1962, the President may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve of an armed force to active duty for not more than twelve consecutive months. However, not more than two hundred and fifty thousand members of the Ready Reserve may be on active duty (other than for training), without their consent, under this section at any one time.

Sec. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, until July 1, 1962, the President may authorize the Secretary of Defense to extend enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, periods of obligated service or other military status, in any components of an armed force or in the National Guard that expires before July 1, 1962, for not more than twelve months.73
The Joint Resolution was enacted as Public Law 87-117 on 1 August 1961, and was implemented by Executive Order 10959 on 10 August 1961. A total of 155,800 Ready Reservists of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were mobilized, which was 94,200 less than that authorized by Congress. The actual mobilization occurred in two increments. The President ordered to active duty 77,989 Ready Reserve members commencing on 1 October 1961. In addition to members of the Navy Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard (no Marine Reserves or Coast Guard Reservists were called), the mobilization included 10,809 Army National Guard, 21,359 Army Reserve (unit members), and 14,351 Army Reserve Replacement Pool Fillers. 

Effective 19 October 1961, another 73,103 Army Ready Reservists were mobilized in the second and last phase involving the Army. A total of 119,622 Army National Guard and US Army Reserve members were mobilized for the Berlin Crisis. Table 1 provides a breakdown of these statistics regarding the Army Guard and Army Reserve. 

**TABLE 1**

BERLIN CRISIS MOBILIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOB DATE</th>
<th>ARNG</th>
<th>USAR UNIT MEMBERS</th>
<th>USAR FILLERS</th>
<th>TOTAL ARNG &amp; USAR</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 Oct 61</td>
<td>10,809</td>
<td>21,359</td>
<td>14,351</td>
<td>46,519</td>
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<td>15 Oct 61</td>
<td>39,930</td>
<td>8,697</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>50,739</td>
<td>30,056</td>
<td>38,827</td>
<td>119,622</td>
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</table>

The Army National Guard mobilization consisted of two divisions (32d Infantry and 49th Armored), one armored cavalry regiment (150th), and 141 combat and combat support units. Two other Guard divisions (26th and 28th) were alerted for possible mobilization and underwent accelerated training at their home stations. The USAR units called were the 100th Training Division and 296 other support units. The mobilized USAR units were at about 66 percent of TOE strength. The ARNG's 32d Division and 49th Division were at 69 percent and 62 percent respectively. The units were brought up to full strength by the receipt of fillers. For example, the 32d Division got 3,850 fillers while the 49th Division was assigned 5,500 fillers. The 100th Training Division trained more than 30,000 men during its active service. The divisions and nondivisional units reported to active duty with substantially less than 50 percent of their authorized equipment.

The two ARNG divisions were mobilized to reinforce the Strategic Army Reserve in the United States, specifically the 4th Infantry Division and 2nd Armored Division, in the event these Regular divisions had to deploy to Germany to strengthen the Seventh Army. The two Guard divisions were actually assigned to the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) on 15 February 1962. The 100th Training Division of the USAR became part of the
training base with the responsibility of training recruits at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. None of the Guard or Reserve units were deployed overseas.

The Berlin Crisis mobilization occurred 6 years after enactment of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, and mobilization procedures and planning had not received serious attention by OSD or DA during that period. One hundred thirteen days after Congress passed the Berlin Crisis mobilization resolution, and 62 days after M-Day, the Department of Defense issued a memorandum to the Service Secretaries setting forth DOD policy regarding del vvs and exemptions to the mobilization. During FY 62, and following the Berlin Crisis mobilization, the military services screened the Ready Reserve as required by the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. The screening process removed 780,388 from a total of 3,337,640 Guardsmen and Reservists from the Ready Reserve. These individuals were transferred to the Standby Reserve or the Retired Reserve (294,460), or were discharged (485,928).

There were, of course, challenges on the floor of Congress to the 1961 Mobilization. The controversies centered on equitable service and unit integrity—the same issues that had occurred during the Korean mobilization. Chairman Russell, of the Committee on Armed Services, for example, insisted that the mobilization be conducted in such a manner that the obligation of defense would be shared as widely as possible. Specifically, he suggested that those Reservists "... who had done the shortest period of active duty and who were on a pay status should be called before those who had done a long term of active duty and those who were not receiving any pay at all were called up." Testimony at the Senate hearing on a 1962 Mobilization Resolution (similar to that of 1961) is pertinent to these issues of equitable burden and unit integrity (testimony is condensed):

Secretary McNamara: Of the 148,000 [sic] we called from the Reserves, 66,000 were men with only 6 months' active service; 54,000 were men with more than 6 months active service, but men who were on paid drill status, and only 28,000 out of 328,000 were men from the Reserves called back involuntarily who had more than 6 months' active service and who were not on paid drill status.

Now, it was that 28,000, small though it be, perhaps 9 percent of the total net increase, that caused most of our trouble. We did make some errors and I think those errors were applied particularly to that group. Some of those men were poorly selected, and I think we could avoid that situation to a considerable degree in the future.

Chairman Russell: So you had to call 28,000 who were not on pay status while passing up several hundred thousand that were being paid directly.
I am aware of all the arguments about the necessity of maintaining unit integrity, but I am very strongly convinced that we must have the most fair and equitable sharing of responsibility of military service possible to attain.

There are many 6-month men who were not called up, while many others who had served more than 6 months were, because the former persons were in a unit?

Secretary McNamara. That is correct.

Nonetheless, this change you suggest would be a desirable one from our point of view. We didn't request it ourselves because in the hearings before the Senate and the House a year ago, members of both bodies expressed a desire that we not take action that would result in breaking up units and it was for that specific reason that we worded the provision as we have.

Chairman Russell. I don't want to break up units but it seems to me that where you have a few men in a unit who have done 6 months, and you are calling up outside of units men who have done 16 months, that justice would demand that the men who had done the 6 months have an opportunity to serve a time longer.

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, we have so many contradictory objectives. We would like to maintain unit integrity but, at the same time, assuring equity in calling men to service.

Another of the controversial issues of the 1961 mobilization was the use of a congressional resolution, rather than a declaration of emergency by the President, as the legal basis of mobilization. This question, and the Administration response, were as follows:

Chairman Russell. Mr. Secretary, under statutory powers, if the President declares an emergency, he has the authority to call up a million for a period of up to 24 months. I am constantly asked why the Congress is called on to take this responsibility of ordering this call up, and why the President doesn't do it under his emergency powers.

Secretary McNamara. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I believe this is a desirable resolution even though the President does have the power to declare a national emergency and under that declaration to call up a million men, because, first, at times of crises and tension such as those we are in and face in the near future, it is essential, we believe, that the world understand the unity with which we are acting, the unity between the executive branch and the Congress and representing the unity of the American people.
Secondly, to apply the authority the President has to call a national emergency with all of the other powers that gives him, and to use that declaration as a basis for calling perhaps 150,000 men or perhaps even a lesser number, may increase the tensions and the crisis beyond what is necessary, and may tend to inflame the situation that we would try to meet without the aura of emergency that declaration would apply to it.

For both those reasons, therefore, we believe it wise to request the authority covered by this resolution. 80

The 1961 mobilization revealed serious flaws in mobilization planning and execution:

1. Selection of units for callup. Some units selected for mobilization were seriously deficient in both personnel and equipment. Readiness conditions were not known or were ignored.

2. Failure to properly notify Reservists of recall. Many were not given the required 30 days notice.

3. Excessive requirements for filler personnel. Peacetime authorized strength of units had been so low that many fillers were needed to raise the mobilized units to full TOE strength.

4. Poor selection of fillers.

5. Failure of the military departments to properly screen the Ready Reserves.

6. Operational readiness was too low. Many units required excessive time to be ready operationally—due to recent reorganizations, low manning levels, and lack of modern equipment.

7. Six-month trainees were not used as fillers. Too few recruits were called, while too many prior-service men were recalled.

8. Equipment shortages. Over 10,500 items of National Guard equipment were withdrawn from nonmobilized units to support units that were mobilized. No one was surprised at the shortage of modern equipment for Guard and Reserve units. Such knowledge, however, did not make this issue irrelevant or inconsequential.

9. Use of mobilized troops. Considerable discontent existed among the mobilized Guard and Reserve troops because they were used to beef-up the active strategic reserve in CONUS rather than being sent to Europe. Such use during the Vietnam War also caused much consternation, which will be reviewed in Chapter 4 of this study.

The Berlin Crisis abated in 1962 and demobilization occurred. The authority granted by Public Law 87-117 to mobilize a portion of the Ready Reserve expired on 1 July 1962. President Kennedy requested renewed mobilization authority (for 150,000 Ready Reservists), which was
incorporated into Senate Joint Resolution 224 in September 1962. The purpose of the request was not predicated on a specific crisis at the time, but upon a potential need for a call-up of Reserve Forces to allow a flexible US conventional response should a crisis occur. Congress passed the legislation but it was never implemented.

One of the interesting combinations of circumstances pertained to the President’s letter of 7 September 1962 requesting renewed mobilization authority. President Kennedy wrote, "In my judgment this renewed authorization is necessary to permit prompt and effective responses, as necessary, to challenges which may be presented in any part of the free world . . . ."81 The letter was addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, John W. McCormack, and more to the point it was also addressed, as was customary, to the President of the Senate, Lyndon B. Johnson. As we shall see in the next chapter, the Kennedy rationale for mobilization during the Berlin Crisis was lost on President Johnson during the buildup of forces in Vietnam.

Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., expressed this view about the 1961 mobilization:

I have observed with deep pride and satisfaction the efficient manner in which Reserve Component units have been brought into the active Army during the current expansion.

The orderly execution of this difficult operation is attributable to outstanding teamwork among the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, the Adjutants General of the several States, and the active Army. It clearly reflects the quality of Army mobilization planning, the fundamental soundness of our Reserve structure, and firm and farsighted military leadership at all levels.

I want to say, further, that I have sincerest admiration for the spirit in which the officers and men of units summoned to service have responded to the call of duty. Their sense of purpose and selfless dedication to mission establish high standards for the Nation as a whole in these critical times.82

The Secretary of the Army also said: "The mobilization was the most efficient in the history of the country; however, problems were revealed in the areas of personnel strength, equipment status, and training levels."83 He also reported: "Fortunately for the Nation, the Guardsmen and Reservists stood ready to respond to the President’s call. As they have so often before, they came from the cities, the farms, and the hamlets, often at substantial sacrifice, but always with the full knowledge that they were doing their duty."84

A lesson in the wisdom of mobilization for deterrence, which could have applied to the Vietnam War, is illustrated by the partial mobilization of 1961. President Kennedy described his callup decision as
having the purpose "not to win the war, but to help prevent a war." Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany reportedly wrote Kennedy that, in his opinion, "the prime factor influencing Khrushchev in his showdown on Berlin was the swift buildup of the American forces." The lesson, then, is this: whenever it is necessary to meet a significant threat, mobilization of the Guard and Reserves will produce a deterrent effect, even if they are retained in CONUS. If political deterrence fails, and war occurs, mobilized forces are immediately available for military utilization. We cannot know what effect mobilization in 1965 would have had on Ho Chi Minh and General Vo Nguyen Gér. We do know, however, the results of a war that witnessed a late and half-hearted limited mobilization.

Between the Berlin and Vietnam Mobilizations

The Cuban Crisis of 1962 was caused by the introduction of Soviet nuclear-capable bombers and medium-range ballistic missiles into Cuba. The entire US defense establishment was placed on alert status in October, and preparation was made for the mobilization of high priority Army National Guard and Army Reserve units. Although 14,000 Air Force Reservists were called to active duty (for 1 month), no Army Guard or Army Reserve units or individuals were actually called into Federal service.8b

The 1960’s were particularly turbulent years for the Army Guard and Army Reserve. Secretary of Defense McNamara, unhappy with the readiness of the RC during the Berlin Crisis, began in FY 62 to form a smaller, quicker responding Reserve. During FY 62, he eliminated four ARNG divisions and in May 1963, further trimmed 802 units from the Guard structure. The Army Reserve was also reshaped beginning in FY 62, losing 4 of its 10 combat divisions and other units.

A major controversy beginning in FY 63 was Secretary McNamara’s plan (publicly announced at a press conference on 12 December 1964) to merge units of the Army Reserve into the Army National Guard and to reduce the size of all the Reserves from 770,000 to 550,000 and the number of units from 8,100 to 6,000. His plan included the elimination of 15 ARNG divisions and 6 USA1 divisions, which would have left the Guard with 8 divisions and 16 separate brigades, and the Army Reserves would have had no units at all.87

Although the major plan was blocked by Congress, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve were further reorganized substantially beginning in FY 63 and lasting through FY 68. Refer to Tables 2 and 3 for a summary of the changes to the Army Guard and Army Reserve in terms of strength, number of units, and major organizations during these hectic years. As illustrated in these tables, the Army National Guard had a net reduction of 1,279 units (30 percent) during this 6-year period, which included a major war in Vietnam. The ARNG strength, meanwhile, remained relatively stable. During this dizzying period, the Army Guard had a net loss of 19 combat divisions, 11 battle groups, 5 division command headquarters, 3 armored cavalry regiments, and 39 battalions. The Army Guard had a net gain of 18 separate brigades, 82 headquarters units, and 54 separate companies and detachments.

25
During the same period (between FY 63 and the end of FY 68), the Army Reserve also underwent considerable reorganization. For example, the USAR was reduced by 682 units (16 percent), while its paid drill training strength did not vary significantly. The USAR lost six combat divisions and essentially all of its combat and combat support units, while increasing a great deal in combat service support units. During FY 67, the 14 US Army Corps (created in 1958 and 1959), which were key headquarters for command and control of USAR units, were eliminated and their functions were transferred to the five Continental US Armies and to 18 newly established USAR general officer commands.

The reorganization of the Army Guard and Army Reserve was particularly extensive during FY 68 (at which time the Vietnam War was raging), despite Acts of Congress (DOD Appropriations Bill for FY 66 and the Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Bill [PL 90-168]) to limit an Army plan for realigning the Reserves. During FY 68, the Army National Guard was reduced from 4,001 units to 3,034—a reduction in units of 25 percent. The USAR was also changed in this year (but not as dramatically as the ARNG) which lost 93 units, including one combat brigade. The Secretary of Defense reported the following about the FY 68 reorganization: "The reorganization of the Reserve Components had an immediate effect on readiness as many individuals required retraining because of changes in skill requirements."88

The Dominican Republic Crisis in 1965 involved the use of Regular forces to prevent a Communist takeover of that country. On 25 April, President Johnson diverted advance elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, then en route to Vietnam via Puerto Rico, to the airbase of San
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>30 Jun 62</th>
<th>30 Jun 63</th>
<th>30 Jun 64</th>
<th>30 Jun 65</th>
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b. During FY 63, all 23 divisions began reorganization to ROAD TOEs.
c. Enlistmen's were ordered reduced to meet budget of 400,000. Excludes personnel in mobilized units.
d. Includes 14 inf, 2 Mech, 1 Airborne, 1 Armored.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>30 Jun 63</th>
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<td>Strength</td>
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a. Examination of DOD Annual Reports for the period in focus (FY 62 through FY 68) reveals no USAR structure, except for the RFPB Report for FY 63 and the Secretary of the Army Report for FY 68. Unfortunately, the structure format of these two reports is not consistent. Furthermore, the Annual Reports of the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces for this period provide no USAR organization tables of any kind except in FY 68, which is the same data as the FY 68 DOD Annual Report.

b. Paid-drill training strengths.
c. Excludes personnel in mobilized units.
d. The six divisions began reorganization into the ROA0 concept during FY 63.
Isidro in Santo Domingo. By 3 December 1965, all US forces, except one Army brigade and support troops, had been withdrawn from the Dominican Republic.49

A major development affecting the Reserve Components in 1965 was the creation of the Selected Reserve Force (SRF) to "offset the deployment [of Regular Forces] now planned to Southeast Asia and to provide some additional new forces for possible new deployment and be prepared to deal with crises elsewhere in the world."90 The objective was to greatly increase the readiness of the selected units to mobilize within 7 days after alert and enter active duty at 93 percent strength. The planned SRF force was for 150,000 in 976 units. Of this total strength, 96,300 were in combat and combat support units and the balance (53,700) in combat service support. The initial contribution by the Army Guard was 744 units, which included all the SRF combat units plus 22,400 of the 53,700 combat service support manning. The Army Reserve initially contributed 232 combat service support units, with a strength of 31,200.91

By the time SRF was abandoned on 30 September 1969, the National Guard SRF composition was 89,039 Guardsmen in 622 company/detachment units, located in 49 states and 798 communities. This Guard force was organized in two Infantry divisions (26th and 42nd), three Infantry brigades (39th, 40th, and 256th), one Armored Cavalry regiments (116th), 34 separate battalions, 10 headquarters units, 3 evacuation hospitals, and 107 company/detachment size units.92 The USAR composition of the SRF at the end of the program was 48,339 personnel in 501 units.93

The Guard Experience in State Services, Domestic Disturbances in Federal Status and in Minor Wars

Thus far in this chapter, the focus has been on the mobilization and use of the Militia/National Guard and the Army Reserve in major wars. A section on the Berlin Crisis of 1961 was added because that partial mobilization experience was to contribute to the mobilization decisions to be made during the Vietnam War. This linkage is further addressed in the next chapters.

Before ending this chapter, however, it is important to review another kind of mobilization that has been prevalent in US history. No mobilization perspective would be complete without an understanding of the use of the National Guard for State service, for domestic disturbances while in a Federal status, and for minor wars.

National Guard in State Service. The concept of an obligation by Citizen-Soldiers to their State dates to the original Colonies. Although the limit of obligation was transformed from the State to the Federal Government during US history, the State-Mission of the National Guard has continued as a fundamental premise. Indeed, the principle of the Citizen-Soldier was so important that it was written into the US Constitution, which contains the following principal military clauses:
Article I, Section 8. The Congress shall have power . . .:

To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water.

To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.

To provide and maintain a navy.

To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and re-elite invasions.

To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the state respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

Article II, Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and the Militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States . . . .

In addition, Article II of the Bill of Rights (the second Constitutional Amendment) recognizes the right and need of the Citizen-Soldier to keep and bear arms in the interests of a well-regulated Militia.

So it is, then, that the National Guard (Army and Air) has a dual status and a dual mission, making it a unique American military institution:

1. As the National Guard of the several States, respectively, to provide sufficient organizations in each state, so trained and equipped as to enable them to function efficiently at existing strength in the protection of life and property and the preservation of peace, order, and public safety, under competent orders of the State authorities.

2. As the Army National Guard of the United States to provide units of the reserve components of the Army, adequately organized, trained, and equipped, available
for mobilization in the event of national emergency or war in accordance with deployment schedules, and capable of participating in combat operations in support of the Army's war plans.

Use of the National Guard for State duty (State mobilization) has been extensive since its inception in the Colonial period. Although the form and scope of domestic emergencies have changed in the United States in the past three centuries, the National Guard has always been vital in responding to the public need by providing disaster assistance and maintaining law and order.

The National Guard, in its State status, is the ultimate posse comitatus for preservation of domestic law and order, since the Guard is not restricted for such utilization as is the Regular Army by the Posse Comitatus Act (Federal law of 1878). The protection of life and property and the preservation of peace, order, and public safety during State mobilizations are extremely important missions of the National Guard. They always have been.

The history of the Guard in performing its State mission is far too extensive to detail in this study, since a full-length book would be required to treat the State callups. Suffice to say that the Guard has been called to protect property in disaster areas, set up emergency communications and electrical power, rescue the distressed, and feed and shelter the homeless and destitute. They have cleared roads, fought fires and floods, transported food and water, and saved lives and property in fires, explosions, floods, and storms. Scarcely a day goes by that this vital, continuous and extensive service is not provided somewhere in the United States by the National Guard in the state status.

National Guard in Domestic Disturbances. During US history, the Militia/National Guard has been used over a hundred times in restoring law and order, to uphold Federal law and to protect Federal property. Among these activities in early US history were the following:

State Militia suppressed Shays' Rebellion in 1786-87.

Militia regiments from the States helped crack the Whiskey Insurrection in 1794.

Militia composed part of the force in 1799 to put down the Fries Rebellion.

State Militia suppressed violent outbreaks against the Mormons in Missouri (1838) and Illinois (1844-46).

The Militia marched to duty numerous times during the great railroad strikes of 1877 and 1894.

In 1957, President Eisenhower ordered the National Guard of Arkansas (and the Regulars) to enforce racial integration in the schools in Little
Rock. The US Constitution provides that the Militia may serve in Federal service for three explicit reasons: to enforce the laws of the nation, to suppress insurrection, and to repel invasion. The 1957 callup of the Arkansas National Guard was in accordance with the first of these provisions.

President Kennedy federalized the entire Mississippi National Guard in 1962 to support the Supreme Court ordered admission of James Meredith to the University of Mississippi. On 11 June 1963 President Kennedy ordered the entire Alabama Guard into Federal service to preserve order during the integration of the University of Alabama. The President repeated this act in the fall of 1963 for the integration of public schools. Finally, President Johnson federalized part of the Alabama Guard in 1965 to protect freedom marchers organized by Martin Luther King, Jr.

A large part of the California Guard was twice on State duty during the Watts problems in 1965. The Illinois Guard was used in 1966 in riot control in Chicago, and the Ohio Guard served on riot duty in Cleveland in July 1966. Other examples of the Guard’s State mission include Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Dayton, Ohio, and San Francisco, California in 1966. During 1967, the Guard served on State riot control duty in Newark, New Jersey, and Detroit, Michigan. During FY 68, thousands of National Guardsmen were employed during civil disturbances 75 times in 50 cities in 29 states.

Similarly, Guardsmen served on State duty for civil disturbance operations in 1969 and 1970. For example, during just the month of May 1970, the Guard served 24 times at 21 different universities (including Kent State University) in 16 states to control rioting students induced by the decision to bomb in Cambodia.

Minor Wars. In addition to the Militia/National Guard having fought in every major war involving the United States, the Militia/Guard also was an important element in numerous "minor" wars. For example, the Colonists were engaged in four wars: King William’s War (1689-97), Queen Anne’s War (1701-13), King George’s War (1744-48), and the French and Indian War (1756-63). Between 1790 and 1898, the Army engaged in 14 named campaigns against the American Indians, and the Militia participated in many of them. The Militia was called from five states in 1836 during the Texas War of Independence. Militia troops were used in the troubles with Mexico in 1866 and the Philippines Insurrection (1899-1902).
ENDNOTES

1. For an excellent review of the European background, see John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, Chapter One.


3. The Army Almanac, p. 494.


19. Ibid., p. 186.

20. Ibid., pp. 188-189.


24. Kreidberg and Henry, pp. 221-278, 308-309; Weigley, pp. 357-358; The Army Almanac, p. 551.

25. The Army Almanac, pp. 119 and 551; Kreidberg and Henry, p. 306. National Army Divisions were largely composed of volunteers and draftees.

26. For a detailed analysis of the 1920 National Defense Act, see Hill, Chapters XII and XV.

27. For example, there were: Special Blue Plans of 1922-1923; War Department Mob Plan, 1923; War Department General Mob Plan, 1928; War Department Mob Plan, 1933; Protective Mob Plan, 1938; 1939 PHP; and Rainbow 1-5. For a history of these mobilization plans, see Kreidberg and Henry, Chapters XII, XIII, and XIV.

28. Thus, there were (and are today) two designations for the same body of troops: "The National Guard of the United States" and "The National Guard." The first refers to the Guard units and individuals in their Federal status, while the latter refers to them in State status. The distinction is important legally, but is not commonly made in oral or written expression.


30. Ibid., pp. 575-580.


32. Kreidberg and Henry, p. 597.


35. US Department of the Army, Directory and Station List of the United States Army, 1 July 1950, pp. 37-64; Weigley, P 502.


37. I. Heymont and E. W. McGregor, Review and Analysis of Recent Mobilizations and Deployments of Reserve Components, p. 3-1.

38. Ibid., p. 3-3.

39. Ibid., pp. 3-2, 3-3.

40. US Department of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense and the Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, January 1 to June 30, 1951, pp. 11 and 81 (hereafter referred to as DOD Report).


44. Ibid., p. 106; *Historical Evaluation and Research Organization*, p. 81.

45. The seven Reserve Components are: Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve.

46. For a review of the difficulties and issues see Kendal, Chapter 4.

47. *DOD Report, January-June 1951*, p. 79.


51. For an analysis of limited war, see Nathan F. Twining, *Neither Liberty Nor Safety*, Chapter VII.


53. Dupuy and Dupuy, p. 665.

54. The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) was established by the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. RFPB Semiannual Reports were included in the *DOD Reports*. The RFPB has a long history of making accurate, timely, and valid assessments of the Reserve Forces, including recommendations for legislative changes.


56. Ibid., pp. 64, 95.


58. Ibid., FY 73, p. 35.

59. Ibid., FY 74, p. 143.

60. Ibid., FY 54, pp. 10 and 15.

61. Ibid., FY 59, p. 36.
62. Ibid., FY 54, p. 15.

63. Ibid., FY 56, p. 21; Mahon, p. 221.

64. DOD Report, January 1-June 30, 1953, pp. 73-74, 102-103.


68. George Fielding Eliot, Reserve Forces and the Kennedy Strategy, Chapter 1.


70. Heymont and McGregor, pp. 4-2, 4-3.

71. Ibid.


73. Ibid., p. 2.


75. Sources for data are: Annual Report on Reserve Forces, FY 61, pp. 51-52; Annual Report on Reserve Forces, FY 62, pp. 3-8.

76. Heymont and McGregor, pp. 4-2 through 4-9.


78. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Authorizing the President to Order Units and Members of the Ready Reserve to Active Duty for Not More Than 12 Months, Hearing, September 10, 1962, p. 4.

79. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

80. Ibid., p. 7.


83. DOD Report, FY 62, p. 115.
84. Ibid., p. 126.


91. Ibid., p. 30.

92. *Annual Report CNGB*, FY 68, p. 34.


94. Ibid., p. 15; Mahon, pp. 244-245.
CHAPTER 3

1965-67 NONMOBILIZATION FOR THE VIETNAM WAR

One of the major decisions in recent US military history was the denial of a simple and fundamental military premise during the Vietnam War. The proposition that the National Guard and Reserves would be called to active Federal service had been proven in every other major war involving US Army forces. Never before in the history of this country had a President declined to use in war forces whose very purpose was for that contingency. That a significant mobilization for the Vietnam War did not occur is one of the key passages of US military history. This chapter examines the extent to which mobilization was considered by the President and his advisers during the first three years of the ground war (1965-67) and the rationale behind the decision not to mobilize the Guard and Reserve during this period. The next chapter treats the partial mobilization of 1968.

Roots of US Involvement in Vietnam

Unlike the Korean War, the Vietnam War did not burst suddenly upon the American scene. US attention to Indochina began during World War II when US military strategy accepted British military primacy in Southeast Asia. Following WW II, the United States provided modest aid to French and Viet Minh forces in 1945, and accepted French sovereignty over Indochina. By 1946, the United States was concerned that Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh were in league with the Kremlin. In 1949, the Chinese Nationalist Government collapsed. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 confirmed the US view that containment of the Communists was necessary in Asia as well as in Europe to thwart their worldwide aggressive designs.

President Truman stepped up military assistance in 1950 to the forces of France and the states of Indochina. Thereafter, the United States was deeply involved in the developing war. When entering office in January 1953, President Eisenhower inherited Truman's policy and saw every reason to expand it. The United States paid for almost all of the French war costs, and increased the supply of military equipment, as well as the US military advisory mission in South Vietnam. However, US policy stipulated that there would be no direct US military involvement in Indochina. The 1954 Geneva Conference did not result in peace in Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) established a collective defense arrangement which was ratified by the US Senate on 1 February 1955 (by a vote of 82-1). Following the Geneva Accords, the signing of the SEATO Treaty, and Dien Bien Phu, the United States replaced the French in South Vietnam. The Communist Party in South Vietnam formally launched the armed phase of its revolution in 1959 and was given public commitment by North Vietnam in 1960. When John F. Kennedy began his presidency in January 1961, the situation, militarily and politically, had deteriorated considerably and President Kennedy, determined to avoid the loss of South Vietnam, significantly stepped up American military involvement.1

At the end of calendar year 1960, 875 US military personnel were in South Vietnam. When Lyndon B. Johnson became President of the United
States on 22 November 1963, 16,236 US military were there. Johnson was the fourth consecutive US President who was committed to battling the Communists in Southeast Asia, and so the US endeavor continued to grow. On 20 June 1964, General William C. Westmoreland became Commander of the US Military Assistance Command, replacing General Paul D. Harkins. The Gulf of Tonkin incidents (2nd and 4th of August 1964) resulted in a Joint Resolution by Congress on 7 August (by a unanimous vote in the House and a vote of 88 to 2 in the Senate) authorizing the President to "take all necessary measures" to safeguard US forces and to prevent further aggression.

**Ground Combat Forces Deployed in 1965**

The first momentous year of the Vietnam War regarding manpower mobilization was 1965. On 6 March of that year, President Johnson decided to support General Westmoreland's request of 20 February 1965 for two US Marine Battalion Landing Teams (3,500 men) to be deployed to Da Nang to take up base security missions. The Marines landed two days later, and although there were already over 20,000 American servicemen in Vietnam, this was the first use of US ground combat units. The United States had already been conducting an air war—FLAMING DART began 7 February 1965 and ROLLING THUNDER began on 2 March 1965, for example—and Da Nang's safety was considered critical in the continued use of US air power.

The buildup of combat units in Vietnam continued, not merely for base security, but for offensive ground operations. On 11-14 April 1965, two additional Marine BLTs landed in South Vietnam; two battalions of the US Army's 173d Airborne Brigade (from Okinawa) arrived at Vung Tau on 5 May; three Marine BLTs landed at Chu Lai on 7 May; 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment closed RVN in early June; two more Marine BLTs landed on 1 and 6 July; the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (three battalions) arrived in Vietnam from the United States on 12 July; 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (three battalions) arrived on 29 July; three Marine BLTs landed on 14-15 August; the 1st Air Cavalry Division (eight battalions) closed in RVN on 28 September; the remainder of the 1st Infantry Division (six battalions) arrived 7 October; and a full division of ROK forces (nine battalions) closed RVN on 8 November. In summary, there were 44 maneuver battalions of US and allied forces deployed to RVN in 1965: 12 US Marine Corps, 22 US Army, 1 Australian, and 9 South Korean. At year's end, the US strength in South Vietnam was 184,314.

When the buildup of ground combat forces began in 1965, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve had a Ready Reserve paid strength of 695,000. The total paid strength in the seven Reserve Components at that time numbered slightly over one million. In 1965, the Reserve Components of the Army had a combined structure of 23 divisions, 11 separate brigades, and some 8,000 units. Immediately prior to deploying the Army's first combat units (173d Airborne Brigade from Okinawa) to Vietnam in May 1965, the Regular Army had a strength of about 970,000, with 42 percent deployed overseas, organized into 16 divisions, 4 RCTs, 7 separate brigades, and 7 special forces groups.
The 6-month active duty-for-training program (Public Law 88-110) was in its 10th year of operation in 1965, and had produced one million basically trained men for the Ready Reserve. To insure that the Ready Reserve was composed of personnel available for mobilization, a screening process was continued as required by US law at the time (Section 271, Title 10, USC). During FY 65, 2,408,571 Ready Reserve personnel were screened, resulting in 529,853 of them being released from the Ready Reserve. (About half of these were discharged and half were transferred to either the Standby or Retired Reserves.)

Mobilization in 1965

On 2 April 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) asked the Secretary of Defense in JCSM 238-65 for an increased ability to wage the war by removing "all administrative impediments that hamper us in the prosecution of this war." This request included authority to extend military terms of service and to conduct consultations with Congress on mobilizing the Guard and Reserves.

Paul H. Nitze (Secretary of the Navy) reported that both he and Secretary McNamara favored mobilization in 1965: "We also thought that there should be a greater commitment of support by Congress, and that the way you could get that would be to put a bill into the Congress asking for the power to call up the Reserves."[

On 15 July, Secretary McNamara stated that if increased numbers of American troops were to be sent to South Vietnam, "it will be necessary to consider calling up Reserves, extending tours, and increasing the draft." On 17 July, Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance informed Secretary McNamara (by cable since the Secretary was in South Vietnam) that President Johnson was favorably disposed to the callup of Reserves and extension of tours of active duty personnel.

Secretary McNamara returned to Washington 20 July and reported immediately to the President. Among his recommendations was one to ask Congress for the authority to call up 235,000 members of the National Guard and Reserves. He also proposed increased recruitment, larger draft calls, and extensions of tours, to raise the size of the Regular Armed Forces by 375,000, for a total increase of 600,000 by mid-1966.

The President considered McNamara's proposals very carefully; he met with his top advisors at the White House on 21 July; with the JCS and Secretaries of military departments the following day; other advisors on 22 July at the White House and at Camp David on 25 July. The President assembled the National Security Council on 27 July, and gave his view that there were five choices regarding Vietnam, and which of these options he favored:

We can bring the enemy to his knees by using our Strategic Air Command, I said, describing our first option. Another group thinks we ought to pack up and go home.
Third, we could stay there as we are—and suffer the consequences, continue to lose territory and take casualties. You wouldn't want your own boy to be out there crying for help and not get it.

Then, we could go to Congress and ask for great sums of money; we could call up the Reserves and increase the draft; go on a war footing, declare a state of emergency. There is a good deal of feeling that ought to be done. We have considered this. But if we go into that kind of land war, then North Vietnam would go to its friends, China and Russia, and ask them to help. They would be forced into increasing aid. For that reason I don't want to be overly dramatic and cause tensions. I think we can get our people to support us without having to be too provocative and warlike (emphasis added).

Finally, we can give our commanders in the field the men and supplies they say they need.

I had concluded that the last course was the right one. I had listened to and weighed all the arguments and counterarguments for each of the possible lines of action. I believed that we should do what was necessary to resist aggression but that we should not be provoked into a major war. We would get the required appropriation in the new budget, and we would not boast about what we were doing. We would not make threatening scenes to the Chinese or the Russians by calling up Reserves in large numbers. At the same time, we would press hard on the diplomatic front to try to find some path to a peaceful settlement.

I asked if anyone objected to the course of action I had spelled out. I questioned each man in turn. Did he agree? Each nodded his approval or said 'yes.'

The President also reported in his memoirs that even then (27 July 1965) the nonmobilization decision was not final. He next met with the leaders of Congress on the evening of 27 July. Following these sessions with key civilian and military advisors, the President held a press conference on 28 July at which he explained the US commitment of ground combat forces to resist Communist aggression in South Vietnam. In his prepared statements he said:

First, we intend to convince the Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power. They are not easily convinced. In recent months they have greatly increased their fighting forces and their attacks and the number of incidents. I have asked the Commanding General, General Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs.
I have today ordered to Vietnam the Airmobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested. This will make it necessary to increase our active fighting forces by raising the monthly draft call from 17,000 over a period of time to 35,000 per month, and for us to step up our campaign for voluntary enlistments.

After this past week of deliberations, I have concluded that it is not essential to order Reserve units into service now. (emphasis added) If that necessity should later be indicated, I will give the matter more careful consideration and I will give the country due and adequate notice before taking such action, but only after full preparations.14

Whatever was personally felt by the political, military, and intelligence players in 1965, and by observers, they all shared one thing in common: they recognized that the 44 combat battalions deployed to Vietnam in 1965 was the crossing of a major threshold and the beginning of a major new course whose end was not in sight. General Westmoreland's plans called for increasing the troops in Vietnam and an expectation that the war would last well beyond a year. The authors of US Vietnam Relations made the following conclusion pertaining to mobilization and length of the war in the 1965 period:

The decision not to call up the Reserves, which was made some time during the week just prior to the President's press conference of 28 July, indicated that the President also expected the war to last in Vietnam well beyond a year. No doubt the Secretary of Defense told him that without a declaration of national emergency—a move the President found politically unpalatable—the Reserves as an asset would be fully expended in one year, leaving the military establishment in worse shape than before if the war still continued.15

US military contingency plans in Indochina, which were being drafted as early as the 1950's, were based upon the campaign in Korea, upon the fundamental concept of the massive use of force—air power, naval power, and ground power—and upon concurrent mobilization of the Guard and Reserve. Mobilization was a cornerstone of the planning. Kinnard reports, "... contingency planning viewed the Army Active and Reserves as one force, and war plans were drawn up accordingly."16 James Gavin, who was Chief of Plans of the Army Staff in the mid-1950's, wrote about war planning for Vietnam: "... we believed it would be necessary to call up the Army Reserve and National Guard."17 General Donald V. Bennett, Director of Strategic Plans in the Joint Staff, reported that he was probably the most shocked man in the world upon hearing of the nonmobilization decision of 1965.18
General S.L.A. Marshall addressed the fallacy of a great power fighting a war with too stringent an economy of force:

Running wholly contrary to the principles of war and thereby yielding initial advantage to the enemy, it threatened a repetition of the Korean miscalculation. There is only one sound way to conduct war as I read history: Deploy to the war zone as quickly as possible sufficient forces to end it at the earliest moment. Anything less is a gift to the other side. 19

General Westmoreland also addressed the American strategy of limited initial commitment:

The strategy of gradually escalating pressure was a new concept; the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with it. It was not, to them, an early 'win' policy. Most military men are accustomed to thinking in terms of terminating a war in the shortest practical time and at least cost, following a decision to fight. It is perhaps unnecessary to make the point that there is a relationship between the length of a war and its cost. 20

The deliberate policy of "graduated response" by the United States in 1964 and 1965 was, in General Westmoreland's view, "one of the most lamentable mistakes of the war. To my knowledge, the history of warfare contained no precedent for such a policy. Although nations in the past have intentionally kept wars limited, as the United States did in Korea, they have applied pressure in terms of the self-imposed restrictions with full force whenever the means were available." 21 General Westmoreland never saw the 44 battalions of 1965 as a sufficient force for victory. He emphasized in June 1965 that the United States "must be prepared for a long war . . .," and that commitment "would require some form of national mobilization and the public airing by Washington of a frank, objective, complete analysis of the problem and what we had to do about it." 22 However, General Westmoreland opposed a mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves in 1965. He wrote of this view and linked it to the Berlin Crisis mobilization:

The Secretary also wanted the President to call the National Guard and Organized Reserve into service, a step that I saw as premature.

Although I wanted an expression of national resolve, I was conscious that without congressional legislation a Reserve callup would be for only a year, and I knew that a year would not do the job in Vietnam without a massive, uninterrupted bombing campaign against North Vietnam, which I knew the Administration was not likely to approve. I well remembered the Reserve callup by President Kennedy during the Berlin Crisis, when strong pressures arose before one year was up, to bring the boys home, a recollection that President Johnson told
we later that he shared. Provided there was an equitable draft without special exceptions for anybody but the most essential civilian workers, I believed the burden of the war could be shared by the whole spectrum of American youth over an extended period, and I was convinced that it would be a long war. A call-up of Reserves should be made only when the enemy was near defeat and more American troops could assure it.23

Even though the President refused to mobilize any portion of the Guard or Reserves in 1965, contrary to the recommendations of his Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, the Department of Defense, nevertheless, clung to the hope that mobilization would occur for the Vietnam War. The President did not foreclose that possibility. In August 1965, Secretary McNamara reported to Congress that "the buildup of the active Army and the improvement of the readiness of a portion of the Reserve Components were necessary to effect planned deployments to Southeast Asia, to provide additional forces for possible new deployments, and to be able to deal with crises elsewhere in the world."24

Therefore, the Army created the Selected Reserve Force (SRF) within the existing Ready Reserve, to increase readiness for early mobilization. The SRF was initiated in October 1965 and the formation was completed within four months. The SRF initially consisted of three infantry divisions (formed from elements of nine ARNG divisions), six separate brigades (formed from three existing ARNG separate brigades and three ARNG divisional brigades), one ARNG armored cavalry regiment, and many combat support and combat service support units. In all, there were 477 SRF units at the end of FY 66, with a strength of 130,000: the ARNG had 746 units with 118,900 personnel, and the USAR had 31,600 personnel in 231 units.25 All SRF units were directed to accomplish a maximum of administrative preparation to satisfy a quick mobilization. The SRF concept was based on the assumption that mobilization would occur.

President Johnson presented only one reason for nonmobilization in 1965: his fear that such a warlike action might trigger a greater war with China and Russia. Kennedy tells of other reasons:

In private conversation, Johnson admitted two other considerations: His fear of "touching off a right-wing storm" and his concern for the Great Society. Convinced that McCarthyism was dormant but not defeated, Johnson feared that if the full extent of our difficulties in Vietnam were known, the political right—a force of uncertain size whose power Johnson almost certainly overestimated—would seize the initiative and demand an invasion of North Vietnam and the bombing of Hanoi. Johnson was much more concerned with the kind of furor that men like John Stennis, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and others might have created than he was about any lose opposition. This reflected his knowledge of the sources of congressional power. Disillusion was the only way to keep the
stampede from beginning. By pretending there was no major conflict, by minimizing the level of spending and by refusing to call up the Reserves or ask Congress for an acknowledgement or acceptance of the war, Johnson believed he could keep the levers of control in his hands.26

Chester L. Cooper wrote that the nonmobilization decision was a balance between military requirements in Vietnam versus political consequences at home:

The announced increase to 123,000 men was almost certainly substantially less than either the Joint Chiefs or Westmoreland had requested and expected. Johnson was determined to fight the war with minimum disruption at home, and the troop increase was not based on the estimated number required, but rather on the maximum number that could be deployed without having to call up the Reserves. Doling out additional forces with a view to balancing off military requirements in Vietnam and political consequences at home typified the President's approach. He wished to avoid giving the impression that the United States was, in fact, 'at war.'27

Another but similar explanation of the President's decision is given by Doris Kearns: "Johnson recoiled from the dramatic display of Presidential action of a Presidential declaration, asking Congress for higher taxes to pay for the war, and ordering a mobilization. The alternate strategy—which was Johnson's strategy—was to tell Congress and the public no more than absolutely necessary."28

David Halberstam's analysis in The Best and the Brightest of President Johnson's decision not to mobilize in 1965 is also particularly revealing:

If there were no decisions which were crystallized and hard, then they could not leak, and if they could not leak, then the opposition could not point to them. Which was why he was not about to call up the reserves, because the use of the reserves would blow it all. It would be self-evident that we were really going to war, and that we would in fact have to pay a price. Which went against all the Administration planning: this would be a war without a price, a silent, politically invisible war. The military wanted to call up the Reserves.

He was against a call-up of the Reserves for other reasons as well. It would, he thought, telegraph the wrong signals to the adversaries, particularly China and the Soviet Union (frighten them into the idea that this was a real war) and Hanoi, which might decide that it was going to be a long war (he did not intend to go
into a long war), and he felt if you called up the Reserves you had to be prepared to go the distance and you might force your adversary to do the same. He also felt that it would frighten the country, and he had just run as a peace candidate; similarly, he felt it would be too much of a sign that the military were in charge and that the civilians would turn over too much responsibility to the military. Finally, and above all, he feared that it would cost him the Great Society, that his enemies in Congress would seize on the war as a means of denying him his social legislation.29

John K. Mahon has written that there were three major reasons for President Johnson's refusal to mobilize the Guard and Reserve in 1965: (1) to conceal America's military commitment in Vietnam from the American people; (2) to avoid sending a belligerent message to the North Vietnamese, Chinese, and Soviets; and (3) to preserve the Reserves for other contingencies.30

Whatever President Johnson's motivations not to mobilize the Guard and Reserves in 1965, one of his objectives is now clear: he wished to conceal the expanded American participation in Vietnam from the public at large, from Congress, and from most of his own government. This policy of concealment was made explicit in National Security Action Memorandum 328, 6 April 1965.31 Calling up the National Guard and Reserves would have destroyed the duplicity.

Nonmobilization in 1966 and 1967

By November 1965, the infiltration of North Vietnamese units had increased substantially. General Westmoreland requested additional forces on 22 November 1965, and following another trip to South Vietnam, Secretary of Defense McNamara recommended troop deployments totaling 74 battalions and 400,000 US personnel by the end of 1966, with possibly 200,000 more in 1967.32 The Joint Chiefs continued to advocate a callup of the Reserves. They believed that commitments to NATO and elsewhere, as well as General Westmoreland's troop requirements for Vietnam, could not be met without a mobilization. The JCS also felt that only a massive deployment of troops and firepower would end the war in the least time and with the least cost.

Thus, whether from pure instinct or considerable intellect, but certainly with a clarity of insight, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of the same conclusion, and General Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, more so, saw the need to mobilize. They did not share with President Johnson any illusion of wishful thinking about the length of the war or its requirements. The Chiefs' arguments to mobilize were not couched in terms of psychology but upon a tried and true approach to war: if there is to be war, do it and end it as early as possible.

American diplomatic initiatives regarding Vietnam continued to fail in late 1965 and early 1966, and the decision on additional forces beyond the 44 battalions of 1965 had to be faced. Existing Regular US forces
could not provide those needed in Vietnam, especially combat support and service support units. Therefore, there were only two classic choices in raising necessary manpower: mobilizing the Guard and Reserve, or form and train new units by manpower raised by the draft and volunteers. President Johnson again refused the mobilization option in 1966, and the capability to raise manpower continued to be an issue of major concern to military and most political leaders during 1966 and 1967.33

On 9 February 1966, Secretary McNamara held a meeting in his conference room with the Service Secretaries, Joint Chiefs of Staff (minus the chairman) and others to discuss force requirements of Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland. Three cases of raising manpower to satisfy requirements were discussed:

Case 1: assumed that Reserves would be called up, tours extended, and units would be redeployed from other overseas areas.

Case 2: same as case 1 except no callup of Reserves.

Case 3: no callup of Reserves and no redeployment.

Secretary McNamara stated that he could not tell which of the three cases to assume, but for the present to plan on no mobilization of the Guard and Reserves, that mobilization was still an open question, and that to assume no callup would not prejudice the question. The Summary of Record of this 9 February meeting includes these statements:

With respect to the possible Reserve callup, this is to be subjected to intense critical analysis over the next several weeks. It must be studied on a worldwide basis. Furthermore, General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp have done a good deal of work on alternatives under Case 1 to callup of the Reserves . . .

Mr. McNamara said that it was important that everyone understand why a Reserve callup is receiving such careful study. There are at least two important considerations. First, the problem is a very complicated one and we do not yet have all the facts. Mr. Morris and others will amass the necessary data as soon as possible. Second, the political aspects of a Reserve callup are extremely delicate. There are several strong bodies of opinion at work in the country. Look, for example, at the Fulbright Committee hearings. One school of thought, which underlies the Gavin thesis, is that this country is overextended economically and that we cannot afford to do what we are doing. Another school of thought feels that we plain should not be there at all, whether or not we can afford it. A third school of thought is that although we are rightly there, the war is being mismanaged so that we are heading straight toward war with China. Furthermore, there is no question but that the economy of this country is beginning to run near or at its
capacity with the resulting probability of a shortage of certain skills and materials. If this continues we may be facing wage and price controls, excess profits taxes, etc., all of which will add fuel to the fire of those who say we cannot afford this. With all these conflicting pressures, it is a very difficult and delicate task for the Administration to mobilize and maintain the required support in this country to carry on the war properly. The point of all this is to emphasize that a callup of the Reserves presents extremely serious problems in many areas and a decision cannot be made today.

General Johnson said he wished to add three additional considerations. First, a Reserve callup might be an important factor in the reading of the North Vietnamese and the Chinese with respect to our determination to see this war through. Second, Reserve callups are traditionally a unifying factor. Third, as a larger problem, a hard long-term look should be taken at the degree to which we as a government are becoming committed to a containment policy along all the enormous southern border of China. Mr. McNamara said he would ask for a JCS study of this last point and discussed it briefly.

During the course of the meeting, General Johnson also pointed out that with respect to overseas deployment, the Army is already shortchanging certain overseas areas so as to increase the training cadre in CONUS. He pointed out that because of the effect on the strategic reserve of deployments already made, the quality of new units will be lower than at present.

On 1 March 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their recommendation regarding 1966 deployments (Phase II A (R) forces—later named Program 3) to Vietnam and reconstituting the Strategic Reserve. They stated that to satisfy further force requirements in Vietnam and to reconstitute the strategic Reserve would require "a selective callup of Reserve units and personnel and extension of terms of service." The JCS also recommended that if the Reserves were not called up or terms of service extended, then the deployments for 1966 (Program 3) should be extended into 1967. On 10 March 1966, the Secretary of Defense rejected this advice and directed the JCS to plan for deployment of forces without either a callup or extension of terms of service.

On 7 October 1966, the JCS forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their analysis of the worldwide US military posture in light of meeting the 1966 and 1967 deployment requirements for Vietnam. This analysis concluded that without a callup of Reserves, no change in rotation policy (1-year tour), and assuming that resources for the proposed 1967 deployment to Vietnam would be taken from existing US worldwide structure, then the Army would have a force deficiency of three and two-thirds active divisions. The JCS analyzed the value of a mobilization for the Army thusly:

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Significant withdrawals of equipment have been made from the Reserve Components to support new activations. This has resulted in a degradation of the training capability and the mobilization potential of the Reserve Components. Therefore, full or partial mobilization of Reserve units would have only limited effectiveness in accelerating Army deployments. However, mobilization of Reserve units would permit a more rapid restoration, personnel-wise, of the STRAF. In addition, Reserve unit mobilization and subsequent deployment of these units to Europe or Korea would accelerate restoration of Army forces in those areas. Selective mobilization of Reservists possessing critical skills could greatly improve the quality of the training and sustaining base and the quality of deploying units which are now having to deploy with shortages of skills and experienced leaders. Selective mobilization would permit some acceleration of unit deployments.  

The kind of mobilization the JCS were thinking about in their analysis during the fall of 1966 was a large mobilization of 688,500 Guardsmen and Reservists from all four services, and they wanted that mobilization to occur by December 1966. However, the JCS also recognized that such a mobilization would not solve all the problems:

Certain critical problems cannot be fully resolved by mobilization because of equipment and skill shortages. Of particular note in the case of the Army, equipment withdrawals from the Reserve Components have substantially weakened the Army's Reserve structure.

In November 1966, the President made his decision on force deployments to Vietnam through FY 67 (Program 4). The forces programmed were to be significantly less than requested by the field commander: a ceiling of 470,000 to be reached by June 1968, as opposed to the request for 542,000 by the end of calendar year 1967. However, there would not be a mobilization of the Guard and Reserves. The Program 4 decision met with disagreement, for various reasons, on Capitol Hill and in the press. Many political leaders spoke out against the restricted force levels. Senator Stennis, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, argued for meeting General Westmoreland's troop requests "even if it should require mobilization or partial mobilization." The JCS also sharply disagreed with the ceiling of 470,000.

On 20 April 1967, the JCS formally reported to the Secretary of Defense that MACV required additional forces in FY 68 (Program 5) to achieve the objectives. They examined service capabilities to meet the forces requirements under two alternate cases: No Reserve callup or extension of terms of service, or having a mobilization and a 1-year extension of terms of service. The Chiefs concluded:
Considering our current worldwide commitments a Reserve callup for a minimum of 24 months and involuntary extension of terms of service for 12 months are the only feasible means of meeting the additional FY 1968 requirements in the stipulated timeframe. The effect of a 24-month limitation on callup of Reserves is that the Armed Forces would expend their major Reserve assets by end FY 1972 as a result of successive callup and commitment of Reserve units. This would be avoided if Reserve units were held for the duration of the emergency. Authority to do this and to extend terms of service involuntarily would require Congressional action.40

The Chiefs consequently recommended a Reserve callup for a minimum of 24 months and involuntary extension of terms of service for 12 months. However, Mr. William Bundy of the State Department wrote a memorandum on 1 May 1967 in which he argued against mobilization:

Apart from the military merits, any force increase that reaches the 'Plimsoll Line'—calling up the reserves— involves a truly major debate in Congress. Under present circumstances, I believe such a debate would only encourage Hanoi, and might also lead to pressures to go beyond what is wise in the North, specifically mining Haiphong. Unless there are overriding military reasons—which I do not myself see—we should not get into such a debate this summer.41

Assistant Secretary of Defense Alan Enthoven, head of the Systems Analysis Office, attacked the war strategy of increasing force levels. Of the mobilization issue he wrote on 4 May 1967:

Additional forces, added burdens on the US economy, and calling of the Reserves will only serve to increase DRV's belief that the US will not remain in SVN for the long pull. Additional forces make it appear that we are trying for the 'quick kill.' Hanoi knows that we cannot achieve it and that the American public will be bitter and divided unless we do. We should be looking for ways to ease the burden for the years ahead, rather than making the war more costly.42

In May 1967, considerable attention was focused on determining capabilities of the services to provide troops and units without calling the Reserves or further drawing down of units in Europe. A 5 May Systems Analysis Office study concluded that the services could provide only 66,000 of the additional 186,000 troops requested by MACV, and only 19 combat battalions of the additional 42 requested.43

On 19 May 1967, Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton surfaced a comprehensive Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM) that not only challenged the war strategy, but especially opposed increased force deployments:
Limiting the present decision to an 80,000 add-on does the very important business of postponing the issue of a Reserve call-up (and all of its horrible baggage), but postpone it is all that it does—probably to a worse time, 1968. Providing the 80,000 troops is tantamount to acceding to the whole Westmoreland-Sharp request. This being the case, they will 'accept' the 80,000. But six months from now, in will come messages like the '470,000-570,000' messages, saying that the requirement remains at 201,000 (or more). Since no pressure will have been put on anyone, the military war will have gone on as before and no diplomatic progress will have been made. It follows that the 'philosophy' of the war should be fought out now so everyone will not be proceeding on their own major premises, and getting us in deeper and deeper; at the very least, the President should give General Westmoreland his limit (as President Truman did to General MacArthur). That is, if General Westmoreland is to get 550,000 men, he should be told 'that will be all, and we mean it.'

Mr. McNaughton went on to address force increases by asking five questions, and providing the answers to them. One of the questions, and his response, was:

Will the move to call up 200,000 Reserves, to extend enlistments, and to enlarge the uniformed strength by 500,000 (300,000 beyond the reserves), combined with the increased US larger initiative, polarize opinion to the extent that the 'doves' in the US will get out of hand—massive refusals to serve, or to fight, or to cooperate, or worse?

The answer to Question 1 (regarding 'dove' reaction), we believe, is a qualified no. Barring escalation of the 'external' war discussed under Question 5, we believe that increased forces will not lead to massive civil disobedience. However, a request for Congressional authority to call Reserves would lead to divisive debate.

On 31 May 1967, the JCS responded to the 19 May McNaughton memorandum in sharply worded and strong terms. Among other objections to the DPM, the Chiefs expressed the belief that "despite some unpredictable debate a Reserve callup would be willingly accepted [by the American people]."

Under Secretary of State Nicholas DeB Katzenbach also responded (on 8 June 1967) to the 19 May McNaughton draft memorandum. Regarding the issue of troop increases and mobilization, he listed a few advantages and 10 disadvantages. His recommendations were essentially consistent with those of McNaughton, which were opposed to large increased deployments, and did not support a mobilization of the Guard and Reserves.
In July 1967, the debate continued. Secretary McNamara again visited Saigon, the press became more involved, papers were prepared, and meetings were held. The focus by this time was on force levels for FY 68 (Program 5). The final Program 5 decision came in mid-August 1967, and was, as all expected, a compromise: between 45,000 and 50,000 men would be deployed in FY 68, bringing the total to 525,000. Secretary McNamara had suggested an increase of 15,000 to 30,000, while General Westmoreland had requested an increased 70,000. No mobilization would occur. The bulk of the increased Army combat units was scheduled to arrive in Vietnam in February and March 1968, and included the 82nd Airborne Division (-), the 11th Light Infantry Brigade, and four separate Infantry battalions.

Major attention was devoted in the fall of 1967 to accelerate deployments of Program 5 and to find new approaches to military operations in Vietnam. Calendar year 1967 ended with the Program 5 combat elements either closing Vietnam or on their way there, with mobilization continuing to be a major issue, and with a continuing Presidential decision not to mobilize.
ENDNOTES


5. Refer to Tables 2 and 3, Chapter 2 of this study.


7. DOD Report, FY 65, pp. 67-68.


12. Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 146.

13. Ibid., p. 149.


15. Ibid., Book 4, Part IV, C. 5, p. 121.


27. Cooper, p. 286.


CHAPTER 4
1968 MOBILIZATION FOR THE VIETNAM WAR

Status of the Regular and Citizen-Soldiers in January 1968

When calendar year 1968 began, American Army combat units had been fighting in Vietnam for 34 months (since March 1965). The new year began with the combat elements of Program 5 (FY 68) either closing in Vietnam or proceeding there on an accelerated schedule. The approved force levels in Program 5 totaled 525,000, with an Army portion of 351,618 which for the Army was a net increase of 27,983 over Program 4.1

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve had a combined Ready Reserve unit strength of approximately 680,000, organized into some 7,000 units, plus an Individual Ready Reserve strength of over 540,000. The force structure included 8 combat divisions, 13 training divisions, 21 separate combat brigades, 2 engineer brigades, 7 support brigades, 250 separate combat battalions, and other units. The Secretary of Defense reported to Congress in January 1968 that "The Reserve Forces continue to serve a vitally important role in our overall posture of national security, particularly when major portions of our active forces are deployed overseas."2

The Regular Army structure in January 1968 included 19 numbered divisions, with a total Active Army strength of about 1.5 million. These divisions were located in the United States, Vietnam, Korea, and Europe as follows:

CONUS (STRAC forces): 5th Mechanized, 6th Infantry; 82nd Airborne (-); 1st and 2nd Armored.

RVN: 1st, 4th, 9th, 23rd, 25th Infantry, 1st Cavalry (Airmobile); 101st Airborne, and the 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne.

Korea: 2nd and 7th Infantry.

FRG: 3rd, 8th, 24th Infantry; 3rd and 4th Armored.

Thus, the Army's Strategic Reserve in January 1968 was 4 2/3 divisions, consisting of two Armored Divisions (with one of the 2nd Armored Division's Infantry Battalions deployed in RVN), two Infantry Divisions, and the 82nd Airborne Division (less its 3rd Brigade). At that time, the Army had nine infantry brigades not organic to any divisions, and all but one of them were stationed overseas: 1st, 173rd (Airborne), 176th, 186th, and 199th in RVN; 171st and 172nd in Alaska; the 193rd in the Canal Zone. Only the 197th remained CONUS (at Fort Benning, Georgia). The only Armored Brigade that existed separate from a division was the 194th, which was stationed at Fort Ord, California.3

The early months of 1968 witnessed major reorganizations still occurring in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, as reviewed in Chapter 2. In addition to across-the-board changes, the Selective Reserve Force (SRF) was also being reorganized. After two years of its existence, the SRF was deemed improperly organized to provide a proper balance of combat, combat support,
and combat service support elements. Therefore, beginning in December 1967, the SRF was reorganized to include a support package, while some units were dropped, resulting in a balanced three-division force named SRF 1A. Simultaneous with the creation of SRF 1A was a new structure called SRF II. SRF 1A was then replaced by SRF II on 1 May 1968.

The readiness of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve in January 1968 was, on the whole, less than it had been prior to the beginning of the Vietnam War. This overall condition was caused by reorganizations and by major shortages of equipment. Not only had the Guard and Reserves not been provided their full TOE equipment, but a great deal of what had been issued has been withdrawn to support the Regular Army forces in Vietnam. The training of Ready Reserve units, however, had improved as a result of the 4-hour training assembly that had replaced, in October 1966, the old 2-hour drill.

The Secretary of Defense reported to Congress in January 1969 that "The Vietnam buildup in 1965-66 [sic] necessitated a considerable drawdown of stocks from the active and reserve forces . . . . This resulted in a considerable quantity of major pieces of equipment being taken from Reserve units which in turn had an adverse impact on the state of readiness of these units."

The readiness status of the Selected Reserve Force was vastly better than that of the balance of the Ready Reserve. In January 1968, the SRF consisted of 3 Infantry Divisions, 5 separate Infantry Brigades, 1 separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 1 Armored Cavalry Regiment, and many combat support and combat service support units, for a total strength of 150,000, organized into 977 units. SRF units were authorized 100 percent TOE strength, an increase in repair parts, additional full-time support technicians, priority for training spaces in Army training centers, and were training 50 percent more than other Guardsmen and Reservists. Equipment was transferred to the SRF from lower priority units. Nevertheless, even these highest priority SRF units were short equipment, including weapons, communications, tactical vehicles, modern aircraft, and ground surveillance radar equipment. Despite the equipment shortages and reorganization, SRF units were ready in 1968 for mobilization. They were ready psychologically and physically, were well-trained and well-led. The Chief, National Guard Bureau reported at the end of FY 67 that "the SRF, through its accelerated training program, attained the highest level of mobilization readiness in the long history of the National Guard."

Partial Mobilization in January 1968

Calendar year 1968 began ill-omened. In Korea, an assassination squad of North Koreans infiltrated into Seoul to murder South Korea's President Park. The attempt failed at the last minute. Then, on 23 January, the North Koreans seized the USS Pueblo and imprisoned its crew. President Johnson reported in his memoirs that "there was a distinct possibility that South Korean forces might be withdrawn from Vietnam," and that, "in addition, we had received intelligence reports that a crisis might develop around West Berlin."

On 23 January 1968, President Johnson directed, by Executive Order, a partial callup of the Guard and Reserves as a result of the Pueblo incident.
He refrained from declaring a national emergency, which would have permitted him to bring up to 1 million Ready Reservists on active duty for a period of up to 1 year. The legal authority actually used by the President was Public Law 99-368 (the 1967 DOD Appropriations Act), which included the following key language: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, until July 30, 1968, the President may, when he deems it necessary, order to active duty any unit of the Ready Reserve of an armed force for a period of not to exceed twenty-four months." The same act also gave authority to call up any member of the Ready Reserve who had not served on active duty or active duty for training for 120 days or more and who had not fulfilled his statutory Reserve military obligation.

Twenty-eight units involving 14,801 unit members were mobilized under the January order: 6 units with 593 Navy Reserve members; 14 units having 9,340 members of the Air National Guard; and 8 units having 4,868 Air Reserve members. No Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve or Coast Guard Reserve units or individuals were called. Although the 25 January mobilization was not ordered at the time specifically for Vietnam, four of the Air National Guard units (tactical fighter squadrons) were deployed to RVN in May 1968. All six of the activated Naval Reserve units were demobilized by the end of calendar year 1968, as were seven of the eight Air Reserve units. By December 1969, all of the units mobilized under the 25 January 1968 order were deactivated.

1968 Decision to Mobilize for the Vietnam War

The enemy’s TET offensive began on 31 January 1968, only 8 days after the Pueblo was seized. The strength, intensity, and length of this attack took the US command and the US public by surprise. As the large-scale TET operations continued, Secretary McNamara asked the JCS on 9 February to provide plans for emergency reinforcements of COMUSMACV. A formal request by General Westmoreland for reinforcements was made on 12 February. Also on 12 February, the JCS provided the Secretary of Defense with the following three plans for emergency reinforcements to counter the TET offensive:

Plan One, which is based upon prompt deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division and 7/9 Marine Division/wing team, callup of some 120,000 Army and Marine Corps Reserves, and appropriate legislative action to permit extension of terms of service of active duty personnel and the recall of individual reservists.

Plan Two, which would deploy as many Marine Corps Battalions as are now available in CONUS, less one battalion in the Caribbean, the battalion in the Mediterranean, and the Guantanamo Defense Force. This plan would not be based upon a callup of reservists or legislative action.

Plan Three, which would deploy the 82nd Airborne Division but would leave Marine Corps Battalions in CONUS. This plan would likewise envisage no Reserve callup and no legislative action.
The Joint Chiefs recommended to defer until a later time the decision to deploy reinforcements (which was a remarkable position to take during a major war), but, favoring Plan One, again recommended mobilization of the Guard and Reserves. Specifically, the JCS recommended the following regarding mobilization:

As a matter of prudence, call certain additional Reserve units to active duty now. Deployment of emergency reinforcements to Vietnam should not be made without concomitant callup of Reserves sufficient at least to replace those deployed and provide for the increased sustaining base requirements of all Services. In addition, bring selective Reserve force units to full strength and an increased state of combat readiness.

Legislation be sought now to (1) provide authority to call individual reservists to active duty; (2) extend past 30 June 1968 the existing authority to call Reserve units to active duty; and (3) extend terms of service for active duty personnel.

President Johnson met with his advisers (Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, Wheeler, Taylor, Helms, and Reston) on 12 February to discuss General Westmoreland’s request for reinforcements. Calling up the Reserves was discussed. The President approved reinforcements but again rejected mobilization. President Johnson wrote of the 12 February mobilization question: "Wheeler was in favor; McNamara was opposed. I asked them to study the problem further and to agree on a recommendation." The meeting continued the following day, and the President reported the following in his memoirs about the discussion:

My advisers still disagree on whether Reserves should be called and, if so, how many and in what categories. I told McNamara and Wheeler there were many questions I wanted them to answer. I remember the complaints about the callup of Reserves during President Kennedy’s administration and, more recently, the failure to use effectively those who had been called up during the Pueblo crisis.

Why, I asked, is it necessary to call up Reserve units at this time? If we decided on a callup, how large should it be? Could we reduce the numbers by drawing on forces stationed in Europe or South Korea? Could we avoid or at least postpone individual Reserve callups? If Reserves were called, where would they be assigned? How long would they serve? What would be the budgetary implications? Would congressional action be necessary? I said that I would take no action until I received satisfactory answers to these and several other questions.
Secretary of Defense McNamara also reportedly reflected, during the Vietnam War, on the Berlin Crisis mobilization of 1961, and was quoted as saying:

"The Berlin Crisis . . . required a substantial number of Reserves of all forces. We learned then that we literally lacked the equipment to train the men called to active duty. And when I say literally 'lacked' the equipment, I mean exactly that. We not only did not have the equipment for these men to fight with, we did not even have the equipment for them to train with."

On 13 February, the reinforcement decision of the day before was being implemented, to consist of the deployment of one brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division and one Marine regimental landing team, for a total emergency reinforcement of 10,500 men. Responding to this decision, the JCS immediately forwarded their recommendations for a callup of the Reserves: the minimum callup, which would replace deploying force, would require 32,000 for the Army, 12,000 for the Marine Corps, 2,300 Navy Reserves, and none for the Air Force. In addition, the Joint Chiefs stressed that it would be both prudent and advisable for a larger mobilization of 130,650: 58,000 Army, 51,000 Marines, 5,150 Navy, and 22,500 Air Force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also reiterated their recommendation of 12 February that legislation be sought for mobilization and extension of terms of service.

General Westmoreland also saw the need for a mobilization at that time in order to provide reinforcements "to deal telling blows" to the enemy forces and to increase the strategic reserve. Amazingly, he regarded the Guard and Reserve as a war-time reserve force to be committed in battle only when the offensive presented the right opportunity. He reported, however, that General Wheeler informed him on 24 February under the President's direction, that "making a major callup of Reserves and contesting the enemy's geographical widening of the war was politically infeasible." The President reversed this decision two weeks later.

On 29 February, Secretary of Defense Designate Clark Clifford (sworn in as Secretary on 1 March) initiated, at the order of the President, a complete reexamination of US strategy in Vietnam which became known as the "A to Z" reassessment. The last week of February and first week of March 1963 were characterized by frantic preparation, discussion, consultation, and writing. On 4 March, the "A to Z" reassessment was presented to the President. The recommendations included a callup of 262,000 Guardsmen and Reservists, an increased draft call, and extension of terms of service.

The day of 13 March 1963 produced significant decisions by the Commander-in-Chief. The President made the decision to deploy 30,000 more men to Vietnam, in addition to the 10,500 emergency augmentation decision of 12 February. The Army portion of this 30,000 increase totaled 24,200 and consisted of one Infantry brigade, one mechanized brigade, one Armor Cavalry squadron, an Aviation company, a Military Police battalion and combat service support units. In addition to these Army forces, one brigade was to deploy to replace a Marine regimental
landing team (RLT 27) and its support because the Marine Corps could not sustain the requested deployments.21

For the first time during the Vietnam War, the President's decision of 13 March 1968 called for a mobilization for the Vietnam War. There would be two Reserve callups, one in March to support the 30,000 deployment, and one in May to reconstitute the strategic reserve at seven divisions. However, it was also decided on 13 March that there would be no extension of terms of service for those personnel currently on active duty and that only units would be mobilized, not individuals.22 Although there was no mobilization in March, the 13 March decision enabled defense planners to finalize the Program 5 deployment plan to Vietnam.

On 14 March, Secretary Clifford formalized these Presidential decisions in a memorandum to General Wheeler. Also, on 14 March, Secretary of the Army Resor pointed out that an additional 13,500 men would have to be added to the 30,000 number to be deployed in order to support the Army forces in RVN. Therefore, tentative plans for the first callup would be for about 45,000: 31,563 to provide for the additional combat deployments and 13,437 to provide sustaining troops. The May mobilization plan would then total 41,000, consisting of one division and its initial support increment (32,000), one brigade (4,000), and a post, camp, and station complement to open one additional station (5,000).23

The objectives of this 1968 mobilization were: (1) to provide troops for actual deployment to Vietnam as part of the emergency reinforcements, and (2) to provide troops to remain in CONUS to build up the strategic reserve. The Joint Chiefs had long been concerned about the status of the general forces in CONUS. They had pointed out in February 1968, for example, that the strategic reserves were constrained by shortages of critical skilled specialists, shortages of essential items of equipment and material, and that a high percentage of personnel were either Vietnam returnees or were close to the end of their obligated active service. In the words of the Chiefs, the strategic reserve "has been appreciably depleted because of Vietnam demands."24

At the time the mobilization decision was being made in March 1968, the US strategic reserve, which was defined as active division forces in the Continental United States, Hawaii, and Okinawa and the Marine units in the Caribbean and Mediterranean, consisted of 4 2/3 Army divisions and 1 1/3 Marine divisions. When the first US ground combat forces had been deployed to Vietnam in 1965, the strategic reserve had nine Army divisions and three Marine divisions. The Chiefs had recommended in February 1968 that 245,000 Reserves be mobilized exclusively for the strategic reserves, which would result in a strategic reserve of seven Army divisions and two Marine divisions.25

Following the historic 13 March decision to have a small mobilization (and to deploy additional forces to Vietnam), the Defense Department planned for the deployment of 43,500 additional troops to Vietnam. Program 6, therefore, totaled 54,000, made up of the 10,500 emergency reinforcements and 13,500 support forces for it, plus 30,000 additional

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personnel. The President made the final decision on the size of the mobilization and Program 6 on 28 March. That decision provided for the deployment of the 10,500 emergency reinforcements, and the 13,500 support forces, but did not include any more. The actual mobilization would then involve approximately 24,500, which consisted of the 13,500 support package for deployment to Vietnam and an additional 11,000 to replenish the strategic reserves.

**Army Planning for Mobilization—January—April 1968**

Based on the experience of the limited mobilization in 1961 during the Berlin Crisis, the Army developed in 1962 a Partial Mobilization Plan (PAM). This plan was not kept current at any time following the 1965 decision to not mobilize the RC for the Vietnam War. The Army conducted no serious mobilization planning between 1965 and 1968.

Although the 25 January 1968 mobilization order did not include Army Reserve Components, the Army Staff, nevertheless, began frantic planning for a partial mobilization of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve on 25 January in response to a directive to do so from the Secretary of the Army. This planning was oriented initially towards the buildup of US Army forces in Korea and reconstitution of the Strategic Army Forces (STRAF), but later was expanded to include the need for additional Army forces in Vietnam. It was assumed that a partial mobilization of Army Reserve Components would be authorized if major reinforcements of Army forces were deployed to Korea and/or Vietnam.

The Army mobilization planning phase lasted from 25 January to 10 April, and consisted of two types of planning: (1) intensive specific close-hold planning characterized by minimal guidance, restricted to a few selected persons on the Army Staff, short suspense dates, lack of staff coordination, changes in the type of units and strength of the force which might be authorized, and secrecy; and (2) general planning, which included a review of the 1961 mobilization during the Berlin Crisis, updated personnel procedures and information action, and preparation of a congressional information plan. This general planning was well-coordinated with the Army Staff and HQ CONARC.

The first type of planning (intensive close-hold) focused on developing troop lists, and it lasted 11 weeks (25 January–10 April). This planning was actually accomplished in two distinct subperiods: the period 25 January–9 February concentrated on developing plans to reinforce the Eighth US Army in Korea and to reconstitute the STRAF; during the period 10 February–10 April, planning additional forces for deployment to South Vietnam was added to the task. Approximately 75 force packages were developed during the 11-week period. Daily revisions in lists of selected units frequently occurred. Each list (revision) required 600 to 850 copies for use by the Army Staff and members of Congress.

The process for troop list development was as follows: The Office, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (OACSFDE) would prepare a force package and forward the Reserve portion to the Chief, Office of Reserve Components (CORC), who would coordinate the Reserve force package
with the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) and Chief, Army Reserve (CAR). CORC, CNGB, and CAR would designate specific units for mobilization. Coordination did not occur with HQ USCONARC, the Continental US Armies (CONUSA), the State Adjutants General or US Army Reserve Commanders. Neither did full staff coordination occur among the Army Staff in the development of troop lists.

Planning was thus restricted and hampered. Adding to the difficulties was the fact that the Army Guard and Army Reserve were undergoing a major reorganization that began 1 December 1967—and not completed until 31 May 1968. Furthermore, current unit readiness data were not available at HQCA because the readiness reporting system of Reserve Components had been suspended by the Undersecretary of the Army in 1966.

The plan to build up Army forces in Korea entailed developing a list of ARNG and USAR units for deployment, developing requirements for individual filler personnel to fill Army units already in Korea, developing a list of ARNG and USAR units to reconstitute the STRAF, and developing a list of Regular Army units to reinforce in Korea. In sum, this plan was to accomplish six specific actions:

1. Fill Army forces currently in ROK with fillers.
2. Redeploy the 82d Airborne division to ROK.
3. Replace the 32d Airborne division with a mobilized RC division.
4. Deploy two Reserve Component (RC) divisions to ROK.
5. Deploy two RC divisional sustaining support increment packages to ROK.
6. Reconstitute and fill the STRAF with RC at a five-division force equivalent.

These plans for reconstituting the Eighth US Army and reconstituting the STRAF with RC were amended on 5 February by the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Army, who directed the development of two RC division force equivalent packages of not over 90,000 total strength. Plans were developed accordingly:

1. Package A included the 67th and 49th Infantry Brigades (Mech) and the 59th Infantry Brigade, and additional support units.
2. Package B included the 28th Infantry Division plus additional supporting units.

The advent of the TET Offensive on 31 January caused planning to also focus on sustaining operations in Vietnam. Therefore, mobilization planning for Vietnam was added to the Korean and STRAF planning on 10 February, and constituted the subperiod 10 February-10 April. During this period, four separate troop lists, each requiring a partial
mobilization, were developed for the sum of Korea, Vietnam, and STRAF. The first three lists ranged in strength from 90,000 to 126,000 men and contained various mixes of units. These plans were never adopted.35

The final Army troop list, submitted to the JCS on 2 April 1968, called for mobilization of 54,000 in three increments, for a total of five Infantry Brigades, an Armored Cavalry squadron and support units. On 4 April, the Secretary of Defense stated in a memorandum that the final troop list of 54,000 was too expensive and that a less costly alternative must be developed. Consequently, only the first of the three increments was approved, consisting of only 76 units with a total of 20,034 Guardsmen and Reservists. This final Army troop list was based on requirements for Vietnam and requirements to reconstitute the STRAF, but did not include forces for Korea.36

Five major considerations were initially identified to determine the selection of specific units to be mobilized. These criteria were, in priority order, as follows:

1. Unit selection was to be based on requirements submitted by COMUSMACV and requirements to reconstitute the STRAF. In cases where the required units were not in the ARNG or USAR structure, similar units were to be substituted.

2. Every effort was to be made to select those units considered most operationally ready for deployment. The prime candidates were, therefore, SRF units or former SRF units. Newly activated units and those suffering from major reorganization were to be considered last.

3. The CONUS civil disturbance threat was to be a significant consideration in the selection of ARNG units, and those units thought most likely to be involved in civil disturbance operations were to be considered last. No state was to be denuded of its National Guard that was having a significant civil disturbance threat.

4. Units were to be selected to equally represent the proportion between the two Army RC, which at the time was 60 percent ARNG and 40 percent USAR.

5. Units were to be selected geographically in relation to population, with an equitable distribution among the states. This criterion was obviously not possible when major units such as brigades, squadrons, and battalions were selected for mobilization.37

A sixth criterion, directed by the Secretary of the Army on 4 March, was to avoid calling units which had significant numbers of men who had been mobilized in the 1961 Berlin Crisis callup. This criterion was dropped when an Army analysis revealed that only a very small number of such personnel remained in the Ready Reserves in 1966.

In addition to mobilizing ARNG and USAR units, it was considered necessary to also call up individuals to fill active units and the mobilized RC units. HQDA also considered it necessary to extend for one year the terms of service for active personnel and to consider extension
of overseas tours. However, on 27 March, the Assistant Secretary of Defense prohibited extension of terms of service.38

Actual Mobilization Decisions and Policy

On 31 March 1968, President Johnson addressed the nation on television. He summarized his efforts to achieve peace in Vietnam over the years and made the following brief comment about a callup of the Reserves:

In order that these forces [the 10,500 emergency reinforcements] may reach maximum combat effectiveness, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended to me that we should be prepared to send—during the next five months—support troops totalling approximately 13,500 men.

A portion of these men will be made available from our active forces. The balance will come from Reserve Component units which will be called up for service.39

The President then reiterated US objectives in Vietnam, and closed his address with the startling announcement that "... I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your President."40

Contrary to the President's mobilization decision of 13 March 1968, his 31 March public statement, and DOD planning, there was only one mobilization for the Vietnam War. President Johnson signed an Executive Order (No. 11406) authorizing that mobilization, which was as follows:

By virtue of the authority vested in me by paragraph (e) of Title I of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1967 (80 Stat. 981), and by Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

The Secretary of Defense, and, when designated by him for this purpose, any of the Secretaries of the military departments of the Department of Defense, are hereby authorized and empowered to exercise the authority vested in the President until June 30, 1968, by paragraph (e) of Title I of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1967 (80 Stat. 981) to order any unit in the Ready Reserve of an armed force to active duty for a period of not to exceed 24 months.41

It is noteworthy that the mobilization authority exercised by the President (and delegated to the Secretary of Defense) was based on the same legal authority utilized for the 25 January 1968 partial mobilization resulting from the Pueblo incident. The mobilization was not based on a declaration of war nor a declaration of emergency.
Details of the mobilization were announced at 1000 hours on 11 April 1968 by Secretary of Defense Clifford at a news conference:

The President has signed an Executive Order under which I am proceeding to call to active duty approximately 24,500 men in some 88 units from the Reserve Components of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The men are being called for service not to exceed 24 months.

Notifications are now being sent to all units. Each man will have a minimum of 30 days' notice before reporting.

Of the 24,500, 10,000 are scheduled for deployment to South Vietnam in consonance with the program announced by the President on 31 March. The balance will be used mainly to strengthen the strategic reserve. Individuals from the strategic reserve are available as replacements for South Vietnam.

The Army is calling approximately 20,000 men in 76 units of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.

The Navy is calling approximately 1,000 men in two units of the Naval Reserve. They will be available for rotation between Southeast Asia and the United States.

The Air Force will call approximately 3,500 men in 10 units of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. About one-third of these will be deployed to Southeast Asia under current plans.

No decision has been made at this time as to whether additional Reserve Forces will be called.

The Secretary further announced that 3,600 members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) would be called up to fill Active Army units and to fill those RC units mobilized. The IRR members would include only men who had served less than two years on active duty. The Secretary's announcement was followed by a DOD news release which listed the units ordered to active duty.

The actual mobilization order was dated 11 April 1968, directing the mobilization to occur on 13 May 1968. The period between 11 April and 13 May was the alert time. Refer to Table 4 for a list of the ARNG and USAR units that were mobilized and deployed to RVN, and to Table 5 for a list of the units mobilized to reconstitute the STRAF.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Component</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>650th Medical Det (DS)</td>
<td>ARNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>HHC, 336th Ord Bn (Ammo DS)</td>
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<td>978th Army Postal Unit (APU) (TyU)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>413th Fin Det (Actg)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>126th Sup &amp; Svc Co (DS)</td>
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<td>472d Med Det (Amb)</td>
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<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>737th Trans Co (Med Trk, Petrl)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>826th Ord Co (Ammo, DS/GS)</td>
<td>USAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>STATE</td>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>COMPONENT</td>
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<td>277th MI Det (Inf Bde)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>227th Engr Co</td>
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<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>304th Med Det (Equip Maint)</td>
<td>USAR</td>
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</table>
Unit Selection Criteria. The 76 ARNG and USAR units that were mobilized did not meet the five selection criteria in the prior order contemplated. Criterion 1 (requirements as identified by MACV and for the STRAF) was generally satisfied: 46 units were selected to fill urgent force requirements in Vietnam, and 30 units were picked to reinforce the STRAF. However, only 43 units were actually deployed while 33 units were retained in CONUS.

Criterion 2 (select units most operationally ready) was not followed: only 59 of the 76 mobilized units were either current or former SRF, while 2 units had no SRF counterpart. Criterion 3 (retain NG in states for civil disturbance threat) and Criterion 5 (geographic spread) determined the selection of the remaining 15 units. Thus, 20 percent of the mobilized units was based on low-priority criteria.

Criterion 4 (proportionate ARNG and USAR) was not accurately applied: 68.1 percent were ARNG while 31.9 percent were USAR, whereas the actual proportion at the time was 60 percent ARNG and 40 percent USAR. This violation, though not alarming, nevertheless contradicted the preselected criterion.

Finally, Criterion 5 (equitable distribution among states in relation to population) was not possible to implement with such a small mobilization. The mobilized units came from 34 states, with no equitable distribution in relation to the population of the 50 states. This violation is also not alarming, and was properly listed last in priority order.

Public Information and Alert Messages. Alert messages were sent from HQDA on 11 April to the 76 ARNG and USAR units being mobilized. The public announcements of the mobilization, as well as a public announcement of the specific units to be mobilized, occurred before the official alert messages were received by the units. This action caused much consternation, confusion and embarrassment among field commanders, Adjutants General, and unit members.

A coordinated DOD information plan for the military services, governmental agencies, and members of Congress did not exist at any time during the mobilization planning phase 25 January-10 April 1968. The final DOD-approved version of a "Press Release" and "Information for Members of Congress" was not received at HQDA until 0030 hours, 11 April 1968—which was the date of Secretary Clifford's public announcement of a mobilization.

Length of Service. The length of service on active duty for units was a period not to exceed 24 months. The same length of service was ordered for all mobilized Guard and Reserve officers. Since all officers were unit members (none were IRR), officers were subsequently separated from active duty (demobilized) at the same time as the unit with which they were mobilized, regardless of the officer's assignment at the time of mobilization.

Enlisted reservists who were mobilized with a unit had a period of service either the same as that of the unit or upon the end of their
The term of enlistment or statutory Reserve obligation, whichever was longer. Trainee personnel (Reserve Enlistment Program [REP]) who belonged to a unit ordered to active duty were ordered to active duty for the same period as other enlisted reservists who were unit members. The REP's joined their unit upon completion of MOS training, if they were able to report to their unit prior to the beginning of its unit training program; otherwise, they received individual orders as fillers. Enlisted reservists of the IRR had a period of service of 24 months, including active duty training which had already occurred, if not released earlier.48

Exemptions and Delays. Unit members exempted from active duty included those enlisted personnel whose statutory obligations or enlistments expired on or before 12 December 1968. The Department of Defense established the 12 December date to preclude activating personnel having limited service time following mobilization. These Guardsmen and Reservists were given the opportunity to voluntarily reenlist for at least 12 months from the completion date of their statutory obligation or enlistment. Also exempted were individuals from the IRR who had served two or more years on active duty, and obligated personnel with prior active duty who had been mandatorily assigned to Reserve units. High school students were delayed entry into the service until they dropped out of school, graduated or reached age 20, whichever came first. Also delayed were officers who were attending medical schools or who were participating in intern training.

Members of units whose order to active duty would result in severe personal or community hardship were delayed or exempted, according to the individual case. Exempted personnel were transferred to nonmobilized USAR or ARNG units within commuting distance against existing vacancies or as overstrength. If there were no units nearby, Reservists were transferred to the IRR and Guardsmen were transferred to the Inactive National Guard.49

Branch and MOS Qualification. Many of the mobilized units had personnel who were not branch-qualified or MOS-qualified: 36 percent of the mobilized officers had not completed branch schools, and a large number of enlisted personnel were not MOS-qualified. Two primary reasons accounted for this situation: recent unit reorganizations, which changed unit TOE, mission and structure, and a large number of ARNG second lieutenants who had recently graduated from state OCSs but had not yet completed their basic branch school. Nonbranch-qualified officers (mostly lieutenants) in nondeploying units were either retained in units and sent to school on TDY and return basis, or were sent to school TDY and then utilized as individual fillers. In the case of deploying units, non-MOS-qualified personnel were transferred to nondeploying units and were replaced by Active Army personnel.50

Overstrength. Officers in the grade of LTC and COL, and enlisted E-8's and E-9's who were assigned to units as overstrength upon mobilization, were transferred to other units having such vacancies. All other grades/ranks of overstrength officers and enlisted personnel accompanied their unit to active duty. The general officer authorization to be on active duty was increased by two positions (to accommodate the commanding generals of the two Guard separate brigades).51
Individual Ready Reserve. ARNG and USAR mobilized units submitted requisitions to their Army headquarters for enlisted personnel to fill unit vacancies. The armies consolidated the requisitions and forwarded them to the US Army Administration Center (USAAC) for action. The initial requirement was for 3,069 enlisted fillers for the 76 mobilized units.

Although the IRR totaled approximately 680,000 at the time, most IRR members were not eligible for mobilization. Since an emergency or war was not declared, the legal authority to activate the Ready Reserves was Public Law 89-687. This law was the FY 1967 Department of Defense Appropriations Act which contained the usual appropriated language, but also contained certain mobilization authority regarding both units and members of the Ready Reserve. The law prohibited calling up IRR members who had completed two or more years of active service, as well as those who had fulfilled their statutory reserve military obligation. These legal restrictions eliminated 99 percent of the IRR from mobilization eligibility.

The IRR pool of eligible enlisted reservists totaled only 4,132, and all of them were personnel who had enlisted in a unit under provisions of the 1956 Reserve Enlistment Program (REP-63) and who had subsequently been transferred to the IRR for a variety of reasons. No officers from the IRR were recalled because only 93 were eligible from an initial projection of 2,400.

Of the 4,132 IRR enlisted members initially selected by USAAC to satisfy the 3,069 filler requirement, 1,380 were subsequently exempted: 371 for hardship and dependency, 175 for special mobilization criteria, 220 joined a unit or active service prior to issuance of orders, 298 were medically disqualified, and 325 were not locatable. The number of IRR enlisted members actually mobilized totaled 2,752, of which 1,692 were assigned as fillers to the mobilized ARNG and USAR units and 1,060 were assigned to Active Army units.

Unit Strength. The actual number of unit members mobilized was lower than anticipated by the Defense Department, largely because the callup had been based on TOE authorized strength rather than assigned strength. Another factor contributing to decreased strength was the loss of hundreds of men whose terms of service were to expire by 12 December 1968 or earlier, and who had declined to extend their enlistments. Liberal exemption and delay policies also contributed to the loss of mobilized enlisted personnel. Within the Army Reserve units ordered to active duty, 814 individuals (13.8 percent of altered strength) were lost during the alert period. The Army Guard fared somewhat better—losing 901 (7.1 percent) of their alerted strength. The 76 ARNG and USAR units entered active duty with a strength of 29,034.

Except for current SRF units, Reserve Component units were authorized only 95 percent manpower level prior to mobilization. Upon mobilization, the actual strength of ARNG units averaged 89 percent of TOE strength, while the USAR units averaged 82.1 percent. Unit shortages were filled with 1,692 IRR personnel and 1,400 Active Army personnel. Fourteen percent (1537) of the total officers authorized in mobilized units was filled by the Active Army.
Movement to Mobilization Stations. Movement from home stations to mobilization stations began on 14 May, and was completed on 21 May by the 43 deploying units and on 27 May by the 33 STRAF units. Every possible mode of transportation was used in moving personnel and units (road, military air, POV, commercial air, rail, ship, and bus). Due to shortages of rail cars and poor planning, delays were experienced in moving unit equipment.  

Movement of dependents and household goods to the mobilization stations was not authorized. Furthermore, the Army did not pay for travel by private automobile, except when it was in the government's interest or for compassionate reasons. These policies created a major morale problem, because active duty personnel were extended full privileges for the movement of their dependents and household goods. Eventually this inequity was corrected but not before morale was severely damaged.  

Stationing Plans and Facilities. The preparation of stationing plans was the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. Considerable difficulty was experienced in this endeavor, owing to troop list changes and because time and authority to coordinate with HQ USCONARC and CONUS Armies were precluded. Stationing plans were prepared for force packages varying in size from 9,000 to nearly 100,000 personnel. Typical of the dilemma was whether to locate a group of nondivisional units at a particular post or to save that installation for a brigade which might enter the troop list. Another dilemma was the necessity to provide proper training and facilities at the mobilization station when different types of units entered the troop list. The planners never knew when the mobilization would occur, if there would be multiple mobilizations (phased), what active deployments might occur prior to or concurrently with mobilization, what units would be mobilized, the time between alert and movement to mobilization stations (important in determining an installation's capability to provide facilities for the new units), or the size of the mobilization.  

These facts explain why, for example, the mobilized 69th Infantry Brigade from Kansas was initially scheduled to be stationed at Fort Campbell due to the guidance that the 6th Infantry Division at that site would be inactivated. When mobilization finally occurred, the 69th Brigade had to be shifted to Fort Carson and the 6th Division was continued at Fort Campbell.  

The final detailed stationing plan prior to mobilization was made for a force of 54,000. When only 22,786 Army RC were later mobilized, there was insufficient time to make necessary and timely changes to the stationing plan.  

Had the mobilization been larger, inadequate facilities would have been required for housing troops. Although no tents were used to house troops, tents were utilized for administration, maintenance, supply, and storage purposes. BOQ space in Fort Carson was provided by commercial motels under an Army contract. To accommodate mobilized units, $1.2 million was provided in a 1968 Supplemental Appropriation for rehabilitation of barracks, mess halls, BOQ's, dayrooms, supply, and  

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administrative buildings. The various mobilization stations had requested $2.8 million for these purposes.61

Equipment Shortages. Equipment planning and distribution for the mobilized units was chaotic. Planners at HQDA did not know, even after the final troop list was determined, the true status of those units. The incredible assumption was made that units scheduled for deployment were in a combat ready status. Equipment shortage reports were available at HQDA for only 39 of the 76 mobilized ARNG and USAR units. It was assumed that the other 37 units had an equipment status proportionate to that of the total Reserve Components. The analysts did not know in many cases the TOE under which the mobilized units were organized. Neither was it known by the planners at HQDA what equipment of a particular unit was actually being kept in equipment pools at field training sites. In actual fact, upon mobilization, all 76 Army RC units were rated C-4 in equipment readiness.62

On 19 April, DA sent a message to the 43 deploying units assigning each an MTOE. Many units did not have the MTOE series available and were thus unable to base their equipment requests on the MTOE under which they were to be deployed. In fact, some units did not receive the message. The Army's logistics wholesale system was thrown into confusion by the MTOE decision, and the situation was made even worse by faulty assumptions and confusing logistical instructions.63

As requirements for equipment became firm, based on equipment status reports submitted by the mobilized units, DA immediately made decisions for distribution and redistribution. Extraordinary management procedures were developed to accomplish the equipment issue. Many logistics directives were issued to the field, arriving late to units or not arriving at all due to an inadequate communications system. There was considerable confusion in interpreting the various directives by units and commanders at all levels.64

By 12 July 1968 (61 days after alert), all mobilized units had received the necessary equipment to bring them to a readiness condition of C-1 for equipment. Since many of the RC supply and maintenance personnel were not authorized to receive, nor had received, training in Active Army supply and maintenance systems and procedures, there were numerous problems with records and reports. The redistribution of equipment caused many difficulties in the areas of documentation, scheduling, movement, and followup procedures.65

Prior to the 1965 buildup of US troops in Vietnam, Army procurement of equipment and missiles had been stable for 3 years at about $2.7 billion per year. The industrial base was operating at a relatively low level, and procurement and receipt of equipment lagged far behind requirements starting in 1965. Items needed in Vietnam were taken from Reserve Component units and from Active Army units not in Southeast Asia.

The Army's post-Vietnam logistics analysis attributed four main reasons for the shortfall in equipment and supply requirements:
1. A planning assumption that all hostilities would end by 30 June 1967. This assumption not only restrained Army budget programs, but also caused producers not to bid on the contracts to be awarded.


3. The "No Buy" restriction that was placed on the procurement of major items of equipment for temporary forces. This DOD policy resulted in reduced reserve stocks and in reduced readiness posture of units that forfeited the equipment for which it was originally purchased.

4. Sole source of procurement. Manufacturers that were providing the single source of procurement in some cases could not increase production fast enough to meet requirements or did not elect to expand production to meet temporarily increased sales to the Government. In addition, new sources of production were reluctant to enter the market.

Training. By 27 May 1968, all 76 ARNG and USAR mobilized units had arrived at their mobilization stations and immediately began a training program. The Army Training Program (ATP) at the time prescribed a certain pace and certain subjects, based on astounding assumptions that every unit was filled with each authorized grade and that each individual was MOS-qualified. Since neither of these key assumptions was valid for the mobilized units in 1968 (and had never been valid in US history), units were forced to simultaneously conduct individual training in addition to unit training. This requirement naturally slowed down the pace and progress of unit training and resulted in the need for extensions of unit training time beyond that which was prescribed in the ATP. The issue of new or different equipment (including the M-16 rifle) which was unfamiliar to the ARNG and USAR was also a contributing factor in extending unit training time beyond that which was forecast during premobilization planning.

HQDA estimated prior to mobilization that the maximum time required to train units would be 8 weeks. The actual training time was extended for 58 of the 76 units. The Army's after-action report for the 1968 mobilization states the following about training time:

The requirement for additional training time should not necessarily be attributed to deficiencies in Reserve Component training. It was largely a result of the MOS qualification problems caused by reorganization, the need to retrain on new equipment, late arrival of equipment, premobilization civil disturbance training, and infusion of new personnel. These were foreseeable problems and should have been considered in premobilization estimates.

Unit Integrity. Members of mobilized ARNG and USAR units were either retained in their units or were used as individual fillers. The Federal Law in 1968 (Title 10, U.S.C., 672(c)) and DOD Directive 1235.6 permitted this option. However, violations of unit integrity were so prevalent
initially that the Department of the Army adopted a policy on 30 July 1968 that limited the individual reassigntments from units to 24 percent per quarter of the unit’s strength, or 10 percent in any single month.69

Unit integrity was not maintained with either the units that deployed to Vietnam or those that were nondeployed. In the case of the nondeployed units, individuals were pulled and used as replacements because of the reassignment policy which was necessitated by the rotation policy in Vietnam. For example, the 29th Infantry Brigade was levied for 1,500 personnel in early 1969 to serve as replacements in Vietnam. Most units deployed to Vietnam also lost their unit integrity due to the rotation policy. Guard and Reserve unit members were transferred from their unit to preclude all personnel of a unit being eligible to rotate back to the United States at the same time.70

Of the 12,234 mobilized Army National Guardsmen, 2,729 reported to Vietnam with their units, but many were subsequently transferred to other units. Of the 9,505 Guardsmen whose units remained in CONUS and Hawaii, 4,311 were later sent to Vietnam as fillers.71

Personnel Turbulence. During the 2-year period 30 June 1965-30 June 1967, the Army gained 1,057,900 personnel and lost 584,500. While the Army’s total strength was expanding 50 percent, it was simultaneously losing 24,000 trained personnel each month, resulting in a turnover larger than its peak strength. Stated differently, it took over 1 million men to achieve an increase of less than 474,000 during the first 2 years of the ground war.

General Westmoreland addressed tours of duty in his Report on the War in Vietnam: “In the belief that high morale and fresh enthusiasm would offset problems of continuity and experience, I insisted on a standard tour of one year except for general officers.”72

The personnel replacement system was a problem of great magnitude, caused in large part by the program of 1-year tours for personnel assigned to Vietnam. Beginning in 1965, the Army avoided 100 percent rotation of men in a unit at the end of the 12-month tour by insuring that no more than 25 percent of a unit would be rotated in any one month. This regular replacement of personnel in Vietnam resulted in a near complete annual turnover. Rotation after one year boosted morale, but it also severely weakened units—units that had to send experienced and qualified men home. The rotation policy restricted operations and logistics in the war theater and also adversely impacted training requirements.73

Personnel turbulence was a major problem also because of the Presidential decision made in 1965 (and never altered) to continue normal separations. Terms of enlistments were not extended. Consequently, discharges at the end of periods of obligated service, resignations, and retirements occurred during the war just as in peacetime. This policy severely restricted the Army, causing a shortage of officers in all grades (except lieutenant), and causing the Strategic Army Reserve and US Army Europe to reduce their readiness by providing trained troops for South Vietnam.74
Deployment. Plans to deploy RC units to Vietnam initially proceeded just as for overseas movement of Regular Army deploying units. This planning was interrupted by a series of lawsuits initiated by some individuals in an attempt to preclude their deployment. They contended that the legal authority exercised by the President to mobilize was unconstitutional, or that the callup violated their enlistment contract. HQDA had to decide whether to deploy the balance of the unit as scheduled without the litigants, or to delay the entire unit’s deployment pending resolution of the lawsuits. The decision was to consider each case individually based on many factors including the number of personnel, prior commitment of airlift and sealift, and whether the unit could accomplish its mission without the litigants. The US Supreme Court ruled on 7 October 1968 that the mobilization was legal, thus putting to rest the lawsuits.

Although 56 units initially were selected for deployment to Vietnam (and mobilized for that purpose), the number was adjusted three times between May and December. The final deployment of mobilized units numbered 43, and the other mobilized 33 units were assigned to STRAF. By December 1968, the 43 units (8 National Guard and 35 Army Reserve) were deployed to Vietnam. Most of these units were in Vietnam within 4 to 5 months after the callup.

Employment in Vietnam. In writing about the employment of ARNG and USAR units in Vietnam, the Department of the Army concluded: "Units of the Reserve Components called to active duty performed well... The few National Guard and Reserve units... were very good." Brigadier General James Gunn, CG, US Army Support Command, Da Nang, stated that "... these units proved to be outstanding in every respect. They were composed of mature officers and men who arrived in-country with 100 percent of their TOE strength and equipment. They were for the most part well-educated and highly motivated and skilled..." A listing of the 43 units deployed and their use in Vietnam follows. The list is not to be interpreted as meeting a unit integrity criterion, as unit membership frequently changed during the unit’s employment in Vietnam.

**ARNG UNITS**

107th Signal Company (Support) (Rhode Island)

This unit’s 260 members trained at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, for 5 months before being deployed in October 1968 to Vietnam. Initially assigned to the 1st Signal Brigade, it was later transferred to the 972d Signal Battalion, with its platoons operating out of Long Binh, Can Tho, and Tan Ninh. Between 19 October 1968 and 24 January 1969, nearly half (121) of its members had been reassigned to other units throughout RVN. The company was demobilized (released from active duty) on 17 October 1969.

116th Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Idaho)

The battalion (815 Guardsmen) underwent 9 weeks of training at Fort Lewis, Washington, and were deployed to Vietnam in the first week of September 1968. The unit, based at Bao Loc, upgraded and maintained a
100-mile portion of National Highway 20. Demobilization was 5 September 1969.

126th Supply and Service Company (DS) (Illinois)

Following 6 months of training at Fort Carson, Colorado, the 125 members of the composite service company were deployed to Chu Lai. The unit served under the 80th General Support Group in Da Nang, and provided supply and service support to approximately 25,000 troops in I Corps. Demobilization was 19 August 1969.

131st Engineer Company (Light Equipment) (Vermont)

After 4 months of training at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, this 179-member company was deployed to Ban Ma Thout in the Central Highlands to improve Highway 21 and to help move Montagnard civilians to more secure homes. Demobilization occurred 12 September 1969.

2nd Battalion, 138th Artillery (155 How Sp) (Kentucky)

This battalion, consisting of 545 Guardsmen, underwent 13 weeks of training at Fort Hood, Texas. The unit deployed initially to Phu Bai, and from there to a series of five support bases between Hue and Da Nang. The unit provided general support reinforcing artillery fire, as an element of the Provisional Corps Vietnam Artillery, to the 101st Airborne Division. Demobilization occurred 20 October 1969.

Company D, 151st Infantry (Long-Range Patrol) (Indiana)

Prior to the mobilization, 97 percent of this company had been awarded the Jungle Expert Patch after completing jungle training at the Army School of the Americas, Fort Sherman, Panama. Following mobilization, the unit (207 members) trained for 6 months at Fort Benning, Georgia, and was deployed in November 1968 to Long Binh in support of II Field Forces. This company became the first ARNG unit since the Korean War to add the Combat Infantry Streamer to its guidon, the criterion for which was that at least 65 percent of its strength had been awarded the Combat Infantryman's Badge. Demobilization occurred 26 November 1969.

3rd Battalion, 197th Artillery (155 How Fwd) (New Hampshire)

Entering active duty with 506 members, this battalion trained for 4 months at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, before deploying in mid-September 1968 to RVN. Operating with a base camp at Phu Loi, the unit served with the 23rd Artillery Group and provided fire support and artillery liaison teams and forward observer teams throughout the II Field Force area of operations. Many of the Guardsmen were reassigned to other units throughout RVN.

650th Medical Detachment (Dental Service) (Alabama)

After 3 months of training at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, this 32-member detachment became the first ARNG unit deployed to Vietnam, arriving
in-country on 27 August 1968. Nine unit members provided dental services for the combat support personnel at Long Binh Dental Clinic, a few operated a dental clinic at Bearcat, and the balance were infused throughout RVN.

**USAR UNITS**

**74th Field Hospital (New York)**

Stationed at Long Binh, the 74th provided the only facility in III Corps and IV Corps tactical zones responsible for the caring of prisoners of war.

**172nd Transportation Company (M4m Trk Cargo) (Nebraska)**

Stationed at Cam Ranh Bay, the unit conducted long-haul convoy runs throughout the southern portion of the II Corps tactical zone, supplying combat troops with ammunition, food, petroleum, and other supplies.

**173rd Petroleum Company (Oper) (Mississippi)**

After training at Fort Lee, Virginia, the unit deployed to a base 50 miles south of the DMZ in Vietnam, then to Phu Bai where they operated tank farms that issued 100,000 gallons of gasoline a day.

**231st Transportation Company (Mdm Boat) (Florida)**

Cited as the outstanding Army transportation unit in Vietnam in 1968-69, the 231st used Mechanized Landing Craft (LCM's) to transport ammunition, food, petroleum, lumber, and other necessary day-to-day items to Delta ports such as Can Tho, Binh Thuy, and Dong Tam.

**237th Maintenance Company (DS) (New York)**

Arriving in Vietnam in October, the unit provided support to the 108th Artillery Group north of Quang Tri. They overhauled 175mm and 8-inch artillery pieces, and repaired wheeled vehicles, refrigerators, and generators.

**238th Maintenance Company (DS) (Div) (Texas)**

Located on a branch of the Mekong River Delta near Dong Tam, the 238th provided direct maintenance support for the 86th Engineer Battalion and all nondivisional units in eight northern provinces of the IV Corps tactical zone. They repaired and serviced all types of track and wheeled vehicles, electronic equipment, and weapons. The company also provided maintenance contact teams which served with Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV).

**259th Quartermaster Battalion (POL) (Utah)**

HHC of the battalion was from Orem, Utah. Its 173rd QM Co (Petrol Ops) was from Mississippi; the 842d QM Co (Petrol Sup) (Fwd) was from Kansas; and a platoon of the 737th TC Co (Mdm Trk Petrl) was from
Washington—an "all-USAR" unit. The battalion was responsible for the storage, transportation and distribution of all petroleum products in the northernmost provinces of Vietnam.

295th Ordnance Company (Ammo) (DS/GS) (Nebraska)

The company was responsible for receiving, storing, and issuing ammunition in the southern I Corps tactical zone. The unit also operated a "brass yard," to recover reusable ammunition containers, and an ammunition condition report yard, where ammunition was stored while awaiting analysis for reissue, retrograde or destruction.

305th Medical Detachment (Ortho) (Pennsylvania)

After deployment to Vietnam, the detachment served with the 312th Evacuation Hospital at Chu Lai. This unit had the distinction of having a female commander, LTC Anna M. Brady, who later became Chief of Professional Services for the 312th Evacuation Hospital.

311th Field Hospital (Ohio)

Upon mobilization, the 311th was sent to Fort Leonardwood, Missouri, for 5 months of training. When deployed to Vietnam, the unit was split into two elements—one was sent to Phu Thanh to operate a convalescent facility for POW's and the other was attached to the 85th Evacuation Hospital at Quo Nhon.

312th Evacuation Hospital (Smbl) (North Carolina)

The 312th, stationed at Chu Lai, was reportedly the busiest medical evacuation hospital in Vietnam. The unit admitted 4,000 patients and treated another 7,000 outpatients.

313th Medical Detachment (Surgical) (Virginia)

Upon mobilization, this unit of one enlisted man went to Fort Belvoir for approximately 4 months. During this time, the unit was brought up to strength and deployed to Vietnam where it was attached to the 22nd Surgical Hospital (MUST) at Phu Bai in support of the 101st Airborne Division.

316th Medical Detachment (Blood Distribution) (New York)

Organized in January 1968 and mobilized in May of that year, the unit was attached to the 9th Medical Laboratory and was responsible for blood distribution throughout Vietnam.

319th Transportation Company (Light Trk) (Georgia)

As part of the 6th Battalion of the 48th Transportation Group, the unit was involved in hauling supplies and equipment from the Army Depot at Long Binh Post, 20 miles northeast of Saigon, to units in southern South Vietnam.
336th Ordnance Battalion (Ammo) (DS) (Arkansas)

With headquarters in Da Nang, the unit supplied ammunition for all forces throughout the I Corps tactical zone. In addition to maintaining ammunition supply points, they fielded technical assistance teams who provided instruction on the proper handling and storage of ammunition.

357th Transportation Company (Acft) (DS) (Pennsylvania)

While stationed at Bien Hoa Air Base, just northwest of Saigon, the unit was responsible for repairing and servicing helicopters.

377th Maintenance Company (Light) (DS) (Wisconsin)

Located at the huge logistical complex at Cam Ranh Bay, the unit repaired vehicles, office machinery, and small arms for units throughout the II Corps area, and also provided technical assistance to 67 units of the 1st Log Command.

41st Medical Detachment (Neurological) (Tennessee)

Following 4 1/2 months at Fort Carson, Colorado, this 7-member unit was attached to the 312th Evacuation Hospital at Chu Lai.

413th Finance Section (Georgia)

From its base in Phu Bai, the unit was responsible for finance support to troops operating in the I Corps tactical zone, handling a monthly payroll of more than $2,240,000 for nearly 15,000 troops.

424th Personnel Service Company (Type B) (Michigan)

Following training at Fort Hood, Texas, for 5 months, the unit departed CONUS in October for assignment with the 80th General Support Group in Da Nang. The company provided personnel services for approximately 550 officers and 8,000 enlisted personnel in the US Army Support Command.

448th Army Postal Unit (TyZ) (New York)

This 23-man unit processed mail for approximately 60,000 men in more than 100 units in II Corps tactical zone.

452nd General Supply Company (GS) (Fwd) (Minnesota)

Operating out of Phu Bai, the company stored and distributed rations for approximately 45,000 troops in the northern I Corps tactical zone.

472nd Medical Detachment (Ambulance) (Maryland)

Upon deployment to Vietnam, the 472nd was based in Chu Lai. The detachment was released from active duty on 9 August 1969 and returned to Rockville, Maryland, with 11 enlisted personnel.
482nd Medical detachment (Equipment Maintenance) (Illinois)

This unit supported medical facilities in the II Corps tactical zone, and operated out of the Cam Ranh Bay complex. 84

513th Maintenance Battalion (Massachusetts)

The battalion provided direct support maintenance for nondivisional units in the I Corps area. Maintenance responsibilities included the repair and servicing of artillery weapons, wheel and tracked vehicles and electronic equipment.

630th Transportation Company (Mdm Trk) (Pennsylvania)

After approximately 45 days at Fort Meade, Maryland, the unit was deployed to Phu Bai and operating under the Da Nang Support Command, supported the 82nd Airborne Division. The unit hauled ammunition, food, petroleum products, and other essential supplies needed to support combat troops. 85

737th Transportation Company (Med Trk Petrol) (Washington)

With a platoon in support of the 259th Qm Bn (POL), the remainder of the company-delivered petroleum products and dry cargo throughout the I Corps tactical zone. Operating out of Chu Lai, in support of the Americal Division, the company was under the operational control of the Da Nang Support Command.

875th Ordnance Company (Ammo) (DS/GS) (Wisconsin)

After arriving in Vietnam in the fall, the unit was stationed at Long Binh and became part of the largest ammunition depot in Vietnam. Serving under the 3rd Ordnance Battalion, the company unloaded, classified, stored, and issued ammunition to convoys running from the central highlands to the Mekong River Delta.

842nd Quartermaster Company (Petrol Sup) (Fwd) (Kansas)

Operating out of Quang Tri as an element of the 259th Qm Bn, the unit managed petroleum storage farms and package yards, issuing two million gallons of products a month. The company also operated and maintained 40 miles of pipeline running from Camp Evans to Dong Ha. The biggest consumer of their products was the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech).

889th Medical Detachment (Surgical) (Virginia)

This unit was attached to the 312th Evacuation Hospital and provided medical support to US and Allied Forces in the Northern I Corps tactical zone. 86

950th Army Postal Unit (APU) (Tv!) (Kentucky)
Operating at Can Tho in the Mekong River Delta, this 15-man unit provided mail services for nearly 10,000 Army and Air Force troops.

978th Army Postal Unit (APU) (TyU) (Arkansas)

This unit operated the Quant Tri Army post office, which served approximately 5,000 nondivisional troops in the area south of the DMZ. They handled over 3,500 pounds of mail daily, which doubled during the Christmas season.

1011th Service and Supply Company (DS) (Kansas)

Serving under the Saigon Area Support Command, the unit had the mission of supplying food, weapons, clothing, gasoline, vehicle parts and administrative materials for the Royal Thailand Army element in the Allied Forces and the US Air Force.

1002nd Supply and Service Company (DS) (Ohio)

The bath and laundry platoon provided showers and clean clothing for elements of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Mbl). In addition, the 1002nd operated an ice cream plant at Camp Evans.

1018th Supply and Service Company (DS) (New York)

In Vietnam, this unit supplied clothing, field gear, petroleum, and construction materials to more than 70 units in the I Corps tactical zone.

Demobilization. The mobilized units had been alerted on 11 April 1968 and actually entered active duty on 12 May 1968 (M-Day). Postmobilization training programs were then conducted varying in length from about 7 to 28 weeks. Between August and December 1968, 43 units deployed to Vietnam, while the balance became part of the Army’s strategic reserve. The first Army RC unit was demobilized on 19 July 1969. Of the units deployed to Vietnam, demobilization was completed on 26 November 1969, while the units that were retained in CONUS/Hawaii were all demobilized by 12 December 1969. Thus, the shortest period of time spent on active duty by a unit was 14 months, while the longest time was 19 months.87

Army planning policies for demobilization were disseminated in December 1968, and the implementing directive was issued in June 1969. The unit demobilization process envisioned the unit members to be assembled at the unit's hometown location for a formal demobilization ceremony. Since unit integrity had been severely violated, for deployed as well as nondeployed units, many original unit members were scattered throughout the Army by the summer of 1969. Reestablishment of unit integrity for demobilization was a major problem. The Department of the Army established on 23 June 1969 five methods by which Guard and Reserve members of mobilized units would rejoin their units for demobilization. The order of priority was:

1. Rejoin unit at its active duty station not earlier than 30 days prior to its demobilization.
2. Rejoin unit enroute to its demobilization station.

3. Rejoin unit at its demobilization station not later than 14 days before its release date.

4. Rejoin unit at its home station (mobilization station) not earlier than 7 but not later than 3 days before its release date.

5. Not rejoin unit, but be individually separated.

The Army soon discovered that priorities one, two, and three caused excessive movement of individuals, and therefore attempted to implement only priority four between July and October 1969. On 2 October 1969, DA gave up this priority and thereafter implemented priority five. Many personnel never rejoined their units prior to demobilization. Accounting for individuals transferred from mobilized RC units was not achieved and many were unaccounted for when required to return to their parent unit for demobilization. Recruitment-retention counseling and administrative procedures to retain the maximum number of demobilized personnel in units were unsatisfactory.92

Units that had been deployed to Vietnam were demobilized with no unit equipment at all, and the balance were demobilized with so little of their equipment that simple training needs were not satisfied in some cases. To overcome this problem, some equipment was pulled from other ARNG and USAR units and redistributed to the recently demobilized units. Department of the Army issued some equipment in such a state of disrepair that it was unserviceable. The units returning from Vietnam were prohibited by DA from maintaining libraries of military publications and blank forms, which imposed additional administrative workload and impeded operations at home stations.90

There was a continuing need in the active force for the type of ARNG and USAR units that had been demobilized. To satisfy this requirement, the Army newly organized active units at the same locations to replace the ARNG and USAR units.

All but one of the 76 mobilized units remained in the RC structure upon demobilization. The 35th Mobile Surgical Hospital was subsequently eliminated. Of the other 75 units, all but 3 were reconstituted in the ARNG/USAR structure at their premobilization configuration: The CS Platoon of the 29th Aviation Company was redesignated as the 2529th Medical Detachment (Air Ambulance); the 107th Signal Company (Support) was redesignated as the 107th Signal Company, Small Headquarters Operations; and the 203rd Transportation Company (Lt Truck-1 1/2 Ton) was redesignated as the 223rd Transportation Company (Lt Truck-5 Ton).91

Performance Ratings. The Secretary of Defense wrote the following about the importance and performance of the Guard and Reserve stemming from the two mobilizations of 1968:

It is my privilege to report that their performance of duty in general, particularly those assigned to combat zones, has been exemplary and in the highest traditions...
of the military services. Their augmentation and support of the regular military forces have materially contributed to the successful fulfillment of military missions and to the national security and interests of the United States during a period of critical need. 92

The praise was repeated the following year by the Secretary, who spoke also of the views of field commanders:

Senior field commanders in the Vietnam combat zone have been unanimous in their praise of the performance of Reserve Component units in combat, combat support, and combat service support roles. In an environment of outstanding performance by US Army units and a high degree of professional competence, the representatives of the Army National Guard and US Army Reserve performed with distinction. 93

On 16 December 1969, President Nixon conducted a special White House ceremony for the commander (or his representative) of each mobilized unit, and issued a proclamation expressing appreciation to all Guardsmen and Reservists who had served as part of the two 1968 mobilizations. Following the ceremony, each Service Secretary and Chief of Staff co-hosted a special luncheon for the participating Guardsmen and Reservists, with General Westmoreland addressing the Army component luncheon at the Fort Myer Officers' Club. The Presidential Proclamation was as follows:

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A
PROCLAMATION

In January and May of 1968, one hundred and fifteen units from the Reserve Components of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were ordered to active duty to quickly augment the Active Forces. This action provided this country with armed strength capability with which to meet possible contingencies that might have arisen as a result of the threats and actions by the North Koreans and the need for additional troops in Vietnam caused by the Tet Offensive.

Many of these units have served in Vietnam while others have served in Korea, Japan, and the United States. Those units remaining in the United States were primarily used to strengthen the strategic reserve and participate in the Military Airlift Command operations.

By June 18th, Reserve units of the Naval Air Reserve, the Naval Reserve Mobile Construction Battalions (SEABEES), the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve were demobilized and the units returned to inactive status. The Presidential Proclamation was as follows:

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A
PROCLAMATION

In January and May of 1968, one hundred and fifteen units from the Reserve Components of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were ordered to active duty to quickly augment the Active Forces. This action provided this country with armed strength capability with which to meet possible contingencies that might have arisen as a result of the threats and actions by the North Koreans and the need for additional troops in Vietnam caused by the Tet Offensive.

Many of these units have served in Vietnam while others have served in Korea, Japan, and the United States. Those units remaining in the United States were primarily used to strengthen the strategic reserve and participate in the Military Airlift Command operations.
All of these Reserve Component units responded to the Nation's call in time of need and established records of performance, both in and out of combat, which have demonstrated a level of readiness and training never before achieved by our reserve forces. In addition, many individual reservists volunteered for active duty during this period. They have truly upheld the heritage and tradition of the citizen soldier and have again proven that both the National Guard and the Reserves are a great resource for our country and one which is necessary to our national security. NOW, THEREFORE, I, RICHARD NIXON, President of the United States of America, do hereby issue this proclamation in recognition of and appreciation for the patriotic, dedicated and professional service of our loyal members of the Reserve Components of the Armed Forces of the United States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 16th day of December, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-nine, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninety-fourth.
ENDNOTES


5. Ibid, FY 66, pp. 6-8; FY 67, pp. 1-14.


13. Ibid., pp. 5-6.


15. Ibid., p. 387.


19. For a detailed treatment of the Clifford Task Force reassessment, see Herbert I. Schandler, The Unmaking of a President, Ch. 7, and The BDM Corporation, Ch. 4.


22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p. 72.

24. Ibid., p. 58.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., pp. 76-78.

27. I. Heymont and E. W. McGregor, Review and Analysis of Recent Mobilizations and Deployments of US Army Reserve Components, Ch. 5; Richard Weinert, CCNARC and the 1968 Reserve Mobilization, p. 7.


29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., pp. 1-2, 1-3.


32. The first readiness report for the ARNG and USAR after suspension in 1966 of previous reporting was not established until April 1969; Annual Report on Reserve Forces, FY 69, p. 41; After-Action Report, pp. 1-2, 1-3.


34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., pp. 1-4, 1-5.

36. Ibid., p. 1-5.


40. Ibid., p. 90; Johnson, Ch. 17; Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson & the American Dream, Ch. 12.


43. Ibid.

44. After-Action Report, pp. 2-25.

45. Ibid., pp. 1-7, 1-8, 3-15.

46. Ibid., p. 2-1.

47. Ibid., p. 1-20.

48. Ibid., pp. 1-10, 1-11, 2-9, 3-1.

49. Ibid., pp. 2-7, 2-8; "Army Reserve Units Respond to Call-up," p. 7.

50. After-Action Report, p. 3-1.

51. Ibid., pp. 1-1, 1-12.


54. Ibid., pp. 2-2, 2-3, 3-3, 3-10, 3-11.


56. Heymont and McGregor, pp. 5-6; After-Action Report, p. 5-1.

57. After-Action Report, pp. 2-5, 3-1, 3-3, 3-7; Heymont and McGregor, pp. 5-6.


59. Weinert, p. 97.


61. Ibid., pp. 2-17, 2-18.


63. After-Action Report, pp. 2-16, 2-17.

64. Ibid., p. 2-17.

65. Ibid., pp. 3-4, 3-5.

67. After-Action Report, pp. 3-2, 3-4.
68. Ibid., p. 3-9.
69. Ibid., pp. 1-10, 1-11, 3-10.
70. Heymont and McGregor, p. 5-14.
73. For an excellent review of the approach to provide replacements used by the United States, Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union, see Walter S. Dunn, Jr., "People Policies in Combat," Parameters, Spring 1984, pp. 49-59.
74. Heiser, pp. 30-38.
75. Ibid., pp. 3-14, 3-15.
77. Heymont and McGregor, pp. 5-7; After-Action Report, p. 3-15.
78. Heiser, p. 256.
81. Telephone interviews with SP5 Lockett Garnett, Richmond, Virginia, November 1983.
82. E. J. Jenks, Jr., Unit History, 424th Personnel Services Company.
84. Weinert, p. 65.


91. Odegard, pp. 6-61.

92. Annual Report on Reserve Forces, FY 68, p. i.


CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS

Three overriding conclusions stand out among those regarding mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces throughout US history (including the Vietnam War): First, when one reflects on the entire course of US military history, the initial focus is unalterably on the Militia, which was the sole military establishment from 1607 (Jamestown) until 1789 (Regular Army established under the Constitution). What is even more important than the exclusive reliance on the Militia during the first half of American history has been the paramount importance of the Militia/National Guard and Reserves during the second half. Extensive reliance on the Reserve Components has prevailed throughout all of US history and this initial reliance continues today under the name “Total Force.” Early mobilization of the RC has been a basic factor on which depended the successful prosecution of all US wars.

Second, the Militia/National Guard and Reserves have never been adequately equipped. The responsibility for equipping the Militia was first adopted by the Federal Government in 1808, and from that time onward the Army (and other Services) provided arms and equipment to the RC via a half-hearted or less, trickle-down process. The result has been, in many cases, insufficient or inadequate equipment with which to merely train, and never have the Guard and Reserve units had full TOE combat standard equipment. The Regular Army has never seriously considered or satisfied total Army equipment requirements, has not learned how to quickly and efficiently redistribute equipment during partial mobilization, and has not integrated Guard and Reserve logistics systems with the Active Army systems.

Third, mobilization of the RC has never been adequately planned. Mobilization planning has been generally nonexistent, and in the cases when some plans were prepared, they were based on grossly faulty assumptions. A result has been the conduct of mobilizations having the same errors, problems, and inefficiencies as previous mobilizations. It is embarrassing at best and disgusting at worst to realize that the US Army must relearn the lessons from past mobilizations upon each new one. Mobilization planning is not intellectually demanding work. It is time-consuming and requires a great deal of coordination, but it can be properly accomplished if the OSD and Service Secretariats demand it—and only if that demand is enforced. Plans must provide for partial as well as full mobilizations.

The regular arrangement, then, throughout US history has been: (1) paramount reliance on the Guard and Reserves during wars and other emergencies; (2) woefully insufficient provisions for the Guard and Reserves during peacetime; and (3) manifestly inadequate mobilization planning. The amazing truth of history is the contradiction among these three arrangements.

Readiness is the extent to which a nation’s armed forces are prepared to go to war. Placing a high reliance on the RC without providing them the necessary weapons and equipment, and without adequately planning the
conduit of a full or partial mobilization, do not lead to the attainment of readiness. What is equally true and alarming is that what meager equipment that has been provided the RC during peacetime has been withdrawn in large quantities in the three most recent mobilizations (Korean War, Berlin Crisis, and the Vietnam War). These conclusions and interpretations, and others, are amplified as follows:

1. Purpose and Meaning of Mobilization.

Mobilization is both a military and political event of crucial importance. The purpose and meaning of mobilization to the military can be expressed in one sentence: the central concept of strategy is force, the central concept of force is manpower, and the central concept of manpower is mobilization. Mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves increases the options and the capabilities of the Defense Department in carrying out national military policy, and directly affects the timing, size, and composition of deployments to a theater of war. In addition, mobilization affects other potential theaters, as well as the strategic reserves. The decision to mobilize is vital to actual and potential military operations and capabilities, as well as to policy, strategy, and tactics.

The other element of mobilization can be stated as a fundamental proposition: mobilization is an act of political will. It makes commitment and determination real and visible to friends and foes alike. It is a conscious and visible demonstration of firm resolve to achieve political objectives over a recognized and acknowledged enemy or threat.

As an unambiguous political statement, mobilization is immensely significant to the American people. It is not merely important—but critically so—in a democracy that the President refers questions of importance to the people for their consideration and consent. Especially in the matter of war, the American people demand the right of being informed and the opportunity to voice their opinion. A President must know for what purpose and for how long his people are willing to support a war.

The response to a mobilization by the American public will be immediate. It may even be gratifying to the decisionmakers, but, in any event, it will be illuminating and not oblique. Mobilization, in itself, does not guarantee irrevocable public support—or public support at all; what it does is place the importance of the endeavor, at least as seen by the President, in plain view to the American people. Neither does mobilization guarantee that the enemy will shiver and quake, but it does guarantee that his attention will be gained by the demonstration of US resolve. Mobilization is thus important psychologically to both friend and foe alike.

Mobilization is a symbol of commitment, and symbolism is often as important as substance. Mobilization is also a substantive act, and therefore is a political and military event having mutually supportive purpose and meaning. Since these two characteristics are cognate, it follows without amplification that nonmobilization for a war
is also of critical importance and may be viewed as a disregard for military and political prudence.

2. Regular Army, Citizen-Soldiers and Citizens.

The United States has never maintained, nor thought seriously of maintaining during peacetime, a Regular Army of sufficient size to meet the needs of major war. The United States has engaged in nine major wars, and extensive initial reliance has been placed on the Citizen-Soldiers in the first eight of them. In addition, the Citizen-Soldier Army has been utilized in numerous minor wars and domestic disturbances throughout US history.

Table 6 illustrates the initial reliance on the Citizen-Soldiers during eight of the nine major US wars (the Civil War is omitted due to its uniqueness). The contribution of the Militia/National Guard and Army Reserve greatly exceeded that of the Regulars through World War II. However, the number of Regulars serving in the Korean War and the Vietnam War was much higher than the number of Guardsmen and Reservists. Two explanations account for this dramatic historical change: (1) the size of the peacetime Regular Army has substantially increased since its inception; and (2) there was no full mobilization for the last two wars.

Table 6 also reveals another interesting historical fact: the contribution of the RC as a ratio of the total number serving in wars has decreased substantially from the first major war to the last one (except for the Korean War). Table 6 also illustrates that it has been increasingly necessary to augment the Regulars and the Citizen-Soldiers with draftees and volunteers to fight major wars. This trend is particularly noteworthy when distinguishing between 19th century and 20th century wars.

The most significant revelations of Table 6 to this study are: (1) the size of the mobilized RC during the Vietnam War was the smallest in US history, and (2) the percent of the RC's contribution to the total number serving in the Army during that war was also the smallest in US history.

The history of the US Army during the past two centuries is a history of two armies: Regulars and Citizen-Soldiers, whereas the history of the US Army in the present century has been a history of three armies: Regulars, Citizen-Soldiers, and citizens. In modern times, the United States has not maintained either a Regular Army or a Citizen-Soldier Army of sufficient size to satisfy the manpower requirements of major wars.
### TABLE 6

**REGULAR ARMY AND CITIZEN-SOL rER ARMY MOBILIZATION FOR MAJOR WARS AND THE BERLIN CRISIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Wars</th>
<th>Strength of Army at Beginning of the War</th>
<th>Number of Militia/National Reserve</th>
<th>Total Serving in the Army</th>
<th>Percent of Regulars to Total Serving</th>
<th>Percent of AC to Total Serving</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary War</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>0(+)</td>
<td>100(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War of 1812</td>
<td>6,744</td>
<td>458,000</td>
<td>522,654</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican War</td>
<td>7,365</td>
<td>73,532</td>
<td>115,906</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish-American War</td>
<td>28,183</td>
<td>170,954</td>
<td>274,817</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>127,588</td>
<td>208,000</td>
<td>4,057,000</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>187,893</td>
<td>377,000</td>
<td>11,260,000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin Crisis</td>
<td>(Sep 39)</td>
<td>382,900</td>
<td>2,834,000</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean War</td>
<td>591,487</td>
<td>119,622</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam War</td>
<td>859,000</td>
<td>22,786</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE a: Numbers include the Continental Army. Statistics are unavailable that show the number serving who were not Militia members.

3. **War Powers and Mobilization.**

The war-making powers of the President have bedeviled Presidents and Congresses (and a few judges) beginning with the Constitution. Of the eight major wars since the Revolution, five were fought under a Congressional Declaration of War: War of 1812, Mexican War, Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II. There were no Congressional Declarations of War for the Civil War, Korean War, or Vietnam War.

Throughout US history, Congress has enacted various laws authorizing mobilization and the terms and limits of that authority. The purpose of these laws has always been twofold: to permit a mobilization in an emergency, but to simultaneously limit the quantity and duration of use (and earlier in history the deployment) of the Reserve forces that were mobilized.

Congress has always had its eye on the warmaking powers of the President when enacting legislation that permitted mobilization of the Militia/Guard-Reserves. In 1950, Congress passed the first legislation authorizing the President to call up the Guard and Reserves without specific congressional approval. The legislative authority exercised by the President to call up the Militia/Guard and Reserves during each of the major wars and the Berlin Crisis was as follows:
War of 1812 - Militia Act of 1792 and special legislation of January 1812.

Mexican War - Militia Act of 1792 and special legislation of May 13, 1846.

Civil War - Militia Act of 1792.

Spanish-American War - Special legislation of April 22, 1898.

World War I - Special legislation (Selective Draft Law of May 18, 1917).

World War II - Special legislation (Joint Resolution of August 27, 1940; special legislation of August and December 1941).

Korea - Presidential decision under the Selective Services Extension Act of 1950. No specific congressional approval.


4. Grass Roots Sentiments.

The National Guard and the Reserves provide a vital link to the grass roots sentiments of the American people by which defense establishment needs are harmonized with local sentiments, and community and state loyalties. Communities across the land have acquired political and economic stakes in both the National Guard and Army Reserve (and other Reserves), and to these substantial interests is added a high military stake in the National Guard in its state mission role. The political, military, and economic values of the Guard and Reserve are beyond estimation.

5. Internal Security.

One of the three purposes of the US Army is to provide for the internal security of the United States—a function satisfied exclusively by the Militia during colonial and first half of the constitutional period. During the third quarter of US history, the internal security function was performed jointly by the Regulars and the Citizen-Soldiers. The most significant realization, however, is that this function has been carried out nearly exclusively during the last quarter of US history by the Army National Guard.

The State mission of the National Guard, to protect life and property, preserve peace, order, and public safety under State authorities, is a unique and vastly significant task. That the National Guard, alone as a military force, performed the internal security function during the Vietnam War is an historical fact of grand dimension.

Planning for partial or full mobilization of the Guard and Reserve has been manifestly inadequate in every mobilization in US history. It is distressing to contemplate, and impossible to penetrate, the reason why mobilization planning has never achieved greatness or even sufficiency. Certainly it is not because of lack of capability, as the planning for great endeavors such as the extraordinary Normandy invasion in 1944, demonstrates. Nor can the reason be lack of time. Neither can the explanation be laid to lack of experience, since mobilizations have occurred for every major war (as well as other times) and written records are available to be studied.


The popular belief throughout US history has been that the Reserve Components were alone responsible for their own mobilization. This perception has never been valid. The true responsibilities for mobilization are shared by the Executive branch (including OSD and the Services), the Legislative branch, and the Reserve Components. The Reserves are not responsible for their shortage of equipment and supplies, housing and training facilities at mobilization sites, TOE structures, Manning authorization, mobilization plans, replacement systems, or war plans. The Reserve Components are responsible for being as well-prepared as possible for mobilization (including training in part, discipline, morale, and leadership) once Congress, the President, and DOD determine their existence and the extent of their provisions. The truth of history is that the Guard and Reserves have always responded to mobilization calls as they were manned, trained, equipped, and supplied. That is all they can do.


The expression "M-Day" (the day mobilization begins) embodies three fundamental assumptions that have governed mobilization planning throughout US history. The first dogma associated with "M-Day" is that a mobilization would occur in the event of a war or other national emergency. That is, that there would be an M-Day. The second fundamental tenet has been that mobilization would be total—that all Militia/Guard and Reserves would be called to active duty. The third basic proposition surrounding M-Day has been that M-Day and D-Day (the day war begins) would coincide, or nearly so.

The US historical experience with M-Day has been consistent with these mobilization assumptions only through World War I. The first assumption (that mobilization would, of course, occur for a war) has been validated in all of the nine major wars except the last one, when mobilization worthy of the concept did not occur. The other two assumptions (size of the mobilization and timing of the mobilization) have not been historically valid in the 20th century. The following table illustrates these facts:
TABLE 7
SIZE AND TIMING OF US MOBILIZATIONS IN THE 20TH CENTURY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Size of Mobilization (Army)</th>
<th>Timing of Mobilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexican Horde</td>
<td>Near Full</td>
<td>M = D+39 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>M = D+4 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>M = D+13 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean War</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>M = D+2 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin Crisis</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>There was no D-Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam War</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>M = D+38 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Table 7, it is clear that a full mobilization has occurred only twice this century. The major lesson to be learned is that an assumption of a full mobilization occurring on M-Day is not necessarily valid, and, therefore, mobilization planning must also include a contingency for partial mobilization. The table also disproves the assumed relationship between M-Day and D-Day. That is, the historical experience suggests that mobilization planners may not assume that M-Day equals D-Day, nor that one always occurs before the other.

An article of faith has been that mobilization should and would commence forthwith in the event of war. The very expression "Minute Men," which is revered in US history, illustrates that at the first moment of hostilities Citizen-Soldiers would mobilize. Mobilization occurred well in advance of World War II. Mobilization for the Korean War was ordered as soon as it was realized that the Regulars could not field sufficient forces. The Berlin Crisis mobilization occurred even though there were no hostilities. Mobilization for Vietnam occurred three years after the ground war had begun. A fundamental military tenet that has been obviously and universally admitted has called for a mobilization immediately upon hostilities, and in sufficient size to meet the threat. Military mobilization tenets have not always coincided with their political counterparts. The 1968 mobilization for the Vietnam War occurred too late and was too small.

9. Limited and Unlimited Wars.

Of the nine major US wars, over half were limited wars (War of 1812, Mexican War, Spanish-American War, Korean War, and Vietnam War), three were unlimited, large conflicts (Civil War, World War I, and World War II), and one was a combination of both (Revolutionary War). The limited wars were limited in the size of the military forces employed, the territory involved, and the objectives. The Revolutionary War was unlimited in its objectives (independence from British rule), but was limited in terms of the military force employed.

The inception of unlimited wars, which were fought by mass armies and involved conflicts of whole nations, has not meant the end of limited wars, as the Korean War and Vietnam War have demonstrated. Both limited and unlimited wars (and the Berlin Crisis) have required mobilization of the Reserve Components.
10. **Length of Service and Rotation.**

The statutory restrictions on length of service of mobilized troops have been the basis for much criticism and consternation throughout US history. The old and discredited practice of short terms of enlistment, which began during the Revolutionary War, came back into the Army personnel system in the Korean War under the name of rotation. During the Korean War, to maintain only 20 divisions (with a strength of about 16,000 each), the Army raised almost 3 million men. A rotation system was also adopted for the Vietnam War, during which 4 1/3 million personnel served on active duty in the Army to maintain 19 Active divisions, with a peak Army strength of 365,600 in Vietnam.

It matters little, if at all, to field commanders and replacement planners whether individual soldiers are removed from a unit due to an expiring enlistment or because of rotation—the effect is the same. The great defect of a rotation system is its degradation of unit cohesion by constantly shuffling manpower in and out of units.

11. **Who Shall Serve?**

During the Korean War, the military manpower supply capability greatly exceeded demands, resulting in a loud hue and cry about who should serve. All this had happened before in the United States. The US experience with this issue began during the Revolutionary War, and recurred during the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Civil War, and would certainly have arisen in the Spanish-American War had it lasted 3 months or more. This issue also occurred during the Vietnam War, when the major source of manpower was through a draft and when the National Guard and Reserves were not used on active duty during the first 3 years of the war, and only slightly thereafter. The issue has never been resolved, and will recur any time when there is conscription unaccompanied by mobilization of the Guard and Reserves.

12. **Where to Use the Mobilized RC.**

The question of where to use mobilized Militia/Guard forces has been an issue throughout much of US history, although two separate reasons account for the controversy. The US Constitution stipulates only three purposes for calling forth the militia: (1) to execute the laws of the Union; (2) to suppress insurrection; and (3) to repel invasion. The Constitution therefore restricts the use of mobilized Militia/National Guard to the land mass of the United States and does not permit deployment elsewhere. This restriction was not legally resolved until passage of the National Defense Act of 1916, which made the National Guard—when in Federal service—a part of the Army of the United States. The Militia was used outside the United States prior to 1916 by the simple expedient of mobilizing its members as individual volunteers.

The question of where to use mobilized National Guard and Reserves arose later in US history during the Korean War, the Berlin Crisis, and the Vietnam War. In those instances, the controversy was caused by policy, rather than being a Constitutional matter. During the Korean War, half of the eight divisions mobilized were retained in the
United States, and only two divisions were deployed to the theater of War. During the Berlin Crisis, none of the mobilized ARNG and USAR units were deployed overseas. Of the 76 ARNG and USAR units mobilized in 1968 during the Vietnam War, only 43 were deployed to the war zone.

Members of the Guard and Reserve expect to be used in the event of war, and this expectation does not mean sitting at some post in CONUS. This expectation is shared by the American public as well. There will always be a controversy and considerable dissatisfaction when mobilized Guard and Reserve units are not deployed to the war zone.

13. Unit Integrity.

The question of how to use mobilized units of the Guard and Reserve has historically been an issue and became controversial again during the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Unit history and unit integrity are matters of great pride and intense concern within the National Guard and Reserves, and these views are widely shared within communities and states. Mobilized units were routinely and deliberately broken up during the last two wars, and their members were used as fillers and individual replacements, which led to considerable and widespread dissatisfaction.

The National Guard has been built on the basis of units, beginning with the initial militia system. Training, equipment, organization, tactics, and readiness are all based on cohesion of units. Mobilization plans are, and have been, based on the availability and use of Guard and Reserve units (and Reserve IRR). The Total Force Policy is based on the certainty that the size of the Regulars will be insufficient to wage war and that units of the Ready Reserve must be mobilized.

Anxiety within the Guard and Reserve that unit integrity will again be violated in the next mobilization continues. Use of the RG units as some sort of individual recruiting preserve is neither proper nor wise.


The structure, size, and location of the National Guard and Reserves have never been static, and should not be so. It is important to realize, however, that reorganizations within the RC have a price. When existing units are eliminated or changed to a different TOE series, or when new units are created, there has always been and will always be an adverse effect on manning, equipping, and training the force affected. The changes in MOSs, grade authorizations, branch qualifications, new equipment, different equipment, missions, doctrine, and tactics all take time to implement and time for the units to achieve readiness.

The major reorganizations of the Army Guard and Army Reserve starting in 1952 and ending in 1968 impacted unfavorably on the mobilization of 1968. Units that had recently undergone reorganizations were eligible only as a last resort for mobilization, regardless of the requirements submitted by the field commander or the requirements to reconstitute the STAF.
Since reorganizations are inevitable to accommodate changing strategy, technology, and total force requirements, the best that can be hoped for is the minimum of reorganizations. One might also hope that mobilization of recently reorganized units will not be necessary. The largest contribution of the US Army in this regard is to properly and thoroughly determine the wisest total force structure and composition so that frequent and numerous reorganizations are not necessary.


Mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves was a major topic of consideration during the 3 years following commitment of ground combat forces in Vietnam (1965-67). Mobilization was strongly favored and recommended by the Secretary of Defense, the Services, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, many members of Congress, and others. President Johnson refused during that time to declare a national emergency, to seek congressional legislation for a mobilization, and to mobilize the Reserve Components.

Nonmobilization in 1965, 1966, and 1967 demonstrated a lack of political will. It also failed to satisfy the military meaning and requirement of mobilization. US military history had demonstrated that in the event of war or national emergency, a mobilization of the Militia/National Guard and Reserves would occur. Every major US war, as well as minor wars, domestic disturbances, and the Berlin Crisis, had witnessed a full or substantial mobilization. Mobilization was, in 1965 and in all prior years, an article of doctrine and of faith.

Had a mobilization been ordered as ground combat forces were being deployed to Vietnam, the American people would have known that the future in South Vietnam depended upon a decision of arms. The impact of this message might have altered the course of the war. The political authorities, however, took every step in building the military ground forces in Vietnam with reluctance and trepidation, which led inevitably to reluctance by the American people to support the war. When the public realized the true course of the war, they suffered inordinate disillusionment with it and with the President who had deceived them.

The American military involvement in Vietnam placed a greater demand upon the Army than had the Korean War or the Berlin Crisis. Yet, as the war in Vietnam grew larger, the Guard and Reserves were not mobilized, resulting in a depletion of the Army's reserve in CONUS. A greater issue lay in the very structure of the Army of the 1960's, which depended upon the Army Guard and Army Reserve in any operation as large as Vietnam. The Regular Army was not organized to conduct a war without mobilization of the Reserves, but did so at the price of significantly reducing its forces deployed elsewhere, as well as reducing its strategic reserve.

When the Army (and other Services) had to adopt Johnson's alternate strategy of war without all-out effort, mental doubt of the strategy became pervasive. Having deprived the Army of a doctrine of mobilization, it was forced to wage a war with a manpower acquisition policy it did not believe in and which was difficult to accomplish. The
first objective in war is a quick victory over the enemy, and the protracted campaign in Vietnam and nonmobilization were flagrant violations of basic military and political strategy.


The enemy's Tet Offensive began on 31 January 1968. General Westmoreland formally requested emergency reinforcements on 12 February. The JCS again recommended a mobilization, but Secretary McNamara was by then opposed to it. On 12 February, the President approved reinforcements but rejected mobilization.

On 19 February, Secretary of Defense Designate Clifford (sworn in as Secretary on 1 March) began, at the order of the President, a complete reexamination of US strategy in Vietnam which became known as the "A to Z" reassessment. On 4 March, the President was presented with the "A to Z" reassessment, which contained a recommendation to mobilize 262,000 Guard men and Reservists for the war.

On 13 March, the President made the decision, in conjunction with a decision to deploy 30,000 additional men to Vietnam, to have a mobilization, but the specific size of the mobilized force was not then decided. OSD began planning on 14 March for a callup of 96,000 personnel, of which 43,500 were to be deployed to Vietnam.

On 28 March, the President made the decision that mobilization would be limited to about 24,500 personnel. On 2 April, the final troop list submitted by the Army to the JCS totaled 54,000. Two days later, the Secretary of Defense decreed that 54,000 was too high because of cost. The Executive Order for the mobilization did not specify the size of the mobilization. The Secretary of Defense announced at a news conference on 11 April that the call to active duty would be for approximately 24,500 men in some 88 units and an additional 3,600 members of the IRR.

It is ironic that after all the debate and arguments about the need for a mobilization, all the planning and consideration about the size and composition of the mobilized force, despite the requirements for forces to be deployed and to reconstitute the strategic reserve, and regardless of the money spent on the war over the past 3 years, that in the end the size of the mobilized forces was decided by financial and political considerations and not operational requirements.

The 1968 mobilization for the Vietnam War was based on legal authority contained in the 1967 DOD Appropriations Act. The mobilization order was dated 11 April, directing the callup to occur on 13 May (N-Day).

Seventy-six ARNG and USAR units were mobilized, with an actual strength of 20,034 entering active duty. In addition, 2,752 members of the IRR were called up. There were two objectives of the 13 May 1968 mobilization: (1) to provide troops for actual deployment to Vietnam, and (2) to provide troops to build up the strategic reserves in CONUS. Forty-three units were deployed to Vietnam and 33 units were redeployed.
Unit Selection. Selection of the 76 ARNG and USAR units to be mobilized was made by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development in frantic consultation with the Chief, National Guard Bureau and Chief, Army Reserve. No other Army staff, major Army commands, or states were involved in the unit selection determination.

Although 74 of the 76 needed types of units were existing in the SRF in 1968 or had recently been in the SRF, only 59 units were selected from the SRF category for mobilization. Thus, the primary criterion of highest operational readiness was applied to only 66 percent of the unit selection. Other criteria which dominated selection were geographic distribution (34 states provided units), proportionate contribution by the ARNG and USAR (68 percent and 32 percent respectively), and the civil disturbance threat (no state was denuded of its ARNG).

Individual Ready Reserve. Because the 1968 mobilization of units was very small, only 3,069 enlisted IRR fillers were required. From a total IRR paper strength of 680,000, only 4,132 of its members were eligible for callup because of legal restrictions. The number of IRR personnel actually mobilized was 2,752, which was less than one-half of one percent (.4 percent) of the IRR.

Personnel Policies. HQDA attempted from the onset to manage mobilized personnel (unit members and nonunit members) in the same manner and under the same regulations as Active Army personnel. It didn't work well. Personnel actions and problems associated with the 1966 partial mobilization for Vietnam had occurred with every mobilization in US history, and included the following:

- Reassignment of personnel in and out of nondeploying and deploying units;
- Reassignment of excess unit personnel;
- Promotion of officers and enlisted members;
- Relief from active duty;
- Delays;
- Exemptions;
- Family members in the same unit;
- Authorization for top six enlisted grades and general officers;
- Deferments;
- Reassignment of unit members as fillers;
- Voluntary and involuntary separation;
- Movement of dependents, transportation, and household goods;
Leave authorizations, status, and entitlements;
Terms of service—periods of active duty;
Proficiency pay eligibility;
Medical examinations;
Selection of IRR enlisted and officer personnel;
Personnel cutoff dates;
Policies for professional complements to active duty;
Personnel accounting, reporting and control;
Determination of accurate officer and enlisted personnel requirements; and,
Delegation of authority for various personnel actions.

Stationing Plans. As was the case with mobilization planning in general, the preparation of stationing plans did not begin until 25 January 1968. Considerable difficulty was encountered in developing stationing plans because of the many changes to the troop lists (type and number of units) during the mobilization planning period of 25 January–10 April 1968. Developing stationing plans was difficult also because the planners did not know what units would be mobilized, when the mobilizations would occur, what Active Army deployments would be made, or the length of time between alert and movement to mobilization stations.

Equipment Planning and Distribution. Determining the Army's capability to equip mobilized ARNG and USAR units was impossible during the mobilization planning period. In addition to similar problems as encountered by those attempting to develop stationing plans, the DA staff did not know the true equipment status of the units that were on the final list to be mobilized. Following M-Day (13 May 1968), there were major problems in equipment status reporting, distribution and redistribution. A consistent feature of every mobilization in US history has been a requirement to provide equipment for the mobilized units.

Training. Unit training at mobilization stations was adversely affected by the large number of personnel who were not branch or MOS-qualified, by understrength units, by equipment shortages, and by the issuance of equipment not previously used by the ARNG and USAR. The major reorganization of the RC immediately before the mobilization degraded readiness, as had the inclusion of civil disturbance training in the Guard's inactive duty training program. The requirement to conduct individual training as well as unit training to overcome these problems resulted in an extension of the postmobilization training beyond that prescribed in the Army Training Program for 58 of the 76 mobilized units.

That mobilized units had to undergo a complete unit training program in 1968 to achieve deployability readiness was no different from the
experience of earlier mobilizations. Whenever mobilized units have a readiness condition of C-4 in equipment (which all had in 1966), a postmobilization training program will be required. Whenever the units are less than C-1, or perhaps C-2, in personnel (which all were in 1968), a postmobilization training program will be necessary. Even if mobilized units were C-1 in both personnel and equipment, the question of operational readiness from a purely training perspective would arise. The historical experience with mobilizations demands the realization that postmobilization training will be mandatory, and that it will take several weeks at least to achieve operational readiness. Peacetime training and the peacetime equipment status of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have never been sufficient for the immediate deployment and employment of Army RC units.

Public Inquiries. The mobilization of Reserve Components, however large or small the callup, is never a routine matter. In addition to strategic considerations and purely military events and activities in conducting the mobilization, there will always be political and public affairs implications—particularly with partial mobilizations. The media, Congress, and the public will direct a barrage of inquiries to the White House and the Pentagon. There will initially be considerable excitement and attention to the topic, and if DOD is properly prepared for the inquiries, the public attention may soon wane. Of the many questions about the mobilizations, the most important one to be prepared to answer is "why." Subsequently, the immediate question will be: "Where are the mobilized troops now and what are they doing?" Three months after the January 1968 mobilization, the media reported that the mobilized reservists were "just waiting around," which was partly true. The same can be said of the May 1968 mobilization. The charge of unsuitable use of mobilized reserves will always occur when the mobilized units are not deployed and when unit integrity is violated.

Demobilization. The 76 units mobilized on 13 May 1968 served on active duty between 14 and 19 months. During the first half of this time, many unit personnel were assigned to other units as fillers, resulting in members being scattered all over the world. During the last half of the period, the Army attempted to plan and execute a system to re-establish unit integrity in order to demobilize the units.

Demobilization of units was accomplished by 12 December 1969, after which time one unit was eliminated from the structure and three were reorganized. The Army's demobilization was characterized by poor planning, inefficiency, disinterest, terrible policy, poor execution, and ill-timing. Nearly everything about the demobilization was cause for complaint. Of the numerous problems, the most serious was the loss of unit integrity. The strong feeling was widespread within the Guard and Reserve that a breach of good faith had been committed by the Army.

17. Major Lessons From the Vietnam War.

Thirty-eight months after the ground war began for the United States in South Vietnam, President Johnson made the belated decision to mobilize a small portion of the National Guard and Reserves. Never before in US history had a President refused to utilize in a major
war the military force of the Reserve Components whose very purpose was for such military and political utility. And, never before had a mobilization for a major war been of such tiny magnitude. The 13 May 1968 mobilization for the Vietnam War occurred far too late to be of any political significance, and was far too small to be of any military significance.

The President had rejected the advice to conduct a mobilization for 3 years—advice virtually unanimous from all military and political advisors. This then is the first conclusion regarding mobilization for the Vietnam War. The nonmobilization decisions were grievous errors—from both a political and a military viewpoint; and the mobilization decision of 1968 was a perfect example of "too little—too late."

The second major conclusion is squarely focused on the Department of Defense, and specifically for purposes of this study, on the Department of the Army. The mobilization itself, once ordered by the Commander in Chief, was conducted by OSD and HQDA in a manner of gross ineptitude: the preparation for a mobilization was impudently unsuitable; the conduct of the mobilization was contemptuous; the utilization of the mobilized Guard and Reserve was a tragedy; the demobilization was a comedy of errors. Once mobilized, countless problems were self-inflicted by the Regular Army—as has been true throughout US history.
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### Mobilization of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve: Historical Perspective and the Vietnam War

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This study provides a review of the mobilization and use of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve throughout US history. A definitive examination is provided of the extent to which mobilization was considered but not permitted during the period 1965-67. A detailed focus occurs on the partial mobilization of 1968 for the Vietnam War. Conclusion and interpretation are presented.