<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AD NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| ADB082797 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIMITATION CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Distribution authorized to DoD and DoD contractors only; Critical Technology; APR 1979. Other requests shall be referred to Chief of Naval Operations, Attn: OP-09XB, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350. This document contains export-controlled technical data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

cno notice, 24 jan 1985
**AD NUMBER**

ADB082797

**LIMITATION CHANGES**

**TO:**
Distribution authorized to DoD and DoD contractors only; Critical Technology; APR 1979. Other requests shall be referred to Chief of Naval Operations, Attn: OP-09XB, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350. This document contains export-controlled technical data.

**FROM:**
Distribution authorized to DoD only; Critical Technology; APR 1979. Other requests shall be referred to Navy Assistant Directore for Net Assessment (OP-090N), Program Planning Office, Room 4A686, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350. This document contains export-controlled technical data.

**AUTHORITY**

CNO dtd Apr 1984

**THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED**
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

Contract N00014-77-C-0708

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT D: Distribution limited to DoD and DoD contractors only; Cf Ta., April 1984. Other requests must be referred to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Attn: Code OP-09XB, Washington, DC 20350.
SOVIET SSBN ROLES IN
STRATEGIC STRIKE

PART I, FINAL REPORT ON
SOVIET NAVAL MISSION ASSIGNMENTS
ONR CONTRACT N00014-77-C-0708

KTR 119-79
APRIL 1979

Submitted to:
Assistant Director for Net
Assessment (OP-090N)
Navy Program Planning Office
The Pentagon, Room 4A686
Washington, D. C. 20350
Attn: Mr. E. L. Woisard

Submitted by:
Ketron, Inc.
1400 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22209
Attn: Mr. Ervin Kapos
Executive Vice President
**Title:** Soviet SSBN Roles in Strategic Strike Part I, Final Report on Soviet Naval Mission Assignments (U)

**Personal Author(s):** Herrick, Robert Waring

**Type of Report:** Final

**Time Covered:** From Jan 77 to Apr 79

**DATE OF REPORT:** 1979 April

**PAGE COUNT:** 210

**Abstract:**

(U) This is the first document in a series of seven examining the Soviet open literature and public media on the subject of strategic strike from the start of the nuclear-missile era after Stalin's death in 1953. Soviet naval writings and top military and political leaders media appearances were researched. The evidence concerning the central issue of whether or not the Navy's SSBNs were given a share with the Strategic Missiles Forces in the initial deep strike mission against the continental U.S. proved adequate to permit drawing reasonably firm conclusions.

(U) This study uses a five-year period between the successive Soviet Party Congresses for the reason that Soviet reviews of strategy, doctrine, and weapons procurement policy are all integrated with the five-year plans for overall production. Revised mission assignments for the five Soviet military services are more often than not completed in the months just before a Party Congress and approved by the Congress along with the new five-year plan.
I. PREFACE

With the primary aim of determining as accurately as possible the precise nature of the general nuclear war missions assigned to Soviet SSBNs, this study examines the Soviet open literature and public media on the subject of strategic strike right from the start of the nuclear-missile era in the USSR after Stalin's death in 1953. To accomplish this thoroughly has necessitated researching not only Soviet naval writings and media appearances but also those of the top military and political leaders.

The analysis presented herein unavoidably becomes complicated and labored at times in order to sort out a great deal of deterrence-propaganda chaff from the analytically-digestible wheat and to present all of the available evidence to insure that nothing important was overlooked. Gratifyingly, the evidence concerning the central issue of whether or not the Navy's SSBNs have been given a share with the Strategic Missile Forces in the initial deep strike mission against the continental U.S. has proven quite adequate to permit drawing reasonably firm conclusions. For determining the SSBNs' roles for four subsidiary missions (which are listed in the Table of Contents and Executive Summary which follow), the available data was generally adequate with a few minor exceptions.
This study employs a five-year periodization between the successive Soviet Party Congresses for the reason that Soviet reviews of strategy, doctrine, and weapons procurement policy are all integrated with the five-year plans for overall production. Revised mission assignments for the five Soviet military services are more often than not completed in the months just before a Party Congress and, in effect, approved by the Congress along with the new five-year plan.

This monograph is the first of ten for Op-96 covering all of the likely Soviet naval mission assignments for general nuclear war. All comments, especially criticism that could contribute to an improved product for the remaining monographs, would be welcome and should be directed to Mr. Ervin Kapos, Executive Vice President and Director of Washington Operations, Ketron, Inc., 1400 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22209 (Area Code (703), 527-4200).
## II. TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>THE SOVIET NAVY AND STRATEGIC STRIKE (SS), 1955-1960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Early Interest Shown by the Navy in an SS Role</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forward Deployment of SSBNs urged by Air Forces</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Navy Reveals its Missile Submarines not Deployed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) are Formed</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gorshkov First Advocates an SSBN Share in Deep Strike</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Summary for the First Period</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>NAVY ONLY ASSIGNED A MINOR SS ROLE, 1961-1966</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Khrushchev and Malinovskiy Report to XXIIIrd Congress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Military Strategy</strong>, 1st ed: No Deep SS Role for SSBNs</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Admirals and Marshals &quot;Debate&quot; Navy's SS Role</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Navy Hits <strong>Military Strategy</strong>, re. SSBN's Deep SS Role</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Military Strategy</strong>, 2nd ed: Still no SSBN Deep SS Role</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Summary of SSBNs' SS Roles on Eve of XXIIIrd Congress</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>NAVY ASSIGNED A LIMITED ROLE VS. U.S. COASTS, 1966-1971</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malinovskiy's Report to the XXIIIrd Party Congress</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some Generalized Data on the Navy and Deep Strike</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Military Strategy</strong>, 3rd ed: Still no SSBN Deep SS Role</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Detailed Evidence on SSBNs and Deep Strike</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The SSBNs Retain a Role vs. CVAs in Port</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SSBNs Finally Assigned at Least a Coastal SS Mission</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VII. NAVY ADVOCACY OF A DEEP STRIKE ROLE FOR SSBNS FAILS, 1971-1976
108
Grechko’s Report on Defense to the XXIVth Congress 108
Statements re. an SSBN Role in Deep Strike Recorded 109
Data Suggestive of Such an SSBN Role Analyzed 124
Evidence Contradicting Such an Assignment Considered 131
Conclusion: SSBNs Still Not Assigned Deep-Strike Share 141
SSBNs Appear to Lose SS Role vs. CVAs in Port 142
SSBNs Retain SS Role Against Coastal Military Targets 144
SSBN Role vs. Naval Bases Largely Given to Naval Air 147
"Coastal Military Targets" — Types of Targets Included 148
Still no SSBN Role vs. Ground Targets in European TVDs 151
Summary of SSBN Roles on Eve of XXVth Party Congress 151

VIII. NAVY ADVOCACY OF A DEEP STRIKE ROLE FOR SSBNS CONTINUES, 1976-1979 153
Statements re. an SSBN Role in Deep Strike Set Down 153
Data Suggestive of Such an SSBN Role Categorized 167
The Evidence Against Such an SSBN Role Correlated 172
The "Pro" Arguments Evaluated 182
The "Con" Evidence Considered 188
SSBN Role vs. CVAs in Port not Reinstated 194
SSBN Role vs. Naval Bases? Evidence Inconclusive 196
SSBN Role vs. European TVDs Discounted 198
Final Summary: Still no SSBN Share in Deep Strike 200
The Soviet Navy's SSBNs currently have no share with the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) in the initial deep strike against continental U.S. targets -- nor, quite conclusively, has it ever been assigned such a mission. Rather, the Navy's share in strategic strike has been limited to coastal military targets and that only since 1968. This SSBN role against coastal counterforce targets is not even considered part of the strategic strike mission in Soviet doctrine but as an integral part of operations in the oceanic theaters of military action (TVDs). While the Soviet SSBNs have often been portrayed as assigned to take part with the SMF in any initial nuclear exchange, this has been done so selectively and inconsistently that such claims may be seen from the abundant evidence to have been made primarily to create a misleading Western perception of the USSR's deterrent strength.

In addition to an overkill of flatly contradictory evidence to refute the view that Soviet SSBNs have, or ever had, a share in the initial deep strike against continental U.S. targets, additional persuasive evidence to that effect is found in the Navy Commander-in-Chief's recurrent campaign of extensive and ardent advocacy that his SSBNs be assigned such a share in the most-prestigious (and hence best-funded) of all Soviet military missions -- that for the initial deep strike against the continental U.S. Fleet Admiral Gorshkov may be seen to have adduced virtually every conceivable argument to that end. Besides the numerous obvious ones such as the relative invulnerability and allegedly lower costs of submarine missile platforms compared to land-based ones, Gorshkov has gone to such extremes as claiming: (1) The Soviet Navy's World War II experience in "strategic strikes" at the Ploesti oil fields and the port of Constanza in Rumania already has given his forces the necessary theoretical and practical know-how to share with the SMF in the deep strike mission against the continental U.S.; or (2) The U.S. has, in effect, abandoned its "strategic-triad" strategy involving ICBMs, SLBMs and ASMs in favor of an "oceanic strategy" that concentrates the bulk of U.S. strategic power in our SSBNs. Gorshkov cannot help but be aware of the falsity of this latter claim, but the frequency with which it has been repeated in recent years suggests he still finds it useful.

Certainly the main reason the Soviet SSBNs have never been assigned a role in deep strategic strike becomes readily apparent from a reading of the Russian open literature on strategic strike. Most important, obviously, is the fact
that the SMF was established specifically and chartered primarily for the deep strike mission. The successive CINcs of the SMF have insistently cited that fact among their arguments and have skillfully and effectively fought off the attempts by the Navy and the Long-Range Air Force to muscle in on the single mission that justifies the SMF’s existence. In addition to the foregoing subjective reason based on bureaucratic politics and interservice rivalry over roles and rubles, there are at least three other fairly obvious reasons reflected in the Soviet military and naval writings and speeches. First, the SSBNs, ever since the SMF was formed in January 1960, have had a reserve, backup role to the SMF for the contingency that, when the smoke clears from the initial nuclear exchange, it is found that the SMF has failed to destroy all of its assigned targets. This role may have been nothing but a nominal sop to the Navy; at least it does not seem to be considered important and the Navy appears to find it distasteful. Secondly, explicit claims made in 1972 by the Navy’s No. 2 political (Party) admiral and in 1973 by the Chief Marshal of Naval Aviation that the USSR’s submarine ballistic missiles were capable of striking ships at sea as well as land targets made it clear that the Navy was at least expecting to have such a dual-purpose SLBM in the foreseeable future. Certainly the prospect of Soviet SSBNs being armed with a missile against which the then-existing defenses of CVA task forces would have been largely ineffective would have constituted another weapon for the CinC SMF to use to repel the Navy’s assault on the SMF’s deep-strike citadel -- and one that seemingly detracted from the vigor of that assault for a time.

A possible third reason that Soviet SSBNs have not been assigned a share with the SMF in the deep strike mission against the continental United States is that the USSR may have adopted an SSBN-withholding strategy to retain a reserve strategic strike capability to enable the USSR to conduct from a "position of strength" such intrawar bargaining and negotiations to end any nuclear war that may be possible after the devastation of an initial nuclear exchange. In addition to the intrinsically great importance of maintaining such a reserve, the USSR may have been encouraged to adopt such a strategy for their SSBNs by the limited access to the open oceans of all four of their fleets (a fact which all three editions of the authoritative work Military Strategy commented on). Such a strategy would account for the relatively small proportion of Soviet SSBNs that have been maintained at sea in or near missile-launch range of the U.S. An SSBN-withholding strategy also would account more satisfactorily for the failure to assign the SSBNs a more important role than just one against coastal military targets or as a reserve backup for the SMF. However, the possibility that the Soviets have adopted such an SSBN-withholding strategy will be the subject of the second of these studies.
of likely nuclear-war missions of the Soviet Navy. Consequently, the preparing analyst will not attempt to anticipate the conclusions of that study here.

Concerning the Soviet Navy's still unsated appetite for a coequal share with the SMF in the initial nuclear strike mission against the continental U.S., that appetite was shown to have been whetted as early as 1955 (five years before the SMF was formed and assigned the sole responsibility for the deep strike mission). At that time, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for shipbuilding commented in the press on the merits of "missile submarines" against naval bases and other coastal targets — even though the only submarine-launched "missile" capable of carrying a nuclear warhead available to the Navy at the time was the torpedo. Later, Admiral Gorshkov revealed that the Navy, from the moment of the formation of the SMF (in January 1960), has endeavored to guide its development in the manner best-suited to enable it to "cooperate" fully with the SMF — by which he, with virtual certainty, meant to wrest from it a share in the initial deep strike mission against the continental United States.

The evidence reveals quite an intensive "debate" over the deep strike mission and the Navy's desire for a share in it. Although couched in esoteric terms, as most such debates are, the advocacy by the admirals that the Navy be given a coequal or greater share with the SMF in the deep strike mission was decried by not only the Commander-in-Chief of the SMF but also by a number of his backers among the Army marshals and generals in the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces' General Staff who control, and are the court of last resort for, both the SMF and the Navy. At one point we are treated to the spectacle of the incumbent Defense Minister calling a halt to the polemics and rejecting the Navy's advocacy by issuing the solomonic judgement that each service was to content itself with missions in its own land, sea, or air medium since that, allegedly, would be the most cost-effective! Nevertheless, Gorshkov is persisting even today in his advocacy, perhaps not unreasonably in the expectation that, once his large force of Delta Class submarines with their missiles of transoceanic range has been completed and is operational in the well-protected Soviet home waters and as increasing missile accuracy makes fixed land-based missiles ever more vulnerable, he may finally prevail on Brezhnev and Ustinov, or their successors, to assign the Navy's SSBNs the major share in the initial nuclear exchange for which the Navy chief has hungered for nearly two decades.
Finally, the present study on the strategic strike roles of Soviet SSBNs found it appropriate and necessary to look at the following four subsidiary aspects beyond the main one for an SSBN share in deep strike:

1. Strikes at major U.S. naval forces in port;
2. Strikes at U.S. naval bases per se, regardless of whether any major naval combatants might be present;
3. Strikes at U.S. coastal targets; and
4. Strikes at ground targets in the European TVDs.

To conclude this summary, there follows a chart summarizing this study's findings with regard to the main mission for deep strike and for each of the above four secondary strategic strike roles for the five periods into which the analytical effort was divided (as explained in the Preface).
### STRATEGIC STRIKE MISSION ASSIGNMENTS OF SOVIET SSBNs, 1955-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A share with the SMF in the initial deep strike?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Versus SSBNs and/or CVAs in port?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (CVAs alone)</td>
<td>Yes (CVAs alone)</td>
<td>No (Lost by 5/73)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Versus naval bases per se?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Versus coastal targets? (Countervalue?) (Counterforce?)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (Counterforce targets only)</td>
<td>Yes (Counterforce targets only)</td>
<td>Yes (Counterforce targets only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Versus ground targets in European TVD?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:**
1 - Only in the event an anti-SLOC campaign were undertaken.
2 - Only as part of the assigned coastal strike mission, so likely not targets of Navy choice.
IV. THE NAVY AND STRATEGIC STRIKE, 1955-1960

The potential utility of submarines for strategic strike against land targets was first pointed out in the Soviet open literature in 1955 by Admiral Vladimirskiy, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for Shipbuilding. Appearing in July, the article in question commented that "the missile-armed submarine can strike not only at enemy shipping but also at an enemy's bases and coastal targets". He went on directly to add: "The modern /i.e., nuclear-powered/ submarine, despite improved ASW techniques, is a formidable weapon that can be equipped with torpedoes carrying nuclear warheads".

From these remarks three tentative conclusions may be drawn. First, Soviet naval thinking in 1955 (when it had just been decided to provide all of the services with nuclear-missile weapons and five years before the SMF was to be formed) was to develop nuclear-powered submarines with nuclear-missiles to use in a strategic strike role. Secondly, the targets had in mind for submarine-launched strategic strike were coastal ones (in correspondence with the relatively short range initially of submarine ballistic missiles). Thirdly, pending con-

---

1/ Lev Anatol'evich Vladimirskiy, "Novaya tekhnika na korablyakh" (New Technology on Warships), Komsomol'skaya Pravda, 23 July 1955. Vladimirskiy had just completed a tour of duty as Chief of the Navy's Main Directorate for Combat Training the previous March so could write informedly from a standpoint of operational capabilities as well as from that of developments in naval construction.

2/ Soviet naval writers consistently use "modern" as a euphemism for "nuclear", whether to imply nuclear-powered submarines or nuclear war.

3/ The Strategic Missile Forces. The "SMF" abbreviation will be used throughout.

-1-
struction of a sufficiently impressive force of SSBNs, the potential threat to US/NATO naval bases, ports, and other coastal installations of submarine-launched torpedoes carrying nuclear warheads was calculated to enhance the USSR's nuclear deterrence posture.

Some 14 months later, Admiral Vladimirskiy published another article that also included mention of the submarine in a strategic strike role. Observing that the U.S. press had carried recommendations that "submarines be equipped with ballistic missiles", Vladimirskiy went on to quote some "specialists", whose nationality was not given, as having stated that "a submarine armed with missile weapons can hit targets 400-500 miles away".\(^1\) He added that the targets for submarine-launched nuclear missiles would be "large coastal objectives covering a considerable area" (e.g., such as the large naval base and shipyard complexes in New York, Philadelphia, and Norfolk).

---

\(^1\)/L. A. Vladimirskiy, "The Views of Foreign Navies", Sovetskiy flot, 21 September 1956. The Soviet admiral adjured his readers that "it should be kept in mind" that the area of destruction caused by submarine-launched nuclear missiles are sufficiently great to compensate for normal errors in navigational plotting of launching positions.
From these comments it appeared that the Soviet Navy already was interested in developing a submarine-launched, nuclear-missile capability for use against ground targets in the U.S. The repetition in Vladimirskiy's second article of his focus in the first on coastal targets highlighted what was to become a feature of Soviet doctrinal thought on the employment of SSBNs for strategic strike that (for reasons to be explained) has lasted until the present despite the vastly increased ranges of submarine missiles.

Just a year later, Air Marshal Vershinen, CinC LRAF, asserted in Red Star that the Soviet "Submarine Force has become a formidable weapon which has become capable of striking with nuclear and hydrogen weapons not only coastal cities but other presumably "deep" targets as well. Although the air marshal's belligerent tone and the content of his next sentence made it clear that, on the surface, his remarks were intended to enhance nuclear deterrence, it also seems probable that he was advocating putting the USSR's early SSBNs out on patrol within missile range of the U.S. in order to provide the USSR with the third leg of a strategic-deterrent triad: "Many large U.S. cities and a number of Western European nations, in the event of war, ...

could be subjected to missile attack from submarines as well as by \textit{Intercontinental} missiles and bomber aircraft ... Thus New York City or Chicago could be destroyed easily by a submarine lying off the Continental Shelf."

In February 1958 an article in the Armed Forces' General Staff journal \textit{Military Thought} by Marshal Rotmistrov (of World War II tank-warfare fame) provided a description of the Navy's top priority missions. Presumably free of any deterrence propaganda, since it appeared in a publication whose dissemination was restricted to senior military and naval officers, the article listed as follows the Navy's current "strategic" missions which, it noted, were aimed at both the enemy's "military and military-economic power" (\textit{i.e.}, at both his military forces and his defense industry) and which together were said to determine the Navy's "overall importance within the system of the Armed Forces":

1) An anti-SLOC campaign against enemy shipping, and

2) The destruction of strategic objectives in enemy territory.\footnote{P. Rotmistrov, "O sovremennom Sovetskom voennom iskusstve i ego kharakternykh chertakh" (On Contemporary Soviet Military Art and its Characteristic Features), \textit{Voennaya mysl'} No. 2, February 1958, p. 89.}

Marshal Malinovskiy, who had become Defense Minister in place of the ousted Marshal Zhukov, continued in early 1958 to use the stock formula from the Zhukov era that the Navy was "capable of delivering powerful strikes on objectives
situated in other continents". Gorshkov adhered to this line in both his *Pravda* article for Navy Day in July 1958 and his *Soviet Fleet* article for the Armed Forces Day anniversary in February 1959.

However, by late July 1959, when the plans for the establishment of the SMF in December must have been well advanced, Gorshkov's annual Navy Day article not only dropped his previous claims to a strategic-strike capability for the Navy, he made an unprecedented remark about his forces operating more often out to the limits of the respective "sea theaters" of each fleet. It seemed apparent that the Navy chief wanted to make public the subsequently confirmed fact that his missile submarines were not then operating beyond their normal fleet operating areas let alone in areas within firing range of the U.S. In what sounded like a carefully orchestrated piece, Gorshkov's First Deputy, then Admiral Tributs, sounded a different note writing in *Izvestiya* but one that included an implicit denial of any strategic-strike mission assignment for the Navy at that time: "The Navy is assigned, together with the Army...

---

1/ Quoted in "Priem v Kremle v chest' sorokaletiya Sovetskoi Armii i Voennomorskogo Flota" (Reception in the Kremlin in Honor of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces), *Sovetskiy flot*, 25 February 1958.
3/*Sovetskiy flot*, 23 February 1959.
4/*Pravda*, 26 July 1959. Gorshkov's Chief of Main Staff, Admiral Zozulya followed his chief's lead in avoiding any claim to even a strategic strike capability for the Navy in his 26 July article in *Red Star*. 
and Air Forces, to guard the territorial inviolability of the USSR”. ¹

Indications appeared in the 1959 Navy Day articles that ascribing to the Navy a capability for "delivering powerful strikes on targets situated in other countries" had been only deterrence propaganda from the start and that the Party wanted to continue it but the Navy was unwilling to continue to play the game of claiming a capability for a mission for which it bore perhaps a nominal responsibility and which Gorshkov greatly desired to have in actuality but for which he was not permitted to deploy and train his forces. In the annual Party-prepared article in Red Star providing "Materials for Reports and Discussions" on Navy Day, the old line was maintained that the Navy was "capable of delivering powerful strikes on targets situated on other continents". ² However, in a comparable pre-Navy Day article in the Navy's own newspaper Soviet Fleet (over which Gorshkov could exercise dominant influence) it was stated that the Navy had "everything necessary" for combat "in the sea theaters". ³ In light of his Navy Day '59 Pravda article's similar statement that the fleets were operating more often at (just) the limits of their "sea theaters", it seems highly likely that the Soviet Fleet "Materials" for Navy Day were intended to deny that the Soviet Navy yet had the necessary capability to operate in the open oceans.

¹/ Admiral V. Tributs, "Na strazhe morskikh rubezhei" (On Guard Over the Sea Boundaries), Izvestiya, 26 July 1959.
²/ Krasnaya zvezda, 17 July 1959. Since this appeared six days after the Navy's own "Materials" for Navy Day, it may have been intended to correct Gorshkov for omitting the customary claim to a strategic strike capability for the Navy.
³/ Sovetskiy flot, 11 July 1959.
In mid-January 1960, Khrushchev reportedly announced the formation of the SMF in a speech to the Supreme Soviet meeting in its Fourth Session. At this time too the broad outlines, at least, of the new missions of the traditional military services were specified in the light of the assignment to the newly-created SMF of the role of main striking force of the Armed Forces. A rear admiral writing in an obscure Central Asian newspaper for 1960 Navy Day revealed what all of the more senior admirals refrained from revealing in their articles for Navy Day-'60:

The Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet ... assigned the Armed Forces a number of important missions .... Together with /certain unspecified/ other services of the Armed Forces, the Navy has been assigned to defend the coasts from assault from the sea and from strikes by missile submarines, and also to carry out a defense of maritime communications.1/

Noticeably missing, of course, was the assignment of a share in the strategic strike mission to the Navy. That this was not an oversight or deliberate avoidance of mentioning an assigned mission is implied by two articles by Admiral Gorshkov. In his annual Pravda interview for Navy Day, Gorshkov acknowledged that the SMF, due to its "greater firepower" must be recognized as "the main service of our Armed Forces".2/

---

1/Rear Admiral V. Lizarskiy, "Na strazhe mirnogo truda" (On Guard over Peaceful Labor), Turkmenskaya iskra, 31 July 1960.
2/Admiral S. Gorshkov, "Vernye syny Rodiny" (True Sons of the Homeland), Pravda, 31 July 1960.
Far from venturing to stake out a claim for a Navy share in the top priority military mission of strategic strike, Gorshkov merely noted that there remained roles for the other services in the conduct of a war. In a July 1960 article in Agitator, a Party propaganda journal for domestic political indoctrination, the Navy chief stayed away from the 1958-’59 line "that the Navy was capable of delivering powerful strikes on objectives situated in other continents" but reverted to the 1955-’56 emphasis on the Navy’s claimed capability for strikes solely at coastal objectives that Admiral Vladimirskiy had emphasized (as described above). Gorshkov wrote: "The Soviet Navy is capable of ... destroying ports, naval bases, and other objectives on the coast ...".1/ By reducing his claims to already existing capabilities for strategic strike to just coastal targets, the Navy Commander-in-Chief no doubt improved his position for advocating that the Navy's SSBNs be further developed into a "deep" strategic strike weapon of vastly improved capabilities and that the Navy be assigned a share with the SMF in deep strike. In retrospect, this July 1960 article may be seen to have been Gorshkov's opening gun in a campaign for an SSBN role in the deep strike mission that has continued over nearly two decades right up until the present time.

1/ Admiral S. Gorshkov, "Strazh morskikh rubezhei" (Guard of the Sea Boundaries), Agitator No. 13, July 1960, p. 24. In this article, Gorshkov was more informative and less adulatory of the SMF. It was no longer credited with being the "main" military service but just an "important" one whose successful performance of the strategic strike mission would, in effect, soften up the enemy's defenses and thereby "ensure the successful activities of the other services of the Armed Forces".
This theme of the Navy's strategic strike capability being (limited to) the destruction of coastal targets was replayed for Navy Day '61 by a political admiral who claimed the Navy was "capable of destroying ports, naval bases and other installations on the coast."\(^1\) Admiral Gorshkov, in his 1961 Navy Day interview for *Pravda*, found a new formula for implying the Navy's still very limited capabilities for strategic strike. He stated that the Navy was "capable" of carrying out any "operational" mission.\(^2\) Such SSBN strikes as might actually be made against ships in port or against naval bases and other naval-related coastal targets appeared to be considered in Soviet military doctrine as only "operational" rather than "strategic" and as only a part of theater warfare rather than of the global strategic strike mission.\(^3\)

So, to summarize the period from Stalin's death in 1953 up until the convening of the XXIIInd Party Congress in October 1971, the following points are of significance:

1. As early as 1955, at the dawn of the nuclear-missile
   for the USSR, the Navy publicly revealed its interest in

\(^1\) Vice Admiral N. Kulakov, "Moguchiy flot moguchei derzhavy" (Mighty Navy of a Mighty Power), *Leningradskaya Pravda*, 29 July 1961.


\(^3\) It appears probable that this was a bureaucratic device by the Soviet marshals to permit use of SSBNs to strike coastal, naval-related targets when and if that should become "objectively" desirable from a military standpoint but without assigning the Navy a share in deep strategic strikes, the most prestigious of all Soviet military missions.
using submarine-launched missiles for strategic strike against U.S. coastal areas -- even though at that time the only available "missiles" capable of delivering nuclear-warheads against U.S. ports and naval bases were torpedoes;

2. By the fall of 1956, the Navy's interest in submarines armed with ballistic missiles was evinced in the press in foreign-navy surrogate form.

3. Articles in 1957 and 1958 by Air Marshal Vershinin and Marshal Rotnistrov, respectively, appeared to favor putting the USSR's diesel-powered ballistic missile submarines out on patrol within missile-firing range of the U.S. with a vaguely-expressed mission assignment for destruction of strategic objectives in enemy territory;

4. However, in July 1959, "Admiral Gorshkov seemed to go out of his way to make it clear that his conventionally-powered missile submarines were not yet capable of operating beyond the limits of the USSR's peripheral-sea theaters.

5. After Khrushchev announced formation of the SMF in January 1960, it was soon made clear that the Navy had been assigned no share in strategic strike worth mentioning -- and certainly none in the deep strike mission against the United States for which the SMF had been specifically created.

6. Gorshkov acknowledged this situation in his Navy Day article in Pravda in July 1960 but in a lesser-read Party journal he remarked that the Navy was capable of destroying "ports, naval bases, and other objectives on the coast" -- thereby seeming to launch the campaign of advocacy for the Navy to be assigned a share in the SMF's deep strike mission that continues until this day.

-10-
Khrushchev, in his 17 October 1961 report for the Party Central Committee to the XXIIInd Party Congress paid unusual attention to the development of the Soviet submarine fleet. Although it is clear from his remarks that the Navy was receiving some ballistic missile submarines for use against land objectives, the Soviet leader's emphasis was primarily on submarines with anti-ship missiles for use against the aircraft carriers of the U.S. and other NATO powers. Since his comments are of exceptional importance for an accurate appreciation of the Soviet rationale for employment of "missile submarines" in the first half of the '60s, the relevant portions of his speech are quoted in full:

The construction of the submarine fleet is proceeding successfully. Our enemies are building a submarine fleet armed with ballistic missiles. We are arming our submarine fleet with both ballistic and cruise missiles. The situation obligates us to do this. Our enemies of the military blocs are preparing to fire from submarines on the territory of both our country and the socialist countries. We are ready to reply to them by firing on surface water targets as well as on land targets. The Soviet Union is a continental power. Those who wish to unleash a war against us will be required to cross expanses of water. That is why we are creating a powerful submarine fleet armed with cruise missiles in order to be able to destroy ships hundreds of kilometers away as they approach the borders of the socialist countries.

The Soviet submarine fleet with nuclear-propulsion plants and armed with ballistic and cruise missiles vigilantly stands guard over our socialist achievements. It will retaliate against aggressors with overwhelming strikes, including against their aircraft carriers which, in the event of war, will not be bad targets for our submarine-launched missiles.¹

In his report as Defense Minister to the XXIInd Party Congress on 23 October 1961, Marshal Malinovskiy made two points of relevance for the Navy's role in the main strategic strike mission. He claimed that the SMF had enough missiles to defeat "the enemy". The implication seemed clear that no help would be required from the USSR's long-range bombers or missile submarines. However, he did quote Khrushchev to the effect that it was within the state-of-the-art for "vital centers" of an opponent to be brought under fire from "submarine-launched ballistic and cruise missiles". To provide some air of credibility to this assertion obviously designed to enhance strategic deterrence, the Defense Minister added the following claim which was to be repeated frequently by Admiral Gorshkov:

...our missile submarines have learned how to navigate well under the Arctic ice and to take up missile-launching positions precisely -- which is very important for accurate strikes at objectives on land or at sea.

Despite Malinovskiy's claim to a capability for submarine-launched strategic strike, especially from Arctic launching positions, the evidence for the 1961-1966 period (between the XXIInd and XXIIrd Party Congresses) that the Navy's SSBNs still were not assigned a major role in the initial "deep" strike mission against the U.S. is substantial and convincing. This evidence takes the form of not only definitions of the missions of both the SMF and of the Navy which exclude any significant strategic strike role by the Navy in the initial nuclear exchange but also a very audible debate over whether or not the Navy should be assigned such a role.

¹The text of Malinovskiy's XXIInd Party Congress report was carried in Pravda, 25 October 1961, pp. 4-5.
To first consider the mutually exclusive definitions just mentioned, the Soviet military and naval writings for the 1961-'66 period afford four good examples of definitions of the SMF that point to it having a monopoly on the initial nuclear exchange. The first (1962) edition of Military Strategy, which was edited by Marshal Sokolovskiy, stated that: "While the Strategic Missile Forces are the decisive means of the Armed Forces as a whole, the missile forces and missile weapons of the other services of the Armed Forces are the basic means of combat for each of them". The 1962 edition also described the SMF as "the main means of inflicting mass nuclear strikes on an aggressor".  

In October 1965, the annual Missile Forces and Artillery Day article in Communist of the Armed Forces stated that the SMF was "the main and decisive means for destruction of an aggressor". Then in February 1966, in the annual Army-Navy Day anniversary article in the same publication, the SMF, alone without any mention of the USSR's strategic-range bombers or SSBNs, was credited with the capability for "promptly" delivering the "annihilating strike"

---


2/ Unsigned "Materials for Reports and Discussions" entitled: "Nesokrushimaya ognevaya moshch' raketnykh voisk i artillerii" (The Indestructible Firepower of the Missile Forces and Artillery), Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 20, October 1965, p. 47.
that by itself could "insure achieving the political aims of a war." 1/

Next, there were five definitions of the Navy's missions published in the 1961-1966 period which appear to exclude any major role in the strategic strike mission. Three of these are to be found in Army sources and two are from Navy sources (one from the Naval Digest and one from Admiral Gorshkov).

The first of these five definitions appeared in mid-'62 in Military Strategy: "Operations on the high seas will be the specific form taken by naval combat operations. Nuclear-powered submarines and naval aircraft armed with missiles will permit decisive naval operations against the powerful enemy navies". 2/

The second definition appeared in a book On Soviet Military Science by four Army authors which was signed to the press on 24 December 1963. It stated, in effect, that the Navy had both offensive and defensive missions but limited the former to destruction of the enemy's naval forces and the

1/ Unsigned article, "Sorok vos'maya godovshchina Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil" (Forty-eighth Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces), Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 3, February 1966, p. 41. The Navy's SSBNs were only mentioned in the context of a claim that ICBMs and SSBNs were "practically invulnerable" which appeared to be a transparent way of refuting Navy claims that the SSBN was much less vulnerable than the ICBM.

2/ Soviet Military Strategy. The Rand Corporation translation of Voennaya strategiya, Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy (Ed.), New York: Prentice-Hall, 1963, p. 420. (This sentence was inadvertently omitted from HFS, p. 300.).
latter to protection of the USSR against seaborne attack and for protection of the USSR's (coastal) SLOC.\(^1\)

The third example is contained in an Army-Navy Day anniversary article by Marshal Grechko that appeared in Red Star in February 1964.\(^2\) The then First Deputy Defense Minister mentioned nuclear-powered missile submarines\(^3\) as becoming, along with naval aviation, increasingly dominant among naval forces themselves. However, like virtually all other Army general officers, he avoided saying anything that smacked of crediting the Navy's SSBNs with a significant role with the SMF in the main strategic strike mission.

The first of the two examples from naval sources which appear by their definition of wartime missions to exclude any major Soviet Navy role in the main strategic strike mission with the SMF is a Navy Day 1964 editorial which appeared in the USSR's professional naval journal Naval Digest at mid-year. The Navy's overall wartime mission was stated simply as "to deliver annihilating strikes at the navy of an aggressor".\(^4\) Nothing was said even about hitting his naval bases or coastal targets,

\(^1\)Kozlov, S. N., Smirnov, M. V., Baz', I. S., and Sidorov, P. A., O Sovetskoi voennoi nauke (Moscow: Military Press, 1964), pp. 374-375. Smirnov was an Army major-general and the others were colonels.

\(^2\)Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, "Na strazhe zavoyevaniy kommunizma" (On Guard Over the Gains of Socialism), Krasnaya zvezda, 23 February 1964.

\(^3\)The majority of Soviet "nuclear-powered missile submarines" in 1964 were still anti-ship cruise missile SSGNs rather than anti-shore ballistic missile SSBNs.

\(^4\)"Moguchiy flot Sotsialisticheskoi derzhavy" (Mighty Navy of the Socialist Power), Morskoi sbornik No. 7, July 1964, p. 3. This editorial went on to sketch the missions of submarines, naval aviation, and surface ships separately but there was still no hint of a strategic strike role for the Navy's SSBNs.
although to have done so would have been quite normal and allow-
able had such mission been assigned officially.

Finally, as the fourth piece of evidence, Admiral Gorshkov himself, in his annual Navy Day appearance in *Pravda* in July 1965, made it abundantly clear that the Navy's missions were limited still to defense of the Soviet Union from seaborne attack and had not been extended to any significant role in the main stra-
tegic strike:

The Navy is called on to defend the Homeland from an aggressor's assault from the sea. All of the Navy's development for the past decade has been subordinated to this aim.1/

More interesting than these definitions, and perhaps more convincing to many that the Navy had no major share with the SMF in the strategic strike role, is the fact of the existence of quite an acerbic public "debate" between the Navy's admirals and the Defense Ministry's marshals over whether or not the Navy should be accorded such a share. As is most often the case with such public Soviet discussions of policy alternatives, the or-
organization or interest group attempting to bring about a change in existing policy is by far the more vociferous while the side re-
sisting the advocated policy change is usually to be heard only in very muffled tones if at all. In this case, the oppo-

---

1/ Gorshkov, in this article, also paraphrased the Navy's overall mission as defeating any naval opponent "at sea". Fleet Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, "Vernye syny Rodiny" (Faithful Sons of the Homeland), *Pravda*, 24 July 1965.
tation of the Army marshals in the Defense Ministry, was at least noticeable from Malinovskiy's XXIInd Congress report and from an article he published in February 1964. These two instances will be noted very shortly as examination is made of the nature and extent of the various examples of Navy advocacy of assigning its SSBNs a coequal share with the SMF in the top priority Soviet Armed Forces' mission for any general nuclear war.

As already mentioned above, in his report to the XXIInd Party Congress in October 1961, Defense Minister Malinovskiy asserted that the SMF already had all the missiles needed to carry out the main strategic strike. He was quite emphatic on the point and may well have been telling the Long-range Air Force and the Navy that they should give up hope of being assigned any meaningful share in the main strategic strike mission.

In an article published in Izvestiya in May 1963, Admiral Gorshkov provided a superficially impressive justification based on naval theory for his call for the Navy to be given a major share in the strategic strike mission. He argued that naval warfare was shifting from combat between naval forces at sea to naval strikes against the land. This was a theme that has

---

Malinovskiy asserted that the SMF "already has a sufficient number of launching installations and missiles with multi-megaton warheads...to greatly exceed the estimates of the American scientists and military men...and to inflict a devastating defeat on an aggressor and the aggressor's country." Pravda, 25 October 1961.

Fleet Admiral S. Gorshkov, "Blizorukaya strategiya" (Short-sighted Strategy), Izvestiya, 19 May 1963.
reappeared so frequently right up to the present that apparently its dubious verisimilitude has not yet been effectively refuted. At any rate, the argument was nicely tailored to Gorshkov's policy need for the theoretical underpinnings that are de rigueur for any Soviet official who would undertake to effect a change in existing policy on any issue of practical import.  

On 22 February 1964, in an article carried by the influential Economic Gazette, Admiral Gorshkov argued implicitly that, since Soviet military doctrine held that a war might not outlast the initial nuclear exchange, the Navy logically should be assigned a share with the SMF in the action. Otherwise, the capabilities of the SSBNs might go unused. Gorshkov may well have been registering a debating-point rebuttal to a public

---

1/ In fact, this argument cuts two ways for Gorshkov. He has used it most to emphasize the Polaris-Poseidon SSBN threat to the USSR and the resultant need for more and better ASW forces of all kinds. In this Izvestiya article in May 1963 in which the "navy-against-the-shore" thesis was first surfaced publicly, Gorshkov cited as authority for his theory a U.S. "interdepartmental" report by a "Poseidon Commission". He added with far more opportunism than accuracy that "the military leaders of the U.S.A. openly declare that the basic mission assignment of the U.S. Navy is inflicting nuclear strikes from the sea on very important defense and industrial installations of the Soviet Union".

2/ Gorshkov made his point with the same esoteric circumlocution that is resorted to generally as a matter of course by Soviet officials having recourse to the public media and which is intended to obscure for all but the elite "insider" the policy prescription being made. The Navy chief first stated the military doctrinal point that any general war that might occur would be "a nuclear-missile war in which the strength and power of the nuclear strikes inflicted on the enemy at the very beginning will have decisive effect". Then he went on to extoll the virtues of SSBNs and clinched his argument by quoting the then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to the effect that the USSR's SSBNs were the only invulnerable strategic strike force available to the Soviet Union. Fleet Admiral S. Gorshkov, "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" (On Guard Over Peace and Socialism), Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 22 February 1964.
admonition two weeks earlier by the Defense Minister, Marshal Malinovskiy, that was directed at any service chief attempting to encroach on the assigned missions of the other military services. Malinovskiy, writing in *Red Star* on the ninth of the same month very likely had Gorshkov primarily in mind when he adjured his military shoemakers to stick to their respective lasts. The notoriously outspoken and blunt Defense Minister made his point briefly but with utmost clarity: by limiting each service to its "natural sphere" on land, in the air, or at sea, the USSR would benefit to the maximum by thereby exploiting the "natural strength" of each service.\(^1\)

In his 1964 Navy Day interview in *Pravda*, Admiral Gorshkov gave a broad hint that the Navy's SSBNs were now developed and trained to the point that they merited being assigned a major role with the SMF in the main strategic strike mission.\(^2\) Gorshkov claimed first that the SSBNs had "great striking power", a claim that may not have carried much weight since the warheads were relatively underpowered compared to the USSR's ICBMs. Secondly, Gorshkov stated that the SSBNs had been practicing firing their SLBMs "to maximum range", apparently suggesting their readiness to share in the "deep strike" mission.

---

1/ This stricture was included in a speech given by Malinovskiy to a meeting of Soviet writers and artists in Moscow. Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskiy, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 9 February 1964.

Also in a Navy Day '64 article, one of Gorškov's top staff admirals presented his chief's May '63 "navy-against-the-shore" thesis in only slightly disguised form. Admiral Chabanenko, writing in Literary Russia, limited himself to describing the ostensible change in the wartime missions of submarines that had been brought about by the development of submarine-launchable ballistic missiles:

Previously submarines were assigned for the destruction of transports, convoys, and warships. At present, it is considered abroad, the most important aspect of the development of nuclear-powered submarines is the creation of strategic means of attack -- submarine missile-launchers with ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads for the destruction of important installations on the territory of the enemy...

By taking customary refuge in a foreign surrogate ("it is considered abroad") Chabanenko could count on it being clear to informed readers that he was urging that the USSR should increase its SSBN construction program to improve the USSR's capability for "destroying important installations on the territory of the enemy". And, of course, to do so the Navy would have to be assigned a significant share in the main strategic strike mission if the capabilities of the SSBNs were to be fully exploited.

Typical of a general tendency of Army writers in the early '60s was either to ignore the Navy's SSBNs completely or to just

---

1/ Admiral A. T. Chabanenko, "Nash morskoi shchit" (Our Maritime Shield), Literaturnaya Rossiya, 24 July 1964.
2/ For example Marshal Malinovskiy, in his Pravda article on the occasion of Armed Forces Day on 23 February 1964 sang the praises of the SMF's ICBMs at length but said nothing to suggest that the USSR also had a submarine-based strategic strike capability.
speak vaguely about submarines with long-range missiles without mentioning that they were ballistic missiles and were designed to be used against land targets. The majority of naval writers also adopted this procedure as though the subject were so sensitive that nothing could be published which suggested that the Navy had a capability for strategic strike without risk to the author.\textsuperscript{1} This practice became so widespread and so ridiculous that in the first six months of 1965 two articles by naval writers, in effect, decried the practice and came out for calling a spade a spade. "As is known", a Navy Captain First Rank wrote in the\textit{ Naval Digest}, "missile submarines have a basic mission of delivering strikes on land targets".\textsuperscript{2} "Submarines with ballistic missiles", added a rear admiral a few weeks later, are "a means for destroying land targets".\textsuperscript{3} These unprecedented elaborations of the obvious, not surprisingly, were ineffectual as far as ending the practice described above but they did highlight it nicely.

\textsuperscript{1} Admiral Gorshkov adopted this approach, for example gingerly stating in a February 1963 article: "The basis of our Navy's striking power is now nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range missiles for various purposes". By contrast Gorshkov described the SMF as having become "the main service of the Armed Forces" and its ICBMs as having "unprecedented range, accuracy, and the capability for delivering powerful nuclear charges on military bases in any region on earth." S. G. Gorshkov, "Sovetskим vooruzhennym silam" (To the Soviet Armed Forces), \textit{Trud}, 22 February 1963.

\textsuperscript{2} Captain First Rank P. V. Nikolayev, "Problema borby c atomnymi podvodnymi lodkami-raketonostsami" (Problems of Combat with Nuclear-powered Missile Submarines), \textit{Morskoi sbornik} No. 2, Feb. 1965, p. 122.

In January 1966 another admiral revealed the extent of the Navy's ambitions for gaining part of the SMF's strategic strike patrimony. Nothing less than coequal status with the SMF may be seen to have been the Navy's objective in the mid-'60s. Admiral Kharlamov, writing in the Naval Digest, professed to note "a trend to the ever greater shifting of the Navy to the first echelon of the strategic striking forces". That Kharlamov was indeed venturing to demand that a major share of the main "deep" strategic strike mission be taken away from the SMF and vested in the Navy was confirmed by the facts that Kharlamov not only moved the strategic strike mission to the top of his listing of the missions which he, and almost certainly Gorshkov too, felt would be fitting and proper for the Soviet Navy but Kharlamov also specified that the Navy's targets should include some of the enemy's defense-industrial installations.

Kharlamov also used the term "colossal", which up to that time had customarily been used only to describe the SMF's ICBMs, to exaggerate the power of Soviet SLBMs. More interesting and significant, after an 18-month lapse Kharlamov reintroduced the "navy-against-the-shore" thesis that Gorshkov had first introduced in May 1963 and that Admiral Chabanenko had broached again in July 1964. Kharlamov put it in these terms:

Admiral N. M. Kharlamov, "Tendentsii razvitiya voenno-morskikh flotov" (Trends in the Development of Navies), Morskoi sbornik No. 1, January 1966, p. 36.
Now the first priority mission of warships of the basic classes are considered to be not so much combat with the striking forces of the enemy navy as the destruction of his land targets with nuclear weapons for the direct achievement of the strategic aims of the war.

The foregoing paragraphs complete the necessary consideration of the substantial evidence which indicates that the Soviet Navy was not assigned any share of the main ("deep") strategic strike mission against the U.S. during the 1961-66 period for the initial nuclear exchange generally expected to occur at the outbreak of any general nuclear war. Attention may next be given to the available data that helps reveal to just precisely what strategic strike roles the Navy's ballistic missile submarines actually were assigned in the first half of the '60s.

To begin with, the 1962 book *Military Strategy* contained a number of invaluable clues. These may be examined most intelligibly under the following rubrics with conclusions drawn from each:

---

1/Written by a group of 14 Army officers on the Armed Forces' General Staff, and edited by Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy who was the Chief of the General Staff between 1952 and 1959, *Military Strategy* obviously was written without any collaboration with the Navy -- as will be seen when this account comes to Admiral Alafuzov's sarcastic comments on the book in his January 1963 review of it in the *Naval Digest*. 
I. Strikes at Enemy Naval Forces at Their Bases:

A. "The Navy's overall importance in a future war is determined by the new missions assigned it, especially for combat with the enemy's navy whether the latter is at sea or in port" (p. 304);1

B. "The Navy's basic mission in modern warfare will be to combat naval forces at sea and in port" (p. 348);

C. "The Strategic Missile Forces ... will also carry out a number of missions in the theaters of military operations, particularly destroying major formations of ground forces and aircraft, operational nuclear weapons, naval forces in port, supply bases, and disrupting the command and control systems of the enemy" (p. 339); and

D. "In a future war, missile strikes from land and from submarines on patrol, operating together with missile-carrying aircraft, will try to defeat the enemy's naval formations, his aircraft carrier task forces and his missile-carrying submarines, both in port and at sea ... " (p. 307).

Conclusion I: The Navy was stated unequivocally to have been assigned the task of destroying enemy naval forces at their bases as part of their overall mission for destroying the enemy's naval forces. The indicated urgency for destroying SSBNs and CVAs as quickly as possible warrants the deduction that any enemy naval forces that could be surprised at their bases were to be attacked as soon as the SSBNs were able

1/All page references in this section are to Soviet Military Strategy, the translation of the first edition of Sokolovskiy's Voennaya strategiya made by the Rand Corporation and published by Prentice-Hall in 1963. In a few cases where the translation erred significantly the original Russian text has been substituted. All of the underlining of the quotes in this part has been supplied by the author of this study.
to do so either simultaneously with the initial strategic ex-
change or as soon thereafter as possible. However, the mission
was not the Navy's alone. The SMF also was assigned this mission
as were "missile-carrying aircraft", probably those of both the
Naval Air Force and the Long-range Air Force.

II. Strikes at Naval-Related Targets including Naval Bases:

A. "... strikes by the /Strategic/ Missile Forces can
destroy submarine bases" (p. 409);

B. "The basic aim of this form of operations /"strategic
retaliatory strike"/ is to undermine the military
capacity of the imperialist coalition by destroying
its nuclear weapons and to destroy its military and
economic potential by destroying the economic war
base and the governmental and military system of
control. The Strategic Missile Forces ... and also
the Long-range Air Force ... are the main means for
attaining these goals ..... Nuclear strikes by /The
SMF's/ missiles and /The Long-range Air Force's/ air-
craft can inflict destruction on military bases (air,
military, and naval), industrial targets ... communi-
cations networks, ports, control points, etc." (p. 408); and

C. "Operations against enemy communications should be
conducted from the very outset of a war. This can
be accomplished by the delivery of strikes by the
Strategic Missile Forces and nuclear-powered sub-
marines against naval bases, ports, canals, narrow
straits, and shipbuilding and ship-repair yards ..." (p. 423).

Conclusion II: The Navy's SSBNs are indicated not to have
had an assignment in the initial nuclear strike against naval
bases or the other naval-related targets enumerated above un-
less the Soviet "Supreme High Command" decided that an anti-
SLOC campaign were both desirable and feasible with the forces
remaining after the initial nuclear exchange and in light of
the insatiable demands for naval forces to protect the Soviet Union's SSBNs and to combat the enemy's SSBNs and CVAs. When the Army authors stated in paragraph C above that an anti-SLOC campaign "should be conducted from the very outset of the war", they were stating the Ground Forces' preference, apparently, rather than official policy.

III. Strikes at Coastal Targets:

This is a subset of the main strategic strike mission for any initial nuclear exchange that requires separate treatment due to the fact, as previously noted, that discussion of a possible Navy share in that mission, particularly by the admirals, tended to center around an SSBN strike mission limited to "coastal" objectives (presumably primarily the numerous large U.S. cities located along our East and West coast) -- which was logical in view of the very limited ranges of early Soviet SLBMs and their lack of accuracy and small kilotonnage which made them unsuitable for use against hardened missile sites. The evidence on this subject from the 1962 edition of Military Strategy is as follows:

A. "Modern submarines are capable of striking vital centers with ballistic and cruise missiles as well as of destroying the ships of an enemy's navy" (p. 304);

B. "In a future war, missions for the complete defeat of /task/ groups of an aggressor's naval forces (his aircraft carrier strike groups and missile submarines at bases and at sea), the interdiction of his sea and oceanic communications, and the destruction of important objectives in coastal regions will be carried out by strikes of the /Strategic/ Missile Forces and by patrolling submarines in coordination with missile-carrying aviation" (p. 307);

C. "Now the Strategic Missile Forces, and to a certain extent the Long-range Air Force, will play the main role /In delivering nuclear "missile strikes throughout the whole of enemy territory"/ .... Missile strikes throughout the whole of enemy territory ... will create favorable conditions for the operations of the other branches of the Armed Forces" (p. 404);
D. ...the Navy's basic mission in a modern war will be to combat naval forces at sea and in port .... These qualities /"great autonomy, high speed", etc./ will permit the submarine forces to engage in successful combat with an enemy navy and, in case of need, to deliver strikes on shore targets" (p. 348);

E. "In a future war, more responsible missions can be assigned the Navy. The expanses of the World Ocean may prove to be theaters of military action for the Navy. The main aims of military operations in oceanic and sea theaters are to defeat the enemy navy and to cut his oceanic and sea communications. In addition, requirements for missions may arise to deliver nuclear strikes on shore targets, for cooperation with the Ground Forces, for accomplishing maritime shipping, and for defense of our own sea communications" (p. 420);

F. "Thus, the unlimited war of total destruction and annihilation being prepared by the imperialists undoubtedly will be turned against them. To do this, it is essential to have the means for retaliation in constant readiness: the Strategic Missile Forces /and/ the Long-range Air Force" (p. 410).

Conclusion III: Quote A above was limited to an abstract discussion of the "capabilities" of modern submarines and seemed, essentially, to be just a perfunctory repetition of Khrushchev's comment on the subject at the XXIIInd Party Congress. Quote B also included the anti-ship submarine and anti-SLOC missions, so there was no necessary implication that SSBNs had been assigned U.S. coastal cities as targets. Moreover, that possibility was specifically foreclosed by quotes D and E which make it quite clear that the SSBNs will only be assigned to strike coastal targets "if necessary", which the author of this report interprets to mean only in the contingency situation that the SMF and Long-range Air Force have failed to destroy all of the coastal cities and military targets assigned to them for destruction during the
initial nuclear exchange, and, therefore, the "need arises" for the SSBNs, in a reserve, backup role, to come in and complete the coastal-strike mission. It is particularly interesting and relevant to note from quote F that the SSBNs were not considered in 1962 to be held in the high state of readiness necessary to participate in the initial nuclear exchange. This supports the conclusion that any contingency assignment of coastal targets, at least any in addition to naval-related ones, would only be made after the dust settled from the initial strategic exchange. Then, since it is generally known that in the early '60s the SSBNs were not out on regular patrols within firing range of the U.S. coasts, a period of at least several days would elapse before the Soviet SSBNs could trek down from the Barents Sea to positions within firing range of U.S. coastal targets.

IV. Strikes at Shore Targets in (European) Ground Theaters:

Particularly in view of the hostile ASW environment that had been created in the western and mid-Atlantic and major areas of the Pacific, the use of some or all of the Soviet SSBNs against land targets of the trans-Atlantic NATO allies of the United States rather than against the continental U.S. itself has long constituted an obvious alternative employment. Hence it is appropriate to note what senior Soviet Army and Navy officers have had to say on this matter. The first Sokolovskiy edition of Military Strategy made some revealing comments in this regard:

A. "The Navy's operations also /like the SMF's/ must not be tied to ground theaters since naval forces are now primarily called upon to fight on the oceans, often at great distances from ground theaters" (p. 402);
B. "These qualities will permit the submarine forces to engage in successful combat with an enemy's navy and, in case of need, to deliver strikes on shore-targets."
(p. 348).

C. "The Navy will combat the enemy's naval forces, especially his aircraft missiles, and thus protect the Ground Forces from strikes from the sea. It is not excluded that naval forces may be involved in delivering strikes on enemy troop formations and nuclear weapons which are close to the coast. Missile-carrying submarines, aircraft, and coastal missile batteries can carry out this mission successfully" (p. 423).

Conclusion IV: From the above, it appears that in 1962 the SSBNs were not assigned a ground-theater strike mission although their contingent assignment to providing missile-fire support for ground operations in Europe was "not excluded" if the exigencies of war made such an assignment urgently vital.

To summarize the foregoing four conclusions as to the nature of the Navy's role in strategic strike in 1962 as indicated by the first edition of the Sokolovskiy work Military Strategy, one may tentatively conclude that the only strategic strike role assigned the Navy was against those of the enemy's major naval combatants that could be surprised in port at the outbreak of war.¹ The Navy was omitted from an enumeration of the military forces (the SMF and LRAF) assigned to strike naval-related coastal targets,

¹/This conclusion is nicely supported by a statement made by Admiral Kharlamov in July 1962 at the time when Military Strategy appeared: This was the claim the Navy could destroy "the strong naval enemy" not only anywhere at sea but also "in distant ports and bases". Admiral N. Kharlamov, "Pod vypemlom Sovietov" (Under the Soviet Pennant), Trud, 29 July 1962.
including naval bases *per se*. Only in the event that the decision were made to launch an anti-SLOC campaign against NATO shipping would the Navy be authorized to strike at the ports and naval bases that harbored the merchant ships and convoy escorts involved. As far as employing SSBNs, in effect, in a limited strategic strike role against coastal cities and "soft" military targets, such a mission assignment definitely had not been made to the Navy. Rather, it was made quite clear that the SSBNs would not perform such a role until and unless the SMF and Long-range Air Force should prove incapable of fulfilling their mission assignments against such targets. Finally, no Soviet missile submarines were assigned for nuclear strikes at targets in the European ground theaters, either on the central front or on the North Sea-Baltic or Mediterranean flanks.

With these insights into the Navy's one minor role and its several non-roles in strategic strike in 1962, it is germane next to note the further relevant pieces of evidence that appeared in the Soviet media for the remainder of the 1961-'66 period.

---

1/ In view of both the Soviet failure to assign the Navy's SSBNs any really significant role in the main strategic strike mission and the very heavy (and well-warranted) emphasis in *Military Strategy* on the top priority importance of fighting the enemy's naval forces wherever they could be found, the question comes to mind whether the USSR in the early '60s might not have been already anticipating the development of an anti-ship ballistic missile that would be invulnerable to the formidable defenses against cruise missiles of the U.S. Navy's CVA task forces. As will be reported in due course, claims were made in the early '70s by two senior naval officers that the USSR had a dual-purpose submarine ballistic missile for use against both sea and land targets.
A review of the first edition of Military Strategy by Admiral Alafuzov appeared in the Naval Digest in January 1963. On the subject of the Navy's non-assignment to a role in the initial nuclear exchange, the admiral commented as follows:

In considering massed nuclear-missile strikes, the authors absolutely correctly name as the main means for their delivery the Missile Forces of Strategic Designation, and also Long-range Aviation. However, the authors do not mention missile submarines among these means.\(^1\)

Had the Navy at the time been officially assigned a share in the main (deep) strategic strike mission, it seems highly unlikely that the authors of Military Strategy or the book's pre-publication reviewers would have opened themselves up to the serious criticism of having deliberately downgraded the Navy by not crediting it with a share in the most prestigious role of strategic strike. On the other hand, the fact that Admiral Alafuzov felt free to chide the General Staff officers with having neglected to include the Navy in the list of the military services sharing the mission suggests that the mission assignments to strategic strike were in a state of flux in 1962 and Alafuzov's criticism reflected a Navy bid for a share in it.

\(^1\) Admiral V. A. Alafuzov, "K vykhod v svet truda Voennaya strategiya" (On the Appearance of the Work Military Strategy), Morskoi sbornik No. 1, January 1963, p. 94. The admiral also lampooned the Army authors by observing sarcastically that their statement that missile submarines were vulnerable to cruise missiles was "unconvincing" and that it obviously had escaped their attention that missile submarines always operate submerged.
The second edition of Military Strategy appeared in August 1963, just a little over a year after the first edition. Some seemingly significant changes regarding the strategic strike roles of the Navy's SSBNs were incorporated in it. These involved the addition of the phrase "missile submarines" in four textual passages concerning different aspects of the strategic strike mission. These passages are given below with the added phrases underlined. To these have been adduced five additional quotations which remained the same in the 1963 edition as in the original 1962 edition but which are essential to the subsequent analysis of exactly how the SSBN's roles had changed or, perhaps, of how they were just belatedly acknowledged by the Army authors of Military Strategy to have changed.

A. "Powerful strategic means -- the Strategic Missile Forces, the Long-range Air Force, and missile submarines are assigned the destruction of strategic means, disorganization of the rear of the enemy, and also for the destruction of the main groupings of forces in ground theaters of military action" (p. 369);[1]

B. "Now the Strategic Missile Forces, omitted: "and to a certain extent" the Long-range Air Force, and missile submarines will play the main role /in nuclear "missile strikes on targets throughout the whole of the enemy's territory" (pp. 371-372);

C. "At the same time /as the main strategic strike "throughout the whole of the enemy's territory", the Strategic Missile Forces, the Long-range Air Force, and missile submarines also will strike targets in the theaters of military action, simultaneously destroying enemy troop formations including reserves, bases for operational and tactical nuclear weapons, communications, the system of military command, etc." (p. 372); and

[1] All page references in this section are to the original Russian second edition of Voennaya strategiya, which was completed and sent to the press on 18 April 1963 and passed by the censors and "signed to the press" for publication on 30 August 1963.
D. "The Strategic Missile Forces ... and also the Long-range Air Force and missile submarines ... are the main weapons for achieving these goals /by means of "strategic retaliatory strikes" to "undermine the military capacity of the imperialist coalition by destroying its nuclear weapons and to destroy its military and economic potential by destroying the economic war base and the governmental and military system of control"/ (pp. 380-381).

(The following five passages remained unchanged from the first edition):

E. "The Strategic Missile Forces is ... the main instrument for dealing massive nuclear strikes at an aggressor" (p. 252);

F. "These qualities /"great autonomy, high speed," etc./ enable the submarine forces to engage in successful combat with an enemy navy and, in case of need, to deliver nuclear-missile strikes on shore targets" (p. 313);

G. " ... strikes by the /strategic/ Missile Forces can destroy submarine bases" (p. 381);

H. "Thus, the unlimited war of total destruction and annihilation being prepared by the imperialists undoubtedly will be turned against them. To do this, it is essential to have the means of retaliation in constant readiness: the Strategic Missile Forces /and/ the Long-range Air Force" (p. 382); and

I. "In a future world war, more responsible missions can be assigned the Navy. The expanses of the World Ocean may prove to be theaters of military action for the Navy. The main aims of military operations in oceanic and sea theaters are to defeat the enemy navy and to cut his oceanic and sea communications. In addition to these, the Navy can carry out missions for the delivery of nuclear-missile strikes on shore targets, for cooperation with the Ground Forces /i.e., by strikes in the European ground theaters/, for accomplishing maritime shipping, and for defense of our own sea communications" (p. 396).
J. "It is not excluded that the forces of the Navy may be assigned for strikes on groupings of enemy troops and his nuclear means in coastal sectors" (p. 400).

Taken by themselves, paragraphs A and B above unequivocally indicate that the Navy's "missile submarines", along with the SMF and the LRAF, had been assigned a major share in the initial "deep" strategic strike mission -- and very likely that was exactly the impression these changes were intended to give. How better could nuclear deterrence be enhanced in U.S. perceptions than by creating a mirror-image of our own strategic "triad" of Minuteman ICBMs, SAC bombers and the Polaris SSBNs?

However, when note is taken of the textual passages that were not changed in the second edition from the first, quite a different conclusion emerges. From paragraph F may be seen that the SSBNs in 1963 still would only participate in strategic strikes "if necessary", i.e., in the contingency that the SMF and LRAF could not destroy all of their assigned targets in the initial nuclear exchange. Additionally, from paragraph J, the retention of "not excluded" suggests that the implied assignment to the SSBNs of a strategic strike mission in the (European) ground theaters, as stated by the sentence in paragraph A, was not definitive, that assignment of such a role at most was on a contingency basis, and that the real assignment made was for the destruction of the "strategic means" comprised by CVAs and SSBNs. In paragraph H it is apparent that the SSBN force was not being maintained in a state of constant readiness, as were the SMF and LRAF, to participate in any initial nuclear exchange.
Additionally, in paragraph D, the formulation of "the Strategic Missile Forces and also the Long-range Air Force and missile submarines" employs a standard method of Soviet military writers which, by separating some forces or missions from others by an "also", places the forces or missions that are listed after the "also" in a distinct "also-ran" category. That this was actually the intention in this instance is amply confirmed by the statement in paragraph E that the SMF in 1963, as in 1962, remained "the main instrument for dealing massive nuclear strikes at an aggressor". Along this same line, as stated by the quote in paragraph G, only the SMF is credited with the capability of destroying enemy submarine bases.

It is noteworthy that none of the passages that were changed to add "missile submarines" in the second edition specified that the strikes at the various targets listed necessarily would take place as part of an initial nuclear exchange. Consequently, if one posits an SSBN-withholding strategy, primarily to provide the USSR with continued deterrence-in-war (to influence intra-war bargaining and the terms on which hostilities would be terminated), then it becomes both logical and feasible for the SSBNs to be considered to have a secondary role as a reserve, backup to the SMF and LRAF in the event they were unable to destroy all of their assigned targets. However, rather than try to fully sort out the conflicting statements in paragraphs A through I and draw definitive conclusions at this juncture, it is more fruitful first to consider the considerable amount of further evidence on the SSBN's strategic strike roles available for the 1964-'66 period.
The first two such pieces of evidence appeared in July 1964 in Navy Day articles by Admiral Sergeyev, the Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy, and Admiral Vinogradov, a submarine officer and the only flag officer known to have been assigned at the time to the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Admiral Sergeyev began his comments relative to the Navy's roles in strategic strike by remarking that the submarine missiles which had been shown to the public in the most recent military parade through Red Square past the Kremlin had been of a type "capable of destroying targets in the depth of any continent". However, further on in the same article he described the Navy as being "prepared for carrying out the missions of delivering nuclear strikes on an aggressor's warships and shore targets". These two statements add up to a clear claim that the Navy had developed a major capability for deep strike although they stopped short of asserting that the Navy had been assigned such a mission.

The Navy Day 1964 article by Admiral Vinogradov was noteworthy for providing a statement of missions for which the Navy was claimed to have been provided with "everything necessary" for their carrying out:

1/ Vice Admiral N. Sergeyev, "Nasha sila i slava" (Our Strength and Glory), Sovetskaya Rossiya, 26 July 1964.

2/ As will be explained subsequently in fuller detail, although the Russian word for "shore" (berega) is defined in Soviet dictionaries as a secondary meaning for "coastal" after the word "poberezh'ye", its common usage also can mean targets inland to any depth. Hence its normal meaning is simply "ashore" as opposed to "at sea" and so can mean deep strike. The preparing analyst is indebted to Dr. James McConnell of the Center for Naval Analyses for this critical distinction.
1) "Break up any assault from the sea and neutralize the strike forces of the enemy;
2) "Deliver annihilating strikes on enemy bases in the most distant regions; and
3) "Deliver annihilating strikes on important military targets in the depths of an enemy's country."

As mentioned above, Admiral Vinogradov was a submarine officer assigned to the General Staff. Since he had held the same post since 1949 and was a Deputy Chief of the General Staff in charge of submarine development and perhaps SSBN operations, he may be presumed to have known exactly what he was saying with regard to the SSBN's roles in strategic strike.

Certainly the formulation of the second and third missions above carry some interesting implications for the Navy's roles in the strategic strike mission. The second mission, strikes at distant enemy bases, appears, in light of the third mission, to be limited to naval bases along the coasts while the third mission was stated to be limited to counterforce targets (quite possibly those that were naval-related). The second and third missions make it clear that all of the targets of the Navy's SSBNs at the time were military. This would seem to confirm that in 1964 the Navy still had not been assigned a major share in the main strategic strike against the U.S. economy, administrative centers, etc. These comments, when taken in conjunction with those already reported from the two editions of

---

1/ Admiral N. Vinogradov, "Na strazhe morskikh rubezhей" (On Guard Over the Maritime Borders), Sel'skaya zhizn, 26 July 1964.
2/ This point is given support by a statement of the 1st edition of Combat Course of the Soviet Navy which was signed to the press on 14 June '64: "Submarines today are capable of ... destroying an enemy's ... ground military targets" (p. 598).
Military Strategy, and despite the clear claims to a deep strike capability made by Admiral Sergeyev, would lead one to conclude that the Navy still had no assigned role in the initial nuclear exchange beyond striking at any major naval combatant surprised in port at the outbreak of war. Beyond that, the Navy appeared to have only the contingency assignments for:

1) Striking naval bases and other naval-related coastal targets if the SMF and LRAF failed to destroy them in the initial nuclear exchange (per point (2) of Vinogradov's mission listing);

2) Striking naval bases, ports, canals, straits and shipbuilding and ship-repair yards in the event that a decision were made to undertaken an anti-SLOC campaign against NATO shipping;

3) Striking "deep" targets as a reserve backup to the SMF and LRAF during the course of any protracted war as circumstances might require (per point (3) of Vinogradov's listing of missions); and

4) Striking ground theater targets should the exigencies of war so require (per evidence previously quoted from the 1962 and 1963 editions of Military Strategy).

The next important piece of evidence is to be found in an article that appeared in Red Star in late August 1964 by Marshal Sokolovskiy and Major-General Cherednichenko, the latter being the best-known contributor to Military Strategy and generally considered to have been the real "brain" behind the work. The two Army General Staff officers repeated the assertion that "missile submarines" would share in "retaliatory nuclear strikes", again placing the LRAF and missile submarines in an "also-ran" position -- but this time listing the missile submarines ahead of the LRAF:
The basic means for carrying out a retaliatory nuclear strike obviously will be the Strategic Missile Forces and also missile submarines and the Long-range Air Force.\(^1\)

The *Red Star* article went on to state that, at the outbreak of any general nuclear war, "active military operations will develop in the oceanic and sea theaters with the aims of defeating the enemy's navy, delivering nuclear strikes on coastal objectives, disrupting maritime transport, and cooperation with the Ground Forces in operations along the coast". On the face of it, the two statements just quoted could be interpreted logically to mean that the Navy's strategic strike targets were limited to coastal targets. However, in the light of the distinctions made by Admiral Vinogradov, it seems much more likely that the first of the Sokolovskiy-Cherednichenko quotes given above (that missile submarines were assigned a share in any "retaliatory nuclear strikes") referred to the third of the Vinogradov missions listing ("to deliver annihilating strikes on important military targets in the depths of an enemy's country"), which then would be a reference to the SSBN role as a reserve backup for the SMF to be used as necessary after the initial nuclear exchange whenever needed to favorably influence the course of the war. If this view is correct,\(^1\)

\(^1\) V. Sokolovskiy and M. Cherednichenko, "Voennoe iskusstvo na novom etape" (Military Art at a New Stage), *Krasnaya zvezda*, 28 August 1964.
then the second of the two quotes just above from the *Red Star* article would fall into the second of Vinogradov's listing of missions, that for nuclear strikes on "enemy bases in the most distant regions".

The unresolved analytical problem here, as with the similar assertion in the second edition of *Military Strategy*, is whether crediting the Navy with even a secondary role in the main strategic strike constituted a factual statement or, conversely, was intended just to enhance nuclear deterrence. As before, it is the tentative conclusion of the author of this report that the statement was not factual but intended to mislead the Western reader into perceiving the Soviet strategic deterrent forces as a mirror image of those of the United States -- as a strategic "triad" of ICBMs, missile submarines, and long-range bombers. The use of the word "obviously" and the publication in *Red Star* (where the statement would be more certain to register in Western thinking than publication in a thick, diffusely-written book) support such an hypothesis. However, as before, a definitive conclusion will be held in abeyance pending consideration of the number of additional pieces of relevant evidence from the 1964-'66 period.

Six weeks after the Sokolovskiy-Cherednichenko article appeared in *Red Star*, two Army colonels published a piece in the second October issue of *Communist of the Armed Forces* which formulated the Navy's missions in a way that wholly excluded any strategic strike role for the Navy except as a contingency.
Employing a conditional "may" that could equally well be translated as "can", the authors wrote:

The Navy is assigned the responsibility for the destruction of submarine, surface, aircraft, and missile forces of the enemy navy, especially in the initial period of a war. Additionally, the Navy may destroy by missile strikes the bases, ports, and shipbuilding centers of the enemy.1/

Gratifyingly, this statement spoke definitively of the Navy's mission assignments rather than "capabilities" and confirmed the continued validity and applicability of the "may" caveat in both the 1962 and 1963 edition of Military Strategy. Consequently, this October 1964 article gives credence to the hypothesis that, as of late 1964, the Navy had no assigned share in the main strategic strike against the U.S.2/ and that its subsequent use for that purpose in an initial nuclear exchange was largely contingent on the SMF not being able to completely fulfill its assigned missions. Moreover, the targets listed "additionally" (bases, ports, and shipbuilding yards) are those for the contingency of an anti-SLOC campaign being undertaken.

In February 1965, on the occasion of the Armed Forces' anniversary, Defense Minister Malinovskiy made two statements relevant to the Navy's role in strategic strike:

1/ D. Palevich and I. Posniak, "Osobennosti i kharakter mirovoi raketno-yadernoi voiny" (Particularities and Character of a World Nuclear-Missile War), Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 20, October 1964, p. 80.

2/ Since the SSBN's assigned role of destroying any SSBNs and CVAs that were suprised in port at the outbreak of war was not classified as a "strategic" (but just as an "operational") mission (of theater war), it is not significant that the two Army officers did not mention it.
The basis of the Navy are nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic and cruise missiles capable of hitting land objectives and of destroying enemy surface ships and submarines in any region of the World Ocean.1/

Our country has become a really great seapower. Soviet nuclear-powered submarines have a practically unlimited radius of action and are capable of delivering strikes with ballistic and cruise missiles from a submerged position and at a distance of several thousand kilometers.2/

It is to be noted that he spoke only in terms of "capabilities" rather than actual mission assignments and the tone of his statements was strongly suggestive of deterrence propaganda. The only point of potential substance was that he no longer specified that the Navy was capable (only) of striking "military" targets. Although certainly not definitive, this omission at least suggests that the Navy SSBNs may have had their reserve, back-up role to the SMF for "deep" strikes expanded to include countervalue targets as well as counterforce ones.

These two quotations are more interesting and significant, however, for reflecting a much higher estimate on the Defense Minister's part of the capabilities of the Navy in general and its SSBNs in particular than had been reflected in his earlier media appearances. As Soviet Army and Navy officers have been traditionally prone to do, in order to insure the most favorable foreign perceptions of the strength of their military forces,

1/ Marshal Rodion Malinovskiy, Speech at the Army Central Theater in Moscow, Radio Moscow, 1430 GMT, 22 February 1965.
Malinovskiy very likely was basing his description on forces programmed but not yet completed — in this case on the Yankee Class SSBNs (the USSR's belated response to the U. S. Polaris SSBN program), the first of which was not to become ready for sea trials until two years later (when the last of the 41 Polaris boats were commissioned).

The deterrence-propaganda element seems to be unmistakable, especially in the first of the two Malinovskiy statements above, in that he listed the Navy's strategic strike capability ahead of that for, in effect, destroying CVAs and SSBNs. All things considered, it is extremely unlikely that the Navy's role in strategic strike even remotely approached the importance in the Soviet view of achieving the maximum of damage limitation against seaborne nuclear strikes. However, for effective deterrence propaganda, only strategic offensive capabilities were useful.

In the first of two articles published in July 1965 by Admiral Sergeyev, Chief of Main Staff of the Navy, he followed the Defense Minister's lead in listing in first place the Navy's strategic strike role in a Navy Day article written for popular consumption by readers of the provincial press: "The Soviet Navy is capable of destroying vitally important ground targets from great distances and of winning victory against the enemy's striking forces, both surface ship and submarine".¹ Yet, in an

¹Admiral N. Sergeyev, "Moguchiy flot Sovetskoi derzhavy" (Mighty Navy of the Soviet Power), Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, 25 July 1965.
article published the same month for the far more knowledgeable and sophisticated readership of the Naval Digest, he reversed these priorities: "Soviet nuclear-powered submarines are capable of carrying out combat missions in conflict with the [naval] striking forces of an enemy...and of destroying from a great distance vitally important ground targets on his territory".  

Sergeyev's use of the formula "vitally important targets on enemy territory" was one that had been used in both editions of Military Strategy and appears to have been chosen to avoid revealing how relatively minor was the Navy's strategic strike role and thereby to enhance the statement's strategic deterrent effect. At any rate, here again the claim was to capabilities not to actual mission assignments. Moreover, the fact that he did not claim even a capability for carrying out a "deep" strategic strike mission (which he surely would have had such a mission been assigned the Navy), is confirmatory evidence that the Navy still had not been accorded the significant share it sought in the main strategic strike mission against the United States.

The Sergeyev articles of July 1965 provided the last information helpful in deciphering the Navy's role in strategic strike that appeared before the XXIIIrd Party Congress convened in March 1966. So, in summation of the five years between the XXIIInd

---

1/ Admiral N. D. Sergeyev, "Flot velikoi derzhavy" (Navy of a Great Power), Morskoi sbornik No. 7, July 1965, p. 5.
and XXIIIrd Party Congress, it seems reasonably certain that the Navy was not given any share in the main strategic strike let alone the one coequal with the SMF which it sought. Moreover, the data suggests that the Navy's roles near the end of the period remained substantially as Khrushchev had set them in January 1960. That is, the Navy's only assigned share in what could be considered a small part of the strategic strike mission (although the Soviets didn't) was the subsidiary task of striking any major naval combatant ships caught in port at the outbreak of war. The Navy also appeared still to have a mission against naval bases, ports, and other naval-related coastal targets in the event the Soviet High Command opted for an anti-SLOC campaign should it become evident that the war would be a protracted one. Otherwise, the Navy was left with only the three possibilities for contingency employment of its SSBNs:

1) Right after the initial nuclear exchange, if the SMF and LRAF had failed to take out all of their assigned coastal targets;

2) During the subsequent course of a protracted war against "deep" countervalue objectives should the SMF prove unequal to the main mission for which it was established and given top priority in funding, R&D, production capacity, and skilled manpower; and

3) During the subsequent course of a protracted war, if the exigencies of the situation should make diversion of naval forces from their main missions for the purpose acceptable and vital, against targets in ground theaters in Europe (and including the UK, of course).

These latter two contingency roles for the SSBNs were ones for which they would be available throughout the course of a protracted war to the extent to which they had been withheld from initial use to provide deterrence-in-war and a surviving strategic force to back up demands for advantageous peace terms.
VI. NAVY ASSIGNED A LIMITED ROLE VS. U.S. COASTS, 1966-1971

In his 1 April 1966 report to the XXIIrd Party Congress on his handling of defense affairs during his tenure as Defense Minister for the five years since the XXIIInd Congress, Marshal Malinovskiy made the following remarks pertinent to the Navy's role in strategic strike:

Together with the missiles of the Strategic Missile Forces, in recent years there has been created for us a missile submarine fleet capable of carrying out strategic missions for destroying enemy targets on the land as on the sea. Into its inventory have come nuclear-powered missile submarines equipped with ballistic missiles having submerged launching and great range...1/

In these years /since the XXIIInd Party Congress in October 1961/ the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government have paid great attention to the development of our Strategic Missile Forces and nuclear-powered missile submarines. To the rapid increase of these forces have been subordinated the basic efforts of the leading branches of our defense industry. These forces are the main means for deterrence of an aggressor and for decisively defeating him in war (emphasis supplied)2/

1/ It will be recalled that in February 1965, the Defense Minister had spoken of both "ballistic and cruise missiles". That Malinovskiy in 1966 only mentioned ballistic missiles for destroying both land and sea targets lends itself to the interpretation that the "SS-NX-13 tactical ballistic anti-ship missile" last tested in November 1973 and which "may have been intended for deployment in Yankee Class SSBNs" per JCS Chairman George Brown's FY 1978 "posture" report (p. 16) was being treated as already an accomplished fact for Soviet deterrence propaganda.

A number of points in Malinovskiy's remarks require comment. In the first of the two paragraphs quoted it was merely indicated that the Navy shared with the SMF in having a capability for strategic strike against land targets. It did not state that the Navy actually had been assigned such a mission against "land targets". Nor did it specify "deep" strike, so the "land targets" for whose destruction the Navy was said to be "capable" could easily have been only coastal ones. Most importantly, there was no indication as to the point of time in a nuclear war at which the SSBNs would be used. That is, there was no indication that the SSBNs would be included in the initial nuclear strike.

In the second paragraph of Malinovskiy's report, the "missile submarines" were included with the SMF as the "main means" both for deterrence and for "decisively defeating" an aggressor. Again the fact that the Navy's missile submarines were credited with sharing with the SMF in "decisively defeating" an enemy does not necessarily imply a share in the initial nuclear exchange but is at least as likely to refer to their use or threatened use during the course of a war to help insure the final "decisive" defeat of an enemy when he accepts his opponent's terms for ending the war.
It should also be noted that the second-place importance of SSBNs for strategic strike was no longer given additional emphasis by use of the "also-ran" formula ("the SMF as well as missile submarines") but was merely listed in second place: "the SMF and nuclear-powered missile submarines".  

Finally, the Defense Minister mentioned openly a factor that previously had been left largely unspoken: that the SMF and the nuclear-powered missile submarines were important not only for their potential war-fighting capabilities but also as the USSR's "main means" for strategic deterrence. The deterrent value of both forces was to be given increasing emphasis from this time onward. In fact, a good case could be made, on the basis of all the evidence available up to the XXIIIrd Congress on the very minor roles in strategic strike accorded to the Navy, that the utility of Soviet ballistic missile submarines had resided far more in their publicity value for nuclear deterrence and in their theater role than in their expected use in strategic strike. Despite the fact that the strategic strike roles of the Navy's SSBNs logically might be expected to have been accorded relatively more importance with the obvious weakening of the LRAF's strategic bomber force as a leg of a strategic "triad", it is important to note that nothing Malinovskiy said in his XXIIIrd Congress speech

---

1 In all probability the large funds expended up to that point on the Yankee Class SSBNs, even though they were not to start coming into full operation for three more years, underlay the Defense Minister's emphasis on the "great attention" he said had been given to missile submarine "development" as well as to that of the Strategic Missile Forces.
changed, or was inconsistent with, the facts of the limited strategic roles accorded to the Navy throughout the five years since the XXIInd Congress.

From the foregoing treatment of the evidence on possible SSBN roles in strategic strike between the XXIInd Party Congress in 1961 through Defense Minister Malinovskiy's report at the XXIIIrd Congress in 1966, it becomes clear that there are four such possible roles with which this analysis must be concerned:

1) The initial "deep" strikes against the continental United States;
2) Strikes against naval forces in U.S. naval bases;
3) Strikes against coastal U.S. targets, including naval bases; and
4) Strikes against European (and UK) ground theater objectives.

Making use of this formulation of the problem, it becomes practicable next to consider all of the data (including the 3rd edition of *Military Strategy*) for the period from the end of the XXIIIrd Party Congress in April 1966 up to the XXIVth in March 1971 under one of these four aspects of the problem. However before beginning in specific detail with the first of them, the "deep" strategic strike, some general information particularly applicable to that mission must be noted.

In the first place, between May 1966 and the end of July 1968, there were five claims from authoritative Soviet Navy sources that a "unity of views" had been worked out regarding the Navy's mission assignments.\(^1\) If true, such a consensus

\(^1\) Gorshkov in *Naval Digest* No. 5 of May 1966 (p.8); and in *Pravda*, 28 July 1966; "Materials for Reports and Discussions" in *Navy Day-'68* in *Communist of the Armed Forces* No. 13 of July 1967 (p. 49); and Admiral Kasatonov in *Military-Historical Journal* No. 1, January 1968 (p. 41); and in *Red Star*, 28 July 1968.
logically, of course, would have included the Navy's roles in strategic strike. In his May 1966 article in the *Naval Digest*, Admiral Gorshkov asserted that such a unity had been worked out but without specifying among whom. This left the impression that both the Party leadership and the Defense Ministry marshals were involved. However, Admiral Kasatonov, in a January 1968 article in the *Military-Historical Journal*, stated that the unity claimed was (only) among "military personnel", suggesting that Party approval either had been withheld or, more likely, had not yet been forthcoming. Moreover, while Gorshkov had implied that the unity achieved was complete, Kasatonov, in the last word on the subject to appear before the XXIVth Congress, stated in *Red Star* at the end of July 1968 that the Navy's mission (only) had been "defined more specifically". In view of Kasatonov's two caveats, plus the twin facts that no more such claims were heard from the Navy and that neither the marshals nor the Party leaders ever lent a word of substance to the claim, it seems warranted to conclude that no full agreement had been reached. Moreover, the problems of settling the roles and missions of each of the five Soviet military services of the Armed Forces were so vexed and so subject to change with each new weapon introduced into operational use that the chances were slim indeed of any *modus vivendi* on service missions (and hence budget allocations) long enduring.

---

1/ In his Pravda article for Navy Day-'68, for example, Gorshkov claimed that the Soviet Union had solved such "complex problems" as "determination of the Navy's strategic and operational-tactical missions".
Between February 1967 and May 1970 Gorshkov asserted publicly four times some variation of his claim in the February 1967 Naval Digest that "Our Navy, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, has become a most important strategic means of the Supreme High Command". It is entirely probable that the Navy's anti-SSBN and anti-CVA missions (both of which had been designated as "strategic" ones) would have been sufficient to warrant such an assertion. The statements appeared, like the changes to the 2nd edition of Military Strategy (discussed above), to have been calculated to create the impression abroad that the Navy's SSBNs were assigned a major role in the initial "deep" strikes of any initial nuclear exchanges between the U.S. and the USSR. Whatever the truth of the matter, Admiral Kasatonov again punctured his chief's propaganda balloon by observing in his January 1968 article in the Military-Historical Journal that the Navy's submarines had (only) "gained real prospects for becoming a most important means of the Strategic High Command".

In the 1966-1971 period between the XXIIIrd and XXIVth Party Congresses, in addition to the "very-important-means-of-the-Supreme-High-Command" claim, Admiral Gorshkov on five occasions belabored another closely related assertion of the

---

1/ The other three occasions besides his Naval Digest article of February 1967 (p. 8) were in the East German newspaper Neues Deutschland on 3 August 1968, in Izvestiya on 27 February 1970, and in the Bulgarian Army newspaper Narodna Armiya on 7 May 1970. The probable deterrent-propaganda motivation that underlay these claims was indicated by the fact that two of the four claims were published outside the USSR where they were doubly sure to attract Western attention.
allegedly decisive influence of the Soviet Navy on the "course" or "course and outcome" of any general nuclear war. For example, in his February 1967 Naval Digest article, he claimed that the Soviet Navy with the SMF was capable of exerting "a decisive influence on the course of a war in military theaters of vast extent". In this article and on a second occasion (his article in the East German newspaper Neues Deutschland on 3 August 1968), he combined the two claims in a formula that revealed that he was claiming nothing more than that the Navy would play a significant role in the military theaters and not against the continental U.S.:

"Next to the Strategic Missile Forces, our Navy has become the most important means in the hands of the Supreme High Command for exerting a decisive influence on vast theaters of military action".

Since "military theaters" would include both the European ground theaters and the Atlantic and Pacific maritime theaters (and quite possibly the Atlantic and Pacific coastal areas of the U.S.) but not the continental U.S., it can be seen that Gorshkov was not actually asserting by either the "Supreme-High-Command" or "decisive-influence" claims that the Navy's SSBNs had been assigned a share with the Strategic Missile Forces in the deep strike mission. By July 1970, even this 1968 claim for the Navy having a "decisive influence" had been cut back to just "a very substantial influence on the course and outcome of armed conflict in vast theaters of military operations".

very considerable retrenchment in terms of what additional naval forces the lesser claim would justify was due to the opposition of the Army as expressed, for example, in the 3rd edition of *Military Strategy* which had appeared in the spring of 1968.

That edition repeated the statement that had appeared in the 1962 and 1963 editions which stated: "Military actions in maritime theaters in a future world war will acquire vast scope but these actions scarcely will have decisive significance for the outcome of a war".\(^1\) Quite possibly to lend emphasis to this standpoint, the 1968 edition dropped a related statement that had appeared in the two earlier editions: "Military actions in maritime theaters also as those by the SMF, the Ground Forces, and the PVO will be very significant for the successful conduct of a general nuclear war."\(^2\)

Malinovskiy's assertion in his April 1, 1966 speech at the XXIIrd Party Congress (quoted earlier) that the SMF and nuclear-powered missile submarines were the main forces for both the deterrence of an aggressor and his defeat in any nuclear war were followed in 1967 and 1968 by a welter of conflicting state-

\(^1\)HFS, p. 299.

\(^2\)HFS, p. 459. Gorshkov, with his usual resourcefulness, came up with a substitute formula that sounded nearly as good and still emphasized the importance of naval warfare in the overall scheme of things. Expanding his formula from just the Soviet Navy to include the NATO navies, he was able to use both of the key phrases "decisive influence" and "course and outcome": "A modern war will of necessity involve considerable military activity in the seas and oceans that will exert a decisive influence on the course and outcome of a war". Again the deterrent-propaganda aspect of this claim was made especially obvious from the fact that it appeared (only) in a foreign newspaper, in this case a Western European one: *La Revue Maritime* (Paris), October 1969, pp. 1139-1143.
ments on the subject. For the remaining nine months of 1966, the Malinovskiy line remained undisputed and the Navy Day - '66 "Materials for Reports and Discussions" in the Party journal for the Armed Forces, Communist of the Armed Forces, cited the XXIIIrd Congress and repeated the Malinovskiy line.\(^1\)

Then in February 1967 and twice again in October and November of the same year, Marshals Grechko, Rokossovski, and Krylov published such contradictory statements that it was apparent that the Malinovskiy line at the XXIIIrd Party Congress was far from being officially-accepted policy and probably was under attack. Grechko began by giving a nearly verbatim quote from Malinovskiy that the USSR had "given great attention to the development of the Strategic Missile Forces and nuclear-powered missile submarines". Having thus established for his readers that it was Malinovskiy's assertion at the XXIIIrd Congress of which he was speaking, Malinovskiy's First Deputy, then Acting Defense Minister for his fatally ill chief, cut the Navy's SSBN force down to what he considered to be its proper size by crediting it only with being able "to operate successfully in any area of the World Ocean".\(^2\)

\(^1\)"Much attention has been given to development of the Strategic Missile Forces and to nuclear-powered missile submarines—the main means for the deterrence of the imperialist aggressors and their destruction in the event they ignite a war." (Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 13, July 1966, p. 60). The following February, Marshal Batitskiy, Commander-in-Chief of the PVO, also repeated the Malinovskiy line: "Soviet strategic missiles and nuclear-powered missile submarines are the powerful means for deterring aggressors and for completely defeating them should they start a war". Tass, 10 February 1967.

\(^2\) Marshal Andrei Grechko, Tass, 22 February 1967.
That the subject was sensitive was shown by the fact that the Red Star account of the ceremonial meeting at the Central Theater of the Army in Moscow at which Grechko had given the main address and made the remarks reported by Tass suffered an unusual 24-hours delay before it appeared in Red Star on 24 February and then the one single remark censored out of the Tass report from among a number of substantive comments was the one quoted above which implied Grechko's disagreement with the Malinovskiy line that nuclear-missile submarines had a major share in strategic strike with the SMF.¹/

Soviet nuclear-powered submarines, in the description published by Marshal Rokossovsikiy in October 1967, were said to have "capabilities for delivering nuclear missile strikes from the ocean depths at great distances".²/ Against what types of targets or with what accuracy, the marshal failed to state. Earlier in the article, the SMF had been characterized by Rokossovsikiy as "capable of annihilating strikes with extreme precision against an enemy in any part of the world".

Writing in November 1967 in Military Thought, the officially restricted journal of the Armed Forces' General Staff, the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Marshal Krylov, reminded his readers, in effect, that the established doctrine in the USSR (said to have been derived from "a deep

¹/"V chest' vsenarodnogo praznika" (In Honor of the All-Peoples' Holiday), Krasnaya zvezda, 24 February 1967, p. 1.
²/Trud, 14 October 1967.
scientific study") was that the SMF had been created explicitly to carry out "the main strategic missions" whose successful fulfillment would "predetermine the course and outcome of a war". Krylov went on to state subsequently:

In modern conditions, the Strategic Missile Forces have become the main striking force, the main branch of our Armed Forces, because the course and outcome of a war will depend to a decisive degree on their combat capabilities ...1/.

In this statement, which was not intended for the eyes of anyone other than senior Soviet military and naval officers, one notes that the Navy's SSBNs were not found worthy of mention in connection with the main strategic strike mission. Moreover, it seems apparent that Krylov was quoting established doctrine in an effort to justify the SMF's retaining its primacy. It seems unlikely that he would have done this unless the military service which he headed was being challenged for a major share in the single mission on which its existence depended -- that for strategic strike. Had Malinovskiy's listing at the XXIIIrd Party Congress of missile submarines, along with the SMF, as a main means for deterrence and defeat of any protagonist been official doctrine rather than deterrence propaganda, it seems unlikely that Marshal Krylov either could have avoided giving them credit for a share in deep strike or that he would have found it necessary to argue so strongly to retain the SMF's sole mission assignment.

An editorial in Communist of the Armed Forces in April 1967 published a variation on the Malinovskiy line that seemed like a Party effort to mediate the dispute. The SMF "and-also" missile submarines were stated to be the two forces that together comprised "the most important feature of the present stage of the development of the Armed Forces". As mentioned previously, use of the "and also" phrase in Soviet military practice placed the second-listed force in an "also-ran" relationship to the first. If this Party editorial were indeed such an effort at mediation, or at least was a reflection of such an effort carried on out of public view, it was not successful. A substantial number of reflections of a continued dispute over the issue were to appear in the Soviet media in 1968 and, although with reduced frequency, right up to the XXIVth Party Congress in 1971.

In the spring of 1968 there appeared the revised Third Edition of Military Strategy, still written by more than a dozen officers of the Armed Forces' General Staff and edited by Marshal Sokolovskiy. A restatement of the Malinovskiy line had been added to the 3rd edition:

"Together with the Strategic Missile Forces, the missile-carrying submarine fleet is the main force for keeping an aggressor in check and for decisively defeating him in war".\(^1\)

\(^1\)/HFS, p. 194.
Seven pages further on, at the end of the same chapter, the phrase underlined in the following quotation had been added to the rest of the sentence, which had appeared in the first two editions:

"The basis of waging it /nuclear-missile war/ will be the mass use of nuclear missiles by all of the services of the Armed Forces, but primarily by the Strategic Missile Forces and by the nuclear-powered, missile-carrying submarines.\(^1\)

That a considerable dispute had taken place with regard to including the statement was suggested by two conflicting statements on the subject retained in the 3rd edition from the 1962 and 1963 versions. One of these stated that the SMF (still) was accorded "the main role in executing the basic missions of a future war".\(^2\) The other said that the missile weapons of the services were (only) the basic means of combat for each of them individually, that is, by direct inference, the Navy's SSBN roles were limited to carrying out naval missions and had no wider strategic role. The SMF, by contrast, was given exclusive credit for constituting "the decisive means /\(\text{for a general, nuclear war}\) of the Armed Forces as a whole".\(^3\)

Particularly indicative of the interservice wrangling and the bureaucratic tugging and hauling that (one feels fairly confident) must have taken place to result in such a mishmash of unreconciled and unreconciliable statements was the selection of the place in the over-500-page text to insert the key state-

\(^1\)HFS, p. 201. \(^2\)HFS, p. 246. \(^3\)HFS, p. 246.
ment mentioned first above that the SMF and missile submarines together constituted the main means for the deterrence and defeat of an aggressor. With obvious malice aforethought and with the unmistakable intent of weakening or discrediting the quasi-elevation of the Navy's role in strategic strike, this key quote was immediately preceded by the assertion that the SMF (alone) could carry out "the main strategic missions of a war" and that it had by then acquired "such a quantity of launching devices, missiles and nuclear warheads for them, including ones of megaton yield, that they are in a shape such that they can completely carry out the missions which they are assigned".

In late July 1968, Navy Day articles by Admiral Gorshkov and the First Deputy Chief of the Party-controlled Political Directorate of the Navy, Captain First Rank Shablikov, for the first time publicly asserted a Navy claim to the share in the strategic strike role that Malinovskiy ostensibly had announced well over two years before at the XXIIIrd Party Congress. The very fact that Gorshkov had not immediately quoted the Defense Minister and claimed the golden-egg-laying goose as soon as possible testifies to the questionable validity of Malinovskiy's 1 April 1966 coupling of the Navy's missile submarines with the SMF as the "main forces" for the "decisive defeat of an aggressor". A further testimony to the same end was that when Gorshkov finally decided to exert his claim he did not do so in his Pravda article for Navy Day but in one carried only in the provincial press. The Navy chief stated that the SMF and the nuclear-powered missile sub-
marines were the main means for "the deterrence or destruction" of any aggressor. ¹

Similarly, rather than the top Party watchdog over the Navy, Admiral Grishanov, voicing the Navy's claim in his annual Navy Day article in the main government newspaper Izvestiya, it was left to his deputy to do in the relatively obscure pages of the DOSAAF newspaper Soviet Patriot. Captain Shablikov minced no words in repeating the essence of Malinovskiy's seeming announcement on 1 April 1966 that the Navy had been assigned a major share with the SMF in the main strategic strike:

"The basic means for the decisive destruction of the enemy are the Strategic Missile Forces and nuclear-powered missile submarines." ²

The opposition to admitting the Navy via its SSBNs to the SMF's exclusive strategic strike club was represented publicly in 1968 by Marshal Bagramyan in February and Marshal Krylov in October. The former, who was Chief of the Rear Services for the Armed Forces, asserted the SMF's continuing monopoly on the strategic strike mission, crediting the SMF (alone) with comprising "the main military means for deterrence of an aggressor and for defeating him in war". ³

As for nuclear-powered submarines, they were portrayed as nothing more than "a basis of the Navy's striking power" along with the Navy's "missile-carrying aircraft". Since the latter certainly had no role in the main strategic strike, the Navy's SSBNs were being

² Captain First Rank N. Shablikov, "Na boevoi vakhte" (On Combat Watch), Sovetskiy patriot, 28 July 1968.
³ Article in the Soviet Armenian newspaper Kommunist, 22 February 1968.
tarred by association. Speaking through the SMF's annual anniversary article in Communist of the Armed Forces, Marshal Krylov ignored the Navy and stated that the SMF in its role as "the main striking forces of the Armed Forces" was the Party and Government's chosen instrument for carrying out of the "strategic missions" essential to the USSR's security.¹/

Indicative too that the Navy had not actually been accorded a share in the main strategic strike mission was a formulation used in a DOSAAF pamphlet, The Soviet Navy, which was written by Admiral Yakovlev and signed to the press by the censors on 9 December 1968. In a statement asserting the SMF's primacy among the USSR's nuclear-armed forces that was similar to one that had been included in all three editions of Military Strategy, but going further, the pamphlet stated:

"Just as the Strategic Missile Forces will destroy the most important nuclear strike weapons of an enemy on the ground, the Navy's strike forces, especially the nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft, will destroy his nuclear-missile platforms at sea."²/

The issue of the Navy's role in strategic strike appeared to have reached its peak of topicality in 1967-'68 and to have been mentioned only on one occasion in each of the three last years of the period. In 1969, only the SMF's anniversary article in Communist of the Armed Forces publicly asserted the SMF's claim

¹/Strategic Missile Forces and Artillery Day Anniversary "Materials for Reports and Discussions", Communist vooruzhennykh sil No. 20, October 1968, p. 38.
to continued "main-means" primacy if not exclusivity in the main strategic strike role for the "decisive destruction" of any aggressor.1/

In 1970, Army General Pavlovskiy entered the lists on the same embattled issue. The SMF, said the Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces, are "a reliable shield, the main force of the USSR's nuclear-missile capability, and assigned to curb an aggressor if he unleashes a general nuclear-missile war". 2/

Not a single voice had been heard in 1969 or 1970 on behalf of the Navy's interest in obtaining a major role in the main nuclear strike. Judging from this fact alone, one might have concluded either that the Navy had won its case (i.e., the issue had been resolved in the Navy's favor and it had been awarded a major share with the SMF in strategic strike) or that the Navy advocacy that it be given such a share had been silenced. However, in early 1971, Admiral Gorshkov had the final public word on the matter prior to the XXIV Party Congress and, as before, asserted in a little read newspaper that the SMF and SSBNs were "the main means for the deterrence and destruction of an aggressor". 3/

1/ "Materials for Reports and Discussions" on SMF and Artillery Day, Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil No. 20, October 1969, p. 47.
2/ I. G. Pavlovskiy, "Istoricheskaya pobeda" (Historic Victory), Zhurnal list No. 5, May 1970.
Pending study of the more detailed evidence on the deep strike mission that will be examined next, no attempt will be made at this juncture to reach any conclusion as to whether or not the issue of the Navy's role in strategic strike had been resolved in Gorshkov's favor prior to the XXIVth Congress and, consequently, he was announcing the glad tidings or whether Malinovskiy's XXIII Congress announcement to that effect had been propaganda and Gorshkov was still keeping alive in the provincial press his advocacy of an issue not at the time on the approved list for active public discussion.

The most convincing pieces of the detailed evidence from the 1966-1971 period that supports the view that the Navy's SSBNs were assigned a major role in the initial "deep" strategic strike at the time of the XXIIIrd Party Congress in March-April 1966^1/ are presented in the immediately following lettered paragraphs (emphasis supplied). They will be followed by a comparable listing of the further evidence that supports the contrary view that the Soviet Navy was not assigned any share in the deep strike role during the 1966-1971 period. With all the relevant evidence pro and con noted, it will be analyzed and the indicated conclusions drawn.

^1/"At the beginning of 1966, on the eve of the deployment of the Soviet Navy's Yankee class, strategic operations against the interior were, for the first time, declared first priority...". James M. McConnell, "Strategy and Missions of the Soviet Navy in the Year 2000", in Problems of Sea Power as We Approach the Twenty-First Century, James L. George (ed.), Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978, p. 45.
A. Malinovskiy, in his 1 April 1966 report to the XXIIIrd Party Congress, stated (as previously quoted) that development of the Navy's nuclear-powered missile submarines, along with the SMF, had been given great attention in recent years, that the missile submarines had been improved to the point that they were capable of delivering nuclear strikes on targets on land as well as at sea, and that the SMF and missile submarines together were "the main means" for defeating an enemy in war.

B. Gorshkov, Pravda, 3 April 1966: "Soviet submarines are armed with powerful missiles which are capable of destroying with great accuracy sea and land objectives /respectively/ that are hundreds and thousands of kilometers distant."

C. Vice Admiral Sychev, Red Star, 20 April 1966: "Nuclear-powered missile submarines are capable not only of tactical and operational missions but even of strategic ones."

D. In May, 1967 there appeared a second edition of the standard history of the Soviet Navy, Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, which included the following two relevant sentences:

1) "The Strategic Missile Forces and nuclear-powered missile submarines are the basic strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union"; and

2) "The basic mission of our Navy in a future war will be to fight the forces of the navy of the enemy at sea and at /their/ bases...At the same time, the mission remains for the Navy to conduct active combat actions on oceanic and sea communications.... Modern warships are armed with missiles of not only operational-tactical but also strategic designation and this allows the Navy to be assigned strategic missions for the annihilation of important military and economic objectives of the enemy in the depths of his territory."1/

E. Military Strategy, the 3rd (1968) edition of the Sokolovskiy work:

1) "Together with the Strategic Missile Forces, the nuclear-powered missile-armed submarine fleet is a main force for the deterrence of an aggressor and his complete defeat in a war" (p. 235). This entire sentence was added new to the 3rd edition;

2) "In a future war, the significance of the Navy as a whole will be determined by the character of the new missions assigned it for destruction of enemy objectives on the land as at sea" (p. 242). The underlined portion was added to the 3rd edition in place of the following phrase in the 2nd edition (p. 248): "especially for combat with an aggressor's navy at sea and at bases";

3) "The basis of waging it nuclear-missile war" will be the mass employment of nuclear missiles by all services of the Armed Forces but, in the first place, by the Strategic Missile Forces and the nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines" (p. 243). The underlined part was added as an extension of the same sentence in the 2nd edition (p. 249);

4) "At the present time, bringing forces into combat readiness cannot be measured by days and, in a number of cases, not even by hours. For many units and formations it is now a matter of minutes. This applies particularly to the Strategic Missile Forces and to nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines, the main means of inflicting mass nuclear strikes on an aggressor" (p. 247). The underlined part was added as an insertion in the same sentence in the 2nd edition (p. 252);

5) "The combat actions of the fleets consist of nuclear strikes at objectives on the continents and mobile employment of missile and torpedo submarines, missile aviation, and surface ships in an active search for the forces of the enemy navy and their destruction employing missile and torpedo strikes" (p. 330). This was added new to the 3rd edition;

6) "...the main objectives in a modern war" are situated beyond the limits of the theaters of military actions; they are located in the depths of enemy territory. For destruction of the strategic means of nuclear assault, disorganization of the rear of an enemy, and also for the main groupings of forces in ground theaters of military actions are assigned our powerful nuclear means -- the Strategic Missile Forces, the Long-range Air Forces, and the missile-armed submarines. They will carry out their missions by delivering nuclear strikes according to the plans of the Supreme High Command..." (p. 340). This passage was repeated verbatim from the 2nd edition (p. 369);
7) "Now the main role /In "nuclear-missile strikes throughout the enemy's territory" against "the enemy's means of nuclear assault, his military-economic potential, and the governmental and military control system, and their grouping forces"/ will be played by the Strategic Forces, the Long-range Air Force Forces, and missile-carrying submarines employing nuclear weapons..." (p. 342). This passage was repeated verbatim from the 2nd edition (p. 371).

F. Gorshkov, Pravda, 14 February 1968: "In order to successfully carry out the missions assigned them, the main forces of the Navy must possess...the capability of delivering strikes on land objectives as well as on targets at sea. These requirements are met in the highest measure by nuclear-powered submarines of various designs and by Naval Aviation...;"

G. Navy Day-'68 "Materials" in Communist of the Armed Forces No. 13 of July: "/nuclear-missile submarines of the Soviet Navy/ have been assigned to deliver strikes on an enemy in the oceans and on his overseas territory" (p. 31);

H. Vice Admiral N. Kulakov, Leningrad Pravda, 28 July 1968: The Soviet Navy was stated to have the capability for nuclear strikes at "the most important military objectives deep inside enemy territory";

I. Gorshkov, Pravda, 28 July 1968: "Our Navy has everything necessary not only for repelling any assault from the sea but also for delivering annihilating strikes on an enemy's naval forces in distant areas of the oceans and at the most important military objectives deep inside his territory";

J. Admiral Kasatonov, Red Star, 28 July 1968: Claimed that the Navy's nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarine fleet had the capability to "destroy not only maritime targets but also military-strategic targets on any continent";

K. Admiral Sergeyev, Radio Moscow, 27 July 1968: "In short, the Navy has everything necessary to carry out large-scale operations on the high seas. It can answer aggression by delivering powerful /nuclear/ strikes on land objectives as well as on targets at sea";

L. Major-General V. Zemskov, Military Thought No. 7, July 1969: Implied that missile submarines on combat patrols in missile-launching areas would participate in the initial nuclear exchange by stating that subsequent strikes could be made by those nuclear-powered submarines "which did not succeed in reaching the launch areas earlier";
M. Gorshkov, Pravda, 27 July 1969: "The Communist Party and the Soviet government have determined the main trends for the development of a modern navy capable not only of repelling any assault of an aggressor from the sea but also delivering annihilating strikes on the aggressor's navy in distant areas of the oceans as well as delivering strikes at important military objectives in the depths of his country";

N. "Gorshkov, Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia, Bulgaria), 19 September 1969: The Soviet Navy was said to have been "assigned the mission of being ready to ... deliver strikes at the most important strategic targets deep within an aggressor's territory";

O. "Rear Admiral A. I. Rodionov, Udarnaya sila flota (Strike Force of the Navy), Moscow: DOSAAF Press, 1970 (signed to press 1 April): "Modern submarines ... possess the capability for launching missile strikes while submerged against not only important coastal objectives but also objectives deep in enemy territory";

P. Navy Day-'70 "Materials" in Naval Digest No. 6, July: Credited the Navy's missile submarines with the capability of striking "enemy objectives at thousands of kilometers" (p. 14);

Q. Vice Admiral Kulakov, Leningrad Pravda, 26 July 1970: "Nuclear-powered submarines are capable of destructive strikes at objectives on land as well as at sea";

R. Gorshkov, Soviet Moldaviya, 23 February 1971: "The Strategic Missile Forces ... together with the Navy's nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines have become the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor and for his decisive defeat in a war ...";

S. N. N. Azovtsev, V. I. Lenin i Sovetskaya voennaya nauka (V. I. Lenin and Soviet Military Science), Moscow: Science Press, signed to press 9 March 1971: "The main missions of a war under modern conditions must be carried out by the Strategic Missile Forces, Long-range Aviation, and nuclear-powered submarines.... The delivery of mass nuclear strikes with the aid of strategic means of delivery permits the achievement of political aims in short periods" (p. 297).
The evidence that argues against the view that the Soviet Navy's SSBNs were assigned a share with the SMF in the initial deep strike mission at the time of the XXIIIrd Party Congress in 1966 is set out in the following numbered paragraphs:

1. Admiral Zakharov, Soviet Russia, 31 July 1966: "The Navy is capable of not only defending the maritime boundaries of our country successfully but even of successfully conducting combat operations against the naval forces of an enemy in the seas and oceans, and also of delivering powerful strikes on vitally important objectives spread over the territory of the enemy";

2. Admiral Kasatonov, Sudostroyeniye (Shipbuilding) No. 7, July 1966: "At the present, the main forces of the Navy are nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines and Naval Aviation" (p. 5);

3. "Materials" for speeches on October Revolution Day 1966, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 19, October 1966: "The Strategic Missile Forces are in constant readiness, in case of necessity, to deliver immediately an all-destroying retaliatory strike on an aggressor....Nuclear-powered missile submarines have become the basic striking force of our Navy. They are now in a condition to carry out most important strategic missions" (p. 49);

4. Gorshkov, Naval Digest No. 10, October 1967: "...in the mid-'50s, the course was chosen to create in a short time a fully modern oceanic navy...capable of delivering strikes at an enemy in the oceans and on his coastal territory as well as defending the USSR's own objectives from oceanic directions. And such a Navy is being built" (pp. 11-12);

5. Marshal Krylov, Military Thought No. 11, November 1967: "The Strategic Missile Forces are... the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor and for his decisive defeat in a war...The Strategic Missile Forces have become the main striking force, the main service of our Armed Forces, because the course and outcome of a nuclear war will depend to a decisive extent on their combat capabilities and constant readiness...";

   a) "While the Strategic Missile Forces are the decisive means of the Armed Forces as a whole, the missile forces and missile weapons of the other services constitute the basic combat means for each of them" (p. 298). This sentence was repeated verbatim from the 1963 edition (pp. 302-303);
b) "The main forces for such /"strategic strike"/ operations will be strategic nuclear weapons, in the first place the Strategic Missile Forces and its missiles. Simultaneously with these strikes or, more probably, right after them /will occur/ front offensive operations, airborne operations, and, in some sectors, operations of the navies... (p. 347). This sentence also was repeated verbatim from the 2nd edition (p. 377);

c) "The basic aim of this type of military operation /"the "retaliatory nuclear strike"/ is to undermine the military power of an enemy to eradicate his military-economic potential by destroying his economic foundation for war and by disrupting his governmental and military control. The basic means for attaining these ends are the Strategic Missile Forces, which are equipped with ICBMs and IRBMs with powerful thermonuclear and nuclear warheads, and also the Long-range Air Forces and missile submarines armed with nuclear warheads and with hydrogen and nuclear bombs" (p. 349). This, too, was an exact repetition of a sentence that had been included in the 2nd edition (p. 380);

d) SSBNs "actually are vulnerable" (p. 350 in 3rd ed, p. 381 in 2nd);

e) Added new to the 3rd edition with no mention of SSBNs: "The SMF were described as "the main combat means of the Soviet Armed Forces" (p. 330).

7. Gorshkov, Military Thought No. 1, January 1968: Stated that the mid-'50s decision to build "an oceanic navy capable of carrying out strategic missions of an offensive nature" created a requirement "for warships of great range and endurance, unlimited seaworthiness, great striking power and combat stability, and capable of delivering strikes at an enemy at sea and in his coastal areas. Such a navy has been built, the first generation of multi-mission submarines rightly constituting the main striking forces of the Navy";

8. General Pavlovskiy, Literary Gazette, 21 February 1968: "The emergence of strategic missiles...does not in the least eliminate the role of the Ground Forces. However significant may be the role in a future war of such a formidable instrument as the Strategic Missile Forces, victory...can be won only by the joint efforts of all of the means of warfare --- the Ground Forces, the Air Forces, the PVO and the Navy...";
9. Marshal Krylov, Sel'skaya zhizn (Rural Life), 23 February 1968: "The most significant expression of the reconstruction of our Armed Forces was establishment of the Strategic Missile Forces, which are the personification of our Motherland's nuclear might.... While assigning our Strategic Missile Forces the role of the main nuclear striking force, Soviet military doctrine proceeds from the fact that, in order to achieve final victory over an aggressor, it is necessary to combine the efforts of all of the services of the Armed Forces.... After separate paragraphs on the Ground Forces, the PVO, and the Air Forces, the Commander in Chief, SMF continued... Our mighty Navy possesses everything necessary to successfully carry out the missions assigned to it. Its might is based on missile-armed, nuclear-powered submarines which are armed with long-range ballistic missiles for underwater launching";

10. Marshal Bagramyan, Kommunist (Yerevan), 22 February 1968: "The Strategic Missile Forces are... the main military means for deterrence of an aggressor and for his defeat in a war.... The basis of the Navy's striking power is the nuclear-powered submarine and the missile-carrying aircraft";

11. Vice Admiral Surabekov, Naval Digest No. 6, June 1969: "Nuclear-powered submarines can destroy large-area objectives on the territory of an opponent.... Western strategists consider that the main and first priority mission /for navies/ is destruction of the important objectives of the enemy, not only on the coasts but also in the depths of his territory" (pp. 28-29);

12. Istoriya voenno-morskogo iskusstva (A History of Naval Art), Admiral Zakharov (Ed.), signed to press 19 August 1969: "The Navy of the Soviet Union was created proceeding from the fact that the main threat for us at sea was constituted by the navies of the NATO countries, and basically by nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines and aircraft carrier strike forces.... The Navy was assigned to combat precisely these forces" (p. 561). "If required, our submarine-aircraft Navy could destroy ground objectives in any territory of the enemy..." (p. 562);

13. Gorshkov, Pravda, 26 July 1970: "Nuclear-powered submarines with missiles of various designations are the pride of the Navy. /These/ submarines together with naval missile and ASW aviation comprise the basis of the Soviet Navy's strike power";
14. Admiral Grishanov, Izvestiya, 26 July 1970: “Our Navy includes nuclear-powered submarines...armed with missiles launched from underwater and high-speed aircraft...capable of carrying out their missions at any point in the World Ocean...capable of a wide range of strategic and operational-tactical missions”;

15. Marshal Grechko, Pravda, 23 February 1971: “Time has fully confirmed the validity of the course chosen for the further development of our Fatherland's Navy. Nuclear-powered and diesel-powered submarines with missile armaments, surface missile combatants and missile-carrying aviation today constitute the main strike potential of our Navy. Soviet naval personnel have mastered the expanses of the World Ocean and possess everything necessary for the simultaneous and protracted conduct of combat actions on the water expanses of several oceans and seas”.

Turning first to analysis of the lettered quotes from the 1966-1971 period that support the view that the Navy's SSBNs were assigned a major role with SMF in the initial deep strike either at the time of the XXIIIrd Party Congress in March-April 1966 or within a year or two thereafter, it is relevant first to look again at the statement by Marshal Malinovskiy in his report to that Congress which appeared to announce that the SSBNs had been given such a major role in the initial nuclear exchange. As may be seen from paragraph A, the Defense Minister stated, in essence, that the SSBNs were both "capable" of striking targets on land and that they had become, along with the SMF, a "main means" for fighting a war should one start.

Three points should be noted here. First, whether a "capability" or an actual "assignment" to strike "targets on land" or even "on the continents" or "overseas territory" is claimed, as in paragraphs A, B, E (2), E(5), F, G, and Q, there is no nec-
ecessary implication that a share in the initial deep strike mission is intended. Rather, the authors instead could have had in mind (and obviously often did) just coastal or theater targets. Nevertheless, the radical newness of Malinovskiy's formula made it clear that he was claiming (whether in earnest or to enhance deterrence) that the Navy's SSBNs had been assigned to some unspecified mission against objectives on land.

Secondly, as noted previously, a claim to a certain capability or even to having "everything necessary" is not logically tantamount to asserting that a mission actually has been assigned to exploit that capability. This applies to paragraphs B, D(2), H, I, J, K, O, P and Q.

A third reservation to be noted is that it also is not logically equivalent to asserting that the Navy had been given a major role in the initial deep strike mission to state, as in paragraphs D(1), E(1), R and S, that missile submarines had been given a share with the SMF as a "main means" for defeating the enemy in war, or for sharing the "main missions" in a nuclear war with the SMF, or, together with the SMF, constituting the USSR's "basic strategic forces". While these are resounding phrases in a deterrence-propaganda context, they do not necessarily imply that the Navy had been assigned any missions beyond their primary ones to protect the Soviet Union from nuclear strikes by CVAs and SSBNs.
Similarly, since the anti-SSBN and anti-CVA missions have been designated to be "strategic" ones, claims such as in paragraph C that the Navy is capable of carrying out "strategic" missions, or even have been assigned such missions, do not necessarily imply anything with regard to the deep strike mission. Furthermore, claims such as that in paragraphs E(3) and 5 that the Navy's missile submarines will share with the SMF in the "mass employment of nuclear weapons" or in "the delivery of mass nuclear strikes" may be discounted since the prescribed requirement for the Navy to destroy the SSBNs and CVAs of the U.S. and other NATO powers at the very outset of any war (to limit the nuclear-strike damage as much as possible) provides a fully adequate basis for such a claim.

While the foregoing analytical caveats allow a number of the more obvious examples of deterrence propaganda to be disregarded, eleven of the lettered quotes merit individual examination: E(2). The addition to the 1968 (3rd) edition of Military Strategy of the phrase "the new missions assigned it /The Soviet Navy/ for destruction of enemy objectives on the land..." constituted the first unambiguous assertion that the Navy had been assigned at least some role even though unspecified in strikes against land targets. Although clearly this statement was phrased in such unrestricted general terms that it was suggestive (intentionally, perhaps) of an SSBN share in the initial deep strike role, it could with equal logic imply a more limited role against coastal U.S. and/or trans-Atlantic
ground theater targets. So, noting that such a clear claim that at least some role in strategic strike had been assigned to the Navy's nuclear-missile submarines was made in the 1968 revision of the Sokolovskiy work, the rest of the evidence on the subject of deep strategic strike will be examined before trying to decide the exact significance of this change to the 3rd edition of *Military Strategy*.

E(4). In this quote from *Military Strategy*, 3rd edition, the Navy's "nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines" had been added to the SMF as forces that were to be kept in constant readiness as part of "the main means for inflicting mass nuclear strikes". The point already was made above that one does not have to posit anything more than the requirement laid on the Navy for carrying out the maximum amount for damage-limiting of anti-SSBN and anti-CVA operations at the very outset of a war to account for the share in "inflicting mass nuclear strikes". Nevertheless this claim remains analytically significant in that it would be necessary to have those SSBNs assigned to participate in immediate action at the outbreak of war already in their missile launching patrol areas in readiness to fire. So this statement that the USSR's missile submarines (at least that part intended to play a role in the initial nuclear exchange) had been added to the SMF as forces to be held in constant readiness indicates the fulfillment of a prerequisite for the Navy's SSBNs playing any role at all in the initial nuclear exchange (or any prompt follow-up to take out any land targets on the SMF's assigned list but which they failed to destroy).
Curiously, however, a second passage from the earlier two editions that limited the forces in full readiness to the SMF and Long-range Air Force was repeated in the 3rd edition. While this was possibly merely editorial oversight, it still left the analyst in doubt as how seriously he should take the claimed addition in the 3rd edition of the Soviet nuclear-powered missile submarines to the nuclear-strike ready forces -- the fact that the change was made in one passage and neglected in another is more suggestive of the results of a last minute censor's effort at a deterrence-enhancing ploy than of an important editorial change to accord with a changed situation.

E(6) and E(7). These two subparagraphs are similar both in content and in the fact that they were carried over unchanged from the 2nd edition of five years earlier. Since both passages when first published in 1963 claimed that the USSR's missile submarines had a role in strategic strike at a time that they definitely did not, the fact that they were republished verbatim in 1968 makes them less convincing than if they had appeared for the first time in 1968. More importantly, they demonstrate the validity of a useful analytical assumption of this study: that in Soviet military writings when a listing of missions is given for more than one force, there is no necessary impli-

---

"Thus, the unlimited war of total destruction and annihilation being prepared by the imperialists undoubtedly will be turned against them. To do this, it is essential to have the means of retaliation in constant readiness: the Strategic Missile Forces, /and\ the Long-range Air Force." (2nd edition, p. 382; 3rd edition, p. 351).
cation that any particular force need only be capable of more than one of the listed missions in order to merit inclusion in the list. In the two subparagraphs, to illustrate the point, it is quite certain that, at the time of the 2nd edition in 1963 (when missile submarines were added to the 1st edition's listing of the SMF and LRAF as capable of carrying out comprehensive lists of both counterforce and countervalue strikes), the Navy's SSBNs were only assigned to contribute to "destruction of the strategic means of nuclear assault" (i.e., CVAs and Polaris SSBNs) as expressed in E(6) or "the enemy's means of assault" as it is put in E(7). Validation of this assumption from the above example is important as an analytical key to interpreting these two and subsequent claims that the SSBNs along with the SMF share in a number of missions listed together. In these two cases, one is well-warranted to reject for 1968 (as was demonstrated earlier that we could reject for 1963) any conclusion that these quotes logically constituted a claim that the SSBNs shared in the deep strike missions for "disorganization of the rear of an enemy" (E 6) or for destroying his "military-economic potential and the governmental and military control system" (E 7).

F. & G. These 1968 statements by Gorshkov in his annual Navy Day interview for Pravda and in the "Materials" for Navy Day discussions are similar to the quote from the 1968 edition of Military Strategy discussed above in subparagraph E(2) in that they laid unambiguous claim to the Navy having been assigned
some role in strategic strike against the land. Unlike the quote in E(2) however, Gorshkov left it unclear whether he was announcing that the Navy already had been provided with the weapons systems required to deliver strikes at whatever ground targets may have been assigned or whether he was advocating that even larger forces, which he specified as consisting of "nuclear-powered submarines of various designations and Naval Aviation", be provided. Certainly inclusion of this reference to the Navy's long-range, missile-armed aircraft did nothing to create the strongest possible Western perception that the Navy's SSBNs had been assigned a major role in the initial deep strike mission. Had Gorshkov been intending to assert a claim to such a mission assignment for his SSBNs, it is reasonable to expect that he would have avoided linking them with Naval Aviation (which definitely had no deep strike role) and specified "ballistic-missile submarines" instead of those "of various designations".

H, I, J & M. It is logically conceivable that at least some of the claims by Soviet naval writers to having a "capability" or "everything necessary" to perform a certain mission or missions may be using these two expressions as euphemisms for claiming an actual mission assignment. This possibility suggests itself particularly in the case of the quotes in the above four paragraphs. In all of these it is indicated that the Navy is either "capable" of, or has "everything necessary" for, carrying out deep strikes (just) against counterforce (i.e.,
"military") targets. While submarine missiles, despite their generally poorer accuracy and lower yield than the ICBMs of the SMF, would be useful in temporarily neutralizing if not destroying "hard" military installations, they normally would be more effective against "soft" countervalue targets, especially cities. However, since destroying or, more accurately, threatening to destroy countervalue targets constitutes the very essence of the SMF's raison d'etre, it seems highly probable that Admirals Kulakov, Gorshkov, and Kasatonov in their Navy Day-'68 articles and Gorshkov again in his Navy Day-'69 article were advocating that the Navy be assigned a share in that part of the deep strike mission which the SMF would be least reluctant to relinquish and which could best be justified as related to the Navy's missions (i.e., to include at least inland "military" targets such as the Great Lakes Naval Training Station or the Naval Ammunition Depot at Crane, Indiana).

I & M. In addition to the comment on these two Pravda interviews for Navy Day by Gorshkov in 1968 and 1969, it should be noted also that, in the two nearly verbatim mission listings, the claim to having "everything necessary" (in 1968) or the "capability" (in 1969) for carrying out the three missions he listed, the strikes on deep counterforce targets were listed in last place. Had the Navy actually been assigned such a role in deep strike, even if just for naval-related targets throughout the U.S., it seems virtually inconceivable that he would not have at least listed it first and probably placed the other
missions in an "also-ran" position by use of the standard technique of listing the deep strike mission first and adding "and also for repelling any assault of an aggressor from the sea and delivering strikes on an enemy's naval forces in distant areas of the oceans."

L. Although General Zemskov, the editor of, and frequent contributor to, the Armed Forces' General Staff restricted-distribution journal Military Thought portrayed a scenario in the article from which the referenced quote was extracted that he stated at the outset was taken from foreign press material as well as World War II experience, it seems likely that he was either advocating how Soviet forces should be employed in any general nuclear war or explicating official views. The relevant passages follow:

In a nuclear war, if one breaks out, the combatants, from the very beginning, will employ all the available forces and means at their disposal, above all the strategic nuclear means.

The Soviet Armed Forces...will be compelled to use against the aggressor to the full extent their nuclear missile means and, above all, the Strategic Missile Forces, the missile-carrying submarines, and the strategic aircraft.... Both sides, it must be assumed, will use to the maximum extent in it all their military... capabilities.

The decisive act of a nuclear war in all conditions is the infliction of a strike by strategic nuclear means, in the course of which both sides obviously will use the main portion of the most powerful nuclear ammunition.

The war will immediately assume a global scope. All the continents and oceans will be directly or indirectly involved in the sphere of military operations.
A decisive role in a nuclear war, especially at the beginning of it, is played by the results of the effects of strikes against the most important deep regions of the states, above all in the territories of the main countries of the combatant coalitions. Subsequently, great importance can be attached to operations and combat actions of the armed forces in completing the defeat of the remaining groupings of the opposing side.

Simultaneously with the infliction of nuclear strikes, a struggle will develop in the sea and ocean regions as well as in the air with the goal of destroying surface and underwater forces of the Navy in order to thwart the enemy's nuclear strikes.

In conducting a nuclear war, the armed forces can use the following forms of strategic operations: strikes of strategic nuclear forces, strategic operations in land and sea theaters of military action, independent sea and ocean operations, and combat actions for thwarting the nuclear attack of the enemy to defend the territory of the country.

Undoubtedly the strikes of strategic nuclear forces will be the main one of these forms. Evidently the most intensive exchange of nuclear strikes will occur during the first days of the war. Subsequently, as a result of the great expenditure of means of destruction, it is possible that there will be a decrease in the nuclear strikes against the deep regions with continuation of an extremely active nuclear conflict in the theaters of military actions on land and sea. At this time, individual strikes can be inflicted by the surviving strategic forces (aircraft and nuclear-powered submarines which did not succeed previously in reaching the regions of missile launch positions) as well as by massed groups and single strikes by the operational-tactical means.

Although the context, in the analysts opinion, amply shows that the foregoing was General Zemskov's own preferred scenario for a nuclear war, his position as a highly respected military theoretician does not allow one to discount the possibility that it also was generally accepted by the General Staff and that, accordingly, his article may have been considered as "a concrete expression of military doctrine". Be that as it may, there is nothing in the Zemskov scenario for a general nuclear war that indicates that the Navy's SSBNs would strike deep targets as opposed to coastal or European ground theater targets.
N. The formulation used by Gorshkov in the fall of 1969 for an article published in Bulgaria was unique in Soviet naval writings and was never repeated by the Navy Commander-in-Chief -- perhaps because it was more revealing of the SSBN's strategic strike role than he had intended. He stated that the Soviet Navy had been "assigned the mission of being ready to...deliver strikes at the most important strategic targets deep within an aggressor's territory". The unprecedented and rarely repeated emphasis on "being ready" to carry out a mission sounded for all the world like the SSBN reserve, backup role to the SMF which was identified earlier in this study and was determined to be one that would only permit the SSBNs to fire their missiles in the unanticipated eventuality that the SMF could not destroy all of the targets assigned to it for the initial nuclear exchange. This remarkably different formulation may have been the result of Gorshkov's wanting to tell the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies that the Soviet Navy finally had sent some of its SSBNs out on patrol in or near missile-launching areas where they were engaged in "being ready" to fire on call at any deep strike targets that the SMF failed to destroy in an initial nuclear exchange.

O. In the pamphlet Strike Force of the Navy which appeared in the spring of 1970, an admiral credited the Navy with the "capability" for strikes against "not only important coastal objectives but also objectives deep in enemy territory" (emphasis supplied). Implicit in use of "capability" in Soviet military
writings is the possibility that the author using it may have chosen it to advocate esoterically that a fitting mission be assigned to put the particular capability to use. Also, the "not only -- but also" grammatical construction is not infrequently used in military advocacy to distinguish between a "not-only" mission already assigned and a "but-also" mission whose assignment is being advocated. The likelihood that such was the case in this instance is increased by the fact that the same construction had been used nine months earlier by another admiral writing in the Naval Digest, but making use of a surrogate (foreign-navy), so often the hallmark of advocacy.\footnote{\footnote{\footnote{\footnote{\footnote{\footnote{\footnote{See Vice Admiral Surabekov's similar comment in paragraph 11 in the immediately preceding list of evidence against the Navy having been assigned a major share in the initial deep strike mission.}}}}}}

Next, consideration must be given to the numbered quotations previously listed that include all of the significant evidence against the view that the Soviet Navy's SSBNs were assigned a major role in strategic strike around the time of the XXIIIrd Congress in 1966 or at some early point in the five intervening years before the XXIVth Congress in the spring of 1971. These 19 quotations will be taken in turn using the same paragraph numbering (and subparagraph lettering in the case of the 3rd edition of Military Strategy) that was used above in listing the quotations.
1. In this quote one finds the Pacific Fleet political officer, Admiral Zakharov, four months after the XXIIIrd Congress supposedly heard Marshal Malinovskiy announce that the Navy had been given a major share in the initial nuclear exchange, not only listing the Navy's purported deep strike mission in third place but in an "also-ran" third place to boot: "The Navy is capable of not only defending the maritime boundaries of our country successfully but even of successfully conducting combat operations against the naval forces of an enemy in the seas and oceans, and also of delivering powerful strikes on vitally important objectives spread over the territory of the enemy". Had the Party considered that the Navy actually had been assigned a significant share in the initial deep strike mission, there is no grounds for doubting such a share in the one mission considered of transcendent importance would have been listed first.

2. Here the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Kasatonov, stated in July 1966 that "at present the main forces of the Navy are nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines and Naval Aviation". As commented previously, a share in deep strike would not have been bracketed with Naval Aviation, since the latter would play a coastal strike role at most.

3. Most indicative of all that the Navy had not been given a share in the initial "deep strike" mission is the fact that this guidance on the Party line to be followed on military matters for speeches on the day celebrating the start of the 50th year of Soviet power stated explicitly that the SMF would carry out the retaliatory nuclear strike if it came to war -- and the Navy was credited vaguely with the capability for "most important strategic missions" - an apt description of the anti-SSBN and anti-CVA missions.

4. This is also a particularly significant piece of evidence since it involves the Navy Commander-in-Chief clearly implying,
in October 1967 in the Navy's professional journal, that the Navy's role in strategic strike had been planned in the mid-'50s to be limited to coastal targets and that this limitation still obtained: "...in the mid-50s, the course was chosen to create...a navy...capable of delivering strikes at an enemy...on his coastal territory. And such a navy is being built."

(emphasis added)

5. Writing in the restricted-distribution Armed Forces' General Staff journal in November 1967, the SMF Commander-in-Chief, Air Marshal Krylov, gave exclusive credit to his service as the "main means" for defeating an enemy in war. Even granting Krylov's vested interest in protecting the SMF from being required to share its sole mission with another service, had such an assignment to the Navy of a major share in the initial deep strike been made officially, Krylov would almost certainly have felt constrained to acknowledge the fact. It seems highly unlikely that he would have been willing to accept the political risk of bucking the tightly-controlled Party-dominated Soviet system of democratic centralism that requires strict adherence to doctrine by all segments of society and particularly by the military since it is traditionally viewed by Party leaders as the greatest potential source of threat to their continued control of the USSR (e.g., the fear of "Bonapartism" as evidenced by the Zhukov affair).

6 (a). This quote from both the 1963 and 1968 editions of Military Strategy not only attributes to the SMF the preeminent and exclusive role as "the decisive means of the Armed Forces as a
whole" but also makes it clear that the nuclear weapons of the
other services are only intended to allow each to carry out its own
service missions. This, too, would seem to make it quite clear
that the Navy's and LRAF's mission assignments did not include
a share in the initial deep strike role.

6 (b). Here the SMF is again the exclusive proprietor of
the main role in the initial nuclear exchange and, while the
Navy may strike simultaneously with the SMF, it is made clear
that this is not essential (as it would be if the SSBNs had
been assigned a share in the initial deep strike). Rather the
Navy "more probably" will not begin its operations until "right
after" the SMF has completed the initial deep strikes.

6 (c). This quote concerned participation in "the retaliatory
nuclear strike" which, of course, is synonymous with the
initial deep strike mission. The fact that this statement had
appeared initially in the 1963 edition, at a time (as has been
determined with full assurance) when the Navy did not have a
share in the initial deep strike mission, surely provides
sufficient grounds for scepticism when that claim was repeated
in the 1968 edition. Even were one to tentatively accept the
statement as valid, it is to be noted that the LRAF and the
Navy's missile submarines are placed in an "also-ran" category
by being mentioned only in an "and also" clause. Moreover,
while the LRAF had been dropped from the "main means" of stra-
tegic strike from the several new passages added to the 3rd edi-
tion, it was still mentioned in this quote that had been carried over from the 2nd edition. This obvious inconsistency suggests sloppy editing and, perhaps, a continuing bureaucratic assault on the SMF's monopoly on the USSR's top priority mission by one or more of the dozen-odd contributors to *Military Strategy*.

6 (d). This quote states, with reference to the U.S. Polaris SSBNs (in what is quite likely to have been intended as a surrogate for the Soviet Navy's SSBNs), that they "actually are vulnerable". Obviously such an argument could have been used to good advantage by Marshal Krylov and any other marshals who opposed giving the Navy a major share in the initial deep strike mission. In light of the admitted great superiority in ASW of the U.S. and other NATO navies, such an argument could scarcely have been ignored. It is hard to believe that the SMF proponents would not have taken full advantage of this situation.

6 (e). Again, the fact that there was added new to the 1968 edition a statement that the SMF (alone) constituted "the main combat means of the Armed Forces" affords a significant piece of evidence that the other concurrent assertions in the 1968 *Military Strategy* about the Navy's missile submarines along with the SMF having various strategic mission assignments could not logically be interpreted as indicating that the Navy had been assigned a major role in the initial deep strike mission.
7. In the January 1968 article in *Military Thought* from which this sixth quote was taken, Gorshkov substantially repeated what he had said in his October 1967 *Naval Digest* article, as already discussed in paragraph 4 above, but with the possibly significant difference that in his article in the January 1968 issue of the restricted-distribution journal of the General Staff he implied that the course selected in the mid-'50s of building a navy capable, among other missions, of delivering nuclear strikes on coastal targets had been completed. He accomplished this by merely changing the assertion in the earlier article that "such a navy *is being built*" to "such a navy *has been built*" in the one published three months later. Except in the unlikely event that the intervening three months were considered to have made the difference, it seems likely that Gorshkov was implicitly advocating that it was time, since the Navy had been basically completed, for it is to be assigned to go beyond the coastal strike assignment to a major role in deep strike. Gorshkov's inclusion of the claim to "combat stability" in his description of the war-fighting capabilities of his forces in the open oceans can reasonably be interpreted as a refutation of the vulnerability of SSBNs asserted in the 3rd edition of the Sokolovskiy work (as discussed in subparagraph 6 (d) above). This affords support for a hypothesis that Gorshkov was taking advantage of the closed forum presumably afforded by the General Staff journal to argue that his SSBNs had finally been developed to the point that they merited assignment of a more substantial role in strategic strike.
Whatever the truth of the foregoing hypothesis, it is of primary importance for this study to note that, in a publication intended only for the eyes of senior military officers and in which, consequently, Gorshkov could speak frankly, he laid claim only to a coastal strike mission.

8. Writing an Armed Forces Day Anniversary article in the Literary Gazette in February 1968, the Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief, General Pavlovskiy, indirectly indicated that the Navy did not have a major share in the initial deep strike mission. He did so by first mentioning the SMF alone as the force which was exceptionally "formidable" and which would play a uniquely important role in a future war. Then he implicitly indicated that the Navy had no special role to play, as it would have of necessity been accorded if it shared in the initial deep strike mission. This latter implication is gained from Pavlovskiy's listing the Navy along with the Ground Forces, Air Forces, and PVO as the "other" services besides the SMF without the joint efforts of which final victory in war could not be gained.

9. Marshal Krylov, the SMF Commander-in-Chief, writing again in February 1968 (at the same time as General Pavlovskiy as discussed immediately above) conceded the same doctrinal point as stressed by the Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief that the joint efforts of all of the military forces would be required to "achieve final victory". It is notable, however, that in conced-
ing this point, Krylov managed not only to mention that it was the SMF that (alone) had been assigned the role of "the main nuclear striking force" and that were "the personification of our Motherland's nuclear might" but he even acclaimed establishment of the SMF (in 1960) as "the most significant expression of the postwar, nuclear-era reconstruction of our Armed Forces". Not only did all this exclude any major strategic strike role for the Navy, it specifically put that service down into a second-priority category of forces that implicitly had only to mop up after the SMF had blown the enemy to bits.

10. Writing in February 1968, at the same time and for the same occasion as General Pavlovskiy and Marshal Krylov (just discussed in paragraphs 8 and 9 above), the Chief of the (unified) Rear Services of the Armed Forces, Marshal Bagramyan, also credited the SMF as being the "main means" for fighting a war successfully. In describing the Navy, Bagramyan made it clear that the latter had no major share in the strategic strike role by listing ballistic missile submarines along with Naval Aviation as "the basis of the Navy's striking power". 1/

11. In the quote by Vice Admiral Surabekov in the June 1969 Naval Digest, the admiral stated: "Western strategists consider that the main and first priority mission [for navies] is destruct-

1/ The fact that "ballistic" missiles were specified supports the preparing analyst's earlier hypothesis that it was generally expected that the Navy would soon have an anti-ship ballistic missile for submarines.
tion of the important objectives of the enemy not only on the coasts but also in the depths of his territory" (emphasis supplied). As mentioned previously, use of the "not only... but also" construction is a common device for advocating that the mission listed after "but also" be assigned in addition to the already assigned "not only" mission. Moreover, use of historical and foreign surrogates ("Western specialists" in this case) is the single most frequent device resorted to by Soviet military writers to advocate changes in officially-prescribed policy. Here it is of particular interest that the admiral-author was referring implicitly to the "navy-against-the-shore" thesis that the nature of naval warfare had changed due to the advent of nuclear-tipped missiles and nuclear-power propulsion plants for ships so that the traditional priority of navies-against-navies had yielded pride of place to navies-against-the-shore. With the appealing aura (particularly for Russians) of being le dernier mot in modern naval theory, this must have seemed to Surabekov, as well as to Gorshkov and his other senior officers, as lending itself with particular felicity to supporting Navy acquisition of a share of the SMF's initial deep-strike mission.

12. This quote from A History of Naval Art, edited by the Party's political watchdog with the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Zakharov, and which appeared in the fall of 1969, used the "if-required"-by-the-exigencies-of-war caveat with regard to the Navy's performance of any role in the deep strike mission that
was dropped from the 3rd edition of Military Strategy, thereby making it less implausible for the Western reader to conclude that the Navy's SSBNs had been assigned a major share in that mission. Use of the same caveat (over a year after the 3rd edition) in a standard textbook which stated on its flyleaf it was intended for use by the (several) Soviet naval academies suggested that the Navy still did not have an assigned share in the main strategic strike mission. This alone is not conclusive, of course, since at least a possibility exists that the "if required" phrase was a superfluous elaboration of the obvious meaning nothing more than "in the event of war". Nevertheless, the emphasis given by the use of the work "precisely" to the Navy's mission-orientation to specifically combating the SSBNs and CVAs of the NATO navies makes the conclusion virtually inescapable that the Navy was not assigned any major role in the initial deep strike mission.

13. In his Pravda interview for Navy Day 1970, Gorshkov not only failed to render any of the usual honors to his SSBNs, he termed the "pride of the Navy" his multipurpose submarines (that is, ones of "various designations", which took in both the diesel and the nuclear-powered missile boats, including those with anti-ship missiles). Had his SSBNs been assigned a significant share in the initial deep strike, it is extremely unlikely that he would have passed up the opportunity to take credit for the Navy for possession of such a highly
prized mission by specifying that the SSBNs were the pride of the Navy. Moreover, in such circumstances Gorshkov would have been unlikely to have detracted from the central fact of having gained such an assignment by including mention of "naval missile and ASW aviation" in the same breath that he referred to the mission of his missile submarines. Rather he either would have omitted mention of aircraft altogether (which he has done quite frequently) or at least have reduced their comparative importance by resort to the "also-ran" construction, viz "and also naval missile and ASW aviation".

14. This Navy Day 1970 quotation from Admiral Grishanov, the top political officer assigned by the Party to keep an eye on the Navy, seemed to go out of its way to avoid any mention of SSBNs or ballistic missiles or land targets: "Our Navy includes nuclear-powered submarines...armed with missiles launched from underwater and high-speed aircraft capable of carrying out their missions at any point in the World Ocean... capable of a wide range of strategic and operational-tactical missions". This not unprecedented practice of avoiding any mention of a Navy role in deep strategic strike (which was noted to have been carried to ridiculous lengths in the first half of the '60s) is a likely indicator that the subject was of particular sensitivity at the time. Moreover, by including mention of naval aircraft along with submarines, Grishanov effectively removed, whether intentionally or not, any likelihood that his remarks could be construed as either a statement that the Navy already had a deep-strategic strike role or as advocacy that the Navy be assigned such a role.

-92-
15. The final piece of evidence controverting the view that the Navy had been assigned a deep strike role around 1966 was provided by Marshal Grechko's Armed Forces Day anniversary article in Pravda on 23 February 1971 -- just shortly before the XXIVth Party Congress. Whether or not with that specific intent, the Defense Minister effectively cut the Navy down to size by making a most unusual reference to the Navy's diesel-powered missile submarines. Since the Navy's conventionally-powered ballistic and cruise submarines were wholly unsuitable for carrying out deep strikes, Grechko’s mention of them along with their nuclear-powered sister boats tended to create an impression of a submarine force most suitable for anti-ship missions and for theater strike missions in Western Europe. Had the Navy's SSBNs been assigned a share in the mission that held the commanding heights of the Soviet military mission structure, it seems most unlikely that the Defense Minister would not have portrayed the Navy in a more flattering light than to say as he did that "nuclear-powered and diesel-powered submarines with missile armaments, surface missile combatants, and missile-carrying aviation today constitute the main strike potential of our Navy".

Next it is appropriate to present the evidence as to whether or not the Navy retained throughout the 1966-1971 period the role of destroying naval forces at their bases (although not the bases per se) which the Navy was found to have prior to the XXIIIrd Party Congress in 1966. Six pieces of evidence were found in the Soviet media covering the 1966-1971 period that indicated the Navy had retained this role:
A. Combat Course of the Navy, 2nd ed., May, 1967: "The basic mission of our Navy in a future war will be to fight the naval forces of an enemy at sea and at bases."

B. Military Strategy, 3rd edition (1968): "In a future war, missions for the destruction of objectives on the shore, for the defeat of /task/ groups of the naval forces of the enemy, his strike aircraft carrier formations and missile submarines at /their/ bases and at sea, for the destruction of sea and oceanic communications will be carried out by strikes of the /Strategic/ Missile Forces with missile aviation" (p. 246). This statement was changed from the 2nd edition (pp. 251-252) in that a general reordering of mission priorities took place which changed strikes against "coastal regions" to ones against the shore 1/ and moved the latter up into first place and pushed down into second place the mission of destroying CVAs and SSBNs.

C. Military Strategy, 3rd edition: "At the same time /that the Navy's priority missions are to protect the USSR from nuclear strikes from CVAs and SSBNs/, the Navy will retain such important missions as fighting with the forces of the /enemy/ navy at sea /Beyond CVA and SSBN strike ranges/ and at bases, and also the interdiction of his oceanic and sea shipping" (p. 308).

D. Rear Admiral Rodionov, Udarnaya sila flota (The Strike Forces of the Navy), Moscow: DOSAAF, 1970: "Modern submarines...possess the capability of launching missile strikes while submerged not only against important coastal targets but also against objectives deep in enemy territory and against combatant ships and merchant ships at sea, at /their/ bases, and in ports....Juding from the materials in the foreign press, the naval command of the countries of the imperialist camp intend to use submarines, and first of all nuclear-powered submarines, for the accomplishment of the following basic missions: the launching of nuclear missile strikes against important objectives of the enemy's territory and against ships at /their/ bases and the destruction of submarines, surface combatant ships, and merchant ships at sea.... How do missile submarines operate against enemy ground objectives and ships which are at /their/ bases?

---

1/ As mentioned earlier, and as will be discussed more fully subsequently, the Russian word for "shore" (berega), although it carries a dictionary definition of "coast", is often employed to mean anywhere ashore, including deep inside a country.
According to Anglo-American views published in the press, the individual use of missile submarines is deemed most expedient. Important objectives are designated to each missile submarine before departure for sea and strictly secret regions for combat patrolling are specified from which they will launch their missiles.

In this naval academy textbook, from which the quote in paragraph A above was taken, we find a most unequivocal assertion that the "basic mission" of the Soviet Navy in a future war will include fighting "the naval forces of an enemy at sea and at their bases". Since a standard textbook for naval officers would seem to be the last place that the Soviets would be likely to plant misinformation in view of the fact that it could mislead the very group it was intended to instruct, this statement that the Navy's "basic mission" included fighting enemy naval forces at their bases would seem to merit credence.

As deduced from a previous example taken from Military Strategy, in Soviet statements such as in paragraph B in which several missions are said to be performed by more than one service, it cannot be assumed that each service is assigned all the missions listed. Accordingly, on the basis of this statement alone, one cannot reasonably conclude that striking U.S. CVAs and missile submarines at their bases remained a role assigned to Soviet SSBNs or one in which SSBNs had a major share.

Paragraph C, of course, constitutes an unequivocal claim that the Navy had indeed retained its role for striking SSBNs and CVAs at their bases. It need only be noted in addition that the wording of this passage had been altered from that in the 2nd edition (p. 312) which stated that "the basic mission
of our Navy in modern war will be combat with the enemy's naval forces at sea and at their bases. If one had to draw a conclusion just on the basis of this change in the 1968 edition of Military Strategy, one would have to conclude that the Navy's role against SSBNs and CVAs at their bases, while still retained by the Navy by 1968, had suffered a major downgrading from having been part of the Navy's "basic" mission in 1963 to having become just an "important" mission by 1968. In the Soviet system such hair-splitting distinctions appear to be quite important for determining the number and modernity of naval forces to be assigned training and forward deployment to be in readiness to carry out the various missions.

Although Rodionov nowhere specified that he was talking about Soviet SSBNs and made reference to the "foreign press" and the SSBN-employment policy of the "naval command of the countries of the imperialist camp", these were quite likely surrogates to discuss either existing Soviet policy in this regard or what Rodionov was advocating for that policy. There is no way of being confident, however, that the admiral actually was claiming that the Navy's SSBNs at the time retained a mission for striking CVAs and SSBNs in port. What is noteworthy in this quote is the clear indication in the final sentences that striking our major combatant ships at their bases is treated as a separate mission category in Soviet thinking. This fact justifies the present study's separate consideration of this category rather than as part of the mission against naval bases.

-96-
The evidence that militates against a conclusion that the Navy retained its pre-1966 role for striking SSBNs and CVAs at their bases is limited to the following two statements:

1. *Military Strategy*, 3rd edition (1968): "In a future war, the importance of the Navy as a whole will be determined by the nature of the new missions assigned it for destruction of enemy objectives on land as at sea" (p. 242).

The underlined portion replaced a phrase in the 2nd edition (p. 248) which specified that the Navy's new missions included "especially fighting the Navy of an aggressor at sea and at base". While this dropping of a specific mission requirement for strikes against the major naval combatants at their bases does not constitute adequate evidence to conclude that the mission assignment had been cancelled, such formulations are worked out in careful compromise and normally may be taken quite literally. However, in light of the other three statements already quoted in paragraphs A, B, and C above, the likelihood that the Navy retained an "important" mission against warships at their bases still remained high. What had happened essentially was that strategic defense against CVA and SSBN strikes had been recognized as the Navy's top priority mission with the result that fighting the enemy's naval forces at sea and at their bases had been moved down to a secondary but still "important" place.

2. *Military Strategy*, 3rd edition: "The Strategic Missile Forces will carry out a number of missions in the theaters of military action, in particular...destroying naval forces in the regions where they are based" (p. 297). "Nuclear submarines with 'Polaris' missiles can be destroyed at [their] bases by strikes of the Strategic Missile Forces and the Long-range Air Force" (p. 366).
Since both of these statements had been carried over unchanged from the 1963 (2nd) edition (pp. 302 and 399, respectively), they did not signify any change in the Navy's role in the mission against ships at naval bases. What these two quotes do suggest, however, is that in 1968 the SMF appears to have had primary if not exclusive rights to the anti-ships-inport role in the ground and naval theaters (which would not include the continental U.S.). This may well have left the Navy out of the picture with regards to strikes at the Polaris missile submarines present at their bases then situated at Holy Loch, Rota, and Guam. This suggests the possibility that the mission the Navy retained after 1968 for strikes against warships at their bases may have been limited all along to striking at CVAs in port.

On balance, from the limited evidence available, one cannot conclude with full certainty that the Navy had retained a mission against any major naval combatants that could be caught at their bases. However, as a working hypothesis for continued consideration in the 1971-1979 period remaining to be investigated, it is posited that the Navy did retain a role for strikes against major combatants in port, namely CVAs, but that primary ownership of the role for striking Polaris submarines at their bases outside the continental U.S. had been vested in the SMF.

Next to be considered is whether, during the 1966-1971 period, the Soviet Navy was assigned a share in the initial strategic strike mission against coastal targets, including
naval bases. All of the evidence relevant to this aspect of the strategic strike role of Soviet SSBNs for that period is listed below in chronological order:

A. Gorshkov, Naval Digest, October 1967: "In the mid-'50s the course was chosen to create in a short time a fully modern oceanic navy...capable of delivering strikes at an enemy in the oceans and in his coastal territory as well as of defending the USSR's own installations from oceanic directions. And such a navy is being built: (pp 11-12);

B. Gorshkov, Military Thought, January 1968: "In the mid-'50s, the Central Committee...and the Government made the decision to build an oceanic navy capable of carrying out strategic missions of an offensive nature. This required warships...capable of delivering strikes at an enemy at sea and in his coastal areas and of defending our own installations from oceanic directions. Such a navy has been built";

C. Military Strategy, 3rd ed., 1968: "In a future war, the significance of the Navy as a whole will be determined by the character of the new missions assigned it for destruction of enemy objectives on the land as at sea" (p. 242);

D. Military Strategy, 3rd ed., 1968: "To the number of main missions of the Navy in a future war belongs the interdiction of the oceanic and sea shipping of an enemy, the disorganization of his communications.... Actions against the communications of an enemy should be developed on a large scale from the very beginning of a war. The carrying out of this mission can be accomplished with strikes by the Strategic Missile Forces, Long-range Aviation, and missile submarines against naval bases and ports, canals and narrow straits, and against shipbuilding and ship-repair yards" (p. 366);

E. Gorshkov, Pravda, 14 February 1968: "In order to successfully carry out the missions assigned them, the main forces of the Navy must possess...the capability for delivering strikes on land objectives as well as on targets at sea. These requirements are met in the highest measure by nuclear-powered submarines of various designations and by Naval Aviation...."

F. Navy Day '68 "Materials" for political discussions, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 13, July 1968: "Nuclear-powered missile submarines of the Soviet Navy have been assigned to deliver strikes on an enemy in the oceans and on his overseas territory (p. 31);
G. Engineering Admiral Kotov, Labor, 28 July 1968: "...nuclear-powered submarines...together with naval aviation have become the main forces of our Navy. They are capable of annihilating the warships of an enemy in any region of the World Ocean and of delivering annihilating strikes on their bases and on objectives in his deep rear";

H. Vice Admiral Surabekov, Naval Digest, June 1969: "Western strategists consider that the main and first priority mission is the destruction of the important objectives of the enemy not only on the coasts but also in the depths of his territory. It is considered that the main forces of a navy for carrying out this mission are nuclear-powered missile submarines armed with ballistic missiles...";

I. Rear Admiral Rodionov, Strike Force of the Navy, signed to press 1 April 1970: "Modern submarines...possess the capability to launch missile strikes while submerged not only against important coastal targets but also against objectives deep in an enemy's territory...".

In paragraphs A and B above, we have the Navy Commander-in-Chief twice stating (in the professional journals of, first, the Navy and then that of the Armed Forces' General Staff) that one of the specific goals to which naval construction had been directed since the mid-50's had been acquisition of capabilities for strikes on "the enemy...in his coastal territories". The fact that Gorshkov substantially repeated his October 1967 Naval Digest assertion to this effect again three months later in a restricted-distribution journal, and one of the highest military professionalism, supports the conclusion that he was speaking in earnest rather than in an effort to enhance nuclear deterrence in Western perspectives. Moreover, he asserted in his Military Thought article that such a navy had been built, i.e., that the key prerequisite for actual assignment of the anti-coastal strike mission to the Navy had been met.
Then in paragraph C the 1968 edition of Military Strategy is found in a passage added to that edition to be speaking of "new" missions assigned the Navy for destruction of enemy objectives on the land as at sea". Moreover, these "new missions", which are said to include an assignment against some unidentified targets on land, are stated to be of such importance that they will determine "the significance of the Navy as a whole" in any future war. Since the evidence already considered regarding the possibility that a share in the deep-strike mission might have been assigned the Navy balanced out strongly in the negative, the second most logical possibility to account for the "new missions" assignment against targets "on-the-land" described in paragraph C would be a share in the initial strikes against coastal targets. And just such an assignment was what Gorshkov had been advocating in his October 1967 article in Naval Digest and his January 1968 piece in Military Thought (paragraphs A and B, respectively). Accordingly, these three statements in paragraphs A, B, and C taken together constitute a good basis for the working hypothesis that the Navy, in fact, was assigned a formal mission to share in the initial strikes against coastal targets by the spring of 1968 when the 3rd edition of Military Strategy appeared.

In the light of this analysis, the statements by Admiral Gorshkov in the 14 February 1968 issue of Pravda (para. E) and in the early July 1968 "Materials" for Navy Day political discussions (para. F) take on clearer meaning. In the previous consideration of their meaning in connection with a possible
deep-strike role for the Navy's SSBNs, it was noted that one could not tell for sure whether a Navy role in strikes against land targets was being announced or merely advocated. Now, in view of the nature of the statements in paragraphs A, B, and C above, it appears much more likely that the statements in paragraphs E and F were announcing that the Navy finally had been formally assigned a strategic strike mission against land targets, specifically against coastal ones.

By specifying "coastal" targets, the two subsequent statements in 1969 by Vice Admiral Surabekov (para. H) and in 1970 by Rear Admiral Rodionov (para. I) are consistent with, and give support to, this likelihood that the Navy's SSBNs finally by the spring of 1968 were assigned a limited share in the initial strategic strike mission, i.e., against coastal targets.\(^1\)

As for the ancillary matter of whether or not the destruction of naval bases per se (rather than the warships present in them) was included in the coastal strike mission that appears to have been assigned the Navy by the spring of 1968, paragraphs D and G are relevant. In the former, Military Strategy repeats in 1968 what it had said in the 1962 and 1963 editions about naval bases being included in the target list for any anti-SLOC campaign. The statement by Engineering Admiral Kotov published in a 1968 Navy Day article (para. G) contains the only evidence supporting a hypothesis that the main continental U.S. naval bases had been included in the Navy's assignment of a coastal

\(^1\)Both of these statements specified "coastal" targets after "not only", a good indication, as noted earlier, that they were assigned missions -- while the deep strike mission specified after the "but also" wording could be assumed safely to be the ones whose assignment to the Navy were being advocated.
strike mission. And Kotov only said "bases" rather than "naval bases". So, he may well have been using the word loosely in reference to "military" targets as opposed to counterforce ones. Accordingly, the question as to whether or not the Navy in 1968 was assigned the major continental U.S. naval bases along with other coastal targets must remain unanswered pending the consideration of additional evidence from the 1971-1976 period. However, more as a matter of logic than of evidence, the working hypothesis is posited that the major continental U.S. naval bases were included as part of the coastal strike mission assigned the Navy's SSBNs in the spring of 1968.

On balance, assignment to the Navy of a coastal strike mission by the spring of 1968 would appear to have been a very rational decision to make at the time that the nearly three dozen Yankee Class SSBNs had been programmed and were starting to slide off the ways without a suitable prior mission assignment on which to plan the training, deployment and logistics support for this major force in search of a mission. It is unlikely that Gorshkov was satisfied, especially when he contemplated the major role in the initial deep-strike mission accorded the U.S. counterpart of his burgeoning SSBN force. More will be given on this and Gorshkov's continuing campaign for a role in the main strategic strike mission when this account reaches the 1971-1976 period between the XXIVth and XXVth Party Congresses.

Before beginning on that period, there remains only the European ground theater aspect of the Navy's 1961-1966 roles
in strategic strike to consider -- and the material on that subject is both mercifully brief and reasonably conclusive.

In sum, the available evidence is limited to the following five quotes from the 1968 edition of *Military Strategy* and a sixth from the naval academy textbook *The History of Naval Art* which appeared in the fall of 1969. All five of these *Military Strategy* excerpts remained unchanged from the 2nd edition:

A. *Military Strategy*, 3rd edition: "At the same time /as carrying out its initial deep-strike mission/, the Strategic Missile Forces will carry out a number of missions in the theaters of military action, in particular for defeating the important groupings of ground forces and aviation, for destroying operational means of nuclear attack, naval forces in the regions where they are based, and supply bases, and for disrupting the command and control systems of the enemy. The carrying out of these missions will create favorable conditions for the successful conduct of combat operations by the Ground Forces and the other services of the Armed Forces for achieving the aims of the war" (p. 297; p. 302 of the 2nd edition);

B. *Military Strategy*, 3rd edition: "The actions of the Navy /like the SMF's/ also must not be tied to the ground theaters since, in modern conditions, it is assigned basically to conduct warfare on the oceanic expanses, often far from the ground theaters of military action" (p. 341; p. 370 of 2nd edition);

C. *Military Strategy*, 3rd edition: "... the Strategic Missile Forces, Long-range Air Force, and missile-armed submarines will deliver strikes on strategic objectives in the theaters of military action also /as for deep strikes/ destroying simultaneously groups of enemy forces, among them the reserves, the base areas for operational-tactical nuclear means, communications, the system of military control, etc." (p. 342; p. 372 of the 2nd edition).

D. *Military Strategy*, 3rd edition: "The main aim for military actions for naval forces in oceanic and sea theaters is the defeat of the enemy navy and interdiction of his oceanic and sea communications. Together with these, the fleets can /If circumstances require/ carry out missions for delivering nuclear-missile strikes on shore objectives, cooperate with the Ground Forces, conduct shipping at sea and the defense of our own communications" (p. 363; p. 396 of 2nd edition);
E. Military Strategy, 3rd edition: "It is not excluded that naval forces may be assigned for strikes at groupings of enemy troops and his nuclear means in coastal sectors. This mission can be carried out successfully by missile-armed submarines, aviation, and shore missile batteries" (p. 367; p. 400 of 2nd edition); and

F. The History of Naval Art: "The submarine-aviation Navy of the Soviet Union has gone out onto the oceanic expanses. Groupings of its forces, armed with nuclear-missile weapons, will be capable, if it is required, of destroying ground objectives in any territory of the enemy and his naval forces in any region of the World Ocean. The Navy also remains the reliable assistant to the Ground Forces that are carrying out combat missions in coastal sectors" (p. 562).

The Navy's missile submarines are listed in the passage from Military Strategy quoted in paragraph C above with (but after) the SMF and LRAF for delivering strikes on strategic objectives in the theaters of military action. This would seem to imply that the Soviet SSBNs had been assigned a role in strikes at the NATO ground forces in European coastal areas. Moreover, by asserting, in the sentence of the passage quoted in paragraph F from The History of Naval Art, that the Navy "remains a reliable assistant of the Ground Forces", it seems clear that the implication would follow logically that the Navy had been assigned a ground theater strike role in support of the Army.

However, this does not seem to be the case. As may be seen from the quotation in paragraph E, such an assignment was still indicated to be of a contingency nature by the "it is not excluded"
phrase. The same situation is implied in the passage quoted in paragraph D which indicates that, while the Navy's main aim is defeat of an enemy navy in oceanic and sea theaters, it could deliver strikes on shore targets in support of the Army should the need for such missile-fire support by the SSBNs become overriding.

Although it seems like an anomaly that the Navy's SSBNs have not had a ground theater strike role all along, two of the probably most important underlying factors are: 1) that the SMF been created specifically for the purpose of striking at land targets and, as evidenced by the writings of the Commander-in-Chief of the SMF, Marshal Krylov, and the annual SMF Day articles in Communist of the Armed Forces, the SMF's sole mission assignment was being defended against diminution with great assiduousness. A second likely reason is that stated in the sentence in paragraph B above. If the Navy were officially assigned a European theater strike role in support of the Ground Forces, the Army marshals who dominate the Defense Ministry could be counted on to repeat their World War II performance in demanding so much naval support that the Navy would be unable to properly carry out its supposedly main mission for fighting the enemy's navy.

In summary then for the 1966-1971 period from the XXIIIrd Party Congress to the XXIVth, it appears that the roles of the Navy's SSBNs in strategic strike at the time the latter Congress convened in the spring of 1971 were as follows:
1. Deep strategic strike -- still no role assigned. The SSBNs still have only a reserve, backup role to the SMF in the event the latter proved unable to destroy all of its assigned targets;

2. Strikes vs. naval forces in port -- the evidence is inconclusive but suggests that, while the Navy may have retained a strike role vs. CVAs in port, the SMF acquired the primary responsibility for the in-port destruction of the U.S. Polaris SSBN force (which had been built during the period);

3. Strikes vs. U.S. coastal targets, including naval bases -- Finally by the spring of 1968, the Navy's SSBNs had been assigned a formal mission to share in such strikes with the SMF and the LRAF in the initial period of any general nuclear war; and

4. Strikes in European ground theaters--no role assigned the Navy, although SSBNs could be so tasked if the requirement for SSBN missile-fire support were deemed to override the importance of the Navy's regularly assigned missions.
VII. NAVY ADVOCACY OF A DEEP STRIKE ROLE FOR SSBNs FAILS 1971-1976

At the XXIVth Party Congress in late March and early-April of 1971, Defense Minister Grechko, in his 2 April "responsibility report" to the Congress, never made any specific reference to the SMF or the individual services. Rather he placed unprecedented stress on the strategic deterrence role of the Armed Forces and probably mentioned the USSR's capability for a retaliatory (deep) strike to "any point on earth" only to lend weight to the new line emphasizing deterrence that he, in effect, was enunciating. He spoke first of the "mission of the Soviet Armed Forces as a mighty factor for the preservation of peace". After vividly portraying the alleged threat from the U.S. and other NATO countries, he added that the Soviet Union together with the other socialist states are capable of retaliating in force with overwhelming power against any aggressor. Further on in his speech, he expanded on this point for emphasis: "In the armaments of the Soviet Army are weapons possessing great destructive force and capable of reaching any point on earth, which enables the Armed Forces to carry out successfully combat missions on land, in the air, and at sea".

For the 1971-1976 period between the XXIVth and XXVth Party Congresses attention will be given first to all the following-listed evidence relevant to determining whether or not the Navy's SSBNs finally were given a share with the SMF in the initial deep strategic strike against the United States (underlining supplied):

1. Unsigned article, "The Nuclear-powered Missile Submarines of the Naval Forces of the Capitalist Countries", Naval Digest, April 1971: "The military commands of the U.S. and NATO countries consider that nuclear-powered missile submarines, due to their high combat stability, are at present a most important component of the strategic offensive forces of the bloc. Precisely because of this, first priority attention has been given over the past decade to construction of the nuclear-powered, missile submarine fleet" (p. 189);

2. "Materials for Discussion and Reports" on Navy Day-'71, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 12, June 1971: "...The improved weapons...with which modern navies have been equipped during the course of the revolution in military affairs have sharply expanded the areas of application of navies and makes it possible for them to deliver strikes against military targets and groups of forces at any point in the world" (p. 39);

3. Marshal Grechko, On Guard Over Peace and the Construction of Communism: Implementing the Decisions of the XXIVth Party Congress, Signed to press 14 June 1971: "The Strategic Missile Forces, which comprise the basis of the combat strength of our Armed Forces, are assigned the destruction of the enemy's means for nuclear attack, the major grouping of his troops and military bases, the destruction of military-economic installations, the disorganization of state and military command, and the work of the rear and of the transport of an aggressor....this branch of the Soviet Armed Forces is now the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor" (p. 41). The main force of our Navy--nuclear-powered submarines--are capable of destroying from great distance both sea targets and important objectives situated on the sea coast and in the rear of an enemy" (p. 48);

4. Marshal Grechko, Naval Digest, July 1971: "The new weapons and combat equipment have sharply increased the scope for the employment of the forces of the Navy and permit it to deliver powerful strikes at military objectives and on groups of forces at any point on earth. The Strategic Missile Forces, together with the nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines, constitute the main means for deterrence of an aggressor" (p. 5);

5. Gorshkov, Pravda, 25 July 1971: "The Navy has received nuclear-missile weapons capable of reaching any point on earth. Nuclear-powered submarines armed with such weapons, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, are the main means for deterrence of any aggressor--the reliable shield of the world socialist system. It is appropriate to draw attention to the 'oceanic strategy' of the U.S....which envisages transferring the main nuclear capability from land to the World Ocean. Militarist U.S. circles are giving priority to the development of submarine missile systems, considering them less vulnerable than missiles based on the ground or underground";
6. Fleet Admiral Kasatonov, Red Star, 25 July 1971: "Armed with ballistic missile having an enormous range...they /SSBNs/ can deliver powerful strikes on an enemy's shore military targets from any point of the World Ocean";

7. Rear Admiral Burlachenko, Turkmenian Spark, 25 July 1971: "We have at our disposal an adequate number of nuclear-powered submarines, which are capable of reaching any point on the surface of the globe....These submarines, armed with ballistic and other missiles, are capable of destroying enemy ships over distances of hundreds of kilometers and of launching submerged strikes against his strategic objectives over thousands of kilometers....Our Navy now possesses great strategic capabilities, which will be skillfully employed against any seaborne enemy should an aggressor dare start a war";

8. Doctor of Naval Science, Professor, Rear Admiral Stalbo, Naval Digest, August 1971: "Together with the Strategic Missile Forces, it /"our oceanic Navy"/ became a most important means of the Supreme High Command, capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of an armed conflict in theaters of military action of vast extent" (p. 95). /Note: The foregoing was cited by Stalbo (correctly) as a verbatim quote from Gorshkov's February 1967 Naval Digest article, p. 20/. "...We meet for the first time with the concept of 'the oceanic strategy'. In other words, an entirely new course for American 'grand strategy' comes to light. The military part of it turns out to be oriented primarily toward one armed service--the Navy. The essence of 'the oceanic strategy' is comprised first of all of a shift of the center of gravity of the capabilities of the strategic nuclear forces of the country into the sphere of action of the Navy..." (pp. 95-96);

9. Materials for SMF Day, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1971: "The Strategic Missile Forces have become now the main striking force of our Army, the basic combat power of the USSR, the reliable means for the deterrence of an aggressor and his decisive defeat in the event of war. This service of the Armed Forces has in its armament the most modern missiles of strategic designation...capable of reliably delivering on target nuclear warheads of colossal power...The Strategic Missile Forces are in constant readiness, are uninterruptedly on combat duty, capable of immediately delivering an annihilating strike on any aggressor in any part of the planet....The high combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces, however, does not lessen the significance of the other services of the Armed Forces. Soviet military doctrine holds that, for final victory in a modern war, it is necessary to employ the united forces of all services and service branches of the Armed Forces." The SMF Day "Materials" go on to mention that the Ground Forces were being modernized and then disposed of the other services in short shrift: "The combat capabilities of the PVO, Air Forces and Navy have grown immeasurably" (pp. 27-28);
10. Gorshkov, Pravda, 30 July 1972: "Nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, are the main means for the deterrence of any aggressor...the presence of Soviet warships in the World Ocean serves as an impressive deterrence factor against any attempts at surprise aggression against our state and against the countries of the Socialist Commonwealth";

11. Gorshkov interview, Narodna Armiya (in Bulgarian), 29 July 1972: "To be able to successfully carry out the missions assigned them, a modern Navy must have great striking power, high combat stability, and the capability of delivering strikes against land and sea objectives that comprise the enemy's basic military strength. At present, nuclear-powered missile submarines and missiles of various types and the missile-carrying Naval Air Force exhibit maximum response to these requirements";

12. Fleet Admiral Kasatonov, Red Star, 30 July 1972: "The combat capabilities of present-day navies have risen markedly. They are capable of operating and of delivering strikes at the enemy's objectives and groupings /i.e., of forces/ at virtually any point of the globe. This means that the actions of naval forces could exert enormous influence on the entire course of a war...";

13. Engineer Admiral Kotov, Rural Life, 30 July 1972: "Our nuclear-powered submarines are the main strike force of the Navy...they are capable of...inflicting strikes on important shore objectives";

14. Rear Admiral Shablikov, Light of the East, 30 July 1972: "Submarines armed with ballistic missiles are capable of destroying ships at a distance of hundreds of kilometers and of delivering strikes from beneath the water against strategic enemy targets at great distances";

15. "Materials" for SMF Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 19, October 1972: "...the Strategic Missile Forces...have become the main strike force of our Armed Forces, the basic means for the deterrence of an aggressor and his decisive defeat in case of war" (p. 37)....In recent years, the firepower, striking force, and mobility of the Ground Forces increased significantly....The combat capabilities of the PVO Forces of the country, the Air Forces, and of the Navy grew immeasurably" (p. 38);

16. General of the Army Kulikov, Party Life No. 24, December 1972: "The main striking power of the Soviet Armed Forces is comprised of the Strategic Missile Forces which are armed with modern weapons unprecedented in history--powerful strategic intercontinental and intermediate-range missiles and modern means of automated control. These forces, which are in a state of constant readiness and in which is concentrated colossal striking power, are capable of delivering an annihilating strike at any aggressor. These forces will play the main and decisive role in a nuclear war....The role and power of the qualitatively new, ocean-going Navy have increased immeasurably. Nuclear-powered submarines armed with a variety of powerful missile weapons are now the basis of the striking power of the Navy";
17. Gorshkov, Naval Digest, December 1972: "Realistically appraising the threat to the security of our country, the Central Committee of the CPSU saw that the way out of the situation which had been created lay in opposing the forces of aggression in the World Ocean with the Strategic Counterforces of Defense whose basis is comprised of the Strategic Missile Forces and the oceanic Navy... In our modern Navy the Armed Forces have acquired a powerful instrument of defense in the oceanic areas, a formidable force for the deterrence of aggression which is constantly ready to deliver devastating retaliatory strikes and thwart the plans of the imperialists. And that is their main mission—defense of the country from assault by an aggressor from oceanic directions—which the Navy is carrying out successfully together with other services of the Soviet Armed Forces" (pp. 20-21);

18. Grechko, Red Star, 17 December 1972: "The Strategic Missile Forces constitute the basis of the Armed Forces' combat might. They are equipped with intercontinental and intermediate-range missiles and the latest automated means of control. Their aim in a war...is to deliver an accurate and annihilating strike against the aggressor, against the enemy's means of nuclear attack, against troop and naval groupings in theaters of military action on land and sea, and to disorganize the activities of the rear, and of transportation and organs of state and military control. Under modern conditions, the Strategic Missile Forces are the most important means for curbing the aggressive aspirations of the imperialist forces and a reliable guarantee against all contingencies... The Navy has evolved into a formidable force. The main strike force of our Navy consists of nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range missiles and homing torpedoes... Soviet naval personnel have repeatedly demonstrated on long cruises their readiness to carry out the most complex missions";

19. Gorshkov, Naval Digest, February 1973:
   (a) "...nuclear weapons... enabled the submarine forces of the Navy to become part of the strategic nuclear forces of the country. The ballistic missiles of submarines insure the capability for destroying from different directions the strategic targets of an enemy located in the depths of his territory" (p. 19).
   (b) "Thus, in regard to its equipping with strategic nuclear weapons, the Navy objectively acquires the capability not only of sharing in the destruction of the military-economic potential of an aggressor but also becomes one of the most important factors for deterrence of a nuclear attack. In this connection, missile submarines, due to their greater survivability in comparison to land-based missiles, are an even more effective means of deterrence" (p. 21);
   (c) "The basic mission assignments of the great powers' navies in a world nuclear war under modern conditions are sharing in the strikes by the strategic nuclear forces of a country, damage-limiting of the nuclear strikes of the enemy navy from oceanic directions, and participating in the operations conducted by ground forces in continental theaters of military action" (p. 21);
(d) "Soviet naval personnel consider their top priority responsibility to be maintenance of a high readiness by all of the forces of the Navy for carrying out the mission for the defense of the state from oceanic directions...to be a reliable shield against enemy strikes from the sea" (p. 25);

20. Grechko, Pravda, 23 February 1973: "The Strategic Missile Forces have taken the leading place in the structure of our Armed Forces. The country's Ground Forces and Air Defense Forces, the Air Forces and the Navy have acquired new capabilities";

21. General of the Army Kulikov, Communist No. 3, February 1973: "The combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces is based on the Strategic Missile Forces....The Navy is a formidable force. Its main striking arm, nuclear-powered missile submarines armed with ballistic missiles, combines great destructive power, mobility, and virtual invulnerability. The Navy also has/surface/ ships for various purposes and modern missile-carrying naval aircraft. This enables the Navy to carry out a vast range of missions";

22. Scientific-Technological Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs, Colonel General Lomov (Ed.), Published In Spring 1973: "...the Strategic Missile Forces are the basis of the military might of our Armed Forces..../Its/ missile strikes will be directed mainly at objectives and targets which are deep in the enemy rear /and/ to the entire depth of the theaters of military action....One thermonuclear warhead is sufficient to obliterate an entire city. This means that not only individual targets and objectives on enemy territory can be destroyed but also entire military-economic regions....The high dependability of reaching the target is also an important characteristic of strategic missiles....The enormous combat strength and constant readiness...make them the main means for thwarting the aggressive inclinations of the imperialists....At present, nuclear-powered submarines and missile-carrying aircraft are the main strike forces of our Navy. These means, and above all the nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines, can strike important enemy objectives located deep in his territory as well as groupings of enemy forces";

23. Gorshkov, Soviet Warrior No. 13, July 1973: "Nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, are the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor and a reliable shield for the world socialist system";

24. Admiral Amel'ko, Military Knowledge, July 1973: "Nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, are the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor....Nuclear-powered submarines, armed with underwater-launched ballistic missiles and homing torpedoes, and Naval Aviation are the main strike force of the Navy;

26. "Admiral Oleynik, Rural Life, 29 July 1973: 'Submarine-borne ballistic missiles now can hit important targets from long range. Missiles...have become an important means of combatting surface ships....Nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, are the main means for deterrence of an aggressor and a reliable shield for the world socialist system';

27. Vice Admiral Novikov, Socialist Industry, 29 July 1973: "The new material and technical base has sharply improved the Navy's capabilities for waging an armed conflict at sea. Nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, are the main means for deterrence of an aggressor and constitute a reliable shield for the countries of the Socialist Commonwealth";

28. Marshal of (Naval) Aviation Borzov, PVO Herald, July 1973: "Nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range underwater-launched ballistic missiles and homing torpedoes are the pride of the Soviet people....Nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles are capable of destroying from great distances both sea targets and important targets located in the coastal area and in the rear of an enemy. Together with the Strategic Missile Forces they are the main means for the deterrence of any aggressor" (p. 13);

29. General Tolubko speech, Tass in English, 16 November 1973: "General of the Army Vladimír Tolubko noted that Soviet strategic rockets have a practically unlimited range of operation. The Ground Forces, the Air Force, Navy and anti-aircraft defense forces are armed with powerful rockets....The creation of the Strategic Missile Forces became the most substantial expression of the cardinal reorganization of the Soviet Armed Forces, Tolubko stressed. 'They now form the backbone of the Soviet Army's [i.e., Armed Forces'] combat might.'";

30. General Grigoryev, Radio Moscow, in English, 18 November 1973: "...the Strategic Missile Forces...have become the main strike force and the chief means for the deterrence of an aggressor and for launching retaliation in case of an attack on this country....The Strategic Missile Forces are always ready for action and they are the main strike force of the Soviet Armed Forces and the chief barrier in the way of aggressive imperialist schemes";
31. Marshal Grechko, Communist No. 3, February 1974: "The services of the Armed Forces and the branches of the services have changed out of all recognition and the correlation between them /of missions assigned/ has been altered. The decisive service of the Armed Forces is the Strategic Missile Forces. The combat capabilities of the Ground Forces, the country's Air Defense Forces, the Air Forces, and the Navy have increased considerably";

32. Gorshkov, Soviet Patriot, 20 February 1974: "The Strategic Missile Forces are being modernized. They are equipped with weapons of enormous destructive force, high accuracy, and now constitute the basis of the military might of the USSR. Our Navy...is carrying out its mission for defense of state interests and the maritime boundaries of our Homeland...";

33. Marshal Vasilevskiy, Speech for Armed Forces Day, Tass, 22 February 1974: "The Marshal stressed the role of the Strategic Missile Forces as the main means for deterrence of an aggressor. 'They have been developed in recent years', he said. The marshal noted the improvement of the Ground Forces, the Air Defense Forces, the Air Forces, and the Navy. 'The Navy's main strike force--the nuclear powered submarine armed with ballistic missiles--has tremendous destructive power and great mobility', said the marshal";

34. General of the Army Pavlovskiy, Armed Forces Day speech, Radio Moscow, 23 February 1974: "The Soviet Army and Navy have modern weapons and first-class military equipment. Their military might is based on the Strategic Missile Forces.... Our Navy has changed completely and is based on nuclear-missile submarines armed with ballistic missiles";

35. Captain First Rank Vlasov, Naval Digest, March 1974: "Nuclear-missile armament give them /"nuclear-powered (ballistic) missile submarines/ the capability for delivering powerful strikes on strategic objectives located in the territory of an enemy while cruise missiles and the newest torpedoes have the capability of destroying various surface ships in the ocean" (p. 22);

36. Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, 1st edition, signed to press 9 April 1974: "The basis of the combat might of the Soviet Army and Navy now is comprised of the Strategic Missile Forces which most fully /of all the military services/ incorporate the achievements of modern scientific and technological progress. They are equipped with missiles of intercontinental and intermediate range...are constantly on watch and ever ready for a retaliatory strike on an aggressor (p. 95).... At the present time, nuclear-powered submarines are the main means capable of carrying out the basic missions of the Navy. They can deliver strikes from great distances on land targets located on the sea coast and in the rear of an enemy as well as on sea targets" (p. 98). Note: A revised and expanded second edition of this book was signed to press on 26 March 1975. The passages above appeared, respectively, on pp. 102 and 105. They remained unchanged with the sole exception that the "now" underlined above was dropped from the 2nd edition.
37. Gorshkov, Navy Day speech, Tass in English, 28 July 1974: "Judging from the development trends of navies and their armaments, action against ground targets is becoming a navy's foremost objective today. Of course, the task of combating the enemy's fleet still remains... If need be, Soviet naval seamen will successfully manage to solve both these tasks";

38. Gorshkov, Pravda, 28 July 1974: "A Navy has always had two main missions: to counter the enemy's navy and to take actions against the shore. The first of these missions has had priority for many centuries. But since the Second World War the situation has begun to change. Judging from the development trends of navies and their weapons, action against ground targets is becoming a navy's foremost objective today. Therefore, defense of the country against assault from the sea assumes even more important significance for our armed forces. This is... the result of the development of submarines which, in a number of navies, now are the main delivery systems for strategic nuclear missiles. Of course, the mission of combating the enemy's navy still remains... If need be, Soviet naval seamen will successfully manage to carry out both of these missions";

39. Admiral Amel'ko, Rural Life, 28 July 1974: "Nuclear-powered submarines of various /mission/ designations constitute the basis of the military might of our Navy. Armed with long-range ballistic missiles with nuclear charges /and/ long-range homing torpedoes... they provide a capability to operate at any point of the World Ocean to destroy not only ships of any class but also strategic objectives located in the depths of the territory of the enemy";

40. Vice Admiral Novikov, Water Transport, 27 July 1974: "Nuclear-powered submarines which have missiles with underwater launch and homing torpedoes have become the most universal and powerful ships of the Navy. They serve as an important means for carrying out strategic missions";

41. Engineer Admiral Kotov, Socialist Industry, 28 July 1974: "The nuclear-powered submarines are the pride of the people... they have become capable of remaining underwater for very prolonged periods of time and covering enormous distances. Together with the nuclear-powered submarines, Naval Aviation is the main strike force of our Navy";

42. Admiral Bondarenko, Soviet Patriot, 28 July 1974: "Nuclear-powered submarines now constitute the basis of the strike forces of the Navy. In the submarines' arsenal are underwater-launchable ballistic missiles and homing torpedoes. The high cruising speed and the stealth of movement permits the nuclear-powered submarines, in a concise period of time, to take up an advantageous position and inflict an accurate strike on targets";
43. Vice Admiral Rudnev, *Pravda of the Ukraine*, 28 July 1974: "Nuclear-powered submarines...are armed with long-range ballistic missiles and homing torpedoes. In the event of necessity, a nuclear-powered submarine could cover a great distance and take up an advantageous position for inflicting a strike on an aggressor";

44. SMF Day "Materials" for speeches, *Communist of the Armed Forces* No. 21, November 1974: "The Strategic Missile Forces, possessing missiles of various yields and missions...constitute the basis of the combat might of our Armed Forces. Even in peacetime, they are in constant readiness, which makes them the reliable shield of the security of our Homeland...the basic means for the deterrence of an aggressor and the preservation of peace. The enormous combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces, assigned to carrying out strategic missions, and their role in modern war do not mean that the other services of the Armed Forces have lost their significance. Soviet military doctrine assumes that the aims of a war can be gained only by the united forces of all of the services and service branches of the Armed Forces" (p. 32);

45. Gorshkov, *Naval Digest*, December 1974:
   (a) "Considering the scale of conflict in its strategic aspect, it is necessary to take note of the constantly growing capabilities of the navies of the great powers to achieve ever more decisive aims. In particular, this applies to the actions of the strategic offensive forces for the destruction of major groupings of an enemy and, first of all, for knocking out his military-economic capability, which can exert an immediate effect on the course and even the outcome of a nuclear war" (p. 24);
   (b) "...the increase in the capabilities of strategic-missile submarines in carrying out missions for the destruction of ground objectives permits widening the front and increasing the depth of their pressure on an enemy....Thus, the sharp widening of the spatial scope of operations against ground objectives is not only a general principle but even the general prospect for the development of the naval art of the nuclear powers. From this, the corresponding growth also of the spatial scope of operations in a conflict with the sea-based systems of strategic nuclear weapons of an enemy is completely obvious. As a result, the combat activity of navies can embrace practically the entire expanse of the World Ocean and take on a global character" (p. 25);
   (c) "In the future, clearly, the strike will become the main method of employing naval forces. In this connection, it will be the sole method in the strategic category since only the delivery of strikes from vast distances and different directions will make it possible to achieve such a strategic aim as knocking out the military-economic capability of an enemy" (p. 25);
46. Doctor of Naval Science, Captain First Rank V'yunenko, Naval Digest, January 1975: "At the end of the '50s in the U.S.A. began the construction of nuclear-powered missile submarines which were considered a most important component of the strategic nuclear forces designated for the destruction of ground objectives in the territory of an enemy.... Large-scale work is being forced by all possible means for the creation of a new nuclear strategic submarine system 'Trident' and also for submarines armed with cruise missiles" (p. 37);

47. S. A. Tyushkevich, Philosophy and Military Theory, signed to press 21 April 1975: "The Strategic Missile Forces become the main service of the Armed Forces under conditions of the employment of nuclear weapons. The role is changing too of the other services of the Armed Forces: the Ground Forces, Aviation, the Navy /and/ the PVO. For example, the Navy cannot just conduct war at sea with like forces as it used to do. It has the capability, by means of nuclear-missile weapons, for taking part in the direct accomplishment of strategic results. Now enormous military might is concentrated in the Navy. Its individual weight among the other services of the Armed Forces has been increased" (p. 181);

48. Gorshkov, Problems of Philosophy, May 1975: "Only experimental testing made it possible to conclude that strategic missiles would have the decisive role in modern warfare and that the primary targets in a nuclear war would not be just the enemy's armed forces but also his economy, power system, military industry, and administrative centers.... Following this tradition of cooperation with other branches of the Armed Forces upon the appearance of the Strategic Missile Forces, the Navy immediately began working on cooperation with these new forces and was successful in this effort.... The Navy has become capable of operating worldwide, expanding its efforts not only over the World Ocean but also to land areas on distant continents.... Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons combined with various types of missiles and radio-electronics equipment have given the Navy new characteristics and advanced it to the ranks of the strategic forces capable of exerting a decisive influence not just on the course and outcome of major operations in large theaters of military action but also on the course of a war as a whole.... As an important part of the Armed Forces, the modern, ocean-going Navy gives them universality, increases their mobility and striking force, and makes them capable of cooperating with other branches of the Armed Forces, firmly stopping aggression and repelling assaults on our country no matter where they may originate. This is of paramount importance if we consider the fact that the imperialist powers have concentrated the lion's share of strategic weapons, which are directed against the Soviet Union, in the sphere of naval action";
49. Gorshkov, Soviet Military Review (in English), June 1975: "A Navy has always had two cardinal tasks: attacking the naval forces of the enemy and operations at the enemy shores. For a long period of time the first mission had priority over all other missions. From the Second World War onwards the situation began to change. Judging by the trends in the development of the navies and their weapons in the major countries, we see that the main task of a navy today is to deliver attacks on ground targets. Therefore, the defense of the country from attacks from the sea has acquired increased importance for the Soviet Armed Forces. This is the result of submarine development. In several navies submarines are the main carriers of strategic nuclear weapons. However, the mission of fighting the enemy navy still remains.... Its' main striking force consists of nuclear-powered submarines and missile-carrying aircraft";

50. Gorshkov, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 14, July 1975: "It is capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of major operations which take place in theaters of military actions of vast extent and depth. The modern Soviet Navy, possessing all different kinds of missiles, can carry out combat missions not only in the World Ocean but also even can exert an influence on the land territories of distant continents. This is one of the important factors for the deterrence of the aggressions of the imperialists.... At the present time, nuclear-powered submarines armed with various missiles and homing torpedoes...are the main means of carrying out the basic missions of the Navy" (p. 13);

51. Fleet Admiral Sergeyev, Naval Digest, July 1975: "In having such a navy, the Soviet Armed Forces have gained a new quality: universality, the capability to repel aggression from any, including from oceanic, directions. Equipped with modern combat means, the Navy, for the first time in the history of its development; has gotten the technical capability to destroy, undetectedly from underwater, military and economic centers located in the depths of the continents, influencing in a most decisive way the military-economic capabilities of an aggressor nation" (p. 7);
52. Vice Admiral Shablikov, Soviet Lithuania, 27 July 1975: "The Soviet Navy, together with the other services of the Armed Forces, has become an important means for the deterrence of an aggressor, a reliable shield covering the system of socialism".

53. SMF Day "Materials" for speeches. Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1975: "The Strategic Missile Forces, which have missiles of virtually unlimited range, basically determine the defensive might of our state. In peacetime, they are in constant combat readiness and serve as the reliable shield of the land of the Soviets...The enormous combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces and their role in modern war does not mean that the other services of the Armed Forces have lost their significance. In modern war, victory over an aggressor can be won only by the joint forces of all the services of the Armed Forces and all branches of the services....In the Navy this /basis of its might/ are modern missile delivery systems, nuclear-powered submarines armed with underwater-launchable ballistic missiles and the Coastal Missile Forces" (p. 32);

54. Gorshkov, Seapower of the State, Signed to press 27 November 1975:

(a) "Can submarines, despite the constant modernization of ASW means, achieve strategic aims in a war at sea? A great deal of research has affirmed the high effectiveness of submarines when properly employed and provided with combat support" (p. 309);

(b) "Thus, in nuclear-powered submarines are concentrated all of the basic indices which characterize the power of a navy: great striking power, high mobility and stealth, the capability for conducting combat actions on a global scale for destruction of important ground objectives /and/ the submarines and surface ships of an enemy. Consequently, in contemporary conditions, nuclear-powered submarines are strategic means of our Armed Forces" (p. 312);

(c) "Missile submarines are weapon platforms for powerful, long-range strategic missiles, which are designated for the destruction of important ground objectives of the enemy. They are the basic component of the combat might of the leading navies of the world, among them, of the Soviet Navy" (pp. 312-313);

(d) "Soviet nuclear-powered submarines are not only the platforms for tactical weapons but also constitute an inseparable part of the strategic nuclear shield of the Homeland" (p. 317);
(e) "Now the Navy is capable of carrying out strategic missions not only for the destruction of important objectives on enemy territory but also for the destruction of nuclear-missile submarines at sea" (p. 336);

(f) "Equipping navies with nuclear-missile weapons has strengthened at the present time the appearance of a trend to an increase in the significance of the activities of a navy against the shore (p. 354);

(g) "However, the course and outcome of a major war will be determined by events of global scale and by decisive aims for the accomplishment of which each of the sides will contend. Precisely to this will be directed the employment of the striking forces of the Navy. In other words, in all spheres of conflict of naval forces in modern conditions, a growing influence will be exerted to employ the forms and methods for the use of forces directly related to actions against the shore (p. 354);

(h) "And if before the basic part of the forces of a navy were directed against the naval forces of an enemy, then today the main aim of a navy becomes the insuring of the carrying out of all missions related to the actions against the ground objectives of the enemy and the defense of our own territory from the strikes of his navy" (p. 354);

(i) "...the launching positions for them [...submarines] are virtually the whole World Ocean. The Navy concentrates in itself numerous mobile strategic-weapon platforms, each of which can carry a very large number of missiles and is capable of shifting its launching position to areas many times larger than can be used by land-based missiles. Sea-based strategic weapon platforms also possess the capability of maneuvering in the depths, covered by a thickness of water and using it not only for protection but also for masking, which to a high degree increases the survivability of sea systems of strategic weapons. Thus, the objective conditions of armed conflict for a nuclear war advance the nuclear-missile navy to the role of nuclear-missile striking forces" (p. 454);
55. Colonel General Alekseyev, Red Star, 28 January 1976: "The Strategic Missile Forces are the main component of the Armed Forces. They are equipped with missiles capable of carrying warheads of colossal yield, of covering any distance, and delivering accurate and inescapable strikes against an aggressor....Nuclear submarines equipped with various missiles and homing torpedoes are now the main means for carrying out the Navy's basic missions";

56. Professor, Captain First Rank Potapov, Military-Historical Journal, February 1976: "Thus, the 'Polaris' submarine-missile system became /1/ a most important component part of the strategic nuclear force of American imperialism and, together with that, /2/ the basic strike force of the Navy in nuclear war. Accepting the nuclear-missile submarine system as one of the main components of the strategic offensive forces, the ruling circles of the U.S. gave special attention to the accelerated construction of their missile submarines" (pp. 81-82);

57. Captain First Rank Yuryevich, Naval Digest, February 1976: "...the superiority of the submarine nuclear-missile system consists of the stealth of missile submarines when patrolling the World Ocean, which raises their reliability over that of land-based and air missile systems....According to the opinion of officials of foreign states and military specialists, in the future, too, the basic nuclear-missile forces must be situated in the World Ocean" (p. 86);

58. Gorshkov, Red Star, 11 February 1976: "In the Navy's composition are modern nuclear-powered submarines with various missiles....";


For clarity of analysis, the pros and cons of whether, during the five years between the XXIVth and XXVth Party Congresses, the Navy's SSBNs were assigned a share in the main "deep" strike against either or both countervalue and counterforce targets in the continental U.S. during any initial nuclear exchange may be divided most meaningfully into the following categories -- which then include all of the foregoing quotes at least once:
Pro:

(1) Navy credited by Army leaders with the capability for "deep" strikes: 3, 22 and 36;

(2) Navy leaders claim the capability for "deep" strikes: 19, 39, 48 and 51;

(3) One claim by the leading naval strategic theorist that the Navy and SMF were important means of the Supreme High Command: 8;

Con:

(1) SMF credited as the means for strategic strike while Navy's missions are depicted as of far lesser importance: 9, 15, 16, 18, 20, 25, 29, 31, 32, 34, 44, 53 and 55;

(2) Navy capabilities or missions described in terms which not only failed to claim a share in the deep strike role but which seemed to exclude SSBN assignment to such a role: 2, 4, 6, 8, 11, 17, 32 and 50;

(3) Navy described in terms which, while not specifically excluding an SSBN share in the initial deep strike mission, failed to claim such a share, as would be expected normally if such a mission were assigned the Navy: 7, 12, 14, 21, 24, 33, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 47, 49, 50, 54 and 58;

(4) The U.S. is falsely claimed to have shifted to an "oceanic strategy" that puts primary emphasis on SSBNs: 5 and 8;

(5) A change is advocated in the existing policy of not assigning the Navy's SSBNs a share in the initial deep strike mission by recourse to a foreign-navy surrogate: 1, 19(c), 45(a), 46 and 56;

(6) A change in the existing policy of not assigning the Navy's SSBNs a share in the initial deep strike mission also is advocated by extolling the characteristics, including the alleged invulnerability, of Soviet SSBNs: 6, 7, 12, 48, 54 and 57;

(7) The non-assignment of Soviet SSBNs to a share in the initial deep strike mission seemingly is further indicated by statements claiming only a deterrent role (vice a strike role) for Soviet SSBNs: 4, 5, 10, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 50, 52 and 54;

(8) That the Navy's SSBNs were not even credited by two sources, including a distinguished Army marshal, with having a role with the SMF in strategic deterrence (for which the SSBNs were best suited) further heightens the unlikelihood that a role in the initial deep strike mission had been assigned them: 33 and 44.
Two claims that Soviet SLBMs are also anti-ship missiles as well as capable of being used against ground targets suggest the possibility that one important reason the SSBNs had not been assigned a share in the initial deep strike mission was a Soviet expectation they would soon be armed with anti-ship ballistic missiles: 14 and 28.

At this juncture it is necessary to take a more detailed look at those of the foregoing three "Pro" categories whose significance are not fully self-evident and require some elaboration. In the first of these, the Defense Minister on two occasions, once in mid-'71 (para. 3) and again in the spring of 1974 (para. 36), credited the Navy specifically with the capability for delivering strikes "in the rear" of an enemy. In both instances, however, acknowledgement of this capability of the Soviet SSBNs was preceded by what amounted to caveats that: 1) the Navy's nuclear-powered submarines were only the "main means" for the carrying out of the Navy's missions (rather than for sharing in the deep strike mission under the Supreme High Command) and 2) the SMF were credited on both occasions with being the "basis of the combat might" of the Soviet Armed Forces. This seems to imply, in sum, that while the Navy was acknowledged to have a deep strike capability, it was not assigned a share in the deep strike role. Otherwise, the Navy would have been still said to be "an important means of the Supreme High Command" and the missions of its nuclear-powered submarines would have been portrayed as "main means" of the Soviet Armed Forces rather than just of the Navy. If this were not convincing enough, one need only look at three other statements made by Grechko, as described below.

A month after his mid-'71 statement (paragraph 3), the only article under his name ever to appear in the Naval Digest (paragraph 4) limited the Navy's deep strike capabilities to counter-
force ("military") targets, thereby excluding the possibility that the Navy might have been assigned to the countervalue targets that constitute the heart of the deep strike mission. Then in two other articles which appeared in February 1975 (paragraphs 31 and 32), which was less than two months before the appearance of the second of his statements discussed above (paragraph 36), the Defense Minister described the SMF as "the decisive service of the Armed Forces" (paragraph 31) and as "the basis of the military might of the USSR" (paragraph 32). By contrast, the Navy came off very poorly as nothing more than a military service whose "combat capabilities", along with those of the Ground Forces, PVO, and Air Forces, were said to have "increased considerably" (paragraph 31) and whose missions were merely those for "defense of the state interests and maritime boundaries of the Homeland" (paragraph 32).

The only other two articles by Grechko during the 1971-1976 period between Party Congresses (paragraphs 18 and 20) were consistent with the five already described. In Red Star of 17 December 1972 (paragraph 18) the SMF was said to "constitute the basis of the Armed Forces' combat might" while "nuclear-powered submarines, armed with long-range missiles and homing torpedoes" were again described as the "main strike force" of just the Navy and only capable of carrying out "complex missions". In a 23 February 1973 article in Pravda (paragraph 20), the SMF was said by Grechko to have "taken the leading place in the structure of our Armed Forces" and the relatively unimportant roles of the other services was made clear by passing them off as merely having acquired "new capabilities".
From these nine examples of the Defense Minister's views on the SMF's and Navy's contributions to the deep-strike role, it is abundantly clear that the latter's role could not conceivably have been anything more than a minor share in the deep strike at counterforce targets. Moreover, it seems from the foregoing that the Navy's SSBNs in all probability still were limited to the reserve, backup role to the SMF in case the latter service was unable to destroy all of its assigned targets in the initial deep strike and required the Navy's help subsequently.

The other statement (besides the two from Grechko already discussed) that was referenced in the first of the "Pro" categories at the outset of this section was one that appeared in a book edited by one of the USSR's most eminent military theorists, Colonel General Lomov (paragraph 22). In the important book *Scientific-Technological Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs*, the SMF was described as "the basis of the military might of our Armed Forces" whose missile strikes would be "directed mainly at objectives and targets which are deep in the enemy rear" as well as to "the entire depths" of the TVDs. Nuclear-missile submarines were lumped together with the Naval Air Forces and portrayed as "the main strike forces" of just the Navy.

While it was stated that "these means, and above all the nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines, can strike impor-
tant enemy objectives located deep in his [The enemy's] territory", the bracketing of the Navy's SSBNs with the maritime-configured, long-range missile aircraft of the Navy served to highlight even further the very secondary nature of the former's allotted role in deep strike. Additionally, this statement appeared to indicate that both of the "main striking forces" of the Navy were designated as reserve, backup forces for the SMF even though the SSBNs far greater capabilities were acknowledged by giving them an "above-all" billing. The fact that the poorly-suited naval aircraft were mentioned along with the SSBNs, in what surely could have been nothing more than a reserve, backup role for the SMF, suggests that the role itself was largely nominal and not considered important.

Next to be examined are the second category of "Pro" statements, those by Navy leaders which claimed a deep strike capability (paragraphs 19, 39, 48 and 51). Two of these claims were made by Gorshkov (19 and 48) and the others (39 and 51) by two admirals serving as his deputies at the time, so it is not unreasonable to expect that the latter two were orchestrated by the Navy Commander-in-Chief. All three of the admirals stated explicitly that the Navy had developed the capability to strike at the "depths" of enemy territory (19, 39 and 51).

In the fourth of these claims (para. 48), that by Gorshkov in the May 1975 issue of Problems of Philosophy, the Navy chief achieved the same effect, although in a more sophisticated and
convoluted manner befitting the erudite journal in which the article appeared. He began his argument on the subject by stating the twin assumptions of Soviet military doctrine that "strategic missiles would play the decisive role in modern warfare and that the primary targets in a nuclear war would not be just the enemy's armed forces but also his economy, power system, military industry, and administrative centers". He then asserted that, like a good Navy should, the Soviet Navy had striven since the day the SMF had been formed to develop a (deep strike) capability so that the Navy could "cooperate" with the SMF. The Navy's efforts had met with full success, Gorshkov claimed, thereby implying broadly, as indicated by the context, that it had become capable of delivering deep strikes on the four types of countervalue targets that he had just enumerated (as quoted above). He concluded with the observation that the Navy had become capable of worldwide operations, including strikes "against land targets in distant continents". So, while he refrained from repeating the explicit claim in his February 1973 Naval Digest article that the ballistic missiles of his submarines had acquired a capability against "strategic targets in the depths" of enemy territory, he accomplished the same end with the line of argument just described.¹/¹

¹/¹It should be noted in passing that in this Problems of Philosophy article Gorshkov felt far freer than he did when writing in the popular press or even the Naval Digest to express what probably reflected his true convictions about the importance of the Navy in any general nuclear war. The Navy, he asserted, had been "advanced to the ranks of the strategic forces capable of exerting a decisive influence not just on the course and outcome of major operations in large theaters of military action but also on the course of a war as a whole...". Seemingly implicit in this assertion was the proviso that the Navy could only realize this potential capability if it were assigned a major share with the SMF in the initial deep strike mission.
Two of these four claims to a deep strike capability by Gorshkov and his two deputies contained novel changes in the usual stock formulations that carried some relevant implications. In his February 1973 article in *Naval Digest* (paragraph 19a), Gorshkov phrased his deep strike claim by saying that his SSBNs "insure the capability" for deep strike. This was an unprecedented claim in Soviet writings, whether in this wording or any other. Unless this phrase is interpreted as intended by Gorshkov to imply that the SMF was incapable of launching its ICBMs for the initial strike (which seems highly unlikely since it seemingly would have constituted both a gratuitous insult and a mortal affront to the SMF and to most of the marshals), it seems probable that the Navy Commander-in-Chief was implying that the "insuring" would not begin until right after the initial nuclear exchange but then would continue throughout the course of the war. This, of course, would be nothing less, nor more, than the reserve, backup role "to insure the capability" for deep strike should the SMF fall on its face.

The other one of the four quotations that introduced a significant change to the standard formulations was taken from an article in the *Naval Digest* of July 1975 signed by the Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy, Fleet Admiral Sergeyev (paragraph 51). He phrased his claim that the Navy had gained a deep strike "capability" by modifying that noun with the adjective "technical".
If this one-word change was intended to convey to the informed reader that the Navy still hadn't been assigned a role in deep strike, it is hard to imagine a more effective way of putting the idea across (at least without committing the security violation of explicitly stating the fact) than to use the distinctively new formulation "technical capability". To have merely said, as was normal, that the Navy had a deep strike "capability" would have left the propagandistically desirable implication that the word "capability" might well be a Soviet euphemism for "assignment". By saying "technical capability", Sergeyev destroyed the propaganda potential by making it clear that he was talking only about a capability and nothing more.

The third and final "Pro" evidence that could be used to argue that the Navy was assigned a share in the initial deep strike in the 1971-1976 period between the XXIVth and XXVth Party Congress was a claim that the Navy and the SMF had become "important means of the Supreme High Command" which appeared in an article in the August 1971 issue of the Naval Digest (para. 8). Authored by Rear Admiral Stalbo, who appears to be the USSR's leading professional naval strategist, the article interestingly harked back four and a half years to Gorshkov's February 1967 article (previously quoted) as authority for the following statement quoted verbatim from page 20 of the 1967 article:

Together with the Strategic Missile Forces, it /The USSR's "oceanic Navy"/ became a most important means of the Supreme High Command, capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of an armed conflict in theaters of military action of vast extent.

-130-
It will be recalled that in addition to his claim in this regard in the February 1967 Naval Digest, Gorshkov had repeated the same claim three more times prior to the XXIVth Party-Congress in March-April 1971. Thus, the repetition of this claim in the Stalbo article in August 1971 was merely a repetition of a claim that Gorshkov had most recently made on 27 February 1970 in Izvestiya and again on 7 May 1970 in the Bulgarian military newspaper Narodna Armiya. For the reasons stated in more detail when the relevant quotes from all four of these articles were considered above, when Stalbo's article appeared in August 1971 there seemed no reason to read into his claim anything more than that the Navy's anti-CVA and anti-SSBN "strategic" missions had made the Navy "an important means of the Supreme High Command".

Turning next to the nine "Con" categories of evidence against any conclusion that the Navy had been assigned a share with the SMF in the initial deep strike mission, it can be seen from the summary listing of the "Pro" and "Con" categories above that the weight of evidence was 58 to 8 against the Navy having won a share in the strategic strike mission. While such a mere numerical count is not necessarily conclusive, in this case it provides an accurate indication of the situation. To demonstrate this, the evidence in each of these nine "Con" categories is considered in turn:
Con:

(1) SMF credited as the means for strategic strike while Navy's missions are depicted as of far lesser importance. Of the 12 statements in this category, four (paragraphs 9, 15, 44 and 53) are SMF Day speech "materials".

While it is not to be expected that the SMF would go out of its way to give any more credit to another service than the circumstances required, had the Navy actually been assigned a share with the SMF in the initial deep strike, these four SMF Day articles could scarcely have passed the Party censors without some credit for the Navy's share in deep strike having been inserted to conform to the approved mission structure.

Five of the statements in this category (paras. 16, 18, 29, 31 and 34) not only asserted the primacy of the SMF but also made it clear that nuclear submarines were only considered the main striking force "of the Navy", not of the Supreme High Command. In one of these four statements (para. 18), Marshal Grechko made the unimportance of the Navy's SLBMs relative to the SMF's ICBMs unmistakably clear by mentioning torpedo attack submarines along with the missile submarines as constituting the main striking forces of the Navy. One additional quotation, while it made no mention of the SMF, specified that missile submarines (and naval aircraft) were the main striking forces "of the Navy" (para. 25).

Three more statements (paras. 20, 29 and 55) first touted the SMF's leading role in the Armed Forces and then passed off the Navy's capabilities with some inconsequential or vague formulation. Colonel General Alekseyev put it this way: "Nuclear submarines equipped with various missiles and homing torpedoes are now the main means for carrying out the basic missions of the Navy". General Tolubko merely credited the Navy (along with the Ground Forces, the Air Forces and the PVO)
as having "powerful missiles". Marshal Grechko was the most vague of all, merely crediting the Navy, also along with the other services except the SMF, as having acquired "new capabilities".

The final statement in this category (para. 32), surprisingly was by Gorshkov in Soviet Patriot, an organ of the DOSAAF para-military youth organization. Here the Navy Commander-in-Chief was wearing his second hat as a Deputy Defense Minister writing about the Armed Forces in general for the anniversary of those forces. If he had a bad moment over following the Party line in acknowledging that the SMF was "the basis of the military might of the USSR", he could have 'consoled himself that he was writing in a newspaper of only minor importance. What is significant, however, is that he went on to describe the Navy's missions as (only) "defense of state interests and the maritime boundaries of our Homeland". It seems inconceivable that he would not have offset the obligatory obeisance to the SMF with mention of a Navy share in deep strike had the Navy been assigned such a role.

(2) Navy capabilities or missions described in terms which not only failed to claim a share in the deep strike role but which seemed to exclude SSBN assignment to such a role.

Of the nine statements in this category, four indicated that the Navy's capabilities were limited to "military" targets (paras. 2, 4, 6 and 11), thereby excluding the countervalue objectives that comprised the essential element of any deep strategic strike. Two further statements limited the Navy's strikes to the TVDs (paras. 8 and 50), which by definition would have excluded deep strikes against the continental U.S. Finally two of Gorshkov's descriptions of the Navy missions (paras. 17 and 32) were so phrased as to exclude any reasonable room for a share in the deep strike mission.
(3) Navy described in terms which, while not specifically excluding an SSBN share in the initial deep strike mission, failed to claim such a share, as would be expected normally if such a mission were assigned the Navy. The statements that fall into this category, can be subsumed under the following general headings:

(a) Missile submarine capable of strikes "at any point on earth", or of "strategic missions, and of "strategic results": 7, 12, 14, 35, 40, 47 and 54(a);

(b) Missile submarines have one or more of the requisite qualities for strategic strike: 21, 33, 41, 42, 43 and 54(i);

(c) Missile submarines said to be capable of striking ground objectives: 45(b) and 54(b)(c)(e);

(d) Naval strategy changed from war at sea to strikes against the shore: 37, 38, 45(b), 48 and 54(f)(g)(h);

(e) Missile submarines of the navies of the great powers were said to be capable of deep strikes (para. 45(a)). Since Gorshkov, in this quotation went on to show that his primary concern was defending against strikes from NATO SSBNs, it seems fair to conclude that in this case he was not including his own SSBNs in "the navies of the great powers".

(f) Gorshkov, in the last bit of evidence before the convening of the XXVth Party Congress, indicated in Red Star of 11 February 1976 that the Navy included in its composition not ballistic-missile submarines capable of deep strike but simply "modern nuclear-powered submarines with various missiles" (para. 58).

The foregoing sub-categories of these statements that failed to claim a deep strike capability (when they in all probability would have done so if a share had been assigned the Navy in the initial deep strike mission against the continental U.S.) seem to require no detailed elaboration. That there were so many statements in this category alone does constitute a meaningful weight-of-evidence factor.
(4) The U.S. is falsely claimed to have shifted to an "oceanic strategy" that puts primary emphasis on SSBNs.

This deliberately falsified and self-serving charge was made by both Admiral Gorshkov (para. 5) and by his top naval strategic theorist, Rear Admiral Stalbo (para. 8). While it is clear from the context that Gorshkov's consuming interest was to support being provided with larger ASW forces against the NATO navies capabilities for submarine nuclear strikes against the USSR, nevertheless, the fallacious charge, which ignored the very public facts of the U.S. "strategic-triad" strategy, also was likely to have had a secondary purpose of encouraging the Soviet Party and military leaders to allot the Navy a share in the deep strikes of any initial nuclear exchange comparable to the deep strike mission assignments alleged to be allotted to the SSBNs of the United States.

(5) A change is advocated in the existing policy of not assigning the Navy's SSBNs a share in the initial deep strike role by recourse to a foreign-navy surrogate.

Resorting to a surrogate form of esoteric expression, as normal for Soviet writers when they want to advocate a change in official policy, an unsigned Naval Digest article in 1971, Gorshkov in 1973 and 1974, and two more of his top strategic theorists (Captains First Rank V'yunenko and Potapov) in 1975 and 1976 spoke highly of the SSBNs of the U.S. The normal Soviet practice is to use hack writers on the staffs of the Naval Digest and Red Star to prepare routine articles on the naval forces of the NATO navies. When such big guns as Professors V'yunenko or Potapov turn to the subject, one may be virtually assured in advance that some policy axe is about to be ground. That all five articles indeed were advocating that the Navy be given a share with the SMF in the deep strike mission against the U.S. seems incontrovertible from the nature of the comments in each:
The military commands of the U.S. and NATO countries consider that nuclear-powered missile submarines, due to their high combat stability, are at present a most important component of the strategic offensive forces of the bloc (Naval Digest, April 1971; para. 1);

The basic mission assignments of the great powers' navies in a world nuclear war under modern conditions are sharing in the strikes by the strategic nuclear forces of a country (Gorshkov, Naval Digest, Feb. 1973; para. 19(c));

Considering the scale of conflict in its strategic aspect, it is necessary to take note of the constantly growing capabilities of the navies of the great powers to achieve ever more decisive aims. In particular, this applies to the actions of the strategic offensive forces for...first of all...knocking out his military-economic capability... (Gorshkov, Naval Digest, Dec. 1974, para. 45(a));

At the end of the '50s in the U.S.A. began the construction of nuclear-powered missile submarines, which were considered a most important component of the strategic nuclear forces designated for the destruction of land objectives in the territory of an enemy.... (V'yunenko, Naval Digest, Jan. 1975, para. 46); and

Thus, the Polaris submarine-missile system became a most important component part of the strategic nuclear forces of American imperialism...Accepting the nuclear-missile submarine system as one of the main components of the strategic offensive forces, the ruling forces of the U.S. gave special attention to the accelerated construction of their missile submarines (Potapov, Military-Historical Journal, Feb. 1976, para. 56).

It should be noted that two more of these five articles, besides that Potapov quoted in full just above, go on in the full quotations given at the outset of this section to indicate that, because of the potential of SSBNs, the U.S. had been building them apace. Here, of course, the most overt advocacy implied is that the USSR should be doing the same. Actually, however, the USSR was building both Yankee and Delta Class submarines during the period so, at most, the advocacy could only have been for an even larger and/or faster SSBN construction program. It is especially interesting that Admiral Gorshkov did not risk confusing his advocacy that the SSBNs be given a share in the deep strike mission by speaking, as in the similar statements above, about accelerated U.S. construction of SSBNs. Accordingly, Gorshkov's
advocacy of Soviet SSBNs "sharing in the strikes by the strategic nuclear forces" (para. 19(c)) and "first of all, for knocking out" an enemy's "military-economic capability" (para. 45(a)) came through with particular clarity.

(6) A change in the existing policy of not assigning the Navy's SSBNs a share in the initial deep strike mission also is advocated by extolling the characteristics, including the alleged invulnerability, of Soviet SSBNs.

The six statements that fall in this category were all written by senior naval officers: two by Gorshkov (one each in 1975 and 1976, paras. 48 and 54), two by his first deputy, Fleet Admiral Kasatonov (one each for Navy Day in 1971 and 1972, paras. 6 and 12) and one apiece by a real admiral and a Captain First Rank in July 1971 and February 1976 (paras. 7 and 57, respectively). So, these six statements were spread fairly evenly over the five years between the XXIVth and XXVth Party Congresses and appear to have constituted a staple argument both for advocating the construction of more SSBNs (particularly in 1971 and 1972 and subsequently when Gorshkov published his Problems of Philosophy article in May 1975 (para. 48) and his book Seapower of the State in November of the same year (para. 54)) and for advocating that his rapidly expanding fleet of SSBNs be assigned a share in the initial deep strike mission commensurate with their growing numbers and enhanced capabilities.

(7) The non-assignment of Soviet SSBNs to a share in the initial deep-strike mission seemingly is further indicated by statements claiming only a deterrent role (vice a strike role) for Soviet SSBNs.

The Defense Minister, Marshal Grechko, in his article in the July 1971 issue of Naval Digest (para. 4), stated: "The Strategic Missile Forces, together with the nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines, constitute the main means for deterrence of an aggressor". Gorshkov echoed this theme later the same month in his Navy Day article in Pravda on 25 July (para. 5), although he rephrased Grechko to put nuclear-powered
submarines first: "Nuclear-powered submarines armed with such weapons /nuclear-missile weapons capable of reaching any point on earth/, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, are the main means for deterring any aggressor—the reliable shield of the world socialist system".

Although Grechko never returned to the subject, the Navy Commander-in-Chief picked it up again and embroidered on the theme the following year in his 30 July 1972 article in Pravda (para. 10): "Nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, are the main means for the deterrence of any aggressor...the presence of Soviet warships in the World Ocean serves as an impressive deterrence factor against any attempts at surprise aggression against our state...". Again in July 1973 Gorshkov used an essentially identical formula in a popular magazine for the troops (although he did not again include it in his annual Navy Day article for Pravda): "Nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, are the main means for the deterrence of any aggressor...the presence of Soviet warships in the World Ocean serves as an impressive deterrence factor against any attempts at surprise aggression against our state...". Again in July 1973 Gorshkov used an essentially identical formula in a popular magazine for the troops (although he did described his nuclear-powered submarines as constituting "an inseparable part of the strategic nuclear shield of the Homeland" (para. 54(d)).

Here, however, he may have been thinking more of the war-fighting capabilities of Soviet SSBNs (as suggested by his use of "shield" in para. 23) than of their value for deterrence. Although the Navy chief did not return to the formula that he had adapted from Grechko in mid-1971 and used again the following two years, it did appear once again in 1975, in an
article written by the Navy's first deputy head of the Main Political (Party) Administration, Vice Admiral Shablikov. Altering the earlier formula only in superficial ways (as affects this study), the relevant passage read: "The Soviet Navy, together with the other services of the Armed Forces, has become an important means for the deterrence of an aggressor, a reliable shield covering the system of socialism" (para. 52).

Although on the face of them, these statements seem to provide additional evidence that the Navy was not assigned a share in the initial deep strike role, there is an alternative interpretation that would lead one to discount these statements. At the XXIVth Party Congress, it will be recalled, Grechko had set a new military line in his report to the Congress that had emphasized deterrence while muffling bellicose statements emphasizing the USSR's war-fighting capabilities. If this actually was the case, it is interesting to note that the Navy went on for four years after Grechko had fallen silent on the subject taking credit for at least sharing with the SMF in deterrence, in the, of course, vitally important role of preventing a nuclear Armageddon.

(8) That the Navy's SSBNs were not even credited by three sources, including a most distinguished Soviet Army marshal, with having a role with the SMF in strategic deterrence (for which the SSBNs were best suited) further heightens the unlikelihood that a role in the initial deep strike mission had been assigned them.

In a speech for Armed Forces Day 1974 the long-time Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Marshal Vasilevskiy, stated that the Strategic Missile Forces were the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor. Nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles were presented by Vasilevskiy as just the main striking force
"of the Navy" (para. 33). The SMF Day "materials" in 1974 made the same point that the SMF was "the reliable shield of the security of our Homeland...the basic means for the deterrence of an aggressor" (para. 44). However, since these two examples constitute only relatively isolated instances, they cannot be given much weight.

(9) Two claims that Soviet SLBMs are also anti-ship missiles as well as capable of being used against ground targets suggest the possibility that one important reason the SSBNs had not been assigned a share in the initial deep strike mission was a Soviet expectation they would soon be armed with anti-ship ballistic missiles.

In the first of the two pertinent statements, the unprecedented assertion is made that Soviet "submarines armed with ballistic missiles are capable of destroying ships..." (para. 14). In the second, the same basic claim is made that the USSR had developed a submarine-launchable ballistic missile that would be suitable for striking ships at sea as well as land targets: "Nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles are capable of destroying...both sea targets and important targets located in the coastal area and in the rear of an enemy" (para. 28).

These claims were made, respectively, by the Party's No. 2 man in the Navy and by the Commander-in-Chief of Naval Aviation. The former, Rear Admiral Shablikov, wrote for Navy Day 1972 in the Party newspaper in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic while the latter, Marshal of Aviation Borzov, wrote just a year later in the equally little-read monthly journal of the National Air Defense Forces. It is not to be wholly excluded that this was an effort to feed misinformation to the West but, from what is known of Soviet testing of such missiles in the first half of the '70s, it seems far more probable that the Soviets actually expected to put an anti-ship ballistic missile aboard the Yankee
Class submarines—and were up to their standard practice of claiming a potential capability for newly-developed weapons even before they go into production. At any rate, if it actually was the case that the Soviet Party and military leaders expected eventually to have a submarine-launchable anti-ship ballistic missile, they would have had a good pretext to oppose assigning the SSBNs a share with the SMF in the initial deep strike.

From the foregoing consideration of the 58 pieces of evidence available for the five year period between the XXIVth and XXVth Party Congresses (April 1971 to February 1976) it seems well warranted to conclude that not only was the weight of evidence overwhelmingly against any conclusion that the Navy had been assigned a share with the SMF in the initial deep strike missions against the "military-economic strength" of the United States but also the eight statements that appeared to credit the Navy with such a role were all very easily accounted for by fully credible alternative explanations that did not fly in the face of the 50 other pieces of evidence that testified beyond the shadow of a doubt that the Navy had not been assigned such a role. That is, there was not a single claim that the Navy had been assigned a share of the SMF's jealously-guarded patrimony. Even when the Defense Minister acknowledged on two occasions that the Navy possessed a capability for strikes at the enemy "rear", he was careful to reassert the unalloyed primacy of the SMF for strategic strike and to add other caveats which made it abundantly clear that he was actually referring to
the Navy's nominal role as a reserve, backup for the SMF. It was quite clear that, at the very most, the Navy had been given a minor role in strikes at deep counterforce targets—and even that seemed highly unlikely. Gorshkov and the other naval leaders, for their part, never did more than claim a capability for deep strike. Had the Navy actually been assigned a significant role in deep strike, it is virtually inconceivable that they would not have trumpeted the victory of their long campaign of advocacy for all to hear.

Next, it is pertinent to turn attention to the conceivable alternative roles that the Navy logically might have played during the 1971-1976 period between the XXIVth and XXVth Party Congresses. Using the same three logical possibilities previously identified, the evidence for the period relevant to a possible strike role against naval forces in port will be examined. Following this, the data pertinent to an SSBN role against coastal targets in general and, in particular, against naval bases per se will be scrutinized. Then, consideration will be given to the status of European ground TVDs as a last possibility.

So, turning first to the data bearing on an SSBN role against naval forces in port, it becomes clear at the outset, from the fact that only two references were made to the subject during the course of five years, that the issue was no longer the subject of controversy. In April 1973, Rear Admiral Filonov wrote in the Naval Digest:
Actions for the destruction of the forces of an enemy navy at its bases, in the opinion of foreign naval specialists, may find wide employment even in modern conditions. This is due to the current progress in technology and, in particular, to the presence of nuclear weapons in the composition of the navies of the great powers. A comprehensive and deep study of the experience of the destruction of enemy naval forces at their bases in the Second World War will help to correctly comprehend the role and place of this type of combat action under modern conditions (p. 26).

As a careful reader of all that has gone before will have recognized immediately, this paragraph smacks unmistakably of advocacy. This is indicated not only by Filonov's resort to a foreign-navy surrogate ("foreign naval specialists") but also by the admiral's use of the conditional "may" and, most importantly, the call for "a comprehensive and deep study" of World War II naval experience in striking at naval forces in port to "help to correctly comprehend the role and place of this type of combat action under modern [i.e., nuclear-war] conditions." Can anyone imagine an admiral of the Soviet Navy talking in this vein if the Navy were assigned a mission against naval forces in port? The preparing analyst of this report considers the possibility so remote that he discounts it entirely.

The only other piece of relevant evidence for the period was a passage in Admiral Gorshkov's 1976 book Seapower of the State which included the following sentence:

Now the Navy is capable of carrying out strategic missions not only for the destruction of important ground objectives on enemy territory but also for the destruction of nuclear-powered submarines at sea (p. 336).
The last phrase suggests that, as already speculated earlier, the SMF had been assigned the mission of destroying the U.S. SSBNs at their advance bases, then situated at Holy Loch, Scotland, Rota, Spain and on the mid-Pacific island of Guam. Since he said nothing about U.S. strike carriers or other major naval combatants that might be caught by surprise in port at the outbreak of a war, nothing can be inferred from Gorshkov's book on this score.

So where does this leave us on this subject? It will be recalled that in summarizing the inconclusive evidence in this regard for the period from 1966 to 1971, the hypothesis was offered for continued testing over the years since 1971 that "the Navy did retain a role for strikes at major combatants in port, namely CVAs, but that the primary ownership of the role of striking our ballistic-missile submarines at their bases, at least those outside the continental U.S., had been vested in the SMF". In light of the remarks by Admirals Filonov and Gorshkov, as miniscule a data base as these two statements comprise, the previous hypothesis is amended for testing over the final three years of this 1955-1979 chronological study to read "The SSBNs appear to have lost their role for striking major U.S. combatants in port by April 1973".

As for the role of Soviet SSBNs against coastal targets in general, and naval bases in particular, the evidence for the 1971-1976 period is numerically somewhat more substantial, numbering as it does seven statements:
A. "Materials" for Navy Day, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 12, June 1971: "The improved weapons...make it possible for modern navies to deliver strikes at military targets and groups of forces at any point in the world" (p. 39). "...aircraft of Soviet Naval Aviation are capable of delivering nuclear-missile strikes on the highly-mobile groupings of surface warships and convoys in distant regions of the oceans and also against his ports and naval bases" (p. 40);

B. Marshal Grechko, On Guard Over Peace and the Construction of Communism, signed to press 14 June 1971: "The Strategic Missile Forces are assigned the destruction of the enemy's...military bases..." (p. 41). "...nuclear-powered submarines are capable of destroying from great distances both sea targets and important objectives situated on the coast and in the rear of an enemy....Naval missile aviation...can deliver powerful strikes...on groupings of surface warships at any distance from the shore and the major ports and naval bases of an enemy" (p. 48);

C. Marshal Grechko, Naval Digest, July 1971: "The new weapons...permit it [the Navy] to deliver powerful strikes at military objectives and on groups of forces at any point on earth" (p. 5);

D. Fleet Admiral Kasatonov, Red Star, 25 July 1971: "...they [SSBNs] can deliver powerful strikes on an enemy's shore military objectives....Naval Aviation is capable of delivering powerful nuclear-missile strikes on fast-moving groupings of surface warships...and also on his ports and naval bases";

E. Marshal of (Naval) Aviation Borzov, PVO Herald, July 1973: "Nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles are capable of destroying from great distances both seagoing targets and important targets located in the coastal area and in the rear of an enemy";

G. Admiral Bondarenko, Radio Moscow, 27 July 1975: Claimed Navy had been "advanced to the class of strategic forces capable of decisively influencing the course of major operations not only on the oceans but on remote continents...Our Naval Air Force has become...like the submarines, capable of delivering devastating strikes on surface ship forces, bases, and coastal objectives of the enemy located in distant theaters of the World Ocean and on continents".

In analyzing these seven statements to determine their collective significance for the Navy's role against coastal targets, including naval bases, it should first be noted that three of the statements (B, E and F) assert that Soviet SSBNs have the capability for striking targets on the "coast" (poberez'ye) or "in the rear" of an enemy. Admiral Kasatonov's statement (para. D) maybe considered to claim a comparable capability if one interprets "shore" (berega) by the common usage as "ashore" to any distance into the interior rather than by its dictionary definition of "coast". Since three of the quotations (A, C and D) specify, in effect, that the Navy's targets are limited to "military" ones, it seems logical to combine the claims and conclude that the overall claim for the Navy's SSBNs is to a capability to strike counterforce targets in both coastal regions and "in the rear".

Since it was just decided above, based on all the negative evidence, that the possibility of the Navy having been assigned a deep strike mission against counterforce targets, while not excludable from the available evidence, did not appear at all likely, the analytical problem at this point boils down to deciding what to make of a fairly well-substantiated claim to an SSBN capability against coastal military targets. In view of the conclusion derived earlier that the Navy in all likelihood had been assigned a formal share in the coastal strike mission if not at the XXIIrd Party Congress in March-April 1966 then by the time the 3rd edition of Military Strategy appeared in Spring 1968, it is not difficult to accept the considerable evidence above that the Navy's share in coastal strike was limited to counterforce targets.
In all probability, the Navy's role had been limited in such a manner right from the time of the initial assignment in the spring of 1968. To conclude otherwise one would have to posit that the Navy had been initially assigned countervalue coastal targets and then relieved of that assignment -- and there is no evidence to support such an hypothesis.

On the subject of coastal military targets for the 1971-1976 period, it remains only to consider whether or not Soviet SSBNs included naval bases among its target assignments, as one might almost logically assume. It is noteworthy that Naval Aviation was specifically credited with the capability for strikes against naval bases in four of the statements (A, B, D and G), including by Marshal Grechko in one of his three statements. This unanimity, as they say, is "no accident" nor is the corollary fact that none of the statements credited the SSBNs with a specific capability against these most important of all coastal military targets. Consequently, one is prompted to hypothesize that Naval Aviation had been determined to be an adequate supplement to the SMF for destroying naval bases so that the SSBNs could be kept free for even higher priority employment. However, on the basis of the available evidence, the possibility cannot be ruled out that some naval bases were still included among those on the target list for the SSBNs assignment against "coastal military targets".
It seems of relevance and of no little interest next to determine to the extent the evidence allows, just what the nature of such "coastal military" targets might be. Some potentially valuable clues were given in the 1968 (3rd) edition of Military Strategy but require for their understanding a brief excursion into Russian terminological nuances.

Involved are the two most common Russian words for "coast" or "shore". The Soviet dictionary of naval terms lists them as follows:

Coast - poberezh'ye, bereg
Shore - bereg, poberezh'ye

Although these words are frequently used interchangeably, it appears that the authors of the Sokolovskiy work were making a careful distinction with regard to the Navy's assigned targets for the initial nuclear exchange. Using the preferred, first-listed word for each of the two nouns above, "coastal" was rendered as "poberezh'ye" and "shore" as "bereg". In the 1963, 2nd edition of Military Strategy (written of course before the 1966-1968 period in which the Navy finally was assigned its coastal-strike mission), one passage 1/ spoke of a third-listed mission which the Navy was (falsely) alleged to share with the SMF for strikes at "important objectives in the coastal regions".

In this case, "coastal" was expressed using the adjectival form of "poberezh'ye" (pribrezhnoye). Then in the 1968 edition when, as already discussed earlier, the navy-against-the-shore role of the Navy was raised into first place ahead of the "navy-against-navy-at-sea role\(^1\), the new formulation used "berega" to express "shore" rather than "poberezh'ye". This definitional distinction seems to be of no little importance since *Military Strategy* defined targets on the "shore" (berega) much differently from those that would likely be subsumed under "coastal" (poberezh'ye). To understand the distinction, it is necessary to appreciate that "shore" can extend to any distance inland (as twice footnoted earlier) while "coast" is tied to targets directly on the coastline or in offshore waters.

Both the 1963 and 1968 editions of *Military Strategy*, provide the same listing of anti-SLOC targets which, by the fact that they all do front largely on the seas or oceans or lie in offshore waters, makes the list a prime candidate for comprising the operative Soviet definition of "coastal" targets. This list includes:

1. Naval bases;
2. Ports;
3. Canals;
4. Straits; and
5. Shipbuilding and ship-repair yards.\(^2\)


-149-
Similarly, both the 1963 and 1968 editions of the Sokolovskiy work include what is tantamount to a definition of the types of targets specified to be the most important "shore" targets. They are listed as:

(1) Naval bases;
(2) Airfields; and
(3) Missile installations.

If this foregoing analysis is a valid reflection of Soviet reality, some significant conclusions follow. In shifting the Navy's stated capabilities from third-ranking "coastal" targets in the 1963 edition to first-ranked "shore" targets in the 1968 version, more than just a change in mission structure was involved. No doubt naval bases would have remained targeted since that they are the one type of target common to each list. The Navy, otherwise, however, would have had to shift its SSBN aim points from ports, canals, straits, and shipbuilding and repair yards to coastal airfields and missile installations. It should be added that, although the anti-SLOC mission slipped from second to third priority between 1963 and 1968, in the event that the anti-SLOC mission actually were to be undertaken after the initial nuclear exchange, the Navy would still have the ports, canals, straits, and shipbuilding and repair yards as additional targets.

---

The available evidence for the 1971-1976 period did not add a single reference, either directly or by foreign-navy or historical surrogate, to the earlier evidence that the Navy would only be assigned a European ground theater role in a contingency situation. The "it-is-not-excluded" description from both the 1963 and 1968 editions of Military Strategy of the possibility of the Navy's being assigned a strike mission against the European ground theater still applied, seemingly, for lack of any evidence to the contrary. What can be said with much more confidence, however, is that the lack of any comment on the subject whatsoever over a five-year span indicates that the matter was not at issue during the period or it would have been included in the extensive naval writings of the period, especially by Gorshkov, since they were full of esoteric advocacy of policy changes expressed by means of surrogates—particularly historical one in the case of the Navy chief's historical treatise on "Navies in War and Peace" that extended through 11 issues of the Naval Digest in 1972 and early 1973.

To summarize the Navy's roles in strategic strike by March 1976 when the XXVth Party Congress convened, they appear to have been the following:

1. Deep strategic strike—still no role assigned. The Navy appears to have retained a reserve, backup role to the SMF in this role but evidence from the 1971-1976 period made it appear that it was not considered of any great importance.

2. Strikes vs. naval forces in port—the Navy appeared to have lost its role in such strikes by April 1973.
3. Strikes vs. U.S. coastal targets, including naval bases—the Navy appeared to have retained this mission assignment of the Spring of 1968. Evidence from mid-1971 pointed to the likelihood that the Navy's mission was limited to "military" targets and so still did not constitute a major inroad into the SMF's counterforce-targets preserve that is the quintessential heartland of the SMF's fiefdom. Further evidence suggested the possibility that the "shore" targets assigned to the Navy included not only naval bases but also U.S. coastal airfields and missile bases within an unspecified number of miles inland from the coast—but quite possibly for at least as much as several hundred miles.

4. Strikes in European ground theaters—Since there was not a single reference to this subject over the five-years between the XXIVth and XXVth Party Congresses, it appears that the matter was not at issue during the period and the Navy's SSBNs still had not been given a formal mission assignment to such a role—probably still due to the circumstances mentioned earlier that Marshal Krylov kept the SMF's bureaucratic chastity belt firmly in place and locked while the Army marshals predictably would have monopolized all of the Navy's forces it could, after the pattern of World War II, unless those forces were assigned primarily and clearly to missions far at sea out of the marshals' reach—which had been done explicitly and emphatically in all three editions of the Sokolovskiy work.
VIII. NAVY ADVOCACY OF A DEEP-STRIKE ROLE FOR SSBNs CONTINUES, 1976-1979

For the post XXVth Party Congress* period since March 1976 (up to 1 April 1979) the following pieces of evidence are relevant to a determination of what, if any, role in the initial deep strike at the continental U.S. may have been assigned to Soviet SSBNs in the three years since the end of the XXVth Party Congress in April 1976:

1. Captain First Rank Zhuravlev, Naval Digest, May 1976: "The Soviet Navy has been turned into an important strategic factor, into a force capable of countering aggression from the direction of the sea and carrying out large scale operational and strategic missions on the World Ocean";

2. "Materials" for Navy Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 13, July 1976: "Mighty power plants, nuclear missile weapons and radio-electronic equipment have given the Navy new qualities and have advanced it to the ranks of the forces of strategic designation, capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of major operations not only in the ocean but also on the land territory of distant continents.

"The basis of the combat might of the Soviet Navy is comprised of nuclear-powered submarines, missile surface warships, and missile-carrying naval aircraft...

"Nuclear-powered missile submarines armed with long-range ballistic missiles and homing torpedoes...are the pride of the Fatherland's shipbuilding. Nuclear-powered submarines in a modern war, if the imperialists unleash, one will become an important means for carrying out strategic missions" (p. 18);

3. "Sea Shield of the Homeland," Naval Digest, July 1976. This unsigned article began by mentioning that Navy Day would be on 25 July and, in effect, constituted the Navy's own version of the Party's "Materials" for Navy Day speeches (just above):

"Equipping of our Army and Navy with nuclear-missile weapons meant that the Socialist Commonwealth had been provided with a reliable shield" (p. 5);

* The customary report on defense was omitted at this Congress, at least none was mentioned in Soviet media or included in the Stenographic Record of the Congress -- probably to avoid pouring fuel on the anti-detente fires in the West.
"The construction of the Soviet Navy always has been closely tied to the latest achievements of science and technology. Nuclear-powered submarines were built which incorporated such qualities as stealth, mobility, practically unlimited cruising range and colossal striking power. These powerful nuclear-powered submarines, which are invulnerable to an enemy, have taken the leading role in our Navy. The striking power of the submarine fleet combines successfully with the growing combat capabilities of Naval missile aviation..." (pp. 5-6);

4. LCOL Khor'kov, "The Armed Forces of the USSR in the Postwar Period", Summary article for political instruction, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 13, July 1976:

"The Strategic Missile Forces constitute the basis of the military might of the Soviet Army and Navy. They are assigned for the destruction of the enemy's means of nuclear attack, the large groupings of his forces and military bases, destruction of his military-industrial objectives, disorganization of his state and military administration, and the disruption of the work of his rear (services of supply) and of his transportation....

"The Navy has grown into a formidable force. At present, nuclear-powered submarines armed with various missiles and homing torpedoes are its main means capable of carrying out the basic missions of the Navy. Naval missile aviation has also been transformed into a mighty force. The Navy also possesses missile, ASW, minesweeping, landing and other surface ships, coastal missile forces and naval infantry. Our Navy has mastered /operating on/ the expanses of the World Ocean. At its disposal are everything necessary for the successful conduct of combat actions on the oceans and seas" (pp. 72-73);

5. Gorshkov, "Naval Art", Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, Signed to press 20 July 1976: "The Navy has acquired the capability for delivering from great distances nuclear-missile strikes on the territory of the enemy, on the navy, and on his bases. It exerts a decisive influence on the accomplishment of strategic aims in combat operations at sea" (p. 234);

6. Gorshkov, "Navy", Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, signed to press 30 July 1976: "A modern navy is one capable of inflicting strikes with strategic nuclear forces on important land objectives of the enemy, of destroying his naval forces at sea and at bases...of cooperating with ground forces in the conduct of operations in continental TVDs.." (p. 235);

7. Gorshkov, Navy Day speech, Radio Moscow in Russian, 24 July 1976: "Our balanced Navy includes ships and combat equipment for various missions. There are completely modern nuclear-powered submarines possessing tremendous striking power and
meeting the requirements for modern war to the greatest extent. The great striking power of the Soviet submarine fleet is successfully combined with the increased combat capabilities of Naval Aviation....";

8. Gorshkov, Pravda, 25 July 1976: "Of most importance, sea-power means the capability of our Armed Forces to defend the country from the threat of assault from the oceans";

9. Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Military-Historical Journal, July 1976: "....the military doctrine of the U.S. has undergone an alteration. The basic might of the strategic offensive forces increasingly is concentrated in the World Ocean. Special attention has been given to what is termed 'the oceanic strategy' as a most important part of the overall strategy. Precisely in the World Ocean, according to the views of the Pentagon strategists, must be deployed the sea-based nuclear-missile submarine systems which, according to their thinking, responds in the best manner to the requirements laid on the strategic strike forces" (p. 29);

"The widespread application of nuclear power, nuclear-missile weapons, and radio-electronics have changed the combat capabilities of the Navy radically. Now it is capable by its strikes not only to decide the fate of a sea battle but also to influence to a significant degree the course and outcome of an armed struggle in continental theaters of military action. This attribute was secured for the Navy primarily by the new submarines which were armed with missile-carrying nuclear warheads and capable, due to their nuclear propulsion plants, of completing cruises in the broad expanses of the World Ocean, of delivering powerful strikes on military objectives located in the depths of enemy territory and on his nuclear-missile ship forces" (pp. 31-32);

"The growing capabilities for the carrying out of strategic missions by the forces of the Navy have brought about fundamental changes in notions of the spatial scope of armed struggle at sea as one of the most important parts of war as a whole. Not only has the scope of possible operations against ground objectives grown immeasurably but also that of conflict with sea, more accurately oceanic, systems of strategic nuclear weapons. The combat activity of navies now can embrace almost the entire expanse of the World Ocean. This predetermines the rise within the framework of our unified military strategy of armed conflict in the oceanic theaters" (pp. 33-34);

"Joint actions of the Navy with other services of the Armed Forces on the operational and strategic levels have become an important condition for gaining decisive success in operations both in continental and oceanic theaters of military operations" (p. 34);
10. Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Red Star, 25 July 1976: "In modern conditions...navies...are in a position to exert an enormous influence on the entire course of a war....the new qualities have advanced the Navy into the ranks of the strategic forces. The pride of the Navy are the nuclear powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles and homing torpedoes";

11. Admiral Grishanov, Izvestiya, 25 July 1976: "Our nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range, underwater-launched missiles and modern homing torpedoes are the pride of the Soviet people";

12. Admiral Mikhaylin, Labor, 25 July 1976: "The basis of the combat might of our Navy is comprised of nuclear-powered submarines and missile-carrying naval aircraft. Nuclear-powered missile submarines armed with long-range ballistic missiles are...the pride of our native shipbuilding";

13. Captain First Rank Shul'man, Naval Digest, August 1976, quotes (correctly) from Gorshkov's Seapower of the State (p. 354): "If before the basic part of the forces of a navy were directed against the naval forces of the enemy, then today the main aim of a navy becomes insuring the carrying out of all missions related to actions against the ground objectives of the enemy and of actions for the defense of one's own territory from the strikes of his navy" (p. 19);

14. Admiral Alekseyev, Peoples' Army (Bulgaria), 31 August 1976: "The military doctrines of the NATO countries, first of all the United States, reflect an ever-greater preference for 'the oceanic strategy,' for war against the land from the sea. Pursuant to this, they are concentrating the basic strength of their strategic strike forces in the expanses of the World Ocean and in foreign bases";

15. Rear Admiral Yashin, Naval Digest, September 1975: "The increase in the role of the U.S. Navy in the system of strategic forces took place, and is still taking place, because nuclear-powered missile submarines are less vulnerable than other components of the strategic forces" (p. 94);

16. "Materials" for SMF Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1976: "...now the Strategic Missile Forces are a main, integral part of the Soviet Armed Forces" (p. 31): "The combat capabilities of the PVO Forces, the Air Forces, and the Navy have grown immeasurably" (p. 32);
17. Captain First Rank Makeyev, Naval Science Candidate, Naval Digest, February 1977: "The Navy has acquired the capability to deliver powerful strikes not only at sea targets but also on objectives in the depth of the territory of an enemy. For the first time in all history, the Navy has been transformed into a strategic service of the Armed Forces, capable of influencing in decisive fashion the course and outcome of a war as a whole" (p. 17);

18. "Faithful Guard of the Gains of October". Editorial article for use in political indoctrination of military personnel, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 3, February 1977: "Now the basis of the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces is comprised of the Strategic Missile Forces, which most fully incorporate the achievements of modern scientific and technological progress....the Navy has become qualitatively different. Its basis is constituted by nuclear-powered submarines, naval missile and anti-submarine aviation, and various types of missile and anti-submarine surface ships. All of this has raised its capabilities radically and has strengthened the seapower of our state still more" (p. 7);

19. Marshal Chuykov, Armed Forces Day speech, Tass in Russian, 21 February 1977: "The Strategic Missile Forces have missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads of colossal power and of inflicting annihilating strikes on an aggressor wherever he may be";

20. General of the Army Tolubko, Armed Forces Day speech, Radio Moscow, 22 February 1977: "The current basis for the combat might of the Armed Forces is the Strategic Missile Forces, which have assimilated most fully the achievements of the latest scientific and technological progress";

21. Marshal Moskalenko, Baku Worker, 23 February 1977: "It must be noted that it is precisely the Strategic Missile Forces, the nuclear-powered submarine fleet, and missile-carrying aviation which now occupy the key positions in the system for the protection of the security...of our people";

22. "Materials" for Navy Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 12, June 1977: "...the new Navy was created in a short time, being changed into an important strategic factor having the forces to counter aggression from seaward directions and to resolve major operational and strategic missions in the World Ocean....The pride of the Navy are its nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range, underwater launched missiles and homing torpedoes" (p. 43);
23. Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Potapov, Scientific-Technical Progress and the Navy, signed to press 27 June 1977: "...According to the views of American specialists...the oceans are the most suitable medium for the creation of nuclear might and for its use after the exchange of the first strikes. For this reason, the second component of the missile forces /after the Minuteman ICBMs/, the "Polaris" system, began to be given obvious preference. Precisely it was begun to be represented by the military leadership of the U.S. as the sole practicable invulnerable weapons system for general nuclear war....At the beginning of the '60s, the nuclear-missile submarine system became a most important integral part of the strategic nuclear forces of American imperialism...nuclear-powered missile submarines are the basic striking force of the Navy of the U.S. in nuclear war" (p. 103);

"The significance of sea-based strategic striking forces grew still more in connection with the new strategic concept of 'realistic deterrence' adopted by the U.S. in the spring of 1971. It tilts toward what is called 'the oceanic strategy'. Its substance is that all future strategic systems must be oceanic because this raises their mobility and invulnerability. "The nuclear-missile submarine system Poseidon-Trident are the basis for these systems" (p. 103);

"All of this permits drawing the conclusion that the defense of the U.S. may be furthered by significantly decreased expenditures /for sea-based missile systems/ in comparison with those for land systems..." (p. 103);

24. Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Technology and Armaments, July 1977: "The leading role in the composition of the Navy is played by submarines. Of all classes of warships, they correspond most fully to the requirements for modern war...By far the most powerful and modern among them are the nuclear-powered missile submarines...They are capable of remaining submerged for long periods of time and, without surfacing, of delivering strikes with ballistic missiles on objectives located on the territory of an enemy and also of conducting combat actions against surface or underwater warships" (p. 2);

25. Fleet Admiral Sergeyev, Military Knowledge, July 1977: "Our Navy truly is the country's military sea shield...The combat might of our Navy is based on various classes of nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range missiles" (pp. 2-3);

"The Navy is an important service of the Armed Forces assigned to carry out strategic and operational missions in the oceanic and sea theaters of military action" (p. 39);

"The Navy is capable of destroying important ground objectives of the enemy and of defeating his forces at sea and at their bases" (p. 39);

"Our oceanic Navy...together with the Strategic Missile Forces, is capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of an armed struggle in vast theaters of military action" (p. 47);

"In world submarine construction...missile submarines are armed with powerful, long-range strategic missiles and are assigned the destruction of important ground objectives of the enemy. They are the most powerful of underwater warships and the basic component of the combat might of the leading navies of the world, among them the Soviet Navy too" (p. 49);

27. Vice Admiral Chernavin, Navy Day interview, Tass, in English, 28 July 1977: "At present, the main means of accomplishing the fundamental tasks of the Navy are nuclear submarines carrying various missiles and homing torpedoes. The Navy has missile, antisubmarine, minesweeping, landing and other surface ships. The naval missile-carrying and antisubmarine aviation have opened up new opportunities for strengthening the combat might of the Navy and for increasing the mobility of its forces... The USSR is a great seapower. It is but natural that a strong Navy... is essential for the reliable defense of the sea borders";

28. Admiral Mikhaylin, Rural Life, 31 July 1977: "Nuclear propulsion and nuclear weapons combined with missiles of various types and radio-electronic equipment have imparted new qualities to the Navy and have advanced it to the level of strategic forces. This is one of the important factors for the deterrence of imperialist aggression and for stabilizing the situation and strengthening the peace.... At present, the main means for carrying out the Navy's basic missions are nuclear-powered submarines armed with various missiles and homing torpedoes";
29. "Materials" for SMF Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, Oct. 1977: "The Strategic Missile Forces are an important, integral part of the Soviet Armed Forces. These Forces now possess powerful missiles...which are capable of rapidly delivering on target nuclear warheads of great force, of delivering undeflectable strikes on an aggressor wherever he may be. The enormous combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces, their role in modern war, do not in any way detract from the significance of the other services of the Armed Forces, Soviet military theory and practice proceeds on the basis that victory in modern war...may be achieved only with the joint forces of all of the services and service branches of the Armed Forces. The other services of the Armed Forces are also equipped with nuclear missile weapons;

30. Gorshkov, Military-Historical Journal, October 1977: "...Soviet naval art was enriched (in World War II) by the working out and use of methods for delivering strikes on strategic targets on the territory of the enemy and in naval theaters" (p.47);

31. Lt. General Gareyev, Military Science Candidate, Chief of the Military Science Directorate of the Armed Forces' General Staff, Military-Historical Journal, Nov. 1977: "The Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government made the decision to establish a new service of the Armed Forces—the Strategic Missile Forces, capable of striking targets anywhere in the world. The Strategic Missile Forces, comprising the basis of the combat might of our Armed Forces, became the main means for the deterrence of the enemy" (p.23);

"The role of the PVO increased. Those forces were assigned the destruction of enemy weapons-delivering aircraft -- not above the defended target but on the far approaches before they fired their nuclear-tipped missiles" (p.24);

"[In 1960] the Navy's basic missions became delivery of nuclear-missile strikes at military objectives in enemy territory, destruction of aircraft carrier task forces, and nuclear-powered submarines: (p. 24);
32. Captain First Rank Schumikhin, Candidate of Philosophical Science, "The Character and Particularities of Modern War", material for the political instruction of military personnel, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20 Oct 1977:

"The Strategic Missile forces now comprise an important part of the combat might of the Armed Forces. The character of modern war, it is assumed, requires that these forces be the reliable means for the annihilation of the enemy's forces for a nuclear assault, of the major groupings of his forces and military bases, the destruction of military-industrial objectives, the disorganization of state and military control, the work of the rear and of the transportation of an aggressor. The modernization of this service of the Armed Forces is taking all of this specifically into account" (p.87);

"...Our Navy also has grown immeasurably. Its basic force is comprised of nuclear-powered submarines armed with various missiles and homing torpedoes...capable of delivering sufficiently powerful strikes to great distances on sea targets and on ground objectives which are located on the coast or in the rear of the enemy" (p. 87);

33. Gorshkov, Naval Digest, Nov. 1977: "The Soviet Navy became an oceanic navy, an important strategic means of the Supreme High Command, capable of exercising a decisive influence on the course of an armed conflict in theaters of military action of vast extent. It now possesses colossal operational-strategic capabilities" (p. 9);

34. Admiral Sisoyev, Naval Digest, Nov. 1977: "Modern armaments...have made our Navy universal, capable of carrying out multiple missions in the oceans, in coastal regions, and in the depths of continents" (p.27);
"In the construction of the U.S. Armed Forces, particular attention is being given to what is termed 'the oceanic strategy' -- the shifting of the basic power of the strategic offensive forces out onto the expanses of the World Ocean. According to the view of American military officials, this permits dispersing and making less vulnerable the systems of strategic armaments and also reduces the number of targets on U.S. territory subject to retaliatory strike" (p. 443);

"...special attention has been given to the development of nuclear-missile weapons...a powerful defensive means for the deterrence of an aggressor" (p. 456);

"Soviet nuclear-powered submarines...are capable of carrying out a wide circle of missions in the World Ocean....Nuclear-powered submarines have become weapons of the strategic nuclear forces of the country" (p. 462);

"The basis of the combat might of the strategic forces of the USSR is comprised of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range aviation, and nuclear-powered submarines. 'We have created strategic forces', said L. I. Brezhnev, 'which are a reliable means for the deterrence of any aggressor'" (p. 465);

"The basis of the combat might of the Soviet Army is comprised of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSH). They are assigned for carrying out strategic missions in a nuclear war...the RVSH is capable of delivering on target with great accuracy nuclear warheads of enormous destructive force. These high combat capabilities account for the leading role of the RVSH in the Armed Forces of the USSR. They are the main and decisive means for the accomplishment of the aims of a war because they can in a very brief period complete the missions of sapping the strength of the military-economic capabilities of an aggressor, of annihilating his strategic means of nuclear-missile assault, and of smashing his main military forces" (p. 466);
"The Soviet Navy is capable of countering aggression from seaward directions and of carrying out major operational and strategic missions in oceanic and sea theaters of military action.... The Navy constitutes a balanced system of the various branches of forces including submarines, surface ships, naval aviation, coastal missile forces, naval infantry ... Submarines and the Naval Air Force, armed with missiles of various classes and designations, are the main branches of the Navy.... Submarines -- one of the main branches of the forces of the Navy -- are continuously modernized" (pp. 469-470);

"The Soviet Navy corresponds to the position of the USSR as a great seapower and is an important factor for stabilizing situations in various regions of the world... and for the deterrence of the aggressive undertakings of the imperialist states" (p.470);

36. Captain First Rank Viktorov, Naval Digest, Jan 1978: In a review of Gorshkov's 1977 monograph The Navy (para. 26), it is stated that the Navy Cinc "portrayed well the role of our Army and Navy in the system of defense of the country and, in particular, for the deterrence of the aggressive undertakings of imperialism" (p. 104);

37. Gorshkov, Shipbuilding, Feb. 1978: "The Soviet Navy was transformed into a formidable force, which enables it, together with the other services of the Armed Forces, to carry out strategic missions in the ocean theaters. It reliably covers the maritime boundaries of the countries of socialism" (p.5);

38. Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Naval Digest, Feb 1978: "...submarines with nuclear propulsion rightly occupy the leading place in the composition of the Navy. Of all classes of warships, submarines meet the requirements for modern war to the greatest degree. The submarine is the universal warship in the full meaning of the word. It is capable of carrying out combat missions in conflict with the strike forces of an enemy navy and of destroying from great distances vitally important ground objectives on his territory" (p.11);

39. "The Strategic Missile Forces". Unsigned article. Technology and Armaments, Feb. 1978. "On 14 February 1960, at the Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Strategic Missile Forces were formed... Now they constitute the basic combat might of the Army and Navy. They are equipped with missiles of intercontinental and intermediate range" (p.14)
40. "The Navy". Unsigned article Technology and Armaments, Feb. 1978: "At the present time, nuclear-powered submarines armed with various missiles and homing torpedoes are the main means capable of carrying out the basic missions of the Navy. They can deliver strikes at great distances not only on targets at sea but also on those located on the coasts and in the rear of an enemy" (p.22);

41. Gorshkov, Pravda, 30 July 1978: "At present the American leadership is placing special emphasis on what is termed 'the oceanic strategy' as a most important, integral part of the general state strategy of 'realistic deterrence'. The plans of the NATO strategists envision the further buildup of their naval power and, in the first place, of their sea-based strategic forces.

42. Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Shipbuilding, July 1978: "At the present time, the main means for carrying out the basic missions on the seas and oceans are nuclear-powered submarines armed with various missiles and torpedoes ... Soviet nuclear-powered submarines have demonstrated their high seagoing qualities under the ice at the North Pole, and in tropical climates during their round-the-world cruises" (p.1)

43. Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Red Star, 30 July 1978: "The U.S. has concentrated in its naval forces a large part of its strategic nuclear means.... Our Navy is carrying out responsible missions in the system of defense of the country";

44. Admiral Grishanov, Military-Historical Journal, July 1978: "The creation in our country of an oceanic, nuclear-missile navy worked a deep change in the views on its role in the system of the Armed Forces and the strategy and tactics for its employment. It has become one of the most important factors capable, by means of direct action against objectives located on the coast and in the deep rear of an enemy as well as against targets at sea, of exerting a very significant, and at times decisive, influence on the course of a war" (p. 18).
45. Admiral Grishanov, Izvestiya, 30 July 1978: "Atomic power and nuclear weapons, together with missiles designed for various purposes...have imparted new qualities to the Navy and have advanced it to the category of strategic forces that are capable of exerting a decisive influence on an armed conflict. Our Navy has become one of the most important factors for the deterrence of imperialist aggression and for stabilizing the consolidation of a peaceful situation";

46. Captain First Rank Skryl'nik, Candidate of Philosophical Science, material for the political instruction of military personnel, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 15, August 1978: "The basis of the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces is constituted by the Strategic Missile Forces.... in a principally new approach to the problem of raising the defense capability of the USSR under the conditions of the scientific technological revolution in military affairs.... Now the Strategic Missile Forces have in their armament missiles of intercontinental and intermediate ranges capable of delivering accurate and undetectable strikes on an aggressor wherever he may appear." (p. 77);

"The Soviet Air Forces today ... are capable of influencing the course of major operations in both ground and sea theaters of military action" (p.78); ....

"Our Navy is a mighty oceanic missile navy capable of reliably protecting the state interests of the USSR in the seas and oceans .... submarines are capable of carrying out a wide range of missions in any region of the World Ocean" (p. 78);

47. "Materials" for SMF Day, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, Oct 1978: "The Strategic Missile Forces are an important, integral part of the Soviet Armed Forces. Even in peacetime they are in constant readiness, standing combat watches uninterruptedly. The enormous combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces, their role in modern war, does not mean that the other services of the Armed Forces have lost their significance. Victory over an aggressor now may be gained only by the joint forces of all of the services and service branches of the Armed Forces .... The other services of the Armed Forces have nuclear-missile weapons too..." (pp. 61-62);
48. Lt General Stroganov, Chief of Staff of Ground Forces' Missiles and Artillery Forces, Radio Moscow in Russian, 18 Nov. 1978: Asserts that "the Strategic Missile Forces are the shield and the sword of our Homeland. They are the real and practicable means for the deterrence of a potential aggressor";

49. "Materials" for Armed Forces Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 1, Jan 1979: "For strengthening its security, the Soviet Union was obliged to increase the combat might of its Armed Forces, to create within them a new service-- the Strategic Missile Forces: (p.30) .... At the present time ... all of the services of the Armed Forces -- the Strategic Missile Forces, the Ground Forces, PVO of the country, the Air Forces, and the Navy -- are equipped with modern weapons ..." (p. 31). Note: These were the sole mention of the individual military services.

50. "Meeting of the Electors with D. F. Ustinov," Pravda, 24 Feb 1979: "Speaking of the role of the Armed Forces, D.F. Ustinov stated that they are the reliable shield of the land of the Soviets, the mighty guard over socialist gains...".

51. Col. Pletushkov, Naval Digest, Feb. 1979: Quotes Brezhnev at XXVth Party Congress in 1976 as having said: "We are creating strategic forces which are reliable means for the deterrence of any aggressor" (p. 75). The article later on states: "The basis of the combat might of the Navy is comprised of nuclear-powered submarines armed with missiles of various designations.... Now our Navy fully corresponds to the position of our country as a great seapower and is an important factor for the deterrence of the aggressive undertakings of the imperialist states, for the stabilization of situations in various regions of the world: (p. 75);

52. Rear Admiral Yashin and Captain First Rank Podionov, Naval Digest, Feb. 1979: "The U.S. Naval Command and its supporters in Congress counter their opponents with the following: The Carter-Brown 'new strategy' is oriented toward the conduct of a ground war, that is, constitutes a renewal of a 'continental strategy,' which little corresponds with the interests of the U.S.' (p.67),

"According to a release by the U.S. Defense Department, the Naval Command in 1978 prepared an analytical report -- 'Sea Plan 2000'-- taking into account the number of warships in the naval forces by the year 2000. The compilers of the plan assumed that the main mission of the U.S. Navy -- 'strategic deterrence' or 'retaliation'-- would be retained. This would be insured by 20-35 nuclear-powered missile submarines of the 'Trident' system." (p.70)
The evidence for the final 1976-1979 period breaks down nicely into the same pro and con categories used for the preceding period. To reduce the amount of necessary analytical comment, since by this point in the study both the analyst and the reader are familiar with the nature of the material to be expected, the parts of the foregoing statements that fall into each category or sub-category are extracted and repeated under the appropriate heading and the analytical comments will be reserved until all of the evidence has been presented. Accordingly, to start with the first of the "pro" categories:

Pro (1). Navy credited by Army leaders with the capability for "deep" strikes:

30. Lt. General Gareyev, Military Science Candidate, Chief of the Military Science Directorate of the Armed Forces' General Staff, Military-Historical Journal, November 1977: "The Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government made the decision to establish a new service of the Armed Forces—the Strategic Missile Forces, capable of striking targets anywhere in the world. The Strategic Missile Forces comprising the basis of the combat might of our Armed Forces, became the main means for the deterrence of the enemy" (p. 23);

"The role of the PVO increased. Those forces were assigned the destruction of enemy weapons-delivering aircraft -- not above the defended target but on the far approaches before they fired their nuclear-tipped missiles" (p. 24);

"In 19607 the Navy's basic missions became delivery of nuclear-missile strikes at military objectives in enemy territory, destruction of aircraft carrier task forces, and nuclear-powered submarines" (p. 24);

35. The Soviet Armed Forces: History of Construction, S. A. Tyushkevich, Ed., Signed to press 22 November 1977: "The basis of the combat might of the strategic forces of the USSR is comprised of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range aviation, and nuclear-powered submarines. 'We have created strategic forces', said L. I. Brezhnev, 'which are a reliable means for the deterrence of any aggressor'." (p. 465);
Pro (2). Navy credited by an Army marshal with playing one of the key roles, along with the SMF and LRAF, in the defense "system" of the USSR:

21. Marshal Moskalenko, Baku Worker, 23 February 1977: "It must be noted that it is precisely the Strategic Missile Forces, the nuclear-powered submarine fleet, and missile-carrying aviation which now occupy the key positions in the system for the protection of the security...of our people";

Pro (3). Navy leaders claim the capability for "deep" strikes:

5. Gorshkov, "Naval Art", Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, Signed to press 20 July 1976: "The Navy has acquired the capability for delivering from great distances nuclear-missile strikes on the territory of the enemy, on the navy, and on his bases. It exerts a decisive influence on the accomplishment of strategic aims in combat operations" (p. 234);

6. Gorshkov, "Navy", Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 2., signed to press 20 July 1976: "A modern navy is one capable of inflicting strikes with strategic nuclear forces on important land objectives of the enemy, of destroying his naval forces at sea and at bases....of cooperating with ground forces in the conduct of operations in continental TVD..." (p. 235);

9. Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Military-Historical Journal, July 1976: "The growing capabilities for the carrying out of strategic missions by the forces of the Navy have brought about fundamental changes in our notions of the spatial scope of armed struggle at sea as one of the most important parts of war as a whole. Not only has the scope of possible operations against ground objectives grown immeasurably but also that of conflict with sea, more accurately oceanic, systems of strategic nuclear weapons. The combat activity of navies now can embrace almost the entire expanse of the World Ocean. This predetermines the rise within the framework of /our/ unified military strategy of armed conflict in the oceanic theaters" (pp. 33-34);

10. Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Red Star, 25 July 1976: "In modern conditions...navies...are in a position to exert an enormous influence on the entire course of a war....the new qualities have advanced the Navy into the ranks of the strategic forces. The pride of the Navy are the nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles and homing torpedoes";
13. Captain First Rank Shul'man, Naval Digest, August 1976, Quotes (correctly) from Gorshkov's Seapower of the State (p. 354): "If before the basic part of the forces of a navy were directed against the naval forces of the enemy, then today the main aim of a navy becomes insuring the carrying out of all missions related to actions against the ground objectives of the enemy and of actions for the defense of one's own territory from the strikes of his navy" (p. 19);

17. Captain First Rank Makeyev, Naval Science Candidate, Naval Digest, February 1977: "The Navy has acquired the capability to deliver powerful strikes not only at sea targets but also on objectives in the depth of the territory of an enemy. For the first time in all history, the Navy has been transformed into a strategic service of the armed forces capable of influencing in decisive fashion the course and outcome of a war as a whole" (p. 17);

22. "Materials" for Navy Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 12, June 1977: "...the new Navy was created in a short time, being changed into an important strategic factor having the forces to counter aggression from seaward directions and to resolve major operational and strategic missions in the World Ocean... The pride of the Navy are its nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range, underwater launched missiles and homing torpedoes" (p. 43);

26. Gorshkov, The Navy, a DOSAAF monograph, signed to press on 11 July 1977:

"The Navy is capable of destroying important ground objectives of the enemy and of defeating his forces at sea and at bases" (p. 39);

"In world submarine construction... missile submarines are armed with powerful, long-range strategic missiles and are assigned the destruction of important ground objectives of the enemy. They are the most powerful of underwater warships and the basic component of the combat might of the leading navies of the world, among them the Soviet Navy too" (p. 49);

27. Admiral Mikhaylin, Rural Life, 31 July 1977: "Nuclear propulsion and nuclear weapons combined with missiles of various types and radio-electronic equipment have imparted new qualities to the Navy and have advanced it to the level of strategic forces";
31. Captain First Rank Schumikhin, Candidate of Philosophical Science, "The Character and Particularities of Modern War", material for the political instruction of military personnel, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1977:

"The Strategic Missile Forces now comprise an important part of the combat might of the Armed Forces. The character of modern war, it is assumed, requires that these forces be a reliable means for the annihilation of the enemy's forces for a nuclear assault, of the major groupings of his forces and military bases, the destruction of military-industrial objectives, the disorganization of state and military control, the work of the rear and of the transportation of an aggressor. The modernization of this service of the Armed Forces is taking all of this specifically into account....Our Navy also has grown immeasurably. Its basic force is comprised of nuclear-powered submarines armed with various missiles and homing torpedoes....capable of delivering sufficiently powerful strikes to great distances on sea targets and on ground objectives which are located on the coast or in the rear of the enemy" (p. 87);

33. Admiral Sisoyev, Naval Digest, November 1977: "Modern armaments...have made our Navy universal, capable of carrying out multiple missions in the oceans, in coastal regions, and in the depths of continents" (p. 27);


"Soviet nuclear-powered submarines...are capable of carrying out a wide circle of missions in the World Ocean....Nuclear-powered submarines have become weapons of the strategic nuclear forces of the country" (p. 462);

38. Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Naval Digest, February 1978: "...submarines with nuclear propulsion rightly occupy the leading place in the composition of the Navy. Of all classes of warships, submarines meet the requirements for modern war to the greatest degree. The submarine is the universal warship in the full meaning of the word. It is capable of carrying out combat missions in conflict with the strike forces of an enemy navy and of destroying from great distances vitally important ground objectives on his territory" (p. 11);
"The Navy". Unsigned article Technology and Armaments, February 1978: "At the present time, nuclear-powered submarines armed with various missiles and homing torpedoes are the main means capable of carrying out the basic missions of the Navy. They can deliver strikes at great distances not only on targets at sea but also on those located on the coasts and in the rear of an enemy" (p. 22);

Admiral Grishanov, Military-Historical Journal, July 1978: "The creation in our country of an oceanic, nuclear-missile navy worked a deep change in the views on its role in the system of the Armed Forces and the strategy and tactics for its employment. It has become one of the most important factors capable, by means of direct action against objectives located on the coast and in the deep rear of an enemy as well as against targets at sea, of exerting a very significant, and at times decisive, influence on the course of a war" (p. 18);

Pro (4). One claim by the Navy Commander-in-Chief that the Navy was "an important means of the Supreme High Command":

Gorshkov, Naval Digest, November 1977: "The Soviet Navy became an oceanic navy, an important strategic means of the Supreme High Command, capable of exercising a decisive influence on the course of an armed conflict in the theaters of military action of vast extent. It now possesses colossal operational strategic capabilities" (p. 9);

Pro (5). One claim that the Navy had been advanced to the ranks of the forces of strategic designation because it had become capable of "exerting a decisive influence on the course of major operations not only in the /World/ Ocean but also on the land territory of distant continents":

"Materials" for Navy Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 13, July 1976: "Mighty power plants, nuclear missile weapons and radio-electronic equipment have given the Navy new qualities and have advanced it to the ranks of the forces of strategic designation, capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of major operations not only in the ocean but also on the land territory of distant continents.

-171-
Con (1). SMF credited as the means for strategic strike while the Navy's missions are depicted as of far lesser importance:

(a). SMF Day articles -- which did not credit the Navy with a share in the deep strike mission as they presumably would be constrained to do if such a share in the SMF's single mission had been assigned to the Navy's SSBNs:

16. "Materials" for SMF Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1976: "...now the Strategic Missile Forces are a main, integral part of the Soviet Armed Forces.... The combat capabilities of the PVO Forces, the Air Forces, and the Navy have grown immeasurably" (pp. 31-32);

29. "Materials" for SMF Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1977: "The Strategic Missile Forces are an important, integral part of the Soviet Armed Forces. These forces now possess powerful missiles...which are capable of rapidly delivering on target nuclear warheads of great force, of delivering undeflectable strikes on an aggressor wherever he may be. The enormous combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces, their role in modern war does not in any way detract from the significance of the other services of the Armed Forces. Soviet military theory and practice proceeds on the basis that victory in modern war...may be achieved only with the joint forces of all of the services and service branches of the Armed Forces. The other services of the Armed Forces are also equipped with nuclear missile weapons;

47. "Materials" for SMF Day, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1978: "The Strategic Missile Forces are an important integral part of the Soviet Armed Forces. Even in peacetime they are in constant readiness, standing combat watches uninterruptedly. The enormous combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces, their role in modern war does not mean that the other services of the Armed Forces have lost their significance. Victory over an aggressor now may be gained only by the joint forces of all of the services and service branches of the Armed Forces....The other services of the Armed Forces have nuclear-missile weapons too... (pp. 61-62).
Con (l). SMF credited as the means for strategic strike while Navy's missions are depicted as of far lesser importance:

(b) Not only is the primacy of the SMF asserted but nuclear-submarines are described as only the main forces "of the Navy";

4. LCOL Khor'kov, "The Armed Forces of the USSR in the Postwar Period", Summary article for political instruction, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 13, July 1976:

"The Strategic Missile Forces constitute the basis of the military might of the Soviet Army and Navy. They are assigned for the destruction of the enemy's means of nuclear attack, the large groupings of his forces and military bases, destruction of his military-industrial objectives, disorganization of his state and military administration, and the disruption of the work of his rear/services of supply/ and of his transportation....The Navy has grown into a formidable force. At present, nuclear-powered submarines armed with various missiles and homing torpedoes are its main means capable of carrying out the basic missions of the Navy". (p.72);

35. The Soviet Armed Forces: History of Construction, signed to press 22 November 1977:

"The basis of the combat might of the Soviet Army is comprised of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSH). They are assigned to the carrying out of strategic missions in a nuclear war...the RVSH is capable of delivering on target with great accuracy nuclear warheads of enormous destructive force. These high combat capabilities account for the leading role of the RVSH in the Armed Forces of the USSR. They are the main and decisive means for the accomplishment of the aims of a war because they can in a very brief period complete the missions of sapping the strength of the military economic capabilities of an aggressor, of annihilating his strategic means of nuclear-missile assault, and of smashing his main military forces (p. 466);

"The Soviet Navy is capable of countering aggression from seaward directions and of carrying out major operational and strategic missions in oceanic and sea theaters of military action....The Navy constitutes a balanced system of the various branches of forces including submarines, surface ships, naval aviation, coastal missile forces, naval infantry...Submarines and the Naval Air Force, armed with missiles of various classes and designations, are the main branches of the Navy...." (pp. 469-470).
Con (1). SMF credited as the means for strategic strike
while the Navy's missions are depicted as of far lesser importance:

(c) The SMF's leading role in the Armed Forces is touted
while the Navy's capabilities are either ignored or
passed off with some inconsequential or vague
formulation:

18. "Faithful Guard of the Gains of October". Editorial article
for use in political indoctrination of military personnel,
Communist of the Armed Forces No. 3, February 1977: "Now
the basis of the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces is
comprised of the Strategic Missile Forces, which most fully
incorporate the achievements of modern scientific and tech-
nological progress....the Navy has become qualitatively dif-
ferent. Its basis is constituted by nuclear-powered submarines,
naval missile and anti-submarine aviation, and various types
of missile and anti-submarine surface ships. All of this has
raised its capabilities radically and has strengthened the
sea power of our state still more" (p. 7);

19. Marshal Chuykov, Armed Forces Day speech, Tass in Russian,
21 February, 1977: "The Strategic Missile Forces have
missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads of colossal
power and of inflicting annihilating strikes on an aggressor
wherever he may be";

20. General of the Army Tolubko, Armed Forces Day speech. Radio
Moscow, 22 February 1977: "The current basis for the combat
might of the Armed Forces is the Strategic Missile Forces,
which have assimilated most fully the achievements of the
latest scientific and technological progress";

39. "The Strategic Missile Forces", unsigned article, Technology
and Armaments, February 1977. "On 14 February 1960, at the
Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Stra-
tegic Missile Forces were formed...Now they constitute the
basic combat might of the Army and the Navy. They are equipped
with missiles of intercontinental and intermediate range" (p. 14);

46. Captain First Rank Skryl'nik, Candidate of Philosophical Science,
material for the political instruction of military personnel,
Communist of the Armed Forces No. 15, August 1978: "The basis
of the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces is constituted by
the Strategic Missile Forces....in a principally new approach to
the problem of raising the defense capability of the USSR under
the conditions of the scientific technological revolution in mili-
tary affairs....Now the Strategic Missile Forces have in their
armament missiles of intercontinental and intermediate ranges cap-
able of delivering accurate and undeflectable strikes on an
aggressor wherever he may appear" (p. 77);
"Our Navy is a mighty oceanic missile navy capable of reliably protecting the state interests of the USSR in the seas and oceans....submarines are capable of carrying out a wide range of missions in any region of the World Ocean" (p. 78);

49. "Materials" for Armed Forces Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 1, January 1979: "For strengthening its security, the Soviet Union was obliged to increase the combat might of its Armed Forces, to create within them a new service -- the Strategic Missile Forces: (p. 30) ....At the present time...all of the services of the Armed Forces -- the Strategic Missile Forces, the Ground Forces, PVO of the country, the Air Forces, and the Navy -- are equipped with modern weapons..." (p. 31).

Con (2). Navy capabilities or missions described in terms which not only fail to claim a share in the deep strike mission but which seem to exclude SSBN assignment to such a role. In this case, both statements in this category are by Gorshkov and limit the Navy's sphere for carrying out its missions to maritime theaters -- which in Soviet usage excludes deep strategic strikes:

25. Gorshkov, The Navy, a DOSAAF monograph, signed to press 11 July 1977:

"The Navy is an important service of the Armed Forces assigned to carry out strategic and operational missions in the oceanic and sea theaters of military action" (p. 39);

"Our oceanic Navy...together with the Strategic Missile Forces, is capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of an armed struggle in vast theaters of military action" (p. 47);

37. Gorshkov, Shipbuilding, February 1978: "The Soviet Navy was transformed into a formidable force, which enables it, together with the other services of the Armed Forces, to carry out strategic missions in the ocean theaters. It reliably covers the maritime boundaries of the countries of socialism" (p. 5);
Con (3). Navy described in terms which, while not specifically excluding any SSBN share in the initial deep strike mission, fail to claim such a share as would be expected normally to be done if such a mission were assigned the Navy. The nine statements which fall into this category do not lend themselves to sub-categorization so are simply listed in chronological order:

1. Captain First Rank Zhuravlev, *Naval Digest*, May 1976: "The Soviet Navy has been turned into an important strategic factor, into a force capable of countering aggression from the direction of the sea and carrying out large scale operational and strategic missions on the World Ocean";

2. "Materials" for Navy Day speeches, *Communist of the Armed Forces* No. 13, July 1976: "Mighty power plants, nuclear missile weapons and radio-electronic equipment have given the Navy new qualities and have advanced it to the ranks of the forces of strategic designation, capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of major operations not only in the ocean but also on the land territory of distant continents. The basis of the combat might of the Soviet Navy is comprised of nuclear-powered submarines, missile surface warships, and missile-carrying naval aircraft...Nuclear-powered missile submarines armed with long-range ballistic missiles and homing torpedoes...are the pride of the Fatherland's shipbuilding. Nuclear-powered submarines in a modern war, if the imperialists unleash one, will become an important means for carrying out strategic missions" (p. 18);


"The Navy has grown into a formidable force. At present, nuclear-powered submarines armed with various missiles and homing torpedoes are its main means capable of carrying out the basic missions of the Navy. Naval missile aviation has also been transformed into a mighty force. The Navy also possesses missile, ASW, minesweeping, landing and other surface ships, coastal missile forces and naval infantry. Our Navy has mastered /operating on/ the expanses of the World Ocean. At its disposal are everything necessary for the successful conduct of combat actions on the oceans and seas" (pp. 72-73);
8. Gorshkov, Pravda, 25 July 1976: "Of most importance, sea-
    power means the capability of our Armed Forces to defend
    the country from the threat of assault from the oceans";

11. Admiral Grishanov, Izvestiya, 25 July 1976: "Our nuclear-
    powered submarines armed with long-range, underwater-
    launched missiles and modern homing torpedoes are the pride
    of the Soviet people";

    combat might of our Navy is comprised of nuclear-powered
    submarines and missile-carrying naval aircraft. Nuclear-
    powered missile submarines armed with long-range ballistic
    missiles are...the pride of our native shipbuilding";

24. Fleet Admiral Sergeyev, Military Knowledge, July 1977: "Our
    Navy truly is the country's mighty sea shield....The combat
    might of our Navy is based on various classes of nuclear-
    powered submarines armed with long-range missiles" (pp. 2-3);

26. Vice Admiral Chernavin, Navy Day interview, Tass in English,
    28 July 1977: "At present, the main means of accomplishing
    the fundamental tasks of the Navy are nuclear submarines
    carrying various missiles and homing torpedoes. The Navy has
    missile, antisubmarine, minesweeping, landing and other sur-
    face ships. The naval missile-carrying and anti-submarine
    aviation have opened up new opportunities for strengthening
    the combat might of the Navy and for increasing the mobility
    of its forces....The USSR is a great seapower. It is but
    natural that a strong Navy...is essential for the reliable
    defense of the sea borders";

46. Captain First Rank Skryl'nik, Candidate of Philosophical
    Science, material for the political instruction of military
    personnel, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 15, August 1978:
    "Our Navy is a mighty oceanic missile navy capable of reliably
    protecting the state interests of the USSR in the seas and
    oceans....submarines are capable of carrying out a wide range
    of missions in any region of the World Ocean".

Con (4). The U.S. is falsely claimed to have shifted to an
    oceanic strategy that puts primary emphasis on SSBNs:

    "....the military doctrine of the U.S. has undergone an altera-
    tion. The basic might of the strategic offensive forces in-
    creasingly is concentrated in the World Ocean. Special attention
    has been given to what is termed 'the oceanic strategy' as a
    most important part of the overall strategy. Precisely in the
    World Ocean, according to the views of the Pentagon strategists,
    must be deployed the seabased nuclear-missile submarine systems
    which, according to their thinking, responds in the best manner
    to the requirements laid on the strategic strike forces" (p. 29);
14. Admiral Alekseyev, Peoples' Army (Bulgaria), 31 August 1976: "The military doctrines of the NATO countries, first of all the United States, reflect an ever great preference for 'the oceanic strategy', for war against the land from the sea. Pursuant to this, they are concentrating the basic strength of their strategic strike forces in the expanses of the World Ocean and in foreign bases;"

23. Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Potapov, Scientific-Technical Progress and the Navy, signed to press 27 June 1977: 
"...The significance of sea-based strategic striking forces grew still more in connection with the new strategic concept of 'realistic deterrence' adopted by the U.S. in the Spring of 1971. It tilts toward what is called 'the oceanic strategy'. Its substance is that all future strategic systems must be oceanic because this raises their mobility and invulnerability. The nuclear-missile submarine system Poseidon-Trident are the basis for these systems.

"In the construction of the U.S. Armed Forces, particular attention is being given to what is termed 'the oceanic strategy' -- the shifting of the basic power of the strategic offensive forces out onto the expanses of the World Ocean. According to the view of American military officials, this permits dispersing and making less vulnerable the systems of strategic armaments and also reduces the number of targets on U.S. territory subject to retaliatory strike" (p. 443);

41. Gorshkov, Pravda, 30 July 1978: "At present the American leadership is placing special emphasis on what is termed 'the oceanic strategy' as a most important, integral part of the general state strategy of 'realistic deterrence.' The plans of the NATO strategists envision the further buildup of their naval power and, in the first place, of their sea-based strategic forces.

Con (5). A change is advocated in the existing policy of not assigning the Navy's SSBNs a share in the initial deep strike mission by recourse to a foreign-navy surrogate:

-178-
15. Rear Admiral Yashin, Naval Digest, September 1975: "The increase in the role of the U.S. Navy in the system of strategic forces took place, and is still taking place, because nuclear-powered missile submarines are less vulnerable than other components of the strategic forces" (p. 94);

23. Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Potapov, Scientific-Technical Progress and the Navy, signed to press 27 June 1977: 
"...according to the views of American specialists...the oceans are the most suitable medium for the creation of nuclear might and for its use after the exchange of the first strikes. For this reason, the second component of the missile forces /after the Minuteman ICBMs/, the "Polaris" system, began to be given obvious preference. Precisely it was begun to be represented by the military leadership of the U.S. as the sole practicable invulnerable weapons system for general nuclear war....At the beginning of the '60s, the nuclear-missile submarine system became a most important integral part of the strategic nuclear forces of American imperialism...nuclear-powered missile submarines are the basic striking force of the Navy of the U.S. in nuclear war" (p. 103);

"All of this permits drawing the conclusion that the defense of the U.S. may be furthered by the significantly decreased expenditures in comparison with those for land systems..." (p. 103);

26. Gorshkov, The Navy, a DOSAAF monograph, signed to press on 11 July 1977: "In world submarine construction...missile submarines are armed with powerful, long-range strategic missiles and are assigned the destruction of important ground objectives of the enemy. They are the most powerful of underwater warships and the basic component of the combat might of the leading navies of the world, among them the Soviet Navy too" (p. 49);

43. Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Red Star, 30 July 1978: "The U.S. has concentrated in its naval forces a large part of its strategic nuclear means....Our Navy is carrying out responsible missions in the system of defense of the country";

52. Rear Admiral Yashin and Captain First Rank Rodionov, Naval Digest, February 1979: "According to a release by the U.S. Defense Department, the Naval Command in 1978 prepared an analytical report -- 'Sea Plan 2000' -- taking into account the number of warships in the naval forces by the year 2000. The compilers of the plan assumed that the main mission of the U.S. Navy -- 'strategic deterrence' or 'retaliation' -- would be retained. This would be insured by 20-35 nuclear-powered missile submarines of the 'Trident' system" (p. 70).
Con (6). A change in the existing policy of not assigning the Navy's SSBNs a share in the initial deep strike also is advocated by extolling the characteristics, including the alleged invulnerability, of Soviet SSBNs.

3. "Sea Shield of the Homeland," Naval Digest, July 1976: "The construction of the Soviet Navy always has been closely tied to the latest achievements of science and technology... Nuclear-powered submarines were built which incorporate such qualities as stealth, mobility, practically unlimited cruising range and colossal striking power. These powerful nuclear-powered submarines, which are invulnerable to an enemy, have taken the leading role in our Navy. The striking power of the submarine fleet combines successfully with the growing combat capabilities of Naval missile aviation..." (pp. 5-6);

7. Zakhkov, Navy Day speech, Radio Moscow in Russian, 24 July 1976: "Our balanced Navy includes ships and combat equipment for various mission... There are completely modern nuclear-powered submarines possessing tremendous striking power and meeting the requirements for modern war to the greatest extent. The great striking power of the Soviet submarine fleet is successfully combined with the increased combat capabilities of Naval Aviation...";

24. Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Technology and Armaments, July 1977: "The leading role in the composition of the Navy is played by submarines. Of all classes of warships, they correspond most fully to the requirements for modern war... By far the most powerful and modern among them are the nuclear-powered missile submarines... They are capable of remaining submerged for long periods of time and, without surfacing, of delivering strikes with ballistic missiles on objectives located on the territory of an enemy and also of conducting combat actions against surface or underwater warships" (p. 2);

42. Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Shipbuilding, July 1978: "At the present time, the main means for carrying out the basic missions on the seas and oceans are nuclear-powered submarines armed with various missiles and torpedoes... Soviet nuclear-powered submarines have demonstrated their high seagoing qualities under the ice at the North Pole, and in tropical climates during their round-the-world cruises" (p. 1).
Con (7). The non-assignment of Soviet SSBNs to a share in the initial deep strike mission seemingly is further indicated by statements claiming only a deterrent role (vice a strike role) for Soviet SSBNs.

29. Admiral Mikhaylin, *Rural Life*, 31 July 1977: "The Navy... is one of the important factors for the deterrence of imperialist aggression, and for stabilizing the situation and strengthening the peace....At present, the main means for carrying out the Navy's basic missions are nuclear-powered submarines armed with various missiles and homing torpedoes";

35. *The Soviet Armed Forces: History of Construction*, by a ten author "collective" of the Defense Ministry's Institute of Military History, S. A. Tyushkevich, Ed., Signed to press 22 November 1977: "The Soviet Navy corresponds to the position of the USSR as a great seapower and is an important factor for stabilizing situations in various regions of the world...and for the deterrence of the aggressive undertakings of the imperialist states" (p. 470);

36. Captain First Rank Viktorov, *Naval Digest*, January 1978: In a review of Gorshkov's 1977 monograph *The Navy*, it is stated that the Navy Commander-in-Chief "portrayed well the role of our Army and Navy in the system of defense of the country and, in particular, for the deterrence of the aggressive undertaking of imperialism" (p. 104);

45. Admiral Grishanov, *Izvestiya*, 30 July 1978: "Atomic power and nuclear weapons, together with missiles designated for various purposes...have imparted new qualities to the Navy and have advanced it to the category of strategic forces that are capable of exerting a decisive influence on an armed conflict. Our Navy has become one of the most important factors for the deterrence of imperialist aggression and for stabilizing the consolidation of a peaceful situation";

51. Col. Pletushkov, *Naval Digest*, February 1979: Quotes Brezhnev at XXVth Party Congress in 1976 as having said: "We are creating strategic forces which are reliable means for the deterrence of any aggressor" (p. 75). The article later on states: "The basis of the combat might of the Navy is comprised of nuclear-powered submarines armed with missiles of various designations....Now our Navy fully corresponds to the position of our country as a great seapower and is an important factor for the deterrence of the aggressive undertakings of the imperialist states, for the stabilization of situations in various regions of the world" (p. 75);
Con (8). That the Navy's SSBNs were not even credited by one source with having a role with the SMF in strategic deterrence (for which the SSBNs are best suited) further heightens the unlikelihood that a role in the initial deep strike mission has been assigned them:

48. Lt Gen Stroganov, Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces' Missiles and Artillery Forces, Radio Moscow in Russian, 18 November 1978: Asserts that "the SMF are the shield and the sword of our Homeland. They are the real and practicable means for the deterrence of a potential aggressor";

Con (9). The Navy chief cites his forces' World War II experience in carrying out "strategic strikes" as an historical surrogate. This seemingly was calculated to advocate that his SSBNs be assigned a major share in the initial deep strike by claiming the Navy's prior experience:

29. Gorshkov, Military-Historical Journal, October 1977: "...Soviet naval art was enriched /in World War II/ by the working out and use of methods for delivering strikes on strategic targets on the territory of the enemy and in naval theaters" (p. 47).

Going back now to the "Pro(1)" category to supply the necessary minimum of analytical comment, it may be noted that there were only two entries, both from November 1977, in the category of "Navy credited by Army leaders with the capability for deep strike."

The first was by a general whose position as Chief of the Military Science Directorate of the Armed Forces' General Staff presumably made him responsible for insuring that the views of Admiral Gorshkov and his officers were consistent with the USSR's unified military doctrine. Accordingly, when he stated (para. 31) that
one of the Navy's "basic missions" was "the delivery of nuclear-
missile strikes at military objectives in enemy territory," it
must be assumed that he was presenting as up-to-date and authori-
tative a statement as was considered desirable to make public.
It should be particularly noted that he did not follow the
much-used formula of the immediately preceding years and specify
that the Navy was "capable of striking enemy objectives on the
coast and in the rear." Rather, he left unspecified whether
or not the Navy's strategic strike targets included "deep" ones
in the interior of the U.S. or just in coastal areas. However,
by his use of "military," he excluded the possibility that
countervalue targets had been assigned the SSBNs.

The other statement appeared in The Soviet Armed Forces:
History of Construction, which was written by a group of Army
officers in the Defense Ministry's Institute of Military History
and edited by Major-General Tyushkevich, a top Army political
officer and a Doctor of Philosophical Science. Since this work
listed "nuclear-powered submarines" along with but after the SMF
and LRAF as comprising "the strategic forces of the USSR", one can
safely assume that the statement, in effect, bore the Party's
imprimatur. However, it must be realized that this was not
at all the same as saying that the Party acknowledged that the Navy's
SSBN's had been assigned a role in the initial deep strike. The
Navy's "strategic" missions against Western SSBNs and CVAs would
have been sufficient by themselves to have warranted this statement
without reading into it a Navy share in deep strike.
Similarly, Marshal Moskalenko's statement in the Pro-2 category crediting the Navy's "nuclear-powered submarine fleet" with occupying "a key position" (behind the SMF but ahead of the LRAF) "in the system for the protection of the security ... of our people" may be accounted for without positing a share with the SMF in the initial deep strike. It is interesting to note, however, that Moskalenko listed submarines second after the SMF but ahead of the LRAF -- which the "objective" capabilities of Soviet SSBNs vis-a-vis long-range missile-armed aircraft would seem to warrant. Yet, since the Navy had not been awarded second-place honors in the work (just discussed) which had been edited by a top Army political officer and since the third edition of Sokolovsky's Military Strategy had made it clear that the LRAF no longer had a major role in the initial deep strike, the fact that the Navy had been listed last in the Tyushkevich work suggested strongly that the Navy still was not considered to have more than a theater role in strategic strike.

Of these 15 statements, five are specific enough in their claim to a Navy capability for deep strike as to require comment, while the others, although all suggestive of deep strike, are too vague to be meaningful. This applies in particular to all three of Gorshkov's statements (paras. 5, 6 and 8) and both of Fleet Admiral Smirnov's (paras. 9 and 38) which merely cited an SSBN strike capability against "enemy territory", his "ground objectives" and so on. The fact that the two most senior naval officers avoided using any formula that specifically claimed a capability against the "rear" or in the depths of "distant continents" speaks volumes. Had the Navy had a specific deep strike assignment, to repeat an opinion already stated several times, Gorshkov and his top
deputy would have been the first to brag about it. It should be noted, too, that Smirnov spoke of "possible" operations against ground objectives, thereby implying a reserve or contingency role.

Similarly, the claims to a Navy capability for carrying out "strategic missions in the World Ocean" (para. 7) or that the Navy had been "advanced into the ranks of the strategic forces" (paras. 10 and 27) or that SSBNs had "become weapons of the strategic nuclear forces of the country" (para. 35) were all easily accountable for by the Navy's anti-SSBN and anti-CVA missions. Also, Captain First Rank Shul'man's quote (para. 13) from Gorshkov's *Seapower of the State* of the Navy-against-the-shore thesis of the changing nature of naval warfare included the corollary of most significance that is invariably added -- that defense of the Homeland against strikes from an enemy's navy is of equal or greater importance for the USSR.

However, in addition to these vague generalities that seem on their surface to imply a deep strike capability but which may be discounted with considerable assurance as deterrence propaganda or, at least, as too vague to be analytically significant, there remain to be considered three claims of a Navy capability against "the coast and rear" (10, 11, and 14) and one each against the "coast and deep rear" (para. 15) and against "the depth of the territory of the enemy" (para. 17). Here, as before when numerous such claims have been made, it seems highly probable that the claims to a capability against the coasts (of the U.S.) reflected the actual mission assignment previously noted for
the SSBNs against coastal counterforce targets while the associated claim for a capability against "deep" or "rear" targets merely reflected the SSBNs' reserve backup role to the SMF.

The Pro-4 claim by Gorshkov in the Naval Digest that the Navy had become "an important strategic means of the Supreme High Command capable of exercising a decisive influence on the course of an armed conflict in theaters of military action of vast extent" is also one that had been made frequently before in a number of variations. Like the earlier such claims, this one may be seen on two counts to fall short of being a claim to a share in, or even a capability for, a deep strike role for the SSBNs. First, as previously observed several times, limiting the claim to the TVDs excluded it, by definition, from being a claim to strategic strike.1/ Secondly, as also noted several times before, the Navy's anti-SSBN and anti-CVA missions provide ample justification for the Navy being considered "an important strategic means of the Supreme High Command."

It seems probable that the Supreme High Command's "Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Country" 2/ are functionally divided into offensive and defensive forces:

1. The Strategic Counterforces of Defense, comprised of the SMFs' ICBMs and the Navy's SLBMs for the strategic offense;3/ and

---

1/ "The main objectives [in "a modern war"] are situated beyond the limits of the theaters ["of military action"] ; they are located in the depths of enemy territory" (Military Strategy, 2nd. ed., p. 340); "The Armed Forces can employ the following forms of strategic operations: 1) "Strikes by strategic nuclear forces" or 2) "Strategic operations in land and sea theaters of military action" (General Zemskov, Military Thought, July 1969).


2. The Strategic Forces of Defense, comprised primarily by the PVO of the Country, the Navy's general purpose forces, the LRAF, and the Ground Forces.\(^1\)

As may be seen from this organization, inclusion of the Navy's general purpose forces in the "Strategic Forces of Defense" for the SSBN-protection mission and for the anti-SSBN and anti-CVA missions would be sufficient by itself to justify the Navy being described as "an important strategic means of the Supreme High Command."

The final statement in Pro(5) that appears to support a deep strike share for the SSBNs was that in the "Materials" for 1976 Navy Day speeches which stated that the Navy had "been advanced to the ranks of the forces of strategic designation, capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of major operations not only in the ocean but also on the land territory of distant continents" (para. 5). This statement was a notably artful dodge in that it combined in one sentence all of the most-used vagaries calculated to enhance deterrence by implying a share in the deep strike mission, or at least a capability for such a mission, without specifically saying so:

1. It claimed the Navy had become a "strategic" force, an argument just disposed of above;

2. It only specified "land territory of distant continents' leaving open the possibility that only coastal targets actually were intended;

\(^1\) Military Strategy, 3rd Edition, p. 81
3. It only spoke of influencing the "course" of a war, rather than "course and outcome" or "entire course" as would have been used with virtual certainty if the Navy had been given a major share with the SMF in the initial deep strike at both countervalue and counterforce targets; and

4. It employed the "not only ... but also" formula that more often than not has been used to show that the Navy had been assigned the mission listed after "not only" (in this case, operations "in the ocean") but was only advocating that it also be assigned the mission given after "but also" -- here that for strikes against "the land territory of distant continents."

Now, turning to the statements that militate against any conclusion that, during the 1976-1979 period since the XXVth Party Congress, the SSBNs have been assigned any share with the SMF in the initial deep strike mission against the continental U.S., it is appropriate to begin with the three SMF Day quotations in Con(1a) (paras. 16, 29, and 47) which emphasize the SMF and fail to suggest any strategic strike role for the Navy. The SMF, for example, was described in October 1977 (para. 29) as "capable of rapidly delivering nuclear warheads of great power on target, of delivering undeflectable strikes on an aggressor wherever he may be." By contrast, the "other services" were disposed of in this same statement with the curt observation that they are "equipped with nuclear-missile weapons too." While there is no apparent obligation for an SMF Day article to give a full or balanced treatment of the other services, it seems
highly likely that some mention, at least, would have to be made of any other service that had a major share with the SMF in deep strike.

In sub-category Con (lb) are statements from two Army-authored sources which limit the service role of SSBNs to missions of lesser importance than those for deep strike. This is accomplished by previously-noted formulas which make such assertions as that nuclear-powered submarines armed with various missiles constitute the main means "of the Navy" (para. 4) or that the main branches "of the Navy" are comprised of submarines, surface ships, naval infantry, etc. Again, as pointed out several times before, had the SSBNs been accorded a real share in the initial deep strategic strike, these formulas in all probability would have replaced the phrase "of the Navy" with "of the Supreme High Command."

In sub-category Con(lc) six statements credit the SMF as being the service capable of strategic strike and either ignore the Navy altogether or credit it with capabilities irrelevant to deep strike. In four quotations (18, 20, 39, and 46) the SMF is praised as "the basis of the combat might" of the Armed Forces. In a fourth quote (para. 19) Marshal Chuykov mentions only the SMF as having "missiles capable of carrying warheads of colossal power and of inflicting annihilating strikes on an aggressor wherever he may be." Chuykov and General Tolubko (para. 20) and the unsigned article in Technology and Armaments (para. 39) simply omitted any mention of the Navy while in a
fourth statement, an article for Armed Forces Day 1979 (para. 51), it was said that not only nuclear-powered submarines but also aircraft and surface ships formed the "basis" of the Navy and the application of science and technology to these forces had further increased the USSR's seapower. The fifth quotation (para. 46) merely credited the Navy with the capability for carrying out "a wide range of missions" and even that statement limited its action to the World Ocean. In the sixth and last quotation (para. 49), the Navy was given only the small horse of being "equipped with modern weapons". None of this, of course, sounded at all like it would have if the SSBNs had been assigned a major share in deep strike.

The two descriptions of naval capabilities or mission assignments by Gorshkov that seemed by their terms to exclude the possibility of the SSBNs being assigned a share in deep strike (paras. 26 and 37) both specified the Navy's sphere of action as (limited to) the "oceanic theaters". As mentioned in stating the Con(2) category, this terminology ruled out any strategic strike missions -- which are considered extra-theater as footnoted earlier by references to Military Strategy and General Zemskov in Military Thought.

In the Con(3) sub-category nine statements are to be found whose descriptions of the Navy's capabilities were sufficient to warrant expecting to find some mention of the deep strike mission if such a mission actually had been assigned to the SSBNs. These statements run the gamut in choice of formulations but, taken together, add up to a substantial refutation of any hypothesis that the SSBNs have been given any share in deep strike in this final April 1976-April 1979 period.
The five statements in the Con(5) category all make the claim that the U.S. has shifted (from its strategic triad of ICBMs, SSBNs, and SAC bombers) to a primarily "oceanic strategy" which puts primary emphasis on SSBNs. While the Soviet writers, largely naval, who have resorted to this propaganda ploy, presumably know that it is intrinsically false, they very likely get some useful mileage out of it not only to support Gorshkov's obvious need for more ASW forces but also to support his claim for a share in deep strike for his SSBNs. ¹/

Five statements qualified for category Con(5) by virtue of the fact that each of them resorted to the foreign-navy surrogate of describing the mission assignment of capabilities of U.S. SSBNs for deep strike to advocate, in an esoteric manner largely understood only by the Soviet military and Party elite, that Soviet SSBNs be given a major role in deep strike. While these statements require no individual analysis, it is particularly worth noting that the implicit advocacy in this current period is not limited to arguing that the Soviet Navy should be "assigned the destruction of important [i.e., countervalue, apparently] targets" (para. 26). Rather, the Navy brief ambitiously calls for "an increase in the role of the...Soviet Navy in the system of the strategic forces" (para. 15) by concentrating in it "a large part" of the USSR's "strategic nuclear means" (para. 43). As support for changing Soviet military policy in this direction, ¹/

An interesting indication of a Navy wish that the U.S. really had such an oceanic strategy was the equally false claim by Rear Admiral Yashin and a naval captain published in February 1979 in the Naval Digest (para. 52) that President Carter had shifted to "a continental strategy" which, the article alleged, was counter to the interests of the U.S. public.
the naval persons participating in this nicely orchestrated
symphony of pleas (Gorshkov, Smirnov, Potapov, Yashin, and
Rodionov) hold out bright prospects for decreased vulnerability
(paras. 15 and 23), lesser expenditures (para. 23), and a system
that may be expected to still be viable by the year 2000 (para.
52). Certainly all of this unmistakable, ardent advocacy by
itself constitutes convincing evidence that the Navy still has
not been assigned the deep-strike share it covets (along with
the commensurate increase in its share of the military budget).

Although not utilized as much as a means of advocacy as
those just described, the four statements listed in Con(6)
implicitly connote the superior capabilities of submarines over
other types of forces for strategic strike. For Navy Day 1976
Gorshkov in a Radio Moscow address (para. 7) and an editorial in
Naval Digest (para. 3) praised submarines with the latter even
venturing to claim them invulnerable. However, neither Gorshkov
in 1976 nor Smirnov in articles in 1977 (para. 23) and 1978
(para. 42) went so far as to make such a patently unsupportable
statement or even that submarines were the "universal" weapons
system, contenting themselves instead with the similar observa-
tions that they correspond "to the greatest extent to the
requirements for nuclear war" (Gorshkov in 1976, para. 7) or
that, "of all classes, they correspond most fully to the require-
ments of modern war" (Smirnov in 1977, para. 23). In July 1976,
Smirnov made the further claim that Soviet submarines had demon-
strated their superior qualities "under the ice at the North Pole"
and during circumnavigations of the globe. Mention of the Arctic was probably intended to be particularly suggestive of SSBN capabilities since ASW in the Arctic ice is especially difficult and is limited mainly to that by SSBNs.

Between mid-'77 and February '79 there were five statements that fall into the Con(7) category of mentioning only the Navy's deterrence capability to the exclusion of its war-fighting capability in general and its strategic strike capability in particular. As mentioned earlier, this is as likely to be indicative more of following the Party line on detente by avoiding warlike pronouncements\(^1\) than a calculated effort to minimize the Navy's capabilities for strategic strike. In this regard it is noteworthy that the most recent statement, which appeared in the *Naval Digest* in February 1979 (para. 51), specifically cited Brezhnev's XXVth Party Congress speech to the effect that "the strategic forces" are the USSR's "reliable means for deterrence". The fact that, having first cited all of the strategic forces in a deterrence context (to the exclusion of their war-fighting role), the article went on to mention the Navy specifically in just its deterrent role makes it particularly clear that no slight was intended to the Navy. Moreover, from the fact that four of the five statements (paras. 28, 35, 45, and 51) also mentioned "stabilization" of regional situations (that is, conflicts at levels below the nuclear threshold) provide additional evidence that these statements

---

\(^1\) Defense Minister Ustinov's speech to his political "constituency" (*Pravda*, 24 February 1979) (para. 50) is the most recent military reflection of such avoidance of bellicose statements; he spoke only of the Armed Forces as the "shield" for the USSR and avoided any mention of the "sword".

-193-
actually do not constitute evidence one way or the other as to whether the Navy has been assigned a deep strike role -- and so must be disregarded for purposes of the investigation at hand.

More indicative of the non-assignment of a deep strike role to the Navy was the fact that even one source could give all the credit to the SMF for being the means of deterrence. In the Con(8) category we find the Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces' Missiles and Artillery Forces giving the SMF not only sole credit for being the "shield and sword of the Homeland" but for being "the real and practicable means for the deterrence of a potential aggressor" (para. 48). Only if General Stroganov had named and explicitly derogated the Navy's SSBNs and the LRAFs long-range strike aircraft as "impracticable" could he have made his meaning clearer. "The SMF is the 'real' means for deterrence and war-fighting", this senior Army officer was asserting in effect, "and the other services are of no great importance."

In the final piece of evidence, Con(9), Gorshkov is seen to have resorted to an historical surrogate in October 1977 to claim that the Soviet Navy had worked out the theoretical underpinnings for strategic strikes as long ago as World War II and, accordingly, met the requirement for prior experience to qualify for a deep strike assignment.

Turning next to the evidence from the current 1976-1979 period that bears on the question of whether or not the Navy has regained a role in destroying naval forces at their bases, primarily SSBNs and/or just CVAs, the following statements are relevant:

-194-
6. Gorshkov, "Navy" Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, Signed to press 20 July 1976: "A modern navy is one capable of ... destroying his ["an aggressor's"] naval forces at sea and at [their] bases" (p. 235);

26. Gorshkov, The Navy. Signed to press 11 July 1977: "The Navy is capable of destroying important ground objectives of the enemy and of defeating his forces at sea and at [their] bases" (p. 39); and

32. Captain First Rank Schumikhin, Communist of the Armed Forces, No. 20, October, 1977: "The Strategic Missile Forces now comprise an important part of the combat might of the Armed Forces. The character of modern war, it is assumed, requires that these forces be a reliable means for the annihilation of the enemy's ... military bases ... The modernization of this service is taking ... this specifically into account." (p. 87).

It will be recalled (from the consideration given to the 1971-1976 period of this aspect of strategic strike) that the Navy appeared to have lost this role by April 1973. Accordingly, the analytical question here is simply whether the evidence indicates that the Navy had been reassigned the role since the XXVth Party Congress ended in April 1976. The answer seems to be negative on all three of the pertinent counts:

1. If a Navy role against U.S. SSBNs and/or CVAs in port were assigned the SSBNs, there would have been much more comment from all sides suggestive of the fact;

2. Gorshkov's two comments (paras. 6 and 26) both of which appeared in out-of-the-way places (i.e., in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia and in a DOSAAF pamphlet rather than in the more-read Pravda, Red Star, or Naval Digest where he was silent on the subject) seemed designed merely as a low-key holding operation to keep the issue alive and on the record against more favorable circumstances for its advocacy; and
3. Captain First Rank Schumikhin's phrasing (para. 32) that "it was assumed" that the SMF must be assigned the destruction of "military bases" probably expressed Gorshkov's reservations on the wisdom of assigning to the SMF alone the anti-base mission (including whatever CVAs and SSBNs as might be present).

Next to be considered is the current assignment of SSBNs versus naval bases per se, independently of whether or not any CVAs or SSBNs might be present. The following three pertinent statements were turned up by research of the open literature for the 1976-1979 period:

4. LCOL Khor'kov, "The Armed Forces of the USSR in the Postwar Period," Communist of the Armed Forces, No. 13, July 1976: "The Strategic Missile Forces constitute the basis of the military might of the Soviet Army and Navy. They are assigned the destruction of the enemy's means for nuclear attack, the large groupings of his forces, and his military bases ..." (pp. 71-72);

5. Gorshkov, "Naval Art," Soviet Navy Encyclopedia, Vol 2, Signed to press 20 July, 1986: The Soviet Navy has acquired the capability for delivering inter-missile strikes from great distances on the territory of the enemy, on his navy and on his bases." (p. 234);

32. Captain First Rank Schumikhin, Communist of the Armed Forces, No. 20, October 1977: "The character of modern war, it is assumed, requires that these forces, the SMF be a reliable means for the annihilation of the enemy's ... military bases ..." (p. 87).

It will be recalled from the analysis of the 1971-1976 period that the evidence indicated the possibility that Naval Aviation had largely freed the SSBNs from strikes at naval bases, even though the SSBNs may have retained some naval bases as targets incident to their assignment against "coastal military bases". The above-quoted statements include two (paras. 4 and 32) in which we see one Army officer and one Naval officer credit the SMF with the mission for strikes against "military" bases -- which in Soviet
terminology would include naval bases. On only one occasion since
1976 did even a naval officer, although Gorshkov himself, claim a
capability for strikes against naval bases. However, as may be
seen from the immediately ensuing section, the Navy did retain a
limited strike mission against coastal military targets. That
conclusion taken in conjunction with the above three statements
appear to indicate that the Navy, although perhaps largely Naval
Aviation rather than the SSBNs, did retain a role for strikes against
naval bases. Thus, the current evidence is inconclusive on this point.

At this juncture, the present role of the Navy's SSBNs
against coastal targets in the current 1976-1979 period comes
under scrutiny. Four pieces of evidence are available:

32. Captain First Rank Schumikhin, Communist of the Armed Forces,
No. 20, October 1977: "...nuclear-powered submarines armed
with various missiles and homing torpedoes ... are capable
of delivering sufficiently powerful strikes at great
distances on sea targets and on ground objectives located
on the coast [poberezhye] and in the rear of an enemy." (p. 87);

34. Admiral Sisoyev, Naval Digest, November 1977: "Modern
armaments...have made our Navy universal, capable of
carrying out multiple missions in the oceans, in coastal
regions, and in the depths of continents." (p. 27);

40. "The Navy." Unsigned article, Technology and Armaments,
February 1978: "At the present time, nuclear-powered
submarines armed with various missiles and homing
torpedoes are the main means capable of carrying out
the basic missions of the Navy. They can deliver strikes
at great distances not only on targets at sea but also on
those located on the coasts [poberezhye] and in the
rear of an enemy." (p. 22);

44. Admiral Grishanov, Military-Historical Journal, July 1978
states that the Navy has become capable of "direct action
against objectives located on the coast [poberezhye] and
in the deep rear of an enemy as well as against targets
at sea." (p. 18)
The consistency of these four disparate sources in all crediting the Navy with the same capability for striking targets both "on the coast" and "in the rear" (or in the "depths of continents" as in the Sisoyev article or in the "deep rear" as in the Grishanov article) suggests that the Navy's roles in strategic strike had been settled to the degree that some "unity of views" had resulted. Drawing on all of the foregoing evidence, it seems well-warranted to conclude both that the reference to "coastal" targets was to the Navy's mission for a limited share against military targets along the U.S. East and West coasts that it apparently was assigned by Spring, 1968 while the reference to targets "in the rear" of the enemy was to the Navy's reserve backup role-to the SMF.

The final pieces of evidence to be considered in this study are the two statements below which superficially seem to concern the possibility of the SSBNs having been assigned a European theater role in strategic strike in the three years since the XXVth Party Congress in the Spring of 1976:


1/ While the use of "coast" (poberezh'ye) rather than "shore" (berega) in all three statements certainly does nothing to support the hypothesis advanced earlier that the Navy had been assigned coastal airfields and missile sites along with naval bases, rather than just the naval-related targets associated with "coastal" targets, the two terms are used so interchangeably that one seems well-advised to await publication of some more definitive work like those by Sokolovsky, Grechko and Gorshkov before deciding to revise the hypothesis.
9. Fleet Admiral Smirnov, *Military-Historical Journal*, July, 1976: "The widespread application of nuclear power, nuclear-missile weapons, and radio-electronics have changed the combat capabilities of the Navy radically. Now it is capable by its strikes not only of deciding the fate of a sea battle but also of influencing to a significant degree the course and outcome of an armed struggle in continental theaters of military action. This attribute was secured for the Navy primarily by the new submarines which were armed with missile-carrying nuclear warheads and capable, due to their nuclear propulsion plants, of completing cruises in the broad expanses of the World Ocean, of delivering powerful strikes on military objectives located in the depths of enemy territory and on his nuclear-missile ship forces". (pp. 31-32) "Joint actions of the Navy with other services of the Armed Forces on the operational and strategic levels has become an important condition for gaining decisive success in operations both in continental and oceanic theaters of military action" (p. 34).

Although on the face of them these statements by the two top Soviet naval officers give the impression that a Navy role in strategic strike against European ground TVDs was implied, such is almost certainly not the case. Rather, Gorshkov and Smirnov may be seen in these two quotations, as in so many closely similar ones before, merely to be continuing their advocacy that the Navy's SSBNs be assigned a real share in the initial deep strike against the continental U.S. This is made doubly clear by Gorshkov when he resorts to his favorite device for advocacy by referring to the capability of "a modern Navy" rather than of the Soviet Navy. Even more conclusive is the reference by Gorshkov to "cooperating with the ground forces". This is a totally different mission from sharing in strategic strikes against European ground theaters in that the former essentially involves giving direct tactical missile fire support to Soviet Ground Forces in coastal sectors while the latter would involve striking "strategic" installations. Thus, we are left as we were in the 1971-1976 period without a single piece of real evidence to
suggest that the Navy had been assigned a share in strikes against ground targets in the European ground theater. Accordingly, it is concluded that the Navy still has not been assigned such a role. Moreover, for lack of any Navy statements advocating such a role for the SSBNs, it seems reasonably certain that Gorshkov does not want such an assignment -- quite probably to avoid any role that might tie his forces to European coastal waters and again, as in World War II, bring them under dominant control of the Army marshals.

So, to summarize the roles of Soviet SSBNs in strategic strike at the time of writing (18 April 1979), they are seen to be:

1. Deep strategic strike -- still no role assigned for the initial nuclear strike. The Navy appears still to retain a rather nominal role as a reserve backup to the SMF in the event those forces could not destroy all the targets assigned in the initial strikes.

2. Strikes versus naval forces in U.S. ports -- the Navy has not regained the role for such strikes that it once had but apparently had lost by April of 1973.

3. Strikes versus U.S. coastal targets -- the Navy appears to have retained the share in this role acquired by the Spring of 1968. However, the current evidence, like that since 1968, indicates that the SSBNs' targets are quite limited in comparison to the SMF and that the targets assigned are not necessarily those that the Navy would prefer to strike to enable it to afford optimum support to the war at sea by destruction of the most important naval bases, including the naval forces present.

4. Strikes in European ground theater -- not a single valid reference was made to the subject in 1976-1979, thereby continuing the silence on this aspect of the Navy's roles in strategic strike that had characterized the preceding five years. This total of eight years during which the matter has been unanimously ignored by the Party, the Army and the Navy is convincing evidence that the Navy is in agreement with the policy of not assigning such a role to the Navy's SSBNs.