<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AD NUMBER</th>
<th>ADB075070</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIMITATION CHANGES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies only; Test and Evaluation; 19 JUL 1983. Other requests shall be referred to National Defense University, National War College, Washington, DC 20319.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
<td>NDU notice dtd 28 Feb 1984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
AD 025-020

AUTHORITY: MDU
Notice 29 Feb 84
Surprise And Preemption In Soviet Nuclear Strategy

Dr. Glenn E. Skaggs, Defense Intelligence Agency
* see reverse side for additional authors

National Defense University
National War College
Washington, D.C. 20319

This paper assesses, from the Soviet perspective, the significance of the concept of surprise and preemption in Soviet nuclear warfare strategy. Four dimensions were examined: (1) Soviet Perceptions of the Role of Surprise and Preemption; (2) Surprise and the Conventional-Nuclear War Interface; (3) Elements of a Surprise (Preemptive) Nuclear Strike; (4) A Fallback Option: Launch on Warning.

Key Words (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)
- surprise and preemption
- Soviet nuclear strategy
- Soviet's four laws of war
- surprise nuclear attacks
- limited warfare
- controlling escalation
- all-out world wide nuclear conflict
- strategic/tactical nuclear weapons
- launch-on-warning

Abstract (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)
- This paper assesses, from the Soviet perspective, the significance of the concept of surprise and preemption in Soviet nuclear warfare strategy. Four dimensions were examined: (1) Soviet Perceptions of the Role of Surprise and Preemption; (2) Surprise and the Conventional-Nuclear War Interface; (3) Elements of a Surprise (Preemptive) Nuclear Strike; (4) A Fallback Option: Launch on Warning.
ADDITIONAL AUTHORS:

James R. Fitzgerald,
Commander, USN

Glenn A. Bailey, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

Steven H. Spayd,
Commander, USN
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

STRATEGIC STUDY

SURPRISE AND PREEMPTION IN SOVIET NUCLEAR STRATEGY

by

Dr. Glenn E. Skaggs
Defense Intelligence Agency
James R. Fitzgerald, Commander, USN
Glenn A. Bailey, Lieutenant Colonel, USA
Steven H. Spayd, Commander, USN

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH
REQUIREMENT

Research Supervisor: Colonel John C. Kelihm, USA

THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
April 1983
DISCLAIMER—ABSTAINER

This research report represents the views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of The National War College, The National Defense University, or the Department of Defense.

This document is the property of the United States Government and is not to be reproduced in whole or part without permission of the Commandant, The National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319.
Problem Statement: This paper assesses, from the Soviet perspective, the significance of the concept of surprise and preemption in Soviet nuclear warfare strategy. Four dimensions were examined: (1) Soviet Perceptions of the Role of Surprise and Preemption; (2) Surprise and the Conventional-Nuclear War Interface; (3) Elements of a Surprise (Preemptive) Nuclear Strike; (4) A Fallback Option: Launch on Warning.

Findings/Conclusions: From a review of the Soviet military literature, the following conclusions may be drawn:

1. The importance of surprise in Soviet military strategy has increased directly with the advent of nuclear weapons and the application of lessons learned from World War II regarding the significance of the initial period of the war.

2. The Soviets desire to prevent nuclear war, but once it begins, controlled escalation and limited nuclear war are not part of Soviet nuclear strategy. That strategy is based upon the surprise and massive use of both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.

3. The principle focus of Soviet military operations during the conventional phase of a war (if there were one) would be to position their forces advantageously for transitioning to nuclear war.

4. The transition from conventional to nuclear war would involve Soviet efforts to be first to conduct preemptive, surprise nuclear strikes.

5. Soviet military writers stress a high degree of combat readiness in order to take advantage of conditions favorable for inflicting a surprise attack on an enemy.

6. There is evidence to suggest that the Soviets do not have total confidence in their ability to successfully carry out a massive surprise attack. Therefore, they have adopted a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack fallback option, although a preemptive surprise attack is viewed as the preferred beginning to the war strategy.
Doctor Glenn L. Skaggs, (PhD, Georgetown University) has been interested in Soviet military affairs since the late 1960's. He is employed as an intelligence analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency. He holds the rank of Captain, USNR-R. Doctor Skaggs is a graduate of The National War College, Class of 1983.

Commander James R. Fitzgerald, USN, (MS, Naval Postgraduate School) has been interested in Soviet military affairs since he was forward deployed to the U.S. SEVENTH FLEET in 1978. He has traveled extensively in Southeast Asia and served on the Staff of the Commander, U.S. SEVENTH FLEET in 1980-82. He holds the Navy Achievement Medal, the Navy Commendation Medal and the Meritorious Service Medal. Commander Fitzgerald is a graduate of The National War College, Class of 1983.

Lieutenant Colonel Glenn A. Bailey, Jr., USA, (MA, University of Texas) has been interested in Soviet military affairs since 1976. He has traveled extensively in Europe and the Soviet Union. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute and the US Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, Garmisch, Germany. He holds the Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Meritorious Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Air Medal, and the Army Commendation Medal. Lieutenant Colonel Bailey is a graduate of The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Class of 1983.

Commander Steven H. Spayd, USN, (BA, Brown University) has been interested in Soviet military affairs since deploying with the U.S. SIXTH FLEET in 1968. He has been deployed to the Mediterranean three times and served in Southeast Asia in 1972-73. He holds the Navy Commendation Medal. Commander Spayd is a graduate of The National War College, Class of 1983.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISCLAIMER</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. SURPRISE AND PREEMPTION</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Military Thought</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Period of War</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation of Forces</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Elements of Surprise</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets: Strategic and Tactical</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense and Damage Limitation</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. SURPRISE AND THE CONVENTIONAL-NUCLEAR WAR INTERFACE</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Forces and the Conventional Phase of a War</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to Nuclear War</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of Limited War and Controlled Escalation Concepts</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Weapons in a Nuclear War</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE FALLBACK OPTION</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preemption vs. Retaliation</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch-on-Warning</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. VICTORY VERSUS SUICIDE</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This strategic studies project examines concepts of surprise and preemption in Soviet nuclear strategy as addressed in unclassified Soviet literature.

Based upon the development of the Soviet's four laws of war, the Soviets believe that the outcome of a nuclear war can be determined by conducting massive, surprise nuclear attacks in the initial period of the war. Soviet strategy is to seize the initiative, and therefore, prevent and preempt the enemy's first use of nuclear weapons.

A Soviet surprise nuclear attack would be:

--massive
--principally directed against the enemy's nuclear means of attack
--an attempt to crush the enemy's will to resist
--launched at night for maximum moral and psychological effect.

The Soviet Union does not have a concept of controlled or "limited" nuclear warfare similar to that of the United States, nor does it have a preplanned, withholding strategy for controlling escalation. The Soviets firmly believe that, should nuclear weapons be introduced, it is in their best interest to fight a short, all-out nuclear war. They make little distinction between the employment of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Both will be used in an all-out, world-wide nuclear conflict. Strategic nuclear weapons that are not launched in the initial strike will be only those which are not operationally
ready at the time of launch. These weapons will ride out in hardened silos an enemy retaliatory strike and will be used in any follow-up attacks.

A principal Soviet objective during the conventional phase of a NATO/Warsaw Pact war would be to establish the best or most favorable conditions for transitioning to the surprise use of nuclear weapons. According to Soviet strategy, the transition from conventional to nuclear war in a NATO/Warsaw Pact scenario would involve the all-out use of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.

Although a massive, surprise nuclear attack remains the most preferred Soviet strategy, improvements in Western reconnaissance systems are such that the Soviets are not sufficiently confident that they could successfully conduct such an attack. Thus, the Soviets have adopted a fallback, launch-on-warning option.

Contrary to former Communist Party Secretary Breshnev's and Defense Minister Ustinov's statements of 1981-1982 regarding the mutually suicidal nature of a nuclear war and the "no-first-use" pledge, Soviet military writings still continue to address the idea of victory in a nuclear war. Mutual assured destruction is not a part of Soviet strategy, and Soviet targeting doctrine supports a war-fighting, and war-winning strategy in a nuclear war. Additionally, a nuclear war would be an unconditionally "just" war for the Soviets regardless of who started it or how it was initiated.
INTRODUCTION

Implicit in current United States declaratory nuclear strategy are assumptions that the USSR, like the US, would be inclined to fight a "limited" nuclear war, once it erupted, to control escalation, and to seek early war termination at the lowest level of nuclear conflict. Former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger dismissed the likelihood of a massive, surprise Soviet nuclear attack as a near zero probability; and, as Dr. Lynn Davis has pointed out, American analysts have generally regarded an all-our surprise Soviet attack as the least likely nuclear war scenario.

This study examines Soviet military writings on nuclear strategy to determine the validity of these assumptions. Are the Soviets more likely to resort to a limited first use of nuclear weapons, as the US countervailing strategy assumes? Or does their nuclear strategy continue to call for a massive, preemptive first strike in the initial period of war? To answer these questions, we focused our research on surprise and preemption in Soviet nuclear strategy. Although technically, preemption could occur without surprise and a surprise attack would not necessarily have to be preemptive, we have roughly treated these terms synonymously. We developed our research of unclassified Soviet military writings around the following subject areas: 1) the importance of surprise and preemption in the beginning period of a nuclear war and means and techniques for conducting surprise nuclear attacks; including likely strategic and theater targets; 2) surprise and the conventional nuclear war interface; 3) the fallback, launch-on-warning option; and 4) war-winning versus the doomsday propaganda line in Soviet strategic thought.
SECTION I
SURPRISE AND PREEMPTION

Soviet Military Thought

No sound understanding of the Soviet concept of surprise and preemption and their role in Soviet nuclear strategy is possible without first understanding the framework of Soviet military thought. Soviet theoreticians and historians have long been preoccupied with the theoretical and practical applications of surprise and preemptive first strike. They stress that surprise is critical not only during individual campaigns, but more importantly during the opening stages of war itself. Soviet military planners view the opening stages of war as crucial and, if success can be achieved during this period, it may prove decisive. Therefore, it is logical that surprise and preemptive first strike would occupy a prominent position in Soviet military theory.

Military thought is a major field of study within the Soviet Union and has the full support of the military as well as the political leadership. William R. Kintner and Harriet F. Scott observed that:

Possibly no nation has invested as much intellectual capital in the study of war as has the Soviet Union during the brief period of its existence. There is a vast quantity of Soviet military literature of generally high quality, sanctioned by the leadership and linked to the political theory and strategy of which it is, in fact, an integral part. Any future Soviet military action is very likely to comply with the doctrine, strategy, and tactics developed by Soviet theoreticians.

The Marxist-Leninist approach, which is characteristic of Soviet scientific investigation in general, has led the Soviets to search for objective, scientifically-formulated concepts that govern the
conduct of war. One such effort was that of V. Ye Savkin in his book *The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics* in which he poses that there are four objective "laws of war":

FIRST: The course and outcome of war with unlimited employment of all means of conflict depend primarily on the correlation of available, strictly military forces of the combatants at the beginning of the war, especially in nuclear weapons and means for their delivery.

SECOND: The course and outcome of a war depend on the correlation of military potentials of the combatants.

THIRD: The course and outcome of a war depend on its political context.

FOURTH: The course and outcome of a war depend on the correlation of moral-political and psychological capabilities of the peoples and armies of the combatants.

These "laws of war" are operationalized through a hierarchical spectrum of military thought. Military Doctrine is the highest level, is based upon the political strategy of the Soviet state, and is formulated by the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). "Military doctrine is the sum total of scientifically based views accepted in the country and by its armed forces." Military science flows from "military doctrine" and investigates the objective laws governing armed conflict. Military science is considered to be a system of knowledge which is dynamic, changing as conditions change. Whereas military doctrine expresses a state's views of the character of war, military science deals with armed conflict.

The Soviets differentiate between war and armed conflict. War consists of ideological, psychological, and economic struggles in addition to action on the battlefield. Armed conflict is much narrower and consists of combat activities of the armed forces.
According to Savkin, "the 'first law of war' arose because, under the conditions of a nuclear missile war, the outcome of a military engagement could be determined by just the first massive nuclear strikes." The development of the "first law of war" was greatly influenced by the Soviets' view of the importance of the initial period of the war and is an outgrowth of extensive study of the opening phases of World War I and the Great Patriotic War. Moreover, under conditions of modern warfare, particularly nuclear warfare, the principle of surprise stems from the first and second laws of war.

Marshall of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff, summarized the current Soviet view in 1982, when he wrote: "The element of surprise [vnezapnosti] already played a certain role in World War II. Today it is becoming a factor of the greatest strategic importance." The technological nature of modern warfare has also contributed to the Soviet perception of the importance of surprise. The widespread deployment of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons has accelerated Soviet concentration on surprise and preemptive first strike. Savkin writes that: "The importance of surprise steadily rises with the development of means of armed conflict."

Soviet discussions of the role of surprise are guided by Savkin's "laws of war," particularly the first which emphasizes a favorable correlation of military forces at the beginning of the war. One would not expect Soviet authors to openly state in publications for general readership that the Soviet Union would initiate war by a surprise preemptive nuclear strike. Such an assertion would be contrary to the official ideological position that the Soviet Union is a "peaceloving state" defending itself against the aggressive designs of the "imperialist
Western bloc. Yet, Soviet publications do stress those factors which the Soviets feel will be of strategic importance in any future war, including the role of surprise in implementing or enhancing these factors.

**Initial Period of War**

The initial period of war assumed increased significance because of the widespread deployment of nuclear weapons and the recognition of their destructive capability. In view of the changed nature of modern warfare—which the Soviets have termed the "revolution in military affairs"—Soviet military science in the late 1950's began a systematic examination centered on what significance initial military operations at the very beginning of the war held for the outcome of the entire war. Lieutenant Colonel I. Rostunov described the direction of Soviet military study when he wrote in *Military Thought*:

> The revolution in military affairs, which is connected with the introduction of nuclear-rocket weapons, exerted great influence in the development of Soviet military-historical science. . . . Radical changes in the structure of the armed forces and methods of conducting military operations required military historians and theoreticians to turn their attention mainly to researching such experiences of the past which had not lost their significance for new changing situations. In particular, a more detailed study of the operations for the beginning period of the war was begun. 9

As a result of this study, Soviet military theoreticians concluded that former notions of the development of armed combat in well defined stages or periods in which tactical or operational successes combine to achieve strategic success, may have been "fundamentally altered." 10

The advent of the nuclear-rocket weapon had dramatically changed the situation in two fundamental respects.  

First, the military-strategic goals of the war have been expanded over what they had been in the past. According to Marshall of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskiy:
The question arises of what, under these conditions constitutes the main military-strategic goal of the war: the defeat of the enemy's armed forces, as was the case in the past, or the annihilation and destruction of objectives in the enemy interior and the disorganization of the latter. The theory of Soviet military strategy gives the following answer to this question: both of these goals should be achieved simultaneously. The annihilation of the enemy's armed forces, the destruction of objectives in the rear areas, and disorganization of the interior will be a single continuous process of the war. Two main factors are at the root of this solution of the problem: first, the need to decisively defeat the aggressor in the shortest possible time, for which it will be necessary to deprive him simultaneously of his military, political, and economic possibilities of waging war; second, the real possibility of our achieving these goals simultaneously with the aid of existing means of armed combat. 11

In other words, the first and second of Savkin's "laws of war" can now be executed simultaneously.

The second factor that Soviet military theoreticians believe has changed is the time at which the military-strategic goals of the war can be achieved. In previous wars, a nation, even one subjected to a surprise attack, could recover and mobilize to fight the war. However, under modern conditions, nuclear weapons have the potential to achieve the military-strategic goals of the war at the very outset. Hence, the strategic importance of this period of the war as reflected by Sokolovskiy:

The peacetime stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their carriers may be used in full measure by the belligerents from the very first minutes of the war to destroy and annihilate the most important enemy objectives throughout his territory, in order to achieve the main political and military-strategic goals within a brief period of time at the very outset of the war. Therefore, the initial period of a present-day nuclear-rocket war will obviously be the main and decisive period and will predetermine the development and outcome of the entire war. 12

Since the initial period of the war is the main and decisive period during which the military-strategic goals of the war may be attained, it is not unexpected that the Soviets would emphasize the importance of surprise for the attainment of these goals. The Soviets believe that "strat-
egic surprise is one of the most important factors which create the most favorable conditions for achieving strategic war aims, particularly in the initial period. In this respect, the Soviets attach considerable importance to seizing the strategic initiative. General Major K. Sevast'yanov underscored the importance of maintaining the initiative when he wrote in Military Thought: "The most important moment, ensuring the successful conduct of a war... is seizing and maintaining the strategic initiative from the very beginning of the war." Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Moskalenko is even more enlightening when he equates the first use of nuclear weapons with seizing the initiative in a war. "In view of the immense destructive force of nuclear weapons and the extremely limited time available to take effective countermeasures after an enemy launches its missiles, the launching of the first massed nuclear attack acquires decisive importance for achieving the objectives of war." 15

Soviet military writings clearly stipulate that they will strive to seize and maintain the strategic initiative from the very beginning of the war. It is equally clear that surprise will play an extremely important role in seizing the initiative.

Correlation of Forces

Another factor that the Soviets believe will be of strategic importance as a result of the "revolution in military affairs" is what they term the "correlation of forces." Correlation of forces is a general concept that has found wide applicability in Soviet military as well as political writings. In the political or international context, correlation of forces refers to an assessment of the relative balance of all elements of power—economic, political, ideological,
moral, and psychological as well as military--between the socialist states on the one side and the capitalist West on the other. While dynamic, the international correlation of forces changes slowly and only as a result of the deliberate efforts of the socialist camp to bring the correlation of forces to its historically predetermined conclusion: the predicted decline of the capitalist West.

In the military context, the correlation of forces refers to the quantitative and qualitative balance of combat might between belligerents. However, the distinction between an international correlation of forces and the correlation of combat-might between belligerents is not sharply defined because the Soviets view the combat-might of armed forces as "the dialectical quantitative and qualitative unity of their material and spiritual elements." 16

The combat might of troops is not just a military-technical concept. It has profound social meaning, because in concentrated form it expresses the economic, political, scientific, and ideological features of belligerent states. For this reason the correlation forces will always also have a social character reflecting both the military-technical capabilities of the classes and states participating in a war as well as the level and trend of their economic, scientific, political and spiritual development. 17

While the political and military aspects of the concept of correlation of forces are interrelated, it is the military element that is addresses in Savkin's "first law of war." Moreover, with nuclear weapons the military correlation of forces is capable of being changed radically and rapidly in favor of one side or the other. According to General Major I. Anureyev, "One of the most important features connected with the application of nuclear weapons is the possibility of a sharp change in the correlation of forces." 18
As with operations during the initial period of the war, surprise figures prominently in Soviet conceptions of how to change the correlation of forces to their advantage.

The role of surprise in combat has become considerably more important under present-day conditions. With the unexpected employment of new weapons, and nuclear weapons in particular, it is possible even with equal and sometimes inferior strength to inflict on the enemy irrecoverable losses in a short period of time, abruptly to alter the correlation of forces in one's own favor . . . . 19

Moreover, the correlation of forces once altered by surprise nuclear attacks may remain in the favor of that belligerent who initiated the surprise attack. The Soviets believe that the effects of a surprise nuclear attack may so disorient the enemy that the course and even the outcome of military operations may be decisively influenced. 20 They further believe that the duration and impact of surprise nuclear attacks will be far greater than surprise attacks in past wars. 21 According to Savkin:

> Surprise permits forestalling the enemy in delivering strikes, catching him unawares, paralyzing his will, sharply reducing his combat effectiveness, disorganizing his control, and creating favorable conditions for defeating even superior forces. 22

It is clear that surprise is highly valued as a force multiplier and that the Soviets will make every effort to achieve it.

The Soviets insist that their forces are defensive, and that the West will initiate a nuclear conflict with a surprise first strike. Therefore, using this rationale to legitimate it, they study the elements of surprise to a degree of detail that would certainly allow them to use it to their advantage. The following describe the individual elements of a surprise nuclear attack as the Soviets discuss them in their own literature.
The Soviets recognize that several preparatory elements contribute to a successful surprise attack. Two elements essential at this stage are intelligence and reconnaissance. According to Sevast'yanov:

"in order to seize and then maintain the strategic initiative in armed conflict it is necessary, in our opinion, to possess well-organized reconnaissance, to constantly know the plans and intentions of probable enemies." 23

Savkin makes this relationship even more explicit: "Objective prerequisites for achieving surprise" are "... the availability of the necessary information on the enemy." 24

Intelligence and reconnaissance are important not only to the Soviet's own surprise strike, but also to "deluding the enemy as to one's own intentions." 25 This delusion would be used as a means to control the enemy's actions, thereby preventing enemy knowledge of a Soviet attack, and would rely heavily on adequate intelligence.

Recognizing the value of surprise to their own battle plans, the Soviets also acknowledge the importance of denying the benefits of intelligence and reconnaissance to the enemy. To achieve surprise in their own attack, the Soviets seem especially interested in developing the tactic of thwarting the enemy's electronic means of reconnaissance. General Major N.D. Vasendin and Colonel N. Kuznetsov, in an early article in Military Thought, not only saw the importance of this element of surprise, but also went on to suggest a specific method for attaining it:

To achieve surprise in a modern war, an aggressor on the eve of war and in the course of it, increasing the activities of his reconnaissance, will evidently take active measures to suppress and blind reconnaissance forces and means of the enemy by creating strong interference against radio and radiotechnical means. For this purpose, high altitude nuclear explosions can be carried out in the beginning and in the course of the war to destroy the system of control and communications and to suppress the anti-missile and antiair defense radar system and the aircraft control systems. 26
Additional Elements of Surprise

Several additional elements of surprise are closely connected to the intelligence, reconnaissance and anti-reconnaissance functions; these include secrecy, deception, misinformation, and related elements. Although the Soviet writers distinguish among these individual elements, they frequently, and necessarily, treat them in combination to produce graphic and practical evaluations of their use in a first strike situation. An apt summary of the secretive elements of achieving surprise is given by Vasendin and Kuznetsov:

Surprise in the course of an armed conflict is achieved above all by retaining secrecy of plans and intentions, a skillful selection of the moment of beginning of combat operations, speed and concealment of regrouping of troops, the use of new methods of combat operations and means of combat, camouflage, and also unexpected and stronger strikes in several zones. 27

The secretive elements of surprise appear both in the preparatory and operational phases of a war. "Secrecy is an essential condition for achieving surprise ... . Surprise and resulting major success have been achieved only in those operations and engagements in which secrecy of preparations was maintained." 28

In his highly analytical article on surprise in warfare, Colonel I. Kuleszynski provides specific prescriptions for the use of secrecy in combination with other elements:

... in order to achieve surprise it is necessary to endeavor to limit the enemy's information-gathering capabilities, particularly the capability to acquire correct, useful information; one must endeavor to keep one's activities secret, to deceive the enemy, to disorganize him, by disrupting his system of communications. 29

One way Kuleszynski suggests to maintain this secrecy is to involve "a strictly limited number of persons" in the planning process "on a strictly need-to-know basis." 30 Savkin considers depriving the enemy
of intelligence of Soviet plans, "especially nuclear missiles," to be a "deciding condition" in achieving surprise. He further stresses the necessity to "lead him (the enemy) astray" and maintain "secrecy of operations" by denying the enemy information and by using camouflage, "military cunning," and disinformation. 31

In an article on the uses of camouflage in warfare, the authors combine several types of secrecy and deception in their definition of "operational camouflage":

... keeping operation preparations secret (radio silence, concealed control, dissemination of false information to the enemy); concealment of troop regroupings, camouflage of assembly areas of support echelons (reserve and supply bases); creation of dummy troop concentrations, command posts, defensive installations, structures, etc. 32

The relationship between secret preparations and a successful surprise nuclear attack is clear, particularly because the weapons involved can be readied without any overtly obvious evidence. 33

In addition to secret planning, the Soviet authors recognize the utility of several other deceptive measures: secret acquisition of weapons to enable "mass employment" and surprise; development of tactics for "unexpected use of available weapons"; and, preparations by commanders and staffs to use new combat methods and to conduct operations in unexpected ways. 34 "Surprise is incompatible with stereotype. Stereotype contradicts the very essence of surprise." 35 In his prescriptive list of the elements of surprise, Kuleszynski also cites active deception, "for example, feinting actions or dissemination of false information." 36 Zemskov provides several methods of achieving success in a sudden attack, including "a strike by the nuclear forces on continuous alert, a strike by ICBM's alone and by missiles from patrolling atomic submarines, a strike by all nuclear forces after a brief preparation, etc." 37
Because the Soviet conception of nuclear war include the integration of all conventional forces as well, the writings on the subject contain frequent references to concealed mobilization and camouflage. The secret massing and regrouping of forces, "primarily ground troops and air forces," must be accomplished "well ahead of time." There is a particularly intriguing definition of "strategic camouflage," as distinct from "operational" and "tactical" camouflage: "Strategic camouflage constitutes a component of defense of home territory and includes camouflage of important installations from the moment of their construction." Such an assertion appears to indicate that specific war preparations are of a long term, possibly constant, nature.

A final element of surprise nuclear attack is night attack. Sidorenko states that in a "future nuclear missile war" the importance of night attack "will increase sharply." Believing that "surprise is a basic characteristic of night operations," he writes that it "is necessary to attempt to take advantage of this factor to the maximum." Sidorenko makes explicit the advantage of using nuclear weapons in such a surprise attack when he writes that such tactics "have a strong moral-psychological influence on the enemy troops."

In considering the discrete elements of surprise, it is interesting to note that at least some Soviet military analysis focuses on the possibility of secretly expanding a conventional conflict into nuclear war.

Such a beginning of war (by conventional means) can create favorable conditions for the movement of all nuclear forces to the regions of combat operations, bringing them into the highest level of combat readiness, and subsequently inflicting the first nuclear strike with the employment in it of the maximum number of missile launch sites, submarines, and aircraft at the most favorable moment. Besides using a "local war" to mask strategic intentions, "training exercises and maneuvers" would also be useful " to implement operational de-
ployement of forces and means and their preparation to inflict a sur-
prise first strike." 43

Of course, the ability to mount a surprise first strike ultimately
depends on the readiness of the forces available, and none of the Soviet
writers neglects that fact. As a way to complete consideration of the
elements of surprise, it may be useful to consider one Soviet author's
views on this aspect: "Conditions favorable for taking the enemy by sur-
prise pass very quickly, while a high degree of troop combat readiness
promotes utilization of such conditions on very short notice." 44

Targets: Strategic and Tactical

The fundamental principle governing the employment of strategic
nuclear weapons is that, unlike previous wars, "mass nuclear missile
strikes at the armed forces of the opponent and at his key economic and
political objectives can determine the victory of one side and the de-
feat of the other at the very beginning of the war." 45 The Soviets con-
sider that "this principle has now become indisputable." 46

It is now possible to simultaneously destroy his forces, "chief
sectors of the economy" and "centers of transport, communications, state
administrative bodies, the bodies of military strategic leadership, and
the basic centers of state communications" with strategic nuclear weapons. 47

The Soviets place primary emphasis on the effort to defeat the enemy's
"basic nuclear missile weapons" 48 and "means of nuclear attack." 49 By
utilizing the principle of massed attack, the Soviets anticipate that not
only can they destroy the enemy's means of nuclear attack, simultaneously
creating mass destruction and devastation of the military, political and
economic apparatus, but they can also achieve the "crushing of his will
to resist ... obtaining victory in the shortest possible time." 50
Following the achievement of a successful strategic nuclear attack, the role of the remaining conventional forces will be only to "destroy remaining groups of enemy troops, occupy enemy territory, and protect their own territory." 51

The fundamental employment of nuclear weapons against tactical targets will include destruction of the "enemy means of nuclear attack," his main troop formations, and "disorganization of the rear, economy and troop control." 52 However, the enemy's nuclear forces will take priority. 53

**Defense and Damage Limitation**

The Soviets recognize that a nuclear attack cannot completely eliminate an enemy's means of retaliation:

> With the existing level of development of nuclear missile weapons and their reliable cover below ground and under water it is practically impossible to destroy them completely and consequently it is also impossible to prevent an annihilating retaliatory attack. 54

Knowing that nuclear retaliation would wreak massive damage on the Soviet Union and produce high casualty levels, Soviet planners see several defensive or damage-limiting options as well as the need to be prepared to continue the conflict.

A frequent theme in Soviet military writing is the necessity of having reserves of all kinds to replace forces lost to a Western attack. General Major K. Dzhelaukhov points out that the first priority of reserve forces, "those arriving from the border regions and from the interior of the country," would be to "promote the maintenance of the strategic initiative." 55 Dzhelaukhov also lists possible missions for what he calls the "strategic reserves":

17
launching a counteroffensive or exploiting success on main axes; relieving operational ob'yedineniya [field forces] and soyedineniya [formations] which have suffered heavy losses; reinforcing rocket-artillery, tank and aviation groupings; repelling thrusts and destroying large operational forces of the enemy; threatening flanks of attacking strategic groupings, reinforcing large airborne forces operating deep in the enemy rear area; operations on new strategic axes; and the achievement of other objectives.  

The most important element of air defense, judging from the Soviet authors, is the PVO Strany air defense forces. The PVO Strany troops would have missions both in combating the initial enemy attack and in reinforcing PVO groups that are destroyed or damaged by the enemy. Although specific anti-ballistic missile systems are not described, the PVO Strany troops are assigned the mission of "the inflight destruction of rockets and space means of attacks." One Soviet author recognized that radiation levels would be a factor in a nuclear war and recommended redeployment of PVO Strany troops to areas of "favorable radiation situation."  

On the defensive side, the Soviets saw the need for civil defense long ago. Seeing that nuclear war would bring destruction to the interior as well as to the combat forces, Sokolovskiy wrote of the need for civil defense as early as 1962. His major emphasis was not on protection of the population, however, but on ensuring "normal activity of all governmental control agencies . . . and the effective functioning of the national economy." This emphasis on civil defense is further evidence that the Soviets recognize that their surprise first strike would not be sufficient to destroy an enemy's capability to retaliate.
SECTION II

SURPRISE AND THE CONVENTIONAL-NUCLEAR WAR INTERFACE

Soviet military writings address the conventional-nuclear war interface in two basic scenarios. One is the initiation of a war by NATO employing conventional weapons alone. The Soviets began writing about this during the mid-1960's, and they have consistently attributed it to the change in NATO strategy to "flexible response." Flexible response provided for the likelihood of a war developing in three successive stages: 1) conventional; 2) tactical nuclear; and 3) strategic nuclear. The other scenario is an all-out nuclear war in which conventional weapons will be used in a supplementary yet essential role.

Nuclear Forces and the Conventional Phase of a War

According to Soviet views, the change in NATO strategy during the 1960's calling for initiating war using conventional rather than nuclear weapons was a direct response to the growth in Soviet nuclear attack capabilities and NATO's desire, therefore, to delay as long as possible use of nuclear weapons against the USSR. Soviet military writers allow for a conventional war erupting either from a direct NATO conventional attack in Europe or from a local conflict situation developing into a world war.

The principal focus of Soviet military operations during the conventional phase of a war would be to position their forces advantageously for transitioning to nuclear war. This means the Soviets would attempt to posture their forces during this period to be ready at any time to seize the initiative and launch massive, preemptive and surprise nuclear strikes with tactical and strategic weapons.
The main objectives of Soviet conventional forces would be to destroy the enemy's nuclear weapons and delivery capability, to destroy his first echelon troops, and to seize enemy territory which would be "advantageous for offensive operations with nuclear weapons." At the operational and tactical levels of combat, this would require deep thrusts into enemy territory by ground and air units to knock out enemy missile and aviation facilities in order to destroy the enemy's "nuclear weapons before they can be employed." Because the Soviets believe the conventional period of the war will eventually escalate to all-out nuclear warfare, and they "expect at any time employment of nuclear weapons during an offensive operation in a nonnuclear war," one of their chief concerns in this opening period will be the maintenance of their strategic and operational-tactical nuclear forces at peak combat readiness. This is essential. It involves, among other things, establishment of their own "nuclear echelons," dispersal of nuclear weapons delivery forces, and maintenance of up-to-date locating information on potential targets for nuclear attack. An essential reconnaissance task at this stage is the "prompt discovery" of enemy preparations for nuclear attack.

As surprise is a basic principle of Soviet military art applicable to strategy, operations, and tactics, it is expected to play an essential role in the conventional period of war. First, surprise has grown in importance for employment of modern conventional weapons, although probably not to the same degree it has increased in significance for the use of nuclear weapons. Some Soviet military authors indicate that the conventional phase could commence with surprise attacks, and one writer observed that modern conventional weapons have been developed.
which, like nuclear weapons, can be used "very successfully for delivering surprise attacks." Of greater importance, however, is the expected use of surprise in the conventional phase for transitioning to full-scale use of nuclear weapons. The key, according to one of the editors of Military Thought, General Major Vasendin, is to be able "to achieve a surprise nuclear attack in the course of nonnuclear operations" and to be able to inflict a surprise (nuclear) attack "at the most favorable moment" of escalation. To accomplish this, it is necessary to: 1) maintain secrecy in moving nuclear weapons delivery forces into combat zones; 2) protect nuclear forces from attack; 3) conduct countermeasures against enemy reconnaissance, command and control, and early warning systems; 4) carry out deception. The Soviet General emphasized that these actions "can have a decisive influence on the achievement of surprise in switching to combat operations with the unlimited use of nuclear weapons." 

The Soviets recognize certain advantages and disadvantages in fighting a conventional phase of a war. On the plus side, it of course provides additional time to prepare for nuclear war, especially for increasing the combat readiness of nuclear attack and strategic defense forces and for moving them into combat positions. As Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Marshal Krylov wrote in 1967 if a war began with use of conventional weapons "the army, the state, and its economy will have some time to complete the strategic deployment of the armed forces, to take measures in mobilizing and concentrating the troops in theaters of military operations, and also to reorganize industry on a military footing." 

On the negative side, one of the biggest problems for combat forces will be the constant threat of the enemy's use of nuclear weapons. This will place severe psychological strain on friendly troops who will have
to be "constantly ready to use nuclear weapons and to defend themselves against them." Other disadvantages include the necessity to develop a single warplan which provides both for separate—and at some point—combined use of conventional and nuclear weapons. This conventional-nuclear weapons employment plan is "closely interrelated and developed as an integrated whole." Nuclear forces must be maintained in high combat readiness, and a particular problem for the dual-capable forces is that they must be ready at all times to operate "both with and without the use of nuclear weapons." In addition, dual-capable forces must constantly be ready "to make a swift transition" from conventional to nuclear combat.

Problems of supply during nonnuclear combat include the necessity to keep nuclear weapons near their potential delivery points. Operational-tactical constraints include the dilemma of having to mass forces for tactical employment of conventional weapons while also having to remain in dispersed formations for fear of the constant threat of nuclear attack. As one writer observed with considerable understatement, operating in dispersed troop formations during the conventional phase "does not assure success."  

There is no consensus among Soviet military writers regarding the duration of the conventional period of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. One view is that it will be extremely short, lasting up to four or five days as indicated in NATO exercises. According to one author, a short conventional period of war would tend to enhance the impact of surprise in initiating use of nuclear weapons. Marshall of the Soviet Union N.S. Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff, is of the view that the conventional period could also be of a lengthy duration. From the mid-1960's to the present, however, all Soviet writers consistently express Soviet
military doctrine that a world war could become protracted and they emphasize the necessity of being prepared to wage it.

**Transition to Nuclear War**

Once the war escalates to nuclear war—which they believe is inevitable—the Soviets consider it in their best interest to wage and win a short, all-out nuclear war. Nuclear weapons allow them to accomplish military objectives in battle in only "a few days or weeks" instead of in "four or five years" as in previous wars, and protracted war is obviously more costly, demanding "more sacrifices and material reserves than does a short, swift-moving war." 83 According to another view, this short "one-act war" will also reduce overall casualties in the long run. 84

We agree with Joseph Douglass and Amoretta Hoeber that the transition from conventional to nuclear war would involve Soviet efforts to be first to conduct preemptive, surprise nuclear strikes. "The side which first employs nuclear weapons with surprise," Colonel Sidorenko stresses in The Offensive, "can predetermine the outcome of the battle in his favor." 85 This overriding importance placed on being able to conduct the first surprise nuclear strikes, however, could even advance the timing of the decision to begin employing nuclear weapons. 86 As General Lieutenant Zav'yalov wrote in Red Star in 1970—attributing it to the NATO command—nuclear escalation could occur "at the very earliest state" of a conventional conflict, "even at its start." 87

Timing is the crucial consideration. It is not simply a question of a Soviet breakthrough triggering a NATO nuclear escalation, as Joseph Douglass has suggested; nor is it merely a matter of the aggressor resorting to nuclear weapons after being threatened with destruction of his troops or loss of his most important territory, as it appeared to General Major Zemskov in 1969. 88 Another Soviet writer suggested the timing
question is more complex: one side might "accelerate" the initial use of nuclear weapons merely to force a favorable turning point in the war and to insure that he succeeds in employing nuclear weapons preemptively, i.e., "at the critical moment." Delay for whatever reason might make it "all the more difficult to use nuclear weapons with the necessary effect." Even the side having greater military success in the conventional period of the war might be the first to resort to nuclear weapons in order to preempt their use by the losing side.

Absence of Limited War and Controlled Escalation Concepts

Regarding the transition to nuclear war, declaratory policy has consistently rejected the American concept of "limited" nuclear war and controlled escalation. The NATO scenario in which a conventional war transitions to "limited nuclear war involving use of tactical nuclear weapons alone in the European theater is dismissed by the Soviets as a "lie," a "deception," and a "scenario for 'limited' insanity." They insist that nuclear war can neither be controlled as to types of nuclear weapons nor geographical scope. Controlling nuclear war is like controlling a volcano, the official government newspaper Izvestia recently observed: once it has erupted it "cannot be stopped." According to the present Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, General Tolubko, a limited nuclear war is impossible, and use of tactical nuclear weapons "will instantly erupt into a world nuclear battle using the conflicting sides' entire nuclear arsenals." Marshall of the Soviet Union Ogarkov, too, views the nuclear transition as taking place between conventional and all-out nuclear war—without an intermediate, "limited", or tactical nuclear phase. Escalation for Ogarkov is escalation to general nuclear war with strategic nuclear weapons being the "main means of conducting it."
Rejecting the notion that a nuclear war can be geographically confined, the Chief of the General Staff quoted from former Secretary Breshnev's November 1981 interview with Der Spiegel, asserting that nuclear war would "inevitably and inescapably assume a worldwide character." A November 1982 Novosti Press Agency attack on Pershing II and GLCM deployments in Europe provides a more recent illustration of the Soviet congenital refusal to distinguish between tactical and strategic nuclear warfare. If Euromissiles are launched at the USSR, the Novosti article warned, it "will inevitably become the first minutes of an all-European and world nuclear catastrophe."

Implicit in the U.S. change to a flexible response strategy adopted under former Secretaries of Defense McNamara and Schlesinger has been the assumption that the Soviets, having reached nuclear superpower status, will share U.S. interests in controlling escalation if nuclear war breaks out. Plausible though this assumption may be theoretically, we have found no evidence in Soviet military writings to support it. To the contrary, the literature on Soviet strategic thought suggests that, although they would share mutual interests in preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, they would not attempt to control escalation once it started.

Concepts of controlling escalation and "limited" nuclear war are not part of Soviet nuclear strategy. As discussed earlier in this paper, Soviet strategy calls for massive and surprise use of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons at the very outset. Stemming directly from this first law of war are two of the most important principles of Soviet military art—concentration of force and surprise. The decisive importance placed on these principles of military art at the beginning of nuclear war dictates an all-out rather than a restrained nuclear war-fighting strategy—once the nuclear threshold is crossed.
By definition, a "nuclear offensive" is the "first air-and-missile operation in the initial period of a war." It is "conducted simultaneously in all theaters in accordance with a unified strategic plan, involving the greatest possible quantity of strategic and tactical weapons of nuclear attack." 101

Consistent with the rejection of "limited" nuclear war is the lack of evidence in Soviet military writings indicating adherence to an American-style withholding strategy for controlling nuclear escalation. 102 The author of the standard Soviet military text on offensive operations wrote that any delay in or waiting to destroy the enemy's nuclear attack capabilities—at least at the operational-tactical levels, and therefore presumably at the strategic level as well—is considered "absolutely inadmissible." Further, although attributing the concept to "Western specialists," he cautioned that nuclear strikes should not be launched separately, nor should they be fired with "large time intervals." 103 In short, Soviet nuclear strategy calls for the massive and simultaneous destruction of strategic, operational, and tactical targets from front to rear, through-out the entire depth of enemy territory, at the outset of nuclear operations. 104

This does not mean, however, that the Soviets expect to be able to launch all of their nuclear missiles in a massive, surprise first strike. Former Strategic Rocket Forces Chief, Marshall of the Soviet Union Krylov, wrote in 1967 of the possibility of some of his ICBM's being unlaunchable in the opening salvo. These would have to ride out in hardened silos an incoming enemy missile attack before they would be launched, presumably in a smaller, follow-up attack. 105 Thus, in writing that a portion of the missile force may be "unable" to be launched in the first strike, it was clear that Marshall Krylov was
suggesting operational-technical limitations—possibly due to readiness deficiencies inherent in liquid-fueled rocket systems—rather than a deliberate withholding strategy might limit the size of the first strike.107

Finally, although some American naval analysts have found indications in the writings of Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov of a possible partial SLBM withholding strategy, this appears to be for influencing the peace settlement at the end of a war, not for controlling escalation at the beginning. 107a

**Conventional Weapons in a Nuclear War**

Frequently overlooked by Western analysts is the importance the Soviets place on the role of conventional weapons in nuclear war. Soviet conventional capabilities are usually assessed in terms of conventional war only. Soviet writings, however, are consistent in emphasizing the essential importance of conventional forces in winning a nuclear war. Soviet conventional force requirements for both conventional and nuclear war therefore, should be considered together in assessing the growth and development of Soviet conventional force capabilities.

The Soviets define nuclear war as one in which nuclear weapons are "the principal means of destruction." 108 Thus, nuclear missiles will play the decisive role but conventional weapons will play an important and essential role in achieving victory. 109 The Soviets envisage concurrent use of nuclear and conventional weapons in nuclear war, and they plan to use them together to carry out surprise attacks in combined-arms operations. 110

One reason for the importance of conventional weapons in theater nuclear warfare is that there will be more battlefield targets than can be destroyed with nuclear weapons alone, and nuclear weapons are expected to be targeted against only the "most important objectives." Additionally, some targets will be on the move when the nuclear attack is launched, and some will remain unlocated until after the surprise nuclear attacks are
launched. In particular, dual-capable forces employing conventional and nuclear weapons will be required to successfully destroy the enemy's tactical nuclear attack forces. Some units and subunits may even conduct combat operations using conventional weapons alone. This would include operations against "operational-strategic" targets after nuclear weapon stockpiles are depleted—especially at the end of the war. It could also involve use by "surviving" ground, air, and naval units for follow-up attacks after a nuclear strike and for completing the defeat of the enemy by occupying and establishing control over his territory.
SECTION III
THE FALLBACK OPTION

Daniel Fouré and Gordon McCormick have correctly pointed out that the Soviet Union does not appear to be "pinning all its hopes on successful preemption." We have found numerous references dating from the late 1960's suggesting the Soviets have adopted a launch-on-warning (LOW) or launch-under-attack option in their nuclear war-fighting strategy. Although they would definitely prefer to fight a nuclear war using preemption and surprise, the Soviets apparently have developed reservations regarding their ability to successfully carry out a massive surprise attack. The problem consistently identified by military authors, beginning with Sokolovskiy in 1963, is the considerable technical improvements made in strategic and tactical reconnaissance systems. By detecting launch preparations, these improved systems could reduce if not negate the chances of either side's successfully launching surprise nuclear strikes.

Preemption vs. Retaliation

The Soviets no longer write about preemption in their nuclear strategy; they now attribute "preemption" to US/NATO strategy in order to legitimately address it. Most discussions of preemption in military writings appeared before the early 1970's, and these usually dealt with preemption in Soviet strategy at the operational-tactical rather than the strategic level. Colonel Sidorenko simply defined preemption in The Offensive in 1970 as the "destruction of enemy nuclear means before they can be put into action." The word is conspicuously absent however, in the Dictionary of Basic Military...
Terms. Preemption of course is incompatible with "peaceful coexistence," "no first use" and the current "peace offensive" in Western Europe. The Soviets have therefore substituted a variety of euphemisms for preemption in their open-source literature. These include words like "forestall," "anticipate," "disrupt," "frustrate," and "repulse"—all of which are variously used to describe Soviet action in nuclear war and all of which imply a preemption "war-fighting" strategy. 119

Soviet authors most frequently write of "repelling" a NATO attack and delivering a "crushing retaliatory blow." Marshall of the Soviet Union Ustinov recently promised an "all-crushing retaliatory strike" in response to a nuclear attack. Preemption and surprise are applied to U.S. nuclear strategy, 120 and military and civilian leaders, like former Secretary Breshnev, Marshalls Ustinov and Ogarkov, and Strategic Rocket Forces Chief, General Tolubko, now specifically deny preemption as part of current Soviet strategy. 121 Of course, one could reasonably argue that these public pronouncements are merely part of the Soviet "peace offensive," or declaratory policy, and do not suggest change in strategy. One could also refer to recent Ustinov statements which fall somewhere between preemption and retaliation, possibly leaning more toward the former. For example, in renouncing first use of nuclear weapons, Ustinov warned that the USSR also denies first use to anyone else, and he has also insisted that Soviet "defensive" military doctrine "will not be of a passive character." 122

Launch-on-Warning

References linking a "retaliatory" response to a LOW attack option, however, have appeared in Soviet military writings intended for internal use dating back at least to 1967. This indicates the Soviets have probably adopted a LOW option and that it coincidentally supports the softer, "no first use" propaganda line. "Early warning systems for detection of
a missile attack," Tolubko advised an interviewer last fall, "are now developing so fast that it is completely impossible for either side to bank on carrying out a preemptive strike." Suggesting a LOW option, Tolubko proceeded to quote Brezhnev that "if a group of missiles appears from anywhere, swift retribution will follow," Brezhnev was also reported by The Washington Post to have remarked in 1978 that "(Jimmy) Carter and I know we both have a couple dozen minutes when satellites will tell us missiles are coming.... I still have time to respond." 124

Most recently, the Soviets announced a LOW option as a threat against West European Pershing II/GLCM deployment. Ustinov has led the barrage of vehement Soviet complaints concerning the short, five to six minute flight time of Pershing II's launched from the Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviets responded by warning in November 1982 that "the appearance of nuclear missiles on air approaches to Soviet territory will inevitably call for instant retaliatory actions from the Soviet Union." This LOW threat was even extended to cover accidental firing of a Euro-missile against the USSR. 125

The earliest references to a possible retaliation-LOW option in Soviet strategy are a 1967 article by the Strategic Rocket Forces Chief at that time, Marshall Krylov, and a 1970 technical manual on ballistic missile systems. The similarity between Tolubko's recent statements on LOW and those of Krylov, his predecessor by some fifteen years, is of particular interest. Marshall Krylov observed that with the SRF forces maintained in high combat readiness and the presence of:

- Systems for detecting enemy missile launches and other types of reconnaissance, an aggressor is no longer able suddenly to destroy the missiles before their launch in the territory of the country against which the aggression is committed. They will have time during the flight of the missile of the aggressor to leave their launchers and inflict a retaliatory strike against the enemy. Thus, in modern conditions, with the presence of a system for detecting missile launches, an attempt
by the aggressor to inflict a sudden preemptory strike cannot give him a decisive advantage for the achievement of victory in war . . . . 126

Figure 1 provides the other earlier indication of possible LOW option. It appeared in a 1970 book entitled Design and Testing of Ballistic Missiles and reflected Soviet desire to be able "to launch a large number of rockets (first launch) before attacking warheads of the enemy (side A) fall upon combat positions." 127 The smaller, second launch probably represents those missiles not in high enough readiness for launch at the time of enemy attack. They could be expected to ride out the enemy strike in hardened silos. 128 They might also be withheld in order to reduce the fratricide effect in the first massive attack.

Fig. 1. Soviet Depiction of Ballistic Missile Density Distribution Launched by Side B (USSR). (Reproduced from Design and Testing of Ballistic Missiles, p. 305.)

The thread running through all of these references to LOW are the technical improvements in reconnaissance and ballistic missile launch detection systems. These improvements render the chances for successful
preemption and surprise less certain. Sokolovskiy first addressed this development in Soviet Military Thought in 1963, noting that it was "impossible" for the West to "completely conceal the preparation of a surprise attack from present-day strategic intelligence equipment since certain signs exist . . . which enable us to determine the likelihood of an attack." In the 1968 edition, he asserted the "possibilities of averting a surprise attack are constantly growing." and the Soviet reconnaissance, detection, and surveillance systems would provide warning of enemy attack preparation and "locate the mass launch of missiles." 129 It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that, if the Soviets believe their strategic reconnaissance systems 130 can prevent a preemptive, surprise U.S. nuclear strike—or at least reduce the chances of it to a minimum—131 they must also credit the United States with similar capabilities. This conclusion is supported by Soviet military writings reflecting detailed technical knowledge of United States reconnaissance and ballistic missile detection systems capabilities. 132

Other reasons scattered throughout Soviet military writings suggesting less than total confidence in being able to conduct a surprise attack include:

--The necessity for and difficulty of maintaining secrecy in preparing for a surprise attack.
--Command, control, and communications problems in coordinating an attack.
--The fact that intelligence information is sometimes "scattered, incomplete, and in many instances contradictory."133

Although not discussed in their military writings, the Soviet liquid-fueled missiles would certainly require a lengthy period of buildup to ready sufficient numbers for either a massive preemptive or LOW attack. The decision of whether to go with their preferred preemptive strategy or to resort to a fallback LOW option may largely depend on the amount of warning they receive. It is of interest that preemptive options for special targets and scenarios are maintained in the U/S SIOP—"in the event of unequivocal warning of Soviet attack." 134
SECTION IV

VICTORY VERSUS SUICIDE

Fully aware of the unprecedented human suffering and material losses they would incur in nuclear war, the Soviets share our concern for preventing its outbreak. If deterrence fails, however, if—according to military doctrine—"the imperialists succeed in unleashing a nuclear war," Soviet nuclear strategy calls for an all-out, war-fighting effort with victory as its ultimate goal. Recent characterization of nuclear war by the civilian-military leadership as being mutually suicidal appears to be more propaganda than strategy. The suicide-doomsday theme buttresses the "no-first-use" pledge and supports the Soviet "peace offensive" in Western Europe. 135

Former CPSU Secretary Brezhnev and Defense Minister Ustinov led the 1981-82 propaganda chorus that nuclear war is mutually suicidal. "Only he who decides to commit suicide," Brezhnev declared in referring to the West, "can begin a nuclear war in the hope to win it." He warned the United Nations General Assembly that nuclear war would mean "the destruction of human civilization and perhaps the end of life on earth," 136 and he assured the 26th CPSU Congress in launching his peace offensive early in 1981 that it was "dangerous madness" to contemplate victory in nuclear war. 137 From the Ministry of Defense, Marshall Ustinov repeated the Brezhnev United Nations theme in a July 1982 Pravda article entitled "For Averting the Threat of Nuclear War." Describing nuclear war as a "blow to everyone, a universal catastrophe," he specifically discounted Soviet reliance on victory in nuclear war, and he tied this and the "impossibility of gaining the upper hand in such a conflict" to the no-first-use Soviet propaganda line. Ustinov also claimed that more attention would be de-
voted in the Soviet armed forces to preventing a conventional war from going nuclear—including preventing the "unsanctioned" launch of a tactical or strategic nuclear weapon. Still, it should be stressed, the emphasis is on preventing the outbreak of nuclear war rather than on controlling escalation once nuclear war has begun. This doomsday propaganda linkage with no-first-use was made even more explicit by a General Major Simonyan who also wrote in July 1982 about nuclear war, the end of civilization, and the end of life on earth in an article entitled "There Must Be No First Strike." 139

The suicide-doomsday theme, however, does not appear in the writings of most military authors. Instead, we found references between 1963 and 1982 to Soviet "victory" in nuclear war by some twenty-one authors previously cited in this study. In addition, five other authors mentioned "defeating" the enemy in nuclear war. As recently as March 1982, the Chief of the General Staff, Marhsall Ogarkov, wrote both of Soviet victory and enemy defeat in nuclear war. 140 In his recent definition of military strategy in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Ogarkov wrote of gaining victory and of the "objective possibilities for achieving victory in nuclear war."141

There is a notable inconsistency between the 1981-82 suicide line of the Brezhnev-Ustinov and the writings of two Soviet general officers about victory in November 1982. One of these general officers, a Marshall Kuleshov of the Rocket and Artillery Directorate, wrote of achieving "modern warfare victory" over the enemy in an Izvestiya article commemorating the 38th anniversary of the Rocket Forces and Artillery Day.142 The other general, General Lieutenant Kiryan, writing in Soviet Military Review, even had "Victory in War" as part of his title and referred to the possibility of achieving "victory in a future war if the imperialists should unleash it."143
Soviet writings on the political content of nuclear war also suggest a war-winning strategy. There are intimations, however, that the official dictum as set forth by Marshall Sokolovskiy that even nuclear war is a continuation of politics has undergone occasional internal challenge since the mid-1960's. Colonel Ribkin, for example, insisted in 1965 that "war is always a continuation of politics" as he condemned the views of "several Soviet authors" who believed thermonuclear war could not serve as an instrument of politics and war unwinnable. Such views, Ribkin expostulated, were theoretically false and politically dangerous because they lead to "moral disarmament, to disbelief in victory, to fatalism and passivity." Ribkin was joined the following year by Colonel Grudinin writing in Red Star. Grudinin supported Ribkin's criticism of those "who deny all possibility of victory in a world nuclear," and he continued that regardless of the destructive consequences of a nuclear war, "this in no way changes the position that war would be a continuation of policies of the government and classes taking part in it by forceful means." This, Grudinin concluded, is the "essence of any war."  

In October 1980, two Soviet general officers in the political directorate criticized Western theorists who believe that nuclear war no longer serves political aims. Indicating some internal disagreement exists on this issue, they noted that "unfortunately" similar views were sometimes presented in the Soviet press. The correct view, they insisted, is that nuclear war for the imperialists would continue to be, according to the Lenin formula, a "continuation of policy by violent means." Senior military authors of an earlier major study on war and the Army also strongly rejected Western views that nuclear war would be mutually suicidal and "devoid of any sort of political essence." To the contrary, they argued, "a nuclear missile war would be the most "political" of all wars known to history."
The most recent Soviet pronouncement on this appeared in July 1982. In an article entitled "War Seen Unacceptable as Instrument of Policy," three Soviet civilian authors presented a "sociologist's" view declaring that a nuclear war was "absolutely unacceptable as an instrument of policy." Although specifically disclaiming nuclear war as an instrument of Soviet policy--socialist countries, after all, do not start wars--the authors left open the possibility that nuclear war would be a continuation of policy by violent means for the imperialists. The timing of the publication of its contents indicates it probably was released to support the 1981-82 Soviet foreign policy peace offensive and the no-first-use pledge. Thus, it is more a political than military statement and does not represent a fundamental change in Soviet military doctrine on the essence of nuclear war. 149

Soviet definition of just and unjust wars also support a war-fighting, war-winning nuclear strategy. Marshall Ogarkov broadly defined any world nuclear war as one which would be a "profoundly just war" for the Soviets and an "unjust, predatory" war for the imperialists. 150 The Soviets also "resolutely reject" the foreign view that a nuclear war under any circumstances would be unjust for both sides. 151 As explained in one study, "use of nuclear weapons as retaliation (by the USSR) to its use by an aggressor does not cancel out the just nature of the war." 152 It would only be unjust for the imperialists.

Fought in defense of the socialist motherland, a nuclear war would be "unconditionally just," and a "patriotic war of a socialist state can never be transformed into an annexationist, unjust war. 153 It is one thing to try to avoid nuclear war, authors of one study discussing just and unjust wars pointed out, but it is "something else to act if such a war comes a-
long." 154 Thus, it should be clear from these categorical pronouncements that a just nuclear war, in the Soviet view, is determined by who participates in it. This definition certainly stretches the ethics of war enough to justify a mass Soviet preemptive nuclear attack, initiated under conditions and circumstances solely of their own choosing.

Finally, Soviet nuclear targeting previously discussed in this paper also supports a war-fighting, war-winning strategy. Mutual assured destruction against population centers has never been part of Soviet strategy; in fact, one military author specifically rejected United States strategic bombing effectiveness against Japanese population centers in World War II as "barbarous" attacks which failed to have a significant impact in undermining enemy morale. 155 Nor are there indications in Soviet military writings of attacking cities, per se. These writings are very consistent in describing nuclear targets as counterforce, plus the political/military control centers and the war-making, economic-industrial base. Main economic targets include transportation facilities, power stations, chemical and metallurgical plants, and petroleum supplies. 156 As Marshall Sokolovskiy simply described nuclear targeting, the aim is to deprive the enemy of his military, political, and economic possibilities for making war. 157 As defined by the Soviets, a "massed nuclear attack" has a strictly war-fighting objective:

1) Destruction of enemy means of nuclear attack
2) Destruction of main enemy troop formations
3) Disorganization of the enemy's rear, economy, C^3, and state administration.158
SECTION V

CONCLUSION

The Soviets have generally ceased writing about Soviet preemption and surprise in their open literature, but there does not appear to be any diminution in the significance of these key tenets in their overall nuclear war-fighting strategy. Military writings in the 1960's and 1970's clearly document the increased importance placed on surprise in the initial period of war brought about by the advent of nuclear weapons. Massive employment, reconnaissance, secrecy, camouflage, deception, nighttime operations, and high combat readiness are all essential components of a successful Soviet surprise nuclear attack.

The Soviets share American concerns for preventing nuclear war, and they would prefer to keep a NATO/Warsaw Pact war conventional. Doubting, however, that such a war would remain conventional, their principal objective during the conventional phase of a war would be to position their forces advantageously for transitioning to nuclear war. They reject U.S. concepts of "limited" nuclear war and controlling escalation once nuclear war erupts. Their strategy, which makes little distinction between use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, calls for massive, preemptive use of nuclear weapons at the outset of nuclear weapons employment. We found no evidence in Soviet military writings to substantiate assumption of American declaratory flexible response nuclear strategy that the Soviets would likely resort to limited first use of nuclear weapons; that they would be interested in controlling nuclear escalation; or that they would seek war termination at the lowest level of engagement.

Soviet nuclear strategy is a war-fighting, war-winning strategy. This is clearly shown in their targeting doctrine and discussions of the just war theory. Despite Soviet declaratory political statements about no-first-use,
the "peace offensive," and mutual suicide in nuclear war, there is considerable evidence indicating that victory continues to be the objective of Soviet nuclear war strategy.

Although a massive, preemptive nuclear attack remains the preferred Soviet strategy, technical improvements in ballistic missile launch detection systems have reduced Soviet confidence in being able to successfully carry it out. Therefore, the Soviets apparently adopted a LOW fallback option beginning in the late 1960's.

Finally, although technical reconnaissance improvements have reduced the probability of successfully carrying out a massive, surprise nuclear attack, they have not eliminated it. As Douglass and Hoeber have correctly pointed out, there may be no conclusive evidence that the Soviets would in fact strike first, but "the converse, i.e., that they would not strike first is extremely difficult to consider valid..." 159 American nuclear strategists who dismiss a surprise Soviet nuclear attack as the "least likely scenario" ignore Soviet military writings on the subject; 159a Based on our research of Soviet military writings on strategy, we believe it is the most likely nuclear war scenario. American concepts of escalation control and conducting nuclear war on the basis of wait-and-see would concede the initiative to the Soviets, and they consider seizing the initiative in nuclear war crucial to their war-winning strategy.

For those who dismiss the possibility of a surprise nuclear attack or a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack as unlikely, we emphasize that surprise—in Soviet military thought—is "the unexpected use of nuclear weapons." 160 It should be remembered, as Klaus Knorr observed in his excellent study on strategic military surprise, that "it does not matter under the defined circumstances whether attack—by surprise or not—is perceived to be improbable. Doing the improbable is the very essence of effecting surprise." 161
NOTES

INTRODUCTION


2. Ibid., p. 5
SECTION I (Pages 4-18)


5. Ibid., p. 203.


11. Ibid.


17. Ibid., p. 63.

18. General Major I. Amureyev, "Determining the Correlation of Forces in Terms of Nuclear Weapons," Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, eds., The Soviet Art of War, p. 188.


23. Sevast'yanov, "Comments on the Article 'Augmentation of Strategic Efforts in Modern Armed Conflict,' " p. 57.


27. Ibid., p. 232.


30. Ibid.

31. Savkin, Basic Principles, p. 239.


34. Savkin, Basic Principles, p. 236.


43. Ibid., p. 230.


48. Ibid., p. 139.

49. Savkin, Basic Principles, p. 92.


51. Ibid., p. 287.

52. Sidorenko, The Offensive, p. 111


44


71. Savkin, Basic Principles, p. 236. (The author was referring to operational-tactical weapons.)


73. Ibid. Also see Samorukov, "Combat Operations," p. 175, and Douglass and Hoeber, Conventional War and Escalation, pp. 19-20.


80. Reznichenko, "Tactics," p. 283. Also see Kalachev, "Attack Without the Employment," p. 93. According to Reznichenko, the solution to this problem is to use air mobility to provide quick concentration and dispersal.

82. Ogarkov, "Military Strategy," p. 21. General Major Shtrik, writing in 1968, believed that the conventional phase of the war would "extend over a longer period of time" if NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces were fairly equal in overall capabilities. (See Shtrik, "The Encirclement and Destruction," p. 187.) General Major Zemskov, writing in 1969, noted that NATO exercises reflected a "tendency" to increase the duration of the conventional period. (See Zemskov, "Characteristic Features of Modern War," p. 52.)


85. Sidorenko, The Offensive, p. 112. Also see Colonel V.V. Larionov, "New Weapons and the Duration of War," p. 61. Larionov wrote, "The massive and surprise use of nuclear rocket weapons can bring utter defeat to an enemy in the shortest time."

86. Douglass and Hoeber, Conventional War and Escalation, p. 8.


88. Douglass and Hoeber, Conventional War and Escalation, pp. 44-45. Also see Zemskov, "Wars of the Modern Era," p. 43.


90. Ibid.


96. Ogarkov, Always in Readiness, p. 11. For an earlier statement of this view, see Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, p. 278.


100. Savkin, Basic Principles, pp. 89-90.


104. Lomov, Scientific-Technical Progress, p. 274


107. John Douglass has correctly observed that there is little in Soviet writings regarding follow-on or subsequent strikes after the massive initial attacks. See his The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive, p. 56.


111. Sidorenko, The Offensive, pp. 113-114, 137.


116. John Caravelli ignored evidence in Soviet writings of a possible LOW option in incorrectly concluding that there had been no "significant change" in recent years in the preemption-surprise strategy. See his "The Role of Surprise and Preemption," p. 13. Douglass and Hoeber also ignore most of the evidence and fail to address the possible LOW option in Soviet strategy. They reproduce a Soviet graphic suggesting a LOW, but do so more to illustrate Soviet strategy to maximize the size of the first nuclear launch. See their Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), pp. 48-49.

117. A deficiency in Douglass', Hoeber's and Caravelli's analyses of nuclear strategy cited above is that they fail to alert their readers to this distinction, particularly as they draw conclusions about Soviet nuclear strategy from writings on nuclear operations and tactics. Three Soviet writers complained about this practice among Western authors in October 1982, naming Douglass for "distorting" Soviet military science by "substituting for its strategic aims its tactical aims and also certain operational principles." See Ye Ribkin, I. Tyulin, and S. Kortunov, "War Seen Unacceptable as Instrument of Policy," Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, No. 8, 13 July 1982, trans. FBIS, DRSU, Vol. 3, No. 199, Annex No. 166, 14 October, p. 6.

Generally speaking, however, one could argue in defense of this practice by Douglass, Hoeber, and Caravelli that, because the Soviets do not distinguish between theater and strategic nuclear warfare, evidence of preemption and surprise at the operational-tactical level is applicable to strategic warfare as well.


The numerous references to "retaliation" in Soviet military writings are largely ignored in works previously cited by Douglass, Hoeber and Caravelli. In fact, the open-source literature does not support Caravelli's assertion that preemption has received "constant and intense support from the Soviet military since the mid 1950's." At the strategic level—as opposed to the operational-tactical—Soviet writings since the late 1960's have dealt more with retaliation than preemption. Further, Caravelli's research is questionable when he references an ambiguous Brezhnev quote from 1973 about "no unexpected event catches us unprepared" and a 1972 Soviet study addressing the importance of strategic surprise as evidence of continuing "contemporary" Soviet discussions on preemption and surprise. See Caravelli, "The Role of Surprise and Preemption," p. 12.


128. Marshall of the Soviet Union Krylov wrote of "a portion of missiles" not being able to be launched in the initial "retaliatory" strike. These would ride out the incoming strike in hardened silos, presumably for subsequent launch. See Krylov, "The Nuclear Missile Shield," p. 18.


130. The Soviets define a reconnaissance satellites as one which, among other things, is able "to detect launchings of inter-continental ballistic missiles." See Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, p. 206.

131. Marshalls of the Soviet Union Ogarkov and Ustinov lack Sokolovsky's optimism regarding the impossibility of the United States being able to conduct a surprise nuclear attack on the USSR. Ogarkov uses surprise nuclear attack scare tactics to develop higher combat readiness among the Soviet military and to increase Soviet awareness of the threat. Ustinov and others write more of "reducing to a minimum" the possibility of a surprise United States attack. See Ogarkov, Always in Readiness, p. 26; Ustinov, "For Averting the Threat," p. AA7; V. Bogachev, "USSR, U.S. Nuclear Strike Concepts Compared," TASS, 14 September 1982, trans. FBIS, DRSU, Vol. 3, No. 179, 15 September, p. AA2.


SECTION IV (Pages 34-38)


An earlier version of the suicide theme held that although nuclear war would be a "disaster for all mankind," the Soviets would nevertheless prevail in a "just and victorious struggle." See Zemskov, "Characteristic Features of Modern War," p. 50-51.

140. Ogarkov, Always in Readiness, pp. 36,42.


144. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, p. 177.


150. Ogarkov, Always in Readiness, p. 33.


156. Ibid., pp. 214-216.


SECTION V (Pages 39-40)


159a. Davis, p. 5.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

SOVIET MILITARY TEXTBOOKS


Skirdo, Colonel M.P. The People, the Army, the Commander. (Moscow: 1970) Translated by DGIS Multilingual Section, Translation Bureau, Secretary of State Department, Ottawa, Canada. Published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. off.


SELECTED SOVIET ARTICLES IN VOYENNYA MYSL'*


Translated from Voyennaya Mysl; No. 8, 1964.

Translated from Voyennaya Mysl; No. 10, 1964.

Translated from Voyennaya Mysl; No. 1, 1966.

Translated from Voyennaya Mysl; No. 10, 1963.

Translated from Voyennaya Mysl; No. 5, May 1971.

Translated from Voyennaya Mysl; No. 6, May 1971.


Kir'yan, M. "Factors Influencing the Organizational Structure of Ground Forces." FBIS, FPD 966, 23 August 1966, pp. 36-44.
Translated from Voyennaya Mysl; No. 1, 1966.

Translated from Voyennaya Mysl; No. 8, August 1968.

Translated from Voyennaya Mysl; No. 4, April 1969.


* Other articles from Voyennaya Mysl' referenced in the text are collected in Douglass and Hoeber, Selected Readings. See section on "Collections of Soviet Military Writings" later in this bibliography.
OTHER SOVIET/WARSAW PACT SOURCES


Translated from Novosti Press Agency.


Translated from Literaturnaya Gazeta, 17 November 1982.


Translated from Novoye Vreinya, No. 28, 9 July 1982.


Translated from Tass, 12 July 1982.

COLLECTIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY WRITINGS


WESTERN SOURCES


THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.