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THE SECURITY OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: IS IT A CASE FOR "SATO"—SOUTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION?

A Thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

LUIZ G. S. LESSA, LTC, Brazilian Army
Agulhas Negras Military Academy, 1956
Brazilian Infantry Advanced School, 1965
Brazilian Command and General Staff College, 1970
B. A., Moraes Junior College, 1970
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1977

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1982

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The growing dependence of the industrialized nations on the South Atlantic area, whose value was sufficiently proved during both world wars, increased considerably the importance of this strategic region to the security of the West, since through its sea-lanes flows a large amount of the raw materials desperately needed by the US, Europe and Japan to feed their industries.

The South Atlantic has become an area of intense East-West confrontation and in recent years it has witnessed a large Soviet influence particularly on the west coast of Africa, giving the USSR the capability to disrupt the vital shipping lanes in the area.

This thesis attempts to analyse the strategic importance of the South Atlantic area to the western world and to ascertain whether the countries located within the boundaries of that area are prone to build a new alliance to cope with the Soviet influence.

Analysis reveals that the South Atlantic countries do not possess either the military power or the political will to create a valid and efficient security pact, due to the lack of a clear-cut consensus on the importance of a potential SATO to protect West interests in the region. Analysis also points out the existence of some valid alternatives that if carefully implemented would considerably upgrade the security of the South Atlantic area, without creating insurmountable political obstacles. However, a more comprehensive approach toward the creation of a formal security alliance is still not ripe, and for the time being the South Atlantic Treaty Organization will remain a challenge to be met by both South American and African countries.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
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THE SECURITY OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: IS IT A CASE FOR "SATO" - SOUTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION?, by LT Col Luiz Gonzaga Schroeder Leessa, Brazilian Army, 227 pages.

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DEDICATION

To my father, Rosalvo, who in his simplicity, wisdom and profound understanding of the human nature taught me the best lessons of life.
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CHAPTER 1

AN OVERVIEW

The post second World War period represented the golden era for the whole Western Hemisphere. Based on large amounts of American economic aid, the world witnessed the gigantic reconstruction and economic recovery of the destroyed European countries and Japan. The ready availability of raw materials at extremely convenient prices in the Third World countries, particularly in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, stimulated the more developed nations to structure their economies closely to the resources of those countries. Thus, the Third World's mineral resources were the key factors in supporting Western economic expansion.

On the other hand, the inexpensive prices of raw materials and the dream that the sources of supply would last forever promoted wastefulness of resources, an excessive increase in the rates of consumption of scarce materials, particularly those related to the energy supply. Very little was done by the industrialized nations to deal with this problem of resource depletion.

The United States with 6% of the world's population is now using about 35% of the planet's energy and mineral production. The average American uses as much energy in just a few days as half of the world's people on an individual basis consume in one year. This nation has literally been developed without any significant restrictions due to the lack of natural resources. However, we now see ever increasing indications of the fact that the United States cannot long maintain the growth rate of recent years in our energy consumption without major changes in our energy supply patterns.
So strong were the ties established between the developed and less developed countries that, now, it has become extremely difficult to sever them without promoting severe economic and social turmoil within the industrialized nations. Therefore, geography is once again exerting vast influence on world affairs. As the Western industrial societies and Japan have experienced a large increase in their economic development, the world has become much more interdependent, and decisions taken in one country are reflected with high intensity in many others. Paradoxically, these industrialized nations' economic power and, consequently, the welfare of their people depend to a great extent on the resources of the Third World countries. This dependency is the challenge faced by the free world industrial societies and represents their greatest weakness.

The 1973 Middle East War portrayed the severe vulnerabilities and growing dependence of the US, Europe, Japan and some regional powers such as Brazil on the Persian Gulf sources of oil supply. They became much more dependent on and vulnerable to overseas imports than they were 30 years ago, bringing to bear many related security problems. In fact, "The Alliance's heavy dependence on Third World oil resources was changing the economic balance of power".  

I. The South Atlantic Area

A large portion of the US, Europe and Japan imports comes from the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, traveling across the Indian, Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Of paramount importance in the international shipping traffic is the Cape Route -- the gigantic sea lane that originates in the Persian Gulf, crosses the Indian and Atlantic oceans
for more than 12,000 miles, eventually reaching the American and Western European ports. The Cape Route is extremely important to the industrialized nations of the West as its major route of oil supply and, also, for carrying many other raw materials from Africa and Latin America. A large portion of this route flows through the South Atlantic, an area that connects the North Atlantic and Caribbean Sea to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The size limitations imposed by the Suez Canal on the traffic of the supertankers transformed the South Atlantic into the most important shipping route to the US and Western Europe. Suffice is to say that every 24 hours about 60 large ships pass by Cape Town going up the South Atlantic. (Map 1)

On the South Atlantic the most important maritime interest is, beyond question, the movement of Persian Gulf Oil to the United States and Europe. About 90 percent of that oil is shipped through the South Atlantic. Although the Suez Canal will be widened and deepened to accommodate larger ships, the volume of imports from the Persian Gulf will continue to grow. Nonetheless, the route around the Cape and up the sea lanes of the South Atlantic will predominate in importance.

In fact and despite all improvements made in the Suez Canal and the construction of pipelines such as the Trans-Arabian and the Suez-Mediterranean (SUMED) pipelines, the Cape Route, as a result of the expected increase in demand, will continue and certainly increase its participation as the main route of world oil supply.

According to an analysis by Shell Oil Co., the volume of oil traded interregionally throughout the world will rise from about 29 million b/d of oil equivalent in 1975 to 45 million b/d by 1990 (Fig 1). This stresses the importance of the Cape Route since most of the augmentation will be derived from the increased participation of the Middle
FIG 1- Interregionally traded oil will rise

*Includes Communist areas  Source: Shell Oil Co


OPEC

Middle East

62%  63%  70%  73%

Africa

Rest of the world
East in the world's oil shipping.

One problem faced by all those who are interested in the South Atlantic area is the clear definition of its boundaries. Although this area is an identifiable geographic unit encompassing the previously mentioned sea lane, the east South American and the west African coasts, and having as its southern limit the Antarctic continent, the clear definition of its northern limit is somewhat difficult to establish and is subject to controversy.

At least three options exist: The southernmost boundary of NATO which falls on the parallel of the Tropic of Cancer, the Equator, and finally the so-called 'Atlantic Narrows'. Let us briefly discuss each of these. The first two options have the advantages of taking into account clear geographic lines but as the northern limit of the South Atlantic they would both include in that area many other regions of Latin America and Africa more closely related to the North Atlantic area than to the South Atlantic geographic unit. If the Tropic of Cancer were the limit it would include most of Mexico, all of Central America, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea areas which are geographically and politically under the influence of the North Atlantic. On the other hand, if the Equator were the limit it would add to the South Atlantic area a large portion of the Brazilian northern coast, between the cities of Natal and Oiapoque, which is much more related to the North than to the South Atlantic. Since the Brazilian colonial period, this area has felt strong influence from and been attracted to the North Atlantic. Brazil presents the unique feature of having its coastal area facing both to the North and the South Atlantic Oceans. The city of Natal marks the inflection point of the Brazilian littoral and divides it into two well
defined maritime segments: The North (Natal-Oiapoque) oriented to the North Atlantic and the South (Natal-Chui) under the influence of the South Atlantic. Similarly, the geographic position of the African Western Salient exerts a clear predominancy on the South Atlantic area and represents a natural divider between the North and South Atlantic Oceans. Both geographical salients -- the Brazilian and the African -- narrow the Atlantic and have an exceptional strategic importance proven in World War II during the allied operations in North Africa. This author follows Admiral Ibsen Gusmão Cámara, who considers the 'Atlantic Narrows' -- an imaginary line connecting Natal (Brazil) to Dakar (Senegal) -- as being the best northern limit for the South Atlantic area. Therefore, as far as this thesis is concerned, the South Atlantic area encompasses the sea lane itself, the Antarctic and all the South Atlantic coastal countries on both the South American and African continents. (Map 2)

This strategic area is subjected to continuous political instability and in recent years the African countries have been the board where the Soviets continue to play their games in order to control or gain influence over them. In reality, the South Atlantic area represents the unprotected flank of the NATO Alliance, a vulnerability not well assessed by the governments of the Western industrialized nations. The growing US and European dependence on non-fuel minerals stresses even more the importance of the South Atlantic area as a main world supplier of raw materials. In fact, for thirty-two strategic minerals, the US presently imports more than fifty percent of its needs and this situation may worsen in the foreseeable future (Fig 2). As for bauxite, chromite, cobalt, columbium and tantalum, manganese and nickel, minerals
FIG 2 - U.S. NET IMPORT OF STRATEGIC MATERIALS

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of utmost importance in the war effort, the US dependence on overseas sources is in excess of seventy-five percent, with South Africa, Brazil, Zaire, Nigeria, Gabon, Guinea, and Zimbabwe figuring as the main suppliers (Maps 3, 4). 6

The South Atlantic area also offers exceptional opportunities to feed millions of people from agricultural and marine resources and could play a key role in alleviating the widespread famine expected to constitute one of the world's most serious problems by the last stage of the present century and after the year 2000. In regards to this particular factor, Brazil and Argentina will have a decisive contribution to make.

The total area of Brazil (3,286,487 sq mi) is equivalent to 1.7 percent of the total surface area of the globe, rather less than one-seventh of the dry land. However, only 13 percent of the Brazilian land is presently cultivated. According to the Brazilian Minister of Agriculture, Amaury Stabile, by 1988 Brazil will add more than 20 million acres of lowlands along the rivers to the Brazilian productive system, which will turn Brazil into the world's largest grain producer. 7 Moreover, the South Atlantic Ocean is an important source of fishing and represents 12 percent of the whole world's catch. Finally, in the South Atlantic area lies, as its Southern limit, the Antarctic continent with its paramount military strategic importance, its tremendous source of mineral resources and an almost unending source of food supply (krills, fish and whales) and drinkable water. 8

II. The Western-Soviet Struggle

The South Atlantic area could be the 'Achilles heel' of the NATO
MAP 3 - U.S. DEPENDENCE ON STRATEGIC MINERALS -- BAUXITE, CHROMITE, COBALT

BAUXITE

ORIGIN OF IMPORTS

U.S. IMPORTS %

93%

USES:
- POTS AND PANS
- WINDOW FRAME S
- SAVE SCALLION
- HOUSE SHINGLES
- AIRCRAFT FUSELAGES
- AUTO PISTONS
- ABRASIVES
- ON FILTERS
- REFRACTORIES
- PAPER MAKING
- WATER TREATMENT
- CERAMICS

COBALT

ORIGIN OF IMPORTS

U.S. IMPORTS %

95%

USES:
- HIGH TEMPERATURE HIGH STRENGTH ALLOYS
- TUBING
- JET ENGINES
- PERMANENT MAGNET ALLOYS
- METAL TO GLASS SEAL FOR RADIO AND X-RAY TUBES
- ALLOY HARD RACING ROSES
- TOOL STYLS
- CATALYSTS

CHROMITE

ORIGIN OF IMPORTS

U.S. IMPORTS %

91%

USES:
- STAINLESS STEEL
- PLATING PLASTIC PARTS
- JET ENGINES
- GUN BARRES
- ARMOR PLATE
- AMMUNITION
- CASTING MOLDS
- WEAR SURFACES OF EARTH MOVING EQUIPMENT
- PETROLEUM REFINING
- EQUIPMENT
- FURNACE REPAIRS

Source: General David C. Jones, United States Military Posture For FY 1982, p. 4.
COLUMBIUM and TANTALUM

**USE:**
- Boiler steel
- Refinery equipment
- Jet engines
- Gas turbines
- Rocket and missile
- Capacitors
- Creep resistance & fatigue
- Strength to alloys
- Cladding for fuel elements in nuclear reactors
- Transistor circuits

**ORIGIN OF IMPORTS**

**U.S. IMPORTS %**

0 - 100%

98%

MANGANESE ORE

**USE:**
- Stainless steel
- Other alloy steel
- Carbon steel
- Cast iron
- Welding rods
- Dry cell batteries
- Chemical reagents
- Vibrational dampeners
- Glassmaking
- Paints & varnishes
- Fertilizers

**ORIGIN OF IMPORTS**

**U.S. IMPORTS %**

0 - 100%

97%

NICKEL

**USE:**
- Stainless steel
- High temperature alloys
- Cast iron
- Mosaic metal
- Jet engines
- Aircraft frames
- Armor plate
- Wires
- Electronic
- Electrical core alloys
- Electroplating
- Gas turbines
- Low temperature applications
- Coinage
- Ceramics
- Desalination plants
- Oil refineries
- Pocket motor cases

**ORIGIN OF IMPORTS**

**U.S. IMPORTS %**

0 - 100%

76%

Alliance. Although Latin America has traditionally been considered an area of American influence and Africa an area of West European predominance, the last few years have brought about a change in this status quo. Due to the rapid African pace of decolonization there appeared a political void and both the Soviet Union and the PRC moved to fill it. Presently Africa is witnessing a high level of Soviet influence, particularly in its east coast, where Ethiopia and Mozambique offer the best examples. In addition, in many other African Atlantic countries like Angola and Guinea, the Soviets have also raised their flag and are exerting their influence on a more permanent basis.

Soviet expansionism in Africa proceeded without any significant opposition directed by the major Western powers. The former colonial powers were not able to cope with it and the US did not focus its attention on Africa because of the heavy involvement in the Vietnam War. Therefore, under the complacency of Europe and the US, the USSR expanded its influence in the late 1960's and all through the 1970's to countries strategically located in the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Indian and South Atlantic Oceans. The Cape Route became vulnerable, which represents a matter of serious concern to the Western Hemisphere. The perception of Walter Lippman who "warned in 1954 that in those continents [Asia and Africa] lay the West's greatest vulnerability to Soviet imperialism" finally became a reality.

Also since the 1960's Latin American countries have shown tendency to move toward a neutral position and follow a foreign policy more independent from the United States. In addition, the influence of Cuba, mainly in the Caribbean Sea and in Central America, has become much more aggressive and favors the penetration of the Soviets in the
continent. As Myles R. R. Freehette stressed in a statement submitted to the sub-committee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 17, 1980:

... there are signs that Cuba has been reassessing the prospects for revolutionary change elsewhere in the hemisphere [Western Hemisphere] and that, after several years of Cuban preoccupation with Africa, we are seeing a resurgence of interest in Latin America. Cuba has also grown increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance; there has been no significant divergence of interest between the two.10

Soviet influence toward the Third World was parallel to the blatant improvements promoted in its Navy by Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov, the constructor of the modern Soviet fleet. It is evident that the Russian Navy is designed to project power to coastal countries far beyond the Soviet boundaries and to threaten the Western democracies in areas extremely important to them. The long-range Soviet politico-military actions have a variety of goals ranging from the show of the flag to establishing bases and facilities in areas of traditional Western influence.11

The Soviet Union, unlike Germany in World War II, is drawing its attention to political preparations in peacetime in order to obtain a strategic advantage in case of war. Africa was selected as one of the most important areas for Soviet political arrangements as a means of overcoming its confined geographic configuration.12 The Soviet naval presence in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans is made not only through warships. It encompasses merchant and fishing assets brought to bear in a very well orchestrated manner to influence and project power under the strategic concept of a total naval force not followed by the Western countries.

Nowadays, the Soviet naval power with its huge submarine fleet
poses a real threat to the Western sea lines of communication (SLOC's) and it is expected an increase in that menace based on the Soviet naval construction program. Former Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, in his 1981 Report to the Congress acknowledged the real threat posed by the Soviet Navy:

Modernization of their naval forces in recent years has given the Soviets a capability -- at least in the early stages of a war -- to threaten NATO's sea lines of communication (SLOC's) with attack submarines, surface combatants, and BACKFIRE bombers. ... New generations of surface ships and submarines -- several classes of each -- are influencing our perception of their ultimate naval goals.13

While the Russians were involved in building their enormous navy, which would enable them to be both a continental and a sea power, how did the Western navies fare? Since World War II, all the European navies, except for the French, have experienced a great reduction. The formerly all-powerful British Navy withdrew its fleet east of the Suez in 1968 and is now "capable of little more than protection of the maritime approaches to the United Kingdom itself".14 France, however, increased and modernized its fleet and it was the only Western power to maintain a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean. Until 1979 the French Squadron was the most modern and powerful naval force in that area.

The US emerged from the Second World War as the strongest naval power having in their inventory 5,718 ships. Over the years, the US Navy has been shrinking so dramatically that it now has only 540 ships, including active and reserve vessels. Although the drop in tonnage was not so steep (about 20 percent) and the quality versus quantity issue can be brought to bear, the question whether the United States Navy is able to accomplish its two most important missions -- sea control and power projection -- is still valid.
The official view is that the US Navy is marginally able to discharge its sea control responsibilities, at least in most areas of vital interest. There is strong dissent, however, from some congressional elements and several naval authorities. The latter believe that, although the United States has sufficiently capable forces for power projection, it lacks survivable forces for sea control in some areas of vital interest. Admiral E. R. Zumwalt has stated that in a showdown with Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean during the Yom Kippur War, the Americans probably would have lost the naval engagement if action had been initiated by the Soviets. Others have suggested that the US Navy cannot protect Atlantic and Indian Ocean sea lines of communication (SLOC's) simultaneously.\(^\text{15}\)

The sea control mission quoted by the Department of Defense as the most important mission to the US Navy seems almost unachievable when one considers its magnitude in time of war in order to keep open the following sea lines of communication:

-- United States-Europe (for military purposes);

-- Persian Gulf-American and European ports (for oil supply and other raw materials);

-- Persian Gulf-Japan (for oil and raw materials).

By recognizing the greatness of the US Navy mission, the Department of Defense has frequently urged a more effective participation on the part of the NATO navies in sharing the security burden by undertaking specific tasks in their immediate area of responsibilities, thus allowing the American fleet to move the necessary assets to protect the interests of the Free World in the Persian Gulf and along the Cape Route. This represents a new posture in the US foreign policy, although it does not change the defense priorities that still remain in the Mediterranean and Western Pacific. But it does represent an important change in the US defense focus. Traditionally, the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans were the neglected blue waters crossed only occasionally by the US combatants ships. However, the 1973 Middle East War and more
recently the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced the Western democracies to recognize their profound interests at stake in these oceans and particularly in the Persian Gulf.

The direct control carried out by the Russian allied countries, coupled with the increased strength in the Russian fleet at many choke points along the Cape Route, has created a situation of severe vulnerability along that route, and has at last drawn the attention of the Western countries to the South Atlantic Ocean. A serious threat is presently posed to the Free World in southern Africa. For example, the fall of Angola and Mozambique to the Marxists, Soviet access to naval facilities in Guinea and the Congo and the Western policies toward South Africa placed the Western forces at a huge disadvantage on more than 7,000 miles along the Cape Route. In fact, "it is apparent that almost the entire southern Atlantic coast of Africa is not only barred to the West, but is actually a region of Soviet naval and air domination".16

In this area, only the South American continent is covered by a fragile and outmoded treaty of international security -- the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) -- which can do very little in defense of the continent. The TIAR does not cover the open seas nor protects the international sea lanes. Lately, its usefulness has been demonstrated only in peacekeeping efforts.

Another important collective arrangement, the Tratelolco Treaty, is not a military agreement but one which sets forth the aims and intentions of the Latin American countries to avoid the introduction of nuclear weapons in the continent. As far as the west African coast is concerned, the situation is even worse. This area does not have any kind
of collective security arrangements although some countries still maintain close defense ties with their former colonial powers. This has come about due to a combination of African desire for "non-alignment" as a result of their colonial experience and benign neglect by the West.

In some collective defense concepts set forth by the United States, the African continent was not even contemplated. That is the case of the "Atlantic Triangle" strategic concept, proposed in 1955 by former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, when the Cold War was at its peak. By this idea North America, Latin America and Europe would be linked in just one strategic defense block, which would join all NATO and TIAR signatory countries. The African continent was not considered important to the security of the West and its main role would continue to be as a supplier of raw materials. This policy did not perceive or assess the future Soviet threat over Africa. Therefore, even more than South America, the west African coast still remains an unprotected area completely exposed to Soviet influence.

It seems beyond question that the South Atlantic has become an area of growing security interest for the West, based on its large availability of raw materials, strategic control over the world's major sea lane of oil supply, and vulnerability to Soviet influence. The South Atlantic is no longer taken for granted as an area of Western ascendancy and it is expected that in the future it will be transformed into a region of bitter struggle between the democratic and Marxist-Leninist ideologies. The area offers ideal conditions to promote Russian strategic goals of expansionism and communism proliferation. As Pravda expressed on 22 August, 1973:

"Peaceful coexistence does not spell an end to the struggle..."
between the two world social systems. The struggle will continue between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between world socialism and imperialism, up to the complete and final victory of communism on a world scale.

Therefore, it is expected that through subversion and other political tools the Soviets could foster widespread instability in order to achieve their aim of establishing a chain of client states and attain political and military advantages. Although the overall Russian policies related to the area seem to place greater emphasis on the strategic aspects, the ideological and strategic elements are, in fact, concurrent.

Subject to continuous political instability due to social and economic problems, nationalism is still expected to be the driving force to be utilized by the major powers to consolidate their influence in the area. Unfortunately, the last few years have witnessed both a decrease of Western influence and a growing Soviet influence in the Third World made under the pretext of détente and appearing to follow a subversive master plan. Détente offered the USSR foreign policy an unique opportunity to apply the geopolitical concepts of Mackinder and Mahan; and the Third World, due to its vulnerabilities and weaknesses, was selected as the target area of Soviet expansionism. As Ray S. Cline pointed out, the USSR is presently involved in a low intensity global war for control of the world economic resources which is occurring during a so-called period of peace.

This "war" is being fought in the peripheral areas of the world where the risks of major power confrontation are considerably lower and the political results highly profitable. The Western democracies have been slow in coping with this threat mainly because their
major security interests are related to North America and Europe.

As far as we can see in the horizon there are no signs pointing to any possible decrease in Soviet influence around the world. On the contrary, it may be increased considerably, although following a much more subtle and indirect route. Soviet failures in Egypt, Sudan and Somalia forced them to adopt a new policy for the 80's. Internal strife in the developing areas has caused the acceptability of Soviet ideology and the development of strong and active communist parties that in spite of their nationalistic tones offer an ideal element to promote Russian influence:

... the new element in the Soviet strategy is to help communist parties gain state power. Then via friendship treaties, arms and Soviet, Cuban or East European advisors, the Soviets will help the local communists hold onto and consolidate power. Ultimately, the aim of this strategy is to establish a new alliance system for the Russians in Africa and Asia [also in Latin America], a looser eastern version of the Warsaw Pact.

It is under this scenario that many voices have recently been heard asking for the establishment of a new security organization -- The South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) -- able to cope with Soviet expansionism in the South Atlantic and to preserve in Western hands this strategic area.

Although SATO, at first sight, appears to be a viable response to curb Soviet penetrations, many questions can be raised about SATO's feasibility. Is the interest of the Western Hemisphere in the South Atlantic area permanent or transitory? Are the countries in the area prepared to accept this new organization and able to fulfill the new commitments? Will SATO add more stability to the area? What is the level of the perceived threat? What are the main interests at stake? How will SATO be viewed by the major Western powers? Will SATO be able to
The objective of this thesis is to answer these and other questions and reach a conclusion whether SATO is or not a feasible organization in the immediate future.
ENDNOTES


3. Ibid., p. 141.


5. Brazilian Admiral Ibsen Gusmão Câmara has been for many years interested in the South Atlantic area. He was the Vice Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Armed Forces.


The major threat posed to the Allied Nations during World War II in the Atlantic Ocean was the menace represented by the German submarine warfare, which accounted for 90 percent of the total German-Navy activities. Admiral Doenitz selected the Atlantic to destroy the Allied Navies and, also, to isolate the New from the Old World. He almost succeeded in his aims.

The submarine warfare and the U-boat campaign in the Atlantic contains many lessons. Fortunately for the Allies, Hitler was land-minded, and the German Navy was unprepared to win a submarine war. Hitler devoted most of his efforts to building a strong Army and Air Force. He did not believe in the theories of sea control as being a decisive way to impose German hegemony on the world. He assumed he could gain control of the "Heartland" with his powerful and efficient Army and Air Force, and so, succeed in isolating Great Britain. After doing that, and if necessary, he would build a sizable Navy to fight and destroy England. He hoped to bring neither England nor the United States into the war. As for England, his overall strategy was to keep it "neutral until the European heartland was reduced to obedience". Several times Hitler told his admirals that "the German Navy was not going to fight England". Therefore, the Navy became the neglected service of the German Armed Forces in the prewar period. Despite all inadequacies, Admiral Doenitz
worked so well with his U-boats that only by the end of 1943 were the Allied Forces capable to cope with their wide-ranging destructive actions.

At the outbreak of World War II, Germany had only 43 U-boats ready for combat, including 25 old models, the so-called 250-tonners. The production rate of its naval industry was also extremely low -- only two to four submarines per month. Although the rate had increased to 25 per month in January of 1940 and the unfulfilled plans for 1942 and 1943 called for a total production of 1200 modern U-boats (the so-called 500 and 750 tonners responsible for the most damage in World War II) the German Navy was not able to carry out all its mission. As Admiral Doenitz said in his post-war statement on 9 June 1945,

The war was in one sense lost before it began. Germany was never prepared for a naval war against England----. A realistic policy would have given Germany a thousand U-boats at the beginning. 3

On the Allied side the situation was even worse. Since 1922 the United States had deployed the bulk of its Navy in the Pacific. The maintenance of the Atlantic as a free sea-lane was traditionally a responsibility of the British Navy. By 1939 the British and American Navies had approximately the same strength, although the former was superior in cruisers. 4 However, after the Munich settlement, President Roosevelt declared that

the United States must be prepared to resist attack on the Western Hemisphere from the North Pole to the South Pole, including all of North America and South America. 5

This opened a whole new world for both the American Army and Navy, with a considerable increment in their strengths. When the war broke out in Europe both the American and British Navies were ill-prepared to fight at sea and wage war against the German U-boats. Suffice it to say that
during the first six months of 1942 the losses suffered by the US Merchant Fleet were greater than during the entire First World War and only six German submarines were sunk in the Atlantic in the same period of time, due to faulty technique, inadequacy of existing materials, and lack of doctrine, training and experience.6

Both England and America might have been better provided with the smaller ships from destroyers down, and with naval ordnance. But in each country it was considered wiser to spend the severely limited naval budgets on big ships that took a long time to build, rather than on small ones that could be constructed fairly quickly; and both Navies were optimistic about their ability to improvise an anti-submarine fleet if necessary.7

The creation of the Neutrality Zone, and the establishment of the Neutrality Patrol in September of 1939 to enforce it, received Pan-American approval through the Declaration of Panama and was the first positive attempt made by President Roosevelt to avoid bringing the European war into the American continent. However, only the United States had the naval assets to patrol the Neutrality Zone. Therefore, their warships were deployed off the American coast from Newfoundland southward and in the Caribbean Sea. The South American Atlantic coast remained an unprotected area where the belligerent warships continued to move freely. The destruction of the German pocket battlefield Admiral Graf Spee in December of 1939 in Uruguayan waters showed the great inefficiency of the Neutrality Zone around South America. (See map 5)

Even before the outbreak of the conflict in Europe the security of the so-called Western Hemisphere had deserved a high priority in the strategic outlook envisioned by President Roosevelt. In November of 1938, the US Joint Board stated the basic directives and, since then, the Navy and Army began to work on a series of war plans -- the Rainbows,
Map 5
THE CRUISES OF THE ADMIRAL GRAF SPEE AND DEUTSCHLAND 1939

Source: Roskill, The War at Sea, facing page 115
one to five, that received presidential approval in October of 1939. For planning purposes, the Western Hemisphere was defined "as including the Hawaiian Islands, Wake Island, American Samoa and the Atlantic Ocean as far east as the 30th Meridian of West longitude".

As far as the security of the South Atlantic is concerned, Rainbows I, IV and V were of utmost importance. Rainbow I encompassed the development of military operation to the latitude 10° South, a line that passed immediately south of the Peruvian-Brazilian bulges, while Rainbow IV considered the entire Western Hemisphere as its area of interest. On the other hand, Rainbow V, besides doing all prescribed in Rainbow I, took into account the participation of Great Britain and France and the "dispatch of American forces to either or both the African or European continents in order to effect the defeat of Germany, or Italy, or both". In these war plans two areas were stressed as being of relevant strategic importance -- both the Brazilian Northeast and African Northwest bulges, due to the importance of Natal and Dakar in controlling the "Atlantic Narrows". The South Atlantic increased in importance after the fall of France in June 1940. It seemed apparent that Germany would soon take over the French possessions in Africa and, subsequently, it would conduct a military operation against the Brazilian bulge in order to control the Atlantic Narrows, stop the flow of raw materials to Great Britain and the United States and threaten the Panama Canal. Therefore, Brazil became a country of key importance in the overall US strategy to limit this movement. Rainbow IV called for the deployment of the US 1st Infantry Division earmarked to be dispatched to the Natal area. This division would subsequently be relieved by the US 30th Infantry Division. In total, more than 60,000 men
would be moved to Brazil. In May 1940, President Roosevelt, based on reports received from the British Admiralty that the Germans were preparing an expeditionary force of about 6,000 men to send to the Brazilian bulge, directed the Army and Navy to work on a plan to forestall the Nazi movement. This emergency plan called "Pot of Gold" provided a large American expeditionary force to the Brazilian coastal area from Belém to Rio de Janeiro, with the first 10,000 men out of 100,000 transported by planes once the Germans started their movement. This plan would be put into effect after consultations with Brazilian authorities. However, in July 1941, the War Plan Division, considering the evolution of the war in Europe and the assumption of a highly probable German movement toward the South Atlantic, started working on a new operation plan for Brazil based on Rainbow V and calling for the deployment

... of more than 64,000 ground and air troops, including two divisions. These forces were to be concentrated, as recommended by the joint planners, in the vicinities of Natal, Recife and Belem. This was the plan the Army wanted to follow in part after the outbreak of war.

The Axis operations in North Africa and their threat posed on the South Atlantic resulted in a tremendous US struggle to obtain bases or naval rights in Brazil. By 1939 the American planners believed that the Brazilian Armed Forces were not able to defend Brazil's coastal area against a Nazi invasion. They were weak, and their doctrine and materials were out-of-date. Furthermore, they were concentrated in the Southern part of the country with no possibility at a short notice to move into the Northeast because of the scarcity of roads and railways. Therefore, all the Brazilian coastal area north of Rio de Janeiro was unprotected and exposed to Nazi naval or air attacks.
The base rights, coupled with the questions relating to munitions and the way to defend the Northeast of Brazil, were very sensitive issues in the US-Brazil relationship during the 1939-1947 period. Since October 1940 the US Navy had succeeded in getting an agreement with its Brazilian counterpart to use the Natal area for its surface ships. In June 1941, the ports of Recife and Bahia were also opened to the South Atlantic Patrol. On 11 December 1941, based on the clearance provided by the Brazilians in November, the first naval patrol squadron -- the VP 52 -- arrived at Natal. Four days later Brazil agreed to receive the 17th, 18th, 19th Marine Provisional Companies to guard the airfields at Belém, Natal and Recife. By June of 1942, the entire coast of Brazil was being patrolled by US naval planes. What seemed to be an easy task for the Navy took nearly three years of delicate and involved political and military negotiations to secure Brazilian permission to station United States Army forces in the area Northeast bulge, particularly the city of Natal.

From the Brazilian point of view, it was one thing to allow the American ships to use the port facilities but another was to agree with foreign troops being stationed in the country. The US past imperialism, coupled with strong nationalism and the fears of compromising Brazilian sovereignty were the driving forces opposing the deployment of American soldiers in Brazil. Based on the Brazilian-American Joint Planning Agreement, signed on 24 July 1941, a joint planning group composed of five Brazilians and six American staff officers was created, which was in charge of planning the defense of the Brazilian bulge. This group had to work under some restrictive rules that clearly showed how the Brazilian government approached the presence of American troops in its
(1) In case of a positive threat against any part of Brazilian territory, and when she considers it appropriate, Brazil will be able to request the assistance of forces of the United States, at the points and for the time determined in advance by Brazil.

(2) The air and the naval bases in the territory of Brazil will be commanded and maintained by Brazilian forces and only on request of its government may they be occupied also by United States forces, as an element of reinforcement.

As a result of the political complexities involved in the defense planning of the Brazilian bulge, the joint planning group evolved in December of 1941 to a Joint Military Board constituted by six members and under the presidency of a Brazilian general. This Board, staffed with engineer, air and naval officers provided by each country, was tasked with the specific mission of planning and supervising the construction of new facilities in the Northeast salient. However, it actually did very little in regard to the defense of the area because its Brazilian members "held that the board's jurisdiction must be restricted to supervising a construction program that would not involve or imply participation of United States Army ground forces in the defense of the Brazilian bulge". Later the Joint Military Board was transformed into a more complex body of advisers -- the Joint Defense Commissions -- as a consequence of the Brazilian Defense Agreement signed on 28 May 1942. These commissions were set up in Washington and Rio de Janeiro with the task of planning the defense of the Brazilian Northeast area. The negotiation of the Brazilian-American Defense Agreement was followed by a sharp change in the US Army policy toward Brazil. One of the most difficult issues to be solved in the Brazil-US relationship was that related to the method of defense to be implemented in the Brazilian bulge. The US Army was totally convinced that
the Brazilian forces were not able to defend this strategic area and, therefore, it was eager to deploy air and ground forces in it. In fact, since 1939 all Army planning toward Brazil had included provisions for the deployment of large American forces in it. This approach was responsible for some irritations in the relationship with its Brazilian counterpart which was fully tied to the basic principle that the defense of the Brazilian Northeast was a task that should be carried out by the Brazilians, although it could be done with the assistance of the Americans mainly on those items related to the supplying of modern material and munitions. By June 1942 the US Army planners laid down a new strategic concept, closely related to the Brazilian outlook stating

... that Brazil and the United States will collaborate on the preparation of defense measures to be carried out by the Brazilians armed forces, with the full support of the United States armed forces for instruction and training in the use of the materiel which will be found necessary for us to supply.\footnote{17}

The Brazilian quest for munitions was responsible for many misunderstandings in the Brazil-US relationship. This issue deserved special interest on the part of both countries and strongly influenced the negotiations of base rights and the stationing of American forces in Brazil. Munitions were an essential item in the overall Brazilian planning related to the defense of the Northeast. In fact, since 1939 Brazil had reversed its traditional military policy of concentration of forces in the South and initiated the establishment of new organizations in the Northeast bulge. Therefore, it had an urgent need for large quantities of modern arms and munitions. The US became the natural market for the Brazilians since they realized that the former traditional supplier -- the Germans -- would not be able to continue delivering armaments to them. However, until the end of 1942
the US was not able to satisfy the Brazilian needs due to its own priorities and those of other nations, and because of its restrictive policies toward the Latin American countries. In fact, during 1940 and 1941 Brazil received more German arms from orders placed in 1938 than of American origin, although, in June 1939, it requested from the US Army a long list of first priority materiel.  

The arms supply problem made the planning and execution of Army defense measures in Brazil far more complicated than the friendly preliminary staff conversations of 1939 and the general prewar cordiality in Brazilian-American relations had seemed to augur.  

II. **Major Headquarters in the South Atlantic**  

In mid-1941 the Brazilian Government, concerned about the evolution of the war in Europe, created the North-Northeast Theater of Operations under the command of General Estevão Leitão de Carvalho and started to strengthen the military establishment in that area. Therefore, three infantry regiments were activated in July, respectively at Recife, João Pessoa and Natal, which later became part of the two newly-established infantry divisions deployed in this region -- the 7th and 14th. Also, the Fernando de Noronha Island had its defenses reinforced and its role as an outpost off the Brazilian coast was emphasized. The air-naval bases at Parnamirim and Recife, the naval base at Cabedelo and the activation of the Northeast Naval Force completed the deployment of Brazilian forces on the Northeast bulge.  

Since the beginning of World War II the US government took positive steps to maintain the Americas far from the internecine European conflict. The Neutrality Patrol carried out only by US ships extended its activities from Newfoundland to the Guianas. The South
Atlantic became unprotected since its coastal countries did not have the naval assets to enforce the Neutrality Zone. However, in June 1941 the area between Trinidad, longitude 26° W, and the bulge of Brazil started to be patrolled by the US Task Force 3, commanded by Rear Admiral Jonas H. Ingram. With its four light cruisers and five destroyers this Task Force watched a large area between Trinidad, Cape San Roque and the Cape Verde Islands. The Brazilian ports of Recife and Aratu became available to its ships for "refreshment, replenishment and upkeep". Later on, the Task Force 3 was renamed as South Atlantic Force and became the most effective US combat force in the South Atlantic area. After Brazil's declaration of war on Germany and Italy on 22 August 1942, the Brazilian naval and air forces started to operate with the South Atlantic Force. The Brazilian Northeast Naval Force under the command of Rear Admiral Alfredo Soares Dutra, with his headquarters at Recife "was placed under the operational control of Admiral Ingram". Also, the new Brazilian Air Force, commanded by Brigadier General Eduardo Gomes, joined the US naval planes in patrol operations off the Brazilian coastal area from Belem to Rio de Janeiro. On 20 August 1942, Admiral Ingram announced that "as senior United States commander in the area he was assuming operational command as Chief of the Allied Forces in the South Atlantic".

His announcement opened the roads for close cooperation and integrated actions with the British commands in West Africa in order to cover the gaps and effectively control the South Atlantic. On 3 September Rear Admiral Pegram, the British West African Naval commander, met with Admiral Ingram at Recife and "as a consequence the United States Navy and the British Royal
Navy arranged a geographical division of the South Atlantic that made its Western half, to and including Ascension Island, an American defense responsibility" (See map No 7).

In March 1943 the South Atlantic Force was renamed as Fourth Fleet and so remained until the end of the war. The Fourth Fleet, a joint American-Brazilian naval force performed extremely well in defending the South Atlantic area from the Axis raiders and submarines, and succeeded in coordinating all allied actions in that strategic region.22

The establishment of the South Atlantic Force in Brazil also stimulated the US Army to set up a headquarters in that country to coordinate all its on-going activities in the Northeast area such as those related to the Ferry Command, airport constructions and intelligence. In May the Operations Divisions activated the South Atlantic Wing, an air unit under the command of General Robert L. Walsh, who established his headquarters at Atkinson Field, British Guiana, on 26 June 1942. General Walsh's Wing area of jurisdiction ranged from Florida to the shores of West Africa. Following suggestions of the Brazilian authorities in August, he set up an advanced echelon of his forces at Natal and in December moved his headquarters to Recife as the commander of the newly created United States Army Forces South Atlantic. So, in December 1942 General Walsh was commanding both the Army Theater in Recife and the South Atlantic Wing at Natal. Finally, the first US Army command was established in Recife, after more than three years of intense negotiations.

The new theater organization had virtually no troops to command at the outset except the two-thousand-man defense garrison on Ascension. Its real task was that visualized the preceding May: a coordinating headquarters to handle Army problems and relationships in Brazil. Recife was the logical place of this headquarters,
even though Army air operations were concentrated at Natal, because Recife was the headquarters of the Brazilian commanders in the area, of the Navy and of the other agencies with which the Army command had to deal.

The US Army Forces South Atlantic played a key role in supporting the American-British operations in North Africa and during the Winter it handled practically all air traffic to Europe, Africa, China, India and even the Soviet Union.23

On the other side of the South Atlantic Ocean, in 1939 Great Britain established the South Atlantic Command with headquarters in Freetown, Sierra Leone (See map No 6). Although sizable, this command had inadequate strength to cope with the menace posed by the German raiders and U-boats. The South Atlantic Command had under its jurisdiction the South American coastal area which was being patrolled by the British South American Division, a force comprised of three cruisers (Exeter, Ajax and Cumberland) and responsible for the traffic between Rio de Janeiro and the River Plate ports. In March 1942, the South Atlantic Command was divided into two commands -- the West African Command and the South Atlantic Command -- with bases at Freetown, Bathurst and Takoradi (See map No 7).24 In developing their operations against the German raiders and U-boats in the South Atlantic these naval commands worked closely with the Royal Air Force West Africa Command, which

... based at Port Etienne, Dakar, Bathurst, Freetown, Harper, Takoradi, Lagos, Douala, Libreville, Pointe Noire and Banana, provided coverage for about 600 miles of the African coast from latitude 30° N to the mouth of Congo.25

III. The War in the South Atlantic

The war in the South Atlantic was basically a naval and air war
waged against the German raiders and U-boats. This ocean was crossed by numerous allied convoys carrying troops, supplies and raw materials. Army troops were practically absent in all confrontations which occurred in the South Atlantic, although until the end of 1942 the Germans had posed a serious threat in landing large forces in both the Brazilian and African bulges. This area was the experimental field for the German raiders and their favorite region of employment. All the allied vessels sunk or captured in it, during 1939 and 1940, and about half of the losses in 1941 were due to the action of German raiders (See Table I).

The performance of the Graf Spree in the South Atlantic during the last four months of 1939 demonstrated the vulnerability of the region. Its first victim, the British S.S. Clement, sank off the coast of Pernambuco (Brazil) on 30 September. In October, November and December, besides diverting a large number of British hunt cruisers, it sank seven more vessels until it was blown up by its own crew in the River Plate. Throughout 1940, six German raiders -- the Widder, Orion, Kormoran, Pinguin, Thor, and Atlantis -- operated in the South Atlantic. The Thor was responsible for the greatest destruction in that ocean, sinking seven vessels, six of them off the Brazilian coast. The year of 1941 continued to witness the destructive actions carried out by the German raiders at an extremely low cost. In fact, during the first 27 months of the war and operating in all seas, they had sunk or captured 157 allied ships (924,893 tons), having lost only five vessels (See Table II). The end of 1942 signaled also the final days for the German raiders. On the eve of 1943, only Michel was operating. They had selected the South Atlantic as their favorite area of operation and
### TABLE I - BRITISH/ALLIED AND GERMAN LOSSES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC DURING THE 1939-1941 PERIOD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>1939 Brit/Allied</th>
<th>1940 Brit/Allied</th>
<th>1941 Brit/Allied</th>
<th>1939 German</th>
<th>1940 German</th>
<th>1941 German</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>58,585</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21,807</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>1 6,199</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11,399</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,134</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>6 31,269</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>1 5,051</td>
<td>1 17,801</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15,526</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>4 22,368</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,297</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,953</td>
<td>1 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>3 21,964</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6,275</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8 49,383</td>
<td>1 55,269</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>133,916</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(1) Admiral Graf Spree, sunk in the River Plate

(2) Atlantis, sunk NW Ascension Islands.
### TABLE II - ACTIONS OF GERMAN WARSHIPS AND ARMED MERCHANT RAIDERS IN ALL SEAS, PERIOD 1939-1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>PERIOD OF CRUISE</th>
<th>MERCHANT SHIPS SUNK/CAPTURED</th>
<th>OPERATING AREAS</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admiral</td>
<td>26/9/39-13/12/39</td>
<td>9 50,089</td>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td>Destroyed in River Plate 17/12/39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graf Spree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
<td>Undetected for 2 months. Renamed LUTZOW early in 1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutschland</td>
<td>26/9/39-15/11/39</td>
<td>2 6,962</td>
<td>N.W. Atlantic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral</td>
<td>27/10/41-1/4/41</td>
<td>16 99,059</td>
<td>North Atlantic</td>
<td>Returned to Germany 28/3/41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral</td>
<td>30/11/40-27/12/40</td>
<td>10 59,960</td>
<td>North Atlantic</td>
<td>Returned to Germany 28/3/41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hipper</td>
<td>1/21/41-14/2/41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15/3/41-28/3/41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHARNHORST</td>
<td>25/1/41-22/3/41</td>
<td>22 115,622</td>
<td>North and South</td>
<td>Both returned to Brest 22/3/41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNEISENAV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BISMARK</td>
<td>25/1/41-27/5/41</td>
<td>NIL NIL</td>
<td>North Atlantic</td>
<td>Sunk 27/5/41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRINZ</td>
<td>21/1/41-1/6/41</td>
<td>NIL NIL</td>
<td>North Atlantic</td>
<td>Returned to Germany in Feb 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUGEN</td>
<td>5/4/40-23/8/41</td>
<td>9½ 57,774</td>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>Returned to Germany 30/11/41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORION (A)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOMET (B)</td>
<td>9/8/40-30/11.41</td>
<td>6½ 42,959</td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATLANTIS (C)</td>
<td>31/3/40-22/11/41</td>
<td>22 145,697</td>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>Sunk NW Ascension Island on 22/11/41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIDDER (D)</td>
<td>14/5/40-31/10/40</td>
<td>10 58,645</td>
<td>Central Atlantic (Atlantic Narrows)</td>
<td>Returned to Germany 31/10/40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THOR (E)</td>
<td>11/6/40-24/4/41</td>
<td>11 83,311</td>
<td>South and</td>
<td>Returned to Germany 24/4/41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Central Atlantic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PINGUIN (F)</td>
<td>22/6/40-8/5/41</td>
<td>28 136,551</td>
<td>Atlantic, Indian</td>
<td>Sunk in the Indian Ocean between the Seychelles and Socotra 8/5/41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>And Antarctic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ocean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KORMORAN (G)</td>
<td>9/12/40-19/1/41</td>
<td>11 68,274</td>
<td>Central and South Atlantic, Indian</td>
<td>Sunk off Shark Bay west of Australia on 19/11/41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ocean, Pacific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>157 924,893</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

caused an extended damage on the allied shipping traffic in these waters.

"In these circumstances the enemy's hope of continuing sporadic warfare in remote waters could only lie with the U-boats. It is not surprising, therefore, to find they now come to replace the surface raiders of the first three years of war".26

As Doenitz pulled his raiders out of the South Atlantic the U-boats started to come. After having caused a lot of destruction against the allied merchant vessels in the Mediterranean, Caribbean and the US Eastern coast, the German submarines gradually moved southward looking for "soft points" and during 1942 and 1943 conducted an intensive campaign in the South Atlantic. The main areas for U-boat operations were the Brazilian coast, "Atlantic Narrows", Gulf of Guinea, Freetown-Dakar coast and the Cape of Good Hope. In September 1942, U-boats sank fourteen ships in the Gulf of Guinea and October-November accounted for respectively twenty-five and twenty-three ship losses off the Cape of Good Hope, which became the most dangerous area for the merchant traffic at the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943. In February of 1943, four U-boats started operating off Capetown and in only three months sank 24 ships. The July blitz against Brazil resulted in the losses of eleven merchant vessels, although the German U-boats paid a high price for their adventure: eight experienced submarines were destroyed in the May-July period. In analysing this blitz, Konteradmiral Gcdt, Doenitz's Operations officer, reported:

Coast of Brazil from Natal to Rio -- six boats deployed, five lost; 10 merchant ships, totalling 59,000 tons, sunk.

As it is apparent from the losses, the Brazilian coast has shown itself to be a difficult and dangerous operation area. With one exception, an attack by surface forces (depth-charge attack on U-6(4)), the defence took the form of fast daylight bombing attacks off the coast or heavy land-and sea-based aircraft up to 400 sea miles off the coast.27

The July blitz off the Brazilian coast was the last large scale
effort by the U-boats in the South Atlantic and meant the loss of momentum in the German Submarine Warfare in that ocean. During the second half of 1943, as well as in 1944 and 1945, the Axis submarines made only token presence in the South Atlantic, following the trend in other theaters of operations and Doenitz's acknowledgment that Germany had been defeated at sea.

According to Morrison, the allied ship losses by U-boats throughout the 1942-1945 period, by main area for merchant ship sinkings, are depicted in Table III (See also map No 8).

### TABLE III - ALLIED SHIP LOSSES BY U-BOATS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, PERIOD 1942-1945
(Only areas with 4 or more sinkings per month included)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREAS</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAZILIAN</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHWEST ATLANTIC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FREETOWN</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHEAST ATLANTIC</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>85</strong></td>
<td><strong>69</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On the other hand, following Roskili the figures are different and the total allied ship losses occurred in the South Atlantic area are shown on Table IV.

In conducting the anti-raider and anti-submarine warfare, each
MAP 8 - ATLANTIC AREAS FOR MERCHANT SHIP SINKINGS

### TABLE IV — ALLIED SHIP LOSSES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC,
*PERIOD 1939-1945*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTHS</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>58,585</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16,116</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21,656</td>
<td>7,136</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>13,125</td>
<td>61,462</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>4,695</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,656</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>21,807</td>
<td>48,177</td>
<td>7,129</td>
<td>1,394</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13,539</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>6,199</td>
<td>11,399</td>
<td>9,081</td>
<td>40,052</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17,277</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>10,134</td>
<td>26,287</td>
<td>14,954</td>
<td>3,159</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,268</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>31,269</td>
<td>23,972</td>
<td>64,478</td>
<td>14,062</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10,062</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>58,585</td>
<td>57,979</td>
<td>10,770</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>17,901</td>
<td>15,526</td>
<td>10,770</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>22,368</td>
<td>15,142</td>
<td>4,663</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>4,953</td>
<td>58,662</td>
<td>4,573</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>21,964</td>
<td>43,496</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>49,383</td>
<td>52,841</td>
<td>10,792</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Remarks:**
1. All sunk or captured by raiders
2. 14 sunk or captured by raiders; this figure was obtained from the analysis of operations of disguised German raiders
3. 19 sunk or captured by raiders; this figure was obtained from the analysis of operations of disguised German raiders
4. 1 sunk by the German raider Michel.
command on both sides of the South Atlantic made all efforts to coordinate their actions. The US Fourth Fleet and the Army Forces South Atlantic established close ties with the British West African Command and the Royal Air Force West Africa Command in undertaking their operations to blockade German raiders and destroy Axis U-boats. The area of jurisdiction of the Fourth Fleet was south of 10° N and west of the following lines: from lat. 20° N, long 40° W, SE to Ascension Island including that island and its territorial waters, thence SW to lat 40° S, long. 26° W.

Initially, the Fourth Fleet had the mission of providing escort to all convoys from Trinidad to Bahia and vice-versa, which was later extended as far as Rio de Janeiro. Besides this task, the small Fourth Fleet provided protection to the merchant traffic between Rio and the River Plate ports, "as well as ships independently routed to South Africa". In patrolling its area of responsibility, it followed innovative procedures such as the models prescribed by professor Jacinto Steinhardt and it was the first fleet in World War II to operate with blimps. During the Fall and Winter of 1943-1944 it was reinforced by the "lighter-than-air" (LTA) which were used extensively to protect convoys at night and rescue pilots in the jungle.

Experience had taught that only travelling in convoy, under the protection of escort warships, could the merchant vessels reach their final destinations. Therefore, the convoy system was organized and Table V shows the main allied convoys that crossed the South Atlantic in 1942 and 1943, period when the U-boat activities reached their peak.

The U-boat activities in the South Atlantic and their blitz against Brazil enhanced the needs for more long-range anti-submarine planes in order to fill the gaps in aerial coverage and reinforce the
### TABLE V — PRINCIPAL ALLIED CONVOYS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, PERIOD 1942-1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>CODE LETTERS</th>
<th>ROUTE</th>
<th>DATE OF DEPARTURE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>AS</td>
<td>USA-Freetown</td>
<td>March 1942</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocean Homeward</td>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Capetown-West Africa-UK</td>
<td>May 1941</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Atlantic</td>
<td>FT</td>
<td>Freetown-Trinidad</td>
<td>July 1943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South American</td>
<td>JT</td>
<td>Rio-Trinidad</td>
<td>July 1943</td>
<td>Originally Bahia-Trinidad, November 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stopped temporarily Sept 1942 Resumed in Feb 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocean Outward</td>
<td>OS</td>
<td>UK-West Africa</td>
<td>July 1941</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West African</td>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Gibraltar-Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Feb 1943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocean Homeward</td>
<td>SL</td>
<td>Sierra Leone-UK</td>
<td>Sept 1939</td>
<td>Stopped temporarily in Oct 1942 Resumed Mar 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West African</td>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Sierra Leone-Gibraltar</td>
<td>Feb 1943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West African</td>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Sierra Leone-Takoradi</td>
<td>Dec 1941</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>SUEZ-Durban or Capetown</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Returning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Atlantic</td>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Trinidad-Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Nov 1942</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
<td>TJ</td>
<td>Trinidad-Rio</td>
<td>Jul 1943</td>
<td>Originally TB, Oct. 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West African</td>
<td>TS</td>
<td>Takoradi-Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Aug 1942</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

garrison at Ascension Island and the Brazilian coast. The bases set up in the Brazilian bulge contributed decisively to eliminate the existing gaps in the Atlantic Narrows until July 1942. This was only achieved through close cooperation between the air commands established on both sides of the South Atlantic and on Ascension Island. (See maps 9, 10).

By the end of 1943, the Fairwing Sixteen, the air unit of the Fourth Fleet, had 10 squadrons of long range planes deployed as shown on Table VI, as a result of the extensive base construction program carried out in Brazil as a part of a major US plan to build bases all over the world.

In fact, envisioning the probability of US involvement in the European conflict President Roosevelt, in late 1940, decided to embark on a large base construction program around the world to serve as advanced outposts to the security of the country. As far as South America is concerned,

By authority of the President, on November 2, 1940, the Secretary of War entered into a secret contract with the Pan American Airport Corporation, a subsidiary of Pan American Airways, Inc. The purpose of this contract was to create a chain of airports and seaplane bases along the coast of Brazil, from the border of French Guiana to Uruguay.

The construction program actually carried out by the Pan American Airport Corporation was supervised by the Army Engineer Corps and although not completely finished, many bases in the North and Northeast Brazilian coast were fully operational and being utilized by Navy planes by the end of 1942. Fourteen bases were constructed or improved in Brazil and one in Uruguay.

IV. Conclusion

The prewar German preparation to win the war at sea was inad-
MAP 9 - THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC, JANUARY-JULY 1942

MAP 10 - THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC, AUGUST 1942-MAY 1943

**TABLE VI - US NAVAL PLANE DEPLOYED IN BRAZIL, 1943**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SQUADRON</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VP-94</td>
<td>PBY-5A (Catalina)</td>
<td>NATAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VB-127</td>
<td>PV-1 (Ventura)</td>
<td>NATAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VB-107</td>
<td>PB4Y-1 (Liberator)</td>
<td>NATAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VB-145</td>
<td>PV-1 (Ventura)</td>
<td>NATAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VB-129</td>
<td>PV-1 (Ventura)</td>
<td>RECIFE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VB-143</td>
<td>PV-1 (Ventura)</td>
<td>RECIFE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP-74</td>
<td>PBM-3 (Mariner)</td>
<td>BAHIA (ARATU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VB-203</td>
<td>PBM-3 (Mariner)</td>
<td>BAHIA (ARATU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP-201</td>
<td>PBM-3 (Mariner)</td>
<td>RIO DE JANEIRO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VB-130</td>
<td>PV-1 (Ventura)</td>
<td>FORTALEZA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aquate. Even so it imposed a tremendous toll on allied merchant ships, sinking or capturing 5,150 vessels which represented a loss of 21,570,720 of valuable tonnage (See Table IX). Although Germany had only 43 U-boats ready for combat at the outbreak of the war, by the end of the conflict it had constructed 1,042 submarines which were responsible for 54.9 percent of the total allied merchant ship losses. The U-boat operations heavily reduced merchant traffic along the US coastline and US-Europe-Latin America trade, and almost succeeded in isolating the Latin American continent from Europe. The major Dönitz objective "to destroy more enemy tonnage that can be replaced by all Germany's enemies put together" was not fulfilled. By July 1943, the total allied constructions outnumbered the total allied losses (See Fig 3) which was an indication that the German war on shipping had failed. German raider operations in the South Atlantic until the end of 1941 were very successful and caused the majority of the allied shipping losses. However, from 1942 until the end of the war the U-boats were transformed into the main killer of merchant vessels. The submarine warfare in the South Atlantic reached its peak during the second half of 1942 and the "Atlantic Narrows", and the Brazilian, Freetown-Dakar, and Capetown coasts were chosen as its favorite area of operation. On the other hand, the Southwest Atlantic and the area around Cape Horn proved to be the safest area.

The British and American Navies were not prepared to face the German submarine threat. They had neglected the doctrine and failed to develop adequate naval assets to wage an anti-submarine warfare, which allowed the U-boats to operate at will. As Admiral King said at the end of the war "the Navy did not obtain adequate means to deal with the
FIG 3 - ALLIED MERCHANT SHIPPING CUMULATIVE LOSSES AND GAINS

Convoys were the natural solution adopted for moving cargoes across unsafe oceans, in spite of their slowness and the need for a considerable amount of warships as escort. In the South Atlantic the Fourth Fleet and the British African West Command employed the following means in escort missions:

**TABLE VII - ALLIED ESCORT ASSETS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMAND</th>
<th>WARSHIPS OF ALL TYPES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FOURTH FLEET</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- US</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Brazilian Northeast Naval Force</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEST AFRICAN</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Shore-based aircraft proved to be an essential asset in dealing with submarine warfare. As the next chart depicts, the majority of U-boats sunk in the South Atlantic were due to actions of shore-based aircraft. In fact, all escorts and patrols accounted for fifteen out of eighteen German submarines sunk in that ocean during the entire war (See Table VIII).

During the war, in the context of the South Atlantic, the strategic position of Brazil was highlighted and its Northeast bulge appeared as an area of utmost importance. The geographic complex formed by the Brazilian-African salients controls the "Atlantic Narrows" and all the traffic routes departing from or entering into the South
TABLE VIII- SUBMARINES SUNK IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, PERIOD 1939-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Task of Killer</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>U-179</td>
<td>8 Oct</td>
<td>ACTIVE - sea escort</td>
<td>Off Capetown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>U-164</td>
<td>6 Jan</td>
<td>Aircraft of U.S. Squadron 83 - air escort</td>
<td>Off Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U-128</td>
<td>17 May</td>
<td>USS Moffet and Jouet and aircraft of U.S. Squadron 74 - air/sea escort</td>
<td>Off Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U-105</td>
<td>2 Jun</td>
<td>Aircraft of French Squadron 141 - air escort</td>
<td>Off Dakar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U-590</td>
<td>9 Jul</td>
<td>Aircraft of U.S.N. Patrol Squadron 94 - air escort</td>
<td>Off North Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U-513</td>
<td>19 Jul</td>
<td>Aircraft of U.S. Patrol Squadron 74 - air escort</td>
<td>Off South Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U-662</td>
<td>21 Jul</td>
<td>Aircraft of U.S.N. Patrol Squadron 94 - air escort</td>
<td>Off North Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U-598</td>
<td>23 Jul</td>
<td>Aircraft of U.S.N. Bombing Squadron 107 - air patrol</td>
<td>Off Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U-591</td>
<td>30 Jul</td>
<td>Aircraft of U.S.N. Bombing Squadron 127 - air escort</td>
<td>Off Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U-199</td>
<td>31 Jul</td>
<td>Aircraft of U.S.N. Patrol Squadron 174 and Brazilian Aircraft - air escort</td>
<td>Off South Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U-604</td>
<td>11 Aug</td>
<td>Aircraft of 200 Squadron - air patrol</td>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U-468</td>
<td>11 Aug</td>
<td>Aircraft of 200 Squadron - air patrol</td>
<td>Off Dakar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U-403</td>
<td>18 Aug</td>
<td>Aircraft of Free French Squadron 697 and RAF Squadron 200 - air escort</td>
<td>Off Dakar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U-161</td>
<td>27 Sep</td>
<td>Aircraft of U.S.N. Patrol Squadron 74 - air patrol</td>
<td>Off Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>U-1t 22</td>
<td>11 Mar</td>
<td>Aircraft of 272 and 262 S.A.A.F. Squadrons - air patrol</td>
<td>South of Cape of Good Hope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U-860</td>
<td>15 Jun</td>
<td>Aircraft from U.S.S. Solomon - carrier air patrol</td>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U-863</td>
<td>29 Sep</td>
<td>Aircraft of U.S. Squadron 107 - air patrol</td>
<td>South Atlantic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Roskill, The War at Sea, Vol I, II, III and IV.
Atlantic. Any large military operation in that ocean has to consider this area with a high level of priority. Although the German U-boats had operated extensively in it, as General Friedrich Von Boltlischer, the prewar German military attaché in the U.S., stressed after the war:

... there was no clear idea of the strategic significance of the narrowing of the Atlantic Ocean between Brazil and Africa and of the land and air routes across Central Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.34

If the Axis powers had been successful in taking over one of these areas they would have posed a totally new threat to the Western Hemisphere. Conversely, since the beginning of the European war the US government acknowledged the importance of the Brazilian bulge to its own security and had been involved in intense and complicated political negotiations to put troops in Brazil. However, until the end of 1942 the Brazilian bulge had been exposed to German attacks and the best security enjoyed by this area was provided by the Axis first priority to attacks on North Africa and Russia.

The Brazilian Armed Forces deployed in the Northeast area were unable to resist, by themselves, a large-scale nazi-fascist aggression. They had to count on the allied assistance. Although Brazil had traditionally been a friend of the US, the relationship between the two countries in 1939-1942 can be defined as being one of mistrust and suspicion. The past US "big-stick policy" toward Latin America had left its bitter marks among the Brazilian people. The US Navy had access to Brazilian ports since 1940. However, the US Army had been engaged for more than three years in difficult negotiations to deploy forces in Brazil. The nationalism, the fears of internal political implications resulting from US troops in the country coupled with some
controversial issues such as munitions, base rights and method to be followed in the defense of the Northeast had made the Brazilian-American talks extremely sensitive. Also, there was a profound gap in the perceived threat. To the Brazilians the war seemed to be far from their territory, therefore, the Germans did not represent a real menace to the nation's independence and sovereignty. As the Brazilian members told their counterparts in the Joint Planning Group in 1941 "the defense of Northeast Brazil appeared to be much more vital to the United States than to Brazil". Only after Brazil's declaration of war on Germany on 22 August 1942 were these political problems solved.35

Until mid-1942 the Brazilian bulge represented a critical area in the overall US war planning. After the establishment of the Vichy Government in Dakar, the invasion of that area seemed to be the logical sequel to be followed by the German planners. Rainbows 1, 4 and 5, as well as the Pot of Gold plan and the Victory Program called for the deployment of large forces in Brazil. As General Gerow, War Plans Division Chief, told President Roosevelt in August 1941:

"Brazil was the southern key to the Army's scheme of hemisphere defense, and the Army planners and General Marshall wanted more than ever to put security forces at strategic airfields on the Brazilian bulge".

After Pearl Harbor was attacked, the importance of Brazil increased even more causing the following War Plan's recommendation on 12 December, 1941:

Take immediate steps to establish in Northeast Brazil sufficient forces to deny this area to Axis forces.

It appears evident that in case of a serious Axis threat against the Brazilian bulge, the US government would not hesitate, even without permission of the Brazilian government, and under the risk of reviving
the anti-imperialistic feelings, to land troops in the Brazilian bulge.  

The US war planning did not take into account the need to
increase the military efficiency of Latin American countries to a level
that they could be valuable to the defense of the Western Hemisphere.
The main objective of the US Army policy set up on 26 July 1940 relative
to Latin America was:

Objective - better mutual understanding, impressing Latin
American officers with our military preparedness and our
determination to uphold the Monroe Doctrine; affording selected
officers of our Army opportunity of studying Latin America. In
attaining our objective, we should concentrate on those countries
of the most immediate military importance to us. Our objective does
not comprise expectations on our part of being able to use Latin
American forces as effective allies in war.

This policy implied that the defense of critical areas (say the Brazil-
ian bulge) would be done basically by American forces, with little or
no participation of indigenous forces. This policy contributed to
increase suspicions and raise delicate issues in the Brazilian-
American relationship. The main struggle of the US policy during World
War II toward Latin America countries was getting base rights from
which the defense of the Western Hemisphere could be more easily
carried out, instead of arming and employing their armed forces as an
effective ally. That resulted in the construction or improvement of
fourteen bases along the Brazilian coastline and one in Uruguay. On
the South American side of the Atlantic, Brazil almost monopolized all
the allied effort to defend the area from the Axis menace. Argentina
did not establish effective measures to deal with the German threat to
the region. In fact, it maintained very cold political relations with
Brazil and the US and was the only South American country not receiving
any kind of military aid from the United States.
In conducting the defense of the South Atlantic there was a great deal of understanding and coordination between the Brazilian, American and British commands. The Fourth Fleet and the United States Forces South Atlantic were able to maintain a high level of understanding when dealing with the Brazilian commands, particularly those related to the Northeast such as the North-Northeast Theater of Operations and the Northeast Naval Force as well as with the Brazilian War Department. The Army Theater Command coordinated all the actions of its units in the Northeast. During the Winter months it directed all the air traffic to North Africa, Europe, China, India and the Soviet Union. It also contributed in organizing, arming and training the Brazilian Expeditionary Forces, sent later on to fight in Italy. Furthermore, the ties between the US and British commands were very close and resulted in the definition of a clear area of responsibility in the South Atlantic and close coordination in conducting the antisubmarine war. Though there was no unified command to coordinate and deal with all the military actions on both edges of the South Atlantic, there was no conflict of commands.

There is no doubt that the South Atlantic area played an important role during the entire World War II. However, it was a secondary theater of war in the global conflict. When compared with other strategic areas, the South Atlantic displayed the lowest figures, both on the allied and Axis sides. As for the allied merchant shipping losses, only 174 out of 5,150 allied ships were sunk in its waters, which represented 3.4 percent of the total allied losses (See Table IX). No major naval or air battle was fought in the South Atlantic. Indeed, no allied warship was sunk in it and the German warship losses during

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Indian Ocean</th>
<th>Pacific</th>
<th>Mediterranean</th>
<th>South Atlantic</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>11,490,372</td>
<td>1,468,942</td>
<td>204,594</td>
<td>50,712</td>
<td>3,300,724</td>
<td>16,664,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>10,275,300</td>
<td>1,738,539</td>
<td>223,868</td>
<td>54,973</td>
<td>3,350,261</td>
<td>16,717,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>8,300,545</td>
<td>1,881,685</td>
<td>217,835</td>
<td>44,146</td>
<td>3,300,735</td>
<td>15,834,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>7,000,146</td>
<td>1,843,362</td>
<td>211,414</td>
<td>41,115</td>
<td>3,241,601</td>
<td>15,757,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>5,175,500</td>
<td>1,758,958</td>
<td>198,875</td>
<td>37,190</td>
<td>3,182,940</td>
<td>13,399,453</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE IX - ANNUAL ALLIED MERCHANT SHIP LOSSES DUE TO ENEMY ACTION, BY THEATERS
the whole war were limited to the raiders Graf Spree, in 1939, Atlantis, in 1941, and Stier, in 1942. On the submarine side, considered the greatest threat posed by the Germans to the South Atlantic, only 18 U-boats (See Table VIII) out of 785 were destroyed by the joint efforts of Brazilians, Americans and British. In fact, the South Atlantic was not the stage for major battles. Its overall importance derived from the shipping traffic of raw materials and from its strategic position that functioned as a bridge connecting the Americas, Europe and Africa.38


3. Ibid., p. 4.

4. Ibid., p. 11.


7. Ibid., p. 11.


10. Ibid., p. 10.

11. Ibid., pp. 33, 88 and 273.

12. Ibid., p. 293.


15. Ibid., p. 290.

16. Ibid., p. 312.

17. Ibid., p. 319; Memo, OPD for Col Walsh, 9 June 1942, Hist of USAFSA, App. XII.

18. In July 1939 the Brazilian Army Chief of Staff, General Goes Monteiro, submitted a list of first priority items that included 156 heavy artillery pieces, 196 antiaircraft guns, 102 combat aircraft, 41 tanks, 252 armored cars, and 722 automatic weapons of various types, (See *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, p. 268).


35. Ibid., p. 297.

36. Ibid., pp. 138, 159.

37. Ibid., pp. 178, 182, 183, 230.

CHAPTER 3

PAST SECURITY EXPERIENCES IN
THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA

The totally different historical heritage between the eastern South American and western African countries have led them to see their security problems under distinct perspectives and viewpoints. As independence was achieved, the African countries did not tie themselves to a single defense and collective commitment able to harmonize and coordinate the specific security needs of the continent. Conversely, the Latin American countries with more than 150 years of political independence and with a reasonably common cultural and social background have been able to consider their security needs under a collective approach.

This chapter intends to trace the security policies followed by the South Atlantic countries, both in Africa and South America, and identify past tendencies, if any, that evidence a link of common security interests among them.

I. Latin America's Quest for Security

For the majority of the Latin American countries, the feeling for a collective defense appeared at the very moment of their independence. There is no doubt that Simon Bolivar, the Liberator, was the father of this great ambition not yet completely fulfilled. Bolivar's ideal extended far beyond the military aspects of security, since his
Dreams were related to building a large Spanish-American unity, which was lost with the fragmentation of the three vice royalties of New Granada, Peru and River Plate during the process of independence from Spain. As early as 1824 Bolivar had planned to form a league of Hispanic-American states and in 1826 he convoked a general congress in Panama which was attended only by Colombia, Peru, Central America and Mexico. These nations signed a treaty of alliance and encouraged the other American countries to join it. By this treaty the federate states intended to have a common army and navy, with all controversies among them being solved by arbitration. Although Bolivar failed to get the unity of American countries, the Congress of Panama laid the foundation for the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the achievement of continental solidarity.¹

Since the very beginning of their existence the Latin American nations have felt a strong US political influence. In fact, the American policies related to the continent were formulated as a reaction to some event in the world arena opposed to US interests. The Monroe Doctrine promulgated on 2 December 1823 was a response to the European pressure on the New World represented by the Holy Alliance, and resulted from the desire to preserve the Louisiana territory on US hands, keep the Americas outside European control and assure US hegemony in the area. All in all, the Monroe Doctrine was defined as "a unilateral national policy of the United States and therefore not an appropriate subject of inter-American action".² This doctrine, although modified, is still a cornerstone in the American diplomacy toward the continent and has been the cause for many conflicts in the US-Latin American relationship.
The US assumed a role of "protector" of the remaining nations on the continent, which sometimes involved bitter armed interventions as a consequence of the adoption of the so-called Theodore Roosevelt's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, built on the assumption of Latin American inferiority and Anglo-Saxon superiority and arrogance.

The Monroe Doctrine has always implied that Latin Americans are among the backward peoples of the world who, but for the United States protection, would have been colonised as Asians and Africans had been.\(^3\)

In spite of all political problems created by the Monroe Doctrine and its famous Corollary of 1904 it represented an effort of regional security in the Americas against threats from external powers. Even during World War II and after the fall of France it was invoked on the grounds of a possible transfer of French overseas possessions in the Americas from the Vichy government to German influence. Such was the case of the islands of St. Pierre, Miquelon, Martinique and Guadeloupe and the territory of French Guiana in South America. The United States informed Germany and Italy that it would not recognize any transfer of territory "from one non-American power to another non-American power".\(^4\) In translating the intention of the US foreign policy the War Department Estimate of October 1941 expressed:

Resist wherever necessary and with all available resources the economic, political and military penetration of the Axis and Associated Powers in the Western Hemisphere. Enforce the Monroe Doctrine.\(^5\)

Another important US policy toward the American continent was President Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, an instrument of peace, friendship and understanding which succeeded in committing the nations of the Americas in effective security measures. The Good Neighbor Policy was a response conceived by the Roosevelt Administration to the
gathering clouds of violence appearing in the political horizon of Europe as a direct consequence of the Axis threat. Although the Monroe Doctrine remained the basic US foreign policy tenet, the Good Neighbor Policy was able to change Latin American perceptions of it because:

Before the Roosevelt Administration came into office, the other American republics believed that the United States would use the doctrine against them. Under the current conditions, the opposite was true.6

The Seventh International Conference of American States, held at Montevideo on 3 December 1933, resulted in the achievement of one of the most important mechanisms governing international relations in the continent -- the acceptance of the non-intervention principle that read "no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another".7 The recognition of this principle by all American states -- a milestone in US-Latin America relations -- alleviated the fears of US interventions in the area and opened the roads for broad military cooperation. The Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Re-establishment of Peace, agreed at the Inter-American Conference convened in Buenos Aires in 1936, under the pressure of the political uncertainties in Europe, adopted for the first time consultation and collaboration among the American states. In effect, article 2 declares that:

... in the event of an international war outside America which might menace the peace of the American Republics, such consultation shall also take place to determine the proper time and manner in which the signatory states, if they so desire, may eventually cooperate in some action tending to preserve the peace of the American Continent.8

However, effective military steps related to the war in Europe were adopted only when the Neutrality Zone was created and the
Neutrality Patrol implemented as an effort to avoid the Americas' involvement in the European conflict. In theory, the Neutrality Patrol was the first concrete step in inter-American cooperation. Due to weakness and lack of naval means on the part of the other American countries, only the US Navy carried out the commitments previously agreed upon, although ports and other facilities along the Latin American coastline were available to US ships. However, more important than military measures was the political support granted by all American countries to the Neutrality Zone at the Conference of Panama, in September 1939, which established a security zone -- a kind of sanctuary area -- along the coasts of the Americas, through which no belligerent country could pass. Despite the strong opposition of the US War Department, the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) was established at the Rio de Janeiro Conference of Foreign Ministers in January 1942, and resulted in a considerable improvement in mutual understanding and war planning cooperation among the countries in the Western Hemisphere.

The objections the Army had initially raised to this proposal were numerous: it would be too large and unwieldy a body for effective action; Latin American military matters required immediate action; and the establishment of the board would be a time-consuming affair; it would not be possible to discuss secret plans before so large a body; the board's membership would lack authority to carry out its adopted measures; and the board would absorb the time of high-caliber men sorely needed for more pressing duties.9

The political viewpoint prevailed and the IADB functioned as an important political advisory board and as a symbol of inter-American military unity, although as for the defense of the continent itself it played a minor role, due to its limited latitude. Much more effective in curbing the Axis operations was the establishment of the Emergency
Advisory Committee for Political Defense also decided upon at the Rio Conference of 1942. This committee represented all the American nations but was actually staffed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. Despite all its internal political diversities the committee performed extremely well and signifies a gigantic step forward in considering the collective security problems related to the very sensitive issue relative to the internal security of the Latin American countries. In effect, this international political body of advisers received ample cooperation from all nations in the continent and recommended political measures to be implemented in order to limit and reduce the Axis subversion carried out by the so-called Fifth Column.10

Immediately after the end of World War II and as a direct consequence of the extensive US-Latin American cooperation during the conflict some attempts were made to establish a naval and air inter-American force. General Henry H. Arnold, the commanding general of the US Army Air Forces during World War II, was one of the most enthusiastic proponents of this idea. After visiting some aviation facilities in Brazil, he wrote to the Brazilian Air Minister saying that "the progress that Brazil had made in aviation under your leadership is remarkable. Brazil is an ally of whom we who live in the United States of America are exceedingly proud and is a worthy partner for the future".11

However, according to the US Navy's view of the time, the defense of the Western Hemisphere at sea should be conducted solely by its own effort. It did not agree with the participation of Latin America in a joint naval force, based on reasons that ranged from
sound arguments such as those related to the weaknesses of the Latin American navies to some prejudices and misconceptions about the realities of the continent. Among the latter one could cite the one expressed by the Secretary of the Navy, William F. Knox, which considered Latin Americans genetically inferior. Also, as the Commander in Chief of the US Fleet during the Second World War, Admiral Ernest J. King expressed, there were the fears that the Latin Americans would misuse the modern equipment provided by the US, either in domestic affairs or in interstate skirmishes. Therefore, the seeds of an inter-American force did not germinate.12

The Good Neighbor Policy succeeded in getting the wholehearted support of the Americas. However, it was based on the tenacity and determination of three men: President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles. Therefore, the death of President Roosevelt also meant the disintegration of the Good Neighbor Policy. The growing interest of the US foreign policy in European affairs was to the detriment of Latin America, which lost importance in the global US strategy in view of the threat posed by the Soviets to the free world. Under the pressures generated by the Cold War, however, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (known as TIAR or the Rio Treaty) was signed in 1947 and the OAS established, through a resolution of the Ninth International Conference of American States convened in Bogota in 1948.

II. The OAS and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance

The adoption of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) in 1947 and the formal establishment of the OAS in
1948 to "reorganize, consolidate and strengthen the Inter-American System", which existed "de facto" since 1890, provided the Americas with adequate means "for the settlement of disputes, for meeting threats to the peace and for resisting armed attacks". These two major instruments are the cornerstone of Hemispheric security.13

As for the defense of the continent, the charter of the OAS defines the basic principle of regional solidarity in its Article 5:

-- An act of aggression against one American state is an act of aggression against all the American states.

and its Articles 43 and 44 state how to deal with armed attack.

Art 43 -- In case of an armed attack within the territory of an American state or within the region of security delimited by treaties in force, a Meeting of Consultation shall be held without delay. Such Meeting shall be called immediately by the chairman of the Council of the Organization, who shall at the same time call a meeting for the council itself.

Art 44 -- An Advisory Defense Committee shall be established to advise the Organ of Consultation on problems of military cooperation that may arise in connection with the application of existing special treaties on collective security.

Continental solidarity, collective self-defense and the application of the Rio Treaty is implied in Article 25, which states:

If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American state should be affected by an armed attack or by an act of aggression that is not an armed attack, or by an extra-continental conflict, or by a conflict between two or more American states, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the American states, in furtherance of principles of continental solidarity or collective self-defense, shall apply the measures and procedures established in the special treaties on the subject.14

It is worth noting that the Advisory Defense Committee foreseen in Article 44 was never set up. Also, it should be emphasized that the OAS does not possess a Defense or Security Council, which would seem to be advisable at first sight. Furthermore, the Eighth Meeting of
Consultation held in Punta Del Este, Uruguay, in 1962, approved a special Consultative Committee on Security against the subversive action of international communism, "composed of experts on security matters, for the purpose of advising the member states that may desire and request such assistance". The fact that it was never set up reflects the widespread Latin American fears of military interventions. Finally, the Inter-American Defense Board still continues to exist "to carry forward its military plans for continental defense" but it is not an organ of the OAS, according to a separate resolution of the Ninth International Conference.

III. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (The Rio Treaty)

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the first world mutual security pact, was signed at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security held in Rio de Janeiro from August 15 to September 12, 1947, and served as a precedent for other regional security agreements. It incorporated the decisions agreed upon in the Act of Chapultepec of 1945 which "established for the first time in inter-American relations the application of certain sanctions to meet threats or acts of aggression against any American Republic including the use of armed forces to prevent or repel aggression", and considerably enlarged what had previously been agreed upon in the Declaration of Havana in 1940.

Therefore, the Rio Treaty provides the juridical support to meet threats to the peace emanating from within or outside the continent. Since its existence, it has been applied in thirteen cases and with the exception of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 -- when the USSR
was involved — all the remaining cases originated from domestic disputes within the continent. Its main purpose is to "assure peace, through adequate means, to provide for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks against any American State and in order to deal with threats of aggression against any of them".18

The main feature of the Rio Treaty is the clause that portrays the principles of collective self-defense and inter-American solidarity expressed in its Article 3:

The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any state against an American state shall be considered as an attack against all the American states and consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

As for its application, Article IV defines its area of interest as being that portrayed on Map Nr. 11.

All the actions taken by the Organ of Consultation, that is, by the Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, related to the peace or security of the continent should be reported to the Security Council of the United Nations, which will take "measures necessary to maintain international peace and security".19 The Organ of Consultation may impose various types of sanctions against an aggressor which according to Article 8 of the Treaty could range from the recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions to the use of armed forces. Article 6 of the Rio Treaty has been the cause of many controversies and has limited its application. It deals with "an aggression which is not an armed attack", situations extremely difficult to be precisely defined, which allows a wide range of interpretations, suspicions and fears that it would favor the strongest countries in the continent.20
In addition to the region defined in Article 3 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947, which includes more than the territories to which it applies. It includes the State of Hawaii as well as the possessions abroad since they all constitute a part of the United States of America.

IV. The Atlantic Triangle Concept

After World War II the US military strategies toward Latin America were aimed at opposing communist expansion carried out by the USSR and its satellites. Among many strategic concepts laid down such as the "secondary space" during the Cold War period or the "antifocus" proposed by the Kennedy Administration to oppose the focus strategy of Castro-Debray-Guevara, one should be emphasized because, for the first time, the Americas and Europe were linked by an "Atlantic Partnership" — I am referring to the Atlantic Triangle strategy. This strategy, which was conceived to link Europe, North America and Latin America in just one security system, was proposed by former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1955 and rested on a broad foundation based on common historical, religious, political, economic, military and cultural heritages:

Consequently, the Atlantic Triangle concept is advanced not with the utopian hope of creating an Atlantic political structure here and now, but rather in the belief that the existing mutuality of interests which links the three corners of the Triangle offers a firm base for constructing a more closely integrated Atlantic Community of the West.21

During the 1950s, several distinguished Latin American leaders expressed the needs for a broader and closer association with the North Atlantic community. Among them were the presidents of Argentina, Brazil and Peru, respectively, Arturo Frondizi, Jucelino Kubitschek and Manuel Prado and also former Secretary General of the OAS, Jose A. Mora. All of these prominent leaders urged a more effective participation of Latin America in the Western Alliance. If the Atlantic Triangle concept had materialized it would not only have forged the military partnership but also strengthened the economic, political and cultural ties
between Europe, North America and Latin America and fostered the consolidation of a strong Atlantic unity. In regard to the security aspects, this concept aimed to unify the NATO and Rio Treaty members in a triangle alliance. However, this strategy was set aside when it became apparent that the Latin American countries would not support a plan that would militarize the inter-American system.

V. Security Aspects in Africa

During World War II, the French, English and Portuguese colonies reached an effective cooperation on security matters related to the security of the South Atlantic. The allies succeeded in taking steps to establish coordinating measures to control the sea lines of communication and wage anti-submarine warfare against the Axis in that ocean. In 1941, President Roosevelt intended to extend the Monroe Doctrine to the west coast of Africa to protect the whole South Atlantic area from German invasions. In effect, it was the first attempt to place both coasts of the South Atlantic under a single security umbrella.

[On 19 May 1941] he asked Undersecretary of State Welles to draft a message that would in effect have extended the Monroe Doctrine to include Western Africa and the eastern Atlantic islands. Later on, however, he changed his mind based on the arguments of his advisers who feared that this extension would overburden the US defense responsibilities.

The post-war regional security agreements signed during the peak of the Cold War did not reach Africa, then under the control of the colonial powers. The wave of independence began in 1957 and although by 1966 most of the African countries had broken ties with their
former colonial rulers they were pragmatic enough to sign defense and military cooperation agreements with them. Such was the case of Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Ivory Coast, The Central Africa Republic, Gabon, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Chad.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU), the most important organization in Africa, -- a result of the determination and endeavor of men like Dr. Nkrumah, from Ghana, -- did not succeed in getting the so cherished dream of African Unity and "the Pan-African movement of the early independence years has failed to provide the degree of cohesion envisioned by many Africans". In contrast to the Organization of American States, the OAU did not make provisions for collective self-defense in the event of external aggression against any member party, although the signatories of the OAU charter have agreed to take common steps to defend sovereignty and territorial integrity.

More recently, some attempts have been made to establish a Pan-African force which would include contingents from every country in Africa, with the purpose of facing external aggression. A first step in that direction is the inter-African peacekeeping force composed of contingents from Nigeria, Zaire, Senegal, Benin, Guinea and Togo, which is operating in Chad under the provisions of the OAU.

France has defended the creation of an African force "by a few states for the purpose of coming to the aid of one of them".

At present, many African countries will maintain some type of military ties with their former metropolitan powers, the Francophones following a contractual approach and the Anglophones being
more informal. France is fully committed to protect the former colonies and its position on military actions in Africa is very clear based on statements made by ex-President Giscard D'Estaing in a press conference on April 12, 1977:

I don't want the African States, friends of France, to feel abandoned when they are within their rights and their security is threatened. They will not be abandoned.29

The basic principles of France's military action in Africa are:

-- to respect its commitments to countries with which it has agreements;
-- to act only at the request of legitimate governments within internationally recognized borders;
-- to participate only in defensive action, particularly, when French nationals are in danger.30

Although some countries have denounced or amended the treaties signed just after independence, France still maintains twenty-one military agreements with its former African colonies, the majority of them being related to logistic aid and training. However, as for the Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Gabon, The Central African Republic, Senegal and Togo "the military agreements include a clause of external defense, allowing these states to call on French forces in the event of outside aggression".31 In five of these states, France maintains a token military presence:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1 Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>1 Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1 Regiment 2 Parachute Companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>1 Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>3700 men and 2 Squadrons of Mirage Fighters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1) Data furnished by the French Liaison Officer at the USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth.


Although in the past France has made military interventions in Mauritania, Zaire and Chad at the request of these governments, the permanence of French troops in those countries did not last long. The French foreign policy in regard to Africa appears to be bound on the non-interference principle, as stated by former President Giscard D'Estaing on May 13, 1977.

Despite the current situation in Africa, France's goal remains that of 'Africa for the Africans'—that is, the Africans still settle their problems among themselves, in the African manner, with respect for frontiers and without aggressive interference from the outside.

On the British side, there is no contractual agreements with
its former African colonies. The links between the African Anglophone countries and Great Britain are based on the grounds of their voluntary association to the Commonwealth which offers them "a greater sense of security, albeit more psychological than real". In fact, the African countries maintain a sizable presence in the Commonwealth represented by thirteen out of forty-four members. The British military presence in Africa is presently restricted to training teams in Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe. In this latter country, about 150 personnel are serving in the British Military Advisory and Training Team.

This team was established at the time of independence, at the Zimbabwe Government's request. It is commanded by a Major-General and is making a key contribution to the task of amalgamating and training the local armed forces.

VI. Conclusion

Since the beginning of their existence, the Latin American countries have felt a strong influence from the US foreign policy, which has governed the interstate relationship in the continent. Among these policies, the Monroe Doctrine and the Good Neighbor Policy of President Roosevelt have played a prominent role and strongly influenced the Latin American perception toward the North Americans. All of these policies resulted from external threats posed on the continent and with the exception of the first one, the others were characterized by lack of consistency among themselves and the absence of long-term goals, which has been the cause for sound Latin American complaints. In effect, the perceptions of the people south of the Rio Grande are consistent with that expressed by former US Vice President, Henry A. Wallace when he observed that:
it is a rather disturbing thought that we in the United States can maintain a deep interest in Latin America only so long as we think we have something to gain by it. I hope... during the next few years that Latin America will feel that we are really her friend and not merely a friend for expedient purposes in time of great need.35

The Latin American feeling of being used only as an instrument of US foreign policy has been responsible for suspicions, unwillingness in sincere cooperation and weakness in participating in effective security matters related to the continent.

The OAS, founded in 1948, is the final product of the persistence, tenacity and determination of the American countries in their long effort to achieve unity and solidarity in the continent. The main feature of the Charter of the OAS is the mechanism that enhances continental solidarity and provides the necessary instruments to deal with aggressions originated both from within or outside the Americas. Although some voices are heard predicting the decline of the OAS and its importance as a viable organism for continental defense on the grounds of its political domination by the US, it has successfully managed the political conflicts within the continent and has been a powerful instrument of peace in the hemisphere.

... the organization typically was able to interpose itself in conflicts in a variety of ways -- gathering facts by on-the-spot investigations, separating belligerents through the establishment of OAS patrols, facilitating consultation between contestants or directly mediating disputes, and sometimes even spelling out and imposing settlement.36

However, the OAS has failed to achieve effective solutions to some very explosive potential conflicts that for years have menaced solidarity and peace in the continent, such as the Argentina-Chile, Ecuador-Peru and Bolivia-Chile border disputes. Besides that, the exaggerated
nationalism, the appearance and expansion of communism in the region coupled with Latin American concerns about the US hegemonic role have worked to arise additional barriers toward collective solidarity and unity of purposes regarding security matters. Moreover, as Professor Jerome Slater stated:

as the United States increasingly sought to use the OAS as an anticommmunist alliance to mobilize the hemispheric states on behalf of its cold war policies, the value of organization to the Latin Americans sharply declined -- one of the primary functions of the system in Latin American eyes was to insulate the hemisphere from rather than involve it in world conflict.  

All the above mentioned factors, in addition to the displacement of the US foreign policy emphasis from the Western Hemisphere to the Northern Hemisphere, has drawn the OAS to be involved much more on economic and social aspects than in political tasks. And it appears that this trend will continue indefinitely.

Although the Rio Treaty was designed to be primarily an instrument of self-defense against external threats toward the continent, in fact it has served more as an instrument of peace for settlement of disputes within the Americas. The historical heritage of the American countries for solving their grievances and divergences through peaceful means has resulted in thirteen applications of the Rio Treaty and on only two occasions military forces were involved -- the naval blockade imposed against Cuba during the missile crisis of 1962 and the military intervention carried out by an inter-American force in the Dominican Republic.

The Rio Treaty is a mutual defense pact, but it lacks homogeneity as a military agreement. In fact, there has never been the intention of transforming it into a strong military instrument like
that provided by NATO. As a pact born during the Cold War period, the Rio Treaty was primarily oriented to curb hostile Soviet attitudes toward the American continent. However, from the Latin American perspective, the menace represented by an open Soviet attack on their countries was always perceived as a vague and remote possibility. Much more plausible and actually implemented has been the support given by the Soviets and their surrogates, mainly Cuba, to promote subversion which has posed a serious threat to the continent. However, this covert aggression foreseen in its Article 6 as "an aggression which is not an armed attack" has motivated widespread discussions which did not succeed in obtaining a regional consensus regarding its interpretation and has paralyzed the application of the Rio Treaty. On the other hand, this treaty does not call for an inter-American force with a unified command able to build a strong military establishment under a single doctrine utilizing the same equipment and unified planning, organization and procedures, albeit this issue has periodically been raised in the continent. For instance, in 1945 the Inter-American Defense Board, as a first step to an Inter-American force, tried to get a fair level of standardization throughout the Latin American armed forces and, in October 1945:

> forwarded to the governments recommendations that they adopt 'as an ultimate objective the full standardization of the materiel of all units of the various armed forces and the facilities for its production'; that they ensure 'adequate capacitation of human resources through measures such as compulsory military service, preliminary training formations of cadres, et cetera'; that uniform tables of organization, training manuals, et cetera, should be adopted, and that exchanges of officers and military students should be made. 38

But, most of these recommendations were not implemented and each Latin American armed force continued to follow its own course, according to
its specific national interest.

In a sense, an inter-American force has always been viewed by the majority of Latin American countries with suspicions and perceived as an instrument of intervention at the service of the most powerful regional countries. Therefore, the Rio Treaty became much more a pact of intentions than a real and effective military agreement, unable to fulfill, by itself, the commitments previously agreed upon. Thus, as in the past, the present burden for the defense of the Hemisphere rests primarily on the strength of the US forces.

The Organization of African Unity does not make provisions to deal collectively with external threats to the continent. Many Anglophone and Francophone countries maintain security ties with their former metropolitan powers either following an informal approach as a member of the British Commonwealth or under contractual links established with France. Nowadays, the dominant fact in Africa is the existence of only token British and French military forces, in contrast with a sizable Soviet and Cuban presence. On the South Atlantic side, the following African countries maintain some kind of security ties with their former metropoles:
The French position on military action in Africa suggests that France is totally committed to fulfill its obligations, and the British Commonwealth possesses the necessary mechanisms to assist a threatened member country. Thus, if a South Atlantic Treaty Organization comes of age, it will necessarily have to consider these European-African security ties.

During World War II, President Roosevelt felt the need to extend the Monroe Doctrine to the west coast of Africa in order to coordinate measures to face the Axis threat on the region.

### State Type of Agreement with France (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Type of Agreement</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
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<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Military Cooperation</td>
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### State Informal Tie with Great Britain (2)

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Member of the Commonwealth</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Member of the Commonwealth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Member of the Commonwealth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (1) Data provided by the French Liaison Officer at the USACGSC - Fort Leavenworth.

However, he dropped his idea due to the advice provided by both Secretary Stimson and Secretary Hull who were strongly "against the idea of extending the coverage of the Monroe Doctrine across the South Atlantic to Africa". That appears to be the very unique attempt in fusing both coasts of the South Atlantic into a single concept of regional security. Nowadays, the Soviet threat to the South Atlantic, particularly in Africa, has motivated Western policymakers in reviving this old strategic concept to oppose Russian expansionism, replacing the Monroe Doctrine by a military alliance encompassing countries on both shores of the South Atlantic.
ENDNOTES


5. Ibid., p. 144.


11. Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, p. 139.

12. Ibid., p. 139, 140.


17. Pan American Union, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
18. Ibid., p. 417.
19. Ibid., p. 418.
20. Ibid., p. 419.
24. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 20.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 2.
35. Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, p. 198.
37. Ibid., p. 78.


CHAPTER 4

THE SOVIET PERIL IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA

In light of its paramount strategic importance, the South Atlantic has become an area where the West and the East have been deeply engaged in a decisive political struggle to gain control over it. As the Soviet movements toward Africa became more apparent and its intentions clearer, the US and its allies, under the menace of having their lines of oil supply blocked, also turned their attention to the area. Quietly and without fanfare, the USSR set up its beachhead in Africa, transforming the Black continent into an arena of fierce East-West confrontation. In addition to Africa, the USSR and its surrogates, through underground and legitimate activities, have succeeded in considerably enlarging their political, cultural, economic and even military ties with some South American countries. The lack of objectivity in the US foreign policy toward Latin America, coupled with the growing South American desire to follow a more independent approach in the international arena, have worked to reduce the US political influence in the area. Therefore, the South Atlantic area is no longer taken for granted as an area of decisive western influence. The major objective of this chapter is to analyse the Soviet Geopolitical maneuver, and insofar as possible, find out whether Soviet interests in the South Atlantic are permanent or temporary.

I. Russian Expansionism

Since the end of World War II the Soviets have experienced an
impressive success in enlarging their sphere of influence by threatening the free world in areas of traditionally democratic heritage. Soviet communism and Russian expansionism have been the driving forces to motivate the USSR in the accomplishment of its ambitious goal of world domination. However, under the Soviet approach, the geopolitical concept has always predominated over the ideological messianism and, as history has proved, the "Soviet Union's view of relationship between Russia and the rest of world is purely geopolitical one". ¹ In fact, the historical Russian expansionism gained a new interpretation and a new justification when Sir Halford Mackinder established his famous concept and associated the pivotal area -- the "Heartland" -- with the territory of the USSR.

Although using more sophisticated tactics to conceal its true intentions, the ultimate goal of the international communist movement coordinated by the USSR is to attain the complete destruction of the western democracies. That does not necessarily mean war. The ideal way to achieve this goal should be through the use of peaceful techniques where the ideological approach works as the main instrument to promote Soviet expansionism.

Today, when there are greater inhibitions than ever before on the use of force by great powers, the Soviet Union possesses unprecedented military strength: in these circumstances, 'revolution' can only be exported by ideological evangelism. However, in an era where values ("isms") represented significant political capital, the appeal to Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism-Khruschevism-Brezhnevism-Kosyginism has never been weaker.

One can argue that this is an obsolete concept and that the USSR became much more responsible and mature in its international relations looking for formulas of sincere understanding and cooperation with the western societies. To a great extent, that could be true on a short-term basis as long as the adoption of a peaceful policy would support the achieve-
ment of its long-term goals. Consistency is one of the major features of Soviet foreign policy. Tactics and strategies can occasionally change. However, the main goals of the USSR remain unchanged. According to Norman Podhoretz in "Present Danger":

The Soviet Union is not a nation like any other. It is a revolutionary state exactly like Hitler's Germany was, in the sense that it wishes to create a new international order in which it would be the dominant power and whose character would be determined by its national wishes and its ideological dictates.

World television is a driving force — the essence — of the communist ideology, which, borrowing Clausewitz's ideas, makes little distinction between war and peace. The total incompatibility between communism and democracy was emphasized during the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party, in 1920, when Lenin predicted that a continuous and restless struggle would govern the relationship between communist and con-communist countries. He stated:

We are living not merely in a state but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialistic states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before the end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.

II. A Soviet View of the World

It is evident that the gigantic Soviet investments in its armed forces and the subsequent change in its traditional defensive posture to an offensive-minded approach is strictly connected to Mackinder's concept of world domination from a pivotal area — the "Heartland", which coincides with the physical territory of the USSR. Soviet successes in the Third World in the last decade seem to be not a result of opportunism, but of a new policy which, in the words of Karen Brutents, a Soviet Central Committee official, is aimed at carrying out "the offensive
against imperialism and world capitalism as a whole in order to do away with them. The present influence exerted by the Soviet Union or its surrogates in Africa and Latin America has gone far to corroborate this assumption.

John E. Kieffer, in his excellent book "Strategy for Survival", written during the peak of the Cold War, portrayed the Russian expansionism with an appreciable precision, which fits extremely well into Mackinder's Russian connection. According to Kieffer's ideas, the USSR divided the world into seven different areas or belts, with each one of them playing a specific role in the geopolitical concept of the Soviet Union (Map 12). The "Coreland" and the "peripheral spaces" are confined within the Soviet borders. The "Coreland" area represents an almost impregnable stronghold, being subject to attack by land forces only under great difficulty and completely immune to attack by sea. Air attack constitutes the great threat, but the vast space under Russian control over which hostile planes must fly enables her to offer sharp effective defense. As a consequence of this, the solid core area, or heartland, offers an excellent site for Soviet industry, stock-piling, and concentrations.

On the other hand, the "peripheral space", including Moscow, has been successively invaded by western military forces, which made it unsafe for a major industrial center. The high vulnerability of this area forced the Soviet Union to shift a large portion of its industry from this region to the "Coreland" after World War II. The third belt — the "cushion space" — is designed to be a protective zone to the "peripheral space". It encompasses Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania on the west side and China in the east. The Sino-Soviet rivalry has greatly compromised the "cushion space" on the east side as a defensive area for the Soviet Union. The "contact space" deserves great emphasis in the USSR geopolitical strategy because most of the invasions directed against its terri-
Map 12 - The Soviet View of the World

tory originated in this area. It is here that the communist and the free worlds confront each other. It comprises Germany, Austria, Japan and Manchuria.

Held by Russia, all these areas represent powerful assets for defense or offense; held by her enemies, they represent a menace to Russian plans.

The next area -- the "prime belt" -- which is some places overlaps the contact space, includes the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, Pakistan, Afghanistan, West Germany, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Austria. As modern history shows, this area has felt an enormous pressure on the part of the Soviets to place it under their heel. Although more recently the USSR suffered the loss of Egypt, its political influence in this strategic area is unquestionable. Recent Soviet successes in South Yemen, Oman, Ethiopia (although outside the prime target belt, it is closely related to it) and Afghanistan and its undeniable influence in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Iran represented a serious setback for the Free World. France, the Benelux nations, Spain, Italy, Great Britain, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, India, Indo-China and Indonesia comprise the "secondary target belt". Also in this area the Soviets enjoy a widespread influence, either through strong domestic communist parties tied to the USSR or by surrogate governments, as is the case with Indo-China as a whole. Even India appears to be far from its traditional neutrality due to its current ties with the Soviet Union and the popularity enjoyed by the latter among the Indians. According to the Institute of Public Opinion, the Soviet Union is "the most admired country" in India today, with 73 percent of the poll results. In the past few years the USSR has invested heavily in propaganda in India with widespread success. Presently the people and Indian government believe that "the US is pursuing an inimical policy toward
India" and that the Reagan Administration "is giving very low priority" to that country, which is contributing to the tensions in the subcontinent as well as "bringing the war to its very doorstep". Whereas public opinion in India has turned against the US, it became very favorable toward the Soviets, which represents a serious setback for the West in South Asia. Finally, the "ultimate target" includes the Americas and Sub-Saharan Africa. Recent developments in the international arena have extensively proved that the Soviet Union has selected both the African part of the ultimate target and the secondary target belts as its areas of primary geopolitical interest.

Kieffer's Soviet view of the world is almost identical to Mackinder's Russian connection concept (Map 13). Strongly castled in the "Heartland" and with a large influence in the "Inner Crescent", all past evidence appears to suggest that the USSR has turned its geopolitical priorities to the "Desert Band" and Sub-Saharan Africa. If successful, this extended geopolitical movement will place the USSR in an exceptional strategic position to place under its influence not only the Mediterranean Sea but also the South Atlantic, Indian and Pacific sea lines of communication and vast resources in raw materials.

Extended as the concept may appear, it does take advantage of the natural defensive strengths of the oceans, much in the way the countries of the Western Hemisphere have been able to rely on the seas as barriers to invasion in the past. The Soviet strategic problem, then, would be essentially one of hemispheric denial of hostile transoceanic incursions. With or without political settlement, the establishment of extended seaward arcs encompassing the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific would place the Soviets in a strong geopolitical position, self-sufficient in resources and with access to the technological assets of Western Europe.

It is not a task for tomorrow. But, as history proves, tenacity, persistence and determination were never in short supply in Russia. The high priority given by the Soviets to Africa seems to be quite un-
questionable. Its remarkable achievements in all continents since the end of World War II, with little or no opposition, has motivated the USSR to make more decisive movements towards Africa. Occasional failures do not weaken the Russian national will to eventually reach its long-range expansionistic goals. The Soviet Union is fighting a decisive battle in Africa in order to control Europe and the Western Hemisphere. Contrary to Germany in the prewar period, the USSR is conducting a very careful political preparation based on the probability of World War III. And, unfortunately for the Free World, it has succeeded in achieving its goals which have remained unchanged for the last 60 years, since Stalin laid down the basic policy to be pursued to defeat the West:

If Europe and America may be called the front, the non-sovereign nations and colonies, with their raw materials, food, and vast stores of human materials should be regarded as the rear, the reserve of imperialism. In order to win a war one must not only triumph at the front but also revolutionize the enemy's rear, his reserves.  

III. The Role of Soviet Naval Power

The impressive naval developments of the USSR in the last twenty years transformed that country into a world maritime power with presence in all seas and continents, conferring it a real dimension of a super-power capable of projecting its influence far beyond its own boundaries. However, the USSR's historical heritage, geographic position and the structure of its armed forces suggest that the Soviets are still land-minded. As former US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt, wrote:

The Soviet Union is a great land power, spanning the Eurasian continent. From earliest Czarist times the Army has held vast influence in the councils of the Russian government. Although there were periods when Russia built up large navies and exhibited an interest in seapower, these efforts were intermittent; and in time of war, first thought always went to the Army. To this day Army marshals dominate the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.
Soviet defense policy is predominantly the product of a land-oriented politico-military hierarchy.\textsuperscript{12}

Admiral Zumwalt's thought gains strength when one analyses the Soviet naval forces and notices that large attack aircraft carriers, long-range assault ships and naval infantry are of minor importance in the total naval force. Paradoxically, the USSR made huge investments in building the most modern submarine fleet in the world and substantially increased the number of its missile-armed surface vessels. Although the new Minsk-class carrier is expected to be in service in the 1980's, which will confer the Soviet Navy a sea control capability, it is still designed primarily to carry out interdiction operations "reinforcing the barrier aspects of the oceans" under the Soviet approach that the seas, instead of being considered as a means that facilitate communication and transport, are, basically, an obstacle in "containing the hemispheres and inhibiting exploration". As Admiral James L. Holloway wrote:

\begin{quote}
If you look at the Soviet's geography, not only are all their principal allies connected to them by overland routes but their two principal potential enemies are on the same continent with them -- China in Asia and the NATO countries in Europe. So their Navy is designed for one thing: to prevent the United States from exercising its influence abroad in support of our allies and our national interests. Therefore, they have an interdictory type of navy -- ships like submarines, aircraft with antiship missiles to sink ships.\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

The priority enjoyed by the Red Army in formulating the country's military policy finds its support in the Soviet laws, which determine that key positions in the Ministry of Defense be filled by ground forces officers. Also, the presence of Army officers in the Central Committee of the Communist Party outnumbers their navy counterparts in a ratio of five or six to one. Therefore, in spite of the formidable strength of the modern Soviet Navy the military policy of the Soviet Union is heavily
influenced by the ground forces.\textsuperscript{14}

Besides protecting Soviet waters, supporting the ground forces and conducting intervention operations on the vital western sealanes of communication, another major mission of the Soviet Navy is to project power far beyond the Russian littoral. As Admiral Gorshkov stated, the Red Navy is "the political force at sea", functioning as "a weapon of state policy in peacetime" and, by coincidence or not, the presence of Soviet combatant ships in all oceans occurred simultaneously with the withdrawal of the British and American Navies from the seas. Fig 4 depicts the dramatic increase, since 1963, in the Soviet out-of-area deployments in all oceans in sharp contrast with the obvious shrinkage witnessed in those of the US.

The latest naval tactics in distant waters signify, in part, an attempt to reach Europe via the Third World. The Western political and military withdrawal from much of the world has decreased the concomitant risks for Soviet expansionism in these regions.\textsuperscript{15}

When one analyses the power projection of the USSR other naval elements than the Navy, itself, must be considered due to the large influence they exercise in the Third World, most especially in the African countries. I am referring to the Soviet merchant, fishing and oceanic research and surveying fleets. Together with the Soviet Navy all these assets are fully coordinated and controlled by the state, and make up the total maritime force concept, a provision not yet envisioned by the West, with a large influence in the perception of the Third World countries. The Morflot -- the modern Soviet merchant fleet -- with more than 1,700 ships and 16,000,000 deadweight tons and composed of small cargo ships suitable for operations in precarious ports of the less developed countries, succeeded in reducing the presence of the
FIG 4 - TRENDS IN U.S.-SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONS:
SHIP-DAYS OUT-OF-AREA

SOVIET NAVY

U.S. NAVY

LEGEND:
C—Caribbean
I—Indian Ocean
P—Pacific Ocean
A—Atlantic Ocean
M—Mediterranean

western liners in Africa through a policy of low rates. Consequently, many African countries are becoming heavily dependent on the Soviet merchant fleet for conducting their foreign trade. If this tendency increases, as it is expected, strong western political and economic interests could be jeopardized with two major undesirable consequences:

First, western industrial countries well being will become ever more hostage to the Soviet merchant fleet, with all economic and political implications that this dependence will entail. Second, the expanded presence of Soviet ships will inevitably spearhead an extension of Soviet influence throughout the region.16

Besides, the Soviet trawler fleet, with more than 4,000 vessels and ranking first in the world, has fished in all oceans and simultaneously developed extensive surveillance tasks, monitoring US naval forces around the world.

... it is worth noting that few Americans are aware of the fact that most long-distance telephone calls along the east and west coasts of the United States -- those passing via micro-wave radio relay stations -- are routinely monitored and recorded by these Soviet electronic snoopers.17

Complementing these activities, more than 200 Soviet oceanic research ships, which account for "more than the rest of the world combined", have intensively surveyed the oceans. Fishing rights granted to the Soviets have resulted in a very profitable deal in promoting their influence in Third World countries, as the case of Mauritius illustrates. The Soviet Union agreed to provide fishing supplies to this island, at very reasonable prices, in exchange for the rights to use harbor facilities at Port Louis. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Soviet combatant ships started also to visit this island and "today the Hammer and Sickle is a familiar sight in and around this strategically located port in the west and central Indian Ocean".18
IV. Soviet Influence in the South Atlantic Area

Soviet political successes in the Third World, particularly in the last 6 years, clearly demonstrate the objectivity of its policy and the priority accorded to developing countries by its foreign policy. As former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, emphasized in a press conference, in 1979, "in a space of a little more than four years [1975-1979], we have had Cuban troops in Angola, Cuban troops in Ethiopia, two invasions of Zaire, a communist coup in Afghanistan, a communist coup in South Yemen and occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam, all achieved by Soviet arms, with Soviet encouragement and in several cases protected by the Soviet veto in the United Nations".19 And when one takes a look at Map 14 the situation is even more disturbing, where the growing Soviet influence in Africa is highlighted by major footholds established in the Southern part of the continent -- Angola and Mozambique. It is worth noting the high priority given by the Soviet Union to the west coast of Africa where its influence is felt through a large presence of military and technical advisers, who are, as past experience shows, the first step toward a more concrete political involvement in the internal affairs of the aided countries (see Tables X, XI and Map 15). As Secretary of State Haig said "developing leaders in black Africa, this hemisphere, and in Asia are recognizing that a close alignment with Marxist-Leninism in the Soviet model brings with it bayonets and bullets, pervasive presence, and frequently a client-state relationship".20
MAP 14 - SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST

Source: General David C. Jones, United States Military Posture For FY 1982, p. 17.
TABLE X

Communist Military Personnel in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1978\(^1\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>U.S.S.R and Eastern Europe(^2)</th>
<th>Cuba(^3)</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>20,300</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>17,900</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>41,680</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,815</strong></td>
<td><strong>37,275</strong></td>
<td><strong>590</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Number of persons present for a period of 1 month or more during 1978. Rounded to the nearest 5.

\(^2\)Mainly Soviets. Among Eastern Europeans, most are believed to be East Germans.

\(^3\)Includes troops.

**TABLE XI**

**Communist Economic Technicians in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1978¹**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>USSR and Eastern Europe²</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>9,910</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1,035</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madameascar</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>1,625</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>3,050</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1,365</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>5,645</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7,525</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>5,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>37,225</td>
<td>7,640</td>
<td>18,615</td>
<td>10,970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Number of persons present for a period of 1 month or more during 1978.
Rounded to nearest 5.

²More than half are Soviets; nearly 1,000 are believed to be East Germans.

MAP 15 - FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN AFRICA

Source: The Economist, September 19, 1981, p. 44.
It is highly evident that the huge Soviet effort in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, South Yemen and in the west African coast has a major goal -- in peacetime, to threaten both the oil fields of the Middle East and the Western sea lines of communication in the South Atlantic to gain political leverage in international affairs and, in the eventuality of a global war, to promote the economic strangulation of Europe. Soviet control of Afghanistan shortened their Air LOCS to the Persian Gulf considerably and put them only 900 miles away from the oil fields, in flagrant opposition to the long US Air LOCS whose shortest one is about 7,000 miles from that strategic area (Map 1b). In addition to the interest in denying Persian Gulf oil to the West, there is much evidence that the USSR is presently devoting high priority to that area for supplying its own future needs.

Very recently, however, there have been indications that Soviet policy may be guided not only by the desire to secure an ability to deny oil to the West, but also by its own need for access to cheap Middle East oil. Although evidence about the oil industry in the Soviet Union is difficult to gather and even harder to interpret, some experts now have little hesitation in saying that access to Middle Eastern oil has become a high Soviet priority.

Soviet naval and military diplomacy in Third World countries, mainly in Africa, has been extensively used in the last few years, either to exert influence or defend threatened Soviet interests. The eagerness of the Soviet Union to protect its power is evidenced by 170 diplomatic port calls made by the Soviet Navy in 48 countries, mostly in the Third World, from 1966 to 1976, while only 37 calls were made during the thirteen years before 1966. In addition, between 1964 and 1976 the Soviet out-of-area operations changed "from less than 4,000 ship-days annually to nearly 48,000." On the other hand, as Table XII illustrates, the USSR did not hesitate to flex its muscles whenever its main goals
MAP 16  U.S. AND SOVIET AIR LOCOS TO THE PERSIAN GULF

CONSIDERATIONS
- STRATEGIC LIFT ASSETS
- EN ROUTE FACILITIES
- OVERFLIGHT ROUTES
- PROTECTION OF LOCOS

Source: General David C. Jones, United States Military Posture for FY 1982, p. 50.
### Table XII - Cases of Soviet Military Diplomacy, May 1967-February 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Action Description</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May-June 1967</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Diplomatic efforts by Soviet carrier warfare (ACW) task groups, matching US naval response to North Korean mining of Haiphong harbor.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1967</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Soviet combatants steam into war zone off Syrian coast after Israeli attacks on Soviet ships in Tartus.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July-September 1967</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Soviet combatants deployed off the coast of Congo (Brazzaville) to protect sealift of military supplies to supported Angolan civil war.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Soviet combatants steam into war zone off Syrian coast after Israeli attacks on Soviet ships in Tartus.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1969</td>
<td>Somali ports</td>
<td>Support for new post-coup regime in conditions of internal tension.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April-May 1970</td>
<td>Somali ports</td>
<td>US carrier task groups to support Somali government that felt threatened by internal tension.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April-August 1970</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Ukrainian air support for new post-coup regime in conditions of internal tension.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Soviet helicopter pilots support government in pushing down black autonomy movement in southern Sudan.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1970-1971</td>
<td>Eastern Atlantic</td>
<td>Soviet West Africa patrol established to deter further naval attacks on Republic of Guinea from Portuguese Guinea (Bissau).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-present</td>
<td>Eastern Atlantic</td>
<td>West Africa patrol continues, apparently to provide domestic support to unstable government of Republic of Guinea.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1971</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>&quot;Attentional&quot; show of force by 4 Soviet ACW task groups against US 6th Fleet during Jordanian crisis.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1971</td>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
<td>Soviet ACW task group deployed, apparently to counter British carrier task group during India-Pakistan war.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1971</td>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
<td>Additional Soviet ACW task group deployed during war to counter US carrier Enterprise task group.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-June 1972</td>
<td>South China Sea</td>
<td>&quot;Attentional&quot; show of force in reaction to US mining of Haiphong harbor.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April-July 1973</td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>Protected sealift of Moroccan troops to Syria.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 1973</td>
<td>Arabian Sea</td>
<td>Protected sealift of South Yemeni troops from capital to eastern region bordering Oman, for probable use in Dhofar rebellion.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1973</td>
<td>Eastern Mediterranean</td>
<td>Soviet combatants steam into war zone off Syrian coast after Israeli attacks on Soviet ships in Tartus.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1973</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Threat of Soviet airborne intervention to deter Israeli advance on Damascus.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October-November 1973</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>&quot;Attentional&quot; show of force against US naval reaction to Arab blockade of Bab el Mandeb straits in Red Sea.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1974</td>
<td>Latakia, Syria</td>
<td>&quot;Attentional&quot; show of force against US naval reaction to Arab blockade of Bab el Mandeb straits in Red Sea.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January-February 1976</td>
<td>Central Atlantic</td>
<td>&quot;Attentional&quot; show of force against US naval reaction to Arab blockade of Bab el Mandeb straits in Red Sea.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

were in peril or could be jeopardized. To that long list of coercive Soviet military diplomacy, we should add its more recent interventions, carried out by direct involvement or proxy forces, in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. Thus the importance of Africa in Soviet foreign policy becomes highly evident.22

The influence of the Soviet Union and its surrogates in the most recent conflicts occurring in Africa and in the Middle East cannot be denied. In Angola, the Soviets airlifted more than 10,000 Cuban troops and modern weaponry which decisively helped the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) of Agostinho Neto to gain power. In Ethiopia the Mengistu government received the strong support of 20,000 Cuban troops, 300 tanks, 3,000 Soviet military technicians and it counted on three Russian generals in planning the operations in the Ogaden. In South Yemen, before the communist coup, the Soviets, East Germans and Cubans were already in charge of training the army, the militia and the security services of that country. Also, the aborted coups in Somalia, the Sudan and North Yemen carried out by domestic communist parties were assisted by the Soviets. Furthermore, the USSR has signed friendship treaties with many countries in the region "most of which contain clauses calling for consultation in the event of a threat to their security" as it is the case of Angola (October 1976) and Ethiopia (November 1978).23

But the USSR is not alone in its task of promoting instability in Africa. As the Soviets, Muammar Kaddafi has been involved in many coup attempts around the world, mainly in the African continent, in order to fulfill his dreams to make Libya the center of a Muslim Sahelian empire (See Map 17). Kaddafi is estimated to support revolutionaries in forty-
five countries, his army has occupied Chad and represents a threat to Niger, the Sudan, Mali and other countries in northern and central Africa. It appears that his dream is to build a Sahelian empire made up of Muslim tribes with its southernmost limit reaching Zaire. Due to its irresponsible actions, Libya has become one of the most disturbing forces in Africa and has strongly supported the Soviet Union in achieving its aims and goals.

Libyan arms and cash are at the center of a skillful and sinister campaign of subversion that has become a major source of African instability.24

As for South America, the Soviet Union has followed a much more elaborated and sophisticated approach in projecting its influence, where political actions have centered on military developments. The main Soviet policy related to the continent is based on covert support of domestic communist parties to gain power status and, simultaneously, without taking into account ideological considerations, to increase the cultural and economic ties with the various countries of the region. Although South America as a whole has made great social and economic strides in the last few years, it is an area where regional disparities, illiteracy, unemployment, underemployment, precarious health care, growing political dissatisfaction still offer a fertile ground for promoting instability and propagandizing communism. Underground organizations and pro-Soviet domestic communist parties are always alert to take advantage of these vulnerabilities to promote turmoil, and have counted on the covert support of the USSR or its proxies. In effect, the Soviet Union has been very careful, patient and cautious in its movements in South America and has selected conventional methods to broaden its influence as:
staffing embassies and newspapers with KGB (security agency) agents and cultivating powerful sympathizers in the private and public sectors, including military officers in places such as Panama, Peru and Ecuador.25

On the other hand, the USSR, as it did so well many times in Africa, has exploited border disputes in South America and taken political advantage of these conflicts. The Soviets have publicly supported Argentina and Bolivia in their claims against Chile concerning the very sensitive issues of jurisdiction over the Beagle Channel and Bolivian access to the sea.26

On the economic side, the USSR has greatly expanded its relations with South American countries and proved to be a valid and convenient commercial partner. Some data point out the Soviet economic effort toward the continent:

-- by mid-1970, excluding Cuba, the region was receiving twenty-five percent of all Soviet credit to the Third World, while in the 1960's this figure was only two percent;
-- large investments in about twenty hydroelectric or thermo-electric projects;
-- heavy participation in the fishing complex of Paita, Peru;
-- offers to supply Argentina and Brazil with enriched uranium;
-- technical cooperation with Brazil, regarding the technology of titanium and vacuum metallurgy, as well as the technology of schist and coal gasification;
-- major market for Argentina's grain and meat. In 1981 the Soviets imported between twelve and fifteen million tons of grain from that country, which represented eighty percent of the total Argentinian production and large amounts of meat.
priority to Brazil and Argentina as commercial partners. As for the Soviet-Third World trade, in 1979 these countries taken together represented sixty percent of Soviet exports and eighty-six percent of Soviet imports.27

Concerning military assistance, the Soviets have not been absent from South America. They became the major supplier of the Peruvian Armed Forces and in the mid-1970's provided Peru with "credits for $650 million worth of Soviet tanks, supersonic fighter planes, heavy artillery and the first surface-to-air missiles in South America".28 However, much more astonishing was the USSR-Argentina military agreement, signed during the strongly anti-communist Videla administration, calling for exchange of military missions and training of military personnel at the Leningrad military college.29

V. Conclusion

Soviet willingness and propensity to project power and gain influence in Third World countries, primarily in Africa, is a result of a well-orchestrated concept -- a kind of master plan -- carefully cultivated for a long time to satisfy their voracious expansionistic appetite. Africa is the target continent in a complex geopolitical maneuver to strangle Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere. The permanent character of Russian expansionism, far from the Marxist-Leninist ideology, is the most prominent threat posed by the USSR to the Free World, and in that context, Africa and Latin America deserve a special place. In fact, the challenge to the West is much more political than military and has to be curbed through the use of political and diplomatic means (Map 18).

The Soviets are making very careful political preparations in
peacetime for the eventuality of a World War, and they have been very successful in their endeavor. By using proxy forces and taking advantage of détente, the Soviet Union, with little risk of a major confrontation with the US, has marked its presence in strategic areas of Africa and compromised the full utilization of the Cape Route by the West. The USSR accomplished a task in peacetime that Germany was unable to achieve in war, which was one of the most serious Allied concerns during WW II -- a foothold in the west coast of Africa. Thereby, Soviet planes and ships are able to cover, and eventually interdict, the South Atlantic area. The long-range Soviet Bear naval reconnaissance aircraft operating from Guinea or Guinea-Bissau can cover the South Atlantic ocean as far as the central coasts of South America, threaten sea interdiction along the west African littoral as far as Capetown or reach north to Gibraltar. A base at Angola would extend aircraft radii to the sea approaches of Buenos Aires and around the Cape north into the Indian Ocean over the sea-lanes as far as Kenya. Furthermore, the influence of the USSR is felt almost all over Africa either through the use of military personnel or economic technicians with profitable results. The US Department of State estimated that, by 1978, 41,000 technicians from the USSR, Cuba, Eastern Europe and China were operating in Sub-Saharan countries. In South America, the USSR has demonstrated to be much more careful and skillful in projecting its power and influence, which is done almost entirely through political methods. The pro-Soviet domestic communist parties, through patience and determination, have succeeded in infiltrating all segments of society and in gaining leverage for their causes, with the covert support of the Soviet Union. That is one of the most salient aspects in the actions carried out by the communists in Latin America. The USSR, through all possible means, avoid being openly
involved in internal politics, although in the vast majority of the cases it provides covert support to the Marxist-Leninist groups, backing terrorism or guerrilla warfare. Presently, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Colombia offer the best examples for the use of this technique, with the same having happened to Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Bolivia in the past.

The provision of arms, money, and training to numerous revolutionary groups is an element in Moscow's worldwide strategy of expanding its influence and ultimately establishing client states in the Third World. ... Overt support for guerrilla war or urban terrorism is generally avoided so as to preserve Moscow's carefully cultivated and reassuring image of normality. The clandestine nature of Soviet assistance to revolutionary groups, which in Latin America mainly takes the form of support for Cuba's revolutionary ventures, makes comprehensive evidence impossible.32

More recently the Soviet Union has demonstrated an eager interest in strengthening economic ties with South American countries and significant commercial connections have been established, which might lead to other forms of international cooperation, including military agreements, as with Peru in the past and Argentina in the present. As French economist François Geze affirmed, the Moscow-Buenos Aires axis is one of the most relevant aspects in the present Soviet economic policy and it stands as the most profound political and ideological change toward Latin America in the last decade.

Whereas Latin Americans want the economic benefits of diversified relations with the Eastern bloc, the Soviets are most interested in the geopolitical value of the new ties.33

The Soviet concept of total maritime force has allowed the USSR to fill many political voids in Africa. Although oriented primarily as an interdiction force, the Soviet Navy improved considerably its capabilities as a long-range projection force and has been transformed into one instrument of foremost importance in accomplishing the geo-
political goals of the USSR. Nowadays, the Soviet Navy challenges the US, British and French navies in all oceans and has effectively functioned as "the political force at sea". In promoting Russian expansionism, it has always been backed by strong merchant, fishing and oceanographic research fleets, all operating under a total force concept, which still has not been well assessed by the West. There is no doubt that "the Soviet leaders have learned a lesson long known to the World's foremost sea powers: Naval forces are indispensable to any nation seeking global influence or control". 34

In short, the Soviet threat in the South Atlantic area, with emphasis on Africa, is a tremendous menace to the Free World. Given the USSR's moral obligation in supporting Third World countries, a long East-West struggle could be envisioned in that strategic area. As the candidate Politburo member Boris Ponomarev pointed out

The devotees of scientific socialism have no intention of denying their spiritual closeness to the progressive forces in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Sympathy with fighters for true freedom is natural for Marxists-Leninists and internationalists. Where such forces exist and are struggling they have the right to depend on our solidarity and support. 35

The USSR and its proxies are totally committed to making their gains in Africa irreversible and are working hard to even augment them. In the future, pro-Soviet African states might be the most appropriate forces to promote Russian expansionism in the Black Continent, as the involvement of the Mozambiqueans in Zimbabwe and the desire of Ethiopia to "emulate Cuba on the international scene" appear to indicate. The latest successes of the Soviet Union in Africa are stimulating it to continue with its offensive approach toward the Third World and have worked to increase Soviet confidence on the final victory against the West in the struggle for control of developing areas. As the Soviet
Despite all efforts undertaken by the United States, the main tendency consists in the gradual weakening of the positions of the leading Western powers on the continent. With the material and moral-political support of the socialist community, the African peoples are inflicting one defeat after another on imperialism. Events in Angola, and then in the region of the African Horn, showed that the West as a whole and the US in particular can no longer impose according to their discretion a solution of the problem of developing countries.


7. Ibid., pp. 28-30.


15. Ibid., p. 84.


27. Ibid., p. 96; "Nao Ha Ideologia para Vender Mais", Correio Braziliense, Jan 10, 1982, p. 18.


29. Ibid.

30. Bagley, p. 28.


35. Morris Rothenberg, The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of

36. Ibid., p. 257.
The South Atlantic area is characterized by the extreme diversity of the various countries that lie within its boundaries. This diversity is brought about by the different levels of social, political, economic and military development, and, in many cases, by opposing ideological approaches. Many African countries with a per capita income of less than US$200.00 and literacy rates ranging from five to ten percent exist with well-developed and industrialized societies such as the Republic of South Africa, Brazil and Argentina, which have widespread diversified interests in the South Atlantic. In view of the high diversity among the different countries within this area, it is an illusion to think about the existence of some kind of catalyst capable of unifying the majority of South Atlantic nations in a single defense concept. Therefore, a restrictive approach should be followed in selecting the different countries to compose a potential SATO, based primarily on their strategic position and political-economic-military power projection.

This and the next chapter constitute a unit entitled "The Road to SATO", which intends to analyse the military establishment, particularly the naval status, as well as the political will of countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, the Republic of South Africa, Nigeria and Senegal toward a regional South Atlantic security concept.
I. Brazil

Brazil is a country heavily dependent on sealanes of communication for its economic survival, since the Brazilian economy is totally oriented to exports and will so remain in the foreseeable future. In fact, ninety-five percent of Brazil's foreign trade flows through the seas, which represents a tremendous vulnerability in case of a world confrontation. Brazilian exports to Northern Europe, Japan and the Mediterranean account for more than 80 percent of the tonnage transported. On the other hand, Brazil gets 74 percent of its imports from the Middle East and North America, with the Middle East being responsible for 58 percent of the total amount of goods shipped. It is noteworthy that 88 percent of Brazil's oil imports flows through the vulnerable east-west Cape of Good Hope-Santos Sealane, which is almost of exclusive Brazilian interest.¹ (Table XIII)

Table XIII - BRAZIL'S OIL IMPORTS, 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>bpd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>280,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Zone</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The remarkable economic growth experienced by Brazil, combined with its dynamic diplomacy and aggressive export policy, particularly toward the Third World (which in 1980 accounted for forty-four percent of the Brazilian foreign trade), as well as its extraordinary developments in the merchant fleet as a direct consequence of its position as the world's second largest shipbuilder (Fig 5), leads us to predict that the already large Brazilian dependence on sealanes will increase considerably in the near future. Nevertheless, a serious menace to South Atlantic SLOC could signify to Brazil the debacle of its economy.  

FIG 5 - GROWTH OF BRAZILIAN MERCHANT FLEET

The strategic position of Brazil proved to be extremely important in both world wars through its influence on the "Atlantic Narrows". (Map 19). During the Second World War this choke point could be controlled only when air-naval facilities were available in the Brazilian Northeast
MAP 19 - BRAZIL AND THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

salient and the Allied operations which originated there blunted the German submarine campaign in the South Atlantic. Despite all technological advances, the importance of the Brazilian bulge in controlling the maritime traffic to and from the Cape of Good Hope increased in view of the Soviet penetration in Africa. USSR footholds in Angola, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau compromised not only the Cape route along the west coast of Africa, but also the Atlantic Narrows, a situation never achieved by Germany even in wartime. That increased the strategic importance of Brazil and turned it into a key country for the protection of the vital South Atlantic sealanes.

Brazil is not only important strategically. She is emerging as regional power in her own right. Her population is in excess of 100 million and most of it is located along the Atlantic coastline. She has an abundance of natural resources (except oil), and she has experienced high rates of economic growth over the last decade. Furthermore, Brazilians think of themselves and their country in global maritime, rather than hemispheric, terms.

The geographical proximity of Brazil and Africa has strongly influenced the Brazilian foreign policy in fostering relations with all black African nations, under the basic principle that the South Atlantic, instead of being an obstacle, is a major catalyst in forging Brazilian-African unity. Thus, now more than ever, the statement made by M. Archer that "Brazil is the border of Africa" has become a reality. On the other hand, with a well-developed shipbuilding industry coupled with the availability of eighteen fully-equipped ports along its 8,000 kilometers of coastline, Brazil offers to cargo and warships an exceptional chain of naval facilities not available in any other country in the South Atlantic area.

With its strength of 45,000 men, which includes 12,000 well-trained marines, the Brazilian Navy is presently the strongest one in
the South Atlantic, although a large portion of its materiel is obsolete, approaching 40 years in service and, therefore, urgently needing replacements. For many years it has felt the strong influence of the US Naval Mission in training and supply.

Suffice to say that in 1980 twenty-three out of thirty-seven warships were from American origin, most of them built during the World War II period or immediately after its end. Brazil has a balanced fleet, its core being represented by a medium aircraft carrier, complemented by a sizable number of destroyers, submarines and frigates (Table XIV). It is primarily oriented to protect sealanes and to fulfill anti-submarine missions, a role in which it acquired enough experience during World War II and expects to play anew in case of a global war.

In fact, the country's strategic position, the long coastline, the heavy dependence on maritime traffic, the limited naval budgets, the absence of potential conflicts with neighbors as well as the need to defend the highly populated and industrialized coastal area, all have worked to structure the Brazilian Navy into an anti-submarine concept.5

The Brazilian Navy's main task is the protection of shipping lanes, reflecting the role it played in the Battle of the Atlantic during World War II. This mission has led to an emphasis in antisubmarine warfare (ASW), while antiair warfare (AAW), antisurface warfare (ASUW), and projection of naval power ashore have received less attention.6

The major naval bases are Natal, Aratu, Rio de Janeiro and São Pedro da Aldeia, all of them possessing in their immediate vicinities well-equipped airfields that afford close Navy-Air Force cooperation and facilitate the conduct of antisubmarine warfare. Near Aratu is located the Air Force Coastal Command, primarily equipped with aircraft
TABLE XIV - BRAZILIAN NAVY

PERSONNEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>NAVAL</th>
<th>Marines</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Men</td>
<td>33,800</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>45,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FLEET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Under Construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Submarines (patrol)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack carrier (medium)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol ships</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing ships</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing craft</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River patrol ships</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large patrol craft</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River patrol craft</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweepers (coastal)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey ships</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey launches</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light tenders</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/M Rescue ship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair and support ships</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large tankers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small tankers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transports</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tugs - Ocean</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tugs - Harbour</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floating docks</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliaries</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1981-82, p. 57
made in Brazil, having as its priority area of interest the South Atlantic along the Brazilian Northeast coastal area (Tables XV and XVI).

The Navy Air Group, established in 1965, arms the carrier Minas Gerais and the new frigates, and with the exception of the nine Lynx helicopters, it urgently needs to be updated. The Navy Air Arm is structured to perform mainly antisubmarine tasks.7

As a result of the many obsolete warships in its inventory, the Navy has embarked on a large program of modernization of its fleet. The most recent developments in that regard are the commissioning of three Oberon-class submarines and six Niteroi-class Mark 10 frigates. The submarines and four frigates were built in England, with the two remaining frigates being constructed in Brazil. The frigates, which were built in the antisubmarine (4) and general purpose (2) versions, are protected against nuclear, biological and radiological contamination and equipped with Seacat SAM, Ikara and Exocet SSM and a Lynx helicopter offering "a good mix of offensive and defensive capabilities, being able to engage air, surface, and submarine targets with equal accuracy. It should be noted that the general purpose derivative has more ASW armament than most ASW frigates of Western design".8 They have performed extremely well in the South Atlantic and evidence suggests that the new warships to be built in Brazil under the provisions of the 1979-1989 naval construction plan will incorporate much of the know-how acquired by Brazilian technicians in the construction of the two Niteroi-class frigates.

The appearance of the Brazilian frigates also created a sensation in the international naval scenario. Indeed, during the Zaire crisis of May-June 1978, the then U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway III, traveled 'incognito' to Rio de Janeiro in
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATAL</td>
<td>Small naval base, being rebuilt as a major base. Presently, it has:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 1 repair yard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 1 dry dock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARATU</td>
<td>Major naval yard with:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 1 dry dock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 1 floating dock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 1 Synchro-lift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIO DE JANEIRO</td>
<td>Main naval base with:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 3 dry docks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 1 floating dock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Submarine base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SÃO PEDRO</td>
<td>Naval Air Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA ALDEIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bell 206B Jetrangers</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikorsky SH-30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westland Whirlwind (UH-5)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westland Wasp HAS-1 (UH-2)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westland Lynx WG 13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>For &quot;Niteroi&quot; frigates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerospatiale Ecureuil AS350</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>on order</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AIR FORCE COASTAL COMMAND**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBERS</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMB-110/S-95 (SAR)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>On order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grumman S-2E Trackers (ASW)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grumman S-2A Trackers (Transport and Training)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockheed RC-130E Hercules (SAR/PR)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMB-111 (LRMP)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMB-110B (PR)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEIVA T25 Universal/Liaison</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell SH-1D (SAR Hel)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell 47G (SAR Hel)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puma (SAR Hel)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerospatiale Ecureuil AS-350</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>On Order</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to make a personal evaluation of the frigates, he took a ship to sea and make all sorts of evolution with her. This fact passed unnoticed by the Brazilian press, with the exception of a brief note in a magazine. The following week, President Carter asked the Brazilian Government for 'diplomatic support' in the Zaire affair.9

A huge naval construction program which accounts for the domestic production or acquisition from foreign sources of forty-nine new ships, including a modern carrier, submarines, missile cruisers, frigates and amphibious ships is being considered by the Brazilian Navy, as a second round in the modernization of the fleet. The priority in this program appears to be given to local production of twelve new frigates and four to six submarines, with the latter based on Italian/German design. The long and extensive overhaul to which the carrier Minas Gerais was submitted at the naval dockyard in Rio de Janeiro, seems to indicate that it will remain in service for the rest of the decade, which makes the acquisition of a new carrier a low priority. However, this large construction program is in serious jeopardy due to the limitations imposed by the performance of the Brazilian economy and governmental restrictions on imports. Notwithstanding, four MK-10 Niteroi-class frigates and one submarine based on the IKL-209/1000 of German design were ordered in July 1981. It is expected that all twelve frigates, three new submarines and several fiberglass minehunters, all built in Brazil, will be commissioned by 1990. Also, as a result of its expanding aviation industry, Brazil is enjoying a very favorable position in supplying its own needs in combat aircraft. In this regard, the AM-X jet fighter (a joint Brazilian-Italian program) and the EMB-111, a very successful naval patrol aircraft, are the best examples. Therefore, for the first time in this century, Brazil has the in-country
capability to considerably enlarge its naval power and achieve a far-reaching projection in the South Atlantic, provided the government decides to do so.  

For many years, the Brazilian Navy has participated in combined naval exercises in the South Atlantic, such as Unitas, involving its counterparts of the US, Argentina, and Uruguay. To a great extent, the Unitas operations have favored the development of common procedures and doctrine among the various South American navies and has played a major role in the readiness of the Brazilian Navy, particularly in performing combined antisubmarine operations.

II. Argentina

Sharing the southernmost part of the South Atlantic and having as its southern limit the Antarctic Ocean, Argentina is, conversely to Brazil, distant from the major sea routes leading to the Northern Hemisphere. Forced by its relatively isolated geographic position, Argentina elected as its area of primary strategic interest the southernmost part of South America and the Antarctic continent. With a long Atlantic coastline (1,600 miles) and claiming an exclusive economic zone of 200 miles, Argentina has strong interest in defending the South Atlantic. Although almost self-sufficient in oil, but with a food production economy totally oriented to exports, Argentina depends largely on the South Atlantic sealanes in its trade with the members of the European Community (particularly the Netherlands, Italy and Germany), the USSR, the United States, Japan and Brazil.

For a long time Argentina has felt the effects of its long-lasting territorial disputes with the United Kingdom and Chile over,
respectively, the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), located about 250 miles off its southern coast and the possession of three small islands in the Beagle Channel, which reached the brink of war in 1979. The disputes over the Beagle Channel, which dates back to the early part of this century, was precipitated by the International Court of Justice decision, in 1976, awarding the tiny islands (Lennon, Picton and Nueva) to Chile, which was not accepted by Argentina. This explosive problem in the Argentinean-Chilean relations is still unsolved and is presently awaiting a Vatican decision. Argentina stands to lose control over the Cape Horn sea-lanes, unimpeded access to its base in Antarctic, control over access to the Beagle Channel and extensive potential fishing and oil resources in and under the sea.⁰²

The international recognition of these three small islands under Chilean control could bring Chile to claim rights in the South Atlantic, which strongly conflicts with one of the cornerstones of the Argentinean foreign policy -- "the two-ocean principle" -- which was set forth in the 19th Century. This principle clearly defines a demarcation line passing through the Cape Horn, considering Chile as a Pacific Ocean country and Argentina as an Atlantic Ocean country.⁰¹ Moreover, in case of failure in the Argentinean-British negotiations over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), the right to use force to gain sovereignty over them (as actually happened on last 2 April) has always been defended by Argentinean policymakers. These very sensitive issues and the probability of resorting to arms to solve them forced Argentina to embark on a large modernization program of its armed forces, placing the country in second and third place respectively in Latin America, as far as per capita and per soldier military expenditures are concerned.
Motivated by the Beagle Channel affair, Argentina "increased the strength of her Armed Forces by approximately 30 percent". The potential conflict against Chile, the surveillance of its 200 mile economic zone, the control of fishing zones against poachers and the need for a permanent presence in the Antarctic continent to support territorial claims altogether have contributed for the construction by Argentina of a balanced naval force with a high level of visibility. The present status of the Argentinean Fleet is portrayed on Table XVII, where the main warships are almost 40 years old. The carrier 25 de Mayo is over 30 years old and the sole Latin American cruiser General Belgrano is a ship of pre-World War II vintage. From its four submarines in active service, two are from the old US Guppy-class which were commissioned in 1945, although the remaining two "Type-209" German boats are only 10 years old. Seven of its destroyers, all former US Sumner, Gearing and Fletcher class ships, are over 30 years of age. However, this present status will change very soon. Argentina is deeply involved in a modernization program in which local production of frigates and submarines based on German design plays a major role. In 1978, the Argentinean Navy signed a contract with the German group Thijsen Rheinstahl/Blohm und Voss for the construction of four large frigates of Meko 60 3,600-ton type, six smaller frigates (corvettes) Meko 140 1,470-ton type, four 1,700-ton submarines, plus two 1,400-tonners (Table XVIII). The six smaller frigates and four submarines will be built by the Argentinians with German technical assistance "at the entirely covered shipyard now being completed at Tandanor". In addition, the "Prefectura Naval Argentina" (Coast Guard) is also being modernized and a program calling for the construction of five
TABLE XVII - ARGENTINEAN NAVY

**PERSONNEL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Type</th>
<th>--</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>24,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>30,930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FLEET**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Building (planned)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrol submarines</td>
<td>4 (1)</td>
<td>1 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack carrier (medium)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>1 (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol ships</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing ships (Tank)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing craft (Tank)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor landing craft</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Attack craft (Gun)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Attack craft (Torpedo)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Patrol craft</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweepers (coastal)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minehunters</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey/oceanographic ships</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey launches</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transports</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tankers (Fleet support)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Icebreakers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training ships</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tugs</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floating docks</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

1. One was destroyed in the Argentinean-British conflict over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas).
2. Sunk during the Argentinean-British conflict.

**Source:** *Jane's Fighting Ships 1981-82.*
### TABLE XVIII - ARGENTINEAN BOATS UNDER CONSTRUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total in class</th>
<th>Displacement (tons)</th>
<th>Dimensions (metres)</th>
<th>Missiles</th>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Torpedoes</th>
<th>ASW</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Propulsion</th>
<th>Max speed (kt)</th>
<th>Complement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>MEKO 360</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>126x15x6</td>
<td>8 Exocet, 1x8 Aspide</td>
<td>1x127mm, 4x40mm twin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2x3 Mk, 32 torpedo tubes</td>
<td>2 Lynx</td>
<td>COGOG, R-R Olympus/Tyne</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>MEKO 1470</td>
<td>6**</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>91x12x3.5</td>
<td>4 Exocet</td>
<td>1x76mm, 2x40mm twin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6xMk32, 2x2 torpedo tubes</td>
<td>1 Lynx</td>
<td>4 Pielstick conventional</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>TR 1700</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>64x7.5x6.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6x21in</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,000hp</td>
<td>13 surfaced, 25 dived</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Similar to Nigerian frigate Republic. **Four TR 1700 and two TR 1400. Identical design except TR 1400 length 56m, dived speed 21kt, propulsion rating 5,900hp, range 13,000 miles against 15,000.

Source: *Jane's 1981-82 Naval Annual.*
corvettes and twenty coastal patrol craft is in progress. The modernization of the Navy Air Arm was also not forgotten. Sixteen French Super Etendard aircraft are replacing the old A-4Q Skyhawk which give "the Argentine Navy a degree of power unmatched in Latin America".

The Argentinean coastline is covered by well-equipped naval bases located at Buenos Aires, Rio Santiago, Mar de Plata, Puerto Belgrano and Ushaia (Tierra del Fuego). The Bahia Blanca, where the main base of Puerto Belgrano and, also, the homes of the marines and of the naval aviation are located, is one of the most important naval facilities in the South Atlantic area (Table XIX).

III. Uruguay

The strategic importance of Uruguay is somewhat overshadowed by its two strongest neighbors -- Brazil and Argentina -- and its relatively short Atlantic coastline. However, the geographic position of Montevideo controlling the movement to and from the River Plate offers excellent conditions for a naval base in the South Atlantic, functioning as a valid alternative to Buenos Aires.

Uruguay is also heavily dependent on maritime traffic for its economic survival, with its main foreign trade partners being the US, the EEC, Brazil and Argentina. However, the Uruguayan Navy can do very little to protect the South Atlantic sea-lanes. Its small fleet is so degraded that it is unable to protect even Montevideo, where more than fifty percent of the country's population is concentrated. The strength of the Uruguayan Navy is centered on three old former US frigates (one Dealey-class and two Cannon-class) and two corvettes
### TABLE XIX - ARGENTINEAN NAVAL BASES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>Dockyard&lt;br&gt;- 2 Dry Docks&lt;br&gt;- 8 Floating Docks&lt;br&gt;- 1 Floating Crane&lt;br&gt;- 1 Syncrolift&lt;br&gt;- Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Darsena Norte)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Santiago</td>
<td>Naval shipbuilding yard&lt;br&gt;- 1 slipway&lt;br&gt;- 1 Floating crane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(La Plata)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar de Plata</td>
<td>Submarine base with slipway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Belgrano</td>
<td>Main naval base&lt;br&gt;- 2 Dry Docks&lt;br&gt;- 1 Floating Dock&lt;br&gt;- Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ushaia</td>
<td>Small naval base</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1981-82, p. 23.*
(former US minesweepers). With the exception of the Frigate 18 de Julio, all other ships were laid down during World War II (Table XX). Three French-built 200-ton large patrol boats ordered in 1979 in an effort to modernize the fleet are presently being delivered. 17

IV. South Africa

The strategic importance of the Republic of South Africa, which controls all sea routes over the Cape of Good Hope, is unmatched in the South Atlantic. Its long-standing importance was considerably increased recently as the Soviets gained influence in Africa, especially in its southern part, and start to pose a new threat against the Cape Route through the use of proxies. To this date only South Africa and Namibia are free from a strong Soviet influence in Southern Africa. However, the political future of Namibia after its independence appears to be in doubt, since the wholehearted support provided by the Russians, Cubans and Angolans to SWAPO indicates that the independent Namibia will be ruled by a pro-marxist government. If that happens, South Africa will stand as the only southern African country where Soviet influence is absent.

There is no doubt in anyone's mind that South Africa is one of the most important countries in the Southern Hemisphere for the defense of Western interests. Besides controlling the most significant route of oil supply, South Africa is also the major supplier of strategic raw materials to the US and Europe, many of which have no alternative sources of supply. However, such an important country, traditionally tied to the West, is now almost isolated in the international arena. Rooted in a strong sentiment of racial segregation, which finally led to the
TABLE XX - URUGUAYAN NAVY

PERSONNEL

Total strength of 3,500 men,
including naval infantry

FLEET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ACTIVE</th>
<th>UNDER CONSTRUCTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvettes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Patrol Craft</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Patrol Craft</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Ships</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvage Vessels</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tankers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenders</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Craft</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transports</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships, 1981-82.
formulation of the abominable policy of Apartheid, South Africa ran into a stiff international opposition and basically has no voice in the world community. Isolated by its former friends in the West and criticized by the African and pro-Soviet countries, South Africa is at a political crossroads which has inhibited any planning attempt calling for the security of the South Atlantic area.

The South African Navy is the strongest in the continent, although it has become somewhat old, due to the arms embargo imposed by the United Nations. For many years South Africa considered as its main mission the protection of the sealanes over the Cape of Good Hope, a mission which was accomplished primarily for the benefit of Western countries. However, as South Africa began to feel isolated, its Navy dropped this task and turned into a coastal defense force. As the Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence reported, "South Africa no longer sees itself as the international watchdog of the Cape. This has changed. South Africa now protects itself". The abrupt change in the South African strategic naval concept was emphatically defined by the Prime Minister, Mr. P. W. Botha, on April 6, 1978, when he stated:

From now on, South Africa's Navy will be specially geared and designed to coastal defense for protecting the sovereignty of home waters. The West will have to conduct its own patrols of the shipping lane to, from and around the Cape and will have to look after its own interest.

The core of the South African Navy is comprised of the two President-class antisubmarine frigates, equipped with a Wasp helicopter, and the new fast attack craft armed with missiles. The third frigate -- President Krueger -- which was the flagship of the fleet, sank in February 1982 after colliding with the tanker Tafelberg, 130 kilometers
southwest off Cape Town (Table XXI). Although the frigates were delivered during the 1960's, all had been refitted and will probably be in service until the end of this decade, when they will be replaced by ships made in-country. The French-built Daphe-class submarines are a little over ten years old, being the only submarines in any Sub-Saharan country. Due to the arms embargo and changes in the strategic naval outlook, these boats will hardly be replaced by more modern ones in the near future. From the ten old former British minesweepers, four were modernized and turned into patrol boats and minehunters which combined with the four Ford large patrol craft and the six high-speed fast attack craft (FAC) make up a sizable and efficient patrol fleet. The FAC, which are now being built in Durban and very soon will compose a powerful coastal force with twelve ships, fit well the present needs of the South African naval defense policy and has freed the country from external dependence. They have an economical range of 3,600 nautical miles, sea-to-sea missiles and became operational in 1980. These new boats are "based on the Israeli Reshef-class and are armed with the South African Skorpioen missile, a version of the Israeli Gabriel."  

The South African Navy is a multi-racial force, being the most racially integrated service in the Armed Forces, with a non-white strength aboard the warships reaching thirty percent. It has been submitted to intense training and, in 1980, it spent between 500 and 600 ship-days at sea.  

As for maritime air patrol, the South African Air Force operates a maritime patrol group composed of eighteen Piaggio P-166 S, seven long-range Shakelton and eleven Wasp helicopters, the latter from platforms on frigates. The old Shakeltons need urgent replacements but the
TABLE XXI - SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY

PERSONNEL

Total strength of 6,758 men. A Marine Corps was established in July 1979.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ACTIVE</th>
<th>UNDER CONSTRUCTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Submarines (patrol)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Attack Craft - Missile</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Patrol Craft</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweepers</td>
<td>10 (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Vessels</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Replenishment Ships</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BVD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Ships</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tugs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbour Patrol Launches</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR Launches</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) The Frigate "President Krueger" was sunk in collision with the tanker "Tafelbergen", on February 18, 1982. (2) Two minesweepers were converted to minehunting and two others to patrol duties.

government believes that they "are operated on behalf of the West and therefore should be replaced by the NATO allies".22

However, the most important assets that South Africa could offer to the West on behalf of the defense of the South Atlantic and the Cape Route are its well-equipped and strategically located naval bases at Richards Bay, Saldanha Bay, East London, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Cape Town, and, above all, Simonstown. The $15 million program to modernize Simonstown transformed it into what Prime Minister Botha calls "the most modern and best-equipped naval harbor in the sea area bounded by South Africa, Australia and the Mediterranean"23 (Table XXII).

V. Nigeria

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa (more than 80 million inhabitants) and one of the major world oil producers, having witnessed during the last decade an impressive economic progress as a consequence of the boom in oil prices, which turned the country into a regional power in the west coast of Africa. Strategically located in the Gulf of Guinea, the economy of Nigeria is largely dependent on oil exports, which account for 92 percent of its total exports revenues, with the US being "the major foreign market for Nigeria's crude oil."24 Therefore, Nigeria has a growing security interest to preserve in the South Atlantic in order to defend its oil platforms and participate in the protection of the vulnerable east-west sealane through which flows more than 80 percent of the country's export revenues.

In allocating 8.2 percent of its GNP for defense, Nigeria has considerably modernized its armed forces and the Navy has received high priority in the programs oriented to forge a strong military establishment
TABLE XXII - SOUTH AFRICAN NAVAL BASES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simonstown</td>
<td>It is the main naval base, where the submarine and marine bases are located. It is being modernized. It has - bunker fuel - dry-dock (780' x 95') - Syncrolift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>Home of the Joint Maritime Headquarters. It has - airport - several dry-docks - bunker oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>- airport - dry-dock (1200' x 110') - bunker oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East London</td>
<td>- airport - dry-dock (650' x 90') - bunker oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>- airport - bunker fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richards Bay</td>
<td>A new harbor has been built. - airport - bunker fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saldanha Bay</td>
<td>- Military college</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in the country. The main mission of the Nigerian Navy is to protect the major sources of the country's wealth -- the oil platforms and the 200 mile economic zone. In addition to that, the Navy is building up a small but modern strike force which will be an important element in projecting Nigeria's power abroad and has been a source of major concern for its neighbors. In fact, the present strength of the Nigerian Navy has created a heavy imbalance in the region of the Gulf of Guinea and transformed Nigeria into the second strongest Sub-Saharan naval power (Table XXIII). The backbone of the Nigerian fleet are the new NEKO-type 360 antisubmarine frigate armed with eight Otomat surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) and the eight Aspide surface-to-air missiles, which was launched in 1980 by Blohm and Voss, and the four British-built corvettes recently commissioned. The frigate "Nigeria", built in 1965 in the Netherlands, was converted into a training ship. In addition, six fast missile craft (FAC) are on order, three of them being built in West Germany (S-143 class with Otomat SSM) and the other three in France (Combatant III-class with Exocet SSM). To those assets one should add thirty patrol craft and two landing ships (each one capable of carrying 1,000 troops), which grant Nigeria with a formidable naval power far beyond its present needs, raising many suspicions and expectations in the west coast of Africa.

Quite what role this new frigate with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and the six missile craft are to fill is not clear, but they will probably scare the pants off Nigeria's neighbors. Maybe that is in fact their role.

The Nigerian naval bases are located at Apapa-Lagos, where the Western Naval Command is stationed, and at Calabar, which is the home of the Eastern Naval Command (Table XXIV).
TABLE XXIII - NIGERIAN NAVY

PERSONNEL

Total strength of 4,049 men

FLEET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>ACTIVE</th>
<th>UNDER CONSTRUCTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvette</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Attack Craft (Missile)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Patrol Craft</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Patrol Craft</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Ships</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Ships</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Ships</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tugs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launches</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Craft</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE XXIV - NIGERIAN NAVAL BASES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apapa-Lagos</td>
<td>- Dockyard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Training Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- New dockyard under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabar</td>
<td>- Naval school is scheduled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As history proved, Senegal enjoys a unique strategic position in controlling the South Atlantic sea-lanes and the "Atlantic Narrows", being its role of paramount importance in the antisubmarine campaign conducted by the Allies against the Axis during World War II. As the West became more economically dependent on the South Atlantic, the importance of Senegal in protecting the North-American and European trade routes to and from the Cape of Good Hope increased considerably. Traditionally, Dakar has been one of the most important African ports and the "Dakar-Yoff airfield is a major stop on routes between Africa and Europe or the Western Hemisphere".26

Through the years, Senegal has been a strong supporter of the West and even after its independence it has succeeded in maintaining close political, economic and military ties with France. In times of great need, the valuable strategic position of Senegal can offer to the West a means for neutralizing the Soviet presence in the "Atlantic Narrows", which was made possible through Soviet influence on the naval military establishments of Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Cape Verde Islands, and Benin.27

The tiny Senegalese Navy, with a strength of only 350 men, is made up of a mixture of French, Canadian and English built, with the most powerful ship being the modern French PR 72M-class coastal patrol boat, armed with Exocet missiles. In addition to this ship, the Senegalese Navy includes three more French-built PM8 large patrol boats, commissioned between 1971 and 1977, three new Canadian-built Interceptor-class coastal patrol craft, all commissioned in 1979, and twelve Vosper-class fast patrol boats. Dakar is the sole naval base of this minute
navy, designed to be essentially a coastal defense force. However, the existing French-Senegalese military ties, with the possibility to call on French forces if necessary, turns Senegal into a viable and efficient partner in the security of the South Atlantic. 28

VII. Conclusions

Brazil's strategic position proved to be extremely important during both world wars and may involve the country in a future world confrontation. The South Atlantic is presently far more important to Western societies than during World War II and Brazil would hardly be neutral in an East-West conflict. Conversely to the sea-lanes along the west coast of Africa, which are primarily of US and European concern, the east-west sea-lane -- SANTOS-CAPE OF GOOD HOPE -- through which flows more than forty percent of the Brazilian foreign trade, is only of interest to Brazil and Japan, which suggests that its protection should be undertaken primarily by the Brazilians. It is a tremendous burden on the Brazilian Navy which does not possess sufficient assets to carry out this task. 29

The Brazilian Navy is primarily antisubmarine oriented, having as main missions the protection of sea-lanes and the highly populated coastal area with its vital economic centers. The carrier Minas Gerais, coupled with the six Niteroi-class frigates, are the nucleus of a carrier strike force and "represent a major ASW force even by superpower standards". 30 However, the Brazilian Navy lacks sufficient capability to carry out an antiair warfare (AAW), which is of fundamental importance to cope with the likely war scenario presented by a submarine threat on South Atlantic sea-lanes in which missiles will be the major antiship weapon.
Despite the existence of some deep-sea capability, it is not capable of influencing, to any great extent, the security of the South Atlantic. Most of its ships are approaching 40 years of age, and urgently need to be replaced. This drove the Navy to embark on a modernization program in order to build a small but sophisticated fleet able to fulfill the present and future needs of the country. Modern frigates and submarines are within the technical capability of the nation and have received high priority in the construction program. However, the present economic situation faced by Brazil could compromise the viability of such endeavor. Also, the Brazilian belief that détente will work to avoid a world military confrontation, coupled with the very low degree of the perceived threat posed on the nation, has influenced the policymakers to minimize any potential threat to the South Atlantic area. Actually, Brazil is following a calculated risk and is devoting its highest priorities to the social/economic sectors, based on its very unique position as a country without potential enemies in the international arena. As Vice-Admiral Ibsen Gusmão Câmara stated:

The scope of the country’s economic interest as well as its extreme dependence on maritime traffic would recommend, as a safety measure, that Brazil should have an adequate naval power. However, by a political option of the government, the military component of the Brazilian maritime power has been maintained at a low level with priority being given to the expansion of its civilian component, primarily the Merchant Fleet, without which the expected rate of national development would be unachievable. Therefore, a calculated risk was accepted in allowing an asymmetry in the Maritime Power of the country, based on the assumed unlikelihood of occurrence of conflicts at sea involving Brazil. Only time will tell whether this option, taken under the influence of the extreme peaceful character of the nation was correct or not.

The geographical position of Argentina makes it somewhat isolated from the main routes toward the Northern Hemisphere. On the other hand, the bulk of the Argentinean foreign trade is made with the US and Europe
and flows along the east and west coasts of South America, enjoying the wartime umbrella provided by TIAR and NATO (in the traffic to Europe). Being practically self-sufficient in oil and having only ten percent of its trade with Far East countries, Argentina is not dependent on the vulnerable east-west South Atlantic sea-lanes for its economic survival. These elements strongly contributed to its neutrality during World War II and may, once again, lead Argentina to follow a neutral policy in the event of a world conflict.

The Armada (Argentinean Navy) is in process of rapid modernization. Although it has a deep-sea capability and the combination of its carrier 25 de Mayo with the modern Hercules and Santissima Trinidad destroyers and the new frigates make up a powerful strike force, its main missions are still related to the protection of the coastal area and the 200-mile economic and fishing zones, as well as the assurance of a permanent presence in the Antarctic continent and the maintenance of a high state of readiness to face a potential confrontation with the Chilean Navy. Its main area of interest is, as in the past, the southernmost part of the South American continent, especially the sea-lanes over Cape Horn. Also, the Armada has shown a considerable desire to participate in joint exercises to improve its level of readiness and training, taking part in the gigantic Venture Operation and the Unitas XXII.32

By the end of this decade the Argentinean Navy will probably be the strongest and youngest navy in the South Atlantic composed of "a light carrier, six large and nine smaller DD/FF-type ships, eight submarines and a sizable transport and amphibious force, plus a coastguard and auxiliaries most of which were built in this decade".33 (Table XXV)
TABLE XXV - MAJOR ARGENTINEAN WARSHIPS - Late 1980s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF UNITS</th>
<th>SUPPLIER</th>
<th>TO BE DELIVERED</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light carrier</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14 Super Etendard on board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer Type 42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Vickers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Year of commission:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Hercules, 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Santissima Trinidad, 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates MEKO 360</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Thijsen</td>
<td>1982-1986</td>
<td>Being built in Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rheinstahl/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Blohm und</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Voss</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates MEKO 140</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Thijsen</td>
<td>1982-1986</td>
<td>To be built in Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rheinstahl/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Blohm und</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Voss</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvettes A-69</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lorient</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>The last one was commissioned in 1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Dockyard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines Type 209</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Howaldts-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Both were commissioned in 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>werke</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines TR 1700 Type</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Thijsen</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Two boats will be assembled in Argentina with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nordseewerke</td>
<td>(first boat)</td>
<td>sections laid down in Germany in 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines TR 1400 Type</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Thijsen</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Both to be built in Argentina from sections supplied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nordseewerke</td>
<td></td>
<td>by West Germany</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Uruguayan Navy is an outmoded coastal defense force whose ships need immediate replacements. In spite of some modernization effort, it can do very little on behalf of the Security of the South Atlantic and can hardly defend the vital areas of the country.

Racial discriminatory policies isolated South Africa, turning it into a country with no voice in the world community of nations. But, at the same time, its importance for the defense of the West is growing considerably due to its unique geographic position and the resultant influence on the Cape Route, as well as for being a major producer of large number of strategic raw materials. Its strategic location is so prominent that it is senseless to talk about a security organization in the South Atlantic without the participation of South Africa.

The well-trained, motivated and equipped South African Navy still has a vital role to play in curbing a major Soviet threat in the South Atlantic/Indian oceans, although it had made a complete reassessment of its traditional mission of protecting the sealanes around the Cape of Good Hope and was transformed into a coastal defense force.

Pretoria would no longer devote any of its budget to aiding them [the Western nations]. Thus the primary mission of the South African Navy has undergone a profound change in recent years. No longer is security of international shipping rounding the Cape of Good Hope a major concern of South Africa.

However, the efficient fast attack craft (FAC) equipped with sea-to-sea missiles enable South Africa to enforce its current policy and, in addition, exercise a significant influence on the sealanes around the Cape of Good Hope. On the other hand, South Africa is modernizing and enlarging some of its strategically located naval bases, as it is the case of Simonstown, in a apparent attempt to force the West to ask for them.
... the South African Navy is hoisting signals to the West that its Simonstown base at the tip of the Cape of Good Hope is ready to resume its wartime role as the custodian of the vital Cape route.35

Through a remarkable political, economic and social progress, Nigeria has become a Third World regional power, capable of exercising a significant influence in the west coast of Africa, particularly over those countries located in the Gulf of Guinea. Although the Soviets had enjoyed a considerable prestige among the Nigerians in the past, their influence has since declined sharply. Nigeria is a country that shares the beliefs of the Western community and has strong ties with the US and Great Britain.

With a total armed forces strength of 146,000 men and employing 8.2 percent of its budget on Defense, Nigeria has the largest military establishment in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Nigerian Navy, though small, is made up of modern ships and has marshalled a formidable combat power which makes Nigeria the most powerful naval country in the west coast of Africa. Albeit possessing a limited deep-sea capability, the Navy is basically a coastal defense force whose main mission is the protection of the oil platforms and the 200-mile economic zone.

The Nigerian Navy is steadily improving its capabilities and strength by purchasing new ships of frigate size and will soon have a useful deep-sea capability.36

Due to its strategic position and close military ties with France, Senegal plays a significant role in the protection of the Cape Route and in the control of the Atlantic corridor. Although its tiny navy is incapable of carrying out ocean-going missions, the ever-present possibility of calling on French forces in case of great need add a new dimension to its importance. Also, Senegal might function as an outpost of the West,
neutralizing the Soviet influence on the Atlantic corridor and thereby minimizing the tasks to be performed by pro-Soviet states located in the African bulge.

To sum it all up, the navies discussed in this study are mainly oriented to protect the coastline and the natural resources at sea within the 200-mile economic zone. The navies of four countries -- Brazil, Argentina, South Africa and Nigeria -- have a limited deep-sea capability and can effectively participate in a major effort to protect the South Atlantic sea-lanes. These four navies and their air arms will be considerably modernized by the end of this decade and, taken together, they will make up a formidable combat power which should not be underestimated (Table XXVI). Having the technical know-how to pursue their own shipbuilding programs, which is the case of Brazil, Argentina and South Africa, means a sharp increase in the strength of their fleets and will develop a more active participation in the defense of the South Atlantic in order to protect their interests at stake. These countries, the most developed and possessing the largest military establishment in the area, became practically self-sufficient in weapons production, with Brazil and South Africa being among the world's ten major producers. Moreover, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa are considered as potential nuclear powers, which gives them a specific strategic dimension.

Furthermore, the availability of large numbers of well-equipped and strategically located naval bases and airfields on both the east coast of South America and west coast of Africa offer excellent opportunities to support large naval operations in the South Atlantic area.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the Soviet threat on the
South Atlantic cannot be curbed only by the regional countries. The
interest in the South Atlantic is worldwide and although there is a
sizable naval asset in the area, it is far below its capability to cope
with the Soviet threat without the assistance of the major western nations.
In his study on the South Atlantic navies, Admiral Ibsen Gusmão Câmara
stated:

By analysing the naval assets of these countries [Brazil, Ar-
gentina and South Africa] it is easy to verify that although they
constitute a reasonable naval power, none of their navies alone
or even putting the three together, possesses the capability to
face, by themselves, the naval power of a major power. However, in
any major conflict, and operating under a framework of alliances
with other naval powers, they can offer a valuable contribution
to the collective defense of the South Atlantic.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRIES</th>
<th>SUBMARINES</th>
<th>ATTACK CARRIERS</th>
<th>CRUISERS</th>
<th>DESTROYERS</th>
<th>FRIGATES</th>
<th>CORVETTES</th>
<th>MINESWEEPERS/ MINEHUNTERS</th>
<th>FAST ATTACK CRAFT (FAC)</th>
<th>PATROL SHIPS</th>
<th>PATROL CRAFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRAZIL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARGENTINA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URUGUAY</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF RICA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENEGAL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (1) All ships are of 1940s vintage. Will probably be replaced.


9. Ibid., pp. 127-128.


11. US Department of State, Background Notes - Argentina, June 1977.


27. Dodd, pp. 50-51.


32. Scheima, "Latin America Navies", p. 24 and "South American


35. Kapstein, p. 34.

36. Dodd, p. 47.

Of course, the participation in a defense organization is mostly dependent on the political will of the various countries located in the South Atlantic area. The perceived threat to their national sovereignty and their national interests are the key factors that may lead them to join efforts to build a long lasting security organization. The major aim of this chapter is to analyze the foreign policy of each of these countries, and, insofar as possible, spell out the statements made by their authoritative officials which may or may not support the creation of a potential SATO.

I. Brazil

The first statement by a Brazilian authority on SATO was made in September of 1976 when the foreign minister, Ambassador Antonio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira, denied any involvement of Brazil in a defensive alliance in the South Atlantic, emphasizing that: "There is not the slightest possibility of establishing a collective defense system in the South Atlantic, especially with the awkward and undesirable presence of South Africa."\(^1\)

Later on, in December 1977, when the Brazilian and Argentinean foreign ministers were discussing an agenda related to the River Plate Basin in Brasilia, the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Geraldo de Azevedo Henning, stressed Brazil's unwillingness in participating in a South Atlantic security pact, saying that: "Brazil had many development
problems and was not prepared to become involved in an arms race and that any attempt to resist Soviet domination in the Southern Atlantic must be a joint effort by all Western forces.\textsuperscript{2}

However, in assuming that the defense of the South Atlantic "must be a joint effort by all Western forces" Admiral Henning implied the Brazilian participation in a potential pact. But, the so-called Brazilian "pragmatic" foreign policy, in which Africa deserves a high priority, would play a major role in modifying the perceptions toward the South Atlantic.

In effect, this "pragmatic policy", following a global approach, revolutionized any former and traditional automatic alignments and placed its emphasis on Third World countries. It is quite apparent that Brazil is not now tied to any major block of nations. It is not previously committed to support any super-power nor are its actions limited by ideological considerations. Although it does not actually mean a break with the past, this pragmatism stands for a considerable enlargement in the area to be covered by Brazilian diplomacy. In this context, the policy toward Africa is designed to explore the previous initiatives and risks assumed, such as the recognition of the pro-marxist governments of Angola and Mozambique, and at the same time strengthen the links with the other African nations. The priority of Africa in the Brazilian foreign policy has many reasons. Common historical and cultural ties, geographical proximity, the affinities and similarities in viewpoints related to the international arena, the promising market for Brazilian exports, all together have worked to turn Africa into an area of Brazilian primordial interest. In addition, Brazil has been a strong supporter of the black African nations in all international agencies and organisms and has
vehemently condemned South Africa and the "apartheid" policy reducing its diplomatic relations with the South African government to the lowest level.³

Also, Brazil's interest in Africa can be stressed by its twenty-one diplomatic missions in the continent and by the frequency of official visits made by the Brazilian minister, Ambassador Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, to Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Senegal in the last two years. Unfortunately, the planned visit of President Joao Figueiredo to Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, Alto Volta, Cape Verde and Nigeria did not materialize due to the heart attack suffered by him in late 1981. Parallel to that, Brazil has received, with unusual frequency, distinguished African delegations such as those from Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria and Togo. In addition, Brazilian exports to Africa are in excess of one billion dollars. Although it represents only 5.5 percent of the total exports, it has experienced a rate of increase much higher than those of more traditional markets. (Table XXVII)

In the last decade, African trade with Brazil increased six-fold. Linked by language to the continent's five Portuguese-speaking countries, Brazil is quickly supplanting Portugal as the major trading partner of these nations. Today, Brazil trades more with Angola than with neighboring Peru. In Nigeria, the company that built Brasilia is installing the infrastructure for Abuja, the new capital. In Angola, a Brazilian supermarket chain runs 25 stores supplying food to one million residents of greater Luanda. In Mauritania, a Brazilian contractor is building an airport and an 850-mile road.⁴
TABLE XXVII  
BRAZIL'S EXPORTS TO AFRICA (US $M)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>103.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>169.5</td>
<td>141.9</td>
<td>180.8</td>
<td>106.1</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>124.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>115.1</td>
<td>233.5</td>
<td>137.5</td>
<td>219.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

percentage of total exports | 4.6  | 3.8  | 4.4  | 5.0  | 4.3  | 5.5            |

SOURCE: **CACEX; Latin America Weekly Report, WR 81-18, 8 May 1981**
Finally, the fact that Brazil is the largest tropical multi-
racial nation in the world, with deep African roots, has facilitated the
Brazilian-African connection. The cultural identity can be spelled out
in the words of the Nigerian Ambassador to Brazil, Mr. Timothy Mgborkwere:
"There are parts of Bahia where I feel I am in Lagos."⁵

Therefore, Brazil is cultivating a very careful image in Africa
and has succeeded in penetrating its market. The Brazilian rapproche-
ment toward the Black African countries could be seriously jeopardized
if Brazil participates in any security pact in which South Africa becomes
an effective partner. The need to preserve both the African-Brazilian
connection and Brazil's higher interest on the South Atlantic, keeping
the area far from arms confrontation, has worked to provide consistency
in all statements made by high ranking Brazilian officials. On 4 Septem-
ber 1981, in a conference held at the traditional and influential 'Escola
Superior de Guerra,' which is attended by distinguished civilian and mil-
itary personalities, the foreign minister Saraiva Guerreiro stated the
basic Brazilian policy related to the South Atlantic:

The area between Africa and Latin America has for us [Brazilians]
an obvious importance, therefore, receiving our close consideration. Among all the oceans, the South Atlantic has the least international military presence. Nowadays, as it has always been in the past, it is a peaceful region which, otherwise, reflects the character of the developing countries on its shores. This is a situation that must be preserved. Brazil and the other riverine countries see the South Atlantic as an area of their primary and direct interest and have expressed the high desire to maintain it far from international ten-
sions and confrontations, emphasizing its role as a peaceful instru-
ment for promoting the exchange and development of our countries.

During a three-day visit to Nigeria, in April 1981, Ambassador Saraiva Guerreiro, as he did on many other occasions, thoroughly condemned South Africa for its military adventures into Angola and Mozambique, and, taking advantage of the opportunity, said "that Brazil would have nothing
to do with a South Atlantic alliance involving South Africa, Argentina, Uruguay and the United States. Brazil, he said, had more in common with Nigeria than any other South Atlantic country." And, as one more evidence of Brazil's opposition to SATO, Ambassador Saraiva Guerreiro talking to a selected audience at the Afro-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce, reaffirmed its previous position saying:

Brazil and other African developing countries are interested in maintaining the South Atlantic from the arms race and super-powers confrontation. Until now, the South Atlantic has been kept disarmed and it is the Brazilian interest to assure that it will so remain.

II. Argentina

More recently it appears that the idea of bringing together both coasts of the South Atlantic as a security organization was revived in August 1976, by the Argentinean foreign minister, Admiral Cesar Augusto Guzzetti, through a speech delivered on television during the visit to Argentina by the South African Navy Commander, Admiral James Johnson, when he said that "a South Atlantic Treaty Organization including South Africa would be an effective way of guaranteeing trade routes around the Cape of Good Hope." For many years, the Argentinean foreign policy has been influenced by the policies laid down by the Navy in an inter-service division of power in the way of running the country. The quest of the 'Armada Argentina' (Argentinean Navy) for a large participation in the formulation of the country's foreign policy is not new and has been a cause of many internal divergencies. Since the establishment of the so-called "doctrine Stormi," in 1918, the Argentinean Navy had set up the basic strategic concepts governing the relations of Argentina with its South American neighbors, in order to keep open its vital sealanes to Europe and, therefore,
securing its economic survival. Furthermore, the potential conflict with Chile, in which the Navy is supposed to play the most prominent role, has given it an even larger voice in influencing Argentinean foreign policy. As of 1976, and, stimulated by the existing good Argentina-South Africa relations, the Argentinean Navy started to set up the foundation of a security alliance involving the countries on both edges of the South Atlantic. In fact, the former navy and foreign ministers, respectively, Admiral Emilio Massera and Admiral Oscar Montes gave their wholehearted support to the idea of creating such an alliance and, although without success, tried to break the international isolation imposed on South Africa. A clear evidence of this policy was the statement made by Admiral Oscar Montes at the United Nations in October 1977, when he stated that relations between South Africa and the Southern Cone are really important for the efficient defense of the South Atlantic, and admitted that "Argentina was involved with South Africa in discussing the defense of the South Atlantic. He said the two countries had not yet moved towards signing a treaty, but 'we have every intention of doing so'." However, in the following day he denied the existence of any formal Argentina-South Africa connection.

One of the most enthusiastic supporters of the idea to strengthening relations with South Africa was General Alberto Marini. In October 1976, as the head of the 'Escuela Argentina de Estrategia' he defended the establishment of close ties with that country, affirming:

If the West does not support South Africa, that country cannot survive. If we let South Africa succumb, without giving it our aid, control over the Indian Ocean will inexorably be lost, and in less than a decade Europe will be communist. After that it will be our turn in America, and then we will really regret our past errors.
Later on, in September of 1977, General Marini, at the invitation of the South African Department for Strategic Studies, delivered a conference in Johannesburg on the subject 'The Strategic Importance of the South Atlantic'.

During the visit of the Brazilian President Joao Figueiredo to Argentina in 1980, the existence of a supposed military arrangement in the South Atlantic was again brought to bear, although the officials of both countries have dismissed the reports divulged by the media.

A top official of the Argentine foreign ministry has denied reports in 'Folha de S. Paulo' last week that the Brazilian and Argentine heads of state had discussed plans for a defense pact of the South Atlantic to include the USA and South Africa. The Brazilians also denied the report last week. The source of the rumour seems to have been the Argentine press, which quizzed President Figueiredo about the possible pact at the end of his visit to Buenos Aires. A possible cause for their questions may have been the discussion of nuclear collaboration which did take place, in which South Africa could in theory be involved through the West German companies which are supplying technology to both Argentina and Brazil.

The visit of President Figueiredo, however, appears to have raised some expectations on the part of the Argentineans about carrying out a combined effort between the military establishments of both countries, which led the commander of the Argentinean Navy, Admiral Armando Lambrushine to proclaim, foreseeing a regional security alliance, that the two nations "would forge a power-centre to serve the ideals of the West".

During his paid visit to Brazil, in August 1980, Argentinean President Jorge Videla touched again on that sensitive subject that Brazilian authorities did not want to discuss, causing some diplomatic embarrassment when he rehearsed some proposals for a regional security system and called for a "crusade of sub-continent against the hegemonism of those who wanted to subjugate free nations". However, on May 26, 1981, President Figueiredo of Brazil and the new President of Argentina, Roberto Viola,
met on the border of both countries and in which may be an apparent shift in the Argentinean foreign policy they "affirmed their opposition to the creation of a South Atlantic defence pact (which had been favoured by President Viola's predecessor, Gen. Videla, and by the United States and Uruguay, and which would include South Africa) or to any formal geopolitical bloc involving the 'southern cone' nations."  

III. Uruguay

Uruguay has succeeded in maintaining close diplomatic links with South Africa which has resulted in the strengthening of the economic and military ties between both countries. A more intimate relationship started in 1975, when the then South African Prime Minister, B. J. Vorster made a visit to Paraguay and Uruguay "to win Latin America support or at least neutrality in the UN." In October of 1976, a group of South African businessmen visited Montevideo and among other subjects considered was the possibility of settling 10,000 Rhodesians that were interested in immigrating to Uruguay as a consequence of their internecine guerrilla warfare. The military links were reinforced in March 1978 by the visit by the Chief of the South African Air Force, Gen Robert Rogers to his Uruguayan counterpart as part of his tour to "southern cone" countries, raising again the suspicion of the existence of a formal military agreement for the defense of the South Atlantic.

In late 1976, the commander of the Uruguayan Navy proposed the establishment of a military alliance in the Southern Atlantic in order to "repulse any possible aggression on the part of the Soviets in that strategic area." But the interest of Uruguay in the formal SATO did not end in that initiative. Again, in 1978, it was revived, and at this time at the regional meeting of naval chiefs held in Lima, Peru, when the
Uruguayan Naval Chief, Admiral Hugo Marquez defended the need of such an alliance to face Soviet penetration in the region.\textsuperscript{22}

IV. South Africa

As South Africa started to feel both isolated in the international arena and threatened by the arms embargo, it devoted a sharp interest to the countries of the "southern cone" of South America with the manifest intention of being militarily associated with them. As a member of a probable regional security organization, South Africa would have reduced the impact of the diplomatic isolation imposed upon it and as a result, it would be able to have a voice in the world community. The opportunity for a closer approximation with "southern cone" countries came with the visit of the Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner to South Africa in April 1974.\textsuperscript{23} The visit paid by Prime Minister B. J. Vorster to Paraguay, in August 1975, "marks the beginning of a new South African diplomatic offensive in the region."\textsuperscript{24} During his visit, in addition to emphasizing that "we are the same kind of people . . . we adapt easily to each other"\textsuperscript{25}, Mr. Vorster signed four long-term economic agreements as a result of the cooperation previously agreed upon during the tour of President Stroessner to South Africa.

Following this first opening toward South America and trying to explore the initial gains, a group of South African businessmen visited Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay at the end of 1976. In the context of reinforcing relations with South American countries, it is worth noting the statements made by the then South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hillgard Muller, at the parliament when he defended the maintenance of close links with Latin America countries, explaining that they
"play an important role in the United Nations", and, furthermore, "they are our neighbours on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean." Trying to transform these expectations into reality many high South African officials visited Latin America and among these tours two stand out: the visits of the Minister of Mines, P. G. J. Koornhof to Brazil and the mission headed by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, B. G. Fourie, to Paraguay and Uruguay.

In 1979, a new South Africa - South America Chamber of Commerce was established. It has succeeded in enlarging the trade on both directions, although some countries, such as Brazil, have frozen its diplomatic relations with Pretoria.

An exhibition of industrial products 'Made in South Africa' was held in Buenos Aires a few months ago. More trade shows are scheduled in other South American capitals for this year [1980]. A high-powered group of South African businessmen has just returned from an important trip to Brazil, Chile and Argentina.

South African business circles consider that the Argentine offers the best trading prospects on the opposite side of the Atlantic. In 1978, South African exports to this country jumped by about 20% and in 1979, results are expected to be even better. The President of the South African-South American Chamber of Commerce, Gawie Yssel, makes no secret why business is bound to grow: there are fewer political problems that might snarl up commercial relations with Latin America countries.

As to the nuclear field, South Africa offers a good opportunity for cooperation with South American countries, with Argentina being the most eager in exchanging technology with it.

In addition to the economic links, South Africa has successfully managed the military ties with "southern cone" countries, inviting many high ranking officers of their armed forces to talk in military schools and other institutes. Such was the case of Argentinean General Alberto Marim and the commander of the Paraguayan Armed Forces, General Andres
Rodrigues, who visited South Africa in 1978. In turn, the commander of the South African Navy and Air Force, Admiral James Johnson and General Robert Rogers, respectively, visited Uruguay, Argentine, Chile and Paraguay during the 1976-1978 time frame. The military connection with the last three of those countries was even reinforced in 1980 through the visit made to his counterparts by the commander-in-chief of the South African Defense Forces, General Magnus Malan. Although not confirmed, there was evidence that a much more intense military relationship was established with the Chileans, who had supposedly fought "alongside the South African forces against SWAPO in Nambia." Stories involving Chilean troops in Namibia appeared in the New Nigerian (March 1976), Noticias de Mozambique (December 1976), and in the Algerie Actualite (April 1977). More recently, according to a report published in the Sunday News Journal of Delaware, in February 1980, "South African 'slush funds' were used to bribe US politicians and journalists into improving the Pinochet regime's image in the United States." The strategic and political importance of "southern cone" countries to South Africa has led it to develop a very careful and objective foreign policy toward them aimed at strengthening its economic and military ties with them.

The interest of South Africa in creating a security organization in the South Atlantic was clearly spelled out by its ambassador to Brazil, Mr. Johan Pretorius, in 1978, when he said "that his country favors the formation of a South Atlantic defence pact between South Africa and various Latin American nations." South Africa knows its utmost importance for the defense of Western interests in the South Atlantic/Indian Oceans and, although without success, it has bargained with its
strategic position to improve its relations with the West. "South Africa is NATO's southern flank. It is the centerpiece of the planning for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization which is to include several Latin American nations."  

The South African politicians are well aware that their country is placed at one of the most important world crossroads, where East-West interests are on a collision route. They also have no reason to doubt that South Africa constitutes the prime target in the Soviet policy toward Africa, and that by no means can the country survive a long political isolation. The importance attached to the destabilization of South Africa by the Soviets was well explained in an article, "Southern Version of NATO," by Dimitry Volsky, published in the New Times No 36, of September 1976:

The "loss" of South Africa would deprive the multinational monopolies and their global strategy-makers of an important military and political outpost at the junction of the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. The West's control over rich natural resources - South Africa occupies first place in the capitalist world in the extraction of gold, platinum, chromites, manganese and antimony, second place for diamonds and third for uranium oxide - would be placed in serious jeopardy. The implications of this are obvious, specially in the light of the continuing raw material crisis. As for the political, social and ideological consequences of the extirpation of the seats of racism, these are easy to foresee. The result would be a further weakening of the positions of all the forces of reaction, war and national and social oppression.

V. Nigeria

Due to the spiraling increases in oil prices, Nigeria experienced a dramatic progress in practically all fields and became a regional power exercising a large influence in the West coast of Africa, mainly, in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria is an active member of the OAU and has been in the forefront in promoting pan-Africanism, having spared no efforts in defending African interests in the international arena.
Nigeria plays a powerful role in the United Nations, other international bodies and African councils. It strongly supports regional economic cooperation, helps coordinate African positions on many issues (such as apartheid), and helps mediate African disputes.36

The Nigerians are moved by a kind of manifest destiny and believe that a future of greatness is reserved for their country which will be inevitably to lead Africa.

Our country [Nigeria] is the largest single unit in Africa . . . we are not going to abdicate the position in which God Almighty has placed us . . . The whole black continent is looking up to this country to liberate it from thralldom.37

Nigeria is presently concentrating most of its attention on problems related to the African continent itself and on consolidating its internal progress, rather than becoming involved in regional issues encompassing countries on both coasts of the South Atlantic. In effect, Nigeria has no apparent desire to participate in a regional security alliance, which is totally coherent with the basic principles of its foreign policy. Since its independence, the policies of "non-alignment" and the prevalence of Africa over other continents has been the pillars of Nigerian foreign policy. Even though the Nigerian "non-alignment" policy has traditionally showed some pro-Western leanings on the statement made by General Yakubu Gowon that "Nigerian development could be attained only by remaining in the system of world capitalism," the fact is that the USSR and the East European countries also have had political and economic influence in Nigeria. The strict observance of the principles of "non-alignment" represents a major obstacle toward Nigerian participation in any regional security pact aimed at curbing Soviet expansionism in Africa.
On the other hand, since the Biafra War, Nigeria has developed an aversion to South Africa and become one of its worst enemies due to the wholehearted support granted the secessionists by the South Africans.

... Lagos took the position that any meaningful post war foreign policy ought to be aggressively militant on issues affecting the 'white south' insofar as they are concerned working towards the attainment of black majority rule in Namibia and Zimbabwe and removing the worst aspects of apartheid in South Africa.39

The unusual Nigerian opposition to the South Africans is continuously nourished by the government itself through intense propaganda carried out by the media.

The loathing of South Africa is an article of faith a fundamental part of the national catechism, in Nigeria. Newspaper reports and radio and television broadcasts do not ordinarily speak of "the rulers of South Africa" or of "the government in Pretoria," but rather of "the racist murderers in apartheid South Africa."40

Even in regional African issues one can feel the stiff antagonism against South Africa. Such is the case of Angola in which Nigeria backed the MPLA, of Agostinho Netto, as a direct response to the support granted to UNITA, of Jonas Savimbi, by the South Africans. The Nigerian aversion to all regarding South Africa can be illustrated by the emphasis Nigerian authorities put in the participation of Pretoria in a probably SATO.

In fact, during the visit of Brazilian Foreign Minister, Ambassador Saraiva Guerreiro, to Lagos in March 1981, the South African newspaper Sunday Express suggested that Brazil might participate in a potential SATO alongside Pretoria, Buenos Aires and Santiago. Although Saraiva Guerreiro vehemently denied this report, it was considered so important to the Nigerians that it was brought to bear twice during the meetings held by the Brazilian foreign minister with the minister of communication, Mr. Isaak Shaadu, and the president of the senate, Mr. Joseph Wayas, making part of the joint Nigerian-Brazilian communique.1
VI. Senegal

Until the end of the government of Leopold Sedar Senghor, in 1980, Senegal had followed a foreign policy closely associated to Paris and moderately pro-Western. Through his charismatic figure President Senghor exercised a considerable influence over the African francophone countries and even on the CAU, being considered as one of the fathers of African unity. However, during his long government, Senegal did not manifest its desire to participate in a security pact such as SATO, even though he had always been committed to support the West and had perceived the threat posed on Africa by the Soviets.

In an interview, he spoke passionately of "the grand strategy of the Communist world," and he appealed to the United States and other Western nations to confront the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other proxies (in his view, a category that includes Algeria) on the ground. . . . But he also complained that the United States was purporting to "oppose Soviet influence with empty hands. It won't work. . . . The American reason logically, but live illogically." Therefore, he was involved in the idea of blocking Soviet expansionism in Africa, which is the major aim of a potential SATO.

The new Senegalese President, Abdou Diouf, is showing the tendency of following a new approach in the foreign policy of his country, looking for greater latitude from France. "Though Senegal is likely to stay fiercely anti-Soviet, Diouf may also start to put a greater distance between Dakar and Paris than existed under his predecessor." Domestically, Diouf has conducted a policy of liberalization and political overture, which has left grounds for actions conducted by influential opposing groups that "stress a nationalism that would return Senegal to an non-aligned path and exclude the French from their military bases in Senegal."
Despite these new tendencies, President Diouf has deserved a high priority in the French diplomacy and is "viewed as a natural ally for France's new African policy." Consequently, unless profound political changes take place there is a high probability that Senegal will continue to support French and Western interests in Africa and in the South Atlantic area.

VII. Conclusion

Since the idea of creating a SATO was revived, Brazil's position has been marked by coherence. The "pragmatic" Brazilian foreign policy is calling for a greater freedom of action in international affairs, with no automatic alignments to any major block of nations or super powers. The multipolarity of the world politics enhanced Brazil's approach toward Third World countries in which Africa has deserved a high priority.

"Brazil is proud of its African roots and, faithful to them, is open to cooperation with the developing countries on the opposite shore of the South Atlantic.""

Successfully Brazil has managed its connection with Africa and, trying to establish a permanent presence in the continent, it increased considerably its diplomatic, cultural and economic links with Black African nations. The importance of Africa to Brazil was stressed in the Presidential message to Congress, in 1981:

Relations between Brazil and Africa were increased. In many cases, the exploratory phase of establishing contacts aimed at a better mutual knowledge has ended. We are now in a phase of construction, in a phase of exchange of experiences and cooperation. In fact, a clear-cut picture for greater and better exchange is developing. Therefore, within our limited capabilities we have the important task to operationalize the multiple opportunities of extension of Afro-Brazilian relations."
On the other hand, Brazil restricted its diplomatic ties with South Africa and has embarked on a sharp campaign against "apartheid," as well as condemned violently South Africa's position on Namibia and its military adventures in Angola and Mozambique. As Foreign Minister Saraiva Guerreiro expressed at the opening of the XXXVI Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, on 21 September 1981,

"The attitude of the South African regime constitutes a flagrant disservice to the cause and interest of the West, which it absurdly claims to defend. It is a permanent source of tension and polarization in Southern Africa, contributing towards turning it into one more area for East-West confrontation, to the detriment of the freedom of the peoples of the area."48

Furthermore, Brazil considers the South Atlantic an area of its immediate interest and has no intention of militarizing it, which certainly would happen with a regional security alliance. Talking about this sensitive problem with Nigerian authorities, Foreign Minister Saraiva Guerreiro, expressed Brazil's opposition to the creation of a SATO, in these terms: "There is no maturity for an agreement of such nature, and in rigor, by strictly security reasons, there is no need at the moment."49

Also, in the Brazil-Angola joint communiqué released on 11 February of 1982, at the occasion of the visit to Brazil of the Angolan foreign minister, Mr. Paulo Jorge, the intention of both countries in maintaining the South Atlantic demilitarized was once again stressed.

They [the Foreign Ministers of Brazil and Angola] agreed that the South Atlantic is a link serving the rapprochement and the development of Brazil-Angola relations. In addition, they emphasized the high convenience of maintaining the South Atlantic free from international tensions and confrontations in order to preserve its character as a peaceful instrument for promoting exchange and development.50

That, however, does not mean any lack of interest on the part of Brazil in the security of the South Atlantic. The modernization of the
Brazilian Navy, presently underway, points exactly to the contrary. Furthermore, the decision to build a $300 million air-naval base at Trindade Island, 600 miles off the Brazilian coast, to function as an advanced outpost, reinforce the growing Brazilian concerns about the security of the South Atlantic. However, Brazil does not want to militarize this strategic area and, in addition, has no intention to be politically committed in any agreement involving South Africa, which would jeopardize not only the Brazilian effort toward Black Africa, but would also compromise its entire pragmatic foreign policy. President Joao Figueiredo in his visit to Lima, Peru, in June 1981, closed all speculations on Brazil's participation in a potential SATO, when he said:

"Brazil repels any type of axis, agreements or military pacts with whomsoever. Brazil repels the power policy and diplomacy. What Brazil wishes is that each country has its own voice and be capable to defend its own interests. . . We will not make pacts nor axis with whomsoever. The greatest pact we can make with South American countries is the sincere desire that the industrial nations can hear our voices and that all of these voices can be joined for the attainment of our common objectives and for the defense of the particular interests of each country."

Argentina and Uruguay have clearly manifested their firm desire in being members of a South Atlantic pact. Particularly Argentina appears to be eager to establish such alliance which favors its strategic outlook, and does not conceal its interest in sharing with South Africa the defense of South Atlantic sea lanes. Contrary to Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay do not have either close economic ties or cultural roots with Africa that stimulate a powerful association with the Black Continent. On the other hand, the foreign policy of Argentina and Uruguay is more oriented toward traditional areas (the United States and Europe) rather than to Third World countries. Moreover, both countries have carried out a stiff anti-Communist domestic policy which has reflected in the
conduct of their external affairs. However, ideology has not disturbed the improvement of the Argentina. USSR economic relations which has transformed Argentina in the major commercial partner of the Soviet Union in Latin America. Therefore, all these elements have driven Argentina and Uruguay toward South Africa in order to create a South Atlantic regional alliance.

Historically, the southernmost part of the South Atlantic has been an area of primary Argentinean strategic interest. A potential SATO would reinforce the presence of Argentina in that area giving its Navy much more visibility in the very sensitive region of Islas Malvinas (Falkland Islands), Beagle Channel and the Antarctic, where Argentina claims sovereignty. In addition, as a member of SATO, Argentina foresees the necessity of a considerable incrementation in the strength of its navy and assumes that it can be done counting on US and European support. If that actually occurs, Argentina would be transformed into the most powerful naval power in the South Atlantic which would generate a serious imbalance among the "southern cone" countries, with heavy implications for Brazil and Chile, and would probably promote an arms race and instability in South America.

In regard to a potential SATO, one must emphasize the preference that the Reagan Administration has showed toward Argentina.

Probably the most important change proposed by Reagan for U.S. Latin American policy is a reevaluation of the policy of alliances on the continent. According to Roger Fontaine, one of Reagan's advisers quoted in El Economista of Buenos Aires, the new policy would break with the guidelines laid down by ex-President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, according to which Brazil was regarded as the centerpiece of US strategy in Latin America, and should therefore receive special treatment. According to Fontaine, Argentina should be treated as equally important. He went even further, and said that he thought that the countries with the greatest economic future were Argentina and Mexico, because they both had oil.
Late in 1980, the U.S. Government exempted Argentina from violating human rights and in 1981, the Senate voted "to lift restrictions on arms sales to Argentina."

Therefore, the recent Buenos Aires – Washington political rapprochement coupled with the tendency of the General Leopoldo Galtieri administration to play the role of international policeman can stimulate Argentina to forge an embrionic SATO counting on the effective participation of Uruguay and South Africa (maybe Paraguay would also support such an organization).

The South African offensive toward Latin America was primarily intended to gain leverage to break its diplomatic isolationism, and secondarily to get the support of "southern cone" countries to curb Soviet expansionism in Africa and its implication on the cape route.

The heightening in the East-West dispute has enhanced even more the strategic importance of South Africa and has led the US to re-evaluate its policy toward it, based on the argument that substantial changes are underway in the apartheid policy and in the question of Namibia. The willingness of the Reagan Administration to establish closer relations to South Africa became evident in a speech by the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Chester Crocker.

The Reagan Administration has no intention of destabilizing South Africa in order to curry favor elsewhere. Neither will we align ourselves with apartheid policies that are abhorrent to our own multiracial democracy. South Africa is an integral and important element of the global economic system, and it plays a significant economic role in its own region. We will not support the severing of those ties. It does not serve our interests to walk away from South Africa any more than it does to play down the seriousness of domestic and regional problems it faces.

In an interview on television with Walter Cronkite, on 3 March 1981, President Reagan outlined the opening of US foreign policy toward South Africa, emphasizing that:
South Africa was vital to Western interests and that its current system of apartheid should not blind the West to South Africa's importance.

... The South Africans had stood beside us in every war we have ever fought ... then surely we can keep the door open and continue to negotiate with a friendly nation like South Africa. 56

Also, both visits of Prime Minister Pik Botta and a delegation of high ranking South African military officers to the U.S. in 1981, are a result of the US-South Africa rapprochement. Although the South Africans did not succeed in lifting the U.S. embargo on sales of military equipment, such rapprochement can induce other nations to follow suit and, pending a viable solution to the problem of Namibia, break South Africa's isolationism. This hypothesis, which became a valid alternative for the near future, may facilitate the negotiations for creating SATO counting on the endorsement of the U.S.

The emphasis of Nigeria's foreign policy is on African issues. Nigeria has an influential voice in the OAU and its efforts have been noticeable in settling many internal divergencies in the continent. Also, it has difficult border problems to be managed with Chad and Cameroon. These special conditions have worked to drawing its attention to regional African issues instead of being involved in intercontinental negotiations. Furthermore, the non-alignment policy coupled with the profound aversion to South Africa portrays a political scenario that makes the association of Nigeria to any security alliance in the South Atlantic very difficult, if not impossible.

Albeit the government of President Diouf has tried to get more latitude from France, the foreign policy of Senegal has maintained its traditional pro-Western leaning. Dakar has been utilized by US aircraft
in periodic maritime patrols and the French-Senegalese military ties remain unchanged. Therefore, the major obstacle to get the effective participation of Senegal in SATO is the presence of South Africa. Senegal has played a leading role in Africa, and it would not admit any alignment with the racist government of Pretoria.

As a final point, and as for the political will of the various countries which have been analysed, it is valid to reach the conclusion that a South Atlantic Treaty Organization could be created counting on the support of South Africa, Argentina and Uruguay (perhaps Paraguay would join this alliance). However, how efficient that organization would be without the active participation of Brazil, Nigeria and Senegal is a question that only the future could answer.

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ENDNOTES


12. Ibid.


17. Ibid., p. 2.


26. Ibid., p. 2.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 192.
44 Ibid., p. 4.


50 *Boletim de Notícias no 14*, de 11/02/82 da Embaixada Brasileira em Washington.


The growing dependence of the industrialized nations on the South Atlantic sealanes, whose value was sufficiently proven during both world wars, increased considerably the importance of this strategic area to the security of the West. Despite all technological advances, 99 percent of all international trade is still conducted by sea, which makes the entire world highly vulnerable to a major disruptive action on the seas. Through the South Atlantic sealanes flows a large amount of the raw materials desperately needed by the U.S., Europe and Japan to feed their industry (Table XXVIII); the area is, itself, a major producer of bauxite, cobalt, chromite, gold, iron ore, manganese, nickel, petroleum and uranium.

As we approach the year 2000, the dependence of the industrialized nations on sealanes will even increase, because their demand for raw materials is expected to undergo a large expansion, as illustrated by the U.S. needs at the end of the century: "...aluminium more than 600 percent; antimony over 300 percent; nickel, over 200 percent; chromium, almost 300 percent; tin, 100 percent; manganese, just under 100 percent."¹

On the other hand, Table XXIX shows the ship traffic in the Atlantic Ocean by 1985, portraying the needs for peacetime and for a protracted war, in which one can assume that the majority of the tankers required to supply NATO will flow through South Atlantic sealanes. These sealanes can be transformed in a real Achilles heel of the alliance.
TABLE XXVIII

IMPORTS AS A SHARE OF CONSUMPTION: MID-1970's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European Community</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bauxite</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromium</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobalt</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Ore</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickel</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phosphate Rock</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tungsten</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source:
TABLE XXIX

ILLUSTRATIVE MONTHLY SHIP TRANSITS IN 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Atlantic</th>
<th>Mediterranean</th>
<th>Pacific</th>
<th>Indian Ocean</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peacetime</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>4,550</td>
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<td>9,400</td>
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<td>220</td>
<td>70</td>
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Source: Paul H. Nitze and Leonard Sullivan Jr., Securing the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options, p. 163
However, the distinctive characteristic of so important an area for the free world is its vulnerability. The South Atlantic is not covered by any regional security organization. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (RIO Treaty) does not provide the necessary security to the entire area. Its area of interest is restricted to a narrow strip following the coastal line of South America. The West coast of Africa, through which flows the very important Cape Route and, also, the east-west sealanes, are not protected by any security pact. The Rio Treaty does not provide adequate security even to the South American coast line. In fact, it is much more a pact of intentions than a military alliance. It lacks homogeneity and political determination to be an effective and reliable security pact. But, despite all weaknesses, the Rio Treaty is still a valid instrument for the security of the Americas and other formulas calling for a more intensive military cooperation can be established based on it. If the security of the South Atlantic sealanes were ever in serious jeopardy, the routes along the coastline of South America could offer a reasonable degree of security and function as a viable option for rerouting convoys to and from the Cape of Good Hope. In that case, the Rio Treaty has a significant role to play in providing air and naval umbrella to the shipping traffic. Rear Admiral Sayre A. Swartztrauber U.S. Navy, in analysing options for rerouting oil tankers to avoid Soviet submarines, suggested that an alternative might be the route "from the Persian Gulf, around the Cape of Good Hope, to the coast of South America, where they could enjoy friendly air cover until reaching a convoy marshalling points in the North Atlantic."

The Soviet presence in Africa and its influence on the Cape Route forced the West to draw its attention to the South Atlantic, reviving old security concepts toward a SATO. Quietly but, decisively, the USSR
obtained strong and significant footholds on the West Coast of Africa. In the south, by its control over Angola and its strong political influence in the so-called "front-line" states (Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia) the Soviets neutralized the entire Southern Africa, enveloping and isolating the Republic of South Africa in a well-orchestrated geopolitical movement. If one considers the hostile policies of the West toward South Africa, one can say that the West is facing a tremendous disadvantage along more than 7,000 miles of the Cape Route. Conversely, the Soviets got the capability to deploy air and maritime assets in Angola and Mozambique, posing a real threat on all sealanes over Cape Town. On the north, the Soviet political-military influence in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau has compromised the free utilization of the "Atlantic Narrows." Therefore, Soviet land-based Backfires and Bears can cover the entire South Atlantic and disrupt the vital shipping traffic in that area. Although in its initial steps, the Soviet movement toward Africa is part of the USSR grand strategy to surround Europe and the Western Hemisphere in its insatiate expansionism.

Naval and air facilities in Western Africa constitute the infrastructure (albeit still tenuous) for potential wartime Soviet naval operations in the South Atlantic. In the meantime, however, the expanding Soviet presence portends an envolving encirclement of the "European Fortress." In effect, the Soviet threat on the South Atlantic area should be viewed in that perspective. Its menace on the main route of oil supply is only a circumstantial motive. The real Soviet peril is the permanence of Russian expansionism. In that regard, it is from this angle that the West should look at the South Atlantic region, in order to oppose Soviet activities with ingenious and innovative diplomatic, political and economic measures, where military alliances may play a minor role.
Undoubtedly, the Soviets will keep on trying to expand their influence in the area "to exploit for their own ends existing differences and actual conflict" and "to create and sustain situations of conflict from which they can profit." For the Russians "detente never was a means to avoid their expansionism. On the contrary, it has favored them to project their power in the world, bringing the Brezhnev doctrine to areas far beyond the USSR borders, as was clearly defined by President Brezhnev at the 25th Party Congress:

Some bourgeois leaders affect surprise and raise a howl over the solidarity of Soviet Communists, the Soviet people, with the struggle of the peoples for freedom and progress. This is either outright naivete or more likely a deliberate befuddling of minds. It would not be clearer after all, that detente and peaceful coexistence have to do with interstate relations...Detente does not at all abolish, nor can it abolish or alter the laws of the class struggle.5

But, would the regional countries have sufficient military power to transform SATO in an adequate instrument to curb the Soviet threat? Moreover, do the South Atlantic countries have a fair consensus on SATO capable of turning it into reality? The answer to both questions appears to be a sound no. Militarily, the air and naval powers in the South Atlantic area are not sufficient to either protect the Cape Route or to cope with the Soviet military presence in the area. The air and naval forces of the regional countries are best equipped for the protection of sealanes along the coast, lacking the capability to perform protracted deep sea missions. An effective defense against the Soviet threat is far beyond their current capabilities and would be only possible with the sizable support of the U.S. forces, which appears difficult to occur considering that the U.S. strategic priorities will remain in the North Atlantic-Mediterranean and Western Pacific areas, according to the
traditional deployments of the Sixth and Seventh Fleets. On the other hand, the capability of regional navies in providing security to convoys is becoming limited when one considers that cruise missiles instead of torpedoes are nowadays the main threat to the shipping traffic. In order to counter that situation, the South Atlantic navies would have to enhance their antiair warfare (AAW) capability, which has not received a high priority in their ongoing modernization programs. Therefore, even the best equipped South Atlantic navies such as those of Argentina, Brazil and South Africa are highly vulnerable to antiship cruise missiles. To upgrade their AAW capability, they would have to allocate a greater portion of the GNP of their countries to military expenditures, which has been avoided by the majority of South Atlantic nations in their endeavor to devote the priority to social-economic programs rather than military build-up.

Nevertheless, it is the lack of political consensus that makes SATO an almost unworkable organization at the present. Although it would be possible to count on Argentina, South Africa and Uruguay to create SATO, the strong opposition showed by Brazil, Nigeria and Senegal toward any association with South Africa, coupled with their whole-hearted pro-black African policy, constitute the major obstacles to turn SATO into a feasible alliance. In addition, the Nigerian non-alignment policy and the Brazilian desire in not militarizing the South Atlantic complicate even more the structuring of such a security alliance. To all of the above, should be added that the presence of South Africa in SATO would make the participation of the United States highly improbable, notwithstanding the fact that the Reagan administration has showed the trend to improve U.S.-South African relations as defined in the U.S.
Department of State policy paper "Regional Strategy for Southern Africa,"

August 29, 1981:

The United States also seeks to build a more constructive relationship with South Africa, one based on shared interests, persuasion, and improved communication. There is much ferment in South Africa today centered on the question of how all South Africans can more fully share and participate in the economy and political process. We recognize that a measure of change is already underway in South Africa. At such a time, when many South Africans of all races, in and out of government, are seeking to move away from apartheid, it is our task to be supportive of this process so that proponents of reform and nonviolent change can gain and hold the initiative.

Therefore, paradoxically as it may appear, the presence of South Africa is the major disturbing element toward the creation of SATO, since it makes no sense to have such a pact without its participation. While South Africa continues to be isolated by the West and steadfastly discriminated against by the African nations, the existence of SATO has little or no possibility to come about.

Additionally, the way these selected South Atlantic nations perceive the Soviet threat does not compel them to create SATO. In fact, most of them do not see the USSR as a real menace to their sovereignty and freedom. Although the majority of their governments have been committed to a fiercely anti-Communist domestic policy, externally they do not perceive the USSR as a threat and look upon it as a viable and profitable commercial partner. In that regard, Argentina and Brazil have clearly evidenced their pragmatism toward the Soviets and upgraded their economic relations with them to a degree never witnessed in the past.

On the other hand, the U.S. aim toward SATO seems to have suffered a profound change. The past U.S. willingness to build such organization seems to have experienced a completely different approach as illustrated
by the statements made by the UnderSecretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Mr. Thomas Enders, in a press interview to Brazilian magazine Veja in August 1981, before making his visit to Brazil. When asked about the U.S. interests in a South Atlantic pact, he emphatically answered:

It is not our objective because our preoccupation is more oriented toward the potential of violence in Southern Africa, as well as with the possibility of such violence escalating, which could bring a greater external involvement to that area. There is a large Cuban intervention in Angola. This foreign intervention force jeopardizes the aspiration for Africa's independence. If we solve the Namibia problem, it might become clear to all African countries that there are no more reasons for the stay of these foreign forces in the area. We need to guarantee that the transition in Namibia occurs with little or no violence, without provoking a greater military intervention carried out by outside continental countries. This greater intervention is exactly the kind of problem we hope does not occur in the South Atlantic. We do not miss the old times of John Foster Dulles and the pacts all over the world. We do not have a nostalgic policy. We are impressed with the dynamism of our two countries (U.S. and Brazil) and with the exceptional role we can play in the future world and we want to be prepared for that. But there is not a political base nor a specific type of threat that dictates a formal link such as a military pact. Of course, there is the need of some military effort in the area. We are going to do some and we hope Brazil does the same.

Also, in an interview to Correio Braziliense on 14 February 1982, the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, Mr. Anthony Motley, expressed his views regarding the preoccupation manifested by a group of U.S. congressmen who had visited Brazil, regarding the inexistence of formal U.S.-Brazil military ties.

I don't think that the Brazilian government has interest in that matter. And we do not have the interest, the need, for a piece of paper, a treaty. Through the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance we already have a text, a formal instrument which either country can invoke.

In spite of the undeniable Soviet influence in the South Atlantic area, particularly in the West coast of Africa, the South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) appears not to be sufficiently ripe to fulfill the
security expectations of the South Atlantic nations. Regional diversities, different perceptions in the strategic outlook, military weaknesses and political unwillingness, all combined, are working against SATO. In short, the following aspects should be stressed:

- the presence of South Africa is the major disturbing factor for the creation of SATO. Under present conditions, where South Africa is taken as a stigmatized nation in the world community, any political-military association with it is also identified with racism, and colonialism and, consequently, subject to international sanctions and pressures. Moreover, countries such as Brazil and the United States with a strong African heritage will face serious domestic problems in case of an overt association with South Africa. Furthermore, Brazil, Nigeria and Senegal are totally committed to a pro-black African policy which makes any partnership with the racist government of Pretoria unthinkable.

- the Brazilian goal is not militarizing the South Atlantic, which would bring other nations' influence to that region that has traditionally been considered as an area of Brazilian primordial interest.

- the tendency to many South Atlantic countries in not being closely identified with any superpower, both in the political and military fields. The Nigerian "non-alignment" and the Brazilian "non-automatic alignment" policies are examples of this trend. Also, the strong economic ties of Argentina, Brazil and Nigeria with the USSR have contributed to their reluctance "to commit themselves to a role of ideological and military opposition to the Soviet Union or to Third World liberations movements backed by the Soviets."

- the preponderance of the social and economic sectors over the military. In order for SATO to have a reasonable degree of efficiency
and to remain a credible air-naval force it would have to compel its members to divert a large amount of their GNP to military expenditures, a task which is not envisioned by their governments. These countries are fully committed to social-economic programs and are prone to assume calculated security risks to improve the living conditions of their populations.

- the weaknesses of the military establishment within the area would basically transform NATO, as it occurred with the Rio Treaty, into a political pact, incapable of accomplishing its military tasks. A NATO based on the present military status of their potential members would be an unreliable force and would probably suffer the same fate of the other regional security organizations such as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) that gradually disappeared or went into oblivion.

- a NATO primarily oriented to the protection of the West’s main routes of oil supply would have failed since its inception. NATO by itself would not provide any security to routes across the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, which are much more vulnerable than those in the South Atlantic. Therefore, unless a NATO counterpart were created in the Indian Ocean, which appears to be a task far more complicated to achieve, the West’s main route of oil supply would remain highly vulnerable and could be blocked even before reaching the South Atlantic ocean. Although some voices have been heard defending the existence of a Persian Gulf command, which apparently was discussed by former defense secretary Harold Brown with the Saudis, in addition to an embryonic American-Soviet effort to reduce military activity in the Indian Ocean, the implementation of real positive actions to protect Indian Ocean sealanes is far from a
At the initiative of Kuwait, the Persian Gulf states are already considering a closer arrangement for economic as well as security consultations and coordination. However, few believe that this or any other arrangement could develop into the kind of Western-related original defense structure such that the Bagdad Pact and CENTO once attempted to be. Such concepts belong to the past.

One question is whether or not SATO would grant more stability to the South Atlantic area. The answer seems to be no. SATO would probably cause serious regional divergencies, reviving old rivalries in both African and South American continents. Certainly, it would stimulate the arms race and the potential for East-West confrontation would increase as a result of small wars or frontier skirmishes among the various countries in the area. For instance, the presence of Argentina in SATO would motivate Chile to upgrade its military forces and, as a snowball, Peru, Bolivia, Equador would be involved in a stiff military competition. On the African side, the same would occur with serious implications on the South Africa - "front-line states" disputes, bringing to a high pitch the superpower rivalry in Southern Africa.

Consequently, if SATO is not the right answer for the security problems of the South Atlantic, and assuming that something has to be done, what are the alternatives? The first option immediately considered is to extend NATO boundaries beyond the Tropic of Cancer up to Persian Gulf. In fact, that looks as the best option for the security of the sealanes, covering the entire Cape Route. However, it runs into very strong European opposition and probably will also be rejected by the South Atlantic nations, which are not interested in seeing the militarization of the area and its direct involvement in the East-West dispute.
This solution is favored by the U.S. in its efforts to commit NATO outside its present boundaries. As the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, General Bernard W. Rogers, stated:

NATO now faces a new global strategic environment, one which contains a dual menace and requires a dual response. Within the NATO area, we must be perceived as having the strength and will to deter direct aggression from the East. Outside NATO's boundaries, the allies must concert their efforts and provide resources to protect common vital interests from direct and indirect aggression.\(^\text{12}\)

However, to assume responsibilities south of the Tropic of Cancer means "serious political opposition in Western Europe and in the Gulf region itself. Even Turkey, the southern outpost of NATO, has been reluctant to discuss any involvement beyond its eastern borders."\(^\text{13}\) Also the "Dutch, Danes and Norwegians are specially reluctant to see the alliance extended its activity outside the treaty area."\(^\text{14}\) In 1981, during the "Ocean Venture" exercise in the Caribbean area, involving NATO countries, "the Norwegian and Danish fleets did not take part in it, based on the argument that the inclusion of Latin America "deforms" the nature of the NATO alliance."\(^\text{15}\) The appeal of General Alexander Haig, Jr., to the allies in order "to coordinate their power to protect allied interests outside NATO area"\(^\text{16}\) has been confronted by the "lack of consensus in the alliance on extending the boundaries of the NATO treaty area,"\(^\text{17}\) as affirmed by NATO former Secretary-General Joseph Lums. Despite all these hardships, NATO has not been inactive and, with the consent of its members, the Alliance has developed "contingency plans for actions outside the NATO area in time of war - for example below the Tropic of Cancer."\(^\text{18}\)

This actually means a transition posture toward the modification of the southern limit of NATO and a tacit recognition that the interests of the alliance are worldwide. Answering a question concerning that subject at
the NATO Seminar held in Toronto in 1979, Ambassador Rinaldo Petrignani, Deputy Secretary-General of NATO, expressed its concerns on the limited self-imposed NATO role and opened a window toward its broader participation in world security affairs.

....There are a number of countries in the Alliance which are not prepared to extend the NATO boundaries....The situation of security is, indeed, a global one. NATO under these circumstances might risk becoming more and more of a regional organization separated from wider responsibilities. But I am convinced that there are ways in which to counterattack the tendency, and that through full and fruitful consultation NATO can overcome this obstacle to a certain extent.19

Therefore, the extension of the NATO southern limit beyond the Tropic of Cancer as far as Persian Gulf is an alternative that should not be discarded in the mid-term, and, depending on the evolution of the international politics in the coming years, it can count on the support of the South Atlantic countries.

The second valid option toward upgrading the security of the South Atlantic is to encourage intracontinent naval cooperation, particularly involving South American countries. This alternative, which has already been implemented, if sufficiently swift, would present solid benefits in a very short time. In effect, taking into account the existing broad internal limitations, it seems to be the best alternative at hand to congregate regional countries without raising political controversies and can be carried out under the provisions of the Rio Treaty. Some positive efforts have already been made to join and coordinate the naval policies of the "Southern Cone" countries. During the visit of President Joao Figueiredo to Argentina in May 1980 "it was announced that the Argentine and the Brazilian navies would henceforth conduct joint annual maneuvers."20

Later on, visiting his Argentine counterpart, the Brazilian Navy Minister
declared that "a tacit defensive alliance exists between the navies of Brazil and Argentina." Moreover the manifest intention of this alliance was clearly spelled out by the Commander-in-Chief of Argentina Navy, Admiral Armando Lambruschini, when he underscored that both countries would "reinforce their brotherhood so as to forge an appreciable centre of power at the service of the values defended by the Western World." There appears to be little doubt that a more intensive Argentine - Brazilian naval cooperation is presently underway through informal links, leaving the door open for the participation of other navies. Toward the same rationale, more emphasis should be placed on the organization called "Coordination of the South Atlantic Area" (CAMAS), which was agreed upon during the First Meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief of the South Atlantic Navies held in Rio de Janeiro in 1956. This organization is composed of representatives of the Argentine, Brazilian, Paraguayan and Uruguayan Navies and its primary mission is to plan and coordinate the defense of the maritime traffic in the South Atlantic area, encompassing the littorals of Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. Presently, it is the single multinational organization functioning in the South Atlantic. At its 10th meeting, held in Buenos Aires on 11 February 1982, and presided by the Chief-of-Operations of the Argentine Navy Staff, Rear Admiral Edgard Otero, it dealt "with a study of the measures to be taken in defense of the South Atlantic in relation to the other naval forces on the continent as well as NATO."

A third viable alternative is oriented toward an informal intercontinental naval cooperation carried out through combined exercises between African and South American navies. Although this option has not yet been tried, it seems workable. It could be set up following the same
framework of the UNITAS exercises but including selected African nations. Within that direction, and taking advantage of the present excellent diplomatic relations between Brazil, France, Nigeria, Senegal and the U.S., the conduct of combined exercises among their navies, either in a multilateral or bilateral fashion, seems to be a feasible course of action to be pursued in a short-run.

A fourth option would be the establishment of secret agreements encompassing "southern core" countries, South Africa and the U.S., calling for the security of South Atlantic sealanes in time of great need. There has been some speculation on that matter as a result of "the conference of defense and security experts from the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and South Africa, which was held in Buenos Aires earlier this year (1981)." Under the political viewpoint, this alternative is extremely vulnerable carrying with its considerable risks that the U.S. and Brazil appear loath to undertake.

Finally, and as a variant of the fourth option, SATO could be formally created with the effective participation of Argentina, Uruguay, and South Africa (the participation of Paraguay would also be probable), with Brazil and the U.S. "occupying a position analogous (at least for the time being) to that of Spain relative to NATO."26

All of the above alternatives rely heavily on political decision to come into effect. However, in all of them it is expected that the U.S., as the leading country in the Free World, play a significant role. It is absolutely necessary that the U.S. strengthen its ties, in all fields, with the key South Atlantic nations under the assumption that a reliable military alliance is thoroughly dependent on the ability of the U.S. to develop an ingenious political and economic identify with them.
Certainly the so-called North-South dialogue is inserted in that assumption. The problematic search for a "New International Economic Order" is greatly responsible for the prevention of serious uprisings and domestic disorders in the Third World, as well as with long-lasting U.S.-South Atlantic countries military ties. Of course, it is not a task for tomorrow. But, without doubt, it is a basic pillar for a sound and far-reaching Western alliance in the South Atlantic. World interdependence calls for a more sincere and constructive cooperation between the northern and the southern hemispheres. The famous historian Hans Kohn, in his book *Is the Liberal West In Decline*, described how the North-South relations should be looked upon.

In the twentieth century - faced by the challenges of proletarian unrest, of communism and fascism, and now of the innumerable multitudes of the non-Western peoples - the North Atlantic nations must outgrow their nationalism and vitalize and strengthen their growing sense of community, not in order to dominate the globe - a goal which in the twentieth century would be as unrealizable as it would be unethical - but to arrive at an understanding of, and accommodation with, the minds and aspirations of the non-North Atlantic, non-communist and non-fascist peoples.27

There is little hesitation in saying that the South Atlantic area is highly vulnerable to Soviet expansionism. However, as a fact of life, it lacks a clear-cut consensus on the utility of SATO to curb the Soviet menace. Therefore, the fate of SATO belongs to the future, remaining as a challenge to be faced by the South Atlantic political leaders for the time being. By one of those twists of history, the South Atlantic has abruptly become an area of intense East-West confrontation, which was clearly demonstrated in the recent Argentino-British undecleared war over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). In effect, this unnecessary conflict brought the USSR closer to Argentina and made SATO even more unlikely, causing serious fissures in the unity of the
Western Hemisphere, whose consequences are far beyond the scope of this thesis.

As the U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger stressed "the refusal to respond to a major challenge, by preparing for conflict, has invited conflict," the South Atlantic leadership must find, at the proper time, practical solutions that best satisfy the national interest and sovereignty of their countries and preserve the self-determination and freedom of their people from Soviet aggression. That is the challenge to be responded to in the future.

-- 00 --
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1 James L. George (Ed), Problems of Sea Power As We Approach the Twenty-First Century, p. 30.


8 Superar diferenças é difícil, Correio Braziliense, 14 February 1982, p. 15.


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