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Interview Conducted by

Major Robert A. Doughty

21 April 1978
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IVAN J. BIRRER: EDUCATIONAL PIONEER

On 30 June 1978, Dr. Ivan J. Birrer retired from his position at the Command and General Staff College after completing more than 30 years of service. After his arrival at Fort Leavenworth on 20 January 1948, Dr. Birrer made a series of important contributions to CGSC. Initially hired as a Statistical Consultant, in July 1949 he became "Educational Advisor," a title he retained until 1 September 1977 when the title was abolished throughout the TRADOC school system. In 1974, he was also designated "Director, Master of Military Art and Science," but this title was later changed to "Director of Graduate Degree Programs."

As a World War II graduate of CGSC, Dr. Birrer was thoroughly acquainted with Fort Leavenworth upon his arrival, and his contributions began almost immediately. One of his first important achievements was to suggest, in April 1948, along with Dr. Jacob S. Orleans, the previous Educational Advisor, that the typical CGSC classroom should be reduced from 400 students to 40-50 students. This began the long development of classroom instructional techniques, which culminated in the late 1950's with small work-group instruction. Throughout that evolution, Dr. Birrer led Leavenworth's effort to adapt and adopt small-group discussion.

In the early 1950's, Dr. Birrer played an important role as a member of the planning committee for the design of the new academic building. That early design envisioned a classroom with modern instructional aids and with a physical setting for smaller classes. Before construction had actually begun and while General Garrison H.
Davidson was the Commandant, Dr. Birrer suggested the building be named after Major General James Franklin Bell.

In the late 1950's, Dr. Birrer suggested that the Leavenworth program be divided into three phases: fundamentals, application, and advanced application. This concept has endured. He assisted in getting the class broken down into four equal parts, which became known as the four-platoon and later the four-division system. Thenceforth, only a quarter of each class was receiving the same instruction at the same time. This permitted more efficient use of instructors and consequently enhanced the quality of instruction.

In the early 1960's, Dr. Birrer became involved with the Master of Military Art and Science Program. Conceived in 1962 while General Harold K. Johnson was Commandant, the program culminated twelve years later in August 1974, with degree-granting authority approved by Congress. A final step was made in March 1976 when CGSC became an institution fully accredited by the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools. This program was always viewed with special pride by Dr. Birrer, and it stands as the clearest indication of his achievement and contribution to the College.

In 1971-1972, Dr. Birrer played a key role in designing a new CGSC curriculum consisting of 60% common courses and 40% electives. This scheme was devised before the advent of the OPMS system and represented a clear move away from the traditional, generalist approach. It provided the basic framework for the development of the CGSC curriculum in the 1970's, and enabled the Leavenworth student to design a course of study that was more directly germane to his individual
needs. Out of all his achievements, Dr. Birrer considered this his most significant contribution to the long-term development of CGSC.

For more than twenty years, Dr. Birrer ran the Instructor Training Course for newly assigned members of the faculty. This gave him an early influence over the CGSC instructor, and enabled him to establish a very personal relationship with the officers who actually conducted the classes. Many of those friendships endured for decades, and some of his personal friends such as Generals Harold K. Johnson, John H. Hay, and John H. Cushman eventually returned to Fort Leavenworth as commandants.

Dr. Birrer's long-term influence over CGSC is almost unequalled, for his ideas and methods inexorably shaped the institution into its modern form. His influence, his intelligence, and his unequalled knowledge of the institution have provided the important spark and sense of direction essential to CGSC during many moments of important decision.
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Q: Sir, may we begin our interview with you describing when you came to Ft. Leavenworth and what positions you have held since you have been here?

A: I reported for duty on the 20th of January 1948. The specific title of the job for which I was selected was Statistical Consultant. When I came to work I was assigned to a large staff organization which was called Analysis and Research headed by a senior colonel. There were about ten senior people in the group, which later became a pretty famous group. It was headed by then Colonel Don Faith who was doubling as the acting assistant commandant. The assistant commandant was General William F. Dean, having departed three days before my arrival. Don Faith had been the director of Analysis and Research.

There was another civilian named Dr. Jacob S. Orleans who had an interesting title, Psycho-Educational Advisor. Dr. Orleans stayed with the college through the school year and then left to return to City College sometime during the summer of 1948. His position was filled for one year by Dr. Robert Davis who came to us on a year's leave of absence from the University of Colorado. That turned out to be kind of a debacle. Davis had never been around the Army before, and his wife didn't like it. He did not understand what was happening. When Davis left there was just no action to fill that position. I guess by default or maybe
The term "Educational Advisor" persisted, and I acquired the title. That would have been something like July of 1949.

That title remained with me, untouched, until 1971, at which time I was given an operational title in addition; it was called Director, Evaluation and Review, or DER for short. That held for about one year at which time it was apparent that we were going to get our degree granting legislation, and then the title became Director, Master of Military Art and Science. The other title we just sort of let drop out. The title later became Director of Graduate Degree Programs. All these titles have been held in conjunction with the title Educational Advisor. That particular title fell under disrepute throughout the TRADOC school system on 1 September 1977. Since that time — officially at least — I have had the title Director of Graduate Degree Programs. So, I will finish my 30th year at the Command and General Staff College on 19 January 1978.

Q: Let's go back, sir, and cover some personal data about yourself. When were you born? Where were you born? Where were you raised?

A: I was born the 24th day of March 1918 in a very small town of about 1100 or 1200 people. It is named Atwood, Kansas. You will find it in the far northwest corner of Kansas. It is a county seat town that borders on Nebraska, and a second county seat from Colorado. I grew up in the town, and went to elementary school and high school there.
I went to undergraduate college at Fort Hays Kansas State College at Hays, Kansas, which was the nearest college. From where I lived, it was about 150 miles. I pursued a degree in history-political science, and indeed finished all the necessary courses for a major in that area. But in my sophomore year I began to take courses in psychology, and by the time I got to be a senior it became apparent that I was going to have to follow that endeavor. By some negotiation, I switched majors at the last moment, and I actually got my baccalaureate degree in psychology in 1939.

Q: What did you do between 1939 and the next few years?
A: I went immediately to graduate school for two years at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts. For those days and for someone from my background, I went on what I thought was a pretty fabulous proposition. Clark University offered me an outright scholarship which paid all fees, and provided me with free room in what they called the faculty house. As I remember the first year, I received some $300 credit in the dining hall. This really meant that if I got there I could probably go almost with no expense. The following year was much the same thing. I finished my masters degree in 1940 in psychology, and then I went back in 1941 for another year. The doctoral programs at Clark required a big examination which they called, euphemistically, the preliminary examinations. We had five written examinations one day after another for five days. I finished that ordeal or obstacle in the spring of 1941.
I was tired of school and was too much uncertain about it, so I went into the draft board and told them to send me out on the next day. I went into the Army in August of 1941. I took my uniform off five years later in May, 1946, went back to Clark for one year and finished the PhD. It was May of 1947. Three or four months previous to that I had been accorded the compliment of being invited back to Fort Hays as a member of the Psychology Department. I accepted that offer with the restriction that they let me begin immediately to teach that summer. We had spent all of our meager earnings. I went back to Hays expecting to live a fairly respectable and normal life as a psychology professor and the director of the psychological clinic there. I did that during the summer and through the fall term, at which point we've already noted my plans were all changed. I was invited to join the college at Ft. Leavenworth.

Q: What did you do during World War II?

A: Well, I shouldn't say I enlisted, because that's not the right term. I simply said that everybody is going to war; just let me go on the next quota. I came into the reception center here at Ft. Leavenworth. The scheme in those days was to keep one here about three days, but in my case it turned out to be something like four weeks. The reason being that the reception center station had some special instruction for anybody who came through and who could be classified as a military psychologist. Under the MOS scheme of that day, I was entitled to that classification. So, I
was not sent out immediately. About three or four weeks later, I began to think something very spectacular was going to happen to Ivan Birrer. It didn’t. One day I was ordered to Ft. Riley to take basic training with the Cavalry Replacement Training Center.

When I got to Ft. Riley, I found out that there were five other young men who had been collected through this military psychologist program. We had all been sent there, and we went through basic training at Riley with kind of a special tag attached because in addition to basic training we worked at night in the classification office. What I really did was give tests. Upon completion of basic training, all six of us were assigned to the classification office of the replacement training center. We were to be watched and be observed to determine whether or not we should be sent to Officers’ Candidate School (OCS). It turns out that all six of us were. Three of us were sent to the Adjutant General’s OCS at Ft. Washington, Maryland. I finished there in September 1942. It was three days before we were married. Then I went back for another four weeks course, or something like that, at which time I was now presumably a qualified personnel consultant, which was an AGC officer that had certain psychological qualifications.

But again, I got a very unglamorous assignment out of that. The Army sent me to Huntsville, Texas, where the Army had taken over the campus of what is now Sam Houston State University, a very small state teachers college in those days in the sleepy little town of Huntsville, where I taught Army Administration to prospective army enlisted clerks. That school lasted about a year.
By now it was January 1944. The school at Huntsville was closed out, and I was sent to a prisoner of war camp in Monticello, Arkansas. I found myself as a personnel officer with a whole series of interesting problems with the Italian prisoners. Practically all the Italians that were captured by the western forces in North Africa were shipped there. I know, for example, there were 33 general officers, and that is quite a story in itself. The salty old colonel that was commanding the center was transferred to North Camp Hood to be the commanding officer of the first branch disciplinary barracks to be established for American prisoners. He had taken a liking to me, and he requested that I be sent to join him in the middle of 1944.

That got me to Hood. It turned out to be a very interesting challenge in that we were in an abandoned barbed wire prisoner of war camp. One night our prison population went from 0 to 500 with the arrival of a train from Leavenworth, and about a week later, from 500 to 1,000. They were supposed to be carefully selected. I think they selected the worst they had and sent them down to us. I served as the adjutant and classification officer. It was a very busy, very troublesome kind of thing.

By now I had become concerned about what kind of an answer I was going to give. 25 years later when my son was going to ask, "Dad, what did you do during the war?" I went home one night and told my wife that I had to figure some way to get out of this. I was just not going to say that I spent the whole war in Arkansas and Texas. Well, as the adjutant I read the incoming official
mail, and one day I saw this invitation for officers to apply to
attend what was then called the Command and General Staff School
at Ft. Leavenworth. As I read it, it was apparent to me that I
could qualify. So, I typed up an application. By then the colonel
that had recruited me, in a sense, had been transferred, and the
other one was perfectly willing to let me go.

I came up to Ft. Leavenworth in the late spring of 1945. I
thought somehow or other that if I could get to Leavenworth that
would get me away from the Service Command, which they then called
the area of CONUS installations. It would also get me out of the
prison business and into what was the real Army. CGSS was a tre-
mendously broadening experience for the young now-Army captain
that did not know very much about the Army. I could read and learn.
My hunch was right. The school was told to pick 300 or 400 officers
(I don't remember exactly how many it was) out of the class of about
1,500 for shipment to the Pacific. This was to man what was called
the Army Forces Western Pacific, which was the command that was
going to stage the Japanese invasion. And I was one of those selected.
I had all the right tickets - young, healthy, never been overseas,
and so on. I was really delighted about this.

In due time, I sailed out of San Francisco enroute to the Pacific.
The war ended either a couple days before or a couple days after-
wards. In any case, when I arrived at Manila everything was turned
around; there was going to be no Japanese invasion as such. One of
my Officer Candidate School colleagues had become an assignment
officer in the then-replacement training system, and we had
maintained some contact with each other. My name came up, and he knew that they had very recently moved up another branch disciplinary barracks from New Guinea all the way through the islands. It was under a different title and was called the Philippine Detention and Rehabilitation Center. It was some sixty kilometers southeast of Manila and in pretty terrible condition. I don't think they had anybody at all that knew anything about the prison business. So now here I was back again in the prison business. I spent another very unglamorous year, or just about a year, in the Philippines. By that time, under the point rotation system, I had enough to go home. That's the not-very exciting story of my military career.

As I said earlier, once I got out of the Army, I went back to school. I taught a semester and a summer term, and then I came to Ft. Leavenworth.

Q: Let me ask you a few questions about CGSS during the war. How was the school operated during that particular period?

A: It was really kind of three schools in one, which started at the same time. I was in the 24th class. There were 27 of them conducted in the shortened version of about 13 weeks. In the latter part of the war, where I had first-hand experience, the class was subdivided into what was called a ground class, an air class, and a service class. I was in the service section. We had about 250-300 officer students. We all sat in what is now the museum. The ground section by the time I was there was the biggest one, and it had the west end of Gruber Hall which was
split about 60/40. The air section had the 40. With about two exceptions, the groups were entirely separate. We did get together a couple of times for a sort of combined exercise.

I remember we sat in class seven hours a day, Monday through Friday, but we got a little break and got off with only six hours on Saturday. With the size of the class and the big kind of hall, the instructor, as you can imagine, did a great deal of formal lecturing. We got talked to, or we had some requirement to solve. After we had it solved, the instructor gave the solution. There certainly wasn't any real opportunity for any dialogue. We were seated in alphabetical order, and the young man sitting on my right was named Tom Bonner. Tom was a very bright young lad, an ordnance officer, with a graduate degree out of a major university. Like myself, he had always done well in school. The first day we sort of got to joking, and we made a little wager. The terms of it were that whoever got called on first lost the five dollars. I finally won the bet, the next to the last day of school. I never was called upon, I never volunteered anything (that is not really my nature), and Tom was only called upon once. I think that sort of tells you how they conducted the course.

Q: Did it require regular homework?
A: Well, not for me it didn't. I lived in one of the Doniphan apartments. There were about eight of us. I was in one of the long outside apartments, and my bunk was in the dining room. We also had a table, and I think five nights a week we played poker. I made a good bit of money.
For those of us for whom school came along fairly easy, or for those who had not been out of school that long, and that sort of thing—all we had to do was listen. They told you everything that you were supposed to know. For some of the other students, the logistics problems would just be horrendous. The relatively straightforward business of figuring replacement requirements, tons per man per day, build-up requirements, and that sort of business caused some people a great deal of difficulty. There was a certain aura, even in those days, about Leavenworth that this was really a significant, make-or-break, tough, demanding sort of institution. I did not find it this way.

Q: Let's begin with 1948. Would you describe some of the problems of the Command and General Staff School during that period. What was happening here at that particular time?

A: I mentioned earlier that when I came I was assigned to this large department called the Department of Analysis and Research. It was really kind of a misnomer; it was kind of a glorified college staff, which was presumably charged with assisting the deputy commander and trying to coordinate what was, even then, a complex structure. When I came in here, it's like anything else, you have to make the job or else somebody gives you something to do. Nobody exactly knew what I was supposed to do, so I kind of looked around.

One of the first things that came to my attention was that the college was struggling with the problem of using so-called "standard scores" as the bookkeeping system for its student evaluation program. I really didn't have anything to do with the decision to go
to standard scores. It had been proposed by the other civilian, Dr. Orleans, to the first post-war commandant, General Leonard T. Gerow, who had approved this. It was a question of implementation. We are still using that system today. Standard scores is the process of taking so-called raw examination test results and converting them into some kind of a standard notation system. In this case the one being used was an arbitrary mean of 100 with the standard deviation of 20. It's the same scheme that we've used throughout the Officer Efficiency Reports, or at least initially until they got inflated. The AGCT system is built the same. Just as an aside, the problem is that when you combine two or more sets of test marks, if you want to have a meaningful result, you need to have them both reduced to some kind of range. And it's worth noting that General Lesley J. McNair, while commandant, had discovered several years before, somewhat for himself, this well known fact about combining scores. He worked out what he called the "McNair Law of Merit." The "McNair Law of Merit" takes scores expressed in percent form, and keeps them in that same scale, but adjusts them in exactly the same fashion that Army standard scores adjusted them. The Army had done this for years at Leavenworth, but nobody ever knew about it because it still looked like percent scores. Standard scores are something else.

So, one of the first things I found myself involved with was trying to assist the people in the local Academic Records Branch to simplify the ways to do this fairly simple numerical procedure. But that got me into the question of student evaluation, which was
kind of a no-man's land. It wasn't very long before I became, not with title but in fact, the assistant commandant's special staff officer for student evaluation. I might say that that position has never changed; it still holds today. It was initially based upon the fact that I knew a little something about educational tests and measurements.

The next thing that I got involved with was somewhat related. For part of the course for some students in those days, there was a 20-or-30 hour block of very elementary educational measurements or psychological statistics. Some teachers were needed and that's how I first got my foot into a Leavenworth classroom as a teacher. These kinds of events kept me involved as I began to reacquaint myself with the institution. Remember now, I had been a student here not too long before, so much of what was going on was familiar to me.

The first substantial action that I had anything to do with came along about April 1948, just four months or so after I came. For this to make any sense, I have to back up and say a little bit about CGSC in its structure and configuration in 1948. The Commandant, General Manton S. Eddy, had arrived two days before I did. The Deputy Commandant was Colonel Don C. Faith, and he held that position for the first five or six months that I was here. In addition to that, the rest of the faculty was divided into what was called four schools - personnel, logistics, combined arms, intelligence - and each of them had a commandant and assistant commandant by title. As far as the student bodies were concerned,
everybody took the same program of study, which was a composite offering of these several departments through the first 32 weeks of the school year. Then in the last 12 weeks the class was divided into these four groupings which corresponded to the four schools. They either got in personnel, intelligence, combined arms, or logistics. But for the first 32 weeks of the common instruction, the class of 400 students all sat in one room in Gruber Hall. This was the same kind of program that I had attended not too long before.

Q: Do you say that in a negative sense?

Q: I guess I sort of implied that. But that's a little unfair, because some things were done very well. I don't want to discount those. Because the faculty was correspondingly as large then as it is now, and because a subject was only taught a single time, the sheer arithmetic will tell you that the amount of time that any single faculty member had to teach was very limited, and that's all he did. So, he would do it very, very well. It would be thoroughly rehearsed; it was a production number; it was platform performance with kind of a capital P. But it was very well done. I was, of course, convinced from my own experience that over time this was just no way to conduct a school program. It became kind of a physical endurance contest.

Although Dr. Orleans had never had this experience, this was his second year, and he had been observing the college. He became convicted on his own that he would do something about breaking up this pattern. So, in due time Dr. Orleans and I sat down and
co-authored a paper. I am probably being a little presumptuous when I say it that way; I think he wrote the paper and I probably provided some of the input and some of the argument of the document which was submitted over our joint signature to General Eddy. The paper recommended that the class be broken down into smaller sections. As I tell you the story I remember that a couple of days ago I read a Christmas card from Dr. Orleans commenting on my announced intention to retire. Along with some other very pleasant comments, he made reference to this paper that we co-authored which turned out to be a landmark in Leavenworth's history. Well, suffice it to say that the recommendation was adopted.

Q: Was that a paper or was it published as a study?
A: It was just a short memorandum addressed to the Commandant that proposed this. I can't really remember much more about it than that. I don't think I could even find a copy of the memorandum.

I do recall very well that there came the time when we were to get our audience. Remember I'm thirty years old, a little brash but still somewhat overwhelmed by 50-year-old colonels, to say nothing about a couple of generals. Here we were in this room with eight or ten or so of the major college people. General Eddy sat at one end, and we were there to discuss the Orleans-Birrer proposal. Everybody had been provided a copy of the paper, and I remember that as each member in turn got to speak, the general comment was, "Well, yes, this is a pretty good idea, but we really can't do it, because..." And then the "because"s went on one after another. I remember this reaction went half way down the...
row of six people, and I could see nothing but doom for this proposition. We turned the corner and the second one on my left was a Navy captain. He said something to the effect, "All of my colleagues before have said this was a good idea, but we can't do it, because... It strikes me that that's a contradiction in itself. If we believe it's a good idea, why don't we turn our attention to the question of trying to figure out how we can make it work." He said it more eloquently than that, I'm sure. All I can really remember is that General Eddy grabbed on to that, and from then on the whole matter turned around.

The specific action was to appoint a board headed by Colonel Stuart Wood not to decide the merits of the proposal; this now had been accepted. Specifically, the Wood Board was charged with determining what could be done to provide the physical facilities, the classrooms. They found that you could put six into McNair, by moving some partitions in there, and six into Muir Hall. When they found the twelve classrooms, that is how we got the 40-man class. We had 480 students, and when they were divided into twelve sections, this resulted in 40 students per section.

That was the first significant change in CGSS since World War II. General Eddy was followed by General Horace L. McBride. I guess if you look in the log you'd find that there is a short period of time where General Hartness, who had become the deputy commandant, served as the acting commandant to be replaced in time by General McBride.

Q: What were some of the problems encountered in implementing the 40-man classroom?
A: You remember that I explained that the faculty was divided into four schools, and this was before the War College was formed at Ft. Leavenworth. Well, when we decided to implement the Orleans small class proposal in May or June 1943, a new class was scheduled to start three months later. As an aside, I suppose when in subsequent years people around here told me something couldn't be done, no matter what it was, I have always been inclined to smile and say, "Well, it has been done." I am always referring to this implementation of the smaller sections, because this was really traumatic, and it occurred all at once.

Back to faculty organization. The first thing we did was kind of compound the problem, because it was decided that we would form a fifth element to do the common instruction. This new department was to be called the Department of Command and General Staff. It was going to do the whole job for 30 weeks, and what was going to be left of the other four smaller elements would do a ten week portion. It was a very big department. One of the first problems was that it became a kind of a status symbol. If you were selected to join the CGS Department, you made the first team. That caused some morale problems, especially when you recognize that the officers left in the other departments really had nothing to do throughout the whole school year until we got to the last ten weeks. It was a very inefficient way to run a railroad.

But now to get back to the question about the problem encountered when we tried to implement the smaller sections. Well, we picked out the people for the CGS Department, and it turns out that there were
about 80 people identified. That was determined to be about the fair share. It had already been decided that we were going to conduct the course in 12 classes. And I might say again that this first year we were going to do it all simultaneously. When you compare 12 with 80 or so, that sounds like you might be able to form six groups, but we had to have some supervisors. So, we decided that we would form five elements. The simplistic scheme envisioned that we would just teach one day in five. Furthermore, for the first year, and I literally saw this accomplished, they put together a set of 3 x 5 cards in which all the subjects were listed, and they actually just dealt them out. It was not quite one at a time, because you had to take into account the length of the subject. But they divided them up equally in terms of hours, and that is what each of the five elements taught. Since these same officers, or at least the old ones that had been on the faculty, had come from an entirely different experience where they had only a very small portion of the curriculum to teach, their curriculum content span suddenly was magnified probably 20 times. Moreover, since it was done with no attempt to associate like subjects together, that further compounded the problem. As I talk about it later, it seems clear that we should have done better than that, but we didn't.

I got my first brush with instructor training during this period. It wasn't exactly called that, but the designated head of this new faculty element was Colonel Robert N. Young, who later retired as a Lieutenant General. Bob Young quite correctly
perceived that this was not going to be business as usual for the faculty. He arranged to have a series of model classes taught in a 40-man section. This was late summer, Dr. Orleans was gone, and I was invited to sit in and critique the performance. I guess as I think about it, that was my first venture into instructor training. The model exercises were introductory kinds of things, and they became kind of what one would call recitations. But for the faculty member who had been engaged in nothing but one-way communication, that small step was a pretty sizable change in scheme.

Q: Are you saying the college was doing much better, despite some of the problems?

A: I am convinced we did better that first year. Jokingly around here, we said, "Never did the faculty learn so much." I think that's literally true. Maybe this was the result that we were looking for, but I only know one person that really believed that this was not a tremendous step in the right direction.

To pursue that a little farther, one of the mistakes we made, though, was that we got people spread out too far. Over time came some developments which narrowed this range of content. One of the simple things to do was make some effort to group the lessons assigned to each faculty element according to some kind of commonality, especially those that required some kind of specialized knowledge. The first kind of group that fell out were those who were dealing with amphibious warfare or airborne operations. It wasn't very long before one of those elements became the Airborne Department. In due time we also saw some other things happen.
Somebody figured out that you really did not have to teach all 12 classes at one time; you might do six at a time, and that cut it down to a half. We did that for a couple years, and then we went down to a so-called Four-Platoon System that prevails today. Over time we began to develop some proficiency, if you will, in conference leadership within the classroom.

Q: Did you have any influence over that?

A: I don't think I can claim any credit for that in the early period. There were some other people who were important, especially an officer named Paul Bogen who probably deserves the major by-line.

I got into instructor training in a big way just a little bit later. I would like to think that maybe I encouraged this along. But given a couple of years the old method, or at least the Gruber Hall thing, had been demolished. We taught in McNair and Muir Hall for a couple of years. At that time the Army wanted to increase the college to 800 students. General McBride was the commandant, and he said we could do it. But we could only do it if they would let him modify Gruber Hall to put in folding doors. That $300,000 project is what put the so-called folding doors in Gruber Hall in about 1953 or 1954. That's where the college functioned until 1959.

Q: Can you describe the period when the War College was at Ft. Leavenworth?

A: One of General Manton Eddy's last tasks at Leavenworth was to head the Eddy Board which was charged with a rather interesting mission of determining (and this is almost the words of the directive) was it desirable or necessary for the Army to reestablish
its Army War College, and if so, where should it be? It was clear from the directive that the answer to the first question was supposed to be yes, and the answer of the Eddy Board to the second question was that it initially should be at Ft. Leavenworth. It was also presumed by the Board that Eddy would stay here as the joint commandant. But he was promoted and moved out to command a corps, I guess, in Europe. General Joe Swing came up from Ft. Sill to be the War College commandant. General McBride became the CGSS commandant. It was a difficult time for CGSS, because the senior officer was General Swing. He had almost a blank check to do what he wanted with the college. He could take the people that he wanted. For all practical purposes, he brought some in, but mostly sort of divided up the CGSS faculty. This thing went on for a year until the War College moved to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

Q: Was the friction that existed on the post one of the reasons for the move?
A: No, I think the move was always going to happen. The friction was just because the War College students and faculty were given tremendous advantages not available to others.

Probably a few words about the curriculum during this period are in order if we are going to trace along the line of the CGSS curriculum. Earlier I said that CGSS consisted of 32 weeks of common instruction and 10 weeks of so-called specialized instruction. At the end of this the class was divided into four groups. The specialized instruction could be characterized generally as Department of the Army-level instruction. Specialized personnel instruction,
for example, dealt with requirements, distribution, the whole business of raising and recruiting, and controlling the Army at what we now call the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) level. Intelligence instruction, for example, was just strategic intelligence.

The Edgy Board's notion was that they could start the War College at Leavenworth quite readily by the somewhat simple process of taking those four 10 week courses and just combining them into a year-long curriculum of 40 weeks. As a matter of fact, that's not at all what General Swing did. But for CGSS it's important to note that on the supposition that it would happen, that material was taken out of the Leavenworth curriculum. Now I might say, and we'll come back to this a little bit later, what happened to CGSS in terms of the 10 weeks. To over simplify the case, the curriculum was, if you will, in kind of a figurative sense, moved forward. Ten weeks of new material was put in front of the old CGSS curriculum. It was now a full school year long, but it ended where the common curriculum used to end. The problem being then, to a degree, as is now: there is always material that somebody thinks everybody needs to have, and needs to have early. If you have got 10 weeks, it will be filled up very quickly. CGSS was just sort of in a holding pattern during the year the War College was here. Nothing much really changed under the leadership of General Henry L. Hodges. He was a very strong and impressive person, and he would have been here about 1953-54.

Q: Let's talk about CGSC during the period of the Korean War.
A: About the only thing that I remember of any special significance during the Modes Regime is somewhat anecdotal. One day General Modes received an inscribed letter from General Billy Palmer in Korea. Palmer was a Corps Commander at the time. In the course of the letter, he added a couple of sentences which said something very close to these words: "I don't know how well you train your students to do my job, all I know is you don't train them very well to do their job." Later, we found out what had happened. A Leavenworth graduate of a couple of years or so earlier, serving on Palmer's staff, had something to do with preparing orders. In the process of getting ready to issue an order, he made the mistake of digging out of the file or out of the book shelf a model of the order format. According to General Palmer this was prima facie evidence that he didn't know what to do. With this kind of encouragement, we had a period of flurry, which culminated in an examination (in the form of student evaluation) which consisted of an operation order exercise which was graded almost entirely in terms of the niceties in operations order writing techniques. The reaction from the class, as you can well understand, was not very positive. I think that's about all I recall during that period.

Q: Did the Korean War affect the curriculum at all, in terms of changing its content?

A: I don't think so. We were still very much oriented toward Europe. I just don't recall any significant data about that.

Q: A couple years ago, when I was putting together some data on the CGSC, I noticed that during the period of the Korean War there
was a tremendous upsurge in the number of hours devoted to tactics instruction. Was that the result of General Palmer's criticism, or was that the result of the loss of the War College hours?

A: It was primarily the latter. It's one of those hidden things that without the explanation doesn't make sense. The material that was added at the front of the CGSS curriculum was primarily material relating to the so-called Army in the field which kind of can fall in a broad category. It was predominantly division-level instruction.

We did, of course, have a sizable amount of hours devoted to formal map problems of the corps, and even field army. The specialized instruction relating to tactics under the category of Combined Arms (one of the four major groupings) really had to deal with what today we probably call force development.

Q: Was there any plan that the War College would have taken that package of instruction on Combined Arms?

A: General Eddy thought the War College should have been responsible for some of it. This was one of the real differences between General Swing's concept and the Eddy concept. Now, I'm convinced that had the War College started here under General Eddy, there would have been some tactical instruction at the field-Army level, maybe theater and perhaps even the corps level. There would have been some kind of interrelationship between that and the CGSS offerings. Under General Swing it was going to be entirely different, even for no other reason than that he just was not going to have anything to do with CGSS. There was a break there, a severance that probably has never been completely healed.
Q: Were there any attempts during this early period to create a separate logistics school or tactics school at Ft. Leavenworth?

A: In a sense we had that. We had so-called specialized instruction, as I pointed out to you, for those first three or four post-war years. After the common instruction, a student took specialized instruction that was all logistics, all intelligence, all personnel, or all combined arms, although that was something of a misnomer.

We gave this up with the Eddy Board, now that I think of it. I was not a member of the Eddy Board, but I got to travel around with them a good bit and do some special studies for the board. I simply went to the trouble once of comparing the area specialization at Leavenworth with the Department of Army staff assignment for those graduates who went to DA. Since three or four years had gone by, there had been a fairly sizable number who had received the specialized instruction. What I remember very vividly is that the results were that your assignment at DA was seemingly completely unrelated to your instruction at Ft. Leavenworth. You didn't improve or lessen your chances of going to DCSPER by specializing in personnel, for all practical matters. When I showed General Eddy these figures, he used them as an argument for the fact that the scheme of tagging people for this just would not work. That's how we got rid of the thing. It came back in later with an option for a while to have either a logistics or tactics concentration at the end of the course just for the reserves. Well, that really didn't make any sense. After a while, people gave that one up, too.
Certainly for the last 30 years or so, there has been a periodic call for a "Logistics Leavenworth" someplace. We have always argued that that would be a mistake, or at least it would be a mistake if it meant that you would take the logisticians out of Leavenworth. You might still want to have another school for the specialists, but there ought to be someplace where the combat service support people and the combat arms people are side by side. That has always been the argument. It seems to me that whenever we finally get down to any really threatening position, that argument has always prevailed.

Q: Do you have any other points that you would like to cover?

A: There are a couple of points I did not mention that merit some attention because of their subsequent influence or effect here at the college. One of these, and I would guess probably the most important one, is that in 1952 or 1953 I was temporarily given the responsibility for instructor training program primarily in the area of student evaluation. The heart of the program was, of course, a purely military affair, and this was in the day, at least at Fort Leavenworth, when a civilian was still some kind of a strange and not necessarily trustworthy breed. But the officer who was in charge of instructor training was pulled away to some special affair, and as a result, just by default, I was asked to take over. Frankly, once I got my hands on that operation, I
carefully held on through 1975, because I had known for a long time that if I had a chance to have essentially the first contact with the incoming faculty it was as good an opportunity as any to influence the course of events at CCSC. Moreover, that made me known to all members of the faculty on a very intimate basis. A good many of my contacts, friendships, and associations stem directly from that arrangement.

The other item that I want to talk about had to do with the design of Bell Hall. The anecdote I will relate occurred when General McBride was the commandant and Max Johnson the assistant commandant. One Tuesday morning my phone rang, and I was told to be in the office of the assistant commandant at ten o'clock; this was about 8:30. I arrived a few minutes early to find two other officers, Colonel Jack Boyle and LTC Paul Bogen already waiting. The three of us were obviously all invited together. We got into Johnson's office, sat down, and he said, "Let me read you this telegram." It was from the office of the area engineer, the district engineer I guess, in Kansas City. The telegram said, in effect: "Have been awarded $35,000 to do the preliminary design for the proposed academic building at CGSC. Require the design criteria. Request I be furnished the design criteria by 'such and such a date.'" The date was the following Monday. Johnson turned to us and said, "You constitute the three-man committee to do the design criteria, and you have until Friday." This was Tuesday!
We had all the guidance we were going to receive, so we left the office quickly. My office was the nearest to Hill's Johnson's, so we congregated there and said, "Now what do we do?" One of the first problems was that we really did not know what was meant by "design criteria." Two of us, Paul Bogen and I, were fortunately serving at the time on the local school board, and we had constructed the first of the dependent schools. Thus, we knew an architect. We called the architect and told him the story, and he gave us some very practical advice on what to put in, and what not to put in, and what kind of a document they were looking for.

You are not going to be surprised when I tell you that the report we submitted on Friday was submitted to the area engineer the following Monday. Based upon the information in that document, the architect actually designed the building. Now, I am not talking about the configuration. What we were responsible for was specifying what we wanted to be able to do in the classrooms. We did not know how to do it, but we knew what we wanted to accomplish. We put it in those kind of terms. Several months later when the architect was actually appointed, we got the committee together, and he came up to see us. After he arrived, he said, "I don't really understand what you have said here. No one has ever built a classroom that does this, and we don't know how to go about it." Our answer was, "We don't know how to go about it, either, and we know there isn't another one; but nevertheless, that's what we want to accomplish."
Q: What was it you wanted to accomplish?

A: We simply wanted the Bell Hall classroom to be equipped to
do the kinds of things in terms of projection, graphics and
whatever, which are there today, and which we take for granted
today. In 1953, however, that capability was unknown. For
example, no rear view projection instrument had ever been made;
all of them had the old keystone effect in terms of transparency
illumination. In 1978, as we are talking, it is hard for me to
believe that 24 years ago we were beyond the state of the techno-
logical art in terms of audio-visual techniques.

We had a big argument in the committee with respect to the
faculty wing of Bell Hall. I argued that it was unreasonable to
try to design a faculty wing to fit the organization existing at
that time. I knew that the organization was going to be different
when the building was built. A more pragmatic view was that if
you are ever going to get it past the assistant commandant, you
have to put his organization into it. When Bell Hall was built,
and as you well know, the faculty wing was a series of seven
repeating patterns of a combination of offices, conference rooms,
and whatever. Ivan Birrer's view prevailed, if that is how you
went to put it. It was not any great wisdom on my part; the fact
that we have had every conceivable kind of organization to fit in
the building speaks for itself.
At the suggestion of the architect we finally wrote that we wanted the building—and I'm using his words—"contemporary functional." When I asked him what that meant he said, "Well, that means that they don't have to pull out the Corps of Engineers' massive building forms; they can use some of the newer version building schemes on Bell Hall." As I look back on it now, I am very proud of the part I played on that committee.

Q: Why was Bell Hall placed in this particular location? Why not in some other location?

A: There was, of course, some discussion about its location at the time of the actual design. The only other serious candidate for the space was that area where the new post hospital was subsequently built. Indeed, that was the first choice of many, but that spot had been designated as the some-day post hospital many years in advance, and the post surgeon simply would not listen to any such scheme. Then you had the possible choice of what we called the polo field, just south of Doniphan Avenue. There really is not any way to get in and out there without tearing down the houses; that seemed to be pretty infeasible and probably too small. The third area that we had some discussions about was someplace around Sherman Airfield. Meanwhile, over here where the building presently sits, there was a fairly high hill, nothing on
it except a little old, essentially unused arsenal. The people that made this kind of decision just simply said that was the better place for it. As a practical matter, not much was really required except to cut down the hill.

Q: What about the design of the building itself, sir? Why are there 24 classrooms? Why not 12 or 18?

A: That's very easy. The 24 classrooms were prescribed in the original design criteria paper that we talked about earlier. But that wasn't the Committee's idea. The Committee knew that there was another planning document, which probably had been part of the backup material for the appropriation requisition. It was a plan to have at some time in the future 850 students in the regular course, 300 in the associate course, and 50 students in the special weapons course. When you add that up, that's 1200, and you divide by 50 and get 24.
INTERVIEW TWO

3 January 1978

Major General Garrison H. Davidson, 1954-1956

Beginning of Modern Era
CGSC and Doctrine Formulation
Educational Survey Commission of 1956
Improvement of Instructional Methods
Combat Developments
Naming Bell Hall

Major General Lionel C. McGarr, 1956-1960

Environment for Change
Atomic Battlefield
/8 Coordinating Group
Three-Hour Block Concept
Small Group Instruction
Improvement of Instructional Methods
Student Evaluation Process
Departmental Reorganization
Introduction of Educational Subjects
Curriculum Planning
The "Back Door Group"
Special Weapons Class
Q: What happened while General Garrison H. Davidson was here?
A: In my view, the Davidson regime is the start of what I would call the modern Leavenworth. Consequently, the college was an outgrowth of the World War II Command and General Staff School, but considering the many things that had happened, there had been a sort of gradual change. With General Davidson, it seems to me, the college came to a point where we made some marked turns.

During my tour here, Davidson was the first commandant that had never been to Leavenworth. He was proud of saying that he had never been sent to any school in the Army except to cooks’ and bakers’ school. When he came here, his preceding command was as the Commanding General of the Weapon System Evaluation Group or WESEG for short. Subsequently, he arranged to have his deputy at WESEG join him. William Train became the assistant commandant, and he of course subsequently acquired much fame in his own right. Perhaps because he had not been here, Davidson brought a new look—one sort of not hampered by the "old school tradition." Interestingly enough, a couple of other general officers who had never been here before also produced sizable insights. I am not sure what that proves; it is just a statement of fact.

But anyway back to Davidson. He spent a few short months, as I recall, making what I would call his estimate of the educational situation, and that estimate produced a couple of conclusions. These two conclusions, as we will see, were the basis of most of the actions which he took. One of these conclusions was that somehow or other, Leavenworth did not have the "place in the doctrinal sun,"
if you will, that he thought was not only appropriate but was essential. He argued that the Army had to wrest doctrinal initiative away from the hardware merchants. This was, I think, the influence of his WESEC experience. As he looked around, Leavenworth just was not providing the push, or the initiative, or the influence that he thought it should. We were content kind of to be "retailers" here. Secondly, his conclusion or his estimate was that CGSC was still much too much a World War II training school for staff officers. It had to make a substantial move in the direction of becoming the graduate professional school for career development for the senior commanders. It was almost an elitism notion that General Davidson carried around.

He was here only two years, and I would say he spent about the first six months deciding how he saw the matter. It was not very long before he began to share his initial writings with me. I guess that is a way of saying that by now I had acquired enough age and, hopefully, wisdom and perhaps maturity and something of a reputation that I had begun to really function as, if you will, the title suggested, as an educational advisor.

I can think of three specific actions by Davidson that had a long-term influence. One of these was that early in his tenure I had an occasion to point out to him that the first post-war commandant, General Cerow, had seen fit to cause the formulation of what was termed an Educational Survey Commission. In this case a group of educators—all civilians—were to make their own independent review of the college operations and make suggestions for improvement. I simply suggested to Davidson that it was now nine years later, and it might be appropriate to do that again. He immediately latched upon
this idea and took the steps necessary to formulate the Educational Survey Commission in 1955. He did it differently, since he decided that it would make the Commission half military, half civilian. The three military members were all World War II Corp commanders: Manton S. Eddy, a former commandant here; Troy H. Middleton, Battle of the Bulge fame; Geoffrey Keyes, who had been Patton's G3 or Chief of Staff. All were colorful guys in their own right. As for the three civilians, he asked me to suggest some names, and he took my three suggestions. I suggested he invite Dr. Jacob S. Orleans, who had been my predecessor here; Harold Harding, who was in the Speech Department at Ohio State University but who had been helping us with instructor training; and Harry S. Douglas of the School of Education at the University of Colorado. The Commission really became my project. The members of the Commission, for the most part, agreed that I should draft the report and send it around to them. Consequently, there is a lot of Ivan Binner in the report, but it was over their names. The report was actually filed almost coincidentally with Davidson's transfer, so its direct effect is a part of the McGarr story. All I want to imply here is that the action was a Davidson initiative.

The second thing that I ought to say something about was Davidson's frontal attack on instructional methods. He formed a three-man committee, and told us he thought CGSC was behind and out-of-date, and ought to get caught up with instructional methods and curriculum design. The chairman of the committee was a military officer named Skinner, a hard scientist not really interested in schooling. As a matter of fact, it was sort of a terminal assignment: he was about to retire. The third member kind of floated in
and out, so I became the permanent member of the committee. Moreover, I was more interested in it than anything else. It gave me an opportunity to tackle what I had perceived to be an almost pernicious practice around here; that being, we were constantly filling up all of our curriculum time by the infusion of more informational material. I had become convinced that somehow or another we had to stop that. At the same time, this opportunity could be combined with Davidson's notion to move the institution, if you will, along the educational continuum. One day I sat down and wrote out what later became known around here as a "three-phase curriculum concept." The concept simply said that our curriculum can be conceived as beginning with a fundamental phase, followed by some application of that learning, and then capped off with what I proposed to call "advanced application". In describing advanced application, we said that during that period of the curriculum no new material was to be introduced. Rather, the students were to be completely immersed in using previous information, knowledge, and procedures in problem-solving activity. We tried this out on the Educational Survey Commission; it made some sense to them, and we got an endorsement. It became a cornerstone of the McGarr regime, but it started under Davidson. Indeed, I feel very strongly that Garr Davidson's influence at Leavenworth has never really been thoroughly appreciated.

Lastly, and the one thing that Davidson really got accomplished, because he could do it on his own and at once, was that he made a very substantial investment of officer resources in combat developments. The CACDA of 1978 is a direct descendant of the Department of Combat Developments that Davidson initiated in 1955. Moreover, he personally went to them—the various personnel managers and the old technical
chefs of the Army—and convinced them that they ought to provide 30
in national units and the people to man this affair. It was
in their interests and that was accomplished. Again, I do not
think the origin of the current CACDA is a very well understood
story.

Q: Would you be more specific in terms of what this Combat Develop-
ments Department actually did?

A: They were charged with the production of training literature
and the conduct of studies—either self-initiated or assigned by
other headquarters—of a doctrinal nature. If you were to combine
the current Training Literature Directorate with CACDA, you would
have the functions.

Q: Why did he think it was that important to have that function here
at Fort Leavenworth, or with the classroom?

A: I am speculating a little I guess, but he was convinced that there
was a void and that nobody in the Army was providing the leadership
in this area. Hence, by default, it was all coming from, as he put it,
either the hardware merchants or the commercial think tanks. Leaven-
worth had to be the place for filling this void. I remember at the
time thinking, "Well, I agree with him." But it was especially
surprising, seems to me, that he would come to this conclusion. That
got was entirely independent; I had nothing to do with that. I
think that was entirely Garr Davidson's own idea, having never been
to Leavenworth. But it has obviously had very significant long-term
influence.

It was during the Davidson regime that Congress at long last
appropriated the money to build Bell Hall. It might well have been
built under the Nades regime except that at the time it would have
been built without air conditioning. General Nades very wisely said,
"No, if we can't get it right, we don't want it at all." The money
was appropriated not long before Davidson's departure; indeed, I
think he already had his orders. He went from here to be the West
Point Superintendent.

I might say something in passing, about that, too. Davidson
told me once that he hated to leave here after two years because he
was just about to get some things accomplished. He said, "The only
job that they could offer me that I would have gone to willingly was
West Point." He had this tremendous attachment to the Academy.

Anyway, we got the money; the new academic building was going
to be built. Davidson called me in one day and said that one of the
last things he wanted to get done before he left was to get the place
named. My task was to propose the name for the building. Obviously,
it should be named for a prominent soldier who had some connection
with the institution. I did a bit of library research, and I dis-
covered this man, James Franklin Bell. I took his name in and said,
"Here's the man". Carr Davidson said, "That's right!" He read it
over, and that is how Bell Hall got named. It was named before they
had dug the first hole, but once the name was decided upon it was
very difficult for anyone else to change it. No one tried. That is
about the end of the Davidson regime. He made one subsequent visit
to Leavenworth, but that was a good many years later and ought to
be told in the context of time.

Q: Would you cover some of the major events during the reign of
General Lionel C. McGarr?

A: Lionel C. McGarr was the commandant from 1956-1960. He was
certainly one of the more colorful and controversial commandants during my time here. I think what I should probably do is endeavor to describe and recreate the circumstances at the time in order for this story to make any sense. When McGarr came to Fort Leavenworth, as I subsequently found out, he had been given some very definitive march orders which were, in substance, "Go out there and get Leavenworth into the present century." The implication was that it was very old-fashioned. He came in the summer, and a new school term was to commence in just a month or so. Obviously, he could do little or nothing about that year, which was school year 1956-57. His mark was going to be in 1957-58 or, as he called it, 1/8. It was not very long before he announced that 1957-1958 was going to be all new, all different and, in every respect, better.

I suppose it always happens that the person at the time gets the blame or the credit for more than is really due to him. I am really talking about the special circumstances existing at the time. The special circumstances in this instance were that the Army for school year 58 had a new division, the Pentomic Division; just by itself, that was necessarily going to require the revision and substantial change of every Leavenworth tactical problem. Secondly, it was decided (and again this was going to be for school year 58) about a third of the way or half way through school year 57 that henceforth all so-called CONARC courses would display "active atomic", as we then called it, as typical and non-active atomic as atypical. That pronouncement would have itself required a substantial revision of a large portion of the Leavenworth curriculum.

Q: What was the previous approach?

A: In previous years, the typical tactical problem emphasized the
conventional battlefield. We had had a couple of problems in which we said, "Okay, now what happens if we have atomics". The answer was to spread out the frontages and increase the depths. But this was only a small variation of the theme. For 1957-58, we were going to change the rules completely. I remember saying at the time, "It's just like somebody saying that now we're going to play the whole game by professional football rules, whereas before we had played by college rules." And the game is somewhat different.

With those two changes, the doctrinal Bible FM 100-5 was essentially overtaken by events, and something had to be written to replace it. The manual was rewritten here, but Jack Cushman can tell you that story much better than I can. But we were going to have great turbulence at Leavenworth under the very best set of circumstances. I will leave it to someone else to decide whether or not McGarr accentuated the turbulence by the way he did it, or whether indeed he took the necessary actions that were required in order to affect the changes that had to come about. You can argue either way. At the time, I would have been very ready to say the former—that he made it worse. A good many years ago, I began to revise my judgment to the point that it probably took some kind of violent action just to move the institution and overcome all the initiative which was built into it.

But in any event, what he did was start out with what he first called a "/8 coordinating group." This group of people were charged, as the name suggests, with the planning for the all-new program. The chairman was Ward Ryan, who would later retire as a general officer. Initially, I was viewed by McGarr as one of the opposition, one of the hold-overs of another regime—obviously opposed to progress and
change. I do not think I ever knew at the time what it was that changed this around; but suffice it to say that in just a few short months, I became at least an associate member of the /8 coordinating group. I became one of the McGarr team.

Indeed, I will forget it if I do not mention it now. I probably never was more embarrassed at Leavenworth than on McGarr's last staff meeting. In front of the staff, he turned to the assistant commandant, General Cunningham, and almost issued an order. "Cunningham, don't let Harold K. Johnson change a thing around here without Ivan Birrer's approval." It was a great implied compliment, but very inappropriate at the time. Well, back to 1956. As the scheme for 1957-58 began to develop, more and more people got added to the /8 coordinating group. And then pretty soon, new departments for 1957-58 began to be created, and people got transferred over as they were chosen. The "die-hards" were for the most part department directors of the past regime. These department directors, for the most part, just remained over to one side conducting the course with ever-dwindling resources, and just being recognized as the vestige of another regime. You can understand that this had to produce internal discord and conflict. A lot of people got caught in the middle of the contest. While you could draw the charts nice and neat, and say that on such and such a day, this officer would go from the old Department Two to the new Department of Infantry Divisions, he might physically move his desk, but he would have some residual instructional responsibilities. This became very awkward. We almost had to choose up sides. In any case, that is how we set out to do it.

When it became apparent to me that McGarr was going to be able to pull this off, that is to say he was indeed going to produce
essentially a brand new program for 1957-59, I realized that there
was an opportunity to effect what I had long thought would be a real
improvement in the Leavenworth curriculum. Up to that time, the
numbered subjects (using the terminology of the day) that made up the
curriculum ran the gamut from one hour packages to forty hours. But
however long they were, they were designed so that they started and
ran without interruption. It was a management monstrosity. I had
thought this for some time. Then one day out of McGarr’s office
came a little memorandum— that was the way he would communicate with
the coordinating staff—in which he said that he envisioned that on
any single school day the student would study material from more
than one department. With that I sat down and wrote out the concept
which became known around here as the "Birrer three-hour block."
All I said was that as long as we are going to rewrite the curriculum
anyway, and in order to be able to follow the scheme of doing two
different kinds of things on one day, let’s just decide to package
everything in three-hour lessons. The notion was that every author
would know that he would have a solid half day for his subject on
any day it would be presented, but it would be at least another day
before the students got the next lesson. There was nothing very
spectacular about this idea, obviously, except that it put order into
the arrangement and made it possible for us to carry out that part of
the McGarr dictum calling for variety in instructional content. I
thought at the time, and I still believe, that we ought to have
some kind of standard building block. It seems to me just common
sense to do it that way. We have regressed somewhat on this scheme,
but there is still some vestige of it, and it goes back to the
McGarr regime.
School year 1956-57 was a very turbulent year. By the time spring rolled around, I got a planning memorandum that said I would conduct a two-week workshop to be participated in by all members of the 1957-58 faculty. That again tells you something; those that had not been transferred were being given up on. I really was not told what to do with this time; I was just given what amounted to two-weeks' time on everybody's time to use however I wanted. What I decided to do was hammer out some practical experience for the instructors in two areas that I thought were going to be given more importance under the McGarr regime than heretofore. One was that the author was now going to be assigned a three-hour block, and he ought to get some practice in terms of how much content, could really be covered in this period of time. We spent about half of our time on authorship problems. By that time it had also become apparent that we were going to make some rather expensive use of what we learned to call workgroups, although at that time we were talking about it in terms of small group instruction.

In the course of these ventures into small group instruction, we demonstrated a couple of practical requirements. Remember, we were going to conduct this first year, 1957-58, and half of the next year in Gruber Hall. Bell Hall was just being constructed. Gruber Hall had large, rectangular classrooms which were equipped with nurse's desks to serve as the student's desk. One of the things that we demonstrated to everyone's satisfaction in the workshop was that, if we were serious about making rather extensive use of the workgroup, we had to do something about the classroom furniture. You could only sit behind half of the nurse's desk and you just could not move those heavy desks around easily. When you got them together, you
could use only half the space. And that's how we got the 3 X 6 foot tables.

We also demonstrated in the workshop that we had to do something about dividing up the classroom. The problem at Gruber Hall was the same problem with Bell Hall; you had a big classroom designed to handle 50 or 60 people as a package. What did you do if you just wanted to use a fourth of it? In the workshop we tried out some wooden dividers. That did not work very well; and that is how we got the acoustical curtains. Bell Hall was being constructed at the time. The design had been for the 50-man classrooms, and we actually moved those curtains over here. It did not work much better in Bell Hall than it worked in Gruber Hall, but at least it was better than nothing. That is the only real change that was made in the original Bell Hall design.

Let me return to the 1956 Educational Survey Commission. After General McGarr assumed command, one of the first action documents on his desk was the report of this commission. He read the report, and he decided he was really going to focus on two points identified by the commission. I quote from the report (page 5): "The Commission believes that the typical college instructional methods are not completely harmonious with the College educational mission. Specifically, it considers that, on the whole, the present College classroom methods are more suited to the branch schools and undergraduate training than to the best graduate schools. The Commission recommends that: (a) the Phase III curriculum concept be energetically developed and imaginatively pursued, (b) the college experiment with practical variations of the typical map exercise." It was not long before I found myself as chairman of a committee charged by McGarr with the
The mission to design new instruction methods was an interesting operation. After all, what is new under the educational sun? What we eventually concluded and sold to McGarr was the notion that we had gotten into the pattern of doing the same thing all the time, and that there were certainly a number of variations that ought to be encouraged. The practical way to correct this was to give the faculty not only a loose rein but kind of a target to shoot for, and to applaud anyone who would work out a different variation of the prevailing pattern of instruction. The other way to correct this was to quit trying to solve the problem by prescription: to prescribe so much lecture, so much practical exercise, or whatever. I said to McGarr, "Let's just cut that nonsense out, because it doesn't make any sense here anyway. Any one of Leavenworth's lessons is a whole pattern of a variety of different kinds of things, and what you call it really depends on the terms you chose. Let's just encourage everyone to try to put together content, methods, equipment and procedures in the most efficient kind of way and not worry about the labels. Then we can encourage and reward those that step out." I think we made some real progress in methods when we took that kind of action.
It was a troublesome matter for the committee, however, because we had a very explicit order. But I did not want to recommend a specific method of instruction.

The other part of the Educational Survey Commission's report that McGarr focused upon was its condemnation, if you will, of the student evaluation process. Let me read a sentence from the report (page 5): "The Commission believes that the determination and report of a class rank and the formal examination program operated for that purpose have a detrimental influence on students' learning and their capacity for independent judgment that greatly exceeds any gain that might originally have accrued therefrom. The Committee considers the class rank-examination program the most significant weakness of the college. It recommends that: (a) The process of determining and reporting class rank be discontinued. (b) The formal examination program designed to produce grades be abolished and that an informal testing program designed to reveal student learning be substituted therefore." In part, this probably reflected Dr. Orleans' views; but it more probably reflected the consensus of the three general officers on the commission. And it also kind of agreed with Gar Davidson's views. When I wrote this part, I was trying to be a good recorder, not because I necessarily believed or disbelieved it. I really just had not made up my mind about this. McGarr came out with a split vote on this; he insisted we were going to have an examination system to establish class rank, but we were not going to do it with a formal examination program. We were going to have to have a different type of a testing scheme, and that was a pretty troublesome matter.

In addition to the turbulence which was going to be involved by virtue of atomic weapons and the new division, CGSC had the problem...
of new methods resulting from the Educational Survey Commission.

I don't think there was any question that by 1960 CCSC had digested
these matters. The faculty had modernized the curriculum content
as appropriate; we made some progress in terms of breaking the ever-
recurring 50-man requirement, solution, discussion routine; and by
1960 the die-hards had long since rotated and the faculty had been
reconstituted. I later came to the conclusion that General McGarr
was just the man the college needed at the time.

Q: You mentioned there were some problems in implementing the small
group method in General McGarr's regime. What specifically were
some of the problems?

A: Remember now, for the previous ten years, for all practical
purposes, the entire course had been taught in classrooms of first
40 and then up to 55 students, with a single instructor in the class-
room conducting what was called by some "lecture/conference". If
you wanted to describe what really went on in the classrooms, the
students were seated one student to a desk--the nurses' desks that
I mentioned earlier--and were told to solve a requirement. They all
did them separately. Subsequent to that, the instructor called upon
one or more to present their solutions. In the course of events, the
instructor indicated what the College solution to the requirement was.
That pattern then constantly repeated itself day after day, so you
had quite an instructor-dominated classroom on a one-to-fifty re-
lationship. There was discussion by the students, but the restraints
of time would necessitate that certainly not very many members of
the students would be allowed to express their views on any single
requirement. Let's not again forget the fact that the classrooms
being used had been specifically designed for just this kind of
operation. The training aids were all big enough to be seen at the back of the room.

When we were told in a policy statement that for school year 1957-58 we were going to make extensive use of the small class instruction technique, we faced the difficult problem of figuring out how we were going to implement the policy. Earlier, I talked about the series of instructor workshops I was directed to conduct, and indeed it was during those workshops that we really hammered out how we were going to implement the policy for small class instruction. We knew how to do what we had been doing but we were not sure how to implement small class instruction. One of the problems, and I will just tick it off again, had to do with the facilities that you need just to make the method work. We have already noted that we had to get rid of the student desks and replace them with the tables which could be moved around, but more importantly with tables that people could put their legs under wherever they sat. That was the practical problem. We needed to find some way to divide up the classroom to cut down the distraction of noise, and curtains were the makeshift solution. For the most part, that system still exists.

However, the real problem had to do with the lesson design itself, and there were a number of subordinate or related problems. A year later I knew what the problems were but initially I did not. We made every mistake in the book, you see, stemming from General McGarr's mandate that we would go to small group discussion—no matter what.

First, it was decided to use the small group process for a lot of requirements that simply did not lend themselves to discussion.
As I sit here in 1979 and talk about it, it is very obvious that we were often dealing with something that could generally be described as facts, techniques, and procedures. There really is not any point in discussing these. If you are going to teach the titles of the paragraphs of the five-paragraph field order, I suppose you might talk about what they might be, but the truth of the matter is that the titles are fixed. So, they are not a matter on which constructive discussion can take place. We did not perceive early in the first year that we wanted judiciously to decide what kinds of requirements were indeed appropriate for discussion as a method.

A second problem, which really became a major issue, was determining who was going to run the small group discussion. There is a tremendous difference between teaching a subject in 15-man classes rather than 50. We were initially going to divide the 50-man class into four smaller classes and have an instructor in each one. That is quite an entirely different scheme than saying simply that when instructor A, with his classroom of 50 students, gets to the time to solve the requirement, we will have them solve it in organized groups under a student leader, rather than have them solve it individually and subsequently discuss how they solved it. These are two different mechanisms. We have never really been able to state this in very understandable terms. I am certain that in January, 1978 there are many members of the faculty that still mingle or confuse these two matters when they talk about small groups. It was a very persistent problem that has never been completely solved. Conceptually, it is very clear to me, but it certainly was not then.
When we actually began to present the course, we found out that for the most part we were not going to teach in small classes of 15 students each with one instructor. We were really going to do this second variation. We were going to continue to have an instructor in the classroom, but we were going to have the students for the most part solve their requirements under a designated student leader.

We then discovered a not very remarkable fact that for at least some of these requirements, the designated student leader needed some advance warning and some additional instructions, if the classroom time was going to be productive. As an aside, we once again overreacted, because when some of the students began to say they did not really know what they were supposed to do and their discussion leader did not know, the quick fix was to prescribe that every student leader would be given an oral briefing in advance. He would also be given a written student leader guide.

Cut of that requirement came that part of the college lexicon which is still known as the "Blue Goose," because the first student leader guides were published in blue paper. General McGarr decided he was going to forbid use of the term. I told him that while I agreed it was not as formal a term as we would like, the worst thing he could do was try to ban it. I told the general, "If you issue the order, you can probably make it stick for the faculty, at least in front of you, but there is no way you're going to make it stick in front of the students because they are going to continue to call this thing the Blue Goose from here on in." He listened to me and he backed off. I think those are the major issues with respect to the small groups.
Q: Why was the examination scheme a "troublesome matter"?

A: Remember the start point was the fairly bitter denunciation of the class rating scheme and the accompanying evaluation scheme which appeared in the Educational Commission Survey Report. I indicated that McGarr latched on to the latter but held on to the former. One of the directives for the totally new program was that the examination system had to be all new and different. The prime movers were probably Majors John Cushman and Richard Halleck, both of whom would present the notion that at a college the students turned in papers, and the professor read them over and assigned a grade. According to them, that's all there was to it. Therefore, that was what we ought to do here. This was in very sharp contrast to the very meticulous, detailed, carefully checked, counterchecked, and doublechecked scheme for grading formal examinations that had long been the Leavenworth practice. There was also implicit in this scheme the notion that the exams ought to be like the university exam. As the two majors liked to say, "Write on a couple of topics". Well, it's not that easy. If you take that sort of policy statement and its explanation, on one hand, and keep in mind that at the same time the college had continual responsibility to report class standing (indeed McGarr insisted that we were going to continue to do it), the two schemes do not exactly fit. They are somewhat in conflict.

I guess it's fair to state that I had the problem of working out the implementation scheme, and have this all come about to the satisfaction of the boss. I proposed that we simply go into an A, B, C, U system in contrast to the former system of grading numerically.
I also proposed that we abolish the formal reclama system, and that we take the stand that if the CGSC student was really dissatisfied, he could do what any college student can if he wants to. If he feels it is appropriate and profitable, he can go complain and take his chances. We also set up a couple of exam weeks. Since it was often argued that having exams caused a great deal of concern and anxiety during the year (and they probably do), I proposed that we have all the anxiety at one time and just be done with it. We set up two periods—one in December, and one in late April or May—and we had examination weeks in the typical collegiate fashion.

Any one of these things represented quite a change, and I suppose the faculty perceived that they were going from positions of strength and anonymity to one of being in jeopardy and very visible. Other people were concerned about the fact that we were throwing away a great deal of precision, and we were going to a system in which someone decided for example, that's about a B paper in tactics, without having much of a basis on which to decide other than judgment. That could be judged to be unfair, and it certainly was not as precise as the previous system. But we did it, and I do not think things were any worse. I believed—and still believe—the examination week scheme had considerable merit. I suppose in a subsequent story we'll come up with what eventually happened to it, but during the McGarr regime that situation prevailed.

Q: What about the institutional organization of CGSC? How did General McGarr change the actual departments?

A: There are really two versions of this story. There's the McGarr Report version, and then there is my version, which is somewhat
different. The McGarr Report version, perhaps to overstate the case a little bit, argues that when McGarr came GSGC had seven instructional departments, and that they were titled I through VII, VI being the non-resident one. That's true; they were. But further, citing McGarr, there was not any particular rhyme or reason about the assignment of material to the departments; it was as if the curriculum had been arbitrarily divided into six groups.

Q: Without any consideration for philosophical or pedagogical content?

A: If you read the McGarr Report, that is the way it reads. Now, that is not really true. He is entirely correct about the numbers, but he was quite incorrect about the grouping of the curriculum by content. Either he did not know, or chose not to recognize, that in the 10 years since the start of the small classes, there had been a gradual grouping of lessons by content and by department. Department I, I remember very well, had the G1 instruction and the Communications Zone; II G2 and Defense; III the G3 staff procedures and offensive operations; and so on. You did not know that, however, by looking at any organization chart. If you looked very carefully, you might be able to perceive it.

When McGarr set up his new departments for 1957-58 he coined some titles that were descriptive. One title he chose was the Department of Staff and Educational Subjects. Heretofore, responsibility for each of the staff sections had been in a separate department. He said, "No, that's wrong! We'll put this all together, and we'll have," what he called, "a Department of Staff and Educational Subjects". The staff portion was the collection of these four groups that had
heretofore been in these other four departments. Educational Subjects was essentially a new notion of McGarr's which was related to his concept of the whole man. What little we had previously had at CGSC was in odd spots here and there, or had just been pulled together. To form the new Department of Infantry Divisions, he simply took the defense and the offensive sections that had been in two other departments and put them in another combination. His Armored Divisions Department was half of what had been one of the other departments.

The point I am really trying to make is that there was some rearrangement, but it was not very spectacular. The change in title was not nearly as significant as it might appear, nor as he reported. He did, however, very carefully select different people to head his new departments.

Q: Are you saying that the selection of department directors was more important than the subject content?
A: Much more important.

Q: Were there any reservations expressed in the faculty or elsewhere about the introduction of the educational subjects?
A: There certainly was as I remember; the start point was an announcement that X number of hours (and I seem to remember it was like 80) was assigned to Educational Subjects. Then the department director of that new department, Walter Vann, was given the task to go out and do something with it. Here again, I do not know whether McGarr had a y notion or any clear idea at all of what he wanted to do here and I do not know where he got the idea. It just came along and we tried to put some sense into it. Walter Vann picked a very
able Colonel, "Bud" Lasche, and they set out to try to figure out what you could do in this area. It was an almost impossible goal. How much can you do in any one scholastic discipline in 80 hours? And whatever your answer to the question is, the next question is how much can you do in several scholastic disciplines in 80 hours. The answer has got to be very little. I do not recall that there was really much dissatisfaction with the notion; there was a considerable scepticism about whether it was going to pay its way. There was not any particular concern about it on anybody's part in those days, nor I might add, even about the total number of hours.

Given the re-grouping that I talked about a moment ago in terms of organization, it was as if the curriculum planners could almost start with a new slate. With 1100 hours of total curriculum time, you can say, "This many go here, this many go there, etc."

The way this happened over time was that the new subjects were given a precise number of hours. The curriculum planners made some estimate about staff instruction by combining what had previously been taught in four departments. They eliminated the portions that were clearly repetitious. So, they gradually allocated the hours. Curiously enough they had a very large number left for the Infantry divisions—just an overwhelming figure.

Q: Do you say that in a critical sense?

A: No. I am just telling you how it worked then. I am sort of musing to myself as I recall this. The department director designate was Colonel Lew Wallace, and as the year went along, the allocation of hours was constantly being reviewed. Customarily, this occurred in terms of somebody saying, "Gee, I've got to have
four more hours for so and so, or six hours," Lew Wallace would always say, "Take some of mine." The first time or two I was extremely surprised. I was sitting alongside him at the meeting, and I commented that I had never seen this happen before. He said to me, "Ivan, everyone I give away is one less I have to prepare." But, as I say, since they had gotten a new slate of instruction that year, it was all very arbitrary. I don't mean that in a pejorative sense; it was kind of a new cutting of the pie.

Q: What about the organization of the curriculum? Were there any changes in terms of the three phases that you discussed earlier?

A: Not really. Although, again, if you read the McGarr report, you are led to believe that there was a fourth phase added. If you look carefully at his curriculum or the graphic portrayal of the curriculum you will see that all he had was my three-phase scheme, and then down below running throughout the year was what he called Phase 4. This was a collection of guest speakers, writing requirements, and whatever. I would say the answer is really no.

Q: In describing General McGarr's reign as commandant, you emphasize his change in methodology. Isn't there also a terrific change in philosophy in terms of the trend towards education?

A: I think so. When I talk about different methods, I use it in a very broad sense. McGarr completely endorsed the Davidson notion that the institution ought to move toward education for career development. Indeed, I can argue that what McGarr did was simply implement the Davidson blueprint. I never told McGarr that, but I believe it. He may have gone that direction anyway; I don't know.
In Davidson's case, it was understandable. It is really very puzzling to me for I have never been able to understand the reason for McGarr's feeling in this matter. It seemed kind of a contradiction that he would reject the ideals of the Davidson regime, even though he was propelling the institution in that same educational direction. It is difficult to describe or put it into particulars, but he simply wanted more substance in the whole school process.

Q: As you look back perhaps not at the Davidson reign but at the earlier period of CGSC, do you think General McGarr had a more sophisticated understanding of what the officer himself needed?

A: I think so. I can document that response a bit. One of the things he began to talk about in the beginning was that we were going to "educate the whole man". In practice, that took the form of two developments. First, he had the notion that this would-be field commander needed to know something about the real life arena in which he would operate and make decisions. He needed to understand the other kinds of influences, the other disciplines, if you will, that impinge upon his business. Somehow or another, we should get him started in this business. That's the origin of teaching strategy at CGSC. You can trace a direct line between the current strategy section and what started in the McGarr regime under the context of educational subjects. Second, McGarr was also concerned about what he called the "moral basis of command". That was a more difficult thing to translate into action, but he had this kind of vision.
Q: I have been told that there were a number of very young field grade officers who had a great deal of influence over General McGarr during this period. They were supposedly referred to as the "back door group". Can you give me some information about those men?
A: Yes. You are talking about three people: Majors Richard Halleck, George Jacobson and John H. Cushman. Let me dispense with Cushman first; that is the simple one. Jack Cushman joined the faculty as a very bright, talented, young man after school year 1955. He was on his third year when McGarr came. Jack played a significant role in the development of the new FM 100-5. He was part of this 1957-58 coordination group, and did have a good deal of influence with McGarr. In my view at the time, it was entirely justified. Jack was reasonably careful to keep things reasonably appropriate and to tidy up. In my view, Jack Cushman was damned with a kind of a generalization brush which was not really justified.

The one that really caused all the trouble was Major Halleck. The Halleck story, or at least the Ivan Birrer part of it, started in an interesting fashion. One day early in the McGarr regime, McGarr issued a memorandum which appointed Halleck as his special assistant in the liaison with the 1957-58 coordinating committee. The same day I received the order, McGarr called me down to his office. The purpose of the call was that he wanted me to know about the order, and I said I had seen it. He pointed out to me that this was not at all unusual, saying that general officers frequently appointed someone to act in this fashion. Halleck would be his spokesman, and so on. McGarr also told me that he was going to need some help and hoped that I would provide assistance. He
also asked whether I would object if Halleck put his desk in my office. I had a pretty big office by myself in those days; so, I said certainly not. I went back to the office, and we got a desk,amesign, etc., the sort of thing that you just do under these conditions. I guess the next day, Major Halleck moved in.

The 1957-58 coordinating group were coming in individually and seeing me almost all the time. If one of them was not there, one of the other guys who was not in the "in" group was coming in to tell me how terrible everything was. Apparently, I was the only safe sounding board, or resonator. Halleck restrained himself about half a day; that is to say, he would come over and listen, and remain reasonably quiet. But I think it was only the first or second day that somebody was in, and we were talking about what we were going to do about examinations. I am not sure, but I think it was Jack Cushman that was carrying on this conversation. I do not remember all the circumstances. What I do recall very clearly was that Halleck proceeded to get in and tell the two of us how we were going to do it and made one pronouncement after another. This went on for several minutes, and there was a little pause. I turned to him, and I said--and I remember very precisely what I said--"Major Halleck, your inexperience frightens me." That was all that I said. Halleck stopped, got up, walked out of my office, and was never in the office again. His office was moved down right outside of McGarr's office. I probably did the institution a disservice as it turned out. Halleck was very capable, but he caused many problems. Once again, I do not know what his orders were, so it is easy to criticize. I do know, however, he was considered
a very pernicious influence by the assistant commandant, Bill Train.

He was also pretty cavalier in the way he dealt with the assistant commandant.

The Halleck story closes during the Christmas vacation of 1958. I remember the conditions very vividly. I was down at the office of the superintendent of schools on the post. Dick Woolfe, who was also a department director, and I were down there working on a school policy document during Christmas vacation. A call came to the two of us saying we were to be in McGarr's office in an hour or so. We got the calls separately. When Dick got his, he tried to find out what was going on. They said, "We don't know except we were directed to have you be there." Dick was very irritated, because he felt he had to go home and put on his uniform. Again, this was a good many years ago; we would probably do it differently today. It did not bother me, for I guess I had on some reasonable attire. I remember I said to Dick, "I wouldn't be surprised if this was Halleck's farewell." Dick said, "You couldn't be right about that." We reported to McGarr's office and here was the whole college brass lined up. It was Halleck's farewell!

McGarr got us all in there and made a speech. He said in substance that he realized that Major Halleck had been controversial and that many of us in the room had been upset with him. But he wanted us to know that Halleck had done his job exactly as he, McGarr, had told him to do it. If there were any blame to be ascribed, it should be to McGarr, not to Halleck. Then he made the second point—and this was not subtle, this was explicit. He knew that no officer in that room, if they subsequently found themselves
in the position to officially rate Major Halleck, would allow this experience to influence them. He concluded by saying, "I'm sure you all want to say goodbye to Major Halleck." That was the end of his speech.

I think I was the first one in line, just because of the way it happened to be. There was no way to get out of the room without making it obvious. When I got to Halleck and went through the line, Halleck said to me, "Well, you've outlasted another one." My response was, "Yes, I usually do." That was the only time Halleck and I had spoken to each other since he had left my office over a year previously.

George Jacobson came in and overlapped Halleck; this is the same Jacobson that later became famous with a certain notoriety based upon his long experience in VietNam. After his tour here, he served several tours in VietNam in a senior military status and subsequently retired from the Army. In the civilian world he returned to VietNam and was at least in a semi-ambassadorial set-up. George Jacobson inherited a mess, but he had the office and could not disassociate himself from a lot of what had gone on before.

This is a very long response to your simple question about the inner circle, but Halleck was the primary one. McGarr also had his informal cabinet that he listened to and I became part of that informal cabinet. You have to remember that through most of the very turbulent period, the relationship between the commandant and assistant commandant was one of strain and conflict, not support.

I have already indicated that at the conclusion of his tour at Fort Leavenworth I was accorded a very high place in General McGarr's
inner core. It had been an extremely sensitive time for me, especially the first year or so. The assistant commandant at the start of McGarr's tour was Brigadier General Bill Train, a Davidson man. In McGarr's eyes, Train was the opposition, a resistance to be overcome. In Train's eyes, McGarr was the threat to order, achievement, success, or whatever. Ivan Birrer found himself occupying a role as confidant to both simultaneously, and the only one to whom I could really converse in the matter was my wife. The fact that I consider Bill Train and Lionel McGarr as my personal and professional friends today is some indication that I was able to play this role successfully despite the difficulty.

Q: What specific areas did General Train have reservations about or criticize?

A: It was not clear to me then, and it is probably less clear now, what the real issues were. But I certainly knew some of it. The problem starts, of course, with the fact that General Train was a Davidson man. Hence, he was in charge of the on-going operation which McGarr had come in to change, you can almost predict the outcome just from that point alone. The matter was compounded with McGarr's peculiar use of his special assistants with their own, especially Dick Halleck's, way of doing business, which was to essentially go around General Train. McGarr's announcement that everything was going to be all new and all different and all better, you see, was obviously construed as a criticism of what was going on, which is what Train was running. During that first year of the McGarr regime, 1956-57, when he set up his 1957-58 coordinating group and began to divide up the faculty, it was very clear
that he had said to Train, "You are just in charge of the vestige
that's left. Conduct it, and get this school year over. You don't
have anything at all to do with what's going on next year." Well,
that is none of the affair. Your question, however, reminds me of
an interesting anecdote.

On the day that General Train left, he stopped outside the
post and called me. What he called to tell me was that McGarr, in
their last interview, had shown him a copy of McGarr's letter of
efficiency report on him, and that Train's fears had all been for
naught, because he had received an extremely laudatory report from
McGarr at the end.

I recall being told something by one of my friends on the
faculty at the time McGarr's appointment was announced. This
officer was just in the process of leaving, but he had served under
McGarr in Austria. We asked him, "What can you tell us about the
new boss coming in?" I remember his saying, "He'll come in, he'll
look around for a little bit, and before very long he'll have his
own little group. And they'll be the ones that are in charge."
I think he said that you will find yourself a member of that group,
or something to that effect. That's how McGarr had done it before.
So, I guess that is just how McGarr goes about it.

I do know that this business of being a special inspector or
a special purveyor of the word outside the normal chain of command
is a difficult or dangerous role to fill, if indeed it can be ac-
complished. I am reminded of another little anecdote about it. In
due time, Major Halleck turned up as a student at the Army War
College, and the commandant at the time was Major General Train.
Vanheck's resignation from the Army shortly thereafter was anyway related, I haven't any idea at all; but I have often wondered how that thing really worked out.

Q: What about combat developments or doctrinal developments while General McGarr was here. What happened in that area?

A: The structure that Davidson had created (I started to say prospered) certainly persisted, and I think the dream or the goal of General Davidson to get Leavenworth more and more involved in more and more matters simply continued to happen.

Q: One of the classes that existed during this period was a Special Weapons class. When did that come into being?

A: It started before the McGarr regime. Now, I am back in the middle 1950's. It commenced at Sandia Base near Albuquerque, New Mexico, I think, as a joint operation. There was a course of instruction in the employment of atomic weapons. There had been a few of these devices detonated out in the desert. It was clear that we were going to have some kind of an atomic capability in the Army arsenal, and somebody needed to know something about it. The course at Sandia tried to handle weapons from all three services and that was not particularly satisfactory for us. It was decided that we would start a parallel course up here that was designed especially for Army people; it was first called the Special Weapons Course and lasted seven weeks. The first director was an engineer named Carl Sklund. His first assistant was a Lieutenant Colonel named Leonard Pasciak—both good friends of mine. Both, however, were entirely convinced that this whole business of atomic weapons was, "Too complicated, too significant, too everything," as Carl said, "to
let any ordinary Army officer ever really know about this sort of thing." I say that because if you start with that point of view, you can make this thing pretty complicated and they did! The seven-week course which was conducted in Pope Hall (this was a stone building, directly across the street and south of the Disciplinary Barracks) was cordoned off—great security—and conducted up there as a top secret operation.

As time rolled along, the Army began to simplify its procedures for estimating effects of mass-destruction weapons. I suppose the nuclear bomb came along, and so it was no longer "atomics," but special weapons. During the early part of the McGarr regime, we were directed to essentially incorporate the Special Weapons Course into the CGSC curriculum. That was a fairly painful affair. We had the instruction and a special examination, and if you qualified, you were not only a Leavenworth graduate, you were "prefix 5" qualified, meaning you were qualified in the employment of atomic or nuclear weapons.

When the material got moved into the curriculum, it was decided that CGSC would, in that same facility, Pope Hall, conduct what became known as SONWEC, the Senior Officers Nuclear Weapons Employment Course. The notion was that they would bring in for, I think, a two-week stint, officers from all over the world (Colonels and Generals), and familiarize them with how this thing was functioning. A number of these courses were conducted over the course of a couple of years.

I can recall an interesting anecdote about this course. The post engineer, Colonel Riel Crandall, was designated a student to
attend the course. On one Monday morning, the first day of the
class, Riel was sitting in the classroom, happened to look around,
and saw smoke coming from near the projection area. He got up
quickly, and as he described it, "I called my fire department." He
was post engineer, and therefore, ex officio, the fire marshall.
But the building was just completely burned out; it became kind of
a Roman holiday.

At that time, we lived about 75 yards from the fire and, in-
deed, by the time I got home the fire department had my wife and
the lady next door out with the fire hoses spraying water on any
of the sparks that flew over on our roof. It was really quite an
affair. It started about 10 o'clock, I suppose, in the morning,
and by 3 o'clock in the afternoon, they finally got it out. People
were all around; everybody had gone to the fire. There was an
officer who lived in one of the Syracuse houses right next door
who was accountable for the highly classified materials that were
down in the basement. In one of the corner basement rooms they had
a Top Secret display and device or two. I never had any particular
reason to go over there, but I knew it was there. He was concerned
about getting them out of there, and determining what kind of shape
they were in. You could not get into the place through the door,
since the room was at the opposite end of the only entrance to the
building. The basement had small windows, about 2/3's submerged,
and there were some bars on the windows. A very pragmatic solution
was opted for. They brought a cutting torch and cut the bars in the
window, so you could crawl through the little windows. Then they
went down there with a collection of big commissary paper sacks,
handed one places out in paper nick form, and carried them away. That was the end of Pope Hall.

Because of the fire, we either had to cancel the next SONWEC course, which was due in a couple of weeks, or had to make some other kind of facility. Fortunately, an officer named Major Will Waschoe had been added to the college faculty. Waschoe was given the mission of solving the problem. He went down to Muir Hall, and put in a couple of classrooms. He sort of did them himself. The significance of this action is that this was at the time that Bell Hall was under construction, and this guy stayed on and was primarily responsible for the design and fabrication of the audio-visual equipment that we have now in Bell Hall. Thus, an earlier generation of the kind of equipment that is here today in the Leavenworth classrooms—the projectors, the sliding boards, and the combination thereof—was done by this guy because of the Pope Hall fire. I guess that's the end of what happened to that and the nuclear weapons effects.

Q: Let me ask a question about Bell Hall. Was the basement of the office wing in Bell Hall completed when the building was occupied?
A: No, we have Riel Crandall to thank for that. Riel Crandall was the post engineer at the time Bell Hall was constructed, and he knew perfectly well that by the time the building was built it would be too small. Riel carefully—I do not really know how much was involved—influenced the detailed plans of specifications so that the conversion of the crawl space under the office wing into a sub-

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view, could be easily accomplished. It worked out exactly as he planned. Perhaps a couple of years went by before it was finished. I do not really remember, but it certainly was not much more than that. So, it was almost as if it were done from the start.

As a final note, during the course of the McGarr regime, I was invited as a Special Advisor to the WAC School at Fort McClellan. I simply mention that as the first of what later became a series of guest appearances here and there throughout the school system. I am proud of the fact that I was the first male consultant in the WAC School.
INTERVIEW THREE

16 January 1978

Major General Harold K. Johnson, 1960-1963

Student Evaluation
Educational Survey Commission of 1962
Clash with Colonel Jasper Wilson
Attempted Centralization of Curriculum

Major General Harry J. Lemley, Jr., 1964-1966

Educational Subjects
Assistance for Special Warfare School
Courses of Study
Broadening of Curriculum
Center of Gravity of Instruction
Haines Board
Program of Electives
Increase in Size of Class
Requirement for Additional Housing
Counterinsurgency

Combat Developments
Q: What were some of the major events and problems when General Harold K. Johnson was the Commandant?

A: We probably ought to know at the beginning that Harold K. Johnson had been on the CGSC faculty when I first came and for a couple of years thereafter. All I am trying to establish here is that he had been a pre-McGarr Leavenworth man. I had had the good fortune to become close friends with Johnny, as those of us who really knew him well called him. When he first came to Leavenworth, we lived in a Doniphan apartment, and they were about two doors down. Our dogs played together all the time. Under those conditions you become friends or enemies; our dogs got along, so Johnny and I became friends. I had always supposed that at some time a colleague would come back as the commandant, and Johnny was the first one.

I recall four major events under the Johnson regime. First, he came in and said, "We are going to get rid of these exam weeks." By now, I had learned that the one part of the educational program that was most likely to change with a change of commandants was student evaluation. Every one of them arrived with some very definite notions in this field, and there really was not much point in arguing about it. So, we got rid of the exam weeks. It really did not change that much. If you are going to have fairly comprehensive tests, they will obviously have to follow the instruction; and if they follow the instruction, they tend to get clustered near the end. So, you may not have an exam week, but you are likely to have four or five tests within a short period of time. Anyway we obeyed that directive. That was fairly easy.
The second point was the 1962 Educational Survey Commission. I was probably the trigger here, for when the opportunity presented itself, I showed Johnry the report of the 1956 Commission. Once again, I suggested this might be something he would like to do again. It was not very long before that became the next chapter in the survey commission story. He formed a committee of five, headed by General C. D. Eddlemen, LTG E. L. Cummings, and LTG E. J. O'Neill, and then two civilian educators both with military connections; Earl Rudder, at that time President of Texas A & M; and Dr. George B. Smith, the vice-chancellor of the University of Kansas. Initially, Colonel John Calloway of the faculty was designated as the project officer, but before the committee began to function, Calloway convinced the commandant that I ought to be associated with it. Very quickly, I became the recorder and project officer for the commission.

This particular survey commission just did not have the lasting influence that the one in 1956 had. But there were two or three things that came out of it that persisted. One of the first was the appointment of a German Liaison officer in recognition of the fact that West Germany by now was one of our strongest NATO allies. The committee lamented what they perceived to be the lack of any meaningful interaction between CGSC and the Army War College, and I do not guess that situation has been changed any since then. The committee pointed out that the then existing two courses, the regular course and the associate course, with one being twice as long as the other, were an administrative or personnel compromise at best. They were particularly concerned that spaces in the
associate course were being filled by the active army. In a sense here they pointed with concern at the matter that was not to be corrected until the Maines Board in 1967. For the most part, I suppose, one could read the report as being a strong affirmation of what the college did.

I guess I am rather proud of the last paragraph in the formal report, which is called "Overall Appraisal." For whatever it is worth, that paragraph probably reflected Ivan Birrer's estimate of CGSC in 1962, because it's exactly as I wrote it. The paragraph concludes with these two sentences: "Although graduation from CGSC is not the culmination of an officer's military education and training, nor is this so intended, the commission is convinced that, as the careers of CGSC graduates encompass subsequent experience and study, these officers will become increasingly effective commanders and general staff officers at the higher levels of assignment.

These graduates are fulfilling their intended roles throughout the Free World. In periods of emergency, they will respond to demands placed upon them as have Leavenworth graduates of the past." That sounds a little corny as I read it here 16 years later.

The most significant thing that stems from the Johnson regime is quite obviously the origin of our Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Program. It started one day in a discussion in the command conference room, with Johnson and Lemley (the assistant commandant), three or four staff officers, and myself. After some discussion, Johnny said something in effect that right after World War II when he had been at Ft. Monroe in the G1 section, this matter had been talked about often and at times off and on over the
years. Why didn’t we once and for all check this project out in terms of something we could or could not accomplish. If we could, let’s get with it and solve the problem. That’s his decision.

We veered from there and skirted this long, very tenuous set of events that really did not culminate until August 1974. While General Johnson should certainly be credited with the initiation of the program, in addition to playing many other vital parts in its evolution, the story is so long, and there are so many people involved that I suggest we ought to do that in a separate package some other time.

There was another occurrence in the Johnson regime that is probably worth noting. It was Johnny himself that insisted that the old Department of Staff and Educational Subjects be redesignated the Department of Command. His argument was that in the Command and General Staff College somebody ought to be teaching Command.

Some of us argued that we should not use the title for a department on the proposition that we all taught command all the time. We should not announce that you have a class on command on a certain day. But we lost that argument, obviously. I have left one other item about the Johnson regime to talk about, because it represents a very special time in my professional career. At the time of McGarr’s departure, the Department of Staff and Educational Subjects was headed by a Colonel Jasper Wilson—Jap Wilson as everyone had always called him since his days as a cadet at West Point. Jap had come to the College a year before and lived three doors from the Birrs on Summer Place. Not too long after General Johnson took over, some other transfers, reassignments, or ends of
tours, found Jap Wilson in the role of what we then called the Chief of Resident Instruction, or CRI for short. Wilson was a brilliant guy intellectually, but he was absolutely vulgar and ruthless in his manner, deportment, and action. I should also add he was extremely effective in getting things accomplished at whatever the cost.

For all practical purposes, the McGarr program had decentralized curriculum matters to the instructional departments; indeed, very little was centralized. I suppose that Jap had been told by Johnson to get this ship tightened up, and let's get curriculum matters and all that is associated with it back in the Leavenworth scheme as it had been before. I think that is why Johnson's previous experience on the CGSC faculty was relevant to this matter.

I do not tell this story very proudly, indeed I tell it very sadly, but what developed was an all-out power struggle between Wilson and me. Sadly, the contest went way beyond just honest differences in a professional matter; it became a personal vendetta. Obviously, if I were to tell the story in detail, it would be one that would place the blame on Jap; I suspect he would tell it quite differently. But regardless of how we got there, to indicate the tone of the matter, he announced before a group once, "I'm going to get you fired." This was not just a contest for status; it became kind of an all-out fight for survival. This went on for a year and half; I am sure it was a very trying matter for Johnson as well. He had two lieutenants who could not get along with each other, and he felt he needed them both.
By the very nature of my charter as Educational Advisor and thereby my having kind of a license to tromp around the whole college and all of its activities, I was always, in a sense, into the business of the Chief of Resident Instruction, or whatever title that position then had. I had made it a practice over the years with each new incumbent CRI to overtly state this fact, and simply say, "We're both into this together, let's kind of work it out together." I think that is the appropriate kind of attitude and position to take. With Jap it simply was not possible, and it was not good for the college. It was hard on the people that were trying to work with us, and we made it difficult for the front office. All I am trying to say, I guess, is that there was within the span of 30 years this one little period (it looked a lot longer then) which was very frustrating, just a very disagreeable experience.

I will just give you one more little anecdote about this, and then I think I would rather forget it. Johnny spent the last six or so months of his official tour here on temporary duty in Washington working on a special project. It was that project that called him to the attention of Secretary Robert McNamara, and as a result, in a very short time he would be elevated to DCSOPS and then later the Army Chief of Staff. He was commuting on sort of alternate weekends. This matter between Jap and me had become so intense and so involved with wives, children, dogs--just horrible--that one day I asked him for an appointment on a Saturday afternoon when he was back in Fort Leavenworth. I was just going to have it out. I had written a paper which tried to state my version of the situation, and I said, "I may be disassociated from the college, but I'm not going
to let Jay Wilson drive me out." Johnny said to me, "Look, you
just have to understand that Wilson is useful to me in a number of
ways that you don't know, but it's not going to get you fired. You
will be issued some specific instructions about this."

This is the same Wilson that later in Vietnam became the
American associate to Premier Ky. At the time he was, I guess,
head of the Vietnamese Air Force, and I am sure Jap served him in
extremely good stead. Later, even more surprising (at least to
many people—not to me especially), Wilson served as the senior
aide to the Army Chief of Staff when General Johnson became Chief
of Staff. He really had not changed a bit as far as I could determine,
and for many people there was this paradox of how this officer --
talented and vulgar--could be on Johnson's staff. The story closes,
I guess by my saying that there was much conjecture around here that,
since he was a senior aide, he would certainly be promoted to general.
But I had had conversations with Johnson long before in respect to
this man, and I became convinced that it would never happen. In-
deed, Johnson would not let it happen if it came down to that sort
of thing. I won a couple of fifths of whiskey betting on that!
Q: Not to prolong this, but were there any differences between
yourself and Colonel Wilson in terms of philosophy, for example,
where the college was or where the college should be?
A: No, not really, I don't think. I don't even know how this thing
started. Jap had been an Armor officer; he had taught math at the
Academy. Somehow or other, it became a contest for status, power
and influence, and I cannot really tell you what the issues were.
Q: Was there a change in the position of the Chief of Resident Instruction during this period?

A: Mr. Wilson was never able to get the centralized control that he set out to get. He did return some, and there were some centralized procedures set up—what later became Faculty Memorandum 2 as we called it around here. A whole series of resident instruction memorandums and procedures had been established, which provided for some kind of control, but the director was never really given the people that it would take to do it, if indeed we were going to centralize curriculum matters.

Q: The Army began looking at a new division during that period, the ROAD Division. Did that result in a re-write of the curriculum here at CGSC?

A: Indeed it did. There had been much disenchantment with the Pentomic Division, and so now we had ROAD. Of course, what that required was that all the tactical problems in which the schematics envisioned five maneuver groups suddenly had to be redone with all the inherent work. Certainly, it was clear that once the Pentomic Division was abolished, all the Leavenworth problems had to change.

Q: What were some of the major events of General Harry J. Lemley, Jr.'s, tenure as commandant?

A: Before the Johnson regime ended, Johnny was called up to do a special study for Department of the Army; it lasted about six months. It was very well received, and he was promptly promoted to be the DCSOPS, for his third star. His deputy, Harry Lemley, then moved across the hall from being the assistant commandant, as it was called then, to being the commandant. He was promoted
and held that position well up to the middle of 1966. Since Lemley had served with Johnson in Europe, I suppose he was hand-selected.

Things sort of continued during that next period of two or three years without major changes. It was really a very quiet time. The FMAS program went on, but we will do that in detail in another sitting.

Probably the most important thing while Lemley was here was that Educational Subjects became known as Strategy. A rationale had been developed which stated that part of the Leavenworth mission was to provide the officer with some understanding of the total arena in which the military functions. I guess that was the most important development.

Q: Were there any reservations among members of the faculty or the staff about this move toward educational subjects?

A: No, by the time Lemley was here, it had been four or five years after their infusion. It was now part of the Leavenworth picture under a different tag, "strategy." There were always some people who would argue that that is not part of our mission; you can still hear that argument. Lemley, rather unwisely probably, described this as our "junior war college" portion of the curriculum. It is unwise to make that statement since you just invite sniping from still other directions. On balance, I would say it was important that we were going to spend some of our time in providing the setting for the employment of military forces.

On a personal basis, and sort of lapping over the Johnson--Lemley era, (and I tend to think of that as a sort of a single period) I had one extremely interesting experience when I was loaned to the CGNARC for a special mission. I reported to CONARC,
and the Chief of Staff, LTG Louis Truman, President Truman's
epew, told me that the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg was
having all kinds of trouble. He arranged to borrow my services--
I recall it was early while Johnson was still commandant— and he
wanted me to go down there and find out what were the problems,
decide what to do about them, tell the people down there what to
do, and then come back and report to him. So I proceeded. Imme-
diately upon my arrival, I found out that the officer in charge, a
brand new Brigadier General named Yarborough, had not been in-
formed of my coming. That first interview, as you can guess, was
an interesting one. But after everybody's feelings were vented,
we decided through common sense that we had better make the best
of the situation; regardless of how I got there, the order stood.
I spent perhaps a week the first time, and it became very clear
that the school was in trouble. It had become too big, too rapidly,
and had too many changes in what it was trying to do. What really
needed to happen was that they needed to institutionalize an orderly
process for curriculum preparation. This is in contrast to every-
body going around with a lesson plan in their hip pocket, making
it up as they went along. On the other hand, in order to make that
possible, they had to have more resources provided. Probably more
important, they had to insulate this body from the constant stream
of Washington experts who were coming down and telling them what
to do.

When I went back, General Truman got in most of his staff, and
I made the point when I said, "Here are the things that need to
happen down there. I told General Yarborough this, and he acknowledges
this is right." I said, "Now, General, the second thing is what you should do up here. What you should do is throw a cordon around that place and not let anyone cross it. Moreover, you have got to get them some more people." He listened and said, "Fine."

Then he said, "I want you to go down there and keep your eye on how this thing works out." I said, "No, General, that is not going to work. You know it is not going to work. You have a new brigadier general down there commanding that post, and he understands what needs to be accomplished. He just cannot have a special inspector looking over his shoulder." I went on to say, "If you want me to go back in a couple of months and tell you what I think their progress is, I will be glad to do that." I did make such a visit. I think it is probably fair to state that what were not very profound observations on my part at the time, were fairly important if they were going to make some progress at Fort Bragg.

Q: You bring up an interesting example of the intrusion of external agents into the writing of the curriculum at the Special Warfare School. Was CGSC having that problem during this period?

A: A little bit, but nothing like at Bragg. All we had to do was certify that each officer had had "X" number of hours of counter-insurgency. There were some efforts by the CONARC staff to at least review what was in our instruction, but we were too far from Washington for anyone to really come down and bother us, whereas that place with the Green Berets was very much in the spotlight, almost from the President himself right down the line.

Q: Was the design of the CGSC curriculum pretty much the prerogative of the commandant or deputy commandant?
A: You mean as compared to having someone tell him from the outside?

Q: Yes, sir.

A: I would say almost exclusively.

Q: Is there any real continuity from the McGarr years up through the Lemley years in terms of what the College was trying to do with its curriculum?

A: Yes, there certainly was. This is a good time for me to point out a development that really occurred during the end of the Lemley regime that has some long-term significance. Within the College scheme of events, there emerged a formalization of the concept of the curriculum being composed of courses of study, the course of study being defined as a series of related lessons within a given curriculum area. To be sure, this had been evolving in the normal course of events as subjects in a single area began to be concentrated in one departmental entity. But it was not really thought of in that sense. We continued to think of the curriculum as a composite of a series of separate numbered subjects—-to use the terminology of today. By the time we got to the end of the Lemley regime, and with the titled departments stemming from the McGarr era (there were some changes but they were essentially the same departments), the decentralization of content and control from the staff to departmental levels was natural evolution. The officer who ought to get credit for formalizing this system was COL Jack Hendry, who at the time was in charge of the curriculum division of what was then called the Chief of Resident Instruction Office. That is kind of a long answer to your question, but yes, there was a natural continuity.
Q: Did you have any influence over the evolving of this "course of study" system?
A: I don't think I should really claim any. Jack Hendry simply convinced me that it was a good idea; I supported it and began to talk about it. I think I can claim some credit for getting some people to change the way they tended to look at the curriculum. I continued to maintain this position, because I had become convinced that as a practical matter the total curriculum was too big a package for anyone, anybody, any agency to deal with. This is not a particularly popular view, even today, with some people, but I have not changed my mind a bit. I am completely convinced.

In the days when we had tight centralized control, we had a large staff to do it. Indeed, I remember that at the time of the Educational Survey Commission in 1956 there were 23 officers in the staff of what we now call the Director of Education and Curriculum Affairs charged just with this function. The 23 people dealt with the total curriculum area, which was greatly constricted when you compare it to today.

In a sense, the curriculum had been getting broader in a piecemeal fashion since 1948. As the total scope of the curriculum offerings widened, in recognition of the widening vista in which the Army officer functions, it just simply became impossible to maintain centralized control. I have often commented to my senior colleagues around here that things were a lot simpler at Leavenworth when we were concerned with only firepower and maneuver, with a little attention paid to combat service support. But all the rest—the management, the setting, the limitations, the strategic
considerations, the lesser forms of conflict—came along later.

As it did, we just pushed the frontier of the boundaries of the curriculum out, sort of, in all directions.

In the earlier period, it had been possible to centralize the development and design of the curriculum; in the later period, it just became impossible to manage it in a way that had been customary or traditional at Leavenworth. This is my argument. I believe what I say. I said it very recently to the new Deputy Commandant.

Q: Would you say that the Leavenworth graduate during this period, was better prepared for the problems that might face him, or was he less prepared than he may have been earlier?

A: Well, he was certainly differently prepared! Whether the difference represents progress or regression is, I suppose, somewhat debatable. Clearly, if you spend the whole school year on G3 operational matters, you ought to turn out a more qualified G3. That contrasts sharply with saying we are going to spend only a portion of time on G3 and we are going to do a lot of other things, because they also are the business of the senior officer or senior staff officer. In that sense, it was different. Everyone would agree upon that. My position is clear. Even a G3 must know something more than operations. I think that this broader, less specialized preparation is what was called for, and still is what is called for. Some people, I suppose, would disagree.

Q: One of the interesting things that one finds as he reviews the CGSC during this period is the idea that we were preparing corps commanders and division commanders. Was that actually accepted as a formal mission?
A: We used to tell everyone that we were going to prepare division, corps, and Army commanders, and that was our job. Today, we say it with a great deal more modesty. I guess your question is, "Did this difference in what we say, reflect in what we did?" I think the answer is "Only to a small extent." The tactics instruction was, for the most part, designed around or built around division operations. Insofar as the actual requirements are concerned, it was the question of planning the division defense, or the counter-attack, which was made by a brigade (or whatever, depending upon the organization at the time). It was also a question of the assignment of key terrain, avenues of approach, and objectives for the major maneuver units. It does not change a bit if you say to the guy, "You're the brigade commander, now pick out the brigade objectives," or whether you say, "You're the G3; pick out the objectives or designate the ones you envision will be in the brigade commander's plan." Once you get by that, the judgment that is involved is exactly the same. I think the difference revolves around what proportion of the time we have the students in a paper exercise employing the corps in the field Army. If you go back into the middle 1950s, this would occur on some few occasions, whereas today, probably not at all. I find this whole argument about a center of gravity to be sort of a futile exercise in verbage, and I just can't get concerned about it.

Q: Was there any thought given at this time to the possibility of a two-year course, or for the possibility of something that might resemble electives?
A: To answer the first part of the two-part question, the two-year course had been proposed by General Carr Davidson. But that proposition died and has never been seriously considered again.

The second part of the question, however, brings to mind something that happened during the Lemley regime that did have some far-reaching implications for CGSC. I am really talking now about the activity of the Department of the Army Haines Board—the body by General Haines to survey the whole scheme for officer education in the Army. The Haines Board made its visit to CGSC while General Lemley was the commandant, and it was probably a year before their report was subsequently published. After they had been here a couple of days, it was clear that they were going to champion two points, and indeed they did. I think these are the two most significant outcomes of the Haines Board insofar as CGSC is concerned.

One of these was that throughout the Army school system there should be initiated what they called (and we probably ought to continue to call) a program of electives. It was not our notion, in all fairness; it came out of the Haines Board and we will see as we talk about the next era how the electives program came about.

The other significant outcome of the Haines Board study was the change in the size of the class. We have noted that Bell Hall had been designed to hold seventeen 50-man sections of the regular course (that's 850), seven sections of an associate course, and one classroom was left over. Over time, a sizable number of the spaces in the associate course had become occupied by active Army officers. This situation was not unique to CGSC. You found the same thing in the major branch schools with their career or advanced
course and with their associate advanced courses. The Haines Board very properly pointed out that this was simply, and logically, a contradiction or inconsistency which just could not be rationalized. The Haines Board said, "We ought to decide how much time and at what level we are going to devote to career education for the full-time officer. Then having made that decision, let's stick with it."

They chose to say it ought to be a 10-month career course and a 10-month CGSC course. They made that decision, really, on just kind of an intuitive feeling that it is worthwhile to invest that much time. The Haines Board went about their business in a quite different fashion than have some DA Boards. They did not attempt to quantify or prove that it ought to be that long. They just said, "That's what we believe is correct."

At Leavenworth, if you follow this line of reasoning, you should take all the active Army people out of the associate course and confine it strictly to non-active Army. But if you are going to (a) use the building to its full capacity, and (b) provide the number of graduates that MILPERCEN now says that they need to fill billets specifying CGSC graduates as a prerequisite, you have to substantially increase the size of the regular course. Yet, even that won't completely take up the slack. In an endeavor to get the concurrence of personnel people, the Haines Board said, "We'll increase the size of the regular course to 1150--using up all the classrooms." Since, as I say, that would not completely satisfy all requirements they then, in an amazing bit of rationalization, said, "We'll start counting the Armed Forces Staff College as the equivalent of Leavenworth, rather than a follow-on." According
to this scheme, the total output of CGSC plus Norfolk, could come close to matching the previous arrangement and, presumably, the personnel requirement. I sat in and heard the discussions about this; the members of the Board knew perfectly well that this business about Norfolk was a personnel-administrative action that they were taking. It was not an educational equivalence. They were just simply being realistic in terms of whose occurrence they needed. They presented this proposal to General Lemley, and he agreed completely. We had all become, if we had thought about it, uneasy with this sort of paradoxical arrangement.

Then came the next question, "When do we increase the size of the course by 350?" More precisely, the question became, "Do we do it after we get the housing?" General Lemley said, "Do it next year." I think that was school year 1967-1968. He told me later, "Ivan, I knew perfectly well we'd never get the housing in advance. The only way we'd get the housing was to get the students here and then be able to make the request on the basis of demonstrating we did not have sufficient housing." After seeing what eventually happened, I believe the General was dead right about this. That is how, during the first or second year of General Mike Davison's regime, the class suddenly jumped to its all-time peak of 1150. We will come back to that later.

Q: Was it during this period that the College began to focus somewhat more so than in the past on counterinsurgency or unconventional warfare?
A: Yes. That came during the Johnson/Lemley regime, because that is when the big build-up in Southeast Asia came. During this period
as I told you, I was loaned out to the special warfare school. There existed then, and I suppose to a degree it still exists, the unresolved problem of where Leavenworth and the Institute at Fort Bragg exactly interface (or whatever the term one wants to use) in terms of educational responsibility for this area. It was not clear then and I do not think it is very clear now.

Q: Where did Leavenworth get the expertise for teaching this sort of subject? Were they imported or did it come from the existing faculty?

A: Some of both. We had some people here who had had some brush with the business, and then we began to get people back from the field with some experience.

Q: Considering the sort of thing we were emphasizing, was it more the cultural aspects of Southeast Asia, or was it how to fight in the jungles of Southeast Asia?

A: I don't have much confidence in my answer, but my notion is that in those days it was more of what Brigadier General Johns once described to me as "nation building or the positive program" whatever that is.

Q: What occurred in the area of combat developments during the Johnson and Lemley years?

A: It was during this time that the Army decided to establish the Combat Developments Command at Fort Belvoir, as a kind of parallel command to what was then called CONARC. Within this scheme, the Combat Developments Command would be responsible for the preparation of doctrine and literature. I think this is the most significant part that concerned CGSC. We have always maintained, at
Leavenworth, that the field manuals having to do with how we fight, should be written and prepared by the faculty who were teaching our students how to fight. General Johnson felt very strongly about this, but the recommendation of a department of the Army board prevailed. It was known as the Holcher Committee. As a result of that, there was established at Leavenworth an organization which was called ICAS, or the Institute of Combined Arms and Support.

The separation of doctrine formulation from CGSC was not clean because in deference to our strongly-held position, the commandant's job became a two-hat proposition; he commanded both ICAS and the College. Presumably, at his office, he was going to coordinate the two activities. Moreover, under ICAS, or at least for most of the time Lemley was here, there were 13 associated research entities at, for the most part, the service schools, that reported under his direction. This kept him almost on a constant circuit just going around finding out what was going on. Basically, the scheme prevailed until the STEADFAST reorganization in 1973.

Q: How did it affect the curriculum, when the writing of doctrinal literature was taken out of the Command and General Staff College? A: It did not really make that much difference, because the responsibility for the doctrinal literature with which we were primarily concerned (FM 100-5 and associated documents) was never actually transferred. It was in a legal sense, but the practical matter was that the only people that could really provide any input were the author/instructors at CGSC. We really had to work around the organization. I think the removal of the responsibility for formulating doctrine just made it more difficult for us to do
business. That was my personal assessment.

Q: Did the College lose any instructors as a result of this loss of the mission for writing doctrinal literature?

A: I do not remember that they did, and if so, it was no more than a small proportion. There wasn't any sizable transfer of people that really affected the strength of the College.
INTERVIEW FOUR

17 January 1978

Major General William S. Davieon, 1968-1971

Implementation of Electives Program
Special Weapons Instruction
Role of Educational Advisor
Residence on Post


Cooperative Degree Program
Student Evaluation
Consultant to Army War College
Instructor Training

Decline in Amount of Tactics Instruction
Effect of Vietnam War on CGSC
Use of Special Texts
Combat Developments
Departmental Reorganization
Q: What were some of the major events and problems encountered during the period when General Michael S. Davison was here?

A: We have already talked about the fact that the Haines Board report was published, and with it a clear mandate to institute electives. If you read the report, you don't really find much of a rationale for the elective program. Again, I had had the opportunity to listen to the Board talk about this matter. The driving force on the Board for electives was a member named Babcock who was promoted to Brigadier General during the Board's visit to Leavenworth. He had sold General Haines on the notion that during part of the student's time at the service schools, he ought to have some choice. So, by mandate we had to institute electives.

The problem was suddenly to find, if you will, 1,150 "training spaces." We did sort of what everybody else did. We conjured up a number of in-house offerings, and we went to the University of Kansas and contracted for them to provide a number of course offerings. It was really a question of not what we want but what will you bring. Because we still could not get up to 1,150, we worked out a scheme, so that anybody who was not enrolled in anything else could satisfy this requirement by taking at least a portion of the correspondence course from the Industrial College. The scheme was that these elective courses would be taught on Thursday afternoon during the last half of the year. We will see as we go on with this interview that that basic notion still has a part in the College program.

The second matter was that by now Harold K. Johnson had become the Army Chief of Staff, and Harry Lemley had become the DCSOPS. Furthermore, Lemley had an executive assistant named Colonel Arthur Olsen. Art had
gone to Washington with Lemley from 1964-1966, and during Arnt's three years here, he had been in charge of the on-going, albeit very small, NMAS program. At this point in the interview, suffice to say that after a few months in Washington (I think at Lemley's initiative) he encouraged Lemley to re-open NMAS in terms of the acquisition of the necessary degree-granting authority or legislation. Therein, he set in motion the series of events which we should tell in another sitting. At least from Ivan Birrer's standpoint, that is what is very significant about the Davison regime.

As a direct outgrowth of the NMAS matter, I should note that during the Davison regime the CGSC advisory committee was created. It held its first annual meeting here in 1967, I guess it was December. With a couple of years' lapse it has met each succeeding year. Over time it has proved to be a very influential body in our institution.

I probably should note also some of the problems of the larger student class of 1150 officers, which I discussed earlier. When the students arrived, housing was pretty frightful. Many had to live downtown, in some rather hastily constructed apartments, and in many cases students lived in Platte City, Kansas City, or Tonganoxie, distances which were considerable, at least when compared to the previous "we can almost walk to school" distances. With this need established, we began to see appropriations for the new housing. This has continued over the years, somewhat as Lemley forecast, and they finally do show up over in the southwest corner of the reservation.

Q: What sort of opposition was encountered in trying to implement the electives program?
A: I don't know that there was any great opposition. It was a "CGSC do it" sort of thing, and it was not particularly hard to find 16 afternoons in which we did not conduct regular classes. My recollection about this first step was that it was a fairly painless operation.

Q: You mentioned that General Lemley was the DCSOPS and General Johnson was the Chief of Staff. Did Leavenworth begin to have problems here in this period with outside agencies influencing the content of the curriculum?

A: No, I don't think so. In fact, I don't think that has ever really been a problem. Now, it is true that on a couple of occasions -- I suppose most especially later, during the first three years of TRADOC--we have spent a good bit of time arguing, explaining, justifying, rationalizing, or whatever other words we want to use, what we were doing to the CONARC or TRADOC commander. But I think if one examined the true record in the case, the facts are that we really continued to do about what we wanted to anyway. You might add an hour here, and two hours there; but that is really all it has ever amounted to when you finally get down to cases.

Q: Wasn't it fairly difficult for the instructor though, sir, when you start looking at the impact of special weapons courses, counterinsurgency, and electives, for example? Didn't that really place an extreme burden on him during this period?

A: Yes, to some extent, it certainly did. Let me speak a little bit about the special weapons thing. All the way back to the McGarr regime, there had been a special department with that title, Special Weapons. The notional scheme was that they would teach the effects--how to estimate things and so on--and then the students would apply this learning in their subsequent tactical problems taught by the Tactics Department, to use our present terminology. In fact, that never really worked well, if for no
other reason than tactics instructors were not very comfortable when they got into this arena of weapons effects, except as they used to say, as "a cookie cutter kind of operation." There was never really this integration, if you will, of nuclear weapons into the tactics instruction—integration in the dictionary sense of combining to form a more perfect whole. We recognized this problem. Moreover, as time went along the procedures for estimating effects became greatly simplified. The Eklund concept that this was too complicated for an ordinary officer had long since been replaced by another notion which assumed that part of the arsenal of any professional officer was some competence in nuclear weapons. That is just the opposite position of today. Moreover, the so-called "Shooter's Manual" had been revised, I might say, over great Leavenworth protest. We fought that battle and lost it, and it is one we should have lost. But we spent many, many hours of argument on this part.

In time, it became apparent that the thing to do was to just dismember this department, to quit treating the effects business as another special staff technique, and then to assign the responsibility to DCOM for that kind of instruction. That department could take whatever action was necessary to insist that at least some appropriate amount of tactics instruction dealt, in an integrated sense, with nuclear weapons. I suppose that is where we are today with the problem still not entirely solved. But it is not much different than the problem of where you draw the line between artillery techniques and what the battalion commander needs to know about artillery. It seems to me it is the same kind of problem of how much is needed. If the staff officer's job is to plan, coordinate, and supervise, the question always becomes, how detailed does his knowledge
need to be. While I know what the question is, I am not wise enough to
figure out what the answer is.

Q: Were there any studies done during this period on the type skills that
a staff officer should specifically have?

A: I don't think so; I don't remember any. We were still operating--and
comfortably--behind the scheme that said we will make curriculum decisions
on the basis of consensus. We were not going to try to quantify and
necessarily prove we were right.

Q: What about your own role, sir? As we look back--let's say from the
McGarr years and the very close relationship that you had with people like
Major John Cushman, and then go forward to, let's say the clash between
yourself and Colonel Wilson--did your role or influence change during this
period?

A: If you have no operational responsibility, you sit organizationally
off to the side in some kind of an advisory-consultant role. If you further
compound this by saying that in this setting you are a civilian, then your
influence is an ever-changing personal matter in interpersonal relations.
If I could chart or describe my association with each commandant starting
with Gar Davidson, I could probably point this out. By the time Mike
Davison came, 20 years had gone by, and I think it is fair to say that at
this point I knew more about the college than anybody else. I had also
learned a number of things--for example, what could be done, and how long
it took to do a number of things. I had also realized that with each
new commandant I would inevitably suffer a certain loss of status, influ-
ence, prestige, whatever term one wants to use, which would be regained
over time. This influence would be regained when something came up in
Which I, because of knowledge gained from being here longer than anyone else or some other reason, would emerge as knowledgeable. That is the kind of thing that went on. I had never known Mike Davison before, and he is not a very easy person to know personally. He treated me very courteously, and on the matters that I dealt with, he gave me great support. I confined myself, for the most part, to a fairly constricted arena, and I thought that was appropriate for the time. Not a very satisfying answer to your question.

Q: Is there anything else you want to say, sir, about this period?
A: I probably should say on a personal note that by now our only child had finished high school and gone off to college. This left Mrs. Birrer and me as the sole occupants of the entire lower floor of that giant structure that was the original Commandant's quarters up on 20 Sumner Place. We had lived there since 1952. She had always wanted a house of her own. As she said, she wanted to be able to put the nails in the wall wherever she wanted and whenever she chose to do it, and paint it any color she wanted. So, we decided that this was the time that we ought to change locations. We bought a small house and moved downtown and lived in it for four years. By that time we decided what kind of house we wanted to subsequently build, with which we are still very comfortable. Financially, of course, I should have made that switch 20 years earlier, if I am just talking about the way real estate appreciated. But I don't really feel that way at all about it.

I am satisfied that a sizable component of what has been a very satisfying career at Leavenworth stemmed from the fact that during these early years when I was, I suppose, making my mark, we were completely an
integral part of the Fort Leavenworth community--of the neighborhood, the bowling team, the church, the hospital, just the entire community. At the same time many of my counterparts at the other service schools never really became a part of and never really became identified with the institution. I think this business of residence played a key role. If I were to do it over again, I would do it exactly the same.

Q: What were some of the problems and major events of General John Hay's tenure as commandant?

A: The announcement that John Hay was to become the commandant represented a first in the sense that during his tour on the faculty in the early part of the McGarr regime, not only had John Hay and I become close friends, but we were also contemporary. I guess it proves, if nothing else, that now I had become considerably older. But it also was a different kind of relationship. The announcement of his appointment caused me to remember our last conversation. It occurred in this same office, probably in 1958 or 1959. The point of the conversation was that he came in to see me, and he was very upset. The reason he was upset was that he had been ordered to attend as a student Canada's--I guess they call it--the National Defense College, in lieu of the Army War College or even more desirably, the National War College. John was really upset about this, and I remember telling him, "You're just completely wrong. You ought to consider that we only send one officer up there. I just know doggone well that the people who made this choice were very careful. It's going to be to your advantage." That was about our last conversation. It was not very long before he was picked up on the brigadier general list, and then later came here as the commandant.
I guess during our first conversation we saw fit to reminisce about that.

To return to the question at hand, I can think of two major matters that I recall during the Hay era with which I was directly associated. One of these was the receipt in 1970 of a letter from the Army Chief of Staff, William C. Westmoreland. The subject was the "Army Educational System." A new educational scheme was described in this very long and rambling letter. The scheme was that during the time an officer came to Leavenworth, he would set up some kind of an arrangement for getting a master's degree. The name of the game was "Let's get as many officers with master's degrees as possible." There was no concern about what for, or in what discipline. The letter said that CGSC was to be the focal point of a system which would start out an officer on a kind of dual educational track at the branch school and culminate in a master's degree, either here or at the War College. That was sort of vague, too, but Leavenworth was to carry this out.

Ivan Birrer became the project officer for this operation. I would remind you again of the timing--1970 or 1971--and this was in the time when the military throughout the whole nation probably reached the depth of its status--especially vis-a-vis higher education. Nevertheless, I spent almost half a year trying to establish something that would at least be responsive to this directive. It was out of this that our Cooperative Degree Program emerged, much in the format that we have today. It soon became clear that the only way that we could hope to pull this thing off, would be with an officer attending six months for full-time study following his graduation from CGSC. Also, during his school year at CGSC, he would have to earn 9 hours of credit in courses presented by that civilian institution. Therefore, as a practical
matter, in his course of study, we had to let him take university courses every Thursday afternoon throughout the year. That was all that was going to work; it had to be structured in that fashion.

You asked me earlier if the inclusion of electives in the last half of the year caused any great problem, and my answer was, "Well not really." But when we took off Thursday afternoon in the fall, that was a different matter, because we had to reduce what John Hay called the "hard core" instruction. Nevertheless, we did it, and we did it by simply cutting down a little bit (some 30-40 hours) on the total course offerings. We established the program, initially, with KU, KSU and UMKC, and that program has continued through the years. Once again, it probably should be noted that as I went out to bargain--plead, would be a better term--with the institutions for arrangements, I really did not care what kind of degree or what kind of program was involved. That was not a matter of concern. The only concern was a scheme which would culminate in a master's degree for the officer.

Q: Was that a result of your own perception, or was it the result of the directions of the Department of the Army?

A: It was due to the directions of the Department of the Army. The goal was to establish as many degree programs as we could, to obtain as many master's degrees as possible. We established them established, and we worked out the arrangements with the three institutions. In the course of those several discussions, I had been assisted by two officers. COL John Thompson operated the MNAS program, and we had adjoining offices with a secretary in between us. We shared our secretary. We were closely associated, and John and I were close friends. COL Lucian Truscott, III, was here on a terminal assignment for a year and was assigned to work with me.
When we got things set up in May or June, we wanted to begin the program the next fall. As he had expected, John Thompson was transferred, and Lucian retired. I proposed that I be given the responsibility to operate the program. The Assistant Commandant at that time was Frank Clay, the son of General Lucius Clay, and he simply would not permit it. It had nothing to do with me as an individual; it was the fact that I did not wear a green suit.

The second matter that came along during that time was my proposal to General Hay regarding student evaluation. The persistent problem, or puzzling question, at the end of each school year, was always the question of who should graduate, or more precisely, the question of who should not graduate. There was never more than a small handful of possible failures. We did not really have any rational basis on which to make such a judgment. One of my colleagues on the faculty board described the operation to me once, after his first experience, as "ten men in search of a gap." That wasn't a completely unfair description. I worked out a scheme which I submitted to the Assistant Commandant, and he liked it well enough that I took it to John Hay for his approval. By now, also, the course of study concept had been well institutionalized. I suggested that we establish a rational basis on which to make this final "go, no go" decision, and that the basis ought to be simply satisfactory completion of each course of study. Satisfactory completion was interpreted to mean a grade of C or better. If anyone failed to do so, in a course of study that was substantially over earlier in the year, he would be given a re-examination.

I remember another point that got to be rather controversial. We had a so-called writing requirement. I said, "Let's take that out, and
put it on a 'go, no go' basis. We are reporting it separately anyway; let's keep it out of the class standing." Then I said, "The problem for the faculty board will be simply to determine or to review the situation of anyone who does not qualify to see if there is any reason that there ought to be an exception made to policy. This was a simpler, more reasonable question to ask than to look at a whole array of numbers and say, "Is there anybody here who's bad enough that we shouldn't graduate him?" John Hay adopted my proposal, and since that time, we have determined graduation-nongraduation on that basis.

On a personal note, I should mention that I was invited to the Army War College as a consultant during this period. This came about, because they were in the throes of a significant reappraisal of their curriculum program. Their Assistant Commandant had been the original 8 coordinator here in the McGarr regime, Ward Ryan. Ward arranged to have me invited to Carlisle Barracks on a couple of occasions. Rather than have an educational survey commission, they decided they would invite three or four civilians in on an individual basis, and get their impressions. That added another chapter of outside consultations for me. So far as I know, the only specific outcome of my visit resulted from an exit interview with the commandant, Major General Gene Salet, whom I had known many years ago (not very well) as a member of the CGSC faculty in the early 1950's. In any event, I was talking to Gene, and one of the proposals that they were considering was designating some professorial chairs, and that over time the incumbent would be perhaps a retired general or something like this. I commented to Gene, "Yes, that would probably be a good idea, but it was going to take a long
time to do that. Why don't you go ahead and just designate the chairs now (because he could do that on his own), and then let develop whatever might develop over time." He said he had just never thought about that, but he proceeded to do so very quickly. I suspect that was my only real contribution to the War College.

Q: Were there any changes in the electives program during this period?
A: You remember we started with electives being conducted only in the last half of the year; we now had to get them all year round. We had to add a number of electives, especially university courses. I suspect that by the time that 1970 or 1971 rolled around, we had become disenchanted with teaching language. In 1968 when we started, we contracted to teach Spanish and German classes (conversational language) as part of the electives course. This really did not work out well. There were some real problems. We had to decide whether we were teaching beginners, or whether we were just going to run a refresher course for people who already had a certain competence in a language. Moreover, what language would we teach, and where were the students going to use it? So, we gave up on languages. There was still a fairly large recipe of courses that prevailed for 2 or 3 more years, really until we get to the next chapter of that operation.

Q: What about the actual conduct of the class itself, sir? Was CGSC still emphasizing the lecture/conference in conjunction with small work group? Had there been any change in that?
A: No. The College had now digested the McGarr small-group emphasis. We had learned the now very obvious lessons about what kinds of requirements ought to be done in small groups. We had even learned when it is and is not necessary to designate leaders in advance, and if so, what you need to
tell them. We had also restored a number of requirements to be solved individually. I think it is fair to say that the institution had incorporated the small-group matter in an effective fashion.

Q: What about instructor training, sir? Were there any major changes?
A: No. I remained responsible for instructor training throughout this period. As I saw it, there were kind of three possible major areas of coverage we could include in the course. One of these is that CGSC is a complex institution and newly assigned members of the faculty could not just be brought in and seated at a desk. We could not expect them to learn everything they needed to know on their own. We needed some efficient way for them to learn who and what were here to help them in terms of services and facilities, and how to get things accomplished. So I tried to do that on a systematic basis. That is not very profound, but I think it is necessary.

I had long since come to the conclusion that an officer made his greatest and most lasting contribution on this faculty as an author. Despite that belief, I had also recognized that authorship was not the problem of the new member of the faculty. Under ordinary conditions, the most he was going to do for several months would perhaps be to do a little revision of something already put together. Authorship came along later—authorship in a creative sense. Hence I had chosen to pare that down for the practical reason that I suggested.

The other matter is the conduct of classes. I had also realized that the problem at CGSC for the typical instructor was not effective one-way communication. He had done a lot of that already, and ordinarily, he could do it well. After all, it is pretty simple anyway; it only takes a little
preparation and rehearsal. What set off the good Leavenworth teacher, in my mind, was the good discussion leader. So, in this era I insisted that the 2 weeks of practice teaching exercises emphasize classroom discussion. I was trying to develop by practical experience, and immediate critique, the skills of the new instructor, if you will, in directed conference leadership. I might add that I have not changed my mind very much about the requirements. If you ask me how successful I may have been, I don't claim any success. I think the requirements have not changed, and I lament the fact that we have, either deliberately or by default, given up here.

Q: Looking back over the evolution of the curriculum, as we examine the number of hours, for example, of tactics instruction from the Korean War up through 1970, we see that there is a clear decline in the number of actual hours devoted to tactics instruction. Would you comment on that?
A: Your observation is entirely accurate. I would extend it perhaps even a little further. As the curriculum expanded in scope, with the total hours being constant, there was always just really one target of opportunity. The CGSC course had heretofore been almost all tactics; hence, we were always carving out some of the tactics instruction. The sizable reductions, however, that are part of Leavenworth's story had not yet occurred. We ought to say something about that later.

Q: We have now covered really the major period of the war in Southeast Asia. What was the impact of that war, in general terms, on the Command and General Staff College?
A: In summary--probably not very much. If one tried to figure out the cause and effects, it could get to be a very tortuous search. You can say
some obvious things. At the height of the build-up, there were a few faculty tours shortened, but really not very many. There was some coverage added of the special kind of tactical operations that became the prevailing scheme in Vietnam, but only one or two lessons. Surprisingly, I still come out with my initial answer. We talked about the change in the size of the student body. I put it that way because I am not sure the effect was clear or I am not sure to what extent it was a direct cause-and-effect relationship. Clearly, at the very height of the build-up for the war, a third of the class was enroute or had just returned from Southeast Asia. This tended to, I think, develop either a lack of concern with or impatience for the European war tactics. But, again, only somewhat.

I think, if you ask the same question about any war, it really comes down to not as much one, I suppose, would expect. If we had had a flexible electives program, such as we had after 1972, we could have better prepared the student for that war. As long as there was a rigid, required core curriculum, it was very difficult to respond to changing and immediate needs of the Army and of the student.

Q: Did the focus pretty much remain on European tactics, sir?
A: For the most part, the tactical problems continued to be concerned with land warfare, as we had customarily thought of it, on a large land mass. We were not so concerned about where it was set.

Q: When did CGSC start using the printing plant for printing all these books and readings that it has? Had that always been the practice during this period?
A: No. We have had printed special texts, for as long as I have been here—special texts in the sense of field manuals that had not yet been approved.
The development of a special kind, if you will, of textbook stems from the start of the McGarr regime, and I believe it grew out of the educational subjects or later in the strategy section.

Q: Did those come into increasing usage during this period?
A: I think there has been kind of an upward sloping, straight line increase here. Perhaps related to your question is the issue of what the college was authorized to teach in terms of doctrine. Really, this is the important part implicit in the question. For a long time we felt restricted to teach only approved Army doctrine—defined to be something that is in a field manual that says "Department of the Army, Official."

During the McGarr regime, we publicly announced that we were going to teach approved doctrine and also tentative doctrine. We were obligated by directive that whenever we did this we had to clearly indicate to the students that this was not, as McGarr would put it, "the Word according to Isaiah."

I have not heard this matter even raised in recent years. I don't know what the current charter is. As a practical matter today, we now have approved field manuals that are current; we have some approved field manuals that obviously have been overtaken by events; we have working papers; we have reference books; we have documents that are almost without title. As a practical matter we have just quit worrying about this, and we use the best source or authority that is available in the field. It occurs to me as I tell this story that is a very reasonable kind of action. It took us a long time to get there, I might add.

Q: What about combat developments during this period, sir? The Combat Developments Command had been created. Was there any tension or any
friction existing between the College and the CDC community?
A: The decision to set up CDC, separate it from the College, and give it the doctrinal responsibility dated back to 1962 or 1963. That same decision set up the research institute at Leavenworth but with the Commandant as its head. That continued throughout this period. It worked about as well as you could make an awkward arrangement like that work. In due time CDC came under the command of Jack Norton, and I think he probably made an effort to actually get more done through the CDC system, of which the Leavenworth entity was one of his major operational units. He was out here a lot of times, and there were meetings, at which the college staff would sort of get to arguing, maybe somewhat on the periphery. What had been occurring—and I don’t think any more here than probably at a lot of other places—was the recognition that the CDC scheme, vis-a-vis CONARC, was simply not a workable solution for the Army. It was getting very close to the time when, in a sense, the Army said, "Yes, this is a mistake. Let's try it again under a different kind of arrangement." I don't think I can add any particulars to that.

Q: Would you summarize some of the institutional changes at CGSC from the time of General McGarr up through the time of General Hay.
A: I noted earlier in our discussion that one of the outcomes of the McGarr regime was the labeling of the departments, as contrasted to an earlier scheme of numbering them. As it evolved, the McGarr organization had five instructional departments. There was one which he called Staff and Education; there was an Armored Division department, an Infantry Division department, one for airborne and army aviation, and then one for larger units and administrative support. As time went along, there
were some normal, natural evolutionary changes in this scheme that came about. By the time we got to 1972, these five had been reduced to four.

I think I can trace it rather quickly. The McGarr department of Staff and Educational Subjects was redesignated the Department of Command, and I have previously pointed out that that was the result of a specific directive from Harold K. Johnson. As we did that, the Educational Subjects were pulled out and moved physically from the third floor of Bell Hall down to the basement; it's still there, now that I think about it. It was physically combined with the old Department of Joint, Combined and Special Operations. After a little more time, this became the Department of Strategy. The two departments teaching division operations simply merged into the Department of Division Operations. This came about as a natural consequence when the mechanized division appeared with its mix of infantry and armor battalions, and so the sharp difference between the two departments really was overtaken by events. That's where we were in 1972.

I should say one other thing, and again I have noted this before. In the McGarr regime there was another department which I have not mentioned called Special Weapons, and by 1972 the responsibility for instruction in nuclear weapons effects had become no longer special but part of standard staff procedures. Consequently, it went to the Department of Command. Also, there was collected in the Department of Command some instruction in leadership. We had a hard time trying to decide what one taught under the title of command. The quick and ready solution was to simply add the word "command" at the top of the title for each of our subjects that heretofore we had thought were staff techniques and procedures.
INTERVIEW FIVE

19 January 1978

Major General John J. Hennessey, 1971-1973

Role of Assistant Commandant, Brigadier General James Gibson
Design of Curriculum Model 1971-1972
Opposition within CGSC
Gaining Approval of CONARC
Concept of Differential Programs
Implementation in 1972-1973
Departmental Reorganization
"Plan for Institutional Development, CGSC 1975"
Design of Curriculum Model 1974-1975
Problems Encountered in Implementing Curriculum Model 1971-1972
Academic Reports

Determination of What the Leavenworth Graduate Should Be
Operation STEADFAST
Q: What were some of the specific problems and achievements of
General John J. Hennessey's reign as Commandant?

A: As a preface, I want to say that we should talk about this period
in the context of the Hennessey/Gibson regime. I say that because of the
very key role played by the Assistant Commandant, Brigadier General James
Gibson. He succeeded Frank Clay a few months before the end of John Hay's
tour as commandant, and then really rotated for all practical purposes
with Hennessey at the conclusion of his tour. Also, I think two other
things need to be noted about this: one is that Gibson, like Gar Davidson
of over 10 years earlier, had never been a student at Leavenworth. The
Army had sent him to Quantico instead. The second thing, and both of
these are important, is that Gibson came here as a Colonel and served in
the Department of Larger Unit Operations as the department director before
his promotion to brigadier general. Upon his promotion, he moved down to
be the assistant commandant. The significance of that is that he had a
lot more detailed information about how the college really functioned
than is really customary for incumbents of that office. Because he did,
he had considerable confidence in being able, when necessary, to override
his department directors with whom a few months earlier he had been a
member of the club.

General Hennessey was a very quiet, extremely calm and imposing person.
Ben Capshaw, who was the chief of staff at the time he came and was shortly
to retire, once told me that among the entire CGSC student body in Hennessey's
day, it was generally understood that one day this man would be a general.
If you ask me why I believe that story, I am hard pressed, because he was
a very quiet man, but at the same time obviously very effective. He quietly stayed out of the limelight, and hence his assistant, Jim Gibson, played a very significant role. With that as a preface, I will go back and pick up the story.

Only a few months after Jack Hennessey, as people who knew him called him, became the commandant, Gibson issued a written directive entitled "Regular Course Curriculum Review" dated 28 September 1971. This directive was addressed to three persons: Colonel Hal Kressin, who had served a couple of long tours here and who had been an assistant department director and the head of DNRI, and who was scheduled to retire in a few months; Colonel E. D. H. Berry, an engineer officer who was serving at the time as the assistant in the CRI office, or I guess it was called the DRI office by now; and me.

The directive was in some considerable detail, and told us to examine a scheme which would divide the college instructional program into three major areas: tactics, logistics and what he called administration. According to this scheme, everybody would take a certain common curriculum, and then would be divided into three groups and pursue three different "tracks" of study. There were some other things that went along with it, to include an examination of the desirability of prescribing a 2-hour standard lesson as the second evolution of my earlier 3-hour block scheme. I did not know it at the time, but Gibson's motivation was based on almost a gut feeling on his part that continuing CGSC essentially as a single-purpose institution did not really make much sense. The proposal he invited us to examine was one way to break this scheme.
If you look at the memorandum, the committee is named in the order that I ticked them off: Kressin, Berry, and Birrer. It really did not work that way at all for a number of reasons. Hal Kressin, as I say, was a man without a job at that point. He was called a special assistant, but he really did not have an office. Berry was quite busy keeping all the day-to-day activities of the academic staff proceeding. I was the only one who really had the luxury to devote my entire energy to this kind of thing. Furthermore, I had a secretary to provide some support, and the room to do it. My room became the committee meeting place, and, indeed, it became very clear that maybe by usurpation I became the chairman.

We met a couple of times to examine the problem, and I quickly concluded that the original Gibson scheme really would not work. The reason I thought it would not work primarily was that if we did it as he outlined (it is kind of funny as I tell you this now), we were going to create for ourselves an enormous authorship problem. We were not going to have a single track of curriculum throughout the year that would be the same and then stop. One of the major problems was knowing when to stop the single track and convert to the three tracks. I thought that was really more than we could do.

After about the first one or two of these discussions, we started going to Gibson. Indeed, we hammered out a working scheme, and our working scheme was to go down every 2 or 3 days with a so-called "butcher paper" and just talk him through where we were. We did this for the whole project; in fact, we had it all approved before I ever put it in writing. What I told the General was that we could have three (and he coined the term professional electives) professional electives, one in tactics, one
in logistics, and one in administration. We could do the tactics, since we already had enough material to run that through the whole year. But we would be hard-pressed in logistics, and would be overwhelmed in the administrative area. So, I argued that what we could do in order to manage part of this would be to allow a person to say take two of these electives. The important part of this discussion was that it was not Gibson's own scheme that he was championing at all; he was just looking for a way to break this kind of traditional scheme or log jam, and when we presented him with what was my alternative, he said, "Gee, fine, work on that one. That'll be gr."

Then we talked some more, and here in my office on the chalkboard one day, we developed the scheme of a curriculum which divided the college into four terms. We split the first half of the year into two parts, and this was the common curriculum. The last of the year was divided into two sub-parts of 9 weeks each. Within this scheme, the student would take two professional electives each term, a total of 56 hours in fourteen 4-hour lessons in each elective. I have been asked a number of times why those particular numbers, and the answer is a very simple one. I worked out the arithmetic, and that is the way I could make it work. So we just said we are going to do it that way. Also, throughout the year, the student would take two associate electives. The associate electives were the ones we were continuing to run on Thursday afternoon, half by contract taught by the universities, and half by members of the CGSC faculty. This is the program that grew out of the Haines Board report and the Cooperative Degree Program. Overall, each
student's program consisted of common curriculum, four professional electives, and two associate electives. We got this scheme worked out, we drew a little diagram to show Gibson, and he was very enthusiastic. Then came the problem of trying to sell it to everybody else. Our method was to get the department directors down in my office one at a time and go through the affair. In an earlier interview you asked me if there was much concern about the decline in the number of tactics hours; and I think I said, "No, not really." Nor was there much concern when we just simply took off Thursday afternoon to make the Thursday afternoon elective program. But it was quite a different story now, because in order to make the curriculum scheme work, we had to make a fairly significant reduction in the number of hours of tactics instruction. Frankly, the department director of the Department of Division Operations was adamantly opposed. He was conscientious and sincere, but he was insistent. As for the other department directors, one of them was enthusiastic; that was Mike Sanger, who had the Department of Strategy. He had been here about a year and found himself dissatisfied with what had been occurring. The other two department directors were not very enthusiastic, though, because whatever else this was, it represented sizable change and turbulence.

We had all kinds of conversations until finally we got to where we could go down and could explain to the general how the matter stood. We finally decided that it was time to have an open, all-out session. We got everybody in the Command Conference Room, I gave the formal briefing on the scheme, and everybody had a chance to say his piece. The opposition was predictable from the Department of Division Operations. The Class Director did not like it because, interestingly enough, he was
afraid of losing some nice, neat control of the student body if we broke up the section arrangement. Furthermore, he was also on his second tour here, having taught tactics as a younger officer. He figured that what we were proposing was heresy. One of the department directors took the position, "Yes, this is a good idea, but we really need to study it very carefully and not rush into this thing peremptorily." Another department director took the stand, "Yes, this is a good idea, but it really will not work because..." And then the "because" always had to do with our inability to schedule it. There were a whole series of opposing views like this. This was a very bitter affair.

Q: Did the opposition believe that this was changing the fundamental direction of the Command and General Staff College?

A: Oh yes. That was the opposition of John White, who headed the Department of Division Operations. That was the viewpoint of the Class Director as well. They held it very sincerely. I want that clearly understood.

Q: How did you respond to that, sir?

A: I don't think we ever really tried to respond to it. It was one of those obvious facts; it was a given. Whether it was good or bad was a matter of opinion, and we were not going to change their minds; they were committed. I just chose not to argue. I acknowledged that that was one way to look at the scheme, or something like that.

But at the end, Jim Gibson agreed with us, and he did it in open court before the assembled colonels whom he previously had served with as a department director. He listened to all this opposition, heard it all out, and said "OK, but now this is the decision, and we shall now present the scheme to the boss." I went home that night, and obviously I
felt very good. The next morning on my way into the office, I went in to see Jim Gibson, and I made a little speech to him. I said something like, "Jim, I know that on the wall in your house there is an imposing collection of combat awards." And he did really have them for valor in action. I said, "I guess what I want to tell you is that yesterday I saw that strong leader in action."

A couple of days later and before we got on General Hennessey's calendar, the college was visited by General Putnam, who I believe was on his first visit in conjunction with the Officers' Personnel Management System (OPMS). Gibson arranged for me to brief General Putnam on this scheme. I did not know a thing about OPMS; I learned something about it at a presentation by General Putnam to the student body just before I was to brief him. It was immediately recognizable that however OPMS came out—and at that point it was still in outline form—there was going to be some breakaway from the old notion of the generalist. In the same sense, our new scheme was also a breakaway from the generalist approach. There was a certain built in degree of commonality, since both moved toward specialization. That commonality became an unexpected bonus. By ourselves at Fort Leavenworth, we had begun to do some things with the CGSC curriculum that were completely independent of but which neatly matched with the concept of OPMS. This was one of those fortunate kind of things. "There are ideas," as the saying goes, "whose day has arrived."

Before long, the committee, Jim Gibson, and myself were in Hennessey's office, and I gave him the briefing. When it was over, he very quietly asked me, "What's the reaction of the rest of the college brass?" I simply
ticked off, not by name but by categories, the various viewpoints: those opposed in principle, those opposed because it was change, those opposed because they said it would not work for some reason. His comment was something like, "That's about the way I expected it. I want you now to try the scheme out on the student curriculum committee, and let me know how that works." That was the next phase of the operation.

The key member of the student curriculum committee was a student named LTC James Van Straten. Van Straten comes back into this curriculum story a little bit later, but I wanted to mention his name now. I got the group together and gave them a briefing. They liked everything they heard. They liked it, because, as they put it, "At long last somebody is going to let us have a little say about the nature of our school program." That was what was very enticing about it. I think they were also flattered that they were asked. We reported this.

By this time we had consumed September, October and November of 1971. Around the first of December, General Hennessey said "Very well. We only have one more thing we need to do to put the operation into effect for next year. We have to get the approval of CONARC." Gibson called CONARC and wrangled an appointment for us to see General Ralph Haines on a Friday afternoon. As I recall, it was about 3:00 p.m. He had to do this rather skillfully or cavalierly, because the trick was to get the audience without disclosing essentially any of the material. At least, we thought that was the trick.

Q: Did you expect opposition?
Yes, I suppose so. There was some uncertainty about it. On Thursday on that day in December, I flew to Fort Monroe and got there that night. Jim Gibson came down the next morning. The DCS of CONARC was Major General Jim Hunt. We were on the schedule to brief his boss on the CGSC curriculum, and he did not know anything about it. That is kind of uncomfortable for any senior assistant to be in, so I was confronted by General Hunt before Jim Gibson joined me late that morning on Friday. I had to tell him what we were going to tell his boss and sell him on the scheme. As I thought about it later I could understand his concern. He was irritated, because we had bypassed him on the way to his boss, and this was his immediate and direct sphere of influence. I suppose anybody would have been irritated. But we had done it because we did not want anyone short of Haines to have the opportunity to say no, or do something else to delay the scheme. By the time Jim got there late in the morning, Hunt was satisfied. I had listened to his wrath, and we had a pleasant lunch with Gibson.

The afternoon finally came and around 3:00 or so in the CONARC conference room everybody came in. I say "everybody" because what we thought might be General Haines and two or three people turned out to be about 25 to include, interestingly enough, four ex-members of the CGSC faculty. Each of them came around to tell me, "This isn't any of our business except that we're wondering what you're doing to the place." General Haines was a little bit late, but he soon came in and met us. I did not really know him very well at that time. General Gibson opened the matter by saying that we were here to talk about a program and that I was going to be briefing.
For this to make any sense I have to back up and give you some background. A few months earlier, Frank Norris completed a Department of the Army study. He did it as a Major General at the completion of his career; he previously had been the Armed Forces Staff College Commandant. It is also important to note that Frank had been an instructor at CGSC in the 1950’s. General Westmoreland had requested Norris to stay on duty for an additional year beyond his planned retirement and to take that year to do what Frank Norris described as a "Poor man's update of the Haines Board Report." This fairly sizable report had been issued, distributed, and briefed by Norris to a number of people a month or so before the time that we were at CONARC to talk to Haines. A great deal of the Norris report dealt with Leavenworth, and what Frank called for had a faint resemblance to Gibson's scheme. That is to say, he called for a common curriculum and then three or four special curriculum tracks. The notion was that a student would pick one and follow it through completely. This was very similar to what had been tried and found wanting right after World War II.

Back to my introduction. As I was being introduced by Gibson, Haines interrupted him to say, "If you are here to talk about the Norris report, I want you to know right now, I don't like it." A minute or two later, I was on my feet in front of this audience, and General Haines was 6 feet away. I changed my introduction by saying something to the effect, "General, the first thing to note is that I don't like the Norris report either. In a sense what I'm about to tell you is what we think we ought to do rather than follow the Norris report." Then I acknowledged the presence of the faculty emeritus members in the body. I gave the briefing which lasted
about 15 minutes, and it went over very well. Before I finished, General Haines interrupted me and asked, "On this proposal, when do you want to do it?" I said, "General, we want to do it in August of next year, 7 months from now." I could tell by the expression on his face that if there had been any contest in respect to Haines, we had won. When he found out that we were going to do it, not year after next, but we were going to start it right away when he was still going to have something to do with it, he was convinced. There were some other questions asked, but none of them with any real consequence. Finally, General Haines turned around and asked, "What do you want me to do?" At this point, Hunt said, "I think what we should do, General, is tell them this has our approval, and that when they send the scheme down to us we will respond in writing with an affirmation." That was that.

Jim Gibson had some business in Washington, and he stayed over the weekend. I flew back that night and spent the night at the national airport. The next morning I flew into Kansas City. A plan had been made, long before the briefing had been announced, that Jack Hennessey and I were to meet at a Kansas City club and be the guests at a stag party. He came a few minutes early, expecting to see me. I also arrived a few minutes early hoping he would get there early. It was in the foyer of the Kansas City club that I told the general that we had gotten the carte blanche to proceed.

Q: Did General Haines appreciate the redirection of the college that would occur as a result of this plan?
A: Yes, I think he did. If he didn't, Jim Hunt certainly did. After it was clear at the briefing that they liked what they
heard and that they were going to approve it, and it became a question of how to wrap this thing up. One of them said to me, "I don't understand why it took you so long to work this thing out. This is what we've been wanting you to do." Or, at least, the words were to that effect. Because the two of them worked so closely together, I think the answer to your question has to be, "Yes, they certainly did understand."

Q: Why did it take Leavenworth so long to come up with that plan?

A: I have pondered that question many times. Sitting here today, I feel strongly that our scheme for differential programs in response to a variety of Army needs, combined with still a strong dose of what's always been here, was the correct plan. I am so convinced that that is what we ought to be doing. I have often asked myself the question, "Why did it take so long?"

And I don't have any really good answers.

When this series of events was over, I wrote the report on the new plan. The report is dated 4 January 1972, so it is hardly anything more than a memorandum for record. When I got ready to write the report, I felt it very important to try to write down some kind of rationale. In all honesty, we did not do that to begin with. We just set out to respond to a scheme that maybe I sensed was a start of a new adventure, but it was not until after it was all over that I went back and put the logical framework around it. I wrote something that I called the "General Concept."

Maybe I ought to read just a couple of sentences. It says: "The general concept is two-fold. Allocate approximately 60 percent of the college's formal program to the common curriculum, with the remainder devoted to optional courses that are extensions of one or more of the courses of
study in the common curriculum." Another sentence added parenthetically, and I think this is the key, "Implicit in this characteristic is the judgment that a common curriculum of about 600 hours can produce CGSC graduates qualified for duty with the Army in the field—the traditional CGSC mission." While writing that, I remember thinking, "Let me put that down there and I'll kind of slip it in," because it does seem to me that it is the key assumption.

I recall one other thing that came out of the briefing to General Haines. In fact, it was the other question he asked me. He asked me when we were going to start, and I gave him the right answer. The second question he wanted answered was, "I'm assuming that in addition to the change of the curriculum structure you're also going to modify your traditional classroom instructional methods." As I recall, my response was a guarded, "Yes, to whatever extent we are able, and over time."

Early in January 1972, we finally put the report in a paper, and it was announced that this would be the curriculum scheme for 1972-73. We set about doing it. My notion was that the optional courses or the professional electives ought to be as the report says: extensions of the common curriculum. I did not mean "extensions" in the sense of "more" but I envisioned them to be an extension in depth of coverage, as well as in length. I especially thought that that was what should happen to the tactics lessons. I knew from my own personal experience of many years ago, and from watching them all during these years, that we were very prone in the tactics lessons to stay on the surface with kind of a corps commander's wave of the hand. I used to tell my friends in the
tactics department, and still do as a matter of fact, "The reason that I
know something is wrong is that I can solve most of your requirements,
and I don't really know anything at all about it. You let me get by with
a little surface knowledge and a few rules, and there has got to be more
to it than that." I believe that, you see.

How did it work out? So far as content was concerned, the tactics
department had the simplest matter, because they had plenty of lessons
on hand, and for the most part they just took their lessons and gave them
a new number. All too often that was the case. They were nudged by
General Gibson to do something more than that. It is the same kind of
thing we're going to talk about a little later under Jack Cushman. Jim
just was not able to get anything accomplished.

Q: Because of instructor intransigence?
A: No, I would rather put it in terms of it being easier to keep on doing
what you have been doing. It takes a blockbuster approach to break that
sort of thing. That's what happened later under Jack Cushman.

Colonel Mike Sanger of the Department of Strategy saw the new scheme
as just what he was looking for, and he moved out. He moved out a lot
farther than I ever anticipated, for almost every day a new course title
came out of the basement. Mike moved out not only in scope and in
depth, but also he moved out in methods. He said, "We'll teach most of
ours in seminars. I'll teach one in my kitchen if I have to." And he
taught them himself. Those are the two extremes, and the other depart-
ments were somewhere in between.
One other thing came out of the Haines discussion. That was a suggestion by General Haines that we invite General Garrison Davidson back and try the scheme out on him. In due time we did this. I found myself giving him a briefing, and I had occasion to tell him, "I know that a lot of these matters, here 20 years later, go back to your period at CGSC." As I said to you earlier, the modern era at Leavenworth really started with Garr Davidson, although he never got the credit for it.

The Birrer, Berry, Kressin committee was dissolved and then succeeded by another committee consisting of just two of us. John Barclay, the Director of Resident Instruction, and I were charged by Gibson to examine the CGSC organization and to see if some changes ought to be made. John was also about to retire, but out of this came a couple of matters. At the same time this was going on, the STEADFAST study was being completed. So, while John and I were talking organizations here, we were having a lot of conversations with Colonel Frank Farnsworth who was the Leavenworth STEADFAST man. In a sense, these things all went along together. As we were discussing what should happen at Fort Leavenworth vis-a-vis STEADFAST, we were at the same time asking what should happen in conjunction with STEADFAST at CGSC.

I think from the college's point of view, three things happened that are of importance. First, we recommended, and it was adopted, that we take the corps instruction, move it over to join the division instruction, and create a department of tactics. That was done. It had been suggested by Garr Davidson. We had talked about it before. I think Gibson knew that his former department had two completely independent sections: corps instruction and communications zone instruction. He knew that there was
much more in common between the corps and the division tactics instruction than there was between the corps and the COMZ instruction. We debated at great length what we should call the department downstairs, and we finally settled on Strategy.

I then went on leave. While I describe this as a Barclay-Birrer committee, all we ever really had were some oral instructions. We were working this thing out on sort of a hip-pocket basis. I went away for some reason, and when I came back, John Barclay advised me that "we" had adopted another recommendation. We being Barclay and Birrer. That recommendation was to create a directorate called Evaluation and Review which was going to be responsible for staff supervision of student evaluation and the communicative arts program (writing and speaking). The "review" title was also a wide license to tromp around and look over everybody else's shoulder. Furthermore, I was to be the Director. This was 1972. As a practical matter, Jim Gibson had already bought that notion; it had been tried out with Hennesey. I was now going to be an operator for the first time; at least I was going to be a legitimate operator. Or, as John Barclay used to put it, "You're no longer going to have the license to sit back and tromp around everybody's area without any responsibility."

Isn't it interesting that this occurred only 2 years or so after Gibson's immediate predecessor had declined to let me run what we now call the Cooperative Degree Programs because I did not wear a green suit. Times had changed.

Barclay and Birrer were split on one point. I thought that the committees ought to be departments. If you followed that reasoning, you would have
had seven departments. I thought I had Jim Gibson convinced, but at the last moment he called me and said, "Ivan, I just can't see my successor sitting here trying to deal with seven department directors." At the time, I thought he had made a mistake. I want to say I am now sure that he did not; that my scheme would have worked but it would not have worked nearly as well. So, that was the second step. We actually formalized that. When it was all over we went through the same deal. We wrote a paper on 26 May 1972, and we got General Hennessey to adopt it on the 30th of May.

While that is an adequate enough account of this, I have forgotten another significant thing that happened during the Hennessey regime that I ought to go back and tell you about. It was only a few months after Jack Hennessey had taken command that he wrote a memorandum in which he observed that a good many things were going on in the College, and he wondered if there was any kind of overall scheme. Now that I think about it, this memorandum was a great deal more significant than I ever really realized at the time and probably led Gibson to let me have a key role in the reconsideration of the curriculum.

In due time, there were four or five of us sitting around in Gibson's office, and the topic was, "What are we going to do with the Hennessey memorandum?" When it became my turn after a number of other comments I said, "It seems to me that what the General is really calling for here is an overall plan for institutional development." And I used that term. I went on to say what I had on my mind, and it was obvious that my notion was vastly broader and more far-reaching than what the other people
were proposing. I hit a responsive chord with Gibson, and he said, "I think that's right." He said, "The question is, who should prepare it?"

There was a big silence. He looked around, and then he finally said, "Ivan, there just doesn't seem to be any one else we can turn to."

Out of that came a document called the "Plan for Institutional Development, CGSC 1975," dated October 1971. The first subsection is Curriculum, and it reads: "Provide a common curriculum adequate to prepare all graduates for duty with the Army in the field, together with a variety of optional courses to be pursued by portions of the student body." Down under part II, Instructional Methods, "Modify instructional methods and procedures in consonance with educational philosophy in curriculum design," and so on. After writing the first draft of this, I took it down and I asked Mike Sanger to review it as a personal favor. Mike made some suggestions which we incorporated, and then I took the plan back and gave it to Gibson. He got it just before he was going out of town, and he wrote a short note saying, "Please take this in, and I would hope that the General would sign this and you can get it distributed immediately." That is really how it happened. You can probably say that the curriculum changes and the organization changes we discussed this morning in a sense stem directly from the paper called the "Plan for Institutional Development" of October 1971.

Q: Would you summarize the advantages of those curriculum changes?

A: In and by themselves, all we had done was provide the mechanism to permit some tailoring of individual student programs of instruction. We had provided a scheme by which we could have differential programs. That
is really all we had done in 1973. You can go on and say, "Obviously, there must have been some reason why you wanted to do this," and the obvious answer is, "There must have been." There was some dissatisfaction with the earlier notion that you could not tailor a person's program, that you treated the whole student body as if it were a single, common interchangeable part. I think that is really what you have to say about it. At least in terms of educational institutions, a number of things had happened very quickly.

When school started in the fall we were all geared up to run this. The Department of Evaluation and Review was in operation, and I had acquired for the first time an assistant. It was the same LTC James Van Straten that I met on the Curriculum Committee. He was a very able guy with a doctorate in education--self-made man, a quality person. In Jim's struggle with the writing program, another very able young officer who was sort of the staff monitor for student evaluation, was transferred into here and that became the operational affair.

My main concern was not to let anyone dicker with the program; that is to say, there were all kinds of people who wanted to make changes. They wanted to change the length of the courses; they wanted to modify the rules. Jim Gibson and I had a very clear agreement. I was to guard the scheme against all comers, foreign and domestic. I carefully watched it. I should note that the way we announced to the world that we were going to reorganize the curriculum was by virtue of a Military Review article which I wrote. It was published in June 1972, and entitled, "The New CGSC Curriculum."
We were probably through the first half of the school year, and we had started the professional electives in the new part of the program when people began to look at the calendar and say, "We've got to get the planning guidance out for school year 1973-74," this being school year 1972-73. It was now perhaps March. In concert we all went to Hennessey and said, "What we need for 1974 is time to consolidate our gains and tidy up the ship. Leave us alone." General Hennessey agreed with us; the planning guidance would not cause any major changes.

Not long thereafter, Jim Van Straten and I were sitting in this office, and we got to wondering about these recent changes. We realized that what we had done was break out of the traditional framework, and that now we ought to address the question, "What should the next generation be?"

It seemed to us that our experience thus far had told us we wanted to do two things. Somehow or other, we wanted to start the optional program earlier in order to make more choices possible. Secondly, we were uncomfortable with the fact that we had two kinds of optional courses: those taught "in-house" and those taught on Thursday afternoon. We had to get rid of the associate elective and professional electives, and have electives. We had to have them all together under some kind of a unifying scheme. With this as a start, we sat down and got to work. Before long there was a three-term arrangement on the chalkboard. As we talked, it was obvious we could do a lot of the things that we wanted to do with this kind of scheme. So, we decided to work out the numbers involved; we used the college POI's for this.

We next got the department directors down to deal with us in a one-on-one discussion. While some of the same people were involved that had
been very troublesome just a few months before, I now started getting a
different reaction. I was able to demonstrate to everybody's satisfaction
that the three-term model was a better scheme than the one we were working
with. Implicit in the three-term model was that it involved an entirely
different kind of scheduling concept. It permitted several things to
happen. It permitted us to integrate the associate course electives; it
allowed us to start the electives early; and it permitted us to have some
more sequential courses. It became clear to me that that was where we were
going to go, and so I toyed with the question, "Here we are with the cur-
rent program running. We've got to make some necessary changes for next
year, because we have some experience on what to correct. And then the
year following, we'll have to make some rather substantial changes to get
it into," what we later called, "the slant 5 model."

I went to Jim Gibson and said the thing we should do was make the
switch to three terms for the next year. Moreover, I could tell him that
the department directors would say that it was at least as easy for them
to go directly from the 1972-73 to the 1974-75 model as it was to go from
the 1972-73 to the 1973-74, to the 1974-75 model. Indeed, in the long run
it was probably the shortest way home.

Jim said we would have to try it on the boss. In due time we went
back to Hennessey. It was now April, and he probably knew he was leaving,
but maybe he did not. In any event, he said, "No." He approved the
scheme, but he approved it for the 1974-75 school year. It is very impor-
tant to understand that as we started school year 1973-74, we had in-hand
an approved model for 1974-75. But neither Gibson nor Hennessey were here
for school year 1973-74. They both left at essentially the same time, Jim
with mandatory retirement and Jack Hennessey for promotion.
Q: What were some of the other problems encountered in the implementation of this optional program?

A: The first year there were, surprisingly, none. I remember some of us saying to each other that the program worked out better than we had any right to expect, because it just came so easily. Scheduling was not any problem, because when we got into the second half of the year, one of the rules was that each student had to have the opportunity to take any course. The way we did this was that each lesson was presented twice or on successive days, and hence the student always had a choice. It was a very simple system. I devised the scheme, took it down to the scheduling office, and said, "Do it this way, and don't let anybody tell you differently. This is the only way we're going to run these things. They are all going to be the same length. You can't vary the hours." We just did not have any problems implementing the program. The school year was just a tremendously successful adventure!

Q: Did the students appreciate the new system?

A: The students liked it, because they got some choice. There were not really as many options as they perceived they had, but given their previous experience in Army schools, it was more than they had anticipated. They especially liked Mike Sanger's adventures in "seminars," as he called them. It started a real terminology debate around here as to what was a seminar. Is this a description of a place, a number, a process, or a combination of all of the above? In fact, Mike insisted that he have some proseminars, but that was more than I could stomach. I said, "Let's leave well enough alone." So, I got that out of the way.
Q: Did the Department of Tactics try the seminars, sir?
A: No, not really. They were content, for the most part, with the lessons they had in hand. It became very apparent to the student body that they simply put a new number on an old lesson, and called it Advanced Tactics 1. There was not anything advanced about it. It was just more of the same. That was not entirely true, but that is the way it was perceived.

Q: Apparently, many authors did not do a great deal of rewriting, but did you get any complaints from any authors?
A: I don't remember that we did. The Department of Command certainly had a sizable effort on its hands, which they struggled with. But complain, I wouldn't say so. What did happen was that this scheme called for a sizable increase of the total curriculum. Remember now, the decision to do it was made only a few short months before the classes commenced. We did not have a long year-and-a-half lead time. The inevitable consequence had to be that we took some shortcuts in our customary, meticulous scheme for curriculum preparation. We just could not have done it any other way.

Q: What about the quality of instruction itself—specifically the quality of instruction within the Department of Tactics? When we implicitly took all of the JAG officers, Chaplains, and the veterinarians, etc., out of the elective classes in tactics, was the instruction that the student received any better?
A: I don't really know the answer to that question. The answer is probably, "Doubtlessly some, but nothing like what might have happened." I couldn't document that answer with anything more than just hunch and hearsay.
Q: Were there any administrative changes that should be mentioned?
A: I should mention a few words with respect to the academic report to fill out the record. At the start of the Hennessey regime, I was absent, convalescing from some minor surgery, and had been away for a month. It was the longest time I have ever been away from CGSC. During this period some of the staff went to Jim Gibson with the proposition that the College's academic reports were very inadequate from the Army's viewpoint, since they really did not say anything. The proposed solution was to change the rather long-held policy by saying that we will start writing a rather extensive narrative description in the academic report. Curiously enough, Gibson had great reservations about this, but for some reason he decided the presentation should be made to Hennessey. Again, this was when I was away. When I came back, Hennessey had approved this scheme. I only mention it, because, curiously enough, it is one of those cyclical things.

For the first year of the Hennessey regime we set out to write narrative reports for each student without any recognition or realization that as we conducted the course, especially at that time, no single member of the faculty was in enough contact with a student to produce anything like a meaningful report. After one year, it turned out to be such a debacle that we gave it up as a bad trip. It was a debacle simply because the kinds of comments submitted by the faculty advisors were either meaningless or full of glittering generalities. Moreover, the College secretary took it upon himself to serve as the editorial board, and he did this without any knowledge of the people involved. By common consent it was a debacle in every respect. It took a tremendous amount of time and effort. It
did not produce anything meaningful. There was great scepticism about what we had actually written on the academic report.

Meanwhile, DA and CONARC were engaged in one of their periodic projects concerned with revising the academic report. CONARC had taken the position that there ought to be one report for all students. One version came out here for us to comment on. We were to comment to CONARC and they would respond to DA. The one thing I remember about it was that there was a special section of the report to be filled in by only two agencies: CGSC and, believe it or not, the warrant officers' flying school. I cite that as an indication of what kind of a hair-brain notion this whole thing was. I did a little checking around and found out that CGSC was not going to get anywhere arguing the matter with CONARC. They dug in their heels, and they were obviously going to hold onto this line.

I went to Jack Hennessey and told him this story and proposed that if we wanted to make the reports meaningful, the most meaningful thing we could report was the officer's scholastic achievement. This was the second year of Hennessey's tour and since each student's program was going to be different, what we needed to do was provide a record of the program he followed. Moreover, the most straightforward way to do this was with the college transcript. I said, "What we ought to do is propose, in a sense, a kind of a trade. Rather than have us try to make out a lot of stuff that we can't really do and aren't set up to organizationally manage, let's propose that in lieu of that we append the transcript, which would represent our comment."
The proposition was a very reasonable one, and I still insist that it is. General Hennessey recognized it as such, and I said, "General, the only way we're going to do this, because of the tenor of the times, is if you correspond directly with your friend Sid Berry, who is the MILPERCEN chief, on this point. I have prepared some correspondence that you might want to send." We followed that scheme. We got MILPERCEN to disregard CONARC comments, attitudes, views with respect to CGSC. Anytime you do this, of course, you ruffle some feathers, and we did in this case. It was one of those times where the issue, it seems to me, was important enough that the violence that we did to the structure was merited by the gain.

By the time Hennessey left, we had worked out the scheme that the CGSC academic report would consist of the standard report with essentially nothing on it, but attached thereto would be the transcript showing the courses the students took. The question about the grades was left up in the air, and indeed that issue came up again a little bit later.

Q: If we look back over the Davison, Hay, and Hennessey years, was there any reconsideration or special studies made about what the Leavenworth graduate should be, or whether he should have any specific skills or should be oriented toward any specific jobs or levels of responsibility?

A: Not directly. There were series of curriculum studies, special groups, ad hoc committees at one time or another, but certainly we were not worried about any necessity to empirically establish what the graduate should be, or to quantify it, or whatever. We were, I think, quite content to operate on the consensus of professional judgement.
Q: Was Leavenworth left alone to make that decision?
A: They certainly were. It has always been that way. Even in our most recent era under DePuy and TRADOC, and a pretty massive effort on their part to gain control, my contention is that it really was not successful. That was about the only significant effort in that regard except, again, for the special interest matters that rose to prominence during that time—counterinsurgency, special weapons, etc. Those tended to be introduced and championed for awhile, and CGSC might have been directed to do a couple of things, or put in a couple of hours here or there. After it is done once, it gets swallowed up; it sort of sifts out to whatever its rightful place is.

Q: During this time, was there really any place for what we might call research, either in a doctrinal area or some sort of instructional area, that was vitally important to the curriculum?
A: I take it you mean this whole period—Davison, Hay, Hennessey. The answer is not very much, honestly. We paid lip service, somewhat, to it. The College consistently had as a part of its assigned mission the furtherance or encouragement of research by its students and faculty, but we really didn’t do anything about it, at least in my view. The first all-out effort to engage the College, and by that I mean the faculty and more especially the students, in significant research came along under Jack Cushman and probably is one of the key features of the Cushman era.

Q: Did General Hennessey devote most of his attention to the operation of the College, or was he more concerned with other considerations such as STEADFAST or CACDA during his tenure as commandant?
A: To my knowledge, the answer is that he paid more attention to the latter. We seldom saw the General. He was available and it was easy to get an appointment. On the other hand, the College proceeded without any great problem, and he was certainly beset with these other problems. The whole question of what was going to happen as a result of STEADFAST was really a very major matter, and I think that probably had most of his attention.

Q: What was happening at CGSC in terms of looking at the problem of combat developments?

A: Remember that I said the College, and its then commandant, Harold K. Johnson, resisted vigorously and unsuccessfully the separation of doctrine and associated training literature from the college in 1962. We all thought it was a real mistake. We were encouraged when STEADFAST began to unfold, because it became apparent, or so we thought, that CGSC was essentially going to regain its "place in the doctrinal sun" that Gar Davidson had worked so hard to establish, and that existed in that period from 1954 through 1962. It seemed to all of us that reason had again prevailed.
INTERVIEW SIX

20 January 1978


Adoption of Curriculum Model 1974-1975
Implementation of "Commandant's Requirements"
Symposium on Officer Responsibility and Integrity
Consideration of British Syndicate System
Student Evaluation
Experimental Classroom
Implementation of Curriculum Model 1974-1975
Conflict with TRADOC Headquarters
Lowering of Center of Gravity of Instruction
Increase in Number of Electives
Effect of OPMS
Introduction of New Methodology and Subject Areas
Faculty Resistance
TRADOC Proposal of Instructional Systems
Design Model
Combat Developments
Investment in Career Development
Faculty Council
Q: What were the major events and programs of General John H. Cushman's tenure as commandant?

A: Among all the things that should be said, obviously this was a very active period at Leavenworth. Again, this was a very special time for Ivan Birrer. Jack Cushman joined the faculty as a young major in 1955, right out of the class. He was a brilliant student, full of lots of great ideas, creative and imaginative, and substantially dissatisfied with military schooling as he had experienced it. It was not challenging or comprehensive enough. It would be almost impossible to make a school program suitable for Jack, from that point of view. He was very outspoken, and when he joined the faculty, he incurred a lot of criticism; you might even say some trouble. I protected Jack on a number of occasions. I served as a buffer for him, and I only mention this because that was the start of our relationship. When he joined the faculty we became good friends.

In those days, as I noted before, I was in charge of instructor training, and when I took over there was a policy that had been established by my predecessor, to write narrative comments on each member of the faculty at the completion of the instructor training program. I have a copy (Jack gave it to me after he came back as the Commandant) of a memorandum that I wrote in July of 1955. It concerns Major J. H. Cushman and the heart of it reads as follows: "Major J. H. Cushman outstanding prospect. Very effective oral presentation. Equally adept as a discussion leader. Will perform any assignment in a highly creditable manner." Then my signature.
I guess all I am trying to say is that I knew when I first met him, that this was a very special person.

Jack was designated as the College Commandant, and in a sense, it seems to me, he now had the opportunity and moreover the authority, to do a number of things with CGSC that he had always wanted to do but had not been able to accomplish in an earlier period. We were not only good friends (he's a little younger than I am); there was a very special relationship between us. Through the whole stormy 2 1/2 years he was here I always was accorded this special position. I was exempt from substantially all the trials, the discord, and the meddling that was going on with the rest of the staff. On my part, I conscientiously tried not to take advantage of this personal relationship.

When we were talking about the curriculum earlier, I talked about the 1974-1975 plan which contained my three-term proposal. We had proposed to Hennessey that it be implemented for school year 1973-1974, but he said, "No, hold it for 1974-1975." Shortly thereafter, he departed. And so when Jack came (it was just at the start of 1973-1974—the second year of the Birrer-Gibson plan), I had in hand a document which said "approved for '75, the 3-term second generation model." Not only that, I had prepared a follow-up article for the Military Review entitled "CGSC '75" that they were very anxious to publish; it was already in proof form, although we had agreed that it probably ought to be published around January of 1974. The article described the new program. It took a couple of months for Jack to realize that the scheme for '75—the 3-term scheme—was a vehicle which was just tailor-made to fit a whole lot of things that he wanted to accomplish.

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I also had a very personal kind of relationship with the deputy commandant who came with him, Ben Harrison. Harrison had been on the faculty as a young captain (promoted to major while he was here), and I had known him. We had learned to respect each other. Harrison quickly endorsed the 1/5 schema, but together we agreed that the thing to do was to let Jack find it out for himself. In other words, we were going to play it "pretty cool."

Meanwhile, school year 1973-1974 had started, and Jack was very busy trying to have some impact upon it. We will come back to that in a moment. I will complete this part of the story by simply saying that it was not very long, a couple of months or so, until Jack came to the realization that this was the scheme he wanted. With that, the Military Review article was published in January 1974, and in a sense, it was that article entitled "CGSC - 1975" which announced the new scheme for CGSC to the world. We were not only going to have a 3-term program, but there were going to have quite a wide variety of offerings, and so on.

It wasn't very long after the beginning of the 1973-1974 school year that Jack started his series of what he called "Commandant's Requirements." My office was the staff agent. The first one had an inauspicious start. He came in here one day and left a copy of an article having to do with the British Mechanized Force between the two world wars. The article concerned the difficulties involved in adopting a new idea, if you will, in the military setting. He later asked me what I thought of the article, and I told him that I had read it. I suspected that he had written it, although he did not tell me
that at the time. Later, in a discussion, I found out I was right. As he told me, he wrote a whole series of articles during this period when he was in the Pentagon, not long after his tour on the faculty here. He had a large family, and he was trying to make more money, so he kept sending these things off. The notion was that we would get this article reproduced without, again, revealing the author. We would send it out to the student body, and would invite anybody who wanted to, to respond. The response was optional. When we actually did it, sixty or so students rose to the challenge. This was the first Commandant's Requirement, but this was not an original idea of Jack's. When you go way back into the thirties, there were some periods in College history when there were some things called the Commandant's Requirements, and he knew about those. The first one had to do with how one effects change within an institution.

This started a series during the year which was concerned with the problems of officership and integrity. We finally got to the famous music box case at Leavenworth, which was probably the second requirement. This was required; in fact, it was required for both faculty and students. Circumstances were described in which an Army colonel became aware of the fact that his commanding general had permitted, allowed, or encouraged the training aids office to make him some furniture. The question really was, "What do you do about it?"

One day I had on the table by my desk over a thousand papers, with people saying what they would do. In order to really understand this, you have to remember the time; we are talking about school year 1973-1974; what was going on in South Vietnam bears heavily upon this matter.
This series of events which started out innocently, as I saw it, with the climate for change problem, picked up speed during the year with the music box case. Then there was the problem of falsification of recruiting reports. We arranged to have Ray Peers come back and talk about the Peers Report, which was related to the My Lai affair.

It finally culminated in the symposium on officer integrity and responsibility. This was a scheme where for two days or so, the Army brought in a couple of dozen general officers, put them in face-to-face contact with the students, and turned to these troublesome problems about body count, and all that sort of thing. We had some civilian observers and participants. The officer corps, at least as it was represented at Leavenworth, was really baring its chest, laying out all of its wounds—perceived, real, and unreal. The system was being examined and found wanting; it was just kind of an orgy in self-appraisal and institutional appraisal. It was really an astonishing operation, if one could step aside and just observe it as a process. I tried to do this when I was walking the halls, but unfortunately I was always getting involved, too. I heard a student officer, for example, say to a major general, "I don't believe what you have said, and I wouldn't believe it if the chief of staff himself stood there and said it." So, as far as the students were concerned, the series of events which were collected under the banner of Commandant's Requirements was the place where they saw the most of Cushman during this first year. That was probably his greatest influence.

It is difficult for a new commander to do very much his first year. As you know, the program is already set, or virtually blocked in.
While this was going on in 1973-1974, we were certainly making big plans for school year 1975-1976, especially with the start of the new 3-term program and our significant adventure into the differential programs. During the course of the first year, Jack made a lot of noises about a lot of things. Three especially come to my mind.

One was the content of the Tactics instruction. His dissatisfaction was that it was not any different, as he perceived it, than when he was here as a student. He did not like it then; he did not like it now.

If you ask me what he did not like about it, I can't really answer that question in any satisfactory terms. That was also the problem of the department director; he could not figure it out either. All he knew was that he was supposed to do something different without knowing precisely what it was. The problem was compounded by the fact that Jack was, as he used to describe himself, "the senior tactical instructor." This was not a very subtle way of saying, "I am going to decide myself what I am going to do with tactics, whenever I get around to figuring it out." So, we knew there were going to be some big changes in tactics.

The second thing that Jack continued to talk about was that he wanted us to adopt, at least in part, some version of the British syndicate system. As a young captain, Jack had served an exchange tour with the British Army. In the course of that experience in Europe he had formed some very favorable attitudes toward the British system. There were a number of lengthy conversations involving Cushman, Harrison, and myself, regarding how we could transport some of that scheme into the Leavenworth classroom—a very troublesome sort of thing.
The third declaration of intent to change 1974-1975 was a decision that resulted from the dissatisfaction of both Harrison and Cushman with the examinations. At this point Harrison was either out ahead of or at least stride-by-stride with Jack. They simply decided that we were wasting too much time, that we were measuring the wrong thing, and that for the next year (that is to say for school year 1974-1975) we were going to do appraisals on the basis of so-called subjective evaluations. This should be interpreted to mean that the classroom teacher would make judgments as he went along regarding the merit of each student's performance, and in due time report that in the usual fashion.

Those are some specifics. Overriding the whole scene at Leavenworth was a very obvious effort on Cushman's part to involve Leavenworth (and Leavenworth to him was essentially the College) to involve the College in the mainstream of Army activity. We had, I suppose, on the most part been content to live on the banks of the Missouri in pleasant isolation. That was turned around. Suddenly, Leavenworth was everywhere, offering to do all things for all people. Jack simply believed that somebody had to get the Army moving, and as he looked around, he concluded that it ought to be Leavenworth. It took a variety of forms--more visits, more visitors. He organized what he called "extra-curricular work groups" in which students were encouraged to join in and participate as sort of an extra activity. Almost every week there was another idea to push this general kind of policy.

During this year I continued to serve under the title stemming from the Barclay-Birrer action of 1973 which assigned me the second
hat of Director of Evaluation and Review, and with it the responsibility for student evaluation. Hence, I had to listen to all this business constantly about what we were going to do about the grading system for next year. I also had the Communicative Arts Program (the writing and speaking program). In the first year of that arrangement (that is to say, the previous year) my deputy, the very capable Jim Van Straten, had managed Communicative Arts. As I remember it, he became acquainted with a young, interesting person in the class named Major James Channon who was originally trained as an artist and who then acquired a whole collection of talents and skills to go along with that original gift. I got acquainted with Channon, and we were able to arrange through some negotiations with MILPERCEN to have him assigned to the College and to my office. Unexpectedly for me, Jim Van Straten was ordered away at the end of the first year to go to the War College. Channon came in, and he had the Communicative Arts programs. Jim certainly did a good job, even though that was not really his interest. As the year went along, Jim periodically came in with a diagram showing some variation of the Bell Hall classrooms. I became convinced that there was some merit in some of these schemes, and to wrap this up quickly, we eventually collected a group of three students. Under his direction, they worked out some proposals with the engineering specifications of what was later known as the Experimental Classroom. In due time I went to Harrison with a proposal. He endorsed it. Then we got an appointment with Cushman, and he approved it exactly as Jim had drawn it. That started the chain of events which led to the redesign of classroom 7. An outgrowth of this was the carpeting
in all the classrooms, and I suppose all the subsequent developments, with which I am not sure we know quite where we are going. But that also occurred during this first year.

I was the action agent for the Commandant's Requirements; I suffered through student evaluation; we tried to keep a hand on the Communicative Arts; and I was sort of Cushman's personal confident. During this time, Jack had endorsed the 1974-1975 scheme, and of course, I felt very good that it was now going to become part of the College. That takes us to the end of the first school year.

A very unexpected development then occurred, and I will not say much about this, because we will pick this up later. It had been perceived by me to be dead or almost completely dead, certainly smoldering in its dying ashes, but the legislative authority for our MMAS proposal suddenly was back under a hot fire. My whole existence changed, because I suddenly became almost completely immersed in the MMAS program. One of the signal events of the Cushman era concerns the first two years of that program, but we will tell that story in a different context.

The second year of Jack's regime then saw the implementation of the 3-term scheme, the new tactics which he helped to teach and indeed helped write, the new evaluation program which was mostly subjective, and instruction in tactics which to a great extent was taught in what I would call a small class in a syndicate scheme. Included in this notion was the idea that each student would do a significant research project as a part of his regular program. I suppose one could say that for the first time we had institutionalized this long-standing mission.
of enhancing the Army through student research; at least, we had set up a mechanism where it might happen.

A great deal of Jack's time was spent that second year in meetings, conversations, and negotiations with TRADOC. That headquarters was now a year or so old. I started to say it had gotten its feet on the ground, but I am not sure that is accurate. It was prepared to function; it was making a lot of waves. I don't really know how the conflict developed, but certainly there was a feeling on the part of many of the TRADOC staff that we were really the "Pack's bad boy" of the school system, that somehow or other we needed to be gotten in line. For one example of this on-going quibble, no less a personage than the TRADOC Chief of Staff and quite a coterie of subordinates came out to make a formal inspection. They did it rather like an FBI investigation; they wanted chances to talk privately with people, and check everything out--that sort of thing. Of course, when it was all over (we referred to it around here as the Talbott Vis.), there probably was not much of a result. There was only one specific thing that I recall. There was some concern expressed on their part about this proliferation of course offerings. One title that especially caught the wrath of some of the people was the one on medieval warfare.

We got into what was a very curious paradox regarding grades. You remember that I told you that by directive for 1974-1975 we threw out formal testing and substituted faculty judgments. As with anything else that is new, we certainly made a lot of mistakes,
especially in tactics, sort of the "bell cow" of the institution in size and in importance. This was the course that was taught in the small class mode, which in a sense would permit the sort of evaluation that Harrison and Cushman had in mind. But as that department implemented the scheme, they set out to prove with statistical data that their grades were right; they set up an accounting scheme that would permit them to quantify their results at the end. It took some pretty bizarre forms even to the point that for a while there was a period when if the student wanted to do well, he spoke frequently. It did not make much difference what he said, but it was important that he contributed.

Some of these problems filtered back through the informal communication system to TRADOC Headquarters. So, Talbott's visit took this curious twist that (a) TRADOC and the Army were dissatisfied with the lack of substance in our academic reports, but nevertheless point (b) was that TRADOC had so little confidence in the grades they did not want us to submit the grades in the transcripts. I still consider that a curious business. But curious or not, halfway through the year we advised the student body that we would not show the grades on the transcript.

There was another problem with the grades. Jack had read about the so-called grade inflation that plagues all colleges; his solution was an interesting one. He said, "I'll fix that. By definition we will have no more than 20 percent A's." We only had A, B, C in these two years. Jack said, "Except for the top 20 percent, the typical grade will be the Leavenworth B." Jack found this to be a very unpopular
policy; he knew that it was unpopular. In a meeting of civilian educators, I heard him say, "80 percent of my students think that they are in the top 20 percent of the class, and since only 20 percent can get A's, my policy is going to make 60 percent dissatisfied." It wasn't that he didn't understand the matter.

We continued through the year. The College was visited by the DOD Committee on Excellence in Education (the Taylor Committee), a very high-powered group of people. When that operation was over a year and a half later, and the Taylor Committee finally submitted its report, it was clear that of the several intermediate colleges reviewed by the Department of Defense, Leavenworth was the model held up to be essentially adopted by the rest. The whole air around Leavenworth was one of excitement and activity. We broke down the invisible barrier between faculty and students. It became very common to see students walking around the part of Bell Hall where the senior officers are. That just was not the previous practice.

As had been the case 17 years earlier during General McCarr's tour, I sat here and encouraged and assisted in any way I could. Most of the things that Jack was trying to do I thoroughly approved. At the same time, I was the sounding board and listening post for those who thought he was wrecking the institution for one reason or another. I used to tell people then, and I believe it now even more so, that given the circumstances, it was time for the institution to move out in a variety of directions. If it were going to happen, it would only happen under a very strong leader who was willing to take hold, say "let's go," and insist that it happen. Jack was this kind of a guy.
The Leavenworth community was not very favorably disposed toward Cushman. He simply did not take time for, nor did he have the interest, in small talk as was the case with some of his predecessors. Jack went to parties, but a cocktail party was just another place to have a serious discussion on some College project. His only real hobby was work; you can have a lot worse faults than that. Jack Cushman and I continue to be close friends. I certainly hold him in the highest regard and there is a great deal of mutual respect between us. He was good for CGSC. He was just what we needed.

Q: There was a radical change in the instructional “center of gravity” during this period; what effect did that have on CGSC?

A: My answer is, really not very much. We did add some brigade problems. You might answer the problem somewhat differently depending upon how you view cause and effect. If you look at, especially, the tactics instruction today, and I am primarily talking about the course for school year 1977-1978, it concerns itself at the beginning with a vast amount of detailed information: weapons effects, ranges, loads, etc. You can argue that that kind of information was not in the curriculum a few years ago. I think it had very little to do with the so-called lower center of gravity policy. More accurately, this greater attention to detailed information stems from the Army's new tactics and weapons, and the realization by the members of the CGSC faculty that students don't have this kind of information when they come here and that without it they cannot work on any meaningful tactical problems. Before one says that we have lowered the content of our instruction, especially in tactics because of the center of
gravity, we have to be careful; I think it happened for quite a different reason.

Q: Do you see the concept for the maneuver of corps being very similar to that of the maneuver of a brigade?

A: I certainly do. On several different occasions, when we have been asked how much corps, division, brigade, or whatever level of instruction we have, we have been able to take the same content and count it up in almost any way that we want, depending upon what answer we think the questioner desires. This is not really a deception plan; I think that is just the way it is. If you have me as a student officer planning the division defense, I know what kinds of judgment I am asked to make, having to do with frontages, blocking positions, positions of the counterattack force, who goes in the GOP, etc. Those are the elements that make up the defense. It does not make any difference whether you tell me I am a division staff doing this, or whether you tell me I am in a brigade planning a counterattack, or whether you tell me that I am the corps commander and I am visualizing the defensive operation; I finally end up doing the same thing. At least that has been the way that matter has come out in the past, and I think that is the way it really is.

Q: Are you saying, sir, that the most important thing is the thinking process or the decision-making process?

A: I think that is right. I think that the important thing is to know what kind of problem-solving competence we are trying to develop here. Then we have to ask what kind of tasks we must have the students perform. I think that it is one of those kinds of arguments that are
not very productive. It is like trying to chase the elusive gap, so-called, between the branch school and CGSC. For over 30 years to my knowledge, we have been trying to run that elusive matter down, and have not been very successful.

Q: During General Cushman's tenure as commandant there was a great increase in the number of elective offerings. Was that due more directly to the changes that were envisioned before he came than it was to his own action.

A: Let me answer the question this way. If you read my January 1974 article in Military Review, which was really written before Jack's arrival, you will not get the impression that there was going to be this proliferation of courses. I suppose that when Jim Van Straten and I first wrote out the scheme we might have envisioned 20 or 30, not 125 courses.

How did it happen? Two things happened. One was that Mike Sanger, the DSTRAT Director as I have already noted, jumped on this bandwagon, and he produced a large number of titles. When Jack came along, it took a little while for him to realize that if he wanted new areas to be scrutinized by the faculty and students, the most straightforward way for him to do it was to have an elective about that particular area. That was a way of guaranteeing that somebody sat down and, in a fairly systematic fashion, devoted some time and effort to whatever it might be. There was a period of time that at every meeting Jack would throw out a couple of new titles which he wanted courses about.
Q: What about the actual number of electives a student could take? I think that the high number ended up being 12. Did you envision a total possibility of 12 electives in the original plan?
A: In my original scheme, yes, we were going to have 12. We were going to have 23 courses of which 11 were required and 12 were optional. That was the original notion. What occurred was that with the passage of time more and more material tended to become required, rather than optional. I think it was an entirely predictable result, and one I very recently tried to highlight to the new deputy commandant. It is an inevitable consequence unless you take a very arbitrary stand and say, "We won't add anything more unless we take something out." In one respect you can say that we did not provide as much option to the student as has been foreseen in the sense of total hours, but on the other hand we provided considerably more choice than had been foreseen in the sense of total possible offerings.

Q: A question about the quality of the program during this period of time. Would, for example, a combat arms officer taking a standard recipe of tactics electives have received a better tactics background with these electives than he would have previously received when there were no electives?
A: Certainly that was the hope and I would argue furthermore that he should have received a better tactics background. But the question you asked me was, "Did he?" That might be debatable; you could say it depended upon which particular group of tactics electives he happened to choose or be enrolled in. We had some tactics authors who did thoroughly first-class work in terms of design of significantly
new, more advanced, and better material. We also had some courses which were little more than patchwork classes, consisting of some stuff that had previously been on the shelf. Over time, you would certainly hope that the advanced courses would get better, as they were slowly improved. You would also hope that since the students in those courses would all be combat arms officers, you would not be plagued with the problem of having students with no interest in or experience in tactics. Theoretically, you would have a more sophisticated and better-prepared student. I don't think anyone can prove much about this, except that common sense tells you the student should have received better instruction.

Q: You mentioned before that the concept of electives appeared at CGSC before OPMS appeared. What effect did the actual adoption of OPMS have on this elective program?

A: It's a very pertinent question, since the relationship between CGSC and OPMS developed into what may be called a very central problem. Part of our problem with TRADOC revolves around this issue. TRADOC was tasked to align the Army school system with OPMS, and to accomplish that a study group was created within the TRADOC headquarters to work on the project. They did not have any particular trouble as long as they concentrated on the branch advanced courses and below. But when they got to determining Leavenworth's place in the OPMS sun, they got themselves into a real quagmire.

Let me see if I can explain the problem. If you look into the OPMS documents, it appears that the infantry officer carrying specialty number 11 satisfies the education requirement for his entire infantry career when he has completed the advanced course. Leavenworth argued
that that was not true at all; indeed, he is only past the apprentice stage. If he is going to be a senior staff officer or commander of infantry units, obviously he has to attend Leavenworth. But the documents do not say that! So, that was one of the OPMS arguments. Our position was that you have to recognize that we provide the final and the crucial educational qualifications of that infantry, armor, or artillery officer. The record did not say that at that time, and it still doesn't say that. I think that that is what Leavenworth, as a practical matter, had always done. It is an unresolved problem only in the sense that the documents have not been changed. I think that the first TRADOC schema stemming from that—which was that CGSC would not have anything to do with infantry, armor or artillery—has long since been overtaken by events, but it took some strong arguments at the time.

The second troublesome problem had to do with the question that if one puts aside Leavenworth's contribution to the primary specialty of the combat arms officer, what should CGSC's role be with the respect to his second or alternate specialty. Remember there are 45 or so specialties on the list, and as a practical matter we know that we could not provide the required educational experience to satisfy that whole package. Since we could not do all specialties, the question became which ones should we do. By documentation, it turns out that only specialty 54 (Operations and Force Development) is specifically a Leavenworth responsibility. If you follow that to its logical conclusion, then the only ones that would come here would be people who are or about to be assigned specialty number 54. The TRADOC study
group kept badgering us about this, and they worked out a scheme.

We would not concur. More importantly, they took it up to MILPERCEN,
and they would not listen to it.

I think that it is probably fair to say that even today the matter
is unresolved. We have not decided what the College's place in the
OPMS sun is. At least to my knowledge, it is now a largely defused
matter, and I do not believe that anybody is worrying too much about
it. It was a very hot iron, however, during Jack's second year!

Q: Let me ask you a question about your first point, sir. Isn't CGSC
caught in an irresolvable dilemma with that first issue, because on
the one hand it argues that the center of gravity is not important,
but on the other hand it argues that the concept of maneuvering
larger units is essentially different from the maneuver of smaller
units.

A: I think I would have to agree. That's true. I think that your
observation is entirely accurate. But I can't really believe that
the Army has been wrong for almost 95 years in believing that
maneuver unit senior staff officers and commanders need a Leavenworth
experience. I think that must be so; the Leavenworth experience is
essential.

Q: What was General Cushman's imprint upon the curriculum? Did he
introduce any new subject areas?

A: Certainly, the use of the computer can go at the top of the list.

Jack held the view that in the Army (when he came and for the future)
the staff officer and commander simply had to know what the computer
could do for him. The only way he could ever know this was, as Jack
put it, "to at least solo on the computer." That translated
to mean that he could work out a simple program, plug it in, debug
it, and get it to work. Jack was influenced partially, at least, in
this regard by his association with the President of Dartmouth who
has done more in civilian education than anyone I know with making
the computer a part of the everyday arsenal of the college student.
He did this, and I don't really know how he pulled it off. The hard-
ware did begin to show up, and people did begin to get their quali-
fications. That is now an institutionalized part of our program.

He insisted that we do something in terms of trying to simulate
the command post and the command and control environment. Out of
this came our Tactical Operations Center Simulation and the practice
of having each student spend some time in that facility, as it simu-
lates on-going activity. I hadn't really thought of it in these
terms, but in a sense he was a little ahead of the game, when one
considers the subsequent emphasis on simulations.

A different kind of an imprint, but sort of a methodological one
was his insistence that we make extensive use of the case method. It
is a matter kind of like the syndicate, or maybe like electricity;
I know what it is but if you ask me to define it, I would have a hard
time stating exactly what is involved in such a method. But the
policy was laid down, and as a result, in the classic, almost legal sense
of "case" down to whatever the other extreme is, we began to see more
of that method in the curriculum.

I should also note that Jack did make one clearly observable
change in the curriculum structure by the creation of the so-called
Profession of Arms course of study. This was related to the business
that started the year before with the Commandant's Requirement—
climate for change, integrity, taking care of the soldier, and so on.
He collected this whole variety of almost unrelated subjects, but
within which a common theme might be personal interrelations. He
collected them under a title which he called Profession of Arms,
and thereby added another committee to the Department of Command. When
Group Dynamics came along and later when Organizational Effectiveness
came along, they fit nicely into this collection of topics.

I suppose it is fair to say that a combination of Tactics and the
Profession of Arms represented, if you will, Jack's first love and
both got his personal attention, almost to the point that he insisted
on reviewing every subject himself. But there just is not any aspect
of the whole profession or the whole wide arena of military art and
science that Jack is not interested in. I don't know of a single
topic in which he is not interested.

He has always read volumes of history. He likes it, and he thinks
Army officers ought to know about history. So he championed that.
Out of this in due time came what is now called the Applied Military
History instruction, although it took a little while to get there.
He almost single-handedly insisted on the acquisition of the two
civilian historians, initially one assigned to tactics and one assigned
to strategy. The Morrison chair came into being during his tour,
although that was probably going to happen anyway. But Jack certainly
welcomed that.

It was a very busy time, and he could juggle more on-going activities
than anyone I have ever seen.
Q: What about problems with the faculty? For example, where did he get all the instructors for this small-group discussion? Did he encounter any opposition among the faculty?

A: He didn't get any more people for the faculty. The faculty strength really did not change; people just taught three or four times as much. Therein is the story; not only did we teach three or four times as much, but we expanded the total curriculum offerings by four hundred percent from what it had been three years earlier. If you take the same faculty and have them teach considerably more and write considerably more, it is not going to be the same scheme as that previously followed. You have to accept the fact that the total curriculum materials were not prepared as carefully as had been our general practice in the past. You have to also realize that there was no way that the classroom teacher could be as well prepared as he had been in the past.

It was on this second point that Jack really encountered the most trouble with the faculty. He was well aware of the changes I just mentioned. He was prepared to accept the fact that this faculty member was not the fountain of knowledge that had been the role of the faculty member in earlier times. At least privately, he was prepared and did accept this change. The faculty member did not really understand that the role was changed, and he was very uncomfortable when he found himself stripped somewhat of the strength, power, and security that comes from being thoroughly knowledgeable. This was an irreconcilable kind of conflict. We just kind of muddled
through that one, I guess. I don't think that the principal variables of the equation have ever changed.

Q: How do you evaluate those three years in terms of student learning? Considering 1972-73, 1973-74, and 1974-75, which were the best years for instruction, and which were the worst?

A: My answer, of course, is going to be that 1974-75 was the best, but obviously I am not going to be able to prove my case. My reasoning is that when we compare 1974-75 to the other two, the opportunities available to the students were greater. I am not only talking about the variety of offerings, or the possibility for doing something worthwhile for the Army in terms of research, I am also referring to the fact that as we got to 1974-75 with our small classes, an air of informality grew up, along with something of a feeling that we were all in this together. A good bit of instruction was conducted in the small classes, and certainly many of our faculty either already knew or quickly became adept in this. Over the course of time, the student was bound to get some of these guys; he didn't get them all, but he got some! I also think that in 1974-75 the institution was set up to be more responsive to the Army, sort of in all of its aspects. I have answered the question by trying to say why I think that by the time we got through 1975 we could say that we had really made some progress, and it is for some of those reasons.

Q: Some of General Cushman's critics during this period have said that there was too much change; is that a valid criticism?

A: There was a lot of change. People would say that, probably while pointing their finger for the most part at the Tactics course of study.
That did change! That changed almost every day for a couple of years, but we ought to take into account that the Army was changing its mind with respect to Tactics, and we were either following those changes or sometimes we were leading. It was just the way things were. Other people would argue that Jack was not content with minor changes. His only tactic, if you will, was attack on a broad front. He had a whole series of targets, and he was not content to say, "We'll do one, two, and three this year, and we will do four, five and six next year." Instead, he said, "We will start all six; we will get something accomplished." Some people would argue that there was too much change because he could not make up his mind. That is not a fair criticism. Jack was almost immovable on the major issues. You could talk to him about some variations on the theme, but the main themes of the Cushman program never changed. They were always there. All we had to do was sit back and look at them.

My answer is also colored by the fact that in this whole maelstrom of confusion, order, disorder, and counter-order, and so on, I was never told to do anything. I was really never told not to do anything. I simply wrote memorandums for record which would come back marked with an initial on them. I was immune from much of this maelstrom, and that honestly colors my view.

No, I do not accept the charge that there was too much change under Jack. He was a student of how one could promote institutional change; that was his first imprint back with the first Commandant's Requirement. He thought about it, he studied it, he worked on it. So, if the final verdict is "Yes, there was too much," it was intentional.
Q: What organizational changes were made while General Cushman was here?

A: A short answer to your question is, not very much, but when I say that, I really cover up a significant story which certainly merits discussing. Previously, I pointed out that as we implemented the /5 curriculum model we got into some conflicts with TRADOC which were initially focused on our course offerings. Then this spilled over and became a part of the larger question of where CGSC fits under OPMS. We weathered those matters without much trouble. I should mention that the Taylor DOD subcommittee on excellence in education examined us from a very critical point of view initially, but as it turned out, we became a bright and shining star that was held up as a model for other schools.

Q: Sir, are you saying that report of excellency that you received could be used to argue against some of the TRADOC ideas?

A: I haven't said that yet, but yes, I think that there is some conflict here. What we said and professed to the DOD committee, and their subsequent endorsement thereof, stands in rather sharp contrast to the next chapter of this on-going story.

As we heard it out here, the next chapter revolved around the TRADOC view of what should happen at Fort Leavenworth and how we should do our business. Those were coupled with the TRADOC notion that the way we should function should parallel the way other Army schools functioned. At least as I knew about it, the TRADOC commander gave tremendous emphasis, more or less directly, to the CAC
Commander, John Cushman, to change the priorities at Fort Leavenworth. As Jack once put it to me, "I was told that the flag should be flying towards CACDA rather than toward the College at Fort Leavenworth."

There is no question that Jack was given some very explicit instructions that somehow or other he had to upgrade the whole CACDA effort in order to produce some kind of a balance between that organization and CGSC. I might say that was a lot easier said than done. It was this influence that led directly to what we subsequently learned to call the Individual Study Projects. But Cushman received almost a direct order to get more effort involved in, if you will, Combat Developments. That was one kind of influence that had a pretty pervading effect. It caused, for example, Cushman at the end of the last several months of his tour to move his office to the clock tower in Sherman Hall, thereby presumably giving visible evidence of his changed primary sphere of influence from CGSC to CACDA.

Then, along came Brigadier General Max Thurman, the current Commandant's younger brother, championing what he called "The TRADOC School Model." The TRADOC School Model was an organizational structure which was established in order to implement the newly adopted so-called Instructional Systems Design Model (the ISD Model) for curriculum preparation and design. From CGSC's standpoint, the TRADOC school model was a radical proposal. It proposed the division of effort between authorship on the one hand (by authorship, I am talking in terms of a lesson) and teaching or presentation on the other; these would be done by two different sets of people. It established a so-called Director of Evaluation who, under the scheme
at least, was responsible for verifying that whatever was to have been accomplished did indeed get accomplished. I think those are the major points. But we argued from the very outset that it did not make any sense for us. As a practical matter, we never adopted and implemented the key elements of the TRADOC school model.

We always said that the primary problem with the school model was that you should not assign responsibility for the preparation of curriculum materials to one group of people and the responsibility for its presentation to another. This is true if for no other reason than that the real knowledge on a subject is required for the design and construction of a lesson; if another group does the presentation, they are certainly not going to be knowledgeable enough to do it. We have always believed this, we have maintained this position, and for the most part we simply held firm. But given the tenor of the times, it meant that CGSC was the odd ball in the pack of all the TRADOC schools. We were the ones that did not comply; we did not fit the pattern. Up and down the line, at staff levels, branches, and divisions this was always a constant point of criticism, a constant point of contention. Certainly, Jack Cushman and Ben Harrison labored with this matter. It created a whole lot of sub-problems. Nevertheless, as long as the two of them stayed, we fought a very successful delaying action; as it turned out, that was what it was.

Q: With this emphasis on CACDA, did the College have any real input other than special study projects into the Combat Developments process?
A: The answer is a pretty strong yes, but it usually took the form of assigning to the appropriate instructional department a major share of the responsibility for one of the CACDA projects. Of course, every time that happened there was always protest and some resentment. From the point of view of the department director, this looked like a diversion of effort. On the other hand, there really wasn't any other choice. If you are going to work, for example, on the problem of command and control, or the makeup of the command post, the people at Fort Leavenworth that are knowledgeable of this question are the people in the Department of Command, who are concerned with staff operations and procedures. So, Jess Hendricks and his people became overwhelmingly involved with command and control.

Q: Did this concern with this ISD model and with Combat Developments affect the content of the curriculum in a negative fashion?
A: I don't think that it really did, because we just simply fought it off. I should not say "we," because by the time the ISD model, the TRADOC pamphlet, and all of its associated matters came along, I personally had directed all of my attention to the WMAS program. I simply got out of the contest; I saw what was happening. Furthermore, I was probably deliberately excluded, since the more senior of us who had served as Educational Advisors among the service schools were viewed by the crusaders of TRADOC as an obstacle. They knew perfectly well that I was not about to be taken in by all of this; that was not only true at Leavenworth but at some other places as well. So, the senior Educational Advisors were kind of pushed off.
to the side. It was that line of reasoning that led to the abolition of the term "Educational Advisor" before this chapter finally ran out to its last page. The people--Ivan Birrer and others--were viewed as a threat or an obstacle, but I kind of stayed out of the fight. Because we did fight the battle successfully, I don't really think that it made much difference.

Q: As you look back, sir, on your 30 years experience at CGSC, wasn't this really the high point in terms of external interference with the curriculum at CGSC?

A: It certainly was the high point of external influence; I am not sure that I accept "on curriculum," because it did not really have that much effect. If you are talking about the whole scheme and process for preparation and presentation, as distinguished from content decisions, then I guess your use of the term "curriculum" would be appropriate. It certainly was the high point. In fact, it was the only one where I thought for a while that the effort might be successful. By effort, I mean the effort by TRADOC to really grasp control and do something significant with the institution. There were some months when I had some real doubts as to whether we could swallow this thing. I have long since gotten over that. I am now persuaded that we have, for all practical purposes, swallowed it. The vestige that remains will be taken care of over time. But it was touch and go, certainly, for a while as I saw it.

Q: Do you see this as one of the major achievements of General Cushman as Commandant, sir?
A: I hadn't really thought of it in those terms. I would say that Cushman and Harrison both deserve tremendous credit because of their very forthright and unpopular stand. I guess that is kind of an indirect way of saying "yes" to the question as you asked it.

Curiously enough, when all the smoke of the battle had cleared, at least as I perceived it, the field captain in charge turned out to be somebody else at the time of the victory--namely Thurman. Whatever else could be said, Jack Cushman and Ben Harrison stood up when it was very unpopular to do so, to say "No, don't do it." More than that, they simply dragged their feet skillfully.

I remember, for example (and this is related to the role of the Educational Advisors), that after the issuance of that horrendous five volume thing called TRADOC Pamphlet 350-20, it became clearly apparent to many of my colleagues as well as to me that the procedures prescribed in that pamphlet were simply too detailed and too complicated for any practical use within the Army school system. This is not to say that the underlying conceptional essence of a systematic approach to curriculum development was wrong; all of us had taught that for years. I am simply talking about the detailed procedures that were announced as something new and different; they are not that at all. But they are overwhelmingly complex and cumbersome. Sooner or later in an endeavor to do something about this, an ad hoc group of Educational Advisors was formed to prepare a simplified Army version of that pamphlet. That is a strange thing to say, because the pamphlet has an Army cover on it, but it is a Florida State University document. These five colleagues of mine went to
considerable effort to produce a simplified and useable Army version. When the draft was prepared, I was invited to a conference in which we were going to consider the draft.

I came home and wrote a short report, just a note, to General Harrison. I had brought a copy of the draft, and I said that I had made only two observations about the revision, which I considered a great improvement over the earlier version. These two observations were: first, I did not believe it appropriate to confine all input into curriculum to that which stems directly from job analysis. I don't think that is a very profound observation, for it seems to me that is fairly self-evident at CGSC. But I thought it should be said, and I said so. Second, I said we should at least acknowledge that there are some very important outcomes of education that are not susceptible to quantification. I still believe that, I might add.

I was just reporting this, and I got back a little note from Ben. I know he put it in writing, because he did not want to embarrass either one of us. He said in effect, "Ivan, while I am sure you expressed this as your view, you know you cannot divorce that from CGSC. In this day and age, what you have said is just heresy, and you just can't say that kind of thing."

I am trying to give some indication of the intense pressures that Cushman and Harrison were under, and I have talked myself around to saying a very strong "yes" to your question, although the battle did not consummate during their regime; but they certainly played a tremendous part.
Q: During this period a TRADOC group made a special study on the education of Army officers, and one of the major conclusions was that the Army school system should prepare officers almost solely for their next assignment. First, did that in fact occur at CGSC; second, what are the problems with that philosophy?

A: During the past 30 years, one of the persisting curriculum questions that came up and did come up regularly was this issue of ultimate goal or purpose. One of the dimensions of that question was whether the College was primarily concerned with the officer's new assignment, or maybe next two assignments (and because of that concern should devote its attention to making him prepared for that assignment rather precisely) or whether the College's major concern was with what might be called an investment in career development. I would argue that one way to describe CGSC throughout the period since World War II has been our consistent evolution away from immediate use of the graduates to an investment in career education. When the TRADOC study was done, it was based on some pretty sketchy data, and a great deal of extrapolation was necessary before that data were applicable to CGSC. According to the TRADOC study group, the crucial evidence was that the tank crews could not shoot. It is a long jump from there to what we are concerned with at CGSC. I think we should recognize that.

There isn't any question again, that there was some greater curriculum concern with the Army as it is today and tomorrow. That is a little different from concentration solely on the next assignment.
I think this is a more accurate way of saying what happened, and I suppose to that degree you can argue that our graduates may have been as a result a little better qualified to take over their next job immediately. But that is a round-about way to get there.

The scheme is unmanageable for CGSC, and as an illustration of that, when the new TRADOC commander, Don Starry, was being given his initial briefing, one of the transparencies displayed the assignments of the previous year's class. I was sitting right along side of him. He looked at this, and turned around to the group. The essence of what he said was, "Given that array of dispersion and different kind of jobs, it makes any notion that you are going to gear the curriculum to the next task impossible." During the time the TRADOC study was being conducted, De Puy came out here several times. As a matter of fact, De Puy also put it quite differently. De Puy would say what the Army has got to have is about 20 battalion commanders immediately, who are ready to go. Somewhere along the line you have got to make sure that you produce those. But that is really a kind of different thing, also.

Anyway, that is my answer to your question.

Q: Is the elective program by this particular time a solution to the dilemma of the need for the broad background and also the need for specialization?

A: I think it had been. I told you in an earlier interview that we produced the curriculum model and got it approved, and then we subsequently wrote the rationalization of the rationales for it. Certainly, by the time the 1974-75 model was in full swing, we had
began to say that this combination of required and optional courses was "the way to have it both ways." We said it enabled us to produce the necessary needed qualification, which has always been Leavenworth's task, while at the same time making some significant overture in terms of longer career development. That kind of a compromise is sort of the nature of this institution, and we need to continue to maintain, if you will, that dual purpose.

Q: By the time General Cushman arrived here, sir, was this design that you came up with in 1971-1972 one of the most important accomplishments of the past decade?

A: I think so. Since I have thought about it in a different setting, I should rephrase your question to ask, "Among the credits that I might have some right to claim, which do I rank as the most important?"

My answer is the sequence of events which first culminated in the 1973 and then subsequently in the 1975 curriculum model. I think over time that is going to be the most lasting matter over which I have some direct effect.

Q: Do you say that with the MMAS program in mind, sir?

A: Yes, I do. It is the competitor, and I think it is very important as well. But if I have to choose between the two, then I will put my contribution with respect to the general curriculum scheme as my number one item.

Q: What role did you play in the creation of the Faculty Council?

A: Not really any except to sit in on some of the original deliberations with General Harrison. All I really did was maybe point out some of the obvious results if such a body were created. I am
referring to the fact that some of the senior members of the faculty would view this as a threat or as a completely irregular, unmilitary-like way to do things. I was pessimistic about their pulling it off. It is now clear that it has been successful. The members of the council deserve credit for making this a meaningful portion of the College community, for their skillful work has made it successful. Yet, the fact that we have it is also an indication that it is a different time. It could not have happened 20 years ago here. But, there are a lot of other things that we now take for granted that could not have happened 20 years ago; they are the obvious indicators showing how the culture has been modified. For example, we now listen to students seriously. For many, many years, as I like to say it, we operated on the assumption that the officers who were joining our faculty from the student body changed from irresponsible to responsible as he walked across the graduation stage, because we operated as if that were the case. That really did not make any sense. Now we are seriously listening to students; some people think maybe we are listening too much! But we are listening, and that again could not have happened many years ago. But we reflect the Army, and we reflect the society; I think the Faculty Council is another piece of evidence that we are a mirror of the Army and of the society.

Q: What do you think the role of the Faculty Council should be, sir?
A: I think it is a means of communicating the views of the authors and the instructors to the command group; these are views that are very difficult for him to get if they filter through the chain of
command. If they choose to use it in this fashion, the council represents a possible means for the command to disseminate notions and ideas. I can even visualize that the Faculty Council can be used as an ad hoc problem-solving body for matters of College-wide concern transcending departmental organizational lines. It is another resource, it seems to me, that is available. I suppose it will be used as the circumstances and the people change.

Q: When you look back at the numerous changes during the Cushman years, have those changes persisted or have they been simply swept aside?

A: Naturally the answer is some of each. Many of his changes have persisted: computers, tactical operations center, Profession of Arms, Applied Military History, etc. While you can't give Jack credit for the structure of the Combined Arms Center (it was already here), he was the guy who made it a reality. It may not be entirely coincidental that the rationale of the Combined Arms Center almost matches exactly Jack's drive to get Leavenworth in the forefront of the field Army. On my personal scale of Commandants—the scale is in terms of personal effect over the long term—he stands with the top three. Perhaps twenty years from now, my successor will put him at the top. I wouldn't be surprised.
INTERVIEW SEVEN

24 January 1978

Major General Morris Brady, 1976


Emphasis on CACDA
Creation of Combined Arms Training Development Activity
Establishment of Directorate of Training Literature and Doctrine
Reduction of College Faculty
Reduction in Small Group Instruction
Adoption of Criterion-Referenced Instruction
Difficulties Encountered in Implementation
TRADOC Workshop on CRI
Centralization of Curriculum Design
Operation of CGSC by Deputy Commandant
Briefing on Manpower Needs
Q: The next commandant to come was General Morris Brady. What were some of the developments during the short period while he was here?

A: I never really looked at it that way. When General Cushman left in February 1976 (I think), we were on vacation in south Texas, so I missed Jack Cushman's departure. General Brady was the second-ranking general; he was up on the hill in CACDA. He was the Commandant-designee. Ben Harrison was still here, and was very much involved with CGSC. I really did not perceive that General Brady had anything really to do with the college, except to sign a few papers.

I had only one dealing with him on an official basis. That occurred just prior to graduation. We had one MMAS student that year who was found by his oral comprehensive examination committee to be deficient. When we established the examining process, I wrote the instructions for the committees that would perform the comprehensive examination. According to those instructions, when the examination was complete, the chairman would excuse the candidate. The vote would then be taken. If it were favorable, the student would be called in and advised of the committee's decision. If it turned out to be unfavorable, the chairman would tell the student the problem had been referred to the Director of the MMAS program; then he would call me immediately. This was the second year of the examining process, and what I always supposed would happen some day, did happen; I got that call.

I went to General Harrison and told Ben what had happened. I suggested that we have a reexamination with a committee composed of the four department directors and the DRI. I would chair the committee without a vote.
He agreed to this proposal, and when we did this, that vote also came out three con and two pro. What made this very sticky was (and that is why I am telling this story now) that the officer concerned had joined the student body from a successful tour in CACDA and had worked under General Brady. When presented with the facts General Brady simply said, "We are going to maintain high standards, and if that is the way it is, then I will approve the recommendation of the Board." That was my only real contact with General Brady, and so far as I know, he really let General Harrison run the school.

Q: What were some of the major events or developments after General John R. Thurman became the commandant, sir?

A: General Thurman inherited the on-going conflict between CGSC and TRADOC. Indeed, it had become a contest between Cushman and Harrison on the one hand, and Paul Gorman and maybe DePuy on the other hand—but certainly Gorman. Gorman was the major proponent for the ISD and the TRADOC school model, and everything that went with it. It was into this setting that General Thurman assumed command. We knew before he reported for duty—he was returning to the US from a division command in Korea—that he had spent some time at TRADOC headquarters. It was apparently a combination of a personal and a social visit; he had some discussions with General DePuy and his brother Max Thurman. That is the background.

He reported, and in a few days or so, he summoned the entire staff and faculty of the college. He made a speech the main point of which was that he had been given in a sense the same march orders that had Cushman. Namely,
somehow or other CACDA had to be brought up to the CGSC level of competence achievement, or any way you want to talk about it. He said in essence that the only way this could happen was if there was some equating of resources. Everybody interpreted that to mean just what he meant for it to mean; the priority position within Fort Leavenworth that the College had long enjoyed was over. All of us tended to read into his declaration more than he intended. By that I mean it was very easy for any of us (and I am one of those) to interpret those remarks as a criticism of what CGSC was doing and its status. It was a long time before I saw very convincing evidence that that was not what he meant at all; that he held CGSC almost in the same awe as many other people. Really all he was trying to say was, "I have been ordered to balance this out, and I can't do it without some readjustment of resources." This was in no sense a criticism of the College, but it got off to a bad start. There is really no question about that. I should also say that in his subsequent efforts to tell the story differently, it did not come out much better.

We really began now to dicker with organization. The problem was compounded by the fact that the post had an extra general officer. Harrison had departed, but there was initially another Major General Glenn Otis, Brigadier General (Promotable) L. G. Menetrey and Brigadier General W. C. Louisell. General Thurman decided that what he would do was establish a third command; in addition to CACDA and CGSC, he would create what he called CATRADA, an acronym standing for the Combined Arms Training Developments Activity. This was kind of an interesting notion, because in a sense it was responsive to DePuy's concept of training developments as an equal part of the three-legged stool: combat developments, training developments,
and education and training. But on the other hand, the creation of a separate command took us farther from the TRADOC school model; it was an interesting kind of contradiction.

From the very beginning the commandant (I think this is critical, but I think it is fair) found it difficult to enunciate in any very understandable fashion what CATRADA was really supposed to do. But it was going to be a separate entity, and it was going to take people. At the beginning, one of the things specifically assigned to it was the responsibility for producing and exporting simulations into the field. That was the clearest responsibility it had. General Thurman, however, decided not to assign CATRADA the TRADOC model task of curriculum analysis and design. He left that with CGSC, and this was another significant break from the TRADOC school model.

One of the far-reaching implications of the new organization was that the new headquarters had to have some people; it was no surprise, I suppose, that they came from the college faculty. There was a noticeable reduction. At first, this did not really bother anybody too much, primarily because the people involved were already totally committed to the projects which were transferred; the people went with the transfer of the projects. I am not saying the college faculty had not lost some teaching strength, but I am trying to say that in effect it had already lost them by their assignment to these projects. The projects and the officers just went under the new headquarters as the first echelon of this affair.
We did pretty well with simulations; they got this stuff packaged and out in the field. We have never, however, been able to deal very effectively with determining to what degree the College instructional departments should be involved in simulations and games, and to what degree CATRADA should be involved. I think it is almost one of those chicken and egg propositions. It was very difficult to sort it out. You just have to live with that ambiguity, I guess.

But given the success with the simulations, the next great thrust of TRADOC was toward training literature and the requirement to produce the "How to Fight" manuals to go along with the new FM 100-5. We really reinvented the wheel here. We used exactly the same reasoning that had prevailed in 1962, namely that it was taking too long to produce the training literature, as long as it was associated with instruction. That was the same argument in 1962 which had led to the creation of the Combat Developments Command and to their being assigned the responsibility for training literature. I'll be damned if we didn't go through exactly the same drill. We decided that the thing we had to do was create a special entity to do the training literature. So, under CATRADA was established the Directorate of Training Literature and Doctrine--along with a long list of training documents to produce, and some 40 people. I think you could generally describe them as "the strong armed men of the College faculty." They were transferred, and that did substantially change the number of people available to man the classrooms.

General Cushman came back to speak to CGSC; I think it was the late fall of 1977. After the lecture, he invited a small group to meet with him.
backstage for a continuing session, and he asked me to join them. Generals Otis and Menetrey were both there. I don't think General Arter was there. In the course of the conversation, Jack turned to me and said, "Ivan, what do you think about this training literature and doctrinal directorate?"

Suddenly things got very quiet and I could see the other two generals turn around. They were probably wondering what I was going to say about this and why would he ask me anyway. My reply was that had I been the deputy commandant at the time and under the pressures of the moment, I might well have opted for that action. But had I done so, it would have been with a clear understanding that this was only a temporary solution, because over time it would not work unless we constantly infused it with new people coming from the CGSC faculty as the older ones rotated; as a practicable matter that was not a workable solution. Therefore, I thought that there would come a time when we would again recognize the error of this "divorce-ment," and we would see responsibility for doctrine and training literature return to the appropriate instruction department. Jack agreed with me, and nobody chose to disagree.

I think that we are very close to that point right now, because the original cadre that made the training and doctrine literature directorate function is rotating, and now the fundamental problem presents itself again.

Q: Would you also point out the effects of this on small-group instruction?
A: With the loss of the forty officers, which occurred probably mid-year school year 1976-77, we limped through the year as we had planned it. But when we started 1977-78, the reduction in manpower made it (at least for
the department of tactics) essentially impossible to conduct their 15-man classes or at least to conduct their classes as they had done before. This was true in some other areas as well. To the extent that small classes are better--it is kind of one of those things that you cannot prove, but you believe it--we lost ground by this affair. But we might have lost even without the reorganization had the training literature requirements been exercised at that high level anyway.

The other major issue that featured General Thurman's time here was another aspect of this TRADOC-ISD crusade. Certainly, the command group was under intense pressure to get with the ISD model, as was everybody throughout the Army school system. I have pointed out already that the original TRADOC Pamphlet 350-30, the five-volume document, was too much to handle; it was too cumbersome, too detailed. Finally, TRADOC came to that conclusion as well; they did not really say that, but they did. They looked around for something that might be somewhat more simple, and they latched on to a commercial course prepared by Robert F. Mager and one of his associates, Peter Pipe, under the title Criterion Referenced Instruction or CRI for short. Suddenly they said, "What we have really got to do is get the whole Army school system in 'sync' with CRI."

This started a series of events. Senior people (I think I am the only one that has escaped the treatment) were sent to attend a 1-week course taught in a fancy Xerox outlay in Leesburg, Virginia. TRADOC provided the commercial materials and two of Mager's people to conduct the faculty workshops at Fort Leavenworth. At least on paper, the College totally embraced the CRI concept. When the planning curriculum guidance was
issued for school 1977-78, it said that we would "CRI" the course. When this faculty gets an order, they are competent people, and when they are told to move out--they move out in great vigor. But in order to move out on this directive, you had to have some notion of what to do when you "CRI the course." It became painfully evident, as we went along, that this term could be interpreted in a variety of ways.

If you deal with it conceptually (which is the way I first heard the term) and not as a proper noun but as a common noun, criterion-referenced instruction meant no more and no less than the fact you would prepare your curriculum materials following a systematic approach. You would start with a determination of what you wanted the graduate to be able to do at the conclusion of the educational program, and in step 2, you would design some instructional materials or experiences that would produce that result. In step 3, you would try it out, and see how it worked, and in step 4, you would correct the program as necessary on the basis of your experience. I have described criterion-referenced instruction as a conceptual function, and when I do it that way, I have described nothing new. Indeed, I think that I have put into the step 1-2-3-4 scheme what good teachers have always done.

Now, that is one kind of explanation, but when you tell people to CRI the course it can have another interpretation. In fact, you almost invite another interpretation, for the reason that almost the entire CGSC faculty were forced to attend a 3-week workshop using these commercial materials with the CRI label. You just invite the recipient of that treatment to conclude that when you say "CRI the course" that means you put the CGSC
curriculum into the pattern, the format, the jargon, the trappings of the commercially prepared Mager CRI course. For many of the more zealous members of the faculty, who read the order and said we will move out, the second interpretation pertained.

I saw this happening; I deliberately stayed aloof. I kept telling myself, "Sometime reason will again prevail, or if not, Ivan, it is time for you to acknowledge that another generation is taking over and you are just no longer at home in this setting." I had these ideas as I watched this process through the latter part of school year 1976-77. I saw the faculty divided in two camps, what one member of the faculty characterized as "radicals and traditionalists" and with almost no middle ground between them. I saw an intense amount of effort and activity of people trying to comply with an order. It was almost as if someone were saying, "We are going to do this, no matter what; don't argue about it!" It was troublesome.

I suppose the essence of the difficulty of the CRI process (not form, using my definition) was determination of what you wanted the graduate to be able to do. To use the more technical term, determination of the terminal objectives becomes increasingly more difficult, as one progresses up the conceptual ladder of learning from facts or techniques on the bottom of the ladder, to synthesis or understanding on the top. Given the fact that a large portion of what we do is fairly high up this scale of outcomes, conceptually, the determination of the terminal objectives in very precise terms is just an overwhelming problem. The published materials, the commercial CRI course, the itinerate missionaries out of the Training Management
institute who would come to visit us and exhort us to keep on with this affair, consistently used examples of the very low-order procedural skills. Then they would say, "You figure out how this applies to CGSC."

There were several months of this kind of confusion, order, and disorder. It was supposed to be straightened out by a TRADOC workshop or seminar, for which they sent out three recognized experts in this business to Fort Leavenworth to conduct a 2 1/2 day faculty workshop in the summer of 1977. They were supposed to deal with the problems of applying CRI to our course. I went to the workshop, and it was a debacle. By everybody's consent, it was a debacle. Even my colleagues who had some staff responsibility for CRI were embarrassed about how it went.

When it was over, I thought it was time I should say my piece, and I wrote a memorandum to the Deputy Commandant, Bill Louisell, in which I said, "I think over time we have made a big mistake. First, it seems to me that we need to agree what CRI is all about, and I think it is just a systematic way of preparing the curriculum. All the rest is trapping or jargon. The essence agrees with what I have always believed and have been taught about how to conduct schooling, and a lot of other people as well, and let's capture that." I said, "Moreover, I will argue that if you roll back the clock about 5 years before our great increase in curriculum offerings, and you examine how we at Leavenworth prepared our own instructional materials, you will find we did it in this systematic fashion." We had taken a lot of short cuts when we made these great enlargements in the curriculum offerings. I said, "The thing to do now is to institutionalize our own scheme with our greater number of offerings." I went on to say,
"We didn't play our cards very well with TRADOC. What we said to TRADOC about CRI was, 'That's a great idea, but it doesn't really apply to us.' This got us into a contest which is still going on." I said, "What we should have done initially, but you can't change that, and what we ought to do now, is swallow this thing up by saying we completely believe in criterion-referenced instruction. That's what we have always believed; that's what we do! In other words, by definition, let's sweep this thing away, and then let's turn our attention to curriculum preparation."

I had no idea what Louisell's reaction to this would be, but I got back a little note which said, "Ivan, you are completely right about this. I want you to write a memorandum which essentially says this." A day or so later, he got unexpected orders and did not publish the paper I wrote. I am sorry he didn't but even if he had, it would not have made too much difference at that point, because a tremendous number of things had happened in terms of curriculum materials for school term 1977-78.

To finish out this part of the story, General Robert Arter came in, like Jim Gibson of 7 years before, if you will, unencumbered by having been a Leavenworth student. He was also not burdened by any tremendous pressure to get on this CRI kick. Indeed, it is very important to note that Louisell's departure essentially coincided with Paul Gorman's departure from TRADOC. The great prime mover from Monroe was no longer in the picture, and that made it easier. Arter did not feel the same intense pressure that had been put on Louisell and Harrison. We started the course for 1977-78; almost from the outset, the student feedback was voluminous and for the most part adversely critical—often bitterly so.
A couple of months went by, and I was in talking with General Arter on some matter; I had finished my business. I got up to go, and he said, "Ivan, if you have got a few minutes, please sit down; there is something else I want to discuss with you." I said, "Sure." Then he proceeded to tell me that he was uneasy about this whole CRI matter, that he did not really comprehend all the problems. He said, "I have two questions. Is this something that I should really get concerned with? Secondly, if it is, how do I get a handle on this monster?" My rather spontaneous reaction was to the first point, "You're damn right you need to get concerned about this. I think it is a major matter that needs your complete attention. I can't think of anything else at the moment that I think is more important." With respect to the second matter, how he should do it, I asked for a couple or three days to think it over. This was a Friday, as I remember.

I went back and I had some conversations with my two associates, who confirmed my conclusion that I really represented the only reasonable one to do the kind of study I had in mind. I was not totally committed to what had or not happened, and I had no personal involvement in it. I had already announced that I was going to retire. On the following Tuesday, I told him that while I realized you should never volunteer for anything in the Army, in this case I was going to volunteer. But if I did, I wanted him to know how I proposed to go about it. I said that I first expected to obtain all the curriculum materials that were used in the first part of the year to review them with respect to what I would describe as CRI application, to check those descriptions with the course directors for accuracy, and then to collect a variety of different judgments about what we did.
Finally, I would type this up and give him my views about the entire CRI effort. That took another month and half or so of my time; it was really a sizeable effort.

The report was submitted, and I think for all practicable purposes, it proved and suggested to General Arter how he should modify the already published documents for school year 1978-79. More importantly, it suggested how he should modify the documents, rationale, philosophy, etc., both from the point of view of having them check with sound education practice and having them offer a way out of this sharp division that had grown up within the College. I think that this was a pretty significant action, although it may be too soon historically to assess its long-term value.

Q: The Office of Curriculum Analysis and Design was one of the offices that was created as a result of this ISD school model. What was it designed to do, and what in fact did it accomplish?

A: I will quarrel a little bit with the way you said it. I think it is more accurate to say that in our negotiations, bickerings, and so forth, with TRADOC about the TRADOC school model, the Office of Curriculum Analysis and Design came out of that. But from the very beginning, it was an anomaly to the TRADOC school model. If you look at the TRADOC school model, it simply says there ought to be a separate group of people who plan and design the curriculum, and there is another group who prepare it and present it. Fort Leavenworth made the fundamental decision that this Curriculum Analysis and Design function would stay with the College. It would not become part of Training Developments, which became part of CATRADA. This was probably done with a view to making this major change from the model more palatable than it might be otherwise.
OCAD was established as a separate organizational entity. It was distinct from the office charged in the school model with implementation, the Directorate of Education and Training. In fact, it is very difficult to divorce the two matters. It is essential that the people who were doing analysis and design be in lock step, if you will, with the people who are going to schedule and implement. The whole thing is so intertwined that it is sort of an arbitrary divorcement. But on the other hand, for convenience, you have to divide up the matter. We have always had those two kinds of functions, the analysis and design function and the schedules and implementation function, somewhat separate, but now we had them under two different directorates. This at least preserved the notion of the school model that they ought to be separate.

It may have happened anyway, but when General Starry made his first visit out here as the TRADOC commander, at the start of the briefing he was shown an organization chart. General Thurman interrupted the briefing, saying, "There are a couple of significant changes between this and the TRADOC school model." He went on quickly to say what they were, this OCAD being one, since it was not in CATRADA. General Starry's comment was, to the effect that he expected it to be different but he didn't care. He did warn us to keep kind of an audit trail of why we made the differences, because this was related to the resources problem. We all breathed a big sigh of relief when we got that pronouncement directly from the TRADOC commander's mouth himself.

This month, it has been decided to rejoin those two functions--operations and schedules on the one hand, curriculum analysis and design on the other--
under the same directorate and under a new title, Education and Curriculum Affairs, or DECA. I don't think it makes much difference, except that you save one colonel. That is not really the fundamental issue anyway. The fundamental issue is to what degree will we, if I can use the word, "recentralize" monitorship and control of curriculum. That is the real issue, and it has been an issue on many occasions in the past.

I was recently asked to give a briefing on curriculum evolution to the faculty board. One of the points that I made at the outset was that if you look at CGSC over time it is just a fact that as the curriculum increased in scope from its pre-World War II, almost exclusive emphasis on firepower and maneuver, to all the rest of it involving the Army today, it simply became too big for any one body or one agency to manage centrally. I advanced the notion to General Arter that the course of study concept, which still exists, came about because of this inability of any central body to manage it, and that we just had to accept the fact that you had to decentralize this at least until about the department or committee level. I went on further to offer some uninvited predictions. My prediction was that we can try it again, but we would come up with the same result. We would get there quicker the next time, because the problem was ever so much greater than it was when we gave up this notion 20 years ago. I am sitting here watching with considerable interest how it will work out.

There is another way to describe the same problem. Are we going to make major curriculum decisions (I am talking about allocations of hours) primarily and sort of comfortably on the basis of informed professional judgment, or are we going to try to quantify our decisions by some kind of
a computerized accounting system. Again, I am willing to bet that over time
the former way holds. My experience here tells me (some of it first hand,
and a lot of it watching very closely over somebody else's shoulder) that
the insurmountable difficulty to centralized detailed management of the
curriculum rests upon the inability to determine the real dimensions of
what you are going to count.

If you are going to have centralized control, you have to have some kind
of a categorization system, from which you are going categorize hours or
objectives, or whatever you use as the unit. To make that scheme, you
have to decide what the meaningful categories are. I have seen it tried,
and I have told General Arter this. I have seen very able groups of people
try this, and they have all finally thrown up their hands in futility,
because there was never any way to establish what the meaningful categories
are. Hence, when you get through, you have a composite or a mosaic, but
nobody will agree upon its relevance. Time may prove me wrong, but that is
what I believe will happen here again.

Q: Do you have anything else to add, sir?
A: I haven't said very much about General Thurman. The College was really
being run by the deputy commandant, and this was true both last year and
this year. General Thurman was very busy in school year 1976-77, and in
late summer or late fall he was given another job as the TRADOC Deputy
Commander. He was now on the road even more than in the past. The deputy
commandant had the College in his hands, and I think it is to General Thurman's
credit that it does function this way.
There is one other thing that the record should include. During the past couple of years, it has been a time of retrenchment in the Army and in the training base, in terms of money and manpower. The College has been constantly arguing with TRADOC about manpower and money, but more especially about manpower. The specifics of the argument are really not very important but they revolve around the basis on which you compute instructor requirements. The only important thing to note is that we were consistently being threatened by further reductions of some sizable magnitude.

In this context, General Thurman arranged to have the people at TRADOC who deal with resources and Gorman's successor, John Seigle, come out to Leavenworth. Their visit focused around a briefing by Major John DeReu, and in part by myself, about the manpower implications for the College. Not only to my satisfaction, but to my delight, I heard General Thurman publicly express what I accept as his honest appraisal of CGSC and its role and importance. Before this body, he gave just the greatest testimonial for the college's long-term significance to the American military, to its key role in officer development over time, and to the argument that this is not a training school but it is an investment in education. I sat there and heard General Thurman emphasize these themes that I had been trying to push over the years. I don't know whether it was the TRADOC deputy commander or the CAC commander, but it was the same lieutenant general putting these points together in a striking testimonial. I remembered that first time I heard him speak, and I found myself saying, "Ivan, you did the man injustice; he wasn't trying to downgrade the CGSC at all. He was only doing what he said he was doing; he was trying to comply with an order." I found that very reassuring.
I guess I have talked myself almost up to the present day. As I see it, the college has (as far as I can determine) digested the essence of CRI and the ISD model. That crusade is over, and it is clear that nobody at TRADOC, at least at the General officer level, is going to come out and tell us what to do. We are going to continue this kind of straddle position between the next job and long-term development. We are going to continue the curriculum model which seems to support both. We have been told very recently that TRADOC has decided that the College, or maybe it is the Combined Arms Center, has at least a partially exempt status from the manpower and personnel reductions; or at least it has a high priority. That is all that they can do really.

When I further add to that the fact that I have great confidence and a long time personal association with the TRADOC commander, I reaffirm one of the points that I made in my letter of last July which announced my plans to retire. In that letter, I said that I thought by the time June 30, 1978 rolled around, everything I wanted to see happen at CGSC would have materialized. To say it differently, I had probably had about as much influence as I was going to be able to, and it was time for someone else to take over. I still feel that way about it. I feel more certain about that now in January 1978, than I did 6 months ago because of these developments that I have just described.

Q: Sir, looking back on this very, very turbulent period that we have been through, doesn't this period of turbulence argue for more continuity and more stability such as that represented by yourself at this institution?

A: I suppose so. If you simply take a narrow parochial view, meaning if you look at it from CGSC eyes, you certainly want to be sure that the institution cannot be seriously threatened. As I have indicated, I was
worried for a while; I really want. I kept telling myself, "Ivan, this is a TRADOC installation in a legal sense, but in a nonlegal, practical sense Leavenworth belongs to the Army. There is a whole lot of the Army that feel that they have got a lien on it." As the saying goes, "When push really comes to shove, some of those arms are going to reach out to help." I believe that, and I kept telling myself that, but exactly how one does that I don't know. In this instance, I played a part in holding the pieces together, but what really held it together was that this institution has a tremendous capacity to absorb, to digest and accommodate. I could write a script, and put down the players that might be able to seriously injure the college as I know it, but it seems to be such a remote matter that I dismiss it. So, in answering your question, I come out puzzled; I just don't really know.
INTERVIEW EIGHT

25 January 1978

Master of Military Art and Science Degree

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Q: Sir, would you describe the evolution of the Master of Military Art and Science program?

A: I'll try, recognizing at the beginning that this is a very long and involved and somewhat tortuous story, but one that is certainly very interesting. It is high time that a number of people be listed in the records who made contributions; and I am going to try to tell it in that kind of context.

Just like every good story, as the little song says from "Sound of Music" a very good place to begin is at the beginning. The puzzle is that it is a little difficult to know what the beginning is. I say that because in the first three or four years after my arrival, I was occasionally confronted with this proposition: we should be awarding a master's degree. The Army War College should be awarding doctorates. On each such occasion my tendency was to respond that while I would agree in principle, as a practical matter, we could never pull it off. These same kinds of conversations, obviously, not only went on at Leavenworth, but a number of other places as well and involved a lot of other people.

When we jump to 1961 and the matter surfaces formally with Harold K. Johnson as the Commandant, one of the things that Johnny said at the start of our discussions was to recall that this matter had often been discussed earlier, when he had been in the personnel business at the Headquarters of Army Field Forces at Fort Monroe, Virginia. He said, "It seems to me the thing for us to do is try this project out. Let's investigate it and either bring it into fruition for once and for all or dispose of the matter."
The specific trigger event, however, was a suggestion written on a tour-end report by an officer who was leaving the faculty. In those days each officer was expected to write such a thing. I am sorry I cannot recall his name, but I do remember that in his suggestion he had some interesting advice, which was "It is foolish to try this scheme on any civilians in higher education or even any civilians on the faculty like Dr. Birrer, because they're just going to be automatically opposed to it on principle." Nevertheless, General Johnson indicated he would like to pursue the matter.

When we had the first series of discussions, it was agreed that in order for us to have a master's degree program we really needed to do two things: somehow or other we had to get the necessary authority to award a degree, but it was also clearly understood and said that the other thing we had to have was accreditation. This meant accreditation by the regional accrediting agency, which in this area is the North Central Association of College and Schools in Chicago, or NCA for short.

With respect to the degree-granting authority, it was agreed that Congressional authority was needed and that this would have to happen over time. If you pin me down as to why that was so, I cannot cite any specific regulation, but the precedent had been established when the Congress in the 1920's had authorized the service academies to award degrees. They had done this by legislative enactment. After World War II, the Air Force Academy, the Naval Post Graduate School, and the Air Force Institute of Technology gained degree-granting authority from the enactment of a specific congressional bill. In the late 1950's or early 1960's there had been an
abortive effort by the Judge Advocate General School to obtain authority to award a Master's Degree, and it was in conjunction with that unsuccessful effort that the Pentagon, in some kind of paper or other, had acknowledged that the only way to obtain authority was through legislation. Alternative ways continued to be discussed, and I will say something about that maybe a little bit later, but I was convinced from the very beginning that the only real solution was congressional legislation.

With respect to gaining accreditation from the NCA, this was really an unknown. The first action was to make an informal contact with the head of the North Central Association, Dr. Norman Burns. We simply told him that we were considering requesting accreditation, and we really did not know how to go about it. He agreed to send two of his regular evaluators or examiners here to discuss this possibility with us. The two names involved were Dr. Robert MacVicar and Dr. Collins. MacVicar was in a sense the lead man of the team; his name shows up again later. They spent a day and a half or so examining the college, and the visit terminated with them discouraging us to take any further action. It wasn't that they disapproved and didn't think highly of what was going on at CGSC; it was simply that they ticked off a whole list of what they thought were overwhelming obstacles to accreditation.

Not withstanding that, we had our feet wet as it were, and we decided to pursue this matter. We arranged for a meeting at NCA headquarters. On a Saturday morning General Lemley (the assistant commandant), Colonel Robert Smith (assistant Chief of Resident Instruction), and I flew to Chicago.
We found ourselves in the headquarters building, met Dr. Burns, and he rather courteously but quickly turned us over to one of his major assistants, Robert Sullivan. While Burns was the titular head of NCA, he was actually a part-time employee. There were about three full-time staff assistants. Robert Sullivan was the one assigned to the question of accreditation for CGSC. Lemley gave a 30-minute or so briefing on CGSC—a kind of standard, generalized treatment. He gave part of it, and Bob Smith gave part of it. I had taken with me a tactics lesson and a logistics lesson. Obviously, I had chosen them with some care; I chose the two that I thought represented the most in-depth examination, analysis, etc. I carefully described and displayed these curriculum materials, trying to advance the notion that there was real substance in our curriculum content. I don't know where I got that idea, but the tactics lesson I used was a river crossing operation in South Africa. Sullivan was very favorably impressed, and he suggested that the matter merited continuation. Then he gave us the procedural instructions, which were primarily the preparation and submission of a self-study document. If it were viewed favorably, there would be a subsequent on-site visit.

The three of us came back to Fort Leavenworth, and we were about ready to proceed. By now it became clear that we had committed ourselves to an action, and we had a major policy meeting. It was clear that if we were going to pursue this matter of requesting accreditation of a master's degree program, we were going to have to be able to describe the program. That is kind of QED. As we met that morning, there were two very opposite points of view. Curiously, they were held by Colonel "Jap" Wilson on the
one hand, and Ivan Birrer on the other. Wilson's argument was, "If we're going to do this at all, the only way we want to do it is to say that CGSC is the equivalent of a master's program; as the guy gets his Leavenworth diploma in his right hand, we'll slip him a master's degree in the left hand." I advanced the other proposition that we ought to think about this in terms of a small program for very able and carefully chosen students. I thought it would have to be a thesis program, and therefore it had to be made somewhat qualitatively different as well. As you see, these are two sharply different points of view. Well, I prevailed, and my position was accepted that day. I don't know whether it was accepted on the pragmatic grounds that only my scheme had any chance of success, or whether it was accepted because my scheme was better on some other criteria. It does not really make any difference; I suspect some of each. Fortunately for what happened thereafter, Wilson, who was pretty bitter about this, went off to Vietnam for about 3 months on temporary duty; he wasn't around the college much thereafter, and kind of faded out of the scene.

Preparation of the self-study in mid-1962 was done primarily by LTC Henry Lopez, now deceased; it was pretty hastily put together and then submitted. The document was titled "Accreditation Analysis." As I look at it now, it is kind of surprising to me that the whole process was not called off, because there was not very much in the self-study of any real merit. The next thing we knew was that the visitation had been established for an NCA team, and the visit was set for December 1962. This was a very unusual set of circumstances. We were going to have a visitation team, and we were going to ask them to review a program which had never been conducted. We had agreed that
we were going to start one, and it would be a specialized thesis program. That is really all we had agreed upon.

One morning while I was thinking about this, it seemed to me that we would greatly strengthen our petition, if you will, with the North Central Association if we could say that we were going to start the program next year—no matter what. I came to work, and I tried that notion on an officer who was in the CRI office but who was closely associated with me, a friend of mine named Beverly Finkle. I said, "Bev, why don't we agree that we're going to start this, and we can call it an Honors Program." This was a time when "honors programs," meaning specialized accelerated programs, was a vague term. I said, "We ought to say to the visitation team this is the program that we're going to start, and we'll describe it. That's what we want them to evaluate." He thought this was a good idea, and we went to General Lemley. In a matter of 5 minutes, I guess, we had a decision that we would announce to the world that an honors program would start at CGSC in the fall of 1963. This was December 1962.

A few days later the Educational Survey Commission of 1962 came to Leavenworth. I have reviewed that before in another interview. I had another interesting puzzle on my hands, because in their travels, they had been to Carlisle Barracks, and they had been very critical of Carlisle's cooperative degree program. By extension, they had also been critical of any other program like that. If you read the report of the Educational Survey Commission, you will find how we managed this. We got them to say that while they disapproved of the Army War College's arrangements, they thought the notion of an in-house master's program for Leavenworth was an idea that had considerable merit.
The day after the commission left, by previous arrangement at my suggestion, I flew out to Greeley, Colorado, to meet the team chairman of the NCA visitation team, Dr. Sam Gates. He had been a World War II bomber pilot. The purpose of my visit was to see what the committee wanted us to do and how we could get ready for it. I think we would say it was good gamesmanship. In a couple of hours in Greeley that morning, we agreed upon an agenda for our meeting. They were coming on a Sunday, would be here Monday and Tuesday, and leave Tuesday afternoon, as I recall. The visit permitted me to establish personal contact with Sam Gates and I felt better about the visitors coming in. They would not all be strangers.

About 2 weeks later, the team arrived at CGSC. In addition to Dr. Gates, the other two members were Dr. George Starcher, at that time the president of the University of North Dakota, and Dean Hannelly, the president of Maricopa County Junior College, Phoenix, Arizona. Hannelly was an interesting person; he had his degree in Latin or Greek, I forget which one, from Chicago. He had taught classical languages all his life. He was a man 72 years old. One of the first things he told me was that the day before he had shot 18 holes of golf and his score was 1 year better than his age, which is a pretty remarkable achievement. But in background he was about as far from CGSC as one could possibly pick a man. Dr. Starcher was a mathematician and a great person. He had had a little brush with the military, since North Dakota had worked out some kind of cooperative program with some of the Air Defense silos up in his area.
Surprisingly, at the end of the 2 days, the visit turned out to be entirely favorable. They told the command that they were going to recommend favorably to the North Central Association, provided the program that we were going to establish was (a) a thesis program, (b) that we created a graduate faculty, and (c) that we included a comprehensive examination.

Interestingly, the morning before the last of the exit interview, I took some coffee up to the room, and they invited me to stay for a minute. They said, "What we'd like to know is what you think the Commandant would say if our report included these provisions." They ticked them off, and I said, "I can find out about that if you want. I could go informally and inquire." I came back to my office, walked down and met with Johnson and Lemley, and said, "They are about to say this; is that going to be all right?" The answer was, "That'll be fine." So, you can see how this worked out.

Our day to appear before the North Central Association's review committee was in April 1963. Since we did this several times, the process is worth describing. After the visitation team makes its report, there are a series of what they call "Committees by Type" meetings which are held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the NCA. They are provided the self study, the visitation report, and other materials from the institution being examined; then there is a meeting with some representatives of the institution, usually the chief and one or two of his subordinates. This is an open-ended thing where they ask any questions they want. The report of this review committee is subsequently submitted to the executive committee of the North Central Association, who pass upon that recommendation,
and then pass it to the general delegation. But these last two steps are pro forma. In those days, they did this all secretly; that is to say, you did not really know what the reaction of the review committee was. Of course, they changed this policy later, but in 1963 the reaction was still secret.

By this time, there had been another serious difference of opinion between Wilson and myself, having to do with the question of where should responsibility for the program be charged. Wilson's view was that this was a part of the Office of the Chief of Resident Instruction and it should be subsumed within that office. I argued, "No, you've got to have a special affair." I believed this was important for visibility. Frankly, I thought it also important to keep it out of Wilson's hands. It soon became apparent that LTC Bruce Koch was going to be in charge of the project, and he would not be working for the Chief of Resident Instruction.

General Lemley, LTC Koch, and I went to Chicago and met with the review committee. It was a very pleasant affair. General Lemley did extremely well; Bruce and I answered a couple of questions; it probably took 35 or 40 minutes. General Lemley came back home, and we stayed around for a few more days, feeling fairly certain that we were going to get what we sought, but not having any evidence at hand. The way the NCA meetings concluded was that the final action meeting was on the last day, and the paper containing all the actions of the executive committee came in for approval. There we were accorded preliminary accreditation, as of the first of April 1963 for a program that had not yet been in operation. The only restriction
was that they wanted to have a consultant with us for the first 3 years of
the program; the consultant subsequently appointed was this same Robert
MacVicar who had been so discouraging initially.

I neglected to point out that we had been very candid with the North
Central Association in all of our discussions. We were candid in the sense
that we had said to them, "We know we need both Congressional authorization
and accreditation for the program to have legitimate status. Legislation
may be a problem; we want the accreditation first to use it as a lever."
As I say, we were very explicit about that.

With considerable exultation, I guess that is the word, Bruce and I
put together a letter to CONARC advising them of the NCA accreditation,
telling them that we were going to start this program under the tag, "Honors
Program," and requesting that they set in motion the request for the legis-
lation. It went through CONARC without any trouble. It got to DA, and it
was submitted as a staff action of what was then called ACSFOR, Assistant
Chief of Staff for Force Development. Almost before we knew it, the ACSFOR
chief was ready to send back a letter saying, "No, don't do this. We don't
like it; we don't want any second class graduates among honor graduates."
It was an absolute turn-down. This started a whole series of coincidences,
and most of the rest of this story is a story of how many times this program
almost died completely, and by chance circumstances was revived.

In this instance the revival was accomplished by the fact that General
Johnson had been promoted and was serving as the DCSOPS. We got word to
him, and he went to his colleague in ACSFOR and pleaded. He was able to
secure a change of the endorsement, which simply authorized CGSC to conduct
the honors program for 1 year on a trial basis. It was a very guarded and
limited approval at best. But it was at least authorization to proceed.
School year 1963-64 was now ready to commence, and we announced to the
students that we were going to have an honors program. We told them it
was accredited at the master's degree level, and we were seeking legisla-
tive authority for the program. I guess we implied that we thought we
would get it. Bruce Koch and I sat down and wrote from scratch the first
version of what is now the "Reference Book Research and Thesis." We
had also by this time made the decision with respect to the title of the
degree. It was Johnny Johnson who insisted that we have both Art and
Science in the degree title. So, he is the one who was responsible for
4AS. For reasons that we did not foresee at the time, it was a very
fortunate choice, the reason being that it was a degree title that was not
used by anyone else. That became crucial as time went along.

The program began in 1963-64, and there were 19 officers who completed
the program in the first year. At the end of the year, we gave them a
fancily engraved certificate which said that they had completed all the
requirements that were a prerequisite to the degree. That is all that
is said.

School year 1964-65 commenced, and in October the trio of Lemley,
Koch and Birrer went to San Francisco to attend the annual meeting of the
American Council on Education. At the annual reception for the entire
meeting, I was standing that night along side Lemley and Koch, and I noted
a person coming in. I said to the General, "Gosh, there's Ed Katzenbach."
Again, I need to back up a moment. In the 2 years immediately before this, Katzenbach had been occupying the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Education. By virtue of the Pentagon arrangements, that office is involved in any Congressional action having to do with schools. Katzenbach had made a visit out here 5 or 6 months previously when we were talking about this program, and he let it be known through his colleagues that as long as he had anything to do with it, this notion of CGSC acquiring degree-granting authority was completely out of the question.

Back to the San Francisco affair. Within a month before the meeting, Katzenbach had resigned his position as Assistant Secretary of Defense, Education, and moved over to head a major sub-element in the American Council of Education, the very largest of all the educational organizations. As I said, I looked up and said, "Gosh, there's Ed Katzenbach." General Lemley took off across the room, obviously as a man with a purpose; Bruce and I followed along, maybe sensing that there was going to be trouble in River City. I saw this animated conversation. I just heard glimpses of it, but I did hear a snatch which sounded something like, "You never would have done it had I still been there." That was Katzenbach's response. I had to suppose what had happened heretofore. With that, the conversation ended.

Before the night was over, I was called by an Air Force officer who was in that DOD office where Katzenbach had been the chief. He said, "I've got to see you right away." We agreed we would meet at breakfast; this was late at night. He said, "You know your boss told Ed Katzenbach that he awarded 19 master's degrees." Of course, I don't really know what Harry Lemley told him, but I was careful to point out to the Colonel what really
had happened at Leavenworth. He said, "I can tell you that there is going
to be trouble about this. Ed Katzenbach won't take this lying down, and I
anticipate that there are going to be difficulties."

There certainly were difficulties, because it was only a short time
thereafter that the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower, Norman Paul,
published a memorandum dealing with degree-granting authority. It specifi-
cally prohibited the granting of any degrees without the approval of his
office. The last sentence of that memorandum added that this prohibition
specifically applied to the US Army Command and General Staff College. I
know absolutely that memorandum was the result of a Katzenbach telephone
call to Norman Paul.

I should have said, also, that we had made one decision for 1964-65.
We were going to drop the term "Honors Program," because we found out that
it caused some trouble. We were now going to call it the Graduate Program.

Now the scene shifted back to Washington. The question was how to get
the degree-granting authority? The situation had also changed, since
Harold K. Johnson had become the Army Chief of Staff. The problem Johnny
had was how to get around this Paul memorandum. We knew a federal policy
on degree granting had been published in 1955. It was a policy which had
been worked out by the US Office of Education in conjunction with the
American Council on Education. After generally describing the undesirability,
in principle, of federal institutions getting involved in degree granting, this
paper established some procedures that would pertain for any such proposal.
Later, I found out that the policy had been written by people who had the
clear intent to write a set of procedures which were so restrictive that no
one would ever again try out this scheme.
Q: Why did they do that, sir? Were they afraid of federal institutions taking money or business, so to speak, away from civilian institutions?
A: No, I don't think that is the point at all. I think that at the time there was a tremendous concern about federal "control" of education. From that you can conclude that the thing to do is to keep government completely out of education. I don't think it necessarily follows, but I think it was the major motivation.

Harold K. Johnson found the policy, and in a conversation with Norman Paul and the Secretary of the Army, he got into this business. It was agreed that the only way to do this was for DA to follow this procedure, which provided that, if the Office of Education felt the proposal had merit, they would appoint a special ad hoc committee to investigate the proposal. After an approach by the Army to the Commissioner of Education, an informal memorandum came back with the following sentence: "I feel quite sure, however, that the subject proposed would not receive favorable action if such a review were carried out. As you know, legislation would be necessary, and in my opinion, the National Commission on Accrediting, and the American Council of Education would oppose the proposed legislation." This was written by the Associate US Commissioner of Education, Dr. Wayne O. Reed. When Mr. Paul got this back, he sent it to the Secretary of Army, Stephen Ailes, with a comment. "In view of Dr. Reed's memorandum, it does not appear that the climate is favorable for the attainment of the Army's goal." I think that is a mild understatement.

School year 1964-65 was now history, and in the fall of 1965, the North Central Association wrote the college and advised us that unless we had
achieved degree-granting authority by the first of March, 1966, their annual meeting day, they were going to withdraw our accreditation. We really could not quarrel with NCA about this. They had made some real overtures to help us, and we just had not come through. General Lemley got this letter and kept it secret for a while. Two or three months went by before he showed it to me. It should be noted that the North Central Association itself was severely criticized by its counterparts for having granted accreditation to a program not in existence. It was not very long after that, just a few years, that all the accrediting agencies wrote into their manual a requirement that no program would even be evaluated unless it was in operation. Things looked pretty grim at this point. The Associate Commissioner of Education had essentially said, "It doesn't seem to me it'll work." The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower had said, "It's not a good climate." Out here, we continued to run the program with 20 or so people each year, without much of anything in the way of a reward except a hope and a promise.

It was almost a dead issue until another revival came along. This time it happened, because at Lyndon Johnson's 1966 State of the Union Message, Harold K. Johnson happened to be seated next to the newly appointed Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, John Gardner. Johnny had a chance to speak with Gardner about this, and Gardner's response was that it did not seem preposterous, and he would at least go back and review the HEW position. He did, and it was not very long before he sent Johnny a little note which read, "It seems to me likely that a formal review committee would not recommend such action be taken, and I cannot recommend to you that you initiate the process." He was referring to the process of the 1955 policy.

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By now Lemley had departed and had become the DCSOPS. He had taken with
him as his assistant Colonel Arthur Olsen, who had followed Bruce Koch as the
director of the program. One Saturday morning in the early fall of 1966,
General Lemley called General Mike Davison, the Commandant, and said it was
time to re-open the matter of the authorization for the degree (not the
legislative authority). While the degree matter certainly wasn’t under the
DCSOPS’ charter, it was under his personal charter with Johnson. He asked
Davison to appoint me as the action/project officer. He wanted to have me
there Monday morning. Of course, that started the next set of affairs.

I went up there, and in the DCSOPS office itself, amidst very fancy
surroundings, I was given a large collection of documents pertaining to
this whole proposal. It was just a mish-mash to start with. I spent some
time trying to sort out the papers, trying to figure out where we were. I
discovered that Lemley had decided that the legislative approach was a loser.
He had been able to more or less convince Johnson to publish an execu-
tive order; but as I read through the documents, it was clear to me that would
be a tragic mistake. I just could not believe that would work. The Paul
memorandum seemed to be very explicit, and to argue that it did not apply
because the program in question had been started before the Paul memorandum
seemed to me a very thin reed on which to hang. I said, "No, that’s not the
way to go about it. The way to go about it is to go through the HEW review
process. That’s the only way it’s ever going to happen. Moreover," I said,
"what we have to do is not only get through that, but we’ve got to get the
concurrence of the American Council on Education, and finally the concur-
rence of the budget office. If we get all of those things and then request
the legislation, we might be successful."
Art Olsen and I talked Lemley out of his idea. I think to this day he maintains that he was right, that no legislation was really required. He may be right in a legal sense, but as a practical matter, he is dead wrong. We have talked about this a good many times.

In due time, I was commuting to Washington every couple of weeks. We decided to go to the Office of Education with a formal request that we initiate this set of procedures. This meant we had to go through the Pentagon layers, the DOD; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Education; everybody got into this thing. Everybody could say no; nobody could say yes. This was my introduction to what life must be really like for an action officer in the pentagon. Suffice it to say that in February 1967 we were informed that the Office of Education would indeed energize the 1955 policy; that is to say, they would appoint the committee. Art Olsen got an appointment with them for me; he called up and used Lemley's office. That's how we did this sort of thing; he made the appointment and I would show up.

I found myself talking to Mr. Peter Muirhead in February 1967 because Muirhead was going to be the one that really did it. I think his title was Associate Commissioner for Higher Education under the whole banner of the US Office of Education, HEW. I had with me some abstracts of theses that had been prepared at Fort Leavenworth, some of the reference books, and some of our instructional materials. It was a late afternoon; I knew Mr. Muirhead was behind schedule. I felt at the time I started, "He's being courteous enough to listen, but this is a real loser." The conversation extended over about an hour and a half or so, and I left very
comfortable with Mr. Muirhead's reaction. It seemed to me that we were going to get a fair shake. We talked about what the ad hoc committee was really going to do; from him I learned that there were going to be three questions. These can be described very succinctly as the question of need, uniqueness, and quality. As a matter of fact, if you read the 1955 policy statement that I referred to earlier, you will find that those are three of the four criteria which are specified. The fourth criteria was freedom of inquiry, or something like that. It was agreed; he told me, "I'll proceed to have the committee appointed, and you'll be informed in due time."

Not very long after that, we were given a request from a staff member of HEW who was going to be with the committee; they wanted some documents and materials to be provided. Actually, the message had come to Fort Leavenworth during one of my frequent visits to Washington, and when I came back, the documents were prepared already. On the basis of my conversation with Muirhead, I thought they were not going to cut it. I went to Mike Davison and said how I thought they should be done. This got to be very touchy because Wilson's successor, Arthur Schutz, was the director of the program. Suffice it to say my view prevailed and we produced a study which was called "The Special Report to the Ad Hoc Committee."

In due time I took copies to Washington and met with the Administrative staff that was going to come to Fort Leavenworth with the ad hoc committee. I secured the names of the other members and I gave them copies of the papers I had brought with me. We also had some discussions with respect to what the agenda would be like. These were in much the same form that I had gone through in the original North Central discussion with Dr. Gates a good many years before.
On this trip to Washington, I was back in Lemley's office talking with Art Olsen and him. The conversation got around to whether there was anything else we could do. I said, "There's only one other thing that I think we might do. If you read the 1955 policy, there is a suggestion in there that a degree-granting institution ought to have somebody that protects the public interest in their governing structure." I went on to say that in the academies they satisfied this requirement by Boards of Visitors, or something like that. I said we probably should have an advisory committee. It was agreed that Harry Lemley would talk to Harold K. Johnson about this, and see if we could get some kind of documentation in hand by the time the committee arrived which would indicate that we were going to take that action. Indeed, on the day that the committee arrived, we received a message from the Chief of Staff which established the Advisory Committee.

On the 17th and 18th of April, 1967, the special ad hoc committee from the Office of Education arrived. The members were: Dr. Herbert Rhodes, the graduate dean of the University of Arizona; Dr. David Feldman, Professor of Political Science at Wisconsin and long-time activist in the American Association of University Professors; Dr. Orin Cornett, vice president for long-range planning Gallaudet College, the federally funded special school in Washington, D.C. for the deaf (Cornett had been a long-time career professional in the United States Office of Education); Dr. James Nickerson, the president of Minnesota State College; and as it turned out, probably the most significant of all, Mr. John Proffitt, who at that time was the Assistant Director of the National Committee on Accrediting. That is one of the
constituent agencies of the American Council on Education. The committee secretary was Mr. William Gescheider from the Bureau of Higher Education.

What I did not know at the time was that ACE had proposed the membership. What I am about to record, I subsequently was told by Mr. Proffitt himself. Mr. Proffitt was not an original nominee, but when the original nominee declined for personal reasons, his boss called him in and said, "We'd like to have you serve on this committee. We're going to get this matter disposed of once and for all." John Proffitt said, "I don't start with any great heartburn about this matter. If you want me to go out and listen, I'll do that and use my judgment. But if you're telling me that there's a directed verdict, get somebody else." Obviously, when put in that form, the guy had to back off and say, "John, you go use your judgment." The point I am trying to make is that ACE carefully picked the jury that they felt very confidently would shoot this proposal down and get rid of it once and for all. I did not know this, of course, at the time.

The commission arrived, and we set up an agenda that I had proposed and followed with the board of visitors before. It was clear that the special report had essentially been studied and had exploded a great many of the criticisms. By mid-afternoon it became clear that we had turned this committee completely around. To indicate how certain we were of it, the morning of the second day of their visit, there had been a long-term plan which would take the Commandant and four or five of the rest of us down to the Air University on a 2-day visit. I went to Orin Cornett, who had been designated as the Chairman at a very lovely dinner on the Monday evening of their first day. I essentially said, "Orin, General Davison and four or
five of us are geared up to go to the Air University; we don’t want to go
if you need us or if you think we should stay.” He said, “I see no reason
why you should stay; I think you ought to just go as planned. We just
don’t need you anymore.” So, we went off to Air University as planned.

The only question that the committee had raised was in terms of a
recommendation. They had a number of suggestions which they thought would
improve the program, and indeed, as I remember it, most of these were items
that we said we were going to do anyway. The only really specific thing
that came from them was a recommendation that we have some outside examiners
on our thesis committee. It was this suggestion which led to what later be-
came entitled our Consulting Faculty Program. That is the specific beginning
point.

When the report was issued a few weeks later (and we got copies of it),
HEW simply contented itself with approving the committee report. The commit-
tee report indorsed the proposal that we be granted degree-granting authori-
ty; more precisely, we had satisfied the criteria which were specified in
the 1955 policy. I think that’s important. Those criteria were need,
uniqueness, quality, and freedom of inquiry. That is what they had been
told to examine; they said, “We have tested them out; they satisfy the
criteria.”

The next step in the process was to get the concurrence of the American
Council on Education, even though the 1955 policy did not require that we do
this. When the Judge Advocate School was engaged in their abortive effort
to acquire degree-granting authority, the legislation had been enacted by
the House, but when it got to the Senate, the American Council on Education
had appeared in open hearing and protested. The committee people had said, "We're never going to have that again. We're never even going to consider one of these unless you get ACE's indorsement."

I soon found myself one day in the office of the ACE president, Dr. Logan Wilson. Dr. Wilson had on several occasions expressed his general disapproval of federal degree-granting authority. I had an ace in the hole, because I had a copy of the ad hoc committee's report. My petition to Dr. Wilson was simply, "Doctor, all we're asking is that you view our request in the context that your organization in conjunction with Office of Education established the policy and published it; you established the criteria and the process to be followed. We have done that; we have met the test. Now in good faith, it seems to us that you should agree." I might add I still think that is a perfectly reasonable affair. Wilson, however, declined to handle the matter himself. I am sure he could have if he wanted to, but he decided he would submit the proposal to ACE's Commission on Federal Relations, which did what its name implied.

This was an unexpected threat; we did not know quite what to do about this. But I got a copy of the commission roster, and I saw the name of a man that I knew a little bit about. His name was John King; I had met him when he was the president of Emporia State College in Kansas. I knew that John had left Emporia. He had been up to visit us a couple of times, and I knew he was favorably impressed with what Leavenworth was about. He had left Emporia and had gone to Wyoming. He got in trouble over there, because he did not want that to become a football machine; John King was a Professor
of Education at Southern Illinois. I called John up and I told him the story. I said, "John, what am I getting into?" His response was tremendous. He said, "I'm a member of that committee. I think it's important that we go up and see those people before the actual commission meeting." And I said "I'll go with you." He said, "Oh, no, you better not do that. I'll meet you there, because I can arrange to have myself up there at their expense."

John King and I met in Washington, and we met with the staff member, who was the action agent for this commission and two of his people. We answered all their questions to his satisfaction. The commission itself was going to meet a couple of weeks later, and John was going to come back to the meeting. We thought that everything was taken care of. When the commission met, it gave us a clean bill of health.

Logan Wilson was still not satisfied. I'm sure he was really concerned about the precedent; I can't believe that he ever really examined the specific proposal on its own merits. He chose the very unusual action of referring the recommendation of his Commission on Federal Relations to ACE's Board of Directors. This process just kept going on. The Board of Directors considered this in January 1968, and they adopted a statement which said, "ACE interposes no objection." Later, one of the members of the Board of Directors told me that this became a bitter quarrel, because the minority members of the Board said this was not playing the game squarely. They argued, "We've gone through all this; we ought to approve the proposal." But that's not quite how it came out. In any event, in January 1968 we had an official statement from ACE that said they did not object.
In the course of these several months, we had actually drafted the Congressional bill and I had gotten acquainted with the legislative liaison people and found out how that thing worked. They provided the technical business of legislative terminology, and I was providing the general framework of what the bill should say. Throughout this period, I had a very broad charter, or at least I chose to act that way. As I understood it, the mission was to get the project through. I would just come back and report, and whenever I had to go to Washington, I would go again. That was the way it was done. During most of 1967-68, it was almost a full-time job.

Getting the necessary clearance from the Bureau of Budget was no problem; there were no monetary expenses involved. In March 1968, there was a hearing before one of the subcommittees of the Committee on Armed Services. Prior to the hearing, the permanent staff member of the subcommittee had provided us a list of so-called "20 questions." They were very good questions; in fact they dealt with the rationale, the process, the specific procedures, and required a whole lot of information about the program. On the day of this hearing, I accompanied General Davison, and he made an opening statement which I had drafted and had approved by the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison. That's how you do this kind of thing I found out. There were a few questions asked, not very many; all were very pleasant. One of the members of the committee was Richard Schweiker, the Senator from Pennsylvania. He prefaced his questions with the statement that he was concerned about people getting education at government expense and then leaving the service quickly. He asked us what were the obligations for students at
CGSC and for those in the degree program. You know, I did not know and neither did Mike Davison. The hearing was soon over, and I had not said a thing. I had sat there and had provided a couple of scraps of information in terms of notes to Davison as committee members were posing questions. When I could see what was happening, I would slip him a note. The sub-committee chairman was ready to recess the hearing. There had been no objections; it was clear that this was routine.

But the chairman surprised me by saying something like, "General Davison, I note that sitting along side of you is a member of your staff. I sense that he's probably been very actively engaged in this program, and we would like to hear from him." Then he just shifted his gaze a little bit and said, "Would you first tell us your name and a little bit about yourself, and then we'd be interested in your comments." This was completely unexpected. I had been making speeches all my life, but in many respects this was the best one I'd ever made. Not because it was the shortest, but I happened to put into words not only what I believed but what I think are the important points.

I gave my name, and stated that I had been in the program. Then I said, "I do think this is a very important matter, and we certainly request your approval." I went on to say, "Not primarily because of the reward to the eventual recipients of the degree, although to be sure they are deserving of an award and this is an appropriate one, but more especially because the existence of a legitimate degree in Military Art and Science gives tangible claim to what we proclaim and believe—namely that there is a scholastic
discipline associated with the military profession, that we will call Military Art and Science. Moreover, for that part of the profession or the discipline which pertains to the Army in the field, the CGSC people are the real pros in the business." All this took about three minutes. When I was asked a few days later on behalf of the Army to review the written record and make any corrections of fact, or whatever, I looked over what I had said and decided that if I had sat down and thought it out very carefully in advance, I probably would not have said it as well.

On 6 May 1968 the bill was passed by the House by acclaim. I believed and, to my knowledge, everyone else believed the matter was done; we had done it, we thought. So much so that I remember saying to Art Olsen, "There is one more thing we ought to do before we break up the Lemley-Olsen-Birrer trio; we ought to have prepared the necessary implementing document or directive from DA; let's get it written the way we want it, so they can issue it." We agreed we would get to it.

But it did not work out that way at all, because the Senate just did not act. Nothing we were able to do would cause the Senate Armed Services Committee to consider the proposal. Why was this so? There are probably three reasons. It was a pretty small matter in a very busy legislative year; that's part of it, but I don't think it's that significant; they could have dispensed with this whole thing in an hour if they wanted. At the same time, a kind of a vendetta had grown up between the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Committee to the point that they just were not considering each other's bills. We got caught in that conflict. And then more especially, we ran into serious opposition in the
person of Mr. Braswell, the Chief Counsel of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who simply was opposed.

What we thought was a clear-cut victory ended in a no-contest defeat; and in due time that Congress adjourned, and with it ended all unenacted legislation. There now ensued a period of, I guess, about five years of great discouragement. All this time we had continued, surprisingly, each year with a number of people in the program, producing some good studies. We had worked out use of the consulting faculty. The advisory committee continued to meet each year, and each year they would endorse what they saw about the program, and lament the failure to acquire the degree-granting authority. But really nothing much happened. We had lost our champion; Johnson was no longer the Chief of Staff. Westmoreland wasn't really interested in the program. Maybe it was our fault.

Q: Are you saying it was our fault in not explaining it to him?
A: We had not explained it in a persuasive enough way. I don't even know that we really tried. Mike Davison had now left, and John Hay took a smaller interest in the affair. It just seemed like nobody cared except maybe the students who had been and were in the program, Ivan Birrer (I really didn't have anything to do with it you see; I was not in charge of it) and the Director, who by now was George Garman. He would have had the position from 1970-74.

There were several people, however, who played key roles in keeping this flickering hope alive. Our first white knight was Bob Dole. He was a new senator in Kansas, and he came back to Leavenworth shortly after his election. We arranged to have him come out.
and spend a little time out at CGSC—an hour or so. We had a chance to
say something to him about the legislation, and he expressed an interest
in it. The people in OCL said, "Look, we can't get the proposals through
the Pentagon hierarchy again." In due time, however, we got the bill
redrafted, and it was agreed that the only way we were going to get this
done was to have Senator Dole do it. The Commandant took seriously his
prohibition against lobbying; the actual contact was made by my wife.
Through a chance set of circumstances she had become the Leavenworth
County co-chairman of the "Dole for Senate Committee." She had gotten
into this, because a couple of years before, after an examination, Dole had
seen fit to award my son an academy appointment. When he got ready to run
for the Senate, he called up and asked her to help. He couldn't ask me, of
course; I was under the cover of the Hatch Act. We knew one night that
Dole was going to be at the Virginia Inn, meeting with citizens in Topeka.
So, Jo and I drove over and took the proposition with us. The official
story is, "She had the conversation; she gave him the documents; and he
said he'd introduce them" He contacted his friend, Barry Goldwater, and
for the next two Congresses Dole and Goldwater would promptly at the
start of the legislation introduce the bill. This would again keep this
very dim thing barely surviving.

During the period from 1968 up through 1974, the House Committee took
the stand, "Don't bother us with this thing again; we've approved it.
We'll approve it again any time you get the Senate to enact it; just send
it to us and it'll be pro forma." Thus, the target was the Senate.
Senator Russell, who was influenced by his chief counsel Mr. Braswell, was obviously the obstacle to start with. One of the last things that Harold K. Johnson did before his retirement was to arrange a private luncheon with Senator Russell for the specific purpose of trying to persuade him to support the proposal. Johnny wrote me a note and said, "I'm sorry, I just couldn't do it. I just wasn't able to change the Senator's mind." But Russell died, so Senator Stennis became the obstacle to cross.

During one of the advisory committee meetings, the members got into a serious discussion of what could they do to help. A couple of them came into my office and called the then (I think) President Emeritus of the University of Wyoming, Dr. Humphreys, because they knew that Dr. Humphreys had been a long-time personal friend of Senator Stennis. This got to be a tricky little business, too, because how were we going to get Humphreys into the act and keep it legal? We agreed that we would invite Humphreys to come here as a recognized consultant on graduate programs. He came, and we paid his way under this set of terms. Meanwhile, he knew why we really wanted him to come to Fort Leavenworth, because the committee had told him that we wanted him, if he could do it in good conscience, to go to Washington on our behalf.

As I was taking him back to the airport (before KCI opened), we sparred around in this conversation. Finally, I just had to say, "Dr. Humphreys, what can you do to help us?" I think he had been enjoying the ring-sparing I had been doing. He said, "I think I could go to Washington and talk to my friend John Stennis, and maybe I could do you some good."
We arranged to have that trip paid for by the Henry Leavenworth AUSA Chapter, so we could not be criticized for using government money. He went by the name of Duke, and he was great old guy in his 70's. He went back; he had a luncheon and long conversation with his very close, long-time friend and associate; then he wrote us a report. He said "You might be able to do this, but it's not going to be easy. There is certainly a lot of built-in inertia, if indeed not hidden opposition, and John Sminis is very reluctant to champion this thing. After all, it's not a very vote-making affair." That was the essence of it.

So, Duke tried; Dole and Goldwater, as I said, kept introducing the bill. It finally got to the point that in late 1973 the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Education, wrote out here and said they proposed to withdraw their endorsement. They had long since ceased to champion it, but now they were going to pull back even further. In short, it seemed certain to me in 1973 that we simply had struck out. Personally, I had turned my attention to the very exciting business of the new 1974-75 curriculum which I have already talked about. I had really written this off.

Then a very unexpected thing happened. What I am about to say now, I have not seen documented, but I was told by the officer concerned. The guy from OCLL who was the chief contact with the Senate was a Colonel Rufus Smith. Smith's version of the story is that one day early in 1974 then Senator Hughes of Iowa, who had already announced that he would not run for re-election, said in a conversation with Colonel Smith something to the effect that he realized that he, Hughes, had been troublesome for the Army on the Senate Armed Services Committee. But he wanted Smith to
know this was a role he had been assigned to play, that he really was not a bad guy, and that he was in a sense free from any obligations, because he was not going to run again. As evidence of his good will, he was prepared to do a couple of things for the Army before his term expired. At the time he was told this, Colonel Smith knew (maybe he already had orders) that he was coming to Leavenworth to join the College faculty. It was another one of those chance affairs! His immediate response to Senator Hughes was, "Thank you, Senator. I'll remember this, and you may hear from me." He happened to pass along the essence of this conversation in a telephone conversation with the Deputy Commandant, Ben Harrison. Ben said, "My God, Rufus, tell you what to do. Take out that MMAS proposal! It doesn't cost anybody anything. It can be done, and get the Senator to do this." I guess Rufus' next response was that he would try.

I can't really testify as to what all went on. All I can really tell you is what I read later in the Congressional Record. When the Department of Defense appropriations bill was under consideration on the floor of the Senate, not the committee, and at a time when Senator Stennis had left the Senate Chamber (I think he had just been presiding, but he had left and somebody else was in the presiding chair), Senator Hughes rose and moved to amend the Defense Appropriation Bill by the inclusion of this original MMAS legislation. If you read the account, it's clear that this was a very carefully programmed action as evidenced by the quick support rising to speak on behalf of the legislation. Those saying very appropriate things, which they really could not have done on the spur of the moment, were Senators Dole, Strom Thurmond, Barry Goldwater, and another one or two.
By voice vote the amendment was approved.

The very next day, the phones at Leavenworth began to ring, and we began to be questioned by DOD, TRADOC, DA, and OCLL. All began calling out here asking questions about the program and its prospects. The Director of the MMAS program, George Garman, was within a month or so of retiring, and indeed, I think at this particular time he was away on leave. So, his deputy began to get these questions. It had already been agreed that the deputy was going to move down and join me a month or so later in my department. George Kuykendahl realized that maybe we had something in hand here, but there were too many people about to get into this pie. He went to Ben Harrison and said, "General, I think what you'd better do is designate Ivan Birrer as the project officer for this legislation. He knows more about it than anybody else, and we need to have somebody on it."

Ben saw me that afternoon, and the specific question that had come up was, what was going to be the reaction of the US Office of Education about the proposal? The specific question that Ben asked me was whether I thought I could "manage" the Office of Education. I said "Well I'll certainly try, and I think I have a chance. The reason I think I have a chance is that I remember seeing just a short while ago that an old friend of mine named John Proffitt" (that's the same person we talked about before), has moved to HEW, and he is occupying the post which I think will establish the position of the Office of Education." So again, I got a mission order: "Go get this matter taken care of."

I went back to Washington, and I took with me the excerpts of each of the Advisory Committee reports having to do with MMAS since the ad hoc
committee from the Office of Education, on which John Proffitt had served, had visited Fort Leavenworth in April 1967. I also took abstracts of our theses. I called on John's office; we had become quite friendly during this original committee report, and while the legislation was under active consideration, I had seen him subsequently on an occasion or two. I was greeted as a friend, and we talked for a while. I kind of camouflaged why I was there; it was as if I were sort of stumbling in. I think he always knew better, but I didn't ask him. He said, "It's very timely that you're here, Ivan, because I've been asked to respond to the House Committee. The question is, does our endorsement of your proposal still hold, or will we insist upon going through the original 1955 policy review?" I left there with John Proffitt promising me that the next day he would send a note to the House Committee saying that the Office of Education's endorsement still pertained. I went by OCLL and told them this; they said, "That's great! Don't worry about it." I came home, and by the time I got back Colonel Rufus Smith had joined the faculty.

The Appropriations Bill that year got caught up into a real conflict now between the Senate and the House over, I believe, a question of force strength, with Senator Stennis on the one hand and Congressman Hebert on the other. In any event, Congress went on its Fourth of July recess without handling this. The point is that they had to have a conference now to reconcile these two positions, but Rufus Smith said, "No problem about your amendment; no one's going to object to this." But the matter kept going on, and on. Several weeks went by, and occasionally Rufus would call and say,
"No, not yet." Then on one day I remember so very well, he was coming down the hall, and I stopped him and said, "Rufus, what have you heard recently?" He said, "I haven't had a report in some time. Let me come in and use your phone, and I'll call the old office." He did this, and I was listening to his part of the conversation, and was hearing enough to realize there was more trouble. When the conversation was over, he told me that the problem they had run into was completely unexpected.

The long-time House Parliamentarian had retired and had been replaced by a new person. The House of Representatives has a rule that says that no non-germane amendment can be added to a piece of legislation which is initiated in the House of Representatives. That rule had been in effect for years, and nobody had bothered about it. But to our horror, the new man had elected to follow the rule. It came down to this MMAS thing, which did not have anything to do with the Defense Appropriation Bill of 1975. I had had some lows before, but that night when I went home I guess that was my lowest low, because we were so certain we had won, and now we had lost again--and on a technicality!

General Harrison was away. He came back the next morning and we told him the sad story. Ben pulled out kind of the last stop; he called his old childhood friend, Congressman Sonny Montgomery. Montgomery was very proud of the fact that he was a Leavenworth graduate, and he was on the Committee. Ben told him what happened. I guess he said he would try, but he was not very optimistic. He said, "This is a very touchy business when we start overriding rulings of the Parliamentarian." I don't understand all of that--I just know that he said, "If we can pull it off without
anybody making too much of it, we'll try." I didn't hold my breath.

But it was managed. Somehow or other, they overrode the ruling of the Parliamentarian, and the bill went through. As I like to tell the story, while history will record 5 August 1974 as being famous for the day that then-President Nixon released the tapes that showed irrevocably that he knew something about the cover-up, I will remember the 5th of August 1974 because that is the date they signed the military authorization appropriation bill, and now CGSC had its long-sought degree-granting authority.

The legislation as enacted was essentially as written earlier, but not quite precisely, the same, since it started out by saying, "Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Army, and with the approval of a nationally recognized civilian accrediting association, the commandant may....," and it goes on to say, "Grant the degree." What that meant was that the Secretary of the Army was going to prescribe some regulations, but that these regulations would have to have the approval of the accrediting association, which was the North Central Association. As you can understand, I had established close liaison with the staff officer in DCSPER who had handled the legislation, and so I called him. I said "The next thing we've got to have is regulations. I have a proposal to make. What if we draft them, get them approved by the regional accrediting agency, and bring them up to you for your approval and publication." Obviously he said "That's great. You just do it that way.

The target now was to comply with the law.

Another issue now came up, and the issue was what was to be my part in this. General Harrison had said, "Ivan, you're the director of the program." This caused Mike Sanger (Director of the Department of Strategy) some real
concern, and we had a pretty painful hour one morning in Harrison's office. I simply argued, "We've got to get the accreditation, and that's going to be difficult. It's a lot neater package, and I'm in a lot stronger position if I bargain with North Central in terms of my being the director of the program, than if I am in some other capacity and somebody else is going to run it. If I'm going to do the bargaining, I'd better be the director." Mike had to acknowledge the validity of the argument. He did not like it, but he reluctantly said, "I can understand that." So, it was agreed that would be the way we would start out. Interestingly enough, about four months went by, and Mike wrote a memorandum to the deputy commandant which said that he would like to have it made a matter of record that my being the director was an arrangement which was a temporary one and that upon completion of the accreditation cycle, which I had forecast to be probably three years, circumstances would be such that we could go back to the original scheme. Harrison wrote on his little personal memo a handwritten note in which he said, "We will make this a mental note. I want the files expunged. Certainly, we don't want to give the impression that Ivan is the director only to get accreditation." Harrison left, and Sanger left, and that matter, of course, never raised its head again.

Q: Wasn't Colonel Sanger a close friend of yours?
A: Yes. Mike may well have believed that was appropriate for reasons I don't know. It had nothing to do with us personally; Mike and I remained good friends. He perhaps believed that the director ought to be somebody who wore a uniform; I don't know. But in any event that never surfaced again. I don't think it will now.
We were now ready to start the accreditation process once again. From Cushman and Harrisor, I had nothing but a mission order. I would like to say again, as I have said to you before, that for this whole year I am about to describe, I have never had such great support. I wrote memorandums for Record, and I sent them in for information; I always got them back with a "C" and an "H" on them. I never was told to do anything, and with one exception, at the end of this process, I was never told not to do anything.

Before going back to the North Central Association, I first flew out to Fort Hays to call on a Dr. Cal Harbin. Harbin had been a member of the consulting faculty working for George Garman for three or four years, and also I knew that he had occupied some key roles in the North Central Association. So, I flew out to see Cal and sought his advice; his advice was simply to request that our preliminary accreditation be reinstated. He said, "Just go up there and do it on that basis." I arranged an appointment with the designated staff member at North Central, and I took with me two documents. One was a request over Cushman's signature that they re-establish our accreditation which had been withdrawn in 1966. Secondly, I took a proposed directive which would presumably emit from the Department of the Army to us, and I had a place for their concurrence, much as we do with a staff paper. I really did not expect to be successful on the first point, but I thought I would play it that way. I did not anticipate what I ran into, however, on the second point, I will deal with it first.

Remember the legislation says, and I will paraphrase, "Under regulations approved by the North Central Association." A staff member, Randall Thompson, pointed out to me that the North Central Association did not
approve degree-granting regulations, the wording of the Congress notwithstanding. They accredit institutions. Moreover, this was no light matter with him. What made this such a touchy point was that in the year or maybe two years immediately preceding this incident, HEW through some legislation had put the accrediting agencies in the position of certifying which of these new proprietary institutions were eligible for government aid. Of course, this caused the accrediting association all kinds of difficulty. This notion of approving our degree regulations was subsumed under that scheme. Randall simply told me, "I can't do this on my own. I'll have to talk to my superiors in NCA with respect to this regulation." I'll come back to that in a moment.

With respect to the accreditation, however, I was not surprised when Randy said, "No, we're not going to do what you requested." I didn't think they would. What we agreed on was that CGSC should go through the accreditation process, which was a two-step phase—the new terminology being "candidacy" and "membership." The timetable we worked out to do this, which would be completed in only two years, represented a great shortening of the usual scheme—a process expected to take five to seven years. The point I am making is that while they did not re-establish our accreditation, our original position of preliminary accreditation and the fact that we had maintained the program, and had been reviewed by each advisory committee did permit us to establish this very favorable timetable.

Not long after that, Randall came down to see us. We sat around this table for a couple of hours one afternoon, and finally we worked out a
paper which I called a Memorandum of Agreement between the North Central Association on the one hand and the College on the other. This memorandum which was dated 18 September 1974 acknowledged that the North Central Association did not approve degree-granting regulations. It went on to say that what it did do was appraise institutions, and this appraisal included, obviously, a consideration of the degree-granting processes. Therefore, what should happen is that we should go through this process, and implicit in the appraisal and accrediting process was an endorsement of our procedures which would comply with the intent of the law. With that, I wrote up a draft set of degree-granting regulations, which simply prescribed that the commandant could award our degrees under these terms: a thesis program, about 30 hours. I took the reasons right out of the law. To handle this matter of approval, I put in the regulation "contingent upon the College attaining either candidacy or membership status." That tied the two together.

I took the Memorandum of Agreement and a letter proposing that this directive be published to Washington and called again on John Proffitt, for the purpose of getting HEW’s chop on the Memorandum for Agreement and the scheme therein. I think it’s a great credit to the institution when I tell you that because John Proffitt was absent because of an injury on the morning I had the appointment, we talked over the telephone for a few minutes and he got his deputy on the line and said, "This is perfectly all right; dictate the kind of a paper that Ivan wants and sign it for me." That was a great compliment, I think, to the institution. With that done, I flew down to TRADOC Headquarters at Fort Monroe and walked the
papers through there with an initial indorsement from the Deputy Chief of Staff and old friend, Colonel Dick Gruenther. Gruenther was a little bit troublesome, for he made me go explain this story to the TRADOC Judge Advocates. That bothered me for an hour or so, but I finally convinced the lawyer not to get hung up on the legalities here, since we had bargained in good faith. Then I took the paper and gave it to my friend in OCLL in DCSPER with the necessary concurrence of HEW, the Memorandum of Agreement of NCA, and the endorsement from TRADOC. He simply retyped it and got it issued exactly as I brought it.

Q: Who issued it?
A: It's signed by MG George W. Putman, Jr., Director of Military Personnel Management, DCSPER, in a letter dated 15 October 1974. Subject: Authority to Award the Degree of Master of Military Art and Science. I suppose you could say that on receipt of that document we had locally received the actual degree-granting authority.

I guess I will run through the accreditation business quickly, because it does not take too long to tell that story now. We hastily put together the necessary document for the NCA which described a little bit about the College and on the basis of which Randall Thompson appointed the on-site visitation team. In this case his members were: Dr. Don Rousch, Vice President for Academic Affairs at New Mexico State, as its chairman; Dr. Tompkins of Rockhurst; and Dr. Carter of Indiana. Because I was maintaining close liaison with John Proffitt's office, he sent along an advisor in the person of James M. Holley. It was the first time that
HEW and a regional accrediting agency had cooperated in a visit. They were here, as I say, on 6 and 7 January 1975, and had a very pleasant two days. The NCA rules had changed, so they gave us a copy of the report almost immediately. It was very favorable. They did not have any reservations whatsoever; they spoke in glowing terms of the College.

In April 1975, Jack Cushman and I appeared before another one of the review committees, as I had way back in 1963; again it was a very pleasant affair. The only difference in the process now was that as soon as it was over they immediately came out and told us the verdict. There is a certain built-in interlocking "directorateness" about this whole process. I am simply reflecting the fact that the overall president of the North Central Association for the school year 1974-75 and the man presiding at the 1975 annual meeting (that is the meeting in which we made our presentation), was this same Don Rousch who had been the chairman of our visitation committee. As of the 9th of April 1975, but announced in a letter a couple of weeks later, the College had attained candidacy, which is an accredited status enroute to full membership. We at last really had the authority to grant the degree.

After that, we very promptly began the preparation of what the North Central Association calls "The Institutional Self-Study." The notion is that this is the document by which the institution carefully examines itself and makes its report. Through another fortunate set of circumstances, I had acquired another assistant by the name of then-Captain Alvin D. Officer, a young man with his doctorate in education from the University of Pittsburgh. I made Al the project officer for collecting
all the information for the Self-Study. After we got the seven chapters together, I picked up my pen and made it all read as if it were written by one person. I might say, referring again to Mike Sanger, the last thing that Mike did as a matter of duty before his retirement was to review the whole document and make some suggested changes. There were none of major concern, but they improved the Self-Study. We then sent the document forward under the same set of procedures we had previously worked out, and then we had the second visitation in September 1975.

Meanwhile, even though we had the accreditation in hand, there was a clear-cut provision that to be accredited somebody had to represent the public interest. On that basis we went back to DA and requested that our Advisory Committee be rechartered. The charter had been dropped in 1973 when there was a significant reappraisal of all ad hoc committees; unless you could prove that you absolutely had to have them and were willing to sign your name and swear away your fortune, you couldn't keep them. Now we had a built-in case, and we went back and had the committee rechartered.

In January 1976, we were visited again by the North Central Association's five-man visitation team, headed by Dr. John Pruis, President of Ball State University. There were four men and one woman, and the men had all been Navy officers. Once again, it was a very pleasant two and a half days, and it ended with complete endorsement of our program.

Subsequent to that, Ben Harrison and I appeared before the committee at the annual meeting in Chicago. To show you how this sort of thing
went, when you went into the committee for one of these meetings, the chairman of your visitation team went along with you. So we were escorted in by John Pruiss, who had become the Vice President of the NCA. We met the chairman of the review committee and he was the vice president of Pruiss' University! As you can see, it was a very pleasant kind of thing. We became a full member, and were fully accredited with the NCA in April 1976. There was only one restriction, and it was not really a restriction at all. But since they had greatly shortened the accreditation process, and because it was a new program, by consent between the team and the Commandant, it was agreed that there would be a re-evaluation three years hence—not by a full visitation team but probably by one person. Ordinarily this would have been five years. I didn't consider that threatening, and I still don't.

That represents the end of the story. What I have not said anything about is the several things that we had done to the actual conduct of the program. Let me back up and talk about some of the things that we did after the legislation was enacted and after we knew we were going to conduct a program. I suppose, in a sense, this becomes the rules of MMAS a la Birrer. I will tick these off not in order but rather in terms of things that we worked out over the first year and with some improvements over the years that followed. The first change was when we said we would complete the program in the course of the regular school year. Earlier, officers had been held over for two or three weeks to complete their thesis. The new rule was that we were going to have graduation day and that was when we were going to give
the degrees. And that is it! The second rule we established
(remember this is the first year of the 1974-75 curriculum model, so
we had the option to do this) was that the thesis would account for
credit for three courses. This was a better trade quantitatively than
earlier candidates had been given. I would not say it was an even
trade, but at least it imposed less of an overload.

I also changed rather substantially the function of the consulting
faculty member; my predecessor tended to view the consulting faculty
members as a group, as a body which sat opposite his office, if you will,
and provided in a corporate sense the quality control for the program.
I took an entirely different view; I said, "If the institution has
arrived, if it is as mature as we claim, then its own faculty has to
be the one in charge. We can augment that faculty as desirable, but
I am going to deal with the committee chairman." I got each member of
the consulting faculty in, and said, "While technically you're going to
be assigned to me while you're here, you're going to be detailed to
these several committees, and under the committee you're going to work
for and report to the committee chairman." With one exception they all
said that was the way it should have worked to start with; only one guy,
disagreed as I said. We parted friends, but he didn't want to play
by those rules.

With the program now in its fourth year, I am completely convinced
that this was and is the way to do it. We set up the notion of a com-
prehensive examination. I suggested we do it orally, and we did it
that way, with one member from each of the four instructional departments,
and with the examination being chaired by the thesis committee chairman. I think we have improved that over the years by demanding that the departments give us a list of proposed topics from which the questions would be chosen.

With respect to the thesis, we developed a system that adds them automatically to the Defense Documentation Collection, and to do so, we made a few copies for immediate distribution. For the first three years of this program, I cautioned discretion in terms of immediate distribution. Last summer, General Louisell said, "Let's open this thing up and go blow our horns." This year I am going to encourage the people that make up the distribution roster perhaps to be a little less modest. We published a collection of abstracts of all these going back to 1965, the first year of the program. It has had very wide distribution and has become a much-sought-for document in and out of the Army, and in and out of the Defense Department.

On the subject of admission, I guess I took a very strange position—strange from the point of view of my background a long time ago in measurement. Basically I said, "I am not going to deny any officer at Leavenworth permission to enter the program because of a poor GRE score or because of poor grades. I submit that he's proved he's a success, or he wouldn't be at Leavenworth. So, he can have his swing with the bat." We have discouraged a few people, but we have never turned anybody down. We have had people withdraw en route by common consent, and I think that's an appropriate way to run the program.
Before the first graduation day, we had a number of questions that had to be decided; one involved where this would fit into the graduation program. I argued successfully that awarding the degrees was a key event, and we have now institutionalized it as being next to the awarding of the Marshall Award. The next thing that came up was the granting of diplomas, and on that first year we invited back the 169 or so previous awardees to make a retroactive award. We did not expect them all to come back, but some 20 did. That made it a very special occasion. We fabricated a new diploma, purchased it, and are quite proud of it. I wanted to make it look entirely different from the CGSC regular diploma, and I think that has been accomplished. After the first year, we opened up the program to faculty participation, and that has proved to be successful.

As an aside, I mentioned earlier that with respect to this whole program I really did not have any bars, was never told to do anything, and was only told not to do only one thing that I proposed. Just before the first graduation, I went to Jack Cushman. We had already agreed to ask General Lemley to award the degrees, and he had agreed to do it. He was going to make the actual awards. I suggested that it would be appropriate if the two of us who were going to present the candidates wore academic gowns. Jack said, "No, I think we'd better not do that," and I dropped the matter. That was my sole loss, and certainly not a very vital one. Last year at General Louisell's direction, not only did I wear my doctoral gown, but we took another further step. Following some counsel from the Institute of Heraldry, we designed a special hood
for the Institution and for its degree. I am satisfied that we will continue to do this. We placed the hood around the recipient's neck as part of the ceremony. This certainly turned out very well.

Finally last year, really at my suggestion, we awarded our first honorary degree to General DOPuy. He was really surprised, and I think it was an appropriate step. I certainly don't want us to do this routinely, but no one could question that DOPuy is a man who had tremendous impact on this College.

By the time we had run the program three years, we had finished the accreditation cycle. I thought the matter was well institutionalized. I further thought that what we needed to do next was to endeavor to link the program directly with announced Army requirements. I thought the way to do this was to create under the general MMAS umbrella some sub-sets geared directly to certain specialties; the one I thought we ought to start was Operations and Force Development. I tried out this notion, and everybody seemed to think it was a good idea to modify the requirements for taking specific electives as part of the program. The concept caught on to the point that we have for this year not only a sub-set for Operations and Force Development but also one for people aspiring to the strategist program. It is my feeling that over time that is likely to be how the MMAS program evolves. I am sure we will continue to have a generalized, non-specific category, but then we are likely to have several categories linked directly with Army specialties. It seems to be a good way to use the program.
That gets me perhaps to where we are now or maybe where we were last July, at which point I told the command in a letter that I intended to retire the 30th of June 1978. One of the reasons for my decision was that I was satisfied that by the end of this year the MMAS program would be thoroughly and completely institutionalized. It seems to me that is a fair appraisal of the circumstances.

Q: Would you go back again and very quickly, state the key dates in terms of when this began, when we actually gained our accreditation, and when we actually issued the true Master's Degrees?

A: In early 1962 we decided in a formal way to energize the proposal. In March 1963 we were granted preliminary accreditation from the NCA on the program which we had started under the tag "Honors Program" in the fall of 1963. In 1966 that status with the North Central Association was withdrawn, because we had not attained degree-granting authority. The legislation was finally enacted on 5 August 1974. We regained our preliminary accreditation, but under a different title now which they called "candidacy", in April 1975. The first thoroughly legitimate degrees were awarded graduation day of June 1573. In March 1976 we were accorded membership status, properly known as full accreditation.

Q: Why is the MMAS Program important to CGSC and to the Army?

A: It is important for a number of reasons. For one, it is an appropriate and a tangible award to those officers who, in conjunction with their stay at CGSC, conduct some serious study and research and submit it to the Army. This is probably study and research that would...
not otherwise be accomplished. That is one kind of an answer. Next, it is important because its accredited existence makes CGSC a part of the higher education community, on its own feet and as a member in good standing of the club. Given that set of circumstances when we discuss cooperative programs, transfer of credit, possible interchange of faculty, etc., it is on a one-to-one equal status, in contrast to the all-too-often circumstance where a representative of an Army institution goes kind of hat in hand, asking somebody to do something for us. We have certainly seen how that has changed our dealings in conjunction with the Cooperative Degree Programs.

But I have saved for last what I think its real significance is. To arrive at where we are today in an accredited program means that we have arrived there after having been examined by a whole array of civilian academicians. They have decided, based on their own criteria, that there is a body of knowledge, a discipline, which is discrete enough that it does not show up anywhere else. Further, they decided that it has real substance which they have acknowledged at the master's degree level. I think this means that they are testifying that the hallmark of any recognized profession (that is, a related, discrete scholastic discipline) is found here; and the MMAS program is the evidence for that. I think over time that is probably the most lasting significance.

I want the program to continue as a quality program turning out material of use to the Army, and I want over time to see the MMAS become a recognized badge of professional and scholastic competence.

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I think that will happen. To whatever degree it happens, among its other beneficial outcomes will be that we will have a device, a scheme, a means to channel this very great talent that we have in the Army directly towards Army matters and somehow or other stop, if you will, the kind of "brain drain" which unfortunately has occurred all too often.

I have given you a whole variety of answers. I think there are different kinds of importance depending on where one sits.
INTERVIEW NINE

25 January 1978

Contribution of the Birrers' to the Leavenworth Community
Changes in Office Organization and Functions
Importance of Problem-Solving Skills
Curriculum Management
Recurring Problems of CGSC
Future Direction of CGSC
Importance of CGSC to the Army
Concluding Remarks
Q: What were your contributions as a member of the community at Fort Leavenworth?

A: I am quite proud of the listing. I don't know that we did this very deliberately; we certainly decided that our whole lifestyle was to become completely involved with the community and be a part of it. I say "we" because I am referring to both my wife and myself. She gets two major credits and let me tick those off first. As soon as our only son was old enough to go to school, she started with Red Cross, and she stopped that when a combination of ill health, moving off post, and our son's going to college thirteen years later made it difficult to continue. For thirteen years she more than earned her Red Cross pin. For 20 years, she was a member of the Altar Guild of the Memorial Chapel, and for eight of those years she was in charge of the Altar Guild work at all chapels on post. At the peak of the affair that included the old (now-torn down) Normandy Chapel, the new one, and the Memorial Chapel. This was very demanding, and I think rewarding, but it was also a very sensitive matter. The woman who does this as a volunteer has to do it entirely by persuasion and manipulation, since she has no authority. So, I cite those two to start with.

For myself, let me just read them off. I don't think there is any more to be said about it. My contributions were: School Board member, Fort Leavenworth School District, 30 years; member of the pre-school council, 20 years; member of the Fort Leavenworth Museum board, 15 years; Executive Secretary of the Fort Leavenworth Boy Scouts, 10 years; Sunday school teacher, junior high level Fort Leavenworth Chapel, 6 years; business manager of Dramatics Club,
4 years; Secretary of the Staff and Faculty Bowling League, 4 years; player/manager of the Staff and Faculty Softball Team, 3 years--obviously that is when I was considerably younger; executive secretary of the Henry Leavenworth Chapter of the AUSA, and charter member of the organization at Fort Leavenworth, a couple of years. I want to conclude this by saying that for 12 years Jo and I have been very actively engaged in the Allied Sponsor program. That is our list of community credits.

Q: Will you discuss the changes in the organization of your office during the past several years?

A: I think the proper start point is mid-summer of 1972, for that was the time that, as I have already noted, in addition to my Educational Advisor position I was given an operating title initially called Director, Evaluation and Review. My only title heretofore had been Educational Advisor. Now I had two titles; I showed up on two places on the organization chart.

Under the DER directorates there were three continuing operating responsibilities. One of these was student evaluation, one was what we then called the "Communicative Arts" (a euphemism for the writing and speaking program, but more so for the writing program, because we did not have any speaking programs to speak of and still do not), and one for faculty development. That's where we started then with this DER directorate title in the summer of 1972.

Over time several changes occurred. The first one was that the "Communicative Arts" program was transferred to DCOM after Jack Cushman came; and along with it the decision was made to hire a civilian person competent in that area. My own personal feeling about that was,
"good riddance, nothing but trouble!" That was a very unpopular and troublesome program.

The next thing that happened grew out of a conversation between Mik, Sanger and myself; after Mike had become the Director of Resident Instruction. Out of my office we had conceived, designed, and had constructed the experimental classroom, and then—Major Jim Channon, who was assigned to me, actually moved his office over to classroom 7, which is where the experimental classroom was located. Jim is a man of many talents, and included among these is competency with television. In the natural course of events that activity became closely related to the television studio. Anyway, one day Mike came in rather diffidently, I think, and said he would like to explore some notions about some possible rearrangements. I should mention that this conversation I am about to relate occurred after I became the Director of MNAS in the summer of 1974. As is clear, MNAS became my major interest from there on in. When Mike left my office, I think he was completely astonished, because I had said, "I think you ought to have classroom 7 responsibility, I think you ought to have faculty development, and I think you ought to have Jim Channon, who goes with it." This was certainly more than he expected and hoped for. From my point of view it was ideal because that cleared the slate and left me with three responsibilities: whatever is involved in the Educational Advisor slot, the MNAS Program, and the continuing responsibility for administering student evaluation at the college staff level. Indeed, the responsibility for student evaluations goes all the way back to the first
couple of years of my tour here when I got involved in the whole process of student grading and evaluation, because, in a sense, I was looking for something to do. For a year my title was Educational Advisor/MMAS Director. Under the Educational Advisor title, as a practical matter, we carried the student evaluation responsibility. This continued through school year 1974-75 and 1975-76.

By the time we finished the full accreditation cycle, that is to say April 1976, the College was faced with some readjustment of personnel; the school model had come along, as well as the internal Combined Arms Center reorganizations that came along with it. When Ben Harrison and I flew to Chicago to appear at the NCA meetings concerning the College's gaining accreditation, I was sitting alongside of him. We knew this was a pro forma thing; we were just going through the drill, as it were. While sitting beside Ben, I took the opportunity to tell him that when the accreditation matter was accomplished, a considerable amount of my time would be freed, that had been engaged with that operation for the past few years. Mindful of the personnel stresses the institution was under and he was under, I felt obligated to tell him that if he wanted to do so he could assign me to the Cooperative Degree program. I could take it and he would save an officer.

Q: Who previously had directed that program, sir?
A: It had been under the Director of Resident Instruction in a separate division, which was called, I guess, Graduate Studies, or something like that. Ben immediately picked up that option, and as
school year 1975-76 was finishing, that transfer of responsibility was accomplished. Now, we needed a new title, and I proposed "Director of Graduate Degree Programs." That is the way it is shown on the organization chart today. I have continued to use Director, MMAS as a subset under that title whenever it is desirable, but this other title does suggest to the outside world that I am kind of the graduate dean. It happened that a position, about a GS-7 position, that was involved with the cooperative degree program was transferred to my office; that lady also administered the consulting faculty program. Since the start of school year 1976-77 and continuing until today, I have had this title Director of Graduate Degree Programs and underneath it, the continuing responsibility for MMAS, the Cooperative Degree program with its related university contract courses, the consulting faculty, and student evaluation.

One other interesting part of this story is that in the summer of 1977 TRADOC deleted the manpower authorization for the position of Educational Advisor at all service schools. I previously pointed out that that action was an outgrowth of our collective resistance to the wholesale onslaught by TRADOC into ISD and so on. It turned out that a couple of people did retire early; in other instances they kept on doing the same thing without having the title. In my case, we simply deleted the title Educational Advisor. As I sit here today, I am only shown under one title, Director Graduate Degree Programs, but the functions--MMAS, Consulting Faculty, Cooperative Degree Program—are going to remain intact as a recognizable entity. I anticipate that student evaluation will probably move to the Director, Educational and Curriculum Affairs, and I think that's appropriate.
For my successor, that is fortunate, because he will not be saddled again with a very bothersome, troublesome matter.

Q: Looking at the future in terms of his future role, sir, do you still see an important contribution of his being the furnishing of educational advice?

A: I do, over time. Yet, on the other hand, there are some realities we should recognize. The command group began to turn to me for some advice or began to listen to what I had to say starting about 1954, and that kind of grew progressively thereafter. Note that that is at least six years after I arrived. I have talked with the generals about this, and have reminded them that someone is going to take my desk and will do it very well. But that is not the point at all. I think everybody's replaceable, but you cannot expect my replacement to come in and be willing to "free wheel" all over the College function as has become my custom, because I do know more about the school than anybody else.

Q: As I examined some of the speeches that you have given in the past, I found one of the most persistent themes is the importance of the Leavenworth emphasis on problem-solving skills. Why do you think that is important?

A: It is a very simple answer. I start with the assumption that CGSC is a very expensive investment in the educational process--a year out of our best man's mid-career time. But we are doing it because we want those officers to be somehow or other more productive--and the "more" does not mean more in quantity but perhaps more in quality. Somehow or other we think they will discharge their subsequent officer
duties better as a result of this school. That must be the basis, or the basic assumption, on which we make this tremendous investment. For those of us who are charged with some of this responsibility, I think the question becomes, "What can we do in order to enhance the likelihood that our graduates will, indeed, be better officers, and that they will perform their functions more effectively as a result of the Leavenworth experience?"

This is a practical way of asking, "What is the real role and mission of CGSC and how do we accomplish it?" My answer to that is that officers get paid to think clearly and decide well. I got that expression from Bruce Clark years ago; he said, "Thinkers and deciders is what the Army needs and what Leavenworth must supply." He told me that in a private conversation, and it really registered, because that is really the objective.

Next you come to the question, "What do you do in a school situation to enhance the students thinking and decisionmaking capabilities?" I have often confronted my instructor training courses with the question, "What kind of a school program do you design in order to produce people who can think and decide?" If you ask the question abstractly, people will make a number of observations. Then I point out that that question is the CGSC question. This "thinking and deciding" can be used synonymously for "problem-solving competence;" sometimes I say "problem-solvers and decision makers," and sometimes I use "people who think and decide." I think those are two different sets of phrases which mean the same thing. What you must do in order to produce people who can think and decide is to provide the student officers...
with a whole series of carefully designed problem-solving experiences in ever increasing complexity and completeness. To my knowledge, there is no magical shortcut that improves problem-solving competence other than this tried and true method of "Let's try it, and see how it works."

I think that is essentially the principle which underlies our curriculum design. It is clearly the foundation of what I once wrote, and I described earlier to you, as the three-phased curriculum concept. Stated very simply, we said we were first going to try to give the officer enough tools that he could work on the problems he has to solve. (The danger is that you use up all your time giving him his tools.) Then we would have him solve some of those problems. Ideally, he would pick up some of the remainder of the tools as he is actually solving problems, and when he needs them. As the year goes along these problems that we have him work on become increasingly more complex and more involved. If you look at our tactical instruction from that point of view, I think it follows reasonably well.

People have often asked me, "How do you know CGSC is doing a good job?" We can answer that question in these terms: "We have this imposing list of graduates who have turned out to be successful." Sometimes I give that answer but it depends on who asked it. I know, as well as anyone who has thought about it, that that is no answer at all! That is a self-fulfilling prophesy that is inevitable under the given set of circumstances. After all, we begin with the top half of the officer corps.

So, what kind of evidence is there? I tell people that the best evidence that I know about is that when our student body arrives in
August and September, our student officers, by and large, lack some fundamental concepts and skills. If you say to them, "You're the Division Commander or Corps G-3. Here is your staff, and here is your mission. Take the next three hours and plan the operation," not many really know what to do. There is an awful lot of fumbling and stumbling around. Our long record shows that in March, April, and May when you give these same officers, that same kind of requirement, they can proceed with dispatch and produce a problem solution that in our faculty's professional judgment is likely to satisfy the requirement. They are no smarter, for we have not enhanced their intellectual capacity. But they know a lot more, and can solve practical Army problems without the fumbling and stumbling that characterized their first efforts. I think that that kind of clearly observable effect is probably the best evidence that we are doing a good job.

Q: Sir, you have just talked about a conceptual approach to problem-solving. How do you defend that conceptual approach to problem-solving against the behavioralist who insists upon task analysis and specific behavioral skills?

A: There is certainly a potential conflict here. But I say "potential" because I think that is really what it is. It is potential, not real. In my approach, I also start with task analysis. It is just that I choose, if I can borrow a phrase I learned long ago from psychology, to look at solar rather than molecular behavior. This is a concept I learned in graduate school from gestalt psychology (I haven't thought about it in over 30 years). But it says that if you want to understand behavior you have to look at the big "wholes"—rather than small
"wholes." My task analysis tells me that the crucial task for senior commanders and staff officers is to think and decide, to solve military problems. I argue that if you do the task analysis correctly, and by that I mean get to the significant behavior, then we are in sync.

The other possible conflict is on the other end. I maintain (and I am not alone, for I think most people in higher education would agree with me) that there are some very significant outcomes we want from higher education that are not susceptible to quantified measurement. I have an outright clash on this point with the behaviorists who say everything exists in amount, and if it exists in amount it can be measured. I am willing to stand up and take my stand against that kind of nonsense! So, there is some possible potential conflict, and yet I insist that the conflict that exists—-at least in the task analysis—has been because they have insisted on taking this molecular behavioral approach.

Q: Have we lost sight of the value of the electives scheme that was established in 1971-72? By that I mean we have reduced our number of elective hours from a high of about 480 hours to next year's low of 180 hours.

A. I don't think that I am prepared to say that we have lost sight of it, but we have certainly reduced the degrees of freedom, if one must put it in those terms. A very real danger exists that we may indeed lose the notion. I felt strongly enough about this that in a recent briefing to the faculty board, which I was asked to give on curriculum evolution, I ended with some unsolicited observations, and I really meant these for the deputy commandant. I had a captive audience!

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The point I made was that you have to understand you are going to be constantly pressured to increase the common curriculum. Everybody will be after you to put something in. To whatever degree you accede to this pressure without taking something out, you are going to reduce the opportunities for programs tailored for individual needs. I may be a voice crying in the wilderness.

I offered another point, too. If one assumes that some kind of structured differential programs will be an outcome from the Harrison Board, and I believe that it is likely to happen, we make it more difficult for ourselves as we get nearer and nearer to an all-common curriculum, or as the common curriculum becomes larger. It will be more painful. This is not nearly as impressive an argument as the former is, but I think it is likely to be one that may be listened to more immediately. I hope the people who count keep this concept which we have developed and worked on for so long, as a vital part of the Leavenworth program.

Q: How can the people in positions of responsibility avoid piecemealing the curriculum to death with these incremental changes?
A: I have some notions about this, and again I have recently offered some advice on this matter. The first point that the people who are in the command group and who deal with this matter must appreciate is that by necessity they must make some very arbitrary decisions with respect to the allocation of curriculum time. Almost every commandant and deputy or assistant commandant starts off with the same assumption—usually implicit. When they deal with the question of curriculum, or the determination of its content, they assume we should be able to do this in a very systematic, rather precise quantifiable
manner. The current deputy commandant is the latest example of this. After a couple of months in office, one of the points he made in a memorandum to the commandant was that we have got to get a better handle on the curriculum for next year; he went on to say how he proposed to do this.

Sooner or later, and I think later in most instances, however, we get back to the start point and make some very arbitrary judgments. I can tell you what the questions are; I can put them in impossible ways to answer. How much curriculum time should be devoted to tactics? Who's to say? The answer you get varies greatly among different people. And are you talking about tactics for all, or tactics for some? You cannot answer the question, however, unless you ask some other questions. How much of a lien on the student's time each day does the college have? It's something short of 24 hours a day, I guess, but then what number do you pick? Whatever number you pick, how much of that time do you want scheduled? What I am trying to argue is that there is a whole series of very arbitrary decisions involved in this business. The problem is that most of these have already been made; they are institutionalized. They can be changed, but it is troublesome. They have a tendency to persist, and essentially they are accepted without question and often without complete realization that they are there. Superimposed upon this series of "rules" are a bunch of special interests because people want us to do specific things--four hours here, more of this, emphasize that--and they get imposed on the system and make it very difficult to deal with.
As a practical matter, the deputy commandant at CGSC has to fight a skillful delaying action. Most of these specific directives can be absorbed by retitling or by verbal manipulation. This is really true. Let me give you an example. If we are suddenly directed to emphasize intelligence, I will argue that every time we consider enemy capabilities in a tactical problem, we are dealing with intelligence. I use that example because it once came up, and we made an impressive list of all the times we taught intelligence. We took what we did, and we counted it differently! That's the sense in which I use the term "verbal manipulation." I do not think there is anything dishonest about this either. It's not dishonest at all; it's a reasoned response. So the deputy commandant can manage a lot of it by that type of action.

But he has to make a showing on some areas. The latest case is Organizational Effectiveness. In some cases, you have got to be able to identify it (that's nothing but labeling), but then you have got to make a little further nudge in a particular direction so it looks like you are really with the program. When we do one of the latter, we should couple it with a deletion. If I were the deputy commandant I would be as arbitrary as I could be about this. If I told the Department of Command to add four hours for Organizational Effectiveness to their Profession of Arms curriculum I would add, "And your total allocation remains the same. You figure out now to do it." I know they would scream. After their screaming, they would say, "Okay, we'll do this," and that would be that. This is not a very neat, tidy operation, but I think that's the way the command group has to approach it.
Q: Sir, doesn't that operate against good faculty morale?

A: Yes. Anytime you delete something that has been produced by someone, that person is going to feel aggrieved. I accept that fact. I am not too concerned about the morale affair, because I believe that very little has to be done differently. We may do quite a bit of relabeling. Since I think very little has to really be done because of outside influence, I would not be worried about being able to explain why an action is necessary. In short, I think that would be managed with some reasonable attention to effective communication so that everybody will know what the problem is.

Q: What about the recent problem with resources? How can we go about insuring that in fact we have enough instructors to do the job? Another way to state the question would be to ask how the College can overcome an intensely bureaucratic and administrative method for justifying the number of instructors at CGSC.

A: I was greatly encouraged a couple of months ago when Major John DeRau developed an alternative to platform hours as the unit to determine faculty requirements; he suggested that as a replacement we should talk about the faculty-to-student ratio. I was disappointed when we presented that scheme to resource people at TRADOC, and it was not adopted. In fact, the ratio proposed by Major DeRau produced the same result in terms of requirements as does the more involved computation of platform manhours. It probably does not make that much difference in the long run. We are in for a difficult time. The Army is scaling down and there is a tremendous push to get as many people as possible out of the school pipeline into the units, to get people
out of the training base. It's an awfully long line from that kind of a policy decision probably at DA, and if not DOD level, before it gets down to how many instructors we get at Leavenworth, or how many we get in committee X at Leavenworth. It is such a very long line that you can hardly trace the line. I am consoled, and maybe reassured by some recent actions. I have not seen this in writing, but I have been advised that at both TRADOC and DA, CGSC has been given some kind of protective status from further reductions. That's all we could possibly hope for. There is one reassuring aspect about this. The "protected status" appeared at a time when all winds, if you will, were blowing in the opposite direction; so, it had to come because the Army does treasure the college. It could not have happened in any other way. Since we recently have had this protected status kind of reaffirmed, if not formalized, under the very worst set of conditions, that suggests that we are going to do all right.

Q: Let me ask two questions, sir. First, what are the recurring problems of the College, and in the same sense, where have we made some of our greatest mistakes in the past?

A: The persisting problem or puzzle is this question of what kind of experiences we will provide for the student officer. There are always choices: short term-long term; generalist-specialist; today's tactics-future tactics. Given this tremendous investment that Leavenworth represents for the Army, the recurring problem is how to get a greater return? That's kind of a cost-effective question, and we have really been wrestling with this question of how the Army gets a return for its Leavenworth investment.
Since the curriculum (I think that comes from a Latin word that means "pathway," or "pathway to learning") is the device, the mechanism that somehow or other is going to change that officers' behavior so that he can do something as a graduate that he could not do before, it naturally follows that in trying to determine how to get more for our money, the key questions are always curriculum questions—content, scope, methods, all wrapped together. I don't have any notion that the 1974-75 scheme (now in its third generation, soon to be its fourth) represents any ultimate plan. Someone is going to come along with a better notion. As a personal matter, I guess I will regret this when it happens, but only for sentimental reasons. It will of course be considered even more appropriate for the Army's needs.

There are a number of other problems which have been solved off and on, sometimes better than others. They usually concern resources, personnel, facilities and money. I am oversimplifying the case when I say that we always want more money, more people, and more facilities than anyone is going to provide us, but that's the way the world really is. So, sometimes we bargain somewhat better than at other times, but the environment has not always been the same.

The other question you asked me was where we had made some of our greatest mistakes. I don't doubt that we have made some very serious ones; however, if you ask me to list them, the heading "mistakes" doesn't produce very many items. Speaking in a general sense, I think we are prone to over-react, both as to amount and time. That's a very easy charge, and I think it's a very understandable reaction, given our particular cultural subset. This institution is just replete
with people who are action oriented over-achievers, and goodness knows, that's what we want them to be! So I think the price one pays, and maybe a small price, is that you are going to get some over-reaction. My civilian friends, although often somewhat bemused by our over-reaction, customarily couple this with some rueful notice that their problem is that they cannot get any reaction at all; of the two, they often consider our position the more desirable. I think that's probably accurate, and I think it's built into the institution. I think it's built into the officer corps. We have gone to great effort to create that, and we reap some of that harvest.

Q: Do you have any thoughts, sir, on where CGSC should go in the future?
A: Not really. I anticipate that the era of the Army generalist is over. Like it or not, our business is far too complicated anymore for any one person to be able to be thoroughly versed everywhere. We have specialization. The question is only how much; we certainly have it. I suppose Leavenworth will continue to foster the crucial residue of the generalist, and it's what we feel every field grade officer should know about the Army, especially the Army in the field. On the other hand, I don't see how the college will be able to resist an increasing alignment with Army specialties. It's bigger than CGSC, for what we need is an Army-wide scheme for the preparation of specialists. I suppose that's in a sense what the Harrison Board is trying to work out, but this is almost as big as all outdoors. This is a monster! If you are asking me to predict what might happen in the next 20 years, it is somewhere along that line that I anticipate the college will go.
Q: How important is Leavenworth to the Army?
A: How do you answer such a question? We have got books full of testimonials, all kinds of anecdotal information, and each of us has their own personal experience. Mine is not especially atypical. I came here, and I knew very little about the Army at large. When I graduated from Leavenworth thirteen weeks later I knew quite a bit about it, and I was a lot better officer because of it. That has happened to all the graduates. I hold a very biased and prejudiced view, but to me it is very simple. The Army in the field is Leavenworth, or Leavenworth is the Army in the field; it isn't any place else. This is the only place that you can find out about the Army in the field, unless you get assigned. I just have to believe that historical testimony over the years, albeit anecdotal and sort of self-fulfilling in a sense, does tell the essence of the story. I see that Leavenworth influence in so many places and in so many ways.

The reaction of civilian educators is always of interest to me, and I mean the reaction of those that invest enough time to find out what Leavenworth is about. I have watched this happen many, many times: hordes of visitors, Advisory Committees (nine different annual meetings), three North-Central visitation groups, an ad hoc committee, a couple of groups from DOD, two educational survey commissions. Sometimes these people have started skeptical, if indeed not with a negative attitude. But regardless of where they started, and I cannot think of a single exception or single person, they have ended their review, inspection, or visit by telling us, in effect, "What you do is of crucial importance to the nation."
I have just finished drafting the report of the 9th meeting of the
Advisory Committee, and I ended the report by trying to catch the
flavor of the last thing that they said to the general. Let me read
it. The paragraph is entitled "The importance of CGSC." Remember,
this is the committee's view, nine higher-education heavy-weights.

"Finally, the committee wishes to communicate to the entire Leavenworth-
CGSC community, the faculty and students, a deeply held feeling about
the institution. The committee is struck by the almost awesome impor-
tance of CGSC to our nation. What is done or not done at Leavenworth
doubtlessly will directly affect the future of our country. The role
of CGSC is a very sobering one for all who have any part therein, how-
ever small it may be." Those words closely parallel the words of the
committee as they gave them in their first interview. So, I come down
pretty hard on the unique significance of the Command and General Staff
College to the Army, and to the nation.

Q: Do you have concluding remarks?
A: As we are talking here this morning and there are just a few days
over five months before I am going to exercise my retirement option,
I certainly have nothing but very positive feelings about the college,
the community, the Army.

Recently, I went to a workshop for people in the health-care pro-
fessions. Indeed, I was there because I was commencing a plan of mine
to reestablish some very rusty skills as a Consulting Psychologist.
For the most part, it was a group therapy session on the frustrations
of these people's position, their occupation, etc. I listened to these
people, and a dozen or so others, for quite a long while, and one of them sort of turned around and challenged me, "How do you cope with all these frustrations?" I guess the question really asked was how had I been able to cope with them, because I was considerably older than anyone else. My answer was a very spontaneous one. Having thought about it later, as often happens, I think it probably came closer to how I feel than anything I could ever say again under those circumstances.

My answer was something like, "I've really been astonished at this conversation, because when I think about my own experience over very nearly 30 years, I have come to the college and my office almost every day with a feeling of anticipation. I have almost always been anxious to get on with whatever was important at the moment; I have always had a feeling that it was worthwhile, and that I could do something constructive—you know, a whole positive sort of attitude." I went on to comment, "I certainly would not want to argue that there have not been some periods in which there were some variations from this theme, but I always knew that it was a temporary situation. I always knew that the conditions would change, and/or the people would change; and they always did. If you take the long period of time, there weren't very many of these anyway."

If you can voluntarily leave a career with a feeling that you have made some contribution and know full well that in the process thereof it has been a satisfying kind of life, that's all you can ever expect. I have really described how I feel about it.
Q: It has been an honor and a pleasure to interview you, sir. I am certain that sometime in the future historians will study the first 100 years of the Command and General Staff College, and they will identify a few people who have made important and enduring contributions to the evolution of the college. That group will probably include John F. Morrison, Arthur Wagner, and Eben Swift. I am certain that all of those historians will include Ivan Birrer among that very select group.
Table 2. Factors Affecting Fatigue Properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stress Field or Distribution</th>
<th>Magnitude</th>
<th>Axial load</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uniaxial</td>
<td>Axial load</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Biaxial</td>
<td>Axial load</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Triaxial</td>
<td>Axial load</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combinations of the above types</td>
<td>Axial load</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stress Concentration</th>
<th>Uniaxial Stress Field or Axial load</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Biaxial Stress Field or Axial load</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Triaxial Stress Field or Axial load</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combinations of the above types Axial load</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spectrum or History or Stress Time Relations</th>
<th>Stress ratio (or mean stress or static stress)</th>
<th>Prestress or residual stress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency (cycles per unit time) or strain rate</td>
<td>Stress wave form: Regular: sinusoidal, square, etc.</td>
<td>Irregular: random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest period</td>
<td>Varying amplitude</td>
<td>Spectrum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varying amplitude</td>
<td>Sequence</td>
<td>Random amplitude</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chemistry or Materials</th>
<th>Ferrous and nonferrous alloys, nonmetalics, impurities, etc.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Substructure</td>
<td>Point defects, dislocations, sub-boundaries, etc.</td>
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</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Microstructure or Material Condition</th>
<th>Raw stock</th>
<th>Heat treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Particle distribution</td>
<td>Cold work</td>
<td>Residual stress</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geometry of Structural Component</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Shape</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>Shape</td>
<td>Chemical - coating, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Physical - roughness, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Component</th>
<th>Surface properties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Notches</td>
<td>Other components, from stiffened flat sheet, shell, to others.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framed structure</th>
<th>Simple joints - weld, riveted, bolted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other components</td>
<td>from stiffened flat sheet, shell, to others.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Temperature</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vacuum</td>
<td>Radiation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radiation</td>
<td>Air</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Corrosion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrosion</td>
<td>Fret corrosion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Results of fatigue tests on 6061T6 aluminum-alloy specimens under axial load at R = 0
Figure 2. S-N curves for smooth and notched rotating-beam fatigue specimens of 4340
Figure 3. Relationship between stages of progressive changes observed on 0.97 Mg aluminum alloy

(Redrawn from Ref. 3)
bending specimens, it is close to the notch strength, and for rotating beam specimens, close to the modulus of rupture. This is because the elementary flexural formulas commonly used to calculate the stresses do not represent realistically the distribution of stress. In general, S-N curves represent the progressive structural deterioration and the gradual breaking of cohesive bonds in materials. This process may be analyzed statistically. The S-N curves for nonmetallic materials also indicate structural deterioration (Figure 4).

A collection of S-N data for small, polished, steel-bar, rotating-beam specimens shows that the endurance limit is approximately 50 per cent of the tensile strength, and the strength at $10^4$ cycles is approximately 75 per cent of the tensile strength. This curve may be used for preliminary design purposes when fatigue data are not available.

Several attempts have been made to find general mathematical relationships between stress and life and several different equations have been proposed to express the S-N relations empirically. Use of these equations reduces the data to a suitable form for data analysis and standardizes curve fitting methods. It also provides some understanding of the S-N relationships.

Weibull proposed an equation

$$\left( S - S_e \right) \left( N + B \right)^a = b \quad (1)$$

where $S_e$ is the endurance limit, and $B$, $a$, and $b$ are constants.

Valluri derived the following more complex equation which has been applied to only one aluminum alloy:

$$N = C \frac{\ln(\sigma_u/\sigma) \ln \left[ (\sigma - \sigma_i)/K \right]}{\left[ (\sigma - \sigma_i)/E \right]^2 \left[ (\sigma' - \sigma_i)/\sigma_i \right]^2} \quad (2)$$
Figure 4. Fatigue data for phenolic laminates at room temperature
Figure 5. Ratio of fatigue strength to static strength for various steels

Figure 6. Effect of internal defects on fatigue life of 7079-T6 aluminum alloy forged plate stressed in short transverse grain direction
where

\[ \begin{align*}
\sigma & = \text{maximum cyclic stress} \\
\sigma' & = \text{minimum cyclic stress} \\
\sigma_u & = \text{ultimate tensile strength} \\
\sigma_i & = \text{internal stress (approximately the endurance limit)} \\
K, C & = \text{material constants} \\
E & = \text{Young's modulus}
\end{align*} \]

When identical specimens are fatigue tested at the same stress level, their fatigue lives are generally not the same but vary or scatter a great deal. When many specimens are tested at several stress levels, the test points are scattered as shown in Figure 6.\textsuperscript{8-13} Based on the scatter of data points, a family of curves called S-N-P curves may be drawn as shown in Figure 7,\textsuperscript{11} where P is the probability of survival. It is anticipated that the actual performance for P% of all specimens will be above the S-N value indicated by the corresponding P curve.

**LOW-CYCLE AND HIGH-CYCLE FATIGUE**

An S-N curve may be divided into the low-cycle range and the high-cycle range; there is no sharp demarcation between these ranges. From 0 to about \(10^3\) or \(10^4\) cycles is generally considered the low-cycle range and from about \(10^3\) or \(10^4\) cycles to \(10^7\), or higher, the high-cycle range.

Until recently, little attention has been paid to the low-cycle range, and as a result, much of the existing fatigue data are for high cycles only. It soon became apparent that for some pressure vessels, pressurized fuselages, landing gears and wing flap mechanisms, space-ship launching equipment, missiles, etc., only a short fatigue life was required. Consequently, the low-cycle fatigue phenomena began to gain attention.
Figure 7. S-N-P diagram for aluminum alloy 7075 T6
The initial portion of an S-N curve is usually horizontal and flat; for notched specimens, the flat portion is shorter than for plain specimens as shown in Figure 8. The difference in the initial behavior between notched and plain specimens appears related to their stress-strain curves (Figures 8 and 9). When the cycles are low, the material fatigue strength is close to the static strength. Consequently, when the notched static strength is higher than the plain tensile strength, the notched fatigue strength at the upper end of S-N curve is also higher than the plain tensile strength. When the cycles are increased, notched fatigue strength drops rapidly to a level that is lower than that for the unnotched fatigue strength.

Another point is noted in the comparison of Figures 8 and 9. Near the top of both the static and the fatigue curves the slope change for the notched specimen is often greater than that for the unnotched. Since the notched specimens show reduced plastic strain in static test and shorter life than the unnotched in fatigue test, the plastic strain may be related to fatigue life. Thus, the plastic strain appears to be a better measure of life than the nominal stress. Indeed, in constant deformation fatigue tests, a straight-line relationship exists between the logarithmic values of either the maximum plastic strain or the range of plastic strain and the lives of the members (Figure 10). This is expressed by

$$\Delta \varepsilon_p N^{1/2} = C$$

where the constant C may be related to the reduction of area R in static tension tests as

$$C = 0.5 \ln \left[ \frac{100}{100-R} \right]$$

Many reports have considered the static tensile strength as the upper limit of the S-N curve, located arbitrarily at 1/4, 1/2, 3/4, or 1 cycle. It should be noted that the tensile strength test data are usually obtained from a static tension testing machine operating at a low strain rate.
Figure 8. Typical S-N curves for constant-load tests

Figure 9. Typical stress-strain curves
Figure 10. Plastic strain range vs cycles to failure; material, 2S aluminum annealed
fatigue test data are obtained in fatigue testing machines at higher strain rates.

The failure mechanism in the low-cycle range is similar to the failure mechanism in static tension, but the failure mechanism in the high-cycle range is different and may be termed "true fatigue." The two mechanisms are compared in Table 3.

**EFFECT OF MEAN STRESS AND COMBINED STRESS**

The stresses created in the laboratory for fatigue study are usually sinusoidal or vibrational stresses, and the vibrational stresses are usually expressed in terms of a pair of variables, such as the mean stress $S_m$ and the amplitude $S_a$ (Figure 11). The fatigue S-N data are then determined using a pair of stress variables. In Figure 12, the data were determined by the maximum stress $S_{\text{max}}$ and the ratio of minimum stress to maximum stress $R$. Figure 13 clearly shows the relationships between different pairs of stress variables and between the stress pair and the fatigue life. The mean stress is sometimes also called the static stress or superimposed stress.

When two- or three-dimensional stresses act at a point, they are referred to as combined or complex stresses. The amount of fatigue data for different combinations or states of stresses is overwhelming. Fortunately, there are some general rules on fatigue effect of combined stress that can be used as a guide. One rule proposed by Sines explains not only the effect of combined stresses but also the effect of mean stresses and residual stresses. Sines proposed that the permissible alternation of the octahedral shear stress is a linear function of the sum of the orthogonal normal static stresses, as long as the maximum stress is below the yield strength, or

$$1/3 [(P_1 - P_2)^2 + (P_2 - P_3)^2 + (P_3 - P_1)^2]^{1/2} = A - \alpha (S_x + S_y + S_z + R_x' + R_y' + R_z')$$

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Table 3. Comparison of Low-Cycle and High-Cycle Fatigue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal stresses and strain hardening</th>
<th>Low-Cycle</th>
<th>High-Cycle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net sum of plastic flow</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross sum of plastic flow</td>
<td>Macro size</td>
<td>Micro size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-ray disorientation</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slip</td>
<td>Coarse (10^3 - 10^4 A)</td>
<td>Fine (10A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slip plane distortion</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Persistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crack origin in pull-pull load</td>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>Surface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crack path</td>
<td>Along max. shear</td>
<td>Cross max. tensile stress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fracture</td>
<td>Delayed static</td>
<td>Structure deterioration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adapted from data presentation in WOOD, W. A., "Some Basic Studies of Fatigue in Metals," Fracture, MIT, John Wiley and Sons Inc., p. 412 (1959).*
MEMORANDUM FOR ATTN: Larry Downing, DTIC-ACQ, Defense Technical Information Center, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 0944, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

SUBJECT: Change in Distribution

1. Request a distribution statement change to the following documents:

ADB064185, Doughty, Robert A., "Dr. Ivan J. Birrer: Service at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 20 January 1948 to 30 June 1978.", dated 1978

2. The distribution statement change, effective 24 September 2004 per Dr. Roger Spiller, Marshall Chair, US Army Command and General Staff College, subject matter expert and Reviewer, should read the following: (A) Approved for public release: Distribution unlimited.

4. POC for this request is Rusty Rafferty or John Rogers, Reference Librarians Classified Documents Section, DSN 585-3128 or COM 913-758-3128 or FAX: DSN 585-3014 or COM 913-758-3014.

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