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Charles W. Raymond III, MAJ, USA
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

Final report 6 June 1975

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A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING:
THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS AND REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF
SOME PEACEKEEPING CONCEPTS AND
DOCTRINE

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

C. W. RAYMOND III, MAJ, USA
B.A., University of Connecticut, 1960
M.A., University of Delaware, 1971

AD BELLUM PACE PARATI

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1975
ABSTRACT

A Military Perspective of International Peacekeeping:

The original purposes of this research were to determine peacekeeping operations' nature and characteristics and to review and evaluate the ABCA concept and US Army doctrine. During the literature review, doctrine was evaluated as inadequate resulting in a new purpose to enhance doctrinal development. The case study method, with a structural-functional approach incorporating comparative analysis, was employed to examine three UN operations: UNEF 1 (Egypt), Cyprus, UNEF 2. The UNEF 2 was judged the best example of a peacekeeping operation from a military perspective. The conclusions were that peacekeeping operations were political actions by military organizations for behavior control purposes; consent is the key to peacekeeping; the ABCA concept is adequate with modification for doctrinal development; and US Army doctrine can be adapted, with modification, to peacekeeping.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST OF FIGURES</th>
<th>iv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACKGROUND</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PURPOSES</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASE STUDIES</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESTATED PURPOSES</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAMEWORK</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. UNEF 1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRISIS</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESPONSE</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANALYSIS</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. UNFICYP</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRISIS</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESPONSE</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANALYSIS</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. UNEF 2</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRISIS</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESPONSE</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANALYSIS</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. SUMMARY</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORCES' EVALUATION</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABCA CONCEPT EVALUATION</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECHNICAL FINDINGS</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**LIST OF FIGURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The Peacekeeping Structure, Middle East, 1956</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>UNEF 1 Organization Chart</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Deployment Phases, UNEF 1</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a.</td>
<td>UNEF 1 Deployment Before 1967 Withdrawal</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b.</td>
<td>UNEF 1 Deployment Before 1967 Withdrawal (cont)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>The Peacekeeping Structure, Cyprus 1964</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>UNFICYP Organization Chart</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Initial UNFICYP Deployment, Cyprus 1964</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Sinai Front, October 18-24, 1973</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>The Peacekeeping Structure, Middle East, 1974</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>UNEF 2 Organization Chart</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13a.</td>
<td>UNEF 2 Deployment, 1974</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13b.</td>
<td>UNEF 2 Deployment, 1974 (cont)</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13c.</td>
<td>UNEF 2 Deployment, 1974 (cont)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping is an established feature in international relations today. It is an activity sponsored and conducted by the United Nations (UN), or by international regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS). It is useful as a crisis management tool, as a desirable alternative to war, or perhaps in a Machiavellian sense, as a mask.

From the perspective of international organizations and other nations not directly involved in a dispute, peacekeeping is viewed as a means for dampening a crisis situation and encouraging a dialogue between the disputants, thereby laying the groundwork for resolution of the conflict. Of course, without the necessary political and diplomatic inputs, there is always the danger that peacekeeping may simply freeze a situation and delay or prolong a solution.

For the disputants, peacekeeping may be an alternative to one or more problems. It may be a desirable alternative to the debilitating effects of war or the burdensome costs of an arms race. It may be the screen behind which one or more states can regroup and re-equip before pressing fresh assaults or demands, or it may be an instrument which favors a small or weak state against much stronger adversaries. Therefore,
the different perspectives about the utility of peacekeeping create
an interest in the subject and serve as a motive for this research.

BACKGROUND

International efforts to keep the peace or re-establish
international stability when upset are not new. Colonel James M. Boyd,
a United States Air Force (USAF) officer who served five years on the
United Nations Military Staff Committee (UNMSC) and who is an expert in
peacekeeping studies, points out that there have been numerous proposals
and suggestions on the subject from the time of the ancient Greeks,
through the Renaissance, the Age of Reason, and the League of Nations,
to the present day. These proposals and suggestions demonstrate "man's
continuing common concern to maintain the peace."^1

Derek W. Bowett, an English international lawyer who served with
the UN Secretariat, provides a distinction between the ways and means
to maintain the peace. The distinction is based on an opinion of the
International Court of Justice. There are enforcement actions, which
are the taking of military action against a State or other authority,
and there are peacekeeping actions, which are not.2

It is appropriate to identify the types of peacekeeping actions
at this point. For our purposes, there are two types: peace observation
missions and peacekeeping forces. Peace observation missions are
generally small organizations, numbering in the tens and lower hundreds,
composed of military and/or civilians whose services as individuals are
offered by their nations. The mission members generally perform those
tasks appropriate for individuals or small groups of individuals. Such
tasks include observation, investigation, reporting, and, perhaps, local
on-the-spot mediation and arbitration of minor disputes. Peacekeeping forces are generally large organizations numbering in the higher hundreds and thousands and composed of military contingents, or "formed bodies of troops", whose services as units are offered by the donor nations. Such forces generally perform those tasks appropriate to military units such as patrolling in force, riot control, manning defense positions, and, if necessary in self-defense, organized military combat. There can be overlap in the activities between the two types, i.e., missions can patrol; forces can investigate.

The UN has sponsored thirteen of the twenty-one commonly recognized peacekeeping actions since World War II (see Appendix A.) International regional organizations account for the rest. The listing includes the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), 1956-1967, generally considered the first UN peacekeeping force; the United Nations Force in the Congo (ONUC, from the initials of the French name), 1960-1964, the largest UN peacekeeping force to date; and the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the longest operating peacekeeping force to date having started in March 1964. The listing also includes the following international regional organization actions: the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), 1965, sponsored by the OAS in the Dominican Republic, and the Arab League Force (ALF), 1961-1963, sponsored by the Arab League in Kuwait. Peace observation missions - both UN and regional - are also noted. The listing does not show the Warsaw Pact action in Czechoslovakia in 1968. An argument can be made that it should.
Three UN peacekeeping forces are presently operating. The UNFICYP is the oldest of the three. As noted earlier, it holds the record for longest continuous operation. It was originally initiated to assist in maintaining internal law and order on that Mediterranean island state. But since the July 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, UNFICYP has, in fact, interposed itself between the Turkish forces and Greek Cypriots though the mandate has not changed. 4

The other two forces are results of the 1973 Mideast crisis. The first of these is UNEF. It was activated in October 1973 in the Sinai Peninsula with forces drawn initially from UNFICYP. The UNEF's mission is to serve as an interposition force between Egypt and Israel. In one sense, this force can be viewed as a continuation of the 1956-1967 UNEF because it is interposed, as it was then, between the two states. On the other hand, the Force's deployment, the relationships between the Force and the disputants, and the UN body authorizing the Force are different from the 1956-1967 model. Now, the Force is not in Gaza; Israel permits some UNEF elements on its sovereign or occupied territory; and the UN Security Council authorized the current Force. In 1956, the UN General Assembly sponsored the Force; the Force served in Gaza; and Israel did not permit it on its soil. Therefore, it is wise in the interests of clarity to adopt the form of differentiation expressed by the Canadian representative to the Australia-Britain-Canada-American (ABCA) Armies TEAL XVIII Conference in London in October 1974: UNEF 1 and UNEF 2. 5
The second force resulting from the Mideast crisis is the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). It was activated in June 1974 with original major elements drawn from UNEF 2. Its mission is to serve as an interposition force between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights. Both of these forces had their mandates renewed for additional periods with ending dates in July 1976 and November 1975 respectively. There are no regional forces currently in being.

Thus, in the light of the extensive modern record of peacekeeping efforts, and the continuing existence of three peacekeeping forces, the focus of this research is on international peacekeeping operations. The research perspective is military. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of the modern peacekeeping record, including political and financial aspects, is outside the scope of this effort.

There are several well-known political features of the modern record, however, which bear repeating. The permanent UN Security Council members participate in UN peacekeeping within certain parameters. They provide personnel for selected peace observation missions such as the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO), which operates out of Jerusalem in the trouble areas of the Middle East. With regard to peacekeeping forces, they provide varying degrees of logistical support, transportation of donor nations' contingents to the scene, and funding. They do not provide contingents of their own armed forces to the peacekeeping forces, although there are exceptions. In UNFICYP, the United Kingdom (UK) provides troops because of their availability in the Sovereign Base Areas on the island and due to special UK interests. Also, the United States (US) provided a USAF air transport unit (along with Canada) as an integral element of the United Nations Security Force (UNSF) - a part of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) - in
West Irian in 1962-1963. The proscription of permanent member contribution of Force contingents is, starting with UNEF 1, spelled out in the resolutions authorizing the peacekeeping forces. More importantly, the non-contribution by the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) reflects those super-powers' tacit agreement and current policy to limit the opportunities for confrontation.

However, the strictures on the US and USSR do not apply at the regional organization level. The US, through the OAS, participates fully in regional peacekeeping operations. Likewise, a case can be made that the USSR participates fully in such ventures through the Warsaw Pact.

But, tacit agreements, current policies and formal proscriptions, have a way of changing, or being changed, in a dynamic international environment. Full US participation in regional peacekeeping operations is a fact. United States participation with an air transport element in the UNSF is a fact. United States logistical support for past and present UN operations is a fact. The legal basis for full US participation is subject to interpretation of "peacekeeping operations" as "non-combat duty". Specifically, Public Law 341, October 10, 1949, as amended, authorizes "the service of up to 1,000 personnel of the U. S. Armed Forces for non combat duty" with the UN.8 Also, Public Law 87-195 (The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) allows "the detailing of U. S. personnel to international organizations as staff specialists or advisors (no limit specified)".9 Finally, consideration of the future of peacekeeping is a fact. For example, a concept for peacekeeping, developed by the ABCA Armies, is in existence for the period 1981-1990.
The possibility of full US and USSR participation in any future UN or bi-lateral peacekeeping operations is the subject of some serious academic discussion and the topic of newspaper articles particularly since the advent and in the atmosphere of US-USSR detente. This discussion ranges from consideration of theoretical models of UN or other international standing military forces to ad hoc operations, the current modus operandi.

The probability of full US and USSR participation in future UN or bi-lateral peacekeeping operations is subject to speculation. One scenario would involve operations designed to stop or forestall conflict between or among client or non-aligned states which are in, or are eminently capable of joining, the so-called "nuclear club". The "club" now numbers six based on testing of explosive nuclear devices. A number of the smaller developed nations, and even the lesser developed ones, are engaged in nuclear research and development. Several of these nations appear to have the capability to test, or to employ without testing, nuclear devices. They may do so if national self-interest dictates. Israel is an example. Moreover, some of the more influential of the smaller nations with a nuclear potential, such as the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Japan, and South Africa, are reassessing national goals, objectives and policies in the light of a polycentric, loose bi-polar world. Thus, in a crisis of survival or self-interest involving smaller "club" members or those with nuclear potential, the US and the USSR could perceive it to be in their interest to participate fully in a UN or bi-lateral peacekeeping operation.
PURPOSES

In view of the above facts, discussion and speculation, there is specific interest in the nature and characteristics of peacekeeping operations. There is curiosity about the ABCA peacekeeping concept and the US Army’s doctrine for peacekeeping operations. Thus, the purposes of this research are: (1) to determine the nature and characteristics of peacekeeping operations; (2) to review and evaluate the ABCA concept for peacekeeping; and (3) to review and evaluate the US Army doctrine for peacekeeping operations.

NOTES


5. Ibid., p. 1.


9. Ibid., p. 33.
10. The author is indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Harry J. Psomiades, USAR, Consulting Faculty member, for this description of the present international environment.
Chapter II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

General

This review of peacekeeping literature focuses on three areas. They are the nature and characteristics of peacekeeping operations, the statement of the ABCA concept for peacekeeping, and status of current US Army doctrine on peacekeeping.

The amount of literature on peacekeeping is extensive. The most recent addition is The Thin Blue Line by Indar Jit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge published in 1974. All three authors have held senior military posts in UN peacekeeping operations. The book is an analysis of the present system, which controls peacekeeping forces and peace observation missions, and a projection for the future. The purpose is to gain "greater credibility" for peacekeeping.\(^1\) The examination of the present system considers three peacekeeping forces (UNEF 1, ONUC, UNFICYP) and peace observation missions in general. There is an epilogue addressing UNEF 2. The work covers the higher level politico-military inter-relationships and many operational aspects.

Numerous other books, reports and theses, and periodical articles are available covering concepts for proposed international military forces, discussions of existing systems for peacekeeping under UN and regional organization auspices, and analyses of past and present peace observation missions and peacekeeping forces (ranging from simple
summaries and overviews to detailed day-to-day accounts). As one indication of the extent, the US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) Library published Special Bibliography 48, *Peacekeeping Operations*, September 1974, which contains an annotated listing of forty-seven books, forty-six reports and student theses, and one hundred fifty-three journal and periodical articles. All are available in the Library. As another indication, Michael Harbottle's *The Blue Berets* contains a bibliography of two hundred books and journals covering the topic.

**Peacekeeping Operations**

Many of the books, theses and reports contain information on peacekeeping functions, tasks, force structure and general manner of operation. Bowett, in a legal perspective, identifies nine distinct functions in his *United Nations Forces: A Legal Study* which a peacekeeping organization - whether an observation mission or a force - may perform. These functions are: (1) ceasefire, truce, and armistice functions entrusted to "observer" groups; (2) frontier control; (3) interpositionary functions; (4) defense and security of UN zones or areas placed under UN control; (5) the maintenance of law and order in a State; (6) plebiscite supervision; (7) assistance and relief for national disasters; (8) prevention of international crimes; (9) disarmament functions.²

He points out:

the first five are, in fact, functions already assumed by United Nations Forces; the remaining categories, 6-9, are functions which may be anticipated in the future.³
It should be noted that the context for Bowett's study is the UN. However, these nine functions can be applied at the regional level.

James A. Stegegna in *The United Nations Force in Cyprus* provides his own typology characterizing peacekeeping forces. For example, he classifies UNEF 1 as a "border patrol or barrier force", and UNFICYP as a "law and order force".

In an article prepared for the US Air War College Associate Program, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, titled "United Nations Peacekeeping - Past, Present, and Future", Colonel Gerald M. Adams notes that the mission of UNEF 1 was "to provide a border patrol and buffer force along the truce lines". He also notes that the original mission of ONUC was "to protect the national territory of the Congo from external aggression" but that later "constraining internal aggression was the real job".

In the nearly twenty years of UN peacekeeping, several attempts have been made to formalize, codify and at least clarify, some of the procedural aspects of peacekeeping. One such attempt is documented in the Canadian "Eighth Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defense Respecting United Nations and Peacekeeping". This report contains numerous suggestions regarding formalized procedures for peacekeeping in the administrative and logistical functional areas.10

Many of the writings about proposed international military forces and analyses of past peacekeeping operations contain an interesting feature pertaining to operational components. There appears to be a heavy reliance on infantry and infantry-type organizations. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Cannon, Jr., and Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier General, Retired) A. A. Jordan, in an appendix to Frye's book entitled "Military Aspects of a Permanent UN Force", call for the creation of a "Brigade, consisting of two regiments, or six battalions, of 24 line companies with a strength of 200 men each".11

With regard to the logistical and financial aspects of peacekeeping, a Johns Hopkins University report prepared for the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, titled National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Missions, provides a wealth of basic data, documents and analyses of various UN and regional peacekeeping operations and peace observation missions. The coverage includes all nations which have participated in peacekeeping through 1970. The emphasis is on US support and participation, from a high-level political and policy-making perspective.
With regard to peacekeeping force composition, Rosalyn Higgins, in United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967, provides some insight in an extract of a UN document. The extract indicates some principles and considerations determining a peacekeeping force's size and composition. The force in point was UNEF 1.

The determination of the numerical strength of the Force and its components is based on assessments of need by the Commander of the Force, which have been reviewed from time to time. The main considerations weighed in determining the size and composition of the Force have been: the needs of the Force on the basis of its functions and responsibilities, at first in the Suez Canal region, and, later, in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip areas; the desireability of balance in the Force with regard to consideration of both geographical distribution and military organization; the comparative utility, in the light of assessed needs, of the troops offered; and the relative availability and economy of transport for the troops offered, together with their essential gear and vehicles.12

The ABCA Concept for Peacekeeping

The ABCA concept for peacekeeping in the period 1981-1990 contains six elements. By way of review, they are:

A. ABCA Armies must plan to ensure that recognition of trouble is timely and reaction to it, once authorized, is speedy and effective.

B. A peacekeeping force must have a clear and authoritative mandate from the sponsor that enhances, not limits its operation.

C. There must be an effective and reliable staff and communication system to provide a proper command and control capability.

D. Normal military formations and units properly trained for war are the most effective organizations to convert to peacekeeping tasks, but they will require special training in doctrine, techniques, and equipment employment to convert them to the role.
E. The ABCA Armies must have a strategic airlift available to them and be trained to use it.

F. Because of the heavy manpower demands of peacekeeping operations, every effort must be made to find technological developments and improvements to reduce the manpower required. 13

US Army Doctrine

US Army doctrine is in a state of flux in the wake of the Vietnam War. There is vigorous reemphasis on conventional and tactical nuclear warfare. There is heavy emphasis on anti-armor operations. One of the so-called capstone documents of US Army doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations of Army Forces in the Field, is being rewritten. In the test draft edition, the emphasis is on the doctrinal aspects above, while discussion of cold war operations contained in the September 1968 edition is eliminated.

In the earlier edition, cold war operations included show of force, truce enforcement, international police action, legal occupation and stability operations. 14 Discussion of the first four items was limited; stability operations were addressed at length. Stability operations, now titled internal defense and development (IDAD), are addressed in a new publication, FM 100-20, Internal Defense and Development: US Army Doctrine, dated November 1974. However, the other aspects of cold war operations, i.e., show of force, truce enforcement, international police action, and legal occupation, are in a state of limbo in that while they were recognized in the past, they are not covered in new publications. Of these four other aspects, truce enforcement and international police action are directly relevant to peacekeeping. Thus, in the past, there was limited general US Army doctrine relevant to peacekeeping; currently, there is a void.
There are elements of current functional doctrine (combat, combat support and combat service support), however, which are applicable to peacekeeping. These elements are found in a wide variety of field manuals, usually under headings of stability operations, internal defense and development, or civil affairs. There is only one publication - FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalions, December 1969 - which uses the word "peacekeeping".15

In combat doctrine, the roles of infantry and armored cavalry units contain references to missions, functions and tasks applicable to peacekeeping.

The infantry battalion can be employed in a variety of other operational roles. These include... truce enforcement; peacekeeping missions; related operations to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order to permit a responsible government to function effectively; and other tasks to include show of force, international police action, legal occupation, protection of personnel and property, civil defense, and riot control.16

Armed cavalry regiments may be deployed abroad... as an application of military force in the furtherance of national policy... short of open hostilities...

Examples of such operations include show of force, enforcement of truce conditions, international police action, occupation duty and counterinsurgency operations.17

The capabilities of these types of units are varied. Of particular interest to a peacekeeping force designer are the following capabilities:

(1) "Conduct sustained... operations... in all types of terrain and climate when properly augmented";18 (2) "hold terrain";19 (3) "conduct independent or semi-independent operations when appropriately reinforced";20 (4) "participate in... combined operations to
include stability operations"; 21 (5) "conduct extensive patrolling"; 22 
(6) reconnaissance and security; 23 (7) economy of force; 24 and (8) 
border control operations. 25

Combat support doctrine contains elements covering engineer 
role: and capabilities, physical security, civil disturbances, psychol-
logical operations, intelligence and civil affairs. All are applicable 
in a peacekeeping situation though not clearly stated so.

Engineer missions are to "facilitate the movement of friendly 
forces, impede the movement of enemy forces, provide engineer staff 
planning and advice to all commanders, and to provide construction 
and facilities engineer services". 26 A number of engineer capabilities 
are directly applicable to peacekeeping including general facilities 
construction, potable water supply, and geodetic and demolition services.

Doctrine pertaining to civil disturbances and physical security 
encompasses guidance in a number of areas. These include the nature of 
collective human behavior, planning and training for control of civil 
disturbances, 27 and organization and employment of physical security 
assets for a variety of installations and intransit security. 28

The doctrine on psychological operations refers to missions 
assigned forces in a cold war situation. The object of psychological 
operations is to gain support from the host country population for the 
US effort. 29

Intelligence doctrine provides information on the nature of 
intelligence, the intelligence cycle, and intelligence organizations, 
and discusses intelligence in stability operations. The point is made 
that "a significant variation in stability operations intelligence is
that intelligence must place greater emphasis on the population in addition to the three traditional considerations of the enemy ..., weather and "terrain." 30

Civil affairs doctrine is extensive. It is oriented towards IDAD, internal civil disturbance, and post-war military government. 31

Combat service support doctrine deals with the functions of supply, maintenance, and transportation, among others. It, too, is applicable to peacekeeping situations, though not clearly stated so. Other general doctrine includes the law of land warfare, and doctrine on operations in various climatic regions. The doctrine on the law of land warfare does not address peacekeeping. However, it does contain information on those Geneva and Hague conventions ratified by the US. Further, it has information pertinent to handling of prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, civilian persons, occupation and the non-hostile relations between belligerents. Some details appropriate to the functions and tasks of "parliamentaries" and other intermediaries is noted. 32 As an example of doctrine in climatic regions, FM 31-25 describes the nature and characteristics of desert operations. 33

On the basis of the review above, it is apparent that in the past there was limited discussion on a general level of the US Army's role in, and doctrine on, activity akin to peacekeeping and none on peacekeeping per se. This limited discussion was reflected in equally limited consideration of such doctrine at the functional levels though bits and pieces of functional doctrine were relevant. Currently, there is no discussion on a general level and, as the US Army rethinks and "re-manuals" doctrine, the bits and pieces at the functional level
relevant to peacekeeping and allied topics are left without any general formal underpinning. These bits and pieces may be sufficient for now. However, as time passes, it is believed that the gap between doctrine and reality will grow wider. Therefore, US Army doctrine on peacekeeping is evaluated as inadequate.

In summary, there is a wealth of material. Most of the material is written from a political perspective. Some of the material is written from a military frame of reference. The material can be grouped, generally, as historical narrative (factual accounts, autobiographies), practical analysis or theoretical speculation. The material written from a political frame of reference, and even some written from a military viewpoint, generally treats peacekeeping in its political aspects. Little of the material treats the military aspects, particularly in terms of a practical analysis. This effort attempts to provide a practical functional analysis of the military aspects of peacekeeping from a military perspective.

NOTES

3. Ibid., p. 268.
6. Ibid., p. 100.

8. Ibid., p. 124.


16. Ibid.


18. FM 7-20, loc. cit.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.


24. Ibid., p. 7.


27. U. S. Department of the Army, FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, March 1972, pp. 3-1 to 3-4, 6-1 to 6-14, and 7-1 to 7-5.

28. U. S. Department of the Army, FM 19-30, Physical Security, November 1971, pp. 3-5 to 3-6, 7-1 to 7-25.


Chapter III
METHODOLOGY

CASE STUDIES


The sources in this effort span the time from the end of World War II to the present. The results of the research, while set in a UN context, are applicable to regional peacekeeping efforts. They are expected to be valid for at least the next five to eight years.

Each case study contains three basic components. They are a crisis section; a peacekeeping response section; and an analysis section.
In the crisis section, there are three elements: a description of the setting, a short narrative about the immediate crisis, and a short summary. The response section contains four sub-sections: The International Organization, The Peacekeeping Structure, The Peacekeeping Force, Deployment and Activities. Each sub-section has its own summary.

Each case study contains a figure depicting a perception of what is called "the peacekeeping structure". The figure is intended to portray channels of communication, and functional relationships among various actors in the peacekeeping response. Each case study also has a figure showing the general military organization of the peacekeeping force. Abbreviations and symbology used in the charts reflect current North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standard Agreements (STANAG) 2019 (Military Symbols) and 1059, (National Distinguishing Letters). Where STANAG 1059 does not provide suitable abbreviations, a US Army country code is used. Other figures in each case show the force's deployment.

Review of the ABCA peacekeeping was made in Chapter II. Evaluation of the concept will be based on a comparison of trends from the case studies with the individual elements of that concept. Review and evaluation of US Army doctrine was made in Chapter II.

RESTATED PURPOSES

In view of the preceding review of the ABCA concept, review and evaluation of US Army doctrine and the use of the case study method employing a structural-functional approach, it is appropriate at this point to restate the purposes of this research. They are:
(1) to determine the nature and characteristics of international peacekeeping operations based on objective structural and functional examination, comparative analysis, and evaluation of case studies of three UN peacekeeping forces;

(2) to evaluate the ABCA concept for peacekeeping in the light of trends derived from the three case studies, which span the record of modern international peacekeeping efforts, and;

(3) to provide an analysis of peacekeeping operations in order to enhance understanding of the subject in any future development of US Army doctrine on peacekeeping.

FRAMEWORK

In order to accomplish the restated purposes, a framework must be developed. Within the framework, terms must be defined, assumptions stated, relationships established and the scope and limits stated.

Definitions

Earlier, it was stated that peacekeeping is an established feature in international affairs today. Paradoxically, in spite of extensive international experience, academic analysis, and writing, there is, as yet, no precise definition of the term, though one is evolving. (In fact, there is still no agreed spelling. In the US, it is one word; in Canada and UN documents, a hyphenated word; in the UK, two words.)

Boyd notes that the term conveys a general concept which has been
applied loosely on different occasions to describe a wide range of measures, actions or proposals of varying degrees of comprehensiveness that have generally been intended or designed to maintain peace.2

Paul Martin, a former Canadian cabinet minister with an extensive background in peacekeeping efforts, provided a four-part "definition" (written in 1964):

1. Peace-keeping involves the interposition of an international presence in one form or another.

2. The object of peace-keeping is, essentially, to prevent violence from breaking out or to contain or curtail it where it has already broken out. United Nations forces are strictly debarred from taking the initiative in the use of armed force, and, indeed may, use it only as a last resort.

3. Peace-keeping is designed to create or restore, as the case may be, an environment in which a peaceful solution to the problems at issue can at least be contemplated.

4. While peace-keeping is not itself a form of conciliation or mediation, it has been specifically coupled with mediation in some situations and has served to underpin the carrying out of mediatory solutions in others.3

Boyd expands Martin's "definition" to include the requirement that the country or countries where the operation occurs must consent to the operation, and the nations contributing forces maintain the right to withdraw their contributions at any time. He also provides examples of the meaning of the term by referring to various tasks that peacekeeping forces have performed. Such tasks include: fact-finding; observation and surveillance; monitoring a cease-fire, truce, or armistice line or an international boundary; assisting in the maintenance of local law and order or in the creation of peaceful conditions; aiding in the resolution of differences likely to endanger the peace; and other related purposes.4
More recently (1970), the International Peace Academy (IPA) in Vienna defined peacekeeping as

the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.5

For the purpose of this effort, Martin's "definition" of peacekeeping, as expanded and exemplified by Boyd, and the IPA definition are considered appropriate and sufficient without further elaboration. This consideration takes into account two deficiencies. As Boyd notes regarding Martin's view, there is no detailed guidance on the size of the force. Further, there is a lack of precision regarding such problem areas as the manner of force operations, relationships with crisis-settlement procedures and legal aspects.6 These same criticisms apply to the IPA definition. It should be noted that the evolutionary importance of this compact definition takes into account a broader perspective of the total peacekeeping experience including the use of civilians and civil police. On the basis of these definitions then, the larger-scale, international, conventional military operations such as Korea, and the single-nation actions of a similar nature, such as Northern Ireland, can be excluded.

Other definitions must be rendered. A mandate is defined as the will and intent of the international organization (in this paper, the UN) creating the peacekeeping force. The will and intent is expressed in five different documents (or series of documents). The first is the Resolution. This establishes the requirements for keeping the peace, designates the Secretary-General as the executive agent for peacekeeping, and defines his and a peacekeeping structure's general
duties and responsibilities. Next, there are the Status of Forces Agreements. They are negotiated between the UN and the countries -- normally the disputants -- involved in the crisis and on whose territories the force will be deployed and positioned. Third, there are the Force Regulations. These summarize the Resolution and the Status of Forces Agreements and are issued by the Secretary-General to the Force Commander. Fourth, there are the Participating States Agreements between the Secretary-General and the nations providing contingents or other support. And last, there are the Terms of Reference issued by the Secretary-General to the Force Commander. These "are akin to general orders in national armed forces which stipulate the weapons, manpower, and other capabilities at the disposal of the commander."7

Peacekeeping force functions are defined as those "appropriate or assigned duties, responsibilities, missions ... of ... an organization".8 Peacekeeping tasks are considered to be those actions and activities which contribute to, and are component elements of, the peacekeeping force functions, e.g., patrolling, manning observation posts.

Operational units are separately-identified, self-contained military elements of the peacekeeping force. The primary mission of the operational units is to perform those tasks that are part of and support the function or functions for which the force was created. Logistical units are separately-identified, self-contained military units of the peacekeeping force. The primary mission of the logistical units is to perform those tasks that support the existence and internal functioning of the operational units. Operational units may perform
logistical tasks from time to time, e.g., unloading supplies destined for operational units. Logistical units may perform operational tasks from time to time, e.g., providing emergency repairs to public transport vehicles in the interest of assisting a mandated return to normal conditions.

Assumptions

There are a number of assumptions relating to the conceptual basis and the substantive aspects. Conceptually, it is assumed that the conditions fostering a polycentric, loose bi-polar world, nuclear proliferation and international instability will continue. Next, there will be future requirements for peacekeeping operations sponsored and conducted by the UN and regional organizations or through bi-lateral US-USSR agreement. Third, the current modus operandi of ad hoc international peacekeeping operations will continue in the absence of a larger integrated world government role by the UN, or expanded regional government by the several organizations. Fourth, detente will continue. This implies closer US-USSR cooperation on international problems where their interests do not directly conflict. Next, peacekeeping operations will be considered as non-combat duty. Last, the US will consider using US Army units in peacekeeping operations. Substantively, it is assumed that the accepted ABCA concept for peacekeeping is valid for the present, as well as the future as stated.

Relationships

The conceptual relationships for this research are shown in Figure 1. The figure portrays the author's concept of the international organization, in response to a crisis, establishing the mandate (in five
Figure 1. Relationships9
documents) from which flow the requirements for keeping the peace, and the resources, or peacekeeping structure, for meeting those requirements. The requirements are usually stated in the resolutions. The resources consist of several components - some existing; some needing to be created. The resulting peacekeeping structure is usually ad hoc, but with a permanent point of origin, e.g., the UN Secretariat or the OAS's Council of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers.

The requirements state or imply certain peacekeeping missions and functions. The peacekeeping structure contains a peacekeeping force, which deploys to undertake the stated or implied missions and functions. Perhaps in the process, the force assumes other functions within the bounds of the mandate generated by unforeseen conditions. The peacekeeping functions are expressed or exemplified by the performance of peacekeeping tasks. The peacekeeping force contains operational and logistical units which perform those peacekeeping tasks.

Scope and Limits

The scope of the research encompasses three UN peacekeeping operations: UNEF 1, UNFICYP, and UNEF 2. As a result, there is a built-in limit in that any findings and conclusions drawn from comparative analysis of these cases are based on a small sample of the modern peacekeeping record and thus will contain weaknesses inherent in small samples. There is also a limit due to the amount of time available for research and analysis.

Some Questions

The small sample and lack of time notwithstanding, there is an interest in several specific areas. With regard to the first restated
purpose, the conventional wisdom is that each peacekeeping operation is unique. When the settings and origins of the crises, the conditions under which the peacekeeping responses are generated, and the environments in which the peacekeeping forces operate are all considered, there are, of course, distinct differences. Yet, from a functional perspective, there may be certain common features. Therefore, a major question is what are the common features of peacekeeping operations, if any? More specific questions are: What are the nature and characteristics of the requirements for keeping the peace, the resources (the peacekeeping structure) for meeting those requirements, and the relationships between the requirements and resources (dotted line in Figure 1)? What are the nature and characteristics of the peacekeeping missions and functions, the peacekeeping forces, and the relationships between the missions and functions and the force (dotted line)? What are the nature and characteristics of the peacekeeping tasks, the peacekeeping units and the relationships between tasks and units (dotted line)?

For these three cases, these questions may be asked. What are the differences and similarities? What are the strengths and weaknesses.

In the light of the modern peacekeeping record, a second major question can be asked regarding the ABCA concept. Are there any trends in the modern record which may affect the concept?

In the interests of enhancing understanding of peacekeeping in accordance with the third restated purpose, the following questions may be raised. What are some principles of peacekeeping operations? How do peacekeeping forces deploy? What do peacekeeping forces do?
NOTES

9. The terminology and description of the Mandate only are based on Ries, op. cit., p. 10.
Chapter IV

UNEF 1

CRISIS

The Middle East was the general setting for the first UN peacekeeping force. The Sinai Peninsula, from the Gaza Strip in the northeast, to the Suez Canal in the west, to Sharm el Sheikh at the southern tip, was the specific arena. There in the mid-1950's, in spite of UN-sponsored armistice agreements and the presence of UNTSO, Israel's concern for her security, supported by British and French imperial interests, clashed with Egyptian and Palestinian nationalism in a highly complex international milieu.

Three factors stand out in this period ...: Nasser's ascendancy and his eventual nationalization of the Suez Canal; increasing fedayeen raids and Israeli reprisals; and British withdrawal matched by a growing USSR involvement in the Middle East on the side of the Arabs.1

Israel attacked Egypt on October 29, 1956. Two days later, a combined Anglo-French air force attacked Egyptian bases in the Suez Canal area. These attacks culminated a period of rising tension starting with the breakdown of international financial negotiations for the Egyptian Aswan Dam and the nationalization of the Canal in July, and stretching through the breakdown of UK-Egyptian negotiations and USSR warnings in support of the Arabs in September.2

33
In a matter of days, Israeli forces overran fedayeen and Egyptian positions in the Gaza Strip, pushed west across the Sinai desert to points just east of the Canal, and swept south to Sharm el Sheikh. Israeli military action was completed by November 5. The same day, Anglo-French airborne forces parachuted along the Canal and at Port Said, the Canal's northern terminus. The next day, Anglo-French ground forces landed at the port.

Thus, an historic world trouble spot boiled over. The effect was that the international environment was disturbed by a crisis involving two members of the UN Security Council and two neighboring states (one of which violated previously agreed armistice agreements). The immediate result was that the armed forces of three sovereign states were present on the territory of a fourth sovereign state without its consent.

RESPONSE

The International Organization

The day after the Israeli attack, the Security Council met and the US proposed a resolution calling for a ceasefire. The UK and France cast vetoes thereby preventing action. The next day, Yugoslavia, at the time a non-permanent member of the Council, proposed a resolution "invoking the provisions of the Uniting for Peace Resolution".

The Council accepted this resolution and the issue was transferred to the UN General Assembly which met in emergency session during the first week of November. During the session, the Assembly passed a number of resolutions. The US proposed Resolution 997 on November 1, and it was adopted on November 2.
The pertinent elements were:

The General Assembly ...

1. **Urges** as a matter of priority that all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area;

2. **Urges** the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighboring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements;

3. **Recommends** that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution;

4. **Urges** that, upon the cease fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation.

When the disputing parties did not respond, Canada proposed Resolution 998 on November 4. This resolution authorized the UN Secretary-General to plan "with the consent of the nations concerned ... an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities". The Secretary-General submitted his plan the next day, and the Assembly approved it in Resolution 1000. This resolution also formally established UNEF 1 and appointed the commander. It further authorized the commander to form a staff of officers drawn from countries "other than the permanent members of the Security Council", and made the Secretary-General, in effect, the Assembly's executive agent for the peacekeeping operation. Two days later, the Assembly passed Resolution 1001, which called for "balanced composition" in the peacekeeping force.
In the space of a week then, the Assembly accomplished several things. First, it formulated some general principles governing international peacekeeping. Among these principles were consent and neutrality, including proscription of permanent Security Council members. 10

Next, the Assembly established the basic requirements for keeping the peace in this crisis. These requirements were: (1) cease-fire and cease-movement by all belligerents; (2) withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt; (3) observation of the provisions of the existing armistice agreements by Israel and Egypt; (4) no future military actions by the participants in the crisis; (5) re-open the Suez Canal; (6) freedom of navigation on international waterways contiguous to the area; (7) restraint and control of arms into the area; and (8) restraint on belligerent acts by all parties concerned in their international relations.

Third, the Assembly sanctioned the establishment of a temporary peacekeeping structure. It appointed the Secretary-General as the single manager of that structure and authorized him to complete the administrative details. Last, the Assembly provided some of the components of the peacekeeping structure, and furnished additional guidance as to the creation of those components, e.g., the principle of balance in the composition of the peacekeeping force.

The Peacekeeping Structure

The peacekeeping structure contained several components. (See Figure 2). Those elements in existence were the Assembly, the Secretariat, the disputing states and other peacekeeping participating states,
Disputing & other Participating States
Host State
Contributing States
UNRWA
UNTSO
EIMAC

LEGEND
Relationships
Command
Support
Operational control
Coordination
Communication

Structure Components
In existence
Created

Figure 2. The Peacekeeping Structure, Middle East, 1956
the host state, the contributing states, the UN Relief and Works Agency in the Near East for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), and UNTSO with its subordinate mixed armistice commissions. Those elements that needed to be created were the Special Military Advisor, the Advisory Committee, the UN Suez Clearance Organization (UNSCO), and UNEF 1.

The Assembly served as the legislative fountainhead for the international organization's response. The Secretariat and the other bodies were the peacekeeping operators.

The Secretariat had a number of functional subordinate offices which became involved in the operation. These include Public Information (PI), the Comptroller (C), General Services (GS) under which was the Field Operations Service (FOS), Special Political Affairs (SPA), Personnel (P), and Legal Counsel (LC). They were located in New York, and had, or furnished, representatives to the Middle East and UNEF 1.

The Secretary-General, the disputing states, and other participating nations communicated on various political aspects of the larger Middle East problem and on financial matters of the Force. The Secretary-General concluded a Status of Force Agreement with Egypt on November 20, 1956, which included agreement on the Force's right to carry arms and freedom of movement.11 No agreement was worked out with Israel.

The contributing states offered contingents for the Force. Some states provided contingents without any serious limitations on their use, while others provided contingents with some time and manner-of-employment limitations. The Secretary-General concluded agreements with the states concerned on June 21, 1957, and these agreements became part of the mandate.12
The advisors performed their special functions. The military advisor provided military advice on general military matters to the Secretary-General and worked with the SPA on peacekeeping. The committee provided political advice to the Secretary-General in the early life of the Force and then generally became dormant.13

The UNTSO provided the first commander of UNEF 1. It also furnished some of the staff officers of the Force and provided vehicles during the early days of Force operations. As the operation progressed, a subordinate element of UNTSO, the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (EIMAC), was placed under UNEF 1's operational control.14

The UNEF 1 and UNSCO coordinated their early activities. At one point, UNEF 1 supported UNSCO with armed guards for the British and French salvage vessels working in the Suez Canal.15 The UNRWA coordinated with UNEF 1 during the temporary UN administration of the Gaza Strip after the Israeli withdrawal and before the resumption of Egyptian rule in early March 1957. Later, UNRWA also provided storage facilities to UNEF 1.16

Thus, an ad hoc, temporary peacekeeping structure was formed with a permanent focal point in the Secretariat and a single manager in the Secretary-General, who supervised a temporary military peacekeeping force, a temporary salvage element and a permanent social welfare agency. In comparing the components of the structure with the requirements, it is apparent that UNEF 1, supplemented by the EIMAC, was responsible for the cease-fire and cease-movement, the withdrawal of foreign forces, the provisions of the armistice agreements, prevention of future military actions, and freedom of navigation. UNSCO was
responsible for re-opening the Canal as an aid to commerce. The requirement for restraint and control of arms movement in the area was the responsibility of all member nations. The requirement for restraint on belligerent acts was the responsibility of all nations concerned with the crisis and the area, whether physically present or with an announced interest.

The Peacekeeping Force

The Force's mission (though others call it "function")\textsuperscript{17} was, in the words of the Secretary-General

to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian government, in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the other terms established in the resolution of 2 November 1956.\textsuperscript{18}

Early in the contingent selection process, the UNEF 1 commander suggested that

contingents should not be less than battalion size, as a force made of many smaller units of different nations would be difficult to control, from the administrative as well as the tactical viewpoint.\textsuperscript{19}

As to the Force structure, the commander provided further recommendations. For the operational units in the Force he noted that they

should consist initially of six infantry battalions, as this seemed ... to be the minimum needed for stationing along the Armistice Demarcation Line, the force's final task as outlined in the General Assembly Resolutions.\textsuperscript{20}

For the logistical units, the commander noted that the first essential was an intercommunication unit (signal corps) to provide radio and line communication as well as dispatch-rider service between headquarters of the force and components. The following would also be needed: several Platoons of mechanical transport
(each about thirty 2-1/2- or 3-ton trucks) for general
duty; a service corps unit to handle food and other
supplies at the base and distribute them to the troops;
ordnance corps to look after stores and equipment at
the base; a mechanical transport repair workshop company;
and an engineer unit to direct and supervise essential
services for quartering the force - repair of buildings,
provision of water and electricity - and also to handle
the very vital operational task of mine clearance.  

Brazil (BR), Colombia (CO), Denmark (DA) and Norway (NO) combined
(the DANOR battalion), India (IN), Indonesia (ID) and Sweden (SW) fur-
nished the infantry battalions. Yugoslavia (YO) sent an armored recon-
aissance battalion. Finland (FI) provided a large (two-hundred fifty
man) separate infantry company. Canada (CA), which originally offered
an infantry battalion but did not due to Egypt's objection at its title
and uniforms, sent an armored reconnaissance squadron (equivalent to a
US armored cavalry troop). During the life of the Force, the Finnish
and Indonesian units were withdrawn in 1957, the Colombian battalion
left in 1958 and the Canadian squadron rotated without replacement in
1966. Also, in 1966, the Swedish and DANOR battalions began to
alternate their periods of service.  

Canada, India, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia provided the
logistical units or elements, with the first two sending the bulk of
these assets. Canada sent a signals squadron (equivalent to a US
command operations signal company), a field workshop (equivalent to
a US direct support maintenance company), a transportation truck
company of two platoons, a field hospital, and an air transport unit.
Canada also provided additional assets which formed the basis for the
UNEF Engineer company (essentially a facilities engineer unit), UNEF
Ordnance company (ammunition and equipment storage and issue), military
police, base post office, the dental unit, UNEF medical equipment supply depot, and movement control. India sent a communications unit, postal and dental teams, and a composite support unit, which operated supply, petroleum (POL), and subsistence depots, and which also contained a truck platoon that worked with the Canadian company. Norway sent a field ambulance/medical unit, which was later combined with the Canadian medical unit to form the UNEF Hospital. Sweden later alternated with Norway in operating the medical facilities. Yugoslavia provided some engineer elements which appear to have been combined with the UNEF company.23

The strength of the Force varied throughout its life. From a high of approximately 6,000 in September 1957, it sank to a low of approximately 3,300 in May 1967.24

The effect of the UN reaction to the crisis was the creation of a balanced, multinational military force which entered a sovereign nation with its consent as a neutral third party to a dispute. The Force had a mission of helping to maintain quiet and to meet the other requirements for keeping the peace.

The immediate practical result of the UN reaction was the creation of an austere division-sized military force formed from battalion-sized (five-hundred to one-thousand man) contingents. The Force was structured with combat, combat support and combat service support elements. The Force contained nine lightly-equipped subordinate operational units (seven infantry, two armored cavalry) - most with organizational level logistics elements. There were military police, signal, and aviation units in direct support of the Force as whole. There
was no Force-level indirect fire support element. The formation also contained a direct support logistics element. This logistics element had facilities engineer, combat engineer, supply, maintenance, transportation, medical and personnel services elements. An organization chart is at Figure 3.

Deployment and Activities

The initial elements of UNEF 1 hurriedly assembled and staged at the Capodichino Airport, Naples, Italy. The USAF flew the elements from their home states to the staging area. From Italy to Egypt, Swissair (UN commercial charter) handled the airlift. Canada handled her own airlift. The Yugoslav and Brazilian contingents, as well as the bulk of the Canadian elements, came by sea directly to Egypt. Units staging through Italy were provided some equipment from US military stocks in Italy and furnished the distinguishing UN-blue, US-style helmet liners.

Initial UNEF 1 forces entered the area of operations on November 15, 1956, ten days after authorization. Contingents arrived during the next two and one-half months. The Force deployed generally in three phases (see map, Figure 4). The first phase was movement and positioning into the Port Said-Port Fuad-Suez Canal area, and lasted from the time of initial entry until the end of December. The second phase was movement and positioning into and across the Sinai desert as Israeli forces withdrew in four successive stages. This phase lasted from the end of December until March 6, 1957. The third, and for our purposes, final, phase was the deployment into the Gaza Strip along the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL), into the Sinai along the international Frontier.
Figure 3. UNEF 1 Organization Chart
(IF) between Egypt and Israel, and at Sharm el Sheikh at the southern tip. This phase ended when the Force withdrew in May 1967.

The actual positioning of individual contingents varied from time to time, especially in the third phase. This variation was caused by piecemeal arrival of units, expansion of areas of responsibility to cover unit personnel strength reductions (a result of pressures to keep costs down), and the withdrawal of contingents without replacement. The positioning of UNEF 1 shortly before its 1967 withdrawal is shown in Figures 5a and 5b.

During Phase I in and around Port Said, UNEF 1 performed a variety of tasks. One unit was placed "between the Anglo-French and Egyptian positions on the very narrow strip of land . . . which connects Port Said with the mainland . . ."31 Units were also stationed in Port Said and a detachment was placed in Port Fuad. Since joint patrols with Force and Egyptian troops were not agreed to, separate areas in the two cities were set up with Egyptian and Force elements providing area internal security by foot and motor patrols. As more UNEF 1 units arrived, the UN areas of responsibility were expanded.32 A main purpose of the patrols was "to show themselves, and get the people used to the idea of UNEF's being in the city."33

It was also agreed that

The UNEF would gradually take over the guarding of "vulnerable points" such as electricity generating plants, water-pumping and sewage installations, telephone exchanges, food warehouses, and so forth, where sabotage by misguided 'patriots' could have had serious effects for the orderly life of the population."34
Figure 4. Deployment Phases, UNEF 135
Figure 5a. UNEF 1 Deployment Before 1967 Withdrawal.
Figure 5b. UNEF 1 Deployment Before 1967 Withdrawal (Cont.)
Other tasks which UNEF 1 performed included reporting on the observation of the cease-fire by all parties; establishing and maintaining a safety cordon around the Anglo-French withdrawal staging areas; guarding the UNSCO salvage vessels (which necessitated civilian clothing for the UNEF 1 troops to prevent Egyptian complaints); establishing and maintaining check points; and arranging for and supervising the exchange of prisoners-of-war, detainees, and internees held by the Anglo-French and Egyptian forces. 37

The Force also performed tasks which contributed to the reestablishment and maintenance of an orderly way of life in the area. In addition to the "show of presence" patrols, the checkpoints, and the vital installation guards, UNEF 1 trucked food supplies; cleared mine fields; "brought currency to the occupied area in order that normal activities could be resumed,"; investigated smuggling and missing person complaints; and handled the transition of public administration activities including utilities, finance, communications, food and fuel distribution, legal affairs, safety, and health and damage claims from the occupying Anglo-French forces to the Egyptians. 38

During Phase II, UNEF 1 discussed the Israeli withdrawal plans in the Sinai with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The principal purpose was "to ensure that there would be no unforeseen contact between the Israel forces and UNEF." 39 The manner of Israeli withdrawal and Force movement was essentially as follows:

Successive lines were designated behind which the Israel forces would withdraw by certain dates and times; Thereupon the UNEF would follow up to a line approximately five kilometers to the west, and would halt there until the next move forward. UN Military Observers, in their
white jeeps and carrying the UN flag, preceded the UNEF columns, making contact at each stage with the Israelis, and ensuring that each side ended up at the location decided upon.40

Company-sized elements - the small size due to difficulties in providing water across the desert41 - moved on three axes designated as: North Road, Center Road, and South Road (see Figure 4).

Throughout the phase, which took nearly two months to complete, UNEF 1 performed a number of subsidiary peacekeeping tasks in addition to following the Israelis and occupying interposing positions between them and the Egyptians who followed in small force behind UNEF 1 columns. Extensive mine-sweeping was performed "over every foot of the routes . . . traversed."42 The Force negotiated with the Egyptians to repair the Sinai roads and the railroad running along the northern edge of the desert to El Arish. These routes were partially destroyed by the withdrawing Israelis until the Secretary-General intervened to halt the damage. The Force also provided some assistance in the repair effort. The Force, at the request of the Egyptians, ran a supply convoy to St. Catherine's Monastery in the southern Sinai, and arranged and supervised the exchange of prisoners-of-war between the IDF and Egyptian forces.43

Early in Phase III, the Force collaborated with the UNRWA to provide temporary public administration and internal security in the Gaza Strip after the Israelis withdrew and before the Egyptians resumed control. During the inter-regnum, UNEF 1 furnished troops to control the prisons temporarily, guard key installations, quell riots, safeguard public records, man the Gaza telephone exchange and perform other public
administration and internal security tasks as it had done in Port Said. The Force occupied "population centers and camps in the area" established checkpoints to control entry into and exit from the Strip, and patrolled the border to prevent infiltration and line crossing.

As UNEF 1 settled into its positions, it developed routines and a manner of operation which was to last the next ten years. The Force established and manned a series of inter-visible watch-towers and observation posts along a two-hundred seventy-three kilometer line encompassing the ADL and a portion of the IF south of the Gaza area. It set up platoon-sized camps in a five-hundred meter wide zone on the Egyptian side of the ADL. This zone was off-limits to civilians except for agricultural purposes. Company camps were sited near roadways; battalion headquarters were at local administrative district seats. It conducted motor patrols along the rest of the IF and the one-hundred eighty-seven kilometer shoreline along the west side of the Gulf of Aqaba. It established a post at Sharm el Sheikh, thereby giving Israel "some satisfaction" with regard to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran. Further, UNEF 1 set up mobile reserves which could reach trouble spots in ten to fifteen minutes. It conducted night "flashlight ambushes" to catch line crossers along the ADL-IF, and it performed aerial reconnaissance of the line several times a week. It also reported violations of air space and violations of territorial waters.

An issue with respect to UNEF 1's manner of operation, which was never settled, involved the question of the right to shoot "during darkness at infiltrators approaching the line from either direction . . . ", though, of course, the right to shoot in self-defense belongs to UN soldiers. There was considerable negotiation among the Secretary-
You mentioned that negotiations broke down since UNEF I could not operate on Israeli territory and Egypt inhibited the Force's operations its side of the line. Thus, due to the lack of a Status of Forces agreement with Israel, UNEF I's deployment took place in three phases completely on Egyptian territory. The deployment was piece-meal and characterized by positioning units in four ways: to control a static interposition line as between the Anglo-French and Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal and, later, the IDF and Egyptian forces along the ADL; to provide an interposition screen, as along the IF in the desert; to control an area of responsibility as in the port cities and the Gaza Strip during the inter-regnum; and, to control a moving interposition buffer zone as during the movement across the Sinai. In Phase I, the first and third types of positioning were used. In Phase II, the fourth type was used. In Phase III, the first three types were employed. (At Sharm el Sheikh, the UNEF I's area of responsibility covered the waters of the Strait of Tiran.)

The Force's peacekeeping tasks, performed by the operational and logistical units, may be classified into several categories. These categories depend on two principal considerations: (1) the nature of the various "target" or beneficiary groups of people and organizations; and (2) the Force's interest in controlling, influencing, or assisting the behavior and actions of these "targets" or beneficiaries.

One category has as its "target" groups, the Anglo-French and Egyptian armed forces, and the IDF and Egyptian forces. The Force had dual interests: the separation of these two pairs of forces by
occupying and controlling territory between them; and the prevention or inhibition of further fighting between them (as would be characterized by maneuvering towards contact and firing) by establishing outposts and positions and conducting patrols in the line-of-fire of direct fire weapons, all the while under constraint from firing except in self defense. Examples of the first category include the stationing of UNEF 1 units between the Anglo-French and Egyptian forces in the port cities areas; the movement of UNEF 1 elements following the IDF withdrawal, and the establishing and manning of positions along the ADL-IF.

A second category focuses on those dissidents, malcontents, and adventurers in the Egyptian and Israeli populations as a whole who, for whatever reason, sought to disrupt a return to peaceful conditions. Force interest was essentially to pacify these people by its presence, thereby inhibiting their activities somewhat, while operating under constraints on weapons' use. Examples of tasks in this category include the guarding of vital installations in the port cities and the Gaza Strip, and the conduct of patrols and "ambushes" with the objective of interdicting illegal line crossers.

A third category has as its beneficiary groups the Egyptian and Israeli populations as a whole, as well as the Egyptians, Israelis and Palestinians in and near the Gaza Strip. The Force interest here was to provide, by its visible presence, a tranquilizing atmosphere of law and order in which the normal, stabilized and self-sufficient population of an area or city could go about their daily routines safely. Tasks in this category include the "show the flag" patrols, the transfer of
public administration activities between disputants, establishing and manning checkpoints to safeguard legitimate population movement, and explosive ordnance detection, demolition, and removal in populated areas and main highways.

Another group of tasks has as its beneficiaries the disrupted, or non self-sufficient, segments of the normal population, prisoners-of-war, refugees, detainees, and internees. The Force's interest was to alleviate suffering and facilitate the repatriation of persons to their proper territories or areas. Such tasks include supplying the Monastery, arranging for and supervising the exchange of prisoners-of-war, refugees, detainees, and internees, and providing transportation as required. Also, this category includes distributing food and fuel supplies, and other activities aimed at alleviating the suffering of the local population over and above the restoration of normal public administration services.

A last category focuses on other UN elements of the peacekeeping structure. The Force interest was to assist those components in performing their duties. Examples here include providing guards for UN installations and activities other than those of UNEF 1, and providing manpower and equipment on a temporary basis in support of the objectives of other UN agencies, e.g., guarding the prisons in the Gaza Strip.

ANALYSIS

This crisis was political in origin, and primarily military in shape and content. It was characterized by the presence of the armed forces of three sovereign nations on the territory of a fourth sovereign
nation without its consent. The crisis caused an international organization to react. The reaction was political in origin, and political, military, economic and social in shape and content with emphasis on the latter three aspects.

The organization explicitly generated three principles governing the nature and characteristics of international peacekeeping. These principles were: consent, neutrality, and balanced peacekeeping force composition. During the course of the operation, additional principles were generated: single-manager peacekeeping operations management (as is apparent from the "command" relationship), weapons used only for self-defense, and freedom of movement.

The organization delineated the requirements for keeping the peace in this crisis and matched resources to those requirements by authorizing, in effect, a peacekeeping structure. The nature of the requirements was a mixture of political, military and economic aspects, and characterized by ambiguity with respect to the political aspects, and a sense of urgency and practicality with respect to the military and economic aspects. The nature of the resources (the peacekeeping structure) was a mixture of political, military, economic and social elements governed by the principles of consent and neutrality. The structure was ad hoc and temporary in intent of duration and reflected the single-manager principle. The nature of the relationship between the structure and the requirements was essentially political, with military, economic and social overtones. The relationship relied heavily on the principles of consent and neutrality.
The Peacekeeping Force was the military component of the peacekeeping structure. The Force had a mission to maintain quiet and to meet the other requirements for keeping the peace. The mission indicated a function of prevention initially, and later was interpreted as indicating a function of pacification. The nature of the mission was military, yet was essentially peaceful governed as it was by the principles of consent, neutrality, and weapons use. The mission was characterized by imprecision regarding details of manner of operation and tasks to be performed. The nature of the Force was a multi-national, self-contained military formation also governed by the principles of consent, neutrality, and balance. The character of the Force was a lightly-equipped, semi-mobile, austere division-sized formation with combat, combat support and combat service support elements. The assembly and movement of the Force to the scene was hurried and disorderly for initial elements - taking ten days from date of authorization and leisurely for the final contingents. Final assembly of the Force took nearly three months from the date of initial authorization. The Force's deployment was piece-meal, as elements arrived, in three phases into population centers and along lines of contact. Four forms of unit positioning were used: a static interposition line, an interposition screen, an area of responsibility, and a moving interposition buffer zone. The nature of the relationship between the Force's mission and functions, and its composition, size and deployment was essentially military, with political overtones, and was governed by the principles of consent, freedom of movement and weapons use. The relationship was characterized
by positioning the force on the territory of only one of the disputing states, and orienting on groups of people and organizations.

The Force's operational and logistical components were infantry and armored cavalry units, Force-level signal, military police and aviation elements, and a direct support logistics group. These military units performed a variety of tasks which can be grouped into categories. By definition, these categories are functions. The nature of the Force's tasks, and therefore functions, was a mixture of military, economic, social welfare, and public administration activities. These tasks and functions can be characterized by the labels: prevention, pacification, normalization, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping support. The relationship between the Force's components and the tasks was governed by the mission statement, the principles of consent and neutrality, and the recognition of unfilled human needs and unforeseen internal functional and administrative requirements of a peacekeeping structure. The nature of the relationship was a mixture of military, political, economic and social aspects and resulted in the generation of functions (normalization, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping support) not foreseen during the initial planning and implementation of the peacekeeping response.

NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 8.


12. Ibid., pp. 325-335.

13. Ibid., p. 274.


15. Ibid., p. 86.

16. Ibid.

17. See, for example, Bowett's typology of functions in Chapter II.


19. Burns, op. cit., p. 188.


23. Ibid. See also pp. 77-78 and Higgins, op. cit., p. 306.
24. Wainhouse, ibid., p. 142.
25. Ibid., p. 64.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 66.
30. Figure is based on data from Wainhouse, ibid., pp. 77-78, 104-113 (see Note 23) and Indar Jit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjoern Egge, The Thin Blue Line (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 56-57.
32. Burns, ibid., pp. 227-228.
33. Ibid., p. 228.
34. Ibid., p. 227.
35. Figure is based on Burns, ibid., p. 319.
36. Figures 5a and 5b are based on UN Map 727, July 1967, reproduced in Wainhouse, op. cit., pp. 130-131.
38. Ibid., p. 73.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 242.
44. Rosner, op. cit., pp. 73, 88.
45. Ibid., p. 88.
46. Wainhouse, _op. cit._, p. 9.

47. Rikhye, Harbottle, and Egge, _op. cit._, p. 55.


50. Ibid., p. 102.


52. James A. Stegegna, _The United Nations Force In Cyprus_ (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968). Stegegna uses this term and "normalization" as his method for categorizing the tasks and activities of UNFICYP. This method was the inspiration for the author to examine the tasks of the three UN Forces from a behavioral control and influence perspective, and refine the categories of tasks and functions.
Chapter V

UNFICYP

CRISIS

The Middle East was the general setting for what was to become the longest, continuously operating UN peacekeeping force. The Mediterranean island of Cyprus was the specific arena. There, in the early 1960's, irreconcilable differences between the two ethnic communities, intermingled throughout the island and forming the state, created conditions which threatened international stability in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean region. The conflict between the two communities stemmed from a centuries-old Greek Cypriot desire for enosis, or union with Greece, and the Turkish Cypriot desire for taksim, or partition into separate ethnic enclaves. Overshadowing this conflict, which had been kept in check by nearly three hundred years of Turkish rule and nearly eighty years of British control, were the concerns of Greece and Turkey for their cultural brethren on the island, a general western concern about the impact of the crisis on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and in the opinion of some writers, the ambitions of a few men.¹

Armed elements of the two communities clashed in early December 1963, in various places throughout the island. The causes of the fighting were a breakdown in the state's constitution "with its extraordinary features for protecting -- in fact fostering -- the rights
of the Turkish Cypriot community . . ."², a breakdown in government day-to-day operations, and Turkish and Turkish Cypriot rejection at the end of November of proposed amendments to the constitution.

On December 27, the UK, Greece and Turkey, with the concurrence of the president of Cyprus, established a Joint Truce Force (JTF). The UK began peacekeeping patrols in Nicosia, the capital, using troops from its Sovereign Base Areas on the southern side of the island.³ The Cyprus UN representative called for a meeting of the UN Security Council the same day, but no action was taken.⁴

In mid-January, the UN Secretary-General dispatched a personal representative to the island to monitor the situation.⁵ Throughout January and into February, numerous mediation and peacekeeping proposals appeared in the UK government and NATO circles, e.g., "a 10,000-man NATO force (including U. S. troops), with a non-NATO, but Western mediator; there was also a Commonwealth force version."⁶ However, the many suggestions failed to bear fruit and "with predictions of Turkish invasion and Greco-Turkish war rampant, Britain threw the problem to the UN Security Council . . ."⁷

Thus, the internal pressures of an island nation bubbled up. The effect was that the international environment was disturbed by a crisis involving four UN members (one of which was a permanent member of the Security Council), and three of which were also members of a multilateral defense organization. Compounding the crisis were the facts that the disputing elements were intermingled throughout the island, Greece and Turkey had military elements on the island, Turkish forces were forty miles away on the mainland and in the adjacent waters, and the UK sought to protect her base rights.
RESPONSE

The International Organization

When the crisis erupted, the Secretary-General, as noted earlier, sent a representative - an Indian general officer with extensive experience in peacekeeping - to the scene to monitor the situation. But, only when the non-UN mediation efforts failed, and the UK raised the issue in the Security Council on February 18, 1964, did the organization effectively get involved. The debate resulted in a resolution adopted on March 4, 1964.

Since the resolution, in Wainhouse's words, "was arrived at only after an agonizing balancing act by its sponsors" seeking to merge widely varying views, it is useful to note it in full:

The Security Council

Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution,

Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the Treaties signed at Nicosia on August 16, 1960,

Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,"

1. Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace;
2. Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;

3. Calls upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint:

4. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The commander of the force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep the governments providing the force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation;

5. Recommends that the function of the force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions;

6. Recommends that the stationing of the force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose;

7. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, a mediator, who shall use his best endeavors with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as appropriate, for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator and his staff.
In the space of approximately three weeks, then, the Council accomplished several things. First, the Council reemphasized the principles of consent, and single-manager peacekeeping operations management (this time explicitly, in contrast to UNEF 1 where it was only implied) in international peacekeeping operations. The principles of balance (in a political sense) and neutrality were modified by the principle of consent and resulted in selection of contingents from those nations acceptable to the governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the UK, the last three named being members of NATO. Therefore, there was little doubt that Warsaw Pact or other communist nations would not be selected to participate in the force.

Next, the Council established the requirements for keeping the peace in this crisis. These requirements were: (1) cessation of on-going violence and bloodshed; (2) no intervention by outside states; (3) cessation of threats of intervention; (4) prevention of recurrence of fighting; (5) restoration of law and order; (6) maintenance of law and order; (7) return to normal conditions; (8) promotion of a peaceful solution to the problems; and (9) settlement of the internal problems by Cyprus, the communities and interested outside states.

Third, the Council authorized the establishment of a peacekeeping structure. It appointed the Secretary-General as the single-manager of that structure and, in essence, authorized him to complete the details of the mandate, including selection of the commander of the Force. This differed from UNEF 1 where the Assembly selected that commander. Last, the Council authorized one of the components of the
structure, the peacekeeping force, and gave the Secretary-General guidance to provide another: a political mediator. This was also a difference from UNEF 1 where there was no political mediation element on the scene in Egypt.

The Peacekeeping Structure

The peacekeeping structure contained several components as did the UNEF 1 structure (see Figure 6). Those elements in existence were the Council, the Secretariat, the Secretary-General’s Cyprus representative, the host state, the states contributing to the peacekeeping force, the states participating in the mediation effort, the JTF, and the two Cypriot ethnic communities. Those elements that needed to be created on a temporary basis were the peacekeeping force and the mediator.

The Council, in contrast to the General Assembly for UNEF 1, served as the legislative fountainhead for the international organization’s response. The Secretariat and the other bodies were the peacekeeping operators. The Secretariat’s subordinate offices became involved in the operation. The contributing states furnished contingents to the Force. All such states had extensive prior experience in peacekeeping operations under UN auspices (Canada) or on a unilateral basis (UK). The Secretary-General concluded agreements with the States, albeit not until 196611, and these agreements became part of the mandate. The Secretary-General worked out a Status of Forces Agreement with Cyprus (also in 1966), which became a part of the mandate.12
The Peacekeeping Structure, Cyprus 1964

LEGEND

Notes:
1. JTF dissolved; UK elements merged with UNFICYP
2. SG Representative staff merged with UNFICYP

Relationships
Command
Support
Mediation
Communication

Structure Components
In existence
Created

Figure 6. The Peacekeeping Structure, Cyprus 1964
As noted earlier, a UN mediator was added to the structure in contrast to UNEF 1. He was charged with working out, in consultation with the states participating in mediation (Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the UK) and the ethnic communities on the island, a solution to the long-standing problems.

The Secretary-General's representative and his staff were merged with UK elements from the JTF to form the UNFICYP staff\(^3\), and the JTF was dissolved. In practice, the military components of UNIFCYP and the UN Special Representative (the mediator) were considered as UNFICYP in toto. However, the military commander and the special representative had co-equal status with respect to the Secretary-General.\(^4\)

Therefore, an ad hoc, temporary peacekeeping structure was formed with a permanent focal point in the Secretariat, and a single-manager in the Secretary-General who supervised a temporary military-civilian peacekeeping force and a temporary political peacemaking mediator. In comparing the components of the structure with the requirements, it is apparent that the host state was responsible for a cessation of the ongoing violence and bloodshed. All outside states were responsible for complying with the requirements of non-intervention and cessation of threats of intervention. Prevention of the recurrence of fighting was a responsibility of UNFICYP. The host state, the ethnic communities, and UNFICYP were jointly responsible for restoration of law and order, maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions. The
mediator was responsible for promoting a peaceful solution to the problems. The host state, the communities, the interested outside states and the mediator were jointly responsible for obtaining an agreed settlement to those problems.

The Peacekeeping Force

The mission of the Force was, in the words of the resolution to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.15

As noted earlier, the principles of neutrality and balance in the composition of the force were applied, in accordance with the principle of consent, on a selective, political basis, i.e., no Warsaw Pact or other communist countries. Further, Cyprus ruled out the participation of Afro-Asian nations.16 Nine states provided contingents or other elements to UNFICYP. They were: Australia (AS), Austria (AU), Canada (CA), Denmark (DA), Finland (FI), Ireland (EI), New Zealand (NZ), Sweden (SW), and the UK. The US offered some transportation and other logistical support.

With regard to the number of operational units required for the operation, Wainhouse notes:

The 6 districts into which Cyprus was divided for local government purposes suggested that 5 other major contingents, in addition to the British, would make for a rational deployment arrangement.17

These major contingents were expected to be "lightly equipped, fully self-sustaining units".18
With regard to the logistical units, this operation was fortunate to set up in the "supermarket parking lot" i.e., near the UK Sovereign Base Areas. Thus, logistical efforts in direct support of the self-sustaining contingents, and those smaller elements without a logistics element, could rely on UK logistical units and depots readily available in the Base Areas.

Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the UK furnished infantry battalions. The Canadians included an anti-tank platoon and the Finns had heavy mortars. Canada and the UK each provided one reconnaissance squadron. There is some question as to the exact content of the UK contingent in the early days. There were as many as three infantry battalions, and some artillery units. The infantry element was scaled down and the artillery eliminated. Austria provided a field hospital. The UK appears to have dedicated the following units to UNFICYP: an ordnance detachment, a transport squadron (equivalent to a US truck company), a field workshop, a military police company, an army aviation unit, and a detachment of air force helicopters.

A feature of UNFICYP was the incorporation of a sizable civilian police contingent: the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL). Australia, Austria, Denmark, New Zealand, and Sweden provided personnel for this element, which numbered about 175.

The strength of the Force was approximately 6,400, at the start. It scaled down through the years to about 3,500.

The effect of the UN reaction to the crisis was the creation of a balanced, multi-national, combined military and civilian force which entered a sovereign nation with its consent. The Force had a
mission of preventing the recurrence of fighting; assisting in the restoration and maintenance of law and order and the return to normal conditions, and assisting the other peacekeeping components to meet the requirements in the resolution for keeping the peace.

The immediate practical result of the UN reaction was the creation of an austere division-sized military force formed from self-contained battalion-sized contingents. The Force was structured with combat, combat support and combat service support elements. A significant feature of the composition was the incorporation of operational units belonging to a permanent UN Security Council member. Another significant feature was the reliance on a single nation logistics operator. A third important element was the employment of a civilian police unit.

The Force contained eight subordinate operational units (six infantry, two armored cavalry) and the civilian police unit. The Force had anti-tank and limited indirect fire support capabilities. The major maneuver elements contained organizational, and some direct support, combat support and combat service support elements. The formation was supported by a direct support/general support logistics group. This logistics group had military police, supply, maintenance, transportation, aviation and medical units. An organization chart is at Figure 7.

Deployment and Activities

It has been said that "UNFICYP 'crawled' into place", primarily because the initial elements, those of the UK, were already in positions throughout the island. The incorporation of new contingents
Figure 7. UNFICYP Organization Chart
was facilitated by early reconnaissance carried out by UN and contributing states' advance parties.

Canada sent its contingent in March. The other states moved their units in during April and May. The USAF, Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), and the Royal Air Force (RAF) provided transportation. Some Canadian units also came by sea.

The Force became operational on March 27, 1964 with Canadian and UK elements, and, thus, can be considered as deploying in one phase. The other contingents deployed throughout the island as they arrived. The initial zones are shown in Figure 8. Over the life of the Force, there were numerous shifts in zone designations and actual positioning of units. One such change was occasioned by the transfer of certain elements to activate UNEF 2 in 1973. A more recent change was caused by the Turkish invasion in July 1974.

Throughout its existence, UNFICYP has performed - and is performing - a wide range of tasks. The UNCIVPOL policemen act as "investigators, observers, negotiators, mediators, reporters - and father confessors". The element "mans police posts in sensitive areas", "provides liaison officers at certain Greek and Turkish Cypriot police stations", "carries out street, urban and rural patrols", and "helps to supervise the harvesting and cultivation of crops by one community in areas adjacent to or under the control of the other." The military elements manned the so-called Green Line (from the color of the map-marking pencil) in Nicosia which was drawn between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in that city. They also manned outposts and patrolled between the entrenched positions of the
two communities' armed elements in the Kyrenia pass and road area and
the Lefka district. During various crises, UNFICYP elements deployed
mobile reserves into defense positions between armed groups of Greek and
Turkish Cypriots in a direct local interposition maneuver to forestall
violence.

The military elements also conducted other tasks designed to
prevent recurrence of fighting, and to contribute to restoration and
maintenance of law and order. These included clarifying cease-fire
lines by marking with paint on the pavement or large immovable rocks
and marking identical maps kept by the opposing sides and UNFICYP;
persuading and negotiating both sides to increase distances between
themselves and eliminating "check points, road barriers, fortifications
and other evidences of confrontation"; establishing and operating
"political liaison committees to meet separately with each opponent";
dismantling new fortifications as they appeared; negotiating with the
opponents to reduce the number of men under arms in local areas;
intervening in the event of a shooting; forcibly disarming opponents
as necessary; forcibly demolishing "fortifications, trenches, gun nests";
providing armed protection (returning fire) of citizens under attack
during harvest; observing and protesting to opponents on arms smuggling
even though the right to stop arms smuggling was granted; searching,
arresting and detaining opponents' personnel on Force premises;
searching persons and vehicles on roadways under Force control which
were "carrying arms or other warlike stores", and controlling traffic
by using convoys and checkpoints.
The Force performed a large number of tasks designed to assist and enhance a return to normal conditions. It acted as a link between disputants via the use of liaison officers by identifying significant problems, seeking the disputants' views, proposing solutions, and arranging for mutually agreeable solutions. The Force reintegrated the disputants into the day-to-day functioning of the government and the bureaucracy, and restored public utilities - telephone, electricity and water - by providing actual service, restoring the billing process, and supervising the construction of auxiliary water supplies.

Public mail service was restored through Force-arranged agreements to provide service, and by using Force vehicles to distribute mail. The Force assisted in restoring social insurance and welfare programs and activities by escorting social workers on their inspection and verification visits. It also aided education by re-opening closed schools, escorting teachers and students, and distributing school supplies, and made attempts to assist the courts and other legal officials to perform their duties.36

The Force conducted surveys to determine the impact of restrictions imposed by the Greek Cypriots on the Turkish Cypriots. It supervised the reconstruction and repair efforts throughout the country to insure that building materials were not used to build fortifications, or for other unpeaceful purposes. The Force prepared special relief distribution plans, and escorted and transported approved shipments of restricted materials.
Normal civilian traffic patterns throughout the island were restored by the Force. It provided escort service to school children, judges, lawyers, farmers, merchants and priests. It also operated mobile patrols and maintained a watch over Cypriot government-operated checkpoints.

The Force was involved in agriculture by plowing, sowing, cultivating, fertilizing, and harvesting crops, and escorting farmers to do those tasks. It helped reopen and guard a seed cleaning plant. During one growing season, the Force helped "salvage citrus orchards". It arranged for irrigation of orchards, collected the fees from the owners, and paid the irrigation costs. Additionally, it helped the farmers by working out water supply and irrigation problems, repairing farm equipment, and obtaining fertilizer and fuel for tractors and irrigation equipment.

The Force fought forest fires and investigated arson cases. It helped shops and markets in the towns to re-open and guarded against looting. The Force arranged for export of crops, set up meetings between businessmen on problems, and conducted property damage surveys and cost analysis.37

The Force assisted relief operations in a number of ways. It coordinated with the International Red Cross and Red Crescent societies to unload, store and distribute food, clothing and medical supplies; conduct food surveys; provide emergency medical treatment and emergency food resupply; conduct medical inspections; build schools and shower facilities for refugee children; and prepare technical plans for food
storage and distribution. It located missing persons, secured the release of hostages, and, in general, attempted to foster trust and confidence within the population.38

In view of the wide range of activities, Stegegna writes:

The United Nations troops have done yeoman service on such a variety of problems that one is tempted to suggest that the ideal peace force soldier would be a Scandinavian farm boy who had gone to the city, quit medical school, and spent a few years as a construction worker before becoming a labor union negotiator.39

As noted earlier, UNFICYP deployed throughout the island in a piece-meal manner in one phase. The deployment was characterized by three basic types of unit positioning: an area of responsibility with a static interposition line between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot armed elements, as exemplified by the Green Line in Nicosia; a static interposition buffer zone, as exemplified by the deployment in the Kyrenia pass area; and an area of responsibility as exemplified by the contingents' deployment throughout the rest of the country.

The Force's peacekeeping tasks may be classified into the same categories as those for UNEF 1. The first category is Prevention, which focuses on the armed elements of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. An example of the Prevention category is the temporary interposition of UNFICYP units at crisis situations, such as during the Melousha incident on July 24, 1964 which involved a face-off between Greek Cypriot elements and UNFICYP Swedish troops.40

The second category is Pacification and has as its target those dissident elements in both communities who sought to disrupt the process of normalization. Examples of the Pacification category include the armed protection of farmers harvesting their crops, the dismantling of fortifications and the search for arms and other "warlike stores".
The third category is Normalization which has as its beneficiary group, the entire population of the country. This category can be further divided into four sub-categories: political, public administration, economic and social. An example of the political sub-category is the on-the-spot, local arbitration of minor disputes. An example of public administration is the restoration of public utilities. The economic surveys and assistance to agriculture and commerce are examples of the economic sub-category. Assistance to education and social welfare programs are examples of the social sub-category.

The fourth category is Humanitarian Assistance, which has as its beneficiaries, refugee elements in the population and others in the population as a whole who, for one reason or another, were in an emergency medical or survival situation. The Humanitarian Assistance category contains such tasks as building schools for refugee children, escorting social welfare workers and providing emergency medical treatment.

The last category is Peacekeeping Support, which has as its objective, the other elements of the existing peacekeeping structure and any future structures. Peacekeeping Support tasks include assistance to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Society to unload, store and distribute food supplies, and provision of units to UNEF 2.

ANALYSIS

This crisis was political in origin, but in contrast to UNEF 1, it was primarily political, social and economic in shape and content, though there were military overtones. It was characterized by civil
disturbances, social conflict, economic disruption and chaos in public administration. The crisis led to the involvement of an international organization by invitation (also in contrast to UNEF 1), after the states involved failed to work out a solution. The response was primarily political and military in shape and content, with emphasis on the former.

The organization reaffirmed two of the general principles of international peacekeeping (consent and single-manager peacekeeping operations management), and established a new principle: concurrent peacekeeping-peacemaking. But, it modified two other established principles - neutrality and balance (in a political sense) - in accordance with the principle of consent.

The nature of the requirements for keeping the peace was the same as with UNEF 1, with the addition of recognition for the need to normalize social conditions. The requirements can be characterized as urgent and practical with respect to the military aspects, and ambiguous with respect to the details of the political, economic and social aspects. The nature of the resources was in many ways similar to UNEF 1, though a separate, co-equal political peacemaking mediator was added in this case and there was no economically-oriented component (as was UNSCO). The characteristics were the same as for UNEF 1. The relationship between the requirements and resources was the same as with UNEF 1: political, with military, economic and social overtones.

The UNFICYP mission indicated the functions of prevention and pacification which UNEF 1's mission did, as well as normalization, which UNEF 1's mission did not. The nature, characteristics, and governing principles of UNFICYP's mission were the same as UNEF 1: military,
peaceful and imprecise with regard to the details of operation and tasks to be performed. The nature, characteristics, and governing principles of the Peacekeeping Force were similar to UNEF 1 with four important distinctions. These distinctions were: the principle of balance in force composition was modified by the principle of consent which limited the sources of force contingents; the principle of neutrality was modified to permit the incorporation of units from a UN Security Council permanent member; a civilian police element was included; and a single-nation logistics operation was adopted. The assembly and movement of the force was orderly, in contrast to UNEF 1, principally because components were already in place and there was time to plan. The time of complete assembly of the Force was the same as UNEF 1 - about three months from date of initial authorization. As with UNEF 1, the deployment was piece-meal, though in only one phase. Three forms of positioning were used: a static interposition buffer zone; an area of responsibility with a static interposition line; and an area of responsibility. The nature of the relationship between the Force's mission and functions and its composition, size and deployment was a mixture of political, military, economic and social aspects in contrast to UNEF 1's essentially military and political aspects. Since deployment was throughout the island, with the consent of the Cyprus government, freedom of movement was greater than in UNEF 1, though the constraints on use of weapons in self-defense still held. As with UNEF 1, UNFICYP oriented on groups of people and organizations.
The nature and characteristics of the Force's operational and logistical units and the tasks and functions, and the relationship between them, were essentially the same as for UNEF I, but did result in generation of the humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping support functions.

NOTES


2. Ibid., p. 407.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p. 409.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 113.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 424.

14. Ibid., p. 420

15. Ibid., p. 412.


18. Ibid., p. 427.
19. Ibid., p. 403.
20. Ibid., p. 449.
21. Ibid., p. 487.
22. Ibid., p. 555.
23. Ibid., p. 503.
25. Based on computations using figures in Wainhouse, op. cit., p. 506.
27. Figure is based on data from Wainhouse, op. cit., pp. 441-442, 447, 449, 451-452, 460, 468, 474, 478-479, and 508.
29. Ibid., p. 438.
31. Ibid.
33. Figure based on a map in Stegegna, op. cit., p. 96.
36. Ibid., pp. 139-142.
37. Ibid., pp. 144-147.
38. Ibid., pp. 142-143.
39. Ibid., p. 147.
40. Ibid., p. 77-78.
Chapter VI

UNEF 2

CRISIS

The Middle East was once again the general setting for another UN peacekeeping operation. The Suez Canal area (and the western part of the Sinai desert) was the specific arena. There, in October 1973, Egyptian revenge, as part of a wider concerted action by Arab nations and supported by USSR policy to maintain influence in the area, clashed with Israeli protective expansionism, supported by US policy to maintain a balance in the region.

Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in a coordinated effort on October 6, 1973 opening what is known as the Yom Kippur War. Egypt assaulted Israel's defenses on the east bank of the Suez Canal; Syria attacked in the Golan Heights. The attacks culminated a six year period of Egyptian and Syrian military reorganization, rearmament and training, dating from the so-called Six-Day War in June 1967. (In that war, which started even as UNEF 1 was withdrawing, the Israelis conducted a surprise air attack on Egypt, carried out a rapid exploitation campaign sweeping to the east bank of the Canal, and occupied the entire Sinai Peninsula. At the same time, Israel seized the Golan Heights along the Israeli-Syrian border.)
During the period October 6-8, Egyptian forces penetrated Israel's Bar-Lev Line and pushed into the western quarter of the Sinai desert only to stop short of conducting a full exploitation and pursuit. Israeli forces counterattacked during the period October 9-13 forcing the Egyptians to consolidate. The Egyptians attempted to renew their offensive on October 14, but Israeli forces held. During October 15-17, the Israelis launched Operation Gazelle which succeeded in crossing the Suez Canal and penetrating Egyptian positions. The Israeli forces exploited their success during the period October 18-24, beating off Egyptian counterattacks, cutting off the Egyptian Third Army on the east bank of the Suez and widening the salient on the west bank of the canal. A cease-fire commenced on October 24 (see Figure 9).

Thus the Middle East cauldron boiled over. The effect on the international environment was the same as in 1956 and 1967. The principal actors were the same and the principal supporters of the disputing parties were the same. A significant difference between the military situation in 1956 or 1967 and 1973 was that Israeli forces crossed the Canal, trapped a sizable Egyptian force on the east bank, and were in a threatening position with regard to Cairo. The immediate result was that the armed forces of one sovereign state were on the territory of another sovereign state without its consent.

RESPONSE

The International Organization
Figure 9. Sinai Front, October 18-24, 1973.
When the war began, the US and USSR conducted intensive consultations which culminated in the UN Security Council in late October. They sponsored Resolution 338 on October 22 calling for a cease-fire. But, the cease-fire broke down the next day, and Israeli forces pressed more attacks. The US and USSR then sponsored Resolution 339 which again called for cease-fire and added the provision of a return to the positions of October 22.

Israel finally agreed to a cease-fire on October 24, but did not withdraw. Egypt, then, requested US and USSR troops to force Israel to withdraw. The USSR sought to force the request on the US but, the US refused and went on alert. The result was that the USSR backed down.3

On October 25, the Council adopted Resolution 340. The pertinent elements were:

The Security Council . . .

1. Demands that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations military observers on both sides;

3. Decides to set up immediately under its authority a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations except the permanent members of the Security Council, and requests the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on an urgent and continuing basis on the state of implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973);
5. Requests all Member States to extend their full co-operation to the United Nations in the implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

The same day, the Secretary-General proposed to send certain contingents from UNFICYP to Egypt. He appointed the UNTSO Chief of Staff as the acting commander of UNEF 2 and authorized him to form a UNEF 2 staff from UNTSO assets.

The next day, the Secretary-General presented his plan, which contained the Terms of Reference:

(a) The Force will supervise the implementation of operative paragraph 1 of resolution 340 (1973).

(b) The Force will use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting, and co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in its humanitarian endeavors in the area.

(c) In the fulfillment of its tasks, the Force will have the co-operation of the military observers of UNTSO.

The Secretary-General also outlined "three essential conditions... for the Force to be effective." These were: "the full confidence and backing of the Security Council"; "the full co-operation of the parties concerned"; and the ability "to function as an integrated and efficient military unit."

Thus, in the space of a week, the Council accomplished several things. First, it re-emphasized time-tested principles of international peacekeeping and elaborated three more. These were, in essence, the unconditional and full support of the Force sponsor (the Security Council), freedom of movement for the Force, and Force military efficiency as an integrated entity. Next, the Council established the basic requirements for keeping the peace in this crisis. These
requirements were: (1) cease-fire; (2) return to specified positions by both belligerents; (3) co-operation by all member states in implementing the cease-fire and return to specified positions; (4) no future military actions; and (5) humanitarian assistance.

Third, the Council authorized the establishment of a peacekeeping structure. It appointed the Secretary-General as the focal point of that structure and authorized him to complete the details of the mandate.

Last, the Council provided one of the components of the peacekeeping structure: UNEF 2. It also provided guidance to the Secretary-General on enhancing the structure by authorizing him to increase UNTSO's activities in the area.

The Peacekeeping Structure

As with UNEF 1 and UNFICYP, the peacekeeping structure contained several components. (See Figure 10.) Those elements in existence were the Council, the Secretariat, the disputing states, the host state, the participating states, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Geneva Peace Conference, UNFICYP and UNTSO. Those elements that needed to be created were UNEF 2; UNDOF (in June 1974); and the Military Working Group (MWG).

The Council in contrast with UNEF 1, but as with UNFICYP, served as the legislative fountainhead for the international organization's response. The Secretariat and the other bodies were the peacekeeping operators.
Figure 10. The Peacekeeping Structure, Middle East, 1974.
The Secretariat as before provided civilian elements to the Force's administrative and logistics efforts. The disputing states and the Secretary-General communicated on various political matters. The contributing states provided contingents to the Force at the request of the Secretary-General or approved the transfer of elements from UNFICYP. The Secretary-General concluded agreements with these states and these agreements became part of the mandate. Egypt agreed to the presence of UNEF 2 in a letter to the Secretary-General in October 27, 1973, and this Status of Forces agreement became part of the mandate also. Since Israel occupied the Sinai (a part of Egypt) - and had done so since the 1967 War - no Status of Forces Agreement was necessary.

The UNFICYP provided the initial contingents to UNEF 2, and UNEF 2 obtained operational control of the military observers of UNTSO. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO became the acting (later permanent) commander of UNEF 2. The ICRC and UNEF 2 coordinated efforts on humanitarian assistance, while a Military Working Group, with the Force commander as chairman, was established within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference to discuss disengagement plans between the Israeli and Egyptian forces, and later between Israel and Syria. When UNDOF was established in June 1974, UNEF 2 furnished the initial elements and currently provides some of the logistical support.

Thus there arose another ad hoc, temporary peacekeeping structure with a permanent focal point in the Secretariat and a single-manager in the Secretary-General. A significant point was that the initial elements of the peacekeeping force of this structure were derived from another peacekeeping structure's peacekeeping force. In comparing
The components of the structure with the requirements, it is apparent that UNEF 2, supplemented by UNTSO, was responsible for the immediate cease-fire, the return to specified positions; and the prevention of future military actions. The disputing states acting through the Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference were responsible for cooperating with UNEF 2 and UNTSO in these activities. The ICRC, assisted by UNEF 2, was responsible for humanitarian activities.

The Peacekeeping Force

The mission of the Force as outlined in the Terms of Reference was

To supervise the implementation of paragraph 1 of the Council's resolution 340 (1973), which demanded the immediate and complete observance of the cease-fire and return to the positions of 22 October 1973; . . . to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting and to co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its humanitarian endeavors in the area.15

The Secretary-General "bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation"16 requested thirteen nations to provide contingents. Twelve responded. They were: Austria (AU), Canada (CA), Finland (FI), Ghana (GH), Indonesia (ID), Ireland (EI), Nepal (NP), Panama (PN), Peru (PE), Poland (PL), Senegal (SG), and Sweden (SW).17 The Austrian, Finnish, Irish and Swedish contingents were transferred from UNFICYP, after consultation with Cyprus and a promise to replace them.18 Later these contingents were reinforced by additional elements. Australia, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), UK, US and USSR provided transportation.19
Early in the formation of the force a strength of 7,000 was deemed desirable in the light of the tasks to be performed.\textsuperscript{20} The force was to be built around battalion-sized contingents. Austria, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Senegal and Sweden provided the infantry battalions.\textsuperscript{21} The Austrian and Peruvian battalions were transferred to UNDOF in June 1974. The Irish and Nepalese battalions rotated home without replacement in May and August 1974, respectively.\textsuperscript{22}

Canada and Poland provided logistics units\textsuperscript{23} and elements to UNEF 2 headquarters staff. Canada sent a signals unit, an aviation unit and a services unit which contained a supply company, a maintenance company, a movement control detachment and a postal detachment.\textsuperscript{24} Poland sent a transportation truck company, which had its own direct support maintenance element, an engineer company, and a hospital.\textsuperscript{25}

The strength of the Force reached approximately 6,800 in April 1974\textsuperscript{26}, and drifted down to approximately 4,500 in October 1974.\textsuperscript{27} The decline reflected the transfer of units to UNDOF and the rotation without replacement of the two contingents noted earlier.

The effect of the UN reaction to this crisis was, as in the past, the creation of a balanced, multi-national military force which entered a sovereign nation with its consent. The Force had a mission to supervise a cease-fire and withdrawal to specified positions, to prevent a recurrence of fighting, and to assist the ICRC in performing humanitarian tasks.
The immediate practical result of the UN reaction was the creation of an austere division-sized military formation formed from self-contained battalion-sized contingents. The Force was structured with combat, combat support and combat service support elements. The formation contained ten maneuver battalions (all infantry) each with organic administrative, supply and military police elements. There is no indication of anti-tank or indirect fire support capabilities. The formation also contained two direct support logistics groups which contained appropriate combat support and combat service support elements including combat engineer, signal, aviation, supply, maintenance, transportation, movement control, medical and personnel services units. An organization chart is at Figure 11.

Deployment and Activities

The Secretary-General noted that "less than 30 hours after the decision of the Security Council, the first elements of UNEF arrived in the mission area". Transportation for elements was provided by the US government, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Air Force, the Australian government, the FRG government, the Polish Air Force, the USSR government, the Norwegian government, the Swedish government and some commercial charter aircraft.

Initial UNEF 2 elements landed in Cairo from Cyprus on October 26, 1973. Followup forces also entered the area by air through Cairo throughout the period November 1973 and early February 1974. The Force deployed piece-meal in three phases. The first phase was into base camps in Cairo, Suez City, Ismailia and Rashid. This phase lasted from
the time of initial entry until the start of the disengagement between the Israelis and the Egyptians on January 25, 1974. The second phase was divided into five sub-phases: January 25-27, January 28 - February 4, February 5-12, February 13-21, and February 22-March 4. During these sub-phases, UNEF 2 elements moved between the disengaging armies as the Israelis withdrew north along the west bank of the Canal and then crossed to the east bank of the Canal north of the Great Bitter Lake. The UNEF 2 elements also deployed by stages into the Zone of Disengagement east of the Canal as the various sections of the surveys marking the A and B Lines were completed. The third phase commenced on March 5, 1974, and continues to the present. The Zone of Disengagement and the Egyptian and Israeli Zones of Limited Armaments are outlined in Figure 12.

Since the commencement of Phase III, the actual positioning of individual contingents has varied from time to time. These variations reflect the expansion of areas of responsibility in the Zone of Disengagement to cover the deployment of units to UNDOF and the withdrawal of contingents without replacement. The positioning of UNEF 2 as of October 1974, is shown in Figures 13a, 13b, and 13c.

During Phase I, UNEF 2 performed a number of different tasks. The first elements into the area, the Finnish advance party from UNFICYP, "established a United Nations presence in the Israeli-controlled area west of Suez City . . ."38 As part of this presence, UNEF 2 began patrolling and conducting meetings with the Israeli and Egyptian forces in the area for the purpose of a "preliminary exchange of views . . . relating to the observance of the cease-fire as well as humanitarian questions."39
Figure 12. Zones of Disengagement and Limited Armaments, Egypt 197340
Figure 13a. UNEF 2 Deployment, 1974
Figure 13b. UNEF 2 Deployment, 1974 (cont.)
Figure 13c. UNEF 2 Deployment, 1974 (cont)
With regard to the cease-fire observation, UNEF 2 coordinated early in its deployment with UNTSO, which also operated patrols throughout the area. In the humanitarian area, a first concern was provision and supply of the trapped Egyptian Third Army on the east bank of the Canal.

It was agreed that a convoy consisting of some 100 lorries driven in groups by UNEF military personnel would proceed from a point on the forward edge of the Egyptian line on the Cairo-Suez road through Israel held territory to a point on the western bank of the Suez Canal. The contents of each lorry would then be loaded into ferries or amphibious vehicles by a group of Egyptian soldiers crossing the Canal for this purpose unarmed. Members of the Israel forces would check the contents of the lorries at the loading point, under UNEF and Red Cross supervision. UNEF personnel would also be stationed at the east bank of the Canal to supervise the unloading from ferries or amphibious vehicles.

The first UNEF supply convoy to Egyptian troops made its run on October 28, 1973. Thus began a supply route and system which lasted until the Israelis withdrew from controlling the Cairo-Suez road on January 30, 1974.

As UNEF 2 units continued to arrive, they set up base camps, reconnoitered future positions in the proposed Zone of Disengagement, established outposts between the forward defense lines of the two armies, and operated patrols between the outposts. Commanders of contingents conducted on-the-spot negotiations with the local commanders of the opposing forces to adjust local positions of their forces. The purposes of their negotiations were to facilitate maintenance of the cease-fire and to provide freedom of civilian movement between the two armies.
The Force also investigated Egyptian complaints about alleged Israeli requests to civilians to move out of areas in Suez City, and alleged subsequent destruction of livestock and dwellings. As the result of an agreement between Israel and Egypt on November 11, the Force periodically operated a civilian supply convoy to Suez City. This supply convoy ended January 26, 1974. The Force and ICRC representatives supervised a prisoners-of-war exchange during the period November 15-22.

During Phase II, UNEF 2 elements began to occupy buffer zones between the disengaging forces on the west bank of the Canal, in accordance with disengagement agreements made at a meeting among UNEF, Egyptian and Israeli representatives on January 24, 1974. The manner of the withdrawal plan was that Israeli forces would withdraw from an area and then hand over control to UNEF 2 elements. The UNEF 2 troops, in battalion strength, would move in, establish temporary positions and conduct patrols. Then, usually within 24 hours, the UNEF 2 elements would hand over control of the areas to Egyptian forces.

Also during Phase II, UNEF 2 and UNTSO personnel inspected and verified various segments of the Egyptian and Israeli Zones of Limited Armaments. They supervised Egyptian surveyors in establishing the A Line, and Israeli surveyors in establishing the B Line on the west and east sides, respectively, of the Zone of Disengagement. These lines were marked with barrels painted black with white UN letters.
As the Zone of Disengagement began to take shape, UNEF 2 elements, also in battalion strength, moved in and occupied outposts. The battalions conducted patrols between the outposts.54

In the area of humanitarian activities, UNEF 2 supervised Egyptian and Israeli teams which used specially trained dogs to search for bodies of their personnel throughout the region. This activity, titled Operation Omega, commenced January 29, and lasted (after one extension) until March 31.55 At the same time, UNEF 2 and ICRC personnel supervised Israeli and Egyptian teams as they exhumed bodies in cemeteries for return to national authorities.56

Handovers of Egyptian prisoners-of-war captured subsequent to the cease-fire were carried out in February.57 Some civilians detained by Israel were also transferred to Egypt.58 Also during this phase, the Polish engineer company conducted mine clearance operations in the Zone of Disengagement and Egypt provided roller vehicles to assist in mine clearance on its side of the A Line. The Force negotiated with Israel to clear its side of the B Line.59

In Phase III, UNEF 2 settled into a routine of manning outposts, patrolling, and, in general, controlling the Zone of Disengagement. It occupied, at one point, nine forward command posts, four reserve positions, and sixty-five outposts in the zone.60 It reported violations of air and ground space. It stopped persons from entering the zone and escorted them out.61 In addition, the Force, in conjunction with UNTSO, conducted weekly inspections of the Egyptian and Israeli Zones of Limited Armaments. The Force used its "good offices" when one or the other of the parties raised questions concerning the agreed limitations.62
In May and June 1974, Egypt and Israel agreed to rely on UNEF 2 to renew the search for bodies of personnel from both sides in the Suez Canal area. This operation was terminated on July 1. Also during this period, UNEF 2 and the ICRC coordinated the exchange of 2,363 persons from Israel to Egypt and the exchange of 7,097 from Egypt to Israel in a family reunification and student exchange program. These exchanges took place in the Zone of Disengagement. In addition, sixty-five civilian detainees held by Israel were transferred to Egypt in May, June and July under the supervision of the ICRC and UNEF 2 officers in the Zone of Disengagement.

Due to Israel's occupation of the Sinai, which was a part of the sovereign territory of Egypt as noted earlier, a status of force agreement with Israel was unnecessary. Therefore, UNEF 2's deployment took place completely on Egyptian territory in a piece-meal manner in three phases. A significant aspect of this deployment was that it was very rapid in its initial stages due to the existence of a near-by peacekeeping force which contained elements acceptable to the host nation.

The deployment was characterized by three basic forms of positioning: an area of responsibility; a moving interposition buffer zone, and a static interposition buffer zone. In Phase I, the first form was used. In Phase II, the second and third forms were employed. In Phase III, the third form was used.

The Force's peacekeeping tasks may be classified into several categories in the same manner as for the other Forces. The first category is Prevention which has as its "target" the armed forces of
Israel and Egypt. Examples here include the stationing of UNEF 2 elements in Israeli-held territory, the establishment of outposts in the buffer zones and the Zone of Disengagement and the conduct of inspections in the Zones of Limited Armaments. The second category is Humanitarian Assistance which focuses on the soldiers of the isolated Egyptian Third Army, the citizens of Suez City, and refugees and prisoners-of-war. Examples of this category include the operation of supply convoys to the Third Army and the city, as well as Operation Omega and the assistance and supervision of prisoner and detainee exchanges. The third category is Peacekeeping Support which has as its beneficiaries the other UN and non-state components of the peacekeeping structure. An example here is the furnishing of units to UNDOF.

ANALYSIS

This crisis was political in origin, as were the others, and primarily military in shape and content as was UNEF 1. In its final form, it was characterized by the presence of the armed forces of one sovereign nation, operating from territory it had captured and held for six years, penetrating deeper into the homeland of another sovereign nation. The crisis caused an international organization to react in a political and military manner, with the emphasis initially on the latter, and, then, in the period of disengagement negotiations after the ceasefire, on the former.
The organization, capitalizing on seventeen years of peacekeeping experience, reaffirmed a number of peacekeeping principles and explicitly stated some new ones. Those principles reaffirmed included consent, neutrality, balance, single-manager peacekeeping operations management, constraints on weapons use and concurrent peacekeeping-peacemaking (though this latter was modified to apply only at the operational level, and unified in one person, i.e., the Force commander chaired the Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference in arranging disengagement.) The new principles announced were: unqualified sponsor support for the Force, force freedom of movement, and force efficiency of operation through integrated operations by all components operating anywhere in the Force's area of interest without constraints due to geographical or political origin of components.

The organization delineated the requirements for keeping the peace in this crisis which were political, military, and social (or humanitarian) in nature and overall more specific than requirements of past peacekeeping ventures. The nature of the resources was a mixture of political, military and social aspects governed, as in the past, by consent and neutrality and characterized as ad hoc, temporary, and reflecting the single-manager principle. The relationship between requirements and resources was essentially political with military and social overtones and governed by the principles of consent, neutrality and the unqualified sponsor support for the Force.

The UNEF 2 mission indicated the functions of prevention and peacekeeping support and, while still somewhat imprecise with regard to operational details, used language similar to the UNFICYP mission
statement. This usage meshed with the employment of UNFICYP elements in the initial stages of the new operation, thereby permitting a direct transfer of experience and manner of operation. The nature of the mission was military, yet peaceful, in accordance with established principles. The nature, characteristics and governing principles of the Force were similar to UNEF 1. The assembly and movement of the Force was more rapid and more orderly for the initial elements - taking thirty hours - than for UNEF 1. This was due to the existence of a near-by peacekeeping force with contingents acceptable to the host nation. Final assembly of the Force took about as long as for both UNEF 1 and UNFICYP: three months. As with the other forces, the deployment was piece-meal; as with UNEF 1 it took place in three phases. Three forms of unit positioning were employed: area of responsibility, moving interposition buffer zone, and static interposition buffer zone.

The nature of the relationship between the mission and functions and the Force's composition, size and deployment was military, political, and social (humanitarian), and was governed by the principles of consent, constraints on weapons use, freedom of movement, and Force efficiency. As with both UNEF 1 and UNFICYP, the Force positioned itself on the territory of one nation and oriented its activities on groups of people and organizations.

The nature and characteristics of the Force's operational and logistical units were similar to both UNEF 1 and UNFICYP with two important distinctions. These were the use of all-infantry operational units, rather than a mixture of infantry and armored cavalry, and the employment of two direct support logistics groups, one oriented to
support Western Bloc-equipped contingents, and one oriented to support Eastern Bloc-equipped contingents. The nature and characteristics of the tasks were similar to those of UNEF 1 and UNFICYP, except that general deployment outside of population centers limited tasks to those incorporated in the stated functions of prevention and peacekeeping support, although some tasks in the functional area of humanitarian assistance arose in limited circumstances.

NOTES


2. Figure is based on Map in RB 100-2, p. 1-C-15.


7. Ibid.


10. U. N., S/11248, April 1, 1974, pp. 4-5.

11. Ibid., p. 4.


15. U. N., S/11248, April 1, 1974, p. 5.
17. U. N., S/11248, April 1, 1974, p. 4.
26. Ibid., p. 4.
27. U. N., S/11536, October 12, 1974, p. 3.
32. U. N., S/11056/Add. 12, February 21, 1974, p. 3.
33. U. N., S/11056/Add. 9, January 28, 1974, p. 3.
34. U. N., S/11056/Add. 7, January 11, 1974, p. 3.
36. Ibid., p. 1.
37. Figure based on data in U. N., S/11248, April 1, 1974, pp. 7-8, 10, and U. N., S/11536, October 12, 1974, pp. 4-5.
39. Ibid.
40. Figure based on map in RB 100-2, pp. 1-44.
41. Figure based on map in U. N., S/11536, October 12, 1974.
42. Ibid., p. 3.
44. U. N., S/11056/Add. 9, January 28, 1974, p. 2.
46. Ibid., p. 4.
47. Ibid.
50. U. N., S/11248, April 1, 1974, p. 11.
52. Ibid., p. 2.
53. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
60. U. N., S/11248, April 1, 1974, pp. 7-8.
61. Ibid.
63. Ibid., p. 10.
Chapter VII

SUMMARY

Throughout the preceding case studies, an examination of the structures and functions of three peacekeeping forces, and a comparative analysis of those forces, has been made. The nature and characteristics of various levels of structure and function and the relationships between them were determined. During the comparative analysis, numerous differences and similarities among the forces were identified. This chapter, then, seeks to evaluate the three forces studied to determine strengths and weaknesses, to identify some trends in the modern record of international peacekeeping and evaluate the ABCA concept in the light of those trends, and, finally, to present some technical findings by outlining some principles and techniques of peacekeeping with a view to enhancing understanding of the military aspects of peacekeeping operations. Some conclusions will be drawn at the end.

FORCES' EVALUATION

These three case studies span the nearly twenty years of the modern record of international peacekeeping operations. The UNEF 1 case initiated that record, while the UNFICYP operation started at the approximate mid-point. The UNEF 2 case is one of the most recent examples.
From a general perspective, the mandates for the three peacekeeping operations studied were adequate to get the respective peacekeeping responses underway. Each, of course, had its peculiarities. These peculiarities reflected the UN's collective perceptions and understandings of the nature and characteristics of each crisis at the time of the crisis. They also reflected the lack of experience in such operations, as in the case of UNEF 1, or the accumulation of experience and expertise as in the UNFICYP and UNEF 2 cases.

All the mandates were adequate in providing specific delineation of the immediate military requirements for keeping the peace, e.g., cease-fire. They were sufficient in providing a military component of the peacekeeping structure to facilitate accomplishing those military requirements. The UNEF 1 and UNEF 2 mandates also adequately spelled out the economic and social (humanitarian) requirements, respectively, appropriate to the particular crisis, e.g., re-open the Suez Canal, and assist the ICRC. In the case of UNEF 1, the mandate further provided a component of the peacekeeping structure to accomplish the economic aspect: UNSCO.

With regard to the political aspects of the peacekeeping response however, the UNEF 1 and UNFICYP mandates were ambiguous in delineating the political requirements for keeping the peace. The UNEF 2 mandate did not state any political requirements. These ambiguities and the void, in themselves, were neither strengths nor weaknesses. They became one or the other only when considered in conjunction with the existence, or lack thereof, of a political mediation component in the peacekeeping structure.
In the case of UNEF 1, the ambiguity and the lack of a political mediator were a source of frustration and a serious deficiency in efforts to obtain a long-lasting settlement in the Middle East in the mid-1950's in the opinion of a number of observers, an opinion which this author shares though not the subject of analysis in this effort. The relevance of these judgements to this effort is that UNEF 1 thus served only to freeze the political situation for eleven years. In the case of UNFICYP which had a political mediator (in this view, and others, a point in its favor), the ambiguity provided the mediator and the disputing parties with a degree of flexibility in working towards a solution. Even under the current conditions on Cyprus, which are drastically different from the time of the original mandate which has not been revised, this ambiguity should continue to provide a degree of flexibility for all parties to the dispute in the efforts to settle the issues. With regard to UNEF 2, the void in the political area was filled by the well-known use of "shuttle diplomacy" which took place outside the peacekeeping structure as envisioned. The efficacy of this approach is moot (though this is not to deny the existence of more than eighteen months of relative peace) since the thrust of peacemaking efforts is now within the peacekeeping structure (the Geneva Peace Conference). It is too early to judge the effectiveness of these efforts.

On a more technical military level, the three Forces' missions, size and composition, deployment, positioning and manner of operation reflected two major factors. These factors were the development of certain key principles of peacekeeping and the accumulation of experience and expertise in peacekeeping operations by a growing number of peacekeeping operations participants.
With respect to the missions, the UNEF 1 mission identified adequately the desired and obvious functions of prevention and pacification. But, it failed to identify the functions of normalization, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping support. During the course of operations, these functions were generated as the result of the Force's presence and the performance of tasks in response to chaos in the public life of the locales in which UNEF 1 operated, human need, and the demands of other peacekeeping structure components. From a military perspective, then, the UNEF 1 mission was inadequate as stated. The UNFICYP mission also spelled out the functions of prevention and pacification, but went further due to the internal nature and civil characteristics of the crisis, to identify a function of normalization. As with UNEF 1, additional functions -- humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping support -- were generated. Although the mission was not comprehensive, it was adequate and reflected thoughtful consideration of the demographic environment in which the Force would operate. The UNEF 2 mission specified the functions of prevention and peacekeeping support. The function of humanitarian assistance was generated briefly as a result of its initial deployment. However, due to the Force's current location in a Zone of Disengagement generally away from population centers and agricultural areas, it appears that no other functions such as normalization and pacification as described earlier, will be generated. Thus, from a military perspective, UNEF 2's mission is the most explicit and definitive of the three.
With respect to the sizes of the three Forces, the strengths of between 6,000 and 7,000 personnel at the beginning of the operations were consistent with the concept of peacekeeping in the light of the missions and the tasks to be performed, the locales of operations, and the tense atmosphere existing at the initiation of the operations. The trend towards reducing Force strengths to generally stabilized levels about one-half the starting strengths, as a result of terminations of some donor nations' commitments and pressures on the UN to reduce costs in an atmosphere of reduced tensions, was to be expected. The significance of this trend is that participants in future operations should be cognizant of the pattern of reductions in strength over the life of a force, and plan accordingly for redistribution of assets and responsibilities in the operational and logistical areas.

The composition and structure of the three Forces was similar with differences only in details. As noted earlier in each case, the Forces were characterized as austere divisions with a supporting logistical element. The point should be made, that the use of "austere" means that the Forces lacked artillery (a sizable component of US divisions) and much of the mechanized equipment found in modern Western-style and Eastern-style army combat divisions. For UNEF 1, the combination of infantry and armored cavalry was appropriate to the mission, tasks and, particularly, the desert nature of the terrain in which the Force operated. For UNFICYP, the same combination of military operational units as for UNEF 1 was also highly appropriate in the light of the mission, tasks and the area of operations. The existence of limited anti-tank and indirect fire capabilities in anticipation of potential
requirements considering the armaments of the opposing forces was also appropriate. A recent analysis of UNFICYP, however, lamented the lack of water-borne elements to operate in contiguous waters.\(^3\) The incorporation of UNCIVPOL in this Force was brilliantly conceived and would have been an asset in UNEF 1, particularly in the port cities and the Gaza Strip. The all-infantry composition of UNEF 2 appears quite suitable since the Force is deployed in a static interposition buffer zone in desert terrain away from population centers. However, as strength falls in accordance with the normal pattern of force reductions, armored cavalry may be desirable to maintain desired levels of Force effectiveness and efficiency in patrolling and surveillance.

The major differences in the three Forces' structures are found in the general logistical organizations for each Force, though the nature of the logistical units is generally the same, e.g., aviation, signal, military police, engineer, supply, maintenance, transportation, medical and personnel services. For UNEF 1, reliance was placed on several nations to provide various types of logistical units in the interest of political and geographic balance in the Force. These units were formed into one direct support logistics group. In UNFICYP, logistical support was provided, as noted earlier, by a single-nation operator operating from fixed installations. Of course, there was a minor modification - or addition - in that Austria provided a field hospital in the interests of balance. In UNEF 2, two nations are charged with providing logistics units which are formed into two separate direct support logistics groups, one oriented towards providing maintenance support towards Western-Bloc equipped contingents and the other providing
the same support towards Eastern-Bloc equipped units with both groups having separate responsibilities at a Force-wide level, e.g., Canada provides communications, Poland provides engineers.

In evaluating the logistical structures of the Forces, consideration of the problems must recognize language barriers, differing national systems of logistics, and the existence of a UN logistical system which is primarily civilian in nature and small in scope. In UNEF 1, the organization of the one logistics group created problems in the language areas and confusion in meshing the differing national systems with each other and with the UN system. In UNFICYP, the single-nation operator concept generally eliminated the language problem and reduced the problems of meshing since only one national system interfaced with the UN system. In UNEF 2, the use of distinct logistics groups supporting operational units and providing Force-level support, as described above, reduces the language problems, and though not as efficacious as UNFICYP's approach, keeps the problems of meshing national systems with the UN system to a minimum. Therefore, UNFICYP's logistical system is considered ideal, UNEF 1's system (though adequate in providing support over the long-term) was inefficient, while UNEF 2's represents the best possible compromise under what is considered the normal circumstances of peacekeeping and will probably be the pattern for future operations.4

The deployments of the three Forces are outstanding examples of what is meant by the accumulation of experience and expertise in peacekeeping operations over the years. This factor, or the lack thereof, had its greatest impact at the time of initiation of the operations.
For UNEF 1, the lack of experience was apparent in that the initial deployment, while fairly rapid, was also somewhat disorderly as operational units arrived without advance parties and logistics units lagged far behind in the deployment. The deployment of UNFICYP was enhanced by the presence of a major contributor already in position at the time of authorization and activation of the Force. The deployment of UNEF 2 was the most rapid and was enhanced by the existence of UNFICYP, from which experienced peacekeeping elements could be drawn, as well as the employment of reconnaissance and advance parties. A deficiency in all three cases was the lengthy period required for final buildup to authorized strength. In all cases, this buildup took about three months.

The forms of positioning adopted by the three Forces were adequate and appropriate to the stated missions and the peacekeeping functions and tasks performed. Some of the constraints imposed on the Forces in keeping with the principle of consent affected the manner of operation and the military effectiveness of the Forces while in their positions. In particular, UNEF 1 was restricted in its freedom of movement in the Gaza Strip area due to Israel's failure to conclude a Status of Forces Agreement with the UN. The Force was also constrained in its efforts to stop illegal linecrossers due to the lack of authorization by Egypt and Israel to use weapons against them. The UNFICYP manner of operation was generally enhanced by the freedom of movement accorded the Force, but, as noted earlier, was inhibited by the lack of maritime elements. At another level, the political ambiguity of the existing mandate, especially in the light of current conditions, created
an atmosphere of uncertainty as to what was expected of the Force, but on the other hand, has permitted a certain amount of flexibility in the Force's continuing operation. The manner of operation of UNEF 2 appears to be effective and efficient, though Israel prohibits certain elements (the Polish contingent, for one) from operating on its sovereign territory. The Force controls the Zone of Disengagement subject to Egyptian consent.

Logistically, the UNEF 1 operation was hampered by the requirement to provide some organizational level support in addition to the expected direct support. This resulted from the fact that some contingents were not self-contained, e.g., the Finnish contingent. In UNFICYP, the same was true to a very minor extent, with respect to UNICIVPOL while the larger contingents were self-contained. In a sense - training contingents on newly arrived Western equipment - the direct support logistics elements of UNEF 2 continue the practice of providing more than direct support to the Force.

Overall, from a military perspective, UNEF 2 appears to be the best example of an international peacekeeping force in terms of mandate, mission, composition and structure, deployment and manner of operation. Particular strengths of UNEF 2 are the clear mission statement, the rapid and orderly deployment and the apparent effectiveness of its operation. The UNFICYP is the next best example with a particular strong point being its logistics operation. The poorest example, which may be excused on the basis of no experience, is UNEF 1, though its operational composition was a strength. The weaknesses in UNEF 1's mission statement, logistics structure, deployment and manner of operation
have served as the basis for some corrective action at the UN and especially among peacekeeping participant nations.

ABCA CONCEPT EVALUATION

There are a number of trends in the modern peacekeeping record which affect the ABCA concept. Determination of these trends considers the total record (Appendix A) and particularly the three case studies. Each point of the concept (see pages 14 and 15) will be evaluated in the light of trends applicable to that point and an overall evaluation of the concept will be made.

With respect to Point A, there is a trend, especially at the UN level, which does not favor the timely recognition and definition of the problems requiring a peacekeeping response. In UNEF 1, a week elapsed from the initial outbreak of the fighting to authorization of the Force. Two weeks elapsed in the case of UNFICYP from the time the issue was raised in the Security Council until the Force was authorized. For UNEF 2, more than two weeks passed from the outbreak of fighting to authorization of the Force. This trend may reflect a conservative approach by would-be peacekeeping and peacemaking participants - especially the US and USSR in the UNEF 2 case - during the crisis to shy away from the brink of confrontation. It may also reflect realistic attitudes by sponsors regarding client or member states to let them sort out the situation first before inserting peacekeeping forces. It reflects the essential powerlessness of the UN - or any regional organization - to intervene unilaterally without consent. It may also reflect a lack of faith in UN peacekeeping-peacemaking capabilities or, perhaps, the
retention of those capabilities as a safety valve - failing nation-to-
nation diplomacy - to avoid confrontation. Whatever the reasons for
the growing time lag in recognizing and defining the problem, solution
is beyond the capabilities of the ABCA Armies. On the other hand, there
is a distinct trend favoring speedy and effective reaction to the
situation once the Force is authorized. Initial units entered Egypt
ten days after authorization in the case of UNEF 1; they were present
at authorization due to the presence of a "regional" peacekeeping force
(the JTF) in the case of UNFICYP; and initial units entered Egypt, again,
forty hours after authorization in the case of UNEF 2, due to the
presence of UNFICYP. Thus, the impact of the trends in the modern record
on this point of the concept is both favorable and unfavorable.

There is a generally favorable trend affecting Point B in that
the most recent mandates and missions are more realistic and phrased in
terms understandable to a growing body of experienced peacekeeping
participants, e.g., the UNEF 2 mission. There appears to be more
thoughtful consideration given to the demographic and political environ-
ments in which the forces will operate, e.g., the inclusion of UNCIVPOL
and the mediator in UNFICYP. Consideration of the geographic environ-
ment has been generally adequate with respect to Force operations on
the land and in the air, but, as noted earlier in the UNFICYP case, there
is an apparent disregard of maritime considerations. This would appear
to be a continuing weakness in UNEF 2 since the Zone of Disengagement
abuts the Mediterranean and Red Seas, and there is no identifiable
maritime operational element in the Force.
With respect to Point C, the trend appears favorable at the highest levels, and in the context of a peacekeeping structure, to rely on the single-manager peacekeeping operations management principle. There is continuing experimentation regarding co-equal peacekeeping-peacemaking capabilities, or unified (or concurrent) peacekeeping-peacemaking. At the operational level, the growing body of personnel world-wide experienced in peacekeeping logically enhances smoother staff operation (though detailed analysis of staff functions, and command and control aspects was not part of this effort). As well, reliance on single-nation Force communications, as by Canada in UNEF 2, indicates an additional favorable trend affecting this point.

There are various ways in which peacekeeping force participants raise units for contribution. Some nations use specially created units, usually as a result of national constitutional and governmental constraints of procedures. Some nations employ elements of their regular armed forces. Others use a combination of the two procedures. Thus, there is no discernible trend favoring one method of the other. From the viewpoint of discipline, the regular formations from a nation's armed forces are probably the best. From the viewpoint of motivation and understanding, the specially raised units (composed of professional military volunteers and/or people recruited "off the street", and trained, for the mission) are probably the best since a number of observers have commented on the professional military's unfavorable reaction to weapons and maneuver constraints and the boredom and general lack of action inherent in stabilized peacekeeping operations.6
Considering the foregoing cases and analyses of peacekeeping functions and tasks, there is little significant difference in the nature and characteristics of a peacekeeping force's military, quasi-political, economic and social tasks and the standard military and civil-military tasks of a nation's regular armed forces (save for the constraints on weapons and, sometimes, freedom of movement). Thus, from the standpoint of training, it is probably more efficient to "train down" regular armed forces to peacekeeping operations, than to "train up" specially raised units from scratch to a minimum effective operating level. In any event though, some special training is required, particularly if elite units, such as paratroopers or other "shock" troops, are employed in order to emphasize the essentially peaceful nature of their mission and role, or to prepare the average person for "culture shock".

Regarding Point E, the tendency is to use any donated airlift to ensure rapid response and enhance Force buildup. This trend impacts on the concept not only with respect to training, but also with respect to equipment, including light armored vehicles if employed, which must be air-transportable. Past and present experience favors this point in that much equipment for peacekeeping is air-transportable, and major nations with strategic airlift and a record of participating or supporting peacekeeping are constantly upgrading their airlift capabilities, e.g., the C-5A.

With regard to substituting technology for manpower, the greatest strength of past forces has usually been during the initial mandated period. The trend has been to reduce forces as tensions ease and in
response to pressures to keep costs down. This point is weak in not recognizing the conflict existing between the value of a small, highly technological (yet costly), efficiency-oriented force and the value of a larger, more visible non-technical force with its orientation on people. Therefore, as the force shrinks, consideration should be given to revising mandated requirements to accommodate the smaller size, rather than stray from a "people-orientation".

The ABCA concept for peacekeeping is being supported and enhanced by a number of trends in the modern peacekeeping record and undoubtedly reflects others' considerations and perceptions of those trends. Overall, the concept is sound. However, there are some reservations. The concern with recognizing and defining the trouble is considered a political matter and inappropriate for an essentially military statement of a peacekeeping operational concept. Additional consideration should be given to the maritime environment and its relationship with the geographical area in which current and future forces operate. Additional study needs to be given to the effectiveness of units of regular armed forces versus specially raised units in peacekeeping operations. The question of technology versus manpower is a philosophical one. The military answer should be based on the philosophy of the sponsoring authority.

TECHNICAL FINDINGS

This section presents findings of technical nature regarding principles of peacekeeping, peacekeeping functions and forms of positioning.
Principles

Over the course of the modern record, as exemplified by these cases, at least nine peacekeeping principles have been developed. They have been stated in resolutions or other documents in the mandate, or developed in practice and later incorporated into documents or the general "common knowledge" of the peacekeeping operations participants. These principles are: consent, neutrality, balance, single-manager peacekeeping operations management, unified (or concurrent) peacekeeping-peacemaking, unqualified sponsor support, force integrity, freedom of movement, and weapons used only in self-defense.

As is true with principles of war, these principles of peacekeeping may or may not be applied, or modified, according to the nature and characteristics of the immediate crisis situation. The first six of the listed principles affect the establishment and the functioning of the peacekeeping structure, including the peacekeeping force. The last three listed directly affect the functioning of the peacekeeping force only.

The principle of consent affects the structuring and functioning of the peacekeeping structure to a very great degree. It applies to the disputing states (or the host nation, as the case may be) and their desire for, or acquiescence in, an international peacekeeping effort. It applies to the states contributing forces regarding their interest in participating in the venture, and once in, regarding the restricted or unrestricted use of their forces in the peacekeeping force. This principle also applies to other participating and interested states in providing other support, or agreeing to refrain from actions inimical
to the peacekeeping and/or peacemaking efforts. The principle operates with and affects a number of the other principles as will be indicated below.

The principle of neutrality is closely linked with the principle of consent in regard to states contributing forces to the peacekeeping effort. Ideally, those states should be neutral in the crisis for which the force is being created. However, this principle has been modified by the principle of consent in regard to a host nation's acquiescence and/or interest in permitting a state with an interest in the crisis to participate in the force, e.g., the UK in Cyprus. At the operational level, this principle is exemplified by an attitude and an atmosphere of impartiality by the Force in the performance of its peacekeeping functions and tasks.

The principle of balance applies with respect to the geographic, political and functional representation in the peacekeeping structure and particularly in the peacekeeping force. It is also affected by the principle of consent, especially with respect to the geographic and political aspects, from the viewpoint of the disputing states or host nation, e.g., Cyprus vis-a-vis Afro-Asian nations.

The principle of single-manager peacekeeping operations management applies primarily at the interface point between the peacekeeping structure and the international body authorizing the peacekeeping effort. In UN practice, this manager is the Secretary-General.

The principle of unified (or concurrent) peacekeeping-peacemaking incorporates the concept that something more must be done in the crisis other than simply freezing the situation by using a peacekeeping force.
It is affected by the principle of consent on the part of the disputing states or the host nation. It is exemplified by providing co-equal military and political elements to handle these two facets at the operational level, or providing a single element with military and political powers. In either case, the single-manager is the direct supervisor.

The principle of unqualified sponsor support applies at the highest level to the body authorizing the peacekeeping effort and relies heavily on the principle of consent. The essence of the principle is that once the authorization is granted, in the interests of peacekeeping and/or peacemaking, the structure is permitted to perform its functions and tasks, subject to review but without unnecessary hindrance. Further, the principle applies to all states participating to the degree that they share in the financial burdens of the venture.

The principle of force integrity conveys the concept that all elements of the force are important to the accomplishment of the mission and the performance of peacekeeping tasks in the name of efficiency and effectiveness. The principle is affected by the principles of consent, neutrality and balance, and is also tied to the principle of freedom of movement.

The principle of freedom of movement applies to the Force as a whole, and individual contingents within the Force. It is tied to Force integrity and is also affected by the principle of consent. The essence is that the Force and its components are free to move in and around buffer zones, lines, or throughout a host nation according to the circumstances of the situation, in an unobstructed manner to perform its peacekeeping functions and tasks.
The principle of weapons used only in self-defense is paramount in the concept of peacekeeping operations. Since self-defense is an inherent right, this is the one principle that cannot be affected by consent.

By way of evaluating the degree of importance of these principles, it is apparent that the principle of consent is the over-riding principle. At the highest levels of political discourse, the lack of consent means the lack of peacekeeping. At the lower operating levels, the lack of consent inhibits the peacekeeping/peacemaking efforts, with one exception: the right of self-defense where weapons use is concerned.

**Functions**

There are five peacekeeping functions. The nature of the functions is behavior control and influence of five distinct groups of people or organizations. The five functions are: Prevention, Pacification, Normalization, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping Support. Detailed descriptions and analyses, as well as the basic rationale for the development of these functions, is found on Pages 52-54, 78-79, and 104-105.

Based on the cases, three of the five functions are always present in a peacekeeping operation. They are Prevention, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping Support. The functions of Prevention and Peacekeeping Support are not dependent on the locations of deployment or forms of positioning, but rather are derived from the mission of the Force. The functions of Pacification, Normalization and Humanitarian Assistance are dependent on the location of deployment, i.e., in or near
population centers. Therefore, unless the Force deploys in populated areas, Pacification and Normalization will probably not be present, although Humanitarian Assistance, which is the least dependent of the three on Force location will be since the Force can be called in from an unpopulated area to provide such assistance, or will assist innocent transients in the vicinity of its area of interest.

With respect to the mandate, the function of Prevention has always been stated, while the function of Peacekeeping Support only recently has come to be recognized, e.g., UNEF 2's mandated support for the ICRC. (It is possible that this was an effort to mandate Humanitarian Assistance, but in the context of this effort, Humanitarian Assistance is a Force-only function.) The functions of Pacification and Normalization have been mandated in the past as circumstances dictated, however, the function of Humanitarian Assistance continues to be unmandated and therefore generated.

**Forms of Positioning**

There are at least six distinct forms of positioning, based on the cases, which a peacekeeping force may employ in performing its mission, functions, and tasks. They are: a static interposition line, an interposition screen, a static interposition buffer zone, a moving interposition buffer zone, an area of responsibility, and an area of responsibility with a static interposition line (or buffer zone).

The static interposition line is a form of positioning which conveys the concept of a clearly marked line between opponents. It is manned by the Force using fixed and mobile sentries, fixed observation posts, and reinforced by physical barriers, as necessary, to control or
prevent movement. It does not prevent opponents from using direct or indirect fire weapons, or psychological warfare devices, e.g., loudspeakers. An aim is to inhibit firing by physical placement of peacekeepers in the line-of-fire.

The interposition screen conveys the concept of a delineated line or zone between the opponents - usually in sparsely populated areas - which is patrolled periodically by Force elements operating from fixed bases near the line or zone using motorized elements or aircraft. Its primary purpose is surveillance as opposed to control of movement or outright prevention of fighting.

The static interposition buffer zone is a clearly defined (preferably surveyed) area between the belligerents. It is occupied by the Force according to agreement and the occupation is characterized by establishing temporary unit positions and semi-permanent outposts interconnected by radio and wire communications and motor and foot patrols. It should be wide enough to inhibit (at least) or prohibit observation between opponents and the accurate use of direct-fire weapons, to discourage the use of infantry indirect fire weapons, and to lengthen the time required for opponents' movement to contact.

The moving interposition buffer zone is a defined area between opponents wide enough to accomplish the same purposes as the static zone with respect to the opponents. The zone is occupied by the Peacekeeping Force usually according to an agreed time schedule for the purposes of peacefully transferring control of the terrain from one opponent to the other. The Force's occupation is characterized by hasty occupation of unit positions and outposts connected by motor and foot patrols and radio communications.
The area of responsibility form of positioning is one in which elements of the Peacekeeping Force are posted in small outposts or cantonments in urban and populated rural areas to provide a peacekeeping presence for normalization purposes. The Force conducts patrols on foot and by motor throughout the area. A central reserve force for emergencies may or may not be a feature.

The area of responsibility with a static interposition line is a form which combines the aspects of both an area of responsibility and the static interposition lines as described earlier.

In summary, then, based on the three cases, there are at least nine principles governing peacekeeping operations. There are five categories of functions which a peacekeeping force will or may perform and which are derived from the Force's orientation to control or influence behavior. There are at least six forms of positioning which a Force may adopt to perform those functions. Many of these principles, functions, and forms of positioning bear close resemblance to the same elements in U. S. Army principles of war and functional doctrine, e.g. single-manager peacekeeping operations management vis-a-vis unity of command; interposition screen vis-a-vis reconnaissance screen. In the course of "training down" regular armed forces to peacekeeping operations, or "training up" specially recruited units, it is believed desirable to employ peacekeeping oriented terminology to enhance understanding of peacekeeping operations and to inculcate an impartial, pacific attitude in participants at the operational level.
APPENDIX
CONCLUSIONS

Peacekeeping operations, by nature, are fundamentally political actions characterized by the employment of primarily military, and also economic and social, assets for the purpose of peacefully controlling and influencing the behavior of people and organizations towards specific ends.

Consent is the key to effective and efficient peacekeeping operations.

The ADOA concept of peacekeeping provides an adequate basis, with modification, for development of peacekeeping operations doctrine.

The US Army's functional doctrine can be adapted, with modification, to peacekeeping operations.

NOTES

2. Ibid., pp. 103-104.
3. Ibid., p. 118.
4. The author is indebted to Major Clement Lavoie, ID, Canadian Armed Forces, a member of the 1974-1975 USACGSC class for his interpretations on the UNEF 1 and UNEF 2 Logistics Systems and delineation of some of the problems based on his experience with both Forces.
5. See Note 4.
APPENDIX A

PEACEKEEPING ACTIONS SINCE WORLD WAR II

(By name, location, dates, type (Bowett's typology), sponsorship)

1. United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB); Greece; October, 1947 - August, 1954 (including the subcommission of Peace Observation Commission formed under the Uniting For Peace Resolution); frontier control and cease-fire, truce and armistice functions; United Nations.

2. United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO); Palestine; May, 1948 - to date (expanded July, 1967, to include Suez Canal Sector); frontier control and cease-fire, truce and armistice functions; United Nations.


8. Honduras - Nicaragua Peace Observation Mission; Honduras and Nicaragua border; 1957 (exact dates not available); frontier control; Organization of American States.


10. Panama Invasion Investigation; Panama; 1959 (exact dates not available); frontier control; Organization of American States.


15. Combined Quarantine Force; Cuba; October 1962; frontier control; Organization of American States.

16. United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); Cyprus; March 1964 - to date; interposition and maintenance of law and order in a state; United Nations.

17. Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF); Dominican Republic; May 1965 - September 1966; interposition and maintenance of law and order in a state; Organization of American States.

18. United Nations India - Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM); India and Pakistan border; September 1965 - March 1966; frontier control; United Nations.


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CONCLUSIONS

Peacekeeping operations, by nature, are fundamentally political actions characterized by the employment of primarily military, and also economic and social, assets for the purpose of peacefully controlling and influencing the behavior of people and organizations towards pacific ends.

Consent is the key to effective and efficient peacekeeping operations.

The ABCA concept of peacekeeping provides an adequate basis, with modification, for development of peacekeeping operations doctrine.

The US Army's functional doctrine can be adapted, with modification, to peacekeeping operations.

NOTES


2. Ibid., pp. 103-104.

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5. See Note 4.