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MACDR-88-PSA

10 February 1973

SUBJECT: Deputy Province Senior Advisor Completion of Tour Report.
(RCS MACCORDS 3480-6) LTC WILLIAM H. TAUSCH JR. 432-38-7352

THRU: DEPCORDS
Delta Regional Assistance Command
APO 96215

TO: HQs, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: MACCORDS-RA (ACofS, CORDS)
APO 96222

Attached is my completion of tour report for the period 1 June 1971 to

WILLIAM H. TAUSCH JR.
LTC IN
Deputy Province Senior Advisor

DAMO-ODU
73B024
Inclosure 3
SECTION I

NAME: WILLIAM H. TAUSCH JR.
GRADE: LTC
SSAN: 432-38-7352
BRANCH OF SERVICE: INF
PROVINCE: KIEN HOA
INCLUSIVE DATES OF TOUR: 28 May 1971 - 11 Feb 1973
EXPECTED REASSIGNMENT DATE: 11 Feb 1973
PREVIOUS TOUR(S) IN VIETNAM (DATES - INCLUSIVE) Sep 1966 - Jul 1967
ASSIGNMENT OF PREVIOUS TOUR(S): ACofS G4, 4th INF Div.
Bn XO, 1/8 Bn, 4th INF Div.
SECTION II

1. What background did you have for your position? One previous tour in Vietnam, one tour in Korea, one tour in Germany plus 19 years experience as a Combat Arms Officer.

2. What training did you have for this position? Thirty-two weeks training at Vietnam Training Center, Foreign Service Institute, Washington, D.C.

3. What additional training would you suggest for your position? I would suggest that some of the language training be conducted in-country. This training could be coupled with the briefings at Saigon. I would suggest a minimum of two weeks and preferably four weeks. The language as taught at FSI was beneficial for "breaking the ice" and social occasions. I feel that a better proficiency would have enhanced the accomplishment of my mission.

4. What should be the length of tour for your position? I feel that two years should be the minimum tour. As mentioned in 3 above, the first month to be spent in Saigon for language training and briefings.
5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory? If not, specify deficiencies. I feel that support was satisfactory. The team was two and one-half hours by vehicle from Saigon therefore readily accessible. However, I feel that is should be pointed out that support personnel on the team are a requirement and cannot be an additional duty. With a large team such as when I arrived (167 personnel) there were personnel going to Saigon on a frequent basis. However, as the team became smaller, the requirement still existed with fewer personnel available.

6. Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming? Were there any programs that were especially successful because support was readily available? Which ones?

No. No. N/A.

7. Do the reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 provide a means for reporting all information of present and future value? If not, what changes would you recommend? I must admit that I was not familiar with Directive 4-70, and still not so because the directive is not in the files. However, my comments on reporting are that frequently there was duplicate reporting. Information was obtained from the Vietnamese and reported to higher whereas the Vietnamese were also reporting the same information through their channels. A report by exception would have sufficed.

8. Do the MACCORDS Management Information System Field Reporting requirements set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 adequately measure progress in pacification programs? A requirement for all Team 28 personnel was to submit valid reports. It must be remembered that reports were "as of" reports and outdated by the time that they were submitted. My objective, partially achieved, was to get the Vietnamese to utilize the reports as management tools. This was also applicable to briefing charts. Frequently, the Vietnamese filled in the blanks but did nothing with the information portrayed. Toward the end of my tour there was a definite improvement both in the districts and at Province. A specific example was the "management by exception" printout.
9. Were instructions from higher headquarters clear with no conflicting requirements? If not, what specific instances occurred where conflicting instructions were received?

   Yes. N/A.

10. The most clearly defined and directed programs are:

   1. Public Safety
   2. Land Reform
   3. Rural Credit

11. The most effective para military forces are:

   1. RD Cadre
   2. National Police
   3. PSDF

12. The most successful pacification programs are:

   1. Land Reform
   2. Agriculture
   3. Territorial Security

13. The programs that have the greatest impact upon the pacification effort are:

   1. Territorial security
   2. Social Welfare
   3. Land Reform

14. The least successful pacification programs are:

   1. VIS
   2. Peoples organization
   3. PRO PAT
15. The programs that have the least impact upon the pacification effort are:

1. Eradication of Social Evils.
2. Youth
3. Peoples Organization

16. The rural people are aware of the pacification efforts the GVM and US are making. If not, how can they be informed?

As noted in 14 above, VIS in Kien Hoa is extremely weak. There were numerous occasions where a good VIS would have enhanced the GVN cause. Specifically, the GVN's decided victories subsequent to the NVA/VC offensive in Apr 72. The outstanding defense of a village against the NVA by the village chief and a few PF. It took a lot of advisory effort and then direction by the Province Chief to get the word to the people.

17. The people, as you know them are more committed to the GVN than when you assumed your job. Why? The people were offered ideological promises by the VC whereas the GVN brought a symbol ism of security, roads, schools, dispensaries and a chance for prosperity. There is still a long way to go. Some of the schools have no teachers and some are taught by RD cadre. Security is far from complete. The actions of the GVN during the next three months will be most critical and a deciding factor between GVN or VC.

18. Do you feel that the pacification plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goals that will result in security and growth of Vietnam? (yes) (No) If no, what change in the plan should be made? I feel that many of the Province goals were too low. After the expenditure of much advisory effort, it was rationalized by the Vietnamese that it was better to set the goals low and then achieve them easily or in some cases exceed them (with little effort).

19. Do you feel that the pacification plan was adequately communicated and explained to you and your counterpart? (yes) If not, how can this be accomplished? The advisors worked closely with their counterparts during the writing of the plan. The Province Chief and I were briefed on each program and in many instance additional guidance was given to the Service Chief, now goals were established and one service chief was told to rewrite his portion in that it was unacceptable.
RF/PF: Territorial Forces have been one of the most frustrating and yet rewarding aspects of my entire tour. To try and understand how all PF in an outpost could go to sleep and allow themselves to be overrun is next to impossible. Conversely, when five PF attack a larger VC force and capture a 75 RR it is a source of encouragement. The formation of the Sector Tactical Command Post (STCP) was a step in the right direction in solving some of the problem of Span of Control. It was a constant advisory effort to get the Province Chief to effectively utilize the STCP, primarily due to the lack of good leaders. The PC was never reluctant to relieve and ineffective leader but always was hard pressed to find a suitable replacement. I for one was in complete accord with the elimination of some OB's, upgrading of PF, formation of RF Bn's, and the conduct of more mobile operations. Unfortunately quite often these were theoretical in nature and not in actual practice. It is my opinion, that the three RF Bn's, the availability of air assets and the dynamic, professional and untiring leadership of the PC were the primary deterrents to a successful VC/NVA campaign in Kien Hoa. The one weakest area was intelligence. Frequently there was a complete absence of any information on the enemy yet he was moving Bn's from one district to another. It has been my experience that the Vietnamese will often discount any information that did not come from his own source. Information often told where the enemy "was" and not where he "is".

The Sector Logistic Support Center (SLSC) has done a magnificent job. One sole function, such as paying 21,000 troops in approximately 600 locations is an incredible feat and I was thankful every month that the SLSC Commander did not ask for "advice" on how to pay the troops. The SLSC is well organized and functional. They provide a service to the troops and are constantly looking for way to improve. They were readily acceptable to advice. They should be specially commanded on the cure and maintenance that they have exercised with reference to the new SLSC installation itself. There has been no degradation and in most instances an improvement in the 11 months that it has been in operation.

Sector Artillery enjoys one of the finest commanders, Major Ca, that I have encountered. He is professionally knowledgeable and extremely competent. Primarily through his ability, the troops in the isolated outpost have received support when necessary and in the required amount. His advanced planning allowed the Province Chief the flexibility of maneuvering the territorial forces to meet any contingency.

PSDF: The PSDF has been a constant flux in my evaluation of their effectiveness. A natural thorn in the side when instances of poor performance prevail vis a vis an instance when PSOF make a determined stand against an enemy force. Much of the dilemma is due to the fact that it is often forgotten the mission or role that the PSDF are to play in the overall defense of the countryside. They were not created or organized as regular forces. They were for early warning only. Then the question arises "why arm them?" I do believe that the fact that they
exist and that they have weapons have been deterrents to the freedom of movement of the VC. The more pacified an area becomes the more effective the PSDF become. It is my opinion that, under the present concept of PSDF, they should be organized only in areas of ARC HES ratings.

PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTORATE

National Police Field Force: The organization and capability of the NPFF provide the sub-sectors with a force for a specific mission. Unfortunately, the employment of the platoons leaves something to be desired, e.g. static guard at district command. They have conducted numerous operations directed toward VCI elimination but results were often per chance. The number of targeted operations against one or more specific individuals that produced results was not encouraging.

National Police Operations; The results obtained by the NP can be attributed to the effort and capability of the NP Chief. Unfortunately he is only one and suffered from the same problem that existed throughout the province, lack of qualified subordinate personnel. There has been a constant effort to upgrade the District Police Chiefs and in some cases successfully. Much advisory effort was expended in an attempt to convince the District Chief that the Police Chief works for him. The capability of the village Police Chiefs in no way is matched by exist. While the overall picture that I have painted sounds quite dismal, it is because of my fear for the future. The advent of the ceasefire and the unlimited opportunities for corruption necessitate a constant vigilance and improvement of the National Police. Careful screening and recruitment of the best is the only answer.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE

Village Self Development: The preponderance of interest shown in VSD was by the advisors and the CDCs. Progress has been accomplished through the program but the projects were not always in the best interest of the majority of the people. A big boost to the program was attained when RDC assumed responsibility.

RD Cadre: This is probably the hardest working group in the entire system and achieves the greatest results. So many of the accomplishments at village-hamlet level can be attributed directly or indirectly to the RD cadre. They not only gave assistance to the village chiefs but served as school teachers, VIS, mailmen and a friend of the people.

Ethnic Minorities

Local Government: The same problem exists here as in RF/PF, NP etc, lack of qualified leaders. Training particularly at Province, has improved the quality. There were village chiefs that could not read or write but a ray of hope exists in the example told by a DSA. "The Village Chief could not read but had a written speech which he delivered to the people. He had memorized his entire speech and fortunately no one saw that the paper that his speech was written on was held upside down by the village chief during the delivery".
Aid in Kind: These funds were one of the most beneficial assets available to the Province Team. They were not used to circumvent the Vietnamese system but as a supplement. The one most frequent usage was in the construction and upgrading of outposts. The big advantage of AIK funds vis a vis VCD funds was the final approval of expenditure rest with the advisor.

REFUGEE DIRECTORATE

Refugee: Kien Hoa had no refugees.

Social Welfare: The Social Welfare Service has made great strides forward during the last six months. Payments to war victims are paid the day of occurrence or the following day. This has done much to retain or win favor for GVN. The Province Chief recognized this fact and has taken a personal interest in all instances and directed or accompanied the delegation to the affected area. SWS has not been as responsive in the Return to Village, RTV, projects. This did not appear to be caused by a lack of interest but more so by a lack of knowledge or expertise.

CHIEU HOI DIRECTORATE

Chieu Hoi: Presently we are receiving comparatively few Hoi Chanhs and mostly guerrilla, low level, VC. It is still a functioning program but believe that with the advent of cease fire, this will be a big investment with diminutive returns.

REPORTS AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE

Report Requirements: Reports were commented on in para 7 and 8. As in every situation, there were instances of "one-time reports" on a crash basis but overall, the suspense dates were reasonable.

Report Feedback: The majority of the feedback was of little or no value to the Province Team. The reason being because the information originated within the Province and there was no value to see it in print one or two months late. The value that was derived was comparison with other Provinces (even though we were not in competition with other Provinces).

PHUNG HOANG DIRECTORATE

PHUNG-HOANG: A separate paper could be written on Phung Hoang, Phoenix and Protection of the people Against Terrorism. However, suffice it to say that I think the transfer to National Police was the only way the program could go and survive. There have been and still are numerous weaknesses within the program. For example; quantity vs quality; failure to target specific individuals; lack of information; failure to form good intelligence nets, ad infinitum.
Public Health: Public Health at Province is one of the finest. The hospital is well staffed and through the untiring efforts of the medical advisor, five years in province, the accomplishments and improvement are numerous. Districts and Villages do not compare but have shown progress. Numerous sanitary hamlets have been established and maintained on a continuing basic.

Education: The big problem with the Education Program is the shortage of teachers, not necessarily qualified teachers, just teachers. The Ministry of Education is behind the power curve every year and months go by after the opening of school before any alleviation of the shortage manifests itself. RD Cadre have helped, especially in the remote areas.

Public Works: PW is one of the finest that I have encountered. They have repaired roads and bridges that have been blown by the VC and did not insist on waiting for security conditions to improve. They not only work fast but the quality of work is also good. The outstanding performance of the Public Work is directly attributable to the PW Chief. He does not supervise from his office but travels throughout the Province visiting every project. The only short fall in PW is lack of equipment and resources.

Economic Development: The economy of Kien Hoa has made great improvement in the 21 months that I have been in Province. More miracle rice is being planted plus the introduction of sorghum; more land is being farmed due to increase in security conditions; main arteries have been surfaced or repaired; one rural bank was opened in Don Nhon (D) and is doing well; the districts of Ba Tri, Binh Dai, Giong Trom and Mo Cay are in the stages of forming rural banks; more homes of a permanent nature are being constructed throughout the Province.

Land Reform: Land Reform will exceed its goals with no particular problem. This is not due to the ease but due to the hard work of the Service Chief and encouragement and advice from his American counterpart. There were the usual problems, reluctance to declare, failure to apply, some instances of corruption at the local level and at the Saigon level. Advisory effort will continue to emphasize the program and get to the less accessible areas for continuation of the program.

Domestic Production: The area was discussed under Economic Development.

Labor: There have been no particular problems with labor. Unemployment is not prevalent at least for those that went to work.

Youth Affairs: I feel that this program has a great potential but as yet undeveloped. The only sure way to the future is through the youth but I am not sure that this philosophy is compatible with the Vietnamese culture. So far, "cowboys" are a rarity in Kien Hoa but I have great doubts about the future.
Public Administration: The Deputy Province Chief is very knowledgeable and professionally competent. He takes an active part and direct supervision of all areas of his responsibility. He was personally interested in the Province Training Center consequently the quality of instruction was outstanding. Vung Tau is an orientation course compared to Province. He headed PMAT II and it was a pleasure to accompany him on these visits. He was efficient, professional, thorough and above all instructive. Corrective action was taken on the spot where possible and each service chief insured that the individual at village knew what corrective action was necessary and how to accomplish it. The remainder of the service Chiefs varied in capability. Some have previously been discussed under their programs. On balance the Province Administrative Staff is capable of coning with the situation.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

PSYOP: VIS was discussed previously. The POLWAR unit functioned very carably. There was a marked improvement during my tour (no credit) and I am not sure as to the motivating factor. The JUSPAO advisor was recommending the relief of the Vietnamese LTC then there was a change of advisors and new Navy Ledr. was effective in achieving outstanding accomplishments through his counterpart. The POLMAR chief visited every district and every village and his personnel were keeping the people informed. Unfortunately POLMAR/VIS combined projects were not the most successful. After the termination of the JUSPAO rep, there was a decrease in such things as leaflet drop, Early Word, and preplanned aerial broadcasts. However, I could never be sure of their effectiveness due to the fact that the VC would not submit any reports to the Province Advisory Team.
SUBJECT: Addendum to Completion of Tour Report

1. Reference: COMUSMACV Confidential Msg. 280540Z Jan 73

2. In compliance with the above cited reference the following comments are submitted:

A. Overall Assessment of Pacification: A look at the Dec HES shown that Kien Hoa has achieved its highest level of pacification, 90.4% APC. In my opinion, GVN will retain control of all of the population in these hamlets. The VC have been unsuccessful in the many years of fighting and I-believe that the cease-fire will strengthen the GVN position. Acts of terrorism were some what accepted during the war but during "peace" will cause much disfavor. I believe that this disfavor will continue to grow with each act as the cease-fire continues. The people will learn to accept and appreciate the syllogism that there is a cease-fire and that there will be peace. I have tried to make an unbiased assessment and not be prejudiced by the fact that I want and have worked for peace. I have analyzed the enemy capability, in Kien Hoa, given them the benefit of every doubt and arrival at the conclusion that militarily the enemy does not have the capability to achieve success in Kien Hoa.

B. Major Problem Areas: One possible problem that I foresee will be the future actions of the GVN from hamlet through Province to Saigon level. The opportunity for corruption will present itself in numerous forms; e.g. the buying and selling of positions. This is conjecture and hopefully will not become a reality, but it will require a constant monitoring and immediate remedial action. People will soon forget the effort and accomplishments of the GVN and the sacrifices that the military exerted, hence any infraction will.
bring forth outcries of severe criticism. This leads to a second problem area; gainfull employment for ex-military and utilization of residual military in a peace time situation. The PSA has submitted suggestions to the Province Chief (PC) including such things as intensified training, upgrading of outposts, tertiary road construction (21,000 troops constitute quite a work force) and other civil action projects. I have confidence that the PC will accept and act upon these suggestions. The third problem area will be the VC, VCI and NVA. Easily recognized infractions of the cease-fire can be coped with. However, proselyting, coercion, threats and retaliation are not as easily recognized and much more difficult to preclude. It is not a function of the JXC or the ICCS. Ideally, this will be a function of the police. I think that this is only ideal and in actuality, theoretical.

C. Recommendations for Missions for A CIVILIANED CORDS ORGANIZATION.

I am not sure that I qualify to make recommendations. Indubitably, numerous individuals have considered this question and possibly by now have decided what the residual civilian force will do. I can visualize that in Kien Hoa the mission will be more monitoring and reporting vis a vis operating and advising. Militarily, the only person qualified to continue to advise is the PSA. Initially there will be five team members, one of which will have the additional duty as boss and one will be concerned with the support and administration of the team plus Vietnamese employees. There are three additional members and two provinces to monitor. It should be interesting. I would like to add that for the Region and National personnel to function effectively, a Province Team is a must. This has been demonstrated by the presence or absence of district teams. With the presence of the province team and through the use of CDA's, monitoring and reporting can be accomplished. Additionally, the province team will be able to assist the villages and hamlets a province level and the province at national level by bringing to the attention of necessary personnel existing problem areas.

WILLIAM H. TAUSCH
LTC, IN, 432-32-7352
Deputy Province Senior Advisor
**Senior Officer Debriefing Report**

**Ending February 1973**

- Robert L. Burgess
- COL Athol M. Smith
- LTC Robert C. Hallmark
- COL Wallace F. Veridry

**Distribution Statement**

- HQ, DAMO-ODU, Washington, D.C. 20310

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**Supplementary Notes**

- N/A

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**Sponsoring Military Activity**

- HQ, DAMO-ODU, Washington, D.C. 20310

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**Abstract**

- N/A