COMMAND HISTORY

1967

VOLUME III

PREPARED BY THE MILITARY HISTORY BRANCH
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF, MACV

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- SANITIZED COPY -
**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

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<tr>
<td>2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. TITLE (and Subtitle)</td>
<td>Command History, <strong>UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIETNAM 1967 VOLUME III</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. TYPE OF REPORT &amp; PERIOD COVERED</td>
<td>Final - 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. AUTHOR(S)</td>
<td>History Branch, Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff, MACV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(S)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA &amp; WORK UNIT NUMBERS</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS</td>
<td>Hq Department of the Army (DAIM-FAR-AD) Information Management Support Agency Alexandria, VA 22331-0301</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. REPORT DATE</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. NUMBER OF PAGES</td>
<td>272 of 1340 &amp; 7 Index pages</td>
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<td>14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME &amp; ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)</td>
<td>Records Access &amp; Release Division Information Access Branch (DAIM-FAR-AI) Alexandria, VA 22331-0301</td>
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<td>15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)</td>
<td>UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)</td>
<td>Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited. A Classified Version of this document has been accessioned into DTIC under AD #</td>
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<td>17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)</td>
<td>Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited.</td>
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<td>18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</td>
<td>This is the Third Volume of the 1967 USMACV Annual Command History, fourth in a series of Histories covering the years 1964 thru March 1973, prepared IAW CINCPAC Instructions for Unified Commands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)</td>
<td>Anti-Inflation Barrier; Civilian Casualties; Montagnard Problem; International Political Developments; Constitution of RVN; Macconomy; Official Visitors; Commanders &amp; Principal Staff Officers; CTZ Ground Ops; MACEVAL; COMUSMACV 1967 Command Strategy</td>
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<td>20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)</td>
<td>This Chapter III, Command History, 1967, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam contains: Letter of Promulgation, Title Page, Table of Contents, List of Illustrations (7 Index Pages). Following are: Annexes A thru M except for G which is not included (Pages 1069-1340). Footnotes following each Chapter refer to information contained in the Chapter. Annexes A thru M are basically titled as in 19 &quot;Key Words&quot; above.</td>
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United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

COMMAND HISTORY
VOLUME III
1967

Prepared by the Military History Branch
Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff
Headquarters, USMACV, APO San Francisco 96222
Saigon, Vietnam
1968
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ANNEX A--THE ANTI-INFILTRATION BARRIER

General

(TS) Based on the studies conducted by COMUSMACV during the latter half of 1966 and early 1967, SECDEF directed the development, preparation, and implementation of an anti-infiltration system for SEA. The primary purpose of this system was to impede the flow of vehicles and personnel from NVN into RVN, and the target date for Initial Operational Capability (IOC) was set at 1 November 1967.

(TS) In order to control this mammoth undertaking SECDEF established a JTF under Director, Defense Communications Planning Group (DCPG) with the responsibility of developing, procuring, and providing to COMUSMACV the necessary elements of the system. The resources and deployment programs evolved from a series of plans which, by the end of 1967, called for an anti-infiltration system known as DYE MARKER/MUSCLE SHOALS. This system consisted of four subsystems which had reached varying degrees of completion by the end of the year.

(TS) The two DYE MARKER subsystems on the east were designed as ground supported systems, whereas the two subsystems on the west were to be air supported.

(TS) The easternmost subsystem was a ground barrier designated Strong Point Obstacle System (SPOS). It was to be constructed westward from the coast through Con Thien to the foothills to the west, and consist of five strong points, four support bases, 23 km of cleared obstacle line and personnel sensors. This subsystem was still under construction at the end of the year with IOC estimated to be 1 July 1968. The second subsystem, the Defile System (DFS) was to be a westward extension to fill the gap between the SPOS and the Laotian border, and to cover the natural avenues of approach from the DMZ into RVN. At year's end it was still in a conceptual stage.
The two MUSCLE SHOALS air supported subsystems were to extend across the VN border into the middle of Laos. DUMP TRUCK, the anti-personnel subsystem included portions of Laos, southwestern NVN, and northwest RVN around the DMZ. It was comprised of mines and sensors laid and monitored by aircraft. DUMP TRUCK did not meet the planned IOC date, but was expected to reach that state of completion in January. MUD RIVER, the anti-vehicular subsystem was deployed in central Laos, in conjunction with other measures which were in being or planned, to block vehicular infiltration in areas where it was not practical to conduct conventional ground operations. It was comprised of mines and sensors laid and monitored by aircraft. MUD RIVER did meet the revised IOC date of December 1967. Both of the air supported subsystems were to utilize aircraft as the strike weapon.

Although three of the subsystems had achieved various degrees of operational capability, this initial capability had certain limitations. It was too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the program and there were problems with munitions, sensors, and related surveillance, as well as with delivery equipment and procedures. As a result, a follow-on program was developed to improve equipment and procedures.

The requirements of a program for 1968 for improved infiltration interdiction were clear: completion of planned installations; improvement in sensor effectiveness and survivability, special munitions, accuracy in locating sensors and delivering special munitions, and data processing; and reduction of aircraft vulnerability.

Background

Infiltration of enemy troops and supplies into RVN from NVN (occurring largely through Laos and across the DMZ) had increased steadily from an average of about two battalion-equivalents per month in late 1964 to approximately fifteen battalion-equivalents per month in early 1966. Concerned by
this rapid rise in the infiltration rates, and aware that the NVA was capable of increasing the rate, COMUSMACV had given careful attention to possible methods of limiting Communist infiltration into RVN. In 1966 considerable time and effort were spent in analyzing plans, providing raw data to other agencies, and particularly in assessing the possible impact of such plans on the overall strategy of the 1966 and 1967 Joint Campaign Plans. 1

(S) Deputy Ambassador Porter had proposed in April 1966 that an extensive barrier be constructed extending from Saigon west through Hau Nghia Province to the nearest point (the "Eagle's Beak") on the Cambodian border. COMUSMACV studied the proposal, and in May informed the Deputy Ambassador that inasmuch as north-south commercial traffic would have to continue, the effectiveness of the barrier would depend entirely on the effectiveness of RVNAF control of personnel and cargo movement across the barrier. COMUSMACV considered that any diversion of military forces to man and secure the barrier would not compensate for the loss of their effective employment in offensive maneuvers. Additionally, construction of the barrier would divert engineer effort, equipment, and materials from other critically-needed operational facilities. 2

(TS) In March JCS requested CINCPAC's views on a plan for an anti-infiltration barrier across northern RVN and Laos from the South China Sea to Thailand. CINCPAC studied the plan and pointed out a number of problems, including the large number of combat forces required before, during, and after construction of the barrier; the magnitude of initial and follow-on logistical support; the large engineer construction effort required; and the length of time needed to complete the project. CINCPAC considered that the existing logistic posture in SEA, particularly the available ports and land LOCs, would make the construction of such a barrier impracticable. CINCPAC also pointed out that reliance on such a barrier would shift the US and FWMA forces into strategy which would enhance the freedom of action of the enemy while denying the advantages of flexibility to friendly forces. 3

(TS) Another barrier study, completed under DOD contract by the Institute for Defense Analysis, was published in August. This study considered an air supported anti-infiltration barrier extending...
across RVN, near the DMZ, into Laos. The plan proposed a conventional linear barrier of barbed wire and mines extending from the South China Sea westward for approximately 30 km. Continued westward into Laos, this barrier would consist of an air supported anti-infiltration system, including anti-vehicular and anti-personnel portions to be seeded with acoustical sensors and area-denial munitions.

(TS) In September JCS notified CINCPAC and COMUSMACV that they were considering a proposal which accepted, in principle, the utility of an air supported barrier system across infiltration routes in RVN and Laos. The barrier would consist of two parts: one designed against foot traffic and the other against vehicles. The barrier would be achieved through use of large numbers of gravel mines, button bomblets, and acoustic detectors, supported by patrol, photo, and strike aircraft and supplemented by ground personnel to set detectors and plant mines. JCS indicated that its response to the proposal would probably take the form of supporting the principle of barrier potential, while recommending a broad study assessing all sensors, materiel adequacy, indicated R&D developments, and trade-offs between barrier efforts and competing demands on money, manpower and materiel. JCS asked CINCPAC and COMUSMACV for comments on the proposal, as well as information on any other barrier plans, proposals or studies in existence. In reply, COMUSMACV indicated that a MACV study had examined the logistical and operational effort required to seed and maintain a continuous barrier, and had concluded that except for trip-wire mines, such a barrier would be extremely difficult and costly to support logistically and operationally. COMUSMACV considered that a non-continuous barrier would be more easily supportable, and would be within limitations set by schedules, costs, and air-sortie resources. This reply indicated further interest in continued study of an air supported barrier system, and stated that it would have the full support of MACV. CINCPAC pointed out that although the establishment of an air supported barrier system astride infiltration routes in RVN and Laos might be technically feasible, its practicability should be considered further, as he doubted that such a barrier would impede infiltration— even initially. It was CINCPAC's opinion that maintenance of an air supported barrier might result in a dynamic "battle of the barrier," and that the introduction of new components
into the barrier system would depend not only on R&D and production capability, but would also depend on the capability to place the components in the right place at the right time. CINCPAC concluded that even if the US were to invest a great deal of time, effort, and resources into a barrier project, it was doubtful that such a barrier would improve appreciably the US position in RVN.5

(TS) On 15 September SECDEF appointed LTG Alfred D. Starbird, USA, Director of the Defense Communications Agency (DDA), to chair the Defense Communications Planning Group (DCPC) and to form Joint Task Force 728. The mission of the Task Force would be to "provide an infiltration interdiction system, to stop (or at a minimum to substantially reduce) the flow of men and supplies from North to South Vietnam. It is to be designed, produced and put in place in RVN and Laos as a matter of highest priority. . . . You [LTG Starbird] are hereby named Director of JTF 728 to achieve the objective of having the system installed and in operation by September 15, 1967." This directive formally established what was to become known as Project PRACTICE NINE.6

(TS) During the visit of SECDEF to RVN in October 1966, COMUSMACV suggested, as an alternate to previous recommendations, that a conventional barrier be constructed all the way across RVN and be augmented by selective use of air delivered munitions and sensors in Laos. At the request of SECDEF, this concept was refined into a Requirements Plan which was based on the premise that additional forces, over and above other MACV force requirements, would be provided for barrier construction and manning. In November, however, JCS informed CINCPAC and COMUSMACV that additional forces could not be made available to meet the requirements of the barrier plan, and that MACV should plan to meet all PRACTICE NINE requirements from within approved in-country strengths. In consideration of this message, which effectively invalidated MACV's Requirements Plan, COMUSMACV prepared a message to CINCPAC on 21 November 1966 to make his position completely clear:

For some time I have been considering the installation of a barrier, depending on the availability of resources, competitive requirement, for these resources, the enemy situation and
other factors. In discussions with SECDEF on 10 October, a proposal for a multinational force was discussed with the idea of establishing a barrier at a later date. Such barrier implementation should not be geared to a rigid time frame as outlined in the proposed plans. Further, I have never supported the prescribed plan air barrier concept in Laos, but rather the selective use of special munitions, as they become available, to augment existing interdiction programs in Laos. However, in my memorandum of 5 November to GEN Starbird, I did concur in proceeding until 1 April 1967 on the basis of readying the means set forth in the prescribed plan, noting decision could be made then as to the basis on which further preparations would go forward.

MACV prepared a plan to identify requirements necessary to construct and man a barrier system within an attainable time frame (Nov 67 for the ground barrier, and Apr 68 for the intensified interdiction operations in Laos), using additive forces. This plan outlined a basic assumption that additive forces would be required; if this assumption is invalid, the plan is invalid for the time frame involved.

It is not my intention, nor has it ever been, to displace in-country forces of the magnitude required to meet total barrier requirements. Rather, I consider it essential that the commander in the field maintain complete flexibility and utilize resources provided him for the benefit of the overall mission. This philosophy is projected throughout the Combined Campaign Plan for 1967 recently signed by General Vien, Chief, RVNAF JCS, and myself. This plan directs increased emphasis by both ARVN and US/FW forces to provide military support to Revolutionary Development (RD). The primary function of the military in support of RD is to attain and maintain the requisite level of security so that RD programs can be accomplished by GVN civil elements. To withdraw military forces of the magnitude required for the barrier would not only reduce RD planned for 1967, but could well result in the collapse of programs already underway in areas from which forces are withdrawn.
It is necessary to point out that I strongly oppose commitment to create and man a barrier of an inflexible time schedule. Any further actions toward establishing a barrier must be based on current intelligence and the enemy's action throughout SVN. Current developments indicate that establishment of a physical barrier can be delayed. At present, only about 5% of total enemy infiltration from NVN passes through the DMZ. Further, friendly forces now in positions south of the DMZ have prevented major enemy gains. I shall wish to weigh any further actions vis-a-vis the barrier against the overall situation in the country. By the same token, we should not redeploy major forces within SVN for a barrier unless enemy pressure demands it. It is conceivable that in the future this could well happen due to the success of our blocking actions in Laos.

In summary, I am unable to concur in meeting all PRACTICE NINE requirements from approved in-country assets alone. I consider it essential that an inflexible time schedule be avoided, that a realistic approach be taken toward construction of a physical barrier consistent with the overall MACV mission, and that freedom of action by the commander in the field be preserved. Finally, I must underscore the fact that I have on no occasion recommended nor concurred in a barrier undertaking governed by the parameters cited in Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 180059Z Nov 66, Subj: JTF 728 Project Definition Plan.

(TS) CINCPAC on 23 November relayed COMUSMACV's views to JCS, agreeing in general with the former's position:

Strongly concur in COMUSMACV's views on the barrier as expressed. . . . Most particularly, a realistic approach must be taken with respect to the construction of a barrier that is in consonance with the overall COMUSMACV mission. The barrier would have to be established in such a manner as to preserve the commander's freedom of action to meet
military contingencies and to avoid jeopardizing other essential operational and logistic undertakings. The proposed 1 April 1967 review of infiltration patterns that will have occurred during the winter Laotian dry season is considered essential to provide a basis on which further preparations could go forward. 8

(TS) On 19 December SECDEF directed JTF 728 to prepare a plan which would provide for procurement of materials for the linear section of the barrier so as to be in-country by July 1967, but without commitment as to when they might later be used. For the air supported capability JTF 728 was to develop and prepare the aircraft elements and other resources unique to the air supported capability, on a schedule to permit operational availability in-country by 1 November 1967. Readying for this date was not to constitute a decision as to deployment. The plan was prepared as a memorandum for SECDEF from Director JTF 728, dated 22 December 1966, and indicated the approach and time schedule to be followed, funding and personnel ceiling requirements, and actions requiring immediate decisions by SECDEF. 9

(TS) By the end of the year 1966, COMUSMACV and CINCPAC were preparing a two-part plan for JCS to present to SECDEF in accordance with the 22 December JTF 728 plan. The first part, providing for interdiction of infiltration through the area contemplated for the conventional linear barrier, was due in February 1967. The second part, covering the air supported interdiction capability, was to be completed by April 1967. At the same time, JTF 728 was concerned with its responsibilities for developing the air supported capability, and for supervision of research, development, testing, evaluation, production, and delivery of barrier system components.

Concept Development During 1967

(TS) The considerable and ongoing effort which already had been committed to improving anti-infiltration measures continued and began to take shape in early 1967 when, on 13 January, President Johnson approved assigning the PRACTICE NINE Program the highest national priority category. On 26 January, after detailed study, COMUSMACV
completed the MACV PRACTICE NINE Requirements Plan which JCS planned to submit to SECDEF in February. The plan provided concepts and estimated requirements to support an anti-infiltration system to be installed in northern Quang Tri Province. The concept envisioned a series of strong points and fortified base areas which could be constructed near the DMZ by tactical troops assisted and supervised by organic engineer units. Forward of the strong points a series of barbed wire and minefield obstacles would be laid to deny the enemy likely avenues of approach and to canalize his movements. Sensor/detector devices, night observation devices (NOD), infrared intrusion detectors (IID), Xenon searchlights, and radars were to be employed to detect enemy presence. The strong points and base areas would occupy key terrain features and serve both as patrol and fire support bases. Extensive air and ground patrolling was considered essential to detect signs of intrusion as well as to maintain contact with the populace in the surrounding areas. On-call, pre-planned artillery concentrations would cover the area, and tactical air as well as naval guns within range would be available on short notice to strike known or suspected targets. Helicopters and other available means would lift mobile reserves and strike forces from rear areas to block enemy penetrations or destroy intruders. All civilians would be relocated from the area in the vicinity of the obstacles, strong points, and forward base areas. Maintaining his earlier reservations regarding the concept, COMUSMACV noted in the plan that the term "barrier" should not be employed since it gave the connotation of an impregnable defense against infiltration which he felt impossible to attain without massive deployment of troops. His plan called for minimum additional forces of one division and one armored cavalry regiment and reiterated the use of an international task force for this purpose. He suggested the name "Tu Do" for this task force since, in Vietnamese, this means "freedom." Another innovation espoused by COMUSMACV in this plan was the development of Route 9 into an international highway running from the South China Sea across Laos to Thailand. For this he suggested the name "Pan Sea Pike." In the letter forwarding the MACV Requirements Plan, COMUSMACV stated:

..... The enclosed plan would meet the requirements by 1 Nov 67. However, I do not consider the end result to be the final solution to stopping infiltration. An obstacle or barrier system must be
regarded as only one of many anti-infiltration programs. A proper balance of all these programs must be preserved to prevent undue reliance on any single system.10

(TS) As refinement of the strong point/obstacle system planning gained momentum, COMUSMACV prepared a second plan requested by JCS for presentation to SECDEF. The MACV PRACTICE NINE Air Supported Anti-Infiltration Plan was published on 11 March. This plan provided for establishing and maintaining an air supported anti-infiltration system primarily in Laos, to the west of the ground emplaced strong point/obstacle system, but capable of being extended into western Quang Tri Province in RVN.

(TS) Interdiction operations had been underway in Laos for some time and were successful in limiting the flow of vehicular traffic; however, infiltration of enemy forces on foot continued at a high rate primarily because of the concealment provided by the jungle, the multitude of routes, and the lack of friendly ground forces to block these routes. Since friendly ground forces did not operate in sizable numbers in Laos, the interdiction of men and supplies would have to be accomplished by air. The plan envisioned expanding the interdiction of vehicular traffic by employing newly designed air emplaced sensor and monitoring devices on all potential vehicular routes within the area. Air delivered mines would be used on a selective basis to delay, damage, and fix in place the traffic at points where it could be most effectively attacked. More specifically, the elements of this interdiction system would include: point interdiction to cut the lines of communications by use of heavy air delivered weapons, anti-vehicular mining operations, and vehicular sensors. Where significant personnel infiltration had occurred or could logically be expected to occur, and where conventional ground operations were impractical, an air supported personnel interdiction system was to be installed and operated. Elements of this system would include anti-personnel minefields and personnel sensors, both seismic and acoustic, which would be air delivered and air monitored.

(TS) In forwarding this plan, COMUSMACV stipulated: "Several immeasurable and intangible factors dictate requirement for a flexible plan which can be modified readily without sacrificing the overall
objective. These factors include: unknown effectiveness of munitions and sensors (most of which are still in the research and development stage); the unknown reaction of the enemy; and the reaction of the governments of RVN, Thailand, and Laos whose willing cooperation is necessary to the success of the plan. Additionally, COMUSMACV emphasized that such a program should include a detailed plan for helicopter and ground team emplacement of special munitions and sensors, that it be oriented toward augmentation of current and projected anti-infiltration operations, and most certainly consider necessary changes to current rules of engagement to improve effectiveness.

(TS) CINCPAC’s comments, recommendations, and identification of possible problem areas relative to MACV’s air supported anti-infiltration plan were recorded on 3 April; it was apparent that some of his observations were due to a planned implementation date of 1 November 1967. CINCPAC pointed out, as had COMUSMACV, that present programs were based on valid concepts, were accomplishing the interdiction of enemy infiltration, and that implementation of the new concept should be considered as complementing and reinforcing. The focal point of the new program depended on an intensification of effort in current programs combined with the orderly and judicious integration of the new concept. Of primary concern were four points: (1) since sensing devices under development could not distinguish between friend and foe or civilian and military, substantial modification to rules of engagement, particularly in Laos, would be necessary due to the possibility of inadvertent strikes on friendly and civilian targets by employing air in reaction to sensing device information; (2) in reference to Thailand, “The spectre of infiltration penetrating Thailand” in an attempt to outflank the system may pose serious political and military problems; (3) the possibility of a gap developing between the air supported plan and the strong point/obstacle portion of the anti-infiltration system; and (4) preliminary studies indicated that the aircraft attrition associated with the plan could present a problem of serious magnitude. CINCPAC recognized the fact that the anti-personnel portion of the air supported plan could be installed initially as an in-country operational test and subsequently, “if the effectiveness of special devices and munitions are demonstrated, the full operational capability can be exploited and extended into northwest Quang Tri Province as required.”
(TS) Following CINCPAC's drawing attention to a possible gap developing between the air supported plan and the strong point/obstacle plan, requests flowed from JCS thru CINCPAC to COMUSMACV to supply an answer to such a contingency. In defense of the two plans submitted earlier in the year by his headquarters, COMUSMACV noted:

Careful consideration was given to concepts for intensified anti-infiltration operations in western Quang Tri Province. Constraints imposed by the selected operational capability date of 1 Nov 67 narrowed the courses of action available for consideration. The principal constraint was the logistics and construction support necessary in the very limited time frame. Priority of effort prior to 1 Nov would be placed on eastern Quang Tri Province, where there exists the threat of invasion by large enemy units. Current operations in western Quang Tri Province, such as long range patrolling, CIDG camp operations, and H&I artillery programs will be continued and intensified as the priority of operations and forces available in I CTZ permit. MACV favors the use of strong points as patrol and fire support bases, use of complementing obstacles and sensor devices, and use of mobile forces as a more effective means of impeding infiltration and detecting invasion of this area. 13

(TS) SECDEF had directed the development of an infiltration interdiction system for SEA to impede the flow of vehicles and personnel overland from North Vietnam to South Vietnam and further that certain preparations for the system go forward immediately. These preparations consisted initially of designing, testing, and developing equipment for a linear array of strong points and obstacles; acquiring and readying the resources for an air supported interdiction capability to be usable against personnel or vehicles or both; and developing plans for their use. In order to carry out these preparatory missions and provide for a smooth transition into the deployment and use of the capability as well as to provide a
common understanding of operational concepts, JTF 728 published the PRACTICE NINE Technical Design and Development Plan on 30 April 1967. Included in the plan was a delineation of the responsibilities of JTF 728, CINCPAC/MACV, and the Military Departments:

JTF 728 is responsible for: (1) preparing and providing to CINCPAC/MACV Practice Nine resources which are approved by SECDEF; (2) accomplishing the overall system planning and engineering. To the greatest degree practical, the JTF will task the Military Departments to accomplish detailed engineering, design and test of the systems elements; (3) tasking Military Departments and agencies outside of DOD as necessary to accomplish the work of developing system resources; (4) overall program review and reporting to SECDEF.

CINCPAC/MACV will plan and employ the Practice Nine resources in such manner as to best accomplish their infiltration interdiction mission. They will review all resources, readying plans of the JTF and advise the JTF, JCS or SECDEF, as appropriate, of changes required.

The Military Departments are responsible for conducting research, development and testing to find ways to improve the Practice Nine capability. They will accomplish specific research, development, procurement, and deployment tasks assigned by JTF 728.

The Technical Design and Development Plan was the most complete single source of information pertaining to PRACTICE NINE. While holding the plan in high regard as an excellent source of reference for all facets of the project, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV felt that there were several points requiring modification and made the following comments: (1) the concept and dimensions of the anti-personnel zone should not be as defined in the plan since the zone would be in actuality based on the tactical situation existing at the time of emplacement; (2) aircraft basing requirements spelled out in the plan had not yet been firmed; (3) the requirement for a
new reporting system appeared to be unnecessary considering that an adequate system for control of shipments, priority handling, munitions expenditures, etc., were already operational within CINCPAC; and (4) it was further noted that much of the information in the plan was perishable and of the "quick change" variety; therefore, some difficulty may be experienced in keeping the plan current.

(S) In June a partial compromise of the classified meaning of the nickname PRACTICE NINE occurred. As a result, on 13 June, DCPG directed that the use of this nickname be discontinued in any unclassified context, and the nickname ILLINOIS CITY was assigned to be effective until 2400H 14 July 1967 when the nickname DYE MARKER was to become effective. To insure clarity, due to the transitory nature of the nickname, "ILLINOIS CITY" will not be used herein.

(S) In October 1966 GEN Starbird had expressed a desire to establish liaison offices at MACV and CINCPAC, and both offices were operational by the end of the year. As concept development of the air supported anti-infiltration system progressed, the political, logistical, and tactical implications pointed up a need for an additional liaison office, and, in July 1967, a third liaison office in MACTHAI was established to coordinate DCPG matters in Thailand. Although no formal charter agreement for the liaison office in USMACV was ever developed, it was understood that its mission was to provide direct liaison for the Dir DCPG with COMUSMACV and, when required, with III MAF, 7AF, and US-NAVFORV. It was to consist of a chief (AF officer), three action officers, and one enlisted man. The Chief DCPG Liaison Office was responsible for representing the Dir DCPG at meetings, briefings, and conferences as requested by MACV; providing to MACV information on DCPG planning; coordinating with MACV on matters of command support of the DCPG mission; providing assistance to MACV staff in interpreting the DCPG mission, plans, and directives; and monitoring certain aspects of the DCPG plans when requested by MACV, e.g., maintaining statistics on unit and logistical items arrivals.

(S) In February 1967, during a visit to Vietnam, Dir DCPG was informed of COMUSMACV's concern about how to "bridge the gap" between requirement planning and operational planning for the employment of PRACTICE NINE air supported resources.
COMUSMACV stated that he would like to integrate some DCPG personnel into the MACV staff, and Dir DCPG agreed. It was felt that some work being done in part in DCPG could better be initiated by MACV Headquarters and components. Personnel from DCPG could provide important assistance. The tasks involved included determining possible locations for employment, establishing flight and ground patterns, determining intelligence information to be furnished the Infiltration Surveillance Center (ISC), integrating the ISC within TACC, developing delivery tactics and techniques, evaluating effectiveness, and developing logistic plans. To provide continuity of planning, Dir DCPG proposed transfer of 19 selected officers and spaces from DCPG to MACV. The proposal was approved by SECDEF and by the end of July the officers had arrived in-country.

(TS) In briefing SECDEF on 7 and 8 July COMUSMACV described his concept of integrating PRACTICE NINE into the existing command structure. CG III MAF would have operational control of the strong point/obstacle system in I CTZ, and Cmdr 7AF would have operational control of the air supported anti-vehicular and anti-personnel subsystems as an extension of the existing STEEL TIGER Task Force. It was COMUSMACV's opinion that this was consistent with the natural growth of the TIGER HOUND tasks of the MACV air component command. COMUSMACV continued that areas of mutual interest between III MAF and 7AF would be closely coordinated through direct communications channels. A special task group was organized at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand to provide an on-the-scene agency responsible for coordinating all forces operating in the STEEL TIGER area including PRACTICE NINE. The Special Task Group would, using the specialized capability of the ISC, gather intelligence, determine and coordinate mission requirements, and recommend delivery of strike, sensor, or specialized munitions to 7AF. Requests for diversion of aircraft for immediate strikes were to be passed to an Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center by the Special Task Group. To insure an integrated effort, provisions were made for joint staffing of the Task Group, which was to be headed by an Air Force brigadier general.

(S) In August COMUSMACV appointed a project manager for DYE MARKER. The Office of the Project Manager was designated
Special Operations (J33) and assumed the DYE MARKER responsibilities of the Special Projects and Analysis Branch. (J344).

(S) On 21 August CJCS sent a memorandum to Dir DCPG spelling out the responsibilities of the Cmdr 7AFTF, as defined by GEN Westmoreland, and further defining the responsibilities of DCPG in overall direction:

As Commander of the 7th Air Force Task Force, General McBride will be the operating manager of the air supported DYE MARKER system. In this capacity, he will manage the entire interdiction effort for the 7th Air Force in the air supported area of interest, TIGER HOUND area of Laos, and possible small portions of NVN and SVN near the demilitarized zone. He will have full authority for directing all infiltration surveillance activities conducted in his area by the 7th Air Force and all other MACV forces and will act as 7th Air Force coordinating authority for surveillance forces employed under other commands. He will direct the employment of surveillance/reconnaissance aircraft (including FAC's) and surveillance teams. Based on the intelligence information gathered at the Surveillance Center, which is part of the task force, he will select the targets and recommend the employment of strike forces allocated for strikes in his area by the 7th Air Force Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). He will also specify the employment of ground action teams available to his area from MACV resources.

I have discussed General McBride's proposed duties, as outlined above, with the Secretary of Defense. I also outlined to Mr. McNamara General Westmoreland's plans to appoint a brigadier general from within country to be a focal point on the MACV staff for all actions concerning the DYE MARKER program. In both cases, he is in full agreement.
However, the Secretary of Defense emphasized his desire that you continue to exercise overall direction of the continuing support effort which will be requisite to the success of the DYE MARKER program. Your responsibilities would include concept planning; research, development, and test of improved concepts and hardware; timely procurement of resources to be made available to the theater commander; and other similar actions which do not infringe upon established command arrangements. Along these lines, I assume that you will continue to maintain liaison groups within the theater to assist you in these matters. 17

(TS) At the Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee (SEACOORD) meeting on 1 August attended by Ambassadors Bunker, Martin, and Sullivan, as well as ADM Sharp and GEN Westmoreland, considerable concern was expressed about the apparent absence of field coordination in the development of DYE MARKER operations. Although it was intended that a good portion of the system was to be deployed in Laos and staged through Thailand, both AMEMB Vietiane and AMEMB Bangkok representatives learned of several elements of the proposed operation for the first time during the meeting. As a result COMUSMACV took immediate steps to create a working group in Saigon and urged the Ambassadors to Thailand, Laos, and the RVN to provide full time representatives. On 6 August COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC that an executive directive be issued to all involved government agencies establishing guidelines for approaching the governments of Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam and fixing responsibility on the US Missions to these countries to insure that specific parts of the DYE MARKER program would be carried out. In stressing the importance of this step and to further clarify possible misunderstandings, COMUSMACV stated his belief that, from a military point of view, DYE MARKER could not supplant or substitute for ROLLING THUNDER and other bombing/air interdiction programs. He pointed out that the locations of the anti-vehicular and anti-personnel sub-system were not yet firmly established, but that locations would be dictated by timely intelligence and availability of munitions and sensors. COMUSMACV cautioned that if Thai cooperation were withdrawn, the effect would be indefinite postponement of the planned initial operational
capability (IOC) date and complete reevaluation of the DYE MARKER system. 18

(U) On 7 September, as a result of speculation in recent news stories on anti-infiltration systems around the DMZ, SECDEF made a public release:

As you all know, we have for two years or more been examining into the possibilities of using ground obstacles and other devices to help impede the flow of men and supplies into South Vietnam. Many persons, some inside the Department of Defense and some in research organizations outside the department, have recommended different proposals.

Some of these proposals have been examined in detail and discarded. Others appear to have more promise. You are all aware that work has begun on clearing the jungle south of the DMZ for a stretch of roughly 15 miles. We are preparing to initiate late this year or early next year the operation of a system to make infiltration more difficult. The system's objectives will be consistent with those of our air campaign against the lines of communication. We know, of course, that no obstacle system can stop the infiltration of personnel or supplies.

Equipment to be installed will range from barbed wire to highly sophisticated devices. The more the enemy knows about our plans, the more ready he could be to defeat the system when it is installed. Therefore, I am directing that no additional information be made public by anyone in the Department of Defense on this program.

(S) As a result of this public release and the expected focus of attention by the press on the strong point/obstacle area, and because the nickname DYE MARKER was in wide use in the III MAF area to identify offices, telephones, etc., DCPG felt that the meaning of DYE MARKER would soon become public knowledge. To preclude consequent compromise of the entire anti-infiltration system, instructions were issued that the nickname DYE MARKER would pertain only to
the strong point/obstacle system. The remaining two subsystems, now requiring new nicknames, became DUMP TRUCK for the air supported anti-personnel and MUD RIVER for the air supported anti-vehicular subsystems; collectively, these two subsystems were nicknamed MUSCLE SHOALS.\(^{19}\)

**Strong Point Obstacle System**

**Developing the Plan**

(TS) The MACV PRACTICE NINE Requirements Plan was presented to SECDEF in February 1967 and, on 6 March, he directed JTF 728, to procure for delivery on schedules acceptable to COMUSMACV, materials for strong points and base camps and sensors and surveillance devices for a 10 km section; take necessary steps to insure that Route 1 and Hue Port were unobstructed; arrange for the State Department to secure GVN support for land acquisition and civilian relocation; and, in conjunction with State Department, to ascertain the feasibility and desirability of integrating the Tu Do Task Force and Pan Sea Pike concepts with PRACTICE NINE. He further directed that other measures be taken to preserve a 1 November 1967 operational capability.\(^{20}\)

(TS) Now having a plan that he considered practical, COMUSMACV took two preparatory steps prior to proceeding with actual construction: he directed CG III MAF to prepare a detailed plan to proceed and he personally made initial overtures to GVN.

(S) On 26 March COMUSMACV, desiring that a start be made as soon as possible on a Strong Point Obstacle System (SPOS), defined that system as one running along the southern edge of the DMZ extending from the sea to a point about one-third of the distance to the Laotian border. He also directed CG III MAF, in coordination with CG I CTZ, to prepare a plan "as a matter of urgency" to locate, construct, organize, and occupy a strong point obstacle line. This plan was to include recommended task organization with US and ARVN units for both construction and occupation of the system. The plan was to address the subject of displacement...
of persons occasioned by construction of the system, and to include relocation areas as well as land clearing requirements for resettlement and cultivation for the displaced persons. 21

(TS) On 16 March General Loan, the Director General of the National Police, met with GEN Westmoreland and stated his concern for the safety of his police in the DMZ because of the VC/NVA capability to harass the police. The police were without mortars or other heavy weapons with which to defend themselves and, even worse, did not have radios to call for air strikes or artillery when under attack. In reply, COMUSMACV revealed the possibility of constructing an obstacle system in that area, to which General Loan was most enthusiastic.

(TS) On 17 March at III MAF Headquarters, COMUSMACV met with Generals Thieu, Phong, Lam, and Loan to explain his plan. The plan was enthusiastically received, and General Loan stated that construction should begin right away taking advantage of the dry season. COMUSMACV expressed his advocacy for use of an international force but felt that for political reasons General Loan should bring up the idea with General Ky. It was the opinion of the GVN representatives that implementation of such a plan posed no problems, political or otherwise. COMUSMACV also suggested that although MACV would assist, clearance of land which might be used for cultivation to ease the problems of civilian relocation from the area and the use of mass labor for improving LOCs should be a GVN program. When contacted, Premier Ky stated that he would confer on the matter with President Johnson at their meeting on Guam. However, since the subject did not come up during the conference on Guam, SECSTATE informed the AMEMB Saigon that resolution should be achieved by COMUSMACV and AMEMB Saigon through the Mission Council. SECSTATE also felt that "mention to GVN of the overall planned interdiction system including the air-laid capability and extension into Laos should be avoided. . . you may, however, say that we are studying the problem of extension westward to the Laos border." 22

(TS) Two significant coincidental actions occurred on 15 April when Premier Ky, during a press conference at Bien Hoa Air Base, stated that a defense perimeter south of the DMZ would be constructed and that new Allied and Vietnamese forces would be necessary for the DMZ. At the same time SECSTATE wired AMEMB Saigon that SECDEF
was anxious to move ahead as rapidly as possible on first stages of preparation and would like an estimate of when GVN approval might be obtained. Following these simultaneous actions, Ambassador Lodge and COMUSMACV, on 17 April, discussed construction of such a military system of obstacles and strong points with Premier Ky. They informed the Premier that, if he agreed to such a project, the US was prepared to furnish the mines and other materials for the system and would commit military personnel to man part of the system. The Ambassador added that the US favored an international composition of forces and suggested that an appeal to certain countries for additional troops might be appropriate. The Premier approved the overall concept and dispatched proposals to the heads of governments of troop contributing countries that they provide additional troops to help man a SPOS in Quang Tri Province along the DMZ.

(TS) The same month, JCS requested CINCPAC comments regarding the proposition for a multinational force. CINCPAC considered the idea worth pursuing but stated there were some questions regarding the capabilities and willingness of troop contributing countries to provide the additional forces for the purpose stated. He believed that the force should be strong enough to deploy and fight as an independent unit and should not be dependent upon other ground forces except when forced by superior numbers. Considering that placing an international force of inadequate strength in a position of jeopardy might prove embarrassing to the US, he felt it would be desirable that the overall force be no less than a division-sized unit with aerial support for reconnaissance. CINCPAC considered that a ROK contribution would be most hopeful, a Thailand contribution might be possible, and additional force contributions for Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines would be doubtful though desirable. CINCPAC in turn solicited COMUSMACV's comments, to which COMUSMACV replied:

There are a number of advantages, primarily political and psychological, to forming and positioning a multinational force south of the DMZ; however, these advantages do not outweigh the disadvantages if the use of forces presently in-country is required. The diversion of forces from current
operational areas, the loss in flexibility in employment of these forces, and the lack of any assurance that the multinational force could prevent enemy buildup in SVN militate against the forming and positioning of the force. The proposed letter from Premier Ky to heads of governments of troop contributing countries requests additional troop commitment to SVN. Should sufficient additive forces become available as a result of this letter, it would be advantageous to form and position the additive multinational force south of the DMZ. 23

Program Takes Shape

(TS) By the end of April CINCPAC summarized the activities to date as including the preparation and acceptance of the 26 January MACV plan, commitments to Premier Ky, GVN indorsement of the plan, III MAF planning responsibilities, and, the fact that some clearing had actually begun, employing US Marine and ARVN units. It appeared to CINCPAC that the work in progress was taking place considerably to the south of the intended area and would require relocation of thousands of civilians. The question then perplexing CINCPAC, which was posed to COMUSMACV was: "What relationship, if any, does present activity south of the DMZ have with respect to MACV plan of 26 January 1967?" COMUSMACV replied that:

The present activity south of the DMZ is divorced officially from PRACTICE NINE... The present undertaking is a modest effort to clear fields of fire and to install a limited obstacle system. However, as time, security conditions, forces, and materials permit, the system could be improved to conform to the PRACTICE NINE concept. The planned locations conform to the PRACTICE NINE Plans. 24

(TS) In development of the SPOS the concept was, in those areas where the terrain and tactical situation would permit, to construct an installation
consisting of conventional equipment such as barbed wire, mines, and flares. In addition, a series of newly developed sensors and surveillance devices would be installed. For the primary sensor, a Balanced Pressure System (BPS) was planned. It consists of parallel liquid-filled hoses buried in the ground and connected to flexible disc transducers which respond to pressures on the surface of the earth. The alarm would be transmitted to observation posts by wire or radio. Unattended Seismic Detectors (USD) consist of five buried sensors (geophones), a buried electronic component, and a remotely located annunciator. The geophones are connected to the electronic component by buried field wire, and the electronic component connected to the annunciator by buried cable. Ground vibrations caused by surface motion are sensed by the geophones which transmit alarm signals to the annunciator. Alarm displays at the annunciator can be either visual, aural, or both. The Infrared Intrusion Detector (IID) is a line-of-sight device consisting of an IR source which illuminates an IR receiver from a given distance. The IR source would be aligned so that its beam will focus on the IR receiver, which may be up to 400 feet away. A break in the beam would result in the wire transmission of a signal to the annunciator which would contain audio and visual alarm indicators and a counter. All equipment would be powered by self-contained batteries, small in size, and buried in the ground. IID was particularly well suited to river, canal, and stream crossings, but line-of-sight and heavy fog limited the range. AN/PPS-5 and AN/PPS-6 combat surveillance radars were planned to be used to detect intruders. The AN/PPS-5 is a pulse doppler radar mounted on a tripod and equipped for either on-location or remote operation. The radar was capable of area surveillance with a personnel detection range of 5,000 meters and a vehicle detection range of 10,000 meters. Both audio and cathode ray tube displays are used. The AN/PPS-6 is a lighter pulse doppler radar used by patrols, and having a maximum personnel detection range of 1,500 meters and vehicle detection range of 3,000 meters.

Night Observation Device, Medium Range (NOD MR) is a tripod-mounted telescope which operates passively with reflected light from stars, moon, and night sky glow in the visible and near infrared regions. NOD would be used at surveillance outposts supporting the system. The viewing range of the NOD is at least 1,200 meters in moonlight and 1,000 meters in starlight. The jeep-mounted Xenon Searchlight provides a capability for either visual or infrared surveillance around strong points and along the obstacle trace.
The approximate viewing range in the visible and infrared mode is 1,500 meters and 1,000 meters, respectively. 25

(S) In mid-April the DCPG Bill of Materials (BOM) was received; it included delivery schedules and breakout of materials to be procured by Service components. The list was essentially as stated in the MACV BOM in the Requirements Plan; however, some differences were identified and action was taken in coordination with III MAF to resolve them. Some of the materials required in the SPOS were available in-country and were transferred to NAVSUPPACT Da Nang. Other materials were funded by DCPG and shipments to RVN initiated during the 4th Qtr of FY67. Shipping schedules established to support the planned installation called for shipments between April and September and, although actual shipment of some items slipped their schedules by up to 60 days, all phases of construction were permitted to begin using some items already available or substitute materials from in-country assets.

(TS) The MACV PRACTICE NINE Requirements Plan of 26 January 1967 enumerated additional troop requirements to man an effective obstacle system spanning Vietnam. An additional division (reinforced with certain in-country elements) would be required to occupy the system and an additional armored cavalry regiment would be required for a highly mobile reserve and route security force. It was considered in the plan that an obstacle system was likely to be completed from the South China Sea to Dong Ha Mountain in northern Quang Tri Province, a distance of 30 km, by 1 November 1967, and that, to man this portion of the system, a three battalion brigade (constituting the first increment of the division) would be required by 1 August 1967. Besides the brigade, an additional armored cavalry troop, engineer company, support battalion, 105mm towed howitzer battalion, and an aviation company also would be required, for a total additional force of 4,460 men. Other needed support units, augmentations, and construction battalions would raise this figure to 7,691. Not considered in this figure were MACV resources already in-country which would be used to support the plan: two Army field artillery battalions (one 175mm gun, and one 105mm howitzer), an Army light equipment company, three Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCB), an Air Force heavy repair squadron, and a Marine engineer battalion. ARVN's contribution was fixed at elements of an engineer group and a regimental task force.
All units would contribute to security forces and it was assumed that enemy activity would not require major reinforcement into northern I CTZ. 26

(TS) On 23 March, in reply to a SECDEF request to recommend the forces required to support PRACTICE NINE, JCS proposed an augmented initial force of 8,353 personnel. The units, which would deploy between April 1967 and August 1968, were a mechanized infantry brigade, an aviation company, two truck companies, an NMCB, an augmentation to the Naval Construction Regiment (NCR) staff, two LSTs, six LCU's, as well as assorted support platoons and detachments. With certain exceptions, SECDEF approved the JCS recommendation and directed that Program 4 be revised to reflect an increase of 7,522 in the deployed strength in RVN and 300 in the off-shore Navy strength. While SECDEF tentatively approved the mechanized brigade proposed by the JCS, he noted that COMUSMACV had requested an infantry brigade and directed JCS to study the feasibility of converting the brigade to an infantry configuration or, alternatively, to deploy an infantry brigade. MACV subsequently accepted substitution of a mechanized brigade for the infantry brigade, intending to deploy the mechanized brigade to II or III CTZ, which would release an infantry brigade for redeployment to I CTZ. 27

(TS) Permissive authority was granted by SECDEF in a memorandum dated 13 June 1967 in which he stated that "... the approvals given in [6 March SECDEF Memo to JCS] are now expanded to include authorization to employ the resources identified with the PRACTICE NINE SPOS in the execution of the MACV Requirements Plan." 28

(S) COMUSMACV recognizing that no definite plans had been made regarding anti-infiltration measures to be taken in the flood plain area to the east of Gio Linh (from YD 224747 to YD 253752), requested CG III MAF on 16 June to make recommendations on how to fill the gap. A problem in this sector of the trace was created because the normal river width through the area in question was 50 to 65 meters, except during the NE Monsoons when the width increased to about 1,400 meters. CG III MAF considered it possible to build a clear causeway from the edge of the flood plain to the sea by moving 2.5 million cubic meters of earth; however, the...
magnitude of such an effort was beyond his capability in a reasonable time frame. He therefore recommended installation of the SPOS to each flank of the flood plain, interdicting forward of the trace with COMMANDO LAVA and observed artillery fire using VT fuses as necessary. It was pointed out as an aside that ground access from the eastern-most strong point to base area during flood season would be a problem.

(TS) During SECDEF's visit to HQ MACV in July, he was briefed on the status of the SPOS including the following. The strong points of Gio Linh and Con Thien were cleared to a 500-meter radius and were being installed and manned by tactical troops then in the area. The 600-meter wide trace between the two strong points as well as eastward to the flood plain had been cleared of vegetation. At the time it was felt that the first 13 km, from Con Thien to the flood plain, including strong points and base areas, could probably be installed and operational with released PRACTICE NINE materials by 1 November. Since it was recognized that the monsoons would reduce traffic to practically zero after mid-September, a major effort was being made to improve the situation by employing the engineer forces to upgrade Routes 1, 9, and 561, build the necessary pioneer roads to connect strong points with base areas, and prepare storage sites for materials at Dong Ha. Plans to develop the system included as first priority, the conduct of offensive operations to install covering forces for security in observation posts, strong points, and bases areas so that by mid-August the infantry units assigned could complete the construction of the strong points, base areas, and OPs to the point where obstacle installation could begin by mid-September. Plans called for a series of OPs and towers to provide interface with the strong points along the trace. The OPs would house the readout for the sensor/detector information, and the towers would provide platforms for observers and for radar. The BOM that had been developed for construction would be adequate for the 13 km obstacle line, and indications were that the delivery schedule was reasonable to support the 1 November date. Looking ahead, an additional 10 km would be required to complete the trace from the China Sea westward to the nearest strong point. The BOM for this section was under study, and a delivery schedule was being prepared to permit completion of the added segment by June 1968.
(S) By mid-August the enemy situation had begun to change drastically in the general vicinity of the DMZ. CG III MAF noted that although his forces had increased, none of the forces regarded as minimum essential augmentation by the 26 January 1967 Plan had been provided. The enemy threat in the DMZ had progressively increased to the point that friendly forces were fully occupied in holding back the enemy in the Con Thien-Gio Linh area. Friendly forces (four battalions plus combat support and combat service support) with the assistance of extensive and continuous artillery, air (including ARC LIGHT), and naval gunfire support could not accomplish this up forward, while at the same time constructing, manning, and operating the SPOS to their rear. Once completed, however, it was considered that the SPOS would permit the release of some troops for defense to the west and missions elsewhere, CG III MAF accordingly requested that additional forces from outside the I CTZ area be deployed to northern Quang Tri Province or that a brigade of TF OREGON be shifted northward to relieve elements of the 5th Marines. COMUSMACV concurred in CG III MAF's request and sent an additional brigade. As a result, CG III MAF informed COMUSMACV that he planned to use nine Marine battalions--seven to search, clear, and screen in support of the construction effort and the remaining two battalions plus an engineer battalion to construct and man the obstacle as work was completed. In order to expedite the construction, which would take about six weeks, the flow of equipment and materials had to be timely, and construction would proceed as soon as minimum assets were available. 30

(S) Because of this drastic change in the tactical situation in northern I CTZ, specifically, the increased enemy artillery capability, it became essential that all personnel, command and control elements, and essential ammunition supplies be afforded bunker protection. A reevaluation of requirements indicated need for an additional 150 bunkers, plus additional materials for flooring all bunkers, and additional overhead cover. Screening of in-country assets by MACDC revealed that the added BOM requirements could be met subject to reimbursement by DCPG, and as a result COMUSMACV directed on 15 September that the materials be issued. By 30 September, the necessary materials had been transferred or were
enroute to the project depot at Da Nang, and III MAF requirements were met in adequate time to allow construction to continue uninterrupted.

**DYE MARKER Reorganized**

(S) On 7 September COMUSMACV directed CG III MAF to prepare an alternate plan for development of the SPOS, taking into account the increased enemy artillery capabilities and their effect on the construction and security forces. III MAF OPLAN 12-67 was prepared and subsequently approved in concept by COMUSMACV on 13 September. The major change resulting from this plan was to stop construction of the obstacle until the strong points and base areas were completed and the tactical situation had settled down. Minor changes included: (1) relocation of one base area toward Cam Lo in order to provide more security for artillery and other support forces at Cam Lo and to protect a vital bridge on Route 561; (2) addition of a company base area behind the easternmost strong point to provide support, especially during the monsoon when this area is isolated by the flood plain to the west; and (3) occupation by ARVN Bns of four strong points instead of only two as previously planned. The latter would free one Marine Bn to provide necessary security for a new airfield at Quang Tri. COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that he felt that these adjustments were compatible with the overall DYE MARKER objectives and consistent with SECDEF's public statement on DYE MARKER. He hastened to point out that preliminary estimates indicated that casualties which might be sustained under this adjusted plan should be substantially less than those sustained under the original plan. Considering this adjusted plan, seven US and four ARVN battalions would operate in the area. One US battalion would split between Dong Ha and the adjacent base area, one split between the next two base areas, one at Quang Tri, and the remaining four at Camp Carroll, Than Son Lam, Ca Lu, and Khe Sanh, providing strong secure bases in the area. These dispositions would enable III MAF to detect and attack enemy infiltration in force and also to patrol for covert infiltration. Should the enemy counter by increasing infiltration to the west, plans had already been prepared to move additional battalions to Lang Ruou, Khe Sanh, and Lang Vei.31 (See Figure A-1).
(TS) COMUSMACV related the status of construction at the time of issue of the new plan to CINCPAC during the latter's visit on 14 September. It was noted that the upgrading of Routes 1, 9, and 561 was progressing satisfactorily in spite of enemy action and heavy rains. Time was lost when base course material on Route 561 failed after a heavy rain that continued for 30 hours, requiring rework throughout. Some delays were recorded due to non-arrival of other necessary construction materials, but the problem appeared to be one of transportation capacity rather than supply. Obstacle materials, although in some cases slightly behind schedule, were all due in by mid-September. Generally, components for the base areas and strong points such as sensors, pickets, and Class V items were behind schedule, although coordination with DCPG LNO reported all items as enroute.

(S) Because of the significant change in the DYE MARKER concept attendant to implementing III MAF's OPLAN 12-67, and the transfer of materials previously reserved for the linear obstacle to other commitments, COMUSMACV requested CG III MAF review his supplementary materials requirements, the dates materials would be required, and the BOM for the ten km obstacle extension. Further, he asked for a planning schedule for installation of the various segments of the obstacle. With the 1 November readiness date but two weeks away COMUSMACV then informed CINCPAC that it was now clear that construction would not be completed by the target date. Weather still precluded ground access to A-3 and A-4, and other priorities prevented work on C-3 and Ca Lu. He pointed out that unless additional resources were applied, construction would not be completed in 1967 even though no delay in construction due to shortages of materials was anticipated.

(S) As a result of his own observations as well as inspections by members of the MACV staff, COMUSMACV concluded that quality control over the installation of the DYE MARKER system was inadequate. It was his opinion that the project had not been accorded a priority consistent with its operational importance and therefore required greater command emphasis and management. Whereupon he directed CG III MAF to take immediate steps to correct deficiencies in construction; to institute a positive system of quality control over construction and installation of the entire system.
and after review of the situation and current progress, to submit rationale for specific slippages and a revised attainable completion schedule. In response, CG III MAF assigned his deputy to head up a permanent DYE MARKER special staff element with representation from NSA Da Nang and his Force Logistics Command (FORLOGCMD). It was made clear to all commanders concerned that the DYE MARKER project had high national interest and a priority second only to emergency combat requirements. In addition, plans were made to deploy a Marine regiment north to provide additional support for tactical requirements. At that time, all A and C sites in the OPLAN 12-67, except A-3, A-5 and A-6, were actually manned and engaged in anti-infiltration operations. CG III MAF assured COMUSMACV that the task of completing construction and improving combat patrol bases would be pursued as a matter of utmost urgency.  

Closing the Gap  

(TS) With the installation of DYE MARKER and MUSCLE SHOALS approaching realization, COMUSMACV turned his attention to the western Quang Tri Province, where he had envisioned, in the PRACTICE NINE Plan, interdicting infiltration in the defiles of the rugged mountain area. More specifically, as he had explained to SECDEF in July, he was contemplating a series of defile obstacles placed in likely infiltration corridors, supported by mobile forces operating from a series of strong points spread from A-5 to the Laotian border.  

(S) In October, COMUSMACV requested CG III MAF to provide a concept for closing the defiles of this mountain area and, in addition, plan to provide interface between the DYE MARKER and MUSCLE SHOALS systems. In reply, CG III MAF spelled out the mission as "conducting anti-infiltration operations in the defile area of northern Quang Tri Province, utilizing battalion combat operating bases, (COBs) located along Route 9 to protect lines of communications, detect, interdict, and destroy/impede enemy infiltration in zone." It was generally assumed in preparing the plan that the installation of DYE MARKER to the east would cause the enemy to increase his use of infiltration routes farther to the west. It was recognized that construction efforts would be impeded during the monsoon season. It was assumed that materials required for construction of the COBs would be available as needed and that sufficient
transportation (land, sea, air) would exist to support COBs west of Camp Carroll. 34

(S) Operations in the defile area would be conducted from battalion-sized COBs located at Camp Carroll, Than Son Lam, Ca Lu, Lang Ruu, and Khe Sanh. (See Figure A2). The operations would consist of patrols along Route 9 and as far to the north as permitted by terrain, fire support, and size of the force employed. Reconnaissance would be conducted to the limit of supporting artillery—generally to the line formed by Dong Ta Bang, Lang Cat Su, Lang Dong and Bao Thuong. Aviation assets assigned to MUSCLE SHOALS were considered available on a limited basis for sensor emplacement and tactical support. Intelligence would be exchanged over dedicated secure voice and secure teletype circuits between the MUSCLE SHOALS Infiltration Surveillance Center (ISC) at Nakhon Phanom and III MAF forces. Sensor devices, yet to be determined, would be deployed to an optimum distance to the west and northwest, and on known infiltration routes within the capabilities of the readout system. Sensors would be emplaced by fixed wing aircraft, helicopter, and hand emplacement by ground forces with readout from COBs and observation posts. As improved sensor devices became available, the depth of sensor installation to the west and northwest would be increased along the valleys and newly-determined infiltration routes. Conceivably, and as the sensors were improved, the MUSCLE SHOALS system might be extended generally eastward and to the north of the defile area of operations to physically link with or overlap the DYE MARKER system.

(S) On 8 December a DYE MARKER Development and Operation Plan was published as MACV Planning Dir 10-67. This plan established responsibilities and schedules for the DYE MARKER Program. Noteworthy in this directive was the definition of DYE MARKER as encompassing the original SPOS of five strong points, a 23 km obstacle, and four support bases. It defined the DFS as a series of battalion base camps, observation posts, and sensors running west from the SPOS to the Laotian border. Specifically, III MAF was directed to plan and test the DFS and to put it into operation as soon as possible with forces in the area together with additional forces which would be made available as I Corps progressively took over the SPOS. 35 (See Figures A1 and A2).
Figure A-2
By the end of the year considerable progress had been made in establishing the counterbattery/fire support coordination effort for the DMZ. A target acquisition battery attached to the 108th Arty Gp had moved into Dong Ha, and was capable of supplying target location data to the counterbattery information center in the 12th Marines FDC. Their equipment, including radar, sound, and flash ranging was deployed to Con Thien, Gio Linh, and the Dong Ha combat base.

Air Supported Anti-Infiltration System

Support for Communist aggression against GVN is provided principally by the overland flow of men and supplies from NVN across the DMZ and southward through Laos. Interdiction operations against determined infiltration had been successful to varying degrees against vehicular traffic; however, clever use of jungle concealment, the use of a multitude of jungle paths, and the lack of sizable numbers of anti-Communist ground forces contributed to continuous high rate of infiltration by foot. The MACV PRACTICE NINE Air Supported Anti-Infiltration Plan, published 11 March 1967, was designed to suppress this flow of men and materials through the difficult and remote terrain. The plan envisioned an air surveillance and support system which would supplement and act in consonance with the overall interdiction program developed by 7AF. The system was to use aircraft equipped with special navigational equipment to distribute sensors and mines throughout the interdiction areas. These deterrents were to suppress personnel and vehicle infiltration either by incapacitating the infiltrators or by alerting the surveillance aircraft to the infiltration. Information received by the monitoring aircraft would be relayed to an Infiltration Surveillance Center (ISC) for evaluation and possible counteraction.

Concept of Operations

COMUSMACV directed that data be developed and continuously updated on personnel infiltration trails, vehicle LOCs, and patterns of enemy movement in LAOS and in the DMZ area. These data were to be gathered to use as the basis for selection of targets.
for employment of sensors and munitions being readied for employment in SEA. Target areas along with minefield and sensor patterns would be under continuous review and changed and refined, based on changing tactical situations or on new information. Although the ability to detect the flow of vehicular traffic had been demonstrated, it had to be expanded and improved in the face of anticipated increased enemy determination to get through. The concept was to employ new or improved techniques, equipment, and forces to block vehicular infiltration in those areas where it was not possible to conduct significant ground operations. On the other hand, stopping personnel infiltration by air interdiction alone was considered to be a far greater if not insurmountable problem. Therefore, the objectives of the anti-personnel operations were to restrict infiltration, inflict significant casualties, disrupt the infiltration pattern, force infiltrators into difficult terrain, and demoralize porters and soldiers. "Such operations," said COMUSMACV, "performed in conjunction with the anti-vehicular system to deny infiltrators the supplies required to make them an effective fighting force, should limit the enemy's ability to project his power into RVN." 37

(TS) On completion of the MACV PRACTICE NINE Air Supported Anti-Infiltration Plan, CINCPAC commented to JCS in detail. He felt that, if the decision were to provide an air supported interdiction capability, and the MACV 11 March 1967 Plan was approved, additional forces, and timely and adequate funding was essential. CINCPAC reiterated COMUSMACV's concern regarding the effectiveness of special munitions, sensors, dispensers, and delivery means which were being developed. He noted that evaluation and testing of certain elements under development indicated that the desired operational capabilities might not be realized within the time frame visualized. CINCPAC recommended that implementation of the plan not be pegged to an arbitrarily selected date which might result in marginal operational effectiveness. 38

Anti-Vehicular Operations

(TS) For anti-vehicle mining operations, it was considered that air-dropped mines should be employed in as varied and unique a pattern as possible to catch the enemy by surprise and to complicate his task of devising countermeasures. Random but selective
areas would be mined using variable seeding schedules to prevent the
development of a predictable pattern. In some instances, air-dropped
mines could be seeded around and on interdiction points to discourage
road repair or bypassing. They could also be used independently
along suitable segments of roads to damage, slow, and harass enemy
traffic. For area denial munitions, aerially delivered self-sterilizing/
self-destruct mines were required. These could be air-dropped by
visual low altitude or MSQ-77 radar directed high altitude delivery.
Items considered suitable for this application were the XM-27
(Gravel) Mine, the BLUE-43 or BLU-44 (Dragon Tooth) Mine,
Light Vehicle Mine, Antitank Land Mine (as an interim capability),
and the Aerial Land Mine BLU-31/B.

(TS) Vehicle sensors would also be air-dropped and emplaced
to detect trucks approaching mined areas or interdiction points. Plans
for deployment included their use downstream from choke points to
determine the degree of success of the choke point and to determine
when it had been breached. It was anticipated that sensors would be
planted in strings where the direction of travel, speed, and number
of vehicles traveling along an LOC was of interest; additionally, they
could be used individually to detect breaching of interdiction points,
to detect resumption of traffic on unused LOCs, and as early warning
devices upstream from choke points. The sensors would be monitored
by EC-121 aircraft 24 hours a day and, when sensor information
indicated a valid and lucrative target, fighter strikes could be called
in to destroy it. Although the primary vehicle detection system was
considered to be visual reconnaissance, sensors would be used as a
supplement by acoustic and seismic detection of engine noise and
earth vibration. Visual reconnaissance by daylight and by use of
flares at night would continue as they had in the past, both independent
of and in conjunction with sensor detections of enemy vehicular
movement. The air deliverable sensors employed to detect vehicular
traffic and to transmit the information to the monitor aircraft would
have a self-destruct/anti-disturbance feature and be deliverable by
the OP-2 and F-4 aircraft. OP-2 was originally the P2V Neptune.

**Anti-Personnel Operations**

(TS) The concept of employment of anti-personnel mines was to
provide selective denial, rather than general denial; therefore, mass
minefields would not be laid, but selective and unpatterned seeding of defiles and trail areas would be accomplished. Known and fixed minefields are easily breached; however, on the other hand, this technique, if properly performed, should cause enemy casualties, complicate infiltration, and in some instances force the enemy into difficult terrain. The same types of area denial weapons were planned to be used in both the personnel interdiction and vehicle interdiction areas. Initially, these were to be Gravel and Dragon Tooth mines only, but as the program began to take shape, a requirement was stated for a Wide Area Anti-Personnel Mine (WAAPM-Trip Wire) BLU-42B with a 30-day self-destruct capability deliverable by F-4 aircraft. The Button Bomblet (XM-40) was required for activation of the acoustic sensors, and a requirement was recognized for a second generation XM-40 which would be casualty producing.

(TS) Sensors to detect movement of infiltrators would also be placed in selected and changing locations. They would be strung along likely infiltration routes and downstream of mined areas to detect breaching. They could also be implanted along relatively unlikely routes to determine if the enemy is forced into using such LOCs. Primarily, sensors were to be delivered by fixed wing aircraft but could also be placed selectively by ground teams. Initially, helicopters would be employed only on a limited basis and for special situations. As with the anti-vehicular sensors, the anti-personnel sensors would be monitored by EC-121 aircraft 24 hours a day and, when sensor information indicated significant enemy movement, fighter strikes would be called in. Both seismic and acoustic sensors were planned for employment to detect personnel infiltration. Seismic sensors detected personnel movement directly; whereas, acoustic sensors initially required the seeding of button bomblets which, when stepped on, provided a loud report to trigger the sensor. It was considered essential that these sensors have an average life of 30 days and a self-destruct/anti-disturbance feature and that they be deliverable by OP-2 and F-4 aircraft. Sensing devices included for consideration were the Ground/Air Beacon System (SEAOR 43-FY-66 QOR), acoubuoy (modified SSQ-38 Sonobuoy), and the Sandia Intrusion Detection Device as an interim solution to SEAOR 43-FY-66 QOP. In addition, development programs were underway for reconnaissance sensing capability for round-the-clock all-weather surveillance.
Air Support Requirements

(TS) A variety of aircraft were planned to support the system. In the initial planning, SECDEF had directed the activation and preparation of an OP-2E Det for sensor delivery and an EC-121 Sq for sensor monitoring to be operationally ready by 1 November 1967, but decision to deploy forces was deferred until 15 July 1967. The initial concept for deployment of the EC-121 Sq envisioned that 16 aircraft would operate from Cam Ranh Bay and five aircraft out of Nakhon Phanom (NKP). The eight OP-2Es would all operate from NKP. In addition, a squadron of 19 A-1E aircraft provided by MACV would operate from Hue-Phu Bai to deliver Button Bomblets, Gravel Mines, and Dragon Tooth Mines. It was understood that the F-4 aircraft would eventually replace the A-1 when a mine delivery system was developed for that aircraft. It was also planned at that time to site an MSQ-77 Radar at Mukdahan for vectoring aircraft.

(TS) Based on COMUSMACV's Requirements Plan, JCS forwarded recommendations to SECDEF on 17 April for the following additive forces: an EC-121 Wg at Nam Phong, Thailand; an F-4 Sq at Ubon, Thailand; a Helo Sq of 12 CH-3Cs at NKP, Thailand; an ISC at NKP; an MSQ-77 at NKP; and an OP-2E Sq at Ham Phong. However, on 8 May COMUSMACV was informed that SECDEF's decision was to proceed with all necessary preparations to base the EC-121 aircraft at Korat, and the OP-2s as well as MSQ-77 and ISC at NKP.

(TS) Although sensors and munitions were scheduled to be delivered primarily by fixed wing aircraft, some sensors were to be delivered by helicopter, and some hand emplaced. Nineteen A-1 aircraft would be used to deliver gravel mines, button bombs, and micro-gravel. Eight OP-2E aircraft were planned for dispensing acoubuoys, Air Deliverable Seismic Intrusion Detectors (ADSID), and button bombs or micro-gravel. Twelve CH-3 aircraft were to be used for troop carrying and for Helicopter Deliverable Seismic Intrusion Detectors (HELOSID) dispensing in conjunction with 12 armed helicopters as escorts.
(TS) The Surveillance Component of the system included both aerial reconnaissance and ground surveillance teams. The aerial reconnaissance by existing 7AF reconnaissance resources (RF-101s, RF-4s) would be provided through the TACs according to the priority assigned to the interdiction system in relation to other reconnaissance requirements. Additionally, in-theater US Army OV-1 aircraft could be used on a permissive basis for target acquisition/confirmation or other surveillance tasks. Visual air surveillance of the anti-infiltration system would be provided by in-theater O-1 and O-2 aircraft located at NKP. The ground surveillance teams would be placed in selected but changing locations to evaluate the effectiveness of the anti-infiltration system and determine routes of infiltration in use.

(TS) Air strikes would be provided by in-theater resources in continuation of BARREL ROLL, ROLLING THUNDER, CRICKET, STEEL TIGER, and TIGER HOUND in accordance with standing methods of operation. Air strikes against detected infiltration would be requested by 7AFTF through the TACs.

Employment of PRAIRIE FIRE SPIKE Teams

(TS) In order to enhance the capability of the air supported anti-infiltration system, selective employment of specially trained PRAIRIE
FIRE SPIKE Teams was planned. SPIKE Teams were 12-man units, composed of three US NCOs and nine indigenous personnel. These teams were highly trained in long-range patrolling, intelligence collection, and ground control of air strikes. Thirty-four of these teams were authorized for use in support of DYE MARKER operations. It was determined that the SPIKE Teams would provide valuable intelligence regarding enemy use of the area. They could pinpoint likely infiltration routes, and determine by observation how sensors may best be employed. They could direct air strikes from beneath the dense jungle canopy which prohibits normal FAC procedures. By ground surveillance patrols, they could detect enemy penetrations of the anti-infiltration system and identify enemy countermeasures to circumvent the system. Since SPIKE Teams would be able to emplace sensors with pinpoint accuracy, it was planned to emplace about 50 sensors per month by this means.

Command Structure

(TS) For the employment of the system, the DYE MARKER capability was integrated into the existing command structure. The CG III MAF had operational control of the SPOS and the Cmdr 7AF had operational control of the air supported anti-infiltration system as an extension of the existing STEEL TIGER Task Force. SPIKE Teams were provided to support the 7AF and liaison officers were placed at the ISC for coordination. To provide an on-the-scene agency responsible for coordination of all forces operating in the STEEL TIGER area, including DYE MARKER forces, a Special Task Group was to be organized at NKP. This Special Task Group, designated 7AFTF, incorporating the specialized capabilities of the ISC, would gather intelligence data, coordinate, determine mission requirements, and make recommendations to the 7AF Command Post for delivery of sensor, strike, or specialized munitions. Request for diversion of aircraft for immediate strike would be passed to the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center by the Special Task Group.
Year's End

(TS) Although all efforts had been pegged to 1 November 1967 IOC, on 24 September, JCS advised CINCPAC of SECDEF's decision to delay IOC for anti-vehicle and anti-personnel sub-systems to 1 December and 1 January, respectively. Accordingly, 7AF recommended to CINCPACAF that deployments be scheduled so that MUSCLE SHOALS resources would be available in-theater to start an intensive training program, including a system shake-down and test, beginning 1 November 1967. This schedule would permit a full exercising of the facility and personnel, and provide time to conduct a comprehensive combat orientation program for all aircrews in the actual environment of employment. 43

(TS) The final shakedown test of the anti-vehicular subsystem conducted on 25 November consisted of the air delivery of seismic and acoustic sensors in the vicinity of a road known to be frequently traveled. This seeding permitted a determination of sensor gain settings and false alarm rates, provided aircrews actual experience, and exercised both the monitor aircraft and the ISC. The subsystem became operational on 1 December. Immediately thereafter, seismic and acoustic sensors were delivered in all preplanned areas. By year's
end some of these sensors had detected traffic; information had been successfully relayed to the ISC; and some recommended strikes had been conducted as a result of the sensor information. As was anticipated, several sensors were picked up by the enemy; however, in each of two reported incidents it was apparent, from the conversations recorded, that they did not know, nor care, what they had found. 44

(TS) By the end of the year, an intensive analytical study of the effectiveness of the deployed system was being conducted by MACV, 7AF, and TFA. The results of this analysis were not sufficiently meaningful to permit even a preliminary judgment.

(TS) It became obvious that IOC of 1 January 1968 for the anti-personnel area of operations would not be met and, on 29 December, COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that the "earliest date DUMP TRUCK operations can commence is 20 January 1968." 45
Footnotes

1. USMACV Command History (TS), 1966.

2. Minutes (S), Mission Council Meeting, 18 Apr 66; Memo (S), MACDC 00941, 30 May 66, Subj: Canal Barrier (U).

3. Msg (TS), CINCPAC, 071925Z Apr 66, Subj: Counter-Infiltration Barrier (U).


5. Msg (TS), JCS, 072155Z Sep 66, Subj: Infiltration Barrier (S); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV, 100432Z Sep 66, Subj: Ibid.

6. Memo (S), SECDEF to Dir JTF 728, 15 Sep 66, Subj: Infiltration Interdiction System for Vietnam (S).

7. Fact Sheet (TS), MACJ3, 11 Jan 67, Subj: PRACTICE NINE (U); Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 180059Z Nov 66, Subj: JTF 728 Project Definition Plan (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 211315Z Nov 66, Subj: Impact Statement by COMUSMACV (U).

8. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 230410Z Nov 66, Subj: PRACTICE NINE (U).

9. Memo (S), Dir JTF 728 to SECDEF, 22 Dec 66, Subj: Plan for Increased Anti-Infiltration Capability for SEA (S).


12. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 030515Z Apr 67, Subj: MACV Air Supported Anti-Infiltration Plan (S).

13. Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 190421Z Apr 67, Subj: PRACTICE NINE Anti-Infiltration System (S); Msg (S), CINCPAC to


15. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to DCPG, 101138Z Feb 67; Memo (S), DCPG to CofS MACV, 17 May 67, Subj: Transfer of Certain DCPG Personnel to HQ MACV; Msg (S), JCS 9031, 281702Z Jun 67, Subj: Transfer of TD Spaces from JTF 728 to MACV (C).

16. DF (S), MACJ3 to CofS MACV, 18 Aug 67, Subj: Project Manager for DYE MARKER (U).

17. Memo (S), GEN Wheeler to DCPG, 21 Aug 67, Subj: DYE MARKER (U).

18. Embtel (TS), Saigon to SECSTATE, 011022Z Aug 67, Subj: SEA-COORD Meeting (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 061215Z Aug 67, Subj: Cambodia and Laos (U).

19. Msg (S), DCPG, 072000Z Sep 67, Subj: DYE MARKER (U).

20. Memo (S), SECDEF to CJCS, 6 May 67, Subj: Plan for Infiltration Interdiction in the Northeast Section of Quang Tri Province (S).


23. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 270101Z Apr 67, Subj: Multi-National Force to Man Strong Point Obstacle System (S); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 050107Z May 67, Subj: Ibid.

24. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 300040Z Apr 67, Subj: Status of Actions Pertaining to PRACTICE NINE (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 140805Z May 67, Subj: Ibid.

26. Ltr (TS), MACJ3 to CINCPAC, 26 Jan 67, Subj: MACV PRACTICE NINE Requirements Plan (U). [Plan transmitted by letter.]

27. Msg (TS), JCS 9752 to CINCPAC, 240031Z Mar 67, Subj: Recommendations for Providing PRACTICE NINE Forces (U); Msg (TS), JCS 2834 to CINCPAC, 150505Z Apr 67, Subj: Forces for PRACTICE NINE (C); Msg (TS), CG USARV to CINCUSARPAC, 260803Z Mar 67, Subj: PRACTICE NINE Additive Army Force Requirements (S).


29. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG III MAF, 180443Z May 67, Subj: Strong Point Obstacle System (S); Msg (S), CG III MAF to COMUSMACV, 301344Z May 67, Subj: Ibid.

30. Msg (S), III MAF to COMUSMACV, 160722Z Aug 67, Subj: III MAF Force Posture (U); Msg (S), III MAF to COMUSMACV, 050342Z Sep 67; Msg (S), III MAF to COMUSMACV, 061430Z Sep 67, Subj: Strong Point Obstacle System BOM.

31. OPLAN 12-67 (TS), HQ III MAF, 12 Sep 67; Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 161208Z Sep 67.

32. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to III MAF, 071310Z Oct 67, Subj: Supplemental BOM (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to III MAF, 151240Z Oct 67, Subj: DYE MARKER Construction Progress (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 151309Z Oct 67, Subj: Command Construction Status Report (U).

33. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG III MAF, 220625Z Oct 67, Subj: Project DYE MARKER (U); Msg (TS), CG III MAF to COMUSMACV, 240204Z Oct 67, Subj: DYE MARKER Progress (U).

34. Msg (S), III MAF to COMUSMACV, 300236Z Oct 67.


36. Msg (S), USARV to DA, 291615Z Nov 67, Subj: Target Acquisition Battery (U).
37. Plan (TS), MACJ3, 11 Mar 67, Subj: MACV PRACTICE NINE Requirements Air Supported Anti-Infiltration Plan (S)

38. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 030515Z Apr 67, Subj: MACV PRACTICE NINE Air Supported Anti-Infiltration Plan (S)


40. Memo (TS), SECDEF to CJCS, 8 May 67.

41. Plan (TS), 7AF OPLAN 481-68, 10 Aug 67, Subj: DYE MARKER (U)

42. Msg (TS), CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 020321Z Nov 67, Subj: Deployments to Thailand; Embtel (TS), Bangkok to SECSTATE 100729Z Nov 67, Subj: Briefing of ACM Dawee on MUSCLE SHOALS (U).

43. Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 241629Z Sep 67; Msg (TS), 7AF to CINCPACAF, 300235Z Sep 67.

44. Monthly Summary (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC; Msg (TS), 7AF to COMUSMACV, 301145Z Nov 67; Subj: Cmdr 7AF Report on Sensor Emplacement Test (U).

45. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 291210Z Dec 67, Subj: DUMP TRUCK Operations (U).
(U) The problem of civilian casualties caused by the war in Vietnam continues to be a matter of vital concern to the USG and much attention has been given to the problem in recent months by international news media. While a detailed nationwide reporting system of Civilian War Casualties (CWC) among hospital admissions was only started in Nov 66, authorities have arrived by statistical techniques at what they feel is a reasonably accurate estimate of war casualties during an average month over the past three years. The report indicates approximately 1,400 hospitalized casualties per month in 1964, 1,570 in 1965, and 2,520 in 1966. The figure is up in 1967 with an average of 3,900 civilian casualties attributable to the war during the first eight months. A total of 4,500 CWC were reported in Sep 67 and 4,007 in Oct 67. November figures were not available at this writing.

(U) Estimates by allied medical men in the field treating civilian casualties attribute about 40% to Communist action, 30% to small arms or mortar fire that could have come from either side, and the remaining 30% to allied artillery or aerial bombardment. In many instances, VC deliberately draw air strikes upon a village by firing at passing aircraft and then beating a hasty withdrawal, leaving the inhabitants, who have remained, exposed to retaliatory fire. While the allied forces exercise all possible precautions to prevent or minimize civilian casualties during engagements with the VC and NVN troops, frequent use of the civilian population as a shield by the VC and their deliberate intermingling with the villagers continues to complicate the situation. Friendly military forces are under the strictest possible controls to avoid casualties, but the nature of the fighting in VN has unfortunately made these casualties inevitable.

(U) RVN, with an estimated population of 16.5 million, has only 1,200 doctors of whom 700 are in the military service, 200 with the Ministry of Health (MOH) staffing civilian hospitals, and 300 in private practice. To overcome the shortage of doctors and medical resources available for civilian care, about 800 US medical personnel, deployed around the country in 21 Military Public Health Assistance Program (MILHAP) teams, are helping in the treatment of VN civilians. Eighteen Free World medical teams, including the 200-bed German hospital ship Helgoland, are providing medical care and out-patient treatment to the civilian population.
(U) After a detailed study the USG announced (April 6) that three fully equipped field hospitals would be built and operated by the US military in Da Nang, Quang Ngai, and Qui Nhon to provide medical services to disabled Vietnamese civilians. The new hospitals, to be built and supplied in cooperation with USAID, were to have a total capacity of 1,100 beds, and would serve primarily as surgical units helping to relieve the overloaded provincial hospitals and their staffs of casualties due to the war. In announcing construction of the new hospitals, the US said it hoped "that the need for these facilities will end soon." Commenting on the USG's announcement which he termed "a historic milestone," the President of the World Rehabilitation Fund noted that "the hospitals will treat all civilian casualties who need and seek care. They will be treated alike regardless of the source of their wounds and disabilities." He explained why he considered the action a milestone: "Never before in history has any nation in the world, including the US, established a military operated hospital program in wartime to care for injured civilians."

(S) The MACV plan for treating the CWC was based on a USAID proposal presented to the President at Guam in Mar 67. Conceptual approval was given and in Apr 67, the plan was under study by DOD. Basically the plan proposed that all US military effort for the purpose come under USARV and be comprised of Army personnel, units, and equipment. It represented, in final form, the commitment of some 1,400 Army beds for the purpose.

(S) The proposal provided for three hundred Army beds from the current MACV resources, and some 1,100 beds and 1,033 medical personnel from other than RVN sources. DOD referred this proposal to JCS and to SA for comment. 1

(S) On 21 May CINCPAC forwarded the MACV plan to JCS commenting that the use of existing US military hospital beds should be a temporary expedient and not planned for occupancy by both military and CWC after construction of the new CWC hospital facilities. CINCPAC reemphasized that the military resources needed to implement the program were not available in RVN. The resources would be required over and above the established ceilings on personnel, funds, and piasters. It was stated that implementation of the program without providing the additional resources would have an adverse effect on the capability to support planned and current military operations. A requirement, based upon estimated casualty loads, was seen for a total of 42 additional AF personnel to include five flight crews of two nurses.
and three medical technicians each and five liaison teams of three personnel each.²

(C) At this time the position taken by GVN MOH was to assume no responsibility for the USAID/US MILITARY system to care for CWC. This was naturally a matter of great concern and effectively prevented a preplanned phase-out of the system from US military to RVN medical organizations. Combining US military and VN civilians in the same hospital in quantity seemed certain to create management and public relations problems not to be encountered in separate hospitals. Notwithstanding the potential problems, and in order to get the program started, approval of the COMUSMACV plan was recommended by CINCPAC on 27 Jun 67.³

(U) On 3 Aug 67 the COMNAVFORVREP at Da Nang informed COMUSMACV that a written proposal made to the mayor of Da Nang for the acquisition of a 35-bed site in the vicinity of Da Nang for the proposed CWC had been verbally rejected. He commented that repeated efforts to secure a written commitment from the mayor had been unsuccessful. Also, at that time the attitude of the local VN seemed to be one of apathy rather than outright objection.⁴

(S) JCS approved the plan on 25 Jul 67 and forwarded it to SECDEF. On 15 Aug 67 the SECDEF gave approval of the plan and stated "approved and will be implemented with the least possible delay for FY68. Civilian and military personnel required will be provided within ceilings currently established for MACV."⁵

(C) On 16 Aug 67 a DOD news release announced that it was expected that the hospitals at Da Nang and Chu Lai would be completed and ready for occupancy by Dec 67, and the hospital at Can Tho by 15 Apr 68. In addition, the news release indicated 300 beds in existing US military facilities would be made available with the next 90 days, which would be 15 Nov 67.⁶

(S) On 16 Sep 67 SECDEF informed CINCPAC that it was desired to proceed immediately with essential construction of the augmented hospital facilities as previously approved. The facilities construction cost would be financed by transfer from military construction when these appropriations became available. In the meantime, it was requested that COMUSMACV initiate action to provide an initial funding increment on a temporary basis within DA FY67, or earlier.
construction programs, to apply to projects authorized. Comments were requested on the categories of work and locations considered necessary to initiate prior to the availability of FY68 funds and a corresponding listing of any approved projects that may be deferred as a result of this action. 7

(C) On 29 Sep 67 AMEMB Saigon informed SECSTATE that to satisfactorily meet the requirement for adequate care of VN war-related injuries as well as treatment of US patients the present US military hospital system should be expanded by construction of additional facilities at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Can Tho. Joint utilization of the entire system for treatment of US and VN CWC was recommended. COMUSMACV commented that with joint utilization, the requirements of both US forces and CWC, could be met by the construction of three new hospitals. In the event that a separate hospital system was required for CWC, then a total of five new hospitals would have to be constructed. 8

(C) On 8 Oct 67 CINCPAC reaffirmed his position that implementation of the CWC program without providing the additional resources that he had requested would have an adverse effect on his capability to support the current military operations. His position was that the US hospitals and medical staffs in RVN were not in excess of the military requirements. He recommended that the CWC program be operated outside the US military hospital system, or that the US military hospital system capability be expanded by providing additional facilities and personnel over and above the programmed resources. 9

(U) A Medical Appraisal Team, sent to VN to make a report on the medical situation, furnished its information to the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees in executive session (Senators E. Kennedy, Long, and Tydings present 16-17 Oct 67). One of their recommendations had been: "No US military hospitals should be established for civilian casualty care. They should be integrated with existing Vietnamese hospital system and be staffed by Vietnamese and Free World personnel rather than US military physicians." 10

(S) The original estimate on the cost of support of the CWC program had been $7.3 million. However, when JCS received the estimate from USARPAC on the cost of the program, the bill had gone up to $15.2 million. CINCPAC's recommendations and comments regarding these recommendations were requested in light of the fact that approval of
funds over the original estimate did not appear favorable. CINCPAC, on
the basis of information furnished by COMUSMACV, stated that the
original cost estimate had been based on construction of very austere
facilities employing a combination of troop and local lump sum con-
tractor effort. The scope and costs had been revised upward because
the CWC hospitals were planned for construction to the same standards
as were the existing in-country military hospitals. This was to include
piped water distribution and waterborne sewage systems. To achieve
the maximum return from the required investment of US medical per-
sonnel and resources, and because critically wounded patients required
prolonged surgery and intensive post-operative care, higher standards
were considered necessary. Further investigation had shown that the
savings anticipated through the use of local lump sum contractors were
improbable in RVN at the time. Also, the assurance of meeting BODs
would be greatly reduced by the use of local contractors. The plans
were to use only the US cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contractors. The
planned use of troop effort to construct the projected Chu Lai hospital
had to be abandoned in favor of CPAF constructor construction because
of the large backlog of high priority troop construction work.1

(C) In reply to CINCPAC's request for reconsideration of the use
of Program 5 personnel and contingency funds for FY68 for the CWC
program, JCS stated that the points that had been brought up had been
considered by the SECDEF in making his decision and no change in the
position of the SECDEF was anticipated. He was ordered to proceed
with the execution of the program as outlined. On 23 Oct COMUSMACV
outlined the status of planning and construction in a message to CINCPAC
and restated his position on the recommendation for joint utiliza-
tion of facilities recognizing the fact that separate hospital facilities
would be the best from the standpoint of US casualties since there would
be less risk of infections and better security. He had recommended
joint utilization because of budgetary and space ceilings placed on the
program. If joint utilization were to be approved, the requirement
would no longer exist for two Program 5 hospitals. This would result
in a savings of 9.6 million dollars in MILCON funds, plus the addition-
al cost of equipment for the hospitals, and a saving of 313 military
spaces. In view of the unsettled conditions, action on planning, design,
procurement, and construction were at a standstill. COMUSMACV re-
quested advice on confirmation of the design scope as depicted in plans
previously submitted; a decision on the total number of hospitals to be
built; and a decision on the operating policy with regard to joint or sep-
arate utilization. Undaunted, CINCPAC, in reference to the recommen-
dation of COMUSMACV and JCS regarding joint utilization, enjoined JCS
again to request reconsideration of the separate facility proposal in light of the changed situation. JCS advised that design and construction standards should be adjusted to permit construction at the planned scope within a funded cost not to exceed $7.3 million. 12

(S) COMUSMACV reevaluated the program and on 4 Nov 67 submitted his plan, reduced in scope, which came within the cost ceiling imposed of $7.3 million. This plan was considered to be the limit of reductions which could be made and still provide an acceptable facility within planned scope of 1,100 beds. The configuration, although acceptable, was less desirable from an operational standpoint due to limited accessibility, inefficient personnel traffic flow, and reduced fire safety. However, $3.4 million were needed for vital facilities and construction which had to be funded by Army reprogramming or other sources. On 8 Nov 67 CINCPAC gave approval to proceed with the construction of the facilities at the originally approved scope (i.e., 1,100 beds) in accordance with the MACV plan. And on 13 Nov, JCS informed CINCPAC that there was insufficient new information available to justify reopening the matter with SECDEF. The order to proceed was reaffirmed with the injunction again to stay within the cost ceiling. 13

(C) A trial run of the MACV/USAID program for evacuating and hospitalizing CWC was directed by COMUSMACV on 15 Sep 67. The trial run started on 1 Oct. Since then 761 civilians with war-related injuries have been admitted and treated in US military hospitals. These were in addition to 1,115 other civilian patients who had been admitted to the US military hospital system. On 14 Nov MACV ordered the exercise terminated and Phase I of the program executed, i.e., reach a census of 300 of these patients in our hospitals in Tuy Hoa and Vung Tau by the end of 90 days. Phases II and III of the program consisted of construction and staffing of three additional US hospitals. 14

(C) JCS queried CLCPAC as to the advisability of making the hospital at Can Tho a joint (military/civilian) facility in light of the fact that the population of US forces there was less than at other complexes in VN and the fact that limited real estate was available. Additionally, acquisition of additional real estate would be very costly. CINCPAC replied on 16 Dec 67 that, in light of the desire to pursue the CWC program at a high priority, he concurred in the joint occupancy while recognizing the continuing existence of disadvantages mentioned previously. As of year-end this problem had not been resolved. 15
On 16 Dec 67 COMUSMACV directed USARV to redesignate the 91st Evac Hosp at Tuy Hoa as the "First Civilian War Casualty Hospital" without delay and phase out US military casualties from the facility by normal attrition. The 2d Surg Hosp at Chu Lai will be redesignated by USARV as the "Second Civilian War Casualty Hospital" by 1 Feb 68 and will also phase out US military casualties by normal attrition. The 36th Evac Hosp at Vung Tau will continue to provide 100-bed credits for civilian casualties until the Second CWC Hosp at Chu Lai is ready to receive civilian patients. CWC Hosp construction programmed for Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Can Tho were not to be delayed by the foregoing actions. He further instructed that US military patients were to continue to be provided medical care in CWC hospitals when in the best interest of the US patient.

As of year-end the situation did not look promising. Although the US medical-regulating and evacuation system and hospitals were ready, the VN province medical chiefs had not yet referred patients into the system. Reasons for this lag included reluctance on the part of patients to leave their native area; professional pride on the part of the province medical staffs; lack of cooperation by the province medicine chiefs; and administrative inertia within the MOH. Both USAID and MACV medical representatives had urged the Vietnamese to expedite these actions but there had been no appreciable response.

During the period 1 Jan to 30 Jun 67, accidental delivery of ordnance from supporting fires accounted for the death of 227 VN civilians with another 613 accounted for as wounded. Reports of investigation showed that supporting fires from artillery/mortar, fixed wing aircraft, rotary wing aircraft, small arms, and naval gunfire were involved. An analysis of the available reports revealed human error to be the cause in most cases. FDC and firing battery errors were the most prevalent. Common errors were: erroneous azimuths, as a result of poor plotting; transposing numerals in coordinates; failure to maintain up-to-date unit locations; improperly laid pieces; improper settings in elevation and deflection; and failure to follow established SOPs. As a general note, the majority of incidents occurred during H&I fires, not during the heat of battle. Faulty ammunition created some incidents and it was noted that accurate record keeping enabled commanders to withdraw suspected faulty lots, thus preventing the possibility of more casualties. FO and FAC errors accounted for additional casualties. Examples are FO azimuth errors (in one case, an error of 3,200 mils), disorientation, TPQ-10 and MSQ-77s not calibrated properly, and FAC
charts not up-to-date. Violation of rules of engagement, particularly delivering ordnance into villages without the sector chief's approval, accounted for 13 incidents. There were, however, isolated cases of artillery firing out of the area of responsibility. Numerous miscellaneous incidents occurred, unfortunately, after all prescribed rules of engagement and established SOPs had been followed. These primarily involved civilians returning to hostile zones which had been cleared for H&I fires or civilians violating curfew laws. The causes of civilian casualties resulting from delivery of ordnance and small arms can be further broken down as follows for the period 1 Jan to 30 Jun 67:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty/Mortar</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Gunfire</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval (Other Surface Craft)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(C) CG USARV felt that the major causative factors underlying such accidents could be attributed in a large measure to carelessness, fatigue, lack of adequate training, lack of sufficient supervision, inexperience, the unique RVN environment, and departure from established SOPs. Consequently, he enjoined all commanders to take the following action:

1) Review artillery SOPs to cover gunnery procedures down to gun section level.

2) Establish evaluation teams to check firing battery and FDC procedures.
3) Issue, in so far as possible, loudspeaker systems to each gun crew in order that commands can be clearly and distinctly heard.

4) Use various colored aiming stakes to distinguish between those of different sections.

5) Take disciplinary action against negligent personnel.

6) Within capabilities, establish additional metro stations to provide more accurate meteorological data.

7) Intensify training.

(S) Another aspect of the civilian casualty problem was the unfavorable light it cast upon USG when exploited by persons and organizations opposed to the war in VN and by Communists all over the world. This was well stated by COMUSMACV in his closing comments at the MACV Commanders' Conference on 2 April 1967:

We have been our own worst enemy in advertising civilian casualties. The press picks up reports and people in the US think there are more civilian casualties than anytime in history. Actually, there are fewer than ever. Commanders and troops have exercised the greatest restraint. We must do all we can to publish the true story. I predict more and more terrorism by the enemy and it is very important that world opinion is informed of these acts. I see many troops carrying cameras. Get pictures and submit them through commanders to the information agencies and JUSPAO. Get the press on the scene and point out the brutality of the enemy and the atrocities he has committed.

(S) General Vien remarked along the same vein:

... in fighting the VC sometimes civilians do get killed and there is no hesitation on the part of the VC in using this propaganda against us. People should be informed of the other side also.
(U) The official position of the USG on civilian war casualties in VN was summed up by the SECSTATE in his letter to American student leaders earlier this year. Mr. Rusk said:

We recognize that there has been loss of life. We recognize that people living or working in close proximity to military targets may have suffered. We recognize too that man and machines are not infallible and that some mistakes have occurred. But there is a vast difference between such unintentional events and a deliberate policy of attacking civilian centers. I would remind you that tens of thousands of civilians have been killed, wounded or kidnapped in SVN, not by accident but as the result of a deliberate policy of terrorism and intimidation conducted by the VC.
Footnotes

1. Msg (S), JCS to CONCPAC, 211917Z Apr 67, Subj: Augmented Hosp Fac for CWC.

2. Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 210951Z May 67, Subj: Hosp Fac for CWC (U).

3. Msg (C), CINCPAC to JCS, 270148Z Jun 67, Subj: Augmented Hosp Fac for CWC (U).

4. Msg (U), COMNAVFORVREP to COMUSMACV, 031236Z Aug 67, Subj: Hosp Fac for CWC.

5. Msg (C), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 161827Z Aug 67, Subj: CWC Program; Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 122124Z Aug 67, Subj: US Force Deployments VN (U).


7. Msg (S), SECDEF to CINCPAC, 161654Z Sep 67, Subj: Augmented Hosp Fac for CWC.

8. Embtel (C), Saigon 7230 to SECSTATE, 290915Z Sep 67, Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 301125Z Sep 67, Subj: Augmented Hosp Fac for CWC (U).


11. Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 122120Z Oct 67, Subj: Hosp & Med Fac, CWC-RVN (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 212133Z Oct 67, Subj: Ibid.

13. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 041244Z Nov 67, Subj: CWC Hosp (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 080334Z Nov 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (C), JCS to CINCPAC, 132118Z Nov 67, Subj: Augmented Hosp Fac for CWC (U).


15. Msg (C), JCS to CINCPAC, 242224Z Nov 67, Subj: Joint Occupancy of Hosp (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 162210Z Dec 67, Subj: Ibid.


18. JUSPAO Fld Memo No. 37 (U), 10 May 67, Subj: Civilian Casualties in Vietnam; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to VMAC, 021210Z Aug 67, Subj: Supporting Fires (U); Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 151058Z Jul 67, Subj: Friendly Casualties Resulting from Accidental Delivery of Ordnance (U).


20. MFR (TS), MACV Commander's Conference, 2 Apr 67.

Probably the most volatile ethnic minority group in the Republic of Vietnam is that collection of aboriginal tribesmen of Malayo-Polynesian and Mon-Khmer racial stock, generally referred to by the French term "Montagnard." These primitive mountain-dwelling people number approximately 800,000, and constitute about five percent of the country's population. The Montagnards are divided into 43 tribal groups, chief of which are Jarai (about 150,000 persons), Hre (100,000), Rhade (90,000), Bahnar (50,000), Reglai (40,000), and Sedang (40,000). The Montagnards are divided ethno-linguistically into the Malayo-Polynesian and the Mon-Khmer groupings. In addition to strong physical resemblances, the Montagnards exhibit a variety of common cultural characteristics and behavior patterns. The most outstanding of these is the fact that their societies are village-centered. Although the highland groups are referred to as tribes, tribal organization does not exist. There is no political unit among the tribes; even tribal groups are only loosely associated on the basis of linguistic and cultural similarities. The village is the real political, administrative, and social unit, normally coextensive with the extended family or clan, and almost all of the villagers are related to each other. The villages are governed by the local tribal chiefs who share power and authority with sorcerers. 1

(C) FULRO was the title of a dissident movement made up primarily of Montagnards or "Highlanders," derived from the French Front Unifié de la Lutte des Races Opprimées. While the French administration in Indochina had found it expedient to let the Montagnards cultivate their own languages and customs and dispense their own form of justice in indigenous courts, the Diem government, by contrast, sought to assimilate and absorb them into the Vietnamese society in ways that aroused the Montagnards' active discontent and resulted in the creation of the protest movement.
they called FULRO. Although the initial movement failed in 1958, it sprang up again in 1964. Led by Y Bham Enoul, who had spent five years in prison as a result of the first endeavor, FULRO addressed the central government with a series of written communications that spelled out the Montagnards' grievances and future needs and desires. The main quest of the FULRO was to receive a guarantee from the government that they might preserve their language and customs while being granted the opportunity for greater participation in the nation's political life and for more direct control over the administration of the Highlands. Additionally, FULRO was interested in social and economic development programs raising the level of their society, particularly the outright title to their farmlands. These aspirations were also the desires of the non-FULRO people. As one non-FULRO leader put it, "The aspirations of FULRO are the aspirations of all Highlanders."2

(C) In 1964, after the second rebellion of the Montagnards, Premier Nguyen Khanh attempted to appease them by issuing a decree which granted them many concessions, such as reinstatement of tribal courts, a revised draft law, a practical system of land distribution, and authorization for the use of tribal language in elementary schools. The Montagnards, disgruntled over lack of progress, again rebelled twice in late 1965. At this point, it became a significant military matter, as well as a political matter; GVN forces had to fight the dissidents, which of course distracted from their efforts to fight the VC. This distraction was a matter which did not sit too well with the US public, particularly as the strength of US forces increased in Vietnam and US casualty figures mounted.3

(C) Despite the slow movement of the GVN to resolve the Montagnard problem in early 1966, the year-end results stood as a milestone in GVN/FULRO relations. The creation of the Special Commissariat for Montagnard Affairs, allotment of six Montagnard representatives to the Constituent Assembly, and the approval of a FULRO-proposed Four-Point Agreement by Premier Nguyen Cao Ky resulted in the first improvement in GVN/Montagnard relations since the early days of the French departure from Vietnam. This was not to say that all problems were solved, for there still existed fundamental differences between Vietnamese and Montagnards, and a satisfactory solution would only result through continued good relations and the passage of time.4

(C) There was good reason to believe that if the GVN were to defeat the VC/NVA forces and to attain a stable peace, it must win
the support of the rural population. Although the Montagnards represented only 5-10 percent of the total Vietnamese population, they occupied 60 percent of the country's territory. The Montagnards lived mostly in the Highlands or mountain regions adjacent to the Vietnam/Cambodia and Laos border. Their strategic location was of particular significance since these areas offered the enemy cover and concealment for their clandestine operations—training bases, infiltration routes, and supply lines. Among the benefits that the GVN would gain by active FULRO support would be the acquisition of an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 armed men who had considerable experience in jungle warfare and knowledge of the terrain in the key provinces of Quang Duc, Darlac, and Pleiku adjacent to Cambodia. As the Highlander's political support of the GVN grew, they would be less accommodating to a VC presence. It is significant to point out that in early 1967 increased FULRO activities in Darlac Province resulted in restriction of VC operations and movements in that area. In addition to the immediate and short-term benefits, "such mutual understanding and support would serve the long-range objectives of weaving the various ethnic groups into the fabric of Vietnamese society, furthering their economic development, and insuring increasing political stability for the country." 

(C) In early 1967 the Mission Council Subcommittee on Montagnard affairs coordinated US efforts to improve GVN/FULRO relations. These US activities were limited to coordination—not representing either party—because "the US was interested in the welfare of all the people of Vietnam and to assist them in winning the war so all citizens of RVN could enjoy peace, freedom, and prosperity." The Director of MACV RD Support reflected that "there are possibilities for significant progress in GVN/FULRO relations over the next few months." However, he went on to point out that "the past relations on both sides, the heritage of past hostilities, and the structure of responsibilities for negotiation make for extreme caution on both sides. Time will tell the extent to which a legitimate concern for security will permit achievement of US and GVN goals in these delicate negotiations." 

(C) On 20 January the SA II CTZ and an Embassy Political Officer, representing the Joint Military/Mission effort, met with General Vinh Loc, CG II CTZ and GVN Delegate to the Highlands, to convey US recommendations on the return of 2,000 armed FULRO personnel "the GVN from Cambodia. These 2,000 FULRO personnel had gone into Cambodian exile during the summer of 1964. General Vinh Loc seemed receptive to the points recommended by
the US for the planned return of the FULRO to RVN. These points included registration procedures, vocational placement, and care resettlement of the returnees. During the meeting it was agreed that GVN and Embassy representatives would offer to both the GVN and USG pledged to guarantee his security. The US was to inform US/GVN intention and make necessary arrangements for the meeting at which General Vinh Loc would represent the GVN; the US was to be represented by the political officer serving as Chairman of Mission Council Subcommittee. The US/GVN also planned to return to RVN in the future after he had ample opportunity to assure himself of the GVN intentions. 7

(C). In late January arrangements were made for a, but it did not materialize. Likewise, the scheduled return of several hundred FULRO to the GVN was concurrently postponed. These two setbacks did not stop the GVN's forward progress, and it continued to press ahead in the special programs for the Montagnards in the field of education and justice and installed a Montagnard Province Chief in Pleiku on 1 February. 8

(C) In March some 400 armed FULRO followers escorted several FULRO political leaders from Ban Me Thu, Cambodia to hold a. The group was expected to conduct talks to determine the future of FULRO relations with the GVN and to ascertain intended to follow through on his desires to talk in person with high GVN officials. Upon return from Cambodia of the FULRO representatives, a meeting was set up for 15 April, failed to show. Finally, on 1-2 May, and made arrangements for the return of FULRO forces to the national ranks. During the wanted a Statut Particulier which would spell out the Montagnards' rights and privileges under the GVN. Additionally, FULRO wanted its own armed forces, a "High Plateau Force" composed entirely of Montagnards, which would include all Montagnard RF/PF RD Cadre, and ARVN personnel. However, this question was dropped after General Vinh Loc raised several objections to the proposal. In regards to the Statut Particulier General Vinh Loc suggested that the GVN convene a conference of Montagnard leaders to draft the Statut. At the close of the meeting signed a joint communiqué in which FULRO recognized the goodwill and sincerity of the GVN, and pledged to cease completely all acts against the national interest and "to return wholly into the national ranks" (after the GVN

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On its part, the GVN would continue its efforts to improve the material and spiritual life of the Montagnards and would promulgate a Statut Particulier prepared by a congress of Montagnard tribes.

(C) On 12 May the GVN announced the joint communiqué to the Vietnamese Press. A preliminary meeting had already been held in Pleiku on 9 May to prepare the Statut. Presented a draft decree to the conferees. On 25-26 June a formal meeting of the Montagnard Congress was held in Pleiku with 200 delegates attending. Although FULRO delegates attended, did not participate; it was believed that final approval of the draft Statut depended. Included in the draft was a provision for raising the Special Commissariat for Highland Affairs to the level of Ministry. The closing session of the congress was attended by Premier Ky (still a presidential contender at this time).

(C) On 29 August Chief of State Thieu and Premier Ky flew to Ban Me Thuot to celebrate the Montagnard Statut Particulier and a Highlander Land Law. General Thieu spoke to several thousand Montagnards assembled for the ceremonies. He told them that "the Montagnards and the Vietnamese must unite, enjoy the same rights and privileges, and achieve the same cultural level. It is the duty of all groups to contribute to the fight against communism." Promulgation of both the Statut Particulier and the Highlander Land Law (providing for land tenure and ownership) was expected to bring the Montagnards and Vietnamese leaders together, in a cooperative effort, to enhance the economic and political position of the Montagnards and to encourage opposition to communism.

(S) Certainly one of the yardsticks for measuring the sincerity of the promises of equality made to the Montagnards by the GVN was the organization for, and conduct of, the national elections. The CA voted to limit the membership of the Upper House, or Senate, to 60. On the six Montagnard candidates among a total of 721, two were ultimately elected. For the Lower House, or Assembly, a total membership of 137 was decreed; of these, 10 were specifically reserved for Highlanders.
(U) Following the national elections and concurrent with the selection of a prime minister and cabinet, the GVN made good its promise to elevate the political status of the Montagnards. The Ministry for Development of Ethnic Minorities was created, and Paul Nur was appointed as its minister on 9 November.13

(C) The nascent ministry, formerly the Commissariat for Montagnard Affairs, continued to press ahead in developing special programs for combating illiteracy within the Highlander tribes. Important among these programs was exploiting the previously gained authorization to use tribal languages in elementary schools. On 10 November the first of four scheduled teachers' workshops to instruct Highlander teachers in the use of new dialect textbooks ended in Kontum. The attendance was nearly double the number of teachers that were expected to attend. It was hoped that Highlander children who were taught basic reading skills through primers in their own language would be better equipped to take up reading with regular Vietnamese primers in their second year. On 28 December a CORDS/USAID funded Highlander boarding school was dedicated in Kontum City. The facility was designed to house approximately 400 students.14

(C) In spite of some measurable progress in cementing friendly relations between the mountain tribes and the GVN, there was still much to be done as 1967 ended. Political sensitivities were still great and were exacerbated by the continued existence of FULRO--still prodding, but less militant. There continued to be areas where Nur was reluctant to tread, and he found other ministers difficult to deal with; they looked upon him as an inferior while other Montagnards tended to regard him as a "Vietnamized" Highlander who was less than optimally responsive to their aspirations and grievances. The program for construction of student boarding facilities, schools, tribal court houses, etc. for fulfillment of Montagnard aspirations progressed through 1967 and early 1968 at a very slow pace. This was in large part due to the bureaucratic Public Works Ministry which was responsible for contracting of the MDEM construction program. Overcoming the traditional antipathy of the Vietnamese toward the Montagnards will continue to be one of the most challenging problems which the central government must face and neutralize if GVN solidarity is to succeed.15
Footnotes


3. Ibid.

4. USMACV Command History (TS), 1966.


6. Memo (S), MACRDS, 2 Feb 67, Subj: SVN Reconciliation with FULRO (C).

7. Embtel (S), Saigon to SECSTATE, 20 Jan 67; Saigon Mission Weekly Report (S), 31 Jan 67.


9. Saigon Mission Weekly Reports (S), 16 Apr 67 and 9 May 67; Embtels (S), Saigon to SECSTATE, 2 May 67 and 3 May 67.


11. Embtel (C), Saigon to SECSTATE, 29 Aug 67, Subj: Promulgation of Montagnard Statut (U).


15. Briefing Paper (S), 23 Feb 68, Subj: CORDS Truong Son Cadre; Memo (U), RAND Corp. (General C. Hickey), 5 Mar 68, Subj: The VC/NVA Tet Offensive: Effects on Highlanders' Attitudes, Relations Between the GVN and FULRO, and on Social and Economic Programs for the Highlanders.
ANNEX D--INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Background

(S) Within the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) an extremely close interrelationship existed between military prosecution of counterinsurgency operations and political developments. Probably the most significant problem the GVN had faced since the 1 November 1963 overthrow of the Diem regime was instability; this was attested to by the myriad of governments which have ruled RVN since that time. Immediately following Diem's overthrow, a military junta headed by Major General Duong Van (Big) Minh, and his Military Revolutionary Council (MRC) of some 40 members moved swiftly to stabilize the political situation. The MRC promised to institute democratic reforms and return governmental functions to civilian control as soon as possible. Lack of aggressive leadership within the MRC, VC exploitation of post-coup weaknesses, and low morale in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) established the setting three months later, on 30 January 1964, for a bloodless coup d'etat by Major General Nguyen Khanh, Commander of I ARVN Corps. Khanh's coup was allegedly staged to prevent formation of a neutralist, pro-French government, to overcome the ruling junta's slowness to move ahead with political reform, and to offset the junta's deleterious effect on the progress of the war against the VC. In order to strengthen its position, the new junta reshuffled many high-level command positions and corps boundaries enabling Khanh to surround himself with commanders whose loyalty was unquestioned.

(C) Two coups in succession, however, had a devastating effect upon the morale and efficiency of the RVNAF, and, as could be expected, the VC lost no time in exploitation. Increased rumblings of dissatisfaction in nearly every sphere of political and military activity bode an uncertain future for the Khanh government; of particular note was the effect at "rice roots" level of ineffectiveness of the armed forces—a lack of will of the peasant to resist the VC efforts to control the countryside. By mid-1964 the GVN's influence over the rural population had dropped seven percent from the previous year. Frustration and growing dissatisfaction among politico-religious factions, together with broad usurpation of civilian prerogatives by
Khanh and the MRC, precipitated a rash of anti-government demonstrations among students, Buddhists, and Catholics. As demonstrations turned to rioting, the MRC, on 16 August 1964, announced its dissolution and the selection of a "Provisional Steering Committee" (a triumvirate of Khanh, Minh, and Lieutenant General Tran Thien Khiem) to head the nation for a 60-day period following which a national congress was to install a civilian government. Minh was selected to exercise the functions of Chief of State, and Khanh took over as Defense Minister from Khiem.

(C) During this probationary period, the cumbersome machinery of government slowly ground to a standstill which gave rise to an image of impotence and immobility on the part of the Provisional Steering Committee. From this image there arose yet another coup attempt when, on 13 September, military officers who resented Khanh's past treatment and those who hoped to stem his drift with the Buddhist tide moved into Saigon in a quick, orderly, and bloodless takeover. Because Khanh had unexpectedly absented himself by visiting Dalat, and because of the loyalty of the Air Force Commander, Nguyen Cao Ky, the coup failed, and the dissident troops were evacuated by noon on 14 September.

(C) The pressure of the coup in conjunction with that of other political, religious, and ethnic groups succeeded in causing Khanh to select a 17-man High National Council which he charged with the task of drawing up a provisional constitution and selecting a provisional national assembly. The resulting charter provided for a chief of state with limited powers and a civilian premier to determine policy, subject to the approval of the council which would act temporarily as a popular assembly. The resulting civilian government headed by former Saigon Mayor Tran Van Huong as Premier and Pham Khac Suu as Chief of State was the first of its kind since the overthrow of the Diem regime and brought some faint hope of political stability. However, it could not be said that the new government really held power, for new moves in late December 1964 by the "Young Turks," a maverick group of young military officers, tended to undercut them, and this, together with increasing politico-religious turmoil, virtually immobilized the civilians as 1964 drew to a close.

(C) Thus, as 1965 began, the political situation was no closer to a solution than it had been the preceding year. A Buddhist attempt
to overthrow the struggling but feeble civilian government was complicated further by the military. In December 1964 the Young Turks formed an Armed Forces Council (AFC) ostensibly to act as an advisory body on military affairs to Khanh, who theoretically had relinquished the trappings of governmental power in August 1964. With Khanh's approval the AFC illegally abolished the High National Council, and in early January it became increasingly clear that Premier Huong could not last much longer. A coordinated Buddhist uprising soon grew out of control. This paved the way for Khanh, on 27 January 1965, to reassert leadership of RVN by persuading the AFC to issue a "decision" that Khanh must be entrusted with the "heavy responsibility of settling the present political crisis" because Huong and Suu could not control the critical situation. There was, however, dissatisfaction among the AFC members regarding Khanh's reassertion of power. Among those dissenters was Brigadier General Nguyen Cao Ky, Air Force Chief. Khanh remained in power for only four short weeks before he was again ousted on 12 February 1965.

(C) One product of Khanh's short tenure of office, however, was a new civilian government with his stamp on it. Important within the framework of this civilian government were provisions for the formation of a National Legislative Council (NLC) which was to consist of a civilian-military group whose function was to advise the government. Included in the NLC would be six military representatives and three unofficial representatives of each of the four major religious groupings (Buddhist, Catholic, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao) and two independents. Thus, the NLC attained the goal of developing an institution for finding a consensus among the national power groups.

(C) On 19 February 1965 another attempted coup, launched against Khanh, failed. The failure of this junta was due, in no small part to two rather significant reasons: First, Khanh was no longer in power since the NLC had ousted him seven days earlier and seated Pham Huy Quat, a highly respected politician; and second, only a very small segment of the military backed the aspiring junta. Shortly thereafter Khanh was appointed as a roving ambassador, and the AFC on 5 May dissolved itself. This, however, did not end the new civilian government's problem. Discord
arose regarding the autonomous power of the Chief of State's authority to replace ministers of the government. This and numerous other more deeply seated problems resulted in Quat's inviting the military to mediate the crisis. In an announcement on 12 June 1965, Chief of State Suu, on behalf of himself, the Quat government, and the NLC, stated that these three elements of civilian authority had handed back to the armed forces all power and authority in Vietnam. Thus the mediating generals set to the task of pounding out a new government and a new statement of national policy. The shaking and sifting that ensued brought forth the emergency of new leading figures, Major General Nguyen Van Thieu, a former Deputy Prime Minister, and Brigadier General Nguyen Cao Ky, Chief of the Air Force.

(C) The military, on 19 June 1965, promulgated a new government charter, the Provisional Convention, and stressed that authority was only temporarily vested in the armed forces pending promulgation of a permanent constitution. The Provisional Convention created as the highest authority an Armed Forces Congress, which was not to take over the running of the country, but was to create the Armed Forces Directory (AFD). Having done this, the Armed Forces Congress disbanded. The AFD, or Directorate, was the real seat of power having as its membership ten senior generals with Thieu as the Chairman, and nine other "commissioners." Thieu's position as chairman corresponded to that of Chief of State while the other key post, Executive Commissioner (Ky), corresponded to the civilian position of Premier. The work of pounding out a new governmental machine was accomplished by Ky, and after the new regime's first 100 days in power drew to a close, there was an ambitious program to be accomplished which included enhancing the new GVN image both at home and internationally, stabilizing itself, attacking economic problems, routing out corruption, addressing refugee problems, increasing pacification, and, of primary importance, prosecuting the war against the VC. These ambitions, together with some evidence to indicate progress in all areas, saw 1965 close with Ky's position relatively stabilized to the degree that he was able to announce preliminary plans for an ultimate return to civilian government.

(C) The beginning of 1966 found the Directorate, in power for just over six months, on fairly stable ground in comparison with previous governments since Diem's fall. The relationship between MACV and Ky's government was generally excellent, which,
together with the close cooperation of the apolitical Lieutenant General Ca6 Van Vin (Chief, Joint General Staff), led to an increasingly successful prosecution of the war. Still there were many tensions threatening the thin fabric of the Directorate's rule. Among these were an increasing regional rift, traditional suspicion of military juntas, a fragile relationship among the Directorate's officers, religious fractionalism dating from the Diem regime, and a condition of deteriorating economics.

(C) With these things under a loosely controlled boil, the Directorate was firmly opposed to an overly ambitious plunge into democratic procedures which might throw RVN back into political turmoil and seriously impede the recent success of the war effort. Consequently, the Directorate recommended as a first step the appointment of a "Democracy Building Council" whose duties would consist of drafting a constitution and establishing statutes concerning political parties, elections, and press regulation. This plan was presented to the Second Armed Forces Congress convened in Saigon 14-15 January. In a climaxing "State of the Nation" speech Ky outlined the goals for the GVN during 1966, which were to win the war, pacify and reconstruct the rural areas, stabilize the economy, and build democracy. He further pointed out that the Democracy Building Council would be appointed soon after the Lunar New Year (Tet), and would draft the constitution which would be submitted to a referendum in the following October; further, he pointed out that he envisioned democratic elections in 1967.
During a temporary lull of the turmoil in I CTZ, it is notable that on 3 April the Armed Forces Congress met and issued a communique calling for a meeting on 6 April 1966 of a small group of leaders "to aid the Directorate in Fixing modalities for convocation of a National Political Congress." Rapid results of these efforts were forthcoming when, on 12 April, such a congress did meet, and on its final day of proceedings, 14 April, Chief of State Thieu, promulgated an on-the-spot decree for an elected constituent assembly within three to five months.

(C) That events in I CTZ had had significant adverse effects on the war against the VC is evident. US advisory personnel were withdrawn from ARVN "struggle" elements; measures were taken to secure threatened US installations; and joint ARVN/US operations had come to a virtual halt in the northern sector. It was evident that VC insurgents had exploited the confusion and had used the Buddhist demonstration to further their own ends. In order to establish a case for settlement of the I CTZ disputes and to preclude a foundation for further similar uprisings, the Directorate, on 6 June, nominated ten civilians to be added to its ranks. Among those nominated were professional figures and Buddhists. This move proved fruitful and assisted in temporarily mollifying the dissident northern Buddhist elements. Further, on 15 June the GVN promulgated a decree establishing the government on political, economic, and social matters. The PAC was inaugurated on 5 July, just after the GVN realized total success in quelling the existent unrest.

(C) The next major hurdle facing Ky's government was the organization and conduct of the elections which would create the Constituent Assembly (CA). The complexity for such a task should not be lightly regarded. Not only would it mean registering all those eligible to vote, but security must be provided against VC harassment for those going to the polls as well as at the polling sites. Not the least among the problems would be advertising the election at
"rice roots" level and insuring that elections were sufficiently super-
vised at local level to eliminate unethical practices insofar as possi-
ble. These problems presented a great challenge to the GVN, but
Ky proved up to the task when, on 11 September, 80 percent of the
registered voters went to the polls and elected the slates of candi-
dates of their choice; this, in spite of very active VC anti-election
propaganda and threats.5

(C) The inaugural session of the CA took place on 27 September
with the Directorate, cabinet, PAC, Diplomatic Corps, and press in
attendance. Through the remainder of 1966, the CA involved itself
with the electing of assembly officers, establishing procedural rules,
creating political blocs, and finally, addressing the ultimate task of
drafting a constitution.6

Setting the Stage, 1967

(C) After more than three years of political turmoil and in-
stability, 1967 opened with a note of optimism. The Thieu-Ky
government had been able to hold the reins of power for more than
18 months, a feat of some magnitude considering that all the old
problems were still in existence, except that unity within the RVNAF
was much greater. Ky had demonstrated great courage and aggres-
siveness in dealing with the 1966 problems in I CTZ and had shown
that he was in command and was willing to use whatever force he
considered necessary to stabilize the GVN position. Not only was
he able to quell the "struggle movement" in the north, but he also
gave promising signs of intending to prosecute actively the fight
against the VC. His diplomatic aplomb enabled him to compro-
mise where he thought it necessary; this had proven to be a nearly
nonexistent capability of his predecessors. He showed considerable
insight in organizing his cabinet when he brought in both civilian and
military members from the north and south, and of varying religious
backgrounds.
Formulating the Constitution

The Constituent Assembly (CA)

(C) On 11 September 1966 over 80 percent of the registered voters went to the polls despite strong Viet Cong opposition and elected 117 deputies to the Constituent Assembly (CA). Contrary to prior widespread doubts within and outside of Vietnam, the elections were almost universal, hailed as free and honest. The deputies constituted a representative cross-section in terms of religion and regional origin, with teachers or professors and provincial councilmen making up the largest occupational groupings. Very few of those elected had previous national political experience, and they were, on the average, younger than past national assemblymen. The Constituent Assembly held its first session on 27 September 1966, and it was more than a month before it settled down into an effective organism in which the inexperienced deputies knew both their jobs and their co-workers. On 25 October, Phan Khac Suu, a former Chief of State, was elected President of the Assembly, and on 31 October the membership formed into four major voting blocs, plus a group of independents. The bloc members shared common interests and banded together in the interests of speeding up the work of the Assembly. 8

(C) While the CA was busy with its preliminaries, the GVN promulgated Decree-Law 21/66 which, in part, gave the GVN authority to amend "one or many" Articles of the Constitution within thirty days preceding its promulgation. Any amendment made would become permanent unless the CA rejected it by two-thirds vote. The CA was afraid that the Directorate would exercise its amendatory power and virtually rewrite the draft constitution after the Assembly had completed its work. Viet Cong propaganda concentrated upon these fears in an effort to disrupt the work of the CA. By mid-January 1967, however, the deputies came to believe that the GVN
did not intend to exercise undue influence upon the Assembly, and that it was willing to discuss informally any changes which it wished to be made in the first draft. In this way the government's ideas could be taken into account discreetly without its having to resort to strong amendatory powers. Another portion of Decree-Law 21/66 to which the CA took exception was that which stated that the CA would dissolve once the Constitution was promulgated. Most members seemed to feel that they should continue to sit until their successor, the National Assembly, convened. Informal discussions between members of the CA and the Directorate resolved this question by agreeing that the Assembly would remain in existence and assist in drafting election laws and monitoring the elections which would follow. These behind-the-scenes agreements fostered mutual confidence and respect between the two groups and augured well for future cooperation. 9

The Constitution

(C) On 19 January 1967 the CA met in plenary session to begin open debate on the first draft of the Constitution. The draft called for elected local officials, including province chiefs and well-defined rights and duties of citizens in a reversal of the strong centralized governmental functions imposed during the Diem regime. The delegates had borrowed freely from the experiences of other nations, particularly the more progressive nations of SEASIA, and adapted them to the realities of RVN in a wartime environment. From the Republic of Korea they adopted the concept of a government headed by a strong president and a premier, rather than a true parliamentary system on the British pattern. The draft, however, included provisions for substantial legislative powers and restrictions on presidential powers; these latter were generally opposed by the Directorate, as were plans for increasing the interim powers of the CA prior to the election of a National Assembly. During the review process there were significant modifications to the draft generally aimed at increasing the powers of the President at the expense of the Premier and the future National Assembly. 10

(C) During the post-Tet resumption of plenary debate the CA yielded by granting authority to the President, rather than to the
National Assembly, to declare emergencies and impose curfews. This met one of the Directorate's most serious objections to the first draft. The CA also voted for a 35-year minimum age limit for presidential candidates which defeated a higher age-limit aimed at barring Premier Ky from running for that office. By mid-March the CA had completed the section on the judiciary, to include a Supreme Court to be chosen by the National Assembly from lists provided by professional associations of judges, lawyers, and prosecutors. Also approved was the establishment of a Military Council to advise the President, particularly on matters of promotion, transfers, and discipline. The CA decided against letting the President chair the Military Council, and placed checks on the involvement of the Military Council in non-military matters. The Directorate continued to oppose the election, rather than appointment, of province chiefs, the granting of power to the National Assembly to vote no-confidence in the government, and details of the transition period. However, on 16 March Premier Ky met with a number of CA members and indicated that the Directorate would no longer oppose any of the draft provisions except those dealing with the transitional government. Two days later the CA held heated debates on the organization of a government for the transitional period prior to the national elections, but Ky's compromise held up. It was agreed that the CA would exercise limited powers, but that the Directorate would remain in power until the new President was elected and installed. After approving these transitional arrangements, the CA voted final approval of the entire Constitution.  

(C) It was now the turn of the Directorate to argue to provisions of the Constitution, and on 19 March there was a stormy session. The supporters of General Thieu and some of the civilian members of the Directorate were opposed to several points of the final draft, but Premier Ky and his supporters prevailed. Finally the Directorate issued a communiqué stating its intention to "accept" the Constitution in the form approved by the CA; as a matter of form the approved draft would be submitted to the Armed Forces Council before promulgation. This *ex-post-facto* approval was necessary, for Thieu and Ky departed immediately for Guam and the meeting with President Johnson from 19-21 March. At the Guam Conference Ky spoke with justifiable enthusiasm about the new Constitution, and he presented a bound copy to President Johnson. Ky noted that the immediate impact would be the holding of village and hamlet elections--for the first time since 1964--the following week, and the national presidential election to be held within six months. Following
the Guam Conference, in a brief ceremony at Independence Palace on 24 March, the CA formally presented the final draft of the Constitution to the Directorate, which in turn submitted it to the Armed Forces Council. The pro forma submission almost upset the delicate balance, for Thieu and Ky encountered strong opposition from the more reactionary members of the Council. However, presumably reminding the hold-outs that President Johnson had accepted a copy of the "approved" Constitution in front of world TV cameras, the two leaders prevailed the Council to withdraw their several objections, and to give final and formal approval to the Constitution on 27 March.12

(U) The new Constitution was promulgated on 1 April. The dignified and impressive promulgated ceremony was held on the grounds of Independence Palace, attended by the entire Directorate, the Constituent Assembly, members of the diplomatic corps, GVN ministerial representatives, religious leaders, representatives of ethnic minorities, school children, and selected Hoi Chans. At this time Chief of State Thieu made the official announcement that elections for President and for the Upper House of the National Assembly would be held on 1 September (subsequently changed to 3 September, a Sunday), with elections for the Lower House to take place a month later.13

Preparing and Conducting Elections

Village and Hamlet Elections

(C) In an effort to expedite the requirements imposed by Articles 70-72 of the Constitution, and to give emphatic evidence of their sincerity to build democratic institutions, the GVN, in early March, began making preparations for holding village and hamlet elections which would not only begin the process of converting the democratic processes at the rice-roots level, but would also be a trial balloon for the presidential and assembly elections in the fall. The local elections were planned in two phases; a ten-week period beginning on 2 April for elections in some 961 villages and 4,576 hamlets considered relatively secure; and a later period, to be
contingent upon the progress of pacification, for elections in some
300 additional villages and 1,500-odd hamlets. It was planned that
village councils would elect village chiefs from among their mem-
bership, while hamlet chiefs would be elected directly. Both vil-
lage and hamlet chiefs were to have appointed assistants for
security, propaganda, and civic action. Salary reforms were
planned which would put elected officials on a par with RD workers
and local GVN employees, and an extensive administrative training
program was planned to follow the elections. 14

(C) The VC made clear their opposition to the elections by con-
tinual threats, and by assassination of candidates and bludgeoning
of the voters, but their terrorist campaigns failed to keep the
villagers from voting. Voting was encouraged by its simplicity; identification cards, previously issued, were presented at the polls, whereupon the voter was handed an envelope with a ballot for each of the candidates; entering a booth, he sealed the ballot of his choice into the envelope and deposited the latter in the ballot box. The high voter turn-out was attributed to the increasingly effective security offered by the RVNAF, the encouragement of the military district officials, and to the moral obligation of returning to the ancient custom of election of village
and hamlet officials.

(C) After the final week of village elections it was deter-
mined that about 77 percent of the registered voters had cast
their ballots. Elections took place in 984 villages of an es-
timated 2,500 RVN. Twelve candidates had been murdered by
the VC, and 31 kidnapped. The village council elections were
considered a success, but there was some evidence that the larger
voter turnout was as much a response to the call of duty as to any
real understanding of the important issues and reforms at stake.
The same general statement probably held true for the election of
the hamlet chiefs, which began on 14 May and ran for four suc-
cessive Sundays. 15
The National Elections

(C) By mid-April the CA had abolished its committees charged with drafting the Constitution and had elected new committees for such functions as drafting electoral laws, press regulations, rules governing political parties and opposition activities, and the organization of a Supreme Court and an Inspectorate. There was a none-too-subtle attempt to consider the CA, now that the Constitution had been promulgated, as a sort of de facto Legislative Assembly, but the Directorate moved quickly to block such aspirations. Phan Khoc Suu was not seriously opposed for reelection to the Chairmanship of the second phase of the CA, and this enhanced his status as a possible presidential candidate. By late April debates began on the draft electoral laws, and it became apparent at once that there were two controversial provisions which reflected the divergent views of the Directorate and the CA. The first provided that military or civil service candidates would have to take leave without pay from the date of filing candidacy. This was aimed particularly at forcing Generals Thieu and Ky to step down from their governmental posts during the campaign, but it met such opposition from the Directorate that a compromise was effected by which the provision would not apply to members of the existing government who might aspire to the presidency or vice-presidency. The other controversial provision would have established a minimum percentage of the vote for the winning candidate, with a runoff required between the two leading candidates if neither achieved the minimum vote. The military leaders opposed this provision, considering that a military candidate could win in a large field of civilian candidates, but might not fare as well in a two-man runoff with the most popular civilian. After an angry debate on 8 May, the runoff provision was abandoned.16

(C) On 26 May General Thieu requested CA Chairman Suu to ask the CA to delete the requirement that presidential candidates be introduced (i.e., nominated) by thirty elected officials. The CA divided sharply on this issue, which also pointed up the political rivalry between Generals Thieu and Ky. Pro-Ky members of the CA argued for retention of the thirty introductions, and on 31 May Premier Ky stated that the introduction requirement would not affect those who had the ability to run. Thieu, however, remained on record as opposing the introductions as undemocratic and unconstitutional. In the
end, the Directorate overrode the CA and the introductions provision was dropped. The Presidential and Upper House Election Laws were promulgated by Chief of State Thieu on 15 June. 17

(C) As early as the end of January 1967 there had been indications that Premier Ky intended to run for the Presidency, with the strong hint that he would have the support of the Directorate. Chief of State Thieu remained mum on his own plans, but both he and Ky made frequent speaking trips to the provinces, both to initiate the hamlet and village elections and to stir interest in the forthcoming national elections. In March General Thieu gave the first indication that, "if the Army proposed his candidacy," he would consider running. On 11 May Thieu told the press that he was not yet in a position to decide whether or not to run, but that his candidacy was a possibility. The next day Premier Ky announced that he would definitely run for the Presidency, and over the following week met with leaders of the Dai Viet and VNQDD parties. He also announced over TV the new rice bonus for military personnel and most government employees. On 17 May Ky made a bid for the Chinese vote when he told the Chinese Congregations Board that he favored "in principle" the return to the Chinese community control over school, hospital, and other property which had been taken over in 1960 by the Diem regime. 18

(C) As the filing deadline of 30 June approached, there was a frenzy of political activity. General Thieu formally announced his candidacy and selected as his running mate a leader of the Hoa Hao sect. Premier Ky announced that his vice-presidential candidate would be the Chairman of the People's Army Council. The apparent rift growing between Thieu and Ky, and the subsequent threat to RVNAF unity, alarmed the Armed Forces Council, and on 28 June it was convened by the Minister of Defense and Chief JGS, General Vien. In a secret session lasting three days—during which coup rumors were rampant—the corps commanders and other senior RVNAF officers voted to support Thieu, and demanded that Ky abandon his own candidacy to become Thieu's running mate. Ky stepped down with apparent good grace, and announced to the press his decision to run for the vice-presidency. At the same time the Armed Forces Council and the Directorate decided not to permit the return from political exile in Bangkok of General Duong Van ("Big") Minh, leader of the coup which overthrew the Diem regime in November 1963. 19
The campaign for the Upper House of the Legislative Assembly was conducted concurrently with the presidential elections. In the absence of established political parties, and because of the obvious impracticability of having candidates stand for areas not under GVN control, the decision was made to require all senatorial candidates to present themselves in slates of ten. The top six ten-man slates would thus constitute the sixty-man senate. The senatorial maneuvering began in June, with some of the lists being tied to specific presidential candidates, but most of the aspirants formed lists representing regional, religious, and ethnic interest. By the 30 June deadline, 64 lists of ten candidates each had filed formally with the Special Commissariat for Administration.

On 18 July the National Assembly made the final decision on validation of presidential candidates. Of 18 slates which had filed prior to the 30 June deadline, seven were disqualified. "Big" Minh's candidacy was rejected, not based on his absence in exile, but on the grounds that his vice-presidential running mate had once held French citizenship. The Thieu-Ky ticket was recommended for rejection on the ground that the Chief of State and the Premier had not resigned their positions, but the Assembly rejected this contention. A total of 11 presidential tickets was approved by the Assembly. Of the original 64 slates which filed for the Upper House, 16 were disqualified by 21 July. On 25 July the GVN sent a message to UN Secretary General U Thant stating that the GVN would welcome UN observers during the forthcoming presidential/upper house elections. On 28 July U Thant replied that he needed the authorization of the UN "competent principal organ" before deciding the observer question. The GVN expected no further UN action—and none was taken.

Serious questions arose about how the presidential candidates would get out into the countryside to conduct their campaigns. It was well known that Thieu and Ky were widely known, but many of the others were completely unknown to the electorate. This, together with inadequate transportation resources and less than ideal security conditions, brought about the suggestion that the GVN arrange and coordinate campaign trips. It was decided that group campaign trips would be made, under the protection of the GVN for all presidential candidates. The first of the GVN organized trips to the provinces took place on 6 August—and was a complete debacle. Scheduled to land at Quang Tri, the aircraft was forced by
heavy crosswinds to divert to Dong Ha, 11 km away. Suitable ground transport to Quang Tri was not readily available, the I Corps Commander was "indisposed," and the candidates returned to Saigon in a huff, claiming the tie-up to be a "government conspiracy." Predictably, certain political elements in the US took up the refrain, announcing in advance that the GVN elections would be a "fraud," "rigged," or worse. The candidates issued a communiqué placing full responsibility for the "Dong Ha incident" on the GVN, following up on 8 August with a letter to Generals Thieu and Ky, asking whether the GVN intended to support the campaign activities of the civilian candidates. The two generals did not reply, but the Special Commissioner for Administration opened correspondence with the civilian candidates which mollified them somewhat, and a new campaign itinerary was drawn up, beginning 15 August. 22

(C) The election campaign for candidates for the Upper House got off to a slow start, primarily because the printing and distribution of campaign material fell behind schedule. Posters of presidential and senatorial candidates were plastered throughout the Saigon area, however, and radio and TV appearances started as planned. One problem that could not be resolved to the satisfaction of all concerned was the matter of transporting 480 senatorial candidates around the country. Meanwhile, on 7 August the Directorate Chairman promulgated the law for the Lower House election which was scheduled for 22 October. 23

(C) During the last half of August, as the election campaign entered the homestretch, interest and activity picked up markedly. The civilian candidates, warming to their work, hurled charges against the government of ineffective leadership, election-rigging, and dictatorial methods. The caravan of candidates visited Nha Trang, Ban Me Thuot, Tay Ninh, Can Tho, Rach Gia, and My Tho; General Thieu joined the other candidates at My Tho on 26 August, the first such meeting attended by either Thieu or Ky. The principal issues emerging from the welter of campaign charges and promises were prospects for peace with honor, corruption in the GVN, the new charter for the United Buddhist Association, and democracy in general. During a press conference on 25 August, General Thieu disclosed that the Armed Forces Council was planning to dismiss five generals and to take disciplinary action against some 50 others on charges of corruption. He announced that he was considering a proposal for a NVN bombing pause, and indicated
there could be no negotiations with the NLF as long as the latter claimed to represent the people of RVN. Of the other candidates, the previously unheralded who billed himself as a "peace" candidate, made considerable political capital out of attacks on the GVN and the military in particular. 24

(C) A US report on the campaigning in Pleiku Province at the end of August was perhaps representative of the country-wide conditions:

Due to apparently inadequate GVN logistic support, total lack of mass communication media, and other negative factors, the rest of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates are reaching and influencing an extremely limited audience in Pleiku province. On the other hand, the nature of the provincial and district apparatus in Pleiku (as elsewhere in Vietnam) is such that it tends to be used on support of the Thieu/Ky ticket. That ticket is accordingly assured of communications with, and influencing the maximum number of people in the province.

Partisan campaign posters were late arriving in province. The Thieu/Ky posters were seen in Pleiku city on August 20 and the other began showing up on the 25th.

In the districts, the Thieu/Ky ticket is favored because the people have little familiarity with the other candidates. It is reported that the Montagnards know only Ky ("the general with the hair on his lip"). Some intellectuals while ideologically in favor of civilian candidates, may vote for the Thieu/Ky ticket because of other considerations such as their jobs.

VIS is carrying out a massive "get-out-the-vote" campaign and most citizens in the province are aware of the election, though they may not understand the issues at stake, or how the election can affect them personally. In part, as a result of the VIS effort, the voter interest seems to be high, and it is expected that voter turn-out will also be high. 25
(C) In spite of strong VC attempts to disrupt the election and to discourage voting, the Vietnamese electorate went to the polls in record numbers on 3 September. The total voter turnout was 4,868,266, or some 85 percent of the registered voters; this was an increase over the 4,274,812 voters in the 1966 CA elections, which was 80.8 percent of the registered voters at the time. Although the Thieu/Ky ticket came out on top as expected, there were several surprises. Thieu and Ky received 34.8 percent of the vote, less than the 40-50 percent anticipated—and perhaps less than needed for effective control of the new government.

Suu had 10.8 percent, Huong 10 percent, and Ha Thuc Ky 7.3 percent—surprisingly poor performances for the first two candidates. All in all, the elections seemed to be remarkably free of irregularities, a fact attested to by a total of 116 observers from 24 countries, including a 22-man US delegation.

(U) At the conclusion of these elections, the Constituent Assembly, now a provisional National Assembly, devoted its attention to investigating complaints, lodged mostly by defeated presidential candidates, that elections were rigged, fraudulent, or otherwise illegal. The Assembly appointed an investigating agency from its membership called the Presidential Central Election Council (CEC). The CEC was charged with investigating the complaints and was to submit their findings to the National Assembly on 25 September. Concurrently, a special committee undertook a thorough examination of voter tally sheets from each of the more than 8,000 separate polling places. Formal recommendations of the special committee were based upon the above examination plus the findings of the CEC. On 30 September, the National Assembly began debates on the committee’s findings, and, just before the 2400 hours, 2 October deadline, they validated the presidential election. In secret ballot, 58 deputies voted in favor of validation, and 42 voted against it. Suu, the Chairman of the Assembly, made one last statement: "If I had voted, I would have rejected the elections," and he resigned his chairmanship as of that moment "so as not to bear responsibility before history." 27

(U) Campaigning for seats in the Lower House began on 6 October with an average of nine candidates for each of the 137 seats. As the momentum of the campaign increased, the Upper House held a brief but formal inaugural session on 9 October with General Thieu presiding. In the Lower House election, on 22 October, a total of 4,270,794
persons, or 72.9 percent of the registered voters, turned out for the lower House election which was conducted under a law promulgated 7 August. With the end of the election of the Lower House, the transformation of the GVN into a broadly based government deriving its position and power from the people was completed.

(U) On 24 October, shortly before the installation of the new government, General Thieu promulgated the Mobilization Decree which called for partial mobilization of the nation's human resources, and requisition of the Nation's material resources to meet national defense requirements. On 25 October, Ky signed an implementing order which provided for the conscription of men between the ages of 18 and 33, mobilization of technicians of all kinds up to age 45, and the recall of some veterans.

(U) On 30 October the Directorate dissolved, and, on 31 October, newly-elected President Thieu and Vice President Ky were inaugurated. On the same day the new Lower House was installed, and the Constituent Assembly, then known as the Provisional National Assembly, passed out of existence. The nascent GVN was launched.

(U) After the inauguration ceremonies were over, President Thieu announced the appointment of Nguyen Van Loc as Prime Minister. Loc brought to this position credentials of some magnitude. He was a Southern Buddhist, a lawyer, had been chairman of the Directorate, the vice-presidential candidate on Ky's initial presidential slate, and later, campaign manager for the Thieu-Ky ticket. Hastening the progress of turning governmental wheels, Loc announced the installation of his cabinet on 9 November. The Cabinet consisted of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Justice, Interior, Revolutionary Development, Land Reforms--Agriculture, Open Arms, Cultural Affairs--Education, Economy, Finance, Communication-Transportation, Public Works, Social Welfare--Refugees, Health, War Veterans, Ethnic Development, and Labor.
During the remainder of 1967, the National Assembly busied itself with establishing its internal rules. Rumblings of discontent were heard regarding General Thieu's hasty promulgation of the Mobilization Decree, and there were significant indications that the legality of the decree and its implementing law was to be one of the first subjects of debate within the Assembly. Some senators of the Upper House said that the act was illegal and unconstitutional because the Constitution did not give the directorate unilateral legislative powers during the transitional period; others said that the way in which it was promulgated was damaging to the prestige of the Upper House and was designed to present the Assembly with a fait accompli. What action might be taken on this controversy by the Assembly remained to be seen as 1967 ended; perhaps this would prove to be a testing ground of the Assembly's control over its old/new leaders.

Other Important Influences Affecting the GVN

Though the GVN had accomplished noteworthy strides in the democratic process, there still remained other factors on which it had to focus attention. Paramount among these were the Buddhist situation, corruption, and its relationships with the US community.

The Buddhist Issue

Between the time the Diem regime fell and the "struggle movement," the Buddhist remained relatively quiescent and unified. While the events which led to Buddhist participation in the struggle movement gave substantial reason to believe that the dominant Buddhist attitude was one of anti-Americanism brought on by the deleterious effects of high concentrations of US troops stationed in the Hue-Da Nang complex, this was not actually so. Closer study indicated that highly resented the predominately Catholic rule of Ky and the Directorate and saw this as a threat to Buddhism reminiscent of the Diem regime.
(S) Other openly stated causes of dissatisfaction were spiraling inflation, uncontrolled GVN corruption, and ineffectiveness on the part of the Ky regime. The strongest aspect of anti-Americanism manifested itself as being the role the American presence played in delaying progress of forming a popularly elected, constitutional government.

(S) The Buddhists seemed satisfied after the April 1966 meeting of the National Political Congress which had resulted in a proposal to the Directorate which included popular elections for a constituent assembly within four months.
The Issue of Corruption

Throughout 1966 one of the most nagging problems impeding the solidarity of the relationship between the US and the GVN, particularly between MACV and JGS, was the open "Secret" that two highly placed GVN officials were widely suspected of corrupt practices. The fact that these two officials remained in their high positions of trust and responsibility was a source of embarrassment not only to the Ky government but to COM-USMACV in his capacity as senior advisor to the RVNAF, as well.

Just prior to the end of 1966, in an act of considerable political courage, Thieu and Ky mustered sufficient support from the Directorate to relieve... This augured well for Ky's earlier promise to act against corruption. 36
The establishment of the Mission of an interagency Corruption Committee early in 1967 attested to the importance of identifying and eliminating corruption so that the work of pacification might progress. In the Mission's words:

The level of corruption in Vietnam has reached a point that it seriously interferes with the war effort. Ways must be found to assist the GVN in reducing it as well as to look for ways in which unilateral US actions may affect opportunities for corruption. For example, a "Sign Off"
system at provincial level. . . wherein funds from the RD budget could be released only by the "joint" signature of the Province Chief and the US Provincial Representative would ensure that the US representation was kept closely informed of the exact status of progress and provide close coordination between US advisors and GVN officials. All GVN provincial authorities would be "kept hy-

The Mission went on to point out that the first essential to reducing corruption would be the payment of higher wages to senior GVN officials and army officers, as well as to other selected categories of the GVN. Some action along these lines had already been noted above (Chapter III), and further studies were under continuous evaluation.

(C) While the identification of corrupt officials was unquestionably in the purview of the US, the action which must be taken to cure the illness rested entirely with the GVN. Clearly, Ky had demonstrated his intention to address the problem as he had promised earlier. Perhaps he was not doing so as rapidly as US officials might have hoped, but he was taking some action which gave promising hope for the future. Both Ky and Thieu had voiced their intentions to fight corruption, but because they both became immersed in the rigors of political campaigning for the approaching presidential elections, action on the program was lethargic.

(C) As the course of the coming elections progressed, promises for the elimination of corruption were heard from every quarter--the presidential candidates, those running for the upper house, and those who were hopefuls for seats in the lower house. As the dust of the presidential elections settled, Ky, Vice President elect, demonstrated his willingness and desire to make good on his campaign promises dealing with corruption. On 6 October it was announced that new measures were being undertaken to combat corruption in Binh Duong Province. These measures included the cancellation of contracts which exploited such facilities as the Phu Cuong Binh My ferry landing, the Phu Cuong slaugther-house, and the Phu Cuong and Ton Thai markets. Ky further ordered reorganization of the Public Works and Communications Department and the Motorized Vehicle Control Service. It was further announced that the chief of
the latter service had been dismissed, and three of his subordinates demoted and transferred. 40

GVN-Mission-MACV Relationships

(C) During the first half of 1967, COMUSMACV theoretically enjoyed a rather well structured line of communication with his counterpart, Chief of JGS General Cao Van Vien. In actuality, however, the situation had political as well as military implications. General Vien was the Minister of National Defense as well as Chief JGS. COMUSMACV was by necessity thrown into the political area of activity, thus what might have appeared on the surface as clearly defined was in fact somewhat complicated.

(C) Indicative of the degree to which MACV was affected by both the political and economic trends of the GVN was illustrated in the well-defined but complex organization of the US Mission, whose responsibility was to provide for support of the war in RVN. By the very nature of this organization, purely political problems fell within the purview of the AMEMB rather than MACV, and COMUSMACV had no political advisor as such. The Embassy's Minister-Counsellor for Political Affairs was the point of contact with GVN Ministries, and either he or the Minister-Counsellor for Economic Affairs approached the GVN on politico-economic matters. However, despite the apparently well-established Mission channels of communication with agencies of the GVN, the hard fact remained that MACV maintained scores of direct-line contacts with GVN agencies, even at the ministerial level. These embodied a myriad of subjects which were beyond the resources of the Embassy proper to maintain knowledgeability.
particularly important to MACV were the GVN Ministries of Defense, Revolutionary Development, and Information and Chieu Hoi. Any changes of either policy or personnel within these ministries directly affected COMUSMACV's conduct of the war in tactical operations, pacification, and PSYOP (see Chapter VI for a discussion of pacification and Chapter VII for a discussion of PSYOP). COMUSMACV, in his role as senior military commander, acted as military advisor to the Ambassador by virtue of his position as a member of the US Mission.

(C) Since during nearly all of 1967 the GVN was in the hands of the predominantly military Directorate, COMUSMACV, by his background as well as his position, was called upon frequently to effect direct liaison with both Chief of State Thieu and Premier Ky. It must be understood, however, that these lines of communication and coordination were just that, and nothing more. When it was necessary to exert leverage or pressure upon any agency other than RVNAF, COMUSMACV had to use his vertical channel through the American Ambassador, who was the senior in-country US representative. The Ambassador then used his horizontal channel of communication with the GVN. Even with RVNAF, COMUSMACV occasionally had to deal through the Ambassador when JGS was particularly intransigent in acting expeditiously on some matter of importance.

(C) On 23 May 1967, the MACV staff agency of Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development & Support (CORDS) was created (see Chapter VI for a complete discussion of COORDS organization and functions). While CORDS greatly simplified directing the multitude of pacification efforts by placing them under a single manager/director, it greatly increased the channels of communications to GVN agencies.

(C) In spite of the fact that the chief CORDS coordinator carried the title of Ambassador, his job title was Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS. Consequently, while the lines of communications and coordination were greatly multiplied, the channel of responsibility continued to be through COMUSMACV to the official State Department Ambassador.

(C) The single management concept inherent in the CORDS structure also meant that COMUSMACV had acquired coordinating responsibilities with GVN agencies down through provincial and district levels. It meant that COMUSMACV's responsibilities encompassed virtually
every area except at the national level in Saigon. The GVN political/quasi-military structure began in Saigon with the national level, then went to regional (or Corps) level with the Corps commander double-hatting as the GVN delegate to the region. From region, the political chain then linked to province and district levels. Province and district chiefs were usually uniformed military appointees. So while the official chain was primarily political in nature, it could not be divorced from the military chain beginning at the Ministry of National Defense and proceeding down through JGS, and the Corps.

(C) After the national elections in September and October, and the selection of Nguyen Van Loc as Premier, the lines of communication were somewhat altered. The most significant of these changes came about when the positions of Chief JGS and Minister of National Defense were separated. General Vien remained as Chief JGS, and Loc selected a different minister. COMUSMACV maintained lateral communications with JGS, but clearly now, his contacts with the ministry were reduced. In his dealings with General Vien, he was no longer also dealing with the Minister of Defense. Because of this, it became more difficult to accomplish actions of a broad, sweeping nature on which the Minister might rightly have to rule.

(C) There continued to be constant, direct liaison between the MACV staff and GVN ministries. In the case of the ministries concerned with economics, pacification, and PSYOP, similar contacts were maintained by civil agencies of the Mission. These lines of communications and coordination resulted in a complex web of interlocking functions and responsibilities. Because of the delicate balance maintained among agencies of the Mission, MACV, and the GVN in prosecuting their several objectives, any changes in organization or key personnel was a cause of concern for all. Yet the very nature of the military rotation system, the less frequent but still inevitable turnover of US civilian officials, and the basic fluidity of the GVN made such changes frequent. It was hoped that within the installation of the properly elected, constitutional government, the problem of GVN instability was eliminated. The end of 1967 found a condition of watchful waiting in all corners as the sifting and settling progressed.
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ANNEX D

Footnotes

1. History of the US Army Buildup and Operations in the RVN (TS), HQ USARPAC, 1 Feb - 31 Dec 63; History of US Army Operations in SEASIA (TS), HQ USARPAC, 1 Jan - 31 Dec 64.


6. US Mission Weekly Reports (S), Sep - Dec 66, passim.

7. US Mission Weekly Reports (S), May - Dec 66, passim.


9. US Mission Weekly Reports (S), 6-12 Nov 66 and 8-14 Jan 67; Special Study (FOUO), Strategic Resources Br-- Production Div (USMACV J2), 15 Apr 67, "The Constituent Assembly."


12. Special Study (FOUO), Strategic Resources Br--Production Div (USMACV J2), 15 Apr 67, "The Constituent Assembly."
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15. US Mission Weekly Reports (S), 23-29 Apr 67 and 7-13 May 67.

PREAMBLE

Confident that the patriotism, indomitable will, and unyielding traditions of the people will assure a radiant future for our country;

Conscious that after many years of foreign domination, followed by the division of our territory, dictatorship and war, the people of Vietnam must take responsibility before history to perpetuate those hardy traditions and at the same time to welcome progressive ideas in order to establish a republican form of government of the people, by the people and for the people whose purpose is to unite the nation, unite the territory and assure independence, freedom, and democracy with justice and altruism for the present and future generations;

i.e., 117 Deputies of the National Constituent Assembly representing the people of Vietnam, after debate, approve this Constitution.

CHAPTER I

BASIC PROVISIONS

Article 1. (1) Vietnam is a territorially indivisible, unified and independent Republic.

(2) Sovereignty resides in the whole people.

Article 2. (1) The State recognizes and guarantees the basic rights of all citizens.

(2) The State advocates equality of all citizens without discrimination as to sex, religion, race or political party. Minority compatriots will receive special support so that they can achieve the same rate of progress as the population as a whole.

(3) It is the duty of every citizen to serve the interests of the nation and the people.
(Chapter I continued)

Article 3. The functions and powers of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government must be clearly delineated. Activities of these three branches must be coordinated and harmonized in order to realize public order and prosperity on the basis of freedom, democracy and social justice.

           (2) Every activity designed to publicize or carry out Communism is prohibited.

Article 5. (1) The Republic of Vietnam will comply with those provisions of international law which are not contrary to its national sovereignty and the principle of equality between nations.
           (2) The Republic of Vietnam is determined to oppose all forms of aggression and strives to contribute to the building of international peace and security.

CHAPTER II

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS

           (2) The law protects the freedom, lives, property and honor of every citizen.

Article 7. (1) The State respects and protects the security of each individual and the right of every citizen to plead his case before a court of Law.
           (2) No one can be arrested or detained without a legal order issued by an agency with judicial powers conferred upon it by law, except in case of flagrant violation of the law.
           (3) The accused and his next of kin must be informed of the accusation against him within the time limit prescribed by law. Detentions must be controlled by an agency of the Judiciary.
(Chapter II continued)

(4) No citizen can be tortured, threatened or forced to confess. A confession obtained by torture, threat or coercion will not be considered as valid evidence.

(5) A defendant is entitled to a speedy and public trial.

(6) A defendant has the right to a defense lawyer for counsel in every phase of the interrogation, including the preliminary investigation.

(7) Any person accused of a minor offense who does not have a record of more than three months imprisonment for an intentional crime may be released pending trial, provided that he or she is employed and has a fixed residence. Women pregnant more than three months accused of minor offenses who are employed and have fixed residence can be released pending trial.

(8) Accused persons will be considered innocent until sentence recognizing their guilt is handed down.

In event of doubt, the court will rule in favor of the accused.

(9) If unjustly detained, a person has the right to demand compensation for damages from the State after he has been pronounced innocent, in accordance with the provisions of law.

(10) No one can be detained for indebtedness.

Article 8. (1) The private life, home and correspondence of every citizen must be respected.

(2) No one has the right to enter, search or confiscate the property of a person unless in possession of orders from a court or when necessary to the defense of security and public order according to the spirit of the law.

(3) Privacy of correspondence is protected by law. Any restriction imposed on this right must be determined by law.

Article 9. (1) The State respects and guarantees freedom of religious belief and freedom to preach and practice religion of every citizen as long as it does not violate the national interest and is not harmful to public safety and order or contrary to good morals.

(2) No religion is recognized as the State religion. The State is impartial in the development of various religions.

Article 10. (1) The State recognizes freedom of education.

(2) Basic education is compulsory and free of charge.
(Chapter II continued)

(3) University education is autonomous.
(4) Talented persons who do not have means will be given aid and support to continue their studies.
(5) The State encourages and supports research and creative work by citizens in the fields of science, letters and the arts.

Article 11. (1) Culture and education must be considered matters of national policy, on a national, scientific and humanistic basis.
(2) An appropriate budget must be reserved for the development of culture and education.

Article 12. (1) The State recognizes freedom of thought, speech, press and publishing as long as it does not harm personal honor, national security or good morals.
(2) Censorship is abolished except for motion pictures and plays.
(3) Press regulations will be prescribed by law.

Article 13. (1) Every citizen has the right to meet and form associations in accordance with conditions and procedures prescribed by law.
(2) Every citizen has the right to vote, run for office and participate in public affairs on an equal basis and in accordance with conditions and procedures prescribed by law.
(3) The State respects the political rights of all citizens, including the right to petition freely and engage in overt, non-violent and legal opposition.

Article 14. Every citizen enjoys freedom to choose his place of residence and freedom of movement including the right to go and return from abroad. These freedoms can be restricted by law only for reasons of public health, security or defense.

Article 15. (1) Every citizen has the right and the duty to work and will receive fair remuneration enabling him and his family to live in dignity.
(2) The State will endeavor to create employment for all citizens.
(Chapter II continued)

Article 16. Freedom to join labor unions and to strike is respected within the framework and regulations prescribed by law.

Article 17. (1) The State recognizes the family as the foundation of society. The State encourages and facilitates the formation of families, and assists expectant mothers and infants.
   (2) Marriage must be based on mutual consent, equality and cooperation.
   (3) The State encourages family cohesion.

Article 18. (1) The State endeavors to establish a system of social security.
   (2) It is the duty of the State to establish a system of social welfare and public health.
   (3) It is the duty of the State to support the nation's warriors both spiritually and materially, as well as to support and raise the nation's orphans.

Article 19. (1) The State recognizes and guarantees the right of private property.
   (2) The State advocates a policy of making the people property owners.
   (3) Expropriation or requisition by the State for the common good must be accompanied by speedy and just compensation at price levels existing at time of expropriation or requisition.

Article 20. (1) Freedom of trade and competition is recognized, but it cannot be exercised to secure monopoly or control of the market.
   (2) The State encourages and assists economic cooperation which has the nature of mutual economic assistance.
   (3) The State gives special support to those elements of society which have a low standard of living.

Article 21. The States advocates raising the standard of living for rural citizens, and especially helping farmers to have farmland.

Article 22. On the basis of equality between duties and rights, workers have the right to choose representatives to participate in the management of business enterprises, especially in matters concerning wages and conditions of work in accordance with framework and procedures prescribed by law.
(Chapter II continued)

Article 23. (1) Military personnel elected to public office or serving in positions in the central government must be demobilized or take leave of absence without salary, according to their choice.

(2) Military personnel on active duty are not permitted to engage in political party activity.

Article 24. (1) The State recognizes the presence of minorities in the Vietnamese community.

(2) The State respects the habits and customs of the minority compatriots. Customary courts will be established to pronounce judgments on some disputes involving habits and customs of minority compatriots.

(3) A law will prescribe special rights in order to assist minority compatriots.

Article 25. Every citizen has the duty to defend the country and the Republic.

Article 26. Every citizen has the duty to defend the constitution and respect the Law.

Article 27. Every citizen has the duty to fulfill his military obligations as prescribed by law.

Article 28. Every citizen has the duty to pay taxes in accordance with the provisions of law.

Article 29. Any restriction upon the basic rights of the citizens must be prescribed by law and the time and place within which such a restriction is in force must be clearly specified. In any event the essence of all basic freedoms cannot be violated.

CHAPTER III

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Article 30. (1) Legislative authority is vested by the people in the National Assembly.
(Chapter III continued)

(2) The National Assembly includes two houses, the Lower House and the Upper House.

The Lower House

Article 31. (1) The Lower House includes from 100 to 200 Representatives.

(2) Representatives are elected by universal suffrage, direct and secret ballot. Candidates run as individuals from separate constituencies no larger than provinces.

(3) Representatives serve for four years. They may be reelected.

(4) The election for a new Lower House will be completed at least one month prior to the completion of the term of the old Lower House.

Article 32. Citizens meeting the following qualifications may run for the Lower House:

(1) Vietnamese citizenship at birth or having held Vietnamese citizenship for at least seven years, or having recovered Vietnamese citizenship for at least five years, counting from the day of election;

(2) At least 25 years old on the day of election;

(3) Enjoying full rights of citizenship;

(4) Having draft status in order;

(5) Meeting other conditions specified in the electoral law.

The Upper House

Article 33. (1) The Upper House includes from 30 to 60 members.

(2) Senators are elected at large by universal suffrage, direct and secret ballot. Election is by list voting and on a basis of plurality. Each list includes from one-third to one-sixth of the total membership of the House.
(Chapter III continued)

(3) Senators serve for six years. One-half of the Upper House is reelected every three years. Senators may be reelected.

(4) Members of the first Upper House will be divided into two groups by drawing lots. The first group will serve six years, the second group three years.

(5) The election of one-half of the Upper House must take place at least two months before the term of that half of the Upper House ends.

Article 34. Candidates for the Upper House must be citizens thirty years of age by election day. They must meet all the conditions prescribed in the Upper House election law and those prescribed in Article 32.

Article 35. (1) If for any reason a vacancy occurs in the Lower House more than two years prior to the end of the term, an election will be held within three months to choose a replacement.

(2) If for any reason a vacancy occurs in the Upper House, the election of the replacement will be held concurrently with the next regular election of one-half of the Upper House.

Article 36. Procedures and conditions for the candidacies and election of Representatives and Senators, including ethnic minority Representatives, will be prescribed by law.

Guarantees for Representatives and Senators

Article 37. (1) Representatives or Senators cannot be prosecuted, pursued, arrested or judged for any statement or vote in the National Assembly.

(2) During their entire term of office, Representatives and Senators cannot be prosecuted, pursued, arrested or judged without the approval of three-fourths of the total number of Representatives or Senators, except in cases of flagrant violation of the law.

(3) In cases of flagrant violation of the law prosecution or detention of Representatives and Senators must cease if the House concerned so decides.
(Chapter III continued)

(4) Representatives and Senators have the right to keep secret the origin of documents presented to the National Assembly.
(5) Responsibilities of Representatives and Senators are not compatible with any other elected position.
(6) Representatives and Senators may serve as instructors at universities and advanced technical schools.
(7) Under no circumstances may a Representative or Senator or his spouse participate in a bid or sign a contract with a government agency.

Article 38. (1) In cases of treason or other serious crime, Representatives or Senators may be removed from office by the House concerned.
(2) Removal from office must be proposed by two-thirds of the total number of Representatives or Senators.
(3) The resolution to remove a member from office must be approved by three-quarters of the total number of Representatives or Senators.
(4) The Representative or Senator concerned has the right to defend himself in debate during all phases of the removal procedure.

Authority of the National Assembly

Article 39. The National Assembly has the authority to:
(1) Vote legislation.
(2) Ratify treaties and international agreements.
(3) Determine declarations of war and holding of peace talks.
(4) Determine declarations of a state of war.
(5) Control the government in the carrying out of national policy.
(6) Within the framework of each House, pass on the validation of the election of Representatives or Senators.

Article 40. (1) Each House, with the agreement of third of its membership, has the right to request the Prime Minister or government
officials to appear before it to answer questions regarding the execution of national policy.

(2) Committee chairmen in each House have the right to request government officials to appear before sessions of their committee to report on problems relating to various ministries.

**Article 41.** The Upper House has the right to open investigations regarding the execution of national policy and to request public agencies to produce documents necessary in its investigations.

**Article 42.** (1) The National Assembly has the right to recommend the replacement of part or all of the government by a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of Representatives and Senators.

(2) The recommendation is binding unless the President has special reasons for rejecting it.

(3) In the event of rejection by the President, the National Assembly has the right to vote final approval of the recommendation by a three-quarters majority vote of the total number of Representatives and Senators. This recommendation by the National Assembly is binding from the day it is voted.

**Legislative Procedures**

**Article 43.** (1) Representatives and Senators have the right to introduce bills.

(2) The President may introduce bills.

(3) Bills must be submitted to the office of the Lower House.

(4) If the Lower House approves or rejects a bill, it must transmit the bill to the office of the Upper House within three consecutive days.

(5) If the Upper House agrees with the viewpoint of the Lower House, the bill will be transmitted to the President for promulgation or will be abolished.

(6) If the Upper House does not agree with the viewpoint of the Lower House, it must return the bill to the Lower House within three consecutive days along with an explanation for its action.
(Chapter III continued)

(7) In the latter case, the Lower House has the right to vote final approval of the bill with a two-thirds majority of its total membership.

(8) If the Lower House is unable to reach a two-thirds majority, the viewpoint of the Upper House will be considered as approved.

(9) The time limit for debating and voting on a bill in the Upper House may not exceed half the time required to debate and vote on the bill in the Lower House. The time limit for debating and voting on a bill in the Lower House may not exceed twice the time required to debate and vote on the bill in the Upper House.

Article 44. (1) Bills approved by the National Assembly will be transmitted to the President within three consecutive days.

(2) The President must promulgate the law within 15 days from the date of receipt.

(3) If the National Assembly appraises the matter as urgent, the bill must be promulgated within seven consecutive days.

(4) If the President does not promulgate the bill within the specified period of time, the bill will automatically become law and will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Upper House.

Article 45. (1) Within the period allowed for promulgation the President has the right to send a message outlining his reasons and requesting the National Assembly to reconsider one or more articles of the bill.

(2) In this case, the National Assembly will meet in joint plenary session to vote final approval of the bill with an absolute majority of the total number of Representatives and Senators. If the National Assembly votes to reject the amendment proposed by the President, the bill will automatically become law and will be transmitted to the President for promulgation.

Article 46. (1) The draft budget must be submitted to the office of the Lower House prior to September 30.

(2) Representatives and Senators have the right to propose additional expenditures but must at the same time propose equivalent new receipts.
(Chapter III continued)

(3) The Lower House must vote on the budget prior to November 30 and transmit the approved version to the Upper House by December 1 at the latest.

(4) The Upper House must vote on the draft budget before December 31.

(5) During the above mentioned period, if the Upper House reconsiders one or more provisions of the draft budget, then the procedures outlined in Article 43 will be applied. In the event that the draft budget has not been finally voted by December 31, the President has the right to sign a decree authorizing expenditure of one-twelfth of the previous budget until the Lower House has voted final approval of the draft budget.

Regulations

Article 47. (1) Each House will meet in regular and extraordinary sessions.

(2) Every year each House will meet in two regular sessions: one session beginning on the first Monday of April; the other beginning on the first Monday of October. A session cannot last for more than ninety days. However, the Lower House can prolong its session in order to vote final approval of the draft budget.

(3) Either House may meet in extraordinary sessions when so requested by the President or one-third of the Representatives or Senators. When extraordinary sessions are convened by the President, the President will set the agenda.

Article 48. (1) Each House will meet in open session except when more than half the members present in the House request a closed session.

(2) In open sessions complete reports of the debate and documents presented will be printed in the official journal.

Article 49. (1) Each House will elect its Chairman and permanent officers.
(Chapter III continued)

(2) Each House may establish permanent committees.
(3) Each House is responsible for establishing its own internal rules.
(4) The offices of the two Houses will meet together to determine procedures for maintaining liaison between Houses.

Article 50. (1) The Chairman of the Upper House will convene and preside over joint plenary sessions of both Houses.
(2) If the Chairman of the Upper House is unable to perform this function, it will be carried out by the Chairman of the Lower House.

CHAPTER IV
THE EXECUTIVE

The President

Article 51. Executive authority is vested by the people in the President.

Article 52. (1) The President and Vice-President run together on one list and are elected by the entire nation by direct and secret ballot.
(2) The term of office of the President and Vice-President is four years. The President and Vice-President can be reelected once.
(3) The term of office of the President and Vice-President ends precisely at 12:00 noon on the last day of the forty-eighth month from the day they took office, and the term of the new President and Vice-President begins at that time.
(4) The election of the new President and new Vice-President will be held on a Sunday, four weeks before the term of the incumbent President ends.

Article 53. Citizens who fulfill the following conditions may run for President or Vice-President:
(Chapter IV continued)

(1) Must have Vietnamese citizenship from day of birth and continuous residence in Vietnam for at least ten years as of the date of the election. Time spent abroad on official assignment or in political exile is considered as residence in Vietnam;
(2) Must be 35 years of age as of election day;
(3) Must have legal draft status;
(4) Must enjoy full rights of citizenship;
(5) Must meet all other conditions set forth in the Presidential and Vice-Presidential election law.

Article 54. (1) The Supreme Court will establish a list of candidates, will control the fairness of the election, and will announce the result.
(2) Candidates will receive equal means in the electoral campaign.
(3) Procedures and conditions governing candidacies and election of the President and Vice-President will be prescribed by law.

Article 55. When assuming office, the President, witnessed by the Supreme Court and National Assembly, shall take the following oath before the nation: "I solemnly swear before the Nation to protect the Fatherland, respect the Constitution, serve the interests of the People, and to the best of my ability fulfill my duties as President of the Republic of Vietnam."

Article 56. (1) The duties of the President and Vice-President may terminate prior to the end of their terms of office in the following circumstances:
(a) Death;
(b) Resignation;
(c) Impeachment;
(d) Serious and prolonged illness such that the incumbent can no longer carry out his duties. This disability must be recognized by three-fourths of the total membership of the two Houses of the National Assembly after complete medical examination.
(2) In the event that the duties of the President are terminated more than one year prior to the end of his term of office, the Vice-President will temporarily assume the Presidency.
for a period not to exceed three months in order to organize the
election of a new President and new Vice-President for a new term
of office.

(3) In the event that the duties of the President are
terminated within one year prior to the end of his term of office,
the Vice-President shall assume the Presidency for the remainder
of the term, except in cases of impeachment of the President.

(4) If for any reason the Vice-President is unable to
assume the Presidency, the Chairman of the Upper House will
assume the office for a period not to exceed three months in order
to organize the election of a new President and new Vice-President
for a new term of office.

Article 57. The President promulgates laws within the period deter-
mined in Article 44.

Article 58. (1) The President appoints the Prime Minister. Upon the
proposal of the Prime Minister, the President appoints members of
the government.

(2) The President has the right to reorganize all or part
of the government on his own initiative, or upon the recommendation
of the National Assembly.

Article 59. (1) The President appoints, with the approval of the Upper
House, Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions and Rectors of Universities.

(2) The President represents the Nation in international
relations and receives the letters of accreditation of diplomatic
envoys.

(3) The President signs and, after ratification by the
National Assembly, promulgates treaties and international agree-
ments.

Article 60. The President is the Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Vietnam.

Article 61. (1) The President grants all types of decorations.

(2) The President has the right to grant amnesty and
pardon for criminals.

Article 62. (1) The President determines national policy.
(Chapter IV continued)

(2) The President presides over the Council of Ministers.

Article 63. (1) The President communicates with the National Assembly by message. In each regular session, and whenever the President considers it necessary, he will advise the National Assembly of the situation in the country and of the government’s domestic and foreign policies.
   (2) The Prime Minister and other government officials may participate in sessions of the National Assembly or its committees in order to present and explain matters relating to national policy and its execution.

Article 64. (1) In special situations, the President may sign decrees declaring states of emergency, curfew or alert over part or all of the territory of the country.
   (2) The National Assembly must meet no later than twelve days after the date of promulgation of the decree in order to ratify, amend or reject it.
   (3) If the National Assembly rejects or amends the President’s decree, the special situations which were decreed will end or be modified accordingly.

Article 65. In a state of war, and when elections cannot be held, the President, with the approval of two-thirds of the National Assembly, has the right to prolong the terms of office of some of the elected bodies of the country and to appoint some province chiefs.

Article 66. (1) The Vice-President is Chairman of the Culture and Education Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Ethnic Minority Council.
   (2) The Vice-President cannot hold any other position in the government.

Article 67. (1) The Prime Minister directs the government and the administrative agencies of the nation.
   (2) The Prime Minister is responsible before the President for carrying out national policy.

Article 68. (1) The President, Vice-President, Prime Minister and members of the government cannot hold any position in the private sector whether it is remunerated or not.
(Chapter IV continued)

(2) Spouses of persons holding the above positions may not participate in government bids or contracts.

Article 69. (1) It is the task of the National Security Council to:
- examine all matters relating to national defense; propose measures appropriate to the maintenance of national security; propose the declaration of states of emergency, curfew, alert or war; propose declarations of war or the holding of peace talks.
- The President is Chairman of the National Security Council.
- A law shall prescribe the organization and procedures of the National Security Council.

Local Administration

Article 70. (1) The principle of local separation of power is recognized for legal regional entities: Villages, Provinces, Cities, and the Capitol.
- The organization and regulation of local administration shall be prescribed by law.

Article 71. (1) Deliberative bodies and the heads of executive agencies of local administrative units will be popularly elected by direct and secret ballot.
- At the village level, Village Chiefs may be elected by Village Councils from among Village Council members.

Article 72. The heads of executive agencies of local administrative units are:
- Villages - Village Chief;
- Provinces - Province Chief;
- Cities - Mayor;
- Capitol - Mayor.

Article 73. The deliberative bodies of local administrative units are:
- Villages - Village Council;
- Provinces - Province Council;

**Article 74.** The government will appoint two civil servants who have the responsibility to assist Mayors, Province Chiefs and Village Chiefs in administrative and security matters, as well as other administrative personnel.

**Article 75.** Members of deliberative bodies and heads of executive agencies of local administrative units may be dismissed by the President if they violate the Constitution, laws of the nation, or national policy.

**CHAPTER V**

**THE JUDICIARY**

**Article 76.** (1) Independent judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and is exercised by judges.

(2) A law shall establish the organization and administration of the Judiciary.

**Article 77.** Every court must be established by law with an element that judges and an element that prosecutes, both of which are professionally qualified. Courts must respect rights of defense.

**Article 78.** (1) The responsibilities of Presiding Judges and Prosecuting Judges are clearly delineated, and the two are governed by separate regulations.

(2) Presiding Judges make decisions according to their consciences and the law, under the control of the Supreme Court.

(3) Prosecuting Judges monitor the application of the law in order to protect public order, under the control of the Ministry of Justice.

**Article 79.** Presiding Judges can be relieved of their functions only in cases of mental and physical incapacity, conviction, or violation of discipline.
Article 80. (1) The Supreme Court includes from nine to fifteen judges chosen by the National Assembly and appointed by the President from a list elected by the Association of Judges, Association of Prosecutors and Association of Lawyers.

(2) Judges of the Supreme Court must be judges or lawyers who have served at least ten years in the Judiciary.

(3) The term of office of Judges of the Supreme Court is six years.

(4) The numbers of electors of the Association of Judges, Association of Prosecutors and Association of Lawyers must be equal.

(5) The organization and regulation of the Supreme Court will be prescribed by law.

Article 81. (1) The Supreme Court is empowered to interpret the Constitution, to decide on the constitutionality of all laws and decree-laws, and to decide on the constitutionality and legality of decrees and administrative decisions.

(2) The Supreme Court is empowered to decide on the dissolution of a political party whose policy and activities oppose the republican form of government.

(3) In these cases, the Supreme Court will meet in plenary session. Representatives of the legislative and executive branches may participate in order to present their viewpoints.

(4) Decisions declaring the unconstitutionality of a law or the dissolution of a political party require a three-fourths vote of the total number of Supreme Court judges.

Article 82. The Supreme Court is empowered to decide appeals from lower courts.

Article 83. The Supreme Court has a separate budget and is empowered to establish regulations governing the Judiciary.

Article 84. (1) The Judicial Council has the following responsibilities: To propose the appointment, promotion, transfer and disciplining of judges;
(Chapter V continued)

To advise the Supreme Court in matters relating to the Judiciary.

(2) The Judicial Council will be composed of judges elected by the Association of Judges.
(3) The organization and regulation of the Judicial Council will be prescribed by law.

CHAPTER VI
SPECIAL INSTITUTIONS

Special Court

Article 85. The Special Court is empowered to remove from office the President, Vice-President, Prime Minister, Ministers, Secretaries of State, Supreme Court Judges and members of the Inspectorate in cases of treason or other high crimes.

Article 86. The Special Court is chaired by the Chairman of the Supreme Court and consists of five Representatives and five Senators.

Article 87. (1) A motion to bring charges and citing reasons therefor must be signed by more than one-half of the total number of Representatives and Senators. The motion must be approved by a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of Representatives and Senators. In the particular case of the President and Vice-President, the motion must be signed by two-thirds of the total number of Representatives and Senators and it must be approved by a majority vote of three-fourths of the total number of Representatives and Senators.

(2) The functions of the accused must be suspended from the date of approval of the motion by the National Assembly until the decision of the Special Court is rendered.
(Chapter VI continued)

(3) The Special Court decides removal from office by a three-fourths vote of its membership. In the particular case of the President and Vice-President, the decision must be by a four-fifths vote of the total membership.

(4) The accused will enjoy the right of defense during the entire proceedings.

(5) After having been removed from office, the accused may be tried by an ordinary court.

(6) The organization, administration and procedures of the Special Court will be prescribed by law.

Inspectorate

Article 88. The Inspectorate is empowered to:

(1) Inspect, control and investigate personnel of all public and private agencies directly or indirectly engaged in corruption, speculation, influence-peddling or acts harmful to the national interest;

(2) Inspect accounts of public agencies and commercial enterprises;

(3) Audit the property of personnel of public agencies including the President, Vice-President, Prime Minister, National Assembly members, and the Chairman of the Supreme Court.

(4) In the cases of the Chairman and members of the Inspectorate, the audit of personal property will be conducted by the Supreme Court.

Article 89. (1) The Inspectorate is empowered to propose disciplinary measures against guilty persons or to request prosecution by competent courts.

(2) The Inspectorate has the right to announce publicly the results of its investigations.

Article 90. (1) The Inspectorate includes from nine to eighteen Inspectors, one-third designated by the National Assembly,
(Chapter VI continued)

one-third by the President, and one-third by the Supreme Court.
(2) Inspectors will enjoy those guarantees necessary for them to carry out their duties.

**Article 91.** (1) The Inspectorate has an autonomous budget and is empowered to establish regulations governing its internal organization and the Inspectorate branch.
(2) The organization and regulation of the Inspectorate will be prescribed by law.

**Armed Forces Council**

**Article 92.** (1) The Armed Forces Council advises the President in matters relating to the Armed Forces, especially promotion, transfer and disciplining of soldiers of all ranks.
(2) The organization and regulation of the Armed Forces Council will be prescribed by law.

**Culture and Education Council**

**Article 93.** (1) The Culture and Education Council has the responsibility to advise the government in the drafting and execution of cultural and educational policy. A National Academy will be established.
(2) With the approval of the National Assembly, the Culture and Education Council may select representatives to brief the National Assembly on related matters.
(3) The Culture and Education Council may contribute ideas before the National Assembly debates laws relating to culture and education.

**Article 94.** (1) The membership of the Culture and Education Council includes:
(Chapter VI continued)

One-third designated by the President;
Two-thirds elected by public and private cultural
and educational organizations and by parent-teacher
associations.

(2) The term of office of the Culture and Education
Council is four years.

(3) The organization and regulations of the Culture and
Education Council will be prescribed by law.

Economic and Social Council

Article 95. (1) The Economic and Social Council has the respons-
sibility to advise the government in economic and social matters.

(2) With the approval of the National Assembly, the
Economic and Social Council may select representatives to brief
the National Assembly on related matters.

(3) The Economic and Social Council may contribute
ideas before draft laws and economic and social programs are
debated.

Article 96. (1) The membership of the Economic and Social Council
includes:

One-third designated by the President;
Two-thirds nominated by industrial and
commercial organizations, and by labor
unions and associations having an economic
and social character.

(2) The term of office of the Economic and Social Council
is four years.

(3) The organization and regulation of the Economic and
Social Council will be prescribed by law.
(Chapter VI continued)

Ethnic Council

Article 97. (1) The Ethnic Council, representing the ethnic minorities living on the territory of Vietnam, has the responsibility to advise the government in matters affecting ethnic minorities.
(2) With the approval of the National Assembly, the Ethnic Council may select representatives to brief the National Assembly on related matters.
(3) The Ethnic Council may contribute ideas before draft laws, programs and plans affecting ethnic minorities are debated.

Article 98. (1) The membership of the Ethnic Council includes:
   One-third designated by the President;
   Two-thirds elected by the ethnic minorities.
(2) The term of office of the Ethnic Council is four years.
(3) The organization and regulations of the Ethnic Council will be prescribed by law.

CHAPTER VII

POLITICAL PARTIES AND OPPOSITION

Article 99. (1) The Nation recognizes that political parties have an essential role in a democratic system.
(2) Political parties may be organized and may operate freely, according to the procedures and conditions prescribed by law.

Article 100. The Nation encourages progress toward a two-party system

Article 101. The Nation recognizes the formalization of political opposition.

Article 102. Regulations governing political parties and political opposition will be prescribed by law.
CHAPTER VIII
AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION

Article 103. (1) The President or an absolute majority of the total number of Representatives or an absolute majority of the total number of Senators has the right to propose amendments to the Constitution.

(2) The proposal must cite reasons, and must be submitted to the office of the Upper House.

Article 104. A Joint Committee will be established to research the proposed amendment and report to joint plenary sessions of the Assembly.

Article 105. The resolution to amend the Constitution must be approved by two-thirds of the total number of Representatives and Senators.

Article 106. The President Promulgates a law amending the Constitution according to the procedures prescribed in Article 45.

Article 107. Article 1 of the Constitution and this article may not be amended or deleted.

CHAPTER IX
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Article 108. The Constitution takes effect from the date it is promulgated, and the Provisional Charter of June 19, 1965 is automatically invalidated.

Article 109. During the transitional period, the National Assembly popularly elected on September 11, 1966, representing the people of the nation in the legislative sphere, will:

1. Draft and approve:
   Election laws for the election of the President and Vice-President, Upper
(Chapter IX continued)

House and Lower House; laws organizing the Supreme Court and the Inspectorate; political party and press regulations.

2. Ratify treaties.

Article 110. From the time the first President and Vice-President take office, the Assembly popularly elected on September 11, 1966 assumes legislative powers until the first National Legislative Assembly is convened.

Article 111. During the transitional period, the National Leadership Committee and the Central Executive Committee will continue in power until the first President and Vice-President take office.

Article 112. During the transitional period, Courts presently in operation will continue to exercise judicial authority until the judicial organs prescribed in this Constitution are established.

Article 113. The Assembly elected on September 11, 1966 will establish a list of candidates, will control the propriety and will announce the result of the election of the first President and Vice-President.

Article 114. During the first Presidential term, the President may appoint province chiefs.

Article 115. The election of the President and Vice-President must be organized no later than six months from the date of promulgation of this Constitution.

Article 116. The election of the National Assembly and the organization of the Supreme Court and Inspectorate must be carried out no later than twelve months from the date the first President assumes office.

Article 117. The other structures prescribed by the Constitution must be established no later than two years from the date the first National Assembly is established.
(U) COMUSMACV directed on 21 October 1967 that a focal point be established within MACV in order to conduct a continuous study of cost effectiveness and management measures. This section would formalize a cost effectiveness program and provide information through joint channels to higher headquarters. He emphasized that MACV must seize and retain the initiative in this field and present to higher headquarters and the press an appreciation for sound management, particularly in regard to cost effectiveness. Resource utilization was included along with force requirements, construction costs, and manpower employment. Component commanders would also participate in the program. It was decided that a monthly report would be submitted to COMUSMACV and that a suitable code name, to be cleared with COMUSMACV, would be developed for the program.

(U) The MACV Comptroller was given the mission of monitoring the program on 24 October 1967 and the code name of "MACTHRIFT" was selected. The objective of MACTHRIFT was, "To develop a well balanced, hard hitting, highly effective, maximum combat power military force which can be sustained at minimum cost for an indefinite period." It was to be supported by an adequate but austere support force designed to provide proper services on an adequate basis. The philosophy supporting MACTHRIFT was, "Effective management at all levels can assist in winning this war given the time, patience, and confidence." There was to be a premium on good management. COMUSMACV envisioned command emphasis in which he would periodically look at the commands and provide benchmark guidance and stimulate competition between components and other elements.

(U) COMUSMACV directed that the necessary management tools, objectives, and philosophy be established quickly. In his guidance he further directed that a message be prepared to inform CINCPAC of the objective and philosophy of the program and to include examples of ongoing projects. COMUSMACV added the following: "We must be sensitive to press allegations that we are trying to win the war on a cheap basis and cutting the soldier short." In saying this he was referring to the summer of 1965 when it was alleged that the troops were not getting toothpaste and mail. A flood of mail resulted. He stressed that, in the management of the program, care must be taken to put
forth the point that MACV was not trying to save to the detriment of the individual or the objective.

(U) In conducting a preliminary survey of the component commands with reference to the program, it was found that the CNO was utilizing the code name THRIFT in conjunction with the DN Cost Reduction program. Since the name initially chosen for the MACV program was similar, additional code names were submitted for consideration and, of those submitted, MACONOMY was selected.

(U) COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC on 28 October 1967 of the purpose and objectives of MACONOMY. He stated that MACONOMY had been established to stimulate full and continuing support at all echelons to management decisions which would eliminate costs that did not enhance combat capabilities. The program envisioned evaluation of the results of the decisions in terms of spaces, material, and money and required reporting of the results of the evaluations for inclusion in reports to higher headquarters. Examples of the then currently ongoing programs were also submitted as a matter of explanation and examples of the scope to be covered by the program. As planned, and in order to minimize the administrative burden on subordinate commands, existing or contemplated reports for similar projects being conducted by the components were to be utilized to the maximum extent in managing and evaluating program effectiveness. COMUSMACV would personally review the progress monthly. It was envisioned that Project MACONOMY would provide USMACV the capability of monitoring and evaluating component and joint management decisions which would either reduce operating costs or provide increased operational capability without a comparable increase in operating funds. On 8 November 1967 COMUSMACV sent a similar message to his component commanders.

(U) On 10 November 1967 SECDEF acknowledged receipt of the program which had been forwarded to him by CINCPAC. He stated:

I congratulate you on the initiation of Project MACONOMY. The Vietnam logistic buildup has been an outstanding accomplishment. Due to its scope and speed it is to be expected that we now have many opportunities for improving the management of inventories, facilities and logistic support activities. Your plans for a vigorous, imaginative attack on these
problems will, I am sure, produce substantial savings
in men, money and materials. You have my full
personal support and that of all defense officials in
this important effort. I will look forward to receiv-
ing periodic reports on your progress.  

(U) On 14 November 1967 COMUSMACV directed each component
commander to establish MACONOMY as a matter of highest priority
with maximum emphasis in order to obtain full and continuing support
at all levels to facilitate the achievement of the objectives. To accom-
plish this, it would be necessary for managers at all levels to continu-
ally review plans and programs; analyze and evaluate methods and
resources and establish objectives with a view towards consolidation;
substitute or reduce requirements; and eliminate non-essentials to
achieve increased operational capability at the most economical cost
in men, money, and materials. Pending the publication of the directive
on MACONOMY, COMUSMACV directed that the project would be
initiated immediately by a survey of past management actions that
could be identified, documented, and verified which resulted in a
savings of $10,000 or more or a personnel savings of ten or more
spaces. A 15 December 1967 date was established for submitting the
initial report. The MACV staff was also directed to survey past
management actions for areas that resulted in savings and submit them
to MACCO by the established reporting date. The program was
finalized when the directive that outlined the program as originally
envisioned by COMUSMACV was published on 1 December 1967. The
initial inputs were received as requested and the first report was
scheduled to be submitted to COMUSMACV in January 1968.  

(U) The initial inputs indicated Project MACONOMY's objectives
were met with enthusiasm, aggressiveness, and imagination. By
15 December 1967 approximately 200 reports had been submitted, re-
flexing an estimated realized savings in excess of $100 million. One
example reflecting the vital interest of the component commanders was
a 7th Air Force program to identify and distribute excess property at
selected bases in RVN, which resulted in a savings exceeding $70
million. Responses to Project MACONOMY from all commands indi-
cated significant progress was being made, and the momentum of this
new program would increase as obstacles are overcome.
Footnotes


3. DF (U), Compt to CofS, 24 Oct 67, Subj: Ibid.

4. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 291210Z Oct 67, Subj: MACONOMY (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG USARV, 080432Z Nov 67, Subj: Ibid.

5. Msg (U), SECDEF to COMUSMACV, DEF 2569, 101712Z Nov 67.


7. Ltr (U) COMUSMACV to Asst SECDEF, 3 Jan 68.
(U) Statistics showed that the monthly number of visitors grew from an average of 104 per month in 1963 to an all-time high of 1,429 in the month of December 1967. During CY67 the monthly average was 740. During CY66 the average number of visitors was 552 per month with the high of 749 in October. This tremendous buildup of visitors, paralleling the buildup of US forces in RVN, prompted the DEPSECDEF to publish a memorandum on the subject on 19 January 1967:

Travel of senior defense officials to Southeast Asia (SEA) continues to impose a severe drain on the time and resources of the US and allied activities in SEA. With the number of US and allied combat forces now deployed to SEA and the supporting arrangements which have developed to sustain these forces, I believe there is far less reason for senior defense officials to visit SEA than prevailed during the period of the major force buildup.

Therefore, I desire that the addresses of the memorandum take immediate action to insure personally that visits to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and Thailand henceforth are held to an absolute minimum, that each proposed visitor has a significant mission that unquestionably requires a personal visit, and that the size of the visiting party be held to the minimum. Each proposed visit to the RVN and Thailand should be evaluated against the following criteria:

1. Will the visit aid the field commanders concerned or their staffs in acquiring needed resources?
2. Will the visit aid future operations?
3. Will the visit provide field commanders or higher echelons with significant information not otherwise available?

(U) COMUSMACV's implementation of the guidance furnished by the DEPSECDEF was MACV Dir No. 1-5, dtd 26 April 1967, Subj: Administration Official Visits. The directive further amplified on the criteria established by the DEPSECDEF: "A proposed visit should be nonconcurred with if it fails to meet a minimum of one of the above..."
To emphasize this, the following is quoted from CINCPAC message, Subj: Procedures for Obtaining Country Clearances for Visits to PACOM Area, DTG 260047Z May 67: "Paragraph 3. . . . Component commanders and Single Senior US Military Representatives are encouraged to disapprove requests except for those that are clearly essential. Only those requests for travel by personnel with a significant mission requiring a personal visit should be approved."

(C) To insure that distinguished visitors received a complete picture when briefed on activities in RVN and not a briefing slanted towards the US operations alone, COMUSMACV furnished the following guidance to his component and corps area commanders:

The long term success of our mission in Vietnam will be determined in large measure by the effectiveness of the Vietnamese forces when United States forces have done their job. To this end, every effort must be exerted to emphasize at all levels of command the importance of the operations and exploits of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces to the overall effort. Every opportunity must be taken to enhance the image of the Republic of Vietnam fighting man, especially when addressing distinguished visitors and representatives from the news media.

Appropriate information that can be presented concerning the Vietnamese forces in their participation in combined planning and operations, success in providing military support in the vital RD program, numbers of personnel or units involved, kill ratios obtained, and overall performance with noteworthy accomplishments highlighted.

(U) In-country requests for visitors were defined as requests for personnel required for assistance in connection with administrative, intelligence, operations, logistics, and related matters. CINCPAC authorized COMUSMACV to delegate to the USMACV Service component commanders the authority to request personnel assistance from support activities by transmitting these requests directly to the PACOM support activities for in-theater requests and to PACOM component commanders for out-of-theater requests. During CY67 there were 61 requests involving 79 persons.
(C) Problems developed in the handling of the many visitors not the least of which was the necessity of high volume cable traffic. This was needed in an attempt to establish a basis for support for each individual case where DOD or State sponsorship was unclear or lacking. A real need was seen to clarify in advance, for each category of visitor, the degree of support which should be accorded in the two sensitive areas of air support to the field and access to classified information.

(C) The matter was extremely sensitive in view of the fact that the visitors' impressions of the efforts and progress of the war were largely determined by whether or not air transport was provided along with classified briefings. The hard fact of life was that unless, in most instances, MACV helicopters lifted visitors to the field, they were virtually restricted to the Saigon area. Consequently, visitors who were in a private capacity and were not given air support, felt they were discriminated against and were blocked from seeing "true facts" about the war in rural RVN. Similarly, non-sponsored visitors viewed the unclassified briefings which, of necessity, was all that they could be given, as an effort to keep the facts from them.

(C) An example of the type of situation that had developed was in the case of a congressional delegation consisting of Congressmen Schwengel and Cowger and eight other persons without any official connection. The Congressmen received an unclassified military briefing because of Congressman Schwengel's insistence on the presence at the briefings of private citizens who accompanied him to RVN. Mr. Schwengel later complained to the press that the military would "tell him nothing."

(C) The most difficult group by far were those private citizens who were non-sponsored but whose visit was considered useful by DOD or State. These persons, generally, were influential individuals and opinion-makers who made contact with governmental agencies prior to their visit and arrived with letters and cables in their behalf. Thus, they came with obvious expectations of receiving all the support necessary to enable them to travel freely throughout RVN. Their marked chagrin, upon learning of the limited access that they had to the field, frequently translated itself to skepticism about statements on the basis that they were told "facts" but were not permitted to "let them see." The comments of the press in RVN served to reinforce this skepticism.
The SECSTATE was requested to make known to perspective "private" visitors the real and unavoidable restrictions which had to be placed on their movements through no fault of the US agencies in-country. 3

(C) A telephone conversation between MACOI and representatives of ASD/PA in December 1967 resulted in a program to host influential groups in RVN. MACV position was that even though it was at the time hosting large numbers of congressional members, their staffs and dignitaries from various states, with closer overall scheduling and a modest expansion in capabilities, groups of reasonable size could be accommodated. The program envisioned hosting groups of prominent private citizens as a means of gaining more public support and understanding of the goals and objectives in RVN. Group size was of paramount importance and MACV requested that the figure be limited to 20-25. The number of visitors was limited by available billeting space, airlift support, and escort personnel. It was proposed to break the groups into parties of not more than five each. In that manner more individualized attention could be provided, the impact on combat units (always a major consideration) would be lessened, and a more meaningful look at the overall situation could be provided. Experience had shown that "herding" large groups had been in the main unsatisfactory. A week was considered appropriate as the frequency of group visits with the duration of each visit being five days. Greater frequency was beyond the capacity of MACV to accommodate and longer intervals would tend to dilute the program. MACV requested that the visitor operation be coordinated in Washington. Improper hosting, resulting from oversaturation, would have a deleterious impact on any visitor group and would not accomplish the desired purpose. 4

(U) The Chicago Tribune, on 29 December 1967, carried an article which very aptly covered the problems official visitors caused to the US forces in RVN; problems which, to a large extent, were amplified as the result of the near mishap to Senator Percy during his visit to RVN. The article said in part: 5

United States officials expect to set aside hundreds of vehicles, including helicopters, for use of visiting congressmen and their staffs in Viet Nam over the next four weeks. Dozens of commissioned officers will be diverted to escort duty.
The United States command is tightening the rules in an attempt to prevent any of the 38 congressmen coming here from wandering into the Viet Cong as did Sen. Percy (R. Ill).

The new military controls on VIPs were issued Dec. 22. One requires that any VIP who goes outside the Saigon area must be accompanied by an armed commissioned officer.

Another regulation says no VIP can deviate from his planned itinerary without approval of the central United States military command.

Sen. Percy . . . . , his wife and seven others were flying without military escort in a white, chartered non-military helicopter when the senator decided to make a stop at Dak Son, a hamlet where the Viet Cong had massacred 200 Montagnard tribesmen.

Ten minutes after they had landed the Viet Cong opened up with mortars and small arms. The helicopter took off with Mrs. Percy. The senator and his companions took cover, and four military helicopters had to be sent to rescue them.

Two senators--Edward M. Kennedy and Joseph S. Clark--and 36 representatives are taking advantage of the congressional recess to tour America's major foreign problem.

Reception of them, making up one of the largest of such VIP invasions, will take up hours of the time of American high officials, military and diplomatic, from this week-end on Jan. 24.

Officials here declined to estimate the cost of these trips. Some of the costs are paid by congressional committees the men represent. Other costs are met by United States counterpart funds in Viet Nam. A few congressmen pay their own way.

Planes, helicopters and other vehicles will be on call and, with aides, escorts, and at times news men along, the parties can be large.

"But don't get the idea we are beefing about (the time spent on) this," one official said. "It can be a drain, but we always feel it's important that they see the effort out here. . . ."
(FOUO) Another problem area that reoccurred frequently was the criticism of military personnel timing visits to RVN and Thailand to overlap two consecutive months. This resulted in obvious and substantial financial gain to the visitor. CINCPAC, in order to prevent further possible adverse comment, directed that each proposed visit be carefully screened to ensure that those visits which overlapped two consecutive months were justified and could not be accomplished within a calendar month period. He further required that a statement to this effect be included in the initial trip request. 6

(U) On 23 December 1967 President Johnson made a brief Christmas visit to US troops in Cam Ranh Bay, the same base he visited when he came to SVN last year. The President's plane landed at 0841H and left about 1030H. 7

(S) Looking towards future problems which would be facing the Mission, DEPCOMUSMACV, in December 1967, remarked that the Mission resources would be placed under severe strain during the period 1-20 January 1968, since 98 VIP visitors were scheduled during that time. He said that this influx would cause air transport and billeting problems, and would impinge on substantial amounts of the work time available to the senior Mission officials and allied field commanders. Ambassador Komer recommended that the Mission inform Washington of the dimensions of this problem and request assistance both in regulating the visitor flow and warning prospective visitors that the Mission might not be able to accommodate all their desires for field trips and interviews because of the large numbers who would be in RVN concurrently. 8
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ANNEX F

Footnotes

1. Memo (U), DEPSECDEF, 19 Jan 67, Subj: Travel to SVN and Thailand; Ltr (C), MACJ343, 30 May 67, Subj: Briefing for Distinguished Visitors (U); MACV Dir No. 1-5 (U), 26 Apr 67, w/Chgs 1 and 2, Subj: Administration Official Visits; Msg (U): CS to CINCPAC, 270053Z Jan 67, Subj: Travel to SVN and Thailand.


4. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to ASD/PA, 040855Z Dec 67, Subj: Visits of Influential Groups to RVN.


6. Msg (FOUO), CINCPAC to CINCUSARPAC, 220051Z Dec 67, Subj: Travel to RVN and Thailand.


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**ANNEX H--COMMANDERS AND PRINCIPAL STAFF OFFICERS**

**HQ US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV</td>
<td>William C. Westmoreland</td>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<td>DEPCOMUSMACV</td>
<td>John A. Heintges</td>
<td>LTG</td>
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<td>DEPCOMUSMACV</td>
<td>Creighton W. Abrams</td>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<td>DEPCOMUSMACV for Air Operations</td>
<td>William W. Momyer</td>
<td>LTG(GEN)</td>
<td>USAF</td>
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<td>DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS</td>
<td>Robert W. Komer</td>
<td>AMB</td>
<td>Civ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>William B. Rosson</td>
<td>MG</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>John N. Ewbank, Jr.</td>
<td>MG</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Walter T. Kerwin, Jr.</td>
<td>MG</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Deputy for CORDS to COMUSMACV (Formerly Deputy for RD--) Changed 28 May 67</td>
<td>Paul F. Smith</td>
<td>MG</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Deputy for CORDS to COMUSMACV (Formerly Deputy for RD--) Changed 28 May 67</td>
<td>George I. Forsythe</td>
<td>MG</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACoS, Pers, J1</td>
<td>Donald H. McGovern</td>
<td>BG</td>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACoS, Pers, J1</td>
<td>Franklin M. Davis, Jr.</td>
<td>BG</td>
<td>USA</td>
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*First-named incumbent occupied the position on 1 January 1967, or upon arrival of his unit in-country, or upon creation of the position. Date of successor is indicated. Promotions during tenure are shown in parentheses.
ACofS, Intel, J2
Joseph A. McChristian
Phillip B. Davidson, Jr.

ACofS, Ops, J3
John C. F. Tillson, III
Willard Pearson

Director, Cbt Ops Gen
John R. Chaisson

ACofS, Log, J4
Carroll H. Dunn
Henry A. Rasmussen

ACofS, Plans, J5
John N. Ewbank, Jr.
Max V. Kirkbride
John N. Ewbank, Jr.
Don O. Darrow

ACofS, Comm-Elect, J6
Sam L. Huey

ACofS, Military Assistance
Donnelly P. Bolton

ACofS, CORDS
L. Wade Lathram

Chief of Information
Roger R. Bankson
Winant Sidle

Director of Const, Const Directorate
Daniel A. Raymond
Mahlon E. Gates
Andrew P. Rollins

Director, Tng Directorate
John F. Freund
Edward M. Flanagan, Jr.
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Deputy ACoS, CORDS (Formerly Director, RD Support Directorate-- Changed 28 May 68)
  William A. Knowlton  BG  USA

Chief, USAF Adv Gp
  Donavon F. Smith  BG  USAF

Chief, Naval Adv Gp
  Norvell G. Ward  RADM  USN
  Kenneth L. Veth  RADM  USN  27 Apr 67

SA, IV Corps
  William R. Desobry  BG  USA

Deputy SA, I Corps
  Vacant

Deputy SA, II Corps
  Richard M. Lee  BG  USA
  Charles A. Cannon, Jr.  COL  USA  29 Jul 67
  John W. Barnes  COL  USA  3 Nov 67

Deputy SA, III Corps
  Vacant

HQ, US Army, Vietnam

CG, USARV
  William C. Westmoreland  GEN  USA

DEPCG, USARV
  Jean E. Engler  LTG  USA
  Bruce Palmer, Jr.  LTG  USA  1 Jul 67

Asst DEPCG, USARV
  Richard J. Seitz  BG  USA
  Frank D. Miller  BG  USA  6 Mar 67
  Robert C. Taber  BG  USA  11 Jul 67

Deputy CofS, Pers & Admin
  Earl F. Cole  BG  USA
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<td>George H. Young, Jr.</td>
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<td>Ac. IS, C-E/CG, 1st Sig Bde</td>
<td>Robert D. Terry</td>
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<td>W. M. Van Harlingen, Jr.</td>
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<td>Avn Officer/CG, 1st Avn Bde</td>
<td>George P. Seneff, Jr.</td>
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<td>CG, USA Engr Cmd/USARV Engr</td>
<td>Robert R. Ploger</td>
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<td>Charles M. Duke</td>
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<td>Stanley R. Larsen</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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<td>Frederick C. Weyand</td>
<td>MG(LTG)</td>
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CG, 1st Cav Div (AM)
  John Norton  MG  USA  1 Apr 67
  John J. Tolson, III  MG  USA
CG, 1st Inf Div
  William E. DuPuy  MG  USA  10 Feb 67
  John H. Hay, Jr.
CG, 4th Inf Div
  Arthur S. Collins  MG  USA  3 Jan 67
  William R. Peers
CG, 9th Inf Div
  George S. Eckhardt  MG  USA  1 Jun 67
  George G. O'Connor
CG, 25th Inf Div
  Frederick C. Weyand  MG  USA  8 Mar 67
  John C. F. Tillson, III
  Fillmore K. Mearns  MG  USA  2 Aug 67
CG, 101st Abn Div
  Jlinto M. Barsanti  MG  USA  13 Dec 67
CG, TF OREGON (Redesignated Americal Division 22 Sep 67)
  William B. Rosson  MG  USA  27 Feb 67
  Richard T. Knowles  MG  USA  25 Jun 67
  Samuel W. Koster  BG(MG)  USA  22 Sep 67
CG, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
  Willard Pearson  BG  USA
  Salve H. Matheson
CG, 11th Inf Bde
  Andy A. Lipscomb  BG  USA  1 Mar 67
CG, 173 Abn Div
  John R. Deane, Jr.  BG  USA  23 Aug 67
  Leo H. Schweiter
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CG, 3d Mar Div
   Wood B. Kyle MG USMC 18 Mar 67
   Bruno A. Hochmuth MG USMC 18 Mar 67
   Rathvon McC. Thompkins MG USMC 28 Nov 67

CG, 1st MAW
   Louis B. Robertshaw MG USMC 2 Jun 67
   Norman J. Anderson MG USMC 2 Jun 67

CG, Force Log Cmd
   James E. Herbold, Jr. BG USMC 6 Oct 67
   Harry C. Olson BG USMC 6 Oct 67

Seventh Air Force

Cmdr, '7AF/DEPCOMUSMACV for Air Ops
   William W. Momyer GEN USAF

Vice Cmdr, 7AF
   Gordon M. Graham MG USAF 1 Aug 67
   Robert F. Worley MG USAF 1 Aug 67

CofS, 7AF
   Franklin A. Nichols BG USAF 10 Dec 67
   Louis T. Seith BG USAF 10 Dec 67

Cmdr, 834th Air Div
   William G. Moore, Jr. BG USAF 28 Nov 67
   Burl W. McLaughlin BG USAF 28 Nov 67
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## I CTZ Ground Operations 1967

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(Year 1961) Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr, May, Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep, Oct, Nov, Dec

- NORTH
  - Central Highlands
    - NORTH
      - Central Coastal
        - SOUTH

- CENTRAL HIGHLANDS
  - SOUTH

- CENTRAL COASTAL
  - SOUTH

- SOUTH

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**KIA**: KILLED IN ACTION
**WIA**: WOUNDED IN ACTION

**CONTINUES INTO 1968**

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## IV CTZ Ground Operations 1967

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ANNEX J -- MACEVAL

(U) On 13 September 1967 DEPCOMUSMACV directed that an Operations System Analysis capability be established as a function of the Office of the Chief of Staff. By 14 October 1967 an in-country survey for qualified personnel had been completed and CJCS was notified by private message that three officer personnel had been assigned and that projected requirements for three civilian analysts and three additional officer analysts remained.

(U) A study commenced by the embryo GSA Office on 22 October 1967 recommended an organization consisting of 15 military and civilian personnel headed by an O6 and reporting directly to the CofS. On 3 November 1967 the study and proposed manning level were approved by the CofS and the MACV Operations Research/Systems Analysis Office became operational as MACEVAL. At the same time, two specific areas of research which appeared profitable were approved:

1) Analysis of statistical indicators to evaluate current indicators for measuring the progress of the war effort, as well as to search for new systems. For example: long-range trends in the progress of the war with the objective of anticipating future actions which might be required.

2) Analysis of resource allocation to determine if a better distribution of effort could be found. For example: the development of new or improved concepts for the employment of the CIDG.

(U) On 14 November 1967 MACV Directive No. 10-17 was published establishing the functions and responsibilities of MACEVAL as follows:

- Functions:
  a) Conducting in-depth studies as directed by the Command Group which employed the discipline of operations research.
  b) Reviewing studies as directed by the Command Group to insure objectivity of approach and significance of findings.
c) Monitoring the overall systems analysis effort within MACV.

2) Responsibilities:

a) To be the principal advisor to COMUSMACV on matters concerning systems analysis.

b) Supervise and coordinate the conduct of studies as directed.

c) Monitor the overall systems analysis effort within MACV.

(S) Simultaneously with its organization, MACEVAL was tasked to undertake a study to develop a methodology for measuring combat capability of forces. The study dealt with one of the key tasks facing MACV—the employment of ARVN forces. Several systems were in existence to measure RVNAF effectiveness, and frequent comparisons between US and ARVN battle results were made. However, there had been no comparison of the relative capabilities of US and ARVN forces. The question arose as to whether a direct comparison of results was reasonable if the capabilities were not directly comparable. With this question in mind, MACEVAL set about developing a methodology to measure relative capabilities of US and ARVN forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations in RVN. Phase I of the study, briefed to DEPCOMUSMACV on 19 December 1967, concluded that:

1) US capability exceeded ARVN by a factor of 3.

2) ARVN was at the least relative disadvantage in III CTZ.

3) ARVN was at a relative firepower disadvantage against NVA.
Footnotes

1. MACJ3 Monthly History (C), Aug 67; MACJ3 Monthly History (TS) Oct 67; MACJ3 Historical Input (TS), Dec 67.


3. MACEVAL Study 1-67 (S), dtd 19 Dec 67.
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Annex K
COMUSMACV 1967 Command Chronology

JANUARY

1 -- US military strength in RVN is 5,000.

-- 7AF takes over operational control of 140 USA Caribou (CV-2) aircraft, redesignated C-7A and assigned to 834th Air Div.

-- MARKET TIME Swift boats intercept steel-hulled trawler 165 miles SW of Vung Tau; trawler beached and burned.

-- Elements of the 4th and 25th Inf Div launch Operation SAM HOUSTON, a 95-day search-and-destroy operation in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces. (LOSES: Frd: 172 KIA, 767 WIA, 1 MIA; En: 773 KIA, 2 RET, 305 DET, 162 I/W, 47 C/S.)


2 -- New Year's stand-down period ends 0700H. MACV recorded 111 violations during the period, 24 are significant (i.e., casualties incurred).

-- USAF F-4C Phantoms down seven MIG-21s in biggest air battle of war. Total MIG kills raised to 34.

3 -- MG William R. Peers, USA relieves MG Arthur S. Collins, USA as Commander 4th Inf Div.

-- 26th ROKA Regt launch Operation MAENG HO 8, a 60-day search-and-destroy operation in Phu Yen and Binh Dinh Provinces. (LOSES: Frd: 7 KIA, 17 WIA; En: 211 KIA, 403 PWS, 673 DET, 145 I/W, 1 C/S.)

4 -- Two American engineers and a Filipina released by the VC after seven months as prisoners of the Viet Cong.
5 -- 2d ROKMC Bde launches Operation SEINE, a nine-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Ngai Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 31 KIA, 57 WIA (2 US); En: 140 KIA, 5 PWs, 71 DET, 15 Ralliers, 4 I/W.)

6 -- RTG announces more than 1,000 RTA volunteers will soon go to RVN.

-- First US assault in Mekong Delta as Marines of BLT 1/3 of the SEVENTHFLT Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force go ashore in Kien Hoa Province in Operation DECKHOUSE V.

7 -- First units of the Mekong Delta Mobile Riverine Force arrive in-country.

8 -- 25th Inf Div units, including ARVN units, launch Operation CEDAR FALLS, an 18-day search-and-destroy operation in Binh Duong, Tay Ninh, and Hau Nghia Provinces (Iron Triangle). (LOSSES: Frd: 72 KIA, 337 WIA; En: 720 KIA, 213 PWs, 512 DET, 555 I/W, 23 C/S.)

9 -- World's fourth-largest dredge, the Jamaica Bay, mined and sunk by VC at Dong Tam, Dinh Tuong Province.

11 -- GVN Constituent Assembly Drafting Committee unveils draft constitution.

13 -- Elements of the 9th Inf Div set up first US base camp in the Mekong Delta region (Dong Tam).

14 -- Navy announces SEAL (Sea-Air-Land) units operational in RVN.

15 -- SEA DRAGON AO extended to latitude 19°N. (S)

16 -- US announces resumption of air strikes in Hanoi area.

18 -- US announces use of bases in Thailand to support operations in Vietnam.

19 -- Units of the 101st Abn Div terminate Operation PICKETT, a 42-day search-and-destroy operation in Kontum Province that commenced 8 Dec 66. (LOSSES: Frd: 23 KIA, 104 WIA; En: 63 KIA, 18 PWs, 14 DET, 108 I/W, 1 C/S.)
19 -- ARVN units launch Operation DAN CHI 275/B, a one-day search-and-destroy operation in An Xuyen Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 22 KIA, 43 WIA; En: 181 KIA, 7 PWS, 3 DET, 30 I/W.)

21 -- 28th ROKA Regt launches Operation MA DOO I, a 17-day search-and-destroy operation in Phu Yen Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 3 KIA, 14 WIA; En: 160 KIA, 57 PWS, 162 I/W, 5 C/S.)

-- 7th Mar Regt units terminate Operation SIERRA, a 40-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Ngai Province that commenced 12 Dec 66; (LOSSES: Frd: 10 KIA, 50 WIA; En: 111 KIA, 10 PWS, 66 DET, 7 RET, 36 I/W.)

25 -- Soviet mine found in Saigon River, first Russian mine found in war.

26 -- 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div launches Operation FARRAGUT, a 56-day search-and-destroy operation in Binh Thuan Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 14 KIA, 128 WIA; En: 115 KIA, 4 PWS, 155 DET, 80 I/W.)

-- Units of the 7th Mar Regt launch Operation DESOTO, a 71-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Ngai Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 76 KIA, 574 WIA; En: 383 KIA, 378 DET, 28 I/W.)

27 -- Deputy Prime Minister Co reported in exile. LTG Vien named as Minister of Defense in addition to duty as CJGS.

-- Newport, Saigon officially opens as a military port terminal facility.

29 -- Elements of the 28th, 29th, and 30th ROKA Regts launch Operation PENG MAI I, a 35-day search-and-destroy operation in Khanh Hoa Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 19 KIA, 35 WIA; En: 394 KIA, 40 DET, 271 I/W, 34 C/S.)

31 -- Elements of the 3d and 4th Mar Regt terminate Operation PRAIRIE, a 181-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tri Province that commenced 3 Aug 66. (LOSSES: Frd: 225 KIA, 1,159 WIA, 1 MIA; En: 1,397 KIA, 27 PWS, 110 DET, 298 I/W, 15 C/S.)

-- MG Douglas Vincent, RAA, arrives in-country and assumes command of Royal Australian Forces, Vietnam.
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FEBRUARY

1 -- US military strength in RVN is 410,000.

-- Elements of the 3d Mar Div launch Operation PRAIRIE II, a 46-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tri Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 93 KIA, 483 WIA, 1 MIA; En: 693 KIA, 20 PWS, 288 DET, 137 I/W, 23 C/S.)

-- Elements of the 9th Mar Regt launch Operation INDEPENDENCE, a nine-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Nam Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 9 KIA, 35 WIA, 3 CIDG WIA; En: 139 KIA, 20 PWS, 86 DET, 12 I/W.)


3 -- First PBR (Operation GAME WARDEN) lost to hostile fire.

-- Coast Guard Activities, Vietnam (COGARDACTV) established under operational control of COMNAVFORV.

-- 28 PWS repatriated to NVN at Ben Hai River crossing, DMZ.

5 -- First defoliation mission is flown in southern half of DMZ.

-- Record 565 sorties over RVN flown by USAF and USMC pilots. (Previous record was 549.)

-- RADM P. L. Lacy, Jr., USN, relieves RADM T. R. Weschler, USN, as COMNAVSUPPACT Da Nang.

8 -- Operation LAM SON II terminates, a combined USA/ARVN 259-day security operation in Binh Duong Province (commenced 23 May 66). (LOSSES: Frd: 70 KIA, 339 WIA; En: 251 KIA, 198 PWS, 1,450 DET, 49 I/W, 8 C/S.)

-- At 0700H Allied forces commence observance of four-day cease fire for TET. Truce period marked by 183 minor and 89 significant cease-fire violations.
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11 -- Elements of 1st Cav Div (AM) launch Operation PERSHING, a search-and-destroy operation in Binh Dinh Province. This operation continues into 1968.

12 -- ARVN and elements of 1st Cav Div terminate Operation THAYER, a combined USA/VNMC 111-day search-and-destroy operation in Binh Dinh Province (commenced 24 Oct 66). (LOSSES: Frd: 208 KIA, 876 WIA, 2 MIA; En: 1,757 KIA, 132 PWS, 3,952 DET, 161 RET, 426 I/W, 52 C/S.)

13 -- Elements of the 25th Inf Div terminate Operation LANIKAI, a 152-day search-and-destroy operation in Long An Province that commenced 14 Sep 66. (LOSSES: Frd: 16 KIA, 44 WIA; En: 94 KIA, 12 PWS, 126 DET, 17 I/W, 3 C/S.)

-- US military court-martial jurisdiction over all civilian personnel serving with or accompanying US forces is announced.

15 -- VC attack USN MSBs on Long Tau River. (LOSSES: Frd: 2 KIA, 16 WIA, 1 MSB sunk, 2 MSBs damaged.)

-- South Korean Prime Minister Chung II Kwon starts four-day official visit to RVN.

16 -- RIVFLOT ONE and 3/47 Inf, 2 Bde, 9th Inf Div units conduct initial combat operation, Operation RIVER RAIDER ONE.

-- SEVENTHFLT Special Landing Force/Amphibious Ready Group launch Operation DECKHOUSE VI, a 15-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Ngai Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 6 KIA, 80 WIA; En: 280 KIA, 21 DET, 1 I/W.)

-- Elements of the 4th Mar Regt (Reinf) terminate Operation CHINOOK II, a 47-day search-and-destroy operation in Thua Thien Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 12 KIA, 111 WIA; En: 104 KIA, 226 DET, 30 I/W.)

21 -- Dr Bernard B. Fall, author and authority on Vietnam, killed by an enemy mine while covering USMC operations 19 km NW of Hue in Thua Thien Province during Operation CHINOOK II.
21 -- 4th, 9th, and 25th Inf Div units launch Operation JUNCTION CITY, an 81-day search-and-destroy operation in Tay Ninh Province.

22 -- USAF/USMC pilots fly a record 575 sorties over RVN.

23 -- NGF against shore targets in NVN authorized from 170N to 200N.
SEA DRAGON operations extended to 200N. (S)

-- Two US PWs released by the enemy and returned to US control at Lai Khe in Binh Duong Province.

24 -- MACV announces initiation of use of artillery based in RVN against military targets in and north of the DMZ.

26 -- First river minefield laid in NVN by TF 77 aircraft.

27 -- Russian made 140mm rockets used for the first time in RVN in an attack on Da Nang AB.

-- Ambassadors of the seven Manila Conference Nations meet in Saigon.

28 -- For the first time radar-guided US jets bomb military sites in the Panhandle and SE of Hanoi.

-- The Mobile Riverine Force (TF 117) activated under command of COMNAVFORV.

-- Operation JUNCTION CITY, Battle of Prek Klok I results in 144 VC KIA; Friendly: 25 KIA, 28 WIA.

MARCH

1 -- US military strength in RVN is 418,000.

3 -- DOD states military court-martial jurisdiction will not apply to newsmen.

5 -- MACV announces new procedure for reporting US casualties for significant actions numerically, instead of as "light, moderate, or heavy."

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7 -- BG W. Pearson, USA, becomes HQ USMACV ACofS for Operations (J3).

-- Elements of the 26th and 27th ROKA Regt launch Operation OH JAC KYO I, a 40-day search-and-destroy operation in Phu Yen Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 23 KIA, 115 WIA; En: 831 KIA, 418 DET, 630 I/W, 29 C/S.)

8 -- First USN river craft for MDMRF arrive in-country.

9 -- President acknowledge US jets based in Thailand are bombing NVA.

10 -- Operation JUNCTION CITY, Battle of Prek Klok II results in 197 VC KIA, 5 DET: Friendly: 1 KIA, 31 WIA.

11 -- White House announces presidential trip to Guam on 19 March for conference with COMUSMACV, CINCPAC and SECDEF.

12 -- US strike pilots fly 575 tactical air strikes over RVN, tying 22 Feb record.

13 -- USG announces agreement with RTG to base B-52s in Thailand.

14 -- A steel hulled trawler intercepted by MARKET TIME units 80 miles SE of Da Nang. After an exchange of fire the trawler beached at Phuc Thien and was destroyed. Large amount of weapons and munitions seized.

15 -- RAAF Caribou and Iroquois aircraft make their first air strike of the war.

-- President Johnson announces AMB Ellsworth Bunker will replace AMB H. C. Lodge in Saigon.

-- Premier Ky announces he, Chief of State Thieu and CJGS Vien will meet with US officials in Guam on 19 March:

16 -- US cargo ship, SS Conqueror, while heading up the Long Tau River hit by six rounds of 75mm RR fire.

18 -- Constituent Assembly votes unanimous final approval of entire constitution.
18 -- Elements of the 9th Inf Div launch Operation KITTY HAWK, a
search-and-destroy operation in Long Khanh Province. This
operation continues into 1968.

19 -- Elements of the 3d Mar Div launch Operation PRAIRIE III, a 30-day
search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tri Province. (LOSSES:
Frd: 55 KIA, 529 WIA; En: 356 KIA, 312 DET, 1 RET, 117 I/W,
11 C/S.)

20 -- Operation JUNCTION CITY, Battle of Bau Bang II results in 227
KIA, 3 DET; Friendly: 3 KIA, 63 WIA.

-- Armed Forces Directorate issues communiqué stating its intention
to accept Constitution as adopted by Constituent Assembly.

-- President Johnson, SECDEF McNamara and CJCS GEN Wheeler
arrive in Guam for talks with Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu.
AMBs Bunker, Komor and Lodge and GEN Westmoreland attend.

-- SEVENTHFLT Special Landing Force launches Operation BEACON
HILL I, an 11-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tri
Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 29 KIA, 230 WIA; En: 334 KIA, 4 DET,
29 I/W, 3 C/S.)

-- MG J. H. Hay, USA; assumes command of the 1st Inf Div.

21 -- Operation JUNCTION CITY, Battle of Suoi Tre results in 654 VC
KIA, 135 I/W, 43 C/S, 580 RPG rockets, 1,900 stick grenades;
Frd: 31 KIA, 187 WIA.

22 -- Elements of the 5th Mar Regt launch Operation NEW CASTLE, a
three-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Nam Province.
(LOSSES: Frd: 5 KIA, 55 WIA; En: 118 KIA, 35 DET, 3 I/W.)

24 -- LTG Jonathan O. Seaman, USA, turns over command of Headquarters,
II FFORCEV to LTG Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA.

26 -- Trip of GEN Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, to US in May announced.

27 -- Armed Forces Council approves draft constitution.
31 -- Phu Cat's new 10,000 foot jet capable airfield opens.

-- Australian destroyer HMAS Hobart joins US Naval Forces off the coast of Vietnam.

-- During the month of March the enemy loses 9,015 killed, and 5,125 returnees, the greatest monthly personnel loss since the war began.

-- Allied personnel KIA during March reaches a new monthly high of 2,155.

APRIL

1 -- Operation JUNCITY, Battle of Ap Gu results in 608 VC KIA, 5 DET, 47 I/W, 6 C/S; Friendly: 11 KIA, 77 WIA.

-- US military strength in RVN is 443,000.

-- MG John J. Tolson, USA, assumes command of the 1st Cav Div (AM), replacing MG John Norton, USA.

-- GVN promulgates new Constitution. Elections for President, VP and Upper House to take place 1 Sep--Lower House on 1 Oct.

2 -- Elements of the 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div terminate Operation ADAMS, a 59-day crop protection and search-and-destroy operation in Phu Yen Province that commenced 25 Oct 66. (LOSSES: Frd: 46 KIA, 278 WIA; En: 491 KIA, 2,046 DET, 33 RET.)

-- First of village and hamlet elections held. Election plan includes 961 villages and 4,578 hamlets.

5 -- Elements of the 4th and 25th Inf Divs launch Operation FRANCIS MARION, a 190-day search-and-destroy operation in Pleiku Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 183 KIA, 843 WIA, 10 MIA; En: 1,203 KIA, 1,092 DET, 11 RET, 299 I/W, 66 C/S.)

6 -- Unknown number of VC attack the Quang Tri Province jail and release 220 prisoners (enemy guerrillas and cadre). (LOSSES: Frd: 99 KIA, 138 WIA; En: 77 KIA.)
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6. -- White House announces assignment of GEN Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., USA, as DEP COMUSMACV.


10. -- USN Hospital Ship Sanctuary (AH-17) arrives at Da Nang.

11. -- First B-52s land at U Tapao, Thailand.

14. -- 196th Inf Bde completes air movement from Tay Ninh Province to Chu Lai. The Bde commanded by BG R. T. Knowles, USA, reported to CG I I MAF and placed under the operational control CG 1st Mar Div.

15. -- GVN announces plan to evacuate 20,000 civilians from area close to DMZ, to allow construction of a fortified barrier.

18. -- 26th and 28th ROKA Regt units launch Operation OH JAC KYO II, a 43-day search-and-destroy operation in Phu Yen Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 21 KIA, 50 WIA; En: 109 KIA, 17 DET, 28 RET, 51 I/W.)

19. -- Eight Australian Canberra (B-57) bombers of Squadron No. 2 arrive at Phan Rang AB to make Australia the second country to support RVN with a tri-service contingent.

-- Prime Minister Ky announces National Reconciliation Program.
20 -- Elements of the 1st, 3d, and 5th Mar Regt launch Operation UNION, a 26-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. (LOSSES: Frd: 110 KIA, 473 WIA; En: 865 KIA, 351 DET, 64 I/W, 8 C/S.)

-- Elements of the 3d Mar Div launch Operation PRAIRIE IV, a 41-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tri Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 164 KIA, 1,240 WIA; En: 489 KIA, 94 DET, 128 I/W, 22 C/S.)

-- CG III MAF assumes operational control of TF OREGON.

-- Seventh Royal Australian Regiment arrives in RVN at Nui Dat.

-- USN aircraft strike inside the ten-mile restricted zone of the port city of Haiphong for the first time. An electric power plant destroyed and the entire city left in darkness.

22 -- CG TF OREGON located at Chu Lai, I CTZ, assumes operational control of 3d Bd., 25th Inf Div and 196th Lt Inf Bde.

-- Elements of the 25th Inf Div launch Operation MANHATTAN, a 46-day search-and-destroy operation in Binh Duong Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 47 KIA, 327 WIA; En: 191 KIA, 370 DET, 28 RET, 614 I/W, 14 C/S.)

-- Elements of the 4th Mar Regt launch Operation SHAWNEE, a 30-day search-and-destroy operation in Thua Thien Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 13 KIA, 139 WIA; En: 128 KIA, 60 DET, 80 I/W.)


-- AMB Ellsworth P. Bunker arrives in Saigon and assumes duties as American Ambassador to RVN, replacing AMB Henry C. Lodge.

26 -- CG 1st Mar Div turns over responsibility for defense of Chu Lai installation to CG TF OREGON.

27 -- RADM Kenneth L. Veth, USN, relieves RADM Norvell G. Ward, USN, as COMNAVFORV and CHNAVADGRP, MACV.
28 -- Special Landing Force launches Operation BEAVER CAGE, a 15-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tin Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 56 KIA, 183 WIA; En: 181 KIA, 66 DET, 10 I/W, 1 C/S.)

-- GEN W. C. Westmoreland addresses joint session of Congress.

29 -- Village elections completed with 984 elections held with an average turnout of 77 percent of registered voters. During elections VC kill 12 candidates and kidnap 31 others.

30 -- USS Gallup (PG-85), first of a new class of high speed, diesel-turbine powered gunboats, arrives CRE for MARKET TIME duty.

MAY

1 -- US military strength in RVN is 460,000.

-- USN planes from TF 77 hit Kep Airfield. First attack against NVN airfields.

-- USAF pilots fly record 625 tactical air sorties in support of war.

2 -- GEN W. C. Westmoreland returns to RVN from US.

3 -- A returnee leads company of the 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div to weapons cache in Binh Duong Province (2,000 rounds 82/60mm mortars, 1,200 grenades, 1,000 rounds of SA ammo, 20 claymore mines, and approximately 400 CHICOM rifles captured).

-- USS Gallup, a new design patrol gunboat, begins MARKET TIME patrols.

4 -- GEN Creighton W. Abrams, USA, and AMB Robert Komer arrive in Saigon to take up duties as DEPCOMUSMACV and DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS, respectively.

5 -- USMC BLT 2/3 takes Hill 881 near Khe Sanh.

6 -- 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div released from I FFORCEVs operational control and assigned III MAFs operational control.
10 -- Kien Airdfield, 5-1/2 miles SW of Haiphong hit for first time.


11 -- Eight-foot center section of Soviet air-to-air missile found by Marine unit Quang Tri Province.

-- AMB Bunker announces RD field programs will be under COMUSMACV.

12 -- Prime Minister Ky announces his candidacy for President.

13 -- Seven MiG-17s downed over NVN by USAF pilots.

-- First increment of New Zealand infantrymen arrive in RVN at Nui Dat and are placed under operational control of ATF.

-- Elements of 26th Mar Regt launch Operation CROCKET, a 64-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tri Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 52 KIA, 255 WIA; En: 206 KIA, 5 DET, 23 I/W, 3 C/S.)

-- Elements of 25th Inf Div launch Operation KOLE KOLE, a 208-day search-and-destroy operation in Hau Nghia Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 92 KIA, 640 WIA, 12 I/W; En: 645 KIA, 1,232 DET, 30 RET, 286 I/W, 5 C/S.)

14 -- Three MiG-17s downed over NVN by USAF pilots. Two-day total of ten (13-14 May 67) is record for 48-hour period in Vietnam war.

-- Units of the 2d Bde, 27th Inf Div terminate Operation ALA MOANA, a 165-day search-and-destroy operation in Hau Nghia Province which commenced 30 Nov 66. (LOSSES: Frd: 47 KIA, 158 WIA; En: 382 KIA, 666 DET, 93 I/W, 5 C/S.)

-- Hamlet elections (to last five weeks) begin in 4,612 out of a total estimated 12,000 hamlets in RVN.

16 -- Air Commodore J. F. Lush, OBE, RAAF, assumes command of RAAF elements in RVN.
I

Constituent Assembly approves presidential election law.

- Elements of 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div Launch Operation BARKING SANDS, a 204-day search-and-destroy operation in Binh Duong Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 152 KIA, 1,060 WIA, 4 I/W, 1 C/S; En: 304 KIA, 2,036 DET, 5 RET, 209 I/W, 18 C/S.)

17 - Units of the 9th Mar Regt launch Operation HICKORY, an 11-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tri Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 119 KIA, 817 WIA; En: 367 KIA, 36 DET, 86 I/W, 22 C/S.)

- VNN PCE 12 begins MARKET TIME patrols in the Second Coastal Zone.

- Elements of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div launch Operation DIAMOND HEAD, a 204-day search-and-destroy operation in Binh Duong Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 80 KIA, 605 WIA; En: 237 KIA, 499 DET, 4 RET, 102 I/W, 2 C/S.)

18 - Units of Operation HICKORY/BEAU CHARGER enter southern portion of DMZ. First US entry into DMZ in force.

- 2d Bde, ROKMC launches Operation THUNDER DRAGON, a nine-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Ngai Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 15 KIA (1 USMC), 45 WIA; En: 147 KIA, 6 DET, 7 I/W, 2 C/S.)

19 - GEN Creighton W. Abrams, USA, assumes duties as DEFCOMUSMACV.

- NGFS forces concentrate at DMZ: USS St Paul, Boston, A. M. Summer, Joseph Strauss, Flechteler, and HMAS Hobart.

20 - First 0-2 aircraft, twin engine Cessna successor to the 0-1 "Birddog" FAC aircraft, arrives in-country at Nha Trang.

23 - 24-hour Allied stand-down for Buddha's birthday. No incidents.

25 - Elements of the 5th Mar Regt launch Operation UNION II, an 11-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. (LOSSES: Frd: 110 KIA, 41 WIA; En: 701 KIA, 40 DET, 19 I/W, 12 C/S.)
28 -- All field functions in pacification and nation building combined under COMUSMACV with the merger of the Civil Operations Office (AMEMB) and the Revolutionary Development Directorate (MACV) into CORDS.

-- BG William A. Knowlton, USA, assumes duties as Dep ACofS for CORDS.

-- Mr. L. Wade Lathram assumes duties as ACofS for CORDS.

-- AMB Robert W. Kömer, assumes duties as DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS.

31 -- 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div launches Operation HOP TAC, a search-and-destroy operation in Dinh Tuong Province. This operation continues into 1968.

-- Elements of the 3d, 4th, 9th, and 40th Mar Regts launch Operation CIMARRON, a 32-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tri Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 38 KIA, 470 WIA; En: 245 KIA, 176 DET, 58 I/W, 10 C/S.)

JUNE

1 -- MG Robert C. Cushman, USMC, relieves LTG Lewis W. Walt, USMC, as CG III MAF and CG I CTZ at Da Nang.

-- US military strength in RVN is 484,000.

-- BG Phillip B. Davidson Jr., USA, assumes duty as ACofS for Intelligence J2.

-- First F-5 Freedom Fighter jets turned over to VNAF.

-- Elements of 2d Bde, 9th Inf Div and TF 117 launch Operation CORONADO, a 54-day search-and-destroy operation in Dinh Tuong Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 40 KIA, 173 WIA, 4 I/W, 1 C/S; En: 478 KIA, 526 DET, 75 RET, 52 I/W, 5 C/S.)

5 -- 28th ROKA Regt launches Operation MATU II, a 15-day search-and-destroy operation in Phu Yen Province. (LOSSES: Frd: light; En: 139 KIA, 12 DET, 78 I/W, 12 C/S.)
7 -- Elements of 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div launch Operation MALHEUR II, a 56-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Ngai Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 30 KIA, 260 WIA, 4 I/W, 1 C/S; En: 488 KIA, 589 DET, 6 RET, 141 I/W, 7 C/S.)

12 -- Elements of the 1st Inf Div launch Operation BILLINGS, a 14-day search-and-destroy operation in Binh Long, Phuoc Long and Binh Duong Provinces. (LOSSES: Frd: 45 KIA, 201 WIA; En: 347 KIA, 2 DET, 4 I/W, 4 C/S.)


20 -- MG George I. Forsythe, USA, assumes duties as Asst Dep for CORDS.

29 -- VC detonate mine against side of USS Coconino County, offloading cargo at Cua Viet LST Ramp.

--- Premier Nguyen Cao Ky withdraws from presidential race to seek the number two place on a ticket headed by Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu.

JULY

1 -- US military strength in RVN is 482,000.

--- LTG F. C. Weyand, USA, assumes command as CG II FFORCEN, relieving LTG B. Palmer, Jr., USA.

2 -- Elements of 3d Mar Div launch Operation BUFFALO, a 12-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tri Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 159 KIA, 885 WIA, 1 MIA; En: 1,281 KIA, 14 DET, 79 I/W, 20 C/S.)

5 -- MG Don O. Darrow, USAF, designated ACofS for Plans J5.
6 -- B-52s set record of eight strikes in a 24-hour period.

-- Hanoi radio announces death of four star NVA General Nguyen Chi Thanh, reputed to be in charge of VC operations in RVN.

7 -- Elements of 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, launch Operation MALHEUR II, a 56-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Ngai Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 30 KIA, 260 WIA, 4 I/W, 1 C/S; En: 488 KIA, 589 DET, 6 RET, 141 I/W, 7 C/S.)

-- SECDEF McNamara, Under SECSTATE Katzenbach and CJCS Wheeler arrive in RVN for four-day visit.

8 -- ROK units launch Operation HONG KIL DONG, a 49-day search-and-destroy operation in Phu Yen Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 27 KIA, 68 WIA; En: 638 KIA, 184 DET, 34 RET, 359 I/W, 94 C/S.)


-- VC terrorists detonate claymore mine at Capital BEQ in Saigon, and scattered sniper fire breaks out after explosion (2 civs killed, 17 US WIA, 19 civs wounded).

10 -- GEN W. C. Westmoreland departs on 13-day visit to US; GEN Creighton W. Abrams assumes temporary command.

11 -- Newport marine terminal (Saigon) officially opens.

13 -- SECDEF and COMUSMACV meet with President at the White House, and announce troop increase for RVN. Precise figures not announced.

14 -- Unknown number of VC attacks Hoi An in Quang Nam Province and Hoi An Prison. (LOSSES: Frd: 4 RF KIA, 1 NP KIA, 4 civs killed, 6 RF WIA, 5 NP WIA, 29 civs wounded; En: 5 KIA, 6 I/W; escapees: 30 killed, 206 recaptured, 960 escape.)

15 -- Unknown number of VC attacks Da Nang AB in Quang Nam Province with estimated 50 rounds of suspected 122mm rockets. West runway cratered, east runway open. (LOSSES: Frd: 8 USAF KIA, 138 USAF WIA, 37 USMC WIA, 10 aircraft destroyed, 41 aircraft
damaged, 1 bomb jump destroyed, 13 barracks destroyed.)

15 -- Units of TF 115 intercept and beach NVN trawler as it attempts to land at Cape Batangan. (LOSSES: Frd: 44 ROK KIA, 6 ROK WIA; En: 23 KIA, 1,169 I/W, 23 C/S, 394,560 rounds of 7.62mm incendiary, 311,520 rounds of 7.62mm ball, 1,960 antipersonnel mines, 1,734 hand grenades, 5,750 rounds of 12.7mm ammo, 43 rounds of B-40 rockets, 996 rounds of 82mm mortars, 6,880 lbs of C-4 plastic explosives, 5,148 lbs of TNT, 900 non-electric detonators, 444 electric detonators.)

-- LTC Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA, officially opens the new USARV HQ at Long Binh.


17 -- Elements of 3d Mar Div launch Operation ARDMORE, a 106-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tri Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 10 KIA, 39 WIA; En: 113 KIA, 6 DET, 9 I/W, 1 C/S.)

18 -- National Assembly disqualifies 7 of 18 presidential candidates.

20 -- CVN ceases censorship of Vietnamese press.

-- COMCOSURVFOR (CTF 115) moves from Saigon to CRB.

23 -- GEN W. C. Westmoreland returns to RVN and resumes command of USMACV.

24 -- GEN Maxwell D. Taylor visits Vietnam; confers with RVN leaders.

27 -- Elements of 9th Inf Div and 25th Inf Div and ARVN units launch joint Operation CORONADO II/SONG THANG III, a seven-day search-and-destroy operation in Dinh Tuong Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 10 US KIA, 61 ARVN KIA, 65 US WIA, 220 ARVN WIA; En: 441 KIA, 780 DET, 1 RET, 33 I/W, 8 C/S.)

29 -- MACV staff begins relocation to new headquarters near TSN.

-- GEN Harold K. Johnson, Army CoS, arrives in RVN on routine visit to Army units.
UNCLASSIFIED

29 -- Fuel from ruptured aircraft tank ignites on after flight deck of USS Forrestal in Gulf of Tonkin (131 KIA, 62 WIA, 3 MIA, 26 aircraft destroyed, 42 aircraft damaged).

31 -- LTG William B. Rossen, USA, assumes command of I FFORCEV, relieving LTG Stanley R. Larsen, USA.

-- Elements of 1st Mar Div launch Operation PIKE, a three-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tin and Quang Nam Provinces. (LOSSES: Frd: 8 KIA, 60 WIA; En: 100 KIA, 58 DET, 4 I/W.)

AUGUST

1 -- US military strength in RVN is 485,000.

-- The 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div, redesignated 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, at Dau Tieng in Binh Dinh Province. At the same time, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, redesignated 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div.

-- SS Bienville arrives in Da Nang, inaugurating containership service in RVN.

-- 3d Naval Construction Brigade HQ shifts from Saigon to Da Nang.

-- The Army's Falcon Combat Aviation Group, activated at An Son 17 miles NW of Qui Nhon in Binh Dinh Province under sponsorship of 1st Avn Bde, becomes the third headquarters command group of its kind in RVN.

-- DOD announces USS New Jersey (BB-62) to be recommissioned.

-- NAVCOMSTA CRB is commissioned and becomes principal Navy relay station in RVN, providing multichannel and fleet broadcast service to SEVENTHFLT units.

-- A-37, the first light attack counterinsurgency aircraft, arrives in RVN at Bien Hoa AB, for combat evaluation.

3 -- White House announces 45,000-man increase in personnel for RVN.
3 -- RVN presidential campaign opens.

-- Unknown number enemy attacks NSA detachment, Nha Be, and POL tank farm (24 USN WIA, 6 USA WIA, 1 USAF WIA, 3 VNN WIA, 44 civs wounded, 8 RF WIA, 1,000 55-gal drums of mogas destroyed, 5,000 55-gal drums of mogas damaged, 1 PBR and 1 MSB destroyed, 2 PBRs and 2 MSBs damaged).

4 -- The MACV Command Center moves from MACV I to new HQ at TSN.

6 -- BG Franklin M. Davis, Jr., USA, assumes duties as ACoS for Personnel, MACJ1 and CG, US Army Element, USMACV.

-- General Wallace M. Greene, USMC, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps arrives in RVN for a routine visit to USMC/USN units.

7 -- Two enemy companies overrun 16th VNN Coastal Group Base Camp in Quang Ngai Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 1 US KIA, 14 VNN KIA, 3 civs killed, 2 US WIA, 35 VNN WIA, 1 VNN MIA, 2 I/W, 7 C/S, 1-1/4-ton truck, fuel dump, and all but one building within compound destroyed; En: 11 KIA.)

11 -- Elements of the 1st Mar Div launch Operation COCHISE, an 18-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. (LOSSES: Frd: 10 KIA, 93 WIA; En: 156 KIA, 138 DET, 41 I/W.)

-- US planes bomb Hanoi's Doumer Bridge, the first air strike on Hanoi in two months.

13 -- Elements of the 101st Abn Bde and 196th Lt Inf Bde, launch Operation BENTON, a 21-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tin Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 41 KIA, 263 WIA; En: 397 KIA, 9 DET, 150 I/W, 8 C/S.)

-- BG Winant Sidle, USA, is appointed Chief of Office of Information, USMACV, relieving COL Roger R. Bankson, USA.

-- The USAF reveals officially, for the first time, that American war planes have been bombing communist targets in Laos since May 1964.
13 -- US planes bomb railroad yard and bridge ten miles from Red Chinese border and hit two other nearby rail centers in the closest American raids to China since the Korean War.

15 -- Premier Ky confirms the General Thang will be appointed CofS JGS (Deputy to General Vien) and Cmdr RF/PF.

17 -- Combination tear-nausea gas dropped from Marine helicopter gunships for first time in RVN.

-- GEN Omar N. Bradley, General of the Army, arrives in RVN for 13 day orientation visit.

18 -- Coastal Squadron THREE (PGs) commissioned at CRB.

19 -- US planes fly one-day record of 209 missions over NVN.

20 -- Elements of 9th Inf Div launch Operation CORONADO IV, a 20-day search-and-destroy operation in Long An Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 3 KIA, 27 WIA, 1 helicopter damaged, 1 I/W; En: 101 KIA, 148 DET, 165 I/W, 15 C/S.)

21 -- Six US jets lost over NVN, a record number for a single raid.

26 -- 16 US jets downed over NVN in seven days, a record number for a one-week period.

28 -- Elements participating in Operation KINGFISHER at Gio Linh in Quang Tri Province receive artillery airbursts. First time enemy employs airburst shells.

-- US Observer Team of 22 prominent persons, headed by former AMB Lodge, arrives to observe RVN elections at invitation of GVN.

29 -- MG Yose Devhasdin assumes command of RTFV.

SEPTEMBER

1 -- US military strength in RVN is 492,000.
3 -- National elections for President, Vice-President and Upper House of the GVN. Eighty three percent of the registered voters participate. Thieu elected President; Ky Vice-President.

4 -- Elements of the 1/5 Mar launch Operation SWIFT, an 11-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. (LOSSES: Frd: 127 KIA, 352 WIA; En: 517 KIA, 66 DET, 70 I/W, 15 C/S.)

5 -- Elements of 2d Bde ROKMC launch Operation DRAGON FIRE, a 55-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Ngai Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 46 ROK KIA, 2 US WIA, 200 ROK WIA; En: 541 KIA, 138 DET, 38 I/W, 7 C/S.)

7 -- SECDEF announces decision to construct a wire and electronic barrier across RVN south of DMZ.

9 -- Phantom Combat Aviation Battalion (Provisional) is activated at Soc Trang Army Airfield in Ba Xuyen Province.


10 -- NVN port of Cam Pha bombed by US war planes for first time.

11 -- Elements of TF OREGON launch Operation WHEELER, a 61-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tin Province (combined with WALLOWA to become WHEELER/WALLOWA on 11 Nov 67).

12 -- Operation NEUTRALIZE, a 41-day coordinated massive air operation to neutralize the threat to Dong Ha, Gio Linh, Camp Carroll, and Con Thien originating from the area in and near the DMZ, is initiated.

-- Elements of 9th Inf Div and TF 117 launch Operation CORONADO V, a 26-day search-and-destroy operation in Dinh Tuong Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 35 KIA, 175 WIA; En: 330 KIA, 253 DET, 1 RET, 16 I/W, 2 C/S.)
15 -- MRF forces run into large enemy force in Ba Rai Creek, Dinh Tuong Province during Operation CORONADO V. 18 boats damaged. 3/47 Inf Bn, 9th In Div engages enemy who suffer 213 KIA.

18 -- COMUSMACV assumes operation control of USAHAC. CG USARV will exercise command, less operational control, of USAHAC.

-- Official results of Upper House (Senate) elections announced.

19 -- Elements of 173d Abn Bde and 1st Cav Div launch Operation BOLLING, a search-and-destroy operation in Phu Yen Province. This operation continues into 1968.

-- Enemy terrorists detonate 20-30 lbs of explosives contained in a suitcase in the passport office of the Embassy of the Republic of China in Saigon. Sniper fire is simultaneously received. (LOSSES: Frd: 1 civ killed, 26 civs wounded, one-third Embassy building destroyed; En: 3 DET.)

20 -- First Armored Support Patrol Base (ASPB) arrive at Vung Tau to augment MDMRF.

21 -- A 2,300-man Queen's Cobra Regt of the Royal Thai Army arrives at Saigon's Newport (to be stationed at Bear Cat).

-- Gunship II, a modified C-130A configuration, designed to replace the older AC-47 for an improved aerial fire support role, arrives in-country at Nha Trang for evaluation.

22 -- TF OREGON is redesignated Americal Division.

23 -- Official communique from Moscow announces signing of USSR/NVN military assistance agreement whereby the USSR will furnish "airplanes, antiaircraft and rocket equipment, artillery and small arms, ammunition and other military equipment. . . ."

26 -- HMAS Perth joins NGFS replacing HMAS Hobart, to become the second Australian ship to operate with SEVENTHFLT.

28 -- Militant Buddhist leader Thich Tri Quang starts 13-day vigil in front of Independence Palace.
29 -- Elements of 1st Inf Div launch Operation SHENANDOAH II, a 51-day search-and-destroy operation in Binh Duong Province (LOSSES: Frd: 107 KIA, 322 WIA, 4 APCs destroyed; En: 956 KIA, 63 DET, 2 RET, 71 I/W, 30 C/S.)

-- The office of the ACofS for Military Assistance is established as a result of the study of MACV Military Assistance and Advisory Resources.

-- President Johnson outlines terms for peace negotiations in a speech in San Antonio, which becomes labeled the 'San Antonio Formula'.

-- New American Embassy Chancery dedicated in Saigon.

OCTOBER

1 -- US military strength in RVN is 476,000.

2 -- The 3d Bde of the 1st Cav deploys to Chu Lai and commences operations in Quang Tin and Quang Nam Provinces as a part of the American Division.

-- National Assembly validates presidential election shortly before midnight deadline.

4 -- Elements of the 3d Bde, 1st ACD, launch Operation WALLOWA, a 37-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces (became WHEELER/WALLOWA on 11 November). This operation continues into 1968.

-- Sydney, Australia becomes R&R Center.

6 -- RVN Lower House election campaign begins.

8 -- The new Huey Cobra, designed especially for ground support in RVN, is used for the first time in a combat operation.

-- First air attack, conducted by aircraft from the carrier Constellation on the MIG capable Cat Bi Airfield, four miles SE of Haiphong.
11 -- Chief of State Thieu officiates at the installation of the new 60-seat Senate.

12 -- Elements of the 4th Inf Div launch Operation MAC ARTHUR (combination of Operation FRANCIS MARION and GREELEY), a search-and-destroy operation in Pleiku Province. This operation continues into 1968.

17 -- Australia and New Zealand announce troop increases for RVN from 6,300 to 8,000 and 376 to 546, respectively.

22 -- The 3/503 US Abn Inf arrives in RVN at Qui Nhon in Binh Dinh Province with their base camp located at Camp Radcliff in Binh Dinh Province.

-- A total of 72.9 percent of registered voters turn out for Lower House elections.

23 -- First C-130 lands at Quang Tri Airfield, eight days ahead of scheduled operational date.

24 -- US Air Force, Marine, and Navy jets, in a coordinated raid, bomb Phu Yen Airfield, the control center for enemy air defense, 18 miles NW of Hanoi, for the first time in the war. Ten MiG aircraft destroyed--nine on the ground, one in the air--and one other probable kill listed in addition to extensive damage to the air complex.

-- General Thieu signs decree calling for partial mobilization of the nation's human and national resources.

25 -- Prime Minister Ky signs implementing order for conscription of men between ages of 18 and 33.

-- BG D. P. Bolton, USA, assigned as ACoS for MACV, MA.

-- Operation SEA DRAGON marks first year. Over 2,000 WBLC destroyed thus far.

28 -- The 7/17 Air Cav arrives at Qui Nhon aboard USNS Walker and sets up base camp at Camp Enari in Binh Dinh Province under the OPCON of 4th Inf Div.
29 -- RTG announced its force in RVN will be boosted by a full army brigade to 12,000 men.

-- First NVN firing of SAMs at US B52s (near DMZ).

30 -- VP Humphrey arrives in RVN for presidential inauguration and tour of the country.

31 -- Newly elected President Thieu and Vic President Ky are inaugurated; the Directorate is dissolved. The new Lower House is installed and the Constituent Assembly passes out of existence. President Thieu appoints Nguyen Van Loc as Prime Minister.

-- Enemy terrorists mortar Presidential Palace in Saigon with four rounds of 60mm mortar fire. (LOSSES: Frd: l civ killed, 2 civs wounded, 1 building minor damage; En: 1 KIA.)

NOVEMBER

1 -- US military strength in RVN is 487,000.

-- Elements of the 3d Mar Div launch Operation NEOSHO, a search-and-destroy operation in Thua Thien Province. This operation continues into 1968.

-- Elements of the 3d Mar Div launch Operation KENTUCKY, a search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tri Province. This operation continues into 1968.

-- Elements of the 3d Mar Div launch Operation SCOTLAND, a search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tri Province. This operation continues into 1968.

-- As a result of the efforts of the U.S. Naval Advisory Group, four Vietnamese Navy (VNN) Fleet Command ships relieved U.S. units in four coastal patrol areas in the most significant integration of the VNN into Operation MARKET TIME to date.

-- Elements of the 3d Mar Div launch Operation LANCASTER, a search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tri Province. This operation continues into 1968.
2 -- Elements of the 9th Inf Div launch Operation CORONADO IX, a search-and-destroy operation in Dinh Tuong Province. This operation continues into 1968.

-- Elements of the 9th Inf Div launch Operation SANTE FE I, a 64-day search-and-destroy operation in Long Khanh and Binh Tuy Provinces. (LOSSES: Frd: 2 US KIA, 3 AUS KIA, 1 ARVN KIA, 13 US WIA, 9 AUS WIA, 13 ARVN WIA, 2 tanks, 1 Rome Plow, and 2 trucks destroyed; En: 126 KIA--34 by ATF, 6 by ARVN, 86 by US; 32 DET--8 by ATF, 24 by US; 119 I/W--52 by ATF, 48 by ARVN, 19 US; 20 C/S--18 by ARVN, 2 by US.)

3 -- FSB of 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div, 40 km NNE Ban Me Thuot, Daklak Province, receives mortar and ground attack. Battle of Dak To commences in Operation MAC ARTHUR area.

4 -- A shore-based VNMC Bn, at Binh Duc Airfield near My Tho in Dinh Tuong Province, begins participation in Mobile Riverine Force operations.

6 -- Estimated enemy company kidnaps 245 Montagnard civilians, nine km W of An Khe in Binh Dinh Province (1 civ. killed, 245 civs kidnapped).

8 -- The ten-day battle of Loc Ninh, which commenced 29 Oct, terminates. (LOSSES: Frd: 29 US KIA, 21 ARVN KIA, 123 US WIA, 111 ARVN WIA; En: 851 KIA, 15 DET.)

9 -- Prime Minister Loc's cabinet installed in office.

11 -- Elements of the Americal Division launch Operation WHEELEP/ WALLOWA, a search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tin Province. This operation continues into 1968.

-- Admiral Ulysses S.G. SHARP, USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific arrives in RVN for up-date briefings on military activities in Vietnam.

-- NLF turns three NCO PW's over to US "peace group" representative in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

13 -- Elements of the 7th Mar launch Operation FOSTER, a 17-day search-and-destroy operation in Quang Nam Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 21 KIA, 137 WIA; En: 125 KIA, 79 DET, 10 I/W, 2 C/S.)
14 -- MG Bruno Hochmuth, USMC, Commander of the 3d Mar Div, is killed in a helicopter explosion near Dong Ha in Quang Tri Province. MG Rathvon McC. Tompkins, USMC, is named as his replacement.

15 -- GEN Westmoreland and AMB Bunker fly to Washington, D.C. for talks.

16 -- Hanoi Shipyard No. 2 bombed by jets from USS Coral Sea. First time any Hanoi shipyard has been hit.

17 -- Elements of the 199th Lt Inf Bde launch Operation STRIKE/UNIONTOWN, a 30-day search-and-destroy operation in Bien Hoa Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 34 KIA, 127 WIA; En: 100 KIA, 8 DET, 7 1/W, 1 C/S.)

-- RADM William H. House, USN, assumes the duties of and becomes first Deputy Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam.

18 -- Korean civilian workers at CRB start two day riot over working conditions.

-- SS Buchanan attacked and hit 19 times by RR and MG fire on Long Tau shipping channel 12 miles northwest of Vung Tau. No US casualties. Reaction forces kill 16 VC.

19 -- Two US correspondents release details and photos of a VC campsite, four miles inside Cambodia, discovered by them. Prince Sihanouk later labels story fabrication.

23 -- Battle of Dak To, Hill 875 taken. (LOSSES: Frd: 325 KIA, 1,137 WIA; En: 1,243 KIA.)

26 -- B-52s strike area just north of Mu Gia Pass, deepest B-52 penetration of NVN yet.

29 -- President Johnson announces SECDEF McNamara will resign to head World Bank.

DECEMBER

1 -- US military strength in RVN is 480,000.
1 -- Elements of the 101st Abn Bde launch Operation Klamath Falls, a 38-day search-and-destroy operation in Lam Dong, Binh Thuan and Binh Tuy Provinces. (LOSSES: Frd: 28 KIA, 138 WIA; En: 156 KIA, 11 DET, 74 I/W, 3 C/S.)

2 -- PBR Mobile Base I arrives at Da Nang (ten PBRs follow on 5 December). Second time PBRs have been located in I CTZ.

4 -- A squadron of 14 A7A, the new Corsair II aircraft, join the Vietnam conflict for the first time in a bombing raid over NVN.

-- USN Patrol Air Cushion Vehicles (PACV) return to Vietnam as part of TF 117 (Mekong Delta Mobile Riverine Force). (These vehicles were previously in RVN in 1966 as part of TF 115, Coastal Surveillance Force (Operation Market Time).)

-- In its first major battle since becoming an integral part of the U.S. Army/Navy Mobile Riverine Force, the 5th VNMC Battalion killed 234 Viet Cong and captured 8 prisoners in a single day of CORONADO IX operations in Dinh Tuong and Kien Phong Provinces. VNMC losses: 40 KIA, 103 WIA.

5 -- Unknown number of enemy, supported by 82mm mortar fire, attacks Dak Son Village, two km NE of Song Be in Phuoc Long Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 2 RF KIA, 4 RD killed, 108 civs killed, 3 RF WIA, 1 Sector Recon WIA, 4 RD wounded, 151 civs wounded, 400 civs missing, 1,382 refugees, 9 I/W; En: 5 KIA, 2 I/W.)

-- Official fixed-wing aircraft losses due to hostile action in RVN are 974; 759 of these occurred over NVN. Fixed-wing aircraft lost to none-hostile actions total 841. Official helicopter losses due to hostile action in RVN are 439; eight of these over NVN. Helicopters lost to non-hostile action total 749.

-- The Constituent Assembly is formally disbanded after the convening of the first National Legislative Assembly.

8 -- The 3d Bde, TF, 101st ABn Div arrives in RVN.

11 -- Mark II PBR combat patrols commence.
11 - Senator C. H. Percy (R-Ill) caught in VC fire at Dak Song (III CTZ) and evacuated to Song Be, while on inspection trip.

13 - The command elements of the US Army's 101st Abn Div, commanded by MG O. M. Barsanti, USA, arrive in RVN in the largest and longest aerial troop deployment in the history of modern warfare. US troop strength in RVN surpasses number in Korean War.

16 -- President Thieu, at Bien Hoa, rules out acceptance of coalition government that includes NLF.

-- Elements of the 199th Lt Inf Bde terminate Operation FAIRFAX, a 381-day search-and-destroy operation in Gia Dinh and Long An Provinces, which commenced on 30 Nov 66. (LOSSES: Frd: 118 KIA, 725 WIA, 30 I/W, 2 C/S; En: 1,043 KIA, 2,529 DET, 40 RET, 321 I/W, 5 C/S.)

17 -- Elements of the 25th Inf Div Launch Operation CAMDEN, a 14-day search-and-destroy operation in Hau Nghia Province. (LOSSES: Frd: 25 KIA, 118 WIA, 1 C/S; En: 101 KIA, 26 DET, 1 RET, 22 I/W, 2 C/S.)

20 -- The 100th and 101st MIG of the war downed near Hanoi.

-- Three SAMs fired at B-52 near DMZ.

21 -- Pan American World Airways indigenous employees go on strike for 30 percent wage increase.

-- The SS Seatrain Texas is mined at anchor in Nha Be River, 15 km SE of Saigon. Proceeds under own power to Saigon.

22 -- Air America indigenous employees strike for 40 percent wage increase.

-- LTG W. Momyer, COMUSAFAV and CG 7AF promoted to General.

23 -- President Johnson makes a brief Christmas visit to US troops at CRB.
24 -- A 24-hour Christmas stand-down is observed from 241800H to 251800H. (At the end of the truce period a total of 46 major incidents; i.e., casualties, and 78 minor incidents recorded.)

-- The 11th Lt Inf Bde arrives at Duc Pho in Quang Tin Province; joins the Americal Division for future operations in I CTZ.

27 -- The 3d Bn, RAA arrives at Nui Dat, eight km NNE of Phuoc Le in Phuoc Tuy Province from HMAS Sydney lying off Vung Tau.

31 -- A 36-hour New Year's stand-down is observed from 311800H Dec 67 to 020600H Jan 68. (At the end of the truce period a total of 63 major incidents; i.e., casualties, and 107 minor incidents recorded.)

-- Total Chieu Hoi returnees for year is 27,178 (compared to 20,242 in 1966, a 34.2 percent increase).

-- End-of-year US military strength is 486,000 (320,000 USA; 31,000 USN; 78,000 USMC; 56,000 USAF; 1,200 USCG). End-of-year I WMA forces strength is: Australia--6,812; Korea--48,739; New Zealand--516; Philippines--2,020; Thailand--2,205.

-- At end-of-year US casualties since 1 January 1961 are KIA: 16,106; WIA: 100,830; MIA 584; PWs: 231.
### ANNEX L--GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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**CLASSES OF SUPPLY**

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UBA United Buddhist Association
UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice
UPI United Press International
UDT Underwater Demolition Team
UE Unit Equipment
UK United Kingdom
UKEMB United Kingdom Embassy
US United States
USA United States Army
USAAD United States Army Advisory Detachment
USAAG United States Army Advisory Group
USAF United States Air Force
USAHAC United States Army Headquarters Area Command
USAID United States Agency for International Development
(United States Operations Mission, USOM, prior to 1966)
USAIR A United States Air Attache
USARMA United States Army Attache
USAMC United States Army Materiel Command
USARJ United States Army Japan
USARPAC United States Army Pacific
USARPAV US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam
USASF United States Army Special Forces
USCG United States Coast Guard
USCGC United States Coast Guard Cutter
USD Unattended Seismic Detector
USDAO United States Defense Attache Office
USFY United States Forces, Japan
USFK United States Forces, Korea
USG United States Government
USIA United States Intelligence Agency
USIS United States Information Service
USMACTHAI United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand
USMACV United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
USNAVFORV United States Naval Forces, Vietnam
USNS United States Navy Ship
USO United Services Organization
USOM United States Overseas Mission
USPOL US Petroleum Oil Lubricants
UNCLASSIFIED

USTDC United States Taiwan Defense Command
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
VAMP Vietnamese Ammunition Monthly Program
VBF Vietnamese Buddhist Forces
VC Viet Cong
VCI Viet Cong Infrastructure
VFM Vice Foreign Ministers
VIP Very Important Person
VIS Vietnamese Information Service
VMAC Vietnamese Military Airlift Command
VN Vietnam or Vietnamese
VNAF Republic of Vietnam Air Force
VNMC Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN Republic of Vietnam Navy
VNMA Vietnamese National Military Academy
VNNQDD Vietnamese Nationalist Group
VNRS Vietnamese National Railway System
VP Patrol Squadron
VR Visual Reconnaissance
VT Variable Time
VTP Vietnamese Telecommunications Patrol
WAAPM Wide Area Antipersonnel Mine
WBLC Waterborne Logistic Craft
WESTPAC Western Pacific (CINCPAC area of responsibility west of 160°E)
WHEC USCG High Endurance Cutter
WIA Wounded in Action
WPB Coast Guard Patrol Boat
WZ War Zone
YFNB Large Covered Lighter (Repair Barge)
YOG Yard Oiler
YR Repair Barge
YTB Large Harbor Tugs
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