HISTORY OF THE SECOND ARMY

Study No. 16

Historical Section . Army Ground Forces

1946

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The Army Ground Forces

HISTORY OF THE SECOND ARMY
Study No. 16

By
Major Bell I. Wiley
and
Capt. William P. Govan

Historical Section - Army Ground Forces
1946
SUBJECT: Studies in the History of Army Ground Forces

TO: All Interested Agencies

1. The history of the Army Ground Forces as a command was prepared during the course of the war and completed immediately thereafter. The studies prepared in Headquarters Army Ground Forces, were written by professional historians, three of whom served as commissioned officers, and one as a civilian. The histories of the subordinate commands were prepared by historical officers, who except in Second Army, acted as such in addition to other duties.

2. From the first, the history was designed primarily for the Army. Its object is to give an account of what was done from the point of view of the command preparing the history, including a candid, and factual account of difficulties, mistakes recognized as such, the means by which, in the opinion of those concerned, they might have been avoided, the measures used to overcome them, and the effectiveness of such measures. The history is not intended to be laudatory.

3. The history of the Army Ground Forces is composed of monographs on the subjects selected, and of two volumes in which an overall history is presented. A separate volume is devoted to the activities of each of the major subordinate commands.

4. In order that the studies may be made available to interested agencies at the earliest possible date, they are being reproduced and distributed in manuscript form. As such they must be regarded as drafts subject to final editing and revision. Persons finding errors of fact or important omissions are encouraged to communicate with the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Attention: Historical Section, in order that corrections may be made prior to publication in printed form by the War Department.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:

[Signature]

J. L. TARR
Colonel, AGD
Acting Ground Adj General

1 Incl:
Historical Study
Lt Gen Ben Lear
Headquarters, Second Army, Memphis, Tennessee

Headquarters, Second Army
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PREFATORY NOTE

The preparation of this History of the Second Army began on 19 December 1942 with the appointment of Capt. Donald J. Reid, Assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, as Historical Officer, in accordance with directives from the War Department and Army Ground Forces. After exploratory research and the preparation of an outline Captain Reid was sent to the Command and General Staff School. His work had demonstrated that an adequate history would require the full time of a qualified officer for a considerable period.

Since no such officer was available in Headquarters, Second Army,rell I. Wiley, Professor of History in the University of Mississippi, was commissioned as first lieutenant on 19 March 1943 and assigned to Headquarters, Second Army, for this purpose. Lieutenant (later Major) Wiley continued the work started by Captain Reid and prepared an initial draft for submission to Army Ground Forces. Upon the completion of this draft Lieutenant Wiley was ordered to the Ground Historical Section and was succeeded as Historical Officer, Second Army, by 2d Lt. Thomas P. Govan on 24 September 1943.

Lieutenant Govan, following the directives of the Ground Historical Section, completed the history on 1 July 1944. During most of the time Lieutenants Wiley and Govan were ably assisted by Sgt. Forrest C. Pogue, a trained and qualified historian.

The narrative briefly covers the history of Second Army from its date of activation on 9 August 1942 until the separation of Headquarters, Second Army, and Headquarters, Sixth Corps Area, at midnight, 18-19 October 1940. Its chief concern, however, has been with the administrative history of Second Army under General Headquarters (GHQ) and Army Ground Forces, and its contribution to the training of an adequate army for the effective defeat of the enemies of the United States from October 1940 to June 1944.

The history has been divided into two parts, the first covering the period before Pearl Harbor and the beginning of the war, and the second describing the period after Pearl Harbor. The activities of the Second Army were so diverse that any division is to some extent artificial, but the beginning of war seems to be the most natural place for a break which is necessary for a unified narrative.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, has been charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the history and has exercised continuous supervision.
PART ONE

1940 - 1941
Chapter 1

ACTIVATION

An army, according to Field Manual 100-15, "is the largest self-contained unit. It consists of a headquarters, certain organic army troops, a variable number of army corps, and a variable number of divisions of which some or all may be assigned from time to time to army corps.

"It is not desirable that a fixed organization be prescribed for the army. The number and kind of army corps and divisions such as armored, infantry, cavalry, and motorized, and additional combat troops and service elements from the War Department reserve or other sources, will be determined by the mission, the terrain of operations, and the probable hostile forces."

These formal words in the bare language of the field manual give little idea of the complex organization of the Second Army. This army was a training army. Its mission, in the simple and succinct words of General Lear, was "training troops for combat." In carrying out this mission the Second Army controlled all or part of the training of 9 corps, 52 divisions, and approximately 2,000 smaller units of all arms and services.

Troops of the Second Army were trained at camps or stations in twenty-four states extending from Minnesota in the north to Florida in the south, and from Virginia in the east to Colorado in the west. The strength of the Second Army varied from 2,045 officers and 63,624 enlisted men on 15 December 1940 to 27,729 officers and 499,987 enlisted men on 15 April 1943. No statistics have been kept as to the total number of officers and enlisted men who passed through Second Army, but it was estimated that approximately half the troops trained by Army Ground Forces were under Second Army control during one stage or another of their training.

The Second Army became permanently active as a part of the first large-scale peacetime training program in the history of the United States. The swift and decisive victories of the German armies in Norway, the Low Countries, and France, coupled with the expansion of Japanese power in the Far East, represented immediate and direct threats to the peace and security of the United States. The President and the Congress responded to this challenge by ordering the National Guard into Federal Service on 31 August 1940 and by passing the Selective Service Act on 16 September.

The army, though small and inadequately equipped, was not unprepared for this emergency. On 9 August 1932, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Chief of Staff, had ordered the creation of four field armies "as a further step in the preparation for the utilization of the fighting forces in possible theaters of operation."


2. A Second Army organized on 10 October 1918 at Toul, France, participated in the final phase of World War I. But in 1941 the Secretary of War ruled that "present day armies and corps are not a continuation of World War I units bearing similar designations." WD lst ind, 10 Jan 42 to Second Army ltr, 12 Nov 41, sub: Organization Day and Battle Streamers, Hq Second Army. AG 322.1-3.

3. Memo of Lt Gen Ben Lear for Hist Off, 31 Mar 43. See Appendix

4. For detailed information on strength see Appendix

General MacArthur's directive provided that the commander of each field army was to be the senior corps area commander assigned to that army, and its components those divisions of the Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserves allocated to the corresponding corps areas for mobilization. Under these provisions the Second Army was to comprise units from the Fifth and Sixth Corps Areas.

On 22 August 1932, Maj. Gen. Frank Parker, Commanding General of the Sixth Corps Area, became the first Commanding General of the Second Army. Troops under command of Second Army during the period August 1932 — November 1940 were either inactive or partially inactive. The Second Army was largely a paper army, but there were brief intervals when the army assumed the semblance of an active unit. These were the quadrennial maneuvers.6

In the summer of 1935 and again in 1940 units of the Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserves conducted field operations under the direction of Second Army. Much valuable experience was gained, though benefits were limited considerably by shortages of essential equipment. Tactical and training doctrines, developed in the army schools, were tested and found to be sound. The groundwork was laid for the rapid training of the Second Army, if and when it became necessary.7

The 1940 maneuvers were in preparation for a greatly extended military training program. Definite plans had already been formulated for expanding the Regular Army, calling the National Guard into Federal service, and placing the Organized Reserves on extended active duty. On 29 December 1939, Lt. Gen. Stanley H. Ford, Commanding General of the Second Army, submitted his views to the Chief of Staff: "Up to the present time the designation of four Army areas, the organization of four Armies, the appointment of four Army Commanders, and the conduct of Army maneuvers in each Army area once in four years, have constituted chiefly the subjects upon which instructions from the War Department have issued... They are no longer sufficient, especially in view of the expansion of the Army, and the emphasis placed upon mobilization and training."8

General Ford recognized that it was too early to separate completely the Corps Area and Army headquarters but he made other recommendations, most of which were authorized by the War Department on 2 April 1940, "as a tentative measure to govern relations between Army and Corps Area Commanders and in order to better prepare tactical units to take the field promptly and to operate effectively in combat." The Chief of Staff of the Sixth Corps Area was raised to the rank of Brigadier General to relieve General Ford of many of the administrative details of the Corps Area Command, and three General Staff Officers were assigned for permanent and role duty with the Army Headquarters. Authority was also granted to place additional officers on temporary duty with Army Headquarters during maneuvers and at other times of peak load.9

The Commanding General of the Second Army was given the responsibility of supervising the tactical training of the Regular Army and National Guard within his area,

6. The staff of the Sixth Corps Area acted as the staff of Second Army during this entire period. Second Army, General Order (GO), 1, 22 Aug 32. Statement of Col. Edward J. Dwan, Second Army IG, to the Hist Off, 10 Apr 43. Col. Dwan was a member of both staffs in 1933.
8. In AG 322.98-3 (1940).
and the right of supervision and coordination of the training of the OEC, ROTC, and CMTC. The responsibility for these components of the organized reserves remained, however, with the Corps Area Commander.10

Lt Gen. Ben Lear succeeded General Ford as Commanding General of the Second Army and the Sixth Corps Area on 1 October 1940. Two days later the War Department directed that Second Army Headquarters and Sixth Corps Area Headquarters be physically separated. This was accomplished at midnight 19-20 October, and General Lear relinquished command of the Sixth Corps area to Brig. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel.11

The original table of organization provided for an immediate staff of 20 officers and 37 enlisted men, with an intermediate objective of 44 officers and 73 enlisted men.12 On 18 October General Lear requested permission to expand the personnel of his headquarters to 107 enlisted men, which was authorized by the War Department radio activating Headquarters Company on 18 November 1940.13

Expansion of the headquarters was slow. The 12 officers and 6 enlisted men in Second Army Headquarters on 31 October were increased to 17 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 33 enlisted men by 30 November, and 26 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 73 enlisted men by 31 December 1940.14 As late as 18 December 1940, Col. Fred L. Walker, G-3, Second Army, wrote: "Up to December 2nd I have been doing everything pertaining to the G-3 section of Second Army myself because I did not have the necessary commissioned and enlisted assistants. That meant that I did not 'max' every phase of my job. However, I now have one commissioned assistant and four enlisted assistants in the section ... and prospects of obtaining two more commissioned assistants. We are now well prepared to handle every phase of our work."15

From the time General Lear took command of Second Army, he was anxious to move the headquarters from Chicago. The choice was narrowed to St. Louis or Memphis by the final week of October 1940, and on 4 November the War Department approved the transfer of Headquarters, Second Army, to Memphis, Tenn.16 This movement began in mid-November 1940. General Lear and four members of his staff arrived in Memphis on 15 November to be followed by the forward echelon of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, which was brought to Memphis from Ft. Sheridan and Chicago by motor convoy. On 5 December Headquarters, Second Army, was officially established in Memphis at 44 South Second Street.17

10. WD ltr AG 320.2 (3-5-40)M-C, 2 Apr 40, sub: Crgn and Status of Army Ha. AG 322.96-4.
14. See AG 330.32.
The War Department assigned to Second Army one corps, two infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and miscellaneous army troops. The VII Corps, activated at Ft. McClellan, Ala., on 8 November 1940, had three National Guard divisions assigned to it. The 27th Division was already in Federal service and the 35th Division was scheduled for 25 November, but construction delays at Camp Joseph T. Robinson caused postponement until 23 December 1940. The units of this division were not required to leave their home stations until after the holidays, and mobilization was not completed until 7 January 1941. Similar delays at Camp Peay (later Camp Forrest), Tenn., caused the postponement of the induction of the 33rd Division first until 6 February and finally to 5 March 1941.

The 2nd Cavalry Division was not activated until 1 April. The 5th and 6 Divisions of the Regular Army were already activated, but their units were widely scattered at their various peacetime training stations. Concentration for the 5th Division at Ft. Custer, Mich., was completed during the first week of January, but the 6th Division did not assemble its units until late in May 1941.

Many of the nondivisional units were already activated. Second Army was charged with their training but the quartermaster, ordnance, and other service-type units were also required for the operation of the installations of Corps Area Service Command. This sort of cooperation between the field armies and corps area was essential to the success of the new training program. Corps area inducted and processed the selectees, activated inactive units, and retained control until they arrived at the training centers. The camps were constructed and all units were supplied and equipped by this same command. The various ways in which army and corps area commanders worked together with the common aim of inaugurating the large scale training program are too numerous and complex to be adequately described, but they are symbolized by the camp commander.

The senior line officer present at a post, camp, or station was the commanding officer, which meant the division commander at most Second Army stations. The station complement, which performed the necessary administrative, technical, and supply services under this commander, was a part of Corps Area Service Command. This concentration of two functions under different commands in a single officer was worked out with a minimum of friction as demonstrated by a typical letter to a Second Army division commander:

You will, upon arrival at Camp Forrest, Tennessee assume command of that station and all troops stationed thereat.... You will organize an administrative

18. WD ltr AG 320.2 (10-31-40) M (Ret) M-C, 4 Nov 40, sub: Units Assigned and Attached to GHQ, Armies and Corps etc. AG 320.2-1.


20. Lt Col C. J. Mathews, G-3, 5th Div to Col Walker, 10 Dec 40. Seventh Corps Area telg to Second Army, 22 May 41. AG 370.5-9.


staff for operating the post, separate and distinct from the tactical staff of your division, utilizing for that purpose personnel assigned or attached to the station complement (Corps Area Service Command).... Your post headquarters and administrative staff should be housed separately from any headquarters of tactical units, and will be so organized as to operate without interruption in case tactical units should suddenly leave the station. Furthermore, the set-up will be such as to require a minimum of your time for supervision of post matters, allowing your maximum effort to be placed on the supervision of training of tactical units.23

The War Department made provision for the appointment of separate post commanders on 17 January 1941. This policy, intended to be applied sparingly and only where it was manifest that efficiency would be increased, could be used where:

1. The present post commanders is an officer who also commands a unit of the field force which might be required to leave the post.
2. The duties required of the post commander are so exacting as to impair the performance of his duties as a field force commander.
3. The appointment of a junior officer to replace the post commander will not impair the efficiency of the post as a whole.24

Early in May 1941 Second Army staff officers prepared a letter to the Commanders of the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Corps Areas which requested them to select Regular Army officers to be appointed post commanders by the War Department at the various posts, camps, and stations occupied by the field forces of the Second Army.25 This letter was not approved by General Lear and was not dispatched. Maneuvers in 1941, however, caused many of the Second Army units to leave their stations, and gradually permanent post commanders under corps areas were appointed by the War Department and the field force commanders were relieved of this duty.

Despite delays, Headquarters, Second Army, completed its organization. The field force units were activated and established in the training centers. The construction of housing and training facilities in these centers was completed. Gradually Second Army started on its part of the great task of creating an army in the United States. Training was Second Army's chief responsibility, and the training program was established as the organizational work was completed.

23. VII Corps ltr AG 320 to CG 33rd Div, 10 Mar 41, sub: Command. AG 322.3-5 (Gen).
25. Draft Second Army ltr, 8 May 41, sub: COs at Posts, Cps, and Stas occupied by Field Forces, Second Army. AG 323.76-5.
Anti-Aircraft Gun

Field Artillery
Chapter II

TRAINING

Training was the primary function of Second Army under GHQ and the War Department in 1940 and 1941. The objective of the Second Army, in the often repeated words of General Lear, was "AN ARMY FIT TO FIGHT....An Army fit to meet veterans in the field and take the field away from them and suffer the least losses." 1 The creation of a large peacetime army was a new task for the Army of the United States, but one for which careful plans had been made.

The foundations were laid in the field manuals, which stated both the principles and the methods of instruction and training. The original War Department and GHQ directives prescribed the replacement center system of initial training for all units because it would give the results sought most rapidly.2 This system consisted essentially of the centralization of specialized training under expert instructors and required a minimum of officers and noncommissioned officers to conduct training of high quality. Its purpose was "to attain quickly the physical hardening and basic and specialist training prescribed in War Department Mobilization Training Program (MTPs) for units and replacements."3

These Mobilisation Training Programs were in readiness for each arm and service. Each embodied the basic training which all troops must have, whatever their arm, service, or specialty, and it was believed that this training, effectively administered, would transform a recruit into a soldier in thirteen weeks.4 Units were given four months in which to settle in camp and complete basic training, after which small-unit training was emphasized. Unit training advanced progressively from squad to platoon, company, and battalion, and was followed by regimental and combat team exercises and the combined training of larger units. During this period command functions and the cooperative working of units as teams were emphasized to compensate for the loss of these important military values inherent in the replacement center system of training.5

1. Gen Lear address to Second Army in field at Hope, Ark, 28 Aug 41. Second Army Press Release in PRG files.
2. D Tng Cir 2, 10 Sep 40, sub: Conduct of Tng. AG 353-41. GHQ ltr to Army Comdrs, no file number, 16 Sep 40, sub: Tng. AG 353-41.
3. Ibid.
4. Basic Field Manual, Military Training, FM 21-5, p 14. This Field Manual was published 16 Jul 41, but it expressed training doctrines developed earlier and which were in use in 1940. The basic training called for proficiency in the following matters: 1. Disciplinary training of the soldier. 2. Physical training, military sanitation and first aid. 3. Marching. 4. Their own administration. 5. Their own shelter, supply, and movement. 6. Their own security to include measures against air and mechanized attacks. 7. Camouflage. 8. Signal communication. 9. Protective measures against chemicals. 10. Expert care and use of their weapons, equipment, and transport. 11. Tactics and technique of their arm or service. 12. Their cooperative duties as part of the combat team.
5. GHQ ltr to Army Comdrs, no file number, 16 Sep 40, sub: Tng. AG 353-41.
The original GHQ letter on training was reproduced by Headquarters, Second Army, and sent to active and in-active elements of its command along with Training Directive No. 1, 18 September 1940.6

The training mission of the Second Army was defined as "progressive instruction designed to attain promptly a state of combat efficiency for existing units, in conjunction with the production of commissioned and enlisted personnel capable of absorbing large increments of recruits and of acting as cadres for organization of new units." The attainment of this mission demanded the inculcation of the ability to lead, coupled with thorough technical proficiency for all commissioned officers. "From the CMTC and ROTC through ORC training to active service with organized units, instruction must be progressive and consistent. It will include study of Mobilization Training Programs...and of unit training schedules covering the instructions of individuals and units...based upon such training schedules, officers will be schooled as trained to individual proficiency in each basic subject and, thereafter, in schooling and training noncommissioned officers in the instruction of enlisted personnel."

The training objectives were outlined as follows:

1. Physical fitness capable of enduring prolonged privation and hardship.
2. Technical proficiency with weapons and equipment.
3. Individual Combat proficiency.
4. Group or team combat proficiency within the army or service.
5. Group combat proficiency in conjunction with other arms and services.7

GHQ and Second Army placed great stress on the development of instructors and the proper training of officers. No commissioned or noncommissioned officer was permitted to instruct until it had been ascertained positively that he was competent in the subject involved and that he was completely familiar with the army's methods of instruction and training. Part-time troop and unit schools were freely used for this purpose, outside of training hours whenever practicable. Special courses were offered at the branch and service schools for field officers and at the Command and General Staff School for staff officers.8

Training in accordance with these directives commenced immediately. The scattered units of the 5th and 6th Infantry Divisions, the activated units of the 2d Cavalry Division, and smaller army and corps units began training at their separate stations. Only one Second Army division, the 27th Infantry Division at Ft. McClellan, Ala., was concentrated at a single station and ready to begin training as a unit in the fall of 1940. But even here there were many difficulties. Roads were not paved -- the Commanding General described his regimental areas as "disconnected islands in a sea of mud" -- training aids and facilities were not available, and many officers and noncommissioned officers were inadequately trained and prepared for their responsibilities.9

The Regular Army divisions and smaller units were further handicapped by the drain of their trained enlisted men to perform administrative work for Corps Service

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6. Tng Dir 1, 18 Sep 40. AG 353-41. WD ltr, AG 320.2, 2 Apr 40, sub: Orgn and Status of Army Hq.

7. Ibid.


9. 27th Div telg to Second Army, 31 Oct 40. AG 353-41. Second Army memo for CoFS USA, 9 Nov 40. AG 300.2-5. Noted on visit to Ft. McClellan, 5-6 Jan 41 by Col R. S. Thomas, CE, AG 333.1-5.
commands and as cadre for newly activated units. The service units of Second Army were also hindered in their MTP training by the required performance of their technical functions for Corps Area Service Command. Serious shortages of equipment, training material, and training aids further handicapped the accomplishment of the planned program.

The seriousness of these obstacles to training became apparent when units replied to the following three questions addressed to them by Second Army on 7 November 1940:

1. Has the training period of 13 weeks instruction, required by MTP, been completed? If not when will it be completed?

2. What personnel of the organization, if any, is absent from training on duty with Corps Area Service Command installations?

3. Are training facilities at present station adequate for proper training? If not, what improvements are necessary?

Company K, 48th Quartermaster Regiment, at Ft. Knox reported that it had never received the 13th weeks instructional mobilization training program. Company R, 81st Quartermaster Battalion (LM), at Ft. Sheridan, Ill., not only said that it had no copy of the MTP, but also added that it "does not understand the reference to 13 weeks instruction." Company M, 48th Quartermaster Regiment (Trk), at the same post reported that MTP training would be completed "upon receipt of necessary training equipment including vehicles to perform motor convoys with 2½ ton truck (cargo), motorcycles and other organic equipment." Thirty to fifty men of this organization were used daily for the operation of the Post Motor Pool and occasional duty with the Corps Area Service Command (CAS). The majority of these received experience from the operation of motor vehicles, but could not be present for class instruction.

The 6th Surgical Hospital at Ft. Knox, Ky., was scheduled to complete MTP training by 18 January 1941. Training facilities were adequate, but "unit training in technical and tactical employment of the surgical hospital may be delayed, as most of the organizational equipment for training has not yet been received. Difficulties in conducting classroom work in technical subjects is being experienced at present as the organization is housed in tents and freezing weather prevails." The 22nd Ordnance Company (LM) at the same station had completed its MTP training in basic military subjects but had not been able to undertake technical instruction because of the necessity of maintaining the Ordnance vehicles at the station. It had extensive shortages in equipment which prevented field training and was also short 1 captain, 1 second lieutenant, and 65 enlisted men. Company A, 87th Quartermaster Battalion, Ft. Des Moines, Iowa, was in an even worse condition. "This organization as yet, has received none of its basic equipment. There has been no means of training the personnel in any phase of maintenance, care of, or operation of motor vehicles. There has been no field equipment


11. Second Army ltr, 7 Nov 40, sub: Information Regarding Units Recently Asgd to Second Army. AG 320.9-1.
such as a field range to train cooks before we go to the field." It was short 1 captain, 2 second lieutenants, and 62 enlisted men. This company had completed 14 of its basic military subjects and was to receive 71 selectees on 1 December 1940.12

Inspections by Second Army staff officers revealed similar conditions. The 50th Signal Battalion had been organized 15 June 1940 under command of Lt. Col. Fred Miller with an authorized strength of 512 enlisted men. It was inspected early in December at Camp McCoy, Wis., where it had 12 officers and 260 enlisted men, with 1 medical officer and 5 enlisted men attached. The dispensary was housed in temporary barracks and men who were seriously ill or needed surgical treatment were sent to a civilian hospital at Sparta, Wis. There was no ambulance available, and the battalion had no radio equipment and no telephone switchboards. It had recently received two 2½-ton cargo trucks, in very poor condition, from the post quartermaster. Individuals had no musette bags, no shoulder packs, no fur caps, gloves, mufflers, or Second Army shoulder insignia. Officers had no bedding rolls. There were no field ranges, cooking being done on coal ranges. The unit was living in pyramidal tents with bare concrete floors and board sidewalls. The health was good, the inspecting officer reported, and morale excellent, "in spite of severe cold (5 degrees below zero date of inspection) and the men seemed happy and contented." The ninth week of the MTP had been completed.13

Losses of personnel were particularly hurtful to certain units. The 9th Cavalry had an actual strength of 543 men on 1 August 1940. Between that date and 15 January 1941 it furnished 295 men as cadres to other units and was scheduled to furnish 109 more before 15 February. There were also 117 men on special duty with the Cavalry School and Post Headquarters, and 52 men at specialists' schools, leaving present for duty with the regiment 175 men. After the scheduled cadres were furnished there were only 64 men with the regiment until those at the schools returned. The 9th Cavalry was scheduled for expansion into a combat regiment of 1,323 men in January and had to furnish cadres for all its nine troops, regimental headquarters, and one-half the cadres for the Brigade Headquarters and the Brigade Special Weapons.14

The trained enlisted men sent out as cadre were permanently lost to their organizations but those sent to Corps Area Service Command were on loan. The War Department set up quotas of selectees who were to be trained to replace these men and permit them to return to their units.15 The Second Army, on 1 December 1940, established a seven-weeks basic course for these replacements.16 A total of approximately 1,600 selectees

12. These and similar rpts from the various units of Second Army are in AG 320.9 and 400-3.

13. Memo for CoS Second Army, Rpt of Inspection of 50th Sig Bn, Cp McCoy, Wis, by Sig Off, 9 Dec 40. AG 300.6-5.

14. Ltr CG, Ft Riley, Kans, AG 320.2, to TAG, 15 Jan 41, sub: 9th Cav, and Second Army 5th ind to CG Seventh Corps Area, 3 Feb 41. AG 322.02-2.

15. WD ltr AG 320.2 (10-17-40) E-A, 24 Oct 40, sub: Enl Pers for Serv Command and Overhead Installations. Three of the corps areas were authorized to call on Second Army units for a maximum of 9,294 enl men to perform adm and sup functions until selectees could be trained to replace them.

were attached to the 4th Cavalry, 2nd Cavalry Division, 5th Infantry Division, 6th Infantry Division, 27th Infantry Division, 35th Infantry Division, and 153rd Infantry, all of whom were returned to the Corps Area Service Command when their training was completed.\(^\text{17}\)

The control and supervision of training of the small separate army units was one of the most difficult tasks confronting the Second Army. It was not satisfactorily solved until the summer of 1942, but numerous attempts were made in the peacetime period to find a workable method. Second Army units were usually attached to major units for training when they were stationed at the same post.\(^\text{18}\) The Commanding General of the 5th Division was charged not only with supervision of training of units at his home station, Ft. Custer, Mich., but also of the Second Army units at Ft. Wayne, Ind., Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Ind., and Ft. Knox, Ky.\(^\text{19}\)

This was not a satisfactory solution. The division commander and staff were primarily interested in the preparation of their own unit and had neither the time nor available personnel to supervise properly the training of these separate units. This was clearly brought out in a report of inspection of Second Army units at Ft. Knox, Ky., by Maj. Gen. J. M. Cummins, Commander of the 5th Infantry Division. He found that none of these units was qualified for field service because they lacked both training and equipment. He recommended that all shortages in personnel and equipment be remedied; that all the Second Army units stationed at Ft. Knox be grouped into a special units battalion; and that a field officer, with a suitable staff, be detailed to command this provisional battalion and supervise training.\(^\text{20}\)

Since the necessary officers were not available and the recommendation could not be followed, the problem remained. Second Army units at Camp Robinson, Camp Forrest, and Ft. Clellen, on 24 April 1941, were attached to the VII Corps and were reattached by that Corps to each of its three divisions at these stations for administration and training. As this arrangement proved unsatisfactory, the units were attached to the same units as before "for all purposes other than training," while that function was reserved for the Commanding General, Second Army, and his staff.\(^\text{21}\) But the training of individuals and units continued, in spite of these difficulties with organization.

GHQ, on 4 January 1941, issued instructions for a period of thirteen to sixteen weeks of combined training and additional unit training to follow the Mobilization Training Program. "Mobilisation Training Programs," the directive said, "necessarily demand comparatively rapid progression, in order to attain quickly a reasonable proficiency in essentials of unit training to include the regiment. It is equally pressing to undertake combined training. Progression to more advanced training should stimulate

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17. Ltr Col Fred L. Walker, G-3 Second Army, to Lt Col Wayne Clark, GHQ, 13 Jan 41. Hist Off files.
18. Second Army ltr to CG Ft Sheridan, Ill, 23 Nov 40. AG 322.01-5. Second Army ltr to 3d Car Brig, 23 Dec 40. AG 353.65. 6th Div ltr to Second Army, 23 Apr 41, sub: Attachment of Units. AG 322.3-7 (Gen).
19. In AG 322.3-1. This entire file is devoted to ltrs to and from 5th Inf Div on trg of these units.
20. Ltr 5th Inf Div to Second Army, 29 Nov 40, sub: Rpt of Inspection. AG 333.1-4.
21. Second Army ltr to VII Corps, 24 Apr 41, sub: Attachment of Units to VII Army Corps. AG 322.12-4 (VII Army Corps). Second Army ltr, 21 Oct 41, sub: Attachment of Second Army Units. AG 322.3-3 (Gen).
interest by its practical application of unit training, and thus stir renewed activity. At the same time, it is practicable and desirable to carry unit training to standards higher than those reached during mobilization training. The two types of training should be conducted concurrently, in order to secure a well rounded development and avoid monotony." 

Detailed instructions were included for the various arms and services, and a schedule suggested for field exercises, field maneuvers, command post exercises, and night exercises. At the same time provision was made for the continuous training of the smaller units, as weaknesses of previous instructions were developed in these combined exercises.

These letters were reproduced by Second Army and sent to the units concerned, where, as with the original GHQ letter of 16 September 1940, they controlled the schedule of training. In addition, Second Army prescribed that all division commanders and commanders of separate units would include in their schedules for this period of combined and unit training the following items:

1. Not less than eight (8) hours per week of review and extension of subjects contained in the thirteen weeks Mobilization Training Program.

2. Weekly marches by regiment, brigade, or division, both day and night, which will gradually be increased to develop physical stamina and endurance. These marches will include overnight bivouacs in sufficient number to instruct the troops in methods of expeditiously establishing and breaking camp, and in maintaining security. When practicable, separate units will be attached to regiments, brigades, or the division for weekly marches.

3. Development and practice of appropriate Standard Operating Procedure for units and combat teams. Standing Operating Procedure will be amended in accordance with improvements which become evident during field exercises.

4. The general nature of the exercises to be made known to commanders of units and combat teams as early as practicable in order to permit thorough and timely preparation.

5. Tests to determine the state of training. These tests will be conducted, when practicable, concurrently with the prescribed field exercises. Tests of instructional ability of individuals will be included.

6. Combat and field firing exercises, within available ammunition allowances.

7. Continuation of emphasis on evening schools for officers and noncommissioned officers preparatory to instruction of troops, and for improvement of technique and tactics.

These directives established the training program. Unit commanders drew up their schedules and training began. The difficult process of creating a modern army was under way. But as the units in the field began training, Headquarters, Second Army, was engaged in the important task of preparation for an even more extensive training exercise, the 1941 maneuvers.

22. GHQ ltr, 353, 4 Jan 41, sub: Combined Tng. Hist Off files.

23. Ibid.

change in the program of Second Army, nor did the GHQ letter based on it, which said, "it is contemplated that the current army corps and army training will be followed by a period of individual and small-unit training, emphasizing the effective use of weapons, together with such special and task-force training as may be practicable."49

On 30 October 1941, Second Army issued another directive amplifying and supplementing Training Directive No. 25. This established two training periods, 1 November 1941 to 15 March 1942, and 16 March to 31 March 1942. All units (except those which had not passed their MTP tests, which were on a 40-hour week) were prescribed a training week of 36 hours in the first period and of 40 hours in the second. Wednesday afternoons were devoted to physical recreation and special instruction for backward men, while Saturday afternoon was reserved for pass privileges. Units held a formal retreat, with inspection, daily except on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays.50

No fatigue or administration was normally held in the morning hours, which were reserved for training. Noncommissioned officer schools were conducted each afternoon in which half of the noncommissioned officers were thoroughly prepared for the next day's training. "A new training year is starting," the directive continued, "which gives to all unit commanders, an opportunity for a fresh start -- to lay a foundation on which to build from the bottom up, step by step, a thoroughly integrated and efficient fighting force second to none. Expressed a little differently, all personnel must first be thoroughly schooled in fundamentals. This must be followed by progressive training and testing of units from the squad (section) on up. Time and effort must be carefully apportioned. This calls for careful planning and continuous supervision."51

Extensive check lists were attached to the directive which were used as progressive training objectives and as guides to commanders in the conduct of progressive field training tests. On the same day, 30 October 1941, that Second Army published Training Directive No. 32, GHQ also published a directive covering post-maneuver training, to correct the "glaring weaknesses in basic and small-unit training" demonstrated by the maneuvers and field exercises. "It is apparent," GHQ said, "that mobilization training as covered in mobilization training programs has not been mastered and that there is a serious lack of leadership on the part of officers and noncommissioned officers in the application of the lessons learned in mobilization training to the maneuver field."52

A new training period of four months was established for an intensive review of basic and small-unit training to include the regimental combat team, followed by a similar period devoted to the training of task forces with flexible organizations. Training was to be varied and progressive with each phase being completed successfully "as determined by actual test" before passing to the next. Combat firing proficiency tests for infantry were added to tests previously prescribed.53

Second Army again issued a supplementary directive imposing the additional training prescribed by GHQ instructions,54 but, in writing to the Chief of Staff, GHQ,

49. GHQ ltr 353/526(9-11-41), 11 Sep 41, sub: Future Tng. Ibid.
50. Tng Dir 32, 30 Oct 41.
51. Ibid.
52. GHQ ltr (C) 353/652(10-30-41), 30 Oct 41, sub: Post Maneuver Tng. AG 353-91 (C).
53. Ibid.
swagger of the soldier." He indicated that small-unit training was still not up to par and that discipline in some instances was laggard. "There are too many soldiers that are sloppy and ill-kept," he said. "This is unnecessary even in maneuvers." He added, "It is certain that the army needs more equipment; it is equally certain, in my opinion, that the army needs stronger discipline, harder work, and training in greater aggressiveness and initiative, more even that it needs equipment." He expressed gratification, however, for the progress made by the army in some respects. Officers and troops showed decided improvement during the course of maneuvers. Given four to six months more training with complete equipment and a bountiful supply of live ammunition, he said, and the army would be ready to go into battle with any foe.45

THE NEW TRAINING PROGRAM

The maneuvers had developed no fundamental weaknesses in the tactical or training doctrines of the United States army. As the deficiencies noted had been in the execution of these doctrines, the training program after maneuvers was continued upon the same general lines as previously, but with intensified effort. Second Army, on 29 July 1941 had issued a training directive applicable to the period 1 October 1941 to 30 June 1942. The purposes of this directive were:

1. To continue the physical and technical training of the individual soldier so that he may perform his duties efficiently.

2. To integrate individuals into disciplined groups with high combat value.

3. To further the study and application, by leaders in all grades, of technical and tactical doctrines contained in Field Manuals and Training Circulars.46

Individual training was continued to achieve physical fitness and combat proficiency in the use of weapons and equipment. Unit training was emphasized, and commanders were required to be certain that units were proficient in this phase before permitting them to advance to the higher phases of training. Prepared field exercises were conducted as drills on suitable terrain, and included the various phases of security, attack, and defense situations.

Unit training was followed by combined training as outlined in GHQ letter of 4 January 1941, and included "firing with live ammunition over the heads of personnel, by supporting weapons." Evening schools for officers and noncommissioned officers were continued in order to qualify them as teachers. Instruction in these schools in technique and tactics was "conducted in such a manner as to coordinate the theoretical and practical phases of the Platoon, Company (Battery and Troop) and Battalion (Squadron) exercises." Frequent tests were required, and failure led to replacement or reclassification.47

The War Department, on 19 August 1941, issued a general training directive for the period of 1 July 1941 to 30 June 1942, the object of which was "to prepare the Army of the United States for combat under whatever conditions the defense of our country and its possessions may require."48 The provisions of this directive necessitated no


46. (Ref missing)

47. Ibid.

48. WD ltr AG 353(6-16-41)MT M-C, 19 Aug 41, sub: WD Tng Dir 41-42. AG 353-91.
The purpose of the maneuvers was to train officers and men, and not to see which side could win. And there was no doubt among the leaders that the exercises had been highly instructive to all who took part in them. Many significant problems had been given such as army concentrations, crossing of unfordable rivers, changes in directions of advance, deployment of troops for battle, clashes of larger units under battle conditions, retreat and pursuit, and changes in supply lines. Valuable training had been afforded by experimentation with large elements of motorized and mechanized units, with antitank groups, with air units, and with parachute troops. The necessity of cooperation and coordination had been clearly demonstrated; likewise the vital importance of security march discipline, concealment, and liaison with adjacent units. The way had been pointed to combined air-ground training. The various exercises had repeatedly shown that armored forces were not invincible — that the proper use of antitank weapons, terrain, and demolitions, supplied the answer to the problem of meeting "the hardest hitting and fastest striking force of today." Most important of all, perhaps, was the demonstration of the importance of the chain of command.

The conduct of exercises on such a large scale afforded invaluable lessons to command and staff in tactical planning, in transportation and supply, in care and disposition of sick and wounded, in river crossing and demolition, in reconnaissance and intelligence, and in numerous other features of simulated warfare. According to General Lear, "the staffs of the higher echelons were given a gruelling workout in all essentials of tactical, administrative, and supply operations." 41

Some officers of the various echelons were unable to discharge the responsibilities thrown upon them by the maneuvers. Others utilized these responsibilities to demonstrate superior abilities. The list of those who distinguished themselves extends beyond the practicable limits of narration here. In an interview with press representatives following the maneuvers, General Lear paid special tribute to the following: Col. Marion C. French, for efficient direction of troop concentration prior to the Second Army phase of maneuvers; Col. A. B. Conrad, for exceptional work in handling supplies; Col. Paul W. Gibson, for skillful supervision of the care of the sick; and Col. Jarvis Bain, for his extraordinary engineering feats. 42

The Louisiana maneuvers, like those of Arkansas and Tennessee, brought to light a number of deficiencies. GHQ comments on the final phase, prepared by Gen. Lesley J. McNair, pointed out particularly the failure to make full and effective use of the armored forces and a lack of aggressiveness in certain phases of attack and defense. 43 Deficiencies were also noted in discipline, infantry-artillery cooperation, and reconnaissance and security.

Some newspapermen who covered the Louisiana maneuvers commented on the lack of "snap, dash, spit and polish" of the new army. 44 This criticism was accepted by General Lear, who agreed that "the men have not yet accepted the idea that they are soldiers trained by the ordeal. They have yet to develop what might be called the mental

41. WD Press Release of speech of Gen Lear before Chicago Union League, 10 Nov 41. Personal files of Gen Lear.
42. Commercial Appeal, 2 Oct 41.
43. GHQ ltr 353/466 (Second Army) - C(10-11-41) to Second Army, 11 Oct 41, sub: Comments on Second vs Third Army Maneuvers, 15-30 Sep 41. Personal files of Col Ford. In draft of a Second Army ltr to CofS GHQ, prepared 28 Oct 41 by G-3, agreement was expressed with number of GHQ comments. Explanatory statements were devoted mainly to justification of Second Army's tae mwnms. AG 353-29(FE '41).
44. Hanson W. Baldwin, N.Y. Times, 24 Sep and 1 Oct 41, and Kansas City Star, 1 Oct 41. Comments on 1st phase of GHQ maneuvers by Lt Gen Lesley J. McNair, 22 Sep 41. Second Army G-3 files.
The second problem of the GHQ phase gave to the Second Army the mission of defending Shreveport and surrounding vicinity. In a preliminary shifting of troops, the Second Army was given some 102 antitank guns. When the problem was begun the Second Army had about 120,000 men and the Third Army about 280,000. The Second Army's left flank east of the Red River was held by the 5th Division, the center, between the Red and Sabine Rivers, was held by the VII Corps (27th, 33rd, and 35th Divisions); the right, west of the Sabine River, was protected by the Second Cavalry Division. The 1st Armored Division and the 6th Infantry Division were in reserve.

Throughout the nine-day period allotted for this problem, the Second Army fought a delaying, retrogressive action, seeking always to avoid a commitment of its main force with that of the opposing Blues. To a large extent the Second Army was successful in performing its defensive mission. It kept its forces intact as it fell back from one position to another before the superior forces of the Third Army.

At the conclusion of the problem on the afternoon of 28 September, the nearest main body of enemy troops was over 40 miles by highway from Shreveport.

The demolition work of the engineers and the use of special task forces constituted the foundation of the Second Army's defensive program. The destruction of bridges and the blocking of roads were a constant annoyance and deterrent to the Blues, who were further hindered by bad weather. Had it not been for the successful work of engineers, the Blues would have forced the Second Army to do battle early in the operations when the defensive lines were so greatly extended as to prevent effective resistance.

When the Louisiana maneuvers were terminated on 28 September 1941, all parties concerned could find considerable cause for satisfaction as they looked back over the month of operations. These maneuvers had broken new ground in a number of respects. First, they were on the largest scale ever known in American history, more than 400,000 troops having participated in the final problem. Second, they involved for the first time in the history of American military exercises the pitting of one field army against another. Third, they made unprecedented use of armored forces. Fourth, they were characterized by an unusual amount of experimentation. Fifth, they involved the greatest concentration of airpower ever assembled in war maneuvers, more than a thousand bombers, pursuit ships, dive bombers, and observation planes having been employed. Sixth, they made unprecedented use of parachute troops.

37. Second Army News Bull 4, 22 Sep 41, and 5, 17 Oct 41. AG 000.76-2 (FE '41).

38. According to Second Army News Bull 5, 17 Oct 41, "one 'suicide' regiment of the enemy did swing away to the north and endeavor to enter Shreveport from that direction," but "A battalion of tanks was in position to meet them when the Armistice was declared." AG 000.76-2. (FE '41). Press rpts emanating from correspondents attached to Third Army Hq painted an unfavorable picture of the Second Army situation at the end of maneuvers, one commentator going so far as to say that the Second Army was "set up for a pushover." Protests were made by Col (then Maj) Robert A. Griffin, Second Army PRO, who charged inaccuracy. AG 000.5-3. (FE '41)." 38


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The Second Army at this time was made up of the VII Corps (27th, 33rd, and 35th Divisions, plus Corps troops), the 5th and 6th Infantry Divisions, the 2nd Cavalry Division, the 1st Armored Corps (1st and 2nd Armored Divisions), and other Army and GHQ troops, including air units. The strength of these units was about 130,000 men as compared to about 270,000 of the Third Army. But the discrepancy was offset to a considerable extent by the superior mechanized force attached to Second Army.32

The Second Army was designated as the Red force, representing the mythical state of Kotmk. Almat was represented by the Blue Third Army.

Instructions from General Headquarters indicated that large numbers of Blue troops were concentrating in the area southwest of Alexandria, La., and required Red forces to attack them in the direction of Lake Charles. This attack constituted the first problem of the GHQ exercises.33

In order to make the attack it was necessary for the Second Army to cross the Red River along a line running from Shreveport to Alexandria. This crossing was one of the most spectacular feats of the 1941 maneuvers. Under the direction of Col. Jarvis Bain, Second Army engineer, four ponton bridges, varying in length from 570 to 700 feet, and capable of carrying loads up to 28 tons, were thrown across the river in less than 48 hours. During the attack Second Army troops poured across these bridges with amazing celerity.34 This was the longest ponton undertaking ever made by an American Army; Second Army observers called it "the largest ponton building and crossing operation in the history of the United States army."35

Immediately after crossing the Red River the Second Army, with the armored forces constituting the right flank, the VII Corps the center, and the 5th Division the left flank, moved forward to attack the Third Army's left flank on the Texas border. General Krueger countered with an attempt to encircle the Second Army's left flank. At this point General Lear "shifted his smaller force into a line running west from Natchitoches to Texas and struck through the center of the Third Army line with armored and cavalry divisions." The Second Army moved forward beyond this point, but the superior strength of General Krueger's Army began to force the center back and it became necessary for the Second Army to assume the defensive. This was the situation when the problem ended on September 19.36

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33. Ibid.
34. Ibid. Second Army News Bulletin 5, 17 Oct 41. AG 000.76-2. (PP '41). This was the final number of a series of News Bulletins issued to Second Army troops to inform them of the high points of the GHQ maneuvers. The first four bulletins were issued while the exercises were in progress. General Lear had complained several times during the Arkansas and Tennessee maneuvers of the individual soldier's inadequate knowledge of the situation. These bulletins were issued to supply the deficiency. Four copies of each bulletin were issued to each company to be read to the soldiers by platoon commanders. The plan was said to have worked "moderately well."
35. Rpt of the Second Army G-2 Sec on Second Army Maneuvers. Second Army G-2 files.
auxiliary troops. A seventh and distinctive exercise consisted of the execution of a river crossing by a task force composed of groups from each of the divisions comprising the VII Corps.29

On 24 August the Second Army Commander took over the direction of the maneuvers. During the next sixteen days the VII Corps under General Richardson was pitted against a provisional corps (5th and 6th Infantry Divisions, 2nd Cavalry Division, 4th Cavalry Division (H Elec) and auxiliary troops), commanded by Maj. Gen. Clarence Ridley. To add realism to the activities, Second Army Press Relations chief, Maj. Robert A. Griffin, had the competing forces represent rival states. General Richardson’s Blue force was designated as the Almat Army and General Ridley’s Red troops represented the country of Kotmk. The problem called for the Blue Army, situated between the Quachita and Red rivers, to fight a delaying action as they withdrew to the south to form a junction with supporting troops stationed in Louisiana. The role of the invading Reds was to destroy the Blue forces before the proposed junction could be affected.

The Red Army had greater mobility by reason of its cavalry units, one of which was mechanized (4th Cavalry); it gained further advantage by addition to its forces during the exercise of the 1st Armored Division.

The Blue Army was favored by the rivers, bayous, and swamps that traversed the country which it was defending. By taking advantage of these natural obstacles and by using road blocks and demolitions, the Blues were able to elude the main body of their pursuers during the first stages of the withdrawal. On 9 September the 1st Armored Division joined the Reds in an attack on the Blues. Skillful use of terrain and of antitank measures prevented a break-through by the armored units, but an encircling movement executed by mechanized elements of the Red Forces near the end of the exercise cut off the Blues’ avenue of retreat. Neither force accomplished its mission, but excellent practice was obtained for the problems to be confronted in the GHQ exercises.30

The Arkansas maneuvers were characterized by many of the deficiencies that had appeared in Tennessee. Reconnaissance left much to be desired. Intelligence information was not disseminated with desirable promptness. Signal communications were inadequate. March and road discipline were deficient. But the Army Commander reported improvement in some particulars, notably in leadership and training of small tactical units, dispersal, concealment and camouflage of weapons and vehicles, antiair and antitank protection and use of terrain, obstacles, and demolitions in defense against armored attack.31

GHQ MANEUVERS

On 15 September the final exercises of the 1941 maneuvers began. In these exercises the Second Army, headed by Lt. Gen. Ben Lear, was matched against Third Army forces commanded by Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger. The activities were directed and controlled by General Headquarters.


30. (1) Rpt of VII Army Corps Fld Exercises and Maneuvers in Southwestern Ark and La, 17 Aug - 30 Sep 41, Vol 1, Second Army G-3 files. (2) Rpt of Second Army G-2 Sec on Second Army Maneuvers, 1941. 2-2 files.

During an eleven-day period, General Richardson put the units under his direction through a series of six exercises closely resembling those conducted under Corps auspices in Tennessee. The sixth exercise was a free maneuver in which the VII Corps, less the 33rd Division, operated against the 33rd Division reinforced by certain

28. For a complete list of participating units, see Second Army Tng Dir 21. The 27th Division had participated in the Tennessee maneuvers. The 33rd Division had just completed MTP training. The 35th Division had had a month of combined training. See Rpt of VII Corps Fld Exercises and Maneuvers in Southwestern Ark and La, 17 Aug - 30 Sept 41, Vol 1. Hist Off files.
things concerning the enemy situation, friendly troops and the mission of his company, his platoon and his squad. All of these things should become automatic and will, if the officer leaders provide the incentive. These same principles apply equally to the platoon, company, and leaders of higher units.

During the maneuvers of June it was apparent that this leadership was missing, that there was an unnecessary number of stragglers; too many men appeared lost so far as their organizations were concerned, and very few knew the conditions of the exercise.

If your squad leaders and your platoon sergeants are not capable of leading their respective commands, then new ones should be obtained. There are plenty of intelligent, capable young men among the selectees who can be trusted with these responsibilities. I suggest that a special search of the qualifications of the men in your command be conducted for the purpose of determining their past experience and capabilities applicable to strong leaders, giving preference to those who have had partial R.O.T.C. training, and that well qualified men be given particular opportunities where deserved....

Other directives were issued containing instructions for training in the use of and the defense against Chemical warfare agents by aviation, artillery, and mortars, and for the training of scouts. Meanwhile Headquarters, Second Army, was occupied with the preparation of supply and administrative plans for the August and September maneuvers. These were published originally on 1 July 1941 in Training Directive No. 21, but there were numerous annexes and changes to meet the changing situation in regard to troops, units, and directives from higher headquarters.

ARKANSAS CORPS MANEUVERS

In accordance with the GHQ schedule, the second phase of the 1941 maneuvers began in Arkansas on 17 August. The period, 17-28 August, was devoted to "warm up" activities, in anticipation of Army and GHQ exercises to follow, staged mainly for VII Corps units which had not participated in the Tennessee maneuvers. The August exercises were directed by Maj. Gen. Robert C. Richardson Jr., Commanding General of the VII Corps. Participating units included the 27th, 33rd, and 35th Divisions, the 75th Field Artillery Brigade, the 107th Cavalry Regiment, and numerous service organizations belonging...

24. Lt Gen Ben Lear to each Div Comdr and CO each Separate Unit, Second Army, 3 Jul 41. AG 353-72. Tng Dir 22, 2 Jul 41, sub: Chain of Comd. AG 353-8.


27. Movement to the maneuver area was to begin on 11 August. Second Army Tng Dir 21, 1 Jul 41. AG 353-8. For a complete schedule of the Arkansas–Louisiana maneuvers see Second Army Operations Dir 1, 23 Aug 41. AG 353-9 (FE '41). The Corps-directed and Army-directed phases of the Arkansas–Louisiana maneuvers were prepared under the direction of Col Louis P. Ford, Second Army G-3. CGs of the War games were Col (then Lt Col) George S. Beurket for the Reds, and Lt Col (then Maj) Ben Stafford for the Blues. The Second versus the Third Army exercises were planned by GHQ. Personal interview of Hist Off with Maj Robert A. Persell, 13 June 43.
Observation gained during current corps and army maneuvers, Second Army, indicates a need of additional training in the tactics and techniques of small units. This headquarters has decided to direct additional training in the tactics and techniques of small units and to conduct that training prior to the beginning of corps training in August, 1941. Time (one week) will be provided for that additional training by not moving troops to the corps training period prior to August 11, 1941 as heretofore contemplated, but subsequent thereto. Concentration of troops will complete August 17th, the first exercise to begin on August 18th.22

GHQ had come to similar conclusions concerning the state of basic individual and small-unit training. The principal causes were said to be that many officers and noncommissioned officers had been instructing before they had been trained as instructors; and many units had been permitted to progress to combined training without the necessary foundation.

REMEDIAL TRAINING

In order to carry out GHQ instructions, Second Army issued a training directive for the period 1 July to 11 August 1941. This directed Corps Commanders to establish and supervise the required troop schools for officers and noncommissioned officers in tactics and technique of small units. In addition to schools for infantry, field artillery, engineers, and medical personnel, there were also special schools in map reading; first and second echelon motor maintenance and driver discipline; wire laying and proper use of message centers; and umpiring. Units which had participated in the June maneuvers were directed to give an intensive review of basic and small-unit training, while troops scheduled for later participation in corps and army training were to make such modifications of their current programs as would be appropriate to insure proficiency in the training and leadership of small units.23

General Lear was particularly disturbed by the weakness of leadership in the small units. Headquarters, Second Army, prepared a directive on chain of command which was accompanied by a personal letter from General Lear to each of the commanders of Second Army units. In this letter he said:

I want personally to invite your attention to Training Directive Number 22, issued by the Second Army on the 2nd of July 1941, and to ask your constant continued efforts towards the improvement in the leadership and control of all units.

A well trained and functioning squad is one where the members look upon the corporal with respect and who are instinctively guided by his expressed or indicated desired. The corporal leads them on any task assigned to the squad, whether it be a work detail, a small patrol, squad in an advance against an enemy alone or as a part of the platoon. He conducts his squad at all times, and during his absence he pointedly and specifically informs the squad as to his absence and designates a second in command to carry on. He informs all of his members of those

22. Second Army ltr to CofS GHQ, 27 Jun 41, sub: GHQ Trs for August-September Maneuvers, Second Army. AG 353-3.

The Tennessee maneuvers opened in the vicinity of Tullahoma on 1 June 1941. The first period consisted of two weeks of division exercises directed by Maj. Gen. Frederic H. Smith, Commanding General of the VII Corps, with the Second Army Commander and selected members of his staff observing. Participating units included the 5th, 27th, and 30th Divisions, the 153d Infantry Regiment, and three VII Corps observation squadrons. Six exercises were staged during this period, two being command post exercises, three field exercises, and one a free two-sided field maneuver. These movements featured organization of defense positions, conduct of defense followed by night withdrawal, armored reconnaissance by mechanized units, air observation—within limits imposed by shortage of planes and unfavorable weather—and attack of numerically inferior foe favored by terrain.

Between 16-28 June four field maneuvers prepared and executed by the Second Army Commander were held. Participating units were the same as on the previous occasion except that GHQ armored force elements were added. These four Army-directed exercises featured swift marches, use of counterattacks, construction of pontoon bridges, destruction of enemy strongholds, lightning attack by armored units, and defense against mechanized onslaughts. A high point of the maneuvers was the stopping of armored elements by the infantry and the subsequent smashing thrusts of the former which threatened to destroy the opposing troops. The exercises ended with the capture of Tullahoma by the "Red Army," a provisional force consisting of the 5th Division and the Second Armored Division.

Troops taking part in the Army-directed exercises aggregated 77,000. All branches of the tactical army were involved. Never before in American history had a tank division operated against such a large infantry force as a complete war-strength division.

An important feature of both the Corps- and Army-directed exercises was the critique which followed each problem. These evaluations revealed much that was praiseworthy. Morale of most units was found to be high. The men physically toughened and capable of sustained effort. Officers and soldiers alike seemed eager to fulfill the tasks assigned them. Concerning the exercises as a whole, General McNair said: "These maneuvers are regarded as the best conceived, best executed, and the most successful witnessed by this headquarters to date."

There were many weaknesses noted, most of which were caused by the failure to carry out the principles and methods laid down in the field manuals and other training literature. The troops were roadbound, reconnaissance was inadequate, and leadership was weak and nonaggressive. Action generally was lacking in coordination, and too little attention was paid to cooperation between the various arms. But the fundamental

17. Both the corps-directed and army-directed exercises of the Tennessee maneuvers were prepared by Second Army Headquarters.
20. The Army, June, 1941.
21. Ibid.
other items for which no authorized allowance existed) were obtainable from the Army Depot. Class V (ammunition, pyrotechnics, mines, and chemicals) were distributed by the Army Ammunition Depot in the same vicinity.13

Administrative regulations governing the conduct of troops and units on maneuvers and moving to and from the maneuver area were published in a series of directives issued from March to May. These covered such things as the type of reports for units to make; the engineer plan for use of roads and bridges, water supply, camouflage, and maps; signal communications; the handling of mail; care and evacuation of sick and injured personnel; and a thousand other details required by a troop concentration of such scale.14

Supply and administration were directly supervised by Second Army Headquarters which was divided for the purposes of the maneuvers into a forward and rear echelon. The forward echelon was established at Manchester, Tenn., in the center of the maneuver area, while the rear echelon remained in Memphis.

One of the principal criticisms of the 1940 maneuvers had been the unreal situations which had developed because of faulty umpiring. Every effort was made to remedy this fault. Col. Marion O. French, Deputy Chief of Staff, was designated as Chief Umpire, with Col. Robert F. Hyatt as deputy Chief Umpire. Early in March all commanders were directed to make certain that all officers who were to act as umpires were properly instructed in their duties, and to use the opportunities afforded by the exercises of the combined training period to give the necessary umpire training for officers and enlisted men.15 Officers and noncommissioned officers, detailed as artillery umpires, artillery fire umpires, and assistants to artillery fire umpires, were sent to a Second Army Umpire School, under the direction of Brig. Gen. Ralph Talbot, Jr., artillery commander of the 6th Division, at Camp Forrest from 5-10 May 1941.16

Unit commanders and umpires were warned that "Maneuvers are not contests in any sense of the word and will fail of their purpose unless commanders exercise the necessary control of the competitive urge of both themselves and their units." This did not mean that troops should not energetically and enthusiastically participate in maneuvers, but that the principal effort should be directed towards executing sound tactical and administrative operations.

Commanders were to explain to their troops that maneuver rules were the substitutes for bullets, projectiles, and bombs, and that the maneuver rules given in the GHQ Umpire Manual were "the result of experience extending over a number of years. Thorough knowledge of these rules, strict adherence to them, and prompt, cheerful compliance by commanders with umpires' decisions—all these are essential to successful maneuvers." Umpires were told that properly performed umpiring required hard work, initiative, impartiality, tact, and the exercise of good judgment, and that it was not the function of umpires to criticize commanders, but merely to give facts.


14. Ibid, 3 Mar 41; Tng Dir 9, 8 Apr 41; Tng Dir 10, 10 Apr 41; Tng Dir 11, 22 Apr 41; Tng Dir 14, 8 May 41; Tng Dir 19, 24 May 41.

15. Tng Dir 5, 3 Mar 41.

16. Tng Dir 9, 8 Mar 41.
Supply and administration of the maneuvers were the joint responsibility of the Second Army and the Fourth Corps Area. The War Department had charged the corps area commanders concerned with the following specific duties in connection with the maneuvers:

a. Obtaining maneuver trespass rights and leases for areas required for the maneuvers.

b. Making available to the field force commanders concerned at least one officer for detail on each board set up for the settling of claims. In addition to serving as a member of the board, this officer will serve as liaison officer between the board and the Corps Area Commander.

c. Arrange for rail transportation and execute movements of troops, impediments and equipment to and from a designated railhead in or near the maneuver area. The movements will be based upon details to be furnished by the field force commander concerned.

d. Deliveries of supplies to Army supply points in accordance with plan of supply prepared by the Field Force Commander and approved by HQ and the War Department.

e. Arrange for commercial telephone and telegraph, including telegraph printer service.

f. Arrange for care and evacuation of casualties from Army force medical installations, which are beyond the capabilities of the field force commanders.

At the same time field force commanders were charged with the following administrative duties:

a. Settling of claims which may arise during the maneuvers. One officer on each board will be designated by the Corps Area Commander concerned.

b. Furnishing the Corps Area Commanders concerned with all detailed information upon which to execute rail movements of troops, impediments and equipment to and from designated railheads in the maneuver area, in accordance with WR & 6-1.

c. Receipt, storage and distribution of supplies stocked at Army supply points.

d. Arranging all details concerning transportation, conducting, lodging and messing of distinguished guests, observers, and members of the press.

e. Publicity and public relations matters incident to maneuvers.

The supply plan of Second Army for the Tennessee maneuvers, in accordance with this directive, established an Army Depot at Murfreesboro, Tenn., with railheads at Manchester, Tullahoma, Wartrace, Murfreesboro, Chattanooga, Camp Forrest, Ft. Oglethorpe, and Shelbyville. Class I supplies (rations) were delivered from the depot daily at these railheads in accordance with telegrams from units in the field. Class II (clothing) was issued only on emergency requisition from the Quartermaster, Army Depot, as all units were instructed to bring full T/bs with them. Arms and tools were obtained from the Army Depot and from the Army Ordnance Maintenance shop on US Highway 241, 2.6 miles south of the middle fork of Stone's River. Class III (gasoline) was handled in the same method as rations, by filing of daily telegram of requirements at the assigned railhead. Units were instructed to bring their full requirements of oil, grease, and lubricants with them, but necessary replenishment was obtained from Army Quartermaster at the Army Depot. Class IV (construction materials, spare parts, and

12. WD ltr A^2 320.2 (-20-41) M-C-M, 14 Apr 41, sub: Div of Duties between Fld Force and Corps Area Comdrs incident to Corps and Army Maneuvers, 1941. AG 355-3.
practicable date in order that the training of individuals might be advanced as far as possible prior to division exercises.  

In the meantime G-3 of the Second Army had begun the detailed planning for maneuvers. The training of divisions was speeded up by having two prescribed exercises a week instead of one during the combined training period. In addition, the time devoted to Corps training was shortened by interspersing the tail end of combined training with the beginning of Corps training and by emphasizing marches, bivouacs, tactical exercises, tests, and the development of Standard Operating Procedures in the division exercises.

Colonel Walker went to San Antonio, Tex., the last week in January to confer with Lt. Col. George R. Barker, G-3, Third Army, concerning the arrangements for the GHQ directed maneuvers in September. The Second Army plan and schedule was completed and forwarded for review by GHQ.

The plan was approved by GHQ and on 3 March 1941 Second Army issued a directive listing the various units to participate in corps and army training and the dates of their participation. The purpose of the training was said to be, "To determine the effectiveness with which the principles of training management, training methods and the provisions of current training directives have been applied during the Mobilization Training Program and Combined Training Periods."

Staff sections of Second Army Headquarters were making preparations for the coming maneuvers. A staff memorandum authorized each section chief to submit personnel requirements up to 80 percent of that authorized for army headquarters by T/O 200-1, 1 January 1941, to the extent necessary to enable "the new personnel plus that authorized now....to efficiently perform the duties of your section throughout the summer maneuvers."

The engineer section made a detailed reconnaissance of possible maneuver areas in the vicinity of Camp Forrest, Tenn. The area finally selected was that between the Duck River and the Tennessee-Cumberland divide in the vicinity of Tullahoma and Camp Forrest. The lateral lines were in general Highway 41, running northwest from Manchester, and Highway 241, northeast of Shelbyville. The principal features of the terrain in this area were the Duck River, a stream approximately 20 to 50 yards in width, and the Tennessee-Cumberland divide. The Duck River was crossed by a number of light bridges between Manchester and Shelbyville and by several modern concrete bridges at each of these towns. There were vehicular fords between these points. The banks were generally steep and the bottoms rocky. Between the vehicular fords, the stream was fordable by individuals at a number of points.

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7. Ibid.
8. Col Walker to Lt Col Clark, 3 Feb 41. Same to Lt Col George R. Barker, 3 Feb 41. Hist Off files. Second Army to CofS GHQ, 7 Feb 41, sub: Corps and Army Tng. AG 353-3.
Chapter III
MANEUVERS-1941

The first indication of the maneuvers which were to be the climax of the peacetime training program came to Second Army, 30 November 1940, in an informal note from Lt. Col. Mark W. Clark of the G-3 Section, GHQ, to Col. Fred L. Walker, G-3 Second Army. Colonel Clark wrote: "We are going to put out a training directive to cover a 3-4 months period after MTP training (13 weeks) is completed. It will also set up Corps and Army Maneuvers. Only some Corps will have exercises. All armies will have exercises, probably 2nd and 3rd Armies combined with GHQ at Beauvogard in September."1

On 7 January 1941, GHQ issued a letter on the 1940 maneuvers which included this comment: "While the maneuvers were executed with commendable enthusiasm and fortitude by both officers and enlisted men the demonstrated faults were so numerous and of such moment as to set up formidable tasks for future training." The principal deficiencies found were listed as follows:

1. Obviously deficient training of small units and in minor tactics.
2. Faulty employment of the infantry division and of its combat teams.
3. Failure fully to appreciate the purpose and exploit the capabilities of motor vehicles.
4. Inadequate reconnaissance; lack of contact between adjacent units.
5. Faulty signal communications.
6. Too passive employment of antitank guns.
7. Improper employment of horse cavalry.
8. Neglect of ammunition supply and evacuation of wounded.
9. Unreal situations due to faulty umpiring.2

A week later GHQ issued another letter scheduling corps and army training to consist of command post exercises, field exercises, and field maneuvers. This training was to follow the period of combined training called for by the GHQ letter of 4 January mentioned above. Dates for the field exercises were to be selected by army commanders, but it was desired that corps training be completed before 30 June 1941, in order to use 1941 funds, and that army training be completed not later than 30 August, because some of the first priority divisions of the National Guard were scheduled to be released from Federal service soon after that date.3

Second Army immediately directed each division to establish a school for all general and field officers "in which the unsatisfactory features of maneuvers, as set forth in the letter GHQ, January 7, 1941...will be studied to insure corrective action for those deficiencies."4 The Commanding General, VII Army Corps, was ordered to prepare and direct a division series of exercises for the 5th, 6th, and 27th Divisions during the month of June, and for the 33rd and 35th Divisions during the month of August. Headquarters, Second Army, was to prepare and direct similar exercises for the 2nd Cavalry Division during the period 4-5 August.5

Regular Army and National Guard units were directed to make arrangements to receive the selectees necessary to bring their units to full war strength at the earliest

1. Hist Off files.
2. GHQ ltr 354.2/17, 7 Jan 41, sub: Comments on Army Maneuvers, 1940. Hist Off files.
5. Ibid.
acknowledging the receipt of this letter on post-maneuver training, General Lear added:

Prior to receipt of the foregoing letter, this headquarters had issued Training Directive No. 32...and others preceding it, prescribing an intensive program of basic and small-unit training and tests designed to correct observed deficiencies. Should it become apparent early in the review period that the additional training and tests ordered by your directive will result in an undesirable crowding of the Training and lack of thoroughness in its execution, this headquarters will request at that time an extension of the period beyond the four months now prescribed.55

Training under this program had just begun when it was interrupted by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war. Before the changes caused by these events can be discussed, however, other aspects of the administrative and training program of Second Army during the peacetime training period must be examined.

55. Lt Gen Ben Lear to CofS CHQ, 7 Nov 41, sub: Post-Maneuver Tng. AG 353-91.
Between Lucky and Jonesboro, La. 6 mi. east of Saline Bayou. Gen Lear observing 69th Ar Regt tank charge against gun implacements.
Chapter IV

INSPECTIONS AND TESTS

Through reports, inspections, and tests, Second Army Headquarters kept itself informed concerning the numerous and varied units making up the army. Reports, covering every phase of training, administration, and supply, were periodically received from each of the subordinate organizations. In addition all training publications were forwarded to headquarters for review and approval. In this way the staff sections were able to keep records of the training progress of each unit and to know the status of its personnel and equipment.

INSPECTIONS

Inspections were more satisfactory than reports for keeping touch with subordinate units. Reports are written on paper, and no matter how complete or accurately prepared they could not give a full picture of training. Visits of inspection, however, enabled headquarters officers to obtain exact knowledge by observation on the ground and through consultation with unit commanders.

Division inspections began before activation. At GHQ suggestion the Commanding General of Second Army and his staff officers conferred with the Commanding General and staff of each of the National Guard divisions at their home stations to review proposed training plans and programs. Then, as soon after induction as possible, a visit of observation to the new station of the division was made by General Lear. These initial visits were chiefly for the purpose of ascertaining whether adequate housing and training aids and facilities had been constructed.

General Lear spent much of his time in the field inspecting units. He was usually accompanied by staff officers. and he left to them the inspection of training and technical subjects. He preferred to walk around the posts inspecting the men, quarters, and mess halls to see whether or not his troops were living, acting, and looking as soldiers should. He did not underrate the importance of tactical or technical training but he trusted the specialists on his staff, and he knew that a good unit needed to present an excellent appearance. This determination of General Lear to make soldiers of Second Army troops is illustrated by a letter written to a division commander:

Will you please make special efforts to see that the standard of housekeeping within your units is materially improved. I mean that the arrangement of bunks, clothing etc in the individual tents; the condition of company and battery storerooms; cleanliness of kitchens, should be improved....


3. Interview of Hist Off with Gen Lear in Washington, D.C., 14 Aug 43.

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I believe it would be highly desirable to adopt a method requiring 1st Sergeants, Supply Sergeants, Mess Sergeants and Sergeants in charge of quarters to meet an inspecting officer at the entrance...the noncommissioned officer in question saluting and reporting, "Sir, Sergeant so and so reporting as Mess Sergeant, etc." This question of reporting can be exaggerated within an organization, but it would seem well for a number of the key noncommissioned officers to make the report and then lead the inspecting officer through the noncommissioned officer's activity...

I think it highly desirable that you institute a refresher course on the subject of military courtesies in all units. There was a marked lack of knowledge in this subject evidenced during my inspection yesterday....

Many of the officers of the general and special staff sections were not fully acquainted with the technique and method of inspections or with the subjects to be covered. On 4 November 1940 the Inspector General prepared a check list which was based on the training directives issued by Second Army. This list was mimeographed and circulated among the staff sections with a notation of the acting Chief of Staff: "As each member of the general and special staff will be required from time to time to make inspections pertaining to his particular activity, it is desirable that such officers prepare for their section a guide to, or check list for, inspections."

These inspections by the various staff sections were not coordinated in the early months, but on 30 January 1941 each section was directed to route its requests for authority to make inspections through the G-3 section to the Chief of Staff "in order that a correct tabulation of inspection trips may be maintained by the G-3 section."

A further effort at coordination was made in March when each inspecting officer, prior to his departure from headquarters, was directed to prepare an "Inspection Page" in his notebook. This would show his itinerary and list the specific administrative and training to be inspected. The page was submitted to G-3 for approval and then the inspecting officer visited each General Staff Section to obtain additional information concerning matters to be reported on.

Upon his arrival at each station the inspecting officer made an official call upon the post commander and the senior commander of Army troops, informing them of the contents of the approved inspection page. He inquired completely into each matter under consideration and any other matters brought to his attention. His findings were entered in the notebook in triplicate; one copy went to the commanding officer of the unit inspected, the second to the post commander, and the third was returned to headquarters. On his return he was required to report orally to the proper General Staff section on any matter requiring immediate action, and then to prepare a written report with the third copy of Inspection Page and statement as the body thereof. The report was ended with Action Recommended prepared in "final form" of letter, radio, or other action for approval. Report was then processed to the Chief of Staff through the General Staff sections concerned, and it was the responsibility of the inspecting officer to see that Action Recommended was executed upon its approval by the Chief of Staff.

4. Gen Lear to CG 35th Div, 14 Apr 41. AG 250-1.
6. Second Army Staff Memo 6, 30 Jan 41. AG 300.6-1.
7. Second Army Staff Memo 13, 7 Mar 41. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
This same memorandum defined the purposes for which a staff officer of Second Army headquarters made a visit to any element of the Second Army as follows:

1. Determination of condition of units with respect to housing, personnel, training, equipment, supplies and morale activities.
2. Determination of all facts bearing on any unsatisfactory conditions existing at the time of visit.
3. Assistance by advice and instruction to improve training and administrative procedure.
4. Action to correct unsatisfactory conditions by report and recommendation to the Army Commander when adjustment locally is not secured.9

These visits of inspection were a regular part of the routine of each section and resulted in representatives of the headquarters being at each of the stations of Second Army units at frequent intervals. As an example, inspection visits to the 35th Division at Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark., began on 3 January 1941 (four days before the division completed mobilization) when Col. Henry C. Merrim, Inspector General, accompanied the Inspector General of the 35th Division for eleven days on the initial inspections of the various units of the division.10 This was followed on 28-29 January by an inspection of medical units by the Second Army Surgeon, and of quartermaster units by the Second Army Quartermaster on 19-20 February. There was an ordnance inspection on 6-7 March, at the same time that the Commanding General, Second Army, was inspecting various activities of the division. A full inspection of the division by Maj. Gen. F. H. Smith, Commander of the VII Army Corps, and his staff officers was made from 21-24 April. The Chemical Officer, Second Army, was also checking on chemical activities in the division on 23-24 April.11

Similar visits of inspection were made throughout the year and to all of the units of the Second Army, but there were so many units and they were so widely scattered that it was a very difficult task for the headquarters sections to keep check on all of them. GHQ, on 7 July 1941, severely rebuked Second Army and the other field armies for permitting units to progress to maneuvers who were not adequately trained and prepared.12 Second Army was aware of this fault, as shown by the comment of Col. Arthur B. Conard, G-4: "In some cases it has been found that the Chief of Section did not know whether a unit scheduled for activation June 1 had been activated.... The outstanding exception to the above has been the Office of the Army Surgeon. It appears well acquainted and up to date on the conditions of medical units in the Second Army."13

In an attempt to remedy this situation each Special Staff Section Chief was required to maintain in his office "a continuous record showing the conditions at all times of each Second Army unit of his arm or service." Section Chiefs were also reminded that it was their responsibility "that the lists prepared by them of service troops that are to participate in the August-September maneuvers are thoroughly reliable as regards condition and availability of units so listed."14

9. Ibid.
10. IG 35th Div to TIG, 1 Feb 41, sub: Inspections. AG 333.1-21.
11. Rpts of these various inspections are to be found in AG 333.1-21.
12. GHQ ltr 353/400-C, 7 Jul 41, sub: Review of Tng Prior to Further Corps and Army Tng. AG 353-6 (Fe '41).
14. Second Army Staff Memo 58, 17 Jul 41.

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Special inspections for particular purposes were occasionally ordered by the Commanding General, Second Army. At the close of the August-September maneuvers four special inspection teams were constituted "for the purpose of making inspections of units departing from maneuver area and en route to home stations." These teams were instructed to cover the following subjects:

1. Dress and cleanliness of troops.
2. March control and discipline.
3. Conduct of troops in communities during halts and marches.
4. Method of making and breaking camp.
5. Supervision exercised by Regimental, Battalion, and Company Commanders of the activities of their units.
6. Condition and care of transportation.
7. Care of transportation at end of day's march.
8. Loading of transportation.
9. Unauthorized equipment.
10. The Team inspecting the 2nd Cavalry Division will, in addition to the subjects mentioned above, include condition of animals; both those shipped and those marching with troops. This Team will proceed to Fort Riley and return to Memphis by Government plane.15

TESTS

Inspections and reports were valuable sources of information concerning the units in the field but they could not measure the progress of the troops in the all-important matter of training. Tests were the means selected for ascertaining training progress. GHQ's original letter on training said:

Responsibility for satisfactory results in training rests first with the commander who exercises immediate control, and next with higher commanders who supervise training. Satisfactoriness of training in a particular subject will be determined positively upon completion by practical test. Such tests will be given in appropriate form by higher commanders of all echelons up to and including General Headquarters. If results are unsatisfactory, training will be repeated or supplemented.16

The 27th Division was the first of the Second Army Divisions to begin MTP training, and in December the Army G-3 wrote to GHQ:

It is planned to make a test of the training of the 27th Division by the Second Army Commander and members of his staff immediately after the thirteen (13) weeks have been completed. This test will be thorough and in detail, and will probably require four (4) days at least. The detail tests are now being worked out here. We will go into every subject but will not attempt

15. Tng Dir 29, 2 Oct 41, sub: Special Inspections. AG 353-8.
16. GHQ ltr, no file number, 16 Sep 40, sub: Tng. AG 353-41.
to test all units. However, it is planned that at least one (1) unit of every type will be tested.17

Later it was decided that the test of the 27th Division was to be directly under the VII Corps with the aid and cooperation of Headquarters, Second Army. The VII Corps was directed to bring in Brig. Gen. Cortlandt Parker and twelve Regular Army officers from the 5th Division to conduct the tests, and officers from the Inspector General, Medical, Quartermaster, Signal, Chemical Warfare Service, Air Engineer, G-3, and G-4 sections, Second Army, were also furnished.18

Each of the general and special staff sections of Headquarters, Second Army, was directed to prepare suitable written tests, based on appropriate MTP's for whatever use the VII Corps wanted to make of them in the 27th Division tests and for subsequent use in the later testing program of the army. Each of the tests was to include questions to be asked individuals, especially instructors, to test knowledge, and demonstrations to test skill. Emphasis was to be placed on the development of skill.19

The tests were administered jointly by representatives of Second Army Headquarters and VII Corps Headquarters and conducted by General Parker and his testing group. They were observed by General McNair, General Lear, and other high-ranking officers of General Headquarters and Headquarters, Second Army.20 At the conclusion of the tests a critique was held at which the Corps Commander, the test coordinators, and the highest ranking observers commented on the result and the significance of the four-day activities. General McNair, Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, congratulated General Lear for initiating the tests, and General Smith, VII Corps Commander, for preparing and executing them. "This inspection," he said, "is the first occasion of the inspection of a division in this wholesale and comprehensive manner,.... It has been a splendid performance." He was enthusiastic as to the future training value of the tests. "I don't say this is the only way in which a division can be tested," he observed, "but it is the best test I have ever seen."

Concerning the distinctive character of this type of test General McNair said: "This has been a 'test' in my phraseology, as distinguished from an inspection or a visit.... This has been the hard way, and its effects will be correspondingly great, principally because we have required the unit to do things....which have a bearing on combat effectiveness."21

17. Col Fred L. Walker to Lt Col Mark W Clark, GHQ, 18 Dec 40. This ltr, which contained a detailed resume of the testing activities of the Second Army, was shown to Gen McNair, CofS GHQ, and caused him to comment, "Apparently the Second Army is on the job." Lt Col Clark to Col Walker, 29 Dec 40. In Hist Off files.

18. Col Fred. L. Walker to Col J. Lawton Collins, G-3 VII Army Corps, 25 Jan 41. AG 300.6-1 (Staff Memos).

19. Second Army Staff Memo 3, 3 Feb 41.


Gen. George C. Marshall added his commendation to that of General McNair. In a letter to General Lear of 7 March 1941, he said: "Please accept my high appreciation of your initiative and resolute and effective execution of training policies as exemplified by this test." He observed further that there is no doubt that such an exercise was "of high value in promoting training and increasing tactical efficiency." 22

The test given the 27th Division revealed many of the same deficiencies in training that have been pointed out in connection with maneuvers. 23 The Commanding General of the 27th Division was directed to prescribe a program of activities for correction of the deficiencies revealed by the test. 24 Moreover, copies of the VII Corps Commander's resume of the results of the tests and of his proposed remedies were sent to all Second Army Divisions for their information and guidance. 25

The first MTP tests to be prepared and administered directly by Second Army Headquarters were those given to the 5th Division, 24-27 March 1941. 26 Headquarters personnel were assisted in administering the tests by several officers of the 6th Division. The tests were observed by General McNair and several other GHQ staff members. 27

These tests were similar to those given the previous month to the 27th Division. On the first day sample groups throughout the Division were tested in such elementary matters as military courtesy, Articles of War, sex hygiene, and close order drill. On the subsequent days testing was of a more specialized nature; weapons platoons were examined for the use of their principal arms; signal groups were tested in the use of communications facilities; headquarters platoons were examined for staff duties; intelligence platoons were tested in the reading of maps and aerial photographs; infantry battalions were given tactical problems of attack and defense; and artillery battalions were tested in reconnaissance, occupation, and organization of position. In short, the testing consisted of mass examination in fundamentals common to all troops and group examination in activities of an advanced or specialized character. The sampling procedure was followed throughout, so as to reduce the number of examinees to practicable proportions. This procedure made possible the testing of a division in all phases of the mobilization training program by a group of approximately fifty officers in a period of four days. 28 The results of the tests revealed the same fundamental weaknesses in basic individual and unit training as had been previously found in the 27th Division tests and which were to be severely criticized in the 1941 maneuvers.


23. See pp 31-32, 34, above.


25. Second Army memo to Second Army staff and Div Comdrs, 11 Mar 41, sub: Result of MTP Tng Tests. AG 353-6. The 5th Div was not attached to a Corps, but was supervised directly by Second Army HQ.

26. The tests were prepared by G-3 Sec with assistance for technical phases of the Special Staff Secs. Brig Gen (then Col) Fred L. Walker, Col John B. Sherman, Maj (then Capt) Horace E. Odell, and Maj (then Capt) William R. Overbeck had a conspicuous part in the drawing up of the tests.

27. See correspondence relating to these tests in AG 353-19.

Other Second Army components, large and small, were tested in the following months. Units assigned or attached to Corps were tested by Corps, with representatives from Second Army usually participating in the testing of divisions. Separate units were usually examined by groups operating directly from Second Army Headquarters, though occasionally divisions and smaller units were called on to conduct the tests for units in their vicinity.29

After maneuvers the testing program was greatly extended by Second Army Training Directive No. 32. This directive, a supplement to Training Directive No. 25, covered the period 1 November 1941 to 31 October 1942 and consisted principally of a series of check lists of which the following, "Test of the Light Machine Gun Section (Of Rifle Company Weapons Platoon)," is a typical example:

1. Are all members trained in technique of fire of light machine gun? In use of pistol, rifle and automatic rifle?
2. Is section properly organized and equipped?
3. Are members adequately trained to be interchangeable?
4. Are cover positions selected as well as suitable fire positions? Are positions properly prepared and occupied? Alternate positions?
5. Does leader exercise proper fire direction, control and discipline?
6. Does leader exhibit the desired qualities of leadership? Does he properly exercise his command functions?
7. Does section displace at proper time and in proper manner?
8. Is section properly disposed in attack? In defense?
9. Are emplacements properly constructed? Intrenchments?
10. Can squads and sections function when leaders are casualties?
11. Can it protect itself against air, gas and mechanized attacks?
12. Has it been instructed in the use and preservation of the "C" ration? 30

The directive cautioned commanders that the topics listed for testing were only suggestions and did not encompass the whole subject of field training in every detail. Answers to these items were to be obtained to the greatest possible extent by practical tests, "though commanders and individuals of the groups being tested should be questioned also to determine their understanding of the situation and the subject. The tests should be in the form of field exercises in which each unit is required to demonstrate its proficiency while operating against a hostile force (imaginary, outlined, or preferably represented). It is not necessary that each squad, for example, be tested in every point listed, but each squad must be tested in some of the points and the sum of those tested in any one company must include all the points listed."31

The testing program was completed by the addition of combat firing proficiency tests for infantry and cavalry Platoons, and service practice and tests for artillery, which were prescribed by GHQ on 30 October 1941.32 These tests, which covered every

30. 30 Oct 41. AG 353-8.
phase of training, were one of the most significant features of Second Army training. Weaknesses in training disclosed by these tests were remedied by additional training. But many units could not fairly be blamed for failures which were caused not by their own inadequacies but by frequent changes in personnel, enlisted men and officers.
Problems of personnel plagued the prewar training program of the Second Army. Some of these have already been discussed, such as the use of trained Regular Army enlisted men as cadre for new units and to operate the installations of the Corps Area Service Command. But these were by no means the most severe. An Army can be no stronger than the men of whom it is composed, and the Army of the United States was short of trained and capable personnel.

PROCUREMENT OF OFFICERS

Divisions and other units of the National Guard were understrength in both officers and enlisted men when they were inducted into Federal service. The War Department, on 24 October 1940, authorized each of the National Guard units inducted on 15 September and 15 October to expand to their full war strength of officers, and directed the remaining National Guard units to commence such action upon their arrival at unit training centers. The initial procurement of officers, "as far as practicable," was provided from qualified warrant officers and enlisted men of the National Guard.1

Second Army immediately directed the Commanding General of the 27th Division to prepare an estimate of the number of vacancies which could be filled by promotion or appointment from within the division and also the number which would have to be filled from sources outside the division.2 On 15 November the 27th Division replied, listing a total of 459 vacancies in grades from second lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. It was recommended that 312 of these vacancies be filled from within the division and 177 from outside.3 The necessary examining boards were appointed, and the division commander was authorized to direct the immediate appearance of candidates before them.4 The remaining officers were procured from the ranks of the Officer Reserve Corps by requisition, with only unavoidable delays and complications.

This relatively easy solution of the officer problem of the 27th Division did not hold true for all units. A copy of the original War Department letter was sent to the 35th Division prior to its induction, and the same instructions given to it that had been given to the 27th Division. The 35th Division completed its concentration at Camp J. T. Robinson on 7 January 1941, and on 8 February General Lear wrote a personal letter to General Truman in which he said that full officer and noncommissioned officer strength was a matter of paramount importance. The military forces of the United States were to be expanded, new divisions were to be formed, and units of the Second Army would have to furnish a "proportionate share of trained officers and trained noncommissioned officers to form the training cadre...for any new divisions that are to be organized." For this reason General Truman should begin steps to fill his division "by induction of reserve officers in the near future."5

2. Second Army ltr to 27th Div, 31 Oct 41. AG 210.31-41.
3. 27th Div ltr to Second Army, 15 Nov 40. Ibid.
4. Second Army ltr to 27th Div, 29 Nov 40. Ibid.
5. Lt Gen Ben Lear to Maj Gen Ralph E. Truman, 8 Feb 41. AG 210.3-5.
General Truman replied that he had previously discussed with General Lear a proposed plan of making our own officers....I feel that I have, among my noncommissioned officers, those who would make good officers if they were only given an opportunity, and I believe that it would be well, at this time to take certain noncommissioned officers and send them to schools to better prepare them for commissions.

"To my way of thinking it would be a reflection upon my Division, and especially upon my noncommissioned officers, were I to ask for Reserve Officers to fill any existing vacancies that I might have, other than specialists such as Medical or Dental Officers, and if we do not give our noncommissioned officers an opportunity for commissions the morale in my organization will undoubtedly be affected."

A short time later one of the Second Army staff visited the 35th Division, and, in his report of a conversation with General Truman, said:

Gen. Truman had a "heart to heart" talk with Col. Byers and myself; stated he knew his officer shortcomings, with special references to inefficient Brigade Commanders....I am convinced that General Truman and his regimental commanders are generally opposed to bringing in Reserve Officers ....Division and probably most regimental commanders favor filling vacancies by promotion and appointment of men within their commands. All stick to "State Lines" and forget the "One Army" idea. At final conference I pointed out to Gen. Truman that in attempting to fill all vacancies by promotion from within, the number of second lieutenants to be promoted would be very large, and that I doubted if there were enough qualified officers entitled to such promotion. General Truman wanted to wait until April lst to give officers a tryout. I told him that the Army Commander did not want to delay that long.

General Lear called General McNair, Chief of Staff, GHQ, concerning this problem and the Second Army memorandum of their conversation ran as follows:

Commanding General called General McNair to confirm War Department policy with respect to promptly filling National Guard Divisions with reserve officers to war strength after all promotions have been made and noncommissioned officers immediately eligible have been appointed. General McNair stated that this was definitely the War Department policy. General Lear stated some National Guard Divisions appeared reluctant to accept this policy and manifested a strong desire to hold their vacancies until they had qualified noncommissioned officers through the process of a 90 day candidate school. General McNair indicated that the War Department directive for requisitions for reserve officers should be adhered to.

After this conversation General Lear replied to General Truman that he understood his desire to fill commissioned vacancies from the division, but called his attention to the fact that the 35th Division enlisted men had had an opportunity to qualify for commissions before being inducted into service. "You have also," he continued, "been given an opportunity to determine through Boards of Officers the numbers and names of

6. Maj Gen Truman to Lt Gen Lear, 11 Feb 41. Ibid.
7. Second Army memo, G-1 for CofS, 13 Feb 41. AG 210.31-3.
8. Second Army record of telephone conversation between CG and CofS GHQ, 13 Feb 41. AG 210.3-5.
enlisted men who are now in your division who might possibly be qualified for commissions at this time...I assure you that, should the Boards report favorably, it will be my desire to approve their action." If these actions did not fill all the commissioned vacancies he was expected to requisition through Army Headquarters all the necessary officers to bring the Division up to war strength.9

This letter did not completely succeed in its purpose. For one reason or another the division delayed in submitting its requisition, but Second Army took no drastic action. On 25 April the Asst G-1 prepared a memorandum for the Chief of Staff entitled "Chronological Summary of Action to fill Officer Vacancies in the 35th Division," but it seems never to have been used.10 Finally, however, the requisitions were sent in, and by 19 June 1941 most of the shortages had been filled.11

Reserve officers, trained by the R.O.T.C. and C.M.T.C. programs, made up the largest number of officers for the new training program. The War Department, on 18 October 1940, allocated 8,128 of these reserve officers to troop units during the period 18 November 1940 to 10 February 1941. Second Army immediately instructed unit commanders to report their authorized number of officers and the number of reserve officers required, by grade and arm or service, to bring unit to war strength. On receipt of this information Second Army indorsed the requisitions over to the corps area commander concerned to be filled.12

These individual requisitions, submitted at any time that the need arose, created great difficulties for the corps area commanders and staff, and on 28 March 1941 Second Army, at the request of the Fourth Corps Area Commander, devised a regular system for the requisitioning of reserve officers. Each division and separate unit commander was required to prepare and submit consolidated requisitions for their commands and attached units on a monthly basis. Requisitions were to reach the Second Army on the 10th of each month and were to anticipate losses by reason of relief from active duty and transfer. Vacancies for which special qualifications were required or desired were to be so indicated, as were the dates and places for officers to report.13

This revised system worked more smoothly, but not without difficulty; and, as with most things in this newly expanded army, there was need for continual adjustment. The original assignments of officers were so hurried and their training in some instances was so inadequate that many strange situations developed. Not typical, but still not unusual, was the experience of the 9th Cavalry, whose commander reported:

Of the officers ordered to report to the 9th Cavalry on February 20, 1941, 1 major, 1 captain, and 19 lieutenants reported. The major is a very good man who knows little about riding, soldiers or military matters.

9. Gen Lear to Gen Truman, 13 Feb 41. AG 310.3-5.
10. Ibid.
11. 35th Div to CG Second Army, 19 Jun 41, sub: Rpt of Off Shortage. AG 210.31-3.
13. Second Army ltr, 28 Mar 41, sub: Asgmt of Res Off to RA and NG Units to Bring Them Up to Authorized Strength. AG 210.31-16.
The captain is worthless at this time as an officer; he may eventually make an officer, but I doubt it. The 19 lieutenants varied from very satisfactory to worthless. Of the 21 alleged cavalry officers of this group, only 6 were able to mount a horse without placing it in a ditch or using other artificial means of mounting. Not one is capable of instructing in riding. These officers were put in garrison school for one month before being assigned to troops....

Under any assumption I am short 9 officers. With 8 officers in school, I am 17 officers short. What is needed most is troops commanders capable of instructing recruits in basic training.

The 9th Cavalry for approximately 18 years has been on duty other than that of a combat regiment. The noncommissioned officers have had little experience in training recruits, training remounts, or combat duties. Several 1st Sergeants are really recruits in riding. This explains the necessity for a full complement of officers.14

Conditions such as these caused the War Department to direct that reserve officers be given a preliminary period of refresher training with already activated units. This would serve the dual purpose of giving needed training to officers and also relieve the shortage of officers in units caused by school and other details. "Each army commander," the directive continued, "will without delay inform the commander of each corps area in which units of his army are stationed as to the specific Regular Army units to which the temporary assignment of additional Reserve officers is practicable. The size of this overstrength will be stated by Army Commanders in each case, but subject to limitations imposed by local conditions, will not be less than ten percent nor greater than twenty percent of the commissioned strength authorized by tables of organization."15

General Lear was very much concerned about the quality of officers. On 6 February he wrote that in some instances "the special technical qualifications of officers" had not been considered in assigning them to duty with units of the Second Army. This was not the fault of individual commanders but had been caused by the hurried call to duty of so many reserve officers and assigning them to units to provide them with the necessary officer complement, rather than taking time to investigate the individual's background before making his assignment. To remedy this it was desired that:

1. The qualifications of the individual officer be studied before making an initial assignment and that his initial assignment be determined, insofar as practicable, by his qualifications or lack thereof.

2. Every effort be made to develop leadership by giving officers with leadership and command ability assignments to command units appropriate to their grade and experience.

3. Officers possessing special technical qualifications and background be assigned to technical units of their arm or branch; and that whenever an officer of technical qualification, important in a technical branch of service, is not properly assigned that he be transferred to the service where his abilities may be put to the best use....

If this policy is not observed, officers may be reported unjustly as inefficient and their reclassification recommended.


whereas the failure to produce the desired results may be due to the fact that the officer's original assignment was not appropriate to his qualifications or to his prior experience and training.  

The chief remedy for inadequately trained officers, utilized by the War Department, GHQ, and Second Army, was schools. There were schools of all kinds, for all grades, and in all the arms and services. These schools were conducted by units themselves and by higher commanders. Special courses were given at all the separate schools of the arms and services and at the Command and General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth. Through these schools and experience in the field the officers learned the technique of their new jobs.

RECLASSIFICATION OF OFFICERS

Some of the officers proved to be incapable of handling the new responsibilities imposed upon them and had to be removed from the field forces. On 29 April 1941 Second Army directed all commanders to familiarize themselves with the regulations governing reclassification of commissioned officers which were to be applied in all appropriate cases. The directive then continued:

The Armies of the United States are engaged in intensive training for one purpose, and that is the attainment of combat efficiency. If and when we are drawn into war, our enemy may consist of powerful, modern armies, efficiently trained, efficiently equipped, skillfully led and consisting almost entirely of veteran officers and soldiers trained to the minute in the requirements of modern combat and animated by a fiercely aggressive spirit and a fanatical attachment to their leader.

To visualize the conditions of combat against such an enemy and to prepare for it mentally, morally and physically must be the constant and conscientious concern of every commander. Elimination of unfit, inefficient and incompetent leaders is of greater and farther reaching consequences than the elimination of defective and inefficient weapons and equipment. Replacement of unsuitable by competent leaders must be accomplished with the same skill and judgment that are exercised in replacing obsolete and ineffective weapons. The question of eliminating an unfit leader must be decided with the same calm, clear and detached judgment that is exercised with respect to the technical efficiency of armament. It must be free from all considerations, friendly or unfriendly.

If and when we are drawn into war, the people of the United States will insist that the leadership of their sons in battle be entrusted only to the most competent commanders of all ranks that we can obtain. The responsibility for exercising this imperative function of leadership increases in proportion to the rank of the commander. Great care must be exercised to prevent injustice, but the necessity for expeditious action in weeding out incompetent leaders, whenever and wherever these are found, is equally as urgent as the speedy accomplishment of the program of rearmament.


17. AG 352.

General Lear at first desired to have a single reclassification board to which all reclassification cases in the Second Army would be submitted. The board was to consist of five permanently detailed members and a recorder. Three of these officers were to be from the Regular Army and one each from the National Guard and Reserve components. The officers were not available, and numerous part-time boards were established at Second Army camps or stations and utilized as cases arose. A permanent Second Army reclassification board was established on 7 October 1941 to supplement these local boards and continued to operate until reclassification was taken over by Service Commands in 1942.

Some progress was made towards getting rid of incompetent officers, but reclassification procedure was slow and cumbersome. On 25 June 1941 General Lear recommended that it be simplified by permitting the commander having reclassification jurisdiction to refer each case to a competent officer for investigation, recommendation, and formal report. During this investigation the officer concerned, with counsel, could be present and afforded an opportunity to cross examine witnesses, call witnesses, and appear as a witness in his own behalf. This report, with all evidence and the investigating officer's recommendation, would be submitted to the commander, who would take action subject to review by the War Department.

This recommendation met with no response, and little progress was being made with reclassification cases. In September General Marshall wrote to General Lear enclosing a chart to illustrate the operation of reclassification, and added: "The charts depict a shocking lack of attention to the important matter of handling such procedures expeditiously. The small number of cases indicates also the absence of an appreciation of the necessity for initiating steps promptly to eliminate those officers who are impeding the development of an efficient Army."

Second Army, to 10 January 1942, handled 84 cases under AR 605-230. Sixteen of these were reassigned without reference to the reclassification board; 6 were forwarded to the Western Defense Command as troops passed from Second Army jurisdiction; 1 had the recommendation for reclassification disapproved; 14 officers had resigned; 46 cases had been investigated and reported on by the board; and 1 was then pending in the board. Some of the officers in this category, whose year of service was almost up, were permitted to continue to serve their time out, but the extension of their active duty was not recommended.

Reclassification involved officers of all grades, each arm or service, and of all components. It was the policy of Second Army to cause "as little embarrassment as possible to officers who must be separated from the service and from field force.

19. Lt Gen Ben Lear to TAG, 29 Apr 41, sub: Reclassification of Commissioned Off. AG 210.01-7.
23. Second Army informal memo, 10 Jan 42, sub: Reclassification Commissioned Off. AG 210.01-25
24. Brig Gen C. P. George, CG 60th FA Brig to TAG, 16 Nov 41. AG 210.31-109. Gen Lear to Gen Lawton, CG 33d Div, 20, Oct 41. AG 210.01-29
assignments owing to lack of technical knowledge or for other reasons not involving misconduct or traits of character."  

Many of the officers in the field forces during 1940-1941 were over-age-in-grade. They had to be used in the early months because of the acute shortage of officers, but beginning in September 1941 they were gradually cleared from combat units and transferred to Corps Area Service Command and other overhead installations. This caused relatively severe complications in certain Second Army units, particularly those which had been designated by the War Department for the garrisons of certain Caribbean bases. These units not only had to clear over-age-in-grade officers, but also those reserve and National Guard officers who would not voluntarily waive the restriction of service to the continental United States.

OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOLS

The pressing need for officers made it evident that the potential officer material in the enlisted ranks should be exploited. On 15 January 1941 the War Department announced the establishment "at the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery and Coast Artillery Schools courses of three-months duration for Officer Candidates, beginning July 1, 1941." Warrant officers and enlisted men who had served six months in active federal service and who would have at least three months to serve on the opening date of the course were eligible to apply. There were to be a total of 500 candidates in each course, divided among the four schools, with four courses scheduled for 1941.

Second Army immediately reproduced this letter and sent it to all units. Candidates from Second Army units were processed through boards appointed by Corps Area commanders. Additional schools were added during the year and Second Army was kept informed, through reports from units and correspondence with Corps Areas, concerning the Second Army men who attended them. The numbers involved were small, only around 300 from all Second Army units in 1941, and the Army itself had no direct responsibility in the matter.
Enlisted personnel problems were as numerous as those concerning officers. The training of a large number of selectees in peacetime was a new task for the army. General Marshall was particularly anxious that nothing happen to discredit the army in the reception, training, and handling of selectees. Each division was instructed to prepare a plan for the training of the newly inducted men, and none was to be sent to a division until after the corps area commander had stated that he had provided proper housing, and the Army commander had decided that the division was ready to receive the selectees and could give them the proper training. Selectees were grouped by themselves and instructed apart from the units until they were qualified, though some, particularly those who had previous military training, were sent to units before the completion of the 13-weeks program.

Frequently divisional training plans were disrupted by the failure of selectees to arrive when scheduled. Second Army tried to find a solution for this problem. On 25 October 1941 a letter was written to The Adjutant General stating that the major units of Second Army were protesting that lack of advanced knowledge as to the future time of arrival and number of trainees to be received prevented orderly planning for the reception of new trainees, the training program, and the preparation of replacement requisitions. It was requested that a schedule of delivery be set up in order that units might know the number of men they were to receive and approximately on what date. In reply The Adjutant General wrote: "Every effort will be made to advise Armies of approximate dates that requisitions of component units will be filled. However, such factors as available skills as developed at Replacement Training Centers, priorities as established by the General Staff, which may be altered from time to time, etc., combined to render inaccurate any long range schedule of replacement to fill quarterly requisitions."

Many units were handicapped by the poor quality of selectees. One of these, and by no means the worst, was "M" Company of the 28th Quartermaster Regiment, whose Commanding Officer wrote:

Out of the ninety-three selectees sent here, there are approximately forty who are either totally or functionally illiterate....Efforts have been put forth with much interest in trying to develop the educational level of these men to the point which would qualify them for efficient truck-drivers as well as qualified soldiers, but due to the fact that the educational level is so low and so much reading and writing is required of an efficient truck driver, very little has been accomplished along this particular line.

RELEASE OF ENLISTED MEN

The slow task of making an army continued in spite of these difficulties. Training at camps and stations and on maneuvers was slowly transforming civilians into soldiers, and the decision of Congress in August 1941 to extend the service of selectees
and National Guard for eighteen additional months meant that training could be con-
tinued. But the executive order carrying out the direction of Congress also provided
for the release of certain men from the army. 33

The normal term of Federal service for selectees, National Guard enlisted men,
Regular Army Reserves, Enlisted Reserves and retired enlisted men, was established as
twelve months from date of induction or date of reporting for active duty. Second Army
was given a quota of 19,300 men to be released from September to December. Releases
were to be at an approximately uniform rate throughout the period and were distributed
among units in varying percentages from 4 to 30 percent a month in accordance with
priority. 34

The initial report of Second Army on 25 September, showed a total of 62 enlisted
men released during the period 1-15 September, but units had reported a total of 26,272
as applying for release in 1941. 35 Second Army immediately took steps to redistribute
the allotment of anticipated releases so as not to exceed its quota of 19,300. 36 The
total number of eligible men continued to increase as additional units reported and
other enlisted men applied, necessitating continued adjustments. 37

These changing allotments made even more complicated the task of the unit com-
mmanders in the field who were already harassed by the "ground rules" of their separate
posts. A typical example is the 53rd Ordnance Company (Am) at Ft. Knox, Ky. The
original quota of this company for release was 15, and immediately 15 of the 23 men
over 28 years of age applied for and received Second Army authority for release. Before
this could be accomplished the quota was cut to nine and, at the same time, six addi-
tional men applied for release on account of hardship. It was Ft. Knox policy to re-
serve a place in the quota for each "hardship" applicant, and it took approximately six
weeks in which to obtain final action in these cases. In the meantime the over-age men,
in a lower priority but whose release had been authorized, were forced to remain in the
army. "It has been thoroughly understood from the start", the commanding officer con-
tinued, "that all releases were subject to revocation, but a serious morale problem has
been created due to our quota being cut a number of times and also due to the fact that some
men inducted in June have been released already while our men, who were inducted in
February, cannot be released. 38

The investigation of these applicants and the arrangements for their release not
only took a valuable time of commanders and other officers, which could have been more
profitably devoted to training, but the loss of the men themselves was a serious drain
on the army. Many of the men, married, with responsibilities, and over twenty-eight
years of age, were the very type the army needed most. Many were in key positions, and

33. WD ltr AG 324.71(8-16-41)EA-A, 22 Aug 41, sub: Release of Enl Men During the
Remainder of Calendar Year 1941. AG 327.3-86.
34. Ibid., Second Army ltr, 28 Sep 41, sub: Number of Enl Men to be Released during
the Remainder of Calendar Year 1941. AG 327.3-86.
35. Second Army to TAG, 25 Sep 41, sub: Release of Enl Men. Ibid.
36. Second Army ltr, 28 Sep 41, sub: Number of Enl Men to be Released during the
Remainder of Calendar Year 1941. Ibid.
37. Second Army ltr, 22 Oct 41, same sub. Ibid.
38. 53d Ord Co (Am) to Second Army, 13 Oct 41, sub: Enl Men to be Released during the
Remainder of Calendar Year 1941. Ibid.
the mere statement of numbers gives no exact idea of the damage done. Nevertheless the numbers themselves are significant and impressive. For example, the 27th Division with a strength of 14,765 lost 1,398 enlisted men; the 33rd Division with a strength of 16,644 lost 2,872; and the 35th Division with a strength of 16,689 men lost 2,167.

There were many problems connected with the routine assignment of commissioned and enlisted personnel. The two following incidents are included because they demonstrated the desire of General Lear and his staff to utilize personnel, enlisted and commissioned, to be best possible advantage for the army as a whole.

The first involved the natural desire of a division commander to retain his officers in his division. On 10 October 1941 the 5th Division commander wrote that although the War Department had recently rescinded its instructions forbidding the transfer of personnel out of the division, he had adopted the policy of forwarding all officer applications for transfer with the indorsement "Not Approved" and requested Second Army to concur. The reaction of the various staff sections was vigorous. The AG said, "Not only does this appear to be his policy on transfers, but also for schools—see attached application." And the Assistant G-1 commented, "Suppose all Divisions took same attitude—WD has lifted the ban—Action of Div Commander would nullify action of WD." The indorsement of the Second Army read "...you are advised that the action taken by this Headquarters will be based on the merits of each case."

The other incident involved eight enlisted men who had been inducted through Selective Service. They were trained and experienced engineers and draftsmen in the fields of mechanical, mining, electrical and diesel engineering. They had been assigned to Troop A, 9th Engineers, for a special engineering job. When this was completed they had nothing but fatigue and other miscellaneous jobs. Finally one of them wrote to Brig. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, ignoring the established channels of communication. The letter was sent to Second Army which endorsed it to division and squadron for investigation. The facts set out were found to be true and the men were immediately transferred to the Engineer section, Second Army, where they proved to be capable and valuable men. One was subsequently discharged but the other seven went to Officer Candidate School and became commissioned officers in the Engineer Corps.

Such individual adjustments could not always be made. Not every soldier in the army could be used in the exact place where his civilian skill could best be utilized. Infantry and artillery soldiers were needed and no such skills were developed in civilian training. Many soldiers consequently believed that they were misplaced when they were being rightly used by the army. The problems of personnel transcended these individual cases. The adjustments and changes in field units caused by the rapid turnover of officers and enlisted men—most of which were unavoidable in a newly created mass army—made even more difficult the accomplishment of effective training and contributed to the low state of morale.

39. Second Army Rad to TAG, 5 Nov 41. AG 327.3-63.
40. 5th Div to Second Army, 10 Oct 41, sub: Action on Request for Transfer from 5th Inf Div. AG 210.33-22.

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Chapter VI

PHYSICAL TRAINING, DISCIPLINE, AND MORALE

Morale is an intangible but definite thing in the army. It is connected with pride of person and pride of unit, and each of these comes from a sense of accomplishment and purpose. General Lear concentrated his personal attention very largely upon physical training, discipline, and morale because he thought these three were interrelated and each was fundamental to the creation of an adequate army, an army "fit to fight."

PHYSICAL TRAINING

General Lear had a deep-seated conviction that the tendency toward softness was one of the greatest dangers facing any country. In a speech made during the 1941 maneuvers at Manchester, Tenn., he drove home his point with a quotation from Cyrus the Great:

Yet I foresee that if we betake ourselves to the life of indolence and luxury... the day will come, and speedily, when we shall be unworthy of ourselves, and with the loss of honor will come the loss of wealth.

Once to have been valiant is not enough; no man can keep his valour unless he watch over it to the end.

As the arts decay through neglect, as the body, once healthful and alert, will grow weak through sloth and indolence, even so the powers of the spirit, temperance, self-control, and courage, if we grow slack in training, fall back once more to rottenness and death.

We must watch ourselves, we must not surrender to the sweetness of the day.

It is a great work, methinks, to found an empire, but a far greater one to keep it safe.1

This doctrine, enunciated by the ancient Cyrus, General Lear thought particularly applicable to a modern army, confronted repeatedly with the necessity of swift movements involving long marches with heavy packs over difficult terrain. It is significant that the first training directive issued by the Second Army after General Lear took command had as its subject the preservation of health and the development of tough bodies.

The directive was divided into two parts, the first concerned with prevention of disease and the second with physical fitness. All commissioned and enlisted personnel had training in the care of troops through instruction in schools and by practical application. Subjects covered were food and water, hygiene, housing, field sanitation, and contagious and communicable diseases. Physical exercise stressed mass calisthenics for the physical development of the group and special exercises for those needing them.2

Competitive contests and games were prescribed for the physical benefit to be derived from them and to develop team spirit. Excessive fatigue and exhaustion were avoided. The training programs provided progressively difficult tasks. "They should never involve objectives that result in failure because of inadequate training. This

2. Second Army Tng Dir 2, 16 Oct 40. CG 553-41.
Obstacle Courses
will cause loss of morale, a sense of injustice, and a doubt as to the ability of the leadership that led the way to failure.\textsuperscript{3}

These instructions were supplemented by an additional directive in February 1941. Emphasis was placed upon correct posture and appearance, and specific exercises were prescribed for this purpose.\textsuperscript{4} Personal letters on this subject by General Lear were sent to unit commanders of the Second Army on two different occasions. In one of these he said, "I hope you will find it possible...to make a most careful and detailed study of these subjects. Smartness is generally lacking in the Second Army in all grades. Posture is far from satisfactory."\textsuperscript{5} And in the other, "It is not intended to have physical conditioning unduly stressed. However, it is desired that full use be made of the physical training time now scheduled, and that instructors be well qualified for the duty they are to perform."\textsuperscript{5}

**DISCIPLINE AND MORALE**

Inspections and other training directives reemphasized the importance of proper physical condition and fitness throughout the year as the army prepared directly for maneuvers, indirectly for war. But as the bodies were hardened the minds and spirits of the soldiers and people were not similarly conditioned for the tasks that lay ahead. The men had not become soldiers, and this became one of the principal concerns of General Lear.

General Marshall set the pattern. In a letter to General Lear and other commanders on 16 October 1940, he said:

> The United States has embarked on an extensive peacetime program of national defense. The President has provided the leadership, and Congress, with the support of the American people, is granting the essential funds. Industry and labor are rapidly mobilizing to produce munitions. The National Guard is taking the field. Recruits are reporting to their regiments in unprecedented numbers, shortly to be joined by large numbers of their fellow citizens, chosen under the Selective Service Act. The preliminaries are over. The task now looming before us is the expeditious development of a unified, efficient fighting force of citizen-soldiers.

> The Army of the United States, keenly aware of its great responsibility, assumes this task as a profound privilege.

> First in importance will be the development of a high morale and the building of a sound discipline, based on wise leadership and a spirit of mutual cooperation throughout all ranks. Morale, engendered by thoughtful consideration for officers and enlisted men by their commanders, will produce a cheerful and understanding subordination of the individual to the good of the team. This is the essence of the American standard of discipline, and it is a primary responsibility of leaders to develop and maintain such a standard. To this end, commanders of all echelons are directed to study and apply the provisions of Mobilization Regulations 1-10, regarding Morale.

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{4} Second Army Tng Dir 4, 6 Feb 41, sub: Physical Development. AG 353-8.

\textsuperscript{5} Lt Gen Ben Lear to CGs all div and 3d Cav Brig and CGs all sep Army units (all comdrs addressed by name), 13 Feb 41, sub: Ltr of Instructions on Physical Development. Ibid. 15 Apr 41, sub: Physical Conditioning Methods. AG 726.5-1 and 726.5-2.
The adoption of a peacetime Selective Service System presents a special problem for all components of the Army. The men selected for service, together with those now enlisting, are representative of the citizen-soldier who has always defended our nation in the past. These men come from all walks of life, with widely varying degrees of education, intelligence and native ability. They differ in racial characteristics, religion, philosophy, social training, physical development and material wealth. It will tax the skill and wisdom of leaders of all ranks to mold these citizen-soldiers into a unified Army prepared to accept cheerfully the rigors of long hours of training, the fatigue of marches, and the discomforts and hardships of service in the field. The officers and noncommissioned officers who will have charge of these men must be instructed in advance concerning every phase of their reception, equipment, care and instruction, and the execution must be carried out under the alert supervision of higher commanders.

In accomplishing the foregoing, there must be no pampering of individuals, no distinctions between men because of their previous military experience or condition of entry into the service. In a spirit of mutual respect and cooperation, the Army of the United States must now proceed with its high purpose of welding from the elements of the American democracy, a disciplined, seasoned fighting force capable of defending the nation.

General Lear and his staff extended themselves to give effect to the purpose of this letter. Every effort was made to see that the troops were properly trained by competent instructors and that adequate training aids, facilities, and equipment were available. They were not completely successful, of course, but this, in large measure, was caused by conditions beyond the control of Second Army.

General Marshall's letter was sent to each unit with the following endorsement:

It is vitally essential that every statement in the foregoing letter be absorbed, digested and remembered by officers of all ranks who will be governed in their decisions and actions at all times by these statements. The letter will be read to the locally assembled officers of each organization of this command at the first suitable opportunity after its receipt. A careful check of absentees will be made and it will be read to them at the earliest practicable moment. The letter will also be promptly brought to the attention of those officers who join a command in the future and to whom the letter has not previously been read.

Morale was the subject of the first memorandum issued by Second Army in 1941. Morale sections were to be established as "highly efficient organizations functioning along definite lines and in keeping with discipline and the execution of the training program." The importance of a good mess, habitable living quarters, properly fitting uniforms, adequate tailor and barber service, and efficient and reasonably priced post and camp exchanges was emphasized. New and interesting motion pictures at low prices


7. Ibid.
were recommended as recreation, and morale officers were directed to build up relations with civilian communities so that the recreational, educational, and religious facilities in neighboring towns would be available to soldiers.  

Morale officers were also instructed to locate possible recreation areas in state or national parks near the various stations to which soldiers could be taken for weekend visits. They were to cooperate with camp hostesses, librarians, and unit chaplains in activities to enable all of these to do their utmost for the soldiers. In addition, unit commanders were directed to manifest a personal interest in the welfare and advancement of each individual under their command. "Fair, just, and impartial treatment of the individual by his immediate superiors (noncommissioned or commissioned) is, without question, a basic essential contributing to the maintenance of a high morale. This, however, does not imply weak-kneed or 'soft-hearted' treatment, but does not imply humane and considerate treatment. There should never be a failure to take prompt and just disciplinary action when, and as, the circumstances dictate."  

Second Army inspections of units covered all of the above subjects, and close check was kept by the headquarters to make sure that every effort was made to provide adequate recreational facilities. Movies, post exchanges, and the provision of recreational areas in the summer of 1941 occupied much of the attention of Headquarters, Second Army. Each company commander was directed to write at least three letters to the parents, or nearest of kin, of each selectee, the first letter when the selectee arrived, the second after the completion of MTP training, and the third at the conclusion of his year of service. This letter "should indicate in general his attainments throughout his year's training and describe the benefits which the selectee has derived from his military training."  

General Lear, himself, on his inspection trips inquired carefully into these matters. He was very much concerned with the general slackness in saluting, reporting, housekeeping, and appearance of individuals and units, and these were the subject of many strong letters and comments to commanders. In every way possible the Second Army Commander sought to carry out General Marshall's direction "that the country be made aware of the excellent work that is being done by the Army, not only in training but in bestowing upon the youth of America, innumerable benefits, physical, social and moral."}

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8. Second Army Memo 1, 11 Jan 41, sub: Morale. AG 300.6-1(Numbered Memos).
9. Ibid.
10. See AG 333.1-3 for numerous rpts of inspections on recreation and morale.
11. See AG 300.6-6(1940), 333.1-2(1940), 322-14(1941).
12. Second Army ltr, 11 Dec 40, sub: Army Contacts with Parents or Kin of Selectees. AG 327.3-2.
14. Gen George C. Marshall to Lt Gen Ben Lear, 14 Feb 41. AG 020.4-1.

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True discipline, of which military courtesy was an "outward and visible sign," was to General Lear a thing to be weighed in terms of human lives. In a speech before the Chicago Union League on 10 November 1941, he said:

It is only by the attainment of the highest discipline in officers and all ranks that we can avoid this unnecessary waste of American lives, this tragic loss of brave and ardent men. Those that belittle the importance of strict and continuous discipline in all matters affecting the soldier's life, the scrupulous care of his equipment, his personal appearance, emphasis on close order drill, long marches, exemplary conduct when off duty, or the meticulous care of his field piece, are a soldier's false friends and worst enemies. The soldier has no better friend than those superior officers who insist that the foundation of his training as a fighting man lies in inculcating thorough discipline, which means self-control, pride, self-restraint, and individual efficiency.  

With this background in mind it is easier to understand one of the most important incidents of the summer of 1941. Important, not because of its effect upon the army, but because the wide notoriety given to a relatively unimportant disciplinary matter by the press revealed the deep seriousness of the problem of national and public morale in the face of inevitable war.

On 12 June 1941 the headquarters of the Fourth Corps Area in Atlanta, Ga., published a letter saying that numerous complaints had been received that soldiers in convoys or single trucks had been addressing insulting and ungentlemanly remarks to civilians along the highway, particularly to women. The field force commanders were requested to issue such instructions as would eliminate this practice, and it was further suggested that "action be taken with the idea of bringing this matter directly to the attention of enlisted men and that full responsibility be placed upon the officers in charge of these groups of men or convoys for the actions of their respective commands."  

The Tennessee maneuver area lay within the Fourth Corps area and many Second Army troops had been moving through this region on their way to and from maneuvers. It was obvious that Second Army troops were being criticized by another command. One Second Army regiment, marching to its home station through Manchester, Tenn., had to be reprimanded in writing for hooting and shouting vulgar remarks at the people of Manchester; and complaints had also been received from civilians living in a town adjacent to one of the large Second Army camps that women had been frightened by being accosted by soldiers of the camp.  

The Commanding General was naturally displeased by these reports and incidents and was determined that they should cease. On Sunday afternoon, 6 July 1941, General Lear was playing golf with friends at the Memphis Country Club when a convoy passed, consisting of a provisional battalion of 110th Quartermaster Regiment, a detachment of the 110th Medical Regiment, and another of the 35th Military Police Company, on route from

15. WD Press release (undated - from Second Army PRO files)


17. Telg Lt Gen Ben Lear to TAG, 11 Jul 41. AG 250-2.
Manchester, Tenn., to its home station at Camp Robinson, Ark. When the convoy passed the golf club the soldiers in practically every truck were waving and shouting remarks of an uncomplimentary nature at people on the golf course, including a man and woman in front and a foursome in rear of the general's party.18

"The general state of discipline in the Second Army has been good," General Lear's report of the incident declared, "but repeated isolated incidents of digression have been brought to my attention. When the incident of the convoy in Memphis occurred within my sight and hearing it was mandatory that immediate exemplary action be taken in order that it be clearly made known throughout the Second Army the standard of conduct I expect of troops in relation to civilians and in the enforcement of discipline by officers and noncommissioned officers. It cannot be permitted that rowdyism and hoodlumism become an accepted matter of conduct on such or any other occasion for reasons obvious in the matter of discipline and of public relations."19

General Lear ordered the convoy halted as soon as possible. It was returned to Memphis and encamped at the airport until 6:30 the following morning. It then was ordered to proceed to Camp Robinson, the officers and men being required to march a total of fifteen miles during that day, using the shuttle method. On Sunday night the officers and noncommissioned officers were assembled at Army Headquarters and addressed by General Lear. He told them that their conduct was a discredit to their company, their regiment, and their division and that he was ashamed of them; that in failing to prevent the misbehavior they had not shown the proper qualities of leadership; and that the officers who did not like the service should submit their resignations and the non-commissioned officers who felt incapable of performing their duties should ask to be relieved.20

The punishment was certainly not severe for trained troops who had just come off maneuvers. Fifteen-mile hikes are a commonplace of basic training, and this one was to be made by the shuttle method of riding five miles and walking five miles. But the story was picked up by the newspapers, probably because it broke on Sunday when news was scarce, and was widely played up. Distorted accounts were circulated and believed. Literally hundreds of letters, many of them reflecting the arguments of isolationists and pro-Nazi groups, poured into Army Headquarters. Many were incoherent, some were threatening and others obscene, but they all reflected the fundamental unawareness of the people of the United States regarding the severity of the crisis with which they were actually confronted.21 Some few letters praised the forthright action of General Lear and recognized its necessity. These were acknowledged by the General, but he made no answer to the others either publicly or privately except in reply to one from a member of Congress. In this letter General Lear said:

As Commander of the Second Army I am responsible for the training of all elements of this army and for raising all elements to the highest attainable standards of conduct and combat efficiency. Nothing less will insure this country's successful defense against thoroughly disciplined, trained and efficiently led hostile forces in case we are attacked. A high state of discipline is the foundation upon which all military attainment is based. Loose

18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Many of these ltrs are now in Hist Off files.
conduct and rowdyism cannot be tolerated among the personnel of any army. I am responsible also that members of the Second Army treat the civilian population with respect and consideration. Every effort has been made by this command in the instructing of the forces of the Second Army to indoctrinate all ranks with high ideals in this and all other regards. The misconduct of the unit subjected to discipline was directed at young ladies and civilians on the golf links which it was passing on its return to Camp Robinson Arkansas from the maneuver area in Central Tennessee recently occupied by nearly seventy thousand men of this army. The unsoldierly conduct of this unit while passing through Memphis on Sunday was in marked contrast to the soldierly and gentlemanly behavior of the vast majority of men who took part in this maneuver. The circumstances called for prompt and immediate action and under the circumstances I saw fit to take such action. The publicity attending the incident has been out of all proportion to the corrective action taken which was neither unjust nor severe. So long as I am Commander of the Second Army soldierly standards of conduct will be demanded of all individuals in uniform. In any case of misconduct or breach of discipline the commanding officer of the unit involved is expected to take immediate corrective action. The Second Army requires a superior quality of leadership from officers of all ranks and noncommissioned officers of all grades. I am confident there will be no repetition of the offense that occurred in Memphis because I expect all units of the Second Army to conform to the standards required by such command.22

This rather strange state of public blindness to danger, evidenced not only by the letters to General Lear but also by the passage in Congress of the extension of service bill by the margin of one vote, was reflected in the army. On 27 June 1941 General Marshall wrote:

We have rumblings here of a buildup in the press unfavorable to maneuvers along the lines of criticism of lack of equipment, lack of air ground activity, lack of modernized procedure of motorized and mechanized forces. Views of enlisted men obtained from circulating correspondents indicate that they know little of what is going on and therefore derive little instruction from the maneuvers and feel that they are losing needed basic training. The matter of equipment involves misunderstanding of why certain divisions have more than others due to logical priorities... The immediate action has evidently been inspired by the failure of officers and noncommissioned officers to keep their men advised of the constantly changing local maneuver situation as applied to them. Steps should be taken to correct this as quickly as possible. There is also a failure on the part of civilians to appreciate the absolute necessity with or without complete equipment of training regimental and higher staffs which can only be done by actual maneuvers. Also the necessity of testing out the quality of the men, that is, their state of discipline and stamina when under physical and other pressure of arduous field service.22

Second Army attempted to remedy this situation by continuing its established policies of transmitting as much information about the tactical situation as possible from the higher echelons through the lower to the individual soldier in the field.

22. Telg Lt Gen Ben Lear to Hon Paul J. Kilguy, Member of Congress, 10 Jul 41. AG 250-2.

23. Telg (C) Gen George C. Marshall to Lt Gen Ben Lear, 27 Jun 41. AG 354.2-39 (C).
It also published a daily news bulletin, distributed to all units to be read to and by the enlisted men. This matter was mentioned again by General Lear in his comments on the Tennessee maneuvers and in the issuance of the Second Army Training Directive on Chain of Command.24

GHQ also issued a letter inclosing extracts from letters of soldiers criticizing and registering complaints about training. In general the complaints concerned: wastage of training time; poorly planned exercises; inadequately explained maneuvers; lack of confidence in officers; illiterate and unintelligent noncommissioned officers; the need of educational instruction in units to build up and maintain patriotic zeal and enthusiasm of soldiers in the Army; lack of opportunity to progress; and assignment to duty not in keeping with technical profession or special training.25

Second Army did not need these letters from higher commanders to be aware of the serious problem of morale among the enlisted men. Observations of staff officers, reports from subordinate units, and comments in press and periodicals had caused the headquarters deep concern. The Negro troops of Second Army constituted a separate problem in the maneuver area in the Southern states. Before Negro troops were brought from northern stations the Commanding General, Second Army, ordered that their division commander should personally lecture "to officers and noncommissioned officers...going to maneuvers on subject of march discipline, general conduct during maneuvers and relationship with civilians, explaining attitude white population in Southern states toward Negro."26

There were several instances of disturbed conditions, those of Murfreesboro, Tenn., and Gurdon, Ark., being particularly noticed, in which the fears of the civilian population along with the unfamiliarity of many of the Negro soldiers with the customs of the region caused outbreaks. In each instance the testimony is confused, but it seems clear that the civilian population and the law enforcement authorities of state and municipality were as much to blame as were the troops.27 Commanders who did not keep effective control of Negro troops were immediately replaced, and it was a policy of Second Army to insist upon strong and capable leadership in these units.

The general question of morale, however, transcended such particular problems. Articles appeared in Life and Time of 18 August 1941, written by a reporter who visited the 27th Division at Ft. McClellan. These articles made serious allegations about the condition of morale in the division and led to an investigation not only of this particular division but of all Second Army units. A staff officer of the VII Corps submitted an extensive report in which he stated:

26. Second Army telg (C) to 5th Div, 14 Aug 41. Same (C) to 2d Cav Div, 15 Aug 41. AG 250.1-11(C).
27. See following AG files on these incidents: 000.51-2; 210.31-59; 250.1-2 (FE 41); 291.2-1 (FE 41). There are also add rpts of investigations in files of the IG Second Army. For particularly interesting ltrs on "morale" in 94th Engr Bn (September) see AG 353-8.
The remarks quoted by the Life correspondent do not represent the sentiments of the bulk of the 27th Division. There has been, and there still is, unrest and dissatisfaction among certain members of the Division...but the Life article is a caricature and not a picture of the true situation....

There has been no organized attempt disclosed to induce men to petition Congress not to pass the extension measure. Individuals have written letters to certain Congressmen and Senators.

There has been no organized movement to induce men to desert or go to A. W. O. L. in the event of the extension of the period of service...

A great many of the officers and enlisted personnel would be glad to return to their homes and pursuits...there has been a marked increase in this sentiment during the debates in Congress, and as a result of the radio speeches of prominent isolationists.

There has been considerable talk in canteens and company streets to the effect that men are willing to fight for their country in the event of necessity, but that neither Congress nor the President has come out flatly and proclaimed any such necessity.

Because of the protracted debate on the extension of service, many men were kept in a state of disturbing uncertainty over their jobs; the leasing of homes, the arrangement for the schooling of their children, etc. This led to numerous complaints.

There is a lot of miscellaneous grumbling about the distance of Fort McClellan from the homes of most of the soldiers....over lack of adequate places of entertainment....and other similar grievances.

During the period of uncertainty the slogan "Ohio" (Over the hill in October) began to be heard. Its origin is unknown. Like most catch phrases it was taken up thoughtlessly and repeated by many men who did not in the least subscribe to the sentiment of the slogan. The letters "D. D. D." standing for "Dix, Devens, or Desertion" have also been heard. It is believed that a policy of ignoring or ridiculing this sort of thing will prove the quickest and most effective method of relegating it to oblivion.28

Similar investigations in all other units produced the same results.29 There was no possibility of mass desertion or any other form of unified resistance to discipline, but there was a serious question in the minds of the soldiers as to the purpose of their training. Many soldiers had little understanding of the meaning of the world crisis exemplified in the European and Asiatic wars, and there were serious deficiencies in their education in such fundamentals as geography, world trade, and even American history and government.

THE SCHOOL OF THE CITIZEN SOLDIER

General Lear was convinced that this inadequacy of orientation led to listlessness in performing army duties and produced a lethargy unbecoming to soldiers. "Far too many soldiers consider they are in service only because the country ordered it," he said in November 1941. "In too many instances lack of knowledge....acts as a brake to his interest in his world and a deterrent therefore to satisfactory results in training. This is so, in spite of the fact that the American is the most intelligent soldier in the world. The urgent questions of state that have influenced their lives are but dimly understood....if understood at all."30

28. VII Army Corps ACoFs G-2 to Second Army ACoFs G-2, 19 Aug 41. AG 353.8.
29. AG 353.8 is filled with these rpts.
In July 1941 he directed his staff to prepare plans for an orientation course, and this became the particular duty of Maj. Robert A. Griffin, Assistant G-2.

Each major unit of the Second Army was directed in October 1941 to send a qualified representative to Memphis to work with Major Griffin and other Headquarters personnel in planning the educational program. This group, designated as the "Second Army Board," devoted long hours to research, consultation, and revision in preparing the twelve lectures on the Armed Forces. It also issued general instructions for the guidance of Yale University experts chosen to draft the lectures on history and geography.

After preparations had progressed to the final stages, adjustments had to be made for the inclusion in the schedule of fifteen lectures on the background of the World Conflict required by the orientation program which the War Department had announced in December 1941. The problem was solved by extending the time from thirteen to fifteen weeks and by prescribing a weekly program of two Second Army lectures and one War Department lecture.

The lectures were launched with a preparatory statement concerning the scope and objective of the program. "Its purpose is not to tell you why to fight," troops were informed; "you have known why since Sunday, December 7, 1941....We don't intend to give you any pep talks.....The purpose is to make clear to you NOT WHY you are fighting, BUT FOR WHAT YOU ARE FIGHTING ---- in material things and in things of the spirit."

The Second Army educational course which these remarks introduced consisted of twenty-nine lectures. First came a group of five lectures on geography and world trade, prepared by William G. Fletcher of Yale University. Professor Fletcher's expositions treated of raw materials, particularly key minerals, and their relation to national security. They dealt also with trade "life lines," strategic bases, and their vital connection with hemispherical defense. Finally they told of the conflict between Axis and American geographic objectives.

The second part of the course consisted of two lectures on propaganda and the world crisis prepared by a board of Second Army officers. Topics discussed included propaganda in the first World War; development of German propaganda under Hitler; the

31. Members of the Board included: Major R. A. Griffin, Second Army Hq, chairman; Maj Ronal W. Shaw, 2d Cav Div; Lt Robert H. Neptune, 6th Div; Capt Jewell K. Watt, 35th Div; Capt Kemp H. Smith, 210th CA; Capt John R. McDonald, 27th Div; Capt Milan H. Hubert, 33d Div; and Lt R. W. Ruffner, 5th Div. These off were selected on the basis of their educational qualifications; the majority of them were experienced teachers. See typed memo on "Officers Named for Educational Program," dated 28 Oct 41, AG 352-16 (Gen).

32. Second Army ltr to comdrs of all units, 12 Jan 42, sub: Second Army Educational Program and WD Orientation Course. AG 352-1 (Gen)(42). The WD lectures were distributed by post comdrs.

33. Second Army Educational Program, Introductory Remarks. Mimeographed cpy in personal files of Gen Lear.

34. The combined Second Army-WD Course aggregated 44 lectures. Subs of the WD lectures are listed in WD ltr AGO 352.01(12-18-41)MTM, 20 Dec 41, sub: Gen Instructions Covering Orientation Course for all Mil Pers. AG 352-3 (Gen). But, for brevity, discussion of the content of these lectures is omitted.
rules of propaganda, and Nazi propaganda strategies; and methods of dealing with Axis propaganda. These lectures, enlivened by apt illustrations, constituted one of the most popular phases of the educational program.

The third group of lectures, written by Ralph H. Gabriel of Yale University, was devoted to the highlights of American history from the discovery of the Continent to the year 1942. The final portion of the course consisted of ten lectures on the Armed Forces prepared by the Second Army Board. Topics treated in this series included the organization of the Army and its various branches; the services; the duties of Army personnel from privates through generals; staff work; military aviation; and the organization and duties of the Navy and Marine Corps. Fundamental information was also given about the Japanese and German Armies — how they were set up, how the men were trained, what sort of foes they constituted, and how to defeat them.

The educational program was interrupted in some instances by tests and other pressing matters of training. Some units were forced by crowded schedules to hold the lectures at night rather than during the regular training day, as instructed by Second Army Headquarters. The camps were not planned to provide auditoriums suited for the lectures. The most serious problem was to find instructors who could hold the attention of the troops. In spite of difficulties, most organizations completed the 15-weeks course on 23 April.

Favorable reactions among both officers and men were much more frequent than adverse responses. In cases where polls were conducted among enlisted men by their commands, about 90 percent indicated that they profited from the instruction. Such polls by commanding officers on questions such as this have their limitations, but there seems to be little doubt of a preponderance of favorable sentiment toward the orientation program.

With the advent of Spring in 1942 the demands of field training became increasingly heavy. It was found impossible, therefore, to repeat the course of educational lectures for units assigned or activated after April. Part of the material was embodied, however, in a book called The School of the Citizen Soldier, and copies were allocated to commanding officers of all Second Army units in sufficient number to permit the distribution of several to each company, battery, troop, or equivalent unit. It was suggested that two copies be placed in company day rooms so that all enlisted personnel might have an opportunity to read them.

In June 1942 General Lear prescribed a weekly orientation hour to be held after inspection on Saturday mornings. Part of this period was devoted to a discussion of world affairs by company officers, with The School of the Citizen Soldier as a partial basis. Other activities scheduled for the orientation period, such as review of the past week's training exercises and an outline of those to come, comments on housing, current directives, etc., in most cases crowded out orientation discussions of the character indicated in the published volume.

35. This discussion of the orgn and content of the Army program of lectures is based on mimeographed copies filed in AG 352-1(Gen)(42).

36. Second Army ltr to Unit COs, 10 Aug 42, sub: Sch of the Citizen Soldier, AG 352-3(Gen)(GNMBG).

37. Second Army ltr Gen Lear to unit COs, 22 Jun 42, sub: Weekly Orientation Period AG 352-3(Gen).
The Second Army Educational Program was splendidly conceived. It was administered with a gratifying degree of success in spite of numerous difficulties. Created during the pre-Pearl Harbor period when morale was a question of vital importance, the entry of the United States into the war eliminated to a large extent its reason for being—the indoctrination of the American soldier as to WHY he had been called to military service. Before the lectures were actually inaugurated the numerous adjustments and reorganization caused by the war had usurped the interest of headquarters and troops.
PREPARING THE LECTURE

DELIVERING THE LECTURE

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PART TWO

1941 - 1944
Chapter VII

REORGANIZATION AFTER PEARL HARBOR

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, and the beginning of war did not change the mission of Second Army, which was to continue in war as in peace a training army. But it did necessitate many readjustments and changes of organizations.

The first effect was to suspend the existing instructions as to the release of officers and enlisted men from active duty, except for incompetence and physical disability, and to provide for the extension of active duty of all reserve officers when current tours terminated. Over-age officers were cleared out of field units by transfer to the Corps Area Service Command, and were replaced through the normal requisition process. This was inconvenient because of the difficulty in getting replacements. There were, for example, 121 vacancies caused by over-age-in-grade removals in the 35th Division alone. Corps area commanders were instructed to release troop age officers for field service to the maximum extent possible, but many units had to move out with hurtful officer shortages.

The chief effect of the declaration of war on Second Army was the loss of units. On 9 December Second Army was directed to move Headquarters and Headquarters Battery of the 40th Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) and the 61st Coast Artillery (AA) to stations to be designated by the Commanding General, First Army. The units moved on 10 December. The next day General Lear left a memorandum for Officer in Charge, Second Army Headquarters, which directed:

Send instructions out tonight by confidential telephone to VII Army Corps, substantially as follows:

Prepare railway movement tables for transfer to west coast of following units: Hq and Hq Co VII Army Corps, 27th Division and 102nd Observation Squadron. Get in touch with proper railway representative and furnish him at earliest practicable moment confidential copy of entraining schedule for later use. All agencies and units to be informed that this is a plan only and they will guard against alarming of the commands as this is a confidential plan to be made effective should later orders be received. The holiday furlough and leave of absence instructions remain in effect. Instructions will be sent you tomorrow requiring similar plans for 33rd and 35th Divisions.

1. Telgs TAG to Second Army, 8, 9, 10 Dec 41. AG 210.455-33. Record of telephone conversation between Col Richmond, G-1 Second Army, and Col Pope, G-1 Sec WD, 9 Dec 41. AG 337-42.

2. Record of telephone conversation between Col Richmond and Col Jenkins, WD 9 Dec 41. Ibid. WD ltr, AG 210.31(12-9-41)08-A, 15 Dec 41, Sub: Removal of Over-age Off from Tr Units. AG 210.31-130.

3. Rad Second Army to Cofs GHQ, 8 Dec 41. Cofs GHQ to Second Army, 12 Dec 41. Gen George C. Marshall to Second Army, 13 Dec 41. AG 210.31-130. This file also contains correspondence between Second Army and subordinate units on disposal of over-age off and their reps.

4. WD ltr (S) AG 370.5(12-8-41)MC-C-M, 9 Dec 41, sub: Confirmation of Telephone Instructions re Certain CA(AA) Units. AG 370.5-166(S).

5. Second Army Informal Check Slip (S), 11 Dec 41. AG 370.5-166(S).
On 13 December the War Department directed that the VII Corps (less 33rd Division) be prepared for an immediate move to the West Coast. Movement was to be started as soon as rolling stock could be assembled and spotted by the railroads. Each of the divisions involved was informed, and a staff officer from headquarters was sent to each station "as representative of the Army Commander to assist in movement of troops, make minor decisions on the spot and constantly inform Army Headquarters of the progress of movement."

By 23 December 1941 Second Army had lost the following units: Headquarters and headquarters Company VII Corps; 27th Division; 35th Division; 207th Military Police Company; 3rd Cavalry Brigade; 107th Cavalry; 40th Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) 35th Engineers (C); 75th Field Artillery Brigade; 11th Station Hospital; 151st Medical Battalion; 7th Ordnance Battalion; 50th Signal Battalion; 58th Signal Battalion; and smaller organizations. Most of the units had gone to the Western Defense Command, but some had gone to the First Army and one station hospital had gone direct to New York, its port of embarkation.

The loss of the VII Corps and other major units necessitated a reorganization of all echelons of command in Second Army. The army had no corps under it until 20 March 1942 when the I Corps was temporarily transferred to its command. The III Corps was assigned to Second Army, 20 April; the XI Corps was activated at Chicago on 15 June 1942; the XII Corps at Columbia, S. C., on 29 August; and the VII Corps was sent back to Second Army on 19 November. In the meantime the army had greatly increased in numbers through the activation and transfer of units of all sizes and of almost every arm and service.

**DETACTIONS, SPECIAL TROOPS**

During the months immediately following the declaration of war there were a large number of smaller units under the direct supervision of Headquarters, Second Army, without any intermediate echelon of command. This was unsatisfactory and steps were taken to remedy the situation. In view of the general adoption of the solution finally worked out, these steps will be traced in some detail. On 29 December 1941 Lt. Col. Ben Stafford was directed to proceed "for temporary duty as representative of the Commanding General, Second Army, in connection with the administration and training of Second Army units stationed at Fort Knox, Kentucky."

At the same time that Colonel Stafford was sent to Ft. Knox, Second Army units at Camp Robinson, Ark., were placed under the control of the Commanding Officer, 43rd Engineers, senior Second Army commander at that post. His duties were to be the same as those of Colonel Stafford. The 43rd Engineers were moved from Robinson early in

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6. Record of telephone conversation (S) between Lt Col John B. Smith, AG-2 Second Army and Maj Hodge, WD, 13 Dec 41. AG 370.5-166(S). TDF memo for Col Lloyd Brown, GHQ, 14 Dec 41. AG 337-42.

7. Second Army ltr (S) to TAG, 23 Dec 41, sub: Distribution of Ground Forces Repls from RTCs to Units. AG 327.3-63(S)

8. See Appendix

9. Second Army ltr to Lt Col Ben Stafford, 29 Dec 41, sub: Supervision of Second Army Units, Ft Knox, Ky. AG 322-43.

10. Second Army ltr to 43d Engrs, 27 Dec 41, sub: Supervision of Second Army Units, Cp Robinson, Ark. Ibid.
January and the units reverted to the direct supervision of Second Army staff sections until 24 March. On this date the supervision and control of army units was assigned to Lt Col Howard Ker, Commanding Officer, 86th Engineer Battalion (HvPon).11 He continued in this capacity until his unit was sent to Denison, Tex., on temporary change of station, and control was passed to the Commanding Officer of the 808th Tank Destroyer Battalion.12

These temporary solutions for the command and administration of small units were unsatisfactory. There was no settled policy, and the various staff sections of headquarters were confused among themselves. On 28 February G-1 recommended that army units stationed at a camp commanded by a general officer under the direct jurisdiction of Second Army be attached for administration to the unit commanded by the general officer. This would "materially reduce administration at Second Army Headquarters and place in the hands of general officers commanding Second Army divisions the power to render administrative decisions on the spot where he can best decide the merits of each individual case."13

The comments on this recommendation were generally unfavorable and the Chief of Staff decided to pigeonhole it. But on 9 March the Quartermaster protested against the attachment of quartermaster units to divisions, which he said was the general practice, because the results obtained were not entirely satisfactory. G-3, in comment on this suggestion, stated definitely that it was the policy of the Army Commander to attach nondivisional units to divisions for supervision of training and administration.14

Confusion and uncertainty were ended on 21 March when a letter was issued by Second Army in conformity with a memorandum from General Lear as follows:

Please issue instructions to the effect that all corps, army or GHQ units stationed at camps or cantonments where divisions or other Second Army tactical units are located are attached for all purposes to the major unit, and command function will be exercised by the senior commander in exactly the same manner he exercises it for his division or other unit.15

When the I and III Corps became a part of Second Army, corps troops were assigned and army units attached to the corps as had been done previously with the VII Corps.16 The I Corps in turn attached these units to brigades, regiments, and specially organized engineer and medical groups for supervision of training and administration.17

12. Second Army ltr to 808th TD Bn, 20 May 42, sub: Status of Units. AG 322-36.
13. Second Army Informal Check Slip, 28 Feb 42. AG 322-12.
14. Second Army Informal Check Slip, 9 Mar 42. Second Army ltr to 6th Inf Div. 12 Mar 42. Ibid.
15. Second Army Informal Check Slip, 14 Mar 42. Second Army ltr 21 Mar 42, sub: Status of Units. Ibid.
17. Change 9 to I Corps GO 23, 17 Jun 42. Ibid.

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Neither of these solutions was entirely satisfactory. The frequent movement of divisions and other major units caused repeated adjustments of command. At Ft. Custer, Mich., the problem was resolved by sending Col. George Byers to organize a headquarters and take command of Second Army units when the 5th Division and the 11th Infantry were ordered away from that station.18

Experience was demonstrating the value of these improvised training headquarters for the control of administration and the training of separate units. The commanders of these headquarters were doing more successful work than the commanders of large units because their undivided attention was given. On 25 May 1942, Col. Leonard S. Arnold was directed to assume a similar command at Camp Pickett, Va., and Col. Rinaldo L. Coe at Camp Crowder, Mo.19

Army Ground Forces (AGF), which had succeeded GHQ after the reorganization of the War Department on 9 March, was also concerned about the control of separate units. On 21 May, Army Ground Forces authorized the experimental organization of a provisional headquarters for all Second Army units, except divisions, at a selected station. But General Lear immediately replied, "Our study and experience up to this time have been such that I feel justified in now recommending a ... headquarters at each of the following places: Ft Bragg, N C, Cp Crowder, Mo, Cp Gordon, Ga, Ft Benning, Ga, Ft Custer, Mich, Cp Pickett, Va... Cp Blanding, Fla, Cp Robinson, Ark, and Ft Knox, Ky."20

These Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments, Special Troops, Second Army, were authorized on 15 June 1942, and nine were organized at the posts named above with the exception of Camp Robinson and Camp Blanding, and with Camp Forrest, Tenn., and Ft Jackson, S.C., added.21 All army troops at these stations were placed directly under the command of the Commanding Officer, Detachment, Special Troops, Second Army, while certain organic corps units were placed under the jurisdiction of detachment commanders for limited administrative functions. Corps commanders were also authorized to call on detachment commanders for assistance in any training or administrative situation that might arise in connection with their units.22

The activation of the detachments, special troops, and the activation and assignment of corps to Second Army in the spring and summer of 1942 completed the formal organization of the Second Army, just as the reorganization of the War Department and the creation of Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces, and Army Air Forces, on 9 March 1942 completed the formal organization and defined command responsibilities for the entire army. The organization was stabilized, but there were numerous changes and

18. Second Army ltr to Col George Byers, 18 Apr 42, sub: Cmd of Second Army Units, Ft Custer, Mich. AG 322-34.


20. AGF ltr (C) 320.2/3(AGF)-GNOPN/02187(5-21-42, 21 May 42, sub: Orgn of Cmd of Army and GHQ Trs. A3 322.17-1(C).

21. AGF ltr (C) 320.2/3(AGF)-GNOPN(5-21-42), 15 Jun 42, sub: Reorgn of Cmd of Army and GHQ Trs. Ibid. Second Army ltr, 12 J. 42, sub: Status of Units. AG 322-12.

22. Ibid.
adjustments, and, because Second Army was a training army, a constant turnover of units. 23

The detachments, special troops, were a great improvement over previous methods of training separate units. The detachment commanders, unlike tactical commanders, could give complete and undivided supervision to the training and administration of army troops. The table of organization (T/O) of a detachment was small, and sufficient officers were not available to supervise properly all phases of training and administration. An assistant inspector general of Second Army recommended that two officers be added "whose sole duties would be inspection of administrative and supply agencies and their instruction in the proper accomplishment of the various administrative papers. 24 This training was important and Second Army realized it, but the officers were not available. The detachments had to do their work with small staffs supplemented by officers from the units under their command.

Units of all arms and services were placed under these detachments, and the supervision of technical training was frequently beyond the experience and knowledge of any of the officers of the staff. Second Army, in an attempt to find a solution for this difficulty, in December 1942 assigned approximately thirty officers, surplus in their units, to Headquarters, Second Army. These technically proficient officers were to be placed on temporary duty with a detachment headquarters whenever it had a large number of units of a particular arm or service to supervise. Army Ground Forces objected to this solution because it was not considered desirable to have army headquarters charged with personnel whose duty was the supervision of training in the detachments. The particular program was not fully put into effect, though occasionally headquarters officers were placed on detached service for such purposes. Second Army also frequently solved problems of this sort by using officers from other Second Army units to fill temporary needs. 25

At first no clear distinction was made between the type of units assigned to corps and those assigned to army for training under the detachments, special troops. Army Ground Forces defined policy in this regard on 29 October 1943 when it directed that in accordance with War Department instructions virtually all separate infantry, field artillery, cavalry, tank destroyer, combat-type engineer and anti-aircraft were to be relieved from assignment to armies and assigned to subordinate corps. The normal assignment for combat units was to corps. But, the AGF letter continued, "in any case when, in the judgment of the Army Commander concerned, the training of a combat type unit will be improved materially by placing it under control of the Army Special Troop Headquarters at its station, a request should be made to this headquarters to relieve unit from assignment to the subordinate Corps and for assignment to the Army." 26

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23. Detailed information concerning the gains and losses of major units of the Second Army along with organizational charts at significant periods will be found in Appendix.

24. Col W. H. Wilbur, CO 1st Det Sp Trs, to Lt Gen Ben Lear, 26 Aug 42. AG 353.01-2.

25. Second Army ltr to CG AGF, 30 Dec 42, sub: Supervision of Tng of Serv Units... Record of telephone conversation between Col Beurket, G-1 Second Army and Col Parber, AG-I AGF, 20 Jan 43. AG 322.17-1 (42). Second Army ltr, 29 Feb 44, sub: Ltr of Instruction. AG 300.1(dets).

26. AGF ltr (R) 320.2/267(29 Oct 43)GNGCT, 29 Oct 43, sub: Asgmt of Combat-type Units. AG 322-12.
FEORGANIZATION OF UNITS

The establishment of these detachments, special troops, in 1942 and the resulting changes in the training and administrative setup of Second Army was accompanied by a reorganization of the units making up the army. On 12 February 1942 the War Department issued instructions for the reorganization of the last square division of Second Army, the 33rd Infantry Division, into a triangular division.

The designation of the 6th Infantry Division was changed on 23 March 1942 to the 6th Motorized Division and its reorganization began. Extensive changes were necessary in the division and these were not completed on 16 June when the War Department issued a letter directing: "As new tables of organization are published, units in the continental United States will be reorganized in accordance therewith as rapidly as practicable." This letter and the new T/O's required extensive reorganization in the new motorized divisions as well as in virtually every other unit in the Second Army. Requisitions for additional personnel and equipment were made in the normal manner. These adjustments were not completed until 16 January 1943 when Second Army reported that all its units had completed reorganization.

There were periodic revisions of T/O's for various units as combat and training experience developed weaknesses or demonstrated the necessity for change, but the next major reorganization came in the summer of 1943. On 21 July Army Ground Forces published a letter as an orientation to the pending revision of organization of larger units which would be accomplished only on direct order from higher headquarters. Under this plan the armored divisions were reorganized into two combat commands of three tank battalions and three armored infantry battalions each, with artillery strength remaining at three battalions. The motorized division was eliminated and the standard infantry division was reduced in aggregate strength about 8 percent and in motor vehicles about 14 percent. Three new light divisions, "suitable for amphibious, airborne, mountain and jungle operation" were organized and assigned to Second Army for training and tests.

GROUP HEADQUARTERS

The new organization was planned to take extensive advantage of the pooling principle. Staffs were being revised downward. Army was to remain a tactical and administrative unit, but its administrative functions were to be more extensive and complete. Corps, as before, was primarily tactical, but its staff was reduced and army was instructed to by-pass corps in every way possible so that it would be devoted to tactical

27. WD ltr, AG 320.2(2-6-42)M-R-M-C, 12 Feb 42, sub: Reorgn of 33d Inf Div. This was completed on 21 Feb 42. Second Army ltr to CG Fld Forces, 25 Feb 42, sub: Tng and Equip of Elements of 208th FA. AG 322.04-4.

28. AGF ltr 322.13 (Mtz Div)-OPN(3-11-42), 11 Mar 42, sub: Reorgn of Mtz Divs. Ibid.

29. WD ltr AG 221(6-3-42)EA-4-C, 16 Jun 42, sub: Almts of Grades and Ratings...to Tac Units.

30. Second Army ltr to TAG, 18 Jan 43, sub: Reorgn of Units. AG 322-50.

31. AGF ltr (R) 320.2/6031(21 Jul 43)ONGCT, 21 Jul 43, sub: Orientation with Reference to Revised Orgn. AG 322-50. The 10th Light Division was trained as an Alpine division and remained under Second Army. The other two (71st and 89th) were given their preliminary training under Second Army but were tested at the Hunter Liggett Maneuver Area by another command. As a result of this test these two divisions were made into standard infantry divisions, but the 10th Light Division was retained as a special unit for high mountain warfare.

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and training activities. In combat the corps was to be reinforced according to the needs of the particular situation, and the new group organization, without organic units, made it readily possible to form task forces for this purpose. 32

Group headquarters had been established on 20 January 1943 when Army Ground Forces announced that the existing organization of antiaircraft, nondivisional field artillery, mechanized cavalry, and engineer combat regiments would be replaced by a group organization. Group headquarters were assigned to armies, separate corps, and other separate commands by AGF and were essentially training and tactical headquarters. 33 At first Second Army directed that where groups were located at stations of detachments, special troops, the detachment commander was responsible for administration and supply and the group commander for training to include housekeeping and the care and maintenance of equipment. Where a battalion or other unit of a group was located at a station other than the station of a group headquarters, the commanding officer of the detachment where such unit was located was responsible for its administration and supply, and for such supervision of training as might be desired by the group commander. Training matters were to be forwarded direct to Headquarters, Second Army, by group commanders, but all matters pertaining to administration and supply were to be routed through the commanding officer, detachment, special troops. 34

Unexpected difficulties developed from this arrangement and it was rescinded on 29 May. Group commanders were made directly responsible to Second Army for all training, supply, and administration of units under their control. 35 Neither Army Ground Forces nor the Second Army was satisfied with this solution. General McNair insisted that group headquarters was not a substitute for regimental headquarters and that it should be relieved of administrative functions. It was a tactical unit and organized accordingly. This point of view won out, and on 8 July a letter was issued which directed that group commanders were to be directly responsible to detachment commanders for all training, supply, and administration. 36

RELIEF OF CORPS HEADQUARTERS

Second Army, in accordance with AGF instructions, relieved corps headquarters of administrative functions by ordering it to keep a minimum of records and by restricting correspondence and instructions from army to corps. Correspondence from Headquarters Second Army to organic corps units and to units attached to corps which required action by corps was indorsed through corps, but all other correspondence was transmitted direct. 37

Corps headquarters was reduced under the new T/0, but an augmentation of 17 officers and 17 enlisted men was authorized for the supervision of training. This

32. Ibid.
33. AGF ltr (R) 320.2/165-GNGCT(1-20-43), 20 Jan 43, sub: Orgn and Asgmt of Gp Hq and Bns. AG 322-3. AGF ltr 353/2209-GNGCT(4-1-43), 1 Apr 43, sub: Asgmt and Tng of Gp Hq and Bns of Tk, TD, and AAA. AG 353-241.
34. Second Army ltr, 26 Apr 43, sub: Tng, Adm, and Sup of Engr, AA, TD, and Cav Gps. AG 322-3.
35. Second Army ltr, 29 May 43, same sub. Ibid.
37. Second Army ltr, 9, 28 Aug 43, sub: Adm of Corps and Corps Units. AG 300.1-10.
augmentation was provided on a temporary allotment basis, and upon movement of the corps headquarters to a staging area for overseas duty it was terminated. On 24 January 1944 Army Ground Forces again insisted upon the importance of freeing corps and group headquarters from administrative burdens. Reports from the field indicated that these were being required to function administratively as well as tactically. Higher commanders were directed not to require group or corps to function administratively except as unavoidably necessary. This did not relieve corps and group commanders from responsibility for the administrative efficiency of their subordinate units, but this was to be accomplished by supervision, providing instruction when necessary, and correcting faults.

Most of the organizational and administrative problems had been solved by the early months of 1944. There were periodic reorganizations of units in accordance with new T/O's and T/E's. Large numbers of tank destroyer, antiaircraft, and coast artillery units were inactivated and the officers and men used as replacements and fillers for units of other branches. But the system had been established and continued operating without substantial change or alteration.


Chapter VIII
ACTIVATION OF UNITS

The declaration of war called for an immediate increase of personnel and the activation of new units for the army. Second Army had lost many of its major units, most of which had been sent to the east or west coast for defense against possible attack. The remaining units continued training for future combat operations and at the same time prepared officers and enlisted men to act as cadre for the activation of new units.

DIVISION CADRES

In December 1941 Second Army recommended that a number equal to three divisional cadres be selected by infantry, field artillery, and other replacement training centers and assigned to the 6th and 33rd Infantry Divisions for further training. Second Army would thus obtain the pick of men in replacement centers for new divisional cadres and to replace those noncommissioned officers taken from the 6th and 33rd Divisions.

The War Department evidently had other uses for the graduates of the replacement training centers because there was no response to this recommendation. On 8 January 1942 Second Army was informed that three new divisions were to be activated and that the 6th Division (which was being reorganized as a motorized division) was to furnish one of the cadres. The program here initiated provided for the formation of three or four new infantry divisions each month. "The success of the plan," the War Department continued, "will depend largely upon the careful selection and training of cadres." Each commander was directed to exercise the most careful personal supervision of the selection and training of cadres. Unqualified men were to be returned to the parent unit for replacement by fully qualified men, and in each unit the best men were to be selected as cadre for the new unit.

The first cadre furnished by the 6th Division under the expansion program was fully qualified. The Commanding General of the 90th Division expressed his appreciation by writing, "I want to take this opportunity to thank you personally and officially and the other officers of the 6th Division who selected our cadres. We have found all these men to be exceptionally well qualified in their work, and we are entirely satisfied with them in every respect." To this General Lear added the following statement:

I want to add my personal and official expression of appreciation and thanks to you, and the officers of your division, for the splendid manner in which you have responded to the mission of furnishing officer and enlisted cadres for new units. I understand that this requirement has inflicted a number of important tasks upon the personnel of the division, has taken away many officers who are important to the division, resulting in a temporary loss of valuable personnel who cannot be replaced in the very near future. Tasks of the character just referred to, and others which we may expect from time to time are so important to the Nation that they must be met graciously, cheerfully and generously with the full realization that the needs of the army as a whole are of paramount importance.

1. Rad (C) Lt Gen Ben Lear to CG Fld Forces, 26 Dec 41. AG 322-46 (C).
2. WD ltr AG 320.2(1-5-42)EA-C, 8 Jan 42, sub: Enl Cadres for New Divs. AG 322.04-1.
3. 90th Inf Div to 6th Inf Div, 2 Mar 42, and Second Army Ind, 13 Mar 42. AG 322.04-1.
ACTIVATION OF NONDIVISIONAL UNITS

All nondivisional units were activated by Corps Area until 3 March 1942 when the War Department designated the Commanding General, Second Army, as the activating authority for certain units. Commanders and other key personnel were furnished by the War Department, the unit forming the cadre supplied one officer of company grade, and the remaining officers were furnished by Second Army from sources under its control. Second Army also set the date of activation, subject to the availability of housing and other facilities, and made the necessary requisitions for fillers when the unit was ready to receive them.  

This letter imposed a new task upon Second Army. The resulting correspondence and other matters connected with activation constituted an important part of the work of the headquarters. Two corps, 11 divisions, and 392 nondivisional units were activated during 1942. The required cadres constituted a steady drain upon the already activated units, but since the quality of the cadre in most cases would determine the quality of the new unit it was to the solution of this problem that much of the effort of Second Army was directed.

Each unit was ordered to select and designate a cadre as shown in the appropriate T/O even before being notified specifically that it was to furnish a cadre. The list of names and assignments was submitted to the division or separate unit commander who was required to check as to the suitability of the selections and to see that each man on the list was trained for his designated cadre assignment. Each unit commander was directed to use the same care in the selection of cadre as if he were to command the new unit.

CADRE TRAINING

When a unit was notified that it was to furnish a cadre, an intensive training program was inaugurated under a qualified officer. Training was both practical and theoretical. There was a short review of basic subjects for the entire cadre and then each member was required actually to perform the duties of his cadre assignment under proper guidance and supervision. There were periodic tests as well as examinations at the conclusion of instruction in each subject, and those proving unqualified were replaced or given additional training.

Second Army frequently required corps, division, and other higher units to inspect cadres furnished by lower units before shipment and to report the results to army headquarters. Some unqualified men continued to get into cadres in spite of every care. On 22 June 1942 Second Army issued a circular quoting War Department and Army Ground Forces publications upon this question and insisting upon the urgency of the proper selection of cadre. "Cadre personnel," the circular stated, "should be of excellent character, capable of performing the duties for which furnished and sufficiently intelligent to instruct and lead others in the performance of the duties connected with the positions for which they are designated." Commanders of new units were again instructed

5. Second Army Tng Memo 1", 1 Apr 42, sub: Enl Cadre Tng. AG 353-9.
6. Ibid.
7. Second Army lst Ind to AGF ltr 320.2/1920-GNOPN(4-20-42), 20 Apr 42, sub: Activation of Hq and Hq Co X and XI Army Corps, AG 322.12-2.

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to report to army headquarters the names of any cadre personnel who were found to be unsatisfactory.

In many instances it was impossible for units to furnish fully qualified cadres, particularly after more than one cadre had been drawn from its ranks. The experience of the 8th Motorized Division is typical of that of many units of all sizes. In October 1941 the average intelligence score of the division was grouped as follows, according to the Army General Classification Tests (AGCT):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of men</td>
<td>1062</td>
<td>3821</td>
<td>3666</td>
<td>2461</td>
<td>1394</td>
<td>12,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In March 1942, after furnishing a cadre for the 77th Division, the average classification score was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of men</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>3579</td>
<td>4024</td>
<td>2916</td>
<td>1868</td>
<td>13,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After furnishing the cadre for the 80th Infantry Division the score was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of men</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>3393</td>
<td>3826</td>
<td>2997</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>12,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The classification grouping of the average cadre furnished by this division was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It therefore followed, the 8th Division report stated, that unless the intelligence average of the division was raised by the reception of average or above-average replacements, the grouping of the division after furnishing cadre number 3 in October 1942 would be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of men</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>3212</td>
<td>3693</td>
<td>3013</td>
<td>2035</td>
<td>12,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The average intelligence rating of the replacements received since January 1942 had been:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of men</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>2,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the above figures pertained to the division as a whole, the infantry grouping in the classification tests was much lower. In October 1941 the score of the infantry was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of men</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>2657</td>
<td>2560</td>
<td>1746</td>
<td>1022</td>
<td>8,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Second Army Cir 28, 22 Jun 42. AG 300.5-1.
After cadres for 77th and 60th Divisions had been supplied the intelligence rating of the infantry was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of men</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>2034</td>
<td>2350</td>
<td>2037</td>
<td>1435</td>
<td>8311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The infantry needed high type men for noncommissioned officers, but with over 41 percent of the infantry in Groups IV and V it was extremely difficult to obtain leaders with the requisite intelligence.

The division had also furnished 416 officer candidates after 10 January 1942, and there were some 200 additional applicants already approved. This in itself had served to drain rather heavily the noncommissioned leaders of the highest type from the division.

In its indorsement to this letter Second Army said that similar figures for the 6th Motorized Division showed the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In comparison, figures for the AGCT distribution of 130,000 selectees showed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AGF was urged to request the War Department to provide filler replacements for the 6th and 8th Motorized Divisions with at least an average grade distribution. AGF replied that it was believed that recent changes in assignment policy would result in a higher quality of replacements for ground units. Prior to 18 July 1942, 75 percent of all men assigned to Army Air Forces were required to have an AGCT score of 100 or better, but an adjustment had been made. The current policy required assignments to be based primarily upon civilian occupational specialties and only secondarily upon intelligence, so that the ground units should begin to receive more of the higher AGCT grade men.

The new policy of assignment based primarily upon civilian occupational specialties was no real help to the divisions or other combat units. The skills of an infantryman or an artilleryman are military skills alone and these combat branches continued to get the "skimmed milk" of the manpower until the spring of 1944, when combat experience dictated an improvement of quality. A special effort was made to induce men in other branches to volunteer for the infantry and a new assignment policy was announced. After 13 April classification and assignment was based first on physical capacity and qualities of leadership, and secondarily upon intelligence and previously developed skills, which meant that the combat branches would get a larger share of the physically qualified and mentally alert selectees.

9. 8th Div ltr AG 220.01 to Second Army, 15 Jun 42, sub: Necessity for High Calibre Repls, 8th Mtzd Div. AG 322.04-19.

10. WD Cir 132, 6 Apr 44. Second Army Weekly Information Bull 17, 22 Apr 44. Second Army ltr, 9 May 44, sub: Strengthening the Inf. AG 220.3 (Inf). For an analysis of the effect of the earlier policy upon diva, see memo proposed by Col Robert H. Griffin, G-2 Second Army, 4 Jan 43, sub: The Manpower Problem of Combat Trs of Ground Forces. AG 220.31-5.

REPLACEMENTS FOR CADRE LOSSES

The War Department had directed in its original letters that overstrength to compensate for officers and men sent on cadres should be obtained by requisition, normally sixty to seventy-five days before cadre was shipped, but this was not working out. On 7 March 1942 the Commanding General, 6th Motorized Division wrote:

I am writing you with reference to the officer situation in the Division...We have never received replacements for the officers sent to the 90th Division, although requisition was submitted on January 20th...

The above situation presents two serious angles: First, the present shortage of officers for carrying on small unit instruction, and Second: The officers that we are short of are, of course, not receiving the benefit of this period of tactical training which the Division may never have an opportunity to repeat in such detail.

I realize that the availability of officers is at present an extremely difficult problem and consequently am not too optimistic regarding immediate relief. I hope, however, that we can receive soon the replacements for the officers furnished for the 90th and 85th Division Cadres. This loss has seriously affected training of this Division. I hope also that some way can be found to avoid taking any more officers from the 6th Division for some time, and that calls on this Division for officers to attend schools may be held to an absolute minimum.

In an attempt to remedy this situation the War Department on 27 March 1942 authorized field force units within the continental limits of the United States to maintain a 25 percent overstrength in officers. Requisitions for enlisted men were to be marked "cadre equivalent" and were to be filled as expeditiously as practicable by the replacement authorities.

On 12 September 1942 Second Army expressed its objection to this program. Cadre losses were numerically replaced by overstrength sent in seventy-five days before activation date of the new division, but "the time spent in classification and assignment, and training the enlisted overstrength to the level of training the division" was a definite loss. Second Army consequently recommended that the overstrength for cadre loss should arrive at the same time that all the fillers for the parent division arrived, or should be included in the totals of fillers assigned. The adoption of this plan would permit "a balanced state of training of all personnel in a division" and eliminate the loss of time used "to train, classify and assign the overstrength which occurs during the MTP training period of the parent division." In addition there would be a wider field for the selection of new cadre by the parent unit.

Army Ground Forces concurred "It is now the policy of this headquarters and of the War Department to authorize all units which will be called upon to furnish cadres full T/O strength (including basics) plus an initial overstrength at time of activation.


13. 6th Mtz Div to Second Army, 7 Mar 42. AG 322.04-1.


15. Second Army ltr to AGF, 12 Sep 42, sub: Cadre Overstrength. AG 320.2-10.
This initial overstrength will be construed as an advance issue of loss replacements which will be absorbed through normal attrition and cadre requirements as the training of the unit progresses. 16

On 25 September 1942, Army Ground Forces published these new instructions which directed that all units should be filled to full Table of Organization strength including basic privates, plus 5 percent overstrength. Units designated as parent units to furnish cadre were allotted a 15 percent overstrength. "This overstrength," the AGF letter said, "is not to be construed as an increase in the authorized strength of the unit concerned but instead as an advance issue of loss replacements which will be absorbed through normal attrition and cadre requirements after the training of the unit progresses. It is contemplated that units to be activated subsequent to 31 October 1942 will be authorized an overstrength of 15 percent to permit them to complete their period of training and arrive at a port of embarkation at full T/O strength with the necessity for furnishing them additional men after their initial issue of fillers. 17

POSTPONEMENT OF ACTIVATIONS

The acute shortage of men which had caused the delay in receiving replacements for cadre losses and had led to the above decision of Army Ground Forces also prevented the Army from fulfilling its planned schedules of activations. On 24 September 1942 the War Department announced that the activation of all nondivisional units scheduled for October was postponed. This was later extended to include those ordered to be activated in November and December.

This breathing spell, caused by the postponement of activations, enabled Second Army units to requisition and receive the authorized overstrength and to give to their selected cadres the full program of training before sending them to the new units. At the same time it was announced that the new divisions whose cadre had already been designated and trained would not receive their fillers as planned. This caused more complications. The division cadres had already entered into or completed the intensive training period. Some were already at the stations of their new divisions while the others, who were still at their old stations, had been pulled out of their units for the special cadre training.

Second Army believed that a special program should be established for these cadres to keep them from going stale. Colonel Pearson, G-3, prepared such a program and it was sent to Army Ground Forces for approval. 18 Army Ground Forces took no action on this proposal and there was no prepared program. Each cadre, whether at its new station or with the parent unit, continued to train upon locally improvised schedules until the fillers arrived, in most cases after a delay of from one to two months from the date originally scheduled.

16. AGF 1st Ind to above, 320.2 Inf-GNGCT/10966(9-1-42), 19 Sep 42. Ibid.
18. Second Army Informal Memo for CofS, 10 Oct 42, sub: Tng of Off and Enl Cadre of Divs not Activated or with Filler Repls. Record of telephone conversation between Gen Randolph, CofS Second Army, and Gen Parks, CofS AGF, 9 Oct 42, sub: Cadres of Divs whose Fillers will be Delayed. AG 322-55.
HOUSEKEEPING DETACHMENTS

Second Army at this time first expressed its objection to the housekeepingdetachments for new divisions. These had been ordered by Army Ground Forces in May 1942, because experience had shown that during the preactivation period the work of the cadre, officer and enlisted, had been hampered "by the necessity of using many of the enlisted cadre outside of their proper assignments to perform purely housekeeping tasks such as guard, fatigue, truck driving, running an officers mess, etc." To obviate this necessity and to permit the cadre to do its proper work such as receiving equipment, preliminary planning, and setting up an effective organization, the Army having immediate jurisdiction over a particular division was ordered to provide a housekeeping detachment of 2 officers, 2 sergeants, 3 corporals, 6 chauffeurs, 4 cooks, and 40 privates, first class, or privates, qualified for guard duty. 19

Second Army had experienced substantial difficulties in providing and maintaining these details, as well as the service units which also had to be provided during this preliminary period. These difficulties had been overcome by various improvisations such as borrowing trucks and personnel from Service Commands; detaching details from combat units to accomplish the required missions; and by combining the cadres of activated Quartermaster companies whose fillers had not been received. But none of these had quite worked out, and Second Army said, "The present system is not considered satisfactory in that combat and service units have been diverted from their training missions and dispersed to separate stations for extended periods to perform service duty under commands which are not primarily concerned with the progress of training and morale of these units." 20

It was recommended that personnel to perform the necessary housekeeping, transportation, and guard duties be furnished by the parent division on D minus 30 as an addition to the cadre already prescribed. 21

These recommendations were approved in principle by Army Ground Forces which stated that recently adopted procedure provided for the activation, on D minus 90, of the Ordnance and Quartermaster units of new divisions and their arrival at the station of the new division on D minus 30. This should obviate the necessity for borrowing truck and service companies for new divisions. In addition the activation orders for new divisions provided "that parent divisions furnish 40 privates, lst class, and privates, qualified for guard duty, as an integral part of the cadre, substantially as recommended by you." 22

This system continued without substantial alteration, though no new Divisions were activated after the summer of 1943. Second Army continued to activate nondivisional units, but with one substantial change. During 1942 nondivisional units, except armored units, of every arm and service, trained by Second Army, were activated by Second Army, but beginning in early 1943 Tank Destroyer Battalions and Anti-aircraft units were activated and given their basic and unit training at the Tank Destroyer Center and

20. Second Army 1tr to AGF, 17 Nov 42, sub: Serv Truck ing and Housekeeping Dets for Newly Activated Divs. AG 322.04-17.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid. AGF 1st Ind to Second Army, 24 Nov 42.
by the Antiaircraft Command. Activations were carried out in accordance with a basic plan laid down by Army Ground Forces. Second Army would receive a letter from Army Ground Forces or the War Department directing activation at approximately D-90 days. This letter established the definite date of activation. Officers were selected by Army and those scheduled for attendance at branch service schools were sent on the date specified by the activation letter. The Army was responsible for the follow-up of activation and initiated corrective action for any shortages or delay in arrival of personnel or equipment.

This program for activation was followed without substantial change until 7 January 1944 when Army Ground Forces, as part of the reorganization of the whole personnel system for the better utilization of available manpower, announced that designated parent units would no longer have an initial overstrength of 15 percent, but only Table Organization plus cadre from the time they were designated until such cadres were dropped.

ARMY CADRE

Second Army began the training of a cadre for another field army in August 1942. Circumstances postponed the planned activation of this field army and the men assigned to this cadre were used as augmentation groups for army and corps headquarters until April 1944. At this time they were sent to Ft. Sam Houston, Tex., to become a part of a new army headquarters to replace the personnel of Headquarters, Fourth Army, at that station.

Around 1 June 1944 officers and enlisted men to form another army headquarters began to report to Memphis. These were assigned to another Second Army augmentation group and began training to replace the existing personnel who were transferred to the newly organized Eighth Army for service in an overseas theatre.

The formation of this new army from the personnel of Headquarters, Second Army, and the assumption of the Second Army designation by a new headquarters in many ways completed the original task of the army. But before the history is closed there must be a discussion of many of the problems of training and personnel in wartime.

23. TDC Information Bull 1, 1 Feb 43. AG 323.7-1. Interview of Hist Off with Col Wilson, Second Army AA Off, 20 Dec 43.
24. AGF ltr (R) 320.2/164-NGC(T2-18-43), 18 Mar 43, sub: Plan for Activation of Non-div Units, AG 322-52(R).
25. AGF ltr 341/1202(7 Jan 44)NGAP, '7 Jan 44, sub: Utilization of Enl Pers.
26. AGF ltr to Second and Third Armies, 21 Aug 42, sub: Enl Pers for Hq Units to be Activated in 42. AG 322.1-2(Gen).
27. AG 321(Hq 2A Aug) and AG 321(2" Army Cadre).
28. Ibid.
Chapter IX

PERSONNEL

The training of cadre and the resulting drain of officers and men from the existing Second Army units was one of the most difficult personnel problems, but it was not the only one. Some, such as the reclassification of incapable, incompetent, and inefficient officers, were but continuations of policies established during the peacetime training period. Here the Commanding General of the Second Army continued to emphasize the necessity for trained, energetic, and competent leaders.

RECLASSIFICATION OF OFFICERS

In an address to Legionnaires at Kansas City on 20 September 1942, General Lear said: "Physical and mental vigor, coupled with tactical knowledge, enterprise, and capacity to make quick sound decisions -- no matter what the conditions of fatigue -- is required of all commanders in this war." A short time before he had said in a maneuver critique in Tennessee: "Men in key positions should be selected for what they can do and for no other reason." On still another occasion he said: "When battles move by miles today compared with the yards of the previous World War, every officer must be equipped to stand the gaff -- physically, mentally, morally -- under the terrific strain of constant movement. It is our implacable purpose to equip our soldiers with such leaders."1

A further insight into General Lear's concept of leadership was afforded by a letter that he wrote to general officers and other selected unit commanders of lower rank in July 1942. "It is vitally necessary," he said in this communication, "that officers of all ranks be the living, working, admirable examples to the soldiers of this high conception of honor (a personal conception...that will give him added strength in battle and eliminate the thought of surrender from his mind) and of unity among themselves and with their troops. This means the complete eradication of complacency, diffidence, selfishness, jealousy, carelessness, or unadmirable standards of personal living and conduct among leaders." The General decried undue attention to rank and jealousy among officers over promotion. Modern warfare required unusual physical stamina as qualification for leadership, he said, for "youth, when accompanied by a sense of responsibility is a great asset." He counselled older officers to reconcile themselves to a setting aside of the rules of seniority in wartime promotions. "The health of the Army," he added, "depends upon those of us in high positions refusing to be tied down by old traditions and precedents, and continually searching for new blood, new leaders and...new genius. We must, therefore, all of us, divorce ourselves from any thought that we belong to a caste, and that we should protect ourselves from the upward surge of new blood and talent."2

The Reclassification boards had been removed from armies and placed under control of corps areas and departments by the War Department on 29 January 1942, but this did not relieve the field forces of the responsibility of initiating proceedings for removal of incompetent officers.3 This was a continuing policy and was followed when the state of training of a unit indicated that the commanding officer and other officers were not properly performing their duties. Whenever there was an unreasonable delay by

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1. Original typescript of Gen Lear's speech over radio station WDAF, Kansas City, Mo, 19 Feb 41. Hist Off'files.
2. Copies of this ltr, having various dates and addresses, are filed in AG 353-29.
3. WD ltr AG 201.6(2-5-42)A OC, 9 Feb 42, sub: Revision of AR 605-230 (Reclassification). AG 210.01-5.
a commander in clearing such officers from units the rebuke from the commanding general was severe. For instance when a corps commander had permitted such a condition to exist for what General Lear considered an unreasonable length of time, his comment was: "I trust that those responsible for slow action in this situation will not find the condition duplicated if and when this unit makes contact or supports a unit in contact with the enemy." General Fredendall, who succeeded General Lear as Commanding General of the Second Army, was no less insistent upon the importance of reclassification and removal of unit officers.

In August 1943 Army Ground Forces began a study of reclassification with the idea of getting reclassification jurisdiction back from the Service Commands and decentralizing it to armies, corps, and independent commands. Second Army was not enthusiastic. As Colonel Beurket, G-1, said: "I am not in possession of any facts indicating that Service Commands have not been performing satisfactory service. We had it at one time and it was a devil of a nuisance. During the past month we sent sixty-odd cases to Service Commands. If we had to take those cases at Army Hq it would throw an administrative burden on us and we would have a board sitting all the time."

General Fredendall, however, decided that he wanted to go along with Army Ground Forces in this matter and Second Army made no objection. On 4 January 1944 the War Department announced that reclassification of officers had been decentralized to the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Army Service Forces. No reclassification cases were to be hereafter submitted to service commands reclassification boards except in cases of officers under the jurisdiction of Army Service Forces or of defense commands.

Army Ground Forces redelegated to Second Army the reclassification jurisdiction over all officers under its control and over the Mountain, Jungle, and Winter Warfare Board which was attached to the Second Army for reclassification purposes only. Second Army, in turn and under the explicit directions of Army Ground Forces, delegated to commanding generals of all corps the reclassification jurisdiction for captains and lieutenants assigned or attached to organic corps units only; and to division commanders the reclassification jurisdiction for captains and lieutenants of all units over which the division exercised general court martial jurisdiction as specified in letters emanating from Second Army Headquarters. Reclassification jurisdiction over all other officers was retained by Second Army.

A Second Army Reclassification Center was established at Headquarters, Second Army, and corps and divisions were directed to establish reclassification boards immediately. The proceedings of these corps and division boards were forwarded through Second Army Headquarters after necessary action had been taken by the convening authority.

4. AG 210.01-7(43). Reclassification records were not retained in the AG files of Second Army, but were sent to the reclassification board and from there to WD, so that no real study of this phase of the Army's activities is possible at this time.

5. Record of telephone conversation between Col McGown, G-1 Sec AGF and Col Beurket, 11 Aug 43. AG 210.01-7.

6. WD ltr AG 201.6(31 Dec 43)FO-M-A, 4 Jan 44, sub: Revision of AR 605-230 (Reclassification).

7. Ibid. AGF 1st ind 210.01/303(4 Jan 44)GNAP, 8 Jan 44.

8. Ibid. Second Army 2d ind, 16 Jan 44.

9. Ibid.
Reclassification involved a considerable number of officers. For example, a total of 218 officers of all ranks were brought before Second Army boards from 1 March to 30 April. Eighty-three of these officers were recommended for probationary reassignment in grade, but the majority were either discharged, reduced in grade and reassigned, or permitted to resign from the service.

All of Second Army's efforts to improve the leadership of the army were not merely negative in character. The requirements for promotion were set by the War Department, but the policies had to be carried out by the field forces. On 27 January 1942 General Lear wrote:

In connection with the institution of the war-time promotion system contained in MR 1-3, as modified by Circular No. 1, 1942, I wish to impress every commander in the Second Army with the importance of earnest and sincere consideration that must be given to selection of officers for promotion to higher rank and position.

Well earned promotion is the cherished reward of a good officer; it is a stimulant to morale and greater effort; and, when its recipients are wisely chosen, there is no better assurance for the future combat proficiency of our Army. Since every young officer is a potential leader of large forces, his selection for promotion is highly important. In the interest of efficiency and the future well-being of our country, seniority and self-interest must be abandoned in favor of demonstrated ability.

In making recommendations for promotion, commanders will give first consideration to demonstrated qualities of leadership and individual proficiency. Under no circumstances will personal interest or an individual's need for higher pay be an influence in making selections.

Soldiers are entitled to the best available leaders. It is the solemn duty of all commanders to do their part in seeing that they have them.

OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOLS

Second Army also gave vigorous support to the program for training officers from the ranks of the army itself. During the peacetime training program officer candidate boards had been established by corps areas and quotas had been allotted to the field forces, but the declaration of war changed this.

The officer corps had to be expanded as rapidly as possible, since there was an immediate increase in the number of classes in each Officer Candidate School. Division, corps, and army commanders were authorized to establish examining boards, and their decision was to be final in all cases concerning their personnel.

10. Second Army rpts, no date, sub: Rpt of Elimination of Unfit Off from 1 to 31 Mar 44. Rpt of Elimination of Unfit Off for Period 1 to 30 Apr 44. AG 210.01 (Reclass).
11. Gen Lear to all Second Army unit comdres, 27 Jan 42, sub: War-Time Promotion, under MR 1-3, as Modified by Cir 1, 42. AG 210.2-2.
13. TAG telg to Second Army, 21 Jan 42. AG 352-1.
immediately ordered the creation of these boards, and each commanding officer was told to canvass his "unit at once and encourage all eligibles to submit their formal application."\(^\text{14}\)

General Marshall, on 26 February 1942, wrote a personal letter to General Lear urging the importance of this program, and General Lear immediately sent the following message to all commanders:

Army expansion program requires tremendous increase in number of officers of every branch. Our greatest source of officer material of suitable character is now in the ranks of organizations. You will personally and immediately explore your source of supply and recommend to this headquarters every noncommissioned officer and private, particularly college and high school graduates, who is qualified to take the officer candidate course no matter what duty he may be filling now. You will in each case state whether the individual desires the officer candidate course and where he prefers not to take it give the reason therefor. Men holding key positions and all others must be encouraged to compete for officer privileges. Personally and orally immediately bring this message to the attention of every officer you command."\(^\text{15}\)

General Lear, in reply to General Marshall, said that Second Army had filled its entire quota for officer candidate schools except for one class for the Engineer School, where there had been a shortage of applications from army troops, though additional applicants had been available in Second Army divisions. He suggested that quotas should be allotted to armies rather than separately to army troops and divisions, so that adjustments could be made and this situation avoided. In addition he strongly recommended that the Air Corps be exploited for applicants for commissions in ground arms and services "since Air Corps has been receiving pick of young personnel, many of whom are disqualified for flying duty."\(^\text{16}\)

Unit commanders who had furnished substantial numbers of officer candidates were commended and Second Army inspectors checked to see that every effort to persuade qualified enlisted men to apply had been made.\(^\text{17}\) But during the summer of 1942 it became apparent that the available supply of officer material was being exhausted. On 24 July 1942 the 30th Division said: "Men are now being examined for officer candidate schools who have had, in some cases, one year of high school, and in some instances none."\(^\text{18}\)

This division had already furnished 900 officer candidates and had quotas of 313 to be filled in August. The 8th Motorized Division furnished 1,232 men for OCS. The 77th Infantry Division, activated on 25 March 1942, had sent 782 officer candidates by 6 October and was to send 225 more in the next three months. The 72d Field Artillery Brigade in the same period had supplied 450 candidates, and so on through all the Second Army units. The situation became so bad that the Second Army Chief of Staff reported to General McNair that "Officer Candidate School material has been personally

\(^\text{14}\) Second Army TWX to all unit comdrs. AG 352-1.

\(^\text{15}\) Second Army TWX to all unit comdrs, 2 Mar 42. AG 352-1.

\(^\text{16}\) Gen Lear to Gen Marshall, 1 Mar 42. Ibid.

\(^\text{17}\) Second Army to Brig Gen A. M. Harper, 30 Div Arty, 13 Aug 42. AG 330.13-12.

\(^\text{18}\) 30th Div ltr (C) AG 324.71-GNMFA to AGF, 24 Jul 42, sub: Repl for Activation of New Combat Team. AG 322.04-34(C).
investigated by General Lear, who finds that the units of the Second Army are just about down to rock bottom in regard to candidates for the Field Artillery, Infantry and Engineers. 19

ARMY SPECIALIZED TRAINING PROGRAM

Just at the time that the heavy demand for officer candidates eased off in the spring of 1943 the War Department announced a new program which was to drain off large numbers of men in the upper two grades of the Army General Classification Test (AGCT) from the field force units. On 26 December 1942 tentative plans were announced for an Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) which contemplated training enlisted men in designated colleges and universities. At first a special test was given to qualify candidates for the ASTP, but later a grade of 115 or better on the AGCT, and certain age and educational requirements were used as the basis for qualification. Field Selection Boards were established by divisions and at camps and stations. Recommended applicants were reported to the Service Command concerned and were ordered by Service Command to report to Specialized Training and Reassignment (STAR) units, where the definite assignment to colleges and courses was made. 20

On 4 April 1943 Army Ground Forces sent to Second Army a memorandum from The Chief of Staff which said that the number of eligible men recommended for ASTP had been disappointing. "I desire that every echelon of command support this program and make it a success. I desire further that proper action be taken by you to insure that all in your command are informed of these facts and of the need for wholehearted cooperation." Second Army commanders were ordered to comply with this desire of The Chief of Staff and to expedite the recommendation of enlisted personnel eligible for ASTP. 21

Nothing was permitted to interfere with the selection of eligible men. All enlisted men with the prescribed qualifications were required to appear before the Field Selection Boards, even though Division Commanders felt, as one said, that it "just splits the division wide open ... it breaks down (the) training program so seriously." Divisions on maneuvers had men taken from their ranks, 750 leaving the 79th Division in the last week of April alone. 22 Field Selection Boards which rejected men for reasons other than those provided in the War Department Selection had the applications returned to them with the statement that, "If a man is judged to have the academic qualifications, he should be recommended." 23

Second Army by 15 July 1943 had 4,637 men recommended for ASTP and 1,636 actually shipped from Second Army troops not including divisions or corps. In one instance an

19. Ibid. 77th Div ltr AG 320.2 Strength to Second Army, 8 Oct 42, sub: Required Overhead for New Div to Cover Early Losses. AG 322.04-1. Second Army G-3 files, 8th Mtz Div folder. Second Army Informal Check Slip, 20 Sep 42. AG 337-29.
21. AGF ltr 352(A9 rP)-GNWD(4-1-43), 3 Apr 43, sub: ASTP. Second Army 1st ind, Ibid.
22. Record of telephone conversation between Col Page, G-1 XII Corps and Col Beurket, G-1 Second Army, 22 Apr 43. Record of telephone conversation between Capt Moore, A G-1 Second Army and Maj Matthews, 4th SvC, 1 Vay 43. AG 220.66-1(21Gn).
23. Second Army ltr to 17th Det Sp Trs Second Army, 4 Mar 43. Ibid.
Anonymous letter from a soldier in a high priority unit, whose commander had prevented thirteen "key men" of his unit from being sent to ASTP, led to an investigation. When the complaint was found to be true the commander was rebuked and the Second Army staff officer in charge of ASTP recommended that an indorsement be sent saying, "it is directed that you immediately make available for ASTP the enlisted men referred to." But before the indorsament could be sent the unit was alerted and no action was taken.24

The drain from ASTP eased up in the fall of 1943 and most of the program was ended in February 1944, but many of the ablest and most intelligent enlisted men had been taken from the field forces.

TRAINING OF SUBSTANDARD INDIVIDUALS

In the meantime the same shortage of men that had forced the postponement of the planned activations of units in the fall of 1942 had caused the Selective Service System to lower its physical and mental standards and to induct large numbers of older men. General McNair’s hope, expressed in 1940, that eventually all recruits would be sent first to replacement training centers for their MAP training had never been fulfilled.25 Second Army units continued to receive the great majority of their fillers direct from reception centers so that the job of clearing the unfit and providing remedial training for those who could become useful soldiers was a part of their task.

Army Ground Forces, on 8 October 1942, announced that the Development and Special Training Section of the War Department and prepared special instructional material to aid field force commanders in bringing illiterates, slow learners, non-English-speaking and other enlisted men requiring special training, to a level of efficiency whereby they could become useful soldiers. Schools for this purpose were to be established in which officers and enlisted men were to act as instructors.26

Second Army directed the commanders of corps, divisions, separate regiments, and detachments, Special Troops, Second Army, to establish special training units for all non-English-speaking men, illiterates, slow learners, and Grade V enlisted men and also for men with correctible physical impairments, who, by appropriate physical training and by remedial measures, could be made fit for general service.27 The units themselves did most of this special training, but Army Ground Forces and Second Army approved the use of WPA teachers at Camp Gordon, Ga., and Camp Blanding, Fla. The established facilities of the public school system of Durham, N. C., were used by the white soldiers at Camp Butner, and Negro school teachers at the same place volunteered their services to aid Negro illiterates.28

These schools constituted a severe burden upon the already fully taxed training personnel of the field forces. There were 2,140 enlisted men enrolled in the 13-weeks course of the special training units of the 83rd Infantry Division. At the close of the training it was found that 60 percent, or 744, could return to their companies as basic combat soldiers or as ammunition handlers, orderlies, laborers, pioneers, riggers, etc.

26. AGF ltr 201.6/322NAGS(10-8-42), 8 Oct 42, sub: Sp Tng for Illiterates, Non-English-Speaking, etc. AG 353-158.
27. Second Army Tng Memo 29, 3 Nov 42. AG 353-9.
and buglers; and that some of the more apt could function as riflemen, chauffeurs, and truck drivers. Twenty percent, or 2\(\frac{1}{8}\)%, were unfit for military service and were being individually examined and sent before boards for discharge under Section VIII, AR 615-380. The final 20 percent could be used in the performance of housekeeping and maintenance operations under Service Command, but no provision had been made for this transfer. Second Army consequently informed the 83rd Division that if the men could not be used in their companies they would have to be discharged under Section VIII. 29

The 2nd Infantry Division had 537 men enrolled in 4 schools, which operated for 1 hour 3 nights a week. The 94th Division had 5 schools with a total attendance of 678 men. The 72nd Field Artillery brigade operated 6 schools at night and on Saturday afternoon with 203 men. Seventeen officers and 148 enlisted men acted as instructors in the 100th Infantry Division School, and 10 officers and 33 enlisted men in those of the 160th Infantry Division. 30

A two-weeks conference on special training was held in May and June 1943 at the Medical Replacement Training Center, Camp Grant, I11. The Second Army representative at this conference was told unofficially that the special training in field units had been considered unsatisfactory and not in accordance with that outlined in MTP 20-1. In defense of the procedure followed in field units he pointed out that the nature of the mission of the field forces was such that neither time, personnel, nor facilities were available for the conduct of special training along the lines approved by the Special Training Division. If an actual Special Training Unit were set up in a regular training organization, the officer and enlisted personnel required to conduct the special training would have to be withdrawn from regular training and miss the first and most important period of training. In addition the men taking the special training would be qualified only to take basic training at the close of the program, but, by this time, the unit itself would have completed basic training, and the special trainees would still be behind their organization. This would necessitate an additional Special Training Phase. 31

The most important result of the conference was the announcement that after 1 June 1943 all non-English-speaking, illiterate, and Grade V inductees were to be sent from reception centers to special training units at the reception center level. 32 Army Ground Forces, and through it Second Army, was given authority to return to reception centers all men shipped to a unit of the field forces after 15 July 1943 who were unable to read and write the English language at the fourth-grade level, who were unable to speak or understand simple English, or who were classified in Grade V I the Army General Classification Test. 33

Second Army recommended that all enlisted men in the above categories who were then in field force units should be sent back to these special training units, because "Those who are now assigned to combat units...constitute a continuing problem and a

29. 83rd Inf Div ltr AG _31.8GNMDQ to XI Corps, 13 Feb 43, sub: Effective utilization of Borderline Mental Defectives. Second Army 2d Ind, 4 Mar 43. AG 220. 31-5.
30. XI Corps ltr AG 353 GNMCW to Second Army, 22 May 43, sub: Tng of ineffectives. XI Corps ltr AG 353 to same, 2 Jul 43. AG 353-168.
32. ASRF ltr SPX 353(5-14-43)08-D-SPGAF, 28 May 43, sub: Estab of Special Training Units (STU). AG 353-168.
33. AGF 1st Ind (R) to above, 353/32(17 Jun 43)-GNAP, 15 Jul 43. Ibid.
definite diversion from intensive battle training." Army Ground Forces refused to concur, though the desirability of removing this burden from tactical units was fully realized. The necessity for this special training would cease after completing the discharge of men then in the Army Ground Forces and it was not considered to be economical to transfer them back to reception centers or replacement training centers. AGF did, however, authorize extension of the individual training period of units in which more than 45 percent of personnel was in classes IV and V.35

LIMITED SERVICE AND OVER-AGE ENLISTED MEN

The proper disposal of men over 38 years of age and those physically unfit for combat service was also a problem for Second Army and its units, and a handicap to the training program. The War Department, in December 1942, announced that no more limited service men would be assigned to combat units, but men over 38 years of age would be received until those then in replacement training centers had been allotted to units. General Lear proposed the drawing up of a memorandum enclosing a list which would show by organization and employment the positions that might be filled by men in these two categories. "Higher commanders," General Lear concluded, "should act with a minimum of delay on the question of the elimination of unfit or misfit personnel. The usefulness of an individual should be considered by company, battalion, regimental, and other commanders, as well as by medical officers and a determination reached with fairness to the unit and to the individual."36

The War Department had suspended the induction of men over 38 years of age on 5 December 1942, and provided a method whereby men over that age who would be more useful in industry than in the army could be discharged if they voluntarily requested it. This did not mean that every enlisted man in the army over 38 was discharged, but it did cause substantial adjustments to be made in many units. Second Army's instructions to its units on this matter were quite clear. They said:

The mere fact that a soldier is over 38 years of age and has a job is NOT sufficient reason to grant discharge under above authority. Careful consideration must be given in each case to determine whether the individual is so physically handicapped due to his age as to make his value to the service secondary to industry. A medical officer's view will be obtained if there is doubt. A suitable and trained replacement must be available for each individual released under provisions of above referred to circular.

Many men in service, over 38 years of age, are as capable of performing general military service as younger men. Therefore, each case must be fully considered and your views and recommendations submitted with application to this headquarters.38

34. Second Army ltr to CG AGF, 12 Jul 43, sub: Transfer of Illiterates, Non-English and Grade V Soldiers to STUs at RTCs. Ibid.
35. AGF ltr 555.01/68(17 Sep 43)GNCS, 17 Sep 43, sub: Tng of Substandard Individuals and Units. Reproduced as Second Army ltr, 21 Sep 43, same sub: AG 353-168.
36. Second Army to all corps cmdrs, 20 Jan 43, sub: Use of Lt Serv Pers and Men Over 38 Yrs of Age. AG 220.31-5.
37. Cir 397 WD, 7 Dec 42.
38. Second Army W/Ind to 5th Det Sp Trs, 5 Jan 43. AG 220.803-1.
This ruling made the task of the field units more difficult than if they had been authorized to discharge all men in this category who requested it and who had a job available in an essential industry. Each case was handled separately. Specific reasons had to be given as to why the individual could not properly perform military duties, and the affirmative statement made that there was a suitable replacement available. Nevertheless, large numbers of men were discharged under this circular. For example, 811 men were cleared from the 30th Division, similar numbers from other divisions, and proportionate numbers from smaller units. On 28 February 1943 there were 2,323 enlisted men over 38 in the alerted units of the Second Army, of whom 1,683 were requesting discharge.

Limited service personnel involved a larger number of men and was to prove a far greater problem to Second Army and its units. On 1 August 1942 Army Ground Forces directed that maximum use would be made of limited service personnel in the permanent installations of its commands.

The only non-tactical installations of Second Army were the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments, Special Troops, Second Army, and these were the only ones affected by this Army Ground Force directive.

Second Army at first directed that every possible effort be made to select officers and men for these headquarters from those not physically qualified for field duty. But on 6 October 1942 the requirement was made positively: "All enlisted men on duty in Headquarters Detachments, Special Troops, Second Army, will by November 1, 1942, be white limited service personnel. Personnel necessitating replacement will be appropriately reassigned by commanders concerned."

On 11 November 1942 Second Army requested a report from each of the detachments as to the number of officers required so that all officers in the headquarters would be limited service personnel. It was found that 52 officers were needed for the 13 detachments, 15 lieutenant colonels, 22 majors and 17 captains, but none of these was available. The detachments never received any substantial number of limited service officers, but the enlisted personnel were largely in this classification. Even this substitution was not accomplished without difficulty, as shown by a letter from one of the detachments:

The additional enlisted men (limited service) will be obtained as soon as practicable, and trained both as soldiers and in their prospective duties at this headquarters. If they cannot be found with suitable grades and rating they will be taken as privates and promoted as they obtain proficiency.

39. 30th Inf Div ltr to XI Corps, 24 Feb 43. AG 220.31-5. Second Army ltr (S) to AOF, 6 Apr 43, sub: Rpt on Enl Men Over 38 Yrs of Age in Intensive Tng or Alerted Units. AG 353.154(S).

40. AGF ltr 220.31-GNAGS(7-11-42), 1 Aug 42, sub: Ltd Serv Pers. AG 220.31-5.

41. Second Army ltr to Cols Det Sp Trs, 16 Sep 42, sub: Pers for Duty at Hq Det Sp Trs. AG 322.17-1.

42. Second Army ltr to same, 6 Oct 42, same sub, Ibid.

43. Second Army ltr to same, 11 Nov 42, sub: Off Pers for Duty at Hq Det Sp Trs. Ibid.

44. Second Army ltr, 24 Nov 42, sub: Requisition for Ltd Serv Off Hq Det Sp Trs, Second Army. Ibid.
The directive from Second Army which forced us to replace all general service men on November 1st with limited service men, has left us badly handicapped and far short of the men needed for effective operation, both as to numbers and as to military and civilian qualifications. We have been able as yet to obtain qualified men only as shown... and these, with the exception of the Master Sergeant, are all new trainees received about 15 October. Every effort will be made to find suitable limited service men to fill all authorized and necessary position vacancies.45

The process of clearing combat units of limited service men was continuous, and all units which had men incapacitated to the extent that they could not be utilized by the field forces transferred them to Service Command without reference to Headquarters, Second Army. It is not possible from records available in this headquarters to estimate the total number of men involved, but it is plainly evident that it involved substantial numbers and resulted in considerable disruption to units. For example, the 75th Infantry Division, activated 15 April 1943, had transferred 500 men on account of physical disability by 6 September. The 30th Infantry Division lost 465 men for the same cause, in addition to 232 who received Certificate of Disability discharges.46

The original War Department circular authorizing the transfer of limited service men had stated that it was the duty of all organization commanders to retain within their units all men physically capable of filling positions therein.47 But such a large number of men were being transferred from Second Army units to Service Command that General Lear came to believe that many limited service personnel were being transferred from combat divisions who could be well employed in service units of the Second Army, such as ordnance maintenance units, laundry companies, bakery companies, graves registration companies and similar units. Commanders, with limited service personnel who could not be used in their own organization but could be used by one of the above units of the field forces, were directed to report such personnel to the next higher headquarters for reassignment.48

After the largest percentage of limited service personnel had been cleared from the field force units the War Department decided to eliminate the use of the term "limited service" and directed that all men who did not meet the minimum standards of induction (the existing minimum standards for limited service as prescribed by MR 1-9, 15 October 1942) were to be discharged. Exception was to be made in the case of men physically qualified to perform their present jobs provided the commander concerned desired to retain them.49

Army Ground Forces, on 21 August 1943, directed that individuals, except those desired by commanders concerned or who were over 30 years of age, who were not up to existing general service standards were to be transferred to service type units and to Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Special Troops, Second Army, and Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Special Troops, Second Army. Personnel over 30 years of age...

45. 8th Det Sp Trs 1tr AG 322.17 to Second Army, 12 Nov 42, sub: Reorg of Hq. Ibid.

46. 75th Inf Div file, G-3 Records. 30th Inf Div 1tr to VII Corps, 24 Feb 43. AG 220.31-5.

47. Cir 327 WD, 27 Sep 42.

48. Second Army 1tr, 8 Dec 42, sub: Transfer of Ltd Serv Pers from Fld Forces. Same, 4 Jan 43, same sub. AG 220.31-5 (48).

49. Second Army Wkly Information Bull 31, 31 Jul 43. AG 220.31-5.
age, not meeting general service standards and whole retention was not desired by commanders concerned, was to be reported to Army Ground Forces for reassignment. It was specifically stated that only in exceptional cases would personnel who did not meet the prescribed standards be retained in tactical units. Once they had been retained, however, such enlisted men were to be held when the unit was alerted or ordered overseas unless their physical condition had deteriorated.

Second Army, in turn, urged unit commanders to endeavor to assign enlisted men who were not up to general service standards to positions within their units where they could be utilized. Men failing to meet the minimum standards for induction were to be discharged. Other men in this category were to be reported to detachment commanders for reassignment. "In many cases," the Second Army letter said, "Detachment Commanders due to the status of service type units under their jurisdiction, and a preponderance of personnel not qualified for general service, will be unable to reassign or absorb personnel reported to them for transfer. In such instances list of personnel, in addition to lists called for in... above AGF letter, will be referred to this Headquarters by Unit Commanders direct. This personnel will be reported to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, for reassignment."

What to do with men not up to general service standards was becoming a critical problem. On 15 September 1943 Captain Moore, Assistant G-1, Second Army, called Colonel Gibbons, G-1, Army Ground Forces, and said: "Colonel Gibbons, I am referring to the AGF letter, subject: 'Disposition of Limited Service Personnel'. The Second Army has reached a saturation point and can no longer reassign or absorb former limited service personnel within service type units. We are still reporting such individuals 50 years of age and over to AGF as directed, but Major Pitts informed me by telephone that this would soon fizzle out, inasmuch as they had reached a saturation point. My problem is this. Since we can no longer reassign or absorb enlisted men, who meet the minimum standards for induction but not general service standards, to service type units under our jurisdiction, shall we report this personnel to you?" To which Colonel Gibbons replied: "Do not report them to us. We have no place for them either. Return such lists to units indicating that this personnel will be retained. Once units are alerted, personnel who suffer from physical disabilities under the provisions of Circular 189 cs, will be pulled out. The term "limited service" no longer exists. Personnel who fail to meet minimum standards for induction will be discharged. Those who do meet the minimum standards will be considered general service."

To make the situation even more complicated Army Ground Forces announced that additional enlisted men who met minimum standards for induction but who were not qualified for general service were to be assigned to the various Commands. These men were to come from replacements rejected for overseas service, students from schools, and replacements returned from overseas who possessed physical deficiencies believed to be temporary and correctible. Second Army, in an effort to find places for these men as well as those cleared out of its combat units, ordered a survey to be made of all service units at a single station. The results of that survey showed that over 85 percent of the personnel in units inspected were fit for vigorous combat service and that over 50 percent could be immediately transferred without disrupting the technical efficiency

50. AGF ltr 327.3(21 Aug 43)GNGAP, 21 Aug 43, sub: Disposition of Ltd Serv Pers in Ground Force Units. Ibid.

51. Second Army ltr, 4 Sep 43, sub: Disposition of Ltd Serv Pers. Ibid.

52. Record of telephone conversation between Capt Moore, A G-1 Second Army and Col Gibbons, G-1 AGF, 15 Sep 43. Ibid.

of the unit. All detachment commanders were ordered to determine from last submitted inventories of specialists the number of nonspecialists and overages of specialists in each service unit not on an alert status. Men not fit for vigorous combat service were to be removed from this list, and then Commanding Officers of service units were to be ordered to submit lists of men for transfer to combat units in numbers equal to results obtained. Transfers were to be made with Second Army combat units at the station. If no vacancies existed in combat units then a report was to be made to Second Army Headquarters.54

Before this directive could be put into effect it was rescinded because Second Army had learned that the War Department was just publishing a new circular on this subject.55 This circular said that it was imperative that each soldier be assigned to a position in which he could render maximum service. "Classification, assignment, re-assignment, and training are command functions which must be exercised energetically and continuously." Some assignments required great strength, but even in combat units there were many places which could be filled by soldiers with defects. The discharge of an enlisted man, or his removal immediately prior to movement overseas, because he was incapable of serving in a physically exacting position when he might well render adequate service in another assignment was prohibited as a waste of military manpower.56

This was final. The units must make use of what men were available to them. The decision was reinforced on 6 January 1944 by a statement of The Chief of Staff:

The present manpower situation is critical. Industrial as well as armed force requirements are pressing and must be met. We are now receiving from Selective Service men who hitherto have been deferred for dependency reasons. The country cannot afford, nor can the Army tolerate, any wastage of suitable manpower. The solution lies in the proper exercise of command functions, and it is desired that this matter be given personal and continuing attention.58

Second Army rigidly enforced this program. Units were not permitted to rid themselves of men who did not meet the minimum standards for induction unless they had one of the five disqualifying defects listed in War Department Circular 293 or the unit commander certified that the enlisted men had not and could not perform duty. Army Ground Forces had ruled that if an enlisted man had been performing duty in a unit he was capable of performing duty overseas, which led one division chief of staff to say, "If he can stand up in ranks and answer roll call, is that it?" To which the Second Army G-1 replied, "That's practically it." This was an exaggeration, but Second Army instructions virtually said if an enlisted man could perform any duty he was to remain with his outfit.57

54. Second Army ltr to 2d Det Sp Tra, 10 Nov 43. Ibid.
55. Cir 293 WD, 11 Nov 43. Ibid.
56. AGF ltr 320.2/7002(12 Jan 44)GNGAF, 12 Jan 44, sub: Utilization of Available Manpower. Second Army Informal Staff Memo, 14 Mar 44, sub: Pers Policy in Clearing Physically Unqualified E4 from Alerted Units. Record of telephone conversation between Col Schanze, G-1 Second Army and Col Thomas, CofS 79th Inf Div. AG 220.3 (Ltd Duty).
57. Ibid.
A special inspecting team of three officers from Headquarters, Second Army, was sent to check the utilization of physically handicapped enlisted personnel in divisions in February 1944. Lists were prepared from "Military Occupational Specialists" of the Division T/O. It was found that there were 1,755 positions in an infantry division which could be filled by physically handicapped men who had a maximum of two months training or retraining. In addition there was a total of 1,318 positions which could also be filled by physically substandard men, but these would require preliminary civilian or military experience, or considerable training extending well beyond the two month period. These possibilities were pointed out to the divisions for their guidance in the reassignment of such personnel.58

Army Ground Forces, on 13 April, directed physically handicapped men to be reassigned to service units of an organization and the assignment of all who possessed physical stamina and aggressive leadership qualities to combat units. After all attempts appropriately to assign an individual within his own organization had been exhausted he was reported to the next higher commander for assignment to a place where he was capable of performing useful work.59

COMBAT REPLACEMENTS

At the same time that Second Army units were having such great difficulties with the proper assignment of men of limited physical capacity, they were drained of large numbers of their physically qualified men as replacements for combat theaters. This was not a new problem. Officers and enlisted men were taken from units to be used as individual replacements all through the war because the replacement training centers never developed sufficient capacity to fill the needs. From October 1942 to 28 February 1943 the 78th Infantry Division and other organizations of Second Army acted merely as replacement pools for the training of combat replacements, but this task, like the calls on organized units for replacements, was to meet a particular need and involved a relatively small number of men and units.60

The need for trained, POR-qualified replacements in the spring of 1944 was on a much larger scale. The offensive in Italy and the invasion of western Europe made necessary calls upon the low priority divisions and other organizations which involved substantial numbers and seriously set back the training progress of the organizations. Over 41,000 men were taken from Second Army units between 30 March and 29 May 1944. The 76th Infantry Division lost 5,688 men, and eleven other divisions were also badly hit, but not to the same extent.61 The replacements for these men came chiefly from the Army Air Forces, inactivated Tank Destroyer, Coast Artillery, and Antiaircraft units, and replacement training centers, but some were direct from reception centers.62

59. AGF ltr 220.3/357(LD) (13 Apr 44) GNGAP-I, 15 Apr 44, sub: Utilization and Conservation of Manpower. AG 220.3(Misc).
60. AGF ltr (3) 320.2/365-GNGPS(10-2-42), 2 Oct 42, sub: Repl Pools. AGF ltr 341/1037-GNGAP(1-13-43) to 76th Inf Div, 22 Feb 43, sub: Disposition of Pers Repl Pools, etc. AG 328.7-3.
61. Interview with Lt O. G. Fishbaine, POM Sec, G-1 Second Army, 29 May 44.
62. AGF ltr (C) 320.2/110(Overseas Repl)(29 Mar 44) GNSL, 29 Mar 44, sub: Overseas Enl Repls. Second Army G-3 memo (C) for CG, 6 Apr 44, sub: G-3 Conference with AGF. AG 220.3(Repls)(C).
Personnel difficulties affected large numbers of men and were serious obstacles in the path of Second Army and its units in the all-important task of training. They made more difficult the creation of an adequately trained army because of the disruption of units and the necessity for the use of men of poor physical and mental quality. Hurtful as these personnel adjustments were, the majority of the men in Second Army were unaffected and continued through the regular programs of established training as set forth by Second Army under the directions of Army Ground Forces and the War Department.
Chapter X

TRAINING IN WARTIME

The outbreak of War caused no fundamental change in the training program as established by the GHQ and Second Army directives previously issued; but the urgency of the training task was increased and the difficulties were for a time enhanced. General Lear, in a letter to division commanders, recognized that the training of individuals and units had been retarded by conditions beyond the control of the commanders concerned. Among these were:

1. Shortage of Officers.
2. Lack of permanence in assignment of officers to duties.
3. Lack of continuity in training, because of additional training tasks prescribed by higher headquarters.
4. Lack of training time available to unit commanders, because of usurpation by higher headquarters.
6. Uncertainty of ammunition supply.
7. Responsibility for training of attached units.
8. Lack of training aids and facilities.

The ultimate training mission of Second Army continued to be the preparation of its divisions and separate units for combat, the Commanding General said, but it had an immediate mission of providing personnel for and training new units. "The accomplishment of this mission will make more difficult the achievement of our ultimate mission as it will involve a drain of commissioned and enlisted personnel from existing units and will impose cadre and other special training tasks upon them." Additional personnel losses would be caused by filling War Department school quotas, "a matter of prime importance as long as officers in our units have not had the advantage of attendance at these schools," which would necessitate temporary shortages of officers and frequent changes in duty assignment.

The Army Commander was fully aware of the foregoing handicaps to the accomplishment of the ultimate training mission and directed his staff to take account of them in evaluating the results of training and administrative inspections. "Commanders of all units," he continued, "must recognize that the tasks imposed upon their subordinates have become more complicated and difficult because of present requirements and must be generous and cooperative in their attitude. Recommendations of Division Commanders based on ameliorating as far as practicable the conditions outlined... will receive careful consideration."

Reports from inspecting officers and from field units completely substantiate this statement on training conditions but there was no let-up by Second Army or its units. The nation was at war, and the training of a greatly increased army was an imperative task.

1. Second Army ltr, 6 Feb 42, sub: Obstacles to Tng. AG 353-29.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. For example, Col William Spence, Asst Art Off, Second Army, to CG Second Army, 20 Jan 42, sub: Inspection of the 58th FA Brig. Ag 353.1-5. 5th Inf Div ltr to Second Army, 6 Apr 42, sub: Obstacles to Tng. AG 353-29.
As many officers as practicable were sent to school to prepare them for their jobs, but there were too many inexperienced and untrained officers and too few schools. The large numbers of newly activated units and the greatly increased flow of inductees from the reception centers made it necessary to use officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men, as they were, for instructors and cadre. The situation could be met in only one way, General Lear wrote, and that was "by extreme devotion to duty and to self-improvement. Every officer of the Second Army must consecrate himself to the life of a soldier, fully and with single-minded purpose, permitting a minimum of other distractions—and none that do not contribute to health and efficiency." This was not a sprint but an endurance contest, the Army Commander continued, and "It requires that every new officer, every officer inexperienced in command and in administration, consider that his 'spare time' is time for preparation and self-improvement, so that he is equipped each day to do his job in a manner that will inspire confidence in soldiers entrusted to his command."5

Replacements for cadre and other losses of the existing units, as well as fillers for the newly activated units, were to come to Second Army direct from reception centers, since the capacity of the replacement training centers had not kept abreast of the expansion of the army. This caused an additional complication for the already hard-pressed units, because Second Army, following GHQ directives, required that each unit conduct special training for these replacements in conformity with the Replacement Training Center Programs of the various branches. In addition it required that during this basic training period the newly inducted men were to be excused from all other duties except training to the extent practicable.6

The movement of troops by rail after the beginning of war had demonstrated that many units were unfamiliar with standard methods of loading personnel and equipment on railway cars. GHQ consequently ordered that all units be trained in entraining and detraining and that weekly reports be made of the units completing this training. Second Army passed on this directive with the statement that this training was of first importance and "will be given priority above other training prescribed by this headquarters."7

Second Army was still trying to remedy the fundamental weaknesses in individual and unit training which had been brought out so conclusively in the 1941 maneuvers. Numerous training memoranda on such subjects as combat intelligence, chemical warfare, antiaircraft defense, and field artillery training were published. Special emphasis was placed on training in defense against tanks as a result of the British experience in North Africa. This was accompanied by an attempt to develop coordinated action among the various arms and services and by an emphasis on realism in training in spite of the shortages of equipment and ammunition.8

These training memoranda did not formulate new doctrine. They were based on War Department publications, but emphasis was gained by the inclusion of material from many sources in a single document on a particular training subject. As the memoranda increased in number they began to defeat the purpose of their publication. Unit

5. Gen Lear to Div and Sep Unit Comdrs, 31 Mar 42, sub: Tng Conditions. AG 353-29.
7. GHQ ltr, 370.5/670 (12-19-41), 29 Dec 41, sub: Tng for tr movements by rail. Second Army 1st ind, 2 Jan 42. AG 353-117 (1941).
commanders, confronting a mass of training directions in the form of directives, circulars, letters, and field manuals, supplemented by specific memoranda on almost all training subjects, found that they could not master it all and hence tended to ignore the greater part of it.

At the same time Second Army remained conscious that training was not being carried on properly — inspections revealed the same weaknesses in individual and unit training that had been criticized in maneuvers — and did not have sufficient personnel to give immediate and direct supervision to all units. The training program was in danger of becoming "paper-bound," with no remedy in sight except the writing of new directives. This apparent impasse was to continue through 1942 and to be overcome only by the drastic intervention of higher headquarters at the beginning of 1943. 9

MANEUVERS -- 1942

Army Ground Forces, on 23 April 1942, published a directive for units which had completed post-maneuver training to cover training during the period 1 June - 31 October 1942. The period was divided into three phases: preliminary air-ground training; maneuvers; and miscellaneous and advanced small-unit training. The objective was "the attainment and maintenance of a complete state of readiness for combat of both individuals and units," and all units were to be considered "ready for actual combat" upon completion of the maneuver period. 10

Second Army distributed this directive to corps and division commanders for their information only and immediately began the preparation of an Army directive based upon that of Army Ground Forces. Second Army had already prepared one directive entitled "Combined Training and Training in Special Operations" to cover a period of 14 weeks for units which had completed the training prescribed by Training Directive No. 32. This had been submitted to Army Ground Forces in April but it did not include the provision for air-ground training and was never published. 11

Training Directive No. 38 was a combination of this proposed directive and the Army Ground Force directive. The first period consisted of eight weeks of miscellaneous and advanced unit training. 12 Activities to be stressed during this period included defense of air bases and of other installations against airborne attacks, destruction of road blocks, defense of road blocks, stream crossing, defense against river crossings, jungle operations, guerilla warfare, night fighting, tank stalking, and street fighting. Training was to be implemented by putting units, organized into task forces, through a series of set exercises. Physical hardening was to be brought to such a state that infantry units could "make a continuous foot march of 25 miles with full field equipment." 13

10. AGF ltr, 353/1043-GNTGRG (4-23042), 23 Apr 42, sub: Tng Dir for the Per: Jun 1 - Oct 31, 42. AG 353-70.
12. Second Army components were instructed by Tng Dir 32 to complete, where necessary, Tng Dir 35 and as much as possible of Tng Dir 32 by 28 Jun 42.
13. Tng Dir 38, 23 Apr 42. AG 353-8.
The second phase of six weeks was to be devoted to preliminary air-ground training. Subjects listed for this phase included identification of aircraft, air-ground communication, designation of safety limits, execution of observation, bombing and ground strafing missions, use of airplane photographs for intelligence purposes, dispersion, concealment, and camouflage of men and material, hasty entrenchments, anti-aircraft security measures on the march, and defense against parachute and airborne troops. The directive prescribed at least one field exercise for each division or separate unit undergoing this phase of training.

The third period of nine weeks was to be devoted to maneuvers. These maneuvers were to afford practical application of lessons studied during the preceding fourteen weeks of training. Throughout, there was to be the closest possible approximation of combat conditions.

Only those units which had completed eight weeks of mobilization training were to be deemed eligible to take part in maneuvers. Organizations not participating in maneuvers were to follow the appropriate training program previously outlined in directives of Second Army and higher headquarters.

Inclosure No. 1 to Training Directive No. 38 set up a detailed schedule for each unit affected by it for the three phases of training. This called for maneuvers in the Carolina Maneuver Area from 15 August to 10 October and in the Tennessee Maneuver Area from 13 September to 7 November. The decision to combine both into a single maneuver in the Tennessee Maneuver Area caused Second Army to rescind the original directive and to substitute another with the same number on 29 June 1942. In addition to the changes required by this decision certain other matters, such as instruction in the dangers of booby traps, required by Army Ground Forces, were included in the new directive.

Second Army troops began to move to the maneuver area in Middle Tennessee during the second week in September. This area, covering 2,254,872 acres in 13 counties, was bounded generally by Nashville on the West, Shelbyville and Manchester on the South, Kentucky on the North, and Red Boiling Springs on the East. Maneuver Headquarters were located at Lebanon, Tenn., on the grounds of Cumberland University.

Maneuvers of 1942 were on a much smaller scale than those of 1941. Two principal factors were responsible for the contraction. One was the inadvisability of moving large bodies of troops over extensive areas in the face of shortages of gas, rubber, and other essentials of transportation. The other was the nature and the objectives of the 1942 exercises. Experience in the war theaters showed that operations by task forces, the various components of which were highly accomplished in special activities, were much more practicable than undertakings by large masses of troops trained only for general missions. Specialized training of task forces could better be accomplished in division and corps exercises than in army maneuvers, such as those featured in Louisiana in 1941.

14. The first four of the six weeks were to be devoted to training of unit commanders and staff in subjects to be taught during the last two weeks. Troops not participating in the schools during these four weeks were to continue advanced training prescribed for the first period.

15. Second Army Tng Dir 38, 29 Jun 42.

16. AGF ltr, 461/1042-QTRG (6-14-42), 114 Jun 42, sub: Instruction concerning the Danger of Booby Traps. Second Army Informal Check Slip, 17 Jun 42. AG 353-87.

Major units participating in the 1942 maneuvers were the 4th Armored Division (Armored Force); the 8th Motorized Division (XI Corps); the 8th Motorized Division (XII Corps); the 4th Cavalry Regiment (Mecz) (XI Corps); and the 1st Bombardment Group (Light) (Army Air Forces).  

The maneuvers were directed by Gen. Ben Lear, Commanding General of the Second Army. On 26 June 1942 General Lear delegated the drawing up of the maneuver problems to Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall, Commanding General of the XI Corps. Until his transfer to an overseas assignment on 7 October 1942, General Fredendall also served as Chief Umpire and Assistant Director of the Maneuvers. On 20 October 1942, Maj. Gen. C. F. Hall, successor to General Fredendall as Commanding General of the XI Corps, became Chief Umpire and Assistant Director.

In compliance with General Lear's instructions of 25 June 1942, General Fredendall and members of his staff made several visits to the maneuver area for the purpose of making preliminary reconnaissance and planning the exercises. In July and August nine exercises, based on general outlines laid down in the AGF training Directive of 23 April 1942, were prepared and war-gamed at XI Corps Headquarters.

On 25 August 1942, Field Headquarters of the XI Corps moved to Lebanon, Tenn., and established Umpire Headquarters in the gymnasium of Cumberland University. Here, in accordance with General Lear's instructions, schools were conducted for the training of umpires and artillery fire markers.

The first exercise, scheduled to open on 12 September, was canceled because the 6th Motorized Division was delayed by a special domestic security mission. Maneuvers began with the launching of Exercise C-2 on 17 September and continued until 6 November. Most of the problems were concerned with the attack and defense of lines along the Cumberland River. Armored forces and combat aviation joined the participating units for the first time on 8 October and the hills of Middle Tennessee were treated to a show of "Blitzkrieg" tactics which in all essentials were patterned after German operations in Northwestern Europe.

The 1942 Maneuvers fell considerably short of the 1941 exercises in drama and notoriety. There was no pitting of army against army, or even of corps against corps. But, in a way, the 1942 exercises were more valuable and significant than those of prewar years. The action of former years had been pointed toward testing of equipment, training of units, and preparation for possible participation in warfare. In 1942 it was clear that lessons learned in mock battle would be applied shortly in foreign theaters. For that reason latest combat reports from the actual war fronts were used as a basis for maneuver problems. The imminence of combat service also gave an earnestness and a realism to exercises in 1942 that had been lacking in 1940 and 1941.

Umpires and Army leaders found much to command in the first wartime maneuvers. Discipline, morale, vehicular maintenance, supply, intelligence, road discipline,

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19. Rpt of CG XI Corps to CG Second Army on Tenn Maneuvers, 16 Nov 42. AG 354.2-3 (FE '42).

20. Ibid. Preparation of Exercise C-4 was deferred and later canceled. Incl 3, AGF ltr 353/1045-GRTRG (4-23-42), 23 Apr 42, sub: Tng Dir for the Per 1 June - 31 31 Oct 42. AG 353-70.

21. Rpt of XI Corps to Second Army, 16 Nov 42. AG 354.2-3 (FE '42).
traffic control, and physical fitness showed a marked improvement over prior maneuvers.\textsuperscript{22} The work of some of the engineer quartermaster, ordnance, signal, artillery, and tank destroyer units was particularly gratifying. Of the exercises as a whole General Lear remarked: "These maneuvers have been one of the bright spots in my army career.... (They were) the finest maneuvers I have ever witnessed."\textsuperscript{23}

But General Lear, General Fredendall and General Hall were keenly aware of deficiencies in these maneuvers. General Fredendall in the critique following the first exercise cited numerous violations of basic tactical principles: lines of offense and defense were unduly extended; coordination of artillery with infantry was poor, orders were verbose, and time and space factors were not sufficiently considered. Generals Fredendall observed pungently that he could summarize his comments in one statement: "Gentlemen, your tactics astound me."\textsuperscript{24}

General Lear's criticisms were equally vigorous. At one critique he said, "Our men must be informed of conditions and what they must do to overcome them for their own protection, the protection of their comrades and the security of the nation itself. We will not find any Japanese in the southwestern Pacific who will permit us to go along with our eyes closed, our guns unloaded and our weapons buried beneath a mass of bedding rolls. They will cut us to pieces. We will not find any Coca-Cola stands along the highways or any battlefield soon to be occupied by our men. It will be too late to stop to clean one's rifle or pistol or machine gun after the enemy is met, and if these things are not taught now, it will cost us much when we confront an enemy. To learn these things by battlefield experience will be too costly for all concerned."\textsuperscript{25}

At several of the critique conferences General Lear lashed out against complacency and inertia on the part of some officers and men. His observations on this score were climaxed with the statement: "We must ruthlessly kill the academic and unimaginative outlook and replace it by one of direct, decisive and practical approach to the problems with which we deal; and we must do all in our power to train ourselves, our commanders, staff, subordinates in all grades and all units that they are physically and emotionally prepared for the realities of the war."\textsuperscript{26}

Both General Hall and General Lear commented extensively on the use of Armored Forces, and it was in this connection perhaps that the 1942 maneuvers taught their most valuable lesson. Following the first exercise in which the Armored Division participated, General Lear made this statement: "It seems to me that many of you have the impression that an armored force can go busting into battle at a very high rate of speed. Quite the contrary. An armored force the size of a division requires a great deal of time for its deployment for battle. It must develop the enemy situation in the front through reconnaissance agencies." He went on to suggest that armored forces could not in themselves effectively perform all the combat functions. Their most effective use

\textsuperscript{22} Gen Ben Lear, Comments on Second Army Maneuvers, 1942, incl 5. Rpt of XI Corps to Second Army on Tenn Maneuvers, 1942. AG 354.2-3 (FE '42). Incl 4, rpt Chief Umpire 4th Armd Div in ibid.

\textsuperscript{23} Gen Ben Lear, Comments on Second Army Maneuvers, 1942. Rpt XI Corps to Second Army on Tenn Maneuvers, 1942. AG 354.2-3 (FE '42).

\textsuperscript{24} Transcript of remarks of Gen Fredendall at critique, 21 Sep 42. Personal files of Gen Lear.

\textsuperscript{25} Transcript of comments of Gen Lear at critique following Exercise C-7, 18 Oct 42. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, from Exercise C-5, 11 Oct 42.
was for shock purposes, for flanking movements, and for finding and exploiting weak spots. Throughout there must be close, well planned coordination with other units. He concluded with the significant observation: "Possibly we need additional infantry strength with the Armored Division either as an organic part thereof or through the attachment of infantry in special situations." 27

No summary of the maneuvers would be complete without reference to the esprit of the majority of officers and men, for this was an outstanding attribute of the 1942 exercises. Concerning the men, General Hall said: "The esprit and willingness... leaves nothing to be desired. They look like soldiers and act like soldiers... They are a credit not only to themselves but to the training they received before coming to this area." His allusion to the junior officers was hardly less complimentary. "The outstanding work done by the younger officers, most of whom are OCS graduates," he said, "has been a subject of much comment. They are aggressive, alert, energetic and tireless. Observation of them leaves no doubt as to the ability of our OCS to provide junior officers of the type needed." 28

The performance of troops participating in these maneuvers was markedly superior to that observed in the exercises of the previous year ---- and this in spite of personnel shortages and turnover experienced by all units in the months preceding the maneuver period. Considerable improvement in performance was manifested in each succeeding problem, "demonstrating attention to details of training by participants and the value of maneuvers as a training vehicle." 29

The most disappointing phase of the maneuvers was the lack of any adequate testing of Air-Ground support doctrines. Army Ground Forces, in its original directive, had placed great stress upon the development of air-ground cooperation, and three of the eight weeks of the maneuver period were to be devoted to air-ground maneuvers. But when on 28 October 1942 Army Ground Forces asked for recommended changes in air-support doctrine as a result of maneuver experience, Second Army replied: "Due to the limited participation by air units and then only with substitute equipment, a true test of present Air Support Doctrine could not be secured during the recent maneuvers." 30

The maneuvers also demonstrated that regimental commanders were devoting a disproportionate amount of their attention to training and operations and not enough to the administrative matters, such as supply, evacuation, and maintenance in combat, which were equally important. Second Army in a letter said: "While operations and training are normally of paramount importance, other command functions cannot and must not be neglected. The effectiveness of a tactical plan will be greatly reduced, to say the least, if the men are not supplied with food and ammunition. In order to provide this necessary training the supply of ammunition, food, water, gasoline, evacuation, motor maintenance and the handling of prisoners of war will be made a requirement in tactical exercises where applicable." 31

27. Typescript of comments of Gen Lear at critique following Exercise C-7, 18 Oct 42. Personal file of Gen Lear.
28. Comments on Second Army Maneuvers, incl 5, rpt of XI Corps to Second Army on Tenn Maneuvers, 1942. 354.2-3 (FE '42).
Maneuvers completed the training program as established by the directives issued in the fall of 1941. A new training program, not fundamentally different from the one just completed, was published by Army Ground Forces and Second Army on 1 November 1942 and training continued. The soundness of American tactical and training doctrines had been established by maneuvers, but soon they would receive the actual test of combat in the various theaters of operations.
Army Ground Forces, organized on 9 March 1942, had a different task from that of GHQ, its predecessor, and the function of the field armies in the training program was changed. Under GHQ Second Army had received general directives but had been permitted to develop its own methods for the accomplishment of the training prescribed by higher headquarters. This relative independence did not continue under Army Ground Forces, which, unlike GHQ, was free to concentrate attention on training.

The change did not come abruptly or as the result of a formal statement by higher headquarters. The development was gradual and slow, a natural growth which began in March 1942 and culminated 1 January 1943.

The reorganization of the War Department on 9 March 1942 was hardly felt in Headquarters, Second Army, or the lower echelons of command. The regular business of the headquarters continued; reports, instead of being sent to GHQ, were directed to Army Ground Forces, but no other change was apparent.

Army Ground Forces at first was fully occupied in the organization of its headquarters, the procurement of officers and enlisted men for the staff sections, and acquainting them with its mission and task. But even in the early months it was evident that Army Ground Forces was to participate more directly and creatively in the training program than GHQ had done. The change was first indicated when the proposed Second Army Training Directive of 31 March 1942 had to be rewritten to include the air-ground training prescribed by Army Ground Forces on 23 April. But the regular training program was left unchanged.

Second Army tests seem to have been the issue which ultimately caused the precise definition of the function of Headquarters, Second Army, under Army Ground Forces as contrasted with its function under GHQ. On 20 September 1942, Colonel Lentz, G-3, Army Ground Forces, in a telephone conversation with Colonel Sherman, Assistant G-3, Second Army, said: "Second Army MTP tests are quite exhaustive. Some units look upon approach to this test with apprehension. Second Army procedure for these tests should be reviewed. Modifications might thereby be indicated."1

Second Army immediately began to check through its units to ascertain the field view of the value and usefulness of the training tests. General Woodruff, Commander of the 77th Infantry Division, replied: "The tests themselves appeared to be sufficiently comprehensive in scope and in the number of units tested to give a fair cross section of the status of training of the Division... I did not get the impression that the units looked upon these tests with any apprehension; they simply took the matter in their stride." Other letters of similar import were received and strengthened the Second Army belief that the testing program should be retained without essential modification.2

1. AG 353-126. This conversation, which was the first positive indication received by Second Army that Army Ground Forces questioned the value of the extensive testing program, specifies MTP tests. But, as will be shown later, the MTP tests were not objectionable to Army Ground Forces. The progressive field training tests, developed and prescribed by Second Army, were the tests criticized and ultimately eliminated. The confusion caused by this inclusion of the initials "MTP" contributed to the misunderstanding between the two headquarters about the whole subject of tests.

Some of the criticism of the Second Army tests probably came from the new divisions which were being trained under a GHQ letter of 16 February 1942. In addition to the forty-four weeks of individual, unit, and combined training prescribed by the directive, GHQ also laid down the requirement that "Army and army corps commanders, particularly the latter, will give the closest possible personal and staff supervision of these divisions. By continual observation and frequent tests they will assure themselves that training is progressing satisfactorily or that proper measures are taken to correct deficiencies."

Second Army interpreted this statement as authority to prescribe its full testing program for these newly activated divisions and did not believe that this decision conflicted with the first Army Ground Forces letter on the subject which stated: "It is of the utmost importance that their training continue throughout the training cycle with as little interruption as possible."

The training directives prescribing the tests were long and formidable documents with numerous annexes and check lists. They were accompanied by letters of instruction which appeared complex and difficult, describing in detail the testing methods developed by the older divisions and the staff sections of Headquarters, Second Army, during the preceding training period. These letters were sent to new units at activation or when transferred to Second Army along with other letters and directives prescribing the whole administrative and training program. Units under corps received still other publications from corps headquarters. This vast amount of paper caused one battalion commander to write: "We are actually swamped with typed and mimeographed literature. More than 90% of it is utterly useless."

General McNair, in a letter to his commanders on 25 June 1942, expressed his concern over this situation, and Second Army, in an attempt to remedy it, directed that its training publications should be passed on to lower headquarters with a definite and clear-cut statement as to the extent of application to each unit. But there was no elimination of publications nor curtailment of volume, and the letter had little effect. The training program of Second Army was continuing without substantial change or alteration.

**TRAINING DIRECTIVE NO. 40**

During the summer of 1942 Headquarters, Second Army, began work on a new training directive to cover the period following the expiration of Training Directive No. 38 on 7 November 1942. Colonel Sherman, Assistant G-3, in charge of training, told General Lear that this was a training directive to end all training directives. In a sense this was true. Previous directives had been of two kinds, those dealing with training in specific subjects (hardly distinguishable from training memoranda) and those

3. GHQ ltr, 335/21 (Inf) - H, 16 Feb 42, sub: Tng of Newly Activated Inf Divs. AG 353-36.
7. Second Army Tng Memo 20, 22 Jul 42. AG 353-9.

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prescribing general training for specific periods. The new directive was permanent in character and was to rescind all previous directives, except three -- the most important of which was No. 32, prescribing the progressive field training tests.

When the Chief of Staff sent in the completed draft of this directive to AGF on 21 October, he referred to the criticism of the testing program and attempted to counter it by saying:

General Lear has... directed me to communicate with you relative to the MTP tests prepared and conducted by this Headquarters for units of the Second Army. As I understand, these tests were developed here and they have been found to be very satisfactory. We understand that there exists an impression in your headquarters that these tests are too detailed and that they create an undue apprehension in the minds of unit and organization commanders....

...I see no necessity, nor does General Lear, for any change in the MTP tests which we have developed and are conducting. The Corps Headquarters which are now conducting these tests under Army supervision are thoroughly indoctrinated with General Lear's training methods and with the procedure of the tests. I strongly recommend no change in the tests themselves, or in the method of conduct.

Army Ground Forces, in the fall of 1942, had also come to the decision to place training on a permanent schedule and was preparing a directive to take effect 1 November 1942. Work continued simultaneously in both headquarters and the two directives crossed each other in the mails. The Second Army directive was approved by Army Ground Forces, and General Parks, Chief of Staff, wrote of it, "I think your G-3 Section did a fine job on your directive. I wish we could have had the benefit of some of its provisions in preparing ours." He also suggested that Second Army incorporate the provisions of the two directives into a single publication for distribution to subordinate units because, he added, "Troops have an inordinate amount of papers to read."

In answer to General Randolph's comments regarding MTP tests General Parks merely noted that these were to be given in the thirteenth week of training, but he was more definite in his statement about the remainder of the testing program, which continued:

Your G-3 Section and ours have not been in agreement on the subject of tests. There may be some doubt as to the wisdom of a headquarters as high as Army Ground Forces prescribing training and tests in such complete detail as we have. Once done, however, if every subordinate headquarters adds other training or testing systems, the troops get it in all directions.

We have done our best to create tests of specific and well understood standards. Much remains to be done in this regard. We are working on further revisions to eliminate every generality possible. The preparation for tests not furnished in specific detail imposes a real burden on testing officers.

Our theory is to prescribe a sound course of training, select capable commanders, and let them alone. At certain prescribed intervals subject the units to tests conducted by our most capable personnel. These tests must show whether the commander has accomplished his mission.

9. Brig Gen Norman Randolph, CofS Second Army to Brig Gen Floyd L. Parks, CofS AGF, 21 Oct 42. AG 353-S.
10. Lt (?) 353 (Second Army), Brig Gen Parks to Brig Gen Randolph, 26 Oct 42. Hist Off files.
If tests are continuous, the commander doesn’t have a chance to show what he can do. The matter of tests and standards are difficult to solve. TM 6-605 contains individual and unit training standards, which, if put in form of questions, are similar to the Second Army tests. Actually TM 6-605 and the “tests” in your Training Directive No. 32 are check lists. To implement them a great deal of detailed work must be done. One battalion commander prepared a 32-page list of checks, based on a few of the tests in Training Directive No. 32.

I can see no necessity for abandoning the “tests” so far as their use as check lists are concerned. To require them to be employed as formal tests, particularly in view of the additional tests now prescribed by this headquarters, is unnecessary, adds to the burden of paper work with troops and duplicates most matters covered in AGF tests.

The Second Army directive was rewritten to include the additional training prescribed by Army Ground Forces, but when it was published as Training Directive No. 4C, the two sets of tests, squad tests and progressive field training tests for platoons, companies, and battalions, as originally prescribed by Training Directive No. 32, were still directed in addition to those required by Army Ground Forces. There were other differences. The AGF directive established three periods of training while the Second Army directive had four, including a schedule for post-maneuver training which AGF was to cover in a separate letter at a later date. Training Directive No. 40 also differed from the AGF directive in that it was much greater detail; it provided for a weekly orientation period of one hour; had a more extensive program of physical training; and required units to live in the field one week each month during the second period of training and two weeks each month during the third and fourth periods.

Training Directive No. 40, as stated above, provided that training of Second Army units should fall into four periods. The first period of 13 weeks was devoted to individual training, according to appropriate mobilization training programs. Emphasis was on the development of leadership, discipline, physical ruggedness, and a smooth functioning of the chain of command.

The second, or unit training, period of 11 weeks called for continued emphasis on individual progress, but the primary objective was the development of "each unit up to and including the regiment into a hard-hitting, aggressive, fighting team." During this period the following phases of training were completed: (1) rail movements; (2) first, second, and third priority firing as prescribed by higher headquarters; (3) platoon, company, and battalion progressive field training tests according to specifications of Training Directive No. 32; (4) field artillery battery and battalion tests as required by higher headquarters.

The third, or combined, training period of 11 weeks had the objective of developing aggressive, hard-hitting teams capable of working in close cooperation with air and mechanized forces. Set problems, involving infantry-tank and air-ground collaboration were recommended to implement the training. The fourth and final period comprised the time elapsing between completion of the third period and arrival at a port of embarkation. The principal aim for this period was the removal of any deficiencies that might exist in individual, unit, or combined training, and the maintenance of a complete state of readiness for combat. In short, this was the final tune-up period prior

11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. For Second Army Tng Dir 40 see AG 353-8 (1942).
to embarkation. Throughout this phase stress was to be laid on all such essentials as air-ground and infantry-tank cooperation, defense against tanks and planes, security, supply, motor movements, traffic control, advance reconnaissance and route marking, night operations, teamwork, intelligence, liaison, physical conditioning, camouflage, and the development of an aggressive, offensive spirit.

To effectuate the program laid down in this directive, commanders of divisions and regiments were ordered to maintain a close supervision over training functions delegated to subordinates. They were also to establish schools for the instruction of officers in the performance of staff and command duties. Understudies were to be trained as alternates for all key positions. Training aids such as sandboxes, charts, photographs, and moving pictures were to be used in all phases.

During all periods of training realism was to be studiously emphasized. Other subjects designated for special stress throughout included camouflage, cover, security, deception, booby traps, motor maintenance, antiaircraft defense, intelligence, standard operating procedure, and the chain of command.

In addition to the foregoing general requirements, the Second Army directive laid down appropriate instructions for the guidance of such special (nondivisional) groups as artillery units, tank destroyer units, mechanized cavalry regiments, engineers, chemical weapons battalions, air base security battalions, military police units, and service units.

Now divisions were instructed to begin the first period training prescribed by Training Directive No. 40 fifteen days after activation, provided 75 percent of fillers had arrived. Nondivisional units were also to initiate individual training fifteen days after activation if 50 percent of their fillers were at hand. Fillers received after the first period were, to the extent practicable, to be given additional instruction so as to bring their level of training up to that of the unit. When enlisted replacements were received directly from reception centers they were to be segregated for training according to programs prescribed for replacement training centers.

CONDUCT OF TRAINING

There had been no change in the Second Army testing program to which Army Ground Forces had expressed its rejection. General Parks' suggestion, quoted above, that since Army Ground Forces had prescribed training and tests in complete detail it would needlessly harass troops for subordinate headquarters to add "other training or testing systems," had not been carried into effect. Second Army was not fully aware of the change in its role and function that had come about as Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, undertook a more direct and immediate supervision of training. In fact, by 1 January 1943 Second Army had become an administrative headquarters carrying out policies and programs established by Army Ground Forces -- it was no longer a semi-independent army operating under a general definition of aims and objectives by the War Department and GHQ.

The change in status was clearly implied in a letter, prepared by General McNair personally, entitled "Conduct of Training" and sent to all the major commands of Army Ground Forces. This letter made it impossible for Second Army to continue the progressive field training tests to which Army Ground Forces had objected. But its purpose was wider and its accomplishment greater. General McNair was determined to eliminate as much as possible of the administrative impediments which had grown up within the training program and were clogging its effectiveness. "There are definite indications," the letter began, "that the all-important matter of training is being encumbered objectionably and even defeated by a mass of paper work --- programs, schedules, charts,
forms, memorandum, and directives -- until the unit commander who actually is conducting the training is swamped and hampered seriously in working with his troops in the field.\textsuperscript{14}

AGF directives, the letter continued, were intended exclusively for army, corps, and other separate commands. Similarly the directives of these commands should be distributed no further than the next lower echelon. Division Commanders had no need to issue written training documents and were directed to transmit directions orally to their subordinate units. War Department manuals were to be the basis of instruction in all cases except as specifically authorized by AGF, and instructions were to be prepared in the form of references to stated paragraphs of these manuals. Units below a division were not to be required to submit periodic written reports on training progress, and tests other than those prescribed by AGF and the War Department were discouraged.\textsuperscript{15}

Second Army at once reproduced this letter and transmitted it to corps and detachment commanders "for immediate and strict compliance." The field training tests prescribed by Training Directive No. 32 was rescinded. AGF directives were no longer sent to Second Army units. Second Army training directives and memoranda were sent only to Corps Headquarters, Headquarters Special Troops, Second Army, and separate units not assigned or attached to these headquarters. Corps training directives were furnished only to the next lower headquarters, and publications below these were confined to appropriate master schedules as prescribed in FM 21-5 with necessary oral amplification. Division and regimental commanders were directed to hold frequent conferences with battalion commanders for the purpose of complete oral dissemination of training instructions, and all commanders were instructed to utilize to the fullest extent every opportunity to observe the training of their units.\textsuperscript{16}

Further directions were contained in a letter to detachment commanders which said that progress charts were no longer required, though it remained a command function for each commanding officer "to keep himself properly informed as to the status of training of his unit." Written training programs were no longer published. Each unit kept a master training schedule and prepared weekly schedules as prescribed in FM 21-5, and detachment commanders continued conducting physical tests but no others unless specifically directed to do so by Second Army Headquarters.\textsuperscript{17}

A staff memorandum of 8 February 1943 directed all staff sections of Headquarters, Second Army, to reduce "the amount of written material, emanating from this headquarters to lower echelons, to the absolute minimum." All chiefs of sections made an immediate and continued survey of all Second Army publications "with a view of rescinding all matters which duplicate or are in conflict with existing War Department publications and instructions." All matters pertaining to training were submitted to G-3 for

\textsuperscript{14} AGF ltr, 319.22/22-GNGCT (1-1-43), 1 Jan 43, sub: Conduct of Tng. AG 353-23.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16} Tng Memo 1, 27 Jan 43, sub: Conduct of Tng. AG 353-9

\textsuperscript{17} Second Army ltr to COs Dets, Sp Trs, Second Army, 2 Feb 43, sub: Conduct of Tng. AG 353-9.

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approval and in no case were training instructions "contained in Circulars, Weekly Information Bulletins or numbered Staff Letters." 18

Continuous emphasis was placed on the elimination of unnecessary paper work, not only by restricting publications to a minimum, but also by the preparation of mimeographed forms for the use of lower headquarters, such as the report of the results of the physical fitness tests, which previously had been written in considerable detail. 19

Army Ground Forces, on 31 January 1943, issued another letter with the purpose of emphasizing the prime importance of training and of eliminating avoidable interferences in every conceivable way. The absences of general officers, general staff officers, and other senior commanders in divisions and corps at schools, demonstrations, maneuvers, and at various training centers, were "reaching excessive proportions" and should be eliminated. The number of experienced officers with troops was decreasing steadily, and "constant supervision of training in detail by the limited number of well qualified officers remaining with units" was needed. 20

Special duty and fatigue details were avoided as much as practicable. Administration and reports were kept to a minimum. Furloughs were short and distributed reasonably and continuously over the whole training program. Adverse weather conditions were disregarded, except when prolonged periods of fog or other conditions made certain types of training, such as firing, impracticable.

The actual training of the troops in the field was continuing steadily while these various matters of method and administration were being worked out in headquarters. Units were activated, trained, tested, and sent to combat theaters with little or no consciousness of the activities of higher commands. Meanwhile General Lear was scheduled to retire because of age on 31 May 1943 and planned to begin his terminal leave on 1 May. On 30 March Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall, who had just returned from combat command in North Africa, arrived for duty as Deputy Commander of Second Army in preparation to succeed General Lear. General Fredendall, however, assumed temporary command of Second Army on 25 April rather than 1 May because General Lear, on the same date, was ordered to Washington to assume temporary command of Army Ground Forces pending recovery of General McNair, who had been wounded while on a tour of the African Front. 21

CHANGE OF COMMANDERS

General Fredendall took full command of Second Army on 1 June, and his promotion to Lieutenant General became effective the same day. 22 The change of commanders caused no fundamental alteration in Second Army policies or programs, but the role of the two

18. Second Army Staff Memo 4, 8 Feb 43. AG 300.6-1. Second Army publications on 1 January 1943 included the following: Mimeographed letters; Circulars; Weekly News Bulletin (later - Weekly Information Bulletin); Numbered letters by certain Staff Sections; Training Directives; Training Memoranda; G-2 Periodic Report; G-2 Estimate of Enemy Situation; Intelligence Bulletin. Training Memoranda and the three G-2 publications were discontinued and the number and volume of the other publications were curtailed.


20. AGF ltr, 353/78 (AGF)-GNGCT (1-31-43), 31 Jan 43, sub: Interference with Tng. AG 353-23.


22. Second Army GO 17, 1 Jun 43. AG 300.4-1.
commanders was quite different, General Lear had taken command of Second Army when it was separated from Sixth Corps Area in October 1940. His was the task of organization and creation. Second Army, under his command, developed a program and devised the means for accomplishing the training objectives set by the War Department and GHQ. As commander of one of the four field armies in the pre-Pearl Harbor period it was part of his task to convince the soldiers under his command -- selectees, national guard, reserve, and regular army, and the people from whom they came that the creation of an adequate armed force for this country was a necessary thing. General Lear, following the lead established by The Chief of Staff, not only had to create and train an army but help convince that army and the people that they were living in danger of attack by brutal and aggressive enemies.

When General Fredendall took command organization had been completed. Most of the critical shortages in personnel and equipment had been overcome. The training program was established and Second Army, no longer a semi-independent command, carried out the policies and orders of Army Ground Forces. General Fredendall's task was not that of a creator or organizer; it was the command and administration of the largest training army of Army Ground Forces.

The new Commanding General's views concerning training were much the same as those of his predecessor. In an informal conference at Army Ground Forces Headquarters on 25 March 1943 General Fredendall said: "There is nothing wrong with the training. We are doing it all. The trouble is to get the guy doing the training to follow the directives that he is using." This was elaborated in a more formal statement read at the same conference in which General Fredendall added:

"It is my impression that preparatory battle training conducted in the United States...has failed in some respects in that the required instruction has not always penetrated down into the smaller units and to the individual soldier as it should. It appears that we have sometimes stressed the training of the higher commanders and their staffs at the expense of adequate training for smaller units. My feelings in this matter have been stated before when I said that if all soldiers were physically hardened to the extent of being "tough guys" and if they were properly instructed in all the elements of scouting and patrolling...military operations would be a success,...

All troops should undergo a course of training paralleling that of our Ranger Battalion. It would involve maximum physical hardening, training for personal physical combat, deception, surprise, night operation, thorough training in all weapons such as the knife, the pistol, the rifle, the machine gun, the mortar, and the rocket launcher.

The soldiers seem to approach battle with a casual attitude. They don't seem to be mad until someone trips them up and makes them mad. They did not have the desire to kill the enemy. We should do everything to produce that attitude and the physical hardening would go with it."

Combat training was the principal interest of General Fredendall. He desired that a high standard of discipline, appearance, and conduct be maintained among officers and men, but that emphasis should be placed on training men to fight. "Good discipline and sound administration," he added, "form the solid foundation upon which to build a well trained unit; however, you must bear in mind that they are a means to an end -- the objective being units highly trained to perform their duties in combat."


Soon after General Fredendall took command of Second Army, Army Ground Forces issued a supplement to "Training Directive effective 1 November 1942" on post-maneuver training. This supplement, published 7 June 1943, prescribed training for the fourth period of training established by Second Army Training Directive No. 40, and not covered by the original Army Ground Forces directive. The experience of our troops in battle in various theaters had emphasized the soundness of our tactical doctrine and the necessity for placing added stress on fundamentals. Differences in terrain and weather conditions necessitated variations in equipment and technique, but they had effected no change in the principles which determined success.

The same weaknesses in basic individual and small unit training which had been found by tests and maneuvers had continued in combat so training in this post-maneuver period was designed "to perfect the technique of individuals and units, with particular emphasis on the essentials brought out by our experience in battle." It was divided into three phases of undetermined length, though it was stated that each phase should be completed in approximately two months. Army or corps was to make spot checks to determine when units had completed a phase satisfactorily and to direct the movement into the following phase.

The first phase was almost a repetition of basic or individual training. All personnel were given a course in preliminary marksmanship, and men eligible to fire for qualification fired the prescribed courses. In addition there was training in individual mine laying, detection, and removal; individual and group cooking; first aid and field sanitation; scouting and observing; and squad tactics and combat firing. The second phase began with platoon tactical training and combat firing and included night patrolling, night infiltration, the gapping of minefields, and night raiding. The technique of night attack was perfected in the third phase. Exercises progressed successively from the attack of the infantry company to the attack of the regiment. Training was conducted step by step, first during the day, then at night, and was followed by field problems in night attack. Exercises were repeated on varied terrain, where practicable, to include open terrain, defiles, and heavily brushed and wooded areas. This phase of training terminated with a test, conducted by corps, of the division in a deliberate attack of a defensive position.

TRAINING DIRECTIVE NO. ONE

Second Army, instead of merely rescinding its previous instructions for the fourth period of training and substituting the supplement, decided to issue a new training directive. In this were included not only the changes necessitated by the supplement, but also all of the minor changes which had been made in Training Directive No. 40 during the winter and spring. In this way Second Army would have the greatest part of its training directions in a single document, which would prescribe training from the day of activation until the unit left Second Army control for the staging area.

The resulting directive rescinded "all training directives, training memoranda and training letters of general application previously issued by this headquarters" except for twenty-one letters, which contained specific instructions for training prescribed in the directive itself.

The new training directive was not radically different from Training Directive No. 40. The requirement for units to live in the field, the extensive program of physical conditioning, and the week's orientation period were continued. In reality it was Training Directive No. 40 brought up to date.

25. Ibid.
The training program for Second Army units as a part of Army Ground Forces was completely established after 1 July 1943. Individual, unit, combined, and post-maneuver training continued in a regular pattern and without substantial alteration. A permanent maneuver headquarters had been established at Lebanon, in the Tennessee Maneuver Area, and maneuvers were made a regular part of continuous training.

Changes and additions to the training program were prescribed from time to time by Army Ground Forces as reports from combat theaters indicated weaknesses or inadequacies in the training of individuals and units. Air-ground and combat intelligence tests were added to those already directed, to emphasize the importance of these two phases of combat training. There was an increased emphasis upon the training of antiaircraft gunners, and provision was made for each unit to send selected individuals to antiaircraft training centers for firing.

Army Ground Forces also directed the establishment of mine schools under the supervision of the engineer school at Camp Forrest in the Tennessee Maneuver area. Four series of courses were conducted to train officers and enlisted men as instructors for unit schools in the laying and removal of mine fields. Additional training in night operations and in malaria control was prescribed. More specific instructions were published for the training of ordnance units in the unit and combined training periods; and all nondivisional combat and service units were required to complete a minimum of three weeks field training prior to movement overseas.

These changes were published as training letters and as supplements to Training Directive No. 1. As they increased in number it became obvious that once more there was need for a consolidation of Second Army training directions. This was accomplished on 15 March 1944 by the publication of a new training directive. This rescinded all previous training instructions whether issued in directives or letters. The contents of the rescinded publications were incorporated into the appropriate sections of the directive, and provision was made for the issuance of numbered supplements to cover any future changes or additions. In this way the complete training instructions for all Second Army units from the date of activation until departure from Army control were found in a single document.


27. AGF ltr, 353/237 (AA) (9 Jul 43) GNGCT, 9 Jul 43, sub: Tng of AA Machine Gunners. AG 353-17-5. (See same file for Second Army letters establishing and carrying out this program prescribed by AGF.)

28. AGF ltr, 476/140 GNGCT (5-26-43), 26 May 43, sub: Course of Instruction in Laying and Clearing of Gaps in Mine Fields. AG 210.63-22 (Engr Sch). Schools were held 21 Jun - 3 Jul, 6 - 16 Sep, 28 Nov 43 and 28 Mar - 44.

29. See AG 353-8 for 1943 and 355 (Tng Dir) for 1944.

30. Second Army Tng Dir 1, 21 Mar 44. AG 353 (Tng Dir).
Chapter XII

MANEUVERS 1943--1944

The Second Army maneuvers of 1941 and 1942 were limited in duration and constituted a separate phase of the training program, but the maneuvers of April 1943 to March 1944 were continuous, and their direction was a regular part of the routine of Second Army Headquarters. The original Army Ground Force letter for these maneuvers was published on 7 December 1942, soon after "Training Directive effective November 1, 1942," which prescribed maneuver training after the completion of the combined training period.

This preliminary letter scheduled only two maneuver periods in the Tennessee Maneuver Area under the direction of Second Army, the first with the VII Corps from 26 April to 20 June, and the second under the III Corps from 5 July to 28 August. These were subsequently increased to five; number 3, the XX Corps from 6 September to 5 November; number 4, the XI Corps from 10 November to 14 January 1944; and number 5, the XII Corps from 23 January to 8 March and the XXII Corps from 8 March to 25 March.

Each maneuver period lasted eight weeks with one operation a week. These consisted of the following, set by Army Ground Forces:

1. Movement to contact, meeting engagement, and aggressive action by both sides.
2. Meeting engagement, aggressive action by a larger force, and the withdrawal of a small force.
3. Aggressive action against a covering force, with a view to forcing it to withdraw across or through an obstacle.
4. Attack and defense of a river line, the objective of the attacker to require the crossing of his major elements.
5. Coordinated attack of a prepared position. Situation to be drawn as to permit at least 24 hours of uninterrupted and unobserved work on the defensive position.
6. Delaying action on successive positions over a considerable distance.
7. Breakthrough of an over-extended position and a withdrawal of the defender over a considerable distance.

Number 4, the attack and defense of a river line, was run twice in each period to make the total of eight operations.

Maneuvers were free, as specified by the Army Ground Forces's letter, and each operation was drawn so that a decision was reached within a reasonable length of time. Each operation was followed by a critique conducted by the maneuver director, either the Commanding General, Second Army, or the Corps Commander of the particular phase.

Col. John B. Sherman, Assistant G-3, was named Deputy Maneuver Director in January 1943 and began the organization of Maneuver Director Headquarters. Each staff section was notified that its office at Director Headquarters would be called upon to perform its functional duties in connection with maneuvers and report such phases of each

1. AGF ltr (R), 354.2/1 (Maneuvers-1943)-GNGCT (12-7-42), 7 Dec 42, sub: Maneuvers - February to August 1943. AG 353.2-6 (FE '43) (R).
2. Ibid.
operation as pertained to it. Each section chief was required to submit a statement showing the organization of his section for the Director Headquarters and the additional officers required to meet minimum requirements for maneuver operation.\(^3\)

The first maneuver conference, at which there were representatives of all general and special staff sections, was held on 9 February 1943. The eight operations of the first maneuver were outlined, showing the areas, forces, missions, objectives, and types of action planned. The functions of each of the staff sections in Maneuver Director Headquarters were discussed and the channels for maneuver reports shown by diagram. Finally the sections were requested to recommend the auxiliary units necessary to service the proposed maneuvers and to indicate the designation of such of those units as were available in Second Army by 12 February 1943.\(^4\)

The proposed operations were "war-gamed" in the afternoons and evenings of 22-25 February inclusive. Staff officers of Second Army represented the red and blue forces to determine whether the operations were clearly stated and whether they would bring about the desired action within the time and area contemplated. Mission orders were issued on maps with attached troop lists. Solutions were then submitted to the appropriate directors in the form of overlays with necessary explanatory notes to show the substance of paragraphs 2 and 3 of a field order together with sufficient data on evacuation, ammunition, bridging, and demolitions to show their effect on the tactical plan. After the red and blue solutions had been plotted on the Director's map, additional instructions were issued and the operation was played to a conclusion.\(^5\)

On 26 February Colonel Sherman was transferred to Army Ground Forces Headquarters and was succeeded as Deputy Maneuver Director by Col. Leo T. McMahon.\(^6\) The various sections of the Maneuver Director Headquarters were filled by officers and enlisted men from Headquarters, Second Army, and other units. As finally organized the Director's staff consisted of 100 officers (58 from Headquarters, Second Army, and 42 procured principally from nonparticipating Second Army units) and approximately 350 enlisted men.\(^7\)

Colonel McMahon and other officers conferred on 10 and 11 March with state and local officials at Nashville and Lebanon concerning the problems of transportation, recreation, and other aspects of the relationships between the military personnel on maneuvers and the civilian population.

The necessity for the army's use of the Tennessee Maneuver Area for the third successive year was explained publicly by General Fredendall in a speech to the Lions Club of Lebanon on 14 July 1943. In Middle Tennessee, General Fredendall said, the army had

4. Second Army Informal Check Slip, 10 Feb 43. Ibid.
6. Col. McMahon was succeeded as Deputy Director on 15 May 1943 by Col. John A. Dabney who served in this capacity until 4 August 1943 when Col. John C. Whitcomb became Deputy Director. On 7 October 1943 a Deputy Director for Administration was appointed. This position was first held by Col. Frederick W. Boye until 19 November 1943, then by Col. Richardson L. Green who was succeeded by Lt Col. Alvin R. Baker on 1 January 1944. The Deputy Director, after the appointment of the Deputy Director for Administration, had charge of training only.
7. Second Army Informal Check Slip, 20 Mar 43. AG 354.2-11 (FE '43).
POSTING THE SITUATION MAP

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found the terrain most nearly resembling that which would be found in the attack on Germany. "The Cumberland River, whose crossing we have made a vital part of almost every problem, is ideally suited to the type of forced river crossings that will be made on the Meuse, the Marne, the Somme, the Po, the Somme across which our engineers must lead the way...Your rolling hills, your ravines, your open fields and thick wood -- yes, even your dust and your mud -- are strikingly similar to the everlasting problems of terrain on which we shall soon find ourselves in the battles we are training for here."

In the Maneuver Area, covering 15,000 square miles and extending 120 miles in a north-south and 70 miles in an east-west direction, 42,000 landowners had signed agreements permitting soldiers to maneuver freely over 9,000 square miles of arable land and 6,000 square miles of woodland. This was a real sacrifice for the war effort, and General Fredendall paid tribute to the spirit of cooperation exhibited by the people of the area. He promised them that the army would repair all damages done to roads, bridges, and fences and pay for all crop losses resulting from the use of land by troops. The engineers had been the first to come into the area and would be the last to leave, and of their work the General added "that the Army invariably leaves an area in a better condition than in which it found it."

On 16 March 1943 Maneuver Memorandum 1, "Administrative Instructions for Movement to Tennessee Maneuver Area for Second Army Maneuvers -- 1943" was issued. This gave detailed instructions for the movement of troops and their conduct on the march. In rail movements of a regiment or larger force the first train was combat loaded. Units were to make tactical dispositions to cover detrainment on arrival, but there were no other tactical requirements en route. Units were ordered to bring certain specified equipment and supplies with them, the remainder was to be furnished by Second Army, and instructions were added for the drawing of supplies and equipment in the area. Directions were included covering evacuations and hospitalization of personnel en route and miscellaneous instructions covering such matters as mail and reports. These instructions were revised on 13 May, 6 August, and 21 October but remained essentially the same throughout the entire maneuvers.

Maneuver Memorandum 2, "Administrative Instructions Applicable in Tennessee Maneuver Area," was published on 4 April. This included directions for the drawing of all classes of supplies, traffic regulations and priorities on roads, reports, and other miscellaneous matters. Separate instructions from G-1, G-2, Ordnance, Medical, Engineer, Chemical, and Signal Sections of Headquarters, Second Army, were included as annexes and covered matters pertaining to those sections. The Fourth Service Command Rents and Claims Board was the agency designated to receive and process claims for damages to private property, but unit claim officers were to be appointed by the commanding officer of each separate battalion, regiment, or corresponding unit. This memorandum was also frequently revised and changed to meet needs as they arose in accordance with the experience of Maneuver Director Headquarters, but the general supply and administrative plan remained substantially the same.

9. AG 300.6-1 (Man Memo) (JE '43).
10. Second Army Maneuver Memo No. 3, 13 May 43; No 5, 6 Aug 43; No. 7, 21 Oct 43. Ibid.
11. AG 300.6-1 (Man Memo) (JE '43).
12. Second Army Maneuver Memo No 4, 22 Jun 43; No 6, 31 Aug 43; No 8, 6 Nov 43; No 10, 11 Jan 44. Ibid.
AMPHIBIOUS JEEP
Units participating in maneuvers and not assigned to corps or divisions were relieved from their home stations and placed under the command of the Commanding General, Second Army, to be exercised by the Special Staff Officer, Second Army, of the branch or service to which the unit belonged. No leaves or furloughs, except in "cases of real emergency," were granted while on maneuvers, but passes were permitted in the interval between operations.13

The Second Army Quartermaster Depot, the Ordnance Depots, and the Chemical Depot at Manchester; the Engineer Depot and the Signal Depot at Wartrace; and the Medical Depot at Shelbyville were opened on 5 April. Maneuver Director Headquarters at Cumberland University in Lebanon opened on 10 April, and the troops for the first maneuver period began to report. One corps headquarters, four or five divisions, and the necessary service and nondivisional combat troops participated in each maneuver period. On 30 June 1943 there were 98,514 enlisted men, 252 warrant officers, and 5,855 officers on maneuvers, which was about the average number at all times.14

On 14 April 1943 the Second Army Umpire School opened at Camp Forrest, with approximately 600 officers and 1,200 enlisted men from the participating units in attendance. This school, which was repeated prior to the beginning of each maneuver period, lasted five days. Officer and enlisted umpires were instructed in their duties through lectures, conferences, demonstrations, and practical work. Tests were given at the end of each subject. Four groups were established for training in the special duties of ground, air-ground, artillery, and armored umpires, but subjects such as map-reading; methods, principles, and general procedure of umpiring; and signal communication, of common importance to all, were taught to the whole school.15

Command of units in the maneuver area was taken by Maneuver Director on 15 April, and Red and Blue Commanders took command of their respective forces. On the same day a conference on air-ground cooperation was held in the Lebanon High School gymnasium, and an air-support school opened on 23 April.16

Representatives of Army Ground Forces attended this school and reported that it "not only met requirements but evidenced superior planning, preparation and execution." The Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces, sent a letter to the Commanding General, Second Army, in which he said, "You and the command, staff, and personnel of Director Headquarters, Second Army Maneuvers, and of the Tennessee Air Support Command, are commended for this auspicious initiation of air-ground training in the Tennessee Maneuver Area."17

The situation for operation 1 was issued to the Red and Blue Commanding Generals on 25 April, and Maneuver No. 1 began on the following day. This was a movement to contact, meeting engagement, and aggressive action by both sides. Blue had the mission to advance and seize the rail facilities at Lebanon and destroy any Red Forces

13. Second Army Staff memo, 10 Apr 43, as amended 14 Apr 43. AG 300.6 (Staff Memo) (FE '43).
15. This summary is based upon the folder prepared for Second Army Umpire Sch, Maneuver No. 4, 7-18 Nov 43. Hist Off files. All the schs were essentially the same.
16. For a full account of air-ground training during the 1943-1944 maneuvers see pp 220-24.
encountered. Red had the mission to advance and seize rail facilities at Shelbyville and Wartrace and to destroy any Blue forces encountered. The operation was concluded on 1 May 1943 and was followed by a critique at Maneuver Director Headquarters in Lebanon.18

The troops then went through the other operations prescribed by the Army Ground Force directives. Another group of troops were brought in for the second maneuver period and went through the same type operations, and so on throughout the year. There were many outstanding events in the various operations. The 101st Airborne Division, the first such division to participate in Army maneuvers, was used in the late operations of the first period and in the second period. On 6 October 1943 over 1,000 paratroopers made a tactical jump at night, and there were many other instances of colorful and exciting action by individuals and units. But the purpose of the maneuvers was not to provide interesting news for the people of the United States. They were more interested in the actual stories of real war coming from the battlefronts. The maneuvers were to train men for combat and to teach them the hard, laborious tasks connected with troop movements, supply, signal communication, and construction. Officers and men learned how to go out on reconnaissance and combat patrols, how to make and keep contact with the enemy, the necessity for maintaining contact with troops on either flanks and all the other business of war.

The critiques at the end of each operation were the means through which the lessons learned in the field were driven home to the participants. On the day following the close of an operation the officers gathered in the Lebanon High School gymnasium, tired and worn from long days and nights on maneuvers, cleaned up but still disheveled, hard, fit, and looking like the combat soldiers they were. The critique began with an officer from the Red and Blue forces reading the narrative of each stage of the operation, illustrated by slides. For the first time the officers of the opposing sides became completely aware of the location of hostile troops and their plan. When this was completed the Commanders of the opposing sides made brief comments in explanation with occasional complaints against the umpires or the problem. Then the Air Support Commander gave a statement covering his observations, and the meeting was closed by a critique by the Maneuver Director, General Fredendall or, in his absence, the corps commander concerned.

These critiques covered every phase of the operation from the large tactical plan to the actions of the individual soldier. The same old subjects come up for discussion time after time: lack of reconnaissance, security violations, the capture of valuable maps, documents, and identifying materials on the persons of staff and command officers, traffic tie-ups, and failure to maintain contact with the enemy and with supporting troops on the flanks. But the story was not all this way. At the close of Operation No. 2, Maneuver 2, General Fredendall said: "I want to take up the subject of signal communications early in my remarks today because I feel that it is not being given the proper emphasis. Although I have seen a few examples of field wire properly laid, in general the laying of field wire throughout by maneuver units is the worst I have ever seen." At the close of the final operation of this maneuver, however, Gen. H. R. Bull, acting Maneuver Director, made the following comment: "I want to take this occasion to express my appreciation of the devotion to duty and tireless energy of the Signal Corps personnel during this maneuver.... The improvements shown in signal communications...has been outstanding... At the start of Maneuver No. 2 wire was laid in a very haphazard fashion, oftences on roads. In many cases no communications were available by wire. In contrast during the last operation wire communication was effective 90% of the time."19

18. G-3 Records, Maneuver Director Hq.

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Similar improvements were noted in all phases of operations during each maneuver period. Mistakes made in the early operations were corrected and not repeated. Then as maneuver followed maneuver the personnel of Maneuver Director Headquarters learned their particular jobs more thoroughly. Maneuvers were not as they had been in previous years, a period of strange and abnormal activity for all personnel, but a regular part of the routine of headquarters with consequent improvement in direction and control.

The value of the maneuvers was not in the training of any particular unit, but in the experience gained by half a million soldiers in combined operations involving all the arms and services, and in the day-to-day training in operation and supply under combat conditions. Rivers were crossed, obstacles were overcome, and problems of cooperation solved in the heat and dust of summer and the cold and mud of winter.

Operation eight of the fifth maneuver closed on 23 March 1944. The participating troops began their return to their home stations. Maneuver Director Headquarters was virtually closed and most of the headquarters officers and enlisted men returned to Memphis, Second Army’s connection with maneuver training had ended. But much was left to do in the maneuver area.

The War Department had ordered that all Second Army troops were to be out of the maneuver area by 31 May 1944. Engineer and Signal Corps troops remained behind to do the necessary repair work, approximately 5,740 of them, and the people of middle Tennessee were promised that all necessary repair to public and private property would be made. 20 Over $2,590,000 had been paid in claims for damage of one sort or another, 2,135,282 feet of woven wire had been installed, 4,345 miles of roads had been graded or ditched, and 1,029 bridges repaired. These were but a small sample of the work that had been and would be done in the effort to fulfill General ‘s earlier promise that the army would leave the area in a better condition than that in which it had been found. 21

20. Speech of Gen Predemall to town and county governmental leaders at Maneuver Director Hq, 22 Mar 44. Hist Off files.
21. Ibid.
HEADQUARTERS ON THE MARCH
Chapter XIII

SPECIAL PHYSICAL AND COMBAT TRAINING

General Lear's emphasis upon the importance of physical condition during the peacetime training program has already been discussed. Actual war made this phase of training more important. On 2 January 1942 the four division commanders of Second Army were told that "the Army Commander desires that obstacle courses be prepared without delay at divisional camps where they do not now exist" because these had been found to be a very stimulating means of arousing interest in physical development.1

Men entering the army were free from disease or disqualifying defects, but they were soft from the lack of heavy physical exercise and did not have the strength and endurance required for combat duty. "There has developed in the twentieth century an asceticism which has belittled the development of strength," General Lear wrote. "We must develop a more general recognition of the importance of strength as a desirable asset in any emergency and especially in time of war." Stamina must be developed, "so that the ultimate resources of human character may be drawn upon by bodies inured to hardship and prolonged endeavor against obstacles."

This could not be acquired by any easy method. "Soldiers cannot march over broken terrain fifteen to twenty miles a day, over roads twenty-five to thirty miles a day, with full equipment day after day, and still be physically and spiritually equipped to do hard battle unless they have developed that stamina by such marches...There is only one way to build legs and hearts -- and that is to build them in training.2

To implement this concept of physical ruggedness, General Lear suggested a seven-point conditioning program to all Second Army units. This schedule consisted of the following items:

1. Marches of increasing length with increasing loads.
2. A great deal of running paced faster than double timing to alternate with walking -- preferably with packs and guns.
3. Calisthenic exercises to strengthen the back, arms, abdomen and feet.
4. Self defense and combat activities.
5. Obstacle course dashes.
7. Games -- requiring vigorous exertion.3

Physical training occupied an important place in each of the training directives issued by Second Army and was stressed on inspections and by occasional letters to unit commanders.4 But it was in setting up the Ranger School program that General Lear's physical fitness concept attained its most impressive fruition. And to a large extent the Ranger project was his own creation.

2. Gen Lear to Comdrs of Second Army units, 6 Jan 42, sub: Cadres and Tng. AG 353-2. Gen Lear to Comdrs of Second Army units, 20 Mar 42, sub: Physical Conditioning. AG 353-29. This latter ltr was based on a ltr of Prof T. Nelson Metcalf, University of Chicago to Maj R. A. Griffin, 26 Feb 42.
3. Ibid.
4. Incl 6 to Tng Dir 40, 1 Nov 42. AG 353-8. Gen Lear to Maj Gen Juhni Millikin, 2d Cav Div, 18 May 42. Hist Off files.

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THE RANGER SCHOOL

In November 1942 General Lear and two of his staff officers, Colonel Sherman, Assistant G-3, and Colonel Griffin, Assistant G-2, visited a special combat training school developed by Major General Smith of the United States Marine Corps at Camp Pendleton on the Pacific Coast. Upon their return to Memphis, Colonel Sherman set to work upon the preparation of a program and doctrine for a Second Army Ranger School. He adopted many of the ideas that had been used by the Marines at Camp Pendleton, drew the infiltration course, close combat course, and the attack upon the Nazi village from the Tank Destroyer Center at Camp Hood, and also studied first-hand reports from the battle fronts.

A "textbook" of ranger tactics was developed. This was based on the doctrine that the most effective way to cope with the Germans and Japanese was by developing individual hardness of mind and body of American fighters. General Lear was convinced that the American soldier must abandon his traditional ideas about sportsmanship; he must learn to fight by methods that hitherto he had considered dirty; he must become determined and versatile in the art of killing; and to achieve this hardness, this determination, and this versatility, he must go through the most strenuous of exercises in an atmosphere closely approximating battle conditions.

The school opened on 8 January 1943 and ran for two weeks. Lt. Col. W. C. Saffarens, distinguished as an athlete, rifleman, and coach, was made commandant, and 600 picked men from all Second Army units were designated to attend the Ranger School at Camp Forrest.

The purpose of this school was to train instructors in rough-and-tumble fighting tactics and in special techniques calculated to bring soldiers to an emotional and physical condition that would assure successful performances on the battlefield. On completion of the Camp Forrest course, the instructors were sent back to their respective units to teach Ranger fundamentals to their comrades. The educational program was designed to teach Second Army men why they were fighting; the ranger program to teach them how to fight most effectively.

Men who took the Camp Forrest course of training were first told about the character of the enemy they were to meet on the battlefield; of his cruelty; of his skill, and of his underhanded tactics. They were then told that the American soldier was inherently superior to the enemy as a fighting man; that they were smarter, larger, and potentially tougher; that they could and must learn to beat the enemy at his own game; in short, that they must learn to be dirtier fighters than their foes.

Students of the Ranger schools had to do more than to complete the course of instruction and perform the routine duties. Throughout the training period they had to exemplify "that intelligence, initiative, alertness, neatness, pride, and leadership which symbolizes the American soldier at his best." Ranger instruction proved to be a


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valuable check on the methods and progress of the general teaching program, and General Lear found that for all soldiers "instruction in Ranger subjects decidedly improves alertness, smartness, aggressiveness, esprit and stimulates interest in training."8

The Rangers put on a spectacular demonstration of the art of killing at their graduation exercises on 23 January 1943 before an audience which included General McNair, General Lear, and newspapermen. In fifteen exhibitions, including camouflage, hand-to-hand combat, tank destruction with improvised grenades, and bridging a river with ropes, they paraded their prowess. The climactic spectacle was a raid upon a mock German town, featured by the use of live ammunition.9

The War Department was so impressed by these graduation exercises that about half the world-wide Army Hour broadcast of 25 January 1943 was devoted to a reenactment of the program's highlights. Another school was held in February. The training was then discontinued because Army Ground Forces disapproved of full-time schools which took large numbers of officers and men away from troops and interfered with regular training.

The purpose of General Lear in inaugurating the ranger training was not to create separate "commando" units, but rather to teach the individual soldier what he ought to know to become an efficient fighter. For this reason, the purpose of the Camp Forrest school was not to create a group of rangers but rather to provide instructors in this training for all units of Second Army.

On 19 January 1943 Second Army prescribed training similar to that given at the Camp Forrest Ranger School for "each infantry battalion, each field artillery battalion, each cavalry squadron, divisional signal companies, military police companies, engineer battalions, and tank destroyer battalions," to be conducted along with regularly prescribed training under T. D. 40.10

Some of the divisions attempted to establish schools modeled after that at Camp Forrest, with the Ranger graduates as instructors, to spread this training more widely through their units. Second Army insisted that these schools be part-time in accordance with the Army Ground Forces directive and that they not be permitted to interfere with regular training of the divisions.11

COMBAT TRAINING

Army Ground Forces, meanwhile, had been gradually developing special courses to be integrated into the regular training program which would, to some extent, teach the principles of the Second Army Ranger School. In June 1942 a description of a model "Battle Practice Course" was sent to all units. This course, in which individual soldiers were confronted with situations that might be met in combat, was designed to teach minor tactics, scouting, patrolling, and the use of individual weapons in close-in fighting.12

10. Second Army ltr, 19 Jan 43, sub: Ranger Tng. AG 352-1.
This was followed by a letter on 5 January 1943 prescribing an attack on a fortified position by combat teams, battalion or larger. Air units and nondivisional combat units, such as tank, tank destroyer, antiaircraft, and chemical battalions were to be included where practicable. At least one battalion per infantry regiment was to use live ammunition with all weapons with a view to creating battlefield realism. Instructors for divisions and separate units were to be given a special course of training at the Engineer School, Ft. Belvoir, Va.13

On 4 February 1943 Army Ground Forces directed the construction by each combat unit of an infiltration and close combat course, modeled as were those of Second Army Ranger School, upon those developed at Camp Hood. Units were also directed to use the model cities, built by Service Command at each large unit and tactical center, for the training in combat in cities prescribed by previously issued directives. The unit training period was increased one week to provide time for this training. In this letter, Army Ground Forces said:

Every combat soldier must be trained mentally for the shock of battle. So far as practicable, he must be subjected in training to every sight, sound, and sensation of battle. He must be trained to act calmly and with sound judgment regardless of noise, confusion and surprise. Every opportunity will be taken to subject personnel to overhead fire and fire past the flanks.

13. AGF ltr (R) 353/2(Assault)-GNGCT(1-5-43), 5 Jan 43, sub: Tng in Ops Against Perm Land Fortifications.
So far as practicable, artillery service practice and exercises or drills of other troops should be so located and coordinated as to provide troops with experience in receiving overhead artillery fire...

Individuals in entrenchedments of their own construction should be run over by tanks when practicable. Such training should require men to throw or discharge practice grenades or simulated grenades at the tanks. If hostile infantry is following the tank attack, men should be trained to bob up as soon as the tank has passed and take the approaching hostile infantry under fire. Men should be confident of the protection of their individual entrenchedments.

Troops will be subjected to realistic attack from the air at every available opportunity. They will be taught to expect the most violent and prolonged strafing from the air. They will be trained to meet such attacks by concentrating the fire of every available individual weapon upon enemy planes as they come within range and by making effective use of dispersion, and available cover including slit trenches...

Training should not be restricted by unnecessary safety precautions. No restrictions for reason of safety should be placed on the use of terrain on which artillery fire has been delivered. Training should be conducted generally under battlefield conditions so far as practicable.¹⁴

Each of these letters was reproduced by Second Army and passed down only to the next echelon of command, as directed by Army Ground Forces, for compliance. These with the increased use of hand-to-hand fighting, physical training, and intensified bayonet training accomplished much the same things as had been the aim and purpose of the Ranger School.

AMMUNITION SUPPLY

Realism in training was not a new doctrine in the army. It was one of the accepted fundamentals, but peacetime safety restrictions and, more important, shortages of equipment and ammunition had prevented its accomplishment. On 16 February 1942, GHQ had been forced to curtail sharply the allocation of ammunition for training. Three priorities were established: first, the minimum necessary to familiarize all men with their principal weapons; second, qualification courses with principal weapons and with secondary weapons; and third, platoon combat firing proficiency tests and other combat and special firing. GHQ, however, added:

Should ammunition received not be sufficient to fire a marksmanship course, all men in combat units who in their military service have not fired their principal weapon should fire a short course of instruction, a minimum of 10 rounds with the rifle, carbine, automatic rifle, pistol, or submachine gun, if so armed...

Combat and special training allowances...are also reduced by 33 1/3%. Corresponding reductions in combat firing, and the like, will have to be made. It is desired that, as far as practicable, proportions of available ammunition be devoted to each of the several classes of special firing in order that training may be rounded. Effort should be made to conserve ammunition firing tests prescribed in letter...October 30, 1941...

¹⁴ AGF ltr 353.01/61-GNGCT (2-4-43), 4 Feb 43, sub: Sp Battle Courses. AG 353-118.

¹⁵ GHQ ltr 353.15/12-H (2-16-42), 16 Feb 42, sub: Marksmanship Courses. AG 353.15-2.
These restrictions were not completely lifted until April 1943, when the only limitation on firing was "the unavailability of ammunition allocated by the commanding general concerned." Army Ground Forces, in making this announcement, said, "Records for 1942 reveal an unsatisfactory state of training in marksmanship in service units generally. Proficiency in arms will be considered a basic requirement for every soldier. Individuals are now authorized to fire record courses within prescribed ammunition allowances until proficiency is attained." In addition, Army Ground Forces called attention to War Department Circular No. 30, 1943, which outlined a course in "transition firing," designed to stress the application of rifle marksmanship to combat firing. This course was to be fired by all men armed with rifle cal .30 and could be used as a guide for similar firing with other types of small arms. The 13-week individual training period was increased to 14 weeks for this purpose.

16. WD Memo W775-2-43, 26 Apr 43, sub: Ammunition for Tng Individuals and Units of the AUS. AG 471-1.

FIRE POWER DEMONSTRATIONS

While restrictions on firing were not completely lifted until the publication of the above described circular, the ammunition situation was being gradually eased throughout the latter part of 1942 and the first few months of 1943. This enabled units and schools to fire more in training and in demonstrations. On 19 December 1942 General Lear wrote to his Corps Commanders: "I have recently received very confidential information that leads me to believe that our troops overseas may not have sufficient knowledge of, or confidence in, the extent of our own fire power." To remedy this he directed that each division give a fire power demonstration modeled after one developed by the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill.18

The Field Artillery School fired this demonstration for Second Army Commanders on 23 January 1943. This was preceded by a short orientation course on the use of artillery as supporting weapons and in antimechanized defense.19 Meanwhile arrangements were concluded with III Air Support Command for fire power demonstrations,20 and it was decided to combine the two demonstrations into one.

These combined demonstrations were given to each of the Second Army Divisions. One of the most effective was that held at Lake Tholoco, two miles northwest of Camp Rucker, Ala., on 4 February 1943. The entire 81st Infantry Division, the 1st Air Base Security Training Group, the Commanding General of the Second Army, and two hundred civilians including the Governor of Alabama witnessed the demonstration from hills overlooking the lake. There was a brief orientation which described the purposes of the exercise, emphasizing the tactical aspects of the situation in logical sequence; the fire power of the supporting infantry weapons and field artillery; the importance of team work between the infantry, field artillery, engineers, and air force; the coordination necessary for such an attack; and the necessity for dispersing troops and men to avoid giving the air force and field artillery profitable targets.

Eleven planes of the 23rd Wing demonstrated level bombing and ground strafing of water-borne and ground targets. Dive bombing was also scheduled but clouds made it impossible. The planes were then flown close to the troops while the air officer described their characteristics.

Afterward an infantry battalion effected a wide river crossing, supported by overhead fire of infantry weapons and field artillery. Engineer sapper squads attacked enemy pillboxes upon landing. As the artillery concentrations lifted and moved to other objectives the infantry advanced in hostile territory. Upon completion of the exercise all officers and noncommissioned officers not required to march troops to the cantonment area marched to the hostile shore of the lake and observed the effects of the bombing and infantry-artillery attack.21

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18. Gen Lear to each Corps commander by name, 19 Dec 42. AG 353-200.
20. Second Army ltr to CGs all Corps, 4 Jan 43, sub: Demonstration by the Air Force. Same to III A Spt Comd, 4 Jan 43, sub: Air Force Demonstrations. AG 353.5-1.
Such demonstrations were dangerous, because war is dangerous, and any attempt to bring realism into the training of men for combat means the reproduction of the conditions of combat, including the use of live ammunition, artillery shells, and bombs. There was one unfortunate accident. A bomb was dropped from an airplane 1,500 yards short of its designated target at a demonstration at Camp Forrest, Tenn., and killed one man, hurt two others, and demolished four trucks. The safety requirements for bombing were modified but the demonstrations went on, because, even though there were regrettable losses, lives would be saved by men getting their introduction to the noise and confusion of the battlefield under the controlled conditions of training rather than from hostile guns on their first day of combat.  


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Chapter XIV

SPECIAL AND COMBINED ARMS TRAINING

Second Army was principally occupied in the training of units in accordance with the regularly established training program. In addition it was assigned many special training tasks such as training for winter and mountain warfare, the preparation of two ranger battalions, the training of certain special groups of foreign nationality or descent, and the training of air base security battalions for the air force. The administration and supervision of these special projects were a part of the routine of the headquarters, but since a discussion of them in the chapters on training would have confused the narrative, they are given separate treatment here. Air-ground training and the training of units in staging areas have also been included in this chapter because the subjects are important enough to justify their treatment as separate phases of the training program.

WINTER AND MOUNTAIN TRAINING

Though Second Army Headquarters was in Memphis, Tenn., where there is no snow, its territory included Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, and Colorado - and hence much of the winter and mountain training was under its control. There were no experts in these subjects on the staff, and Second Army had little to do with the specialized operations or the testing of equipment and clothing. The War Department, and later Army Ground Forces, selected the units, provided the specialists, and supervised and controlled the experiments. Second Army was the channel of command and administration.

The 4th Cavalry and the 5th and 6th Divisions in 1940-1941, the 2nd Infantry Division in 1942-1943, and the 76th Infantry Division in 1943-1944 were the units selected for specialized training in over-snow operations in flat country. The 10th Light Division at Camp Hale, 9,500 feet above sea level in the Rocky Mountains of Colorado, was activated on 10 July 1943 "to test the organization and equipment best suited to the employment of a division in high mountain warfare." These units were trained for specialized operations, so that the army would have troops ready for such warfare if it became necessary, but they also had the mission of experimenting and testing as pioneers in types of combat operations never previously undertaken by American troops.

The reports submitted by each of these units were sent through Headquarters, Second Army, to Army Ground Forces and the War Department, and constitute an invaluable source of information concerning the peculiar problems of winter and mountain warfare.

The Mountain Training Center at Camp Hale was discontinued on 23 October 1943, and expert mountaineers and the skiers in this command were transferred to the Mountain Training Group as an augmentation of the 15th Detachment, Special Troops, Second Army, which was activated on the same date. This group acted as specialized instructors in mountain warfare for the 10th Light Division, and detachments were sent from it to the 76th Division at Camp McCoy and to the West Virginia Maneuver Area for the same purpose. Second Army had no direct connection with the specialized operations of the group, but acted in a command and administrative capacity in regard to it.

**SEPARATE NATIONAL UNITS**

Another experiment in special training in which Second Army participated was that of units whose personnel was drawn from certain nationality groups: a Norwegian, an Austrian, a Greek, and a Japanese separate battalion, and a Japanese regimental combat team. Two of these, the 101st and 122nd Infantry Battalions (Sep), made up of Austrian and Greek nationals, were never filled and both were disbanded before the completion of training. The 99th Infantry Battalion (Sep), composed of Norwegians, completed its training and was sent to an overseas theater on 24 August 1943, but only after great difficulties had been experienced in filling it with Norwegian-speaking personnel.

The most successful of these units were the two Japanese. The 100th Infantry Battalion (Sep) was composed of American-born Japanese, many of whom had been members of the National Guard in Hawaii. The unit arrived at Camp McCoy, Wis., on 15-16 June 1942, after six months of beach defense duty. An initial two-and-a-half weeks training program was prescribed for the review of basic subjects and to correct known deficiencies. Afterwards the regular training program was prescribed. The battalion made an excellent record in all its tests and was one of the high-rating units in Second Army when it was transferred to the Third Army for maneuvers on 9 January 1943. A similar record was made by the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, made up of Japanese-American selectees, which was given its final training by Second Army from 9 January to 23 April 1944. The unit performed excellently in field problems and during its final preparation period the Second Army G-3 reported of it, "This unit is in fine shape." The Japanese seemed motivated by a strong desire to convince Americans that they were loyal and capable soldiers, and there was a spirit among them which was lacking in the other national units. Neither Army Ground Forces nor Second Army was particularly enthusiastic about these experiments, with the exception of the Japanese, and the record of such organizations did not justify their continuance.

**RANGER TRAINING**

Second Army had a special interest in the training of the 2nd and 5th Ranger Battalions which were activated on 1 April and 1 September 1943 at Camp Forrest, the site of the Second Army Ranger School. There was no direct connection between the battalions and the school, but Lt Col. William C. Saffrans, director of the school, was the original commander of the 2nd Ranger Battalion, and the enthusiasm for ranger training had continued in Headquarters, Second Army.

The training schedule for the battalions allotted three months in which "to mold an organization capable of performing combat duty." The individual training program

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2. AGP ltr 320.2/23(Ind) (7-10-42) - GNOPN, 10 Jul 42, sub: 99th Inf Bn (Sep). AG 322.04-29. Record (C) of telephone conversation between Col Harding, G-3 Sec AGP and Lt Col John B. Smith, A G-3 Second Army, 16 Nov 42, sub: Orgn of Austrian Bn. AG 322.04-48(C). AGP ltr (R) 321(Ind) (5-3-43) - GNCT, 13 May 43, sub: Disbandment of 101st Inf Bn (Sep). AG 322.04-49.

3. Gen Lear to all Gen Off, 24 Sep 42, sub: Tng of 100th Inf Bn. AG 353.01-2(C).

4. Second Army Informal Check Slip (C), 13 Mar 44. AG 353(Inf) (C). See also 333(Inf) (Jan-Apr).

was not basically different from that of a regular infantry soldier, but particular attention was paid to physical hardening, proficiency in hand-to-hand combat, scouting, and patrolling. In other words, the battalions were composed of experts in infantry fighting, but did not constitute a separate combat arm.  

Personnel for the battalions came from volunteers above average in physical endurance and ability. The 2nd Ranger Battalion experienced considerable difficulty in getting adequate personnel. Fillers were slow in arriving and some were too old or physically unfit. The 5th Battalion was more fortunate in that Second Army was authorized to recruit its personnel from other Second Army units and none of the previous difficulties developed.

The 2nd Battalion was ordered to the Amphibious Base at Fort Pierce, Florida on 2 September 1943 for two weeks of amphibious training prior to going overseas. The beginning of the Italian campaign caused the 5th Battalion program to be cut short and it left Second Army control on 6 November for amphibious training. Both battalions were subsequently used for special missions in the Italian theater.

AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALIONS

One of the special missions assigned to Second Army was "to furnish basically trained air base security units for the Army Air Forces to provide protection of airfields or air base defense areas." The original directive pointed out that the units would be opposed by the best troops and equipment of the enemy and would have to fight without support against superior forces. The individual training of officers and enlisted men was to be of such thoroughness as to permit them to carry on a vigorous defense against all odds. Infantry elements were taught to fight as small self-sustained combat teams, while 75-mm self-propelled platoons were trained in direct and indirect laying of fire. Physical endurance, boxing, wrestling, and hand-to-hand fighting were stressed.

White battalions were attached to larger units for training and administration, but Negro units were assigned to the 1st and 3rd Air Base Security Training Groups at Camp Rucker, Ala., and Camp Butner, N.C., respectively. Training of these units continued from June 1942 until August 1943, when combat experience indicated that their services would not be required and the program was concluded.

Training of the Negro units had been attended with many difficulties. In spite of the importance of their missions the quality of enlisted man assigned was very low and training equipment inadequate. Nevertheless, some effective training was accomplished. The commanding officer of one unit reported that he had been told that his was one of the best outfits to move through a staging area. An even stronger statement was contained in a letter from a battalion commander in North Africa who wrote:

6. AGF ltr (S) 353/10 (3-11-43) - GNGCT, 8 Apr 43, sub: Tng of 2d Ranger Bn. 5th Ranger Inf Bn memo, 16 Sep 43, sub: Tng Schedule 5th Ranger Inf Bn. AG 322.171-1.

7. AGF ltr (S) 353/10 (Ranger) (3-11-43) - GNGCT, 11 Mar 43, sub: Activation of 2d Ranger Bn. 322.171-1 (S). Lt Gen Fredendall to Lt Gen McNair, 27 Jul 43. 1st ind, McNair to Fredendall, 29 Jul 43. AG 322.171-1.


9. WDAGO to Second Army, AG 322-12, 24 Jul 43, sub: Disbandment of Units.
I don't know whether or not I told you this, but Dewey's outfit held down the right flank of a certain division at Faid Pass, when a white organization ran through his lines to the rear, losing a lot of their equipment in the process. This should have panicked Dewey's men, but they held together without exception. He has had a total of only 4 casualties in his entire organization: 1 killed, 3 wounded from strafing. I tell you this because I thought you might be interested in knowing how some of your men held up under fire when according to most psychological standards they should have been unnerved.

AIR-GROUND TRAINING

Cooperation between air and ground troops was one of the fundamental necessities of modern war. Army Ground Forces, in the month following its organization, prescribed air-ground training for all units and directed that three weeks of the maneuver period in 1942 be devoted to air-ground maneuvers. The preliminary air-ground training was divided into two periods. Schools for commanders and staffs were scheduled for the first four weeks while the troops continued small-unit training. But in the second period of two weeks the whole unit participated in the practical application of the subjects covered in the school.

The schools were conducted by corps with the assistance of staff officers from army headquarters. Originally it was planned to have the lectures given by Air Forces officers and for airplanes to participate in the second phase of training. But this cooperation in training was not possible in the summer of 1942. As Lt. Col. Edward D. Marshall of Headquarters III Ground Air Support Command wrote, "this Headquarters is handling five corps maneuvers this summer....Inasmuch as we are losing units and individuals from time to time and will continue to lose units and individuals throughout the summer, we must anticipate changes at any time...In compensation for any shortcomings which we may have I can only point to our activities over Cologne and other points where we are beginning to show results in the theaters."

The airplanes were not available for large-scale participation in the 1942 maneuvers, which were changed to standard ground exercises rather than the special air-ground maneuvers which had been originally scheduled.

Second Army, on 26 November 1942, issued a memorandum which directed that advantage be taken of every opportunity for joint training of air and ground units, with emphasis on air-ground visual communications in all forms. Ground units were to employ panels and pyrotechnics for ground-air identification and communication in field exercises and maneuvers regardless of the presence or absence of actual air participation.

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12. Par 6b, Second Army Tng Dir 38, 29 Jun 42. AG 353-8.

13. Lt Col Marshall to Col John B. Sherman, A G-3, Second Army, 1 Jun 42. AG 353-2(FE 42).


Units in the first period were to conduct training in identification of friendly aircraft, concealment and camouflage for men and vehicles, and hasty intrenchments. Air-Ground schools were directed for the second period. A representative of the Air Force was to be made available to each division and brigade for air-ground schools, and provision was also made for the detail of officers from the III Air Support Command to divisions and other units to familiarize them with the operations of ground units. Where representatives of the Air Force were not available for these schools, units were to conduct their own on the basis of prepared mimeographed lectures which were to be distributed by Second Army.\(^{16}\)

The participation of III Air Support Command in air-ground training was limited to demonstrations of air power to each of the divisions in Second Army,\(^ {17}\) and even as late as 17 April 1943 the Army itself had to report that the lectures were still in process of preparation.\(^ {18}\)

Air-ground training, in spite of the great emphasis placed upon it, had largely been confined to the issuance of directives by headquarters, but the increase in personnel and equipment by the spring of 1943 made it possible for the first time to carry out the directives. Army Ground Forces, on 20 April 1943, published a letter prescribing air-ground tests to be given after the completion of the combined training period and prior to maneuvers. These tested the ability of ground troops to identify friendly aircraft and to employ aggressive action and passive defense against hostile aircraft. In addition tests were designed to stress the coordination and training necessary to enable air and friendly ground units to locate and recognize each other, and the ability of combat aviation to attack targets, particularly close-in targets of opportunity, designated by ground troops.\(^ {19}\)

These tests made it necessary for units to concentrate to a greater degree on air-ground training. In addition the increasing supply of air corps personnel and equipment made it possible for such training to be carried on realistically and with interested participation by the troops. The first workable plan for cooperative air-ground training was finally arranged between Second Army and I Air Support Command on 15 May 1943. Air-ground schools, conducted by unit officers, were held during the second period of training. A team of air corps officers visited each division during the 4th or 5th week of the third training period, lectured for five hours, and participated in bombing and strafing exercises. Immediately following this training one C Flight of liaison planes was attached to the division for the remaining two months of combined training. A combined group of bombers and fighters was also attached to each division for a period of two to three weeks for division exercises culminating in the air-ground tests.\(^ {20}\)

\(^{16}\) Ibid.

\(^{17}\) See p 206.

\(^{18}\) Col H. C. Raymond, Ex O, 14th FA Brig to Second Army, 19 Feb 43, sub: Air Force Representative to Conduct Brig Air-Ground Sch; I Air Spt Cmd 3d ind, 9 May 43; Second Army 6th ind, 17 Apr 43. I Air Spt Cmd ltr to Second Army, 31 Mar 43, sub: Air Spt Tng. AG 353-70.

\(^{19}\) AGF ltr 353/268(Air Gnd)(4-20-43)-GNGCT, 20 Apr 43, sub: Air-Ground Tng Tests. AG 353-70.

Air-ground cooperation was stressed in the Second Army maneuvers of 1943-1944. A conference on this subject was held on 15 April, the opening day of the maneuvers, and an air-support school was opened on 23 April. This school was attended by approximately 300 officers including commanding officers and intelligence, operations, and communications officers of each combat unit down to and including regiments, groups, and separate battalions. Conferences were held on the following subjects: "Purpose of Air Support School; "Air Support in Algiers and Tunisia"; "Air Support"; "Air Support Organization and Doctrines"; and "Air Support Communications."

The purpose of these conferences was to give a theoretical background of the organization, tactics, method of employment, capabilities, and limitations of the aviation of an air-support command. Afterwards a demonstration was held on the aircraft parking apron at Berry Field, Nashville, which consisted of a display and demonstration of aircraft on the ground and in the air, and of armament, photo equipment, communications equipment, and very high frequency and direction finding equipment. The next day a field exercise was held at Observers Hill, approximately eight miles northeast of Lebanon. The exercise was in the form of a drama which showed the air and ground staffs at work planning an offensive operation with air and ground troops brought into the play to demonstrate the results of this staff work. Scenes were laid at the division command post to illustrate all the steps necessary to secure air cooperation at the division, regiment, and battalion levels. Ground troops made an attack on enemy positions with planes rendering air cooperation. The air cooperation included reconnaissance, bombing of rear supply dumps, and bombing and strafing of troop and motor columns, close-in targets, and tanks. During attacks in which bombardment aviation was employed fighter escort was provided. At later demonstrations resupply by air was demonstrated by dropping the lunch to be served to the spectators, and airborne operations were illustrated by dropping paratroopers.

Great stress was placed on air-ground cooperation in all periods of the 1943-1944 maneuvers. The Tennessee Air Support Command (Provisional) or TASCO, later known as the I Tactical Air Division (Tennessee Provisional), furnished the necessary air support. Liaison officers from ground units were stationed at operations airports. The purpose of their work was to effect an exchange of information and doctrines with regard to equipment of air and ground forces. Their duties were to keep the air staff informed of the progress of ground troops and their proposed plan of action; to maintain at the airfield an up-to-date operation map of ground forces, and, conversely, to assist their own headquarters by transmission of information pertinent to air operations; to assist in the briefing of air commanders and pilots on selected reconnaissance points or targets; to cooperate and assist S-2 of air unit in interrogation of returning pilots; and to submit a report at the termination of operation covering the activities at the airport, relationship with the air force units, and comments, suggestions, or recommendations.

The general purpose of this training was to promote air-ground coordination in various types of action. The cardinal problems to be solved were the securing of information by reconnaissance aviation; prompt dissemination of such information to all

21. These Air-Ground Schs were also held at the beginning of each maneuver period. Maneuver Dir Second Army, Dir Memo L, sub: Schedule for Air Spt Sch, Second Army Maneuver 1, 43. 353/275(Air-Ground).
22. Ibid. Rpt of Air-Ground Sch staged jointly by I TAD (TP) and Second Army Maneuver Dir Hq, 10-11 Sep 43. AG 354 (FE 43).
23. Maneuver Dir Hq ltr, 20 Nov 43, sub: Ground Air Ln. AG 211-1(Ln Off) (FE 43).
air and ground units; and bombing and strafing in direct support by bombardment and fighter-bomber aviation. The accepted doctrines in FM 31-35 and FM 100-20 were followed, but various systems and tactics used in foreign theaters of operation were also tested. Air critiques that were held at the close of each operation were attended also by personnel of supported ground units, which resulted in a better understanding on the part of both forces. Key air personnel attended the Ground critique, thus gaining a better understanding of the ground situation. The commanding officer of TASCO was allotted time at the critiques and gave the ground forces a picture of air operations for each exercise.

Army Ground Force observers paid particular attention to this phase of maneuvers. A letter of 31 May criticized air support umpiring rather severely. Work had not been completed on the communications necessary to maintain air umpire supervisors in the air as had been suggested by Army Ground Forces. Only prearranged bombardment missions could be flown, and antiaircraft casualties were assessed prior to flight without regard to realism or the actual laying and simulated fire of the weapons. Effort was to be continued to make air umpiring effective for mutual identification; for air attack on targets which had not been prearranged; and for the assessment of casualties against airplanes in flight due to antiaircraft fire, the delivery of which was actually simulated and checked.

Subsequent letters found conditions improved, and on 31 July 1943 AGF said, "Commendable and unusual progress has been made in correcting deficiencies in air-ground training previously reported by this headquarters." Another letter of 15 March 1944 said, "Success of the air-ground cooperation in the maneuver of 7-10 March was outstanding, and it indicated careful pre-planning, successful umpiring, and efficient teamwork between participating air and ground units."

The intensification of air-ground training, which was made possible by the accumulating surplus of Air Force personnel and equipment, was a notable characteristic of training in 1943-1944. Air-ground schools, demonstrations, maneuvers, and tests were among the most colorful and interesting, as well as useful, phases of training. Ground troops going into battle knew how helpful our Air Force could be and how to fight back against enemy attacks from the air.

TRAINING IN STAGING AREAS

Units trained and processed for overseas shipment by Second Army and other commands of Army Ground Forces were sent to staging areas under the control of Army Service Forces, prior to movement to a port of embarkation. The original staging areas had limited housing and no training facilities, but their capacity was soon exceeded as units were ordered to them, while shortages of shipping prevented movement overseas. Supplementary staging areas were established at regular camps and stations, and here units were retained awaiting shipment as long as six months. The "true staging areas" had housing for personnel only — no facilities for training. Some provision had to be

24. Maneuver Rpt, Tenn Air Spt Comd (Prov), Second Army Maneuver 2, 43, 6 Jul 43 to 29 Aug 43. AG 354.2-6(FE 43).
25. AGF ltr 353.02/156(AGF)-GNCT, 31 May 43, sub: Inspection of Second Army Exercises, 17-20 May 43. AG 004.5-1(FE 43).
26. AGF ltr 354.2(Tenn 43) [31 Jul 43]GNCT, 31 Jul 43, sub: Visit to Second Army Exercises, Jul 43. AGF ltr 353.02(15 Mar 44)GNCT, 15 Mar 44, sub: Visit of Observers to Second Army Maneuvers, 7-10 Mar 44. AG 333.1-4(FE 43).
Signal Panels
made for training in the quasi staging areas. The War Department, on 26 March 1942, directed that this training was "to be supervised in coordination with the Port Commander concerned, by the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces respectively." 27

It was not entirely clear how the supervision was to be exercised. Army Ground Forces instructions merely directed, "Notify all units upon departure for a station such as Fort Dix or Fort Ord under the control of a port of embarkation. A true staging area is a permanent installation designated by the War Department as a staging area, such as that at Stelton, N. J." And to this Second Army added, "In addition to such training preparatory to embarkation as may be prescribed by the Port Commander, the time available at the staging area will be used to correct deficiencies noted in previous training and to continue with your training program insofar as practical." 28

Army Ground Forces, on 10 July 1942, issued a training directive for the period from time of arrival at staging areas to time of departure for ports of embarkation. The purpose was to maintain a complete state of readiness for combat of both individuals and units, and emphasis was placed "on individual and small unit training including: marches, completion of firing on all types of weapons by necessary personnel, field fortifications, communications, and other necessary types of instruction and training which can be accomplished with the training equipment available." 29

On 17 July Second Army asked if the supervision of training prescribed by the War Department letter of 26 March was to be handled by Army Ground Forces or by Second Army. The answer was that it would be handled by Army Ground Forces unless otherwise specifically directed. 30 This decision was changed on 31 July 1942 when it was decided that "a Second Army unit ordered to a staging area will continue to be under Second Army supervision and control until expressly released by AGF." 31

Second Army in the meantime submitted to AGF a draft training memorandum on the subject of training in the staging area. This was returned with the following comment: "Your draft looks OK. General Marshall recently expressed his dissatisfaction over the control of units in staging areas. I expect that there will be a change in War Department policy under which command will be retained by us instead of passing to the SOS. It may be that in the Northeast we will set up a headquarters solely for the purpose of exercising necessary control. However, that is all in the future and your memorandum is as clear as it can be in this confused situation." 32

The day before this letter was written Second Army was notified "that the personnel system of responsibility for troop movement is going to be changed immediately. AGF will take over the responsibility for all troop movements from home station to staging area and the administration of training troops scheduled for overseas movement.

27. WD ltr AG 355(3-24-42)MT-C, 26 Mar 42, sub: Tng of Units at Staging Areas. AG 355-55.
28. AGF 1st ind, 1 Apr 42. Second Army 2d ind, 8 Apr 42. Ibid.
29. AGF ltr 353/1515 (7-10-42)-CMTGRG, 10 Jul 42, sub: Tng Dir for Units During Period from Arrival at Staging Area to Departure for PE. AG 353-55.
30. Record of telephone conversation between Col Sherman, A G-3 Second Army and Col Phillips, A G-3 AGF, 17 Jul 42. Ibid.
32. Col John M. Lentz, G-3 AGF to Col R.G. Leham, G-3 Second Army, 10 Aug 42. Ibid.
while in the staging areas. To carry out their new responsibility an administrative, training and disciplinary corps headquarters will be established at Indiantown Gap, Pa. 33

Second Army, however, published its training memorandum on 22 August 1942. This stated that Second Army units ordered to a staging area would continue under its control and supervision until expressly released by Second Army or Army Ground Forces, and that during this period port commanders had no supervisory control. Units ordered to staging areas outside Second Army jurisdiction would be notified when control passed to another army or division command. The specific training prescribed was that directed in the Army Ground Forces directive of 10 July 1942. 34

These directives did not remain in effect long. On 5 October 1942 Army Ground Forces rescinded its previous letters and directed, "Upon arrival in a staging area all units pass to the command of the Commanding General, Port of Embarkation. This command responsibility includes supervision of administrative and supply matters; maintenance of adequate security measures to safeguard information on overseas movements; enforcement of high disciplinary standards; and continuance of such training as will not interfere with preparations for overseas movement." To carry out these responsibilities the Commanding General, Services of Supply, was to establish small permanent command groups in each staging area camp. The Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, was charged with maintaining liaison with port commanders and with these special command groups, and was "to cause periodical inspections to be made of Army Ground Force units within staging area in order to insure that training" was continued and that disciplinary standards were maintained. 35

The responsibility for liaison and inspections at the ports of Hampton Roads, Va., and Charleston, S. C., was delegated to the Commanding General, Second Army, and re-delegated by him to the Commanding General, XII Army Corps, for Charleston and to the Commanding General, III Army Corps, for Hampton Roads. 36 Training Memorandum No. 24 was rescinded and instructions issued that "The Commanding General, Port of Embarkation, is responsible for the continuance of training of all Second Army units arriving in a staging area." 37

There is no record of such inspections of training by either the III or XII Corps. In fact there is no indication that at any time did the units in the staging areas pay any attention to the directives concerning training. Finally on 23 January 1943 Army and Army Corps were, in effect, relieved of all responsibility in the matter by an Army Ground Force letter which said:

Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, is charged with maintaining liaison with port commanders, and through him, with the special command groups....

33. Record of telephone conversation between Maj Weheill Pars Div AGF and Col Beurket, G-1 Second Army, 9 Aug 42. AG 370.5-203.

34. Second Army Tng Memo 24 (C), 22 Aug 42, sub: Tng Dir for Units During Period from Arrival at Staging Areas to Departure for PE. AG 373.5-203(C).

35. AGF ltr (R) 380.2/92 (9-12-42)-GNGCT, 5 Oct 42, sub: Control of Units in Staging Areas. AG 353-55.

36. Second Army lst ind, 17 Oct 42. Ibid.

As a result of this liaison, army and separate corps commanders will render such assistance as requested by the port commander and as may be practicable to be rendered in the training and preparation of Army Ground Force units. Assistance, if practical may include temporary procurement of equipment necessary for training, and cooperation and coordination of administrative functions....

The port commanders made no calls for assistance and the whole subject, as far as Second Army was concerned, ceased to exist.

In addition to these special training projects, Second Army was also charged with the administration and supply of the divisions and other units undergoing training directed by the Airborne and Amphibious Commands. This administrative responsibility was discharged in accordance with the established policies and caused no complications. Second Army was also in command of the special amphibious training of the 46th Division prior to its successful landing in Sicily, but here the great interest of the War Department and Army Ground Forces caused Second Army in reality to be but a channel of command.

These special training programs were handled as part of the regular routine. In most instances, the selection of units and the drawing up of programs and policies were accomplished by higher headquarters, and Second Army merely supervised their execution. The inspection and supervision of the training of these units were carried out as part of the established work of the headquarters.

38. AGF ltr (R) 320.2/4 (Staging Areas) (1-23-45)-GNGCT, 23 Jan 43, sub: Control of Units in Staging Areas. AG 353-55.
Chapter XV
SUPERVISION OF TRAINING AND INSPECTIONS

After Army Ground Forces took over the detailed preparation of the training program the supervision of training became the most important activity of Headquarters, Second Army. This supervision was greatly facilitated by two devices which G-3 developed for keeping accurate tab on Second Army units. The first of these was the Operations Kardex System. In the months immediately following activation of the Second Army there was no satisfactory record of units under Army jurisdiction. Occasionally instructions would be sent out to a unit, and the reply would come back that this unit did not belong to Second Army. To alleviate this unhappy situation, Col. John B. Smith and Maj. Harwood O. Benton modified the Kardex System for Second Army use in the autumn of 1941 so as to afford an accurate and up-to-date record of Second Army Components.

STATUS OF TRAINING REPORTS

Even more significant than the Operations Kardex was the Status of Training Report initiated in June 1942. In the months immediately following Pearl Harbor many inquiries came from higher headquarters concerning the availability of various units for overseas movement. Second Army Headquarters sometimes had to do considerable investigation before the desired information could be provided. It became imperative, therefore, to develop a system whereby the status of training of any given unit could always be readily ascertained.

Army Ground Forces had decided that the following factors constituted readiness for overseas movement:

1. Satisfactory completion of MTP tests.
2. Satisfactory completion of type of training applicable to unit involved.
3. Completion of firing as prescribed by training directives.
4. Full complement of personnel including qualified officers.
5. Complete equipment.

Late in May 1942, Second Army received a copy of a status report prepared for the I Army Corps by the Engineer Group of that Corps at Ft. Bragg, N.C. This report gave the strength, and condition of supply, administration, funds, and training of each of the units which had been placed under this temporary group for supervision and control. This report attracted the attention of the G-3 section and it was sent to the Chief of Staff "for note of form of report." The Army Engineer said, "This type of comprehensive report is desirable in that it eliminates a separate report required from time to time on almost all of these items. It does or can contain all of the essential elements of information necessary for preliminary alert reports to AGF and would allow the records of the special staff sections to be up to date -- much more so than inspections at four or six weeks intervals." 3

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1. Statements of Lt Cols V. P. Mock and A. J. Boyle to Hist Off, 17 Jun 43. When Maj Benton was later trfd to the Air Forces, he helped to develop a similar system for that br of serv.
2. Army Corps Engr Gp ltr to I Army Corps, 22 May 42, sub: Status Rpt for Wk Ending 23 May 42. Second Army Informal Check Slip, 29 May 42. AG 322-12.
3. Ibid.
On 22 June 1942 Second Army directed that on 15 July and the 15th of each month thereafter the commanding general of each army corps should submit a status-of-training report of each division and nondivisional unit assigned or attached to army corps. Separate divisions and units not assigned or attached to army corps or divisions were to submit this report direct to Army Headquarters. A form for the report was drawn up and distributed with the memorandum. Later these instructions were modified and reports, instead of being submitted monthly, were sent in only when called for, or were completed by Second Army or corps officers after inspections or tests.

When filled-in forms reached Second Army Headquarters, the information contained therein was transferred to the Kardex file. By utilizing this file Headquarters officers could ascertain at a glance when a given unit was attached; when it was activated; when various stages of training were begun and completed; when tests and inspections had been made, by whom, and with what results; and final activities prior to departure of unit to the staging area.

In order to correct deficiencies in the training program, Second Army had previously directed all officers to study FM 21-5, Military Training, and see the training film on the same subject. All nondivisional units were ordered to prepare training programs and weekly training schedules in accordance with the directions in this field manual. Two copies of training programs and one copy of the weekly schedule were sent to Army Headquarters, direct by separate units, and through proper military channels by others. Each commander also maintained an individual progress chart to keep record of each man's knowledge of the particular subjects required of that unit. Each man was graded as either excellent, satisfactory or unqualified in each subject. At the end of the month a unit progress chart was compiled from the individual progress chart and sent to Headquarters, Second Army.

Copies of divisional and corps training publications were sent to Army Headquarters and were extensively reviewed. All of these publications and charts except the weekly training schedules were discontinued as the result of AGF letter, 1 January 1943, subject: "Conduct of Training," but they served a useful purpose during the period of reorganization and expansion of the army in 1942. Second Army was able to keep check on the progress of units, and the units themselves were made conscious of the importance of the training program and its proper planning and carrying through, by the mere existence of these charts and reports.

INSPECTIONS

Inspections continued to be the most effective means through which Second Army supervised the training, administration, and supply of its units and kept itself informed concerning their condition. Both General Lear and General Fredendall spent large portions of their time in the field with the troops and each of them frequently participated actively in inspections.

5. Second Army ltr to all nondivisional unit comdrs, 5 Feb 42, sub: Tng. AG 353.01.
7. Ibid.
2nd Army Inspection Team
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Inspections were so important and at the same time so difficult -- particularly since in a rapidly expanded army many of the inspecting officers had but little more experience and training than did the officers in the field -- that a great deal of attention was paid to the development of inspection procedure. New systems and methods were suggested, adopted, and tried, only to develop weaknesses which in turn had to be remedied. This led to frequent changes in staff memoranda concerning inspections but the actual work continued in the same fundamental pattern regardless of these administrative changes.

For a time after Pearl Harbor the inspection methods developed in 1941 were continued. The first important change came on 17 April 1942, when the disruption which attended the outbreak of war and the loss of so many of the original units of Second Army had been overcome and new routines had been established. This new procedure called for an inspection of the training and administration of each unit every month. These unit inspections were ordered and made by the staff section involved, but were coordinated through G-3 and G-4 under the direction of the Chief of Staff. The purpose of this coordination was to permit the inspecting officers to visit units at a single station in two groups during each month. Each officer of the group made his own inspection and, upon his return, submitted his individual report.

The monthly inspections became increasingly difficult for the staff sections of Headquarters, Second Army, as the number of units increased through activation and transfer from other commands. After 23 July inspections were made of every unit twice within three months, instead of once each month. Reports on separate units were still made by individual officers, but units that were organically a part of a command group such as corps, or detachment, special troops, were inspected by the whole group, and one consolidated report was submitted.

A new experiment was tried beginning 1 January 1943. Inspecting officers no longer went in groups. Section Chiefs scheduled visits of inspection at such stations and on such dates as they desired, subject to a set of inspection principles in which the guiding factor was the accomplishment of the purpose of the inspection rather than the coordination of visits. Each staff section prepared an inspection guide including pertinent Second Army training publications and other data for the assistance of the inspecting officer.

These uncoordinated inspection visits interfered too much with training and were soon abolished. At the same time Army Ground Forces had taken a strong lead designed to free actual training from interference by the supervisory activities of higher headquarters. After 26 February 1943 officers from Headquarters, Second Army, no longer normally inspected corps units including divisions. The responsibility for inspecting such units rested with corps commanders. Copies of corps inspection reports were forwarded to army headquarters in order that the status of training of these units might be known.

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8. See pp 51-52.
9. Second Army Staff Memo 13, 17 Apr 42, AG 300.6-1.
10. Second Army Staff Memo 19, 23 Jul 42, AG 300.6-1.
11. Second Army Staff Memo 30, 26 Dec 42. Ibid.
12. Second Army Staff Memo 5, 26 Feb 43. Ibid. Second Army ltr to XI Corps, 21 Mar 43, sub: Rpts of Visits of Inspections. AG 333.1-29.

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Three types of inspection were established, team inspections, technical inspections, and special inspections of specific units when so directed by the army commander. The inspection teams inspected all Second Army units not under a corps once every six weeks to two months and inquired into the following matters: housekeeping, administration, motors, and training. Technical inspections were scheduled by section chiefs at such stations and on such dates as they desired, but each unit was inspected at least once each two months "in order to assure that technical training is being satisfactorily conducted."

The extensive check lists which had been developed by the staff sections for the guidance of inspecting officers had caused these officers to pay too much attention to housekeeping and administrative subjects and too little attention to training. An attempt to alleviate this situation was made on 2 July 1943, when G-3 was placed in charge of inspections and authorized to issue instructions for their conduct and to recommend the composition and set the schedule of team inspections. Technical inspections were eliminated and in their place was substituted the following statement: "When a unit is reported as unsatisfactory as a result of team or other inspections, the Chief of Section concerned will initiate action and follow-up inspection of that unit. Chief of section may recommend specific inspection for other cogent reasons."

A more complete revision was made on 31 August which widened the inspection activities of Second Army in a further attempt to emphasize training. Second Army officers once more inspected corps troops every three months and divisions once in each phase of training, and a Second Army officer attended each training test conducted by corps. G-3 was specifically charged with the coordination of all training inspections. "He will prepare schedules for inspections," the memorandum continued, "recommend composition of groups of officers to make inspections, and issue instructions for the conduct of these inspections. For groups or teams of officers from the various staff sections making training inspections a G-3 officer will normally be placed in charge of each group or team, regardless of seniority."

The inspection system remained stabilized after this change. Training was the prime function of Second Army and the effectiveness of training was the object of Second Army inspections. In addition to inspections of Second Army troops by Army and Corps Headquarters, Army Ground Forces officers also made inspections. The results of their findings were written up in reports to Second Army with directions for rectifying the conditions found wrong. Army Ground Forces also authorized the Antiaircraft Command, the Armored Command, and the Tank Destroyer Center to inspect the state of training and equipment of units of their respective commands which were assigned or attached to other elements of Army Ground Forces. Second Army notifying units concerned said: "It is contemplated that these inspection visits will not interfere with training in progress. Direct contacts and correspondence concerning arrangements for inspections are authorized. The conduct of inspections indicated herein does not relieve Corps Commanders of any command responsibility toward units concerned."

13. Second Army Staff Memo 5, 26 Feb 43. AG 300-6-1.
14. Second Army Staff Memo 22, 2 Jul 43. Ibid.
15. Second Army Staff Memo 25, 31 Aug 43. Ibid.
16. For AGF inspection rpts see AG 331-29.
17. AGF ltr 333.1/1504 (22 Aug 43) GNGCT, 22 Aug 43, sub: Tng Inspections, AA, Armd, and TD Units. AG 333.1-29.
The War Department, in order to provide The Chief of Staff "with up to date information concerning technical training of personnel and suitability of weapons and equipment" authorized chiefs of the technical service of Army Service Forces to send representatives to visit troops and installations of Army Ground Forces. Visits were to be confined to technical matters and not to interfere with training. Army Ground Forces here said, "The above authorization by the War Department does not permit the Chiefs of Services or their representative to give instructions to elements of the ground forces either orally at the time of their visit, or later in writing."18

MOTOR VEHICLE AND ORDNANCE INSPECTIONS

Motor vehicle and ordnance inspections were among the most significant activities of Second Army. They began during the 1941 maneuvers when serious deficiencies in the maintenance and operation of vehicles were revealed. General Lear had orally suggested that each organization should conduct a "motor stables" or check and service of each vehicle under the supervision of a commissioned officer at the completion of each march or day's operation. Satisfactory results had not been obtained from this method, and inspections also revealed that inaccurate and incomplete records were being kept upon the motor vehicles. A regular system of inspections was established which required that frequent inspections of vehicles and records be made:

1. In Divisions by the Inspector General assisted for the purpose by one or more qualified officers of the Quartermaster Regiment or Battalion, preferably graduates of the Quartermaster Motor Transport School. Written reports to be made to the Division Commander for such action as he deems suitable.

2. In separate Brigades and other separate units not part of or attached to a Division, the Commander will himself, or through detail of an acting inspector assisted by a qualified Quartermaster inspector when available, make these inspections.19

Deficiencies in maintenance and operation of vehicles persisted. A Second Army automotive inspection team was organized at Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Ind., early in January 1942 with Col. Ralph B. Howe, Army Quartermaster, in charge of technical work and Lt. Col. Edward J. Dwan, of the Inspector General's section, in command. This team consisted of five officers and twenty-three enlisted men and its operations were based upon the experience of a similar War Department team which had inspected motor vehicles of Second Army units in November 1941.20

Second Army units at Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Ft. Knox, Camp Forrest, Memphis, Camp Robinson, Ft. Leonard Wood, and Ft. Meade, S. Dak., were inspected in the period from 10 January to 12 February 1942. When the inspecting team arrived at a post it was divided into groups of six who inspected different units simultaneously. Each group was furnished the serial numbers of the unit's vehicles the night before the test and selected the specific vehicles to be inspected at random to prevent "cramming" and

18. AGF ltr 333/96 (22 Sep 43) GNAGS, 25 Sep 43, sub: Tech Inspections of Trs and Installations by Representatives of Chiefs of Tech Servs of the ASF. AG 333.1-29


last-minute preparation. As vehicles were brought down the line for inspection one man checked the cab and another the body, the chassis, the brakes, the doors, and so on. The plan was to test about 30 percent of the vehicles, but no set number was established. Each vehicle was graded poor, fair, good, or excellent. After the inspection was completed the results were consolidated, a list of specific defects was drawn up, and the commanding officer of the unit was informed of the situation. A complete report was then sent to Headquarters, Second Army.21

Colonel Howe checked on the work of the inspecting group at Camp Forrest and in his report he said:

This group is rendering a very important service to Second Army in throwing the spotlight on the lack of supervision of preventative maintenance by unit commanders. It is serving to bring these deficiencies to the attention of officers immediately responsible for the care of motor equipment, as well as commanders of larger units. The findings of this group also clearly indicate the existence of a serious situation which will require constant effort and diligence to correct.... It is also felt that since the benefits of the activities of the Second Army Inspection Group are so obvious that these benefits should be perpetuated by continuation of such tests.22

The inspections revealed serious deficiencies in all phases of motor maintenance and operation and confirmed the value of such teams, but the Army Quartermaster's recommendation that they be made permanent and continuous was not followed at the time. The inspections ordered by Training Directive No. 34 were continued and, on 14 May 1942, units were directed to hold a "Motor Stables" formation immediately before and after all operations. Motor Stables was defined "as a military formation to be held either in motor parks or in bivouacs, during which personnel will inspect, service, and maintain automotive equipment, accessories, and armament."23

On 25 July 1942, however, Colonel Dwan was directed to take charge of an inspection team at Camp Forrest, Tenn., to inspect vehicles at Camp Forrest, Ft. McAllan, Ft. Benning, Camp Rucker, Camp Blanding, and Camp Gordon in the period between 4 and 27 August.24 Automotive maintenance, meanwhile, had been transferred from Quartermaster Corps to Ordnance, and the Ordnance Officer, Second Army, organized this second group and had charge of its technical work.

He was so impressed with its accomplishment that on 16 October 1942 he recommended that a similar group be organized to ascertain the status of ordnance preventative maintenance in Second Army. This was agreed to, and an ordnance inspection team checked the status of weapons in Second Army units at Ft. Leonard Wood, Camp Chaffee, Camp Robinson, Ft. McAllan, and Camp Gordon from 3 to 26 November 1942.25


22. Second Army QM memo for CofS, 26 Jan 42. 333.1-2.

23. Second Army Cir 14, 14 May 42. AG 300.5-1.


25. Second Army Informal Check Slip, 16 Oct 42. Ibid.
These two team inspections were combined on 16 December 1942 when the ordnance officer was directed to organize inspection teams for the technical inspection of ordnance equipment and the spot check of automotive and other material. Each team was to consist of a vehicle inspection group, consisting of 5 ordnance officers, one Inspector General Department officer, and forty-one enlisted men, and three weapons inspection groups, consisting of two weapons inspectors and one recorder each. The inspection was made of Second Army units once every three months, and when time was available a limited number of vehicles and arms in division and corps units at posts visited were inspected regardless of whether or not these units had been inspected by corps.

These inspections continued throughout 1943 and 1944 and resulted in a greatly improved state of automotive and Ordnance preventive maintenance in Second Army. On 24 November 1942 Army Ground Forces wrote:

The Disability Report submitted as of October 16, 1942 by the units of the Second Army indicate that 2.5% of the vehicles assigned were deadlined for three days or over, of which 67% was attributed to lack of parts: 0.02% were deadlined for 30 days of which 64% was attributed to a lack of parts. These figures are considerably below the average in the Army Ground Forces. They indicate the standard of preventive maintenance within the Second Army is higher than average, and that command impetus on motor maintenance is excellent.

The Second Army is commended on its automotive disability record as of October 16, 1942.

Favorable reports also came from units in the field. On 14 August 1943, Maj. Gen. W. M. Robertson, Commanding General of the 2d Infantry Division, wrote:

Your Second Army Ordnance Team under Major L. S. Devore had just completed a 100% inspection of the motors and ordnance of the 2nd Infantry Division. I must confess that when this team first started its inspection I felt that they were unnecessarily exacting, were in fact, expecting a standard beyond the ability of a combat unit to attain. I watched their work closely and subsequently revised my initial opinion. Their method of procedure and spirit of cooperation, enabled me to utilize them for the education of my officers and men in methods and standards of inspection. I had been stressing both motor and ordnance maintenance for some time prior to this inspection and although my command supervision was effective, in so far as attendance was concerned, it was defective in the knowledge of how to obtain maximum efficiency therefrom. By taking full advantage of the opportunities afforded by your team I am confident that we have immeasurably improved our standard of maintenance by better methods of procedure...

An even more impressive commendation came from a junior officer in England who wrote back to a detachment commander and said: "We see now exactly why Second Army is so particular about motor maintenance. A great many vehicles are deadlined here due entirely to lack of or improper preventive maintenance."

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26. Second Army Staff Memo 20, 16 Dec 42, sub: Reorgn of G-4 Automotive Sec and Ord Maint Inspections, Ibid.
29. Ibid.
These inspections were very successful at home stations of Second Army units and progressive improvement resulted in first and second echelon maintenance. There were two of these traveling ordnance inspection teams, and they inspected 33 1/3 percent of all divisional and corps vehicles and weapons, and 50 percent of Army material at least once in three months. Where unsatisfactory conditions were found, a follow-up inspection was made by officers from Headquarters, Second Army, to insure that necessary corrective measures had been taken. Units on maneuvers, however, seemed to lose consciousness of the importance of continued preventive maintenance when confronted by the hard conditions of field operations.

A special inspection in the Tennessee maneuver area by an officer of the Inspector General Office, War Department, revealed serious shortcomings in all echelons of maintenance and the storage and supply of spare parts. Second Army immediately organized thirty small inspection teams to make weekly visits to all units on maneuvers. When unsatisfactory conditions were disclosed there was a follow-up inspection by an officer with a view to initiating disciplinary action if corrective actions had not been taken.

Alert inspections of units which had completed their training and were ready for shipment overseas were among the most important special inspections conducted by Second Army staff officers. These inspections were first directed on 26 December 1942 and were held within two weeks of the first notice of alert, corps for corps units, and army headquarters for all others. Alert inspections were thorough and complete, covering every phase of administration, supply, and training, because during the alert period all shortages in personnel and equipment and all deficiencies in training had to be eliminated. These inspections, and those conducted by the War Department Inspector General just prior to shipment, were the final test of Second Army training before its units joined the forces in active combat.

30. WD Off IG Memo IG 331.1—Second Army Maneuvers (M) for CG AGF, 12 Aug 43, sub: Sp Maint Inspection of the Automotive and Armament Activities, Second Army Maneuvers. Suggested Second Army 2nd ind, 16 Sep 43 (not sent). AG 331.1-4 (FE 43).

31. Second Army Staff Memo No 30, 26 Dec 42; No 10, 15 Apr 43; No 25, 31 Aug 43. AG 300.6-1.
Chapter XVI
PREPARATION FOR OVERSEAS MOVEMENT

The purpose of all training was combat, and, in this war, combat overseas. Second Army, as a training army, completed its work when its units were shipped overseas. Consequently, the final stage of Second Army's task was Preparation for Overseas Movement, or "POM."

Immediately after the declaration of war there was too little time for any particular preparation. In a typical instance, the Adjutant General notified Second Army on 25 December 1941 that the 147th General Hospital should be prepared for prompt movement to a port of embarkation to be announced later, for tropical foreign service. On the same day the Second Army, by radio, instructed the 6th Infantry Division to direct the 147th General Hospital to order all officers and enlisted men to return from leave before 5 January 1942 and to bring the unit to full enlisted strength. On 29 December 1941 the Adjutant General wrote: "Detail written instructions issued this date provide transfer of 147 General Hospital at approximately full T/O strength and that units furnishing fillers will not be reduced below 25% of T/O strength...Separate action is being taken to procure officers and nurses, who will be shipped direct to Port of Embarkation."

This hurried procedure was unsatisfactory, though necessary to meet the emergency confronting the army. On 13 February 1942, Second Army published a digest of the general instructions and provisions which had recurred in War Department letters directing movements of troops to be transferred to foreign service.

Movement-orders had been issued as designated in War Department letters by corps area in which station (most usual); defense command; Air Force combat command; port of embarkation; or The Adjutant General. Required strength was T/O including basics (most usual); T/O less basics (1 case); or strength as specified (principally for special detachments). The time of arrival at the port was specified by port of embarkation unless otherwise directed, and units were dispatched by the corps area commander. The final destination was to be given to all concerned only "immediately after information that a troop movement to a foreign station" had been completed. No identifying markings were permitted on clothing, equipment, boxes, packages, or railroad cars, and great care was to be exercised that no member of the unit gave out any information.

Men not qualified physically for extended foreign service, awaiting trial by general court martial, or whose release from active duty was pending, were not to be sent. All were to have a physical examination and complete the prescribed immunization before departure from home station. Procuring replacements and filling units to prescribed strength had been made in different cases the responsibility of a field army, a defense command, a theater of operations, an Air Force combat command, or The Adjutant General. The War Department also occasionally allotted filler replacements from other sources, thereby reducing requirements on those listed above. Such replacements usually met the unit at the Port of Embarkation. Detailed instructions that had been given regarding clothing and equipment and the methods of filling shortages of controlled or non-controlled items were restated.

1. Telg (C) TAG to Second Army, 25 Dec 41. Rad (C) Second Army to 6th Inf Div, 25 Dec 41. Rad (C) Second Army to TAG, 27 Dec 41. Telg (C) TAG to Second Army, 29 Dec 41. AG 370.5-174(C).

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.
Second Army recommended to Army Ground Forces, when one or more units were ordered overseas and two or more units of the same type were under the control of the Army Commander, that Second Army be allowed to recommend the particular unit to go overseas. This procedure would "permit the Army Commander to select the unit best trained and equipped for operations in the field" and so contribute to the success of the force it was destined to join. Army Ground Forces concurred in principle with this recommendation and followed it whenever practicable. But this was seldom. On 29 November 1942 General Lear again wrote "urgently" recommending adherence to the policy. Two quartermaster, one ordnance, and one signal unit had been recently designated for overseas service though other units of the same type in Second Army were better prepared by length of service and training. "It was necessary to change the officer personnel in all of the units requested by one hundred per cent," General Lear concluded.

Army Ground Forces too frequently did not have sufficient time for this procedure. The requirements of the combat theaters and urgent demands for the quick procurement of units did not permit its adoption as regular practice. Some improvement was noticed when Army Ground Forces directed the establishment of a reserve pool of units to be brought up to 100 percent in equipment and personnel and held available for call. But even this pool could not be maintained because of critical shortages in equipment and personnel.

Meanwhile Army Ground Forces had been trying to establish a system for the alerting of units. On 9 April 1942 Army Ground Forces sent Second Army a list of units indicating "the approximate order of priority under which it is estimated by this headquarters that units under your control will be assigned to task forces." And on 8 June Second Army was directed to have the 30th Infantry Division organize a combat team "with suitable personnel and equipment earmarked for emergency duty, to be ready on call at any time after July 15." These were not definite alerts but advance information so that the field force commanders could avoid hurried transfers of personnel and equipment.

A definite system was first established by Army Ground Forces on 10 July 1942. Troop movements normally were in two echelons because of the shortage of shipping facilities. Warning orders were received six weeks in advance of the sailing date of the second echelon, at which time the first echelon moved directly to the port of embarkation on call from the port commander. The second echelon either moved to a staging area or remained at the home station subject to call. During this period the unit was finally processed for overseas shipment and devoted the remaining time to intensive training of individuals and small units.
This establishment of a definite period between warning orders and movement enabled Second Army to issue specific directions for the training of alerted units and to insure that all prescribed training -- such as rail movements and firing -- was completed. On 29 September 1942 Second Army published a letter bringing all instructions for alerted units together. The purpose of the letter was "to furnish the unit addressed with instructions and information applicable to an alerted unit, and to permit it to initiate at once such study and plans as are applicable." Units were thus prepared to take all necessary action when alerted and in a position to make definite reports to Second Army as to existing shortages of personnel and equipment. Preparation for overseas movement was a responsibility of the unit commander, but Second Army held corps and detachment, special troops, commanders responsible for supervision and direction. A unit commander would do the job only once, while corps and detachment headquarters through supervising many units developed standing operating procedures (SOP's) which made the alert and intensive training period easier and more effective.

Gradually during the fall of 1942 the time allotted to units for intensive training and preparation for overseas movement was increased. Army Ground Forces alert letters began to include most of the administrative matters contained in the Second Army letter which had been published as a temporary guide for alerted units. Consequently that letter was rescinded, and units were guided in their alert preparations and intensive training by the general publications.

The War Department on 1 February 1943, on the basis of a year's experience in the movement of troops overseas, published a bulletin, "Preparation for Overseas Movement (Short title POM)" for the guidance of all units. Army Ground Forces issued a letter of instructions for the use of this document which began with the statement, "The mission of the Army Ground Forces is to provide ground forces units properly organized, trained and equipped for combat and service operations as directed by the War Department." All ground force units were to become familiar with POM and would follow the procedure outlined in it upon receipt of alert instructions, and warning or movement orders.

Second Army immediately began to complete its system for the handling of alerted units. Attention was directed to the War Department POM and to the Army Ground Forces letter. Units were given specific instructions concerning reports, requisitions, and

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9. Second Army Tng Memo 21 (C), 7 Aug 42, sub: Tng in Rail Mvmts. AG 373.5-203(C).
   Second Army ltr to III Army Corps, 5 Sep 42, sub: Marksmanship Tng, Alerted and Semi-Alerted Units. AG 471-1.

10. Second Army ltr (C), 29 Sep 42, sub: Alerted Units. AG 370.5-203(C). The basic instructions were set out in thirteen inclosed letters concerned with the following subjects: Supply and Movement of Units Ordered Overseas; Rail Movements; Transfer of Certain Enlisted Men from Organizations Scheduled for Departure from the Continental Limits of the United States; Ammunition for Familiarization Firing by Troop Organizations Awaiting Shipment Overseas; Military Personnel Suspected of Disloyalty or Subversive Activity; Motor Transport Equipment; Safeguarding Military Information; and Instructions Applicable to Units Ordered Overseas.

11. Second Army ltr (C) to III Corps, 20 Nov 42, sub: Intensive Tng of 256th QM Sv Bn for Overseas Serv. Second Army ltr (C) to 4th Det Sp Trs, 17 Nov 42, sub: Intensive Tng of 3462d Med Main Lc (Q). AG 353-154(C).

12. WD Document AG 370.5/1-6-43) CB-3-E-GN-AP-SPOPT, 1 Feb 43. AG 353-154.

13. AGF ltr (R) 370.5/171(2-19-43)-GNCT, 19 Feb 43, sub: POM. Ibid.
the handling of personnel and equipment problems. The Army Inspector General was directed to inspect each alerted unit prior to the final inspection by the War Department Inspector General so that defects in training and administrative matters could be remedied prior to rather than after the final War Department inspection.14

Ratings of unit training were compiled from the records of the regularly scheduled tests. Maneuver ratings, at first, were compiled only after a unit was alerted, from the records at maneuver director headquarters. This did not prove satisfactory, and on 27 October 1943 each special staff section was directed to rate each unit pertaining to its arm or branch, divisional as well as nondivisional, and submit report of rating to G-3, maneuver director headquarters, within one week of the termination of the unit's participation in maneuver.15

The working of this alert training system is illustrated best by the experience of the 11th Detachment Special Troops, Second Army, at Camp Forrest, Tenn. Nondivisional units of the Second Army participating in the Tennessee maneuvers, upon being alerted, were moved by Maneuver Director Headquarters, Second Army, to Camp Forrest and attached to the 11th Detachment. The Commanding Officer of this detachment was directed to assume "full responsibility for the preparation of the units for overseas service as provided for in POM, and Second Army Circular Number 15."16

Three such units were sent to the 11th Detachment during April 1943. Colonel Becker, the Commanding Officer, assigned one officer to this work and exercised general supervision himself. But soon the work became too heavy as additional units were alerted, pulled off maneuvers, and sent to Camp Forrest. Second Army, in its original letter had said: "It is impossible to predict the number of alerted units that might be processed by your command. If circumstances warrant, you may request additional assistance from this headquarters." Consequently, on 11 June 1943 two additional officers were attached and a special POM section was organized in the 11th Detachment consisting of a captain, a first lieutenant, and a second lieutenant.17

An additional lieutenant colonel was brought in around 1 August and took charge of this section. But on 1 September eleven alerted units were sent to the 11th Detachment at approximately the same time. Additional officers had to be attached to handle this increase, and finally on 5 October 1943 the 11th Detachment was reorganized as a type B detachment.18 The POM section was discontinued and the whole detachment headquarters took over this work as its principal activity. The T/O of a type B detachment provided


15. Maneuver Dir Hq Staff Memo 41, 27 Oct 43. AG 353-01-1(FE 43).

16. Second Army ltr to 11th Det Sp Trs, 5 Apr 43, sub: Preparation of Alerted Units in the Tenn Maneuver Area. AG 353-154(FE 43). Second Army Staff Memo, 10 Apr 43. Hist Off files. The original instructions called for all nondivisional alerted units to be sent to Cp Forrest but through the summer and fall of 1943 so many nondivisional units were alerted that the facilities of other Second Army stations had to be used.

17. 11th Det ltr to Second Army, 11 Jun 43, sub: POM Sec for Alerted Units. AG 370.5-203.

18. 11th Det ltr to Second Army, 5 Oct 43, sub: Reorgn of Hq and Hq Det Sp Trs. AG 322,17-11.

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for 8 officers and 32 enlisted men, but this was insufficient. Consequently Second
Army placed additional officers on DS at the 11th Detachment to bring its actual
strength on 10 November to 26 officers and 27 enlisted men.19

In the beginning the 11th Detachment usually had about 18 days for the processing
and preparation of these units, but the time available was increased so that during the
erlier months of 1943 the average time for a unit was 36 days. A tentative forty-day
schedule was established. The unit settled in camp during the first two days; the
third to sixth inclusive day was devoted to physical examinations, inoculations, dental
survey, fitting with glasses, etc; the seventh to ninth day inclusive, to preliminary
marksmanship or range firing; the tenth to thirteenth day to range practice and record
firing; the fourteenth day to the infiltration course; and the fifteenth and sixteenth
days were left as slack time. The first prescribed furloughs began on the seventeenth
day and ended on the twenty-seventh; the twenty-eighth day was for furlough and unit
adjustment; the second group of furloughs began on the twenty-ninth day and ended on
the thirty-ninth day; and the fortieth day was to be used for a final showdown inspec-
tion and departure.20

Standard operating procedures were developed in each of the staff sections of de-
tachment headquarters. S-1, on the third day, sent a noncommissioned officer team to
the unit for the purpose of spot checking administrative records. Errors were pointed
out and the unit was given about ten days in which to correct these, after which the
same noncommissioned officer team made a complete administrative checkup. About the
third day a complete alphabetical roster of officers and enlisted men was drawn up.
Those declared excess were designated by name. The individuals designated as excess
had to be a cross section of the unit, and, by local ground rule, no man with a record
of AWOL or court martial, nor any low-standing AGCT, was permitted to be included in
this list. The excess was usually carried with the unit almost up to the time of de-
parture to take care of contingencies. Where there were shortages an indication was
made on the original roster. The 11th Detachment was authorized by Second Army to fill
shortages by adjustments within units under its control, but where they could not be
filled from this source Second Army was called on.21

S-3 made a check on training as soon as the unit arrived at Camp Forrest. Provision
was made for all men to fire the necessary weapons and run the infiltration course; and,
where necessary, units were given tests not already completed. The 11th Detachment con-
ducted the air-ground tests for most units, and occasionally Second Army instructed the
detachment to give the MTP and platoon firing tests. Each unit had particular problems
of training to be met and weaknesses to be remedied. Basic instruction was sometimes
given by officers of the 11th Detachment in addition to their other work.22

S-4, upon receipt of notification that a new unit would arrive, prepared for its
reception in tent area or in barracks. After the unit arrived conferences were held
with the unit supply officer to show him how to make out an inventory showdown of all
organization property. S-4 then checked the prompt completion of this report and sub-
mitted it to the director of supply, Camp Forrest. The unit officer was then directed
to submit to Second Army a letter requesting disposal of excess property, and S-4
checked the disposal of this property when authority was given by Second Army. S-4
checked the unit by WDAGO forms 32 and 33 for correct sizes of clothing and completeness

20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
of equipment and showed all officers of the unit how to hold a showdown inspection of T/E 21 clothing and equipment when the unit received movement orders. S-4 also checked the completion of shortage lists of T/E 21 clothing and checked the filling of these lists by the director of supply, and, finally, S-4 directed and supervised a final showdown inspection for each unit.23

S-4 had many other duties in connection with these alerted units. This section had to check the marking of all barracks bags, duffle bags, and individual clothing and equipment; the crating of all articles to be taken by the unit; requisitions for identification tags; ordnance and gas mask inspections; the disposal of all general service vehicles; and the disposal of unit records to be deposited with post commander. When the unit departed from the station, S-4 arranged for and inspected baggage, kitchen cars, and coaches or Pullmans for personnel; checked unit travel rations; and arranged with post medical officer and post engineer for final inspection and clearance for the unit of all barracks and areas occupied. The section also checked the unit's last meal, and supplied motor transportation for personnel to the railhead. After the unit was gone S-4 completed the S-4 records of the unit for the secret file and prepared the S-4 section of the administration letter.24

Camp Forrest was selected as the place for this processing of nondivisional units alerted while on maneuvers, because of its nearness to the maneuver area and because of its good transportation facilities. But the situation was far from ideal for POM processing. Most of the units had to be housed in tents. They had just come off maneuvers and many of them had been away from their home stations and barracks for considerable periods of time. This increased the difficulty of inspection and checking. In the early months especially, individual and unit equipment was often inspected on the ground at night by candlelight. Training facilities at Camp Forrest were in some respects inadequate. The artillery and .50 caliber range was seventy miles from the post. Rifle ranges in some instances were fifteen miles from the unit's encampment. Since no service troops or vehicles were provided the detachment, organic personnel and vehicles had to be used for administrative work and the packing of equipment, while at the same time the necessary training had to be carried on and the furloughs granted, as required by the War Department order. There was no reserve of qualified personnel maintained at Forrest, so that it was necessary to procure replacements from other posts under Second Army. These replacements occasionally came in late and were not POM qualified, though instructions said that they should be.25

Nevertheless the work was done. Some representatives from the Second Army inspector general section was at the 11th Detachment most of the time, checking and rechecking the units, so that when the final War Department inspection was made the units were ready and prepared. Serious inadequacies in these Second Army units were rare, and no unit was turned back.

When commanders and officers of a unit were found to be weak or inadequate, they were reclassified or removed from the unit, corrective training was prescribed, and

23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
frequently additional time was requested for the remedying of defects. For example, the Second Army report of a telephone conversation from Colonel Becker stated:

In the opinion of Colonel Becker, subject unit is not qualified for overseas service, due to the following reasons:
1. Either the Bn CO is not qualified to command the battalion or the battalion is not ready for overseas service.
2. Sanitary conditions throughout the battalion are unsatisfactory.
3. Command responsibilities down to including NCO’s are unsatisfactory.
4. Administration including housekeeping within the battalion is unsatisfactory.
5. The Battalion Surgeon is not considered qualified for his present assignment.
A delay of approximately 30 days is recommended.

The same system, though not generally so elaborate, was used throughout Second Army. It was modified in detail as POM was revised by the War Department and instructions were changed by Army Ground Forces, but essentially and basically it remained the same. Though preparation for Overseas Movement remained primarily the responsibility of the unit commander, Second Army had supervised and controlled the training of the unit and was responsible for its condition. This fact was not forgotten, nor were the corps and detachment commanders under Second Army permitted to forget their responsibilities. Close cooperation between these two commanders in the processing of nondivisional corps units was directed. The corps commander was notified by a "alert instructions" letter whenever a unit under his command was placed on alert. This letter prescribed certain action relative to training, personnel, and equipment and a date by which this action was to be completed. Except in the case of divisions the latter was also sent to the detachment commander at the unit's home station, but the corps commander retained "all responsibility for furnishing the unit qualified to perform its primary mission on the date specified." 27

Each unit was inspected by corps within one week after receipt of alert instructions, and such follow-up inspections were made as were necessary to insure that the unit would satisfactorily complete all required action by the alert instructions date. Headquarters, Second Army, was notified when each of these inspections was made and was told either that the unit would be ready to fulfill its specified mission on the date set or an appropriate recommendation was made for extension of time "with a definite, cogent reason for such recommendation." 28

The detachment commander at the unit's home station acted for the corps commander in all matters affecting personnel, administration, and supply in accordance with instructions issued directly by Second Army and without further notification to corps. The detachment commander sent all necessary reports about these matters to Second Army with information copies to corps, but the latter was responsible for the submission of a completed status report on each alerted unit to Second Army twenty days prior to the alert instruction date. These status reports were in some detail because they were the basis upon which the decision was made by the Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army, as to the availability of the unit for overseas duty. 29

26. Record of telephone conversation (C) between Col Becker and Lt Col Siegert, G-3 Sec Second Army, 24 Jun 43, sub: 409th MP Bn. AG 353-156(C).
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
Corps again inspected the unit immediately after report of "alert for movement" or "movement orders," whichever was earlier, to confirm the ability of the unit to perform its primary mission and for the correction of any deficiencies. Follow-up inspections were again made when necessary to insure that all POM requirements were fully met at the time the unit departed. Movement orders, however, were issued by the detachment commander as directed by Second Army when the call from the port was received.30

Late in 1943 and early in 1944 several Second Army units went to the port of embarkation without physically qualified personnel, requiring dental treatment, or with identification tags missing or incomplete. Other men had been found without complete immunization.31 On 25 January 1944 all corps and detachment commanders were directed to take positive action to insure that all Second Army units arrived at ports of embarkation "properly organized, trained and equipped for combat and overseas operations as directed by the War Department." If proper medical personnel and facilities were not available for the proper examination and treatment of the personnel of alerted units, Second Army was to be immediately notified. After the completion of the War Department Inspector General's inspection of an alerted unit the responsible commander was to secure a verbal or written list of the deficiencies noted. These deficiencies were to be remedied without delay and a report submitted to Second Army within five days of the completion of the inspection indicating the deficiencies noted and the corrective action being taken.32

PREPARATION OF HEADQUARTERS, SECOND ARMY

Headquarters, Second Army, supervised the preparation of many units for overseas movement, but it remained in Memphis, Tenn., for month after month as units it had trained engaged in combat with the enemy in all theaters. The army's cherished motto -- "Fit to Fight" -- seemed not to apply to the headquarters. But early in September 1943 the War Department list of priorities for controlled items of equipment showed a significant rise for Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Second Army. As this rise in priority continued through October, November, and December the Headquarters intensified its training in the hope that it was destined for overseas duty.

At the beginning of September each of the staff section prepared plans for moving into the field. Boxes were prepared and numbered for all equipment and records except the permanent files of the Adjutant General. The Headquarters Commandant worked out a schedule for the movement of each section, and practice moves were made to tents set up in the fair ground adjacent to the headquarters buildings. The actual movement to a field location was not made because of transport shortages, but the headquarters was ready.33

The training program for enlisted and commissioned personnel was intensified. Physical training, consisting of practice marches twice a week and calisthenics three times a week, was inaugurated. All officers and enlisted men were required to fire the qualification course with the pistol, the familiarization course with the carbine, and go through the infiltration course.34 The physical fitness test was taken by 15 percent.

30. Ibid.
31. AG 333 (Read Ins (44) (S).
32. Second Army ltr, 25 Jan 44, sub: POM. AG 370.5 (POM).
33. Second Army Unnumbered Memo, 2 Sep 43. Hist Off files.
34. Daily Bulls 247, 266, 275, 280, 283, 294, 298, 299, 305; Staff Memo 34, 24 Nov 43.
   Ibid.
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of the officers and enlisted men, chosen by lot, on 23 December. This test was passed with the unusually high score of 93.14 percent, which drew the commendation of the Army Commander.35

Soon after the physical fitness test, word came from higher headquarters that Headquarters, Second Army, was not to move. The priority for equipment was reduced and the intensified training program abandoned. Officers once more had physical exercise only twice a week, while enlisted personnel and company officers drilled and took physical exercises five mornings a week plus a two-hour march on Wednesday afternoons. The drill was accompanied by continued instruction in subjects such as first aid, use of basic weapons, map reading, and the like.36

The headquarters continued under this program for about three months. Officers and enlisted men carried out their daily routine duties. Units were activated, trained, prepared for overseas movement and shipped out, but the headquarters remained. On 17 April 1944 a memorandum was issued requiring all officers who had not previously had a service school course in map reading to attend a course given by the Engineer Section.37 When the map reading course was concluded, G-2 conducted a course on censorship and the security of military information for all personnel, and this was followed by nine hours of instruction in basic medical subjects.38

The Memphis newspapers had carried stories to the effect that Headquarters, Second Army, was to move to another station in the continental United States. The cadre for a new army headquarters, which had been training with Second Army since 1942, was sent to Ft. Sam Houston, Tex. Consequently the new intensification of the training program was not taken to mean that overseas duty was in prospect. But during the last week of May many new officers began to report for duty with an augmentation group, Second Army. Early in June an undated and unnumbered memorandum was sent to each officer with the significant title, "POM Qualification of this Headquarters." Section chiefs cautioned all personnel to say nothing and to know nothing, and the whole headquarters suddenly realized that it was on an "alert status."

POM qualification became the primary duty of each officer and enlisted man. Physical examinations, immunization shots, and the completion of all required training were given priority over routine work. Leaves and furloughs were granted to all personnel who had not previously had them. At the same time officers and enlisted men to fill the augmentation group for each section reported. In some sections it was almost impossible to get chairs and desks for all those on duty. Enlisted men were sleeping in the garage and in the old cattle exhibition building on the fair grounds. The regular routine continued, but with an air of suppressed excitement and anticipation.

On 10 June 1944 Headquarters, Headquarters Company and Special Troops, Eighth Army, was activated at Memphis, Tenn.39 Two days later the POM-qualified personnel of the Headquarters, Second Army, were transferred to Headquarters, Eighth Army; and the newly arrived personnel, assigned to the augmentation group, were transferred to Headquarters, Second Army.40 The old personnel of Headquarters, Second Army, were moving

35. Daily Bull 308, 28 Dec 43. Ibid.
36. Staff Memo 2, 11 Jan 44. Ibid.
37. Unnumbered Memo, 17 Apr 44. Ibid.
38. AG 353 (Hq 2d Army).
39. Second Army GO 9, 7 Jun 44, sub: Activation of Elements of Eighth Army, Eighth Army GO 1, 10 Jun 44. Hist Off files.
40. Second Army 90 150, 12 Jun 44. Ibid.

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to a combat theater overseas but with a different designation and a new commanding general. Headquarters, Second Army, remained in Memphis, but with new commissioned and enlisted personnel.

Only four of the members of the original Headquarters, Second Army, when it separated from Sixth Corps Area in October 1940 were still assigned in June 1944. Two of these went with the New Eighth Army and two remained with the new Second Army. While many officers and enlisted men had come and gone as individuals, the Headquarters retained a continuity independent of the individuals assigned to it. But the change in June and July 1944 was virtually complete. Only the Commanding General, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, and the Headquarters Commandant remained among the high-ranking officers. One officer and one enlisted man, each with experience in maneuver director headquarters, were retained from the old staff in each section, and some officers and enlisted men who could not be qualified under POM also remained with the new headquarters.

In many ways the departure of Headquarters, Eighth Army, completed the mission of Second Army. One part of the mission originally assigned to General Lear in October 1940 had been to prepare troops for combat. For almost four years training had been the primary mission of Second Army, and the record of the troops it had prepared for combat was sufficient testimony to its accomplishment. But Second Army was also a field army, and the other part of its mission was to prepare the headquarters to direct troops in combat. The decision of higher authority to change the designation did not alter the fact that Headquarters, Second Army, was going to war, and the proud leadership and training of General Lear and General Fredendall would receive its final test on the field of battle.
Chapter XVII

TRAINING UNDER THE NEW STAFF

The new staff of Headquarters, Second Army, formally took over on 12 June 1944 but both staffs continued to occupy the same space in the headquarters. Duties were gradually shifted as the new officers and enlisted men learned from those who had been transferred to Headquarters, Eighth Army, but the shift was not completed until the Eighth Army departed on 6 August.1

The mission of the new headquarters staff was identical with that of the old, the supervision of training of combat and service troops for employment in all theaters of operations. The Second Army in June 1944 was the largest of the two training armies in the United States. The 728 tactical units under its command had a total strength of 24,133 officers and 401,018 enlisted men. These units were assigned or attached to three corps and seventeen headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops, Second Army. Nineteen of the units were divisions, of which three were in the second period of training, one in the third period, and the remainder in the fourth and final period. Sixty-three of the units were under alert instructions and 146 had been alerted for movement.2

Comparatively few new units were activated. The principal task of Headquarters, Second Army, after June 1944 was the completion of the training of units already active. On 14 July Army Ground Forces promulgated an accelerated schedule for all nondivisional combat and service troops to meet increased requirements of European and Pacific theaters.3

The strain on available military resources had shown itself earlier when, between 30 March and 20 June 1944, 42,064 trained combat replacements, principally infantrymen, were taken from eleven of the divisions and a few of the smaller units of Second Army. Losses varied from 1,425 in the 65th Infantry Division to 5,588 in the 76th Infantry Division. These replacements were sent individually and in small groups as casualties to the replacement depots at Ft. Meade, Md., and Ft. Ord, Calif. At the same time the divisions lost large numbers of officers to overseas replacement pools.4

Loss of this personnel interrupted the regular training of the divisions and corps prepared a special program to enable each division to train new men to replace its losses. The new fillers came from replacement centers, inactivated ASTP, coast artillery, air corps and tank destroyer units, and some indeed from reception centers. The devious training background of these groups made the divisional task all the more difficult.5

1. Second Army GO 9, 7 Jun 44, sub: Activation of Elements of the Eighth Army.
2. (1) "Personnel Statistical Strength Report as of 31 May 1944, Second Army Units." G-1 files. (2) Second Army ltr AG 322 (SU), 20 Jun 44, sub: Status of Units. (3) Second Army G-3 Records.
3. AGF ltr 353.01/124(14 Jul 44)GNCCT, 14 Jul 44, sub: Accelerated Tng of Nondiv Units. AG 353 (Tng Dir).
4. Second Army G-1 Records.
5. AGF ltr 353.1/114(27 Apr 44)GNCCT, 27 Apr 44, sub: Supplemental Tng Dir for Specially Designated Divs. AG 353 (Tng Dir).

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Further drafts on divisions for combat replacements were avoided by the use of separate regiments to convert men of other branches to infantry. On 16 April 1944 Army Ground Forces had directed the Second and Fourth Armies to transform these regiments into replacement pools. Men sent to these regiments for conversion were given four weeks of individual training to include qualification, transition, and familiarization firing and two weeks of tactical training to include that of the squad and platoon.6

Later the 174th Infantry Regiment was directed to operate a pool for infantrymen required to replace men returned to the United States under the rotational policy. At the same time the 37th Infantry Regiment was sent to Ft. Benning to train personnel from other branches who had volunteered for parachute duty, and the 372d Infantry Regiment was designated as the training unit for Negro volunteers for infantry.7

Gradually the Second Army lost all of these regiments except the 113th, 201st, and 300th. Some were transferred to the Replacement and School Command and others to the Fourth Army in September 1944 when all the stations and units located west of the Mississippi River were transferred to that command. The three regiments assigned to Second Army were all stationed at Ft. Jackson, S. C., and a provisional brigade under the command of Brig. Gen. Neal C. Johnson was organized on 5 January 1945 to supervise their training and discipline. The headquarters of the provisional brigade, formed largely from staff officers of Headquarters, Second Army, functioned for a little over two months. After its disbandment the three regiments were transferred to the Replacement and School Command.8

Meanwhile the divisions continued the training of their new fillers under the special programs. Plans were made for combined training under the direction of the Fourth Army in the Louisiana Maneuver Area but the need for additional strength in Europe intervened. In the place of these large-scale maneuvers each division was directed to hold four weeks of maneuvers under the direction of the division commander at or near its home station, but so urgent was the need for troops in Europe that most divisions had to forego even this limited period of combined training.9

The strength of Second Army rapidly declined in the winter of 1944-1945. The last corps headquarters, the XXIII, was lost on 1 December 1944. The final division, the 20th Armored, departed on 25 January 1945, and by 1 March Second Army had less than 150 units of all kinds. Many of the camps had been closed and thirteen of the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments, Special Troops, Second Army inactivated or transferred. The remaining units were grouped in four detachments at Ft. Benning, Ga., Ft. Jackson, S. C., Ft. Bragg, N. C., and Samp Shelby, Miss.10

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6. AGF ltr 353.01/112(16 Apr 44)GN CCT, 16 Apr 44, sub: Tng Dir for Sep Inf Regts. AG 353 (Inf).
7. AGF ltr (R) 353.01/101 (Inf)(27 Jul 44)GN CCT, sub as in note 6 above, 27 Jul 44. Ibid.
Japanese replacements for the 442d Infantry Combat Team were supplied by the 171st Infantry Battalion (Sep) at Camp Shelby.
8. (1) Second Army ltr to Brig Gen Neal C. Johnson, 5 Jan 45, sub: Ltr of Instructions. AG 210.311. (2) Second Army G-3 Records.
9. (1) Record of telephone conversation (C) between Col Faine, Tng Sec AGF and Col Debney, G-3 Second Army, 2 Sep 44. (2) Record of tal conversation (C) between Col Barnes, G-3, AGF to Col Allen, G-3, Second Army, 13 Sep 44. AG 353 (Div) (C).
10. See appendix.

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Chapter XVIII
REDEPLOYMENT

The shipment of the trained units overseas did not complete the training mission of Second Army. Early in December 1944 the headquarters was notified that it would have a prominent part in the redeployment training units then fighting in the European theater. Plans were announced for the return of these units to the United States for reorganization and retraining before they were sent to the Pacific.¹

Prolongation of hostilities in Europe through the winter of 1944–1945 meant that the planned redeployment had to be delayed. Headquarters, Second Army, had less and less to do as the few remaining units were sent overseas, but it had to be retained so that it would be ready to help administer redeployment.

Many of the headquarters sections conducted schools for enlisted men and officers to train them further in the proper performance of their duties. General training was intensified but still most of the staff officers remained only half employed. Finally on 13 February 1945 Army Ground Forces ordered temporary reduction of the staff to 153 officers by 1 March and to 111 officers by 1 May; the headquarters was to be brought back to authorized strength as soon as the War Department inaugurated the redeployment program.²

Second Army representatives received information outlining the general plan of redeployment during a conference at Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, on 27 March 1945. The program as outlined contemplated that:

1. Units scheduled for use against Japan would be the first to return from Europe.
2. All personnel would receive 30 days at their home on a temporary duty status at government expense for purposes of rest, rehabilitation, and recuperation.
3. All movement of units from ETO and MTO to the port and the movement of individuals of the units from the port to the various reception stations and return to the final assembly station on completion of the period of temporary duty would be conducted through Army Service Forces. But on arrival at the port a small records detachment from each arriving unit would be sent by the port commander to the assembly station of the unit. The entire unit would be assigned Second Army effective on arrival of this records detachment at the Second Army assembly station.
4. Upon reassembly units would prepare for further overseas service in accordance with a training program prescribed by Army Ground Forces.

Second Army immediately initiated a survey of housing, firing ranges, training aids, and other facilities, and in cooperation with the Service Commands concerned began a program of building and repair designed to insure the availability of every facility necessary to expedite the training of redeployed units. Existing ranges and housing were repaired and construction begun on new facilities required.

The scope of this program may best be illustrated by the fact that at each Second Army station construction was begun on an oriental type village surrounded by a 15-foot wall and supported by Japanese type pill-boxes, a fortified area organized with Japanese

¹. WD ltr (C) AG 35C.5(24 Nov 44)OB-S-E-M, 29 Nov 44, sub: WD Policies and Procedures Governing the Redepl of the Army upon Cessation of Hostilities in Europe.
². AGF ltr (C) 210.31 (13 Feb 45)GMAP-B, 13 Feb 45, sub: Reduction of Off Pers.

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type fortifications, including the well-known cave defenses, emplacements for training
with flame throwers, ranges designed for training in close combat, and numerous football
and baseball fields and other athletic facilities. By V-J Day this construction
program was approximately 90 percent complete.

An eight-weeks training program with the objective of preparing individuals, crews,
teams, staffs, and units specifically for operations against Japan was prescribed by
Army Ground Forces to become effective on "R" Day (the day officially specified for
military redeployment procedures). This training was divided into an individual phase
of two weeks, a unit phase of four weeks, and a combined phase of two weeks. If addi-
tional time was available to a unit, further training was provided in a supplemental
phase consisting, for most units, of four periods of which the first three were of
approximately four weeks duration each; the first period to emphasize squad and platoon
training, the second company training, and the third battalion training. A fourth
period of indefinite length emphasized regimental and division type exercises.

Throughout all of this training, great emphasis was to be placed on leadership,
physical training, Japanese tactics and techniques, and living in the field.

An eight-weeks program prescribed by Army Ground Forces for redeployed infantry,
field artillery, cavalry, armored, tank destroyer, antiaircraft, and coast artillery
units is shown below.

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<th>Subject</th>
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<th>3</th>
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<th>6</th>
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Corps and divisional units scheduled to return to the United States for assignment to Second Army were as follows:

V Corps 30th Inf Div
XVIII Corps 35th Inf Div
4th Inf Div 87th Inf Div
13th Abn Div 97th Inf Div
28th Inf Div 95th Inf Div

Up to V-J Day, a total of two corps and eight of the divisions had arrived in the United States. Both of the corps and three of the divisions, the 4th, 95th, and 97th, had completed reassembly when Japan surrendered. One division, the 97th, had departed from Second Army control for the Pacific Theater. Following is a list of the units, with the station and effective date of assignment to Second Army, which completed reassembly prior to V-J Day.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>DEPARTED</th>
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<td>2 Sep 45</td>
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<td>XVIII Corps</td>
<td>Cp Campbell, Ky</td>
<td>14 Jul 45</td>
<td>28 Aug 45</td>
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<td>Cp Butner, NC</td>
<td>13 Jul 45</td>
<td>28 Aug 45</td>
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<td>22 Jul 45</td>
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<td>28th Inf Div</td>
<td>Cp Shelby, Miss</td>
<td>7 Aug 45</td>
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<td>30th Inf Div</td>
<td>Ft Jackson, SC</td>
<td>24 Aug 45</td>
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<td>Cp Breckinridge, Ky</td>
<td>13 Sep 45</td>
<td></td>
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<td>87th Inf Div</td>
<td>Ft Benning, Ga</td>
<td>14 Jul 45</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>91st Inf Div</td>
<td>Cp Rucker, Ala</td>
<td>14 Sep 45</td>
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<td>95th Inf Div</td>
<td>Cp Shelby, Miss</td>
<td>3 Jul 45</td>
<td>28 Aug 45</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>97th Inf Div</td>
<td>Ft Bragg, NC</td>
<td>28 Jun 45</td>
<td>8 Aug 45</td>
<td>22 Aug 45</td>
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</table>
After the defeat of Japan, Army Ground Forces directed that all training conducted specifically toward operations against Japan be discontinued and prescribed that subsequent training be planned and conducted with the objective of preparing individuals, crews, teams, and organizations to perform their primary missions in combat, and to perform their duties as occupational forces. Second Army training directives were amended accordingly.

Plans for the reception of the various division units remained in effect after defeat of Japan. One change brought about by V-J Day was an increase in the number of nondivisional units assigned to Second Army following announcement by the War Department that all units east of the Panama Canal en route to the Pacific under direct redeployment would be diverted to the United States for further assignment within the United States.

In order to readjust military personnel and to allow the return to civilian life of such personnel as were not essential from a military view, the War Department prepared a plan for the readjustment of military personnel after the defeat of Germany (RR 1-1). Following publication of this plan on 15 February 1945, commanding generals of major commands prepared their respective plans based on the general principles and responsibilities stated in RR 1-1. These were submitted to the War Department for approval.

Readjustment regulations provided for the release of personnel according to a service rating score. This score was based on (1) number of months service, (2) number of months overseas service, (3) number of awards and battle participation credit, and (4) number of dependents under 18 years of age. The initial critical score for release (computed as of 12 May 1945) was set at 85 for enlisted men, 85 for company grade officers, and 100 for field grade officers.

By a process of gradual lowering of the critical score, separation of high point men was continuous. By 1 September 1945, a total of 1,508 enlisted men and officers of the Second Army had been discharged under RR 1-1.