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A COMPARISON OF THE COMBAT PERFORMANCE
OF
GOOD AND POOR INFANTRY SQUAD LEADERS

by

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September 1954

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A Comparison of the Combat Performance of Good and Poor Infantry Squad Leaders W/Supplement A

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Combat Performance
Infantry Squad Leaders
Leadership

This report describes research to determine (1) characteristic behaviors of rifle squad leaders on the main line of reconnaissance patrol, and (2) the evaluation of these behaviors by other squad leaders and by superiors and subordinates. Results of questionnaire surveys of Korean War veterans are analyzed.
The objectives of this study were to (1) identify what behaviors are performed by rifle squad leaders when on the main line of resistance and reconnaissance patrol and then to (2) determine the extent to which these behaviors are indicative of good or poor infantry squad leaders as reported by men of squad leader ranks as well as by men of ranks subordinate and superior to that of squad leaders.

The research was carried out in 1953 by means of questionnaires administered to a sample of combat veterans of the Korean War. Each soldier rated the overall effectiveness of a squad leader with whom he had served in combat and then indicated how frequently the rated squad leader performed certain behaviors appropriate to a patrol or MLR situation. The data were analyzed on the basis of the rank held by each of the soldier's at the time of the questionnaire's administration.

This research has identified important gaps in the leadership doctrine currently described in Army field manuals. More specifically, these manuals do not adequately deal with certain leadership problems which the squad leader is likely to encounter in combat.

I. Soldiers in a rifle platoon do not always agree on what kinds of behavior distinguish the good from the poor squad leader in combat.

A. Some behaviors are considered by men of all ranks to be characteristic of good squad leaders.

B. Frequently, the soldiers in a squad do not agree with squad leaders or with soldiers in the platoon headquarters as to what behaviors characterize the good squad leader. This can be viewed as a lack of appreciation on the part of the soldiers in the squad of the demands of the tactical mission and the problems besetting their squad leader or, a lack of appreciation on the part of squad leaders and platoon headquarters personnel of the needs and problems of the men in the squads.
C. Frequently, squad leaders do not agree with the soldiers in their squad or with soldiers in the platoon headquarters as to what behaviors characterize the good squad leader. This can be viewed as a lack of appreciation on the part of the soldiers in the squad or soldiers in the platoon headquarters of the many problems besetting the squad leader or, a lack of appreciation on the part of the squad leader of the needs and problems of those above and below him in the platoon, or of the demands of the tactical mission.

D. Frequently, soldiers in the platoon headquarters do not agree with soldiers in a squad or with squad leaders as to what behaviors characterize the good squad leader. This can be viewed as a lack of appreciation on the part of soldiers in the squad or the squad leader of the demands of the tactical mission or of the needs and problems of platoon headquarters personnel; or a lack of appreciation on the part of platoon headquarters personnel of the needs and problems of squad leaders or the men in the squads.

II. Soldiers in a rifle platoon expect different things of the squad leader when on patrol than when on the MLR—that is, in a stress and non-stress situation.

III. Compared to those above and below them, squad leaders frequently have difficulty defining what a squad leader should do, particularly when on patrol—a stressful situation.

IV. Squad leaders must adjust both to those above and below them in the platoon if they are to perform effectively.

These points are discussed in detail in the body of this report and the possible implications of these findings to the Army are indicated on pages 93 to 103.
PREFACE

One of the prime objectives of Human Resources Research Unit #2 has been to concern itself with the Army's NCO training program. Officers and non-commissioned officers alike have indicated that this training should incorporate experiences gained in the Korean War. In 1952-53 many veterans of the Korean War were either passing through or stationed at Ft. Ord, California. This research was initiated in order to tap the valuable combat experience possessed by these Korean War veterans. The research project was approved by OCAFF and G-1 Department of the Army, 26 November 1952.
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A COMPARISON OF THE COMBAT PERFORMANCE OF GOOD AND POOR INFANTRY SQUAD LEADERS

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

This paper presents an analysis of the leadership techniques utilized by good and poor infantry squad leaders in a stress and non-stress situation. Specifically, this paper reports (1) the frequency with which various leadership techniques are employed by squad leaders when on patrol and when on the MLR and (2) the extent to which these behaviors are identified as indicative of good or poor squad leader by men of squad leader ranks as well as by men of ranks subordinate and superior to that of squad leaders.

PROCEDURE

In the fall of 1952 intensive exploratory interviews were conducted with combat infantry veterans of the Korean War. These interviews confirmed previously held hunches that combat could be divided into a number of specific situations differing in the amount and kinds of physical and psychological stress present. It was hypothesized that the leadership techniques employed by squad leaders would differ with the combat situation and that, moreover, a soldier's attitudes towards these leadership techniques would not only depend upon the specific combat situation in which that technique is employed, but also depend upon his rank. For the most part, Army field manuals dealing with leadership, e.g. FM 22-10 and FM 22-100, have not fully dealt with these hypothesized situational and rank differences in their exposition of leadership principles.
Questionnaires dealing with two combat situations were prepared—one dealing with squad leadership techniques while on a patrol and the second dealing with squad leadership techniques while on the MIR. These two situations were selected because (1) they characterized the combat situation prevailing in the latter stages of the Korean War and consequently, were situations with which many returning veterans would be familiar; and (2) there were marked differences in the amount of physical and psychological stress present. The patrol situation is perhaps second only to the fire fight situation in the amount of physical and psychological stress that is imposed on the infantry soldier. On the other hand, the MIR situation is relatively non-stressful. This was true (at least in some parts of the MIR) of the period of time when the soldiers completing the questionnaires were in Korea, the spring and summer of 1953.

In the summer and fall of 1953 questionnaires dealing with the patrol and MIR situation were administered to a sample of recently returned combat infantry veterans of the Korean War. These veterans were contacted as they were processed at or while being stationed at Ft. Ord, California. Approximately 280 of these veterans completed each of the questionnaires, and approximately 80% of the veterans completed both questionnaires.

Each infantryman was first asked to rate the overall effectiveness of a squad leader with whom he served for at least one month in Korea. This rating was made on the following five point scale: "way above average," "a little above average," "about average," "a little below average," and "way below average." For purposes of analysis the rated
squad leaders were divided into two groups. Approximately half of the rated squad leaders had been rated "way above average," or "a little above average." These leaders have been designated good leaders. Leaders rated as being "about average," "a little below average," or "way below average," have been designated poor squad leaders. (Three-fourths of these poor leaders had actually been rated as being "about average." Thus, this study may be a comparison of the combat performance of above average and average infantry squad leaders. Since there is a well known tendency for men to be rated somewhat higher than they should be, it seems probable that many of the "about average" squad leaders were actually fairly poor. For ease of presentation, the leaders are referred to as good and poor respectively.)

After rating the squad leader, each infantryman was asked to indicate how often this same squad leader performed each of a number of behaviors while in a patrol and/or MLR situation. Frequency of performance was indicated on the following five point scale: "always," "usually," "about half the time," "seldom," and "never." For purposes of analysis, frequency of performance of the various behaviors was also divided into two groups. The cutting point again was the point which divided the rated squad leaders into two groups of approximately equal size, i.e., the median.

The findings presented in this report are based on the relation between a squad leader's rating (good and poor) and the frequency with

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1These behaviors were identified earlier as a result of interviews held with other combat veterans of the Korean War. An example of a behavior is "gave his orders in a firm confident manner."
which this same squad leader was reported to have performed the various leadership behaviors (above or below the median). When the relation is such that it is unlikely to have occurred by chance, the particular behavior is described as being characteristic or typical of one kind of squad leader and not the other, e.g. typical of the good but not the poor squad leader. Following this, desirable behaviors are those which were typical or characteristic of good leaders. Similarly, undesirable behaviors are those which were typical or characteristic of poor leaders.

It should be noted that while the infantrymen were asked to indicate what behaviors the rated squad leader actually performed, some infantrymen probably indicated what behaviors the rated squad leader should have performed. It is likely that these "ideal expectations" reflect the soldier's social and psychological needs as well as whatever leadership training he had received in the Army via NCO school or OCS.

Since the infantrymen were contacted as individuals rather than as members of organized units, it is doubtful that any squad leader is reported on more than once. This cannot be ascertained, however, because the soldiers were not requested to indicate the name or organization of the squad leader they chose to describe. Such a procedure was followed in order to obtain an unbiased evaluation of a squad leader's effectiveness and an accurate report of his actual behavior.

The data was analyzed on the basis of rank held by each of the combat veterans at the time they answered the questionnaires. Three rank categories were formed and the men used in the study were assigned to
one of three rank groups: **subordinates**—consisting of approximately 85 soldiers holding the rank of private or private first class; **squad leaders**—consisting of approximately 120 soldiers holding the rank of corporal or sergeant; and **superiors**—consisting of approximately 70 soldiers holding the rank of sergeant first class through captain. This breakdown permitted a study of the relationship between a soldier's position (rank) in the military organization and his evaluation of squad leader behavior. It should be pointed out that in the early part of 1953 very few squad leaders in line infantry units held a rank higher than that of sergeant.  

On the basis of content, each of the behaviors were assigned to one of five activity areas: **control activities**—concerned with ways a squad leader exercises control over his men; **intermediary activities**—concerned with how a squad leader acts as an intermediary between his subordinates and his superiors; **interpersonal activities**—concerned with informal relationships existing between a squad leader and his men; **maintenance activities**—concerned with keeping the squad in a state of combat readiness; and **tactical activities**—directly concerned with carrying out the squad's mission against the enemy or maintaining security.

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2 All soldiers were asked to indicate the particular job they held for the longest time while in Korea. Approximately three-fourths of the men of subordinate and superior rank held jobs appropriate to their rank. One-third of the men of squad leader rank reported that the job they held for the longest time had been squad leader or assistant squad leader. It is likely however, that others of squad leader rank held the job of squad leader or assistant squad leader for a shorter period.
The particular behaviors in each activity area which were employed by the squad leaders, and the extent to which these behaviors were viewed as desirable by the three groups of soldiers—subordinates, squad leaders, and superiors—will be discussed in the following section entitled RESULTS.
DEFINITION OF TERMS USED IN TEXT

The material presented in this report is based on an analysis of statistical data. For ease of presentation and in order to increase the readability of this report the findings have been presented in lay terms. Since these lay terms are based upon precise statistical relationships, the exact meaning given these terms in this report are outlined below.

SUBORDINATES, SQUAD LEADERS, AND SUPERIORS:

We have called soldiers SUBORDINATES when they held the rank of private or private first class. We have called soldiers SQUAD LEADERS when they held the rank of corporal or sergeant. We have called soldiers SUPERIORS when they held the rank of sergeant first class through captain. Ranks were those held at the time the soldier completed the questionnaires.

GOOD or POOR squad leaders:

We have called a squad leader GOOD if the soldier rated him as being "a little above average," or "way above average." We have called a squad leader POOR if the soldier rated him as being "about average," "a little below average," or "way below average."

FREQUENTLY performed a behavior:

We have used the term FREQUENTLY when the soldiers reported that the squad leader they rated "usually" or "always" performed a behavior.

TYPICAL, CHARACTERISTIC, or THE MARK of a good (or poor) squad leader:

We have considered a behavior as TYPICAL, CHARACTERISTIC, or THE MARK of one kind of squad leader (good or poor) when the soldiers indicated that it was more frequently performed by one kind of leader.
than another, for example, more frequently performed by good squad leaders
than by poor squad leaders. In these cases the difference in frequency
of performance between good and poor squad leaders is of a magnitude that
it is unlikely to have occurred by chance. (Significant at the .10 level
of confidence or better).

**DESIRABLE, APPROVED, UNDESIRABLE, CRITICAL, DISAPPROVED:**

We have referred to a behavior as **DESIRABLE** (or **UNDESIRABLE**) when—

We have said that soldiers **APPROVE** (or **DISAPPROVE** or are **CRITICAL**)
of a behavior when—

the soldiers indicated that the behavior was more frequently performed by
good (or poor) squad leaders than by poor (or good) squad leaders. In
these cases the differences in frequency of performance between good and
poor squad leaders is of a magnitude that it is unlikely to have occurred
by chance. (Significant at the .10 level of confidence or better).

**GREAT INTEREST, GREAT CONCERN, SENSITIVE:**

We have said that soldiers show **GREAT INTEREST**, **GREAT CONCERN**, or
are **SENSITIVE** towards a behavior when they have indicated that the be-
havior was more frequently performed by one kind of (good or poor)
leader than another. In these cases the differences in frequency of per-
formance between good and poor squad leaders is of a magnitude that it is
unlikely to have occurred by chance. (Significant at the .10 level of
confidence or better).

**LITTLE INTEREST, LITTLE CONCERN, UNCONCERN, INDIFFERENCE, UNCERTAINTY,**
**UNCritical, AS TRUE, EQUALLY TRUE:**

We have said that soldiers show **LITTLE INTEREST**, **LITTLE CONCERN,**

3
UNCONCERN, INDIFFERENCE or UNCERTAINTY towards the performance of a behavior when—

We have said that soldiers are UNCITICAL of the performance of a behavior when—

We have said that soldiers consider the behavior AS TRUE of good as it was of poor leaders, or EQUALLY TRUE of good and poor leaders when—

the soldiers report that there was little difference in the frequency with which good and poor squad leaders performed a behavior. In these cases the differences in frequency of performance between good and poor squad leaders might well have occurred by chance.
RESULTS

The results are presented in turn for each of the five activity areas. The behaviors within each of these five areas have been arranged into a number of logical sub-areas. Tables summarizing the findings in each activity area are included at the end of the textual discussion of that area.

Control Activities Area

Probably the most important function of the squad leader in any situation is exercising control over his subordinates. The behaviors making up the control activities area have been divided into four sub-areas for purposes of analysis: manner of giving orders; manner of implementing orders; delegation of responsibility; and maintenance of prestige. (A table summarizing the findings in this area is on pages 17-18.)

Manner of Giving Orders.—The precise manner in which a squad leader gives orders to his subordinates was found to be related to how highly he was evaluated. In both the patrol and MLR situations, approximately eighty-five per cent of the men reported that their squad leader frequently gave his orders in a firm confident manner and also made sure that his orders were clearly understood by his men. All three rank groups—subordinate, squad leaders, and superiors—agreed that these behaviors are typical of good squad leaders.

Approximately three-fourths of the squad leaders when on the MLR were reported as frequently directing their orders to specific people.
rather than to their men as a whole. In the eyes of all soldiers good and poor leaders were about equally likely to direct their orders to specific people, though to some extent subordinates were more inclined to view this as a desirable practice than were men in the other two rank groups.

While people usually associate threats and swearing with Army non-commissioned officers, evidence available in this study indicates that, both when on patrol and the MLR, such behavior is not the rule. Only about fifteen per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently accompanying their orders with threats or swearing. Squad leaders, and particularly subordinates disapproved of threats in the relatively secure MLR situation. Superiors indicated that it was as true of good as it was of poor leaders when on the MLR. The three rank groups showed little concern with threats when on patrol. Concern with survival in that stressful situation may well account for this apparent indifference to threats. Soldiers are apparently less critical of swearing than they are of threats. All soldiers agreed that, both when on patrol and when on the MLR, swearing was about as characteristic of good as it was of poor squad leaders.

Manner of Implementing Orders.—Subsequent to the giving of an order, it is necessary for the squad leader to ensure that the order is promptly and properly carried out. Approximately eighty per cent of the squad leaders, both when on patrol and the MLR, were reported as frequently making some attempt to secure the effective implementation of their order. The various attempts to ensure the implementations of orders
however, were viewed differently by the three groups of infantrymen involved in this study. All soldiers, and particularly soldiers of subordinate rank, indicated that a squad leader should make sure that his orders are promptly and properly carried out when on patrol. There is a striking difference in attitudes towards manner of implementing orders when on the MLR however. When on the MLR soldiers of subordinate rank are relatively unconcerned with the extent to which a squad leader checks on the implementation of his orders or fails to supervise his men when carrying out his orders. Squad leaders and superiors, on the other hand, show great concern with these two forms of order implementation. The reverse is true with reference to "riding" of men when they work. Here subordinates show the most critical attitudes while squad leaders and superiors show relatively little concern, that is, they attribute it as often to good as to poor squad leaders. The great emphasis shown by superiors towards supervision of men is also shown by the fact that they, in particular, approved of squad leaders who pay close attention to "8 bells" on work details. A more detailed discussion of these situational differences in attitudes towards supervision is found in a later section of this report.

In the course of making certain that orders are carried out, the squad leader has many opportunities to indicate to his men the calibre of their performance. Approximately seventy per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently telling their men when they performed poorly and also telling them when they performed well. This was true both when
on the MLR and when on patrol. Men of subordinate ranks reported that such behaviors were characteristic of good leaders both when on patrol and the MLR. Superiors made such an evaluation only on the MLR. Men of squad leader rank indicated that good and poor leaders used these techniques equally often in both situations. Subordinates and superiors indicated somewhat greater concern with "knowing how one stands," in the patrol than in the MLR situation.

Personnel management principles frequently indicate that when criticism is leveled at subordinates, this criticism should be given privately in order to protect the integrity of the offender in the eyes of his fellows. A statement concerned with private criticism was included only on the MLR questionnaire. Approximately half of the squad leaders were reported as frequently giving their criticism of subordinates in private. Oddly, only soldiers of squad leader and superior ranks clearly indicated that such behavior was more characteristic of good than of poor leaders. An inspection of other data, (see Supplement, TABLE VI) revealed that soldiers of subordinate ranks reported criticism being given privately less frequently than did soldiers of squad leader or superior rank. Inasmuch as soldiers of subordinate ranks would have the greatest opportunity to detect such behavior their observations are particularly worthy of note. Apparently criticism in private occurs less frequently than either squad leaders or superiors realize.

Delegation of Responsibility.—Orders can originate from the squad leader alone, or from the squad leader after consultation with his men. It may be assumed that the acceptance of orders will be increased when
the men in a squad are consulted in the decision making process. Both when on the MLR and when on patrol, approximately half of the squad leaders were reported as frequently openly seeking their men's advice while a much larger number of squad leaders (approximately seventy-five per cent) were reported as frequently following their men's advice when it was considered good. These findings show that squad leaders are more likely to let subordinate's opinions influence their decisions than they are to openly seek assistance from them. Attitudes towards the seeking and following of subordinates suggestions however, differed with the soldiers' rank as well as with the situation in which the exchange takes place. While this rank and situational difference is discussed in more detail in a later section, a few observations can be made at this point. All soldiers indicated moderate approval of leaders who seek advice from subordinates when on the MLR. Subordinates clearly approved this same behavior when on patrol also, while squad leaders and superiors indicated that, when on patrol, both good and poor squad leaders were about equally likely to seek their men's advice. Both when on patrol and when on the MLR, subordinates feel that a squad leader should follow their men's good advice. Squad leaders felt that good and poor leaders were about equally likely to follow their men's advice in both situations. Superiors however indicated that the following of good advice was the mark of a good squad leader when on patrol, but about as true of poor as it was of good leaders when on the MLR.

Approximately seventy per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently giving their men wide discretion in the implementation of
orders when on patrol. Only squad leaders and superiors approved such behavior. The apparent indifference of subordinates to greater freedom when on patrol is consistent with their earlier high approval of close supervision by leaders when on patrol, as well as their desire to know exactly how well they are performing when on patrol. This interesting finding is discussed in more detail in a later section.

Maintenance of Prestige.—The role of the leader has traditionally brought with it certain elements of prestige. Whether the maintenance of this prestige has resulted in greater or lesser acceptance of the leader by his subordinates can, to some extent, be answered by the data available here.

In addition to delegation of decision making authority (discussed in the previous section) three other items were concerned with the prestige factor. These three items appeared both in the patrol and MLR situation—they dealt with the admission of error; explaining the "why" of an order; and the acceptance of "back-talk."

Approximately three-fourths of the leaders were reported as frequently admitting when they were wrong and, whenever possible, explaining the "why" of an order. Admission of error was approved by all soldiers in both situations. Not so their attitudes towards the explaining of "why." While subordinates approved the explaining of "why" in both the patrol and MLR situations, squad leaders and superiors approved this behavior only when on patrol. They indicated that it was about as true of poor as it was of good squad leaders when on the MLR.
Less than ten per cent of the leaders were reported as frequently taking back-talk from their men, either in the patrol or MMR situation. The soldiers most critical of this action were of superior and to a lesser extent, squad leader, ranks.
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<td>15</td>
<td>69 gives orders in a firm confident manner*</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>50 makes sure that his orders are clearly understood</td>
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<td>directs his orders to specific people</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>85 does not threaten his men</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>29 does not swear at his men</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>20 checks to see that his orders are promptly and properly carried out</td>
<td>X X Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>supervises his men</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>pays close attention to &quot;8 balls&quot;</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>does not &quot;ride&quot; his men</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>97 compliments his men when they do well and chews them out when they do poorly</td>
<td>X Y Z</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>criticizes his men in private</td>
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* Behavior wordings have been paraphrased for ease of presentation with behaviors worded negatively in the original questionnaire reworded positively here. See Supplement to this Technical Report for original wording.

** The symbols X, Y, and Z indicate the attitudes of the three soldier groups towards the listed behaviors.
X indicates that the behavior was very clearly considered the mark of a GOOD squad leader. (Significant at the .01 or .001 level of confidence.)
Y indicates that the behavior was clearly considered the mark of a GOOD squad leader. (Significant at the .05 level of confidence.)
Z indicates that the behavior tends to be considered the mark of a GOOD squad leader. (Significant at the .10 level of confidence.)

*** Behavior not included in that situation.
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<td>TROL MLR</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pfc Sgt Capt</td>
<td>Pfc Sgt Capt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 70</td>
<td>asks subordinates for suggestions</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Z Z Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 47</td>
<td>acts upon good suggestions offered by subordinates</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>gives his men leeway in carrying out orders</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 81</td>
<td>explains, whenever possible, the &quot;why&quot; of an order</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y Y X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 61</td>
<td>admits when he is wrong</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y Y X X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57 64</td>
<td>does not let his men talk back to him</td>
<td>Z X</td>
<td>Y X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18
Intermediary Activities Area

When acting as an intermediary between the men in his squad and platoon headquarters, the squad leader performs one of his most important functions. It is also a trying duty since the demands of his superiors and subordinates are not always the same. The behaviors making up the intermediary activities area have been divided into four sub-areas: questioning of superior's orders; respect for superiors; defense of subordinates; and securing non-tactical information. (A table summarizing the findings in this area is on pages 26-27.)

Questioning of Superior's Orders.—One aspect of acting as an intermediary involves the passing along of orders from superiors to subordinates. In passing along such orders, difficulties can arise on one of two scores; the squad leader can view the orders as unclear; or he can consider the orders unreasonable or impossible to implement. A leader's evaluation of his superiors orders receives no mention in current Army leadership doctrine.

Nearly ninety per cent of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently questioned orders from superiors which they felt were unclear, and this was true both when on patrol and when on the MLR. Regardless of rank, all soldiers agreed that good leaders were more inclined to question unclear orders than were poor leaders.

A smaller number of squad leaders (approximately 80 per cent) were reported to have frequently questioned orders from superiors which they felt were unreasonable, and this was true both when on patrol and when on the MLR. Men of subordinate ranks considered this practice the mark
of a good squad leader both when on patrol and when on the MLR. Soldiers
of squad leader rank indicated that good and poor squad leaders were
about equally likely to question unreasonable orders both when on patrol
and when on the MLR. Superiors approved the practice when on patrol,
but felt it was equally true of good and poor leaders when on the MLR.
The attitudes of squad leaders probably reflects their greater familiarity
with the difficulties involved in questioning "unreasonable" orders.
Such questioning may well be viewed as a challenge of the wisdom of the
superior originating the orders. Superiors are probably reluctant to
admit that "unreasonable" orders are given, and in the face of such
resistance, the squad leader may have little choice other than informally
ignoring or modifying the order. Superiors greater willingness to accept
questioning of unreasonable orders when on patrol than when on the MLR
probably reflects the crucial nature of good orders in a stress situation.
This is discussed in more detail in a later section of this report.

Respect for Superiors.—When acting as a link in the chain of com-
mand, the squad leader may or may not respect the integrity of his
superiors. By respecting their position, the squad leader tends to ful-
fill his role in the military structure, though this may be at the
expense of losing the loyalty of his men. His disrespect for superiors
can be demonstrated by publicly criticizing superiors or griping about
orders.

Approximately fifteen per cent of the squad leaders were reported
as frequently publicly criticizing their superiors and a smaller number
of squad leaders (ten per cent) were reported as frequently whining and
gripping when receiving orders from superiors. These two patterns were evident both when on patrol and when on the MLR.

In the opinions of all soldiers, good and poor leaders were about equally likely to criticize their superiors when on patrol. Subordinates and squad leaders indicated the same thing when on the MLR, but superiors were highly critical of this behavior when on the MLR. A squad leaders whining and griping when receiving orders was clearly disapproved by subordinates and superiors both when on patrol and when on the MLR. Men of squad leader ranks attributed this practice as often to good as to poor leaders in both situations. This probably reflects the awkward intermediary position of the squad leader. Certainly retaining the position of squad leader is contingent upon acceptance by superiors. Such acceptance would be jeopardized by public criticism of superiors or by repeated whining and griping when receiving orders.

Respect for superiors is also indicated by the extent to which squad leaders identify with orders of superiors when passing these orders along to subordinates. If a squad leader does not pass down a superior's orders as if it were his own, then he places the responsibility for the order directly upon the platoon sergeant or platoon leader. Approximately sixty-five per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently identifying with their superior's orders, and this was as true when on patrol as when on the MLR. While men of subordinate ranks clearly considered this a desirable practice when on patrol, squad leaders and superiors felt that good and poor leaders were equally likely to identify with superiors orders in that situation. No rank group reported that
good and poor leaders differed appreciably in the frequency with which squad leaders identified with superior's orders when on the MLR. Since subordinates indicated that, when on patrol, a good leader gave direct orders, permitted no leeway in the execution of orders, and closely checked on the carrying out of orders (see previous section) it is likely that when subordinates are under pressure, they feel a need for more direct commands and orders. This finding is discussed in more detail in a later section of this report.

Defense of Subordinates.—The remaining behaviors in the intermediary activities area are appropriate only to the MLR situation. The analysis which follows is thus confined to the MLR situation.

The squad loader can also be viewed as a spokesman for his subordinates in their dealings with the platoon headquarters. As such, his job would involve protecting and furthering the interests of his men. Approximately seventy-eight per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently looking-out for their men with reference to the various details for which men are assigned. Desirable behavior in this area consisted of objecting when he felt that his squad was being asked to provide more than its share of men for the various details. As is to be expected, the higher a soldier's rank, the less critical he was of squad leaders who failed to object to discrimination in this area.

In order to function effectively, it is necessary that the men in a squad possess a certain minimum of food, clothing, equipment and materials for cleaning weapons. Due to the conditions of combat, it frequently occurs that men do not possess an adequate supply of such necessities.
To some extent, squad leaders are able to exert pressure upon platoon headquarters to secure such items which are short, and such action requires that the squad leader speaks-up to his superiors. Approximately ninety per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently trying to get their men such things as clothing, equipment, food, and cleaning materials. While all soldiers tended to agree that a squad leader's concern for securing food and cleaning material is important, it was evident that the higher a soldier's rank, the less critical he was of squad leaders who did not try to secure needed items. This may indicate a greater awareness by men of squad leader and superior ranks of the logistical problems encountered when on the line.

While soldiers of subordinate ranks approved of squad leaders who protected their interests with reference to the strictly military areas of food, clothing, equipment and cleaning materials they gave additional praise to those squad leaders who protected their interests in the relatively fringe areas of PX rations and recreational activities. Approximately three-fourths of the squad leaders were reported as frequently looking-out for their men's interests with reference to recreational opportunities and approximately ninety per cent of the squad leaders were reported as doing the same with reference to PX rations.

In the eyes of soldiers of subordinate and squad leader ranks, good squad leaders were far more likely than poor squad leaders to try to get PX rations for their men and to object when they felt their squad was being discriminated against when it came to amusement and recreation. Soldiers of superior ranks tended to associate such behavior equally with both good and poor squad leaders.
Decorations and promotions are two additional areas in which a squad leader can look out for the interests of his men. Approximately two-thirds of the squad leaders were reported as frequently trying to secure decorations for those men in their squad who they believed deserved them, and over three-fourths of the squad leaders were reported as frequently trying to get more rank for their men. All of the men agreed that such practices were desirable inasmuch as they were more characteristic of good than they were of poor leaders. Soldiers of squad leader ranks were the ones most hesitant to evaluate squad leaders in terms of their concern with promotions. This, perhaps, reflects the TO&E restrictions which effectively limit a squad leader's efforts in this area. Soldiers of superior ranks were the ones most reluctant to evaluate squad leaders in terms of their concern with decorations.

Securing Non-Tactical Information.—The squad leader can also act as a channel of communication between superiors and subordinates. To a considerable extent, information influencing the future of the men in the squad is in the hands of persons at the platoon headquarters. It is reasonable to expect that the rank and file would be vitally interested in such information, and the effective squad leader would thus be one who makes serious efforts to secure such information and pass it along to subordinates. Approximately eighty per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently inquiring from superiors as to when their men were expected to go out on special details, out-posts, guard, what the future plans of the unit were, and as to when men might expect opportunities for amusement and recreation. Squad leaders who showed
such concern, particularly with the two semi-tactical areas, were rated as good by all of the soldiers concerned. Only soldiers of subordinate ranks, however, clearly considered inquiries as to future recreational opportunities to be the mark of a good squad leader. Squad leaders and superiors identified this practice as often with poor as with good squad leaders.
### TABLE II—INTERMEDIATE BEHAVIORS REPORTED BY SOLDIERS OF DIFFERENT RANKS TO BE THE MARK OF A GOOD SQUAD LEADER ON PATROL AND ON THE MLR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>A Good Squad Leader on Patrol</th>
<th>On Patrol</th>
<th>On the MLR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pvt</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>Sfc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 26</td>
<td>X**</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 98</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27 34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58 100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Behavior wordings have been paraphrased for ease of presentation with behaviors worded negatively in the original questionnaire reworded positively here. See Supplement to this Technical Report for original wording.**

**The symbols X, Y, and Z indicate the attitudes of the three soldier groups towards the listed behaviors.**

- **X** indicates that the behavior was very clearly considered the mark of a GOOD squad leader. (Significant at the .01 or .001 level of confidence.)
- **Y** indicates that the behavior was clearly considered the mark of a GOOD squad leader. (Significant at the .05 level of confidence.)
- **Z** indicates that the behavior tends to be considered the mark of a GOOD squad leader. (Significant at the .10 level of confidence.)

**Behavior not included in that situation.**
TABLE II concluded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
<th>ON PATROL</th>
<th>ON THE MLR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pvt</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>Pfc</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLR</td>
<td>A GOOD SQUAD LEADER IS ONE WHO</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>tries to get PX rations for his men</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>objects when his men have too few recreational opportunities</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>recommends decorations for deserving men</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>recommends promotions for deserving men</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>inquires about future work details and guard duty</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>inquires about his units future plans</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>inquires about future recreational opportunities</td>
<td>Z</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27
Interpersonal Relations Activity Area

A considerable portion of a leader's relations with his men are relaxed and informal and reflect the fact that they both are fellow human beings rather than soldiers differing in their position in the military structure. The nature of a squad leader's behavior towards his men in these informal situations may well influence how he is evaluated by his men, and consequently, how well the squad performs. Obviously, opportunities for informal social relations are relatively few when on patrol, and relatively many when on the MLR. Unless stated to the contrary, the behaviors in the interpersonal relations area apply to the MLR situation. For purposes of analysis, the behaviors in this area have been divided into four sub-areas: rank consciousness; favoritism; morale of men; and handling of new men. (A table summarizing the findings in this area is found on pages 41-42.)

Rank Consciousness.—The squad leader invariably holds a position, if not a rank, superior to that of his men. This higher position brings with it certain privileges which are, to varying degrees, recognized and accepted by the rank and file as the prerogatives of leadership. On the other hand, it has frequently been noted that certain leaders abuse these privileges, or take other unwarranted privileges. Four items on the MLR questionnaire concerned themselves with the privileges of rank.

One of the most important tasks imposed upon a squad while on the MLR is the posting of guards. At times, during the 100% alert periods, every member of the squad is expected to be available and ready for duty. At the same time, infantry squads on the MLR are frequently shorthanded,
and the remaining men are usually lacking adequate sleep. In such instances, guard duty becomes a particularly odious burden. Although the squad leader is not ordinarily expected to pull guard, some squad leaders, in order to give their men additional rest, have chosen to go on guard when their squad was shorthanded. Approximately eighty-three per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently going on guard when their squad was shorthanded. While infantrymen of all ranks tended to approve this practice, soldiers of subordinate, and to a lesser extent, soldiers of squad leader ranks particularly identified this behavior as the mark of a good squad leader. Superiors indicated this behavior was about as true of poor as it was of good squad leaders.

A less important, but still necessary, task placed upon squads on the MLR is that of furnishing men for various details which arise, such as going for rations, fuel, cleaning trenches, or building bunkers. Technically, the squad leader's job is to supervise his men as they work on these details. On the other hand, the squad leader, for various reasons may select to pitch-in, to work alongside his men. This decision may be due to the fact that the squad is shorthanded, or that the squad leader wishes to show his identity with his men by helping them. About fifteen per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently refusing to help their men when they worked on details, that is, these squad leaders preferred to retain the privileges which traditionally accrue to the leader. Soldiers of subordinate ranks were critical of squad leaders who refused to help their men on detail. On the other hand, soldiers of squad leader and superior ranks attributed this practice as
often to good as to poor squad leaders. They may well feel that the leader
has earned his position, and has little responsibility for working along-
side his men.

The squad leader can also show great concern for the maintenance of
his own prestige during periods when he is not directly involved in
furthering the squad's tactical mission. For example, how does the
squad leader spend his spare time? Sixteen per cent of the squad
leaders were reported to have frequently spent their spare time with
others of similar rank or position rather than with the men in their
squad. Interestingly, it was subjects of squad leader ranks who were
most inclined to attribute such behavior to poor squad leaders. Soldiers
of subordinate and superior ranks attributed this practice as often to
poor as to good squad leaders. They may accept this practice because
they feel that the squad leader, as well as any other individual, has
the right to select and associate with people of his own choosing. The
fact that such associates are primarily others of like position or rank
may not be a deterrent to such an evaluation. In fact it may strengthen
it inasmuch as men of subordinate and superior ranks may feel that such
selective associations are the privileges of rank, help maintain the
prestige of the leader, and even contribute to his effectiveness as
leader through the exchange of relevant knowledge and skills. It is
apparent also that such selective associations do not materially harm
subordinates.

Squad leaders may spend their spare time withdrawn from their own
men as well as withdrawn from other squad leaders. Such behavior would
seem to indicate an anti-social personality or perhaps a leader who would prefer not to mingle with the men in his squad because of differences in their respective positions in the military hierarchy. Only six per cent of the leaders were reported as frequently staying off by themselves. Soldiers of subordinate and superior ranks were critical of such behavior, both tending to attribute it to poor squad leaders. Soldiers of squad leader rank however, tended to attribute "staying off by themselves," equally to good and poor squad leaders. Their uncritical attitude towards this behavior probably reflects their awareness of a leader's need to withdraw from the group at times to rest from and reflect upon the responsibilities of the job.

Favoritism.—In dealing with his men, it is important that the squad leader show impartiality. One of the most severe criticisms leveled against squad leaders is the tendency for some of them to show favoritism, or to discriminate when dealing with their men. Such behavior frequently has led to dissension in the squad, and consequently, a lessening of its combat effectiveness.

Favoritism when on patrol may be indicated when a squad leader does not make sure that the responsibility for carrying heavy weapons and equipment is rotated among the various men. Failure to insure the rotation of such heavy items however, may simply indicate lack of appreciation of the difficulty of transporting such weapons. Approximately eighty per cent of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently rotated men on the heavy items. Subordinates and squad leaders considered such behavior the mark of a good squad leader. Men of superior ranks
however identified this practice as often with good as with poor squad leaders. This is to be expected since the men least likely to be assigned the job of transporting the BAR or coils of communication wires are sergeants first class or above.

Favoritism on the MLR can be shown in the manner in which a squad leader spends his spare time. Eleven per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently spending their spare time with certain "buddies" in the squad rather than with all of the men equally. Interestingly, soldiers of subordinate and superior ranks did not attribute such behavior more to poor than to good squad leaders. The group most critical of such a practice was soldiers of squad leader ranks. They tend to prefer leaders who did not single-out special buddies in the squad and spend their time with these buddies. These findings are consistent with those indicated in the previous section. That is, the rank and file and superiors are quite willing to permit a squad leader to select his own friends, whether in the squad or out of it, and willing to permit him to spend his spare time with these buddies. Soldiers of squad leader ranks, in both instances, were the group most critical of such behavior, perhaps reflecting a reluctance to accept behaviors which superficially smacks of blatant favoritism.

The squad leader has considerable voice in the selection of his assistant. Consequently, the squad leader has an opportunity to discriminate in favor of his buddies in the squad. Approximately fourteen per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently selecting their buddies for the position of assistant squad leader, even though this man
was not necessarily the one best qualified. All soldiers tended to view this as an undesirable practice but the groups most critical of this practice were soldiers of squad leader and superior ranks. The failure of soldiers of subordinate rank to be vitally concerned with this problem may be due to the fact that the position of assistant squad leader seldom brought with it an increase in rank. It did bring with it added responsibilities, however, which the rank and file may be reluctant to assume. Moreover, soldiers of subordinate ranks may be rationalizing their failure to arise in the military hierarchy by attributing relatively little importance to the job of assistant squad leader or the procedure by which assistant squad leaders are selected.

The area of discrimination of greatest concern to soldiers of subordinate ranks was the manner in which squad leaders assigned men to various work details. Ideally the squad leader may be expected to show no favoritism in assigning men to guard or work details. Impartiality is insured when the squad leader selects men by using a roster, either written or merely kept in mind, but clearly recognized by the rank and file. (It is the author's contention that many squad leaders use a written roster in order to remove the responsibility for selecting men for details from themselves to the impersonal and automatic roster).

Ten per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently discriminating in favor of their buddies when assigning men to work details or for guard duty. While all groups tended to consider this practice undesirable, soldiers of subordinate and to a lesser extent soldiers of squad leader ranks were the ones most critical of squad leaders who showed discrimination in this area.
Discrimination can also occur in the manner in which squad leaders distribute the supplies necessary for the effective functioning of the squad, for example, food, clothing, and equipment. Approximately eighty-nine per cent of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently distributed such supplies impartially among the men in their squad.

Soldiers of squad leader ranks identified the equitable distribution of food and water rations as the mark of a good squad leader. Subordinates and superiors attributed this practice as often to poor as to good squad leaders. This may indicate that the supply of food and water, while limited, is relatively steady and their fair distribution is relatively guaranteed by their very necessity. Moreover, platoon headquarters personnel may have an interest in their distribution and thus increase the likelihood of impartiality. On the other hand, only subordinates and superiors considered the equitable distribution of clothing and equipment to be the mark of a good squad leader. Soldiers of squad leader rank attributed this practice as often to poor as to good squad leaders. Relative uncertainty of the supply of these items may increase the load of discrimination in their apportionment.

Discrimination in the fringe areas of PX rations and opportunities to secure recreation was consistently related to rank. Discrimination in the provision of opportunities for recreation (18%) was reported to have occurred somewhat more frequently than discrimination in the distribution of PX supplies (0%). Soldiers of subordinate and squad leader ranks considered the fair distribution of these fringe items to be the mark of a good squad leader. Superiors, on the other hand, indicated
that good and poor leaders were about equally likely to apportion them fairly. The relative indifference of superiors to discrimination in this area probably reflects the fact that superiors have less interest in these fringe areas, and also are less vitally affected by such discrimination on the part of squad leaders.

Morale of Men.—The squad leader can do many things which affect the morale of his men. His behavior can serve to make his squad a more effective and spirited team or it can serve to make it an ineffective and dispirited team.

In his own personal behavior the squad leader can affect the morale of his men. For example, approximately eighty per cent of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently had a friendly word and a smile for the men in their squad. Soldiers of subordinate ranks and, to a lesser extent, soldiers of superior ranks clearly attributed such behavior more often to good squad leaders than to poor squad leaders and this was true both when on patrol and when on the MLR. The relative inability of soldiers of squad leader ranks to differentiate between good and poor leaders on this behavior suggests the difficulty of behaving in such a manner while in combat. Approximately eighty per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently trying to keep their men cheerful when on the MLR. Subordinates considered this to be the mark of a good squad leader, while squad leaders and superiors attributed this practice about as often to poor as to good squad leaders. Squad leaders stood alone in their attitudes towards the sharing of liquor and cigarettes when on the MLR. Only about ten per cent of the squad leaders
were reported as frequently refusing to share their liquor and cigarette
rations. Here again, we find that soldiers of subordinate and superior
ranks were the ones most inclined to consider such behavior as the mark
of a poor squad leader.

The personal problems of the men may easily come to the attention of
the squad leader. For example, family problems, or problems concerned
with one's girl friend would easily manifest themselves in the soldiers
behavior in the squad in the forms of moroseness, seclusinn, irritability,
etc. Only about one-fourth of the squad leaders were reported to have
frequently payed little attention to their men's personal problems.
Interestingly, only soldiers of superior ranks were critical of such
squad leaders, subordinates and squad leaders attributing this practice
as often to poor as to good squad leaders. This pattern probably reflects
the fact the personal problems of subordinates would come to superior's
attention only when squad leaders had failed to deal with them effectively.
Moreover, superiors may feel that they have little tiVe for such prob-
lems, and that these problems are legitimately the province of the squad
leader. The failure of subordinates to be critical of squad leaders who
show little concern for personal problems may have at least two bases.
First, help with personal problems may be forthcoming from all members of
a squad in view of the high degree of intimacy usually prevailing among
squad members. Thus, it would not be the sole or primary responsibility
of the squad leader. Second, subordinates may feel that it is none of
the squad leader's business to show excessive concern with their men's
personal problems.

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A parallel area is the extent to which a squad leader is considerate of men who are in a poor physical or mental state when assigning men to details or guard duty. Only about ten per cent of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently failed to give men special consideration at such times. Soldiers of subordinate ranks were the ones most critical of such squad leaders. Soldiers of squad leader and superior ranks however, considered this behavior about as true of poor as it was of good squad leaders.

According to reports almost all of the squad leaders, 97%, did their best to see that the patrol brought wounded and dead back from enemy territory. Since so many men performed this behavior, differentiation between good and poor leaders was markedly reduced. However, men of superior and subordinate ranks viewed this behavior as more characteristic of good leaders than did men of squad leader ranks. Men of squad leader rank were probably reluctant to differentiate since they had a first-hand knowledge of the difficulties involved in such an endeavor—the burden of responsibility it places on the leader, and the conflict between responsibility for the living and responsibility for the wounded or dead.

In any group of men, it is normal to expect arguments to arise which can serve to tear the group apart. Similarly, in any group of men, one can expect "in-groups" or cliques to develop as those of compatible interests band together and those of incompatible interests separate. In this instance also, the effectiveness of a squad can be hampered, particularly if the different cliques do not get along with each other.
Approximately seventy per cent of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently tried to settle arguments that arose in the squad, and to have tried to prevent the formation of incompatible cliques. Soldiers of subordinate ranks were the ones most likely to attribute such behavior to good rather than poor squad leaders. The sensitivity of subordinates to this problem is noteworthy. The failure of soldiers of superior ranks to differentiate between good and poor leaders in this area may be due to their lack of intimate knowledge as to the inner workings of the squads in their command.

One additional area in which the squad leader can influence the morale of his men is by keeping them informed about the unit's future plans. Admittedly, to some extent this will consist of rumor, but what information is available is most likely to be in the possession of the squad leader—the member of the squad who is in closest contact with the platoon headquarters. As was noted earlier, soldiers of subordinate ranks indicated that good leaders more often than poor leaders inquired from superiors about the unit's future plans. A somewhat similar pattern is evident here. Only twenty per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently neglecting to pass such information along to their men. While all ranks were critical of this failure, subordinates were the ones most critical.

Handling of New Men.—The squad is constantly faced with attrition through combat losses or as a result of men having completed their tour of duty in Korea or in the Army. In order to balance these losses, the squad continually receives new men, usually fresh from basic training
camps in the Zone of the Interior. The integration of these recruits into the existing squad is probably one of the most important tasks imposed upon the squad leader as well as his men.

Sixty-three per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently talking to new men in order to learn all they could about them, as for example, name, family background, home town, civilian experience, personal problems, etc. Only men of squad leader ranks considered such behavior the mark of a good squad leader. Subordinates and superiors identified this practice as often with poor as with good squad leaders. Subordinate's failure to differentiate between good and poor leaders on this behavior (as was also evident on another behavior—concern with men's personal problems) may reflect their interpretation of this questioning as one of prying into a man's personal and private life.

Integrating the man into an existing squad can be broken down into a number of specific activities. Approximately eighty-five per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently telling new men how the squad did things, what the squad had been doing, and what it would probably do in the future. All soldiers agreed that good and poor squad leaders were about equally likely to tell the new man the squad's and platoon's SOP. On the other hand, all soldiers agreed that telling the new man what the squad had been doing and probably would be doing, was the mark of a good squad leader.

In addition to orienting new men, approximately eighty-five per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently introducing recruits to the veterans in the squad and as urging these veterans to
keep a protective eye on these recruits. These two practices were clearly considered desirable by all concerned.

The tendency for veterans to relate their past combat accomplishments to the newcomers has been frequently commented upon. Unfortunately, such accounts are usually embellished and exaggerated, and its effect upon the newcomers is often felt to be harmful. Such accounts have come to be called "war stories". Approximately eighteen per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently telling newcomers war stories. There was little difference between good and poor leaders, however, in the frequency with which these leaders related "war stories" to newcomers.
### TABLE III—INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIORS REPORTED BY SOLDIERS OF DIFFERENT RANKS TO BE THE MARK OF A GOOD SQUAD LEADER ON PATROL AND ON THE MIR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
<th>A GOOD SQUAD LEADER IS ONE WHO</th>
<th>ON PATROL</th>
<th>ON THE MIR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pvt Cpl Sfc</td>
<td>Pvt Cpl Sfc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROL MIR</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pfc Sgt Capt</td>
<td>Pfc Sgt Capt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>goes on guard when the squad is shorthanded*</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>*** X** Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>helps his men on work details</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>does not spend his free time primarily with other NCOs</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>mingles with people—does not stay off by himself</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>Y Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>rotates the job of carrying heavy equipment or weapons</td>
<td>Y Y</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>spends his spare time equally with all of his men</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>makes the best man in the squad his assistant</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>X Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>is fair when assigning men to details</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>X Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>is fair when apportioning food and water rations</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>is fair when apportioning clothing or equipment rations</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>Z X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Behavior wordings have been paraphrased for ease of presentation with behaviors worded negatively in the original questionnaire reworded positively here. See Supplement to this Technical Report for original wording.

** The symbols X, Y, and Z indicate the attitudes of the three soldier groups towards the listed behaviors.

X indicates that the behavior was very clearly considered the mark of a GOOD squad leader. (Significant at the .01 or .001 level of confidence.)

Y indicates that the behavior was clearly considered the mark of a GOOD squad leader. (Significant at the .05 level of confidence.)

Z indicates that the behavior tends to be considered the mark of a GOOD squad leader. (Significant at the .10 level of confidence.)

*** Behavior not included in that situation.
### TABLE III concluded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
<th>A GOOD SQUAD LEADER IS ONE WHO</th>
<th>ON PATROL</th>
<th>ON THE MLR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pvt Cpl Sfc</td>
<td>Pvt Cpl Sfc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTOL</td>
<td>MLR</td>
<td>Pfc Sgt Capt</td>
<td>Pfc Sgt Capt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>is fair when apportioning PX rations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Y X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>is fair when apportioning opportunities for recreation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Z X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 4</td>
<td>has a friendly word and smile for his men</td>
<td>X X X Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>tries to keep his men cheerful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>shares his liquor and cigarettes with his men</td>
<td></td>
<td>X Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>helps his men with their personal problems</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>excuses from detail men who are sick whenever possible</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>does his best to bring sick and wounded back</td>
<td>Z Z</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>tries to settle arguments that arise in the squad</td>
<td></td>
<td>Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>tries to discourage the formation of incompatible cliques in the squad</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>tells his men what he knows about units future</td>
<td>X X X Z</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>learns all he can about the new men</td>
<td></td>
<td>Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>orients the new men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>tells new men about squad's past and likely future</td>
<td>Z Y X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>introduces the new men to the older men</td>
<td>X Y Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>cautions older men to look out for the new men</td>
<td>Y Y X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>tells the new men &quot;war stories&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Maintenance Activities Area

Maintenance type activities loom prominently in the daily life of the squad leader. Men must be prepared, materially, physically, and even psychologically for the eventual contest with the enemy. Accordingly, many of a leader's activities on the MLR are concerned with maintenance. Although not as important as accomplishing the patrol's tactical mission, the squad leader can also profitably concern himself with maintenance activities when on patrol. For purposes of analysis the activities in this area have been divided into six sub-areas: retention and care of clothing and equipment; personal cleanliness; food and drink; health; handling of weapons; and training. (A table summarizing the findings in this area is found on pages 53-55.)

Retention and Care of Clothing and Equipment.—The amount of clothing and equipment available to the front line soldier is usually at a minimum. This is particularly true when men are on patrol for their possessions are solely what they are able to carry on their person. Consequently, great care must be taken to insure that such items are retained and properly cared for. At the same time, men are often reluctant to exercise supply economy. Concern with the retention and care of clothing and equipment thus becomes a difficult chore for the squad leader.

Over eighty-five per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently making sure that their men had adequate clothing and equipment when on the MLR. (Since little can be done to rectify deficiencies when on patrol, this behavior was not included in the patrol situation).
All soldiers agreed that such behavior was desirable in that they attributed it primarily to good rather than poor squad leaders.

The four remaining retention and care items appeared both in the patrol and MLR situations. Approximately twelve per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently permitting their men to abandon or discard their clothing and equipment. Superiors were clearly critical of such behavior both when on patrol and when on the MLR. Subordinates were critical of such neglect when on patrol but indicated that good and poor leaders were about equally likely to be lax when on the MLR. Squad leaders' attitudes were the reverse of that of subordinates, that is, critical when on the MLR, but indicating that good and poor leaders were about equally lax when on patrol. This situational difference is dealt with in more detail in a later section of this report.

Approximately eighty-five per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently setting an example for their men by not discarding or abandoning their own clothing and equipment. All soldiers indicated that this practice was as true of poor as it was of good squad leaders when on patrol. Squad leaders and superiors reaffirmed this when on the MLR, but subordinates viewed it as the mark of a good squad leader in that situation.

Clothing and equipment, once retained, must be kept in good condition. Approximately ninety per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently keeping their own belongings in good condition and as insuring that their men did likewise. All soldiers appeared to judge a leader by his personal appearance, for all indicated that good leaders rather
than poor leaders were likely to keep their belongings in good condition. As applied to the rank and file however, a different pattern is evident and this is discussed in more detail in a future section of this report. Superiors clearly indicated that good leaders, rather than poor leaders, characteristically insured that their men kept their belongings in good condition both when on patrol and when on the MLR. Subordinates were lauditory of such behavior when on patrol but felt it was as true of poor as it was of good leaders when on the MLR. Again, squad leaders attitudes were the reverse of that of subordinates—approving concern with maintenance when on the MLR but indicating that it was equally true of good and poor leaders when on patrol. It thus seems that superiors approve strict supply economy both when on patrol and when on the MLR. Subordinates approve such strictness when on patrol but not when on the MLR. Squad leaders on the other hand are uncertain as to its value or feasibility when on patrol, but approve a squad leader's concern with supply economy when on the MLR.

**Personal Cleanliness.**—If a soldier's clothing and equipment should be kept in good condition, so should his own body. Yet, at the same time opportunities and facilities for maintaining personal cleanliness are at a minimum while on the MLR.

Approximately ninety per cent of t. squad leaders were reported as frequently urging their men to keep clean, urging them to go back for showers when they were available and, in turn, setting an example, by keeping themselves clean. All soldiers agreed that good and poor squad leaders did not appreciably differ in the frequency with which they urged their men to keep clean. On the other hand, all soldiers agreed
that good leaders, more often than poor leaders, kept themselves clean and made sure that men took showers when they were available. Soldiers of subordinate ranks particularly approved of the urging of men to take advantage of opportunities to go back for showers. This reflects the high value placed by combat troops on the opportunity to take showers as well as their insistence that those few among them reluctant to make the long hard trek down the hill to the shower point, be urged to do so.

In addition to keeping their person clean, it is necessary for the men to keep their living facilities in good order. Approximately eighty-seven per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently urging their men to keep their living quarters in good condition, and as setting an example for their men by keeping their own quarters in the same condition. Squad leaders and superiors attributed these behaviors to good rather than poor squad leaders, while here again subordinates identified the behaviors as being as true of poor as it was of good squad leaders.

The sanitary disposal of refuse and body waste is an important problem on the MLR. Space for the disposal of such material as well as opportunities to bury garbage or prepare latrines are at a premium due to periodic and sporadic enemy action. Nevertheless, approximately eighty-five per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently making sure that the disposal of garbage was done properly, and that latrines were dug and used by their men. All soldiers agreed that concern with latrine discipline was the mark of a good squad leader. Only soldiers of squad leader ranks made such an evaluation with reference to
the disposal of garbage and refuse, subordinates and superiors indicating that good and poor leaders were equally likely to see that they were disposed of properly.

Food and Drink.—The data with reference to food and drink presents a somewhat inconsistent pattern. Over eighty-five per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently making sure that their men had adequate food and water when on the MLR. (Since little can be done to rectify deficiencies when on patrol, this behavior was not included in the patrol situation). All soldiers identified this practice with good rather than poor squad leaders.

The conservation of food and water, invariably in short supply in combat, is also the concern of the squad leader. Approximately eighty per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently urging their men to conserve food and water when it was in short supply. All soldiers agreed that concern with the conservation of food and water when on patrol is the mark of a good squad leader. Good and poor squad leaders were about equally likely to show such concern when on the MLR. The scarcity of food and water when on patrol probably is responsible for the greater concern shown towards conservation in that situation.

Deviations from issued rations occur when soldiers resort to native foods and liquor and to native sources for drinking water. Differences in sanitary standards make suspect such deviations from official supply sources. Approximately eighty per cent of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently made sure their men did not consume native foods or liquors. Only squad leaders considered such concern to be the mark of a
good squad leader when on patrol. Subordinates and superiors reported that good and poor leaders were equally likely to be concerned with the consumption of native food products when on patrol. Subordinates considered such concern on the MLR to be the mark of a good squad leader, but squad leaders and superiors indicated that it was true of both kinds of leaders when on the MLR. Seventy per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently cautioning their men against the drinking of water of questionable purity. Subordinates considered this a desirable practice when on patrol but squad leaders and superiors reported it to be as true of poor as of good leaders in that situation. Superiors considered concern with water purification the mark of a good squad leader when on the MLR, but subordinates and squad leaders considered it true of both kinds of leaders in that situation.

Health.—Opportunities for consumption of alcoholic beverages as well as for sexual relations are at a minimum while on the MLR. Nevertheless, veteran combat men frequently do find means for satisfying their desires in these two areas. Approximately sixty-three per cent of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently tried to keep their men sober and to have frequently urged their men to use prophylactics whenever they might be exposed to venereal disease. All ranks approved a squad leader's concern with the problem of venereal disease, though to some extent soldiers of superior ranks were the ones most inclined to rate good those leaders that urged their men to use prophylactics. Only soldiers of superior ranks indicated that efforts to keep men sober was a characteristic of good rather than of poor leaders, subordinates and
squad leaders indicating that it was true of both kinds of leaders. Three per cent of the men reported that their squad leader was frequently drunk while on the MLR. While the number of instances is small, there is some indication that soldiers of subordinate ranks were the ones most inclined to view drunken squad leaders in an unfavorable light. This may reflect greater awareness of this condition when it does occur as well as an awareness of the consequences to the squad when a leader is in no condition to perform his leadership functions. Squad leaders and superiors reported that poor leaders were drunk no more often than good leaders.

Opportunities for rest and relaxation also constitutes a phase of concern with health. When on patrol this takes the form of periodic rest breaks and ninety per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently giving their men rest breaks whenever possible. Only men of squad leader rank identified the giving of rest breaks as a mark of a good squad leader, subordinates and superiors indicating that good and poor leaders were about equally likely to give rest breaks when on patrol. The failure of men of subordinate ranks to differentiate between good and poor leaders on this item perhaps indicates that since a rest break is of advantage to the leader as well as his men, even poor leaders give rest breaks.

When on the MLR, rest and relaxation can take the form of letting men rest and relax when there is nothing of great importance to do. Approximately one-third of the leaders however, were reported as
frequently keeping their men busy, even when there was nothing important to do. Men of superior rank clearly identified "keeping men busy" as the mark of a good squad leader. Squad leaders, on the other hand, were inclined to consider "keeping men busy" as the mark of a poor squad leader. Thus we see here an area of potential conflict, that is, what is acceptable to one group is viewed with disfavor by another. The key issue here is the necessity of the tasks assigned to the men. Soldiers of superior ranks may feel that men should be kept occupied and that any task assigned to men therefore a necessity. Soldiers of subordinate ranks may resent this infringement on their "free time" and soldiers of squad leader ranks may be reluctant to assign their men to such tasks.

The physical condition of his men is the responsibility of the squad leader yet opportunities for checking on their physical condition are not always present. More leaders were reported as frequently checking on their men's physical condition when on the MLR than when on patrol (82% versus 74%). Subordinates considered checking on men's physical condition a desirable practice both when on patrol and when on the MLR. Squad leaders considered this behavior the mark of a good leader when on the MLR, but true of both kinds of leaders when on patrol. Superiors considered checking on physical condition the mark of a good leader when on patrol, but as true of poor as it was of good leaders when on the MLR. Squad leader's attitudes may well reflect the pressing nature of the patrol situation when other responsibilities may crowd out opportunities to check on their men's physical condition. This is discussed in more detail in a later section of this report.
Men who are sick or injured require medical attention, and approximately ninety-five per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently themselves providing, or as seeing that others provided, needed first aid. This was true both when on the patrol and when on the MLR. Squad leaders and superiors clearly considered the giving of first aid the mark of a good leader in both situations. Subordinates, in both situations, considered the behavior as true of good as it was of poor leaders. The close knitness of the squad probably results in all members showing concern with individuals who are sick or injured and in all members taking steps to see that aid is forthcoming. The leader alone then, is not the source of that aid, but he must show concern. Consistent with these findings is the fact that subordinates alone were highly critical of squad leaders who did not take into consideration a man's physical condition when assigning him to details.

Handling of Weapons.—Perhaps the most important item of equipment in the hands of the front line soldier is his weapon. Seventy-seven per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently urging their men to exercise care when handling or cleaning their weapons and eighty-eight per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently making sure that all new weapons were test fired and zeroed—in promptly. All soldiers agreed that good squad leaders were more likely than poor squad leaders to see that new weapons were promptly checked. On the other hand, while soldiers of squad leader and superior ranks indicated that a squad leader should urge his men to be careful when handling or cleaning their
weapons, soldiers of subordinate ranks made no such evaluation. They attributed this practice as often to good as to poor squad leaders. This probably reflects the resentment the rank and file may have for superiors' attitudes and actions which tend to underestimate the common sense of subordinates.

Training.—Time and space for training while on the MLR are at a minimum. Nevertheless certain opportunities do exist during which the squad leader can make an effort to improve his men's level of knowledge and skills. Over eighty per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently training their men to work as a team and as trying to have each man know every other man's job in the squad. A much smaller number of squad leaders (58%) were reported as frequently giving their men instructions in tactics, weapons, etc. Such concern with training on the part of squad leaders was approved by all infantrymen inasmuch as all identified these practices with good rather than with poor squad leaders. Team work proved to be of greater importance than interchangeability of jobs perhaps reflecting the relative similarity of jobs found in an infantry squad. There is evidence that soldiers of superior ranks were most inclined to evaluate squad leaders in terms of the frequency with which they showed concern with the training of their men.

Nearly half of the squad leaders were reported as frequently trying to increase their own knowledge about weapons, tactics, etc. All soldiers tended to identify such behavior with good rather than with poor squad leaders.
**TABLE IV—MAINTENANCE BEHAVIORS REPORTED BY SOLDIERS OF DIFFERENT RANKS TO BE THE MARK OF A GOOD SQUAD LEADER ON PATROL AND ON THE MLR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
<th>A GOOD SQUAD LEADER IS ONE WHO</th>
<th>ON PATROL</th>
<th>ON THE MLR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PA-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pvt</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROL MLR</td>
<td>have adequate clothing and equipment*</td>
<td>Pfc</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>make sure that his men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>make sure that his men do not discard or abandon their clothing or equipment</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>does not discard or abandon any of his own clothing or equipment</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>makes sure that his men keep their clothing and equipment in good condition</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>keeps his own clothing and equipment in good condition</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>makes sure that his men keep themselves clean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>makes sure that when showers are available his men take them</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>keeps himself clean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Behavior wordings have been paraphrased for ease of presentation with behaviors worded negatively in the original questionnaire reworded positively here. See Supplement to this Technical Report for original wording.*

**The symbols X, Y, and Z indicate the attitudes of the three soldier groups towards the listed behaviors.**

X indicates that the behavior was very clearly considered the mark of a GOOD squad leader. (Significant at the .01 or .001 level of confidence.)

Y indicates that the behavior was clearly considered the mark of a GOOD squad leader. (Significant at the .05 level of confidence.)

Z indicates that the behavior tends to be considered the mark of a GOOD squad leader. (Significant at the .10 level of confidence.)

***Behavior not included in that situation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
<th>ON PATROL</th>
<th>ON TH. MLR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pa-TROL MLR</td>
<td>A GOOD SQUAD LEADER</td>
<td>Pvt Cpl Sfc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>makes sure that his men keep their living facilities clean</td>
<td>_________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>keeps his own living facilities clean</td>
<td>_________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>makes sure that garbage and refuse are properly disposed of</td>
<td>_________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>makes sure that latrines are prepared and used</td>
<td>_________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>tries to keep his men sober</td>
<td>_________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>stays sober himself</td>
<td>_________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>makes sure that his men use prophylactics when exposed</td>
<td>_________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>gives his men rest breaks whenever possible</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>keeps his men occupied— even on unimportant tasks</td>
<td>_________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>checks on his men's physical condition</td>
<td>X X Y Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>makes sure that first aid is given to the sick or injured</td>
<td>X X Z X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>makes sure that his men have adequate food and water</td>
<td>_________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>makes sure that his men conserve their food and water rations</td>
<td>Z X Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>cautions his men not to consume native foo or liquors</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>cautions his men to purify questionable water</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**** Soldiers of squad leader ranks considered this behavior the mark of a POOR squad leader.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
<th>A GOOD SQUAD LEADER IS ONE WHO</th>
<th>ON PATROL</th>
<th>ON THE MIR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FA-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pvt Cpl Sfc</td>
<td>Pvt Cpl Sfc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROL MIR</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pfc Sgt Capt</td>
<td>Pfc Sgt Capt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>makes sure that his men are careful when handling weapons or ammunition</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>makes sure that his men test-fire and zero-in their weapons</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>trains his men to work as a team</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>trains each man to know every other man's job</td>
<td>Y X X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>teaches his men about weapons, tactics, etc.</td>
<td>Y X X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>tries to increase his own knowledge</td>
<td>X X Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Tactical Activities Area**

Most of the leader's behaviors in combat are necessarily concerned with the successful accomplishment of the squad's tactical mission. For ease of presentation the behaviors making up the tactical activities area have been divided into five sub-areas: knowledge and skills; communication; awareness; concern for men; and courage. (A table summarizing the findings in this area is found on pages 68-70.)

**Knowledge and Skills.**—Two of the items in this sub-area dealt with the use of equipment when on patrol, the radio-telephone and map-compass. Approximately eighty-five per cent of the leaders were reported as frequently using this equipment properly. While all groups considered the effective use of radio and telephone to be the mark of a good squad leader, only subordinates and squad leaders made such an evaluation with reference to the map and compass. Superiors indicated that good and poor leaders were equally likely to use the map and compass properly. It is likely that superiors did not have an opportunity to observe this behavior, and therefore could not use it as a basis for differentiation.

Six of the knowledge and skill items were concerned with the deployment of men under the various terrain conditions which are likely to be encountered when on patrol, such as formation when crossing streams, when crossing valley, through forest, etc. It was reported that in all six instances effective deployment was frequently achieved by approximately ninety per cent of the leaders. Subordinates and squad leaders associated all six behaviors with good rather than with poor leaders. Superiors agreed with subordinates and squad leaders on
three, and indicated that good and poor leaders were equally likely to perform the remaining three deployment items. It is probable that soldiers with lower rank are most likely to feel the impact of effective or ineffective performance. Here again it is likely that superiors did not have as much opportunity to observe these behaviors as did squad leaders and subordinates, and accordingly were less certain of these behaviors as a basis for differentiation.

Two other behaviors revealed the presence or absence of tactical knowledge and skills when on patrol, the proper handling of prisoners and the selection of a route by which the patrol could return to its own lines. Approximately seventy per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently using different routes when leading their patrol back to its own lines and approximately ninety-five per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently handling prisoners properly. There were no sharp differences in how soldiers viewed these behaviors. Men of subordinate rank placed emphasis upon the proper handling of prisoners—a behavior which squad leaders and superiors felt was as true of poor as it was of good squad leaders. Men of superior rank placed emphasis upon the selection of different routes when returning to friendly lines—a behavior which subordinates and squad leaders felt was as true of poor as it was of good squad leaders. It is doubtful if many patrols were ever faced with the problem of handling prisoners. This may account for the relative unconcern of squad leaders and superiors with this behavior. Patrol routes were frequently precisely defined by superiors rather than left to the discretion of the patrol (squad) leader.
Consequently, it was rare that squad leaders had much say in the selection of routes of travel. It is doubtful if the rank and file were interested or even aware of the precise route taken by their patrol. Other evidence available in this report indicates that subordinates placed little value on being kept informed as to the patrol's geographic location.

Maintaining security is an important problem both when on patrol and when on the MLR. Approximately eighty-five per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently designating definite men to security positions in both situations. Superiors, and to a lesser extent squad leaders, clearly considered such assignments the mark of a good squad leader. Subordinates again showed the least interest or concern with assignments which they would be expected to fill—for they identified it as often with poor as with good squad leaders.

A number of knowledge and skill behaviors are appropriate primarily in the MLR situation. Over eighty-five per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently urging their men to improve their living and fighting positions as well as obstacles on enemy approaches. These two behaviors were considered the mark of a good leader by all soldiers.

For various reasons, men filling key positions on the MLR find it necessary to leave these positions. It then becomes the responsibility of the leader to find replacements. Over eighty-five per cent of the leaders were reported as frequently trying to keep key positions covered. Here again, squad leaders were the ones most reluctant to differentiate between good and poor leaders, for while subordinates and superiors
considered "trying to keep key positions covered" the mark of a good leader, men of squad leader rank indicated that it was true of both good and poor leaders.

Approximately ninety per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently trying to keep in contact with friendly units on their flanks. The higher a soldier's rank, the more likely was he to consider this the mark of a good squad leader. The same pattern appears with reference to squad leaders who urge their men to prepare range cards while on the MLR. For while three-fourths of the leaders were reported as frequently urging their men to prepare range cards, it was primarily men of superior and to a lesser extent men of squad leader rank who considered the behavior a mark of a good leader. The rank and file are relatively unconcerned with these two activities, associating them equally with good and poor leaders.

Communication.—The squad, while on the MLR, is a part of a larger organization, the platoon, company, battalion, etc. At the same time, it is opposed by the military units of the enemy. Yet, the squad is, to a great extent, isolated, intelligence wise, in that individual squad members know little, if anything, about the nature of either the larger organization of which they are a part or about the strength and disposition of their opponents. To what extent are squad members concerned with this larger picture? Seventy-nine per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently asking superiors about the strength, location and disposition of neighboring friendly units as well as the enemy. A larger number of squad leaders (90%) were reported as frequently
telling their men whatever they knew about the strength and location of neighboring friendly units as well as the enemy. Soldiers of subordinate ranks indicated that good and poor squad leaders were about equally likely to secure such information. Soldiers of squad leader and superior ranks clearly identified this practice with good squad leaders. While all soldiers considered the transmitting of such information to the rank and file to be desirable, subordinates were the ones least inclined to make such an evaluation. This suggests that the men in the squad are relatively less concerned with the larger picture than are their superiors in the platoon headquarters. Survival on the MLR itself, the day-to-day problem of existing under the trying conditions of the MLR, may account for this apparent apathy.

One might expect the rank and file to have greater concern with their own tactical situation on the MLR, and to some extent the evidence here supports this expectation. Less than one-fourth of the squad leaders were reported as frequently being slow in determining such information as the squad's geographic location and the best routes to such places as CPs, ration dumps, aid stations, etc. A much larger number of squad leaders, however, (88%) were reported as frequently passing any information they had in this respect along to subordinates. The perhaps superfluous need for specifically inquiring about these relatively obvious facts is evident in that soldiers of all ranks indicated that good and poor leaders were equally likely to inquire about the squad's geographic location and the best routes to CPs, supply dumps, and aid stations. On the other hand, all ranks did agree that
good leaders were more likely than poor leaders to pass such information along to subordinates.

The use of challenges and pass words on the MLR is designed to maximize security. Over ninety per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently inquiring as to the current challenges and pass words and only six per cent of the leaders were reported as frequently neglecting to pass such information along to subordinates. All soldiers agreed that securing such information was primarily a characteristic of good squad leaders. Only men of subordinate ranks were highly critical of squad leaders who neglected to pass such information along to the rank and file, for squad leaders and superiors attributed this practice as often to good as to poor squad leaders. That subordinates are concerned in this area is understandable, but what is puzzling is the apparent lack of concern on the part of soldiers of squad leader and superior ranks. They may feel that such information is passed down as a matter of course by all squad leaders. The apparent greater concern of soldiers of subordinate ranks suggests that this is not the case.

Up to this point the source of information has been the platoon headquarters and the movement of this information has been downward, to the rank and file. Information can also originate with the men in the squad and move upward to the platoon headquarters, and this is true when on patrol and when on the MLR. Here again, the squad leader can be instrumental in facilitating communication. Approximately eighty-five per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently urging their men to pass any information they secured to him, and approximately
ninety per cent of the squad leaders were reported as in turn, frequently passing whatever information they secured along to the platoon headquarters.

All soldiers considered the urging of men to secure and transmit information to be the mark of a good squad leader. Only soldiers of subordinate and superior ranks however, attributed the transmission of such information to superiors to be the mark of a good rather than a poor squad leader. This was true both when on patrol and when on the MLR.

Soldiers of squad leader ranks showed relatively little concern with the transmitting of information along to superiors for they attributed this behavior equally to good and poor leaders. This probably reflects their feeling that this behavior is performed as a matter of course by all leaders and thus provides no basis for differentiation.

One aspect of communication confined to the patrol situation is the taking of notes by the leader for the patrol report. Approximately three-fourths of the leaders were reported as frequently taking such notes. While all soldiers considered the taking of notes to be a mark of a good leader, again, soldiers of squad leader rank were the ones least inclined to make such an evaluation.

Awareness.—While in combat it is frequently difficult for the squad leader to be aware of the location of the squad as a whole (as when on patrol) or the location of the individual soldiers making up his squad. Approximately one-fourth of the squad leaders were reported as frequently having but a vague idea as to the exact location of the patrol when out in front of its line. While all soldiers were critical of leaders who failed to have this knowledge, men of squad leader rank
were the ones least critical. Certainly securing such information is difficult under the circumstances within which a patrol functions and the leader of the patrol may be the ones who most fully appreciate this difficulty.

Knowledge as to the exact location of individuals is also difficult, particularly when on patrol. While over ninety per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently knowing the location of each of their men when on the line, approximately one-fourth of the squad leaders were reported as frequently not having such information when on patrol. Soldiers of squad leader and superior ranks felt that knowledge as to the location of each man when on patrol is the mark of a good squad leader. Subordinates felt that poor leaders were as likely as good leaders to have this information when on patrol. Subordinates and squad leaders felt that a good leader knows the location of each of his men when on the MLR. Superiors however, felt that good and poor leaders were about equally likely to have this information when on the MLR. This difference is discussed in detail in a later section of this report.

**Concern for Men.**--A squad leader's concern for his men involves behaviors in which personal and human interest merge with tactical knowledge and skill—that is, those behaviors where both personality and knowledge operate.

It was reported that when on patrol approximately ninety per cent of the leaders frequently told their men, how, when, and where to move; saw that their men retained contact with one another; and made sure their men did nothing which would give the patrol's position away to the enemy.
Mei of all ranks agreed that these activities were characteristic of good leaders. Taking steps to insure that the unit's position is not revealed to the enemy was also included on the MLR questionnaire. In this instance however, only men of superior rank identified the behavior as a mark of a good squad leader, subordinates and squad leaders indicating that good and poor leaders were equally likely to caution their men not to expose themselves to enemy observation or fire. This attitude on the part of subordinates and squad leaders probably reflects their feeling that such precautions are unnecessary inasmuch as (1) the enemy already is well aware of the units' location and (2) soldiers obviously will do nothing to reveal their position to the enemy or to attract enemy fire.

Ten per cent of the leaders were reported as frequently moving too fast while on patrol, for some or all of their men. As expected, the men most sensitive to this behavior were those who had to move with the squad leader—soldiers of subordinate ranks. This group, and to a lesser extent men of squad leader ranks, reported that moving too fast was more typical of poor leaders than of good leaders. Superiors did not use this behavior as a basis for differentiating between good and poor squad leaders.

Motivating and encouraging men to keep moving while on patrol is a trying task. However, it was reported that eighty per cent of the leaders frequently tried to encourage and motivate their men. All groups of men considered this behavior important, and indicated it was characteristic of good leaders. However, men of squad leader ranks were more reluctant to use it as a basis for differentiating between
good and poor leaders than were superiors or subordinates.

It can be assumed that the more members of a patrol know about the patrol's location, the more secure they feel. Since the leader usually possesses such information, he is in a position to express personal concern for his men by communicating this information. Nearly ninety per cent of the leaders were reported to have frequently tried to keep their men so informed, but only soldiers of superior, and to a lesser extent squad leader ranks, indicated that this behavior was characteristic of good leaders. Failure of men with lower ranks to differentiate between good and poor leaders on this item probably indicates a reluctance to accept the additional responsibility which often accompany an increased level of information.

The assigning of men to the "point" position is difficult. Success of the squad's mission requires that a man with unique skills be assigned to this exposed position. Since the incidence of such skills in a squad of men is usually limited, this may require the repeated use of the same man as point-man. The men in a squad may view such a course of action as blatant discrimination or favoritism, and in truth, some leaders have used such assignments as a means of enforcing their will upon subordinates. This puts the leader in the position of reconciling the need for a point-man with the need of maintaining the morale of his men.

Approximately one-third of the squad leaders were reported as frequently using the same man as point on a patrol. While the men did not actually differentiate between good and poor leaders on the basis of this behavior, the pattern suggests that the lower a soldier's rank—the less
willing he was to consider such a practice a desirable one. Reluctance to use this behavior as a basis for differentiating between leaders may reflect contradictory points of view regarding the desirability of serving as point-man. Some soldiers view the point position as one of honor, and consider being assigned to such a position as a mark of recognition from superiors. Some men believe that the point position is the safest one on the patrol since the enemy is inclined to "let the point-man get through" so as to lure the patrol into a deeper trap. On the other hand, some consider the point position to be one of extreme danger since the point-man is the first to contact enemy mines or enemy fire. Others avoid the point position because it involves excessive responsibility. (This information was secured from infantrymen interviewed on the MLR in Korea during the winter of 1952-1953.)

A squad leader can show concern for his men's welfare on the MLR by frequently moving from position to position, making sure that his men are well, reassuring them, and incidently, making sure that they are doing their job. Approximately eighty-five per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently moving from position to position on the MLR checking on their men. Soldiers of subordinate and superior ranks considered this to be the mark of a good squad leader. Soldiers of squad leader ranks felt it was true of both good and poor squad leaders.

While on patrol a leader's special attention may be required by two types of squad members—the new men, primarily to insure their survival;
and potential "bug-outs", primarily to insure the survival of the patrol. Approximately ninety per cent of the leaders were reported as frequently paying special attention to these two types of men while out on patrol. Soldiers of subordinate and superior ranks agreed that such leader behavior was desirable, and characteristic of good leaders. Men of squad leader rank indicated moderate approval with concern for new men, but indicated that good and poor leaders were equally likely to pay special attention to "8 balls". Men of squad leader rank were probably reluctant to evaluate good and poor leaders on the basis of this behavior, because it involved the assumption of critical responsibilities.

Courage.—It is likely that the largest single factor influencing the evaluation of a combat leader is the amount of courage he displays under stress. Evidently squad leaders did not lack courage. While on the MLR only six per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently spending their time at the relatively safe company or battalion CPs. While on patrol only twelve per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently taking up positions that sacrificed adequate control over men for personal safety, and only four per cent were reported to have "bugged-out" on their men. (These figures probably reflect the fact that our sample included few, if any, really poor squad leaders.) Infantrymen were unanimous in agreeing that "excess caution" in the leader's choice of position while on patrol or his remaining in the rear at company or battalion CPs were undesirable. Since so few of the squad leaders studied, bugged-out when on patrol, no rank group actually differentiate between good and poor leaders on this item. All tended to view it as undesirable however.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
<th>A GOOD SQUAD LEADER IS ONE WHO</th>
<th>ON PATROL</th>
<th>ON THE MLR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FA-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pvt Cpl Sfc</td>
<td>Pvt Cpl Sfc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROL MLR</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pfc Sgt Capt</td>
<td>Pfc Sgt Capt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>uses a radio and telephone properly*</td>
<td><strong>X</strong> X Z</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>uses a map and compass properly</td>
<td><strong>Y</strong> Y</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>uses good formations on roads</td>
<td><strong>X</strong> X</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>uses good formations through villages</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>uses good formations crossing streams</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>uses good formations crossing valleys</td>
<td>X Y X</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>uses good formations passing through wooded areas</td>
<td>Z Y X</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>uses good formations crossing open areas</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>handles prisoners properly</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>uses different routes when possible</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>assigns specific men to act as security</td>
<td>X Y Y X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Behavior wordings have been paraphrased for ease of presentation with behaviors worded negatively in the original questionnaire reworded positively here. See Supplement to this Technical Report for original wording.

** The symbols X, Y, and Z indicate the attitudes of the three soldier groups towards the listed behaviors.
X indicates that the behavior was very clearly considered the mark of a GOOD squad leader. (Significant at the .01 or .001 level of confidence.)
Y indicates that the behavior was clearly considered the mark of a GOOD squad leader. (Significant at the .05 level of confidence.)
Z indicates that the behavior tends to be considered the mark of a GOOD squad leader. (Significant at the .10 level of confidence.)

*** Behavior not included in that situation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>ON THE MLR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pvt Cpl 5fc</td>
<td>Pvt Cpl Sfc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA-</td>
<td>TROL MLR</td>
<td>Pfc Sgt Capt</td>
<td>Pfc Sgt Capt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>urges his men to improve their living and fighting positions</td>
<td>X Y Y</td>
<td>X Y Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>urges his men to improve obstacles on enemy approaches</td>
<td>X Y Y</td>
<td>X Y Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>makes sure that all key positions are kept covered</td>
<td>X Y</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>tries to keep in contact with units on his flanks</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>urges his men to prepare range cards</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>finds out all he can about friendly and enemy units</td>
<td>X Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>tells his men all he knows about friendly and enemy units</td>
<td>Z Y X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>finds out all he can about the squad's tactical and logistical situation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>tells his men all he knows about the squad's tactical and logistical situation</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>X X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>finds out the correct challenge and pass word</td>
<td>Y X X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>tells his men the correct challenge and pass word</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>urges his men to pass information to him</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>X Y X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>passes information along to his superiors</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>takes notes for the patrol report</td>
<td>X Y X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>knows the exact location of each man in his command</td>
<td>Y Z X X X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>knows the exact location of the patrol</td>
<td>X Y X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE V concluded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITM NO.</th>
<th>A GOOD SQUAD LEADER IS ONE WHO</th>
<th>ON PATROL</th>
<th>ON THE MLR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PVT CPL SFC</td>
<td>PVT CPL SFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA-</td>
<td>TROL MLR</td>
<td>PFC SGT CAPT</td>
<td>PFC SGT CAPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>tells his men how, when, and where to move</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>urges his men to retain contact with one another</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 6</td>
<td>cautions his men to do nothing that will reveal their position to the enemy</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>does not move too fast for some or all of his men</td>
<td>X Z</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>uses the same man as point man</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>encourages his men through his words and actions</td>
<td>X Y X</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>keeps his men informed as to the patrols location</td>
<td>Z X</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>moves from position to position checking on his men</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>pays particularly close attention to new men</td>
<td>X Y X</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>pays particularly close attention to likely &quot;bug-outs&quot;</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 117</td>
<td>stays up with his men where he can lead them</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>Z X Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>does not &quot;bug-out&quot; on his men</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

70
As has been stated earlier, combat is not a homogeneous phenomenon. It differs along various dimensions and these variations are directly related with proximity to the enemy. The most important of these dimensions perhaps are psychological stress and physical hardship. At one end of the continuum, in the rest area, the soldier is relatively secure from enemy action and relatively well off in terms of those material goods and services which make life comfortable. As he moves towards the front his security decreases as his exposure to enemy action becomes more likely. At the same time logistical problems materially decrease the availability of those goods and services which make life pleasant in rear areas. At the other end of the continuum, in a fire fight or, more clearly, hand to hand combat, the soldier's insecurity is at a peak. Life and limb are at stake and concern with, much less the availability of, material goods and services is at a minimum. It is to be expected that there will be differences in the type of leadership expected of the squad leader under these various phases of "combat."

The previous sections of this report have dealt with leadership behavior in two different situations, on patrol and on the main line of resistance. These two situations can be considered near-extremes on the combat continuum so far as infantrymen are concerned. It is likely that being on patrol is second only to hand to hand combat in terms of the amount of stress and hardship it imposes upon the individual soldier. The patrol is in front of its main line, it is moving through a no man's
land, and enemy action is momentarily expected if not always forthcoming. The material resources available to the soldier are at an absolute minimum and are confined to those items he can carry on his immediate person. On the other hand being on the main line of resistance involves relatively less stress or material inconvenience. This was particularly true of the static tactical situation prevailing during the later stages of the Korean War. While physical discomfort was always present, particularly in winter months, psychological stress was largely confined to times when intermittent enemy rounds shelled the front lines and when patrol assignments were in the offing. Since the patrol and MLR situation do differ materially in their demands upon the individual, it is not unreasonable to assume that men's expectations of what they want of a squad leader also differ in these two situations.

Thirty-one behaviors appeared both in the patrol and MLR situations. On seventeen of these behaviors there were clear differences in how they were evaluated by the three rank groups. These differences involve identification of a behavior as characteristic of a good (or poor) squad leader in one situation, and equally true of both kinds of leaders in the other situation. These differences will now be discussed in turn for the four activity areas in which they occur—control activities, intermediary activities, maintenance activities, and tactical activities.

Control Activities.—While on patrol, subordinates expect firm guidance from their squad leader. This was evident from their highly favorable attitudes towards leaders who identify with their superior's
orders, (an intermediary activity area behavior) give orders in a firm confident manner and make sure that their orders are clear. They do not consider threats to be the mark of a poor squad leader in that situation. Subordinates think a leader should check to see that his orders are carried out, and should specifically define how his orders are to be carried out by limiting his men's discretion in the implementation of the order. At the same time, subordinates wish to be consulted in decision making for they clearly prefer leaders who ask their men for suggestions, and then, act upon good advice when it is forthcoming.

Thus, it appears that, when on patrol, subordinates wish to be consulted in decisions which affect them, yet, at the same time, expect the actual decisions to be made by the leader.

Subordinate's expectations when on the MLR are somewhat different and this may well reflect differences in the two situations. While subordinates again prefer the leader to act the leader, (firm, confident, clear, etc.) they are clearly less concerned with making themselves heard in decision making. This is evident from their only slightly favorable attitude towards leaders who consult with their men and who then act upon worthwhile suggestions offered by these men. When on the MLR subordinates are more critical of threats which may accompany orders. And again, in contrast to when on patrol, subordinates when on the MLR, are less concerned that the squad leader identify with his superior's orders, or with supervision from their squad leader. While in the patrol situation subordinates expect little discretion and much supervision, in the MLR situation they expect less supervision and, 

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implication, a great deal of discretion left to them.

The above noted pattern is highly suggestive. It appears that the greater the physical and psychological stress upon the individual soldier, the more willing he is to accept firm guidance and direction from his superiors. Confronted with a new situation, and every patrol is essentially new, confronted with a stressful situation, and every patrol involves stress, the rank and file look to their leader for direction. They expect him to lead. On the other hand, their lives rest upon a correct decision and so they wish to be consulted, they wish their good advice heeded by that leader. When the stress diminishes however, as on the MLR, the soldiers tend to resent direction and supervision from above. No longer is life and limb at stake. The situation is familiar and relatively secure. Attempts on the part of the squad leader to direct, to supervise, are viewed as an imposition, as a restraint to be avoided. And since relatively little is at stake, since a right or wrong decision will have little affect on his own well being, the soldier is less vitally interested in being consulted by his squad leader and in having his squad leader respect his opinions. It should be pointed out that these shifts are relative rather than absolute. That is, in both situations the soldier wishes to be consulted, but less so when little is at stake. The soldier probably always expects some direction from his leader, but much more when so much is at stake.

The attitudes of superiors towards decision making also tends to reflect differences in the stress and non-stress situations. The data suggests that a desire to maintain the prestige of the squad leader or
a desire to strengthen the chain of command is related to superior's
differences in attitudes in the two situations. In both the stress and
non-stress situations superiors expect the squad leader to give orders in
a firm confident manner, to make sure that orders are clearly understood
and to make sure that orders are promptly and properly carried out. In
contrast to when on the MLR, superiors report that a good squad leader,
when on patrol, can be identified by the fact that he also tells his men
the "why" of an order, keeps his men informed as to how well they are
doing and acts upon good suggestions offered by his men. Superiors
report that these three behaviors are as true of poor as of good squad
leaders when on the MLR. Providing knowledge as to the "why" of an
order, as to the caliber of performance, and acting upon subordinates
suggestions can all be viewed as contributing to the successful accomplish-
ment of the patrol's mission, even though, to some extent they involve a
lessering of the prestige of the leader and an assumption of additional
responsibilities. Superiors do not identify these three behaviors as
the mark of a good squad leader when on the MLR, probably because,
since relatively little is at stake, it is felt to be unwise to infringe
upon the prerogatives of the leader or to violate the chain of command.
Yet, under stress, when the "chips are down," when a wise decision and
effective performance are vital, superiors are more willing to recognize
that subordinates may have something to contribute to the accuracy of
the decision. Consistent with this analysis is the fact that superiors
were the ones most critical of squad leaders who accept back-talk from
their men—that is, they wish to maintain the prestige of the leader
as well as strict lines of authority.

Squad leaders' attitudes show only slight differences in the stress and non-stress situation, and these differences are not inconsistent with the pattern discussed earlier. Squad leaders consider the absence of threats and the seeking of suggestions from subordinates to be the mark of a good squad leader when on the MLR. These behaviors are not used to distinguish the good from the poor leader when on patrol however. It would seem that squad leaders expect leaders to show greater consideration for the integrity of their men when in non-stress than when in a stress situation. The difficult problems encountered by leaders when on patrol may well preclude greater attention being paid to the feelings of the rank and file in that situation.

On the other hand, squad leaders considered explaining the "why" of an order to be the mark of a good squad leader when on patrol, but as true of poor as it was of good leaders when on the MLR. In this instance, (and in the whole maintenance of prestige sub-area) squad leaders' views are identical with those expressed by superiors, and the rationale for the shift is probably the same. The success of the patrol's mission is so essential that it may be necessary to infringe upon the prerogatives of the leader in order to give the rank and file that amount of additional information which may contribute to their more effective performance when on patrol.

Intermediary Activities.—Three shifts in attitudes in the stress and non-stress situations occurred in the intermediary activities area. The one involving subordinates' attitudes towards a squad leaders'
identification with superiors' orders has been discussed in the previous section.

The two remaining shifts in attitudes involves men of superior ranks. When on patrol, superiors indicate that a mark of a good squad leader is that he questions orders which seem unreasonable. When on the MLR however, this behavior is reported to be as true of poor as it was of good squad leader. The importance of securing a reevaluation of orders of doubtful wisdom is obviously of greater importance when on patrol than when on the MLR. This probably accounts for the attitude shift.

Superiors consider the public criticism of superiors when on the MLR to be the mark of a poor squad leader, but consider the practice as true of good as it was of poor leaders when on patrol. Here we see an apparently more lenient or tolerant attitude being taken towards the leader's behavior when on patrol than when on the MLR, a leniency confined to a non-tactical (public criticism of superiors) rather than a tactical (directly concerned with accomplishing the combat mission) problem. Public criticism of superiors however, is not tolerated when the squad leader is not under stress.

Maintenance Activities.—Subordinates and squad leaders differed in their attitudes towards the retention and care of clothing and equipment in the stress and non-stress situations. Subordinates indicated that when on patrol, a good squad leader could be identified by the fact that he urged his men to retain their belongings as well as urged them to keep these belongings in good condition. However, subordinates
considered these practices to be as true of poor as they were of good leaders when on the MLR. Thus, and consistent with earlier findings, subordinates expect their leader to exert greater and stricter control over his men in a stress than in a non-stress situation.

Squad leaders attitudes were the reverse of that of subordinates, for while squad leaders considered concern with the retention and care of belongings the mark of a good squad leader when on the MLR, they indicated that good and poor leaders were about equally likely to show this concern when on patrol. Here again it would appear that squad leaders feel that the problems of leading men under stress conditions precludes great attention being given to the relatively fringe area of supply economy.

Subordinates also showed a tendency to be critical of squad leaders who discard their own belongings when on the MLR. They indicated that good and poor leaders were about equally likely to abandon such belongings when on patrol. This reflects a more tolerant attitude towards a leader's personal conduct when under stress, and a less tolerant attitude towards his conduct in the relatively secure situation.

Attitudes towards a leaders' checking on his men's physical condition also appears to be related to the type of situation in which it occurs. Subordinates considered checking on men's physical condition to be the mark of a good squad leader both when on patrol and when on the MLR. Squad leaders viewed it as such when on the MLR, but when on patrol, they indicated that it was as characteristic of poor as it was of good squad leaders. The pressing problems of leading under stress
conditions may preclude a squad leader frequently checking on his men's physical condition.

Superiors attitudes towards checking on physical condition were somewhat different. They considered it to be the mark of a good squad leader when on patrol, but as true of poor as it was of good squad leaders when on the MLR. The squad leader, who on patrol, finds the time to check on his men's physical condition is obviously to be commended. When on the MLR however, it is perhaps a routine operation, one which does not distinguish the good from the poor leader.

Attitudes towards food and drink were also related to the specific combat situation. While all ranks agreed that a squad leader should urge his men to conserve food and water rations when on patrol, little emphasis was placed upon this behavior when on the MLR. The relative certainty and abundance of food and water when on the MLR may well preclude emphasis upon their conservation.

Concern with the consumption of native foods or with native sources of drinking water was also somewhat different in the patrol and MLR situation. No consistent pattern however, was evident. It should be remembered that the data was gathered from men who served in Korea and since food habits of native Koreans and Americans are quite different, there was relatively little desire on the part of the soldier to consume native food or liquor. This was particularly true inasmuch as the soldiers frequently indicated amazement, if not disgust, with Korean standards of food preparation and cleanliness.
Tactical Activities.—Two behaviors in the tactical activities area were viewed differently when on patrol and when on the MLR. Squad leaders indicated that the mark of a good squad leader in both situations was the fact that he knew exactly where each of his men was located. Subordinates agreed with this evaluation when on the MLR but felt that poor leaders were as likely as good leaders to know the whereabouts of their men when on patrol. This more lenient attitude of subordinates when on patrol is surprising for we might expect them to place great emphasis upon a leader having such knowledge. In some respects however, such knowledge is more readily secured when on patrol than when on the MLR. When on patrol, it is essential that the men retain contact with one another for their own personal safety. Thus, it is to the advantage of the individual soldier himself, to make his whereabouts known to his leader. When on the MLR however, the individual soldier has a greater incentive to conceal himself from his leader. Possible assignments to work details place high value upon remaining concealed.

Superiors indicated that knowledge as to the whereabouts of his men was the mark of a good squad leader when on patrol, but as true of poor as it was of good leaders when on the MLR. Certainly it is more important to have this knowledge when on patrol than when on the MLR. The relative availability of this knowledge in the two situations may not be fully appreciated by superiors.

Men of all ranks agreed that a leader should urge his men to do nothing that would reveal their position to the enemy when on patrol.
Only superiors were highly commendatory of such concern when on the MLR. Subordinates and squad leaders indicated that such behavior was as true of poor as it was of good squad leaders when on the MLR. Thus, they apparently show little concern with such extreme precautions when there is relatively little danger to the men concerned. Men interviewed on the MLR frequently indicated that "we know where they (the enemy) are and they know where we are." In view of such an evaluation of the enemy's level of information, there is little to be gained by cautioning men not to litter the front of the MLR or by cautioning them against smoking in the open. Again, consistent with earlier findings, subordinates are willing to accept, even expect, direction and supervision from above when they realize that much is at stake.
RANK DIFFERENCES IN EVALUATIONS OF BEHAVIORS

While the soldiers included in this study all served in front line rifle platoons, they differed in the positions they occupied with reference to squad leaders. Their rank provided a guide as to the position they occupied. Some were subordinate to squad leaders, others squad leaders, and still others superior to squad leaders. As was to be expected, the squad leadership expectations of the men in these three groups frequently differed. In this section the unique leadership expectations of the three rank groups are briefly summarized.

Subordinates: Soldiers of subordinate ranks were second only to those of superior ranks in their certainty as to what a squad leader should do, both when on patrol and when on the MLR.\(^3\) That is, subordinates frequently and clearly identified a behavior as being desirable or undesirable. An examination of the behaviors so evaluated gives some clues as to the psychology of the rank and file when in combat.

As has been pointed out earlier, subordinates expect close supervision and direction from their leader when on patrol, but resent such

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\(^3\)The relative certainty of superiors may well reflect their leadership training in NCO school or in OCS as well as, to a lesser extent, their greater opportunity to observe and compare a number of squad leaders in action. The relative certainty of subordinates may well reflect their having a clear conception of what they expect of a leader and this ideal probably rests in a great extent upon their need to protect their own interests rather than their having had formal leadership training or the opportunity to observe and compare a number of squad leaders in action. Moreover, this idealism is not tempered by a first hand knowledge of the pressures on the squad leader in combat.
supervision and direction when on the MLR. They wish their opinions to be sought and respected by the leader when on patrol but again place little emphasis upon the behaviors when on the MLR.

Attitudes of subordinates towards behaviors confined to the MLR situation also show interesting patterns. Subordinates show relatively little enthusiasm for housekeeping, such as the retention and care of clothing and equipment, personal cleanliness, and food and water discipline. Favoritism is selectively criticized by subordinates. While they show little interest in discrimination in the distribution of clothing, equipment and food, they are quite sensitive to it in the areas of details, guard duty, and the luxury areas of PX rations and recreational opportunities. This probably reflects the fact that the equitable distribution of necessities is insured by their tangible quality as well as by established and supervised rules of procedure imposed by the squad as a whole and even by superiors.

Subordinates also show relatively little interest in certain tactical activities particularly when on the MLR. They are unconcerned with the broader combat picture, the location, strength, and activities of other military units, but they are vitally interested in their units future. They show relatively little interest in keeping in contact with adjoining units, with the preparation of range cards, or with behaving in such a manner as to reduce the likelihood of revealing the unit's position to the enemy. When on patrol they show little interest in knowing the patrol's position. When on patrol, and particularly
when on the MLR, subordinates show little interest in the maintaining of security.

On the positive side, and in addition to what has been pointed out above, subordinates show great interest in their leader's efforts to defend his men in their relations with superiors. This is evident in their favorable attitudes towards leaders who question superior's orders and who "buck for their men" with reference to the necessities and luxuries of combat living. Subordinates are also highly sensitive to friction within the squad and laud leaders who attempt to minimize such friction.

In the strictly tactical sense, subordinates stand out in their concern with the effective deployment of men under various terrain conditions.

**Squad Leaders:** Compared to men of subordinate and superior ranks, men of squad leader ranks were relatively uncertain as to what a squad leader should do. That is, men of squad leader ranks were the ones most inclined to identify a behavior as being about as true of good as it was of poor squad leaders. While this pattern was evident in the MLR situation, it was most apparent in the patrol situation. On approximately one-third of the patrol situation behaviors, the evaluations of subordinates and superiors were more in agreement with one another (either favorable or unfavorable) than were the responses of either with squad leader's responses (uncertain). (See Tables I-V in Suppl. Ant.) An examination of the patrol behaviors exhibiting this pattern gives some clues as to the psychology of squad leaders when on patrol.
Compared to subordinates and superiors, squad leaders place less emphasis upon the desirability of: letting men know how they stand with reference to their performance, taking the advice of their men, explaining the why of an order, and admitting when they are wrong. Squad leaders, (as well as superiors) also were relatively indifferent to the seeking of advice from subordinates. Thus, it would appear that squad leaders are concerned with maintaining the prestige of the leader for they do not show approval of those behaviors which might tend to lessen that prestige in the eyes of their men.

Squad leaders were also relatively alone in their uncritical attitude towards whining and griping when receiving orders and towards the criticizing of superiors, though subordinates also showed indifference towards this behavior. They may well feel that these are the inalienable rights of all soldiers, squad leaders not excepted. The awkward intermediary position of the squad leader was also evident in their failure to identify the questioning of unreasonable orders as the mark of a good squad leader, an evaluation made both by subordinates and superiors. Here squad leaders may be underestimating the receptivity of superiors to such questioning, or they may feel that all leaders, poor as well as good, question such orders as a matter of course.

Compared to subordinates and superiors, squad leaders also placed less emphasis upon the desirability of motivating subordinates and being friendly and smiling when with them, understandably difficult in times of stress. Squad leaders were alone in their relative unconcern.
with new men, potential bug-outs, or with those of their men who might be sick or injured. Concern with supply economy when on patrol was also of least interest to men of squad leader rank. The securing and transmitting of information was of more concern to subordinates and superiors than to squad leaders.

The apparent unconcern of men of squad leader rank towards these leadership functions—their attributing of these behaviors as often to poor as to good squad leaders warrants an explanation. An examination of the data (See Tables VI-X in the Supplement) reveals that men of squad leader ranks are less critical of leaders they have rated "poor" and more critical of leaders they have rated "good" than are men of either subordinate or superior ranks. Men of squad leader ranks attribute desirable behaviors more often to poor leaders, and undesirable behaviors less often to poor leaders than do men of subordinate or superior ranks. On the other hand, they attribute desirable behaviors less often to good leaders and undesirable behaviors more often to good leaders than do men of subordinate or superior ranks. Squad leader's attitudes may rest on a number of bases.

1. Soldiers of squad leader ranks may feel a need to defend the actions of squad leaders they have rated "poor". They may have been squad leaders themselves, and consequently want to justify their own shortcomings; or they may feel a need to defend others of like ranks, particularly since these others experienced and shared the hazards and discomforts of front line combat. Thus, they would be inclined to report that poor squad leaders performed desirable acts more frequently,
and undesirable acts less frequently, than was reported by men of subordinate and superior ranks.

2. Soldiers of squad leader rank may not fully recognize the many desirable acts performed by squad leaders they have rated "good". These may be acts which are routinely performed, and while not looming prominent in the eyes of squad leaders, are recognized and appreciated by those above and below them in the platoon. On the other hand, soldiers of squad leader rank may be recognizing the humanness of these squad leaders by attributing undesirable acts to them somewhat more frequently than was attributed by men of subordinate and superior ranks.

3. Soldiers of squad leader ranks, may have a better knowledge of the restricted range in which all squad leaders have to operate. Many have been squad leaders. Consequently, they are the ones most likely to be aware of the problems faced by squad leaders—the conflicting demands of subordinates and superiors, the difficulties of operating under physical and emotional stress of combat, and the like—than are men of subordinate and superior ranks. Thus, men of squad leader rank may feel that all squad leaders are doing all that they can or should do. The contrary evaluation of subordinates and superiors suggests that men of squad leader rank either do not appreciate the needs and expectations of those above and below them, or that subordinates and superiors do not fully appreciate the problems of combat leadership.

4. Another explanation lies in the actions of the squad leaders themselves. All squad leaders may be uncertain as to the best way of
handling particular problems which confront them while on patrol, and perhaps, good and poor leaders may not differ in how they handle these problems. If they do not differ, then men have little actual basis for differentiating between good and poor leaders on a given behavior. Men of squad leader ranks familiar with the actualities hesitate to make evaluations, whereas subordinates and superiors, having an ideal before them, make differential evaluation judgments.

5. Men of squad leader ranks may have the least opportunity to observe and compare the performance of a number of squad leaders, and lacking such opportunity, they may be inclined to use a less rigid standard when evaluating squad leader performance. Thus there would be relatively few behaviors upon which they would differentiate good and poor leaders.

Up to this point the isolated position of men of squad leader ranks with reference to those above and below them has been discussed in some detail. An examination of their attitudes towards other behaviors gives some clues as to squad leader’s psychology when in combat.

In many instances, men of squad leader ranks agree with men of subordinate ranks on what a squad leader should do. For example, both groups are critical of leaders who threaten their men. On the other hand, they both agree that a squad leader should defend his men in their relations with superiors, that is, "bucks" for his men, with reference to work details, clothing and equipment, PX rations, and opportunities for recreation. Squad leaders and their men both indicate that a good squad leader is impartial, by insuring that work details, the burden of
heavy equipment, PX rations, and recreational opportunities are fairly apportioned among the men. They also agree that a good squad leader shares the burden of guard duty with his men when the squad is short handed. When on patrol, both squad leaders and their men emphasize the importance of effective deployment as well as a rate of movement consistent with the ability of the men.

On the other hand, both squad leaders and their men were relatively unconcerned with public criticism of superiors or, when on the MLR, with the need to keep men sober, with showing interest in men's personal problems, or with precautions against revealing the squad's position to the enemy. Both groups considered these four behaviors to be as characteristic of poor as they were of good squad leaders.

In some instances men of squad leader ranks agree with men of superior ranks as to what a squad leader should do. For example, both indicate that the mark of a good squad leader is that he exercises close supervision over his men when on the MLR. Both believe a squad leader should criticize his men in private and accept no "back-talk" from his men. Both squad leaders and superiors would give subordinates wide leeway in the carrying out of orders when on patrol. Squad leaders and superiors agreed on the importance of supply economy when on the MLR, or the necessity for maintaining high standards of health and sanitation, and on the need to insure that men exercise care in the handling of weapons and ammunition. In the strictly tactical sense squad leaders and superiors frequently agreed. Both indicated that a good squad leader insures that security is posted and supervised, contact is
maintained with units on the squad's flanks, and that men prepared range cards. The larger combat picture, that is, concern with the location, strength, and activities of other units was also of concern to both squad leaders and their superiors.

Squad leaders and superiors frequently agreed in their indications that specific behaviors were as characteristic of poor as they were of good squad leaders. For example, both agreed that good and poor leaders were equally likely to direct orders to specific people, to seek suggestions from subordinates when on patrol, and to act on suggestions and advice when on the MLR. Squad leaders and superiors both indicated that good and poor leaders tried to keep their men cheerful and tried to keep the men in their squad a harmonious group. With reference to work details, both also agreed that good and poor leaders were about equally likely to excuse sick men and to work alongside their men when the squad was short handed. Both indicated that when on the MLR all squad leaders did not hesitate to question orders which seemed unreasonable.

Men of squad leader ranks alone showed great concern with as to how and with whom squad leaders spend their free time. They indicated that the good squad leader spends his spare time with his men, rather than with others of like rank, and with all of his men, rather than with certain buddies he may have in the squad.

Superiors: Soldiers of superior ranks were the ones most certain as to what a squad leader should do both when on patrol and when on the MLR. That is, superiors most frequently and most clearly identified a
behavior as being desirable or undesirable. An examination of the behaviors so evaluated gives some clues as to the psychology of platoon sergeants and platoon leaders when in combat.

As has been pointed out earlier, superiors expect the squad leader to exert strict control and supervision over his men, both when on patrol and when on the MLR. They are intolerant of the acceptance of "back-talk" on the part of the squad leader. They most clearly expect the leader to be courageous. Thus, it would appear that they expect the leader to live up to the conventional picture of a leader and maintain that prestige usually accorded the leader.

On the other hand, superiors show little interest in a leader's attempts to buck for his men by going to his superiors on his men's behalf. This is particularly evident with reference to the necessities and luxuries of combat living—clothing, equipment, PX rations, and recreational opportunities. They show little interest in the manner in which these goods are distributed.

Superiors show relatively little appreciation of the fact that dissension may rent a squad asunder and that leaders must take steps to reduce this dissension. They also fail to appreciate the fact that the rank and file expect the leader to "pitch in and help" on guard duty and even work details when the squad is short handed. This perhaps is related to superior's concern with maintaining the prestige of the leader noted above.

In contrast to the attitudes of subordinates, superiors show great concern with housekeeping, such as the retention and care of clothing.
and equipment, personal cleanliness, and food and water discipline.

As is to be expected, superiors also show the greatest concern with strictly tactical matters, both when on patrol and when on the MLR. Such things as maintenance of contact with neighboring units, preparation of range cards, awareness of the larger tactical picture, were of great concern to superiors.
POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF RESULTS

In considering the usefulness of these findings to the Army it is necessary to keep clearly in mind current Army doctrine in the area of small group leadership. FM22-10, Leadership and FM22-100, Command And Leadership For The Small Unit Leader are representative of the various Army publications currently dealing with this problem. References to Army leadership doctrine will be based on the material found in these two manuals.

At the outset it must be stated that the findings of this research generally do not contradict or conflict with Army leadership doctrine. The primary value of this report rests in the fact that it (1) points up leadership problems which are given little if any consideration under current Army doctrine; (2) indicates the relative acceptability to soldiers of different ranks, of leadership techniques already recognized by the Army and the implication this has for changing leadership training; (3) reveals the extent to which squad leaders are reported as utilizing good leadership techniques.

I. Leadership Problems Identified in this Research but Receiving Little if Any Mention in FM22-10 or FM22-100.

A. Leadership Expectations are Related to Rank: It was hypothesized earlier that soldiers of different rank would hold different attitudes toward specific leadership techniques. Nowhere does FM22-10 or FM22-100 deal directly or specifically with this problem of the relative acceptability of leadership techniques to soldiers differing in their position.
in the military organization. The nearest statement to the above is the repeated admonition to "try to understand the problems, military or personal, of your men" and "make a conscientious effort to become personally acquainted with your men, and recognize their individual differences".

Evidence presented in this report indicates that while in some instances subordinates, squad leaders, and superiors agree on what they expect of a leader, in many other cases there were differences in their respective expectations. That is, soldiers of different rank do in fact hold different attitudes towards specific leadership techniques. These differences primarily reflect differences in emphasis as to the desirability of specific leadership techniques rather than outright conflict in attitudes towards these leadership techniques.

The fact that disagreement exists, even in its milder form of differences of emphasis, points up an important problem for leadership. It indicates that there is great likelihood that one party in a leadership situation (e.g. squad leader) does not always fully appreciate the needs and expectations of the other two parties, (e.g. subordinates and superiors). To the extent that one party is not able to put itself in the shoes of the other parties, communication between the parties is hampered, cooperation and coordination reduced, and the successful attainment of the tactical mission jeopardized. The leader who is unaware of the expectations of those above and below him in the military organization is as likely as not to act in a manner incompatible with those expectations, even when he is not compelled to do so. Moreover, if the expectations of those above and below him conflict, being unaware
of that conflict, he will probably make little effort to reconcile that conflict.

It would seem wise then to emphasize in a leadership training program that points of view vary with position in the leadership situation and that cooperation and harmony are facilitated when soldiers know, appreciate, and take into account the points of view of others. Data available in this report throws light upon the specific needs and expectations of the three groups most directly concerned with leadership, the squad leader, those above him, and those below him.\textsuperscript{4}

B. The Leader is in a Difficult Position: While FM22-10 and FM22-100 carefully outline what the leader should do in the form of traits, principles and techniques, at no point does it make any mention or show any appreciation of the difficult and ambivalent position in which the leader finds himself when under stress. These difficulties apparently arise from the fact that under the conditions of physical hardship and psychological stress the leader must behave in a manner acceptable to both those above and below him in the military organization.

Our data reveals that squad leaders are relatively less certain as to what to do in a stress (patrol) situation. As has been pointed out earlier subordinates and superiors frequently indicated what behavior they expect of a leader when on patrol. Squad leaders, on the other hand, just as frequently failed to differentiate between good and poor

\textsuperscript{4}This point is emphasized by recent work in manufacturing plants of the International Harvester Company. See Fleishman, E. A. "Leadership Climate, Human Relations Training, and Supervisory Behavior." Personnel Psychology 1953, 6, 205-222
leaders on these behaviors. What is clearly suggested here is a lack of appreciation on the part of those above and below the leader of the many difficult problems confronting the leader when on patrol. It appears that the expectations of subordinates and superiors may be out of line with what can actually be done.

On the one hand this suggests that subordinates and superiors must be given a fuller appreciation of the problems of leadership under stress conditions. This could be done by incorporating these findings into the basic training as well as OCS curriculum. Such greater appreciation might well scale down what is expected of the leader under stress. On the other hand, squad leaders must be shown that the leadership expectations, particularly of subordinates, increase rather than decrease during times of stress. Squad leaders, consequently, must be urged to tailor their leadership techniques to the particular situation—for example exacting greater control and indicating greater certainty and confidence when on patrol. This may well call for a more exacting selection of men for leadership positions in stress situations, a selection which incorporates knowledge of the psychological variables contributing to effective performance under stress.5

C. Leadership Expectations are Related to the Stress Involved: It was hypothesized earlier that a soldier's attitude towards specific leadership techniques would be related to the type of situation in which that

technique is performed. While FM22-100 and particularly FM22-10 deal with situational differences to some extent, they nowhere indicate that situational differences affect attitudes towards control and discipline.

Evidence presented earlier indicates a striking situational difference in the attitudes of subordinates towards control from their leader. When on patrol, that is, in a relatively stressful situation, subordinates are willing to accept, in fact, demand strong firm direction and guidance from their leader. To some extent when on patrol, squad leaders and superiors are even very willing to give subordinates greater leeway and discretion than subordinates are willing to assume. On the other hand, subordinates apparently resent and chaff under close direction and supervision when the stress is reduced, that is, when on the MLR.

The bulk of the soldier's time however, both in the ZI and overseas, is spent in non-stress situations. The apparent reluctance of the rank and file to accept rigid discipline under such circumstances may be of great concern to the military. But this opposition is confined to non-stress situations. When the need for discipline is great, as when under stress, the men will submit to it. This information should reassure those in the military who feel that any breach of discipline in the non-stress situation will inevitably have unfortunate consequences in the stress situation. It should stimulate reappraisal of some basic concepts concerning discipline. This is not to argue that discipline should be de-emphasized in basic training, but to point out that discipline training is supplemented and buttressed by psychological needs when the "clips

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are down," with the result that cooperation is facilitated.

In some respects the Army's attitude with reference to discipline is contrary to that which would be in line with these findings—in actual practice the closer the situations are to actual combat, the less emphasis there is upon discipline. Mauldin's cartoons depicting the combat veteran's resentment against the strict enforcement of military courtesy and discipline in rear areas has strong bases in fact. Where the soldier wants direction and guidance it is often lacking. Where the soldier is inclined to resent direction and guidance, there it is imposed.

D. The Leader has Superiors as Well as Subordinates: FM22-10 and FM22-100 outline principles which should guide the leader in his relation with his subordinates. Yet the leader's unit is part of a larger unit. For example, the squad is part of a platoon. The platoon leader is the squad leader's leader and the relation between these two sets of leaders poses unusual problems which are only dealt with indirectly in FM22-10 or FM22-100, under the principle "employ your command in accordance with its capabilities".

A squad leader receives orders from his superiors. It is his function to implement these orders. But in order to implement these orders, it is necessary to reevaluate them, first in order to understand what is expected and second in order to consider these orders in the light of his understanding of his "commands capabilities". Army doctrine indicates great concern with the leader's prompt and proper implementation of superiors' orders but yet tends to ignore the fact
that every leader, explicitly or implicitly, must carefully evaluate these orders before attempting to implement them. This reevaluation of the order is difficult however, for a questioning of superior's orders is, by inference, also a questioning of the skill and wisdom of the superior. Army doctrine does not openly recognize the need for a leader's questioning or reevaluating of a superior's decisions.

The bulk of the leaders described in this study do in fact question orders which they deem unclear or unreasonable. Questioning of "unclear" orders was approved by all groups. Questioning of "unreasonable" orders however, was not approved by men of squad leader rank, probably because such questioning involves a more direct challenge to the wisdom of superiors. Yet, superiors approved such questioning. The fact that squad leaders appeared to be hesitant to question orders which appear "unreasonable" suggests that squad leaders either (1) misjudge superiors attitudes towards the reevaluation of orders or (2) superiors in effect do not sanction reevaluation of orders on the part of subordinate leaders. In either case it appears that Army doctrine should be cognizant of the problem by urging leaders to evaluate superiors orders rather than blindly conforming and by urging superiors to permit if not encourage subordinate leaders to reevaluate orders in the light of their knowledge of their "command's capabilities".

II. Attitudes Towards Leadership Techniques Inferred from FM22-10 and FM22-100 and Their Implications For Modifying Leadership Instruction.

Army leadership doctrine as outlined in FM22-10 and FM22-100 present a number of leadership principles and techniques. The bulk of
the behaviors analyzed in this report can be identified in these
two field manuals. This report provides information as to the extent to
which soldiers in the field recognize and approve of these leadership
techniques. To the extent that soldiers in the field recognize and approve
of these leadership techniques, we can assume that official Army leader-
ship doctrine has been substantiated. To the extent that all soldiers
in the field recognize the desirability of these leadership techniques,
we can assume that harmony within a rifle platoon is increased and its
effective combat performance facilitated.

A. Some Leadership Techniques are Considered Distinguishing Marks
of Good Squad Leaders by All Soldiers: Many of the leadership techniques
outlined in this report were identified as a mark of a good squad leader
by squad leaders as well as by those in positions subordinate and superior
to that of squad leaders. That is, these behaviors were reportedly per-
formed more frequently by squad leaders rated "good" than by squad leaders
rated "poor," and the differences between the leaders were statistically
significant. These techniques, since they are undoubtedly acceptable to
all men in the field, can be emphasized in those training programs designed
to instruct the basic soldier, the squad leader, or platoon headquarters
personnel. These behaviors are listed in Appendix A.

B. Some Leadership Techniques are Considered Distinguishing Marks
of Good Squad Leaders by Some Soldiers but not by Others: Many of the
leadership techniques outlined in this report were identified as a mark
of a good squad leader by one rank group but not by another. (With one
exception, these differences in point of view were differences in
emphasis rather than outright conflict. For example, one rank group considered the behavior to be the distinguishing mark of a good squad leader while the other group considered the behavior to be about as true of a poor as of a good squad leader.) These differences in point of view are a potential source of ill feeling within a rifle platoon. Since such ill feeling may well lessen the platoon's combat effectiveness, it would seem well to attempt to reconcile these differences.

Such a reconciliation may be attained by changing the attitudes of any or all of the three rank groups involved in this leadership situation. Instruction can be focused upon the squad leader, upon those below the squad leader, or upon those above the squad leader. In some instances the attitude change involves the approval of leadership techniques previously not identified as the distinguishing marks of a good squad leader. In other instances, the change involves the relinquishing of leadership techniques previously judged to be the distinguishing marks of a good squad leader. These behaviors are listed in Appendices B, C, D, E, F, and G.

III. Overall Combat Performance of Squad Leaders.

Data available in this report seems to indicate that squad leaders are generally rated as being above average by those soldiers who have had the best opportunity to observe these squad leaders in action. Moreover, these rated squad leaders more often performed desirable behaviors

Superiors indicated that "keeping men occupied" was the mark of a good squad leader. Squad leaders indicated that such behavior was the mark of a poor squad leader.
than they performed undesirable behaviors. It would thus appear that in
the eyes of those soldiers who have the best opportunity to know, combat
squad leaders in the Korean War have performed well.

Three qualifications are necessary to the above statement however.
First, it must be remembered that soldiers were interviewed some months
following their actual combat experience. This lapse of time may well
have resulted in more charitable evaluations of squad leader's overall
performance, over estimations of the frequency with which these leaders
performed desirable behaviors, and under estimations of the frequency
with which these leaders performed undesirable behaviors.

Second, soldiers rated squad leaders who they had observed as squad
leaders for at least one month. Undoubtedly this has eliminated from
consideration really poor squad leaders who would have been removed from
the position of leader prior to that time. This has resulted in this
study being confined to an examination of only those squad leaders who
have performed well enough to retain command of a squad for at least one
month.

While it might be argued that the high ratings received by the squad
leaders discussed in this study reflects favorably upon the Army's current
leadership training program rather than the result of a "weeding out
process taking place in combat," available evidence indicates to the
contrary. Research conducted with combat units in Korea recently
revealed that (1) there is considerable turnover in personnel filling
the position of squad leader and (2) less than 10% of all men had
received formal leadership training of any kind.?

Third, the relatively high frequency with which squad leaders are reported to have performed desirable behaviors also probably reflects the fact that frequency of performance was based on the number of squad leaders who usually or always performed a given behavior. It is likely that few squad leaders, particularly those left in charge of a combat squad for one month or more, usually or always perform undesirable behaviors.

In conclusion, the reader should bear in mind that the data gathered from combat veterans of the Korean War amplifies existing knowledge about leadership in two aspects of combat—the stressful patrol situation and the relatively non-stressful MLR situation. The material presented here can be utilized in the basic training program as well as in the various leadership training programs now conducted by the Army—for example NCO school and OCS. These findings can be incorporated into current training programs via lectures, field manuals, field problems and other training aids. It would also seem desirable to bring these findings to the attention of soldiers in TOE units in order that they may take them into account when performing their duties in their units.

7Rodney A. Clark and Martha B. Myers, "A Description of Combat Rifle Squads on the Korean MLR During the Winter of 1952-53."
Leadership Techniques Considered Distinguishing Marks Of Good Squad Leaders By All Soldiers:

Many of the leadership techniques outlined in this report were identified as a mark of a good squad leader by soldiers of all three rank groups. These techniques, since they are acceptable to all men in the field, can be emphasized when training soldiers to fill the position of the squad leader or positions subordinate or superior to that of the squad leader.

Subordinates, squad leaders, and superiors agree that when on the MR, a GOOD squad leader can be distinguished by the fact that he—

- gives orders in a firm confident manner.
- makes sure that his orders are clearly understood.
- asks subordinates for suggestions.¹
- admits when he is wrong.
- questions unclear orders.
- tries to get food for his men.
- tries to get weapon cleaning material for his men.
- recommends decorations for deserving men.
- recommends promotions for deserving men.
- inquires about future work details and guard duty.
- inquires about the future plans of his unit.
- tells his men what he knows about the unit's future plans.
- tells new men about the squad's past and likely future.
- introduces the new men to the older men.
- cautions older men to look out for the new men.

¹See APPENDIX C for attitudes towards this behavior when on patrol.
raker sure that his men have adequate clothing and equipment.
keeps his clothing and equipment in good condition.
keeps himself clean.
makes sure that when showers are available his men take them.
makes sure that latrines are prepared and used.
makes sure that his men use prophylactics when exposed.
makes sure that his men test-fire and zero-in their weapons.
makes sure that his men have adequate food and water.

trains his men to work as a team.
trains each man to know every other man's job.
teaches his men about tactics, weapons, etc.
tries to increase his own knowledge.

urges his men to improve their living and fighting position.
urges his men to improve obstacles on enemy approaches.
tells his men all he knows about friendly and enemy units.
tells his men all he knows about the squad's tactical and logistical situation.

finds out the current challenge and password.

urges his men to pass information to him.

stays up with his men where he can lead them.

Subordinates, squad leaders, and superiors agree that when on patrol

a GOOD squad leader can be distinguished by the fact that he—

gives orders in a firm confident manner.
makes sure that his orders are clearly understood.
checks to see that his orders are promptly and properly carried out.

explains, whenever possible, the "why" of an order.

\[See \text{AIP\text{DIX D}} \text{ for attitudes towards this behavior when on the MLR.}\]
\[See \text{AIP\text{DIX C}} \text{ for attitudes towards this behavior when on the MLR.}\]
admits when he is wrong.

questions unclear orders.

keeps his clothing and equipment in good condition.

makes sure that his men conserve their food and water rations. 4

uses radio and telephone properly.

uses good formations on roads.

uses good formations crossing valleys.

uses good formations passing through wooded areas.

urges his men to pass information to him.

takes notes for the patrol report.

knows the exact location of the patrol.

tells his men how, when, and where to move.

urges his men to retain contact with one another.

cautions his men to do nothing that will reveal their position
to the enemy. 5

encourages his men through his words and actions.

pays particularly close attention to new men.

stays up with his men where he can lead them.

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4 Reported by all soldiers to be as true of poor as of good squad leaders when on the MLR.

5 See APPENDIX B for attitudes towards this behavior when on the MLR.

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Leadership Techniques Which Soldiers In A Squad And Squad Leaders Consider To Be The Distinguishing Marks Of Good Squad Leaders But Which Are Not So Identified By Soldiers In The Platoon Headquarters:

Many of the leadership techniques used in this study have been identified as the distinguishing marks of a good squad leader by subordinates and squad leaders but have not been so identified by superiors. Soldiers in platoon headquarters should recognize the fact that squad leaders and their men alike expect squad leaders to employ the leadership techniques listed below. Squad leaders and their men, on the other hand, should be made aware of the fact that the combat situation may make it difficult for soldiers in platoon headquarters to fully appreciate and respect their wish for squad leaders to employ the leadership techniques listed below.

When on the MLR—

6 does not threaten his men,
objects when his men are put on too many details.
tries to get clean clothing for his men,
tries to get clothing and equipment for his men.
tries to get PX ration for his men,
objects when his men have too few recreational opportunities.
goes on guard when the squad is shorthanded.
is fair when assigning men to details.

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6Reported by all soldiers to be as true of poor as of good squad leaders when on patrol.
is fair when apportioning PX rations.
is fair when apportioning opportunities for recreation.
checks on his men's physical condition.?
knows the exact location of each man in his command.8

When on patrol—

rotates the job of carrying heavy equipment or weapons.
uses a map and compass properly.
does not move too fast for some or all of his men.
uses good formations through villages.
uses good formations crossing streams.
uses good formations crossing open areas.

7See APPENDIX G for attitudes towards this behavior when on patrol.
8See APPENDIX D for attitudes towards this behavior when on patrol.
APPENDIX C

Leadership Techniques Which Soldiers In A Squad Consider To Be The Distinguishing Marks Of A Good Squad Leader But Which Are Not So Identified By Squad Leaders Or Soldiers In The Platoon Headquarters:

Many of the leadership techniques used in this study have been identified as the distinguishing marks of a good squad leader by subordinates, but have not been so identified by squad leaders and superiors. Squad leaders should employ, and soldiers in platoon headquarters should urge squad leaders to employ, the leadership techniques listed below. Soldiers in the squads, on the other hand, should be made aware of the fact that the combat situation may make it difficult for squad leaders to employ the leadership techniques listed below, and for soldiers in platoon headquarters to appreciate and respect their wish to have squad leaders perform these techniques.

When on the ME—

direct his orders to specific people.
does not "ride" his men.
compliments his men when they do well and chews them out when they do poorly. 9
acts upon good suggestions offered by subordinates. 10
explains, whenever possible, the "why" of an order. 11
questions unreasonable orders. 12

9See APPENDIX G for attitudes towards this behavior when on patrol.
10See APPENDIX G for attitudes towards this behavior when on patrol.
11See APPENDIX A for attitudes towards this behavior when on patrol.
12See APPENDIX G for attitudes towards this behavior when on patrol.
inquires about future recreational opportunities.

helps his men on work details.

tries to keep his men cheerful.

excuses from detail, men who are sick whenever possible.

tries to settle arguments that arise in the squad.

tries to discourage the formation of incompatible cliques in the squad.

does not abandon or discard any of his own clothing or equipment.\(^{13}\)

stays sober himself.

cautions his men not to consume native food or liquor.\(^{14}\)

tells his men the current challenge and password.

When on patrol—

asks subordinates for suggestions.\(^{15}\)

identifies with his superior's orders.\(^{16}\)

cautions his men to purify questionable water.\(^{17}\)

\(^{13}\)Reported by all soldiers to be as true of poor as of good squad leaders when on patrol.

\(^{14}\)See APPENDIX F for attitudes towards this behavior when on patrol.

\(^{15}\)See APPENDIX A for attitudes towards this behavior when on the MLR.

\(^{16}\)Reported by all soldiers to be as true of poor as of good squad leaders when on the MLR.

\(^{17}\)See APPENDIX F for attitudes towards this behavior when on the MLR.
Leadership Techniques Which Squad Leaders And Soldiers In The Platoon Headquarters Consider To Be The Distinguishing Marks Of A Good Squad Leader But Which Are Not So Identified By Soldiers In The Squad:

Many of the leadership techniques used in this study have been identified as the distinguishing mark of a good squad leader by squad leaders and superiors but have not been so identified by subordinates. Soldiers in the squads should be made aware of the fact that the combat situation may make it necessary for squad leaders to employ the leadership techniques listed below and for soldiers in platoon headquarters to require squad leaders to employ these techniques. Squad leaders and soldiers in platoon headquarters, on the other hand, should be made aware of the rank and file's relative indifference towards the employment of these techniques.

When on the MMR—

- checks to see that his orders are promptly and properly carried out,\(^{18}\)
- supervises his men,
- criticizes his men in private,
- does not let his men talk-back to him,
- makes the best man in the squad his assistant,
- makes sure that his men do not abandon or discard their clothing or equipment,\(^{19}\)
- makes sure that his men keep their clothing and equipment in good condition.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{18}\)See APPENDIX A for attitudes towards this behavior when on patrol.

\(^{19}\)See APPENDIX C for attitudes towards this behavior when on patrol.

\(^{20}\)See APPENDIX G for attitudes towards this behavior when on patrol.
makes sure that his men keep their living facilities clean.
keeps his own living facilities clean.

makes sure that first aid is given to the sick or injured.

makes sure that his men are careful when handling weapons or ammunition.

assigns specific men to act as security.

tries to keep in contact with units on his flanks.

urges his men to prepare range cards.

finds out all he can about friendly and enemy units.

When on patrol—

gives his men leeway in carrying out orders.
does not let his men talk-back to him.

makes sure that first aid is given to the sick or injured.

assigns specific men to act as security.

knows the exact location of each man in his squad.\textsuperscript{21}

keeps his men informed as to the patrol's location.

\textsuperscript{21}See APPENDIX B for attitudes towards this behavior when on the MLR.

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Leadership Techniques Which Soldiers In The Platoon Headquarters Consider To Be Distinguishing Marks Of A Good Squad Leader But Which Are Not So Identified By Squad Leaders And Soldiers In The Squad:

A few of the leadership techniques used in this study have been identified as the distinguishing mark of a good squad leader by superiors but have not been so identified by squad leaders or subordinates.

Soldiers in the squads and squad leaders should be made aware of the fact that the combat situation may make it necessary for soldiers in platoon headquarters to require squad leaders to employ the leadership techniques listed below. Soldiers in platoon headquarters, on the other hand, should be made aware of squad leaders' and their men's relative indifference towards the employment of these techniques.

When on the "MLR---

- pays close attention to "8 balls".
- does not publicly criticize his superiors. 22
- helps his men with their personal problems.
- tries to keep his men sober.
- keeps his men occupied—even on unimportant tasks.
- cautions his men to purify questionable water. 23
- uses different return routes when returning from patrol when possible.

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Reported by all soldiers to be as true of poor as of good squad leaders when on patrol.

See APPENDIX C for attitudes towards this behavior when on patrol.
cautions his men to do nothing that will reveal their position to the enemy.24

24 See APPENDIX A for attitudes towards this behavior when on patrol.
Leadership Techniques Which Squad Leaders Consider To Be The Distinguishing Marks Of A Good Squad Leader But Which Are Not So Identified By Soldiers In The Squad Or Soldiers In The Platoon Headquarters:

In a few instances behaviors identified as the distinguishing marks of a good squad leader by squad leaders have not been so identified by subordinates or superiors. Since these behaviors are of relatively less concern to subordinates and superiors, they do not warrant emphasis in a leader training program.

When on the MLR—

- spends his spare time equally with all of his men.
- does not spend his free time primarily with other NCOs.
- is fair when apportioning food and water rations.
- learns all he can about the new men.
- makes sure that garbage and refuse are properly disposed of.

When on patrol—

- gives his men rest breaks whenever possible.
- cautions his men not to consume native food or liquor.  

See APPENDIX C for attitudes towards this behavior when on the MLR.
APPENDIX C

Leadership Techniques Which Soldiers In The Squad And Soldiers In The Platoon Headquarters Consider To Be The Distinguishing Marks Of A Good Squad Leader But Which Are Not So Identified By Squad Leaders:

Many of the leadership techniques used in this study have been identified as the distinguishing marks of a good squad leader by subordinates and superiors, but have not been so identified by squad leaders. Squad leaders should be made aware of the fact that, in combat, soldiers in the squads and in platoon headquarters expect squad leaders to employ the leadership techniques listed below. Soldiers in the squads and in platoon headquarters, on the other hand, should be made aware that the combat situation may make it difficult for the squad leader to employ the leadership techniques listed below.

When on the MLR—

- does not whine or gripe when receiving orders.
- mingles with people—does not stay off by himself.
- is fair when apportioning clothing and equipment rations.
- has a friendly word and smile for his men.
- shares his liquor and cigarettes with his men.
- makes sure that all key positions are kept covered.
- passes information along to his superiors.
- moves from position to position checking on his men.

When on patrol—

- compliments his men when they do well and chews them out when they do poorly.\(^{26}\)

\(^{26}\)See APPENDIX C for attitudes towards this behavior when on the MLR.

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acts upon good suggestions offered by subordinates.  
questions unreasonable orders.

does not whine or gripe when receiving orders.

has a friendly word and smile for his men.

does his best to bring sick and wounded back.

makes sure that his men do not abandon or discard their clothing or equipment.

makes sure that his men keep their clothing and equipment in good condition.

checks on his men's physical condition.

passes information along to his superiors.

pays particularly close attention to likely "bug-outs".

27 See APPENDIX C for attitudes towards this behavior when on the MLR.
28 See APPENDIX C for attitudes towards this behavior when on the MLR.
29 See APPENDIX D for attitudes towards this behavior when on the MLR.
30 See APPENDIX D for attitudes towards this behavior when on the MLR.
31 See APPENDIX B for attitudes towards this behavior when on the MLR.