Living Jointness
Bottom-Up Review
Standing Up Coalitions
Vietnam as Military History

Theater Missile Defense
Atkinson as Crusader
Defense Transportation

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL
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The greatest lesson of this war has been the extent to which air, land, and sea operations can and must be coordinated by joint planning and unified command.

—General Henry H. ("Hap") Arnold

Report to the Secretary of War
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The cover features an Abrams main battle tank at National Training Center (Military Photography/Greg Stewart). Insets (top left) Operation Desert Storm coalition officers, (bottom left) infantrymen fording a stream in Vietnam (DOD), (top right) students at the Armed Forces Staff College (DOD), and (bottom right) a test launch from USS Bunker Hill (U.S. Navy).

The front inside cover and cross-over page captures Boeing B–17Gs of the 8th Air Force’s 91st Bombardment Group (Heavy)—known as “The Ragged Irregulars”—over England during World War II (National Air and Space Museum/USAF Collection).

The background illustration for the table of contents depicts a C–5 Galaxy transport during Operation Able Sentry (Combat Camera Imagery/Efrain Gonzalez), Scots (from top left) 6/502nd Infantry arriving in Macedonia (Combat Camera Imagery/Efrain Gonzalez), F/A–18 Hornet being readied for takeoff from USS America during Operation Deny Flight (Combat Camera Imagery/Raymond T. Conway), EOD officer putting on parachute (U.S. Navy/Aaron Harris), Scud missiles being recovered during the Persian Gulf War (U.S. Air Force/John Wolters and Troopers of the 1st Air Cavalry Division moving into Bong Son District in South Vietnam during Operation White Wing (U.S. Army/Gilbert L. Meyers).

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I am pleased to offer a few thoughts to the readers of Joint Force Quarterly in this, the third issue. JFQ fills a longstanding gap. It offers a professional forum to trade views and opinions, discuss ideas, and educate ourselves on jointness.

As General Powell did in the inaugural issue, I invite any and all to participate, to submit articles, or at the very least to read and mull over what others are thinking. There are no boundaries on who should be writing for this journal. Napoleon was a young and relatively unseasoned officer when his brain was forming the electrifying ideas that would revolutionize warfare and overpower nearly every army in Europe. A little over a century later, a young, medically discharged captain named Liddell-Hart was struggling to get Britain’s senior military leaders to hear his controversial views on warfare. Unfortunately, his own military wouldn’t listen, but its future enemy did. When it comes to good ideas, neither rank nor age confers a monopoly.

JFQ is intended to stay at the vanguard, to raise and air controversies, to tell us what we don’t understand. Since World War II we have moved a long way toward jointness. It has been a prolonged march, punctuated by occasional disagreements, but ushered by a recognition that unity is dangerous as a battlefield advantage over disunited opponents. But jointness is not a science, it is surely not static, and the march is by no means over. We need this journal, we need it to be open-minded, and above all it must be accessible. When you think back to General Billy Mitchell’s frustrating crusade to educate the Armed Forces about the dawn of airpower, General George Marshall’s tireless efforts to form a unified military establishment, or the more recent efforts by our own Congress—in the face of considerable military stubbornness—to formulate and pass the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it only emphasizes why we need JFQ. There is always room for improvement and there is a ceaseless challenge to adjust to new developments.
In the past four years alone, our Armed Forces participated in 29 major joint operations. Each and every one has been different. They have ranged from a large-scale conventional war in the Gulf through the embargo pressures we are even now applying against the dictators holding Haiti in their grip. Withal there are countless new lessons and observations which impact on the future of jointness.

At the same time, literally hundreds of possible reforms, criticisms, and suggestions are percolating inside the think tanks that ring Washington, within our own Congress, and between ourselves. They need to be explored, their strengths assessed, and their warts exposed. We have to distinguish between those worth embracing and those that are dysfunctional or risky.

JFQ must contribute to this exchange and, based on these first three issues, I think we are right on the mark. I encourage both the editors and contributors to keep it up. To those of you who have worked hard to give JFQ this good start, all of us are very appreciative. Thank you.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The readers of this issue of JFQ will find a diverse range of contributions, from a critique of the Bottom-Up Review to the lessons of the Vietnam War. But one particular topic that emerges from among the articles, namely, coalition warfare, deserves special mention. In the current transitional era—between the end of the Cold War and an uncertain new world order—the United States faces the prospect of forging and leading ad hoc multinational coalitions to quell regional unrest abroad and to meet a myriad of other challenges to national security.

Today many people who think or write about coalitions are of two minds about their utility. One view is that coalitions are strategic force multipliers, indispensable vehicles for bolstering both political and military power. As the support for the Gulf War evidenced, multinational coalitions afford international legitimacy while providing enormous resources in human and material terms. The other view of coalitions is that they seldom equal the sum of their parts (or, more precisely, their partners). Systemic impediments prevent coalitions from achieving their potential. Napoleon once remarked that “If I must make war, I prefer it to be against a coalition” and Churchill mused that “The history of all coalitions is a tale of the reciprocal complaints of allies.” Such skepticism on the subject of coalition warfare is deeply rooted in Western history and the profession of arms.

Perhaps there is another way to view coalitions that refrains from both undue optimism and excessive skepticism, but instead is grounded in an understanding of national limitations. “There is no state so powerful,” said the renowned Swiss jurist Hugo Grotius, “that it may not some time need the help of others outside itself. . . .” This has been true of all major conflicts waged in this century, including the Cold War; it also promises to be axiomatic in the dawn of the next century.

The contributions in JFQ Forum focus on the implications for joint and combined warfare of standing up coalitions. From this series of articles a number of pressing concerns come to the fore, among them that:

▼ clearly defined national objectives may be more difficult to reach today, but they are particularly vital for coalitions to avoid interest and mission creep (as illustrated by policy on Somalia)
▼ efforts must be made to improve U.S. participation in U.N. operations by centralizing DOD support, raising the level of defense advice given to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and harmonizing U.S. doctrine with the traditional tenets of U.N. operations
▼ joint task forces will form the nuclei of international coalitions because the United States alone possesses the wherewithal to conduct large-scale, unified actions
▼ future coalition commanders must learn to achieve unity of purpose and effort, maximize interoperability, and minimize the risks to American members of coalitions.

Above all, one idea clearly flows from the articles in JFQ Forum: whether or not coalitions are effective largely depends on the strength and capacity of their leaders. As Eliot Cohen has observed, “only the greatest efforts by statesmen . . . [can] secure unity and celerity in a coalition of states.”

STUART E. JOHNSON
Editor-in-Chief
Joint operations are taken almost as a given in Pentagon pronouncements and it is virtually impossible to find anyone who professes to be against them. The unanimity with which they are endorsed, however, is not supported by an in-depth, well-articulated grasp of what joint operations are or how to conduct them.

There are some areas of agreement. By definition, joint operations involve more than one service component, and most professional officers would argue, I think, that the fundamental reason for having joint operations is to increase overall combat effectiveness.

Competing Views

Beneath these common understandings, however, there are at least two competing views of how different force components should be used to increase combat effectiveness. One view argues in favor of using the best qualified force component for a given mission which implies that overall combat effectiveness can be best enhanced by fitting forces to missions for which they are specialized. Let’s call this view the specialization argument. The other claims that higher combat effectiveness is made possible by combining forces in such a way that
higher outputs result than could be achieved by simply adding the outputs of different forces. Let’s call this the synergism argument. These views don’t really represent two sides of the same jointness coin, and accepting one or the other ultimately leads to differing operational behavior and force structures.

Discussions of joint operations often refer to a toolbox analogy which entails an admonition to consider all the forces available to a joint commander as if they were the contents of a toolbox. In this analogy a joint force commander can pull the forces needed to do the job from the toolbox, regardless of whether the tools bear the markings of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force. An advocate of what I called the specialization view of joint operations would say that the toolbox analogy is exactly right and explain that a joint commander turns to the box and chooses the right tool for the job. For instance, if required to plan and conduct a strategic bombardment campaign, the joint commander would assign the missions to the force component that knows the most about strategic bombardment campaigns—perhaps to the Air Force. An advocate of what I termed synergism would also say the toolbox analogy was exactly right. But he would explain that a joint commander would put together the right tool out of various force components. Then if a job required strategic bombardment the air assets available from all services would be combined in the most productive way by a joint commander.

The operational implications of these two views, I suggest, vary greatly so far as the use of force is concerned. The essence of specialization is to clearly differentiate combat responsibilities along force specialty lines and break out missions by service components while that of synergism is almost the opposite, at least with respect to mission assignments. Specialization takes advantage of inherent efficiencies in the integrated traditions, doctrines, discipline, and procedures of a single service; synergism blends particular service strengths on a mission basis to provide higher combat output than either any single service or the sum of individual service contributions could produce.

Each view leads down a separate path of logic and to a different practical understanding of joint operations. Specialization, for example, ultimately argues in favor of a command and control system that keeps the responsibilities and operations of various service components distinct and separate. Interaction among service components, according to this view, should be concerned with maintaining distinctions and keeping lines of responsibility from overlapping, for operational clarity will keep components from getting in each other’s way and allow them to carry out their particular specialty with greatest effectiveness. There is synergism also in this approach, for if each service component meets the demands of its particular mission, the result will be an effective, smoothly conducted war or operation. That is, if Air Force, Navy, and Army components focus on air, sea, and ground campaigns respectively, the overall operation will benefit. Air Force resources will not be diluted by allocating sorties to support Army ground operations, Navy resources will not be stretched between providing gunfire support to the ground campaign and destroying an opponent’s naval forces, and Army resources will not be diverted to protect Navy or Air Force bases. Is this an exaggerated extension of the inherent logic of this view? Yes. But it is essentially the logic that girds spirited defenses which each service makes in justifying its own aircraft, communications, and logistics systems.

The logical extension of synergism generates similar problems of unreasonableness. When pushed to the extreme, for example, it not only erodes individual service traditions, doctrines, and procedures, but ultimately argues in favor of unification and differentiating among forces strictly in terms of functional capabilities. However rational such a
conclusion might be, of course, going too far could undercut recruiting, training, and preparing men and women who make up the force as suggested by the Canadian experience with unification.

I have exaggerated both arguments to point out the differences between them. In the real world the contrast is not as dramatic, and as Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the use of force in an actual conflict is likely to involve aspects of specialization and synergism. But it is important to note that two potentially divergent views of joint operations underlie the discussion. Neither has as yet prevailed, though both have legitimate claims on our understanding of jointness. This leads me to make two suggestions.

**Practical Meaning**

My first suggestion is to promote day-to-day activities by the forces of all services which will work out a practical balance between the two views of jointness. The Armed Forces, in large measure due to the active interest of General Colin Powell in developing an in-depth understanding of joint operations, has come a long way in this regard over the last several years. There are more joint exercises being conducted today than at any other time since the end of World War II. It’s hard to argue, however, that there will ever be too many. More importantly, I think we have to go further in trying to work out the practical meaning of jointness and in defining where the right balance really lies between specialization and synergism. In short, we must step beyond the idea of joint exercises toward operating jointly on a continual basis. This goal challenges both the current joint command structure and the peacetime activities of all services other than participation in joint exercises. It challenges the existing joint command structure because it argues for creating standing joint commands (as opposed to joint task forces) at the tactical level, the level of command most often engaged in actual war fighting—that is at corps, numbered fleet, and numbered air force level. Currently joint commands do not extend to this level. While joint task force commands do, they are almost always formed for specific operations. What I am suggesting here, however, is what might be called standing joint force commands at the regional three-star level, maintaining direct operational command over units of each service that normally would only be part of an identifiable joint command in a particular operation or crisis.

**An Interim Understanding**

The practical meaning of jointness is derived essentially from promoting joint exercises and joint operations, and will emerge as operational forces work out the myriad aspects of what joint operations entail. The military does not, however, have the luxury of not thinking about what joint operations should be until all the details are worked out. We in the Navy, in particular, are in need of a non-rhetorical definition of what joint operations imply, because we have committed ourselves to them both in the way we expect to use naval forces and in the designing, structuring, and sizing of naval forces for the future. We have stated formally in documents such as “...From the Sea” that the primary role of naval forces is to “enable joint operations in littoral areas,” and we have informed Congress and the
American people that we will build a Navy that is better able to do this.

To return to the distinction between the two notions of jointness, the Navy ought to line up behind synergism because this view is far more compatible with the concept of enabling.

Enabling Joint Operations

Some have argued that enabling is something temporal in character, referring primarily to the ability of forward deployed naval forces to be the first on the scene in a crisis; and if the crisis cannot be contained, to secure beachheads and prepare for the arrival of ground and ground-based air power. Once accomplished, according to this argument, naval forces fight alongside the other forces and—after the objectives of the operation are achieved and the ground and ground-based air power withdraw—cover the post-conflict period. I think this is an important part of what the Navy ought to mean by enabling.

But there is more to it. I believe the concept of enabling ought to extend throughout these stages, and that naval forces ought to operate continually with the purpose of aiding and facilitating operations of the other service components that will be involved in conflict. We ought to operate naturally in such a way that we help the Army do what armies must do, and assist the Air Force in doing what it must do. This does not posit a subordinate or unique role for naval forces. The Air Force and Army also ought to add this concept of enabling to their operations. And it does not mean the Navy can or should abandon its classical conflict focus on control of the seas, even if the seas are most likely to be the littorals of the world for the foreseeable future. But, for the Navy, it means coming to appreciate the priorities of conflict and peacetime operations from the perspectives of the other services and acting accordingly.

To illustrate this point, I would like to suggest how naval forces could enable some basic concerns of the Army and Air Force, respectively, in littoral warfare. My example for the Army is taken from what military planners are wrestling with as the Army develops its expeditionary force concept and that for the Air Force deals with something long near and dear to air power theorists—strategic bombardment.

Building Ground Power

Recognizing changes in the world, and particularly the likelihood of fighting where there are no prior overseas deployments, the Army has been developing an understanding of expeditionary warfare. This is not the place to discuss the emerging concept in any detail, but one key aspect is the need for a sequential, rapid build-up of power in the region in which conflicts will occur. Briefly, the Army’s answer to the problem of fielding overwhelming, combined arms force rapidly in a potentially hostile environment focuses on deploying units in a logical sequence; those arriving early would be charged with and capable of both preparing for the arrival of larger, heavier units logistically and protecting their arrival. Thus, the Army normally plans for the early deployment of units that can protect themselves and provide air and ballistic missile defenses.

The sequential approach to the buildup of power has long been a central tenant of the Army view of expeditionary warfare, and the Army has long recognized the inherent tension between building its strength sequentially and in a defensible manner, and doing this rapidly. It takes time for units that arrive initially to get in place, and the rate at which following units can arrive and take up their places is a function of available lift and reception capabilities. Airlift, the fastest way to deliver forces, will always be constrained by the capacity to provide all the things everyone wants in the theater of operations early. And such constraints delay the rate of building ground power.

The Navy’s role in assisting the build-up of Army power has traditionally been reflected in terms of how fast weapons and materiel can be delivered to the intended debarkation points by sea. But there are other ways in which the Navy can cooperate to increase the rate of building up Army strength abroad. One is to provide or to cooperate in establishing air defense and ballistic missile defense screens that are a key early step in the Army build-up sequence. Another is to hold up the advance of enemy land forces
by focused surveillance, intelligence, and fires from tactical aircraft, naval guns, and sea-based missiles, including Tomahawk land attack missiles and seaborne versions of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).

The agility of sea-based systems allows them to be deployed in such a way as to provide for the air and ballistic missile defense of any coastal area. Operationally, this can mean extending a defense umbrella over systems like the Patriot or Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), by protecting areas where land-based air and ballistic missile defense systems are established. In a regional conflict in which there is a premium on the rapid build-up of land-based forces, sea-based theater defenses could be of particular benefit. This is because of the airlift required to transport a land-based defense system. Getting a THAAD battery in position to protect against missile attacks eats up airlift. And since a regional commander faced with a possible missile attack would want to establish a defense against it as the first step of a deployment, airlifting a land-based system would eat up lift capabilities precisely when competing transport demands would be highest.

The sea-based system could ease competition for airlift in one of two ways: by providing a defensive umbrella to allow later introduction of a land-based system or by obviating the very need to deploy a land based system at all.

**Cooperative Engagement and Forward Passes**

But a more synergistic approach would be to deploy the fire control radar of the land based system and link them with the Aegis missiles off shore. The demanding airlift requirements to establish a land-based ballistic missile defense system are generated largely by what it takes to transport the missile and missile support components of systems like THAAD. Accordingly, transporting only the
radar initially would ease the demands on airlift greatly when competition for it would be high. The basic idea would be to deploy an air and ballistic missile defense system that could use land-based radars to detect, track, and control missiles from the sea for the intercept.

Cuing and communications to support this forward pass concept are technically feasible. They would allow land-based acquisition and fire control radar, perhaps located at the extremities of the land coverage provided from the sea-based defense system (which is a function primarily of the range of fire control line-of-sight radar aboard the Aegis ship), to identify the "basket" into which the sea-based interceptors would be fired, and then to assume control of those missiles and direct destruction of incoming ballistic missiles or aircraft. In effect, this cooperative arrangement would extend the range at which the sea-based missile launching platform could destroy ballistic missiles while easing the early demands on airlift, thus allowing a more rapid introduction of other land and land-based air forces.

**Enabling Strategic Bombing**

The concept of strategic bombardment grew out of the search for ways to avoid the bloody horror of ground force attrition warfare. In its modern form, it is an intellectually compelling, well-articulated expression of the difference between decisive and overwhelming force. That is, one of the arguments running through the growing body of literature about strategic bombardment theory is that it is possible to defeat an opponent by focusing air power on the command, control, and logistics links between enemy leaders and their forces. Near simultaneous, relatively quick, and sustained destruction of such links, the argument goes, leads to the disintegration and paralysis of an opponent’s operations. And precision guided munitions, coupled with rapid, comprehensive, systematic, and accurate target acquisition and battle damage assessment make this possible. The bombing campaign that can result from melding this argument to advanced military technology is an example of decisive force, as opposed to overwhelming force, since it attains war goals quickly without annihilating enemy forces.

The potential success of strategic bombing campaigns and validity of the theory supporting them are contentious, largely because many consider them an argument for shifting resources to the Air Force. While I believe such concerns are unwarranted, this is not the occasion to debate them. It is important, however, to note three fundamental points about strategic bombardment campaigns. First, whether called strategic bombardment campaigns or not, interest in bringing force to bear in the manner of strategic bombing is a key and integral part of the U.S. approach to conflict. Second, and because of this, the issue facing naval forces is not whether strategic bombing theory is totally correct but rather how best to contribute to successful strategic bombardment campaigns. Third, the answer to this question revolves around how the services operate together in conducting campaigns. Successful strategic bombing campaigns will be the product of joint operations—they will not be the purview of a single service.

Moreover, what does it mean to say that naval forces ought to enable a strategic bombing campaign, and in particular what should their relationship be with the Air Force? The answer in part lies in the keys to a successful strategic bombing campaign. Two of the most important are accurate, timely intelligence on an opponent’s operational scheme as well as the key command and control nodes and links through which an operational scheme can be implemented, and a judicious, efficient use of all the military assets that can attack those potential targets.

Accurate, timely, and complete intelligence is the essential precondition of a successful strategic bombardment campaign, for if the wrong targets are struck and the nodes
that are truly critical to an opponent’s military operations are missed, then the tremendous potential leverage of precision guided munitions is nullified. As one Air Force manual states: “Air power is targeting, and targeting is intelligence.” Many targets that become key to strategic bombing are discernible long before an opponent embarks on aggression. They are embedded in the national infrastructure, and many of them—roads, bridges, and communications towers relied upon to conduct military operations—are truly fixed targets. They don’t change or move during the bombing campaign. But effective targeting depends on knowing which potential targets are important and where nodes critical to an opponent are when operations begin. That’s harder. Knowledge depends profoundly on surveillance and intelligence generated before a conflict, and on the capacity, once hostilities start, to keep track of both efforts to destroy vital nodes and an opponent’s efforts to overcome or circumvent our bombardment.

No single service can do this alone. The problem is too complex and demanding. It can be done jointly, however, by all force components working together to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate the necessary information. And the contribution of naval forces will be essential, for they are the most likely to be on the scene providing surveillance and intelligence before, during, and after strategic bombing campaigns. They can do this with a broad range of platforms available to them, from submarines which gather information covertly, to surface platforms which gather the entire spectrum of signals intelligence, to aircraft (manned and unmanned), and to personnel on the ground. And, tied into the nets through which other sources of information flow, they can provide on-scene intelligence and assessments which are key to effective targeting.

Judicious and efficient use of attack assets is another necessary component of successful strategic bombardment. Efficiency stems in part from good targeting—picking the key targets and destroying them when it will have the greatest effect. But this also involves getting the destructive output needed from each of the attack assets committed to the campaign. And that is a function of close coordination with supporting and participating forces.

Stealthy B-2 bombers and F-117 attack aircraft are effective, deadly, and efficient assets. Their stealth enables them to be used in areas where an opponent has heavy anti-aircraft defenses and, since they are highly survivable, the aircraft and their pilots can be employed again and again. With precision guided munitions, they can destroy virtually any target in a single sortie. But their effectiveness is even greater when they are employed with diversionary attacks by aircraft which can be provided by naval forces, when air defenses are suppressed by manned or unmanned assets such as naval attack or electronic warfare aircraft and cruise missiles, when provided with real-time target updating from naval manned and unmanned aircraft, and when it is necessary to rescue pilots which in some cases may only be possible by using naval forces in the theater. The efficient use of attack assets also means that the strategic bombing campaign should not be limited by the vagaries of weather or by the fact that daylight erodes the stealth characteristics of aircraft like the B-2 or F-117. That is, the success of a strategic bombing campaign depends on severing many links in an opponent’s command and control system more or less simultaneously, and keeping them severed for an extended period. This simply cannot be done by attacking only at night and, given that the leverage offered by stealth is greatest at night, it means other aircraft must conduct the campaign during the day. Against heavily defended targets the most effective weapon in daylight is likely to be the sea-based Tomahawk land attack missile.

Finally, efficient use of attack assets in some cases means that they should not be
diverted to air defense missions and that their overall efficiency depends on the air defense security. In the aftermath of Desert Storm there was considerable debate over the extent to which naval aviation contributed to the success of the strategic bombardment campaign against Iraq. A great deal of the discussion was narrow-minded because it focused on how many precision guided munitions were used by Air Force and Navy aircraft respectively, along with similar bean counts which missed the bigger picture. One reason Air Force tactical fighters were so effective in bombing missions, for instance, was because the Navy controlled the air space over the Gulf. If this had not been the case the Air Force would have had to divert aircraft from striking targets to air defense missions. This is the kind of synergism that often gets overlooked. It is, however, a prime example of how naval aircraft enabled Air Force aircraft to contribute to the air campaign in the Persian Gulf War.

The key to success in strategic bombardment campaigns is the effective use of precision guided munitions, which depends in the first instance on coordinated, focused surveillance and intelligence. And that is best achieved by blending capabilities from all service components with the special perspective of national space-based assets. It means practical, operational links between Air Force assets like Rivet Joint RC–135s that provide electronic surveillance and reconnaissance with similar platforms provided by naval forces like the EP–3s and ES–3s. Together, these assets can provide a better electronic map of an opponent and his forces than either can do separately. It also means tying together the tactical assets of two force components. Air Force and Navy manned and unmanned vehicles can provide a far better, more comprehensive picture of the campaign than either one operating on its own. This means coordinated planning which brings people together in the same way they do for joint war games, seminars, and day-to-day operations by second nature.

Which brings me back to the central point. The question of whether joint operations are desirable has been resolved for some time. Everyone agrees that they are here to stay and should stay fundamentally because they increase the efficiency by which the Nation uses military power. The outstanding question is what jointness means in a practical sense which can be resolved only though experience—by experimentation, doctrinal development, and military exercises. But we should not kid ourselves. While the trends are favorable, we have a way to go before we can claim to have made the transition from rhetoric to reality insofar as jointness is concerned. To complete this important transition we will have to keep pushing, for making joint operations second nature to the Armed Forces means continued innovation, probable organizational changes, and a deep sense that operating jointly is the way things ought to be.

**NOTES**

1 The Army provides ample references. See, for example, Gordon R. Sullivan, “Moving into the 21st Century: America’s Army and Modernization,” Military Review, vol. 73, no. 7 (July 1993), and “Projecting Strategic Land Combat Power,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 1 (Summer 1993).

The American military came out of Vietnam demoralized if not broken by the experience. The services all had serious problems, including racial friction and drug abuse. Toward the close of the conflict in Indochina the Armed Forces instituted various far-reaching changes. Some of them were forced on the services, others were initiated from within the military. These changes included the end of conscription and the introduction of the All Volunteer Force as well as the Total Force concept, plus a renewed emphasis on professional education for officers.

Decline and Rise

Change is never easy. The collapse of the Republic of Vietnam in April 1975 ended a long national nightmare. As the military sought to reconstitute itself from inside out, it also had to deal with a nation that wanted to turn away from things military. At the same time the Armed Forces confronted continuing challenges posed by the Warsaw Pact while maintaining a substantial force structure but at the expense of readiness.

By 1980, however, defense spending was simply inadequate. The military had become a fundamentally hollow, unprepared force with ships that were unable to sail, aircraft that could not fly, weapons disabled by shortages of spare parts, personnel unsuited for service in the force, and inadequate operational training. The tragedy of Desert One, the unsuccessful attempt to rescue our hostages from Teheran that resulted in the death of eight Marines, symbolized the state of disrepair to which the Armed Forces had been reduced in the post-Vietnam period.

Summary

Events following Vietnam reinvigorated the military and led to the prominence of jointness: the end of the draft, the All Volunteer Force, the Total Force, and improved military education all helped to pave the way. The credibility of the Armed Forces ebbed with Desert One which prompted the Reagan administration to vow to restore American military strength. The Goldwater-Nichols Act redistributed institutional power across the defense establishment—under the rubric of jointness—and made possible the unified command structure which performed so effectively in the Gulf War. Jointness was recently given another boost by the Report on the Bottom-Up Review. But the force structure proposed in the review may not be adequate to cope with simultaneous regional conflicts as envisioned. We must not endanger our security in a frenzy of cost cutting only to find ourselves faced once again with a hollow force.
When he entered office in 1981, President Reagan convinced Congress that defense cuts in the 1970s under Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter had left the Nation exposed. The humiliation of Iran holding Americans hostage for 444 days, along with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, convinced the public that change was required. Defense spending which increased during the final years of the Carter administration was raised substantially by the incoming Reagan administration.

**Goldwater-Nichols**

Early in the Reagan years other changes affecting the military were also taking place. Two articles published in 1982—by General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and by General Edward “Shy” Meyer, Army Chief of Staff—made the same point. The defense establishment was in need of substantial changes to improve the way it did business. So was born what came to be known as defense reorganization which culminated four years later with passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Goldwater-Nichols was fundamentally about rearranging power among institutions within the Department of Defense—namely, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, and the unified commands. It reduced the influence of the service chiefs and increased the power of the Chairman and commanders in chief (CINCs), the commanders with responsibility for employing U.S. forces in given theaters of combat. It also helped simplify the chain of command. This occurred as a result of the 1983 House Armed Services Committee investigation of the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. Among other problems, the committee found fault with a complicated chain of command. An example of how business was conducted before and after Goldwater-Nichols helps to illustrate this finding. The chain of command during the Vietnam war was anything but clear and simple. While Generals Westmoreland and later Abrams ran the ground war in South Vietnam, the Navy ran its own air operations over the North as did Air Force. And while the Air Force ran tactical aircraft from headquarters in Vietnam, the Strategic Air Command maintained its own chain of command through the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington for B-52 missions against targets in the North. In other words, operational coordination was a nightmare. American military leaders violated one of the fundamental principles of war, unity of command.

Goldwater-Nichols corrected the problems of Vietnam by strengthening the authority of the theater commander. Thus in the war in the Gulf, the Commander in Chief of Central Command, General Norman Schwarzkopf, commanded all forces in the theater whether Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force. The military buzz word for this ability to fight together in a unified fashion is jointness. Unlike the experience in Vietnam, the effort was coordinated by a single commander in the theater running the entire show. Goldwater-Nichols made this unity of effort possible.

**Professional Military Education**

The House Armed Services Committee Panel on Professional Military Education (PME) was established in the wake of Goldwater-Nichols and undertook the first comprehensive review of PME by Congress. Its charter was to assess the military’s ability to develop strategists and to review joint education requirements under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. The panel’s findings appeared in a 206-page report which had two major thrusts. One established a conceptual model in which each level of schooling builds on previous levels and each college has a clear, fundamental teaching focus. The other urged resurrecting two joint colleges—the National War College (NWC) at the senior level and the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) at the intermediate level—to the prominence they enjoyed in the early post-World War II period. Under this scheme...
schooling at service colleges would precede joint education.

The principal recommendations focused on joint institutions, a proposed National Center for Strategic Studies (as a reconstituted NWC was referred to) and AFSC. Numerous suggestions sought to strengthen these institutions by combining greater operational competence at the military level with sound, imaginative strategic thinking at the national level.

End of the Cold War

The Berlin Wall fell a few months after the House report on military education was issued and shortly after that, the Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, crafted a new “national military strategy” which envisioned the end of the Cold War. It differed from Cold War strategy in a number of ways. First, it envisioned the primary threat as regional rather than global. Second, it emphasized conventional forces instead of nuclear weapons. Third, forward presence replaced forward deployment as the key to protecting U.S. interests around the globe. The military would be primarily U.S.-based, especially the Army and the Air Force. Subsequently, the Base Force, articulated by DOD, spelled out the new military strategy. It envisioned a 25 percent reduction in both forces and funding by the mid-1990s.

Service and Joint Reorganization

In the midst of these momentous developments each military department began efforts to reorganize for the future as did DOD as a whole. The Air Force, for one, published a white paper entitled “Global Reach, Global Power” in 1990, a visionary document which outlined a strategic planning framework for the post-Cold War world. Venerable institutions such as the Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, and Military Airlift Command passed into history. In their place the Air Combat Command incorporated all winged firepower—fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, command and control, tactical airlift, and rescue—in one organization. The Air Mobility Command acquired most mobility and refueling assets: strategic transport, tanker, and medical evacuation aircraft. The number of major commands was reduced from 13 to 8.

The Navy—regarded as the service traditionally most resistant to change—also responded to the end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War in dramatic fashion by issuing a white paper in 1992, “...From the Sea.” The result of a year-long study, it incorporated two assumptions: America and its allies would control the seas and most future military operations would be joint. This strategy symbolized a new way of thinking. The focus of future operations shifted from open seas to coastlines. In concert with the Marine Corps, the emphasis on littoral warfare marries naval forces and the priorities of both services. “The Navy and Marine Corps will now respond to crises and can provide the initial, ‘enabling’ capability for joint operations. ...”

In many respects the Army instituted a number of far-reaching changes twenty years ago. The bitter outcome of Vietnam was reflected in three crucial decisions which affected this service more than any other: the end of the draft and beginning of the All Volunteer Force, the creation of the Total Force concept, and the establishment of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Fortress Monroe, Virginia. Recruiting high school graduates and adequately paying them built an Army of high-quality people. TRADOC yielded great dividends. First-rate training programs, as symbolized by the National Training Center at Fort Irwin in California, and a renewed emphasis on PME helped produce combat leaders who had studied war and were well prepared when called to action. Those officers responded magnificently in Panama and in the Gulf with campaign plans that produced quick victories with few casualties. Although less prone to white papers than other services, the Army is indeed undergoing fundamental change as it becomes “A Strategic Force for the 21st Century.” The Army is coming home; it will be primarily based in the United States rather than forward deployed as in the Cold War. Substantial force reductions have led to inactivating four divisions and one corps along with consolidating fifty-one war reserve stocks to five.

As all the services reorganize for the post-Cold War era, each understands that most future operations will be joint or multiservice.
This view was underscored in 1991 by Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*. That document and the related effort to develop joint doctrinal publications will help the services to work more closely together in a period of declining budgets and force structure. Leading thinkers in each service can offer their creative talents toward integrating the disparate ways the military thinks about employing forces. The publication in 1993 of the first issue of *JFQ* was another tangible indication that jointness had finally come of age.

While the services were busy adjusting to the changed political circumstances in the world, the Chairman was also busy reviewing defense policy. As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, General Powell issued a report on roles, missions, and functions of the services in 1993. Two considerations dominated the report, improving the way the Armed Forces fight and saving money in the process. The report noted the dramatic changes that have taken place already: the creation of Strategic Command, the elimination of nuclear weapons in the Army and the Marine Corps, and the end of the need to maintain chemical weapons brought about by the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention in January 1993. The report also highlighted savings from further consolidation among the services of depot maintenance and flight training.

Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee in March 1993, General Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, described the roles and missions report as “simply a snapshot of a continuous process of self-evaluation that occurs every day. The Joint Staff will continue to examine other

as all the services reorganize for the post-Cold War era, each understands that most future operations will be multiservice
areas for possible consolidation or elimination.\textsuperscript{7,8} The Joint Staff will soon get more help. The DOD Authorization Act for FY 94 included a provision calling for the establishment of a commission on roles and missions of the Armed Forces. It will have seven members appointed by the Secretary of Defense and will issue a report within a year of its first meeting.

**Jointness in the Post-Cold War Era**

In September 1993 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin reported the results of the long-awaited Bottom-Up Review. The review envisions a force designed to fight two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously, one that is smaller than the Base Force and appears to cost 10 percent less. Overall active duty strength will decline from 1.6 million to 1.4 million. The force level will allow for the permanent stationing of 100,000 military personnel in Europe and 98,000 in the Pacific. To bolster the capability of a smaller force the Pentagon plans to add airlift and sealift, preposition Army equipment in both the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia, develop and procure more precision guided weapons (especially anti-tank munitions), and improve Reserve component forces.

If truth be told, I have serious reservations about the Bottom-Up Review. Peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcement, and other peacetime contingencies have increased dramatically in the brief period since the end of the Cold War. Such operations impinge on the military’s ability to carry out the national military strategy to fight two major regional conflicts. In addition, I question that the force described in the review can fight two regional conflicts even if all U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations was terminated: the overall force is too small. The Bottom-Up force is underfunded, overstretched, and verging on hollowness while a declining defense budget pays for nondefense functions such as industrial conversion, drug interdiction, and environmental cleanup.

As the size of the force decreases so does our margin of error. As a result, the requirement for greater jointness increases as a way to compensate for smaller forces. This growth in jointness takes two forms, greater cooperation in the field and fleet among each service’s respective combat forces and greater attention to matters that concern two or more services in the planning, research, and development phases of the acquisition process. The former is the primary responsibility of the CINCs and the latter that of the Joint Chiefs working with the services. Airlift, prepositioning, sealift, command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I); space, ballistic missile defense, and advanced munitions are just some of the cross-cutting issues that must be addressed from a joint perspective early in planning and R&D.

**Atlantic Command**

The return of units formerly deployed overseas to bases in this country means that a larger and more important segment of the overall defense establishment will be stationed at home. Except for those forces attached to Pacific Command, all other forces in the United States now come under U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) which was established on October 1, 1993.

This was recommended in the Chairman’s 1992 “Report on Roles, Missions, and Functions of Armed Forces of the United States” and is the fourth such effort. There
was Strike Command in 1961, Readiness Command in 1971, and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in 1980 (which is now Central Command). While service parochialism undermined the first two efforts, ACOM should succeed for two reasons: first, Goldwater-Nichols gave unified commanders authority over component commanders which they previously lacked and, second, since 1986—especially after the Gulf War—jointness has not only become fashionable but has also proven itself.

**Joint Exercises**

Prominent among the activities of the trend toward greater jointness are training exercises. ACOM is charged with the joint training of forces based in the United States. Reductions in forces stationed abroad makes it crucial that the forces which reinforce regional commanders arrive fully capable of operating as a joint team. The services had five months to prepare for the Gulf War and we must assume that any potential opponent learned from that experience not to give the American military time to prepare for combat.

This is not an easy matter to work out. Service expertise comes first. Service personnel—both officer and enlisted alike—must first become skilled as soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. Service skills progress from the individual to the unit. Much time, effort, and training is needed to become combat ready, be it an infantry battalion, ship, or fighter squadron. Finding time for both service and joint training is difficult. Balancing service and joint needs may require emphasis on service training with field exercises and joint training with computer-aided staff exercises. Advanced simulation technologies now exist that allow service and joint staffs to participate in staff exercises from remote locations. This will result in improved joint interoperability.

There is still a requirement to conduct field exercises for forces that normally do not work together: Army armor units supporting Marine Corps infantry units, naval gunfire support for Army forces, Air Force tankers refueling Navy fighters, Army helicopters working with Navy ships, and Navy attack aircraft providing close air support to Army and Marine Corps units. These are just some of the activities that require joint training exercises among the services.

At the same time, regional unified commands must also conduct joint training exercises in theater. And forces deployed from the United States in the future will have to be well grounded in joint warfare fundamentals and better prepared to conduct combat operations on arrival in theater. If we fail to train in peacetime we will have to learn in wartime at the high price of American lives.

**Joint Doctrine, Training, and Education**

Each service has come to understand the importance of doctrine, the prescribed procedures and fundamental principles for conducting combat operations. The Army established TRADOC twenty-one years ago. In 1993 the Navy and the Air Force established doctrine centers at Norfolk Naval Base and Langley Air Force Base, respectively.

As the importance of joint training increases in the post-Cold War era, so does that of joint doctrine. The newly established Joint Warfighting Center (JWC) will promote both joint doctrine and training. It consolidates activities of the Joint Warfare Center at Hurlburt Field, Florida, and the Joint Doctrine Center (JDC) already in Norfolk. Situated at Fortress Monroe, Virginia, JWC is responsible to the Chairman through J–7 (Operational Plans and Interoperability). ACOM will also play an important role in evaluating, testing, and sequencing the development of joint doctrine by working closely with JWC.

Yet, if current efforts to improve joint training and doctrine are to be institutionalized and have a permanent impact, more needs to be done. At present JDC reviews recommendations for joint doctrine but doesn’t formulate it. The time has come to increase the stature and responsibility of JDC by remaking it into a Joint Doctrine Command with a major role in formulating doctrine.

Careful consideration must also be given to where JWC is located in the Norfolk area. JDC is already there as are TRADOC and the Naval Doctrine Command, ACOM, and AFSC, while the Air Force Doctrine Center is near by at Langley Air Force Base.
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President, National Defense University, need to focus attention on the role of AFSC in this whole effort towards greater jointness. The purpose of the college is to prepare students for immediate assignment to the unified commands or to the Joint Staff. AFSC is intended to be a hands-on school, teaching students to cope with the kinds of problems faced in joint assignments. The absence of adequate wargaming facilities hinders AFSC in accomplishing its mission. Placing JWC at the college would resolve this inadequacy. At the same time, AFSC offers JWC a source of expertise for evaluating and developing joint doctrine. Such a move would have a mutually reinforcing effect.

In 1923 Major George C. Marshall, the future Army Chief of Staff, described the regular cycle in the doing and the undoing of measures for the national defense. He noted in a speech to the Military Schools and Colleges Association that “we start in the making of adequate provisions and then turn abruptly in the opposite direction and abolish what has just been done.” Today we are in the midst of making one of those changes in direction.

World conditions have changed. Both forces and defense budgets should be reduced. But President Clinton remarked at West Point in May 1993 that while “(defense) budget cuts . . . at the end of the Cold War were necessary . . . there is a limit beyond which we must not go.” He underscored that concern in an interview on the same occasion indicating that he wanted “to send a cautionary note to the House and Senate . . . that we have cut all we should right now.”

The challenge now is to reduce the size of our military without putting our national security at risk. There are still threats to American interests in the world that cannot be ignored. Military power still counts in the late twentieth century and will in the twenty-first as well. The United States must maintain a ready, modern, and sufficiently powerful military to meet any contingency. As the military gets smaller, the necessity for the services to fight as an integrated force increases.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower got it right more than thirty years ago when he observed in a message to Congress that:

Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparation and organizational activity must conform to this fact.

Those thoughts of a former President and five-star general should guide both civilian and military leaders responsible for shaping the Armed Forces of today for the missions of tomorrow.

NOTES

1 Panel members included Joseph E. Brennan, George Darden, Jon Kyl, Solomon P. Ortiz, Owen B. Pickett, John G. Rowland, and Ike Skelton (Chairman).
5 Department of the Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps, “...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century” (1992), p. 12.
6 Ibid., p. 2.
7 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Report on the Roles, Mission, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States” (February 1993).
8 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, statement before the Committee of Armed Service, House of Representatives (February 1993), p. 10.
Assessing the Bottom-Up Review

By Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.
The recent Bottom-Up Review of defense requirements for the post-Cold War era offers us an insurance policy to minimize security risks to the United States. Like other insurance policies it is accompanied by a blizzard of data, underwritten by the best minds in the field, and brings with it a hefty price tag at $1.2 trillion for five years of coverage. While it has attractive features, overall the plan offers insurance we probably do not need, at a cost the Clinton defense budget likely can’t afford. Equally disturbing, it may not insure us against the security challenges that we are most likely to face beyond the five-year coverage period.

We buy insurance to cover risks. Against what risks is this new plan designed to insure? This is difficult to discern since the administration has yet to reveal its national security strategy. In the absence of that guidance, the review assumes the United States must be able to act unilaterally in fighting and quickly winning two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (for planning purposes, another Gulf War and a war on the Korean peninsula). It argues that, in the event we deploy forces to fight in one region, another hostile state might initiate aggression elsewhere if we are unprepared to fight and quickly win there as well. Interestingly, this planning requirement was originally established during the Bush administration.

Insuring quick success in two simultaneous regional wars is expensive. But what are the odds of such an event occurring? This is difficult to discern since the administration has yet to reveal its national security strategy. In the absence of that guidance, the review assumes the United States must be able to act unilaterally in fighting and quickly winning two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (for planning purposes, another Gulf War and a war on the Korean peninsula). It argues that, in the event we deploy forces to fight in one region, another hostile state might initiate aggression elsewhere if we are unprepared to fight and quickly win there as well. Interestingly, this planning requirement was originally established during the Bush administration.

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Insuring quick success in two simultaneous regional wars is expensive. But what are the odds of such an event occurring? Since America became an active global power following World War II, it has fought regional wars in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf. The United States committed the majority of its combat power to each of these contingencies, a point worth noting since the Soviet Union was the other major regional contingency during two of the conflicts. Yet the Soviet Union never attempted to exploit this situation by initiating aggression in another region of the world. Nor did Moscow pressure one of its client states to do so.

Furthermore, while force is important in deterring aggression, the Nation’s political leaders can play a crucial if not decisive role in deterrence. The Korean and Gulf Wars themselves might have been averted altogether had the United States clearly stated its intention to fight in the event of aggression. One should recall Dean Acheson’s speech in which he placed South Korea outside of the U.S. security perimeter in the Far East, and the ambiguous message transmitted by Washington to Saddam Hussein on the eve of his invasion of Kuwait. Force is no substitute for a clear sense of national interests and a strategy to preserve them. For deterrence to work, our resolve must be both clearly communicated and credible. Unfortunately, the current administration’s track record thus far in crises such as Bosnia and Somalia leaves a good deal of room for improvement.

In any event, given President Clinton’s early focus on peacekeeping, peacemaking, nation building, and humanitarian assistance operations, meeting two regional contingency requirements may prove to be an elusive goal, especially considering shortfalls in strategic airlift. Presumably, part of the requisite combat capability could be made up by our allies. But the review asserts that U.S. forces must be sized and structured to act unilaterally. In some ways that begs the question of what constitutes President Clinton’s national security strategy. Are we buying an insurance policy to meet the Pentagon’s regional contingencies? To meet the administration’s peacemaking objectives? The review concluded that we will not have the forces to conduct operations in places such as Somalia and Bosnia and, at the same time, meet the regional conflict contingency requirements.

More worrisome, amid debate over short-term requirements we run the great risk of failing to realize that unlike the Cold War the greatest challenges to our security lie beyond the review’s five-year coverage period.
It is in the so-called out years that we will likely face the consequences of military technology diffusion and weapons proliferation—including those of mass destruction—in the Third World, and possibly a new great power challenge. Secretary of Defense Aspin himself cited these two challenges in identifying his “four dangers” to U.S. security.

But with a few notable exceptions—tactical ballistic missile defenses, for one—the review is focused on near-term threats. Why does the review accord relatively little emphasis to longer term dangers? If (more likely when) Third World countries acquire nuclear weapons, late-model cruise and ballistic missiles, and access to satellite photography, the Armed Forces will have to operate in very different ways to retain the freedom of action—and success—that they enjoyed in the past. Yet the review calls for a force for the next century that is essentially a slimmed-down version of the Bush administration’s base force which was crafted when the Soviet Union existed. This is hardly surprising since the review wargamed U.S. forces fighting the kind of tank-heavy forces that characterized the Cold War. In a sense, the military is falling into the same trap as other successful military organizations: it is preparing to fight the last war better instead of the next war.

Furthermore, history rarely presents cases where one military organization has dominated for a protracted period. Typically another challenger (or coalition) arises relatively quickly. If the United States dissuades or deters the rise of a major challenger—and the prospect of another arms race—it will be due in large part to an effective, long-term national security strategy and the force structure to support it. Unfortunately, that is not the kind of insurance policy the Pentagon is proposing. The Clinton budget cannot pay the premium on this five-year, short-term insurance policy. Secretary Aspin admitted to being 13 billion short of the 104 billion savings target mandated by Clinton over the Bush plan. And with Congress rejecting the administration’s call for a one-year freeze on military pay, the Pentagon is very likely to be more than $30 billion short. Moreover, the ends-means gap is likely to widen over the next five years unless military operations and support accounts are reduced substantially more than in past efforts.

A force structure that is too big for the budget may suffer in numerous ways. Siphoning money from research and development can beggar capabilities and our insurance against long-term risks, cutting operations and maintenance can erode readiness, and reducing procurement can lead to a lag in modernization and eventually to a procurement balloon payment in the out years when equipment must be replaced. In essence, we are mortgaging our future security. When we may need insurance most, we could well be financially strapped by an insurance plan that has expired.

It also makes sense to take out a group insurance policy against common risks and thereby reduce individual premiums. The Bottom-Up Review presumes that the Armed Forces must be prepared to act alone in regional conflicts. But it seems reasonable to assume that regional states that are most threatened would join us to defend themselves. It is also encouraging that in many areas of potential instability our prospective allies are wealthier than our potential adversaries, and they can well afford to pay their share of the premiums to insure against risks to our common interests.

The Aspin team must be commended for providing a point of departure for a long overdue debate over defense needs. But we can’t afford a rich man’s approach when purchasing insurance for defense. Nor are we likely to be able to buy our way out of future mistakes as easily or as painlessly as in the past.
Since the end of the Persian Gulf War—if not the Cold War—coalition warfare has become a catchword. Pundits and practitioners alike support the notion of harnessing multinational forces to respond to regional contingencies. But few have clearly outlined the terms of coalition warfare, and detailed doctrine has yet to be articulated. The four articles which comprise JFQ Forum do not proffer a ready-made formula for conducting coalition war, but they do provide a basis for mulling a wide range of issues on joint and combined task forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

The first article reminds us that coalitions often lead decision-makers to lose sight of national interests and enlarge military missions; it also spells out guidelines for balancing the advantages of combined versus unilateral control of forces. The second suggests ways to minimize the existing tensions between U.S. and U.N. military culture. Then a third article reviews some of the salient aspects of forming joint and combined task forces. And a final piece rehearses recognized principles for planning and executing coalition warfare that may benefit future coalition commanders.
The rules of the coalition game have changed. The high hopes for multinational coalitions as responses to crises in the wake of Operation Desert Storm are threatened by disillusionment and disorientation. Suddenly problems of interest creep and mission creep have arisen. We do not seem capable of containing political interests and military objectives any longer.

It has now become commonplace to view Desert Storm as a post-Cold War exception that proves the new post-Cold War rule. We have even surveyed the world and described the kind of situation that will be the rule: internal conflicts involving breakdowns of civil order. But we have not looked at how the rules for our proposed response to these situations—multinational coalitions—have changed. Nor have we thought about the implications of these changes in setting American political and military objectives. Let’s first review the old rules.

▼ America was the head honcho—and set the agenda which others followed.
▼ The West accepted the U.S. lead because of a shared vision.
▼ America did the big ones—from Korea to Kuwait—which were the real coalition wars and the United Nations got smaller countries to do the noncombat peacekeeping operations.
▼ In American-led coalitions, the U.N. role was limited to providing the seal of legitimacy.
▼ U.S.-led military coalitions were against clear adversaries.

These Realities Died Along with the Cold War

But to a large extent we still want to plan for coalitions and to sometimes, at least, set our objectives according to the old rules even though we know the rules have changed and say as much while discussing the problems of U.N. incrementalism.

Interest creep, mission creep, and incrementalism—these phrases describe real difficulties, but they are not post-Cold War conundrums. We’ve seen them before in Vietnam and Lebanon. Our preoccupation with them suggests a larger sense of loss of control, of unclear goals. But do these seemingly prevalent problems in post-Cold War, U.N.-sponsored coalitions have solutions?

To better understand these problems, we need to explore two important questions: Why do we hold onto the old set of rules (with some modifications)? How can holding onto them frustrate our efforts to define viable, limited objectives for involvement with coalitions? Examining these questions will not yield clear-cut answers to the dilemmas confronted in Bosnia, Somalia, or Haiti. But it will provide insights into implications for setting political and military objectives as well as into the prospects for the kind of coalitions currently envisioned.

The Old Rules

First, we prefer the old rules because we liked calling the shots. We set overall coalition objectives or at least sat at the head of the table. Thus national goals coalesced with...
coalition goals. Furthermore, because we provided and controlled most coalition forces, we could tailor missions to our political objectives, or reevaluate the ends if the available military means seemed insufficient or ill-suited. Because we could be vigilant about both political ends and military missions, any interest or mission creep would have been of our own making.

Second, the old script for coalition warfare was relatively simple. There was an identified villain, like Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. For the most part, U.S. forces played the role they knew best, a combat role. And when the enemy was beaten in the field we knew who had won. This is the theater that grabs and holds public attention.

By contrast, post-Cold War peace-enforcers can’t demonize one of the parties to an internal conflict. For starters, taking sides is now seen as a violation of the internal political process of the conflict-torn country which is to be restored with the resolution of the conflict. Furthermore, more inclusive post-Cold War coalitions are likely to have partners who differ in their sympathies for the parties to a conflict. Choosing a side may mean turning one part of the coalition against another.

Third, we see the past as a system that worked. We won the Cold War, after all. And it took a lot of work to build a Cold War vision, to create institutions and processes that buttressed it. Now that the foundation upon which that vision rested—the bipolar world—is gone, we are trying to simply slide a looser foundation, the new international order, underneath the old buttresses. But the result is shaky: there is no new shared orthodoxy built upon this less firm foundation.

Since most of us recognize this deficiency, we and our former Cold War allies tinker a bit with the ideals of the old vision and make a few modifications to fit the new world in which we want to live. This is our dream of a world of cooperation, of burden-sharing, of a combined police force rather than a world policeman. Like jointness, combinedness is a peacetime ideal that tells us we can’t invest as much in force structure as we did in the past, but working together perhaps it won’t be necessary. The world is less dangerous: there may be ugly scraps, but no Evil Empire.

Past and Future

How does holding onto the modified past affect how we choose our objectives? How can it result in interest or mission creep? First, the Washington foreign policy establishment still wants to lead. It’s like having a leadership reflex, and it will make choosing our battles harder in a world where choice is less clear-cut. Although few conflicts pose direct threats to U.S. security, there are a lot of troubles in the world with strong moral appeal. And many voices will call out to us for help including some Americans who are linked by satellite to countless tragedies. Ironically, some may pine for the old constraints of a bipolar world and Soviet vetoes in the U.N. Security Council.

Second, it is unlikely our coalition partners and the United Nations will allow us to lead in the old-fashioned way. But they too are used to our leadership; many Europeans admit they await an American initiative on Bosnia, despite the talk about European solutions to European problems including some outside Europe’s borders. And, when things get dicey in ongoing operations, our partners

when things get dicey, our partners expect the U.S. cavalry to ride over the hill

Dixon

U.S. and Korean marines during Team Spirit ’93.
expect the U.S. cavalry to ride over the hill. Their reflexes complement our own.

Third, we are bio-engineering a hybrid type of coalition which blends the two traditional varieties of multinational coalitions: peacekeeping operations and coalition warfare. But we are not observing this process with the scientific detachment of Mendel: we are the hybrid. The American military knows the characteristics of coalition warfare better than it knows the traits of a pure blue-helmeted force. These traits are better understood by the United Nations and its smaller members. So the hybridization is not complete. Incomplete integration means partial understanding. We probably see the risks and costs of fighting more clearly (although we have lessons to learn when it comes to urban guerrilla warfare) while others will be better prepared for long-term peacekeeping operations. Almost 1,500 troops are assigned to the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which has been there since 1964, and some 5,200 troops make up the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which was formed in 1978. So hybrid coalitions may have shorter life spans than peacekeeping operations. Some are apprehensive about the magnitude of forces which coalitions might eventually require. The bottom line is that both interest and mission creep are likely due to a poor understanding of what is needed to achieve objectives.

Finally, military planning does not fit the new idea of coalition operations. Conditions for committing forces include limited objectives with clear exit strategies based on an attainable notion of victory; overwhelming or decisive force, and a clear U.S. interest. The criteria will be hard to pin down. But the Armed Forces, Congress, and the American people still expect them to be met. Initially supportive public opinion could prove fickle as the cost of operations rises above expected levels. When satellites no longer transmit images of our troops helping hungry people but instead show American casualties, this reversal will limit involvement. On the other hand, leaders will have no victory to declare and no compelling justification to commit resources if we leave too soon and a pasted-together situation unravels again. Such costly dilemmas may engender not only case-by-case popular rejection of new types of coalitions but opposition to them in principle. And the aversion to global combinedness would not be confined to America. People in other societies would respond in similar ways.

So what does this mean for coalitions? Remember, all wars—even tribal wars—are made up of coalitions of directly interested groups. So the reaction to failed global combinedness would not mean a rejection of coalitions. But it would mean that coalitions would look different from what we expect at present. The new coalitions might be more:

- situation-specific, with objectives tailored to a conflict rather than to broad global norms
- regionally-based, as most countries directly interested are likely to be proximate
- ad hoc, not within an existing framework—though U.N. legitimacy might be sought.

Would this spell an end to the pursuit of moral and humanitarian objectives? Probably not, for it is too natural a trend to only be pushed or stalled at the margins. What it may mean is more of a free market approach which seems slower and more uneven, but which may be more enduring and effective as a means of response. For political decisionmakers and military planners it may mean that future coalitions could be very different from what we now expect.

NOTES

1 Interest creep describes situations in which original national interests in resolving a crisis or conflict—that determine political objectives or the ends sought by American leaders—widen in the absence of conscious decisionmaking. This can happen in coalitions when U.S. objectives fall short of those of our coalition partners or of the United Nations. Mission creep is its military counterpart and occurs when the Armed Forces take on broader missions than initially planned.

2 This might imply that strengthening the United Nations as a world police headquarters could become an interest in and of itself, with all manner of possibilities for interest creep.


4 As found in former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s “six major tests” for using U.S. forces abroad in combat.
Implications for U.N. PEACEKEEPING

By JOHN O.B. SEWALL

The Clinton administration is currently in the process of determining what role the United Nations will play in achieving U.S. national interests, and how that role relates to multilateralism. A Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on multinational peace operations has not yet appeared, and the document will undoubtedly be influenced by current U.S. and U.N. operations in Somalia and prospective plans for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This article does not predict, nor depend on, the ultimate PDD. Whether the United States elects to participate exclusively in peacekeeping observer missions, as in the past, or moves more forcefully by putting logistic or combat units under U.N. operational control in peace-enforcement or peace-building operations remains to be seen. The proposals contained herein are designed to better support the United Nations, whatever the mission or degree of participation. The focus will be on organizational support, the enduring definitional problems associated with peace operations, and the importance of doctrinal harmonization.

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Organizational Support

As long as American participation in U.N. operations was limited to observers—such as those with the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) observers in Egypt, Israel, Syria, and Lebanon—it was appropriate that support of U.N. observers reside in a DOD executive agent. The limited number of observers and preponderance of ground force personnel clearly supported designating the Department of the Army as the agent. In fact, the Army has steadily improved its support role in terms of planning, personnel acquisition, area-specific pre-deployment training, and liaison with U.N. Headquarters in New York.

Nonetheless, while giving credit to the Army, times have changed and a reexamination of how DOD organizes to support U.N. operations is required. We are moving into multiservice or joint operations in support of, or under actual operational control of, the United Nations. Somalia exemplifies the latter and Sharp Guard in the Adriatic, Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, Southern Watch over southern Iraq, and Deny Flight in Bosnia attest to the fact that U.N. operations and American participation in them are now a joint enterprise for the Armed Forces.

This would suggest that U.N. support matters should logically reside with the Joint Staff where coordination is best effected, on the one hand, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Department of State as well as the United Nations and, on the other, with combatant CINCs. While the precise role of regional CINCs will depend on the nature and scale of U.S. involvement, the time has come for a centralized Joint Staff role. In this regard, J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy) on the Joint Staff has an authorized U.N. Division with 7 professionals, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans on the Army Staff—the executive agency—is in the game with 13 professionals in the U.S. Military Observer Group, Washington Branch. My point here is not to propose a precise organization, but rather to promote centralization and rationalization across the Joint Staff and service staffs in order to better plan and execute joint peace operations.

Like U.N. Headquarters itself, which is undergoing reorganization and professionalization, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN) must shake loose from its Cold War moorings and restructure for more muscular U.N. operations. The lack of a defense advisor’s office which reports to and provides the best possible military advice to the ambassador reflects both the historic tie to the moribund Military Staff Committee and to the traditional U.N. peacekeeping culture, that is, impartial, nonprovocative, minimum force levels operating with restrictive rules of engagement.

USUN does not have an integrated defense advisor’s office, but instead has a limited military advisor’s office with a colonel and two enlisted members, augmented by two other military professionals. Out of the USUN strength of 75 professional and support personnel, the military advisor’s office has only 7 percent of the assets available to the ambassador. In fact, the assigned colonel is a J-5 asset who, among other duties, is designated as U.S. Representative to the Military Staff Committee. As a result there is predictable competition between J-5 taskings emanating from the Joint Staff in the Pentagon and the needs of the ambassador and her deputies in New York.

It is helpful to compare USUN with the U.S. Mission to NATO (USNATO). This is not to suggest replicating the organization of NATO Headquarters in Brussels at U.N. Headquarters in New York. But the relative
scale of effort and resources suggests that we do not have it quite right on the East River. Excluding administrative staff, half of the 92 professional and support personnel in the U.S. mission in Brussels work in the defense advisor’s office. Thus, whereas US-NATO has a defense advisor’s office of 30 professional and 17 support staff members, USUN has a military advisor’s office with only 3 professional and support staff members. The ability to provide appropriate defense advice is undoubtedly a reflection of this allocation of resources.

Again, this is not to suggest a particular organization to solve perceived problems at USUN in New York. Whether or not the PDD in fact endorses what our ambassador, Madeleine Albright, calls assertive multilateralism—implying selective participation in more muscular peace operations—remains to be seen. In any event, some broad conclusions seem to be emerging.

First, an integrated defense advisor’s office would provide the ambassador better military advice so that New York would have greater weight in developing policy in Foggy Bottom, at the Pentagon, and within the White House. Second, a more robust defense advisor’s office would be better suited to deal with deployment, force structure, logistics, and cost estimates for USUN and the U.N. Secretariat. A better in-house capability would obviate a lot of current TDY presence in New York, to include the J-5, who is better situated in Washington to work problems from inside the Pentagon. Finally, and perhaps more symbolically than substantively, a robust defense advisor’s office with a general or flag officer would project a more serious image of American interest in the United Nations as a vehicle for meeting our security interests.

The organizational refinements addressed above presuppose a better interagency process to develop and refine American policy. The fact that humanitarian and peace-building operations do not comprise just U.N. civilian and military personnel but nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) as well suggests a complex process of consultation and coordination with a stronger National Security Council Staff focal point. There are indications that point to just such an improved process coming out of the yet to be published PDD. Whether this administration realignment will be matched by Congress remains to be seen.

**Definitional Problems**

Although both the defense establishment and international security community have moved beyond the generic term peacekeeping to more sophisticated terminology, there are still definitional problems between Pentagon (Joint Pub 3–0) and U.N. (*An Agenda for Peace*) usage—not to mention in the press. For example, the term peacemaking has achieved common understanding in both Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* and Joint Pub 3–0. It is understood to mean a diplomatic
process in the main, essentially through such peaceful means as enumerated in chapter VI of the U.N. Charter. But it was not that long ago that the United States and NATO used peace-making and peace-enforcement almost interchangeably, a confusion which continues to exist in both the media and public speeches.

Peace-enforcement is another term with multiple interpretations. In *An Agenda for Peace* Boutros-Ghali uses peace-enforcement in a specific sense—that is, in cases where an established cease-fire has been agreed to, but not complied with, and peace-enforcement units are called in to restore and maintain the cease-fire. But peace-enforcement as used in Joint Pub 3–0 describes a chapter VII response to breaches of the peace or acts of aggression such as that authorized by U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Similar military action in *An Agenda for Peace* is described as “military action to maintain or restore international peace and security” under article 42 of chapter VII, using forces preferably provided under article 43, and under the strategic direction of the Military Staff Committee under article 47. Boutros-Ghali’s use of peace-enforcement as found above corresponds to *aggravated peacekeeping* in Joint Pub 3–0. Unfortunately the problem is compounded in Joint Pub 3–0 by using *peace operations* to mean, among other things, traditional peacekeeping, aggravated peacekeeping, and low-intensity—but not high-intensity—peace-enforcement; however, *peace-building*, a U.N. term, is not included.

This discussion shows that there is still considerable terminological confusion among the United States, United Nations, and NATO. It is beyond the scope of this article to solve the debate over terminology. Nonetheless, as a rule, it seems logical to take the lead from the United Nations as the world organization involved in peace operations. Hence all regional organizations alluded to in chapter VIII—for example, NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Western European Union—and individual nations should adopt similar or at least complementary rather than competitive usage.

**Doctrinal Harmonization**

As with terminology there is a corresponding debate over the doctrinal underpinning of peace operations. Doctrine is more important and pervasive in its impact on how nations undertake a specific mission than terminology. Cross referencing appropriate dictionaries, although perhaps not the best approach, can solve terminological problems. Doctrine, however, sets the framework for how a coalition will conduct operations to achieve the objectives of a U.N. mandate. Doctrine, in effect, is the capstone from which organization, equipment, training, exercises, and rules of engagement are derived.

The problem, in brief, is that the United Nations has grown comfortable with traditional peacekeeping doctrine, emphasizing low force levels, restrictive rules of engagement, use of force only in self defense, compromise, and impartiality. Peace operations, however, as exemplified in Somalia and Bosnia, have moved far beyond traditional peacekeeping to something short of a chapter VII response and clearly require a doctrinal basis different from that used in Desert Storm (namely, massive firepower and overwhelming force). Traditional peacekeeping is fairly well documented in U.N. publications and the Scandinavian regional training
schools, but the same is not true for the grey area of peace operations which falls between chapters VI and VII.

This is not to say that no one is working the problem. In fact, many bright, energetic staff officers are engulfed in the process. The problem, once again, is central direction and guidance. The military chain of guidance should ideally go from the United Nations to J-7 on the Joint Staff, and then to Atlantic Command (ACOM), the unified command responsible for preparing joint forces for peace operations. What one finds, however, are centers of doctrinal development—or islands of excellence—with little harmonization. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is currently developing a new field manual, FM 100-23, Peace Support Operations, with assistance from the Center for Low Intensity Conflict. TRADOC is also providing scenario support for peace operations at the Joint Readiness Training Center. The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center is developing a joint tactics, techniques, and procedures document on humanitarian assistance. Undoubtedly a lot more is being done across the individual services, not to mention the combined doctrine being developed at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and by the peacekeeping workshop at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch. In addition, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council Ad Hoc Group on Peacekeeping has charged combined conferences and workshops, with various individual nations taking the lead, to develop doctrine in this area.

In sum, there is a lot of activity in the field, but its coherence is questionable, and both J-7 and ACOM have yet to fully assert themselves in the processes. What is worrisome, moreover, is the political imperative to move quickly toward conducting combined training and exercises with North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) members under the Partnership for Peace program, using peace operations as the scenario, before we have the doctrinal foundation fully in place. We risk putting the cart before the horse and possibly learning the wrong lessons by embracing this form of cooperative security activity prematurely. It may well be that recent events in Somalia and the anticipated peace operations in Bosnia are bringing assertive multilateralism into clear focus. If they also better focus the doctrinal debate, we could enjoy an unanticipated but welcome benefit.

The matters of organization and process discussed above—involving DOD, interagency, and USUN activities—also highlight the need for both definitional and doctrinal harmonization. The proposals are relatively modest and low cost, and they will be appropriate regardless of the final version of the PDD on support to the United Nations. There are obviously other initiatives in train or being considered under the general rubric of support to the United Nations including:

- removing legal constraints (the War Powers Act and U.N. Participation Act)
- improving funding responsibilities; eliminating arrearages to the United Nations
- enhancing planning for peace operations (including training, education, and materiel, and also identifying lift, logistics, C3I, and equipment capabilities)
- supporting U.N. training for peace operations (through political-military simulations and provision of training facilities).

The extent to which the U.S. Government engages in higher cost activities will directly reflect the importance attached to U.N. peace operations as a vehicle for achieving U.S. security interests and the balance between unilateral and multilateral solutions. Irrespective of this balance, however, the United States, as a Permanent Five member of the Security Council, bears a direct responsibility to become actively involved in both U.N. internal reform and the professionalization of U.N. peace operations.
During the Cold War joint operations were primarily seen as set-piece battles to be fought by unified commanders against known threats in Europe or Korea. But in the new world disorder greater emphasis is being placed on an operational concept reminiscent of World War II: joint and combined task forces. Like Task Force 61, the joint expeditionary force assembled for Operation Watchtower at Guadalcanal, joint task forces (JTFs) are seen today as a means of tailoring military responses to a growing number of crises. As Rear Admiral David E. Frost, the operations officer at European Command, has remarked: “[JTFs are] the biggest growth industry in the military.”

The challenges facing JTFs are likely to be greater than in the past. These mission-specific organizations must achieve unity of effort among disparate forces in shorter periods of time. JTFs may undergo a significant transformation as the nature of operations changes and they become the focus of coalition efforts or part of combined task forces. To make things even more complicated, joint and combined task forces in operations such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and counternarcotics may encompass various governmental and nongovernmental agencies functioning as either integral parts or close partners in order to achieve national objectives. Despite a seeming multitude of variables, planners can count on one constant: each JTF differs with the situation.

The Nucleus

Clearly the trend in the Armed Forces is toward joint operations. However, it should be remembered from experience in the Mayaguez incident and Desert One rescue operation that joint organizations don’t ensure success in and of themselves. Coordinated employment of forces with different service orientations requires special consideration. JTFs are temporary means for unified commanders to accomplish specific tasks but require coordinating capabilities from more than one service, except when Navy and Marine Corps forces are employed together. Ideally, the nature of a task should determine the service of the JTF commander and the
identification of the right forces with the requisite capabilities for a given mission.

The predominant maritime nature of Earnest Will (protecting Kuwaiti tankers transiting the Persian Gulf), for example, necessitated that naval forces form the core of the JTF and a naval staff act as the nuclear command element. Since Proven Force consisted largely of air attacks launched from Turkish bases against Iraqi targets in Desert Storm, the Air Force provided the JTF nucleus. Because of inherent expeditionary capabilities and expertise in transitioning ashore from sea bases, Marine units were the force of choice for JTFs during Sea Angel in Bangladesh and Restore Hope in Somalia.

The fundamental challenge facing JTF command elements is achieving unity of effort among diverse service forces in a relatively short period of time. As Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, points out: “Effectively integrated joint forces expose no weak points or seams.” The more demanding a mission the more stress it places on a JTF, and structural seams may be subject to fracture. It is possible that ad hoc JTFs can be formed as in the case of Provide Comfort which furnished relief to Kurds in northern Iraq. Service components such as Central Air Force provided the nucleus for Southern Watch to enforce no-fly zones over southern Iraq. But the merits of forming JTFs around service organizations such as an Army corps, numbered fleet, Marine Expeditionary Force, or numbered Air Force lies in unity of effort and in the efficiency of an existing staff with established operating procedures, previous training, and common doctrine. Service headquarters provide nuclei for JTFs around which augmenting forces can rapidly form.

The building blocks of JTFs are service capabilities. Every effort must be made to preserve the integrity of tactical level units, those within JTFs being more joint at the top than at the bottom. As Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, USA (Ret.), noted in Thoughts for Joint Commanders, a JTF can be seen as a system of systems, wherein each system represents a service organization or capability. JTF commanders are responsible for harmonizing systems in pursuit of objectives. But inevitably procedural differences arise among service organizations. Marines who took part in JTF Restore Hope, for instance, published operations orders in a five-paragraph/rapid response planning format, but the Army used a decision matrix format.

Service differences regarding Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) procedures in Desert Storm are well known. Much is also made of the need for joint doctrine which certainly plays a role in reducing differences. Yet interservice doctrine today exceeds what was available to the architects of joint success during World War II. Inherent differences must be minimized to avoid their divisive effects, something which is largely up to a JTF commander’s leadership skills and ability to build a cohesive team.

No precise formula exists for organizing JTFs, and specifics vary with given situations. Joint Pub 5–00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, proposes JTFs built upon Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force components as in Restore Hope and similarly the U.S. Central Command organization for Desert Storm. Others in the aftermath of the Gulf conflict have proposed more functional approaches to using ground, sea, and air components. JTFs may be structured for specific operations in a given geographic area, such as in Provide Comfort when JTF Alpha was created for Special Operations Forces at Kurdish camps in the Turkish mountains and JTF B was established to secure and resettle Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq. Conceivably, JTFs may also be formed using a combination of geographic–oriented and functional organizations.

JTFs may undergo a metamorphosis as a situation changes. The nucleus provided by U.S. Air Forces Europe for Proven Force first served to form Provide Comfort. The latter transitioned from an air-heavy organization dropping supplies for refugees to a predominantly ground effort. Also, when sea-based operations move ashore, as may happen in Provide Promise if troops are committed to Bosnia, the naval character of a JTF can become more continental. Thus a nuclear service component may transition into an ad
JFQ FORUM

Joint Task Forces, 1983–1993

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hoc joint and combined task force command element as the First Marine Expeditionary Force in Somalia for Provide Hope did with UNISOM II.

Headquarters functions of JTFs are far more complex than service headquarters. In many cases service organizations designated JTF command elements will be responsible for deploying, employing, and sustaining much larger and diverse forces than they had previously. Their span of control is likely to encompass land, sea, air, and special operations forces. J-3s must be cognizant of current operations and long-term planning. Even if logistics is a service responsibility, J-4s may have to allocate such sought-after resources as petroleum, blood supplies, transportation, engineer support, and common usage facilities. JTF command elements must communicate directly with U.S. Transportation Command to ensure the flow of personnel and equipment in accordance with OPLANS, and if necessary alter the sequencing of deploying forces to meet the situation.

Without significant augmentation and planning, operational bottlenecks are likely to occur. To handle such circumstances U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Atlantic Command provide command elements of JTFs with joint force augmentation cells consisting of 33 predesignated augmentees. Also, JTFs may be augmented by joint communication support elements to provide connectivity with unified commanders and National Command Authorities through the National Military Command Center.

The Coalition Symbol

Prior to Desert Storm coalitions were primarily viewed as means of maintaining regional balances of power. Since then the international community and, in particular, the United Nations have come to regard coalitions as the paradigm in responding to world problems. Collective action has created the appearance of legitimacy and burden-sharing in dealing with crises, and even Japan has
committed elements of its Self Defense Force to multinational peace operations.

While the trend has been toward collective responses, the burden for their success in major military endeavors falls in many cases to the United States. Only this Nation has the resources to conduct large-scale, unified actions in distant regions. U.S.-led operations such as Restore Hope testify to this fact, while U.N.-led operations in both Somalia and Bosnia stand in stark contrast. As a result, U.S. military commitments have become prerequisites and catalysts for many coalition efforts. Combined joint task forces are manifestations and symbols of these coalition efforts.

The context in which combined JTFs operate must be understood. First and foremost coalitions are political arrangements among nations with recognized common interests. While decisions in U.S. unilateral actions regarding political and military objectives are determined by the President as commander in chief, in coalitions they are reached by a consensus among the participating member nations.

Common objectives as well as decision-making processes ensure coordinated efforts within coalitions as well as restricting actions by participants. For example, the coalition in the Gulf War accomplished the objective of ejecting the Iraqis from Kuwait but constrained U.S. commanders who may have desired the total defeat of Iraq. Decisionmaking processes vary with coalitions and are time-consuming and highly structured relative to unilateral actions. Success in combined efforts relies on patience, understanding the decisionmaking and planning process, and recognizing and ameliorating differences among coalition partners.

Unity of effort in combined operations demands that coalitions accept unity of command. While this seems self-evident, some nations may be unwilling to subordinate their forces to another nation’s command and instead prefer parallel commands. The

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<tr>
<th>Provide Hope</th>
<th>Provide Transition</th>
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<tr>
<td>(February 1992) Relief</td>
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<td><strong>JTF–LA</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hurricane Andrew</strong> Florida-Louisiana (August–September 1992) Disaster Relief</td>
<td><strong>JTF—120</strong> Haiti (September 1993) Interdict Sea Lines of Communication</td>
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<td><strong>Typhoon Omar</strong> Guam (August–September 1992) Disaster Relief</td>
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<td>Civil Disturbance</td>
<td><strong>Typhoon Iniki</strong> Hawaii (September–October 1992) Disaster Relief</td>
<td><strong>JFT—Somalia</strong> (October 1993) Internal Security</td>
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<td><strong>Military Support to U.S. Embassy, Freetown</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sea Angel II</strong> Bangladesh (November 1992) Disaster Relief</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<td><strong>Provide Relief</strong></td>
<td><strong>Restore Hope</strong> Somalia (December 1992–May 1993) Relief / Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<td>(August 1992–February 1993) Relief</td>
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<td><strong>Southern Watch</strong></td>
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<td>Iraq (August 1992 to date) No-fly Zone Enforcement</td>
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Vietnam War offers an example of an incoherent coalition. Unlike the Korean War, no combined command was created to attempt to effect unity among American and South Vietnamese as well as Free World Military Forces. On the other hand, then Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, made it clear to allied forces in Provide Comfort that they would either operate under his tactical control or not participate at all. Their acceptance of a single command structure was a key factor in that operation’s success.

In major coalition efforts, JTFs are likely to be nuclei around which combined task forces will form, as in Restore Hope. Unity of effort in combined commands will be facilitated if forces come from existing coalitions with established operating procedures. In Desert Storm coordinated action by allied navies was possible because most subscribed to NATO standardization agreements for naval operations. The differences which must be overcome in forming a joint and combined task force are usually profound and require considerable time and effort. Participants must contend with linguistic, cultural, and operational differences. Issues like rules of engagement are subject to varying interpretations but must be clear. Major differences may also exist between the capabilities of allied and U.S. forces. In some cases allied forces may arrive in a crisis region with insufficient tactical mobility or logistics expecting U.S. forces to compensate for their lack of capabilities.

Team efforts, particularly in rapidly changing situations, require an existing unity as well as dynamic leadership around which allied forces can form. Such unity is by no means inherent in multinational efforts as evidenced by reports of a fragmented UNISOM II. Trust and confidence must be fostered from the top. No matter what the JTF organization, national components should be established which report to the overall combined commander to facilitate the employment and support of allied forces in the field. Allied staff representation should also reflect the composition of joint and combined task forces.

Organizational Cooperation

In the new world disorder many operational situations facing U.S. and allied forces have become increasingly complicated by domestic, economic, and environmental—as well as military—considerations. Unified actions in these situations require military forces to coordinate efforts at the operational and tactical levels with both governmental and nongovernmental agencies. In many instances, relationships among joint and combined task forces and these agencies will be ill-defined until liaison is effected. Moreover relationships are likely to vary with each agency. Nevertheless, involvement by governmental and nongovernmental agencies, in coordination with military action, is likely to be integral to crisis resolution.

The kind of the crisis at hand will determine the nature of the involvement of the agencies. In Sea Angel, which provided disaster relief in the aftermath of a cyclone in Bangladesh, the JTF coordinated its efforts with the Department of State and the Agency for International Development with which memoranda of agreement existed. It also developed ad hoc relationships and a division of labor among the International Red Cross, Red Crescent, CARE, Save the Children, and other relief agencies. While many nongovernmental humanitarian organizations eschew the appearance of formal relationships with military forces, they have nevertheless become dependent on them for security and even logistical support.

Similarly, in domestic crises which occurred as the result of Hurricane Andrew in Florida and civil unrest in Los Angeles, JTFs worked with many organizations including the Departments of Interior, Commerce, and Health and Human Services; Federal Emergency Management Agency; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as well as other Federal, state, and local agencies. And the complexity of counternarcotics operations
requires a very different group of agencies ranging from the Drug Enforcement Administration to various counterdemand programs. No prescribed mechanisms exist for achieving unity of effort among joint and combined task forces and various governmental and nongovernmental organizations. It is only brought about through initiative, thoroughness, cooperation, and communication on the scene. Successful joint and combined task forces have ascertained the involvement of all external agencies in a given crisis and sought to embrace agencies in order to achieve a concerted effort. JTF Sea Angel established a coordination cell for military and external agencies, and all concerned were invited to JTF planning sessions. In addition, the JTF and relief agencies followed the lead of the Bangladeshi government in determining priorities. Finally, the JTF ensured that tactical priorities meshed with relief efforts.

Unified actions have evolved with the nature of warfare. Technologies have allowed land, sea, air, and special operations forces to reach beyond their traditional bounds; joint and combined efforts have enabled the concentration of the power of all these assets. Transnational issues like the environment, domestic unrest, refugees, and drug traffic have also increased as considerations in crisis resolution, requiring not only joint and combined responses but unity of effort with both governmental and nongovernmental agencies.

There is no formula for unified actions in crises which remain largely situation-dependent. However certain principles are evident. Joint and combined actions alone do not ensure success; rather success is ensured by an existing unity of effort and teamwork built by dynamic leadership. The task at hand will determine the requisite capabilities and the nucleus of the joint and combined task force. Organizations may vary, but the integrity of tactical units which do the fighting must be preserved with a result that the force is more joint and combined at the top than at the bottom.

while humanitarian organizations eschew relationships with military forces, they have become dependent on them.
This Nation has fought every conflict since World War II either unilaterally or as a member of an ad hoc coalition. No military action has been conducted as the combined effort of a standing alliance in which the United States was a member. Even though the United Nations played a major role in both the Korean and Persian Gulf Wars, the forces that fought in those conflicts operated as ad hoc coalitions under U.N. authorization. There have been many other operations carried out by the United States as part of an ad hoc organization. Even the war on drugs has been prosecuted by a coalition. When America has been involved in multinational operations it has been as a member of ad hoc coalitions. What follows are some considerations intended to help coalition commanders of the future plan and execute operations in support of such coalitions.

This article is adapted from a distinguished individual entry in the 1993 CJCS Essay Competition which the author completed while attending the Naval War College.
Planning Coalition Warfare

Ad hoc coalitions are unique in that they are based on temporary agreements and normally are less formal than standing alliances. The psychological and sociological problems generated by differences among coalition partners in culture, customs, religion, and standards of living require a unique mental approach to planning military operations. The experience of combined operations reveals that integrating multinational forces is complex and requires a great deal of understanding and skill on the part of commanders. An awareness of the unique aspects of coalition warfare can enable commanders to plan intelligently and avoid problems which arise through insensitivity and ignorance. Creating this awareness among command and staff personnel is essential to preparing for coalition operations. The mission of commanders is to plan and direct the combat power of coalition members to accomplish common objectives. Key planning considerations for combined operations must include proposed command relationships, interoperability, logistical support, and the risk to U.S. Armed Forces.

The most important element in preparing for combined operations is developing sound and effective coalition command relationships. One report on the Gulf War noted that relationships “met with difficulties, were complex, but workable.” When unity of command is not achievable, then unity of effort and an agreed upon strategy must be achieved through the coordination and cooperative efforts of allied commanders. Operational commanders can prepare for this eventuality by understanding the various factors which influence a coalition’s ability to coordinate forces and achieve unity of effort. Unity of effort cannot be realized unless commanders understand allied political and military objectives and reach agreement on their common interests and objectives. Dealing with allies must be accomplished with patience and respect. Commanders must establish and maintain trust among coalition forces. Both coordination and cooperation are key ingredients to successful coalition command. Harnessing the personalities of allied military leaders and coping with problems associated with interpersonal relations can be among the greatest challenges.

Effective use of coalition combat strength is achieved when operational planning is carried out by a combined staff which includes equitable representation from each coalition nation. This coordinated planning is essential to ensuring unity of effort. In Operation Desert Storm this was done through a Coalition Coordination Communications and Integration Center (C3IC). Even though planning must always be coordinated, overall planning responsibility for specific operations should be vested in commanders responsible for execution. The responsibility for planning and execution must not be separated.

Several general considerations should guide coalition planning. A combined plan should reflect an appreciation of the unique capabilities of each national contingent in assigning missions. Multinational forces should optimize their strengths and avoid duplication or degradation of unique capabilities. Likewise, planning must compensate for comparative vulnerabilities among coalition partners. Forces are normally more effective if employed under military commanders from their respective nations. Other considerations which affect planning and mission assignment of forces are common doctrine, logistic sustainment capabilities, and systems interoperability. One principle of war with significant applicability in planning coalition operations is simplicity. It is essential that the plan be capable of being understood and executed by all combat forces in a coalition.

Another important consideration in coalition planning is interoperability. Military success in coalition warfare depends on the ability of American commanders to harmonize the capabilities, doctrines, and logistics of forces from varied cultures. In an ad hoc coalition such as Desert Storm where nearly forty different nations contributed to
in many instances the common political objectives that bind members together become the center of gravity

the effort, this was a monumental task. There are, however, some general principles and planning factors which can contribute to overcoming interoperability problems. Unity of effort requires coordinating air defense, intelligence, electronic warfare, and operational timing. A communications network and interoperable connectivity also are key ingredients in effectively coordinating the capabilities of multinational forces.

Liaison officers provide one of the most effective ways of coordinating coalition efforts as the Gulf War confirmed. Nearly all our partners had American liaison officers drawn from Special Operations Forces with them. The officers were language qualified and served as communication links to coordinate with the military forces of diverse nations.

In ad hoc coalitions, interoperability problems are usually managed but rarely solved. One method of minimizing problems which usually proves effective is to allocate discrete geographical or functional areas of responsibility to national forces. This preserves unique capabilities and prevents diluting combat strength which may occur if attempts are made to combine incompatible forces. It also helps to minimize blue-on-blue fratricide or friendly fire incidents.

Gathering and disseminating intelligence can have a major impact on successful coalitions. Planning and preparations must provide timely military intelligence to all partners. The degree of dissemination will undoubtedly vary depending on the individual member. In ad hoc coalitions the United States may be operating with partners with whom there is a reluctance to share intelligence, especially when it might reveal sensitive sources or collection methods. In Desert Storm there was no preplanned system or mechanism to govern the release of essential military intelligence to other than our traditional allies.

Logistics affects success in every military operation. Logistical support and sustainment needs of multinational forces vary significantly and are influenced by tactical doctrine or individual dietary requirements. Coalition experience confirms the desirability of making logistical support a national responsibility. The combined staff must, however, ensure the coordination of host nation support including transportation networks and major facilities such as ports and airfields.

American coalition commanders must always consider the risks to U.S. forces involved in combined operations. Assessments must concentrate on the reliability of other coalition forces, as well as on combat strength and capabilities. Rules of engagement (ROE) also figure in planning coalition operations. U.S. forces are governed by specific ROE during peacetime and the Law of Armed Conflict in war. Different rules within a coalition—particularly in operations short of war—can provoke responses that put the forces of certain members at risk. Coordination must ensure that ROE are consistent in a coalition. In the Gulf War, coordination among commanders and liaison teams ensured the effectiveness and consistency of such rules.

In addition, the vulnerability of a coalition’s center of gravity must be evaluated. In many instances common political objectives that bind members become the center of gravity. Plans must minimize risk by including appropriate defensive measures, even when the measures do not directly defend a coalition partner. This situation existed in the Gulf War when explosive efforts were made to protect Israel against Scud missile attacks. Had Israel retaliated against Iraq the
cohesion of the coalition and willingness of some members to contribute militarily may have been jeopardized. This potential breakup might have resulted in an increased risk to U.S. forces.

The next coalition war or the members of the alliance cannot be predicted. There are steps, however, that the Armed Forces can undertake to prepare and enhance capabilities for coalition operations. Education in coalition warfighting for senior officers is a prerequisite. Increased study emphasizing planning considerations and execution decisions for ad hoc combined operations must be a central part of all war college curricula. Preparation for coalition efforts must be focused on the most probable planning scenarios for future conflicts such as hypothetical Pentagon planning scenarios. It is essential in planning for future regional contingencies that all ramifications of coalition operations are considered. The United States should increase the number of multinational training exercises in each theater with potential coalition partners. Combined exercises, regardless of their size, are productive because they create a spirit of cooperation and enhance awareness of interoperability. Additional language training for liaison officers can provide significant advantages in combined operations. Planning scenarios can focus the language training on specific regions and countries most likely to be future coalition allies. Sales of U.S. equipment to potential coalition partners and training foreign military personnel are also ways of enhancing interoperability for coalitions. Security assistance for critical infrastructure as well as International Military Education and Training can be particularly helpful.

Ad hoc coalitions will continue to be unique in terms of their membership and the obstacles encountered in attempting to achieve unity of effort. The planning considerations discussed above are intended to heighten awareness of potential difficulties and provide a framework for thinking about coalition operations. The success of commanders of ad hoc coalitions will depend upon their ability to correctly apply coalition warfare planning considerations.

**Executing Coalition Warfare**

Understanding the complexities of coalitions and successfully executing coalition warfare requires a unique combination of political and military prowess. As Clausewitz noted: “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” His observation is especially relevant in the case of ad hoc coalitions.

The key element in successfully executing coalition warfare is the ability of commanders to achieve unity of effort among their forces. In ad hoc coalitions like Desert Storm this will normally be accomplished through cooperation rather than by appointing supreme coalition commanders. The prerequisite for unity of effort is unity of purpose which involves reaching a consensus on military objectives and coalition strategy. War-fighting commanders must be assured that there is a consensus prior to committing military forces to combined operations.

Both the planning and the execution phases should be accomplished as a coordinated effort. Combined staffs are an ideal means of ensuring that multinational forces are utilized in compliance with national political and military restrictions. In execution, multidimensional battlefields require special consideration when fighting coalition wars which involve land, naval, and air forces from a wide variety of coalition partners. Many of the concepts discussed here as planning factors were actually applied in executing the
Persian Gulf War. Unity of effort was achieved by establishing a multinational coordination center. Continuous liaison and collaboration by all partners through the C4IC provided a mechanism to achieve unity of effort. Coalition forces were assigned missions consistent with political restrictions, military requirements, and force capabilities.

Politically and militarily it is important that the United States and its allies fight side by side against a common enemy. This is particularly desirable from the perspective of national prestige. In the Gulf it was important to ensure that each coalition member was provided an opportunity to contribute to the effort. The assignment of forces and missions in ad hoc coalitions must reflect the unique capabilities of each partner and create organizations whose combat potential is not degraded by a lack of interoperability. As previously mentioned, the options which best satisfy requirements may be functionally or geographically oriented. Specifically, options should include assigning:

- a national single service or joint force to a specific area of responsibility
- a national single service or joint force to a specific function
- a combined single service force to a specific area of responsibility
- a combined joint force to a specific area of responsibility.

Each option was utilized in Operation Desert Storm. Specific geographical areas of responsibility were assigned to both ground and naval units operating in the Gulf. Other units were assigned functions consistent with their capabilities, such as anti-mine warfare or air defense missions. The air war combined single service forces which were responsible for a specific functional area of the overall campaign. The Arab coalition functioned as a combined joint force with a geographical area of responsibility. Each option has utility by providing a mechanism for matching ends and means in coalition wars.

The responsibility for logistical support in ad hoc coalitions is best retained by each nation. Key transport facilities and host nation support (such as water and petroleum, oil, and lubricants) should be coordinated by a multinational combined staff. Policies relating to medical treatment and evacuation of casualties are also best left to individual national forces.

Enemy prisoners of war will undoubt- edly always be a sensitive issue and the United States will bear responsibility for their welfare since we traditionally contribute more to coalitions in terms of political power and military strength. Regardless of the arrangements, the Armed Forces must retain sufficient oversight and control to ensure appropriate treatment of prisoners and compliance with international conventions and also should ensure compliance with the provisions and intent of the International Law of Armed Conflict by all coalition partners.

Another major consideration for American commanders is the risk to U.S. Armed Forces. This means balancing the sometimes sensitive subject of burden sharing with consideration of risks which could result from the desertion of coalition partners or the failure to achieve unity of effort. In Desert Storm there were partners who saw their roles strictly in terms of defending Saudi Arabia or liberating Kuwait and others who committed forces in Iraq to neutralize enemy military power. As history has borne out, the closer a coalition is to victory, the more individual partners diverge from common objectives to pursue their own aims. This phenomenon in the war-termination phase introduces an increased element of risk to U.S. forces. Commanders must be aware of this issue and execute in a manner that enables risk-reducing alternatives or unilateral options to protect both our interests and forces.
Principles for Coalition Commanders

Historical evidence and the lessons of Desert Storm reveal four enduring principles which commanders must consider in planning and conducting coalition operations:

- **Unity of purpose** is the political glue that binds coalition members together. Operational commanders must understand ultimate political objectives and create military conditions which will achieve strategic goals in theater.

- **Unity of effort** is necessary to achieve success in combined and coalition operations. If unity of command is not possible, then cooperation and coordination are the keys to unity of effort. Coordinated planning staffs and assignment of liaison officers significantly enhance the process.

- **Interoperability** is best managed by appropriate force assignments and the retention of responsibility for logistical support by individual nations. Intelligence sharing, the treatment of prisoners, and rules of engagement are best handled by cooperative planning and coordination. Although interoperability is often the major obstacle to achieving unity of effort, there are measures which can be undertaken to minimize problems. Language training for liaison officers, targeted military sales and security assistance, and combined exercises can promote interoperability with potential coalition partners.

- **Minimizing and preventing risks to personnel** in combined operations with nontraditional allies and without formal treaties may lead to situations in which changing political events influence the military contribution of each partner. This may mean increased risk to American forces. Also, diverging national aims in the war-termination phase—or a vulnerability to the coalition’s center of gravity—may be sources of risk for U.S. forces.

In the closer a coalition is to victory, the more individual partners diverge from common objectives to pursue their own aims.
While coalition warfare is being touted as a silver bullet for the future of the Armed Forces, its utility may be questionable in operations where unique national interests are at stake. Political and military benefits derived from coalition operations will vary across the entire conflict spectrum. In scenarios when the United States is able to conduct unilateral operations the potential advantages of coalitions must be weighed against the disadvantages. In more fragile and less enduring ad hoc relationships the urgency to act may influence operational timing. More importantly, in order to achieve consensus on unity of purpose, the United States may be restricted from pursu-

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7 Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, p. 16–1.
Change, life’s only true constant, still buffets the European security environment like wind. The fall of the Wall, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the collapse of the Soviet Union have eliminated any immediate threat of large-scale attack against Western Europe. These changes have allowed U.S. European Command (EUCOM) to judiciously reduce forward-based forces. But the challenges and responsibilities of a new European environment still loom large. Revolutions in recent years have been largely bloodless yet revolutions nonetheless. More new nations, borders, and expectations have been created by these events than by any others since World War II.

A new security environment has enabled European Command (EUCOM) to carefully draw down American forward presence on the Continent. Since the dust has not settled on the momentous events of the last few years, continued U.S. engagement remains imperative. Cooperative security arrangements which guided the allies through the Cold War have unique capabilities that could not be replicated if NATO ceased to exist. Therefore the status of the Atlantic Alliance as the protector of Europe—a region with immense cultural, political, and economic claims on our national interests—seems assured for at least another half century. With the flexibility to adjust in changing times, and American resolve to support the Alliance through continued forward presence, NATO will remain the vehicle for meeting security challenges in EUCOM’s area of responsibility.

Summary

A new security environment has enabled European Command (EUCOM) to carefully draw down American forward presence on the Continent. Since the dust has not settled on the momentous events of the last few years, continued U.S. engagement remains imperative. Cooperative security arrangements which guided the allies through the Cold War have unique capabilities that could not be replicated if NATO ceased to exist. Therefore the status of the Atlantic Alliance as the protector of Europe—a region with immense cultural, political, and economic claims on our national interests—seems assured for at least another half century. With the flexibility to adjust in changing times, and American resolve to support the Alliance through continued forward presence, NATO will remain the vehicle for meeting security challenges in EUCOM’s area of responsibility.
That post-war era, in fact, offers clues to our mandate for a new European security identity—in many ways a task as challenging as that faced by our predecessors in 1945. Looking out on a bleak, war-scarred landscape with economies in ruin and populations displaced, who would have imagined the vibrant, cooperative Western Europe of today? In fact, we can empathize with the difficulty that they had in making their decisions while facing down the declared Soviet intent to export a bankrupt ideology and expand hegemony over war-ravaged countries to the west. The critical structure needed to meet the Cold War’s grueling challenges—a nuclear-backed deterrent alliance incorporating all concerned democracies and even former adversaries—took ten years to contrive. Similarly, one cannot expect instant solutions to today’s challenges nor exclude any nation as an unlikely actor from a future, unknown stage. Hopefully, the answers we arrive at will, through cooperative action, ensure European peace and stability for at least another half century.

Stability in Europe—as well as in neighboring adjacent areas of Africa—is important. Since it was founded, this Nation has been strengthened through commerce. Stability and peace allow an open international economic system to benefit all participants. In addition, a stable environment creates a climate where American ideals and values prosper. Only economic well-being and security from aggression can allow us to enjoy democracy’s healthy institutions and unlock the creative endeavors of a free people. Liberty is a value that the founding fathers enshrined in a new political union which in part was a rejection of the old world. Yet most Americans still feel connected to that old world for cultural, ethnic, or far more pragmatic reasons.

Many of us feel a strong connection to foreign shores in a visceral way. In the last national census only one in twenty Americans did not claim some cultural, racial, or national identification. Three-quarters of them cited a European heritage, while one in ten

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**Major James P. Stanton, USAF, is assigned to the Plans and Policy Directorate at Headquarters, European Command. He has operational experience in tactical fighters and strategic bombers to include eleven combat missions flown in B-52s during the Gulf War.**
claimed to be African-American. We have a rich, varied culture, formed not in a melting pot but in a crucible, building strength from the contributions of individuals who retain their unique ethnic identities. The individuals are, without a doubt, American—yet their ties to their origins are real. European and African-American influences on our culture are clearly visible in our music, foods, religions, and even the dialects we speak. These influences form a strong cultural bond with the EUCOM area of responsibility.

America is part of a global economy with worldwide systems of banking and commerce. While one can argue that we
should focus more closely on domestic priorities, no one would argue that we should conduct a global economic retreat. An invisible web of economic interconnectivity guarantees that there is no possibility of a healthy, prosperous U.S. economy without a healthy, prosperous European economy. While recognition of political and demographic ties to EUCOM’s area of responsibility depend largely on experience and observation, economic ties can be readily quantified. Recognizing that statistics are the best tool of propaganda since the warm smile, they nevertheless indicate how European trade is vital to U.S. prosperity.

Europe imports more American goods than Canada, Japan, or Australia, even more than Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan combined. Trade with Eastern European and former Soviet states in 1992 increased 13 percent over the previous year. These are expanding markets with untapped potential. Annual trade between Europe and the United States is more than $235 billion.\(^3\) Trade equates to U.S. products sold overseas, and that means American jobs.

Interest in maintaining stability and peace in EUCOM’s area of responsibility is not based on humanitarian concerns for the good of mankind, Europe, or Africa—but rather on what is good for us. The United States has fought two world wars in this century, despite concerted efforts to remain disengaged. The globe is too small and violent for disengagement. The over half million American soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen who died in the world wars bear silent testimony to our historical connections with a dangerous world.\(^4\)

In fact, stability is at risk throughout the world. While arms control implementation and efforts to further regional economic integration tend to level the rolling deck, seas beneath are not calm. A geographic survey of EUCOM’s area of responsibility reveals top-to-bottom upheaval—rough seas where in former times of bipolar confrontation there was a troubling though predictable stasis. The days of easy analysis, a known threat, and more simple but painful choices are gone. The dynamics of the revolutions of 1989 are not yet completely understood or over. Civil war and conflict are a daily reality.
which serve as humbling reminders of our inability to predict political events. Centrifugal political trends follow ethnic, religious, and nationalistic fault lines. Fears of the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are exacerbated by the demonstrated will to use them. The World Trade Center bombing in New York City has put an exclamation point on the assertion that America is no longer an inviolate island.

Indeed, there are some growing dangers. Real tension from economic disparity can be felt from north to south and from east to west. While an affluent Western Europe looks out over the Mediterranean Sea to an impoverished African continent, the struggling former Soviet Union and nations of Eastern and Central Europe see prosperity over walls erected to discourage immigration where walls of oppression once stood. Economic disparity heightens differences between lucky oil-rich states of the Middle East and their less fortunate neighbors on all sides. The tectonic plate formed by a rise in Islamic fundamentalism also is centered in the Middle East. Radical elements fill a vacuum of political and economic disenfranchisement which then can spread to other regions through migration causing even greater tension between east and west.

World War I brought a violent end to the house of cards created by the Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic wars. The turmoil following that collapse of imperial power allowed the twin totalitarianisms of fascism and communism to eventually bloom. World War II dealt a fatal blow to fascism but the post-war political turmoil that followed led to the Soviet subjugation of Central and Eastern Europe. For over forty years America led the free world struggle against a political, economic, and military threat. It ended with a victory of democracy over imperialistic communism and took a high toll in human lives and resources. But the strategies of deterrence and containment succeeded. The Iron Curtain fell and the Soviet empire dissolved. Unfortunately, despite the cost of past sacrifices, there is a chance that post-Cold War turmoil may have unwelcome results. Will ethnic strife, religious militancy, and nationalistic fervor lead to another era of European conflict?

Today the answer to European security remains a vibrant, capable North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which served as the pillar of transatlantic security throughout the long dark years of the Cold War. It is still the hope for the future because of its unique structure, capability, and flexibility. The transatlantic linkages between the United States and Canada on one shore and Western Europe on the other are not accidental. While the Alliance has been long recognized as the linchpin of North American and Western European security interests, it now looks hopefully to the east. Within NATO the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) has emerged as a forum for peacekeeping, security cooperation, and consultation with members of the former Warsaw Pact. NATO is an extremely valuable organization because of its capabilities in command and control, infrastructure, standardization, and multinational force structure with shared training experience. No other organization has such military potential, a legacy of bipolar confrontation that could not be reinvented. There is no imaginable set of bilateral agreements or system of alliances that could approach the current capabilities of NATO.

The Alliance has the flexibility to handle new challenges. NATO’s mission is expanding. Article 5 of its treaty—“[that] an armed attack on one or more...shall be considered an attack on them all”—remains the central security provision while article 4 offers flexibility for future crises. Taken together the 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept and article 4 provide for consultation among the allies and “where appropriate, coordination of their efforts including their responses to such risks...whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the parties is threatened.” The Alliance recognizes that the new security environment requires political engagement as well as the “indispensable defense dimension.” The task for the foreseeable future is understanding complex social, political, and economic difficulties. NACC can serve as a conduit for cooperation as emerging democracies to the
east confront these difficulties. But NACC membership does not provide insurance under article 5, only assurance derived from consultation. NACC offers a vehicle for acting in concert to conduct peacekeeping operations and defuse crises in a new environment through common goals, tools, and openness in communication. Eastern and Central European nations are eagerly looking to the west for a means to enhance security in troubled, unpredictable times. NATO is listening and will step forward as the single most important forum for an emerging security architecture.

America has a leadership role in this landscape just as it has since the end of World War II. We will continue to lead because it is impossible to shun the challenges and unknown dangers that accompany today's unparalleled opportunities. The U.S. role in the Alliance is shaped by common national interests, the accident of geography, and the reality that our treaty commitment is a political bond not only to security, but to a system of procedure. America is trusted as a European power: it is a cultural, political, and economic force as well as a participant in the area's security institutions. Geographic separation ensures that we play the role of honest broker. The baggage of Europe's past struggles for liberation, unification, and conquest prevent other powers from assuming this leadership role. Few have the will, and none have the resources.

American defense dollars have been well spent. Over the years we have continually honed our fighting forces and technology. No other nation can project and sustain combat power as well. Strategic lift, tactical aviation, amphibious capability, and aircraft carrier battle groups are just a few examples of the sustainable combat power that we can provide in a short period of time. Also, America's lead in theater ballistic missile defense will help protect vital regions and forces in both crises and conflicts. Weapons of mass destruction are proliferating and ballistic missiles have the potential to deliver them. Operation Desert Storm dramatically demonstrated that such weapons are political as well as military threats. We need to develop a capable defense against them.

Technological advantage is valuable, but it is only part of the story. American fighting men and women are unique and respected because they have demonstrated their ability to combine land, sea, and air power in a dramatic synergy. Only our Armed Forces can field the finest men and women with the
best training and equipment. Preparing for war at the operational level where the greatest combat power can be brought to bear on an enemy at the decisive moment and location to achieve strategic and policy objectives is a tall order, but one for which the United States is well prepared.

Synchronized land, sea, and air forces can realize economies of scale. Greater effects with a smaller force can be achieved by melding preparation, skill, and technology. As we reduce our forward-based forces in Europe to approximately 100,000 military personnel by FY96, we must ensure that we retain the right balance of combat and support forces. Despite the smaller forward-based presence we must plan and train for a full spectrum of missions. U.S. forces will continue to be called upon to act in concert with allies and friends or alone. According to Secretary of Defense Aspin's comments on the Bottom-Up Review:

The U.S. will maintain a corps headquarters, with support units, and two heavy Army divisions consisting of two brigades each, as well as approximately two and one-third Air Force fighter wings in the European theater. In addition, there will be five brigade-sized sets of Army prepositioned equipment and one set of forward deployed Marine Corps equipment. The Navy Sixth Fleet will continue to routinely patrol the Mediterranean.

Aspin also stressed that our "troops stationed in Europe will remain there primarily to reinforce European security, [and] they will also be available to deploy on relatively short notice for other missions such as peacekeeping or peace-enforcement." American forward-based forces can meet the challenge posed by an emerging security landscape. Flexibility and sustainability guarantee that EUCOM's forces will continue to be relevant. These forces are fundamental to a national strategy which merges political and economic realities in an unpredictable climate with security concerns.

U.S. interests are linked to global stability, and Europe and Africa are among the regions of importance to all Americans. We live in a global village where a fire in our neighbor's house is of great concern to us for the obvious reasons. Our cultural affinity, political connectivity, and vital participation in international commerce are ties that cannot be broken. Thus a peaceful Europe is of particular importance. NATO is key to continued transatlantic security and the means of coping with a new environment and its unpredictability. Forward presence enables us to affirm our commitment to the Alliance while enhancing regional stability. The United States maintains its security by engaging in collective defense. In sum, collective defense is America's defense.

NOTES

6 Ibid, p. 143.
8 Announcement of Bottom-Up Review Results, Joint State/DOD Message, September 1, 1993.
A SOLDIER IS A SOLDIER

By ROSEMARY BRYANT MARINER

Summary

From Desert Storm to Tailhook, prevailing attitudes about military women are being reformulated and tested in myriad ways. How smoothly or quickly a shift in attitudes occurs is chiefly a matter of leadership. Commanders must give women equal access to a level playing field on which each competitor either succeeds or fails based on individual merit. If you put points on the scoreboard, you play. Tough standards outlawing fraternization, shunning paternalism, and minimizing segregation must be accompanied by realistic assessments of pregnancy, privacy, and harassment. As the result of recent statutory and policy changes, the hard fact is that women will fight as well as die in our next war. While a gender-neutral meritocracy may be difficult to achieve, an initial step is to promote a shared common identity and purpose: man or woman, a soldier is a soldier first.

This article is based on the winning entry in the 1992 LtCol Richard Higgins, USMC, memorial essay contest sponsored by the National War College class of 1985.
Three years ago hundreds of thousands of men and women were preparing for combat. Faced with the potential of chemical and biological weapons, Scud missiles, and Iraq’s large army, these service members left their families for an unknown fate in a distant place. Fortunately, their fate was victory over the enemy and the vast majority of them returned home safely. In the greatest display of military prowess since World War II, the Gulf War was a resounding affirmation of the All Volunteer Force as well as national leadership which allowed the Armed Forces to fight to win. It also impressed on America that more than 41,000 women in the military went to war alongside men. Desert Storm fundamentally altered the debate over women in combat by demonstrating—under any accepted meaning of the phrase—that women had been in combat.

In a televised war, the Nation watched women serve on ships in the Gulf, fly troops deep into Iraq, and cross occupied Kuwait with ground forces. They also learned that combat exclusion laws and policies did not protect women from becoming prisoners of war or coming home in body bags. Yet instead of the predicted hue and cry, Americans accepted with both remorse and respect the sacrifices of its sons and daughters. The few female prisoners and fatalities perhaps provided a tougher test than if many women had been captured or killed. Unlike the high, impersonal casualty statistics of the protracted conflict in Vietnam, the small number of losses made it difficult for the public to be indifferent to the perilous effects of war on any man or woman.

After that experience, and prior to the infamous Tailhook convention, Congress repealed all restrictions barring women aviators from combat thereby demonstrating the popular support which the measure enjoyed. Now the debate has shifted to the exclusion of women from ground combat. Despite the fact that women serve in combat ships and aircraft, it is still common to hear senior people in uniform openly express opinions—even in front of subordinates—that women do not belong in combat units. After Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced his decision regarding women in combat aviation, the hard reality is that women will fight and die in the next war.

The same principles that military leaders have used for centuries to forge effective fighting forces, namely, discipline and accountability, underpin gender integration. Successful integration is dependent on a common identity and purpose: a soldier is a soldier. The initial step, both for those doing the integration and those undergoing integration, is to regard themselves and each other first and foremost as officers or as soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen.

**Mythology**

Many commonly held axiomatic beliefs, often accepted uncritically, fall into the category of myth. According to one political scientist the sure sign of a myth “is the acceptance of the logically and empirically dubious.” Judith Stiehm identifies three prevalent myths about women and war which she reduces to: war is manly, soldiers are substitutable, and warriors protect. These myths are the rationale for arguments against women in combat. The best way for skeptical male soldiers to accept that women can fight is by observing competent women performing successfully and being integrated into military operations—they must see with their own eyes to believe. There is also a generation gap between senior military men who have not served with women in an operational environment and younger men who have competed with women in civil and military professional settings. Desert Storm demonstrated dramatically that, contrary to myth, the domain of war is shared by men and women.

The second myth, known as substitution, is illustrated by the notion that all soldiers—from Air Force data processors in Omaha to Navy fighter pilots at sea—are equally subject to combat duty. It was also exploded in the Gulf War. Despite the old refrain that “we’re all in this together,” the reality is that the

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danger of combat can be minimized by seeking rear-area or support positions. Most hazardous duties, such as flying combat missions or serving with Special Operations Forces, involve elite specialties that are voluntary, highly selective assignments with rigorous training. But in Desert Storm universal risk was also evidenced by the Scud missile attack on Dhahran in which Reservists as well as noncombatants died. Men and women in the military volunteer for combat by virtue of joining the All Volunteer Force, something driven home to everyone by the Gulf War.

The third myth about women and war is that of the warrior-protector: men protect women, women don’t protect men. This myth is perhaps the most pervasive, contradictory, and damaging. For the myth to function women are not seen as individuals who may or may not need protection, but as a group requiring protection by definition. It is commonly conveyed by what have been called the feminine images of what men fight for—peace, home, family. Men do not want women to fight because sharing the province of war makes it difficult to retain the illusion of protector. But the need for some men to see themselves as female protectors does not justify discriminating against women who neither need nor want protection. Both men and women protect: the strong protect the weak.

**From Prejudice to Integration**

The problem of gender integration in the Armed Forces is not attributable to women or men but to prejudice. For commanders to deal with this prejudice, they must understand its nature and root causes. What is someone who believes that he or she is superior, not because of individual achievement but by virtue of gender? The common term for such a person is sexist, but something other than simply not recognizing women is at work here. To feel superior a sexist must “keep” women in their place. A belief in natural superiority is the desire for unearned recognition. The military is an ideal institution in which to control conduct without changing attitudes. Because the services emphasize professionalism as well as objective and superior achievement, commanders have a perfect remedy for redressing the prejudice of hard core bigotry—disciplinary proceedings.

The history of racial integration in the Armed Forces serves as a useful road map for gender integration since it involves the same institution and value system. Also, the pernicious belief that was manifest throughout much of American history that Negroes were inherently inferior to whites is similar to the visceral belief that women are inherently inferior to men as warriors. Both beliefs resulted in professional segregation. While the myths differ for race and gender, how the military overcame institutional and individual racial prejudices to become a meritocracy is relevant to gender integration. Though at times associated with affirmative action, which is controversial because it makes race—rather than individual ability—a determining factor, the services have pursued racial integration with the noble goal of color-blindness. However, the military must still keep the ever present fact of racism in check.

Being black or female in the military has several important similarities. Both are minorities: women comprise 11 percent of the military, blacks 20 percent. Described as the visual invocation of the problem, there is no way either blacks or females can avoid stereotyping in an institution that is overwhelmingly composed of “average white guys.” The stereotypes suggest some fundamental perceptions: in the case of black men it is intellectual inferiority, for women physical weakness and lack of warrior characteristics. The notion of feminine frailty is so embodied in male culture that weakness is synonymous with being female as evidenced by the frequent resort to derisive female adjectives to insult weak males.

Such prejudice influences ideas about individual ability. A white male entering a physically or mentally challenging program such as flight training is presumed qualified and likely to succeed. He must be proven unqualified by poor performance. But a black man or a woman is presumed unqualified by fact of race or gender. This is especially a problem for blacks, due to false notions about lowered selection standards based on quotas. Blacks and women thus find themselves in a no-win situation: performing poorly proves a negative stereotype, doing
well indicates preferential or unfair treatment. Both bear the burden of proof for class and individual ability.

It was not until racial incidents occurred in Vietnam that the Armed Forces acknowledged the existence of institutional racism. Faced with large numbers of poorly educated black draftees and racial violence at home, the military had to admit that racism went beyond individual actions. A lesson of racial integration is that prejudice does not constitute grounds for discrimination. The success of the All Volunteer Force disproved the so-called tipping point theory that an Army made up of over 30 percent blacks might fail to attract white volunteers, thereby risking support from a predominant white society.\(^2\) The opinions of a minority or a majority are irrelevant, but there are grounds for removing racists from the military.

One significant aspect of the success of racial integration is the fact that stereotyped class characteristics are not used in recruiting and assignment policies. If individual ability was ignored, a case based on average numbers could be made that blacks should be restricted to nontechnical fields. For reasons that are unrelated to race, blacks get lower scores than whites on aptitude tests and roughly 60 percent of enlisted African Americans are found in clerical and support specialties. They have also been represented in other positions, from commanders of nuclear submarines to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Transgressions**

The perception of women as problems is indicative of not recognizing them as individuals. Discerning people by class rather than individual attributes suggests superior and inferior classes, and leads to differential treatment. For instance, if all women are excluded from direct ground combat, vice unqualified individuals, the natural conclusion is that women are inferior to men. Women aren’t good enough for real combat. Disparate treatment also results in perceptions of discriminatory or preferential treatment of one class over the other. Therein lies the genesis of many conflicts over gender integration within the Armed Forces. A commander who stereotypes people runs the risk of ruling by emotion instead of reason which can lead to paternalism, with its inherent discrimination, and fraternization.

**Paternalism.** An extension of the protector myth, paternalism is a common and destructive offense. It is insipid because it is often committed for a benevolent reason, such as affirmative action or concern for a woman’s safety. Emotionally, it is easier for some men to view women as they would their daughters, instead of soldiers, and thus become protective. This ignores the fact that female soldiers are responsible and capable individuals who have chosen to serve their country and accept the same risks as men. Paternalism also forms a basis for segregationist policies that justify separate treatment of the sexes to protect women; for example, billeting emphasizing privacy or security for females over unit integrity or policies requiring women to deploy in pairs.

**Fraternization.** Clearly defined and rigidly enforced fraternization policies are fundamental to gender integration. Traditional mores prohibiting undue familiarity among personnel of different ranks are held as conducive to good order and discipline. The potential for undue consideration is greater when men and women, accustomed to unrestricted sexual and romantic relationships in civilian life, must live and fight together in uniform. Another reason that relationships between juniors and seniors are restricted is the possibility of personal attachments overcoming professional detachment. In organizations which require personal risk and sacrifice, seniors must give orders that may get juniors killed. The seniors must do so with
full objectivity and juniors must have confidence that orders issued to them are necessary and fair. For women in uniform fraternization is often associated with dating between officers and enlisted. However, fraternization is defined by junior to senior relationships, not by gender. Some commanders are confused when it comes to enforcing antifraternization standards since they assume that, as sexual and romantic relationships are natural, such conduct transcends the divisions of rank which define appropriate junior to senior relations. In this case females are not seen as soldiers or officers first, but as women. And if men and women engage in personal rather than professional relationships, commanders may adopt “an anything goes outside of work” attitude. This not only departs from the rule that military members are accountable for their actions regardless of duty status, it is an “anti-unit morale” time bomb.

The profession of arms has always emphasized controlling emotions and divisive conduct. The services are expert in taking diverse groups of young people, with their adolescent hormones and prejudices, and making them a cohesive team. Cohesion is a function of leadership, of shared experiences and purpose, not homogeneity. Reason must overcome emotion, and gender is not an acceptable excuse for misconduct. Nonjudicial punishment is based on the need to establish a clear causal link between youthful misdeeds and their consequences, while not destroying the careers of junior soldiers who are prone to act before thinking. Seniors have no excuse for misconduct. The most natural yet dangerous emotion in our profession is fear: controlling fear under fire is courage.

Gender Differences

Two oft cited reasons for dissimilar treatment of men and women are physical strength and pregnancy. But like racial characteristics, these differences are negated by individual abilities that transcend class distinctions. Claims that the average woman is weaker, better coordinated, or shorter than the average man are fallacies of the undistributed middle. Some women are stronger, more clumsy, and taller than some men. Character traits that distinguish great warriors are not gender determined. The major
difference is that most women can bear children. But pregnancy, a temporary medical condition, must be distinguished from parenthood which is a class common to both men and women.

Physical Strength. Professional athletes do not have to take strength tests or meet special physical standards prior to being allowed to play. This is because selection for competitive teams is predicated on demonstrated performance. In those activities requiring more fitness and skill than strength women and men compete on an equal basis. There is no need for an occupational physical standard since the standard is outsourcing the competition. The other critical trait that distinguishes great athletes from merely talented ones is spirit. No test exists for spirit. The only way it can be measured is on the playing field when the pressure to perform is greatest. Sports fans might cry foul because in the military physical fitness tests are gender-normed which means women are not required to run as fast as men. That such tests are also age-normed is seldom mentioned. This is because physical fitness testing does not measure combat readiness, strength, or job performance.

Fitness standards ensure an individual’s health and are appropriately determined by gender and age. Physical strength is a separate issue from fitness; it is related to performing a given task, independent of gender. Standards involve two questions: what is strength and what is skill? If the concern is that women would be arbitrarily excluded, then the objective standard must be reviewed vis-à-vis the performance requirement. This is best done by those with operational experience and a realistic perspective on correlations among factors such as strength, skill, and motivation. Where doing it is the fundamental criterion, however, an individual man or woman who completes military flight training or Ranger school is strong and skilled enough by virtue of successfully completing the course. These difficult programs also provide the important gut checks which measure spirit and commitment.

Pregnancy. Perhaps the one gender difference that evokes the most emotion, paternalism, and stereotyping is pregnancy. The classic example of a seemingly benign yet invidious policy is mandatory pregnancy testing for Navy women officers and enlisted reporting for sea duty aboard ships or aviation squadrons. The policy reduces a commander with many years of experience and responsibility for hundreds of lives to the level of a recruit. It treats pregnancy not as a normal medical condition, but as if it was symptomatic of HIV or illegal substance abuse, for which we only conduct universal random urinanalysis to prosecute identified offenders. The idea that pregnancy is a major readiness problem is not grounded in fact. The vast majority of unplanned personnel losses, which are the tie-in to readiness, result from medical causes such as sport-related injuries, disciplinary status, or dependent-related issues.

Pregnancy must be viewed in terms of individual accountability. Military women, pregnant or not, are adults and fully responsible for their actions. Current policies that allow the temporary status of pregnancy to become a reason for discharge are paternalistic and establish motherhood as a class different from fatherhood. The pregnancy rate among junior enlisted personnel is a visible barometer of morale; high rates can imply fraternization, harassment, or other disciplinary problems. Just as a high rate of drug infractions signals commanders that something is wrong, pregnancies suggest that young women are opting to escape. In a much publicized incident of high pregnancy rates aboard USS Acadia during Desert Storm, for example, female sailors complained of extensive sexism and hostility within their command during the eight-month deployment.

Family

Unlike pregnancy, concerns over single parents and dual-service marriages are common to both sexes. The services have long emphasized the importance of family to morale by providing a large dependent support structure. It is unreasonable to expect service women to forgo marriage and family just as it is for service men. Military fathers who find themselves incapable of matching professional and parental responsibilities have traditionally received hardship discharges. Military mothers must be held to the same standard. Women in the military with children are still individual soldiers first.
first. Motherhood does not override professional integrity nor does wearing the uniform equate to poor parenthood. The application of equal standards to mothers, including combat duty, will force a difficult choice for those women who desire protected status to facilitate the demands of parenthood over military service. A return to the draft need not alter this perspective since family deferments were granted to fathers during past periods of conscription. As with men, those women who cannot resolve this dilemma should be civilians.

Harassment and Discrimination

It is odd that a range of problems associated with military women are identified with sexual harassment because few everyday problems have anything to do with sexual attraction. This is not to minimize the issue of unwanted sexual advances which tends to receive a disproportional amount of media attention. In the military a senior’s sexual exploitation of a junior amounts to professional incest. The fact that it is seldom viewed in such harsh terms bespeaks a larger problem of sexism. Like racism, sexism underscores overt, subtle discrimination that makes gender integration very difficult to achieve. Gender harassment is better understood as a form of bigotry, analogous to the maliciousness of racism. Its purpose is to drive unwanted intruders out of an institution.

Soldiers subjected to this type of bigotry also have a professional duty to confront it. They must distinguish between imagined and real slights, maintain perspective and objectivity under difficult circumstances, and attempt to deal with problems at the lowest level possible. But if faced with gross discriminatory acts by hard core bigots, one cannot turn away. Action must be taken through the chain of command for the same reason that any serious violation of the trust placed in one’s rank and position cannot be ignored. While confrontation may cause an immediate backlash of resentment, victims must respond to acts of bigotry. Failing to do so means assuming some of the responsibility for future infractions. Such behavior exists not because most men are sexist, but because a majority tolerates the transgressions of a minority.

Leadership

For gender integration to succeed, bigotry must be seen foremost as a leadership issue. Responsibility, accountability, and commensurate authority are traits that define command in the profession of arms. They are as essential to successful gender integration as they are to running an effective battalion, ship, or squadron. The basic lessons of Tailhook involve a difficult precept of leadership: sins of omission. Tailhook became a national scandal, instead of an embarrassing incident, because of what didn’t happen after alleged assaults were reported.

The principle that commanders are responsible for everyone and everything under their command is central to preventing small problems from becoming mission-threatening conflicts. It is also the reason gender integration problems cannot be treated differently from other issues of military discipline. Because commanders must retain the authority to execute their responsibilities, the Uniform Code of Military Justice and judicial process should not be altered to create separate categories or procedures for gender harassment and discrimination complaints. A judge advocate general investigation is the traditional means to ascertain facts, establish accountability, and make recommendations for disciplinary action. Such investigations should also reveal false accusations and help to avoid paternalistic over reactions. Inspector general avenues are open if the chain of command fails. Under strict codes of individual accountability, commanders can’t dismiss gender discrimination or harassment complaints as social or equal employment opportunity problems. Commanders must be held personally accountable.

Leading by example is a basic axiom of command. No one is more essential to successful gender integration than the unit commander whose example sets the tone throughout the ranks. If a commander truly wants to avoid problems brought on by gender integration, the most effective action is to tell the unit’s assembled officers and enlisted personnel that women are here to stay and that their military status is not open to debate. Anyone who has a problem with that position can either get over it or get out.

Women have served in the defense establishment for almost one hundred years. Tens of thousands of women saw service in World War I, some years before they gained the right to vote, and hundreds of thousands
of women held traditional as well as previously unimaginable positions during World War II. Both conflicts were followed by brief periods of recognition for such distaff contributions, then the wartime achievements of women were forgotten. Ironically, significant institutional change for military women did not result from their participation in two world wars, but from the All Volunteer Force which required their permanent participation in the Armed Forces. Previously women had donned uniforms to free men for combat; but with the All Volunteer Force they entered the military in progressively greater numbers in the place of men who chose to remain civilians. The number of qualified female volunteers exceeded ceilings placed on their enlistment by personnel planners.

During the military buildup of the 1980s, the increased utilization of female recruits was essential to maintaining the educational and technical quality of the enlisted force. When the Gulf War ended, over 11 percent of the Total Force was female, including 21 percent of the Army Reservists who participated in Desert Shield. A significant sector of the Armed Forces that won the Gulf War had been gender-integrated for almost twenty years.

The next war will also be fought with a gender-integrated force. Return to conscription would not alter this reality. With unrestricted participation by women in the civilian work force, it would be politically difficult to implement a draft that impressed marginally qualified male citizens for combat duty but excluded better qualified female volunteers. Those who oppose extending the draft to women should be among the strongest advocates of a volunteer force. Would the conduct of military affairs be easier without women? Perhaps, but it would also be easier to dispense with military justice, prohibit marriages, maintain a force of “average white guys,” and do other things that occur in authoritarian societies, but this is America. Instead, we have a complicated system of rights and benefits to protect the interests and families of service members. Such considerations, however inconvenient or costly, are tolerated because they both enhance combat readiness and are consistent with the principles of our Nation. In the American military tradition, what we fight for and how we fight for it matters. Unlike Roman legionaries or Prussian officers, our purpose is higher than simply killing for the state. We swear allegiance not to emperor or fatherland, but to the Constitution of the United States.

Gender integration is about integrating individuals. In a certain sense every American is a minority of one. A gender-neutral meritocracy creates a level playing field where membership on the team and the position played is predicated on individual ability. A person’s sex is irrelevant. If you put points on the scoreboard, you play—no quotas, ceilings, restrictions, or special treatment. Any player, man or woman, who cannot perform or get along with his or her teammates gets cut from the squad. It is the common identity of being a soldier first that transcends the differences of gender and unites highly competitive people to serve a common purpose. Participation based upon individual ability also ensures the strongest possible national defense. Not only does it increase the size of the pool from which to draw the best qualified soldiers but, as Clausewitz noted, it reminds us that the support of all the people is fundamental to victory.

NOTES

3 Navy Military Personnel Manuals 1820325 and 1830200.
Brigade Commander,
USNA, Annapolis.

Vice Commander,
Cadet Wing, USAFA,
Colorado Springs.

First Captain, USMA,
West Point.

Vice Commander,
Cadet Wing, USAFA,
Colorado Springs.
When Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act, few could have imagined the eventual impact it would have on military education. The act fundamentally changed the way intermediate and senior colleges approach Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) by redressing the balance between service and joint educational needs. The accomplishments of Goldwater-Nichols in this field are many and varied and include Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) education, joint officer development goals, joint educational accreditation, and increased interaction among the service colleges. While the law...
has achieved its purpose, a systemic review of the joint educational process that has evolved is called for. This review should ensure continued progress in developing officers with expertise in service capabilities and joint warfighting. This article documents the progress made and offers some suggestions that can increase excellence of JPME as seen from the intermediate college level perspective.

Toward Goldwater-Nichols

The failure of the April 1980 mission to rescue the American hostages held by Iran helped set the stage for the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Desert One reinforced doubts among many members of the Congress, defense establishment, and military over the ability of the services to operate in a joint environment. At the heart of the controversy was whether an adequate organizational structure existed to carry out joint operations on short notice around the globe.  

In the aftermath of Desert One two seminal articles on defense reorganization appeared in Armed Forces Journal International. One, entitled “Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change,” was by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones. The other, “The JCS: How Much Reform is Needed?,” was by the Army’s Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer. These articles called for institutional change and helped bring about hearings by the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee and pave the way for Goldwater-Nichols.

A primary purpose of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation was to strengthen the position of the Chairman as well as the commanders in chief of the unified combatant commands. Congress believed that this would eliminate many of the problems identified in the aftermath of Desert One. The act changed the ways in which DOD and the services managed the careers of officers assigned to joint duty. Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act dealt with joint officer personnel policy and specifically required the Secretary of Defense “to establish policies, procedures and practices to develop and manage joint specialty officers who are particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters.” In addition, it also required service colleges to intensify their focus on joint matters and the preparation of officers for joint duty assignments.

Title IV was originally intended to provide policy for JSO personnel management. But it was extended beyond that purpose through the efforts of Congressman Ike Skelton, a member of the House Armed Services Committee. He believed that in order for the services to develop high quality JSOs, a strong joint educational system had to be created together with effective personnel management practices. Due to this interest, Mr. Skelton was appointed to chair a panel on military education to assess the capability of the Professional Military Education (PME) system to produce officers competent in both military strategy and joint matters.

The Skelton Panel

The Panel on Military Education of the House Armed Services Committee—also known as the Skelton Panel—began work in 1987. With the help of the institutions concerned, the panel reviewed education at all intermediate and senior colleges. The initial visit was to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where the panel members met with faculty and students and heard testimony from the college’s leaders. Repeating this process at each college, the panel gathered data that led to publication in April 1989 of a comprehensive report on military education. The report made a number of recommendations that had a significant impact on PME. Among the most radical was a proposed two-phase JSO educational process. Phase I would provide students at intermediate and senior service colleges with expertise in multiservice matters which the panel believed officers of all services must understand. Phase II would provide a hands on course to teach the integrated deployment and employment of joint forces. This second
phase would be offered to students on temporary duty at the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) in Norfolk, Virginia. Congress responded by mandating a two-phase JSO education process.

**Implementation**

Responding to a recommendation of the panel, the Chairman created a Director of Military Education as a member of the Joint Staff in 1989. One of the first tasks of the Military Education Division (J-7), Joint Staff, was to prepare the documentation to develop and execute a JSO education program. A memorandum was issued in May 1990 to provide that policy. It was then revised and issued as CM–1618–93, *Military Education Policy Document*, in March 1993 which specified the three elements of a two-phase JSO educational concept:

- an educational development framework with goals for officers of every service, from pre-commissioning to flag rank
- specific learning objectives: basic joint knowledge taught at intermediate service colleges (phase I) and application of that knowledge at AFSC (phase II)
- an accreditation process to assure program goals to be met by each service.

Using this guidance the service colleges and AFSC set about implementing the two-phase program—or Program for Joint Education (PJE)—during academic year 1990–91.

Initial PJE development and other aspects of JPME were closely monitored by the House panel. The General Accounting Office (GAO), which reviewed PJE implementation, concluded in a 1991 report that the services were taking positive action to meet the spirit and intent of the panel’s recommendations. Congressman Skelton subsequently held several hearings to follow up on the GAO’s findings which also confirmed that progress was being achieved in the field of PJE.

**Joint Progress**

The most important evidence of PJE progress is the increase and strengthening of joint curricula that has occurred across the military educational community. Prior to Goldwater-Nichols most institutions regarded jointness as a separate discipline normally
taught by one department. Today service colleges consider joint education as an integrated subject area that cuts across every warfighting discipline. For example, at the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) which is part of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, all five of its academic departments have joint learning objectives embedded in their courses. The joint lessons support PJE phase I and constitute about one-third of its core curriculum. In addition, each end of course after-action review includes an assessment of how the course supports PJE.

Progress also has been made by adjusting the interservice mix of faculty and students. Since the start of academic year 1993–94, for instance, CGSS has had one air and one sea service officer in each of its 80 seminars. This is a major increase over the 40 air and 16 sea service officers who attended the school in 1986. Similarly, all the other intermediate service colleges—including the College of Naval Command and Staff at Newport, Rhode Island; Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; and Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, Virginia—have increased their overall sister service student bodies to 55, 90, and 26, respectively. A better faculty mix has also brought diverse skills and experiences to the service colleges.

One important reason for creating a joint culture is to shape new attitudes and perspectives. Through a better joint mix of both students and faculty members, the educational environment at the service colleges has changed. Learning activities no longer have a single service perspective. Seminar discussions and college exercises now benefit from the ideas and opinions of officers of all services as well as the expertise of civilians and international officers. This has changed the way graduates think about the profession of arms, their sister services, and joint warfare.

Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, colleges taught jointness based on self-defined service needs. That graduates of both intermediate and senior colleges share a basic joint knowledge and common understanding of joint operations. Similarly, phase II at AFSC increases the understanding of joint operations. Each phase enhances joint planning and cooperation in the field and fleet—where theory is translated into practice.

Progress has also been made with regard to standards. Before 1986 little policy existed to guide joint standards at service colleges. JCS Memorandum 189–84, “Joint Professional Military Education Policy Document,” offered guidance but lacked focus to meet the provisions of title IV. CM–1618–93 is a significant step forward for joint standards. It contains common learning objectives, sister service student and faculty mixes, student-to-faculty ratios, and institutional standards for measuring program effects. As a result the colleges now have uniform benchmarks to plan joint educational programs and requirements which apply to all service colleges and to the National Defense University (NDU).

The PJE accreditation process represents another major step forward. It provides a formal review process that ensures service colleges are meeting specified standards and achieving program goals and objectives. Modeled after civilian college accreditation programs, PJE accreditation is a peer-review system that takes place at least once every four years. A key benefit of accreditation is that institutions conduct self-studies of how to plan, execute, and evaluate PJE programs. This can take up to a year to complete and is a challenging and healthy experience. Both self-evaluation and accreditation demand a comprehensive internal review based on external standards. Accreditation is a significant development for PME because it provides common standards against which all the colleges can be measured.

Another area of significance is the increasing interaction within the PME community. The best example is found in the revitalized Military Education Coordination Conference (MECC) that meets twice a year. These events are chaired by the Director of the Joint Staff and attended by the presidents and commandants of the intermediate
and senior colleges. It is a forum for discussing important educational issues. In recent years, the MECC agenda has been keyed to subjects related to enhancing joint education at service colleges, although other critical topics are featured including academic freedom, ethics, and technology. In addition to the MECC, J-7 often hosts conferences to provide the colleges with a vehicle for discussing problems and developing common solutions. One such conference was recently held at NDU to review space operations and their role in combat operations. This event was attended by members of the colleges, space community, and services, and provided an opportunity to share ideas on how space issues can be integrated into curricula. Other conferences have focused on command and control and on library interconnectivity.

**The Payoff**

PJE improvements are meaningless if graduates cannot perform effectively on the job. The real proof of progress is whether graduates have the skills and knowledge to work as a joint team in combat. Operation Desert Storm provided our first major test. The result was a clear validation of the principles espoused by Goldwater-Nichols. Victory in the Gulf War demonstrated that the services and joint community were accomplishing their educational mission. We have come a long way from Desert One to Desert Storm. While PJE deserves much of the credit, we must continue to improve joint education. How do we sustain progress yet take joint education to higher levels of excellence? The joint community and services must work together to answer this question or progress will atrophy. On-going initiatives focus on joint doctrine, enhancements to PJE phases I and II, a Joint School of Advanced Military Studies (JSAMS), interconnectivity of library assets, common teaching scenarios, and the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). These are only a few of the issues that must be addressed if we are to sustain the gains made to date in PJE.

**The key to joint education is joint doctrine**

The key to joint education is joint doctrine. It is the foundation of the educational process and curricula. Without a complete body of joint doctrine the service colleges are handicapped and must teach solely from experience rather than a sound doctrinal foundation. A class discussion on joint operations without available doctrinal publications is like attending a school that does not have any books—the discussion may be lively but rarely substantive. Until joint doctrine is published and fully integrated into college curricula, JPME will be taught from individual service perspectives and never attain its potential. A study of joint operations must be doctrinally based. The intent of PJE—as well as that of Mr. Skelton and the other members of the Panel on Military Education—cannot be met without publication of a complete edition of joint doctrinal manuals.

Feedback from many quarters revealed shortcomings in PJE phases I and II that must be addressed to increase effectiveness and efficiency. The on-going J-7 review of this important area is essential to deconflicting curricula between the two phases. One key problem with a two-phase process is overlap. This is the case on the intermediate level partly because the PJE design calls for teaching joint knowledge in phase I, followed by the application of that knowledge in phase II.

Most intermediate service colleges teach subjects, particularly joint subject matter, at a level of learning beyond knowledge. The requirement to integrate and embed jointness in curricula has dictated that the resulting instruction be at a higher level, usually the application level of learning. Most intermediate colleges believe that every student—not just those going on to phase II—need more than a basic knowledge of joint operations. At CGSS, for example, the curriculum includes application-level study of deploying and employing a joint task force as the capstone exercise to the academic year. All students participate because they all require a thorough understanding of joint operations. This overlaps with phase II curricula which also teach joint task force operations.

This positive aspect of redundancy in joint curricula provides an opportunity to enhance the learning experience in phases I and II and links both curricula. It is, however, important to identify areas of overlap and sort out curricula to eliminate unnecessary redundancy. Thorough audits of curricula will reveal that we are shortchanging...
phase I service colleges on PJE. Audit results will show that the length of phase II at AFSC can be reduced by simply giving credit to service colleges for subjects being taught at phase II standards. The payoff will be a reduction in the time required to meet phase II requirements which will benefit each service college. This could be done without forcing additional joint subjects into service college core curricula. In any case, improving the JSO two-phase concept is a challenge that must be resolved.

The first step in reviewing the two-phase concept should be a comprehensive audit of PJE learning objectives and curricular overlap. This will involve analyses of PJE learning objectives to ensure they focus on skills JSOs need to perform. It will also require reviewing where objectives should be taught (in phase I or II, or both) and at what level (knowledge or application). The key is focus on the desired levels of competence to be achieved at the intermediate and senior colleges as well as the unique differences between them.

Another timely idea is to create a Joint School for Advanced Military Studies or JSAMS. In a journal article Congressman Skelton suggested creating a one-year intermediate level JSAMS course under the auspices of NDU. He pointed out that such a course would provide the Chairman and unified commanders with a pool of officers well grounded in the planning and conduct of joint operations. As envisioned JSAMS would include 60 officers (20 from each military department) and be offered in addition to similar programs of the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

The Army SAMS program has fostered similar curricula in both the Marine Corps and Air Force. These service oriented courses have proven their worth over the years. All have promoted better understanding of operational art in their respective services while simultaneously producing exceptionally well qualified operational level planners. The courses focus on intermediate service college students in the rank of major/lieutenant commander. The curricula approach operational art from unique service perspectives with joint operations a necessary by-product of the education.

To build on this foundation of operational art, a JSAMS should be the next logical step in the education process. There are, however, two problems with this model. First, service-unique programs should not be sacrificed or modified to achieve JPME objectives and standards. Existing programs have served the services well and each should maintain a service-unique perspective on operational art. Second, although a JSAMS is needed, focusing on the intermediate level will not yield the greatest payoff. Rather, focusing on the senior service college level for JSAMS would enhance joint professional development and provide more experienced campaign planners.

Along similar lines several senior colleges are addressing the need for increased education related to preparing and executing campaign plans. A JSAMS would be an excellent way to meet that need. Because theater campaign planning is inherently joint, a JSAMS could create a student and faculty mix to develop and execute plans in a truly joint learning environment. A senior-level JSAMS would produce graduates—lieutenant colonels or colonels/commanders or captains—who would be available for repetitive assignments as joint planners for the balance of their careers.

The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College has begun a curriculum to increase campaign planning in its two-year advanced operational studies fellowship, a senior service college program. This enhancement extends the current course 6 months and includes 24 to 30 months of regionally focused courses. In the first phase, students receive a foundation in military theory, history, and strategy. Regional travel, exercises, and languages are also included in the first year. In the second phase the focus is on campaign planning across the range of joint operations, going beyond the study of generic campaign design to the individual preparation of comprehensive campaign plans (the overall curriculum devotes approximately 350 hours to planning). End results are turned over to skilled practitioners assigned to unified commands and contribute to our body of knowledge on joint operations.

Other colleges also recognize that more must be done to produce theater campaign planners. The Air University has revised both intermediate and senior curricula to
put a greater emphasis on campaign planning; AFSC is doing likewise in phase II. Desert Storm demonstrated the need for trained and experienced campaign planners. The senior colleges must continue to emphasize this important aspect of modern warfare. A JSAMS at the senior level would be a step in this direction. In ten years its impact on theater campaign planning could be just as significant as the intermediate level SAMS courses have been to operational art.

Improvements can also be made in college library systems. A coordinated master plan that allows intermediate and senior college libraries to collaborate in enhancing their collective assets is technically possible. Such an initiative was taken at a MECC meeting in December 1992. Seeking to improve library coordination, the MECC endorsed the concept of a joint knowledge network and gave the Army the lead in studying library interconnectivity. To share service college library assets a multiservice master plan is needed.

Through such a coordinated plan libraries can develop ways to share archives and special collections as well as other programs. The plan should automate service-unique archives, expand current library collections, fund special collections, use multi-media approaches to increase information access, and create service and joint knowledge networks. The payoff for students, faculty, and staff is complete access to archives and collections at all colleges through the power of automation and personal computers.

Recently the defense establishment has been focusing attention on the use of simulations to train leaders. As simulations proliferate, there is a need for the services to work closer together to develop a common denominator that will not only enhance learning but provide a way to improve joint planning. That common denominator should be
joint doctrine along with the development of joint common teaching scenarios. The Army has relied on common teaching scenarios for years to standardize curricula and learning across its school system. CGSS has developed common tactical teaching scenarios for use throughout the Army school system. This not only links the education system together but provides better understanding under field conditions where officers of all ranks must work together to plan and execute combat operations. Common teaching scenarios could be adopted in joint education as well. Service colleges could pool their resources to develop common teaching scenarios to allow students at different colleges to plan combat operations under similar conditions (a scenario for Southwest Asia is a place to start). Common teaching scenarios would enhance joint learning and lead to improved teamwork among the services.

Policy change is also required in regard to the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). Under current provisions, colleges cannot include faculty positions from their own service on the JDAL. Instead, only officer positions from other services can be placed on the list. This causes a double standard at service colleges and has an adverse effect on morale. For example, the Joint Systems Division at CGSS is composed of eleven faculty: four Army, three Air Force, two Marines, and two Navy. All the positions except for the Army’s are on the JDAL. It is difficult to justify such a disparity in the case of Army officers who work side by side with officers from sister services who get JDAL credit for teaching identical courses. And similar situations prevail at the other service colleges. The JDAL problem also extends to the field and fleet. Like some officers at the colleges, not all positions in joint activities are included on the list. As a result there are officers serving in various joint billets who do not receive joint duty credit for their assignments.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act brought about dramatic changes in joint education. In the past seven years it has revitalized joint curricula, established a system to educate JSOs, and reinforced the attitudes of both students and faculty toward joint operations. Much has been accomplished, and more remains to be done. We should not be content with the status quo but instead should go beyond Goldwater-Nichols. Expanding joint doctrine, streamlining JSO education, implementing a senior level JSAMS, automating library resources, developing joint common teaching scenarios, and revising the JDAL policies are all critical initiatives that can take joint education to higher levels of excellence. The task is to maintain momentum. The initiatives discussed here as well as similar efforts by other service colleges provide an azimuth.

**Notes**

Jointness, Service Culture, and the Gulf War

By Bernard E. Trainor

The victory in the Gulf War is viewed as a vindication of those who called for military reform in the wake of the disastrous 1980 Iranian hostage rescue mission and the flawed invasion of Grenada a few years later. Those clumsy operations were attributed to the failure of the services to work together. Reformers charged that the services had exchanged officers and sent students to each other’s schools for years, but that it was not enough to transcend service culture. When it came to operations, land, sea, and air forces tended to operate autonomously, ignoring colleagues in differently colored uniforms. Critics cited numerous cases of counterproductive parochialism. A service would develop weapons and equipment without regard to their compatibility with that of the other services. Army and Navy communications systems couldn’t talk to one another, heavy equipment was acquired that could not be loaded into cargo planes, and each service had its own doctrine for employing air assets, to cite a few impediments to smooth interservice cooperation.

There was no intent to erase the differences in service philosophies and cultures, but it was hoped that the unique characteristics and strengths of each service could be molded to complement one another so the whole would be greater than the sum of its parts. Jointness became the mantra of the Armed Forces after passage of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986.

Curiously enough, the first military operation in the wake of that act was anything but joint. Operation Just Cause, the surprise attack on Manuel Noriega’s regime in Panama in 1988, was an Army-run show from start to finish. It was planned by the Army, with the other services having little knowledge of it and less input. The Navy played virtually no role. The Air Force provided only transport and a few misdirected bombs delivered by stealth bombers. Marines

This essay is drawn from a forthcoming book entitled The Generals’ War which will be published by Little, Brown next summer.
in Panama at the time were given busy work on the periphery of the operation.

The first real test of jointness came in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. It showed, as reformers maintain, that much had been accomplished in fulfilling the goals of Goldwater-Nichols. The most demonstrable example was seen in the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell. As a result of Goldwater-Nichols, he wielded power and influence beyond that exercised by previous Chairmen. He was the politico-military maestro of the Gulf War. His fellow members on the Joint Chiefs were relegated to onlookers who simply provided the forces. While Powell kept them informed, he made clear the intent of the 1986 legislation. He in no way needed their concurrence for his decisions.

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, unschooled in military affairs, knew that such singular power in the hands of one officer could make the Nation's civilian leadership hostage to Powell's advice. Cheney adroitly and informally bypassed Powell for additional military opinions to assure himself of differing views. In this way he restored the checks and balances that disappeared when Goldwater-Nichols removed other JCS members from corporate decisionmaking (in their advisory capacity). This technique did not sit well with Powell and, although he never challenged Cheney's right to solicit advice from others, it angered him.

Goldwater-Nichols also increased the authority of theater commanders and freed them from service parochialism. Like the Chairman, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT), General Norman Schwarzkopf, understood both the letter and intent of the law and wielded it effectively. As the result of the act, he was king in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. All within his domain had to do his bidding. During the war, no serious attempt was made by any service to go around Schwarzkopf. (A service chief couldn't visit the theater without the express permission of the CINC, and then only to interface with personnel of his own service.) Goldwater-Nichols had drawn clean and efficient lines of authority. Service component commanders under Schwarzkopf communicated only with him and he only communicated with Powell.

But the Gulf War shows that there is still a lot to be done if the Armed Forces are to operate in a truly joint manner. The structure for joint operations put in place by the act had not yet taken root. It was a template that did not fully accommodate the cultural differences among the services. For example, a Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) was created with interservice agreement to govern the air war over both Kuwait and Iraq. But JFACC was in the hands of the Air Force and reflected that service's cultural biases. It believed in centralized control of air power and attacks against only the targets planners believed critical to the overall campaign. These views did not necessarily comport with those of other services. The Army, with only attack helicopters for air support, complained that its sister service was ignoring its needs. The Marine Corps, also unhappy with Air Force control of the air war, but with its own air arm, simply subverted the Air Force-dominated joint system.

There are no actual villains in this scenario: each service sought to accomplish the mission but was looking at the situation through a lens colored by its own concept of
warfighting. The Air Force believed it was *shaping the battlefield* for the Army by hitting Iraqi targets within kill boxes it drew on battlefield maps. But the Army had specific targets its commanders wanted hit and, when the Air Force removed targets from the list for reasons it viewed as sensible, the Army complained bitterly. In turn, the Air Force was frustrated in the last days of the conflict when the Army’s VII Corps placed the fire support coordination line so far forward that aircraft could not freely attack Iraqi forces fleeing toward Basra.

Even the Navy and Marines, conscious of their status as integrated components of the naval service, had differences. The Navy had little interest in amphibious operations, the centerpiece of the Marine *raison d’être*. The Navy was carrier-oriented and saw itself in competition with the Air Force for laurels in the air war. It was having a hard enough time trying to deal with Air Force tasking orders for air strikes to entertain hare-brained notions from the Marines. The very idea of an amphibious assault in Kuwait did not conform to the Navy’s view of warfare. The Marines had to dispatch a special team of amphibious planners from the United States to get the Navy to even understand the possible virtues of an attack from the sea against the Iraqis.

From the very outset of the Gulf crisis, Schwarzkopf himself violated the spirit of jointness as enshrined by Goldwater-Nichols. He imported a special team of Army planners to draw up his ground offensive strategy. They then invited a British planner to join their supersecret inner circle, but excluded a Marine representative. Yet the Marines, with almost all their combat forces committed to the campaign, had greater call on formulating strategy than the British. It was not a deliberate slight; it was an unconscious reflection of service culture. For decades the Army had institutionally focused on Europe. It had much more in common with a long-standing NATO ally than it did with a service with which it rarely associated.

Even in the Army there were cultural differences which influenced performance. Heavy in armor brought from Germany, VII Corps was organized, trained, and equipped to fight the Soviet army. Not surprisingly it planned to fight in the Gulf as though it faced the Soviets. Meticulous planning and deliberate synchronization of forces are hallmarks of NATO procedures. The British 1st Armored Division, also from NATO Europe, fit into the VII Corps scheme of things far more easily than fellow Americans from XVIII Airborne Corps. Based in the United States as a central reserve, XVIII Corps was not NATO-oriented and was ready to go anywhere in the world against any enemy. In that respect there was greater kinship among its divisions and the Marines than with VII Corps. Culturally, battle procedures in the 82d Airborne, 24th Mechanized, and 101st Air Assault Divisions were different and less formal than those in NATO units.

Paradoxically, Schwarzkopf recognized that jointness didn’t mean his subordinates would all think or act alike. This was one reason he adopted a decentralized command policy which gave maximum freedom of action within the framework of the overall plan. But having done so, neither he nor his staff fully thought through the implications of executing the plan. Had they done so, they could have better anticipated how the battle would unfold and been positioned to capitalize on it. As it was the battle got away from the CINC at the outset and he never regained control.

The rapid Marine advance on the first day of the war knocked the VII Corps timetable into a cocked hat. CENTCOM planners counted on the Marines holding the enemy in place in southern Iraq so that VII Corps could launch its planned seven-
ten-day offensive on the following day to envelop the Iraqis further north. But the Iraqis were in retreat. It should not have been a surprise that the Marines were not going to dally at the Kuwaiti border. Their plan, which was known to CENTCOM, and the cultural commitment which the Marines have to offensive operations, should have made it clear that they would advance aggressively. The only thing Schwarzkopf could do to get things on track was to speed up the VII Corps attack. But VII Corps was trained to advance in a deliberate, synchronized fashion. This was part of its culture, so well suited to a war in Europe. To Schwarzkopf’s frustration they didn’t move fast enough. But once again he should not have been surprised since he knew the corps commander and his style of operations. Schwarzkopf’s decentralized style of leadership undid his carefully crafted strategy.

Besides endorsing decentralized operational planning and execution, the CINC also elected not to name an overall commander of both Army and Marine ground forces, which was legitimate given the wide separation between service components. But had he done so, more control might have been exercised over the offensive from the outset. At very least the land force commander would have seen that the planned rates of advance between the Marine supporting attack and the VII Corps main attack were unbalanced. It was expecting too much of jointness to assume that the Marine Expeditionary Force on the southern border of Kuwait would think much about its Army counterpart in the western desert. The same may be said of VII Corps in that desert. It cared little about what the Marines were up to. The force commanders planned to fight the war according to their own style. Goldwater-Nichols may not have intended that they fight the same way, but it did anticipate that a joint command would be knowledgeable of the differences and harmonize them.

What conclusions can be drawn from the Gulf War, the first major enterprise in jointness? At the highest level the goals of the DOD Reorganization Act were largely achieved. Throughout the war there were clean lines of authority, direction, and responsibility. But at field level jointness still has a way to go. Doctrinal differences between the services still exist. As in the past they are frequently papered over with ambiguous language in joint agreements, leaving commanders in the field to interpret differences on a case-by-case basis. Secondly, the degree of jointness is directly proportional to the degree of dependence implicit in any given set of circumstances. The service that depends most on support from a sister service will champion jointness. The Army is the prime example of dependency. Services capable of semi-autonomous action are inclined to go their own way if circumstances allow. The Navy and Air Force fall into this category.

Finally, joint culture has not yet matured sufficiently to take into account and accommodate the cultural differences among the services. And herein lies a danger as we proceed along the path towards greater jointness. If for its sake conformity is achieved at the expense of uniqueness, we could end up with a military that is inflexible, uncreative, and most importantly, predictable. Both for present and future planners the task is to recognize the unquantifiable value that service culture plays in warfighting. It is a characteristic to be exploited, not suppressed.
The ability of Assyria in the 7th century B.C. to field 50,000-strong armies in deserts and mountains is attributed to smoothly operating staffs and logistics. Over the centuries the innovative commander has mastered the art of foraging with two effects: limiting the avenue of attack to those places where sustainment is found, and muting popular support by the local inhabitants when their crops are confiscated or burnt, cities pillaged, and families separated. General Erwin Rommel said that the first condition for armies to endure the strain of battle is to have ample stocks of weapons, ammunition, and fuel. He added that battles are decided by quartermasters, for even brave soldiers can do nothing without weapons. And weapons can accomplish nothing without ammunition, and weapons and ammunition are useless in mobile warfare unless vehicles have the fuel to haul them. Admiral Ernest King echoed a similar point.

Contingency plans often fail to give due consideration to transportation and logistics. It is assumed that troops and equipment will get there when needed, and that ports, airheads, roads, and railways will be available and secure from interdiction. These assumptions are dangerous. Today much of the core airlifter fleet is degraded or nonoperational, merchant ships and their crews are dwindling, and commercial airlines are pulling out of the Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet. The U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) consolidated the efforts of the Military Sealift, Military Traffic Management, and Air Mobility Commands in times of war and peace. Like a single-stop travel agency, TRANSCOM is endeavoring to provide capabilities to deploy forces by various modes of transport from anywhere in the United States and to supply them with the wherewithal to win the next war.
when in frustration he said: “I don’t know what the hell this logistics is that [General George] Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it.” Such historical vignettes should remind joint planners and commanders when preparing for war or a contingency to train to get where they are going and to be sustained when they get there.

Dangerous Assumptions

Having participated in a variety of wargames, exercises, and contingencies, it is clear to me that we frequently assume difficulties of deployment and sustainment, but bank on infrastructure—at home, en route, and in theater—to meet our requirements. We assume that we will know the location of every critical piece of equipment at all times and that the transportation assets needed to rapidly mobilize and sustain a force will be there in adequate numbers, ready for battle.

Such assumptions lead to complacency and sometimes to disaster. Many assumed that the C-141 aircraft designed in the 50s, built in the 60s, stretched in the 80s, and flown hard ever since would be there as our core airlifter. They overlooked that the size of equipment and the amount of supplies to be lifted have grown since the 50s, that we are not just postured for operations to large airfields in Western Europe, and that the majority of our forces will now be predominantly based in America. Some assumed that the U.S.-flag merchant marine fleet would still be there in sufficient numbers with the appropriate types of vessels to provide bulk sustainment for the Armed Forces. They assumed there would always be a pool of trained U.S. merchant mariners to man Fast Sealift Ships and Ready Reserve Force vessels. Others assumed that railheads, roads, cranes, and ports would always be ready to support surges accompanying major contingencies. Assumptions lull us into thinking that we will always be able to fly and sail to facilities that are well maintained, sized to handle the load, and immune from enemy attack.

I want to hang out a banner for everyone to read: check your assumptions. Don’t conduct wargames with invalid Timed Phase Force Deployment Data and assume that all
your forces will be there when needed. Accounts of employing forces that don’t consider deploying and sustaining them are probably suspect. Discussions about long arm movements over maps without mention of railheads, roads, airports and airlift, seaports and sealift, the health of the civil transport sector, and access to key, capable international transportation facilities should be carefully scrutinized.

**The System Today**

When the President, through the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, asks if ports and airfields are secure, air superiority has been achieved, a ground offensive is ready to begin, or victory has been achieved, he is actually asking about deployment and sustainment or, in other words, about strategic mobility. In the recent past a significant portion of the C–141 core airlifter fleet is grounded, a larger portion restricted from air refueling operations, and each aircraft limited to carrying only 74 percent of its designed load capacity. Both U.S.-flagged merchant marine fleet vessels and the Americans aboard them are declining in number with no improvement in sight. Commercial air carriers, under pressure to achieve profitability, have declined to participate in the Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF) program to such an extent that we are not able to meet all CRAF stage II and III requirements. Today, the United States is withdrawing from overseas facilities which were once ready and available for global deployment and sustainment operations.

It is fortunate that the President, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs, and CINCs, as well as many in the Congress, support strategic mobility programs like the C–17, sealift ship conversion and construction, and Ready Reserve Force expansion and maintenance. But there are some who suggest we
can’t afford the mix of assets recommended by the congressionally mandated Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) which did not meet the warfighting requirements of the CINCs. Deploying forces with a low risk to lives was too expensive. Thus a compromise was struck: delay the closure of necessary forces by giving the enemy more time to lay land mines, seize key terrain, move tanks and equipment forward, sow harbors with mines, and attack U.S. and allied forces that may be present, and thereby reduce the cost of transportation.

Let me illustrate the importance of reevaluating planning. MRS assumed that in FY99 there would be a certain number of fully mission-capable C–141s (which is now highly unlikely), that there would be a fully supported CRAF program (which is now in doubt), that there would be a certain number of converted or constructed sealift ships (which is now delayed), and that a badly needed new C–17 core airlift program would be supported (which is now under attack). The study also pointed out that even after an expected 120 C–17s were built, a shortfall would exist (which is as yet unaddressed). Today MRS is undergoing further review.

The Case for Change

One learns from a constant stream of articles and speeches that change is required, coming, or even here already. I couldn’t agree more. But the distance between the United States and other regions of the world hasn’t changed. The speed at which surface, sea, and airlift assets will travel isn’t likely to change any time soon. And the need to rapidly respond, almost simultaneously, in many parts of the globe hasn’t changed.

What is changing—really happening—is that America is returning to its origins as a militia nation. America has not historically maintained large standing forces, instead encouraging reliance on the Guard and Reserve, and avoiding international entanglements. After major wars, including the Cold War, administrations have sought to radically downsize the military by shifting resources to domestic priorities on the assumption that the remaining force structure is trained, deployable, sustainable, and capable of winning future wars—however winning is defined.

The U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) was established in 1987 with the idea that unity of effort in mobility is essential to ensuring joint combat effectiveness on the battlefield. It was not until Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm that TRANSCOM really came into its own. While successful, the experience proved what coaches have known for decades: you must practice the way you are going to play. That realization led to a 1993 DOD Directive which designates TRANSCOM as the single manager for defense transportation in both war and peace.
by placing the Military Sealift, Military Traffic Management, and Air Mobility Commands under one combatant command and assigning strategic mobility (or common user) forces to an operational command.

TRANSCOM is taking its newly assigned responsibilities very seriously. The warfighting CINCs determine requirements for their respective theaters of operations. We, in turn, determine within the constraints of the existing defense transportation system whether these requirements can be met. If not, we work with the CINC’s staff to minimize shortfalls and maximize opportunities for victory. In concert with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, military services, Department of Transportation, and commercial transportation sector, we will strongly advocate the need for and promote the acquisition of mobility assets to support our national military strategy.

With the current administration’s call for reduced defense budgets while still maintaining the capability to achieve victory when the Armed Forces are committed, we got a clear, unambiguous message: we can’t continue to conduct business as usual, we can’t afford it financially nor do the men and women who are asked to go in harm’s way deserve a transportation system that reduces their chance of victory—even of survival. In sum, a smaller force structure based predominantly in the United States which is not deployable or sustainable in a manner that allows us to win with what are considered acceptable losses is a hollow force.

Re-engineering the System

To ensure military forces are successful despite declining defense budgets, TRANSCOM is hard at work charting a course for the defense transportation system into the next century. Change means more than total quality management or improving existing processes. It is investing the time and resources to re-engineer the defense transportation system. The first task of a recently formed TRANSCOM initiatives team is to develop an *ought to be* defense transportation system as well as to provide a framework to get there. The team will work with the Joint Transportation Corporate Information Management Center—which was recently chartered by DOD—to further refine plans to include detailed procedural, organizational, and technological reforms.

In retrospect one can see how in part the defense transportation system developed in both service and functional stovepipes. This has affected the ways in which requirements are identified, tasked, contracted, monitored, and billed to customers, and involves various automation systems used to run these processes—many of which originated centuries ago (if measured in technological years) and most of which don’t talk with one another, even within a single headquarters.

Some ask why TRANSCOM is unable to provide services like the private sector. Why is it that in the marketplace there are local travel agents who, upon request, can book a flight to Florida, a ship for a cruise, a bus tour en route at intermediate stops, and a train trip to complete the journey—one agent for air, sea, road, and rail, and with only one bill? After sending parcels via a delivery service a toll free number is available to check on where the shipments are, anytime of day or night. If that can be done by private enterprise, why can’t critical spare parts destined for a CINC’s area of responsibility be located and arrival times determined in the DOD pipeline?

Re-engineering the defense transportation system will give customers—the Armed Forces—the type of quality service offered by the private sector, or perhaps better. Soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and coastguardsmen—active and Reserve—as well as members of the civil service and the commercial transport industries, have ensured a strong and robust defense transportation system throughout our Nation’s history. For those who today go in harm’s way, TRANSCOM pledges to develop a new system that lives up to Winston Churchill’s dictum: “Victory is the beautiful bright coloured flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.”

**Fogleman**
When the first Patriot missile rose to meet an incoming Iraqi Scud during the Persian Gulf War, it heralded the age of anti-tactical missile defense. As ballistic missiles proliferate, theater missile defense (TMD) will continue to receive attention and resources while planners and commanders are considering its political and military implications. Proliferation has prompted adapting the Strategic Defense Initiative to protect not only the United States but also our forward-deployed forces. A residual presence abroad is inevitable for the foreseeable future to reassure our allies and maintain a sufficient infrastructure to rapidly expand our force structure if conditions demand. The deterrent value of such capabilities will be threatened without a defense against area ballistic missile threats. That protection will require a variety of TMD options as well as careful coordination among all the services, the NATO Alliance, and ad hoc coalition partners.
When Patriot air defense batteries modified for an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) role were deployed to Israel and Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War, history was made as the Armed Forces intercepted an attacking Iraqi Scud in defense of forward-deployed forces and allied territory.\(^1\) Patriot’s success inaugurated a joint theater missile defense (TMD) mission when Army batteries rapidly deployed on Air Force C-141 Starlifters and the sensor cueing of American missiles against Scuds was carried out by Air Force space-based assets. While the debut of Patriot was not perfect, its political value in underwriting Israeli restraint to ensure the solidarity of the coalition was pivotal to the overall success of Operation Desert Storm. From now on TMD will be a critical component of joint and combined warfare as ballistic missile proliferation becomes an increasingly serious global problem.

As the United States projects military power overseas for crisis response and to protect vital interests, TMD may become a central feature of the politico-military equation.

Because of missile proliferation in the post-Cold War world, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program was redirected in early 1991. The new focus was the development of defenses to protect not only the United States, but also our forces deployed overseas, power-projection forces, and allies and friends against accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source.\(^2\) The Gulf War made pursuit of effective TMD a top priority, as manifest in the Missile Defense Act of 1991 and renewed in subsequent National Defense Authorization Acts.\(^3\) This increased focus on TMD was sharpened by the Bottom-Up Review which established TMD as having the highest priority.\(^4\) Current ballistic missile defense plans provide for more effective TMD systems to become operational during the course of this decade.

The following discussion of TMD addresses its role in national military strategy, the status of current programs, and the effective integration of this new mission into joint doctrine, planning, doctrine, operations, and organization as well as into combined warfare.

**U.S. Strategy**

American strategy has shifted significantly with the end of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union. It is no longer based primarily on a global threat to U.S. interests, but instead on unpredictable and ambiguous regional threats. This shift occurred as a significant proliferation of ballistic missiles with ranges that could seriously threaten regional stability spread to a number of potentially hostile states. As a result, the significance of TMD requirements in the overall scheme of national military strategy has become more urgent than ever.

The relevance of the TMD mission can be readily understood in the context of the Bottom-Up Review which identified four categories of “dangers” to U.S. security interests:

- Dangers posed by nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, including the proliferation of such weapons and the massive Russian nuclear arsenal inherited from the former Soviet Union
- Regional dangers, including aggression by regional powers—some with ballistic missiles—against the security interests of the United States,

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A layered defense protects targets by intercepting ballistic missiles in the boost, assent, midcourse, or terminal stage. This chart illustrates defended footprints for three areas from the North Atlantic to the Eastern Mediterranean defended by (a) Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THADD) system with Kick propulsion option, (b) THADD Block IV booster with Kick, and (c) Standard missile-2 Block IV with Kick and Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile (LEAP).

Source: U.S. Navy

As well as internal conflict within states of key regions that threatens stability

▼ dangers to democracy and reform in the new independent states of Eurasia

▼ economic dangers—both internal and external—to the United States.

Since U.S. forces are key to deterring or defending against regional threats, the capability to deter or defeat aggressors in major regional conflicts (MRCs) was the primary planning factor in the methodology used in the Bottom-Up Review. Moreover, a fundamental assumption in sizing our force structure was that we must be able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous MRCs. Both the overseas presence of U.S. forces and U.S.-based contingency power projection forces will play major roles in successfully combatting regional aggression; and when aggressors possess ballistic missiles, TMD forces will also be essential.

In the event of a hostile invasion that threatens U.S. security interests, the highest priority of the Clinton administration’s strategy will be to halt such an invasion as early as possible in an initial defense. After that is accomplished U.S. forces will be built up in-theater concurrent with efforts to degrade enemy forces; then a counteroffensive to decisively defeat the enemy will follow; and finally residual forces will remain to guarantee post-war stability. One of the major tasks that must be performed in the critical first-phase initial defense is protection of friendly forces and rear area assets from attack by aircraft and both cruise and ballistic missiles since their loss could be catastrophic for effective combat operations.

Appreciation of the quantitative threat from ballistic missiles can be derived from the threat projections for possible regional aggressors that were posited for the Bottom-Up Review. In the future U.S. forces could be faced with hostile forces in a specific region comprised of as many as 750,000 troops, 4,000 tanks, 5,000 armored vehicles, 3,000 artillery pieces, 1,000 aircraft, a 200-ship navy, and anywhere between 100 and 1,000 Scud-class ballistic missiles (some armed with weapons of mass destruction).

Short of actual hostilities, TMD will be important in maintaining regional deterrence and stability. While American presence overseas is being reduced (especially in Europe), and there is an ongoing substantial downsizing of force structure, it is essential that some presence be retained. It is an important political assurance for our allies and a requisite for preserving our global security interests and regional interests such as a stable supply of oil from the Middle East. Moreover, the infrastructure of bases and daily contact with allies would be critical in restoring a major presence if required by a reemergent or newly emerging threat. Ultimately the deterrent posture of overseas U.S. forces could be undermined if they became vulnerable to regional ballistic missile threats.

Given the diverse U.S. interests at risk in various regional security environments, a variety of flexible deployment modes will be desirable. For example, our presence in NATO should make fixed ground-based TMD a viable option for European defense. TMD in Europe could entail a mix of U.S. and allied assets; in addition, sea-based TMD in-theater
would be an excellent complement to—if not a partial alternative for—ground-based TMD. In areas such as the Middle East where U.S. security presence must be less conspicuous for obvious political reasons, TMD may have to be positioned either just over or on the horizon. Sea-based TMD along with rapidly-deployable Army TMD units are well-suited for this situation. In Northeast Asia, flexible TMD planning may be needed to balance the interests of allies and friends alike. Finally, ballistic missile threats could conceivably arise elsewhere with little warning—an event that could require contingency projection of TMD capabilities in crisis response similar to the initial use of Patriot in the Gulf War.

In sum, a regionally oriented strategy requires that all U.S. forces operating in-theater be protected against missile threats. This previously missing dimension of U.S. strategy is now fully appreciated. For example, the new Navy TMD program is essential to the “littoral” strategy which now defines the Navy’s approach to ensuring regional stability. Yet, complexity and uncertainty are constants. The complexity of U.S. politico-military relations with other countries as well as the unpredictability of future crises which could involve ballistic missile threats dictate that the TMD mission must be dynamic, flexible, adaptive, and joint. These mission characteristics are reflected in TMD programs and should guide us in integrating TMD into doctrine, planning, operations, and organization for joint and combined warfare.

**Multiservice and Multinational**

The overall program objectives of the Clinton administration are to field a TMD capability rapidly by upgrading existing systems and developing more advanced systems for acquisition later in this decade. The proposed budget to support those goals is $12 billion for FY95–FY99.9 An array of service programs reinforces the joint and combined nature of the TMD mission. The TMD Initiative (TMDI) involves the Army, Navy, and Air Force.10 The elements of the Army candidate system have included upgrades to Patriot (PAC–2 and PAC–3) to be fielded over the next six years. PAC–2/3 upgrades expand the system’s battlespace for lower tier ATBM area coverage, increase firepower, and enhance lethality with possible hit-to-kill technology.

The Army is developing a wide-area, upper tier system called Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) made up of advanced high-altitude, long-range, ground-based interceptors and new ground-based radars. Fielding a deployable prototype for national emergencies could start in the mid-90s followed by an operational THAAD by 2000. It will be air-transportable for response and might be interoperable with Israel’s Arrow ATBM. In the next decade, a short-range Army Corps Surface-to-Air Missile (Corps SAM) interceptor could offer added lower tier TMD protection for rapid force projection. If deployed, Corps SAM could become compatible and interoperable with other Army, service, and allied systems for joint and coalition operations.

Navy TMD would use a planned 50-ship Aegis fleet for sea-based ATBM and theater-wide defense in two phases. First, a near-term capability could be provided by modifying and improving the Aegis SPY–1 radar and weapons control system for the Standard missile for defensive coverage similar to PAC–3 for fleet concentrations, debarkation ports, coastal airfields, amphibious objective areas, and expeditionary forces being inserted ashore. Second, for longer-term theater-wide
The circles traced over the Red Sea and Persian Gulf represent the approximately 400-kilometer coverage of Aegis Radars on missile cruisers. This range coverage would detect offensive missile launches from either Iraq or Iran and provide defensive protection for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and portions of Israel as well as for ships in waters adjacent to the Southwest Asian region.

Source: U.S. Navy

The outcome of the Bottom-Up Review for TMD is to continue a core program for the next five years emphasizing development and acquisition of Patriot PAC–3, THAAD, and Aegis/SM–2 Block IVA systems. Also, a technology demonstration program for Corps SAM and technology research for a sea-based upper tier system as well as for an ascent phase interceptor will proceed. TMD as a broad mission entails three other tasks in addition to active defense: passive defensive measures such as hardening and deception, counterforce (preemptive) offensive attack options, and command, control, and communications for TMD assets. These tasks are no less joint in nature. For example, counterforce attack options—preemptive destruction of hostile ballistic missiles prior to launch—undoubtedly (1) will involve multisensor identification and acquisition of launchers, (2) will likely involve air-control targeting of both Army and Air Force ground attack aircraft, and (3) will conceivably involve Navy cruise missile attack operations. An additional asset available in the anti-missile defense repertoire is the capability of Special Operations Forces.

has been studying concepts for an air-based boost phase interceptor to negate reactive countermeasures such as chemical submunitions and, through early and multiple intercept opportunities, enhance overall TMD effectiveness. Specifically, these include an Assent Phase Intercept (API) system comprised of a modified Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM) with a LEAP hit-to-kill vehicle and a true Boost-Phase Interceptor (BPI) using an airborne laser platform. Air Force sensor programs for TMD currently include: upgrading or modifying the Defense Support Program (DSP) system as used in the Gulf War to cue Patriot batteries; and the Brilliant Eyes space-based sensor which has been under design by BMDO. Congress has directed the Pentagon to choose only one of these three systems to perform the missions of tactical warning and attack assessment and TMD cuing.

maximum Radar Coverage of Theater

upper tier ATBM capability the Aegis Vertical Launch System might be upgraded to accept a sea-based interceptor consisting of Standard—with new Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile (LEAP) hit-to-kill technology—or a compatible Army THAAD interceptor.

The Air Force, in conjunction with the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO),
Finally, command, control, and communications for TMD will possibly involve all three military departments, with Navy shipboard sensor systems interfaced with Army missile defense batteries and possibly Air Force space-based and air-based ATBM assets. Clearly the complexities and challenges of the mission will make TMD both a highly integrated joint enterprise and a critical requirement for quick victory in joint and combined warfare in the 21st century.

Beyond the oversight of TMD weapons development by the services BMDO is establishing multiservice theater test beds that can provide computer simulation analysis and modeling of TMD in the areas of system architecture, doctrine, battle planning, systems integration, and war gaming. The test beds will use existing facilities funded by BMDO and the services including the National Test Facility at Falcon Air Force Base, Colorado, and distributed National Test Bed. TMDI plans for system testing and exercising—live and simulated—are being prepared in anticipation of TMD elements to be introduced in the services by late 1996. BMDO also manages TDM international participation and cooperation that include co-funded programs such as the U.S.-Israeli Arrow and architecture studies with the British and Japanese.

The NATO approach to the ballistic missile threat is to consider it as extended air defense which has resulted in establishing an Extended Air Defense Test Bed (EADTB) that includes TMD. Both the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Technical Center and the British Defence Research Agency participate in EADTB. It has also attracted the interest of the Germans and French. One clear indication of the burgeoning interest in TMD by the Alliance is the growing array of TMD activities within NATO. There are several groups—ranging from senior committees and international military staffs to national staffs and research centers—working on various aspects of TMD integration. Some of the activities underway within NATO include:

- a NATO Defense Committee (NADC) study of countermeasure, transportability, and interoperability issues
- an Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) study entitled “NATO Ballistic Missile Defense in the Post-Cold War Era”
- a SHAPE working group to identify long-term requirements, assess the threat, and develop operational concepts for TMD integration.

In sum, TMD programs include multiservice participation in multiple weapons technologies which when integrated effectively with possible allied systems will produce robust capabilities for defending military and nonmilitary area and point targets against various theater missile threats.

Organizing for TMD

The introduction of TMD capabilities into the Armed Forces will be an evolutionary process in the next decade. Developing joint doctrine for TMD is ongoing and will be updated periodically to accommodate programmatic changes and developments. Moreover, most allied TMD programs are at an incipient stage, and TMD planning for combined warfare raises myriad integration
issues. These realities will undoubtedly challenge those planners responsible for unified direction of TMD. But if missile proliferation continues to worsen, TMD will become a joint wartime mission critical to future regional battlefields. Accordingly, a centralized and joint approach to organizing for TMD is being developed. Unity of command is a military principle of the highest order. Accordingly, TMD planning, development, and organization suggest centralized control for an array of reasons:

▼ missile proliferation is a global problem that requires a planning perspective spanning more than a single region or individual CINC’s area of responsibility
▼ the evolutionary and dynamic nature of threats and regional security environments require flexible and adaptive force planning which is accomplished best with centralized control
▼ the readiness, versatility, and basing requirements of U.S.-based contingency forces also benefit from centralization
▼ the need for joint TMD training and exercises requires centralized planning direction
▼ the need for interoperability among U.S. and allied TMD systems for use in combined operations requires centralized technical direction, policy planning, and negotiation with allies
▼ centralization will ensure effective development of strategy, doctrine, and tactics for joint TMD employment
▼ common technical challenges for BMD systems—strategic or tactical—such as guidance, propulsion, and sensors are most effectively and efficiently solved through common efforts
▼ fiscal constraints in the future will dictate efficient use of resources which is best done through direction and centralized management by a single command.

DOD organization for TMD must also be considered. Currently the Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology determine overall policy, program, and fiscal guidance for TMD. Responsibility for central management and direction of TMDI is assigned to the Director and the Assistant General Manager for Theater Defense of BMDO. The Office of the Secretary of Defense develops and ensures policy implementation, conducts program reviews, and assures compliance with the acquisition...
process. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs formulate concepts, validate requirements, conduct liaison with allies, issue command and control doctrine, and establish command relationships, force structure, assets, protocols, and rules of engagement.

Ultimately, of course, only decentralized mission execution under the authority of CINCs, allied commanders, or joint task force commanders can ensure that TMD is protected in a conflict. CINCs must establish appropriate subordinate components responsible for identifying, analyzing, and tracking ballistic missile threats; TMD mission operational planning, tactics, and execution; and planning and coordinating TMD support for other CINCs or joint task forces as directed.

In combined allied commands such as NATO which views TMD as extended air defense, it is most likely that TMD would become a responsibility of the air component commander. TMD must also be internalized in future joint task force planning, organization, and leadership.

And finally, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) must be updated to clarify TMD command relationships and ensure that TMD commanders are provided with logistical support, satellite early warning information, communications, and other requirements. Interservice cooperation for joint TMD operations will be critical in the years ahead especially if—from a continuing drawdown in force structure—responses to threats become more expeditionary. In future expeditionary warfare, American lives and the success of military operations will depend upon getting TMD protection to regions of interest prior to the arrival of U.S. forces and the effective integration of those defenses into an operational plan (OPLAN). Moreover, when combined operations are involved—including allied TMD systems—still another complex dimension will be added to planning, coordination, and operations with formal allies and coalition partners.

The ability to follow up on the ground-breaking success of Patriot in the Persian Gulf War and actively shape theater ballistic missile defense as an exemplary joint and combined enterprise will prove critical to the success of U.S. strategy in the post-Cold War world.

**NOTES**

1 The first Patriot interception of an Iraqi Scud occurred on January 18, 1991.
2 On January 29, 1991, President Bush ordered refocusing SDI on Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS).
4 The review affirmed Secretary Aspin’s initial guidance issued in May 1993 when the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was redesignated the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO).
6 Ibid, p. 10.
7 Ibid, p. 7.
8 Ibid, p. 5.
11 The original BMDO proposal for BPI (Brilliant Pebbles) was relegated to a research program.
12 See OSD/PA, News Release, op. cit.
In the months leading up to the Tet offensive and the siege of Khe Sanh, General William C. Westmoreland (the Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) came to the conclusion that existing arrangements no longer enabled him to effectively coordinate and direct the air teams of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force in the northern part of the country. The solution was to place fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft under one manager. The officer selected was the Commander, 7th Air Force, which brought remonstrance from Navy and Marine commanders. In the ensuing debate, Westmoreland held that his concept did not affect service doctrine, roles, or missions. The concept was adopted in the event despite continued squabbling among the Joint Chiefs and field commanders while the control of air assets in I Corps unarguably improved.
In the early spring of 1968, General William C. Westmoreland, USA, the Commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), introduced a single manager for tactical air in I Corps to make more effective use of available assets. He wanted to improve combat efficiency and streamline MACV organization, but what began as an intra-command reorganization turned quickly into a serious interservice quarrel.

A controversy began when Westmoreland named his own deputy for air, General William M. Momyer, USAF, as the single manager for air in I Corps, with operational control of all fixed-wing aircraft, Marine and Air Force. The Marines resisted placing their assets under a non-Marine commander and the Commandant brought the issue before the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) who, in turn, after failing to agree called on the Secretary of Defense to resolve the issue. But this did not end the dispute which dragged on throughout 1968. The issue of controlling air assets was not unique to the Vietnam conflict. It arose in the European and Pacific theaters during World War II and resurfaced in the Korean War. Two decades later, the single manager controversy was to prove to be one of the most acrimonious interservice disputes of the Vietnam era.

The Prelude

With the emergence of air power as a major element of combat power during World War II, the issue of control soon followed. In North Africa, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Allied commander, initially had no central direction of his air forces, with the U.S. Army Air Force acting independently of Britain’s Royal Air Force. Then at the Casablanca conference in January 1943 President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill established an Allied air command for the entire Mediterranean area. The Commander in Chief, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, controlled all air in North Africa, Malta, and the Middle East. In Northwest Africa, Tedder was subordinate to Eisenhower. Under Tedder was Northwest Africa Air Force, which consisted of all the air forces in the campaign. This organization combined all air elements in the area into a single structure and allowed Eisenhower to concentrate his air resources as needed.1

The North Africa experience demonstrated the type of command arrangements needed for the invasion of Europe. In August 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided to combine Allied commands for both air and naval forces under an overall commander. Subsequently, they named Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory commander of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF), the air component under Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the invasion. But what appeared good organization in theory did not work in practice. While all tactical air forces committed to the invasion came under Leigh-Mallory, the U.S.

Army Air Forces and the Royal Air Force refused to put their strategic forces under AEAf. They feared a diversion of effort from the strategic bombing of Germany. Consequently, Leigh-Mallory planned all the air operations for the invasion and the first months of the war on the Continent and commanded tactical aircraft while strategic aircraft remained under separate U.S. and British commands. Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander in Europe, coordinated American and British strategic bombers with both ground and tactical air operations during the invasion and after forces were ashore. Subsequently, in October 1944, AEAf was dissolved. Thereafter the U.S. Army Air Forces and Royal Air Force supported their respective ground forces in Europe. Coordination of operations and settlement of problems were handled by the Supreme Commander's headquarters.2

In the Pacific Theater the potential for trouble over control of air operations was greater. Army, Navy, and Marine air was assigned to two major commands, the Southwest Pacific Area under General Douglas MacArthur and the Pacific Ocean Area under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. But these forces all cooperated well, and centralized control never became an issue.

The question of control and responsibility for air operations arose immediately after World War II. During the interservice debates of 1946 over unification and roles and missions, control of land-based aircraft became an issue. The Navy wanted control of all air required for operations at sea, including those based on land. The Army argued that air operating from land bases should be under the Army Air Forces.3 The National Security Act of 1947 unified the Armed Forces under the National Military Establishment (soon to be renamed the Department of Defense) and created the Air Force as a separate service. It did not, however, resolve the question of service roles and missions. Among other things, the Navy feared the Army and Air Force were trying to restrict the development of carrier air forces while the Air Force believed the Navy was attempting to assume part of the responsibility for strategic air operations. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal met with JCS in Key West during March 12–14, 1948, to settle the dispute. The result was a statement on “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” better known as the Key West Agreement, issued on April 21, 1948. The agreement called for integrating the Armed Forces into “an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces” and for the prevention of unnecessary duplication among the services. With regard to specific responsibilities, the agreement authorized the Navy “to conduct air operations as necessary for the accomplishment of objectives in a naval campaign.” It assigned the Air Force primary responsibility for “strategic air warfare.”4

The Key West Agreement did not prevent the issue of control of air operations from arising during the Korean War. There MacArthur was Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and Commander in Chief, Far East, the U.S. unified commander. His air component, the Far East Air Force (FEAF), was responsible for control of all air operations in Korea. Initially, the Navy component, Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE), resisted placing its air forces under FEAF, but did eventually recognize FEAF as the controlling authority for air operations. The Marines participated in Korea as well, and the Commander, FEAF, asserted that Marine planes should come under his control, as exercised through 5th Air Force in Korea, in support of ground operations when and where needed. The Marines objected, wanting their assets used in direct support of their ground forces. In the end a compromise was reached. Marine aviation did come under the control of the 5th Air Force, but was used to support Marine forces whenever the tactical situation allowed.5

War in I Corps

Command arrangements governing Marines deployed in I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) in early 1968 dated from 1966 when Westmoreland proposed and JCS approved that III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) operate as a separate uni-service command directly subordinate to Westmoreland. III MAF was comprised of the 1st and 3rd Divisions
supported by 1st Marine Air Wing (MAW). The force came under Westmoreland’s operational control while in the service chain it was under “the command, less operational control, of the Commanding General Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.”6

This arrangement functioned well throughout 1966 and for the first half of 1967 when the Marines were the only American forces in I CTZ. But as the enemy began to concentrate major forces in I Corps, Westmoreland increased strength in the region, deploying the Americal Division in the fall of 1967 and then sending two additional Army divisions in January 1968. These forces, plus Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces, constituted a field army. With this buildup, three air teams were operating in the area, each with its own control system: 1st MAW supported III MAF and units organic to it; 7th Air Force supported U.S. Army divisions, ARVN forces, and Republic of Korea marines; and, on a much smaller scale, Navy carrier-based aircraft, which were outside of Westmoreland’s jurisdiction, but responsive to him when requested.7

Early in 1968 Westmoreland became convinced that the coordination and direction of the diversified air assets supporting ground forces in I Corps were beyond the capability of existing command and control systems. The large number of aircraft committed and the close proximity of airfields, he believed, dictated a more centralized management of tactical air if he was to concentrate air fire power effectively, exploit tactical flexibility, and provide balanced air support. He also was concerned that the Marines, who provided most of the close air support from Da Nang northward, were not supplying adequate tactical air support for the Army forces. These developments, plus the fact that Marine fixed-wing assets now provided only a relatively small number of the total air support sorties in I Corps, led Westmoreland to consider assigning responsibility for managing all fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance planes in I Corps to one individual—his own deputy for air who also commanded 7th Air Force. This meant giving operational control of 1st MAW, which then resided with the Commanding General, III MAF, to an Air Force general.8

Westmoreland first proposed the single manager concept on January 18, 1968. He and the Commander of 7th Air Force met with Lieutenant General Robert Cushman, Commanding General of III MAF, to discuss the possibility. Westmoreland stressed that only the fixed-wing assets of 1st MAW would be integrated into the overall tactical air picture while helicopters would stay under III MAF. Cushman objected, however, on grounds that the proposed system would be doctrinally and functionally unsuited to his requirements.9

From Saigon to Honolulu

The Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, was also wary. He cautioned Westmoreland against changing a system that had worked well for...
nearly three years. Any plan divesting III MAF of operational control of its air resources, he thought, required “full consideration of all aspects of the problem.” Subsequently, the single manager for air concept was tabled, only to be raised again one month later.¹⁰

The massive enemy Tet offensive, coupled with increased requirements for tactical air in the defense of Khe Sanh, reinforced Westmoreland’s desire for a single manager. “I have given long and detailed thought to this complex problem,” he told Sharp, “and have concluded that the situation dictates the creation of a single management arrangement...it is essential that I look to one man to coordinate this air effort and bring this fire power on the enemy in the most effective way in line with my day-to-day guidance.”¹¹ On February 19, 1968, Westmoreland directed that Momyer, in coordination with Cushman, prepare necessary plans to implement the single manager concept. The plan, he specified, should give his air deputy control of all assets, less helicopters and transport aircraft, and at the same time provide for “Marine aircraft to continue direct support to their deployed ground elements.”¹²

The Marines opposed the single manager concept when it was first proposed. Now they objected at a higher level. On February 21, the Commandant, General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., informed the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, of his “increasing concern” over recent proposals by Westmoreland for assigning control of aircraft of the 1st MAW to the MACV Deputy Commander for Air. Chapman said that if such a plan were implemented, it would be “a flagrant violation” of the Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)¹³ and the February 1966 JCS decision fixing command relations in Vietnam. He found no deficiencies in air support under the existing

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**I CTZ: Unified Management of Tactical Strike Aircraft**

- **Airborne controller (or radar)**
- **Airborne Command and Control Center**
- **Air Force aviation**
- **Navy aviation**
- **Marine aviation**

system or any evidence the change would enhance air support, and wanted to continue the existing arrangements for air support operations in I Corps without change.\textsuperscript{14}

Westmoreland found it difficult to understand the Marine concern. On February 24, he explained the problem to Wheeler:

The situation has changed in I Corps as compared to what it was three years ago or even two months ago. The enemy has concentrated a major portion of his regular forces in I Corps. I have had to counter this build-up with appropriate forces. I have the equivalent of a field army now deployed [there]. To support this magnitude of forces requires a major portion of the air assets of the 7\textsuperscript{th} Air Force plus the air assets of the [Vietnamese Air Force] VNAF, carrier forces, and Thai-based forces. Marine air, therefore, has become a junior partner in the total air effort, but an important one. The problem is one of coordination and directing all of these diversified air elements so that the air support can be put where and when needed in the required quantity. I do not see how this can be accomplished without one airman fitting the B–52s, fighters, VNAF, carrier air, Thai-based air, and Marine air into schedules that do not conflict with one another. Thus, the old concept of a geographical area of responsibility breaks down by sheer magnitude of the forces going into I Corps.\textsuperscript{15}

Westmoreland added that his proposal would maintain the Marine air/ground team intact except when tactical situations dictated otherwise. Moreover, he said there would be no change in service doctrine or roles and missions.\textsuperscript{16}

Meanwhile Momyer and his staff, after consulting Cushman, presented Westmoreland with a single manager plan. Throughout the planning sessions, the Marines repeatedly expressed grave concern over the proposal and its possible long-term implications for the air/ground team concept. Nevertheless, Westmoreland submitted the plan to Sharp who approved it with minor revisions on March 2, 1968. Westmoreland implemented the plan on March 8 which directed Cushman to make available to Momyer all strike and reconnaissance aircraft for mission direction and his tactical air control system as needed. Momyer would be responsible “for fragging [assignment of individual missions] and operational direction of these assets with all other available assets under his control to meet the daily requirements of forces in CTZ. Consistent with the tactical situation, Marine aircraft will be fragged . . . to support Marine ground units.” The first missions flown under the single manager system occurred on March 22, 1968.\textsuperscript{17}

Enter the Chiefs

With implementation of the single manager concept, the focus of the controversy shifted to Washington. On March 4, Chapman voiced concern over the pending action telling Wheeler and other JCS members that Westmoreland’s plan violated the 1966 approval of III MAF as a separate command. He could not concur in an arrangement that would prevent Marine air assets from being directly responsible to Cushman. He wanted JCS to advise Sharp that only they could revise JCS-approved command arrangements and urged Wheeler to obtain Westmoreland’s plan for JCS review.\textsuperscript{18} The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General John McConnell, disagreed. In a personal note of March 4, he told Wheeler, “Westy has now done something he should have done a long time ago. He should also, in my opinion, place Navy air into the same structure. Also, I consider that Westy \textit{has} the authority to do what he has done.”\textsuperscript{19}

Chapman’s recommendation went unheeded until, three weeks later, he raised it again. He did not concur with Westmoreland’s action, he told JCS on March 23, and recommended revoking the single manager plan. The Marines followed up with a briefing to JCS two days later. The new control procedure, the Marines said, would result in an “inevitable” increase in response time for both preplanned and immediate strikes because of the additional “layering” of agencies.
in the chain. The Marines concluded that the overall system in effect prior to March 10 had worked well during nearly three years of combat, providing flexible and responsive support to both Army and Marine Corps ground units. Since the single manager plan would require more resources to accomplish similar results, but over a longer time, the Marines wanted to return to the old system.20

In reviewing the air control issue JCS sought Westmoreland’s views, including his reasons for changing the control arrangement. Westmoreland replied in detail, citing all the justifications previously presented to Sharp and Wheeler.21 Should JCS rule against his proposal, he requested the “courtesy” of appearing before them to explain the practical problems involved.22

JCS considered the control of air assets in a series of meetings in early April but could not agree. As noted, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force supported Westmoreland, and Wheeler took a similar position. On the other hand, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Harold K. Johnson, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas C. Moorer, sided with Chapman. Consequently, on April 21, JCS forwarded split views to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.23

Out of the Tank

It was militarily unsound, Wheeler told the Secretary, to dictate to responsible commanders of the level of Westmoreland and Sharp how to organize and command their forces. He felt that, “Commanders of such rank, experience, and knowledge of the principles of war, who also have intimate knowledge of the specific situation facing them, are expected to utilize assigned forces and resources so as to maximize their combat effectiveness and minimize casualties sustained.” He assured the Secretary that the single manager plan was an expedient to meet a tactical situation imposed by the enemy—the sizeable buildup around Khe Sanh and along and south of the DMZ. Wheeler did not regard the single manager system as a precedent for future assignment of Marine air units or as affecting the air/ground team concept. The Chairman argued against directing Sharp to modify the single manager system. Instead, the Secretary should direct JCS to note the revised arrangements for control of air assets in I Corps and advise Sharp that, as the tactical situation changed, Westmoreland should revamp management and control of those assets “in light of the situation.”24

During the JCS consideration of the single manager question, a principal Marine complaint was the lack of responsiveness of the new system and the long lead time between requests for and authorization of preplanned sorties. Total elapsed time from battalion request to first strike, the Marines said, was “about fifty hours.” Wheeler asked Westmoreland to ensure that such requests were handled in a timely manner. Westmoreland replied that the fifty-hour figure was misleading and said that the new system had actually improved response time. In any case, Westmoreland directed modification of the system to meet preplanned air support requirements. Wheeler told Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze of this pending modification and that it would provide the necessary responsiveness for preplanned missions.25

On May 15, 1968, Nitze decided the single manager issue in Westmoreland’s favor. The unified commander, he said, must be presumed the best judge of how to organize, command, and deploy his combat forces. He also concurred that the assignment of Marine air units under a single manager for air should neither set a precedent for centralized control of air operations under other combat conditions nor pose a threat to “the integrity of the Marine air/ground team.” He wanted control of III MAF air assets to revert to “normal command arrangements” as the tactical situation permitted. He noted the Marine concern over the responsiveness of air support under the single manager, but accepted Wheeler’s assurance that the system was being improved. Finally, Nitze wanted Wheeler to review the single manager system for necessary changes. Accordingly JCS instructed Westmoreland in conjunction with Cushman and Momyer to continue his review of the single manager system and submit monthly evaluation reports.26

Nitze did not convince the Marines of the merit of a single manager. On May 18, Chapman told his JCS colleagues that the current procedure was “unwieldy, not yet producing the results it was designed to produce.” Consequently, he proposed a
flexibility, responsiveness, and continuity in the management of preplanned air support to meet the day-by-day requirements of ground commanders.” Wheeler described the modification to Nitze as “a significant step in the reduction of delays caused by administrative procedure in handling requests for preplanned sorties.”

The modification did not satisfy the Marines. After two weeks of operation under revised procedures, Chapman told JCS on June 14 that the alterations “still will not meet the standards of responsiveness possible within the Marine support system.” Ground commanders, he said, were required to adjust tactical operations to accommodate advance scheduling of the air arm. Hence he could not accept the modification. Only by possessing operational control of its own air assets could III MAF ensure immediate availability of air support for the troops on the ground.

But Chapman did believe that the modification provided a framework for further revision. “An alternate interim solution,” he indicated, would be to return operational control of 70 percent of his available sorties to Cushman for direct support of Marine forces, with the remaining 30 percent retained by Westmoreland for daily allocation. Chapman added that assets returned to Cushman’s operational control could be diverted at any time to meet Westmoreland’s emergency requirements. He felt that this procedure would increase responsiveness, allowing Cushman to assign sorties to the next day’s tasks as required by Marine ground commander’s plans while Westmoreland would retain his prerogative to preempt Marine resources if needed for emergency situations.

JCS addressed the new Marine proposal on June 19, but deferred action pending a review by Sharp. Wheeler told Sharp that it was not necessary to do more than consider and comment on the proposal in his monthly evaluation of the single manager system. Wheeler noted that reports of apprehension from the field indicated the problem was getting “out of hand” in Washington. Such was not the case, he said, adding:

I wish to evaluate the control system as now modified soberly, objectively, and without undue haste. In my judgment it is only by proceeding in an orderly fashion that we can ascertain the facts of the situation and correct deficiencies to the end of providing optimum close air support to our ground forces.
On June 30, after the modified single manager procedures had been operating for over a month, Westmoreland filed his monthly evaluation. Based on inputs from Momyer and Cushman, he reported to Sharp that the system had improved “markedly” since implementation. The 70/30 split in the weekly/daily frag orders had proved “a giant step in the positive direction of providing maximum flexibility, responsiveness, and continuity within the mechanics of single management.” Moreover, Westmoreland said the 70/30 split provided executive control while delegating insofar as possible “planning, allocation, and a degree of control” of strike support to major ground units. As a result tactical air support in I CTZ, as well as in the other corps areas, had improved.

Westmoreland noted that Cushman still favored total management of his own assets while Momyer supported current procedures. Westmoreland opposed the proposal to return 70 percent of air sorties to Cushman’s control for direct support of Marine ground forces in I Corps on the grounds that it would be double management. Care must be taken not to vitiate the Marine structure and system for air/ground support. During the evaluation period from May 30 to June 26 Marine battalions had received an average of 6.65 tactical air support sorties per day while Army battalions received 3.03 sorties per day against a country-wide daily average of 2.14. Hence there was no reason to believe the Marine air/ground capability had been impaired.31

In reviewing Westmoreland’s report, Sharp found insufficient information to support the statements regarding the effectiveness of the system and asked Westmoreland for further support of his statements, specifically data on the distribution of Air Force and Marine air efforts in South Vietnam during the evaluation period. The new COMUSMACV, General Creighton W. Abrams, furnished this data on July 13.32

Two weeks later Abrams informed Wheeler that he had completed an appraisal of the single manager system. He cited improvements in the processing of air support requests and a reduction in the administrative workload. He believed the system could be improved further by “a relatively minor change”—arranging for III MAF to frag directly those Marine sorties within the 70 percent weekly frags “or whatever split COMUSMACV determines,” which were to be flown in I Corps. (This would seem to have achieved essentially the same result as Chapman’s June 14 proposal.) Such an arrangement, Sharp believed, would improve the evolutionary process further without detracting from the overall objective of single management.33

Sharp had planned to implement this change immediately, but Wheeler asked him to wait. Wheeler did not agree that it was a relatively minor change. Sharp was retiring on July 31 and, as Wheeler planned to attend the ceremony, he suggested talking about the proposal at that time.34 Sharp did retire on July 31, and Wheeler participated in the ceremony, but what they discussed or what decisions, if any, they reached on the single manager are not recorded. Nor did Sharp take further action on the matter before he retired.

On September 4, 1968, the new CINCPAC, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., forwarded to Wheeler his evaluation of the single manager system. After reviewing all pertinent information as well as discussions with Abrams, Moorer, and Chapman, McCain concluded that the system had improved “considerably since its institution” and enabled Abrams to control the assets he required to carry out his mission. He noted
Cushman's proposal to allocate a block of sorties for fragging and Abrams's opposition to it. He believed that, though the single manager system still did not give Marines the responsiveness of their organic control system, it was “the best overall use of tactical air in COMUSMACV’s assigned areas of responsibility.” He thought the system would continue to improve as procedural modifications were smoothed out. He intended, therefore, to continue the current single manager system, but to monitor it carefully. Three days later, on September 7, McCain notified Abrams of his decision. With JCS concurrence McCain rescinded the requirement for monthly evaluations by Abrams, although both he and JCS wanted notification of any significant changes in the system.35

**Nitze Redux**

Based on McCain’s evaluation, Wheeler submitted a report on the single manager for air to Nitze on September 16, 1968. He told Nitze of the recent field evaluation, noting the careful and systematic consideration given the concerns of Chapman and Cushman. He described Abrams’s improvements and refinements in the system as well as his care not to vitiate the Marine structure and system for air/ground support. Wheeler noted the Marine proposals for further revisions and of Abrams’s opposition. Wheeler, like McCain, also acknowledged that the single manager did not give the Marines their accustomed responsiveness, but added that air support for Marine forces had been “equitable under the circumstances existing in I CTZ. . . .” He recommended continuing the single manager system for as long as Abrams deemed it necessary.36

Chapman did not concur. While recognizing the improvements made in the single manager arrangement, he pointed out that, as Wheeler had stated, the system failed to provide the Marines with their accustomed responsiveness. On October 1, he requested a 30-day trial of a proposal by Cushman that would in effect return tactical air assets in I Corps to Marine control. He specifically proposed that, “following the MACV weekly allocation of air effort, Marine air, except that allocated by MACV outside of I CTZ, be scheduled by III MAF on a daily basis to satisfy the dynamic air support requirements of all III MAF ground commanders, Army and Marines.” He also recommended resuming normal command arrangements for III MAF as soon as possible.37

After seeking the views of Abrams and McCain, and obtaining a review by the Joint Staff, Wheeler forwarded Chapman’s recommendations to Nitze on November 22, 1968, stating that the field commanders continued to support the single manager as the best overall use of tactical air in I Corps. Therefore Wheeler again recommended against any further change.38 Nitze also accepted Wheeler’s advice again and the single manager system for tactical air in I Corps, as modified on May 21, 1968, operated without change during the remainder of 1968 and throughout 1969 and 1970. The issue eventually became academic. With Vietnamization of the war, the withdrawal of U.S. forces initiated in 1969, Marine air operations steadily declined. The operations fell by more than 50 percent in 1970 and ceased altogether as the last Marine combat units departed in June 1971.39

**The Last Word**

Despite strenuous Marine Corps resistance to the control of its air assets by an Air Force commander, the single manager for air worked and provided improved coordination and direction of air elements in the combat zone. Westmoreland viewed the initiation of the system as part of his responsibility “to use all resources available to me in the most effective way possible.” It was the one issue, he later said, where had JCS not supported him he would have considered resigning.40

The Marines, too, eventually conceded that the system improved coordination and control of air resources. Lieutenant General Keith B. McCutcheon, who served as Deputy Commander of III MAF for Air during 1970, confirmed this assessment in 1971:

> There is no doubt about whether single management was an overall improvement as far as MACV as a whole was concerned. It was. And there is no denying the fact that, when three Army divisions were assigned to I Corps and interspersed between the two Marine divisions, a higher order of coordination and cooperation was required than previously.41
The single manager experience in Vietnam proved the value of central control of air assets in joint operations. When air forces of two or more services participate, the joint commander must look to a single manager to plan, allocate, and coordinate all air resources. While service needs must be accommodated, the overall joint mission remains the primary concern. The issue of joint control of air resources in the Gulf War confirmed this principle.

NOTES

6 Message JCS 3964 to CNO and CINCPAC, February 14, 1966. All official documents cited in this article have been declassified.
10 Message, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 182231Z January 1968.
11 Message, COMUSMACV 02365 to CINCPAC, 191239Z February 1968.
12 Ibid.
13 UNAAF was the general JCS guidance setting forth “principles, doctrines, and functions” governing the activities and performance of the Armed Forces.
14 Memo, CMC (ATA16–ras) to CJCS, February 21, 1968.
16 Ibid.
19 Memo (handwritten), CSAF to CJCS, March 4, 1968.
21 Ibid, pp. 6–8.
24 Appendix D to JCSM–237–68 to SecDef, April 19, 1968.
33 Message, CINCPAC to CJCS, 272134Z July 6, 1968.
34 Message, CJCS 8550 to CINCPAC, July 29, 1968.
36 CM–3651–68 to DepSecDef, September 16, 1968.
38 CM–3778 to DepSecDef, November 22, 1968.
40 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 134.
Admiral Arthur William Radford, U.S. Navy
(1896–1973)
Commander in Chief, Pacific Command
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

VITA

Born in Chicago, Illinois. Graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy (1916). Served on board the battleship USS South Carolina (1916). Completed flight training (1921). Assigned to the fleet, at naval air stations, and in the Bureau of Aeronautics. Appointed chief of aviation training (1941). Commanded carrier division eleven in the Pacific (1943). Served at the Navy Department (1944). Commanded carrier division six (1944). Became the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (1948) and the Commander in Chief, Pacific/High Commissioner, Trust Territory of Pacific Islands (1949). Appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1953). Involved in the so-called “revolt of the admirals”; as Chairman supported President Eisenhower’s “new look” policy and also dealt with the Formosa and Suez crises. Retired in 1957 and remained active in national security affairs, often being called upon for advice by the White House. Died at Bethesda Naval Medical Center.

On arrival in Washington, I wasted no time in reporting to . . . Secretary [of the Navy Forrestal]. He said something like this:

“Radford, I have become increasingly concerned with the situation in regard to the merger fight or unification of the services. . . . I have, therefore, had you ordered back to take charge of the Navy’s efforts to insure, if at all possible, that legislation on this subject, which is sure to be passed in the not-too-distant future, is satisfactory from our standpoint. My personal position is that an improved and unified defense organization is needed. The President wants one quickly, and the Army is pushing for speedy action with his complete backing. You are to set up an office, under me, and go to work as soon as you can."

By 1946 I had a broad knowledge of the problems of the services. In my new job I tried to establish and define my own position. I concluded that:

• There was no doubt that the services could not return to the earlier status quo, two separate and independent Departments of War and Navy.
• Any new organization must attempt to coordinate military with national planning in political and economic fields.
• A “joint chiefs of staff” organization, similar to the one that had worked so well under President Roosevelt in World War II, must become a statutory body.

—From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford
Americans and Somalis

To the Editor—in “New Contingencies, Old Roles” (JFQ, Autumn 1993) Professor Huntington states that “it is morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible that members of the Armed Forces should be killed to prevent Somalis from killing one another.” While true, that is exactly what was happening as Somali warlords killed compiler members through the weapon of starvation. And, although “the United States has no interest in which clan dominates Somalia” our Nation does have a vested interest in the success of U.N. coalition-type operations, which is why we are really there. Furthermore, recent events suggest that future large-scale conflicts in which the United States participates will be coalition rather than unilateral actions.

Maj Robert P. Wagner, USMC
Student, Marine Corps Command
and Staff College

To the Editor—I read the letter to the editor by Colonel Meilinger in the last issue with disbelief. After displaying blatant service bias and parochialism, he took pot shots at examples of redundancy which diverted attention away from the real flaw in Dr. Rosen’s argument (“Service Redundancy: Waste or Hidden Capability?” JFQ, Summer 1993). Rosen mistakenly promotes redundancy by suggesting that creative competition is healthy amongst the services and then appeals to good and bad inter-service rivalry to make his case.

This is exactly the kind of debilitating thinking we ought to be eradicking, not advocating, in the pages of Joint Force Quarterly. What the services and CINCs need to concentrate on is creative collaboration. We can’t afford to advocate any (nonsupportive) competition or rivalry—creative or otherwise—between those who should be cooperating and coordinating all their efforts to defend the Nation’s interests. In the long haul, jointness cannot be built on a shaky foundation of creative competition. Mutual trust, confidence, and collaboration are the constructive building blocks of jointness.

CAPT J.K. Perini, USN
Dean, Joint and Combined Staff
Officer School
Advanced Airpower Studies

To the Editor—Thanks to Col Meilinger for pointing out in his letter (JFQ, Autumn 1993) that all it really takes to pull off amphibious operations is training troops to get into landing craft and ride ashore. I’ve worried about insignificant things such as planning embarkation on amphibious ships to sequence combat power ashore, preassault reconnaissance and hydrographic surveys to ensure that landing beaches, can support the scheme of maneuver and logistics build up, deception operations, air and naval gunfire support, mine sweeping, and preparing the myriad of documents needed to make sure that men, equipment, and supplies reach the beach when required. I’m happy to learn that all I have to do to synchronize complex amphibious operations is to “teach soldiers to climb down rope ladders and hit the beach.”

Maj Robert P. Wagner, USMC
Student, Marine Corps Command
and Staff College

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CURRENT ALSA CENTER PROGRAMS

The following programs are underway at the Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA) Center:

- **Electromagnetic Spectrum Management**—Procedures for commanders in planning, coordinating, and controlling the electromagnetic spectrum in support of joint operations.
- **Electronic Warfare Operations in a Joint Environment**—General, unclassified guidance for conducting joint electronic warfare; a pocket reference handbook.
- **AWACS Ground Based Air Defense Operations**—Joint early warning and air defense command and control requirements to facilitate planning and operating a joint air defense network.
- **Integrated Combat Airspace C2**—Basic background information and operational level which provides them with an in depth look at fire support, targeting, airspace control, deception, air defense, joint suppression of enemy air defense, C3I, logistics, and command relations from a joint perspective. The course ends with a week-long war game which emphasizes operational level decisionmaking.
- **Army-Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations**—Techniques and procedures for effectively and efficiently integrating Marine and Army units of Marine Expeditionary Forces corps-size and smaller when operating in a joint environment.
- **Procedures for Requesting Reconnaissance and Information in Joint Operations**—Basic background information about reconnaissance (RECE) and standardizes procedures for requesting and using RECC products compiled in an unclassified user-level procedures manual.
- **Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System**—Standard joint operational procedures for VHF–FM frequency hopping systems known as SINCGARS that provide procedures to effect interservice communication and interoperability.

### Doctrine

**Theater Air-Ground System**—Joint considerations affecting air-ground operations, service perspectives on using air and air support of respective service operations, and unique service airground systems that contribute to the theater air-ground system.

**Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations**—Concepts, roles, responsibilities, and linkages between services and governmental as well as non-governmental agencies. See JFQ, number 2 (Autumn 1993), p. 116, for further details.

**Joint Close Air Support (J–CAS)**—Standard procedures for close air support by both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft for all ground forces; ALSA—the primary review authority—will deliver a final draft through the Marine Corps—the lead agent for the J–CAS joint publication project—to JCS and then the draft will enter the joint publication process. See JFQ, number 2 (Autumn 1993), p. 116.

**Anti-Radiation Missiles (ARMS) in a Joint and/or Combined Environment**—Considerations for planning, coordinating, and conducting defradation missile employment in a joint or combined environment.

For further details on these programs contact: ALSA Center, 114 Andrews Street (Suite 101), Langley Air Force Base, Virginia 23665-2785 or call: (804) 764-5936/DSN 574-5934.

### Education

**NEW SENIOR-LEVEL COURSE**

In response to congressional action the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) has replaced its five-week senior-level phase II Program for Joint Education (JPE) offering with a new twelve-week course offered by the Joint and Command Warfighting School. The curriculum incorporates information drawn from unified commands, Joint Staff, joint agencies, and military and civilian educational institutions.

The course emphasizes the application of skills acquired in phase I at the service colleges and begins with a crisis action exercise intended to quickly coalesce individual seminars and create an appreciation of the complexities of joint force operations. This is followed by an overview of strategic synchronization including service warfighting philosophy and interagency operations with a focus on joint warfighting skills. Seminars analyze joint aspects of historical campaigns which culminates in group presentations (each student also prepares two short papers during the course).

Operational synchronization is then examined using case studies. In addition to traditional subjects such as crisis action and campaign planning, the course covers disaster relief, counterdrug operations, and peacekeeping, humanitarian, and limited objective operations. Over half a dozen exercises are conducted to supplement the case studies.

Next students focus on functional synchronization at the operational level which provides them with an in depth look at fire support, targeting, airspace control, deception, air defense, joint suppression of enemy air defense, C3I, logistics, and command relations from a joint perspective. The course ends with a week-long war game which emphasizes operational level decisionmaking.

The new AFSC course also features visits to unified commands and Washington as well as mentoring by retired general and flag officers with expertise in joint matters. After twelve weeks of case studies, exercises, campaign analysis, guest lectures, wargaming, and—most importantly—learning from one’s peers, graduates are better equipped to become joint warfighters.

### NEW JOINT ESSAY COMPETITION

The U.S. Naval Institute—a non-profit professional organization—has announced the creation of the Colin L. Powell Joint Warfighting Essay Contest. For information on the contest see the announcement on the next page.
After four successful years, the Warfighting Essay Contest is turning "purple." The U.S. Naval Institute is pleased to announce the first annual Colin L. Powell Joint Warfighting Essay Contest.

In the words of the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the competition seeks "those who are motivated to enter this contest not by a need to 'toe the policy line,' but who are devoted to the security of this great Nation."

Essays should be about combat readiness in a joint context—persuasive discussions of tactics, strategy, weaponry, combat training, or other issues involving two or more services.

Entries may be heavy in uni-service detail, but must have joint application in terms of force structure, doctrine, operations or organization for combat. Interoperability of hardware and procedures may be discussed within the context of combat readiness. Essays are welcome from military professionals and civilians alike.

The Naval Institute will award cash prizes of $2,500, $2,000, and $1,000 to the authors of the three best essays entered. Maximum length is 3,000 words, but shorter opinion pieces or "professional notes" (typically 2,000-word technical arguments) may also be competitive.

**ENTRY RULES**

1. Essays must be original, must not exceed 3,000 words, and must not have been previously published. An exact word count must appear on the title page.
2. All entries should be directed to: Colin L. Powell Joint Warfighting Essay Contest, U.S. Naval Institute, 118 Maryland Ave., Annapolis, MD 21402–5035.
3. Essays must be postmarked on or before 1 April 1994.
4. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author shall assign a motto in addition to a title to the essay. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title, in lieu of the author's name, and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope containing the name, address, telephone, social security number, and short biography of the essayist, the title of the essay, and the motto. This envelope will not be opened until the Naval Institute has made its final selections.
5. All essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8½" x 11". Submit two complete copies. (If typed on a computer, please also submit an IBM-compatible disk and specify word-processing software used.)
6. The essays will be screened by a panel composed of officers from the five military services who will recommend six essays to the Naval Institute's Editorial Board. The Editorial Board will award the three prizes.
7. The awards will be presented to the winning essayist at a special ceremony in July. The award winners will be notified by phone on or about 20 May 1994. Letters notifying all other entrants will be mailed by mid-June.
8. The three prize-winning essays will be published in Proceedings, the Naval Institute's magazine with a 120-year heritage. Essays not awarded a prize may be selected for publication in Proceedings. The authors of such essays will be compensated at the rate established for purchase of articles.
EDITOR’S NOTE: The Bottom-Up Review was an effort to define the strategy, force structure, modernization programs, industrial base, and infrastructure to meet new dangers and seize new opportunities in the post-Cold War world. The review was a collaborative effort of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, unified and specified commands, services, and other DOD components. Numerous studies formulated issues for decisionmakers and provided the analytical underpinning for the process. The summary of the Report on the Bottom-Up Review which appears below covers force structure and was prepared by the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Other aspects of the report (such as overseas presence and force modernization) will be presented in subsequent issues of JFQ.

New Dangers, New Opportunities

The Cold War is behind us. The Soviet Union no longer exists. Events in recent years—the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the failed Soviet coup—underscore revolutionary change in the international security environment. Most striking in the transition from the Cold War is a shift in the dangers to U.S. interests which fall into four broad categories:

- dangers posed by nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction
- regional dangers
- dangers to democracy and reform, in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere
- dangers to our economic well-being.

The Armed Forces are central to combating the first two dangers and can play a significant role in meeting the other two. Predictions and conclusions about the nature and characteristics of these dangers will help mold our strategy as well as the size and shape of future military forces.

New dangers bring new challenges, but they also create opportunities: realistic aspirations that, if goals are worthy, can mean a world of greater safety, freedom, and prosperity. The Armed Forces can contribute to this objective. In brief the new opportunities:

- expand and adapt existing security partnerships and alliances
- promote new regional security arrangements and alliances
- implement the dramatic reductions in nuclear arsenals reached in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) I and II treaties
- protect and advance security with fewer resources, freeing excess resources for investment in other areas vital to our prosperity.

Engagement, Prevention, and Partnership

Despite these revolutionary changes in the security environment, the most basic goals of the United States have not changed—protection of American lives and personal safety, maintenance of political freedom and independence, and providing for our well-being and prosperity.

We also have core values to promote: democracy and human rights.
## Force Enhancements to Halt a Short-Warning Attack

### Persian Gulf Region

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<td>Prepositioned Forces</td>
<td>1 Battalion Training Set</td>
<td>2 Brigade Sets ashore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS)</td>
<td>1 Brigade Set afloat*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>squadron</td>
<td>1 MPS squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Prepositioning Ships</td>
<td>7 Prepositioning Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Carrier Battle Group (fighter)</td>
<td>1 Carrier Battle Group (fighter)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PHASE I**  
**Halt Invasion**  
Fair  
Lack of heavy forces to help stop invader  
Limited antitank capability  
Limited anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capability  
Increased early-arriving land-based and carrier aircraft and long-range bombers

**PHASE II**  
**Build Up Forces in Theater for Counteroffensive**  
Fair  
Slow closure due to modest sealift capability  
Airlift and sealift upgrades support rapid closure of heavy forces

### Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Today’s Force</th>
<th>Future Force</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prepositioned Forces</td>
<td>1 brigade-sized MEF</td>
<td>1 Brigade Sets ashore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 MPS Squadron</td>
<td>1 Brigade Set afloat*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 brigade-sized MEF (2 MPS Squadrons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Division (2 Brigades)</td>
<td>1 Division (2 Brigades)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.4 Fighter Wings</td>
<td>2.4 Fighter Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Carrier Battle Group</td>
<td>1 Carrier Battle Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 MEF</td>
<td>1 MEF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PHASE I**  
**Halt Invasion**  
Good  
Substantial in-place forces  
Established command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) network  
Rapid reinforcement from Japan, Okinawa  
Limited ATBM capability

**PHASE II**  
**Build Up Forces in Theater for Counteroffensive**  
Fair  
Slow closure due to modest sealift capability  
Airlift and sealift upgrades support rapid closure of heavy forces

*Brigade set would be positioned to “swing” to either region.*
peaceful resolution of conflict, and maintenance of open markets. To protect and advance such enduring goals, America must pursue a strategy of political, economic, and military engagement internationally. This strategy of engagement is defined by two characteristics, prevention and partnership. It advocates the prevention of threats to our interests by promoting democracy, economic growth and free markets, human dignity, and peaceful resolution of conflict, with priority given to regions vital to our interests. The new strategy will also pursue an international partnership for freedom, prosperity, and peace. To succeed the partnership requires contributions by our allies and depends upon our ability to establish equitable political, economic, and military relationships with them.

**Developing a Force Structure**

Four broad classes of potential military operations were used in the Bottom-Up Review to evaluate the adequacy of future force structure alternatives:

- Major regional conflicts (MRCs)
- Smaller-scale conflicts requiring peace enforcement operations
- Overseas presence
- Determined attacks with weapons of mass destruction

These types of operations allowed us to analyze the building blocks of the required forces. By combining and adjusting blocks to account for judgments about conducting simultaneous operations we determined the number and mix of active and Reserve forces needed to carry out our defense strategy. The balance of this summary will focus on the building blocks related to MRCs which we considered the most demanding operations.

**Major Regional Conflicts**

During the Cold War thwarting a global Soviet threat dominated defense planning. Now the focus is on projecting power to defeat potential aggressors in regions of importance to U.S. interests. These aggressors are expected to be able to field forces in the following ranges:

- **400,000-750,000** total personnel under arms
- **2,000-4,000** tanks
- **3,000-5,000** armored fighting vehicles
- **2,000-3,000** artillery pieces
- **300-1,000** combat aircraft
- **100-200** naval vessels, primarily patrol craft armed with surface-to-surface missiles, and up to 50 submarines
- **100-1,000** Scud-class ballistic missiles, some possibly with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads.

For planning and assessment purposes we selected two illustrative scenarios that were both plausible and posited demands characteristic of conflicts with other potential adversaries. While various scenarios were examined, we focused on aggression by a remilitarized Iraq against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and by North Korea against the South. The scenarios should not be regarded as predictions of future conflict but rather as yardsticks against which to assess capabilities in gross terms. Each scenario examined forces in relation to critical parameters like warning time, threat, terrain, weather, duration of hostilities, and combat intensity. Overall these scenarios represented likely ranges of these parameters.

**MRC Building Blocks**

In planning a future force structure, we established force levels and support objectives that should enable us to win one MRC across a range of likely conflicts. Detailed analyses of possible future MRCs, coupled with military judgment about outcomes, suggest that the following forces will be adequate to execute our strategy for a single MRC:

- **4–5** Army divisions
- **4–5** Marine Expeditionary Brigades
- **10** Air Force fighter wings
- **100** Air Force heavy bombers
- **4–5** Navy Carrier Battle Groups
- **Special Operations Forces**

These forces constitute prudent building blocks for force planning. In a conflict response depends upon the nature and scale of the aggression and on circumstances elsewhere in the world. If the initial defense fails to halt an invasion quickly, or circumstances in other parts of the world permit, decisionmakers might opt to commit more forces than listed above (for example, additional Army divisions). The added forces would help achieve a needed advantage over the enemy, mount a decisive counteroffensive, or achieve more ambitious objectives, such as complete destruction of an enemy’s war-making potential. But analysis also concluded that enhancements to our forces, focused on ensuring an ability to conduct a successful initial defense, would reduce overall force requirements and increase responsiveness and effectiveness to project military power.

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**U.S. Force Structure: 1999**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 divisions (active)</td>
<td>1 aircraft carrier (active)</td>
<td>174,000 personnel (active end-strength)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 enhanced-readiness brigades (Reserve)</td>
<td>1 aircraft carrier (Reserve/training)</td>
<td>42,000 personnel (Reserve end-strength)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–55 attack submarines</td>
<td>45–55 attack submarines</td>
<td>Strategic Nuclear Forces (by 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>346 ships</td>
<td>346 ships</td>
<td>18 ballistic missile submarines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Up to 184 bombers (B-52H, B-1, B-2)</td>
<td>Up to 94 B-52H bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 fighter wings (active)</td>
<td>174,000 personnel (active end-strength)</td>
<td>20 B-2 bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 fighter wings (Reserve)</td>
<td>42,000 personnel (Reserve end-strength)</td>
<td>500 Minuteman III ICBMs (single warhead)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this context, we decided early in the review that the United States must field forces sufficient to fight and win two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously. This is prudent for two reasons. First, we need to avoid a situation in which the Nation in effect makes simultaneous wars more likely by leaving an opening for potential aggressors to attack their neighbors, should our engagement in one region leave little or no force available to respond effectively to defend interests in another. Second, fielding forces sufficient to win two wars simultaneously provides a hedge against the possibility that a future adversary—or coalition of adversaries—might one day confront us with a larger-than-expected threat. In short, it is difficult to foresee precisely what threats we will confront ten to twenty years from now. In this dynamic and unpredictable post-Cold War world, we must maintain military capabilities that are flexible and sufficient to cope with unforeseen threats.

For the bulk of our ground, naval, and air forces, fielding forces sufficient to provide this capability involves duplicating the MRC building block described above. However, in planning our overall force structure, we must recognize two other factors. First, the foregoing list of forces includes only combat force elements. Clearly, several types of support capabilities would play essential roles in all phases of an MRC. These capabilities include, but are not limited to: airlift; sealift; prepositioning; battlefield surveillance; command, control, and communications; advanced munitions; and aerial refueling. We must ensure that we provide sufficiently in these areas to meet the needs of our strategy. Second, certain specialized high-leverage units or unique assets might be dual tasked, that is, used in both MRCs. For example, certain advanced aircraft—such as B-2s, F-117s, JSTARS, and EF-111s—that we have purchased in limited numbers due to their expense would probably need to be shifted from the first to the second MRC.

Enhancements to Support Strategy

As mentioned above we have already undertaken or are planning a series of enhancements to improve the capability, flexibility, and lethality of the Armed Forces, geared especially toward buttressing our ability to conduct a successful initial defense in major regional conflicts. Enhancements include improving strategic mobility (through more prepositioning and improving airlift and sealift), strike capabilities of aircraft carriers, the lethality of Army firepower, and the ability of long-range bombers to deliver conventional smart munitions.

Strategic Mobility. Plans call for substantial enhancements to our strategic mobility—most of which were first identified in the 1991 Mobility Requirements Study or MRS. First, we will either purchase and deploy the C-17 or purchase other airlifters to replace aging C-141 transports. Since the development of the C-17 has been troubled we will monitor it closely, but significant, modern, flexible airlift capacity is essential to our defense strategy. A decision on the C-17 will be made after the completion of a current review by the Defense Acquisition Board. Second, we plan to store a
brigade set of heavy Army equipment afloat; ships with this material would be positioned in areas from which to respond on short notice either to the Persian Gulf or to Northeast Asia. Other prepositioning initiatives would accelerate the arrival of heavy Army units in Southwest Asia and Korea. Third, we will increase the capacity of surge sealift to transport forces and equipment rapidly from the United States to distant regions by purchasing additional roll-on/roll-off ships. Fourth, we will improve the readiness and responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Force through various enhancements. Finally, we will fund efforts to improve “fort-to-port” flow of personnel, equipment, and supplies in the United States.

**Naval Strike Aircraft.** The Navy is examining a number of innovative ways to improve the firepower aboard its aircraft carriers. First, the Navy will improve its strike potential by providing a precision ground-attack capability for many F-14s. It also will acquire stocks of new “brilliant” antiarmor weapons for delivery by attack aircraft. Finally, the Navy plans to develop the capability to fly additional squadrons of F/A-18s to forward-deployed aircraft carriers that would be the first to arrive in response to a regional contingency. These additional aircraft would increase the striking power of carriers during the critical early stages of a conflict.

**Army Firepower.** The Army is developing new smart submunitions that can be delivered by the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS), and standard tube artillery. In addition, the Longbow fire control radar system will increase both the effectiveness and the survivability of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. We also are examining prepositioning more ATACMS and MLRS and having Apaches self-deploy from their overseas bases so that all would be available early in a conflict.

**Air Force Long-Range Bombers and Munitions.** There will be Air Force enhancements in two areas. First, we plan to modify B-1 and B-2 long-range heavy bombers to improve the ability to deliver smart conventional munitions on attacking enemy forces and fixed targets. Second, we will develop all-weather munitions. For example, the Air Force is developing a guidance package for a tactical munitions dispenser filled with antiarmor submunitions for use in all types of weather. This will dramatically increase our capacity to attack and destroy critical targets during the crucial opening days of a short-warning conflict. We have also initiated improvements in the readiness and flexibility of Army National Guard combat units and other Reserve component forces to make them more readily available for MRCs and other tasks. One important role for combat elements of the Army National Guard, for instance, is to provide forces to supplement active divisions should...
more ground combat power be needed to deter or fight a second MRC. In the future, Army National Guard units will be better trained, more capable, and more ready. If mobilized early in a conflict, brigade-sized units could provide extra security and flexibility in the event a second conflict arose while the first was still going on. There are also plans to increase the capability and effectiveness of Navy/Marine Corps Reserve air assets by introducing a Reserve/training aircraft carrier.

**Overall Force Structure**

On the basis of a comprehensive assessment of defense needs, the review determined that the force structure, which will be reached by the end of the decade, can carry out our strategy and meet our national security requirements. This force structure will be adequate for both overseas presence in peacetime and a range of smaller-scale operations. It will also give us the ability to prevail in the most stressing situation we may face—two major regional conflicts occurring nearly simultaneously.

In addition, the force structure provides sufficient capabilities for strategic deterrence and defense. It also provides enough forces, primarily Reserve component, to hold in strategic reserve and utilize if and when needed. For example, Reserve forces could deploy to one or both MRCs, if operations don’t go as planned. Alternatively, they could serve as backfill for overseas presence forces redeployed to an MRC.

**Structures and Mixes**

In the analysis that supported the review, four force structure options were investigated. The options were designed to meet successively more demanding regional defense strategies. Option 3—a force structure adequate to win two nearly simultaneous MRCs—is, in broad terms, the approach chosen.

Option 1 would require the fewest resources, allowing us to reduce the defense budget and redirect excess funds to other national priorities. But, in providing only enough assets to fight one major regional conflict at a time, this option would leave us vulnerable to a potential aggressor who might choose to take advantage of the situation if virtually all our forces were engaged in a conflict elsewhere. At a minimum, this option would require us to scale back or terminate certain existing mutual defense treaties and long-standing commitments, with a corresponding reduction in our influence in those regions where we choose to abandon a major leadership role.

Option 2 would free additional resources for other national priorities, but is premised on the risky assumption that, if we are challenged in one region, respond to the aggression, and then are challenged shortly afterwards in another region, a sizable block of remaining forces will have the stamina and capability...
to defeat the first adversary, and move to another region (possibly several thousand miles distant) and defeat another adversary. This option might provide sufficient military strength in peacetime to maintain American leadership, but it would heighten the risk associated with carrying out a two-MRC strategy in wartime.

Option 3 provides sufficiently capable and flexible forces to position the United States as a leader and shaper of global affairs for positive change. It would allow us to confidently advance our strategy of being able to fight and win two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously. However, it leaves little of the active force structure to provide an overseas presence or to conduct peacekeeping or low intensity operations if we had to fight more than one MRC. If such tasks became necessary—or either MRC did not evolve as anticipated—then we might have to activate significant Reserve forces. Also key to option 3 is the ability to carry out our strategy through a series of critical force enhancements described earlier, including further prepositioning of brigade sets of equipment, increased stock levels of antiarmor precision-guided munitions, and more early arriving naval air power.

Option 4 would allow us to fight and win two MRCs nearly simultaneously while continuing to sustain some other overseas presence and perhaps an additional peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, or intervention-type operations. However, maintaining forces of this size would require significant additional resources thereby eliminating any peace dividend the American people may expect as a result of the end of the Cold War. Yet the analysis showed that, despite this larger investment, option 4 would provide only a small increment of increased military capability.

Each strategy and force structure option was tested by weighting various mixes in favor of land, sea, or air contributions. The analysis indicated that, under some circumstances, emphasis on certain types of forces or capabilities could help offset the loss of certain other capabilities or forces. For example, additional ground forces might be able to compensate for the loss of some air contributions when dealing with guerrilla or insurgency threats in thick and constrained terrain, or where an enemy is not technologically advanced. Alternatively, substituting air power for some ground forces might be supportable in cases where terrain is open; an enemy is highly dependent upon key industries, resources, or utilities; or heavy armored forces are engaged in some other conventional conflict. Even among air components, certain environments or circumstances favor the use of land-based versus sea-based air forces or vice versa.

Nevertheless, while the analysis indicated that a structure geared toward particular types of forces might enhance overall capabilities under specific conditions, it would also create serious vulnerabilities under other circumstances. Given the great uncertainty as to where, when, and how future crises might occur, anything but a carefully balanced force will risk ineffectiveness, high casualties, or a failure to meet objectives. The conclusion was that the balanced force structure we selected is the best choice for executing our defense strategy and maintaining the flexibility needed to deal with the wide range of dangers.

In sum, the force structure that emerges from the Bottom-Up Review represents the most appropriate mix and balance of capabilities while reflecting the Nation’s need for more resources to devote to investments in future competitiveness. In a world of new challenges, opportunities, and uncertainties, this force—together with planned qualitative enhancements—supports an ambitious national strategy of global engagement and provides the military wherewithal to meet the unknown and unexpected.
BOOKS


MONOGRAPHS, PROCEEDINGS, TEXTS, &c.


ARTICLES


VIETNAM AS MILITARY HISTORY
A Review Essay by MACKUBIN THOMAS OWENS

A generation has passed since America’s involvement in Vietnam ended, yet the question persists: how was our Nation, with superior technology, firepower, mobility, and air supremacy, unable to defeat a seemingly smaller, less well-equipped enemy? To address this haunting question this essay will look at a number of books published in the decades since the end of that war.

The first theoretical framework for examining the war was provided by Harry Summers with publication of On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. The book revolutionized thinking about the role of the Army in Vietnam and why the United States had lost its first war. By using Clausewitz’s well-known, oft-quoted, but seldom read On War as the basis for his analysis, Summers argued that America lacked an appreciation of strategy and did not apply the principles of war as did North Vietnam. The Armed Forces had won on the battlefield where their tactical and logistical superiority was overwhelming, but the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN)—also known as the North Vietnamese Army (NVA)—won at the strategic level which is what really counts.

Academic Theories and Military Fads

Summers contends that the strategic mind-set that characterized American leaders during the Vietnam era resulted from two factors, in fact, from two sides of the same coin: the academic theory of limited war and counterinsurgency doctrine. Both factors were rooted in the development of thermonuclear weapons. Academic theory on war, he argued, displaced traditional understanding of strategy and the use of force. The Clausewitzian strategist believes that the purpose of war is to achieve certain objectives by force. The use of force, however, is structured by a strategic concept guided by the idea of victory. Tactical success in and of itself is only of minimal importance—to contribute to victory any such success must fulfill a strategic purpose and achieve a strategic goal.

The emergence of nuclear weapons led many defense experts to claim that previous notions of strategy and force were rendered obsolete. Thus in 1946, Bernard Brodie wrote that heretofore “the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.” That assertion was echoed by Thomas Schelling some years later: “Military science can no longer be thought of . . . as the science of military victory.”

According to academic theorists, using force in a limited war was only acceptable to signal resolve to one’s adversaries. However, it was only acceptable to signal resolve to one’s adversaries or to force them back to the negotiating table. The pursuit of even limited victory in the traditional sense could lead to escalation of a conflict, culminating in nuclear war. Thus nuclear weapons and the concomitant theory of limited war had a corrosive effect on the Armed Forces, especially the Army. As limited war caught on and as classical understanding of strategy gave way...

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to the economic paradigm of deterrence, the very existence of the Army came into question. In this climate, military affairs increasingly meant defense economics, the attempt to achieve the “maximum deterrent at the least cost.”

Summers indicates that as the defense establishment became preoccupied with technical, managerial, and bureaucratic concerns, the Army, in self-defense, adapted to the new environment. But the cost was high: officers turned into “neophyte political scientists and system analysts” and military influence on strategic thinking declined as soldiers were replaced by academic strategists. When Presidents called on the military for advice, they were ill-prepared to provide it. Having lost the capacity to think strategically, the military could not properly identify the nature of the Vietnam War or recommend the appropriate military policy and strategy with which to conduct it.

Into this strategic vacuum flowed counterinsurgency doctrine which was less of a strategy than a military fad according to Summers. Counterinsurgency was the social scientists’ answer to limited war theory. It was in vogue among policymakers in the 1960s as a means of dealing with communist revolutionary warfare (or wars of national liberation as they were called on the left) and thus seemed tailor-made for the situation in Southeast Asia. The problem was, Summers says, that Vietnam was not a revolutionary war. Because of their preoccupation with counterinsurgency, policymakers did not identify North Vietnam as the enemy and mobilize national will to defeat it. Instead, Vietnam was fought according to a limited war paradigm—including counterinsurgency—that was an economic rather than a strategic model. The objective was to inflict incremental pain on the North Vietnamese to convince them that the marginal cost of continued aggression against the South would exceed the marginal benefit. Every American action, from introducing ground troops to bombing the North, was taken in terms of economic cost-benefit analysis.

Summers identifies the two great strategic failures which characterized U.S. conduct of the Vietnam War. The first was failing to focus on the
main effort against North Vietnam, both on the ground and in the air. Instead, he points out, we “expended our energies against a secondary force—North Vietnam’s guerrilla screen.” The second was failing to recognize that the Cold War policy of containment meant that the military would always, as in the case of the Korean War, be limited to the strategic defensive. The best possible outcome of the strategic defensive is stalemate on the battlefield. This did not mean that the United States could not have achieved its ostensible political goal, the survival of South Vietnam. But to do so, Washington would have had to seal off Saigon from Hanoi. In this view Summers endorses an argument advanced by Bruce Palmer in The Twenty-Five Year War that “together with an expanded naval blockade, the Army should have taken the tactical offensive along the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] across Laos to the Thai border in order to isolate the battlefield and then deliberately assumed the strategic and tactical defensive.”

Such was the plan contemplated by General William C. Westmoreland, Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, but rejected because the political “opportunity cost” was perceived to be too great: President Lyndon Johnson did not wish to endanger his domestic policy initiatives by mobilizing the Reserve components.

The questions about Vietnam that both civilian and military policymakers should have been asking, says Summers, were strategic ones: how do we achieve our political objectives by the use of force? How do we destroy the enemy’s strategy? How do we use tactical successes to obtain strategic goals in the theater of operations? These questions were precluded by the academic theory of limited war. But the failure to ask, much less answer, such questions in the context of Vietnam, argues Summers, rendered our superiority in firepower and logistics ultimately useless.

Strategic Vacuum?

How persuasive is the explanatory paradigm presented by Summers? Was there a strategic vacuum created by adherence to the academic theory of war? Did the United States fight the wrong war, mistaking what was essentially a conventional conflict in which the Viet Cong guerrillas were used merely as an economy of force measure for an insurgency? The Pentagon Papers support the argument concerning a lack of strategic thinking on the part of the American leadership, at least after 1962. Before then, planners were concerned about how to win in South Vietnam, albeit what they thought was an insurgency. But once U.S. troop strength began to increase, emphasis shifted from military strategy to signaling North Vietnam and China. Thus in late 1964, Walt Rostow was claiming that “too much thought is being given to the actual damage we do in the North, not enough to the signal we wish to send.” The State Department was recommending the dispatch of a detachment of Air Force fighter aircraft to Thailand, not for military purposes but “with a view toward... potential deterrence and signaling impacts on communist activities in Laos.” The Central Intelligence Agency was maintaining that the proposal to simultaneously bomb targets in North Vietnam and negotiate “would not seriously affect communist capabilities to continue that insurrection,” but would affect North Vietnam’s will.

Westmoreland reports a particularly egregious example of the signaling mentality. When the military sought permission in early 1965 to destroy the first surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that had been discovered in North Vietnam in order to reduce U.S. casualties, the request was denied. “[John] McNaughton ridiculed the idea,” writes Westmoreland. “You don’t think the North Vietnamese are going to use them!” he scoffed to General Moore. “Putting them in is just a political play by the Russians to appease Hanoi.” It was all a matter of signals said the clever civilian theorists in Washington. We won’t bomb the SAM sites, which signals the North Vietnamese not to use them.
The emphasis on signalling as opposed to traditional military strategy continued as the commitment increased and the intensity of combat escalated.

Time and again, the Pentagon Papers attest to the "how much is enough" mentality of the policymakers responsible for Vietnam, which was an economic rather than a strategic model. As a result, the U.S. leadership failed to define a clear mission for the military or, until 1968, to clearly establish limits on the resources that would be made available to the military to pursue the war. Yet aligning ends and means is the essence of strategy. Ironically, when the failure of the limited war signalling strategy became apparent in 1968, and President Johnson finally did limit the troop level for Vietnam, the military could finally formulate a strategy to best employ the resources available. The result was the policy of Vietnamization.

Insurgency or Conventional War?

The most serious challenge to Summers' thesis concerns his claim that the Vietnam War was primarily a conventional conflict as opposed to an insurgency. In *The Army and Vietnam*, Andrew Krepinevich agrees with Summers that America fought the wrong war in Vietnam. But he stands Summers on his head by arguing that this was because the Army paid too little attention to counterinsurgency, not too much. Summers writes that in the early 1960s, "counterinsurgency became not so much the Army's doctrine as the Army's dogma, and (as nuclear weapons had earlier) stifled military strategic thinking for the next decade." Krepinevich, on the other hand, argues that a rhetorical commitment to counterinsurgency was not matched by substantive change in doctrine, training, or force structure.

Unable to fit [President Kennedy's] prescriptions into its force structure, oriented on mid- and high-intensity conflict in Europe, the Army either ignored them or watered them down to prevent its superiors from infringing upon what the service felt were its proper priorities.

Thus the Army never emphasized the skills that constitute "the essence of counterinsurgency—long-term patrolling of a small area, the pervasive use of night operations, emphasis on intelligence pertaining to the insurgents' infrastructure," instead relying upon tactics which were derived from "the Army Concept—a focus on mid-intensity, or conventional, war and a reliance on high volumes of firepower to minimize casualties..." Krepinevich argues that the doctrine stemming from the Army Concept had hardened into dogma and, as a result, the Army was not prepared for the war in Vietnam. The debate between Summers and Krepinevich mirrors the clash between the Army and Marine Corps from 1965 to 1967 over how to pursue the war. In *A Soldier Reports*, Westmoreland writes:

"During those early months [1965], I was concerned with the tactical methods that General Walt and the Marines employed. They had established beachheads at Chu..."
Lai and Da Nang and were reluctant to go outside them, not through any lack of courage but through a different conception of how to fight an anti-insurgency war. They were assiduously [sic] combing the countryside within the beachhead, trying to establish firm control in hamlets and villages, and planning to expand the beachhead up and down the coast.

He believed the Marines “should have been trying to find the enemy’s main forces and bring them to battle, thereby putting them on the run and reducing the threat they posed to the population.” Westmoreland, according to Krulak, made the “third point the primary undertaking, even while deemphasizing the need for clearly favorable conditions before engaging the enemy.”

Westmoreland’s concept is illustrated by the battle of Ia Drang in November 1965. The North Vietnamese planned to attack across the Central Highlands and cut South Vietnam in two, hoping to cause the collapse of the Saigon government before massive American combat power could be introduced. Ia Drang was the single bloodiest battle of the war. The definitive account of the action is contained in a recent book, We Were Soldiers Once... And Young by Moore and Galloway [see the reflection on this book which immediately follows this review].

Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore, USA (Ret.), commanded a battalion in the battle, and Joseph Galloway was a UPI correspondent accompanying the unit. Moore’s battalion of 450 men landed in the middle of 1600 members of a NVA regiment. We Were Soldiers Once describes two parts of the battle, one successful—the defense of Landing Zone X-Ray—another a debacle—the ambush of Moore’s sister battalion at Landing Zone Albany—in which 155 Americans died in a 16-hour period, “the most savage one-day battle of the Vietnam War.”

The battle in the Ia Drang Valley convinced Westmoreland the Army Concept was correct. Summers would agree. In a head to head clash, an outnumbered U.S. force had spoiled an enemy operation and sent a major NVA force reeling back in defeat. But Krepinevich and Krulak would demur. For Krulak, Ia Drang represented an example of fighting the enemy’s war—what North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap predicted would be “a protracted war of attrition.” And says Krulak, a “war of attrition it turned out to be... [by] 1972, we had managed to reduce the enemy’s manpower pool by perhaps 25 percent at a cost of over 220,000 U.S. and South Vietnamese dead. Of these, 59,000 were Americans...”

The question remains, who is right? Both Krepinevich and Krulak seem persuasive, but Summers in his observation that “...it was four North Vietnamese Army Corps, not dialectical materialism that ultimately conquered South Vietnam” cannot be gainsaid. How is it possible to reconcile these two apparently conflicting points of view?

Hanoi’s Strategy

One possible answer can be found in PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam by Douglas Pike. Through an examination of communist strategy, he demonstrates that different elements prevailed at different times which accounts for differing the perceptions of the war. In the event, however, Pike’s analysis provides substantial support to Summers. According to Pike, PAVN successfully followed a strategy called dau tranh (struggle), consisting of two operational elements: dau tranh vu trang (armed struggle) and dau tranh chinh tri (political struggle) which were envisioned as a hammer and anvil or pincers that crush the enemy. Armed dau tranh had a strategy “for regular forces” and another for “protracted conflict.” Regular force strategy included both high tech and limited offensive warfare; protracted conflict included both Maoist and neo-revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Political dau tranh included dich van (action among the enemy), binh van (action among the people)
among the military) and dan van (action among the people). As Pike observes, to defeat dau tranh both arms of the pincer had to be blunted. U.S. and South Vietnamese forces defeated armed dau tranh. Echoing Summers, Pike writes that “the American military’s performance in this respect was particularly impressive. It won every significant battle fought, a record virtually unparalleled in the history of warfare.” But the Allies never dealt successfully with political dau tranh, which led ultimately to defeat.

Pike argues that a constant struggle existed between Giap and political leadership. After 1959, when the Lao Dong party in Hanoi decided to launch dau tranh in the South, until 1965, political dau tranh prevailed. Then it shifted to armed dau tranh until mid-1968. And two more full cycles followed according to Pike: political dau tranh from 1969 to 71, armed dau tranh from 1972 to 73, political dau tranh from 1974 to 75, and a hurried shift to armed dau tranh as Saigon collapsed in 1975. Several conclusions can be drawn from Pike’s work. One is that there were roles for both the Army Concept and counterinsurgency doctrine during the war. There were major conventional aspects of the war. The strategic thrust that culminated in the battle of la Drang was part of armed dau tranh regular force strategy, as was the 1972 Easter Offensive, and the final push in the spring of 1975. But after la Drang until 1967, armed dau tranh seems to have followed a protracted war rather than regular force strategy. In periods in which political dau tranh or protracted war armed dau tranh predominated, and given the political constraints placed on U.S. forces in Vietnam, there is much to be said for counterinsurgency doctrine as applied by the Marines from 1965 until 1967.

On the other hand Pike demonstrates the weakness of the contention that counterinsurgency was the only means by which America could have won. While Krepinevich successfully refutes the claim made by Summers that the Army had succumbed to the siren song of counterinsurgency, he is not convincing when he argues that a lack of counterinsurgency doctrine was the proximate cause of the defeat in Vietnam. To accept this claim, one would have to believe that the insurgency in the South was independent of the North, a claim that Pike absolutely demolishes. This is where Krulak parts company with Krepinevich. While he is closer to Krepinevich than Summers on the issue of counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics—like most defenders of the Marine Corps approach—he argues that the insurgency in the South was only part of the problem: a “multipronged concept” was necessary to achieve victory in Vietnam. Accordingly, he was an early advocate of taking the air war to the North for reasons of military strategy rather than merely as part of limited war signalling. In 1965, Krulak recommended addressing “our attitudinal efforts primarily to the source of North Vietnamese material introduction, fabrication, and distribution; destroy the port areas, mine the ports, destroy the rail lines, destroy power, fuel, and heavy industry…. ”

The Air War

Krutel’s proposal raises the issue of the effectiveness of air power in the Vietnam war. He is not alone among military leaders of the time who claim that intensive bombing of North Vietnam could have proved decisive in 1965. That claim is disputed by Mark Clodfelter in his 1989 book, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. Clodfelter indicates that the U.S. strategy for employment of air power failed until 1972 when two changes occurred to create conditions favorable to an air power strategy. The first change, he argues, was the shift in North Vietnamese strategy to what Pike calls armed dau tranh, this time in a conventional (regular force) mode. Hanoi’s decision to mount a large-scale conventional invasion of the South meant that the North Vietnamese, unlike the Viet Cong in 1965–67, became dependent on logistic support to an extent that made them vulnerable to American air power.

The second change was the shift in political goals and the international environment. While Lyndon Johnson sought an independent, stable, noncommunist South, capable of standing alone against future aggression by Hanoi, Richard Nixon was willing to disengage without achieving those goals. Additionally, in accordance with the theory of limited war, Johnson believed he had to worry about the effect on China and the Soviet Union of massive airstrikes against the North. Detente with the Soviet Union and China gave Nixon freedom to effectively employ air power, an option that Johnson lacked. Clodfelter’s argument is compelling, but there is evidence that the North Vietnamese would disagree with him on the effectiveness of air power. Pike has indicated elsewhere in his writings that “the initial reaction of Hanoi’s leaders to the strategic bombings and air strikes that began in February 1965—documented later by defectors and other witnesses—was enormous dismay and apprehension. They feared the North was to be visited by intolerable destruction which it simply could not endure.” Based on interviews and archival research, Pike concludes, “while conditions had changed vastly in seven years, the dismaying conclusion to suggest itself from the 1972 Christmas bombings was that had this kind of air assault been launched in February of 1965, the Vietnam war as we know
Surveying the historical literature on military aspects of the Vietnam conflict reveals that the war was multifaceted. Accordingly, a comprehensive framework is needed to analyze it. Without such a framework, there will always be a tendency to mistake one phase of the war for the whole. I believe that Summers comes closest to providing such a framework although as Krepinevich and Pike show even he commits the error of treating a phase of the North Vietnamese strategy (armed dau tranh regular force strategy) as the whole. As Pike explains, the war was neither conventional nor an insurgency when seen as a whole. As one form or other of dau tranh dominated Hanoi's strategy, the war took on a more or less conventional aspect for the United States.

But in his overall assessment Summers holds up very well under scrutiny. The American defeat in Vietnam was the result of a strategic failure. The political leadership did not take strategy seriously because they were not intellectually equipped to do so. Imbued with the academic theory of limited war, they confused economics with strategy and were far more comfortable dealing with hypothetical nuclear exchanges than with how to employ military force to achieve political goals. The military leadership, for whatever reason, did not fill the strategic vacuum.

The argument about the effects of the strategic defensive on operations seems vindicated as well. In After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam, Ronald Spector says that "an examination of the events of 1968 makes clear that... the most appropriate analogy to Vietnam is World War I. As in World War I, the war in Vietnam was a stalemate [but] as in World War I, neither side was prepared to admit this fact." Both sides, he observes, made maximum efforts to break the stalemate during 1968.

The strategic vacuum at the top—including the failure to recognize that the military had no other choice than to pursue the strategic defensive—had implications for the operational and tactical conduct of the Vietnam War. The operational level of war consists of operational art and planning. Accordingly, it involves using available military assets to attain strategic objectives in a theater of war, with or without hostilities; designing operations to meet strategic objectives; and conducting campaigns. Tactics involves winning battles and should serve operational ends which themselves should have strategic goals. Yet absent coherent strategic objectives, tactics and operations become their own justification. This is what occurred in Vietnam. Lacking strategic guidance, each service fought the war in accordance with its own strategic concept. In Krepinevich’s words, the United States conducted the war in accordance with a "strategy of tactics."

Debate over the conduct of the Vietnam War illustrates the necessity for having a military that thinks strategically. Operational art and tactical skill are of little value without an overarching concept about how and when military force should be applied to defend national interests, and how military force can achieve political goals with limited resources. Military professionals must understand strategic reasoning and also be able to convey to the Nation’s leaders an understanding of the resulting relationship between political ends and military means. The great legacy of Vietnam, to coin a phrase, is the military’s recognition of the fact that articulating strategy is too important to be left to the likes of civilian analysts. JPQ
Dear Friend,

You asked to borrow the Vietnam remembrance, We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young. I sat down this evening to pen a quick cover note to you, but memories took over and these pages are the result. Please indulge me for just a few minutes.

The book was coauthored by Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore, USA (Ret.), and Joseph L. Galloway. It recounts four days of incredibly intense and desperate combat between the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and three regiments of North Vietnamese infantry in the Ia Drang Valley of Pleiku Province in November 1965. Then-Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore commanded the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry, whose saga is recalled in the first part of the book. Joe Galloway, a young UPI war correspondent, was on the ground with Moore’s unit. A sister battalion, the 2/7 Cavalry, is the major focus of the balance of the book, beginning with a section entitled “Albany.” Elements of several other cavalry regiments were also involved. All told, during a four-day period, 234 young Americans lost their lives in the action. The 2/7 alone had 155 killed in just six hours. But together, the two battalions killed perhaps ten times as many of the enemy.

The book is one of the most important and painstakingly researched, lovingly created, and vividly described first-person accounts of infantry combat ever written. Over the years, I’ve read widely in this genre from across the expanse of military history. Many were skillfully and even inspirationally rendered by soldiers and scholars of deserved renown. But none surpasses what the authors have achieved here. It is absolutely stunning—even riveting. Please excuse the underlined passages and marginal comments that I made in the book. Some are rather personal and, I must say, not always measured. I never anticipated that anyone else would read them.

Experiencing this book—and that is really the best way to put it—was an intense personal catharsis for me. I have deliberately avoided Vietnam, when I could, for over 25 years now. I’ve read very little about it and have seen none of the films that feature it. I guess I’ve been waiting all of these years for something to happen that would cause me to say, finally, it’s ended—those of us who served so loyally and sacrificed so greatly, only to return to ignominy...
and harsh, unfair, and mean-spirited criticism from our fellow citizens, at last have been fondly remembered and richly memorialized with genuine feeling and ennobling dignity. The wait has been rewarded in full measure.

I have never visited the Vietnam Memorial on the Mall. I have no plans to go there—ever. Many (certainly not all, perhaps not even most) of my buddies—largely the former rifle platoon leaders and company commanders who led units that did most of the hard ground fighting in Vietnam—feel the same way, albeit for many different and complex reasons. But, profoundly moved by Moore and Galloway’s immense and touching labor of love, we have talked a great deal. We believe that this inspired creation is a truly fitting memorial to the thousands of soldiers who served, bled, suffered, were maimed, and died on the field of battle in Vietnam, and for those who continue to wage that war in their minds . . . because they cannot forget. This splendidly written remembrance graphically tells their story and poignantly honors their gallantry, heroism, and appalling sacrifice as no carved stone monolith ever can.

In the autumn of 1965, South Vietnamese and Americans were fighting hard to prevent the forced cleaving of the Republic of Vietnam across Route 19 through the Central Highlands by Viet Cong guerrilla and main force units and their recently arrived allies of the People’s Army of North Vietnam. Thousands of other North Vietnamese soldiers were streaming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and Cambodia toward South Vietnam. The war had reached a major turning point, and we knew it.

I was a first lieutenant and executive officer, and then the commander, of an airborne infantry rifle company (B 2/502) in the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Our battalion was involved in a number of sharp actions during the two months prior to the bloody campaign recounted in this book. Even though they had just arrived in country and were not yet well established, elements of the 1st Cavalry nonetheless supported us and even came to our relief on several occasions.

Although my battalion was committed elsewhere when the hellish battles in the Ia Drang Valley were raging that November, I personally knew many of the officers and men who were involved, including their families. I had gone to college, the Infantry Officers Basic Course, and Airborne and Ranger Schools with some of them. Others had worked with or for me in earlier assignments. Many more I would meet in the years to come.

One was a fine young infantry officer who, a decade hence, was my colleague at West Point and a dear friend. He died tragically a few years ago, just days after we had enjoyed lunch together. My profound sadness at his loss is heightened by the realization that his premature death prevented him from reading this book, in which his and his buddies’ selflessness and suffering are so heart-rendingly chronicled. In sum, this work recalls for me—and for many others, I am sure—a gut-wrenching personal experience of truly epic proportions.

Let me add that the only real differences between the combat actions described in this book and many others that we participated in before and after were the size of the forces engaged and the magnitude of the carnage. Battles between small units can be equally horrendous and profoundly alter the minds and being of those who fight them. The phrase “hell in a very small place” (which is also the title of a superb book by Bernard Fall on the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu) is an apt metaphor for the infantryman in time of war. And for all too many, the hell never ends.
The often sanguinary passages found in *We Were Soldiers Once... and Young* cry out for public attention. I hope they prompt no small measure of soul searching by Americans, and especially in our Nation’s capital, by our political leaders. Washington is full of people interested in national security, and with a passion for righting all manner of injustice throughout the world, who stop well short of wearing a uniform themselves much less putting their lives on the line in combat. No political party occupies the moral high ground when it comes to the use of force. In fact, some of the most vocal hawks on defense matters and other reputed pillars of American society tend to be the biggest hypocrites on this score.

Those removed from the reality of war are sometimes the first to talk in glib terms about applying the military instrument when unfortunate and even grotesque things happen abroad that they determine can only be redressed by force of arms. Such ill-advised impetuosity seldom is heard from those who have survived the terrifying baptism of fire, borne the awesome responsibility for the lives of others in battle, filled body bags with the remains of their comrades, and known the reality of going in harm’s way. Sadly, Erasmus got it right in the title of his treatise against war: *Dulce Bellum Inexpertis* (war is sweet to those unacquainted with it).

More to the point, policymakers of this ilk at virtually every level in Washington seem far too eager to argue for sending others, including no small number of essentially economic draftees, to fight and die in distant, lonely places. This they do even for vague, ill-conceived policies which—however well intentioned—often cannot even be articulated adequately in terms of risks to our vital national interests or the desired outcome. It is not surprising then that the American people do not buy into these policies. As we know only too well this is what happened in the case of Vietnam.

It’s disturbing that many otherwise well-informed people, along with others who should know better, see a combat-wizened soldier’s insistence on receiving reasonably clear and militarily actionable political objectives prior to commitment to battle as a nuisance, if not an impossibility.
How can this be? If Clausewitz had not finished On War, we would have learned the fallacy—even the moral bankruptcy—of such thinking through the many wars and smaller actions in our Nation's two centuries of history. Tragically this includes a few conflicts that have occurred since the war in Vietnam officially ended and its lessons were finely distilled, gently decanted, and widely distributed for public consumption. Here Moore and Galloway give us reason for pause.

Those who would use the military as a test bed for all manner of social experimentation—as is the vogue today—need to understand what the “sky troopers” of the 1st Cavalry experienced in the Ia Drang. They need to understand it clearly since, in the course of events, what happened there is only a variation on a theme: it is what soldiers experience whenever they are committed to battle. No amount of political and technological change in the world is likely to significantly alter this basic fact.

This heart-breaking yet incredibly inspiring book breathes new life into the meaning of unit cohesion in ways that no research study, academic treatise, or field manual could approach. It demonstrates how critical, precious, and, perhaps most importantly, fragile cohesion truly is. That a superbly organized, trained, and led unit like Hal Moore's could hover so close to utter destruction for so long and survive not only to recover, but also to fight again another day, is both a lesson and a warning for those who would tinker, even at the margins, with the fabric of the military, the profession of arms, and the warrior ethic as we know it in the United States.

I later served with the 1st Cavalry during my second tour in Vietnam. After taking command of my second rifle company (A 2/5 Cavalry), we air assaulted into a hot landing zone north of Saigon near the Cambodian border, an action not unlike the one described by Moore and Galloway. But there were differences worth recalling. We had learned from the experiences of others and the terrain, weather, and tactical situation allowed us to promptly and effectively bring to bear just about every kind of fire support available—mortars, artillery, rockets, gunships, and fighter-bombers. And the division piled on quickly, inserting almost an entire brigade by helicopter. By day's end we had overwhelmed and destroyed a North Vietnamese regiment, albeit at considerable cost. My company took heavy casualties and I spent most of the next year in hospital and several more recovering.

Still some things never change. Leading-edge technology, world-class combat systems, and new and innovative organizational and operational concepts have served to make the military more effective than we were back then. But it has made war more intense and the task of ground combat potentially more deadly. Much of what I and other members of the 1st Cavalry experienced in combat in Vietnam could easily occur again—for many of the same reasons. Neither the end of history nor the end of the vital role that we mortals must play in its often painfully costly and not infrequently disastrous results is close at hand.

I was going to close by saying that I hope you enjoy this book. But it is not something to be enjoyed. Instead it must be experienced, reflected upon, remembered, and then cherished. It is an inspired story of the victory of human spirit against overwhelming odds. It should be read in the hope that we learn from what We Were Soldiers Once... and Young has to tell us.

Sincerely,

David
The release this past autumn of yet another post-mortem on the Persian Gulf War received the kind of hype normally reserved for exposés by Washington insiders. While Crusade by Rick Atkinson does indeed retail a variety of personality quirks and expletives undeleted, it also raises serious questions about the purpose and aftermath of Desert Storm. In the tandem politico-military reviews that follow, a former senior policymaker and a military historian take separate looks at Atkinson as a crusader in the quest to capture the lessons of the Gulf War.

Atkinson as a crusader in the quest to capture the lessons of the Gulf War.

Two Book Reviews by
PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ and RONALD H. COLE

The Persian Gulf War occupies a unique place in American military history. It is unique particularly from the standpoint of the casualties suffered by U.S. and coalition forces. No major war in our history has resulted in so few friendly casualties, a number that the U.S. Commander in Chief, General Norman Schwarzkopf, aptly called "miraculously" low.

That very uniqueness seems to have made it difficult for many people to grasp the broader significance of the event. It was a war that transformed the security structure of the Persian Gulf—a region that will remain the principal source of world energy needs well into the next century, with dramatic effects on the Arab-Israeli peace process. And it appears to have foreshadowed a truly revolutionary change in military technology and its accompanying doctrine and tactics, even though most of the technology demonstrated was ten or fifteen years old.

Yet in a good deal of popular discourse the Gulf War seems to be dismissed as a kind of peripheral incident at the end of the Cold War, about which the most significant observation is that Saddam Hussein survived it.

Ironically, if the conflict had been more costly, its significance might be better appreciated today. Probably at no other time in our history has the Nation so overestimated the dangers of war before the fact or so underestimated them afterwards. Largely because of the fear over thousands or even tens of thousands of body bags, the resolution authorizing the use of force to evict the Iraqi army from Kuwait almost failed to gain a majority in the U.S. Senate. Afterwards, however, it all seemed so easy that President Bush was subjected to a drumbeat of criticism for not having gone all the way to Baghdad to round up Saddam Hussein.

In his book, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War, Rick Atkinson offers us a helpful corrective to this ex post facto underestimation. It is a volume that is impressive not only for the breadth of its research, but also for the drama of its narrative. In particular, by bringing to life the fears of commanders and the heroism of individual warriors, Atkinson leaves to others substantive treatment of U.S. strategy in Southwest Asia; crisis action in the first week of August 1990; the unprecedented air and sealift of half a million personnel, 3,800 aircraft, and three million tons of cargo over 8,000 miles; the problems of peacetime underestimating at the headquarters of both U.S. Central Command and the Office of Joint History where he is currently doing work on the Persian Gulf War. He is also the coauthor of a forthcoming book entitled The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1878–1945.
Atkinson makes clear that this war was no cake-walk for those who actually had to fight it. He brings the story alive with a technique that is in vogue among investigative reporters but scorned by rigorous historians—the use of quotations to give readers the feeling of being present in crucial conversations, even though most of the quotes probably come from later recollections of participants rather than from contemporaneous records. This means that many things end up inside quotation marks that probably do not belong there. The result, nevertheless, is a far more complete picture than one which limits itself to things that can be precisely documented.

As someone who was present in a number of the meetings which Atkinson describes, I am impressed by the overall accuracy of his portrayal of events, even where I might question the use of a particular word or phrase. In general, the historical record will be much richer for having this body of information, which could not have been assembled by any other method.

Atkinson’s detection of a “jaundiced discontent” after the Gulf War reveals a phenomenon that has been common following other wars, certainly the Korean War, but even World War II. Some perspective is needed to form an accurate historical judgment. Current assessments of the significance of the Persian Gulf War are colored heavily by the popular disillusionment that began to set in afterward, as Saddam Hussein maintained his grasp on power and continued to provoke and defy the international community.

In trying to answer the question why the “sweet savor of victory” so quickly turned “to the taste of ashes,” Atkinson places the emphasis on the critique which is implicit in his title, Crusade. President Bush, in his view, so “encouraged the Nation to consider the war a great moral crusade,” that people were bound to be disappointed by the limited results.

That view, it seems to me, exaggerates Bush’s rhetoric and, even more, exaggerates the influence of his rhetoric. Bush’s accomplishments as Commander in Chief during the Gulf War were enormous, but his rhetorical powers of persuasion were not foremost among them. For all of his mastery in commanding the military and leading the coalition, the President was distinctly not a master of rhetoric. It is a real stretch to say that the public formed its view of the conflict largely based on Bush’s rhetoric. Moreover, by any standard of a democracy at war, the rhetoric of this conflict was not particularly crusading. Indeed, it was characterized at least as much by emphasis on limited goals as by emphasis on the morality of the cause for which we were fighting.

It became almost a cliché even before the war to criticize President Bush for “demonizing” Saddam Hussein and “overpersonalizing” the conflict. But it was Saddam Hussein’s actions much more than the President’s rhetoric that damned him in the eyes of Americans. That demonic quality became even more clear in the wake of the war, with the terrible environmental destruction he visited on Kuwait, his horrendous attacks on Iraq’s Kurdish and Shia populations, revelations about the extent of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, and Saddam’s defiance of U.N. inspections. It was these things, and not earlier Presidential rhetoric, that caused the public to ask what the war had accomplished if Saddam Hussein remained in power, even as the administration attempted rhetorically to downplay his importance.

In this respect, the problem arose more from the spectacular ease of the victory than from the President’s alleged rhetorical excess. Having achieved so much at a relatively low cost, many Americans began to assume that we could have had more simply for the taking.

But there is also a failure to fully understand what the war did accomplish. By and large, wars are not constructive acts and are best judged by what they prevent rather than by what they accomplish. The Gulf War prevented something truly terrible, as we now know even more clearly from post-war revelations about Saddam’s nuclear program. It seems virtually certain that—if this program had not been stopped—he would have controlled the entire Arabian peninsula and would have turned his nuclear arsenal against either Iran or Israel, if not both countries in succession. To have prevented a nuclear war by a tyrant in control of most of the energy supplies that are the lifeblood of the industrialized democracies of the world was no mean accomplishment. By that measure, the Persian Gulf War achieved a great deal and the sacrifices of those who fought it have a much larger meaning. Perhaps that is what Atkinson has in mind when he closes his account by stating that the war was neither the “greatest moral challenge” since 1945—as Bush had claimed—nor a “pointless exercise in gunboat diplomacy” as some critics saw it, but rather that “the truth lay somewhere on the high middle ground awaiting discovery.”
the previous reviewer, Dr. Wolfowitz, commented on) with material from published and unpublished secondary sources and occasionally with documentation. In addition to Woodward’s *The Commanders* and autobiographies by both Generals Schwarzkopf and de la Billière, Atkinson has made extensive use of the *Department of Defense’s Conduct of the Persian Gulf War* and two other official histories, the Air Force’s *Gulf War Air Power Survey* and the draft of the *Army’s Certain Victory*. In all three accounts teams of authors pored over mountains of documents that would have been impossible for any one person to read in the two years Atkinson spent researching *Crusade*. It does appear from the notes, however, that Atkinson has at least reviewed enough documentary material to have seen the tip of the evidentiary iceberg.

Atkinson devotes the first half of *Crusade* to examining the personalities and salient events of the air campaign that comprised the first 39 days of Desert Storm. His focus is largely on how Lieutenant General Charles Horner, the CENTCOM air component commander, and his planner, Brigadier General Buster Glosson, dominated every aspect of the operation and managed until the last two weeks to deflect attempts to shift resources away from the strategic air campaign against Baghdad and central Iraq.

The book refers in glowing terms to Colonel John Warden of the Air Staff’s Checkmate division in the Pentagon. He praises Warden as the principal architect of the air war; but in truth, Warden was one of several fathers of the final air plan. Following the operational philosophy put forth in his own book, *Air Campaign*, Warden and his staff did produce Instant Thunder, a plan to destroy 84 strategic targets in six days in response to a request from the CINC for a campaign to punish Iraq if its troops invaded Saudi Arabia. Schwarzkopf later decided to make Instant Thunder the first of a four phase battle plan to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait. After Warden briefed Horner and Glosson on the plan in August, Glosson and his team in the “Black Hole” spent the next few months expanding the strategic phase and developing three other phases: air superiority in the Kuwaiti theater of operations, preparation of the battlefield, and close air support of the ground campaign. By means of a daily secure-line phone call to Rear Admiral Mike McConnell (the Chairman’s intelligence advisor who coordinated with the Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Intelligence Agency), Glosson got substantial targeting data that became part of the mature plan. The plan eventually included 600 targets, half of which would be struck in a war that lasted six weeks instead of six days.
Overall Atkinson offers a balanced summary judgment of the impact of the air war on the campaign, including the fact that while stealth and laser-guided munitions greatly enhanced lethality they didn’t negate the need for both traditional weapons and ground forces to finish the campaign. To illustrate the point he writes that, during the first five days, the vaunted F-117A successfully struck 46 percent of their targets, missing the rest because of some common bugaboos such as pilot error, malfunctions, and poor weather. Atkinson cites himself and another journalist as the source of this statistic which, if correct, still reflects phenomenal accuracy. According to the Gulf War Air Power Survey, “the F-117 alone, with two percent of the total attack sorties, struck nearly forty percent of the strategic targets and remained the centerpiece of the strategic air campaign.”

When he argues that the strategic campaign wasn’t critical to the coalition’s ultimate success Atkinson is on far shakier ground. A closer look at the evidence including the Gulf War Air Power Survey reveals a contrary view, namely, that allied air supremacy and the resulting six-week period of uninterrupted bombing frequently disrupted Iraqi command and control, paralyzed a good part of Iraqi efforts to supply front line troops, and deprived Iraqi intelligence of aerial reconnaissance.

Owing to the absence of strategic or tactical intelligence, neither the Iraqi general staff nor the field commanders detected the repositioning of hundreds of thousands of coalition troops to execute the decisive envelopment. On the other hand, Atkinson is correct in stating that the 22,000 airstrikes used to prepare the battlefield were effective. They battered and demoralized the front lines of Iraqi defenders and enabled the allies to move north in force before the commanders of enemy armored divisions could effectively organize their still potent forces in an effective defense.

In Crusade Atkinson initially describes General Powell as a talented officer who “managed the Schwarzkopf account” and picked up “broken crockery” left by a volatile theater commander. Powell insisted that Lieutenant General Calvin Waller join Schwarzkopf as Deputy CINC to assist and calm the “bear.” In Desert Storm Powell did far more. According to Atkinson’s account, Powell routinely played George Marshall—the commander’s commander—to Schwarzkopf’s Dwight Eisenhower. When F-117s bombed the military intelligence command bunker at Al Firdos on February 13, 1991, inadvertently killing over 200 civilians, Powell insisted that the Joint Staff review all future strategic targets. He also supported ground force commanders when they called for a shift of sorties away from Baghdad to the Saddam Hussein line in southern Kuwait. The Chairman played a critical role in resolving a dispute over battle damage assessment that threatened to delay the start of the ground war. Powell convinced his political superiors that the higher rates of attrition claimed by Schwarzkopf’s headquarters were probably more accurate than the lower rates shown by satellite imagery.

Based on Atkinson’s interviews we learn, in gossipy detail, that Powell’s deft handling of Schwarzkopf was not mirrored by the CINC’s treatment of his ground force commanders, notably Lieutenant Generals John Yeosock and Fred Franks. Atkinson takes pains to depict Schwarzkopf as overbearing and the sole cause of friction both within and between headquarters. However, that is only part of the story and Atkinson fails to address the institutional factors. Early in Desert Shield Schwarzkopf designated himself, not Yeosock, supreme land force commander. Perhaps to contain possible interservice resentment over a theater headquarters that was top heavy with Army generals, Schwarzkopf thought it prudent not to have a third Army general occupy a top post in CENTCOM. This unintentionally turned Yeosock’s headquarters into an unwanted filter between the CINC and his field forces. Also, impatient with Yeosock’s methodical style, Schwarzkopf often bypassed him and dealt directly with the corps commanders.

From the moment Franks arrived in Saudi Arabia, if not before, Schwarzkopf took an immediate dislike to the man. Atkinson says that Schwarzkopf privately dismissed Franks as a pedant with an ability to mask battlefield timidity with verbose and theoretical lectures on tactics and operational maneuvering. On G-Day, after ordering Franks to move his attack forward by 15 hours, Schwarzkopf fumed over the slow pace of the armored corps, especially when contrasted with the progress of XVIII Corps, the Marines, and the Arab corps. Atkinson defends Franks as commander of the principal attack on four counts: he had the largest corps, his divisions needed to stop frequently to refuel their M1A1 tanks, he had to wheel his corps around a potent force of Iraqi armor, and he had to assure that division movements were synchronized to avoid fratricide and to clench the fix to smash the Republican Guard. Moreover, Franks alone can’t be blamed for failing to encircle the Republican Guard. Schwarzkopf halted the advance of the 24th Division. Yeosock couldn’t coordinate attacks by XVIII and VII Corps across the rear of the Republican Guard in time. Similarly, owing to the fog of war, Franks shouldn’t be blamed for Schwarzkopf’s mistaken assumption on the final day of the war that Franks’ troops physically controlled Safwan, the Iraqi airfield which had been chosen for the ceasefire talks.

In Crusade the great classic of military history as claimed on the dust jacket, or a gossipy account of the names and faces in the news? The answer, like Atkinson’s appraisal of the overall significance of the Per-
sian Gulf War itself, lies somewhere on the “high middle ground.” Perhaps the greatest fault of Crusade is an overemphasis on Schwarzkopf’s personality, especially his famous temper. Atkinson blames Schwarzkopf for many of the problems and setbacks during the war. But as Clausewitz has noted such things are part of the friction found in every war. Two British observers, General Sir Peter de la Billière and the distinguished military historian John Keegan, have reminded us that it is often desirable for a commander to focus the attention of his subordinates on orders rather than to allow them to dwell on the enemy. Schwarzkopf’s temper notwithstanding, the Gulf War was in military terms—from the magnitude of the enemy’s defeat to the exceedingly low level of allied casualties—a triumph of joint and combined warfare.

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The back cover displays the flag of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is medium blue and white—also the colors of the flags of both the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense—with an American eagle holding three crossed gold arrows to represent the Army, Navy, and Air Force and a shield with 13 red and white stripes. It was made for General Omar N. Bradley, USA, when he became the first CJCS in August 1949. After being promoted to five-star rank in September 1956, Bradley indicated that he did not think another flag was needed since it represented the position of CJCS, not the rank of the incumbent. The Secretary of Defense acceded to this wish of General of the Army Bradley and consequently a five-star CJCS flag was never designed.