Call for Entries for the annual Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition

Who’s Eligible: You, the military or civilian student—including international students—of a U.S. senior war college, staff college, or advanced warfighting school, or a Service research fellow.

What: Research and write an essay, with options to write a concise opinion piece (1,500 words max) or a fully detailed and documented research paper (5,000 words max). Must be original research or informed commentary, unclassified, and submitted via your college. May relate to a course writing requirement. Not a school solution—but an innovative, imaginative approach to a national security-related issue of your choosing.

When: Late April (exact date to be announced via the Web site—see below) is the deadline for schools to submit entries to NDU Press. It is strongly recommended you begin your planning and research the previous fall in order to incorporate your academic research and to allow time for your school to evaluate and select nominations for the contests. To keep the competition manageable, slots are limited for each school.

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www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/NDUPress_SECDEFEC.htm
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Inside
Issue 53, 2 d Quarter 2009

Department of Defense - Department of State Areas of Responsibility

Every 2 years the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required by law to review the missions, responsibilities, and geographical boundaries of each combatant command in the U.S. military and present to the President, through the Secretary of Defense, any changes that he deems necessary. The review process includes combatant commanders, the Joint Staff, and the Department of Defense (DoD) leadership.

DOD Unified Command Plan 2008 is a key strategic document that established the missions, responsibilities, and geographical boundaries of each combatant command in the U.S. military. It was signed December 17, 2007.

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The review process includes combatant commanders, the Joint Staff, and the Department of Defense (DoD) leadership.
The use of military means to achieve political ends evokes a thread of a rich discussion, one that reaches back through the ages. It was certainly so even in the winter of 1775, as Edmund Burke spoke on the floor of Parliament, at a time when England decided to send an army and a navy to put down the American rebellion.

Although Burke wasn’t exactly espousing our independence in his speech, he did question his government’s reliance upon military force in preventing it:

*Those who wield the thunder of the state may have more confidence in the efficacy of arms. But... my opinion is much more in favor of prudent management than of force; considering force not as an odious, but a feeble instrument in preserving a people as spirited as this.*

So I can only imagine Burke’s surprise—if he were alive today—to hear our Secretary of Defense calling for more assets for the Foreign Service, U.S. Agency for International Development, Departments of Agriculture, Justice, and Commerce, and other non-uniformed implements of power and influence. Surprise as well, perhaps, to hear someone wearing the uniform, telling you the same thing—much as I did back in 2005, as the head of our Navy.

My profession has taken me in and around countries all over the world, where I learned the critical value of great Ambassadors and a great Country Team, a team that is inclusive of so many of our Federal agencies—and in that teamwork, the possibilities were, and are, endless.

There is no question that we need a whole-of-government approach to solving modern problems, and we need to reallocate roles and resources in a way that places our military as an equal among many in government—as an enabler, a true partner. On those points, I think most people already agree. But I think it’s worth thinking about what we can do about it.

First, when asking why our instruments of national power may be unbalanced, we, the ones wearing uniforms, need to look in the mirror. Yes, our military is flexible. Well funded. Designed to take risk. We respond well to orders from civilian authorities. It’s what we do. It’s in our DNA. And so, when we are willing to pitch in, as we usually are, we tend to receive more resources. And then get asked to do more. And so on.

I believe we should be more willing to break this cycle, and say when our Armed Forces may not always be the best choice to take the lead. We must be just as bold in providing options when they don’t involve our participation or our leadership, or even when those options aren’t popular—especially when they are not popular.

Although there are many situations where we should not take the lead—in most cases, we could be one great supporting
And in my travels here at home, as I meet with young people, Servicemembers and civilians alike, I sense a hunger for the opportunity, and the dignity, of public service.

I believe we have a great opportunity, right now, to seize this moment in history, by enabling all aspects of our power and influence, as a force for peace by fully leveraging the spirit and diverse talents of all Americans, by empowering them to go out and make a difference—whether they wear a uniform or not.

Sometimes, we have to be brave enough not to lead.

MICHAEL G. MULLEN
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Because options without resources aren’t options at all—especially in times of crisis. And our diversity of engagement and response can suffer as a result. We must also acknowledge that it would be a crime to waste the precious resource of experience our military has gained while executing elements of foreign policy throughout the world.

There truly are no more expensive lessons than these, as the families of our wounded and fallen know all too well.

We must expand our interaction with other departments and agencies, conveying those lessons through training and consultation where and when needed.

Finally, there is a great deal for us in the military to learn about, and from, what many of us call the “interagency”—not just at the senior levels, but also throughout our entire institution.

Too often, we in the Pentagon talk about the “interagency” as if it were some alien being. That’s a bit unkind, because if we are truly to cut oxygen from the fire of violent extremism, we must leverage every single aspect of national power—soft and hard.

The way we approach these issues is critical; it requires a comprehensive approach, from diplomacy, to foreign assistance and aid, to building partnerships—an approach both informed and sustained by the capabilities of the whole of our government.

As Henry Kissinger once wrote, “Diplomacy is the art of restraining the exercise of power.” When called, our military has served the role of ambassador extremely well. But our most effective ambassadors of peace in the future will not be those who wear uniforms or bear arms. They will be our civilians. And the Nation’s greatest strength, at home and abroad, is not the arms we bear, but the example we set, the values we share. It is our citizenny. I think Edmund Burke, gazing at America from across the ocean, would have agreed.

Today, in my travels abroad, I hear one message that rings clear: Most of the world wants a stronger relationship, and a deeper mutual understanding, with the United States. Americans, by empowering them to go out and make a difference—whether they wear a uniform or not.

Sometimes, we have to be brave enough not to lead.

MICHAEL G. MULLEN
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
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About the Covers

Front cover shows sunrise view from Space Shuttle Discovery on departure from International Space Station (NASA Human Spaceflight Collection). Table of contents (left to right): Indian Air Force Su-30 lands at Nellis Air Force Base for India's first-ever participation in Red Flag exercise (U.S. Air Force/Larry Reid, Jr.); U.S. Army Civil Affairs officer briefs Iraqi soldiers before mission in Basra (U.S. Army/Karah Cohen); U.S. Marines with 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit and Afghan National Security Force soldiers exchange congratulations after successful mission (24th MEU/Andrew J. Carlson); and U.S. and Iraqi soldiers search for suspected militia members (982nd Combat Camera Company/Rob Summit). Back cover (top to bottom): Marines deploy MK-154 mine clearance launcher during assault course training at Twentynine Palms (U.S. Marine Corps/Kelsey J. Green); Italian peacekeeper patrols "Blue Line" demarcating border of Lebanon and Israel (United Nations/Enkinder Debebe); Soldier teaches Afghan National Police during 3-day training course (U.S. Air Force/April Lapetoda); and U.S. and Iraqi soldiers move toward cover during firefight with insurgents (U.S. Air Force/Stacy L. Pearse).
Open Letter to JFQ Readers

JFQ seeks the assistance of its readership in exploring new ideas in force modernization, technology, and innovation. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has recently observed that it may be time to more carefully review the planned weapons programs of the individual Services to reduce costly, duplicative efforts: “We may have to invest more in the future-oriented program of one Service and less in that of another Service—particularly when both programs were conceived with the same threat in mind.” As the economic crisis makes the problem even more acute, striking the right balance between force modernization and recapitalization will provoke intense debate, especially as it occurs against the backdrop of emerging technologies and unforeseen national security developments.

JFQ encourages you to submit manuscripts that speak to these issues in addition to your unique professional strengths and interests. Boldly challenge traditional thought and practices in the joint, interagency, national security community, and propose a new school solution!

JFQ would also like to solicit manuscripts on specific subject areas in concert with future thematic focuses. The following topics are tied to submission deadlines for upcoming issues:

- **June 1, 2009**

- **September 1, 2009**
  - (Issue 56, 1st quarter 2010): Irregular Warfare, U.S. Special Operations

- **December 1, 2009**
  - (Issue 57, 2nd quarter 2010): The Expeditionary Interagency

- **March 1, 2010**
  - (Issue 58, 3rd quarter 2010): Strategy and Strategists

JFQ readers are typically subject matter experts who can take an issue or debate to the next level of application or utility. Quality manuscripts harbor the potential to save money and lives. When framing your argument, please focus on the *So what?* question. That is, how does your research, experience, or critical analysis improve the reader’s professional understanding or performance? Speak to the implications from the operational to the strategic level of influence and tailor the message for an interagency readership without using acronyms or jargon. Also, write prose, not terse bullets. Even the most prosaic doctrinal debate can be interesting if presented with care! Visit ndupress.ndu.edu to view our NDU Press Submission Guidelines. Share your professional insights and improve national security.

Colonel David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.)
Editor, Joint Force Quarterly
Gurneyd@ndu.edu
LETTER

To the Editor— I very much appreciate the spirited debate within the U.S. Army engendered by Colonel Gian Gentile’s writings, particularly “Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars” (Joint Force Quarterly 52, 1st Quarter 2009). Finding the appropriate balance between stability and combat operations is one of the most critical questions facing the U.S. Armed Forces, and Colonel Gentile has played an important role in that discussion. Unfortunately, he misrepresents my argument regarding the challenges facing the Armed Forces in one significant way. Colonel Gentile states that “John Nagl . . . is so cocksure of the efficacy of Army combat power that he believes it will have the ability not only to dominate land operations in general but to ‘change entire societies’” (28).

Colonel Gentile selected the quoted material out of context from my review essay, published by the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute in April 2008, on Brian Macallister Linn’s excellent book The Echo of Battle. In that review, I argue that:

**victory in the Long War requires the strengthening of literally dozens of governments afflicted by insurgents who are radicalized by hatred and inspired by fear. The soldiers who win these wars require not just an ability to dominate land operations, but to change entire societies—and not all of those soldiers will wear uniforms, or work for the Department of Defense.**

Those familiar with this context will recognize the metaphorical use of the term soldier as part of an argument to build interagency capability to conduct counterinsurgency more effectively. Winning the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the longer war against radical Islamic extremism, will require significant changes in the societies that engendered them. Although I have enormous faith in the capability of the U.S. Army, I think it needs help to perform a task of this magnitude. Success in the Long War depends on an effective counterinsurgency capability that can facilitate and coordinate the development of host nation security capacity, good governance, and economic growth under wartime conditions. Although the Army is currently performing all three of these tasks, they are more properly the purview of other agencies of the U.S. Government. Thus, I have advocated significant increases in the resources devoted to the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture, as well as the recreation of the United States Information Agency. A task force of these 21st-century warriors is required to win today’s wars, and tomorrow’s.

Some serious thinkers now suggest that the United States cannot afford to engage in nationbuilding or that it cannot succeed. I believe otherwise. Americans demonstrated in the Philippines at the turn of the last century, under General Creighton Abrams during the later years of the Vietnam conflict, and in our most recent operations in Iraq that we can help rebuild societies with some degree of success. The task is enormously difficult, but its completion will allow the United States and its allies to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan, leaving behind governments that are sovereign within their borders and do not provide a safe haven for terror. This mission is vital; as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has noted, “the most likely catastrophic threats to our homeland—for example, an American city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack—are more likely to emanate from failing states than from aggressor states” (JFQ 52, 3).

The most important responsibility of a state is the protection of its citizens from harm. Our national security apparatus failed us on September 11, and our Army was unprepared for the kinds of wars that resulted. It is the responsibility of national security professionals to learn from those mistakes and vow never to allow our Army and our nation to be unprepared again.

—John A. Nagl
LTC (Ret.), U.S. Army
Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security
Washington, DC
Executive Summary

The first duty of the grand strategist is . . . to appreciate the commercial and financial position of his country; to discover what its resources and liabilities are. Secondly, he must understand the moral characteristics of his countrymen, their history, peculiarities, social customs and systems of government, for all these quantities and qualities form the pillars of the military arch which it is his duty to construct.

—J.F.C. Fuller

Since the November 2008 election in the United States, a great deal of ink has been spilled over grand strategy, the process by which all instruments of national power are orchestrated to realize the policy of the United States in a dynamic global competition of state and nonstate actors. A successful grand strategy must assign roles and missions, determine methods to make these assignments mutually supporting, and identify areas of potential conflict and cooperation, both domestic (interagency) and with foreign allies and other partners. Beyond executing military operations and strategies, joint service professionals play an important role in providing advice to policymakers; contributing to a grand strategy that connects ends, ways, and means; and supporting other federal agencies as they bring to bear diplomatic, informational, and economic support strategies of their own. To do this effectively, an understanding of the global environment of competition and cooperation is indispensable. In this issue, Joint Force Quarterly explores important contextual elements against which the U.S. grand strategy is devised, restrained, and inevitably revised.

The Forum begins with current trends in the economic dimension of national power, with detailead essays by Ellen Frost, William Overholt, and James Lacey and David Asher addressing this most puissant and fundamental instrument of power from a broad strategic perspective. The key theme of this survey is the global redistribution of economic power, a power that can be thought of as the ability to resist external control or influence. Just as globalization has altered the content of economic power, so has it limited the sovereignty associated with it. Despite the fact that Asian countries now hold roughly two-thirds of the world’s foreign exchange reserves, the majority of it is denominated in dollars, and consequently these governments have a large financial and commercial stake in the health of the American economy. Nevertheless, huge trade and budget deficits, heavy dependence on imported oil, record-high consumer debt, and rising levels of protectionism undermine U.S. influence abroad. Sustained economic power is at the root of sustainable military power. Strategic planners need to overcome stovepipe thinking that consigns economic and security issues to different mental boxes. Global economic trends must be understood and incorporated as a core element of strategic analysis. As Cicero pointed out some 2,000 years ago, the key to success in war is “endless streams of money.”

In our second Forum installment, Michael Moodie extrapolates conflict trends by addressing three dimensions: the nature of conflict, why conflict occurs, and how conflict is waged. Major power competition has a military dimension, even if it is not prominent at the moment. Future conflicts between states are less likely to be motivated by political ideology than they are by the age-old goal of control—of territory, resources, or political, economic, and social power. Conflicts are increasingly between “communities” that are defined by ethnicity, religion, language, or some self-defined criteria. The characteristics of these community conflicts are that they involve failed or failing states, they do not involve classic military confrontations, they are hard to end, and they are localized. Many contemporary conflicts are made possible by the exploitation of illicit activities that involve what some analysts call “dark networks.” Such networks facilitate conflict in two ways. First, they provide a source of income that funds both acquisitions and operations. Second, they provide operational support, such as exploitation of a globalized financial system to manage monetary assets. Mr. Moodie concludes with the prediction that most future conflicts will not be America’s wars or even America’s conflicts. The U.S. military response to these future conflicts shall require careful calibration.

The third Forum entry calls for an “all-of-society” response to transnational movements and terrorism. After identifying Salafi jihadism as the most prominent threat, within which al Qaeda is the standard bearer, Mark Stout, Thomas Lynch, and T.X. Hammes compare its strengths and weaknesses, trends and goals. Ultimately, the objective is to see the West evacuate the Muslim world as a step toward toppling corrupt regimes and hastening the beginning of the caliphate. In organizational and strategic terms, al Qaeda has suffered substantial setbacks in recent years, but it is adaptable. In alliance with young and highly militant Pakistani-Pashtun collaborators, al Qaeda has overthrown most of the tribal elder system in western Pakistan and embarrassed the Pakistani military. It has tried to formalize relationships with all forms of regional Salafi jihadist and insurgent activity and to extend access to underdeveloped recruiting networks in North Africa and Western Europe. Salafi jihadism remains dangerous. It is irregular in nature, but easy to understand because it is an open mass movement with universal aspirations. The key issue for developing all-of-society defenses against various threats is developing the rule sets that allow all elements of society to participate without having any specific individual or agency in command.
In our fourth installment, Craig Deare calls attention to an area of responsibility that has suffered significant opportunity costs since the beginning of the war on terror. He begins by outlining the reasons why the quality and level of Department of Defense engagement with the nations of the Western Hemisphere have been suboptimal and observes that Latin American security elites see nontraditional, transnational, and other than state-on-state aggression as the most pressing dangers they face. The author takes the reader on a tour of priority countries before outlining the factors that have contributed to U.S. inattention. The second half of the essay is dedicated to thoughts and recommendations to remedy the cumulative effect of many years of inattention or disinterest by the U.S. Government. Perhaps most interesting of these is yet another call for the merger of U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command. While the author advocates improved U.S. defense policy and hemispheric interaction, he makes it clear that this must be done as a subset of larger U.S. foreign policy interests.

The fifth essay takes us to the other hemisphere and examines how nuclear weapons shape alternate futures. Michael Krepon looks initially at nuclear shocks globally and then narrows his focus to shocks and trends in South Asia specifically. Speaking to the former, he identifies the events and drivers for a negative nuclear future, giving special attention to a breakdown and radical change of governance within Pakistan. Pakistan has managed to hold together despite its many weaknesses, and the population has demonstrated forbearance in the face of persistent misrule. While many analysts fear that it could suffer a massive internal upheaval reminiscent of the Iranian revolution, outsiders are poorly situated to track bottom-up changes in Pakistani society. The author addresses five dominant trends in the security calculus on the subcontinent that, while not irreversible, would be difficult to alter. He follows these with influencing factors that could reinforce both positive and negative trend lines. Four shocks, wild cards, and game changers are explored that could significantly accentuate or shift dominant trends in either a positive or negative direction. The policy consequences of this analysis lead Krepon to recommend improved military-to-military ties with both India and Pakistan that include training exercises and arms sales. The primary focus of military assistance to Pakistan should be internal security and counterterrorism programs.

The Forum concludes with a rather pessimistic analysis of demographic trends within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the implications for the transatlantic relationship in the years ahead. Jeffrey Simon explains that when the Cold War ended in 1989–1990, NATO’s European Allies had roughly 60 percent more military personnel than the United States. Today, however, there is near parity between the United States and its European Allies, each with approximately 1,400,000 professional troops. As European militaries have transitioned to smaller, all-volunteer forces concentrated in fewer garrisons, their political importance has eroded, budgets have declined, and the willingness of elites to deploy them has diminished. Declining European population trends are forcing lower enlistment standards and making it difficult to modernize these smaller forces. Muslim immigration has contributed to an increasing European focus on internal security (rather than defense) and will impact Europe’s overall political relations with the Islamic world. Dr. Simon predicts that if NATO still exists in 2050, Europe’s demographic marginalization and diminishing social, economic, and political weight will ensure that it will no longer be the center of the world or of U.S. attention. If in fact NATO’s Article 5 has less relevance in a 21st-century world, and if internal security concerns are becoming more pertinent to Europe than external defense, NATO’s overriding task should be to identify what transatlantic interests remain and how to act with common purpose in light of them. It is hard to see how demography will not prove to be NATO’s Achilles’ heel.

In support of our Forum theme, the back cover of this issue folds out to reveal a modified geographic combatant command map similar to the one published in the new Unified Command Plan. The current U.S. Department of State Regional Bureaus have been overlaid for the convenience of strategic planners in both departments. Please go to our Web site to download a high-density electronic version for local reproduction. For readers in search of additional global strategic analysis to support their appreciation of contextual issues, two of National Defense University’s research centers are producing volumes to meet precisely this need. The first is Global Strategic Assessment 2009: America’s Security Role in a Changing World, edited by Patrick Cronin and produced by the Institute for National Strategic Studies. The second is Fighting Chance: Global Trends and Shocks in the National Security Environment, edited by Neyla Arnas and produced by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. JFQ

—D.H. Gurney
Economic power is the bedrock of sustainable military and political power. The severity and expected duration of the financial crisis that gripped the world in 2008 make it all the more imperative to understand the national security implications of U.S. and global economic trends. The following collection of three short articles focuses on selected economic issues from a broad strategic perspective. The topics are diverse, but together they illustrate a key theme: the global redistribution of power.
What Is Economic Power?

There is general agreement that in the 21st century, economic power is an important strategic asset. But what is economic power? How is it changing? And how can it be measured?

Economic power can be broadly defined as the ability to control or influence the behavior of others through the deliberate and politically motivated use of economic assets. National economic power implies that a government is in a position to use, offer, or withhold such assets even when they are in private hands (for example, by mandating trade embargoes or imposing controls on exports to targeted countries). In fact, the exercise of economic power may well have economic costs because almost by definition it entails interfering with decisions made for economic reasons.

Economic power can also be thought of as the ability to resist external control or influence because dependence on external suppliers is sufficiently diverse to preclude vulnerability to outside pressure. The United States, for instance, imports about two-thirds of its oil from foreign sources and is thus vulnerable to outside pressure. The United States were to significantly reduce their dependence on foreign oil and become more self-sufficient, some countries will be more self-sufficient than others, but none will be completely self-sufficient in all sectors.

National economic power has often been used to punish other governments. Whenever another government behaves in a way that violates international norms, a common U.S. response is a call for economic sanctions. Certain “smart sanctions”—such as denying U.S visas to family members of dictators and freezing their bank accounts—may have some effect. But efforts to apply trade embargoes and other forms of economic coercion to influence another country’s political or military behavior fail more often than not, especially when the targeted regime perceives that the reforms sought by the outside world threaten its survival. Worse still, economic sanctions often end up enriching elites, who have ready access to the black market, and impoverishing everybody else.

Globalization and Economic Power.

Throughout much of recorded history, the assets associated with economic power consisted primarily of land, natural resources, and the ability to spend more than one’s adversarities on weapons and wars. In a global economy, these elements, while still important, contribute less to overall economic power than what societies and governments can create for themselves: sound financial and macroeconomic policies, an educated and adaptable workforce, market-based competition, a supportive infrastructure (including transportation, communications, and energy distribution), and a stable and welcoming investment climate backed by good governance and predictable rules.

These self-created assets virtually guarantee a competitive niche in the global economy and a greater degree of poverty than would otherwise be the case (North Korea is a perfect example). If market forces are allowed to operate, some countries will be more self-sufficient than others, but none will be completely self-sufficient in all sectors.

Dr. Ellen L. Frost is an Adjunct Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and a Visiting Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
in another. But thanks to the revolutions in transportation and information technology, most of the world’s biggest companies now operate in numerous countries. Although the components of a product may come from multiple sources, that product’s label usually records only the point of final assembly and shipment. Interdependence also characterizes the operation of international financial markets. The first decade of the 21st century has witnessed a major shift in financial power from the West to other parts of the world, particularly Asia. Countries in the region hold roughly two-thirds of the world’s foreign exchange reserves. Well over half of those reserves are denominated in dollars, and much of that is recycled back into the U.S. economy. Foreign governments therefore have a large financial as well as a commercial stake in the health of the American economy.

Security ties help to explain the continuing predominance of the U.S. dollar as a major reserve currency. Other governments’ decisions to accumulate dollar reserves and to link the management of their currencies to the movement of the dollar rest in part on the belief that the United States remains the predominant, if not the sole, provider of security. They watched in dismay as the fall in the value of the dollar caused the value of their dollar-denominated assets to tumble. In the future, their mix of reserve currencies may well continue to shift toward the euro and the yen. Nevertheless, security ties with Washington will likely prevent them from tilting too far in this direction.

What governments can do to exercise financial power is extremely limited compared to the burgeoning size, speed, and pace of innovation in private capital markets. In the past, finance more or less followed trade flows, but financial flows now occupy a separate and ever-expanding universe. Private capital resources dwarf anything that governments and international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can provide. Governments with sufficiently good credit ratings prefer to borrow from private sources, thus avoiding the politically onerous conditions often placed on support packages negotiated with the IMF or the World Bank.

Financial flows provide needed liquidity (ready cash) to international markets, but they can be extremely destabilizing. As Asians learned in the financial crisis of 1997–1998, the sudden withdrawal of private capital can topple governments and send economies reeling. The proportion of Indonesians living in absolute poverty, for example, doubled almost overnight, from 13 to 26 percent. The credit crisis of 2008 stemmed from risky behavior on Wall Street, but stock markets around the world plunged.

Measuring Economic Power. The national security implications of economic power transcend the ability to finance a higher defense budget and field expensive weaponry. Signs that a country is on the road to economic power include a strong and stable currency, adequate foreign exchange reserves, inflows of foreign investment, rising productivity, manageable inflation, and a declining level of poverty. Other indicators reflect the degree of urbanization, levels of education, social indicators such as life expectancy, and others. All of these can be measured.

The most common indicator of economic power is the size of a country’s gross domestic product (GDP), defined as the sum of consumption, gross investment, government spending, and exports, or alternatively, as the sum of all goods and services produced in a given year. GDP is calculated in two ways: by measuring output in terms of prevailing exchange rates, or by calculating the purchasing power parity of each currency relative to some standard (usually the U.S. dollar). To simplify, one measures how much a nation’s output is worth abroad (usually in dollars), and the other measures how much people in one country have to pay for a given basket of goods compared to the price in other countries.

The rate of GDP growth is also a key measurement. As a general rule, developing countries grow faster than highly industrialized ones, provided they have reasonably good economic policies and a functioning government.

GDP per capita is also widely used. Economists have predicted that several decades from now, China’s GDP will surpass that of the United States. This achievement certainly signifies China’s growing economic power. But because of its huge population, when this threshold is crossed China’s GDP per capita will likely be only about one-quarter to one-third of the U.S. level. Which figure matters more to perceptions of economic power? The answer will vary according to the values and goals of the observer.

Several yardsticks have been developed to measure various other contributors to economic power, such as market-oriented policies and low levels of corruption. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report measures “the productive potential of nations.” Top marks in 2007 went to Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden, while China weighed in at 34th and India 48th out of 131 countries polled. The International Finance Corporation’s 2007 report on the ease or difficulty of doing business abroad names Singapore, New Zealand, and the United States as the top 3 among the 181 economies that were ranked, with Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo bringing up the rear; China and India are ranked 83rd and 120th, respectively. Another index, produced by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, measures “economic freedom”: top winners in 2008 are Hong Kong and Singapore, with the United States ranked fifth.

Good governance is a key pillar of durable economic power. Politicians who demand huge bribes and send millions of dollars to foreign bank accounts stunt their countries’ development in multiple ways. An index developed by Transparency International measures perceptions of corruption. Based on a scale of 1 to 10 (10 means least corrupt), top prizes in 2007 went to the Nordic countries, New Zealand, and Singapore. The United States trails at 7.2 points, and China and India are tied at 3.5.

Concern for the environment has given rise to several indices of “sustainability.” The idea here is not only that the environment should be protected, but also that GDP growth will falter if a government depletes its natural resources and sickens its people.

Small countries may get high marks in these various contests, but size matters.
It used to be said, for example, that a large population of poor people was a liability. But as markets grow, large numbers of people who are eager for jobs, education, and training are now seen as an asset. From this perspective, China, India, the United States, Russia, and Indonesia all carry economic weight no matter what they do.

Finally, two related elements of economic power are popularity and prestige. If a given country is highly anti-American, resistance to U.S. economic power will be stronger. A trade minister from a country whose press spews forth daily attacks on the United States will have less freedom to make trade “concessions” than a trade minister from a country where the United States is admired and liked.

Prestige has been a longstanding American asset. Thanks to its huge market, skilled manpower, and ever-growing stock of leading-edge technology, the United States is still an economic powerhouse. But huge trade and budget deficits, heavy dependence on imported oil, record-high consumer debt, and rising levels of protectionism have tarnished America’s economic reputation and undermined U.S. influence abroad.

American prestige suffered a further blow in 2007, when the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis sent many major U.S. financial institutions to Asian banks for relief. In September 2008, the crisis ballooned. The dramatic financial crash and associated bailouts shook Wall Street to its foundations and seriously undermined America’s economic image. Although the shakeout can be seen as a healthy corrective, it has diminished America’s near-term economic power.

Economic Power and National Security Strategy. In today’s world, economic power has become largely synonymous

strategic planners must understand global economic trends and incorporate them—not as an add-on, but as a core element of their analysis

with successful engagement with the global economy. Paradoxically, the greater such engagement becomes, the more limits governments face when they contemplate using their country’s economic resources as a coercive tool to influence the behavior of other governments.

Used constructively, however, U.S. economic power bolsters Washington’s influence abroad. But sustaining such influence depends critically on sound policies at home. The risky behavior and lack of oversight that ultimately ignited the financial crash of 2008 damaged America’s relative power and influence. Restoring them requires paying heed to the old adage, “Physician, heal thyself.”

Sustained economic power is at the root of sustainable military power. Strategic planners need to overcome stovepipe thinking that consigns economic and security issues to different mental boxes. They must understand global economic trends and incorporate them—not as an add-on, but as a core element of their analysis. Drawing on this broader concept of national security, America’s elected leaders will be better equipped to make decisions about using economic power. They will also understand that America’s economic vitality, flexibility, and spirit of innovation are the true foundation of U.S. economic power, and that adopting the right mix of policies to sustain them is a national security imperative.
The Rise of the Rest

By WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT

The 1990s were marked in the West by triumphalism. The “end of history” thesis, articulated by Francis Fukuyama, argued that a combination of liberal democracy and market capitalism had become so dominant that, with communism and fascism vanquished, the Western way of governance would no longer face significant challenges. This thesis held that the West, and specifically the United States, had no effective rivals and for the indefinite future could rule at will.

Most noteworthy in the first decade of the new century, however, has been the appearance of nascent power centers outside the traditional Western sphere, especially in Asia. On balance, this is a positive trend, but it poses a long-term challenge to the U.S. global standing.

Implications. What are the implications of this new era of rapid growth in “the Rest,” especially Asia?

First, the consequences of the “Asian Miracle” have so far been extremely stabilizing. Rapid growth has stabilized the internal politics of countries from Japan to Indonesia. As late as the mid 1960s, Japan’s internal stability seemed to be in doubt. Moreover, Indonesia contained both the world’s third largest communist party and more Islamic militants than the rest of the world combined. Following a severe crackdown on the communist party in 1965, the Suharto government launched an era of rapid growth that significantly diminished political unrest in most of the country. Economic growth has also stabilized regional geopolitics. Ideological demagoguery and proselytizing have declined throughout the Asian Miracle region. The ability to achieve national prestige and influence rapidly by focusing on economic growth, together with

the costs that modern military technology imposes on any attempt to achieve those goals by military means, have led to a vast shift of strategy from geopolitical aggressiveness and territorial disputes to economic priorities.

This shift has occurred throughout the entire Asian region. South Korea moved from a failed strategy of military priorities under Syngman Rhee to a brilliantly successful economics-focused strategy under Park Chung Hee and his successors, leaving the economy of the once hapless South Korea over 22 times larger than that of its formerly superior northern rival. Other regional successes have included Indonesia, which abandoned territorial claims covering most of Southeast Asia, and China, which has settled 12 of its 14 land border disputes to the satisfaction of the other parties and which has embarked on a remarkably successful campaign of “friendship diplomacy” in order to focus on economic development. India, which has also adopted “friendship diplomacy,” shows early signs of making a similar shift, despite greater difficulty. None of the rapidly rising Asian powers has yet shown any inclination to revert to obsolete territorially focused strategies. This shift toward stability appears to belie the argument among prominent realists that rising powers are invariably disruptive. Asia’s shift to stability shows that similar economic progress could stabilize other regions.

Second, most of these great economic successes have been based on movement toward integration into the Western-style market economy and acceptance of the basic institutional arrangements the West created after World War II: relatively open trade and foreign investment, a competitive internal market, market-driven domestic pricing for most things, Western-type law, a substantial degree of freedom of inquiry, considerable freedom to travel and exchange ideas, Western-style capital markets and banking systems, and engagement with the most important Western economic institutions (notably the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization [WTO]). None of these movements is irreversible, but the dominant trends in these success stories have included rejection of autarky (Burma vs. Thailand), xenophobia (Sukarno vs. Suharto), the command economy (North Korea vs. South Korea), arbitrary personal rule (Mao Zedong vs. Hu Jintao), and other forms of behavior that are antithetical to the modern market economy.

Third, convergence in economic policy has been accompanied by some elements of convergence in systems of governance. So far, all of the fully successful industrialized Asian economies, from Japan to Indonesia, have adopted variants of democracy from fully competitive democracy (Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia) to dominant-party democracy or quasi-democracy (Japan, Malaysia, Singapore). Those in earlier stages of development have all had to accept key elements of the Western system of governance, such as some degree of freedom of inquiry, increasing transparency, Western-style legal norms, reduction of arbitrary rule, and the like. But the degree to which China and Vietnam will be compelled to

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Workers process piles of carrots in China as wholesale market price hit lowest point in 15 years

follow the paths of South Korea and Taiwan remains open to question.

Although the eventual degree of convergence remains quite controversial (can China and Russia sustain capitalist autocracies?), the degree that has already been reached constitutes a substantial triumph of Western norms. The argument can be made that, on the one hand, continued success on the part of the rising powers will require a good deal more convergence with Western political norms. On the other hand, the successful emerging economies may also develop competitive advantages that force traditional Western systems to bend some old norms. European-style pension systems and adversarial unionism are potential candidates for Darwinian decline, along with American-style lack of national infrastructure planning and low educational standards.

Finally, the balance of influence in all the major institutions of the post–World War II world—the IMF, World Bank, WTO, United Nations, and others—will have to shift; those institutions must either bend or break.

**Crucial Uncertainties.** Projecting economic growth is rife with uncertainties. A generation ago, many people believed that Japan’s continued success would make it the world’s leading economy. There are even greater uncertainties about how economic prowess will translate into geopolitical influence. A few of these uncertainties will be highlighted here.

Most obviously, both the success of the West and the rise of “the Rest” have depended on the steady progress of globalization. So long as globalization advances, the most open economies win, but by the same token, they will be the ones most damaged by a crisis of globalization. Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan would be devastated. The trend toward competing geopolitically on the basis of economic priorities rather than military ones would surely be reversed in many places. Raw materials producers would suffer severely from declining demand and radical price collapses. Financial markets would suffer catastrophic reversals, with the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom probably hurt the most. The reverse sequence is also possible: the financial crisis that exploded in the late summer and early fall of 2008 could deal a serious blow to globalization, depending on how quickly recovery proceeds and confidence in the financial system is restored.

A second great source of uncertainty is the impact of demographic differences. Many countries, including most of the rich ones, are graying, meaning that the number of productive workers is declining relative to the number of elderly retirees. In countries such as Japan, where there is resistance to immigration and radical domestic productivity reforms, graying implies relative economic, and probably geopolitical, decline. In the United States, tendencies toward graying have so far been more than offset by immigration and rising productivity.

The greatest contrast in approaches to demographic challenges is between India and China. India is betting on continued population growth to avert graying, but it has so far failed to provide the education and infrastructure to ensure that its large and youthful workforce will have the requisite ability to work competitively and productively. India’s risk is that whole population segments and geographic regions will be left out of or prove unable to cope with global competition, and that severe social unrest will ensue. An indigenous Maoist insurgency is already
taking advantage of popular disaffection in some of India’s poorest states. China, on the other hand, has recently recommitted itself to a “one-child” policy (a partial misnomer) that ensures a rapid decline in the ratio of the working population to the nonworking. China is betting that rapid progress in education, infrastructure, urbanization, and globalization, combined with a relative reduction in environmental stress, will raise productivity and offset the effects of graying. These contrasting strategies comprise one of the most consequential bets in human history and may largely determine Asia’s and the world’s future economic and geopolitical balance.

A third source of uncertainty centers on energy and food prices. The 2008 upsurge may be prolonged if demand continues to rise faster than supply, or it may prove to be a temporary phenomenon, either because supply catches up or because growth slows down. The effects will vary enormously from country to country. Moreover, the long-term consequences of sustained high prices depend heavily on whether today’s primary consumers compete destructively or, for instance, collaborate on clean coal technologies that could shift the economic and geopolitical balance away from the Middle East and toward the United States, China, and India. The world’s future economic and political balance hangs on these multiple layers of uncertainty.

Finally, climate change is another great unknown. Desertification, declining fish populations, the melting of the polar icecap, and other aspects of climate change are to the advantage of some groups economically, while giving the disadvantage to others. The “march to modernity”: free markets, science and technology, meritocracy, pragmatism, a culture of peace, the rule of law, and education.

Issues for the New Administration. The rise of new powers and the failure of others to adapt create profound challenges for the new administration. First, continuation of the virtuous circle whereby globalization creates economic takeoffs, and economic takeoffs in turn stabilize world politics, can only occur if the United States leads. But instead of celebrating their successes, Americans have fallen into a mood that assumes, falsely, that the United States cannot compete successfully against rising economic powers and that the emergence of new powers inevitably brings increased risks of violence and instability. If the current defeatism is not overcome, the United States will suffer disproportionately in any crisis of globalization. Reversing this defeatist mood will require strong, positive political leadership.

More specifically, the executive branch and Congress will have to work together to find new ways to distribute the fruits of globalization. Doing so will require major changes in tax, welfare, and education policies. There will also be a need for a Presidential campaign to educate the public about the changing global economy. The President will have to explain why Americans should welcome, rather than fear, rapid economic growth in China and India. He will need to point out, for example, that surging Asian demand for African energy and raw materials is boosting growth rates in Africa and reducing the risk that jihadism will spread throughout the continent.

Second, economic and geopolitical changes will challenge many assumptions and force many institutional changes. The governance of all major global institutions will have to be revised to accommodate the new powers. Otherwise, these institutions will become ineffective and discredited.

Third, the President will need to find ways to draw more of the Islamic world into the global economy. It was economic globalization that substantially ameliorated radical Islamism in Indonesia, Malaysia, and India.

Finally, there is no possibility that the United States will be able to extend its military dominance to every country in the world. It needs allies more than ever. But the U.S. alliance system will have to adjust to the relative decline of Japan, an important partner that in some ways is failing the test of globalization, and to the emergence of China, which is embracing globalization relatively well and which, despite its serious domestic challenges, will necessarily be a principal U.S. partner on a range of global issues.
A critical challenge for the new administration will be to reassert American leadership in the international economy and rebuild America’s financial health. Economic strength has underpinned the national power and influence of every state in history. Economic strength, in turn, is driven by a strong financial system capable of raising large amounts of capital and efficiently deploying it. No nation has long maintained its strategic or military dominance after it has ceased to be the world’s foremost financial center. If a nation allows its financial system to weaken, it undermines its economic strength, and by extension its ability to project its power and influence into the larger world.

In 1992, Clinton administration advisor James Carville said that in his next life, he wanted to come back as the bond market so he could scare everyone. His comment, although framed as a joke, was a stark admission that finance was already driving U.S. policy and that no major decision could be made without taking the reaction of the bond market into account. When Carville made his comment, global financial assets, including the market for U.S. Government debt, totaled about $42 trillion, and the combined GDP of the world was $21 trillion. If these huge numbers worried Carville in 1992, he would likely be panic-stricken to face a world where financial assets are now over $167 trillion with a global GDP of $48 trillion. These numbers represent not only huge growth in a short time, but also a divergence of the financial market from the underlying real economy.

When Ronald Reagan assumed the Presidency, global GDP and financial assets were relatively equal. By the time Bill Clinton became President, the ratio of financial assets to GDP was 2:1, and by 2008 it was closing in on 4:1. How the United States adjusts to this rapidly changing and little understood world of global finance will determine its strategic influence in the 21st century.

Unfortunately, for at least the past decade, the United States has set itself squarely on the path of wrecking the financial system that has maintained its global prominence for the past seven decades or more. Drastic action is now required to change course in time, for once economic rot sets in, it is historically very difficult to reverse. If the United States is to have any chance of doing so, policymakers must first understand how the global financial system works and how much it has changed since Carville first voiced his trepidation about the bond market.

A number of measures reveal that America’s leadership position in the international economy has gone through a remarkable period of decline over the last decade. This is best reflected by the value of the dollar, which since 2001 has depreciated by 56 percent against the euro, 30 percent against the Canadian dollar, 24 percent against the British pound, and 4 percent against the Japanese yen. Remarkably, although the trade-weighted value of the dollar against all currencies declined by over 23 percent since 2001—which should have given U.S. exporters a large competitive boost—the U.S. trade deficit nearly doubled before exports began to rise in 2008.

Likewise, the cheapening dollar is becoming progressively less attractive as a store of value for other central banks. Markets are already adjusting to the fact that a weakening dollar is being increasingly replaced as a reserve currency by a strengthening euro (see figure 1). Since the turn of the decade, reserve holdings of the dollar have fallen approximately 8 percent, while euro holdings have risen in rough proportion. Although the dollar remains the chief currency for global trade finance, this leading status has come under stress (see figure 2). Presently, the United States accounts for only 26 percent of world trade, while 56 percent of global commerce is dollar-based. This strategic advantage could dissipate if confidence in the dollar’s reliability as a storehouse of value slips further. As economist Barry Eichen green notes, “Never before have we seen the extraordinary situation where the country issuing the international currency is running a current account deficit of 6 percent of GDP. Never before have we seen the reserve currency country so deeply in debt to the rest of the world.” By 2008, that ratio had fallen to 5 percent, but unless these trends are more
substantially reversed, the dollar’s dominant position in global trade will rapidly erode.

Making matters considerably more challenging, America’s financial system and private finances have entered their darkest period in decades. In the last decade, Americans became more financially leveraged than at any time since World War II. Before the housing bubble burst in 2007, consumer and business debt had jumped by nearly 50 percent—twice the run-up experienced in the 1980s (see figure 3). Household mortgage debt accounted for the largest percentage of total private debt by far (see figure 4). In turn, the ready availability of subprime and adjustable rate mortgage financing drove a major increase in home ownership and sent property values skyrocketing. Consumers substituted these rising home values for savings, which at both the national and household levels are at 75-year lows. The ability to cash out home equity also drove a personal consumption binge of historical proportions (see figure 5). Even as the national savings rate turned negative, consumption accounted for ever greater amounts of GDP (over 71 percent in 2008). Consumption as a percentage of GDP is now 4 percent over its 25-year average, far higher than at any other point in American history.

In June 2007, the housing bubble burst. In the next 15 months, home prices fell by 7 percent nationally—the first sustained decline since the Great Depression. The housing crisis, in turn, triggered a string of bank failures. The first casualties were the large regional bank Indy Mac and the famed investment bank Bear Stearns. Unfortunately, in succeeding months, the Treasury and Federal Reserve still failed to get ahead of a crisis they hardly understood. Two U.S. Government-sanctioned institutions, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, saw their capital wiped out and had to be nationalized at a cost to the taxpayer initially estimated at over $200 billion. Even those steps did not stem the tide. In September 2008, two more large investment banks vanished, and the world’s largest insurance company was taken over by the Government. The details of the largest government-led market intervention in history were recently hammered out with Congress. As a
result of these negotiations, the U.S. Government initially announced that it would begin recapitalizing the banking system through a combination of direct capital injections ($250 billion) and purchase of certain financial instruments ($450 billion) currently sitting in banks’ books in order to set a price floor under the debt market.

In April 2008, the IMF estimated that the total cost of the U.S. subprime crisis could amount to over $1 trillion, but it is now clear that this was a lowball estimate. Worse still, the subprime blowout is buffeting other financial markets: the Standard & Poor 500 index fell to levels last seen in January 2001.

The U.S. Government can continue to backstop the market without imperiling its fiscal position, as a debt-to-GDP ratio of under 70 percent still gives financial officials some room to maneuver. It will become increasingly difficult, however, for the Government to absorb the costs of the largest financial bailout in history while dealing with slipping tax revenues, slower economic growth, and increasing public sector imbalances. It should be remembered that Japan went from having the best fiscal position in the Group of Seven (G–7) in 1990 to the worst in 2000, because, in response to its own financial and banking crisis, it mismanaged and delayed writeoffs and selloffs. Combined with the long-term funding challenges of entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare, the United States may be laying the groundwork for the emergence of an even worse financial crisis.

The implications of America’s financial distress for the world economy are consider-

able, not simply because of the role that U.S. consumers play in driving global growth, but also because the entire global financial system has become leveraged to the U.S. household sector. This situation arose largely as a result of the explosive growth in financial instruments linked or leveraged to U.S. property markets, which were marketed heavily to foreign investors by U.S. investment banks. There were myriad strategies that offered apparently low risks and high returns (but in hindsight had high risk and potentially no positive return). These included “structured investment vehicles” that many banks used as a way to earn money off their balance sheet, arbitraging their ability to plow low-cost, short-term capital into longer dated and high-yielding asset-backed securities. These worked until the market for asset-backed securities imploded.

Another supposedly low-risk investment class was in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), instruments issued by investment banks and backed by U.S. subprime loans, mortgage-backed securities, commercial mortgages, debt financing, and leveraged buyouts. Pools of CDOs were packaged into super-leveraged instruments called “CDO squared” or even “CDO cubed.” Incredibly, these CDOs were given AAA ratings by the rating agencies, which implied almost no probability of default, because investors in CDOs had taken out insurance with bond insurers. Ironically, investors would learn, when it was too late to change anything, that these insurers had inadequate capital to cover a default and would head toward bankruptcy themselves. Chasing these Ponzi-like schemes were pension funds, banks, insurance companies, and other supposedly smart institutional investors that bought into the assumption that financial risk could be largely engineered away. Many of these investors came to realize gigantic losses. Investment banks such as Citigroup, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch that were involved in selling CDOs also got clobbered. With the market for selling CDOs gone, Merrill Lynch decided in July 2008 to liquidate its mammoth unsold inventory of CDOs at 20 cents on the dollar.

The financial crisis of 2008 revealed that perhaps the fastest growing segment in the rapidly expanding derivatives universe was also its most dangerous: credit default swaps. In simple terms, they are a type of insurance policy contracted between two
parties, whereby one guarantees a payment to the other in the event of a default, in exchange for an insurance premium paid along the way. The Bank for International Settlements estimated that, as of the end of 2007, there was over $57.8 trillion in credit default swaps outstanding—a fourfold increase over the level at the end of December 2005. Large financial firms such as the now-defunct Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns issued massive amounts of these swaps to cover their myriad risks. Among the biggest buyers of these default swaps were the banks and insurance companies, which also had snapped up the aforementioned CDOs. The net result was that when Lehman and Bear collapsed, already beleaguered banks and insurers were left holding the bag, with an expected payout on the failure of Lehman’s credit default swaps alone of over $365 billion.

The U.S. housing finance bubble propelled asymmetric growth in the market value of derivatives contracts globally. In summary, the U.S. housing finance bubble propelled asymmetric growth in the market value of derivatives contracts globally, which rose from $382 trillion in June 2004 to $684 trillion in June 2007—a jump of 135 percent. Today, the notional value of the derivatives market adds up to 1,000 percent of world GDP—a tenfold increase since 1990. In Berkshire Hathaway’s annual report to shareholders in 2002, Warren Buffett pointedly described derivatives as “financial weapons of mass destruction.” He further commented:

Unless derivatives contracts are collateralized or guaranteed, their ultimate value also depends on the creditworthiness of the counterparties to them. In the meantime, though, before a contract is settled, the counterparties record profits and losses—often huge in amount—in their current earnings statements without so much as a penny changing hands. The range of derivatives contracts is limited only by the imagination of man (or sometimes, so it seems, madmen).

As a result of the derivatives boom, financial distress in the U.S. household and banking sectors has been magnified globally, adding to the stresses facing European and Asian economies. The potential unwinding of the globalization of financial leverage threatens the success of economic globalization itself.

At risk is the almost century-long U.S. primacy as the world’s foremost financial power. If that primacy declines, economic growth will slow as capital becomes more costly and harder to obtain. Furthermore, as Cicero pointed out 2,000 years ago, the key to success in war is “endless streams of money.” That remains true today. If raising capital in vast amounts becomes harder, America’s ability to finance the military forces it requires in the future will be more difficult.

The United States has always snapped back following times of economic doubt and apparent decline. The stagflation and stagnation of the 1970s produced in the wake of the Vietnam War, the 1973 oil shock, and the decisive break with the fixed exchange rate system were followed by the economic boom of the 1980s and victory in the Cold War. There is no reason to believe that recovery should be any different in the coming decade. But understanding the scope of the problems—and devising and implementing a strategy to solve them—will be imperative.

Noted economic historian Charles Kindleberger observed that nations that have turned back negative economic tides and emerged stronger from moments of seeming decline are those that possess flexibility and adaptability, rather than passivity and rigidity. Americans are known for being flexible and adaptive. Unfortunately, however, the scale and scope of America’s global economic and financial challenges are considerable, and they will defy any easy or rapid solution.

In summary, the U.S. housing finance bubble propelled asymmetric growth in the market value of derivatives contracts globally, increasing over the level at the end of December 2005. Large financial firms such as the now-defunct Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns issued massive amounts of these swaps to cover their myriad risks. The net result was that when Lehman and Bear collapsed, already beleaguered banks and insurers were left holding the bag, with an expected payout on the failure of Lehman’s credit default swaps alone of over $365 billion.

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As the Cold War was coming to a close, most of the world had never heard of the small Yugoslavian provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo, let alone believed they would demand global attention. Nor would the world have believed that a state such as North Korea, deemed a “basket case” in many fundamental functions of government, would acquire nuclear weapons and maintain chemical and biological capabilities. A global network of extremists based on the perversion of one of the world’s great religions that was willing to resort to sustained acts of violence resulting in the deaths of thousands of civilians was a scenario worthy only of a movie script. The identification of U.S. national security priorities as waging a “global war on terror” and the deployment of tens of thousands of U.S. troops to preempt a “gathering” threat to the Nation’s security—troops who would then become engaged in a protracted attempt to create a democratic nation-state in the midst of a civil war—were on no one’s radar.

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Far from promoting peace and stability, the end of the Cold War invited disorder and conflict. It took the lid off confrontations thought too dangerous at a time of superpower showdown, unleashed rivalries and competitions whose fires had been banked by the chill of the East-West standoff, and fostered a succession of violent eruptions that the world could not ignore, even though they occurred in parts of the globe long considered peripheral to the central security dynamic.

As with most clichés, these views contain a central element of truth. It is generally agreed that war between great powers is unlikely, although not impossible. In 2005, for example, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s conflict database reported no interstate conflicts for the first time. Some analysts even argue that major war has become “obsolete,” not in the sense that it is not possible, but that it is improbable because war no longer serves political purposes. While many other analysts think this view overstates the case, there is considerable agreement that a “total war” of the World War II variety is not and should not be a major concern for today’s or tomorrow’s policymakers.

Caution should be the watchword in evaluating trends related to conflict, however. In 1838, Lieutenant General Antoine-Henri de Jomini wrote in his Summary of the Art of War that “the means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightful rapidity.” Jomini was wrong. It took more than 100 years for nuclear weapons to make their appearance. Even good analysts can be wrong about trends. In less than 20 years, prevailing paradigms that ordered both thinking and policy with respect to conflict have been shattered and replaced with paradigms entailing profound differences.

An examination of trends in conflict can be conducted by addressing three dimensions: the nature of conflict, why it occurs, and how it is waged.

What Kinds of Conflict?

It is useful to remember Donald Kagan’s admonition that the one great truth of history is that “there is always one other possibility besides all the ones that you can imagine.” Even if World War II–style conflicts are no longer serious prospects, a wide array of state actors could interact in diverse ways to create multiple scenarios that are anything but benign. Major power competition, for example, has a military dimension even if it is not prominent at the moment. The continuing centrality of U.S., Chinese, and Russian nuclear weapons in national security policies provides an important reminder of this reality, as does China’s modernization of its conventional forces. A second tier of aspiring major powers or regional powers is in a position to capitalize on the global diffusion of technology that will become even more prevalent in the years ahead, and they appear to believe they are not getting their due from an international system they see as designed by and for the major powers. As a result, they sometimes nurture animosity toward those major powers and often toward one another. The environment is further complicated by states that do not play by the rules. North Korea, for example, may not be particularly powerful in absolute terms, but it is unwilling to abide by international norms, and its national priorities elevate power in all forms, especially military, both for internal consumption and external profit. These traits create major uncertainty and potentially profound international instability.

The potential for conflict arising from these dynamics is not particularly unique to the current and emerging security environment. What is new is the complicating presence of proliferation, not only of CBRN weapons, but also of a variety of militarily relevant technologies.

Proliferation has become an important feature of the current security landscape because of the changing dynamics between supply and demand. On the demand side, CBRN proliferation might be attractive for a number of well-identified reasons: leverage against regional rivals or major powers, the United States in particular; prevention of the exercise of leverage by others; prestige; diplomatic influence; a “ticket to the top table”; and others.

With respect to the supply side, the combination of rapidly advancing science and globalization has brought the knowledge and technology of CBRN weapons within reach of a much wider range of actors. Technological advances, particularly in the life sciences, are also creating capabilities that never before existed.

This supply-side trend is fostering a changing relationship between intent and capability. Conventional wisdom holds that “intent drives capability,” in which the proliferation process is marked by a systematic move down a path toward the deployment of specific capabilities following a government’s decision to acquire them. This assumption may no longer represent the exclusive dynamic in play. Rather, a second dynamic has also emerged in which advancing science and technology (S&T) combines with glo-
balization to generate an environment in which “capability shapes intention.” Indeed, a 2006 study by the National Research Council argues that future decisions to seek chemical and biological weapons (CBW) are not likely to be driven as much by the perceived efforts of an adversary as by scientific and technological advances.3

In a security context, the combination of what is interesting and what is doable—of curiosity and capability—could yield worrisome results. Although the Biological Weapons Convention bans any work on offensive biological weapons, particularly in a deteriorating security environment, states might be willing to explore the CBW potential of the life sciences, for example, not because they are committed to an institutionalized program or deploying a complete weapons system, but because they are curious. They might begin such an exploration merely because knowledge and capabilities exist somewhere in their scientific or economic establishments, and they are interested in what possibilities these capabilities might offer. Work might go forward with no sense of an ultimate objective, and certainly without the highest levels of government intent on fielding a CBW capability. “Dabbling” could become the order of the day. Why would government officials, scientists, or others push for the creation of a dangerous capability? Often the only answer is because they can.

The challenge posed by the combination of curiosity and capability has been identified by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Center for Global Security Research as proliferation “latency”—possibly the greatest conundrum confronting those responsible for addressing proliferation.4 How does one counter proliferation in a world in which key actors—primarily states but increasingly nonstate actors as well—enjoy through the diffusion of technology developed for legitimate purposes a “breakout capability” that need be activated only when it is decided to do so? In terms of conflict dynamics, if North Korea and Iran become recognized nuclear powers, no one could be certain of the chain of consequences. More countries might feel compelled to seek a countervailing capability. Current assessments seem to assume that the other countries would opt for nuclear weapons. Is such an assumption warranted? A nuclear weapons program is expensive, technically challenging, lengthy in development, and politically risky. A case could be made, therefore, that rather than expending the massive resources required for developing a nuclear capability that takes years to come to fruition, countries would instead seek a more immediate response by exploiting what they already have on hand, which increasingly will be life sciences–based capabilities.5

The impact of proliferation on future conflict has been hotly debated. Some analysts argue that proliferation, especially of nuclear weapons, will increase the prospects of at least a limited nuclear war for actors that are not major powers, such as those in South Asia. Others argue the opposite, contending that the presence of nuclear weapons in second-tier countries will spur a reversion to more prolonged, lower level conflicts by other means—intimidation, subversion, terrorism, proxies, and insurgency operations—that are less likely to provoke escalation. Which side is right is impossible to know. What can be said, however, is that proliferation will give potentially global and unlimited dimensions

Small arms and other unsophisticated weapons present significant threat in failed and failing states
to conflicts that would otherwise be localized and perhaps limited.

While conflict between states, including those with CBRN weapons, cannot be dismissed, today’s primary conflict contingencies are those complex conflicts in what Phil Williams has described as the “growing number of increasingly disorderly spaces” across the globe, spaces that are geographic, functional, social, economic, legal, and regulatory. These conflicts are often among communities, defined either by some concrete factor such as ethnicity, religion, or language, or increasingly by self-defined and self-selected criteria. They usually are not motivated by political ideology as were the major conflicts of the 20th century, but rather by the age-old goal of control—of territory, resources, or political, economic, and social power.

One should resist describing such conflicts as “internal” or “civil,” however, in that they do not always remain contained within the boundaries of a single state, and the fighting can occur not only between nongovernmental entities and government, but also among a variety of nongovernmental players, and even among multiple governments. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, has been “transnational” in that it has been in part a civil war involving several insurgent groups and warlords, and in part an international war for regional power and influence, with Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe providing forces to one side, and Rwandan and Ugandan troops fighting for the other.

These contemporary community conflicts often share a number of characteristics. First, they involve failed/failing states or anocracies, regimes between democracy and autocracy that have an incoherent mix of the characteristics of each. The concept of a failed or failing state is well established. Recent analysis suggests an alarming likelihood that such states will become participants in crises at either the regional or global level. According to data analyzed by the University of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 77 percent of all international crises in the post–Cold War era have involved at least one state classified as unstable, fragile, or failed. This leads analysts to conclude that the “extension of the dangers of instability from the domestic to the international realm is . . . a defining characteristic of the current international system.”

proliferation will give potentially global and unlimited dimensions to conflicts that would otherwise be localized and perhaps limited

Anocracies also appear to be closely associated with contemporary violence. Again, according to University of Maryland data, countries with these forms of government are as much as two and a half times more likely than either democracies or autocracies to experience instability and be associated with violent conflict.

Second, contemporary community conflicts do not usually involve classic military confrontations in at least two respects. Most importantly, they involve a wider range of participants. Although formal military forces might be engaged, they are not always—in fact, not usually—the dominant participants. Rather, community-based conflicts are usually waged by competing militias, warring ethnic groups, warlords, and informal paramilitary organizations.

Moreover, these kinds of conflicts tend to be crude, with brutal and often indiscriminate violence. Few if any of the participants take notice of the “laws of war” as defined by the Geneva Conventions or other international legal agreements. The conditions that Lawrence Freedman has identified as necessary to leave civil society relatively unscathed in conflict—defined and discriminatory military means, operations in relatively unpopulated areas, and restraint that allows belligerents to restrict their options—are all unlikely to exist.

A third quality community conflicts share is that they are hard to end. Data suggest that in any given year over the last decade, most active conflicts have been going on for some time. According to Dan Smith, in 1999, for example, 66 percent of existing conflicts were more than 5 years old, and 30 percent were more than 20 years old. No participant usually is in a position to claim victory. Several of the conflicts that now disfigure the global landscape have lasted for many years at a low level. Others have gone into abeyance following conclusion of a ceasefire or peace agreement, but they have resumed (as happened recently in Sri Lanka and Azerbaijan). The reasons for the difficulty in truly ending contemporary conflicts are many: one or more parties are insincere and use the hiatus to rebuild combat capability; one or more are disappointed with political or other developments following the agreement; one side or the other may fragment, with more radical elements continuing to resort to violence; or the underlying causes of the conflict are not addressed.

Baghdad residents inspect damage from suicide car-bomb attack

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The impact of the conflict on the psychology of the participants also plays a part. Attempts to destroy an adversary’s community and infrastructure—homes, schools, places of worship, and other social fixtures—seem to have become a permanent feature of conflict. These efforts leave lasting scars that blend into existing community mythology to promote a “never forget” mentality, which fosters a willingness to return to violence.

Attempts to destroy an adversary’s community and infrastructure seem to have become a permanent feature of conflict.

Lastly, community conflicts are localized. One reason some conflicts can endure for decades is that they remain contained geographically (even if they cross national borders). Most of the decade-long violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, has occurred in the eastern portions of the country. Darfur remains an ongoing challenge, but the conflict is not defined in terms of Sudan as a whole. In such cases, neither side has the capability—or sometimes the desire—to precipitate a decisive confrontation, allowing a level of violence to continue that neither side necessarily wants but with which both can live.

A variant of community warfare, one in which the “communities” are globally defined, is transnational terrorism of the kind promoted by al Qaeda and its affiliates. Osama bin Laden is the leader of a self-defined community—one committed to a particular brand of Islamic fundamentalism—that is neither bound by territory nor, in its mind, accountable to any authority other than God. In part, its members achieve their sense of community by posing themselves in opposition to another community, the West, in particular the United States and those “apostate” regimes associated with it.

Although more global in scope than many contemporary conflicts, transnational terrorism shares several characteristics with other forms of community conflict. While it is not necessarily state sponsored, al Qaeda has benefited from the existence of failed states and anocracies, which provide it important room for maneuver. It also has a proclivity for brutality, with high casualties rather than a particular political objective as the primary goal of an attack. And most certainly, transnational terrorism is a kind of conflict that will be difficult to bring to an end.

Why Such Conflicts?

The nature of conflicts and the manner in which they are conducted are closely related to the reasons for which they are waged. The causes of today’s conflicts are a mix of political, economic, social, psychological, and environmental elements.

One concept that describes this combination is what has been called the “new medievalism” or “neomedievalism.” Philip Cerny captured the elements of this phenomenon by identifying the interaction of the following factors as the source of an ongoing “durable disorder”:

- growing importance of identity politics, ethnicity, and multiple, fragmented loyalties
- contested property rights, legal status, and conventions
- the spread of geographic and social “no go” areas where the rule of law does not run.

Whether these factors truly represent sources of conflict similar to those in the Middle Ages is, of course, not really the point. Rather, what must be understood is the combination into a complex pattern of state, group, and individual elements interacting to yield today’s unique conflicts. Moreover, to this neomedieval mix must be added other forces of modernity that have the effect of turbo-charging conflicts that otherwise would have little international impact. The forces of globalization, particularly the interconnectivity provided by modern information technology, as well as S&T advancing at unprecedented speed, are perhaps the two key elements in this regard.

Another school of thought emphasizes the psychological factors that generate today’s small wars. It argues that the search for basic human needs such as identity, belonging, dignity, and self-respect can only be expressed through specific channels in today’s international system and combine with massive, accelerating, and disorienting processes of modernization to produce enormous social discord and, ultimately, conflict and violence.
Michael Mazarr summarized the argument in contending that “the nature of conflict has shifted from a largely rational enterprise waged by elite-dominated states in pursuit of power objectives to the product of mass psychological trauma attendant to modernization.”11 In this view, conflict will increasingly have more to do with psychology and identity than military forces.

Yet another school of contemporary analysis regarding the sources of conflict focuses on the competition for and need to protect vital resources. Not surprisingly, this discussion is most often cast in terms of oil and natural gas, in connection with not only the geographic sources of these key resources, but also the security of the systems by which they are transported (pipelines, tanker routes, and ports) and processed and used (refineries and power stations). This orientation has also revived attention to other important resources, which have been a key objective in recent conflicts. Perhaps most notable in this regard are diamonds in Africa. Valuable timber stands have similarly been the object of conflict in Southeast Asia, particularly in Borneo. Concern has also been reappearing over the prospects of “water wars,” given a new impetus by attention to climate change and the implications it might have in altering the availability of water resources in some vital regions, not least the Middle East. It should be noted that water-related disputes have tended to be resolved without resort to violence. Under the pressures of climate change, however, this might not remain the case.

A final trend related to the purposes for which conflicts are fought may not have as much to do with the causes of conflict as the reason for their continuation. That is, in the current environment, those involved may have either little choice or desire to end the conflict. The issue of choice is in part related to the participation in contemporary conflict of child soldiers. Many of the conflicts discussed here are conducted by participants not out of, and in some cases not even into, their teens. For them, conflict is a way of life; they have virtually no other experience, opportunities, or prospects. Thus, they comprise a pool who can do nothing but fight for at least a generation. They contribute to what has been called “supply-side war”—conflict driven by the availability of men who have no other skills.

Even if they know nothing else, whether all these individuals want to fight is questionable. But for another category of individuals the perpetuation of conflict is important, and they want it to continue because their power, status, and economic privilege result directly from it. This line of thought begins with the view that traditional interpretations do not fully take into account the rational economic calculations that drive many current conflicts. Rather, to understand contemporary violence one must also understand the economic dimensions underpinning it. David Keen, for example, identifies seven economic activities arising from war: pillage; extortion of protection money; control or monopolization of trade; exploitation of labor; access...
to land, water, and mineral resources; theft of aid supplies; and advantages for the military. This is the “greed rather than grievance” school. For example, Paul Collier of the World Bank argues that greed is a principal cause of contemporary conflict, and that warring factions have an economic interest in initiating and sustaining war. While Collier provides macroeconomic evidence in support of his position, the more widely accepted view is that economic agendas account less for the origins than for the longevity of violent conflict.

How Are Such Conflicts Waged?

The final set of trends related to contemporary conflict relates to how conflict is conducted. At this level, the issues are less about the conflict and more about the war and the battle. The characteristics of the conduct of conflict will largely depend on the respective capabilities of the adversaries, particularly whether they are relatively balanced or whether one of the adversaries, such as the United States, has markedly greater military wherewithal. Despite these differences, however, one can suggest some commonalities that will manifest themselves somewhat differently depending on the combatants.

Future conflicts will not usually be fought with advanced conventional weapons. According to some figures, 80 to 90 percent of all casualties in recent wars have been caused by small arms and light weapons. One estimate puts gun deaths in conflicts between 60,000 and 90,000 per year. This is no surprise when one considers who is doing most of the fighting today and why. Those engaged in many community conflicts, especially in Africa, not only do not have access to more sophisticated technologies, but also, given their opponents, do not need them. In some cases, machetes do just fine.

Where the adversary is a more advanced military, such as the U.S. Armed Forces, the opponent has little ability to match its conventional capabilities. The use of less advanced weaponry reflects the goals of the weaker combatant, which are not to impose a decisive military defeat on an opponent such as the United States, but rather to undermine the legitimacy, authority, and determination of its government, as well as diminish its popular support, whether among noncombatants within the area of conflict or domestically.

The use of unsophisticated arms also reflects those who use them. Most combatants in contemporary conflicts are not professional soldiers. Rather, they are individuals, often unskilled and unemployed, recruited on the basis of their enthusiasm for a cause, or attracted by the camaraderie and sense of purpose provided by such enterprises. Over time they may become hardened veterans with honed skills who know nothing but conflict. But this still does not make them military professionals, although they can be formidable fighters.

In such cases, small arms, light weapons, and armaments with some degree of precision and other advanced characteristics predominate. They are enhanced by the use of common explosives, albeit in increasingly sophisticated and innovative ways. In this regard, the appearance of improvised explosive devices using chlorine in Iraq might be a harbinger of things to come. A variant in the use of explosives is suicide bombing.

The point is that those involved in such conflicts have learned what limited capabilities can do. As retired Major General Robert Scales, USA, points out, they have recognized that unsophisticated weapons with increased killing power made possible by technologies that exploit “simple craft improvements” can reduce the margin in effectiveness that would otherwise favor the few but very effective (and expensive) weapons of their adversary.12
The technology of conflict will not remain static. Some technologies, several of which are still concepts more than finished products, have the theoretical potential to influence the conflict environment significantly over the next 15 to 20 years. Among those considered to have the greatest potential to alter the relative capabilities of combatants are biotechnology, nanotechnology, directed energy weapons, advanced information systems, and cheaper and more reliable space-lift systems. Importantly, the development of the underlying technologies will be driven more by the private sector than the military, which will have to find ways to translate those commercially driven developments into military capabilities.

Since technological innovation does not automatically translate to new military capabilities, technical hurdles will need to be overcome, not least of which is the research and development cost of new or improved systems. Organizational, bureaucratic, social, and other factors may also retard the process. In reality, then, few actors—state or nonstate—will have the resources, expertise, and motivation to integrate these new technologies fully.

But perhaps they do not need to. An important example in this regard is the potential terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons. Some experts contend that terrorists are both unwilling and unable to exploit the life sciences. With respect to biological weapons, for example, they may not be able to handle advanced genetic engineering capabilities, despite the prevalence of genetic engineering competence, because it does not necessarily translate into terrorist capabilities. Other commentators disagree, arguing, for example, that increasingly sophisticated practical knowledge related to the life sciences is available, that the full potential of past programs was never unleashed, and that biological weapon use by small groups historically was relatively unsophisticated and far from representative of what moderately well-informed groups might do today.

Even if terrorists cannot exploit the most cutting-edge science and technology, it does not mean they can do nothing. Terrorists do not need the most advanced capabilities. They do not demand the same operational performance as militaries. Their science and technology just have to be “good enough.”

Predicting how technological change will affect international conflict is therefore difficult. Technology is neutral, and how it is used will depend on human choices. Those choices, in turn, are influenced by the perceived utility of a given technology, the costs of acquiring it and making it usable for operations, the timelines to achieve that, and the negative consequences that may be attached. While many technologies have the potential for providing those who harness them with new capabilities, the actual impact is not guaranteed.

The target set is more expansive. Because of the disparity in capability, major direct assaults on the forces of a well-equipped adversary are often avoided. This does not mean those forces are not attacked, but such operations are usually far removed from the force-on-force battles generally thought to characterize conventional warfare. Rather, superior forces are targets of more classic guerrilla or insurgent operations of a kind that goes far back into history.

The military, however, represents only one set of targets in today’s violent conflicts. Another set is economic assets, whether they relate to the source of a government’s income (such as attacks against tourists in Egypt) or its infrastructure. In this regard, especially in the context of conflicts over resources, pipelines emerge as attractive targets—as they have been, for example, in Colombia. Another key infrastructure causing growing concern is the communications sector, which is vulnerable through cyberwar. Attacks against computer networks in the financial sector and against such security entities as the Pentagon have been widely publicized. Yet little or no publicly available evidence exists that terrorist groups or other adversaries engaged in conflict have perpetrated such attacks. Nevertheless, that sort of contingency is now considered one of the risks for which significant planning is necessary.

A third category of targets is symbols, again useful in undermining the legitimacy and authority of the adversary. The 9/11 attacks represented an assault against both economic and symbolic targets.

Finally, an important set of targets in many contemporary conflicts reflects a new phenomenon and illustrates the brutality of modern clashes. In today’s conflicts, civilian populations have become fair game. It is not a question of “collateral damage,” which is a tragic dimension of any conflict, but of the conscious targeting of noncombatants as part of a strategy to destroy the adversary psychologically as well as physically. This strategy accounts for such measures as the deliberate use of rape against women, assaults against medical personnel (even those from international organizations) whom the laws of war consider neutral, and the use of violence to control food supplies and manipulate dynamics in refugee camps.

Many contemporary conflicts are made possible by the exploitation of illicit activities that involve what some analysts call “dark networks.” Those networks facilitate conflicts in two ways. First, they provide a source of income that funds both acquisitions and operations. Commentary has been widespread on the involvement of terrorist groups in the drug trade and other forms of illicit trafficking. Reports also indicate al Qaeda’s efforts to raise money through the sale of diamonds from Africa. For most terrorist groups, these activities are largely instrumental in the sense that they allow the groups to continue doing those things they most want to do. Some conflicts, however, have become inseparable and indistinguishable from such activities, especially when it comes to control over key resources. In these cases, the violence is intended to ensure control, reflecting again the greed rather than grievance phenomenon.

Second, dark networks provide operational support. Most important here is the exploitation of a globalized financial system to manage the money required to continue the violence. But such networks clearly provide other forms of support as well, including logistic, transportation, and special services, such as documentation.

Combatants operate out of remote or inaccessible locations. The mountains of Afghanistan and the inhospitable territory on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border are examples. In the future, however, inaccessibility is equally likely to be found in the sprawling urban areas that have become a feature of the early 21st-century landscape. These slums and shantytowns are often already “no-go areas,” where authority is
asserted by actors other than representatives of the government, including those responsible for public security. As such, they are likely to contribute significantly to the dispersed, distributed, protected, and non-nodal kinds of operations that contemporary combatants are perfecting.

it is not a question of “collateral damage,” but of the conscious targeting of noncombatants to destroy the adversary psychologically as well as physically

Trends giving shape to international conflict in the years ahead portray a turbulent, volatile, and multidimensional dynamic. They suggest a wide set of diverse participants at the state and nonstate level motivated by a complex combination of political, economic, social, and other reasons related to the international system, national governmental performance, group dynamics, and individual alienation and psychological trauma. The spectrum of instruments used will be both brutal and savage, and sophisticated and discriminate. Military and civilian personnel and areas will be targets, facilitated by disorderly spaces and dark networks, most likely for the long term. This is not a pretty picture, nor is it a familiar one. As a result, it places enormous demands on thinking and operating creatively at both the policy and operational levels.

This article has provided some thoughts on trends related not to war but to conflict, albeit conflict involving often intensive and extensive violence. For U.S. policymakers, keeping this distinction in mind is important because clarity of view with respect to the real challenges will help to ensure appropriate policy responses. War in its traditional sense of the engagement of adversaries’ armies is complicated enough and is getting more so as the potential battlefield expands into more dimensions. But the conflicts discussed here have a multifaceted dynamic that poses even more vexing challenges for the future.

Some of these challenges will involve decisions about when to engage in a conflict. At times, no choice will exist—for example, if the United States or its interests are the direct target of violence. In most cases, however, the choice will not be so clear-cut, and the criteria for determining when Washington should engage or intervene will remain the subject of intense debate. Other questions will relate to how we engage. In this regard, two issues come immediately to mind. First, with whom will we engage, and under whose auspices? The occasions in which the United States will act alone will be rare if they arise at all. So with whom will Washington act, and by whose authority? Again, answers to these questions are not self-evident, and they could be hotly contested. The second issue pertains to whether U.S. involvement will necessarily entail the military. This issue is controversial and will plague future debates over engagement. Traditionally, the view of the U.S. military has been that its role is to “fight and win America’s wars.” But most future conflicts will not be America’s wars or even America’s conflicts. What the U.S. military response should be in such circumstances, therefore, needs careful calibration. JFQ

NOTES
3 National Research Council, *Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences* (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2006), 59. The mid-1990s scientific experiment to recover the virus responsible for the 1918 Spanish flu provides an important example of the kind of scientific research that could lead to offensive capability. The research team that did the recovery had recently developed a technique to analyze DNA in old, preserved tissues. Looking for a new application, they decided on the Spanish flu. It appears that “this work was not triggered by a search for flu treatments or the search for a new biowarfare agent, but by a rather simple motivation: [the] team could just do it.” According to the team leader, “The 1918 flu was by far and away the most interesting thing we could think of.” In short, the work went ahead because the team was curious, the issue was interesting, and they could do it.

This is what Syria has done vis-à-vis Israel. Damascus has responded to Israel’s nuclear arsenal by developing at least chemical and possibly biological weapons. Syria probably recognizes that its chemical weapons do not truly offset Israel’s nuclear capabilities, but they do provide some countervailing capability that Israeli decisionmakers must take into account in any confrontation. In a deteriorating security environment, other countries faced with a sense of urgency to act and limited resources might emulate this “Syrian option.”

12 Simple craft improvements are those that enhance the effectiveness of relatively less advanced systems available to insurgents and other non-state adversaries such as increasing the reach of shoulder-fired, heat-seeking missiles by a few thousand feet. Robert Scales, *Fighting on the Edges: The Nature of War in 2020*, prepared for the Global Trends 2020 Project of the National Intelligence Council, 6.
National and international security now involves nonstate actors to an extent unprecedented in modern history. Transnational movements and substate groups have tremendous power both to contribute to the greater good and to bring about violence, death, and repression. The most prominent such threat arises from transnational Salafi jihadism, of which al Qaeda is the standard bearer. Al Qaeda and the larger movement that presently command America’s attention remain serious threats for two primary reasons. First, this movement threatens the use of weapons of mass destruction, though its ability to do so in the near term is questionable. Second, the movement’s ability to create humanitarian dystopias, as in Afghanistan and Iraq’s Anbar Province, among other places, remains significant and should not be underestimated.

Nevertheless, the movement has substantial weaknesses. It finds itself surrounded by opponents that include not only the Western democracies but also the media, the governments in majority Muslim countries, mainstream Muslims, and even other Islamists. Moreover, it is becoming clear that the Muslim community’s familiarity with al Qaeda and its ilk is breeding contempt, not converts.

Recent poll results underscore some of these points. Gallup polls taken across the Muslim world make clear that many Muslims, justifiably or not, are extremely skeptical about U.S. actions and policies, but that these feelings do not translate into support for al Qaeda and its associates. In fact, only 7 percent of Muslims, some 91 million people, “fully support” the attacks of September 11, 2001, with another 7 percent leaning toward supporting it.

Clearly, then, the United States has some fence-mending to do among Muslims. The terrorism problem, however, is much smaller in extent than even Gallup’s numbers indicate. Al Qaeda and likeminded groups boast as members only a fraction of 1 percent of the 91 million Muslims who may have celebrated September 11. Arguably, this suggests that increasing America’s popularity among Muslims, while desirable in itself, is an inefficient way to shrink the number of Salafi jihadists. Indeed, some of America’s staunchest allies against al Qaeda—such as Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Iranian regime, many radical preachers, and even the much maligned Arab media—may be some of our staunchest foes on other issues. In short, an approach to the contest in which the United States remains active but does not insist on putting its actions (especially the military ones) at center stage may be most effective.

Looking to the future, technology, notably biological technology, is in the process of “super-empowering” not just small groups such as terrorist organizations, gangs, organized criminal networks, anarchists, and

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ultra-extreme environmentalists, but even Unabomber-style individuals. An appropriate response to this emerging threat will need to be an “all-of-society” response.

The Salafi Movement

A particularly idiosyncratic understanding of the Sunni Islamic faith called “Salafi jihadism” by its practitioners underpins al Qaeda and inspires more than 100 kindred terrorist groups around the world, not to mention numerous isolated groups or even individuals. Salafi jihadism is a minority, reactionary viewpoint within a wider acrimonious debate among Muslims about how to reconcile the progress and frustration unleashed across the Islamic world by modernization and globalization. Though many Muslims (and, for that matter, non-Muslims) are concerned about the implications of globalization, only a tiny minority of Sunnis adhere to the stern tenets of this harsh and xenophobic worldview, which calls for the formation of a caliphate—an Islamic superstate stretching from Spain to Indonesia—and the conversion of all other Muslims from their purportedly innovative, unfounded, and corrupt beliefs. (It is important to note that the destruction of the United States is not among the goals of Salafi jihadists per se, though many and perhaps most of them would be happy to see it happen. Instead, they desire to see the United States quit the Muslim world as part of a process to topple corrupt regimes and hasten the beginning of the caliphate.)

Present Trends. American policymakers have recently been confronted with dramatically differing analyses of the health of and risk posed by al Qaeda and the rest of the Salafi jihadist community. One line of analysis argues that al Qaeda, operating from its safe haven along the Afghan-Pakistan border, remains the source of the gravest threat for catastrophic terror. The contend- ing perspective is that al Qaeda’s operational decline renders it less salient to international security concerns than the growing threat from diffuse, low-level groups emerging out of local social networks and acting out of a shared belief in the Salafi jihadist mass media message. What are global policymakers to think? Can both of these perspectives be correct? If not, which threat is more severe?

Ultimately, the question of whether al Qaeda itself or its relatively diffuse constellation of loosely affiliated coreligionists poses the greater threat may be moot. Both are substantial threats. Each requires a tailored response from its opponents. On the one hand, the al Qaeda–led globalized variant is more intellectually adaptable within its ideological commitment to nonstop jihad, but it faces major structural challenges. It has the greater ability to mount narrow but devastating attacks, as its track record makes clear. On the other hand, the surrounding movement with its violence-prone group of men poses a more widespread but less physically potent threat. There is growing evidence that the multifaceted approach to countering Sunni terrorism that has evolved in the past few years, with a concentration on denying al Qaeda its desired outcomes, is showing signs of success. While American strategy for countering terrorism can, of course, be improved, policymakers should use caution to avoid discarding methods that are known to work in their zeal to get rid of what has not.

Overview of the Threat. In organizational and strategic terms, the Salafi jihadists have faced substantial setbacks over the last several years. The United States and its partners have continued to kill or capture key leaders regularly, such as a succession of operational chiefs of al Qaeda central and a string of successive leaders of “al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.” There have been similar successes against Jamaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia and against other groups large and small across the globe. Important leaders of al Qaeda in Iraq, including Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, have been killed or captured. Moreover, the overall Salafi jihadist position in Iraq is, as of this writing, grim, under relentless American military pressure, and facing increasingly capable Iraqi services and the Sunni tribal “Awakening.” In sum, because of the combined pressures of various national security services and the military, intelligence, and law enforcement resources of the United States, al Qaeda and its allies find it hard to operate in most places on the globe.

At the same time, the movement has arguably made a grave strategic blunder. By allowing Zarqawi to reorient attention of the Salafi jihadists in Iraq and, indeed, in the entire Middle East, toward attacking the Shia, it took on an additional adversary, both ideological and physical, while it was still grappling with the formidable alliance of the “Jews, Crusaders, and [Sunni] apostates.” This was not part of Osama bin Laden’s or Ayman al-Zawahiri’s master plan, for they always felt that the Shia would be quickly eliminated late in the process of forming a caliphate, when the numbers of Sunni “true believers” would form an overwhelming weight to wield against Shia heretics. As a result of these developments, almost nowhere in the world is there a truly permissive environment for the operation of Salafi jihadists.

Nevertheless, al Qaeda and the broader movement have been adapting in a number of ways. First, al Qaeda has worked hard to reestablish a physical safe haven in Pakistan, and especially within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Al Qaeda requires a place of physical freedom to practice the management of a proto-caliphate, to congregate in an unfettered manner, and to plan and launch spectacular acts of...
terrorism against its opponents. Al Qaeda strategists are incessantly writing to each other about the good old days in Afghanistan (between the expulsion of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the post-9/11 invasion), and the need to generate a similar safe haven soon. They lament the loss of the once-promising safe haven in Iraq, particularly in Anbar Province, largely blaming Zarqawi’s intemperance. Today, al Qaeda’s strategists are trying to establish a permanent safe haven in Pakistan’s border areas adjacent Afghanistan. Intense efforts since late 2005 have produced results. After only a few years, al Qaeda stands on the cusp of attaining its first significant safe haven since the Taliban fell in 2002. In alliance with young and highly militant Pakistani-Pashtun allies, al Qaeda has overthrown most of the tribal elder system in western Pakistan and routinely embarrassed the Pakistani military. Many of the major attacks planned and executed against Western targets since 2002—including the London 7/7 bombings, the United Kingdom–U.S. airliner plot of 2006, and the Frankfurt airport plot of 2007—had common origins in western Pakistan and featured direct contact between key attackers and al Qaeda leaders.

Second, al Qaeda has expanded its formal franchisee arrangements with heretofore loosely affiliated Salafi jihadist groups. Al Qaeda’s leadership has tried to formalize relationships and stamp the al Qaeda brand name on all forms of regional Salafi jihadist and insurgent activity. At the same time, these groups seek their share of the prestige, and often funding, that goes with the “al Qaeda” name and reach out to it. For instance, in 2004, Zarqawi’s Iraqi group was assimilated into the movement as “al Qaeda of the Two Rivers,” a reference not only to Iraq, but also to the wider territory extending toward southwestern Iran and Kuwait. Similarly, in early 2007, distinct references to “al Qaeda of Khoristan” (al Qaeda in Afghanistan, eastern Iran, and western Pakistan), and the announcement of its leader, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, began to appear on the al Jazeera Web site, with reference to that jihadist group’s evolving status as the Arab partner to the Taliban. Then, in September 2007, the longstanding Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) in Algeria announced formal affiliation with al Qaeda and changed its name to the “al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM). These moves extend al Qaeda’s reach and reinforce the Salafi jihadists’ narrative that a fundamentalist Sunni caliphate is borderless and destined to encompass the entire Islamic world. They also enhance previously informal communications and terror management conduits and potentially extend al Qaeda access to underdeveloped terror recruiting networks such as those affiliated with Algerian GSPC across France and in other parts of Western Europe.

By way of contrast, Salafi jihadists have only a limited ability to forge alliances with Muslims who are not Salafi jihadists, even those with whom they have very substantial theological similarities. For instance, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood on the one hand, and al Qaeda on the other, are constantly at daggers drawn, in particular over issues of the propriety of electoral politics and the relative value of violent and nonviolent aspects of the jihad.

**Policy Considerations.** The United States will continue carrying out defensive measures to protect itself and its allies against Salafi jihadists. The movement is under tremendous stress and has failed to attract genuine adherents despite its media efforts, the once-high popularity of Osama bin Laden, and the fact that the U.S. prosecution of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is widely unpopular across the Islamic world.7

The problem, from the Salafi jihadist perspective, all other things being equal, is the more Muslims are exposed to its indiscriminate violence, the less they support al Qaeda and the movement it represents. As many have argued—including those who still see al Qaeda as tremendously dangerous—the movement is inherently self-limiting.8

The United States, ironically, is the best friend the Salafi jihadists have. The Salafi jihadists want the United States to use its military power extensively because they believe such actions help to mobilize Sunni Muslims to become Salafi jihadists. It is also worth remembering that what most contributes to anti-Americanism in the Islamic world is the perception that U.S. policies unfairly dictate how things must be. Reducing the visible American profile in the world would undercut Salafi jihadism at least to the extent that it can take the edge off of anti-Americanism. To this effect, the United States might wish to support regional programs that grow responsible local paramilitary and law enforcement capacity in Sunni Muslim states. Building local partner capacity, along with intelligence-sharing to help constrain the ability of organized Salafi jihadist terror groups to topple these regimes, might undercut the effectiveness of the terrorists while reducing America’s military profile.

The United States must recognize that it is in a similar position to the terrorists. Not surprisingly, given its preponderance, the more it uses coercive force, the more it is likely to be seen as a threatening power. Arguably, the more visible the United States is, with the notable exception of manifestly humanitarian missions, the less it is liked. Indeed, al Qaeda usually wants the United States to act, believing that American actions will inevitably vali-
date their narrative. Accordingly, the United States must avoid falling into a maximalist, activist, and interventionist approach. In addition, it must not make the mistake—too often committed by both sides of the political system—of believing that it alone has power and agency and the other peoples around the world have none. Furthermore, Washington must recognize the limits of its power, not only because America’s intrinsic capabilities to deal with this (and any other) problem are finite, but also because Muslims themselves will always outnumber Americans in Muslim countries, and they have positional and cultural advantages over the United States. But Washington still has numerous potential partners in fighting Salafi jihadist extremism. These range all the way from the governments of Indonesia, Syria, and Iran, to Hamas and many other Islamist groups, to al Jazeera, to the United Nations (UN), to traditional allies such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Policymakers have a range of cooperative techniques available for dealing with these countries and groups, ranging from unwitting, to tacit, to covert, to overt.

The most important potential partners for the United States are Sunni Muslims, who have credible voices with other Muslims. Salafi jihadists’ complaints suggest that most of those in the Islamic world are against them. If it is going to take full advantage of this fact, the United States might continue to quietly support Muslim voices opposing Salafi jihadism, while improving activities in areas where unacceptable al Qaeda strength remains, notably in the safe haven of western Pakistan.

Several other policy considerations stand out:

- Proposed changes in U.S. counterterrorism policy should be measured against the possible harm from degrading what has already proved successful in the struggle against Salafi jihadism and al Qaeda. It is clear that an al Qaeda under pressure is less tactically and strategically effective. Similarly, the Salafi jihadist movement has, at various points in its 40-year history, seemingly been contained or reduced to manageable levels in selected countries. When the pressure was removed, the movement always rebounded.

- While the United States wishes to be liked in the Muslim world, it is clear that America’s unpopularity is largely unrelated to the health of Salafi jihadism. Reform of Islamic societies under the leadership of mainstream Muslims is most likely to render the Salafi jihadi social critique impotent. This reform will take time, but Western governments may be able to help indirectly by continuing to encourage temperate Muslim reformers and visionaries, while avoiding heavy-handed gestures and pompous demands for immediate change. To the extent that direct Western efforts can help, these need to be seen and not heard. By the same token, Western leaders may wish to take every opportunity to provide significant, visible assistance to Muslim victims of flooding, earthquakes, famine, and other natural disasters. As was the case with U.S. assistance to Pakistani Muslim victims of the November 2005 earthquake, and Indonesian Muslim victims of the December 2004 tsunami, such overt assistance will slowly but surely erode general Muslim beliefs that the West is only about subjugating and exploiting Muslims.

- The United States can provide additional indirect support for the growing number of Muslim critics of Salafi jihadism. Washington might encourage the natural tendency of Muslims who have been victims of the violence to speak out before fellow Muslims, for it is these voices that carry the most weight in discrediting the Salafi jihadist ideology.

- Most importantly for 2009, American and allied leaders will have to face the major threat posed by al Qaeda and the Salafi jihadist ideology: the terrorist safe haven in western Pakistan. A collaborative effort to fully and firmly engage the Pakistanis in order to eradicate al Qaeda may be indispensable to preventing another 9/11. The approach most likely to succeed will frame the safe haven in Pakistan as part of the more general problem with jihadism in terms of an ongoing Pakistani security strategy, and address this wider problem in the context of a reformulated South Asia security arrangement.

In short, Salafi jihadism remains dangerous. It is a threat that is irregular in nature but is easy to understand because it is an open mass movement with universal aspirations. It can be penetrated nearly at will, however, whether for collecting information or influencing its actions. This is a different problem from competing with closed societies such as the former Soviet Union. Salafi jihadists are remarkably open in discussing and debating their strategies, weaknesses, fears, and vulnerabilities. The United States might thus profitably invest more in its ability as a nation to “know the enemy,” which is the wider movement of Salafi jihadism. Washington can then tailor its strategies to exploit the movement’s growing vulnerabilities in the Muslim world, while simultaneously taking only prudent offensive actions that inhibit catastrophic terrorism and supporting ongoing Muslim efforts.
to marginalize the Salafi jihadist ideology across the Islamic world.

**Emerging Threats**

Even as nations adjust to fighting today’s combination of insurgencies and terror groups, political, economic, social, and technical trends are setting the conditions for conflicts that may involve even smaller but potentially more powerful entities. These players could range from super-empowered individuals and small groups unified by a cause, to gangs and other criminal enterprises motivated primarily by profit.

**Key Issues.** These new developments are of particular concern because emerging political, business, and social structures have consistently been more successful at using nascent technology than older, established organizations. Today, two emerging technologies, nanotechnology and biotechnology, have the power to alter our world—and warfare—more fundamentally than information technology has.

Even before these technologies mature, the fragility of globalization means it is imperative to prepare for significant shocks. In many ways, military and business problems are merging as the world becomes more interconnected and power is driven downward. In 2006, a score of angry Nigerians took hostages from a Shell Oil Company oil platform in the Gulf of Guinea. In response, Shell shut down its Nigerian Delta production and world oil prices rose dramatically, demonstrating how vulnerable our interconnected world is to disruptions in key commodities, and how business issues can rapidly become matters of international security. This is not the same as in the “banana wars” of the early 20th century, in which U.S. Marines were consistently committed to protect American business interests that mattered only to a few stockholders. Today, tiny armed groups can affect the entire world’s economy immediately and dramatically.

Fragility in the oil supply system is duplicated in a number of key elements in the international supply chain, including rail and shipping bottlenecks. To prevent minor damage from translating into a major economic shock, these systems need excess capacity. Yet businesses are rightly reluctant to pay for surplus capacity “just in case,” since it makes them less competitive in an increasingly competitive world market.

At the same time that globalization has created a more interconnected and fragile economic system, small groups and even individuals now have access to much more powerful weapons. Using the leaderless resistance model of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and, increasingly, some Islamist terrorist groups, these players can use materials available in modern society to attack it. These range from the simple arson attacks conducted by ALF, to the attempted chlorine attacks by al Qaeda in Iraq, to the potential for major chemical attacks based on a Bhopal-type accident, to nuclear-equivalent detonations modeled after the 1947 Texas City disaster. The remarkable growth of innovation in synthetic biology means there is a high probability that within the next 10 years, small groups will be able to create lethal viruses, including smallpox, from commercially available DNA. The possibility of a planned, worldwide release of smallpox gives small groups access to a potential lethality equal to dozens of nuclear weapons.

One of the crucial issues facing the developed world, and the United States and its allies in particular, is the mismatch between investments in defense and the potential threats. The earlier forms of war will continue to coexist with newer kinds of threats represented by small groups and gangs. Therefore, future conflict is likely to cover an enormously broad spectrum, from small groups conducting single actions, to Hizballah-type movements, to nation-state wars—in essence, hybrid war. Increasing the complexity of these conflicts, most clashes will involve a multitude of players with widely varying objectives. The United States and its allies must be prepared to fight these hybrid wars, but unfortunately, our current investment in national defense is still skewed heavily toward external, nation-state wars.

**The Future.** As noted above, future enemies will make use of the entire spectrum of warfare and crime to achieve their goals. Some will have traditional political ambitions of controlling territory or coercing behavior in rival states, others will pursue purely criminal goals, and still others will want to achieve a mix. Finally, some fear that a relatively new entrant, radical environmentalists, might attack in defense of the “planet.”

For the United States, the absence of a peer competitor in the short to medium term poses particularly difficult questions. While the United States will have to be prepared to fight across the spectrum, even the Department of Defense, in its 2008 report to Congress on China’s military power, suggested that a China out-of-area threat would probably not emerge until the 2020s. Similarly, a “near peer” competitor to Washington is not likely to materialize over the next decade or more. Meanwhile, the threats to U.S. forces in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan obviously will remain priority considerations for some time. Beyond those considerations, however, the United States and its allies will have to be aware of what could cause serious harm at home.

Third-generation transnational criminal gangs represent both a direct and an indi-
already gained physical control in parts of the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. These gangs are essentially leaderless networks that answer to no single authority, but have extended unchallenged use of force over noncontiguous spaces in the United States and overseas. They directly challenge the legitimacy of civil rule within parts of America. States and cities lack the resources to control them. Indirectly, gang violence compels migration by increasing political and civil instability in the “home” countries. This instability, combined with looming population and resource crises south of the U.S.-Mexico border, could force major migrations of people with no other choice. Gangs and cartels are fighting to establish mini narco-states in various nations in Central America and Mexico. They do not want control of the entire state, simply enough to provide a secure base for their operations and to enjoy their wealth.

A more distant nonstate threat may be that of environmental activists. Of course, the vast majority of environmentalists are law-abiding; however, a few believe their ends justify violent means. Usually, this violence amounts to small-scale criminal activity. But one could imagine the emergence of a more radicalized fringe movement, driven by a fervent belief that governments are ruining the planet. Thus, a loose, violent antiglobalization movement could take hold, albeit this time with access to highly disruptive means, whether cyberterrorism or a radiological attack to demonstrate dangers associated with nuclear power. To date, their attacks have been limited to minor nuisance attacks. However, as globalization affects people at higher levels of education (computer programmers, radiologists, and biotechnicians, for instance), some of those displaced workers will inevitably lend their skills to efforts to reduce globalization. This may well take the form of attacks on the communications and transportation systems that create globalization.

The most dangerous attacks probably would emanate from apocalyptic groups. Their causes would vary, but they are likely to be driven by an absolute belief in what they do. In particular, these groups may look to exploit the advances in synthetic biology, as well as the possibilities of other weapons of mass destruction. Belief in their cause will provide the moral justification for mass destruction of fellow human beings, as well as allay concerns about the number of their own personnel who will inevitably die.

Finally, the United States must consider how other states will react to the increasing power flowing to small groups. While some states will use them for their own purposes, most states fear this threat to their own sovereignty. Washington must take advantage of the common interest in stopping such apocalyptic attacks to build relationships with other nation-states. Containing this type of emerging small-actor threat should be a challenge around which developed nations can fully cooperate.

All-of-society Response. These potential threats will be extremely difficult for governments to counteract. A defense against them must involve all of society. Just as insurgency requires all elements of government to work together to defeat it, the challenge of super-empowered leaderless networks will require all elements of society to defeat them.

Creating an all-of-society defense will be difficult but not impossible. There are already models of such defenses, the most obvious being the protection of the Internet. It is being attacked daily by what is essentially a leaderless array of networks and individuals. In response, a leaderless network has developed to defend it. While some elements of the defense are sophisticated organizations, the vast majority simply follow basic rules: never run a system without an updated protection package, and never open emails from unknown senders. This creates the emergent intelligence that has, to date, protected the Internet from another computer virus such as the “Love Bug” that caused worldwide damage in 2000. Other examples of successful defense are crime control through community participation and disease control through a network of public health officers.

The key issue for developing all-of-society defenses against various threats is developing the rule sets that allow all elements of society to participate without having any specific individual or agency in command. This may well be the legitimate role of the Federal Government. Only it has the resources to bring together the entire range of players—all levels of government, business, academia, the media, and others—to discuss and game possible threats, and develop the rule sets that will allow a global, leaderless, emergent, and intelligent response. JFQ

\section*{Notes}


2 The bunch of guys formulation originates with Marc Sageman.


4 This position, articulated by notable terrorism experts Bruce Reidel (“Al Qaeda Strikes Back,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2007) and Bruce Hoffman (“Why Al Qaeda Still Matters,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008, his rebuttal to Marc Sageman’s Leaderless Jihad), was buttressed by the July 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate and in public testimony by the Director of National Intelligence, Michael McConnell, throughout early 2008.


6 The al Qaeda grand strategy of “Vexation and Exhaustion,” with a primary focus on the United States, the West, and “apostate” Muslim autocrats, is articulated by Doran, “Somebody Else’s Civil War.” See also Stout et al.


8 Journalist Peter Bergen, Daniel L. Byman of the Brookings Institution, McConnell, and Sageman all make this point.
A
times the Nation adjusts to the reality of the Obama administration, the time is ripe for a fundamental improvement in the Pentagon’s relationship with its counterparts in the Western Hemisphere. It should be acknowledged that U.S. foreign policy in general, and defense policy in particular, is not routinely engaged in matters of importance to the nations of the hemisphere. Given the nature of a globalized world, and the fact that the United States is no longer the only security option available to the region’s actors, American policymakers must work to remain relevant and engaged with those open to being our partners.

This article runs the risk of being a bit “inside baseball” regarding U.S. defense policy toward the region as it seeks to explain the primary structural shortcomings associated with both the formulation and execution of policy. It does not recommend specific policies for particular countries or concerns; rather, it is intended to address matters of structure and process. There are a number of reasons why the quality and level of Department of Defense (DOD) engagement with the nations of this hemisphere have been suboptimal. Among these, the current organizational structure within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Unified Command Plan (UCP) for this hemisphere is the result (not the cause) of key factors responsible for our traditional inattention. At the end of the day, however, key structural changes within OSD and in the current UCP are required to significantly improve the quality of DOD policy formulation and security cooperation with the partner nations of the Western Hemisphere. This is not to suggest that structural changes alone are necessary; clearly, sound policy requires informed analysis and wise decisionmaking. As Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson stated, “Good national security policy requires both good policymakers and good policy machinery.” Indeed, one cannot be divorced from the other, but the focus here is on the machinery.

It is important to understand the context in which this effect has occurred to make the decisions necessary to correct the structural shortcomings. For reasons that will be addressed briefly, the geopolitical realities at play in this part of the world are serious and troublesome. They will not disappear in the short term, but they will require the dedication of time and attention by senior defense decisionmakers sooner rather than later.

A Current Snapshot of Defense Concerns

Prior to delving into DOD structural shortcomings, we must address why it is more important than ever to have a more effective configuration of assets to engage the region. Space limitations preclude addressing all 35 countries of the hemisphere, but make no mistake—the security issues at play in this part of the world represent real and present dangers, and DOD has an important role to play. This is particularly true given the department’s recent policy of elevating stability operations to the same priority level as those related to combat, and the reality that the region presents a target-rich environment for the entire range of tasks involved in those operations.

The notion of threats, challenges, and other concerns represents the consensus language that emerged from the Conference...
Transnational Threats

Traffic of Drugs, Small Arms/Weapons, and Contraband. Although these items are linked, the menace of drug smuggling is perhaps the most pernicious and troubling. The effects of the transshipments of drugs, and increasingly their consumption in the countries of production and the transit zone, are wreaking havoc throughout the hemisphere. The monies derived from these illicit activities are funding the acquisition of greater firepower than is available to local and national police forces, requiring the militaries of many countries to play a direct role. These trafficking routes are also available to terrorist organizations.

Terrorism/Insurgency. Most U.S. policymakers equate terrorism with al Qaeda and its derivatives, but the region has its own homegrown varieties. The best known are the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia and Sendero Luminoso in Peru. Although Colombia’s President Álvaro Uribe has led a successful effort to combat the FARC, that endeavor is not yet concluded. For its part, Sendero Luminoso, believed to have been defeated and eradicated in the 1990s, is making a comeback. And while Islamic radical terrorist cells are not known to be operational in the region (yet), there are groups present within the hemisphere, some in urban areas. It is widely believed that Islamic groups raise funds legally and illegally to finance operations around the world. The Venezuela-Iran linkage is particularly troublesome. As well, there are small groups of insurgents in Mexico and other countries that merit close monitoring.

Organized Crime. Listed as a separate entity from the trafficking trio, this term refers to the large number of active criminal networks and their role in undermining societies and governments. In the majority of countries in the hemisphere, organized criminal networks play a debilitating role over the viability of the state. Included in this category are the Maras, or gangs, that operate in a transnational fashion as well, generating greater levels of violence and insecurity throughout Central America, Mexico, and beyond.

Priority Countries

Mexico. Although many things are going right in this key neighbor’s territory, its security situation is bad and getting worse. There are seven major narcotics trafficking cartels operating throughout the country, generating violence and challenging the very authority of the state. According to the private intelligence agency STRATFOR (Strategic Forecasting, Incorporated), “the 2008 death toll related to drug trafficking reached 4,325 on November 3, far exceeding the total of nearly 2,500 for all of 2007.” President Felipe Calderón has given the mission to the armed forces, due to the combination of factors related to Mexican law enforcement (corruption, ineffectiveness, and no national police force). The watered down Mérida Initiative represents a tepid attempt to address this serious situation; much bolder thinking and far more resources will be required.

Venezuela. Despite protestations to the contrary and words about democracy, this country is a de facto military dictatorship. Hugo Chavez has essentially dismantled any semblance of democratic institutions, and threatens the military balance of South America with planned acquisitions of 4.5th-generation aircraft, submarines, tanks, and antiaircraft capabilities. His active pursuit of relationships with Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, Belarus, and North Korea is anything but benign. Matters will get considerably worse before they improve.

Brazil. The country of the future is arriving. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has taken on the role of regional leader, moving beyond the potential to the real. Beyond mere economic and political influence, defense minister Nelson Jobim has bold and grand designs for a much more robust and energetic military role, in terms of both new capabilities and leadership. Jobim has created the Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano (South American Defense Council), a regional defense entity that excludes the United States. A new defense strategy is in the offing, seeking strategic relationships with France, Russia, and other extraregional actors. The United States needs to consider...
its national security interests as it ponders whether to deepen or reduce its defense relationship with this key player.

**Bolivia.** Internal political strife is running high, and although the likelihood of the country splitting in two is not great, it is nonetheless a possibility that bears monitoring. The fact that Hugo Chavez has promised to intervene militarily in the event of civil infighting presents a challenge to the countries of the region. How will DOD react to such an eventuality?

**Cuba.** The question of what happens when the Castro brothers disappear from the scene remains open. This land, the size of Pennsylvania and with 11 million people, is at what the National Security Strategy would describe as a “strategic crossroads.” DOD’s stability operations mission has serious implications when matters begin to unravel. Conversely, should the Obama administration decide to engage the government of Cuba, and understanding the preeminent role of the Cuban armed forces, the policy implications for DOD could be significant.

**Colombia.** This country comes closest to acting as an ally in the region. The Ministry of Defense and the armed forces have transformed significantly during the tenure of President Uribe, although many observers will continue to emphasize the human rights shortcomings of the government far more than those of the insurgents. To its misfortune, Colombia is located in a less than desirable neighborhood, bordered to the east by Venezuela and to the south by Ecuador. How will DOD engage the Colombian military in the future?

The above limited sample does not fully capture the wide range of challenges that confront the region; there are myriad other vital issues meriting attention. It does underscore that there are many matters of substance calling for improving the structure to ensure they are properly served.

**Factors Contributing to Inattention**

A number of specific factors are responsible—for in large part—for the relatively consistent (save periodic crises) lack of DOD attention in matters related to the Western Hemisphere.

**A Dangerous World.** National security challenges in East Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa in general, as well as Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, China, Russia, and other locales demand the attention of the Secretary of Defense on an almost daily basis. Very infrequently do issues in this hemisphere call for his immediate attention, and in many important ways, this is a very good thing.

**A (Relatively) Peaceful Region.** The risks represented by national security challenges in this hemisphere seem to pale in comparison with those elsewhere. Canada is a strong and dependable ally; Mexico is an increasingly capable partner; our “third border,” the Caribbean, is relatively stable (though currently facing important internal concerns). The average level of defense spending (approximately 1.5 percent) of the nations of this hemisphere is the lowest in the world, which is fortunate in broad terms. This reflects the reality that the likelihood of state-on-state conflict is low enough not impossible, particularly if we are inattentive, as evidenced by the Colombia-Ecuador-Venezuela “crisis” in March 2008. Despite the unlikely event of state-on-state violence, the number of both transnational and internal threats and challenges related to violence and crime warrants increasing attention.

**It’s the Economy.** The principal U.S. interest in this hemisphere has long been, in general terms, economic. Washington’s foreign policy has emphasized democracy, market economics, and stability, dating from the Monroe Doctrine in the 19th century and the Roosevelt Corollary in the early 20th century. However, more recently it has been formed in response to crises. Examples beyond Colombia where U.S. administrations paid significant attention to the security situation include Haiti (1994/2004), Panama (1990), Central America in general (Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala in particular in the 1980s), Grenada (1983), and the Dominican Republic (1965). The recent level of U.S. commitment to Bogota is an exception to this general trend, and was due initially more to an effective Colombian diplomatic campaign with the Department of State and Congress than to a DOD-led effort.

**Developmental Challenges.** The primary challenges confronting the majority of nations of the hemisphere are developmental in nature. The institutional frailty of many of the democracies, the myriad challenges confronting the societies (from poor educational systems to struggling health care delivery), the uneven character of the economic programs, and the predicament of the justice systems and the rule of law are the fundamental issues that confront the region. These challenges, and the regional governments’ deficiencies in addressing them, have led to the aforementioned internal—and increasingly transnational—security threats. Organized crime, gang violence, and trafficking of drugs, persons, and small arms are the effect. These issues are not resolved with military means, although the armed forces can and do play an important role in dealing with the associated security effects of the developmental problems. In fact, because of the institutional weaknesses of many governments, the military is all too often called on to perform missions not traditionally within the scope of the armed forces.
**Heterogeneity.** Yet another complicating factor is heterogeneity. Nonspecialists tend to think of the hemisphere—to the extent they think of it at all—as Latin America, or perhaps Latin America and the Caribbean. And it is true that both of those “areas” share a number of culturally similar characteristics. But the fact is that there are 19 different "Latin American" countries, and 13 different “Caribbean” countries, as well as 14 U.S. and European territories and dependencies. This reality makes the notion of crafting a “defense policy for Latin America” or a “defense policy for the Caribbean” exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, in practical terms.

**Divergent Conceptions of Security and Defense.** A subset of the great heterogeneity is that each country has a different understanding of the role of the armed forces in its security and defense equation. As mentioned previously, some armed forces are required by constitution to be involved in the internal security matters of the state (for example, Guatemala), while others have been limited to reacting exclusively to external military threats of state actors, greatly reducing their roles (for example, Argentina). Because of these distinctions, the interaction between DOD and the militaries of other countries may be quite different, as in Chile, Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico. This reality exacerbates the general lack of understanding of the region, making the task of crafting coherent and nuanced policy more difficult.

Having reviewed the reasons for the relative neglect by DOD, the hemisphere is distinct in one critical variable: it is our hemisphere in the sense that this is where we live. It is worth repeating—those who pay attention to the region know this intuitively—that this hemisphere in general, and Latin America in particular, is thus the area of the world that most directly affects our citizens’ daily lives.

To highlight just one of many examples of the region’s impact, U.S. trade with countries in this hemisphere in 2007 was 29.16 percent of the Nation’s total, essentially double that with the European Union (15.22 percent), and more than triple that with China (9.77 percent). The importance of stable economic markets, and the role of security and defense toward achieving that stability, is self-evident. As Senator John McCain said to an audience of broadcasters during his Presidential campaign, “To all of the people and governments of our shared hemisphere: No portion of this earth is more important to the United States. My administration will work relentlessly to build a future with liberty and justice for ALL.” Although President Obama may not have shared the same view, he now needs to get up to speed quickly.

**Addressing the Challenges**

These realities did not come about overnight; they are the cumulative effect of many years of inattention and/or disinterest by U.S. administrations of both parties as well as the inexperience, inconsistency,
and incompetence of many regional governments. Clearly, the resolution will also take considerable time and will depend on both U.S. and regional efforts. A major challenge regional governments must overcome is a history of authoritarian and military rule, a reality not shared by the United States. Many countries continue to work their way through relatively fresh civil-military wounds, with some efforts actually exacerbating rather than healing those wounds. That said, there are two comparatively simple structural changes that DOD can adopt to fundamentally improve the nature of the defense relationship between the United States and the countries of the region.

**combatant commands from this hemisphere have routinely bypassed the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, consulting directly with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy or the Secretary**

First, DOD should create the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA). In essence, this calls for exchanging the configuration of one ASD office with a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) office within the same “directorate.”

This upgrade of the DASD WHA to ASD WHA employs similar logic to that used to create the office of the ASD for Asian Affairs. Prior to the latest OSD reorganization in 2006, Asian affairs were the domain of the DASD for Asia-Pacific Affairs, situated within the ASD for International Security Affairs (ISA) (as were the DASDs for Inter-American Affairs, African Affairs, and Near East-South Asian Affairs). Given the scale of the region and the influence of Asian affairs in general—the cases of China, North Korea, Japan, South Korea, and India, among others—it made good sense to carve out the Asian affairs portfolio and create a separate ASD office. Robert Kaplan argues that a confluence of the experience of three key individuals—Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Myers—was a key factor in this shift. For reasons listed previously, a similar organizational rearrangement is called for in the Western Hemisphere.

A separate but also key issue of this “elevation” is that it more appropriately balances the relationship between the policymaker’s position and that of the combatant commander. Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense are many levels removed from the Secretary of Defense, having to route their recommendations through multiple levels of bureaucrats, most of whom know little and care even less about the region. In hierarchical terms, a DASD is roughly equivalent to a major general, while geographic combatant command commanders are among the most powerful four-star general/flag officers in the system. Over the years, combatant commands from this hemisphere have routinely bypassed the DASD, consulting directly with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy or the Secretary, effectively relegating the DASD to a senior staff officer within the bureaucracy. On the other hand, Assistant Secretaries of Defense are four-star equivalents, requiring confirmation by the Senate (DASDs do not require confirmation). An individual sufficiently senior and experienced to receive Senate confirmation as the ASD WHA would be able to establish and maintain clear lines of policy supremacy vis-à-vis the combatant commander.

As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is the principal military advisor to the Secretary and the President, a combatant commander should be the principal military advisor for issues in the Western Hemisphere to the OSD leadership. An ASD WHA should be the individual responsible for providing advice on defense issues and defense policy—a more strategic and broader perspective than purely operational military matters, which are the purview of combatant commanders. As when the Chairman accompanies the Secretary to Capitol Hill, the combatant commander should accompany the Assistant Secretary, clearly reinforcing the hierarchy of the civilian policymaker for the region over the subordinate military operational commander.

On another note, from a reciprocity and protocol perspective, one should not underestimate the impact of the level of the official charged with defense policy for the hemisphere. Most countries were offended when they were informed of (but never consulted about) the moving of the office responsible for regional policy development from the ASD ISA to the newly created ASD for Homeland Defense (HD). Many senior regional officials questioned whether the United States considered their countries as subordinate to the defense of the American homeland, and why regions such as Africa and the Middle East were still within ISA, while Inter-American Affairs migrated to a newly created office responsible for internal defense of the United States. Upgrading the office responsible for regional policy formulation would go a long way toward reassuring the region that DOD assesses it as important. Moreover, this bureaucratic upgrade would enable the Assistant Secretary to interact on par with the other ASDs within the policy office.
An ancillary advantage of the ASD WHA upgrade is the associated level of congressional (specifically Senate) involvement in Western Hemisphere matters. Senate Armed Services confirmation hearings will require much greater attention than currently exists. Aside from U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) annual testimony, scant attention is paid to the region for reasons already listed. It is also safe to assume that a nominee for ASD WHA would have to be a senior individual with a demonstrated record of experience related to the region. No longer would the office responsible for DOD policy in the area be filled by relatively junior political appointees with limited regional defense experience or expertise.7

The “exchange” of an ASD WHA for the ASD HD is warranted. The creation of the ASD HD office in the post-9/11 environment was an effort to adjust to serious internal threats to U.S. security. The reality, however, was that in broad terms, there was little substantive change in DOD policy. Defense Support to Civil Authorities (or Military Support to Civil Authorities, as it was known previously) is longstanding in U.S. military tradition. DOD’s relationship with the Department of Homeland Security, as well as other relevant actors within the interagency community, does not require this level of organizational interface, particularly in terms of policy. DOD’s role remains what it has long been: to respond to requests from other lead agencies when military capabilities are required to support domestic law enforcement or other agencies. The important civilian policy matters related to Homeland Defense will continue to be performed, but under ASD WHA oversight. Nonetheless, DOD’s primary focus remains external threats and challenges.

This new configuration would be as follows:

ASD WHA. This official now receives the same level of support as his counterparts. He is assigned two military assistants (colonel/captain), a confidential assistant, an executive assistant, and so forth. The ASD would move about the Pentagon, as well as the interagency community and abroad, with much greater prestige, credibility, and authority. The ASD would be supported by a principal deputy and three DASDs.

Principal DASD WHA. Among the perks of being an ASD is the advantage of having a deputy to assist in running the office, typically focusing on the Pentagon, leaving the ASD to work externally. In many cases, the Principal DASD is a career member of the Senior Executive Service (SES), not a political appointee. Ideally, this position would be filled with a career civil servant with 20 years or more of defense experience with Latin American and/or Caribbean issues.

DASD for North American and Caribbean Affairs. This DASD would have responsibility for two of the most important U.S. partners in the world: Canada and Mexico. Despite attempts to shoehorn issues into the Security Prosperity Partnership, the fact is that Canada and Mexico have different security and defense challenges, and require distinct policy management. The Caribbean, for its part, has perhaps the least heterogeneous
of Central America cannot be arbitrarily separated from Mexico, as in the artificial separation resulting from a U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)/USSOUTHCOM boundary. Policies and operational relationships for Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Belize, Costa Rica, and Panama must be made in a coherent and consistent fashion.

**DASD for South American Affairs.** The major actor of this continent, Brazil, demands much greater time and focus than it has received in recent history, not simply because of its physical size, but because of the combination of its geopolitical weight, its growing economic and energy importance, the sophistication of its armament industry, and its ability to change hearts and minds in the region. Many other countries also require attention in their own right, and for diverging reasons: Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Argentina to name a few. And a key country of significant current concern is Venezuela.

**DASD for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities.** The office retains its principal functions as it did under the ASD HD. The DASD and his subordinates continue to interface with Homeland Security and other key interagency actors to ensure effective Defense Support to Civil Authority policies.

**DASD Crisis Management and Mission Assurance.** This office, too, remains organized as it was under the ASD HD, performing Defense Critical Infrastructure Program activities as well as conducting the DOD Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program.

Key functions conducted within the DASD for Homeland Security Integration are melded into the other two DASDs responsible for homeland defense matters, and this “DASD-ship” is disestablished.

A final issue is the quality and the quantity of the individuals assigned to the organization. Over the years, both of these variables have tended to decline. The high-water mark was probably during the 1980s, when a confluence of factors (events in Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and elsewhere) focused Presidential-level attention on the region. Nestor Sanchez—a well-known interagency player with years of experience—was the DASD, and he remained for many years. Since that time, the office’s principal director shifted from a general/flag officer to a career (typically junior) SES, and the country directors shifted from the colonel/General Schedule (GS)–15 level down to major/lieutenant colonel/GS–13, –14, –15 levels. Equally important, the number of personnel assigned to the office declined, routinely totaling fewer than 10 individuals. Moreover, although the military personnel tended to be Army Foreign Area Officers with genuine regional experience, many (if not most) of the civilian personnel had little to none. To be truly effective, the upgrades suggested must include significantly increased numbers of experienced individuals to pay sufficient attention to the region.

The second structural change DOD can make to change the nature of the defense relationship between the United States and the countries of the hemisphere is to establish U.S. Americas Command (USAMCOM). This action is not a replica of the newly created U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), which was essentially carved out of U.S. European Command (USEUCOM); rather, it merges the Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) functions of USNORTHCOM—essentially those related to the external relationship with Mexico, as well as those non–North American Aerospace Defense Command issues specifically related to Canada—with those of the longstanding USSOUTHCOM. The fundamental reason underpinning this UCP change is simple and profound: unity of command. This UCP change eliminates an unnecessary and counterproductive seam between the two existing combatant commands in the hemisphere, and places all counterdrug/counternarco terrorism, disaster relief/humanitarian assistance, and operational and TSC responsibilities for the hemisphere under a single unified commander. While not an original proposal—this idea has been debated for years—it is an important complement to the establishment of the ASD WHA office. For the first time, responsibility for defense policy for the entire hemisphere would be consolidated under an Assistant Secretary of Defense, supported operationally by a single combatant commander.

For its part, USNORTHCOM is disestablished as a geographic combatant command, but its homeland defense operational responsibilities remain in its new designation as a subunified command of USAMCOM. A major advantage is the
U.S. foreign policy attention to the region is far broader than just DOD. The general lack of U.S. foreign policy attention to the region is due to causes similar to those listed above, and it too requires attention. Although this analysis clearly advocates improved U.S. defense policy and interaction, this must be done as a subset of larger U.S. foreign policy interests in the hemisphere. Absent that, the United States runs the risk of exacerbating the perception of a military-focused approach. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates apparently agrees: “This has led to concern among many organizations . . . about what’s seen as a creeping ‘militarization’ of some aspects of America’s foreign policy.” Getting the U.S. Government to exert greater effort and then obtaining positive results from regional governments will be difficult, but the matter at hand is important, so the effort must be made. Secretary Gates continued:
Locher, is one ongoing effort to restructure the 20th-century national security system to one capable of dealing with 21st-century threats and challenges. The Obama administration should recognize the strategic importance of the region and act accordingly to persuade Congress to provide funding for needed programs. As Admiral James Stavridis noted in his 2008 posture statement, “The U.S., in general, needs to be capable of assisting our partners in addressing underlying conditions of poverty and inequality.”11 Those conditions are shaped by political, economic, and social factors and require greater civilian-led interagency efforts, with the military in support.

For defense issues, however, the two previously identified structural changes—simple to articulate but difficult to implement due to a variety of political and bureaucratic obstacles—would give the Secretary of Defense a more robust, authoritative, and effective organizational staff element, coupled with a more coherently organized combat command/military capability. But these steps in and of themselves do not guarantee success. Well-conceived, -coordinated, and -articulated defense policies for the region still must be crafted, and that is done by experienced specialists. As Senator “Scoop” Jackson sagely concluded during his examination of the national security machinery, “The heart problem of national security is not reorganization—it is getting our best people into key foreign policy and defense positions.”12 But getting the individuals with the right background and experience will call for a stronger and more effective organizational structure. Finally, sound policies require a well-resourced and culturally aware combatant command to execute them.

In January 2009, the Obama administration assumed the high responsibility of formulating U.S. foreign, national security, and defense policy. The risks confronting the administration as it attempts to understand and adapt to the myriad challenges of this globalized world will test its wisdom, experience, and judgment. The Western Hemisphere is deserving of attention as the new administration seeks to reestablish U.S. credibility abroad. JFQ

NOTES

1  Final Statement of Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, November 15, 1961, 4.
Trend lines have shaped the nuclear past and will shape the nuclear future. But trend lines are usually set by major events, and major events usually have crosscutting effects. The use of atomic weapons to end World War II and the appearance of the hydrogen bomb, close calls such as the Cuban missile crisis, and game-changing events such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union generate countervailing impulses to control the atom and to build bombs.

Alternative nuclear futures exist; some are far better than others. The choice of a nuclear future does not occur in a vacuum or by happenstance. Nor can the future be masterfully engineered by deliberate choice. Game-changing events can waylay the best made plans. Whether the net effect of such events is negative or positive depends on the nature of the event and how national leaders and their publics react to it. These reactions, in turn, will be shaped not only by the shock of the new, but also by the political context that precedes major headline events. If that context is generally positive, the probability increases that damage can be contained and the net...
effect will be positive. If the preceding context is negative, the headline event is likely to accelerate negative trends.

This article looks initially at nuclear shocks globally and then at shocks and trends in South Asia specifically. Dreadful acts of terrorism occur in this region, although with less frequency than in the past. Acts of terrorism that can do the most damage occur in periods of deteriorating relations, in the context of high infiltration rates across the Kashmir divide and prior incidences of terrorism. If a headline act of terrorism occurs in the context of a deep crisis or border skirmish, it can generate military mobilizations and an escalatory spiral, especially if that act involves a mushroom cloud or, to a lesser extent, radiological material, or conventional explosives are used that produce large-scale loss of life, or an act of terror occurs at a highly symbolic national monument or religious shrine. If, however, a headline act of terrorism occurs during a period when national leaders are working to improve bilateral relations, are making progress, and are seeking a settlement to the Kashmir dispute, there is a reasonable chance that the leaders will redouble their efforts, or at least insulate the process of reconciliation from those who attempt to reverse it.

Trends can build imperceptibly at first and unmistakably over time. Headline events can accentuate these trends, slow them down, or reverse them. Change will have positive as well as negative elements. Opportunity can flow from misfortune, or it can encourage hubris. Choice matters, especially when confronted by game-changing events. It is easier to predict major events—at least in generic form—than to forecast their net consequences. This article thus focuses initially on the major events that could lie ahead because they are the axes on which the nuclear future may turn. Constructive actions now and in the years ahead—or sins of omission and commission—will shape the trend lines that follow, for good or ill.

This is, of course, a speculative exercise. The difficulty in following George Santayana’s famous dictum about being condemned to repeat history is determining which lessons among the large menu of choices bear remembering. Our shared nuclear history will assuredly shape future choices, but as Bernard Brodie, the first great analyst of the nuclear age, observed, “The phrase ‘history proves’ usually signals poor logic and worse history.” International relations theorist Kenneth N. Waltz agrees: “History tells us only what we want to know.”

Unpleasant as well as pleasant surprises happen in life, and it would be quite extraordinary if they did not apply to the bomb as well. Some big events make sense in retrospect but still come as surprises. Continuities can accumulate to the tipping point, where they produce significant discontinuities. Sound analysis and common sense suggest that every act of proliferation has unique aspects, but every new aspect of proliferation also connects to some preceding step. The hipbone, in this business, is usually connected to the thighbone. One permutation of the problem can lead to the next, and as this organism grows, it can become more complex, less predictable, and less manageable.

The flip side of this process could also apply: one wise decision or fortunate development can lead to the next, and the scope of the proliferation dangers can progressively contract. Wise decisions that produce fortunate consequences may produce only temporary relief from proliferation problems. But in the nuclear business, buying time can often be considered a victory.

Shocks and trends in South Asia do not happen in a vacuum, especially those related to nuclear issues. Therefore, before looking at South Asia, let us first consider headline events that can shape our global nuclear future. Perhaps the easiest way to tackle this question—and to identify and prioritize preventive measures—is to identify the events that would produce the most harm. Troubling events could generate positive reactions that contain damage and make subsequent troubling events less likely. Alternatively, negative events could trigger more backsliding. A short list of negative game-changing developments must therefore factor in the potential for even worse downstream consequences. In order of potential damage to nonproliferation norms, rules, and treaties, my list of the nine worst drivers for a negative nuclear future is:

- use of a nuclear weapon in warfare between states
- failure to stop and reverse the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs
- breakdown and radical change of governance within Pakistan
- further spread of enrichment and reprocessing plants to nations that are hedging their bets and might want to be a “screwdriver’s turn” away from the bomb
- failure to lock down and properly safeguard dangerous weapons and nuclear materials that already exist
- acts of nuclear terrorism directed against states by extremist groups
- demise of international inspections and other nuclear monitoring arrangements
- resumption and cascade of nuclear weapons testing
- continued production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons.

This list does not presume to be definitive, and good cases can no doubt be made for additions and reordering. Since my primary intent is to address shocks and trends in South Asia, I will not provide analysis to defend all of these choices, but the third negative driver, the breakdown and radical change of governance within Pakistan, demands comment.

Pakistan has been poorly governed for so long—by both military rulers and civilians—that its demise has been predicted repeatedly. The nation’s cadres of civil servants and its public education system and social services have progressively degraded. Political leadership positions within Pakistan have become lifetime appointments; few business opportunities offer as much prospect of success as being an elected official. National elections are rarely fair and usually do not produce representative governments.
Growing areas within the country have become autonomous from central rule, not only the tribal belt adjacent to Afghanistan, but also parts of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province. Islamic extremism, once a favored tool of the Pakistan military to dislodge the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and punish India across the Kashmir divide, has turned against the organs of the state. Acts of violence are on the rise within Pakistan and have been directed against former paymasters in the military.

Pakistan's strains have grown appreciably since the 9/11 attacks, when the ruling chief of army staff, Pervez Musharraf, abruptly turned against al Qaeda and repositioned his country as a U.S. ally in the "war on terror." The army's links to the Taliban have proved harder to sever. To do so would create rifts within the country's ethnic Pashtun population, which lives astride the border with Afghanistan; to avoid doing so would create a wider rift with the United States. Musharraf did, however, engineer a quieting of the Kashmir divide. Pakistan's military leaders follow the precept that one inflamed border is manageable, while two constitute a severe threat to the state. Consequently, the army seeks to avoid severe crises with India prompted by high rates of infiltration and acts of terror while the Afghanistan border remains explosive. The military leadership also faces growing domestic discontent over its extended stay in power. The army has been trained, equipped, and led to fight India, not to counter extremist groups that engage in domestic violence.

Despite Pakistan's many weaknesses, the country has managed to hold together, and its populace has long been forbearing of misrule. Religious parties have historically received little more than 10 percent of the vote in relatively fair elections. Pakistan remains a rare example of an Islamic state in which the two largest political parties do not define themselves primarily in religious terms. Both parties, however, have suffered from the weaknesses of their leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, who spent most of Musharraf's rule in foreign exile. The Bhutto and Sharif families oversee the only truly national parties within the country. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto raises the possibility that her party will fissure.

Pakistan's multiple weaknesses have long raised concerns that it could suffer a massive upheaval from below, akin to the Iranian political revolution. Iran under the shah was also a secular, progressive Islamic state until many Iranians and their religious leaders rebelled and engineered a toxic shift in national orientation. The United States had little ability to monitor and predict a revolution from below because its ties to Iranian society were from the top down. The same holds true for Pakistan; Washington is poorly situated to track bottom-up changes in Pakistani society that could result in a breakdown and radical change of governance within the country. U.S. concerns over the country's future stability have reinforced Washington's support for military rule, which in turn has accentuated the very trends Washington fears most. The progressive destabilization of Pakistan could reach the point of no return, but sufficient capabilities remain within the
country to avoid this outcome. The departure of military strongmen who create conditions of great political instability is a necessary step before national equilibrium is restored.

**Dominant Trends**

Dominant trends can be defined as significant drivers in the security calculus on the subcontinent. These trends are not necessarily irreversible, but changing course would be hard.

The first such dominant trend is that Pakistan and India will probably keep viewing economic growth as essential to national well-being, domestic cohesion, and national security. Trade between the countries presumably will continue to grow. While the perceived primacy of economic growth does not ensure peaceful relations between Pakistan and India, the pursuit of this goal is likely to further ameliorate animosity. Pakistan's future growth is limited in part by constrained trading partnerships with India and states in Central Asia. As long as Pakistan's ties to neighboring India and Afghanistan remain conflicted, these natural trade routes will generate far less than optimal results. This dominant trend is conducive to improved bilateral relationships on the subcontinent.

Second, in view of the primacy of economics in the national security calculations of Pakistan and India, it is probable that the leadership in both countries will seek to avoid major crises and border skirmishes in the years ahead. Pakistan's interest in nonhostile relations with India is likely to be reinforced by continued difficulties along its border with Afghanistan. The leadership goal of peaceful borders between Pakistan and India could, however, be challenged by significant acts of terrorism perpetrated by extremists with quite different agendas. Nonetheless, there are greater buffers against escalation arising from significant acts of terrorism than in previous years. This dominant trend also points in the direction of improved bilateral relations on the subcontinent. It is hard to envision another standoff like that of the "Twin Peaks" crisis in 2001–2002. This does not, however, exclude lesser cases in which extremist acts trigger retaliatory measures.

A third dominant trend is that Pakistani and Indian leaders will seek to avoid arms racing, which characterized the U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War and resulted in extreme vertical proliferation. With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, arms races have been replaced by asymmetric warfare. No nation is interested in replicating the U.S.-Soviet model, which resulted in grotesquely large nuclear stockpiles. Instead, national leaders in Pakistan, India, and China have repeatedly declared their intention to follow the requirements of minimal credible deterrence.

If this analysis is accurate, Pakistan and India will avoid arms racing, but they will still compete in fielding more capable nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Thus, if India resumes nuclear testing, Pakistan likely will as well. Countries that acquire more and more nuclear weapons and more sophisticated ways to deliver them typically do not feel more secure as a result. Instead, they feel increased concern over the improved nuclear capabilities of a potential adversary. This dynamic is likely to apply to South Asia.

The nuclear arms competition between Pakistan and India has an additional driver: Chinese reactions to U.S. national security policies that seek "decisive" victory in the event of warfare with China over Taiwan. Beijing has long pursued what, in Cold War terms, has been a lackadaisical strategic modernization program. This relaxed pace is changing. The Bush administration’s incorporation of conventional strike capabilities into strategic war plans, the proposed deployment of more than 40 ground-based interceptors in Alaska and...
California, the revised U.S. Air Force guidance related to space superiority, and other military initiatives have gained Beijing’s attention, as they have particular relevance vis-à-vis contingencies related to Taiwan.

The accelerating pace of China’s strategic modernization programs will feed into India’s calculations for a minimal nuclear deterrent, which in turn will feed into Pakistan’s perceived needs. The China-India-Pakistan nuclear triangle is likely to be the primary axis of vertical proliferation over the next 10 years or more. While this competition will fall well short of an arms race—at least in Cold War terms—it will work against nuclear stabilization on the subcontinent.

The fourth dominant trend is that internal security concerns will continue to be paramount for both Pakistan and India. Pakistan’s domestic cohesion is being stressed by several separate but mutually reinforcing factors, including the strains generated by prolonged military rule, the resurgence of al Qaeda and the Taliban, and the difficulties generated by being an ally of the Bush administration in its war on terror. Tensions between provinces and Islamabad have been acute under military rule. Competing demands over resources, particularly water, are likely to exacerbate these tensions in the future. Pakistan’s leaders also must work toward ameliorating sectarian and communal friction.

India, too, must focus on internal security concerns in the northeast, which are growing, and in Kashmir, which appear to be waning. Violence against the state perpetrated by the Muslim minority also must preoccupy India’s leadership. It is a rare conjunction when internal security concerns are greater than external ones in both Pakistan and India. This trend could be conducive to improved relations between New Delhi and Islamabad unless Pakistan’s military and intelligence leaders seek to revive militancy in Kashmir.

A fifth dominant trend is that the United States will seek to maintain strong ties with both governments. This has been a rare occurrence in the diplomatic history of independent India and Pakistan. For most of the Cold War, American diplomacy toward the subcontinent was an either/or proposition: when U.S. ties with Pakistan were strong, they were troubled with India, and vice versa. The Bush administration made a concerted effort to improve ties with both countries, and the events of September 11, 2001, have resulted in better, but by no means uncomplicated, relations with both governments.

U.S. ties with India have never been stronger. While overly optimistic views are likely to lead to disappointment, the upswing in bilateral relations can be expected to continue, bolstered by increased economic ties and trade as well as the increasingly active role in U.S. politics of the Indian-American community.

The United States also has an important stake in Pakistan’s future. If Pakistan transitions to a progressive, moderate Islamic state, it will become a model for other nations and will contain Islamic extremism, which has become a permanent element of national life. Given Islamabad’s importance, Washington will continue to seek improved ties despite lingering issues of contention. Nonetheless, the legacy of the past and the mutual mistrust will not go away. Pakistan’s prior support for the Taliban, its ties to extremist groups that have been active in Kashmir and Afghanistan, and its export of nuclear weapon–making equipment and designs to Iran, North Korea, and elsewhere continue to shadow bilateral relations. The other side of the coin is that many Pakistanis remember the imposition of sanctions over their nuclear program shortly after

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their country helped Washington succeed in prompting the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. There is a widespread view that the United States can be counted on to advance its own interests but not to be a reliable supporter of Pakistan.

Even with this recent history, Washington and Islamabad have managed to keep bilateral relations on a mostly even keel. The biggest stumbling block at present is the resurgence of al Qaeda and the Taliban, which have established sanctuaries on Pakistani soil along the Afghan border, from which cross-border military operations are carried out. Extremist groups within the country are not confined to border regions, however. They can carry out acts of violence in all of Pakistan’s cities. Washington under- stands that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghan border have always had considerable autonomy and resent efforts by the central government to exercise direct control. Nonetheless, Washington cannot accept this as a reason to allow sanctuaries and training camps that carry out attacks against U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and undermine the government of Afghanistan.

Both Islamabad and Washington understand that this issue carries the possibility of another break in relations, which could have severely negative consequences for Pakistan’s national security and domestic politics, regional stability, and U.S. national security. Both capitals can therefore be expected to try to prevent these outcomes. Another sharp break in U.S.-Pakistan ties likely would remove an important shock absorber in the subcontinent.

Influencing Factors

Influencing factors are those that could reinforce both positive and negative trend lines on the subcontinent but that are unlikely to sharply accentuate or reverse them. The India-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement, China’s test of an antisatellite weapon, India’s testing and pursuit of theater missile defenses, and India’s and Pakistan’s military modernization programs can all be defined as influencing factors. Leadership changes in both New Delhi and Islamabad also could become important influencing factors.

The India-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement is a significant initiative that is likely to have negative repercussions for global nonproliferation norms, but it is unlikely to markedly impact the nuclear balance on the subcontinent. Even assuming that all of the national and international hurdles are surmounted to proceed with this agreement, the construction of nuclear facilities is a lengthy and expensive process. It is far from clear at this writing whether domestic sensitivities concerning the proposed agreement would allow the Indian government to proceed. It is also unclear, after the 1984 industrial accident at a Union Carbide facility in Bhopal, that the Indian parliament would approve legislation to limit liability to foreign companies in the event of a nuclear accident. This may not prevent Russia and France from building nuclear power stations in India, but it would likely foreclose U.S. investment in this energy sector.
If existing hurdles could be overcome, Indian and U.S. approvals of the nuclear cooperation agreement would further bolster India’s standing as an exceptional nation and heighten Pakistan’s sense of grievance. Even so, if past remains prologue, Indian governmental entities are likely to proceed with civil nuclear power generation at a measured pace, given the entrenched bureaucratic and political hurdles associated with building nuclear power plants. If this projection is accurate, significant energy dividends resulting from the nuclear agreement are unlikely to materialize over the next decade or more—including the growth of civil nuclear infrastructure that could be redirected to India’s military nuclear programs. The most likely nuclear accord would not lead to a convergence of Indian and U.S. strategic objectives. With or without the nuclear deal, New Delhi would seek to improve ties with both Beijing and Washington. And with or without the nuclear deal, New Delhi would seek to cover growing energy needs, including dealing with Iran.

China’s successful test of an antisatellite weapon in January 2007, like the India-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement, is a significant development. It does not, however, fundamentally change security calculations on the subcontinent or elsewhere. Satellites are inherently vulnerable and extremely difficult to defend. Any nation that possesses medium-range missiles and nuclear weapons has the means to do great harm to satellites in low Earth orbit. In this context, India, Pakistan, and China all possess rudimentary, indiscriminate means of harming satellites. Some spacefaring nations also possess the means of destroying or disabling satellites by using hit-to-kill technologies—as China and the United States have demonstrated—or by using lasers and jammers. China has invested substantially in these capabilities.

China’s demonstrated antisatellite capabilities could be used against India as well as the United States. It therefore would not be surprising if India’s military space sector is also investigating such capabilities. Pakistan relies less on satellites than India, but neither country’s military capabilities appear heavily dependent on satellites for warfighting. The same can be said regarding China. Over time, all three countries are likely to become more dependent on satellites, but this timeline is likely to be extended. Moreover, dominant trends suggest that the likelihood of warfare between Pakistan and India or between India and China is low and decreasing. And if the dominant trends were reversed and war were to occur, it would likely be focused on the ground, not in space.

It can be expected that the Chinese antisatellite test might somewhat accelerate Indian research and development programs related to space warfare applications. It is probable that hedging strategies will be further developed in Pakistan as well. But it is even more likely that other security concerns will continue to dominate Pakistani and Indian military plans and programs.

Pakistan’s military plans also must take into account India’s interest in theater ballistic missile defense programs, as well as the possibility that New Delhi might invest considerable resources to acquire and field such defenses. India’s demonstrated interest in such capabilities has been greater than its interest in space warfare capabilities. Nonetheless, Pakistani military planners appear to have a well-founded appreciation of the technical difficulties associated with deploying effective missile defenses. Indian officials are also likely to be keenly aware of the opportunity costs of investing in missile defenses that may be ineffective compared to, say, investments in improved offensive military capabilities of proven effectiveness. If,

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China’s demonstrated antisatellite capabilities could be used against India as well as the United States. It therefore would not be surprising if India’s military space sector is also investigating such capabilities. Pakistan relies less on satellites than India, but neither country’s military capabilities appear heavily dependent on satellites for warfighting. The same can be said regarding China. Over time, despite these calculations, India chooses to invest in ballistic missile defenses, Pakistan can decide to increase investments in both ballistic and cruise missiles.

Thus, while Pakistan is likely to view India’s interest in missile defenses warily, the primary concern in Rawalpindi, headquarters of Pakistan’s army, may relate to New Delhi’s acquisition of multipurpose military technologies rather than the deployment of effective missile defenses. The acquisition of such technologies would further extend India’s conventional military advantages over the next decade but would not fundamentally change dominant trends or the continuation of mutual vulnerability to nuclear attack.
India and Pakistan will modernize and expand their conventional military capabilities over the next decade through domestic and foreign procurement. These programs are most likely to accentuate the growing disparity between the power projection capabilities of India and Pakistan, but not fundamentally change dominant trends, which include more normal bilateral relations, increased trade, and a mutual unwillingness to turn back the clock to intense crises, brinkmanship, or another limited war. India’s conventional advantages over Pakistan relate to domestic infrastructure, purchasing power, and a larger set of military suppliers. Over the next decade, New Delhi can be expected to make its procurement decisions increasingly with an eye toward China rather than Pakistan.

Pakistan cannot match India’s conventional capabilities, but it appears intent on keeping pace with respect to nuclear modernization. Islamabad has invested heavily in this competition and might well view its nuclear stockpile, fissile material production capacity, and delivery vehicles as compensation for the growing conventional imbalance. Both countries, as well as China, are likely to test and acquire more effective ballistic and cruise missiles. Over the next decade, all three countries are likely to obtain improved means of delivering nuclear weapons from seaborne platforms. The possibility of resuming nuclear weapons testing cannot be ruled out, but leaders in all three countries would prefer that their nation not be the first to break a global moratorium on nuclear testing. Modestly paced nuclear force modernization programs should not fundamentally alter the subcontinent’s strategic environment.

The last potential influencing factor relates to the possibility of leadership changes that disrupt positive trends or accentuate negative ones. Changing leadership in both countries has slowed efforts at normalization and could do so again. Successive coalition governments in New Delhi have spanned the political spectrum, but they have all pursued similar national security policies. India’s contentious domestic politics can, however, seek to accentuate differences, as is now the case with respect to the Bharatiya Janata Party’s opposition to the civil nuclear cooperation agreement it previously sought. The likely conclusion from this record is that changes in Indian governance and the vigorous domestic political challenges that sitting governments face are likely to slow but not greatly alter dominant trends.

While potential changes in governance in Pakistan offer a wider range of choices, there is little reason to believe, as is expressed in some quarters, that Pakistan could experience a significant shift in which religious extremists gain the levers of power. Nothing in Pakistan’s history lends credence to this scenario. If the two major political parties, which do not define themselves primarily in religious terms, are allowed to compete freely in national elections and to mobilize their respective political bases, this scenario becomes even more remote. Nonetheless, political destabilization within Pakistan will surely slow positive regional trends.

**Shocks, Wild Cards, and Game Changers**

Shocks, wild cards, and game changers are developments that could greatly impact political, national, and regional security on the subcontinent. These developments could significantly accentuate or shift the dominant trends already identified.

The biggest shock would be a radical change in governance in Pakistan. One contributing factor could be U.S. military operations within the country to combat the resurgence of the Taliban and al Qaeda, and their continued use of Pakistani territory to carry out attacks on U.S. and NATO forces operating across the border in Afghanistan. The resurgence of the Taliban, the widely presumed location of Taliban and al Qaeda leaders on Pakistani soil, and unrest in Pakistan’s tribal belt along the Afghan border pose major challenges for U.S.-Pakistan ties and the Islamabad government. If the executive and/or legislative branches in the United States conclude that Pakistan is unwilling or unable to control the Taliban and al Qaeda, bilateral ties will face rough sledding. Pressures would likely build on U.S. military and political leaders to undertake cross-border actions against perceived sanctuaries for the Taliban and al Qaeda leadership, which could have negative impacts on relations between Washington and Islamabad and for Pakistan’s domestic politics.

A second shock would be an incident of nuclear terrorism on the subcontinent. Concerns about nuclear terrorism are well founded in this region; there are extremist groups operating in both countries that could have the means as well as the motive to acquire radiological and perhaps even fissile materials. Fears of nuclear terrorism could eclipse concerns over the India-Pakistan nuclear balance during the next decade.

Warfighting scenarios involving total mobilization along the two traditional fighting corridors, as well as the deliberate escalation of a conventional conflict across the nuclear threshold, do not appear likely for the foreseeable future, although these scenarios cannot entirely be ruled out. New
crises could still unfold, and the use of nuclear weapons—whether by accident or a breakdown of command and control—cannot be dismissed by relying on an academic theory such as the stability-instability paradox. One possible driver of unwanted crises and escalation could be an act of nuclear terrorism in either India or Pakistan that is attributed to extremists who have received foreign support. An act of nuclear terrorism could be particularly hard to contain if it occurs in the context of ongoing deterioration of Pakistan-India relations.

The use of a radiological dispersal device or “dirty bomb” is more plausible than the detonation of a nuclear weapon that has been stolen or constructed out of highly enriched uranium. In both India and Pakistan, as elsewhere, materials that could be used to make dirty bombs are widely available and poorly guarded in the civil sector. These devices would not cause great loss of life, but they could provoke widespread public anxiety and economic disruption.

A third shock, wild card, or game changer on the subcontinent could be a crisis between the United States and Iran in which Washington uses military force against Tehran, perhaps to delay its nuclear programs or in retaliation for Iranian-backed attacks against U.S. interests or forces in the region. In these scenarios, Washington would expect diplomatic support from Islamabad and New Delhi. If support were not forthcoming in one or both cases, the U.S. executive and/or legislative branches might reevaluate ongoing bilateral cooperation efforts, particularly with respect to military assistance and, in the case of India, civil nuclear cooperation.

A clash between the United States and Iran would likely be problematic for both U.S.-Pakistan and U.S.-India relations. Domestic backlash against the United States could be expected in both countries. Pakistani authorities might also face increased sectarian violence and domestic unrest. Leaders in both countries would find it difficult to improve ties with Washington. Instead, backsliding could occur.

A fourth potential shock, wild card, and game changer would be a U.S.-China clash over Taiwan. Another Taiwan crisis could also become a test of U.S. ties with both Islamabad and New Delhi. India seeks improved ties with Beijing as well as Washington and would seek to avoid antagonizing either capital. Pakistan also would be placed in a tough spot in the event of a possible clash between its two most important patrons. Depending on how a U.S.-China confrontation over Taiwan were to play out, Pakistan and India could choose different sides. In that event, U.S. ties with India could improve even more, while ties with Pakistan could deteriorate further.

Not all shocks, wild cards, and game-changing developments are negative. A Pakistan-India agreement on the key elements for settling the Kashmir dispute would be a significant accomplishment, even if negotiations on implementing details take considerable time. Agreement on the key elements of a Kashmir settlement would likely generate extremist acts as well as provide insulation against a downturn in bilateral Pakistan-India ties. It would facilitate economic growth and cross-border and regional trade, providing one basis for greater domestic tranquility in both countries, and a counter to the negative wild cards described above.

**Policy Consequences**

What policy consequences that flow from this analysis would apply more narrowly to the Pentagon, and what should the Pentagon do as a result? First, it should strive to improve military-to-military ties with both Pakistan and India. Clearly, this would be more challenging with Pakistan, but solid ties with both countries would help prevent unintended escalation arising from the triggering events discussed above.

Second, two standard instruments for improved military-to-military ties are bilateral training exercises and arms sales. What kind of training exercises and arms sales deserve prioritization? Some major U.S. arms sales with India could, ironically, become a casualty of the civil nuclear connection between U.S. arms sales to India and Pakistan’s nuclear requirements. The more indirect the connection between U.S. arms sales to India and Pakistan’s nuclear requirements, the better. The more direct the connection between U.S. arms transfers and monitoring the Kashmir divide, the better.

Third, the Pakistan army’s raison d’être since its inception has been to defend against the Indian army. A relatively small fraction is trained and equipped to deal with internal security and counterterrorism operations. The primary focus of the Pentagon’s arms sales and training programs for Pakistan should accordingly be explicitly oriented toward those requirements. This approach is obviously needed and has the added benefit of providing the best chance of sustaining a domestic political consensus in the United States for continued military ties to Pakistan.

Similarly, the Pentagon should seek, over time, to engage in trilateral counterterrorism military exercises with India and Pakistan. In addition, U.S. Defense Department leadership should seek to accelerate and broaden cooperative threat reduction programs that fall under its purview with India and Pakistan. Finally, despite time constraints, high-level Pentagon visitors should make it a point to request meetings with a range of political and military leaders when they visit Pakistan.

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NOTE 1 This crisis was triggered by an attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 and reached another fevered peak with attacks against the families of Indian servicemen in battle-ready formations in May 2002.
NATO’S UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Is Demography Destiny?

By JEFFREY SIMON

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) finds itself increasingly stressed by current and prospective demographic shifts within its membership that will almost certainly hamper its collective ability to deploy operational forces and further strain the transatlantic relationship in the years ahead.

NATO has shifted from large conscript forces, which were useful for its territorial defense during the Cold War, toward smaller, all-volunteer military establishments to carry out expeditionary operations. This shift has had different political consequences in Europe and the United States and has resulted in increasingly diverging views of the role of the military and how it contributes to security and defense.

Demographically, the gap between U.S. and European NATO members’ military age cohorts is widening, with the U.S. cohort increasing while the European numbers shrink. At the same time, diverging immigration patterns and shifting internal demographics could erode the common historic identity of the United States and Europe and affect the transatlantic relationship. A relatively young and growing U.S. population will contribute to its slightly enhanced global economic profile in 2050, while Europe’s aging and shrinking productive population will be a factor in its diminishing presence.

Finally, the world’s population and the locus of its economic growth will continue to reflect the inexorable shift away from the Eurocentric world that existed when NATO was created in 1949, leading to Europe’s rapid demographic marginalization and relative economic decline by 2050.

Anticipating Change

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is no stranger to controversy. Over the past 60 years, it has endured disputes over defense strategy, the role of nuclear weapons, the size and composition of its membership, and how best to respond to looming challenges beyond its immediate territory. Today, however, the Atlantic Alliance finds itself increasingly stressed by emerging socioeconomic and political changes among the Allies—changes that are fundamentally influenced by larger...
Military Capacity: How Usable?

The most immediate trend of concern is already being seen within NATO’s military manpower base. The shift from large conscript forces, which were useful in the defense of European territory during the Cold War, toward smaller, all-volunteer military establishments with a more expeditionary focus has had different and somewhat unexpected political consequences in Europe and the United States.

When the Cold War ended in 1989–1990, the United States had an all-volunteer force of 2,181,000 troops, while NATO’s European Allies had 3,509,000 troops (roughly 60 percent more) under arms (see table 1). All European Allies—with the sole exception of the United Kingdom, which had an all-volunteer force since 1963—maintained largely conscript forces.

During the Cold War, NATO’s main role was the territorial defense of Europe; it never engaged in expeditionary operations. Such missions only began in the early 1990s with air and naval operations in the Balkans and expanded dramatically in December 1995, when the Dayton Accords resulted in the deployment of a 60,000-troop Implementation Force and follow-on Stabilization Force to Bosnia-Herzegovina. After a 78-day bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999, NATO deployed a 50,000-troop Kosovo Force, 16,000 of which remain there today. In August 2003, NATO assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force, which was authorized after the events of September 11 and the start of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom and now maintains 52,700 troops in Afghanistan.

Since 1989, when the former Soviet threat to Europe was diminishing and out-of-area risks were increasing, NATO’s European armed forces declined by more than 1.5 million troops. When Europe was beginning to respond to new risks, it had already lost roughly half a million troops by 1995, then another 300,000 by 1999, and 700,000 more by 2004; by 2008, only 1,970,000 troops remained. At the same time, most of European NATO was abandoning conscription and moving toward smaller, all-volunteer forces. By 2008, seven of NATO’s military establishments had become professional; of the five military establishments retaining conscription (because of long-held threat perceptions in Turkey and Greece, territorial defense traditions in Norway and Denmark, and Germany’s commitment to Innere Führung, or “citizens in uniform”), conscript terms have shortened because of declining social support. In sum, in 2008, the 12 Cold War European NATO countries man a force roughly equivalent to that of the United States—about 1,400,000 professional troops.

During the post-Cold War period, NATO has added 10 new members (in 1999 and 2004) and has extended invitations to Croatia and Albania for entry in 2009. The militaries of NATO’s new members have experienced the same trends as the established members (see table 2). As expeditionary operations had become the main focus of NATO’s attention, the new members focused on developing this capability and participated in NATO operations to enhance their admission prospects.

In 1999, the 10 militaries counted 230,000 professionals among their 618,000 troops. By 2004, their total force declined to 409,000 troops, but their professional strength increased to 270,000. By 2008, 8 of the 10 new members had become totally professional.
(with only Lithuania and Estonia retaining conscription for a small part of their armed forces). As a result, 314,000 of their 317,000 troops were professional soldiers and could be counted toward augmenting European NATO’s potential deployable force.

But as European militaries have shifted to smaller, all-volunteer forces concentrated in fewer caserns, significant social and political consequences resulted. Public unease over the expeditionary use of military forces that one might have expected with heavy reliance upon young conscripts has not eased with the shift toward professional soldiers; if anything, those anxieties have increased. As defense was no longer the priority that it had been during the Cold War and armed forces were becoming less visible to their publics, many European societies began to raise questions about their utility. This was particularly the case when used in unpopular expeditionary operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, as the armed forces no longer constituted the large voting blocks of earlier years, they were becoming less politically important to their elites. This situation has already become acute in Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and is becoming more so with the other new members, with the notable exception of Poland.

Defense versus Security

Along with, and compounded by, these shifts in military capacity is the reemergence of diverging views within the Alliance of the role of the military in meeting current security challenges. In the aftermath of 9/11, although the United States did create a Department of Homeland Security, it substantially increased defense expenditures, consistently allocating 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to defense since 2004. The defense budget allocations reflect the fact that the U.S. public and political elite continued to see the military as providing a significant role in the defense of the country. For the United States, the main lesson of 9/11 was that emerging nonstate threats should be interdicted before they reach the American homeland, and the U.S. military has proved to be the best available instrument for that purpose.

In contrast, most European NATO members are increasingly focusing on internal security, not defense, as a predominant concern. Not only do the recent White

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<th>Table 2. Comparative Trends in Defense Establishments of New NATO Members</th>
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<td><strong>Strength of Defense Establishments</strong></td>
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<td><strong>(military)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Conscription Terms</strong></td>
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<td><strong>(months)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Hungary</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Czech Republic</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Slovakia</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Romania</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Bulgaria</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Estonia</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Slovenia</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Force</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Professional</strong></td>
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<tr>
<th>Table 3. Comparative Trends in Defense Budgets of NATO’s Cold War European Members*</th>
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<td><strong>Defense Budget as Percent of Gross Domestic Product</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>(average current prices)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Spain</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Netherlands</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Belgium</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Norway</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Portugal</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Greece</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
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<th>Table 4. Comparative Trends in Defense Budgets of New NATO Members</th>
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<td><strong>Defense Budget as Percent of Gross Domestic Product</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>(current prices)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Hungary</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Czech Republic</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Romania</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Estonia</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Slovenia</strong></td>
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Papers issued by the United Kingdom, Germany, and France reflect their growing internal security concerns,1 but also their defense budgets, as well as those of other European NATO allies, seem to correspond to those perceptions. While European interior ministries are enlarging and playing more important roles in addressing security concerns, their defense budgets have been stagnating or decreasing.

This downward defense trend has been consistent among NATO’s Cold War European members since 1990 (see table 3) and is unlikely to change any time in the future. Only 4 of the 12 Allies maintain budgets meeting the generally accepted 2 percent of GDP threshold: the United Kingdom and France, with all-volunteer and expeditionary capabilities and experience, and Greece and Turkey, with large conscript forces and mutual defense concerns. France pledges to hold its defense budget constant at 2 percent until 2012 but will reduce its defense establishment by 54,000 over the next 7 years. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and Spain have defense budgets that have declined to 1.3 percent or lower.

When a terrorist train bombing killed 191 and wounded more than 1,400 in Madrid in 2004, Spain did not want NATO to invoke Article 5; it increased its interior ministry budget and held defense expenditures steady at 1.2 percent. When other NATO European members have faced similar challenges, they, too, have focused on internal security institutions, where NATO’s defense instruments are less relevant. This emphasis conforms to the traditional tendency in many parts of Europe to view terrorism as a law enforcement problem first and foremost, thus falling within the purview of a country’s police and public security apparatus, rather than a threat to be countered by military means. In sum, internal security challenges are becoming more relevant to European societies and political elites, an area where NATO’s Article 5 has a diminishing role to play. Hence, many European NATO members apparently see defense allocations as less relevant to deal with their security challenges.

The same stasis or downward trend has been evident even among NATO’s 10 new members since their accession (see table 4). Only Bulgaria meets the 2 percent goal, and only Poland and Romania come close at 1.9 percent. Despite earlier promises, some Allies—Hungary, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic—have clearly returned disappointing defense results. And this trend is not likely to change among NATO’s new Allies in the near future.

In marked contrast to NATO’s Cold War and new European members, the United States continues to see defense as a vital instrument to deal with threats. These diverging transatlantic views on how the military contributes to defense and security are likely to exert further pressure on European defense budgets and military forces and on the transatlantic relationship.

### Shrinking Military Age Cohort

The issues of shrinking force size and resource commitments, while significant in their own right, pale in comparison to a much more profound challenge: U.S. and European NATO members’ military service cohorts are moving in opposite directions.

The U.S. population of 283,230,000 in 2000 is projected to grow to roughly 397,063,000 in 2050.4 During the same period, the U.S. median age of 35.5 is to increase only slightly to 36.2 in 2050.4 Hence, the United States should have an adequate cohort available for military service at current troop levels. In marked contrast, European

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**Table 5. Selected NATO European Member Population, 2000–2050 (medium variant)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population (thousands)</th>
<th>Difference</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>59,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>59,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>82,017</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>39,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>57,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>15,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>10,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>66,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total w/o France and Turkey</td>
<td>290,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total w/ France and Turkey</td>
<td>(416,835)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population (thousands)</th>
<th>Difference</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>9,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>38,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>10,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>5,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>22,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>7,949</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>3,696</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2,421</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1,393</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1,988</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>104,129</td>
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</table>

(Cold War and new) NATO members not only will experience population decline, but also the median age of 37.7 in 2000 is projected to rise to 47 in 2050. What this means is that the Europeans’ declining military service cohort could affect their ability to meet planned force levels and make it more difficult to modernize their smaller, expensive professional forces in the face of mounting health and social costs for their aging populations. Some European Allies actually may have to face the question of whether they will be able to maintain a viable military.

Among NATO’s Cold War European members (see table 5), the declining cohort and aging problem will be felt most acutely in Italy and Spain, where overall declines of 21 to 25 percent in population are projected. As a result, between 2005 and 2050, Italy’s population over the age of 60 will increase substantially from 25.5 to 41.6 percent, and Spain’s from 21.4 to 39.7 percent. Although Germany, Greece, and Portugal have overall projected population declines of 10 to 15 percent, they also will experience an aging challenge. Between 2005 and 2050, the 60-and-over population will increase in Greece from 23 to 36.8 percent; in Portugal from 22.3 to 36.3 percent; and in Germany from 25.1 to 35 percent. In all these cases, a shrinking 15- to 59-year-old cohort will find it more difficult to fill out military billets to maintain existing force levels, while the need to subsidize the increasing health care and social welfare costs of an aging population will compete with efforts to maintain and modernize existing armed forces. Even France and the United Kingdom, which have relatively more favorable demographics, face challenges. In 2005, both had 60-and-over populations of 21.1 percent; by 2050, those French and British populations will be 33 and 29.4 percent, respectively. In all these cases, a shrinking 15- to 59-year-old cohort will find it more difficult to fill out military billets to maintain existing force levels, while the need to subsidize the increasing health care and social welfare costs of an aging population will compete with efforts to maintain and modernize existing armed forces. Even France and the United Kingdom, which have relatively more favorable demographics, face challenges. In 2005, both had 60-and-over populations of 21.1 percent; by 2050, those French and British populations will be 33 and 29.4 percent, respectively. In all these cases, a shrinking 15- to 59-year-old cohort will find it more difficult to fill out military billets to maintain existing force levels, while the need to subsidize the increasing health care and social welfare costs of an aging population will compete with efforts to maintain and modernize existing armed forces. Even France and the United Kingdom, which have relatively more favorable demographics, face challenges. In 2005, both had 60-and-over populations of 21.1 percent; by 2050, those French and British populations will be 33 and 29.4 percent, respectively.

Impact of Immigration

Any assessment of shifting demographics within the Alliance must consider the distinctive impact of diverging immigration patterns in Europe and the United States and the potential for these patterns to erode a common historic identity. As fertility declines in Europe, the contribution of international migration to its population growth is increasing in significance. Although immigration is one way to increase the number of European cohorts available for military service, other demographic forces are pulling the United States and European NATO countries in different directions. Worldwide, the countries with the highest levels of net emigration annually are projected to be China (−329,000), Mexico (−306,000), India (−241,000), Philippines (−180,000), Pakistan (−167,000), and Indonesia (−164,000). While the United States and Europe will be net receivers of international migrants, their intake composition is increasingly different. The traditional U.S. immigration pattern increasingly has shifted away from Europe, while Europe’s is increasingly shifting toward immigration from Muslim lands in Asia Minor, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and the Maghreb. This could pull each side of the Atlantic in different directions.

The United States faces immigration demographics that are very different from Europe; its birth rate is higher, and it can absorb many more immigrants. From 2005 to 2050, the United States is projected to receive 1.1 million immigrants annually, many of whom are Hispanic (Spanish is rapidly becoming its second language) and Asian, whose populations will triple in size. The Hispanic population, 42 million in 2005, will rise to 128 million in 2050, constituting 29 percent of the U.S. population (compared to 14 percent in 2005 and 3.5 percent in 1960). The Asian population, 14 million in 2005, will grow to 41 million in 2050, constituting 9 percent of the U.S. population (compared to 5 percent in 2005 and 0.6 percent in 1960). This means that 38 percent of the U.S. population will be either Hispanic or Asian in 2050, compared to only 4.1 percent in 1960.

During the same period, the internal demographics of NATO’s European Allies face drastic changes as well. Germany is projected to receive 150,000 immigrants annually, Italy 139,000, the United Kingdom 130,000, and Spain 123,000. Immigration from Turkey, the Muslim East, and North Africa to fill labor shortfalls is already having an impact on intercommunal relations and security concerns. Since the attacks of September 11, public anxieties about an influx of Muslim populations into Europe have risen, sparked in part by numerous outbreaks of violence. Security concerns have increased since the Madrid commuter train bombings on March 11, 2004; the assassination of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands in November 2004; terrorist bombings in London in July 2005; weeks of street violence and car bombings in France in October-November 2005; and widespread riots following the publication of cartoons offensive to some Muslims in a Danish newspaper in February 2006. Pew public opinion polls in Spain, Germany,
Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands indicate that between 70 and 78 percent are either somewhat or very concerned about Islamic extremism.\(^{14}\) While Muslims in the United Kingdom constitute roughly 3 percent of overall population (mostly Pakistanis and Bangladeshis), in Germany, 4 percent (mostly Turks), in France, 8 percent (mostly Algerians), in Spain, 2 percent (mostly Moroccans), and in the Netherlands, 6.6 percent (mostly Indonesians, Turks, and Moroccans),\(^{15}\) their fertility rates are three times higher than non-Muslims.\(^{16}\) Muslim immigration has contributed to European NATO’s increasing focus on internal security (rather than defense) and will likely have an impact on Europe’s political relations with the external Islamic world.

While Muslim population growth resulting from immigration and higher fertility rates is clearly a factor within European NATO, it is also having an impact in wider Europe. During the same period (2005–2050), Russia’s population is projected to decline from 145.5 million to 104.3 million, with Muslims approaching the majority of the population. Ukraine, facing increasing pressures in South Crimea, will decline from 49.6 to 29.9 million.\(^{17}\) Similarly, demographics in the Balkans will evidence some local Muslim populations (Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina) approaching majorities.

In summary, U.S. and Europe’s diverging and shifting internal demographics will likely continue to pull each side of the Atlantic in different directions. The U.S. reorientation from predominantly European to increasingly Hispanic and Asian will likely pull diaspora attention toward these regions, while Europe’s increasingly Muslim diaspora probably will draw attention in different directions.

**The Age Factor**

Another phenomenon, closely connected to immigration, is that of aging. While a relatively young and growing U.S. population will be a factor in its slightly enhanced global economic profile in 2050, Europe’s aging and shrinking productive population will contribute to its diminishing presence.

Within Europe’s NATO members, the link between aging and productivity will be especially acute. Europe’s fertility rates remain low (decreasing from 1.9 in the mid-1980s to 1.4) and are projected to decline over the next decade;\(^{18}\) its active working population will decline from 331 million to 243 million.\(^{19}\) Hence, fewer productive people will need to devote more resources to provide health and social services to an aging European population. As a result, according to some estimates, the share of the gross world product (GWP) of the 15 European Union (EU 15) members as of 1995 will decline from roughly 22 percent in 2003 to 12 percent in 2050.\(^{20}\) Europe’s aging population will comprise a shrinking portion of the global population with resulting economic, social, and security consequences.

In marked contrast to Europe, the U.S. population will actually increase during the same time. Due to higher fertility rates (2.1) and immigration flows, the median age of the U.S. population (35.5 in 2003) will rise only slightly (36.2 in 2050),\(^{21}\) and its active working population will actually increase from 269 million in 2003 to 355 million in 2050. And according to some estimates, the U.S. share of GWP is projected to increase from roughly 23 percent now to 26 percent in 2050.\(^{22}\) In other words, the U.S. experience will significantly diverge from that of Europe. This factor, combined with immigration patterns noted earlier, could also have a dramatic effect on its identity and political orientation. While Europe will remain important to the United States, Asia and Latin America will be gaining in relative economic, social, and domestic political importance. These trends, too, are likely to have an impact on the transatlantic
relationship and the Alliance’s future as we move toward the mid-21st century.

**Demographic and Economic Marginalization**

Finally, there is a global reality to be considered: The world’s population will continue to reflect the inexorable shift away from the Eurocentric world that existed when NATO was created in 1949 to the rapid demographic-economic marginalization of Europe by 2050.

In 1950, the world population stood at 2.519 billion; shortly after NATO’s 50th anniversary in 2000, the world population stood at 6.057 billion. Over those 50 years, the North American (including Canada) share of world population of 172 million (or 6.8 percent share) grew to 314 million (or 5.2 percent). In marked contrast to North America, although the population of the 25 member nations of the EU (the EU 25 as of 2004)—350 million (at 13.9 percent)—had grown to 452 million, this represented a decline to 7.5 percent of the world population. In effect, Europe registered a significant demographic marginalization within the world.

Over the next decades, Europe’s demographic marginalization will become more rapid and will result in relative economic decline. If NATO still exists in 2050, it will do so in a world with a population projected to be 9.322 billion. The North American population is projected at 438 million (or 4.7 percent) with a 26 percent share of GWP; the EU 25, forecast as down from 452 million to 431 million (or 4.6 percent), is projected to only share slightly more than 12 percent of the GWP. Significantly, thanks to an increasingly non-European diaspora, U.S. political attention will shift away from Europe and toward Latin America and Asia as these areas become more important. The population of Latin America and the Caribbean, which stood at 519 million in 2000 (up from 167 million in 1950), is projected to surpass Europe by more than 30 percent in 2050, with a population of 806 million (or 8.6 percent).

In Asia, China counted 1.275 billion in 2000 (up from 554.8 million in 1950) and is projected to be at 1.462 billion in 2050 (or 15.7 percent). During the same period, India’s population of 1 billion in 2000 (up from 357.6 million in 1950) is projected to be 1.57 billion (or 16.8 percent of the world population) in 2050.24 The two countries together will comprise 32.5 percent of the total world population and will play a larger role in the world economy. China’s 25 percent share of GWP in 2050 will be roughly equal to that of the United States and twice that of the EU 15. Internal demographic factors and external global shifts increasingly will draw the attention of the United States away from its traditional European focus. Europe’s rapid demographic marginalization and diminishing social, economic, and political weight will mean that it will no longer be the “center” of the world or of U.S. attention.

**Is Demography Destiny?**

As the French philosopher August Comte suggested in his now-famous formula, a society’s demographic inheritance can indeed be a decisive factor in its fate. And what is true for countries is no less true for alliances. The future of the Alliance is increasingly challenged by a range of problems that are fundamentally rooted in its social demography, and these problems will very likely continue to divide the two sides of the Atlantic. The Alliance’s future is being influenced by Europe’s shifting from large conscript armed forces to smaller, all-volunteer forces and by diverging transatlantic views on the military’s role in providing defense and security. In addition, as the Alliance advances toward the middle of the 21st century, increasing U.S.-European demographic divergences will likely continue, reflecting the shrinking European population cohort available for defense establishments; altered immigration patterns will further loosen traditional social ties; aging European populations will compete with defense for ever scarcer resources; and the changing global population mix will reflect Europe’s demographic marginalization and relative economic decline.

How will the diminishing overall “weight” of the “West” affect both Europe’s and the U.S. positions and roles in the world? How relevant will NATO be to U.S. and European interests in 2050? Will the trends discussed above loosen further or actually undermine Article 5, the transatlantic foundation of the past half-century, or could these trends conceivably foster a sober Euroatlantic community discussion that could ignite the spark to seek a newly defined mutual security organization that could pull both sides of the Atlantic together to fend off the outside world?

No one can answer these questions in any definitive way. What is clear is that as Europe’s 60-and-over population expands and as NATO approaches its 60th anniversary in 2009, these social, economic, and demographic factors need to be consciously weighed by the Alliance as it looks ahead to writing a new Strategic Concept. A reexamination of the 1949 Washington Treaty and an assessment of how NATO responded successfully to 20th-century world challenges might be in order as the basis to explore how the Washington Treaty might be refocused, updated, and/or recast to deal with the greatly transformed world of the mid-21st century. If in fact NATO’s Article 5 has less relevance in a 21st-century world, and if internal security concerns are becoming more pertinent to Europe than external defense, NATO’s overriding task should be to identify what, if any, transatlantic interests remain—be they international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and failed states, transnational crime, energy and cyber security, migration, pandemic disease, or global warming—and how the Alliance can best act with common purpose in light of them. Without such concerted action, it is hard to foresee how demography will not prove to be NATO’s Achilles’ heel.

NOTES


3 The United Kingdom White Paper sees “no major conventional threats . . . but the threat from proliferation and international terrorism remains very real. [Hence] defence forces must support Home defence and security in support of the Home Office and civil authorities . . . achieved through Joint Regional Liaison Officers to protect our citizens at home.” Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper (London: Ministry of Defence, December 2003), 3, 9. The German White Paper portrays internal and external security becoming increasingly interwoven, arguing that “the need for the protection of the population and of the infrastructure has increased in importance as a result of the growing threat that terrorist
attacks pose to German territory” and calling for “expanding the Constitutional framework for the deployment of the armed forces.” White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006), 9, 57. The French White Paper claims “the traditional distinction between internal and external security has lost its relevance,” adding that uncertainty requires the ability to anticipate and take decisions autonomously. Hence, it calls for increased expenditures for intelligence and establishing a new Defence and National Security Council. The French White Paper on Defence and National Security (Paris: President of the Republic, 2008), 5, 11, 16.


3 “With the notable exceptions of Turkey and France, which project population increases, and the United Kingdom and Netherlands, which fundamentally remain unchanged.”

4 World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision, UN Report ST/ESA/SER.A/261/ES (New York: UN, 2007), 9. These figures are similar to median age (the age that divides the older and younger halves of the population) calculations. In Europe in 2002, the median age was 38 years; by 2050, it will be 51. In Germany, it will be 53; in Italy, 57. See Peter G. Peterson, “The Global Impact of a ‘Gray Dawn,’” Heritage Lectures No. 729 (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, February 26, 2002), 4.


6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.


10 Ibid.


13 Omer Taspinar argued in 2003 that the Muslim birth rate in Europe is three times higher than for non-Muslims, and that if current trends continue, the Muslim population in Europe will nearly double by 2015, while the non-Muslim population will shrink by 3.5 percent. See Europe’s Muslim Street (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003), available at <www.brookings.edu/opinions/2003/03middleast_taspinar.aspx?p=1>.


15 “Half a Billion Americans?—Demography and the West,” 22.


17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.


20 Ibid.

Trouble with Doctrine?

By DAVID H. GURNEY

It will do what good doctrine ought to do, which is to stimulate thought. It’s not a template. I don’t think it’s going to be a rigid set of prescriptions. But what it will do, I think, will be to stimulate thought and to be the basis of ever-developing practice in this field.

—Department of State Counselor Eliot Cohen
Signing Ceremony for the U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Guide
January 13, 2009

JFQ readers are accustomed to seeing one or more essays on various aspects of joint thought, usually challenging or expanding extant doctrine. In this issue, we present opposing views of systemic operational design, which unlike effects-based operations, explored in previous editions of JFQ—is targeted primarily at commanders and their key subordinates and less toward staffs in their supporting and secondary roles. JFQ sponsors these debates in hopes of contributing materially to the refinement of ideas necessary to keep the institutional wisdom that is joint doctrine right and relevant.

It is fashionable for those advocating various aspects of joint thought to opine that joint doctrine is somehow faulty, and to conclude that because of its often unspecified deficiencies, military strategists, operational planners, and commanders fail to see the “big picture.” Such a perception was recently given voice by retired Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege when he asserted in the January-February edition of Military Review that “current doctrine needs to provide more wisdom about how to help the command think critically and creatively as a team.” But is the problem really with doctrine? Or could the problem be elsewhere, such as doctrinal familiarity or policy? Joint doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces, and commanders must exercise judgment in selecting courses of action appropriate to the unique circumstances prevailing at the time of decision. “Policy” is more fundamentally about specified choices and it is directive, whereas “doctrine” is authoritative advice. This difference is important because policy restraints and constraints are among the unique circumstances providing context to decisions.

In the Winter 2009 issue of World Affairs Journal, H.R. McMaster asserts that in both Vietnam and Iraq, it was not doctrine but rather policy that was responsible for the conceit “that the United States had discovered the secret of using violence with minimal uncertainty and a high degree of efficiency: the mere demonstration of American military prowess, policymakers argued at the outset of both conflicts, would be sufficient to alter the behavior of the enemy.” Senior military leaders provide recommendations on feasible military options, resources required, and anticipated consequences of military action, as well as the military requirements for conflict termination. The interaction between senior military leaders and policymakers is largely confidential, and therefore some elements of strategy are difficult to trace. After reading the arguments of Colonel Richard Swain and Professor Milan Vego that follow, the questions for JFQ readers to ponder are: Do we indeed have defective or deficient doctrine? Are military professionals insufficiently familiar with extant joint doctrine? Or are the issues elsewhere, specifically in the policies imposed? JFQ
Effects-based Thinking
in Joint Doctrine

By JOINT STAFF J7 JOINT DOCTRINE AND EDUCATION DIVISION STAFF

Much discussion in Joint Force Quarterly and other media has occurred lately regarding what can broadly be called “effects-based ideas.” To bring clarity to this debate, it is worthwhile to consider exactly what published U.S. joint doctrine says—and does not say—on this topic.

For the record, one does not find the terms (or their related acronyms) effects-based operations (EBO) or effects-based approaches to operations (EBAO) anywhere in the 77-volume U.S. joint doctrine hierarchy. Furthermore, one does not find the terms (or acronyms) operational net assessment (ONA) or system-of-systems analysis (SoSA). What one does find is the inclusion of the term effects as an element of operational design—one of 17 such elements provided as “tools to help commanders and their staffs visualize the campaign or operation and shape the [concept of operations]” (see Joint Publication [JP] 3–0, Joint Operations, IV–5).

Current joint doctrine promotes a “Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment” (see JP 3–0, chapters II and IV). This perspective—or better understanding—“supports operational design by enhancing elements such as centers of gravity, lines of operations, and decisive points. This allows commanders and their staffs to consider a broader set of options to focus limited resources, create desired effects, avoid undesired effects, and achieve objectives.”

Not surprisingly, JP 5–0, Joint Operation Planning, takes the above into account as it details its subject matter. It would have been incomplete and inconsistent with JP 3–0 if it did not—something the joint doctrine community finds unacceptable.

The “systems perspective” and the inclusion of “effects” as an element of operational design in both JP 3–0 and JP 5–0 should not be construed as U.S. joint doctrine blanket acceptance of EBO/EBAO in the fullness of those ideas. Even considering that there is no definitive treatise on what constitutes EBO/EBAO, a nonpartisan analysis of the center mass of EBO/EBAO thinking would show that the bulk of the construct was not incorporated into joint doctrine. Authors on both sides of the discussion would do well to note the above and focus their arguments accordingly.

Two things pertain to the future of this discussion. First, it would benefit from homing in on the two topics included in current joint doctrine as recounted above. The question is not one of EBO/EBAO; instead, it goes directly to the relative efficacy of including “effects” as an element of operational design. A sample line of inquiry might consider if the construct of “effects”—in the context of articulating conditions to be established (or avoided)—helps or hinders clarification of the relationship of objectives and tasks in achieving an end. There are other such questions to be raised and analyzed.

Regarding a “systems perspective,” this too would benefit from a careful parsing. Does the inclusion of this perspective suggest a universal truth that aids planning and assessment, or does the argument centered on key differences in system theory (related to closed, linear systems versus open, nonlinear systems) undercut the utility and practical applicability of the perspective?

Second, interested parties should note that both JP 3–0 and JP 5–0 are in formal assessment with a mind toward beginning revision in 2009. Joint doctrine purports to be recorded wisdom about our fundamental business in the Armed Forces, and wisdom is gained over time as ideas gain or lose stature on their own merits, clarity, and effectiveness. Arguments regarding “effects-based ideas” scoped with this in mind would provide good service to the shared goal of having joint doctrine that is both right and relevant.

JFQ
Operational Design is commander’s business. Its principles and practices are useful to all leaders contending with complex situations and problems. Those who champion structuring the practice of systemic design through systematic doctrinal discussion seek to enhance a creative function practiced more or less self-consciously, and more or less systematically, by all successful commanders. It is an error of perspective to consider design as either a competitor or an inconvenient supplement to formal planning processes—such as the military decisionmaking process/joint operation planning process—or a function of a select group of staff officers closeted in secret with a commander cooking up strategic plots. Planning is a formal analytic process intended to maximize utilization of a particular force to achieve given aims. Design is a heuristic (trial and error or “rule of thumb”) or abductive (after Charles S. Peirce, meaning, more or less, reasoning by best inference or inference to the best explanation) practice intended to develop strategies and stratagems to transform complex social-cultural-political systems that have slipped beyond the bounds of tolerance. Design is an element of the art of operational and battle command. This is not to say that staff officers do not have a role in supporting the commander in developing a design, both as source of information and as alter ego, only that the staff role remains, rightly, supporting and secondary.

Without understanding one cannot control causes; only treat effects, suppress symptoms. With understanding one can design and create the future.1

—JAMSHID GHARAJEDAGHI and RUSSELL L. ACKOFF

Dr. Richard M. Swain is a retired Army Colonel and an employee of ASE, Inc., a subsidiary of Booz Allen Hamilton. Copyright © Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc.
INCREASING DOCTRINAL WISDOM | Commander’s Business

Commanders may employ staff design groups to aid their learning about the situations they seek to influence, but these formal bodies, and the staff organs they come from, are only one source of inquiry available. Commanders and their subordinates engaged in learning about common projects constitute another “design group,” as does the ensemble of actors from external agencies who can be engaged in a collective discourse of peers to ground collaborative action to achieve unity of effort in projects of common or complementary interest. It is the engagement of a commander with others in learning through purposeful discussion that defines a design group. A commander will participate in and serve as the key link between several such groups. The commander will participate both as the central figure in his own design groups and as a contributing actor in those of others. In the end, design is what commanders do before formulating their commander’s guidance and statement of intent that initiate formal planning. It is what they do during operations, when they consider not only whether they are doing things well, but also if they are doing the right things. Design is “a method of problem solving that utilizes learning and rigorous dialectic to derive sound appreciation of the problem and the best options available for managing and treating” the underlying causes of complex transformative situations.7

Why Do Operational Design?

Current attention to the practice of operational design is a response to the recognition that there were conceptual problems early on in the conduct of the current wars, which were attributable to flaws in imagination and understanding. Moreover, for the foreseeable future, military commanders at all levels will confront similar situations, characterized by a high political content and shaped by issues of identity, values, and individual and group agendas, as much as calculable military capabilities. The social-political structures encountered may be characterized as complex transformative (human) systems—complex because they involve a large number of autonomous actors interacting with one another; transformative because the systems that the actors constitute change their systemic nature in response to external infusions of energy.

We ascribe nonlinear behavior to what we call complex systems. In complex systems science, complex systems are characterized not just by multiple actors (complicated systems), but by the frequency of interactions between autonomous actors—interactions that make system behavior nonlinear in magnitude and unpredictable in direction. Small infusions of energy into complex systems can produce entirely disproportional effects. Unintended and unanticipated responses to actions are the norm.

Human systems, and systems with significant human components, differ from mechanical and biological systems precisely because human beings possess autonomous will and respond to subjective values and motivations as well as objective conditions. Groups of humans may interpret identical situations in diametrically different ways, depending on how they perceive their interests and relevant identity group. Gharajedaghi and Ackoff (see the epigraph) describe such social complexes as “purposeful systems” and observe, “their parts [too] are purposeful systems, and they are part of larger social, hence purposeful systems. . . . Managing a social system not only requires dealing with ends that may be in conflict at the different levels, but dealing with conflicting ends at any or all the levels.” Complex human systems produce ill-structured problems in which both the nature of the problem and the appropriate response are unique and fluid. Because of their nature, such problems are not susceptible to intuitive solution grounded solely on comparison with prior experience. Effective action requires significant insight into the relationships defining the wider system.

The conditions inherent in the world today produce situations where traditional military action alone is unlikely to bring finality, although it may be essential to apply military force to enable use of more effective tools of influence. Where the nature of the situation lacks recognizable structure, and system behavior is largely unpredictable, the best that can be done is to formulate strategies for change that apply a process of informed trial and error, sensitive always to independent self-reorganization by the actors who make up the target system. In such circumstances, initiating action often constitutes the best way to learn how the target system operates.

As the context for his term of service as Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey set forth a vision of balancing the Army for a world in a condition of persistent conflict. Institutionally this has been enshrined in the August 2008 Army Strategy.8 What General Casey means by his vision is that the multiple observable conditions in the world today that promise a future of continuous global instability will require a range of national responses from peacetime engagement to interstate war. The clear implication is that most future conflicts will be the result of a complex of forces not lending themselves to the operational clarity of the Cold War, or even Operation Desert Storm. The Army will have to prepare for a variety of roles and missions, ranging from response to the implications of nuclear proliferation, to traditional warfighting, to constabulary work, to peacetime engagement and stability and support operations. Probabilities, most agree, are more likely to be centered at the middle and lower end, with the threat of the superempowered outlaw individual ever present.

British General Sir Rupert Smith, in his perceptive book The Utility of Force, takes a nuanced look at conflict based on his experiences in the Balkans and Northern Ireland. He characterizes contemporary conflict as wars amongst the peoples and observes that these struggles are unlikely to lend themselves to resolution by force or, for that matter, to any rapid resolution at all. In these conflicts, the best that can be sought in the short- and midterm is management of unsatisfactory situations, often for long periods.9 Smith is discussing the limitations on the employment of limited military forces to effect lasting change in complex social-political situations or problems. Operational design becomes a necessary conceptual tool for management and, ultimately, resolution of just such problems.

Retired Israeli Brigadier General Shimon Naveh uses two examples to illustrate the key ideas of what he calls Systemic Operational Design: T.E. Lawrence’s reverence at Wadi As in March-April 1917, described in chapter 33 of Seven Pillars of Wisdom (and in the 1921 Army Quarterly essay “The Evolution of a Revolt”), and the model of the command and
battle learning exemplified by Lord Horatio Nelson, reflected in various documents and histories. Lawrence, a graduate of Oxford and well read in military classics, was an advisor to the leaders of the Arab Revolt. He acquired a deep understanding of the Arab language and culture while living among the Arabs to research a book on Crusader castles and work on archeological projects. Nelson was a gifted commander of established reputation for aggressive action by the time he led his squadrons against the French at the Battle of the Nile and later at Trafalgar.

The Lawrence case describes a process of cognitive reframing, or reflective reconsideration of Arab strategy, carried out as a highly individual process of critical thinking during a period of enforced inactivity due to illness. Lawrence’s private musings led to recognition that his existing understanding of the Arab Revolt, and the associated operational concepts, were not relevant to the actual situation, so he created new versions of each in his mind. Lawrence’s reframing, or conceptual redesign of his understanding of the requirements of his situation and the nature of the Arab forces, resulted in adoption of a revised guerrilla strategy based on mobility and hit and run tactics.

Nelson’s problem—how to achieve decisive tactical defeat of an approximately equal, or slightly superior, enemy force—differed in quality and kind from that of Lawrence. Nelson appears to have solved his problem through the same kind of conceptual process that Lawrence used to solve the puzzle of Arab strategy. That is, Nelson compared the possibilities of existing practice (parallel attack) to his needs (decisive victory over the French-Spanish fleet), considered the critical variables involved, and formulated (designed) a tactical procedure to achieve the Jominian goal of throwing the mass of his force on a fraction of the enemy’s.12

The Nelson example also portrays what one author calls a “consensual style of command,” carried out in part by fraternal discussions conducted by Nelson with subordinate captains on board his flagship before the Battle of the Nile, and then by meeting and correspondence before Trafalgar. Each method vested subordinate commanders with a common understanding of the admiral’s vision of a battle stratagem in an anticipated future engagement as well as the authority to act as required within the admiral’s intentions to achieve his goals.13

In both cases, design consisted of individual reflective learning by a leader—formulation of new patterns of action (a strategy in the case of Lawrence and a stratagem in the example of Nelson) to transform existing situations through action, or to achieve success in future combats through enthusiastic collaborative action. Notably, neither provides an example of a staff-centric process in which the commander is simply an appendage.

In teaching design, much attention is paid to the conduct of challenging egalitarian discourse and the creation of shared understandings. However, these activities ought not to be conflated, for they have different groups and purposes in mind. Discourse is a learning technique based on classical dialectics, where ideas from multiple perspectives are offered and tested in argument, challenging fact with fact and triangulating meaning. Shared understanding, which may be achieved not only by discourse but also by dialogue, a clear substantive directive, or explanatory memoranda, is a requirement for decentralized operations—what the Army calls mission command. Too often, when these ideas are thrown together while exercising a staff design group, the impression is given that design is a staff activity in which commanders’ participation is incidental and the outcome a mystery shared only by the participants in the discourse.

As described here, design is a commander-centric leadership approach, part of what Army doctrine calls Battle Command. The explanation that follows describes a logical order of cognitive actions that suggests a sequence of performance. In fact, while some things necessarily precede others, logically, the design activities may be thought
Designers want to understand the motives underlying the sponsor’s decision to take action and the expectations concerning the consequences of employing military forces for satisfying larger goals.

Clarification is required where the new orders may conflict with standing instructions. They will ask if the mission and the sponsor’s apparent expectations make sense in view of what is known. Is the expectation of change coherent, given what is understood about the system in question? Standing headquarters with regional responsibilities will know quite a bit about their regions and about likely responses to new initiatives, often more than national policymakers know.

Once available information has been examined, the commander will want to have a dialogue with his superior to ensure complete understanding between sponsor and actor as to the sponsor’s motivations and expectations for the meaning of success and the role(s) the assigned military forces are expected to play.

Design proper, then, consists of two broad groups of activities. The first, System(s) Framing, is an effort to learn all one can in the time available about the nature and content of the system creating the unsatisfactory situation. The second, Operational Framing, involves the commander’s formulation of a strategy—that is, creating a proposal of a flexible pattern of operations or actions that seems likely to move the system from one state of affairs to another. This pattern, which gives form and function to action, is expressed as planning guidance and a preliminary intent to initiate formal planning processes.

When the higher authority’s initial guidance is understood, the commander and his design group(s) will begin System(s) Framing to learn all they can about the system in which the intervention will be required. They record their learning by creating a Systems Frame.
understanding to contemplating operations. This requires a cognitive transition from learning to action. Building on the understanding of the constructed Systems Frame, and their understanding of the sponsor’s expectations, the design group creates a "mental model" or depiction of the sponsor’s desired state of affairs (or system) as a basis of dialogue and(0,0),(996,996)

This Desired System not only is based on the understanding of the sponsor’s guidance, but also reflects the professional judgment “of what would be desirable and attainable based on what has been learned” about the existing state of affairs. It is a hypothesis that must be revised periodically as more thorough understanding is developed.15

Then, relevant to the desired transformation from the existing state of the Systems Frame to the desired state (Desired System), the designers refine their portrayal of the existing system, identifying the composition and underlying logics of opposing and potentially friendly forces and influences (called by some practitioners the logic of the enemy as rationale and the logic of command as rationale). They also assess mobilizable energy (logistics as rationale) that might be brought to bear by all interested parties and agencies to advance or retard the sponsor’s project. Some cases may require speculation on different or unique categories for adequate systems explanation. Commanders do not limit themselves on the friendly side to consideration only of organizations under their command. They identify all interested parties with whom some form of common or harmonious action might be concocted, and the design group speculates about the adequacy of existing organizational arrangements to achieve unity of effort with heterogeneous partners.

The defining part of the transitional series follows this refinement of the Systems Frame. This action, problem formulation, involves the development of an understanding of what needs to be done to establish the conditions to achieve desired goals. The commander must be intimately involved in this critical task, and agreement about the articulated form of the problem of transition will usually be sought with superiors. This is the critical conceptual event, moving from system understanding to design of action. Problem formulation consists of estimating the requirements for transforming the existing system, defined by the Systems Frame (informed by identification of opponents, allies, and potential resources), into the Desired System, identifying the obstacles and opponents to be overcome, and the opportunities (favorable potentials, propensities, tensions, and trends) existing within the system that can be exploited for success. Movement from one state to the other can then be expressed as a set of partial or intermediate goals, and the commander and design team(s) can move forward to formulate a theory of action, a coherent expression of things to be done to achieve the transformation, and then to articulate a strategy, corresponding to the theory and discriminating among short, intermediate, and long-term events required to move the unsatisfactory system into tolerances.

Strategy is a word that has migrated a good deal in the past 200 years. In the 18th century, it meant simply the art of the general. Carl von Clausewitz defined it as “the use of an engagement for the purpose of the war” and his rival, Antoine-Henri Jomini, as “the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion.”16 Julian Corbett, the late 19th-early 20th-century British naval historian, defined strategy as “the art of directing force to the ends in view,” and classified it as major and minor, the former a branch of statesmanship and the latter having to do with plans of operations.17

Joint Publication 3–0, Joint Operations, currently defines strategy as ”a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”18

While retaining the hierarchical locus of strategy, Sir Rupert Smith characterizes its expression as “a desired pattern of events . . . an expression of the aim and its links to the overall purpose and the context of the conflict, together with the limitations on action that flow from the political purpose in the circumstances.”19 Where the theory of action portrays what must be done, strategy, as used here, indicates the pattern of actions by which it will be accomplished—regardless of the hierarchical level at which such patterns must be proposed. There may be qualitative differences between the decisions made by theater and to achieve the ends within the available means will remain a feature of strategy formulation

alternate courses of action to achieve the ends within the available means will remain a feature of strategy formulation

brigade combat team commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, but both would seem to involve creation of strategies, thus understood, to achieve long-term goals. Developing strategies, so understood, is the defining act of design.

A design is a vision expressed in terms of intent (what I want to do), concept (how I want to do it), and narrative (my instructions). Proponents of design often say that if one has done his system framing and problem formulation properly, there is only one course of action, which will more or less present itself. This creates some unnecessary misunderstandings. In theory, if the Systems Frame has been created in sufficient depth, problem formulation will reveal everything that must be done to transform the system. But design acknowledges that full understanding is an ideal unlikely to be achieved, and this complex of actions is seldom a course of action. More often it is a menu of things that, if accomplished together, would resolve all issues. Normally, the sponsor, his partners, and allies will not have sufficient resources to accomplish all identified tasks simultaneously. Choices must be made. Resolution and patience must be stretched to make up for deficits in resources. Creating the strategy (the desired pattern of events) and assigning emphasis (priority) and place and timing (essentially operational art) will remain a task of fine judgments. Alternate courses of action to achieve the ends within the available means will remain a feature of strategy formulation, as will development of traditional branches and sequels in plans for execution.

Formulating a strategy, or pattern of actions, to change the system described by the Systems Frame is called Operational Framing, which is a narrower perspective derived from the Systems Frame. It identifies the smaller system of actors, friendly and opposing, among which focused transformative action is proposed to realize the desired state. Defining the pattern of intended actions, giving the strategy form and function, remains pretty much the sole business of the commander compared to the earlier Systems Framing, which is largely a staff exercise performed by the staff design group. Conceiving a strategy for the operations comprehends, in terms of the Army model of Battle Command, the
cognitive process of visualization and ends with the issue of commander’s broad guidance and statement of a preliminary intent to subordinate commanders and staff to initiate formal planning. The commander may avail himself of the advice of others in this action, but only he can decide and direct, giving form and function to actions intended to realize the abstract goals set by the action’s sponsor.

This translation of the strategic to the tactical remains the essence of operational command. The commander’s guidance to planners should include as a minimum:

- direction about the combination of parallel and sequential objectives that lead to mission success and define the way the mission will be performed
- identified points of influence that provide the best potential for advantageous action, the relationships and tendencies that can be exploited, and the lines of least resistance and least expectation that might lead to success
- ways and means of assessing the continued relevance of his situational understanding, particularly what indicators he believes would indicate reframing was called for
- the logic of the commander and his intentions for collaborating with coordinating authorities
- the national “message” that military actions and words are intended to convey, as a boundary condition for anticipated actions.20

Once in receipt of the commander’s guidance and intent, the planning staff formulates various alternative uses of the available resources, which, on approval by the commander, are translated further into plans and orders for subordinates.

Unlike planning, which is intended to guide events from start to finish, Operational Design is grounded on a presumption of unpredictable system transformation and an inevitable decay of the accuracy of understanding and relevance of intended actions. The planning process, focused on concrete realities of forces, time, and space, may require adjustments to understanding and strategies. Therefore, design continues even while planning and execution go on. While planners monitor operations to see whether the commander’s instructions are carried out efficiently, designers monitor the system to see whether their systemic understanding remains adequate to explain individual actor and collective system response. When the system responds in ways that cannot be accounted for by the existing understanding (or when new knowledge becomes available challenging prior understanding), it is time to reframe—to go back to the original analysis and formulate a new understanding in light of new data. Once this is done, commanders must ask if their strategy is still relevant to achieving the desired outcome, and if not, they must formulate a new theory of operations and strategy consistent with their revised understanding. Design is by nature continuous and recursive. Successful practice requires self-confidence and the humility to admit the likelihood of error when dealing with complex human systems. Success demands openness to challenges to one’s understanding without impeding the will to decide and see an action through to completion.

**Leading Collaborative Learning**

The notion of leading collaborative learning is a central feature of the theory of operational design. Collaborative learning is desirable in situations involving complex transformative states for the fairly obvious reason that by their very nature such systems resist rapid understanding through the kind of pattern recognition that underlies the intuitive leadership of great captains. Rather, insight, or coup d’oeil, in addressing complex problems is expected to come from deep collaborative study of the human systems that create them. This learning provides structure to guide decision by illuminating the internal lineaments of the systems, revealing the range of actors and underlying relationships that define them. Lawrence and Nelson seem to have arrived at their understandings largely through individual reflection on their personal experiences and to have shared their visions by discussion and composition of detailed memoranda. Today, proponents of design propose to enhance this highly individual practice by suggesting the use of a kind of collaborative learning that will enable a commander to study questions deeply in spite of the pressures on his time that were not part of the experience of either Lawrence or Nelson. The belief is that the technique of collaborative discourse, or dialectic by knowledgeable participants, can tease out the hidden meanings of ambiguous facts and that the understanding gained can be shared with others.

A wise commander uses different groups to study the system in question and to develop with them a shared understanding of how the system is constituted and how it works, based on the best available evidence. The core groups will normally be made up of knowledgeable staff officers who can focus on learning, the commander and his subordinates, and finally the commander and coordinating leaders who will depend on the harmony of actions to produce desired outcomes. The staff group is the more formal,
and it will require general management by the commander or a senior leader and engagement with the commander at critical points if it is to advance his understanding.

Management of learning discourse is a skill acquired only through practice.

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**collaborative discourse can tease out the hidden meanings of ambiguous facts and the understanding gained can be shared**

Participants must be mature enough to depersonalize disagreement. Effective dialectical discourse requires building confidence among subordinates that their honest critical ideas are desired, and that their understanding will be tested and often rejected, without reflection on the overall respect in which they, the subordinates, are held. The commander must be prepared to offer his counterviews for challenge and be open to disagreement about them. He must manage his relationships with the design group so debate over understanding remains separate from questioning of integrity or authority to decide. These are distinctions that will place demands on the commander’s leadership and the professionalism of the design group, both showing the humility of admitting the possibility of error and recognizing the essential requirement for preserving decision and direction for the commander. The commander who desires only applause from his subordinates may receive it but will learn little from them.

Operational design proposes that inclusive collaborative learning results from a process of challenging open discourse by groups of informed colleagues who approach situations from a variety of perspectives. In this sense, discourse is the combination of individual searching for relevant information about the subject system and a collective, challenging examination of data, in which individuals offer hypotheses about the meaning of the information and are required to confront challenges from other perspectives as a means of hammering out a more refined understanding. Discourse in this sense is dialectical—both “egalitarian” and “asymmetric.” It is egalitarian in that everyone is expected to participate, offering both data and insights. It is asymmetric in recognizing some participants are more knowledgeable than others, though this recognition does not privilege the views of the experts absent presentation of evidence.

These critical discussions are expected to be passionate and uncompromising. The object is not to arrive at the lowest common denominator but to identify alternative interpretations, resolve those that can be concluded with additional evidence, and identify and preserve the differences where they cannot be resolved without still more information. Common understanding does not mean a common narrative of how things are but the story of how things can be agreed to be and where there are alternative, competing views of the same phenomena. Collective understanding is built incrementally, not by consensus but through accumulation of perspectives that cannot be rejected because of clearly contrary evidence. The design group will seek information internally and externally, drawing in experts where they are available, and they will begin to construct a conceptual picture of the system and a narrative that accounts for system behavior as they observe and understand it.

Generally a staff group proceeds by identifying the actors who make up the system through some sort of graphic mind-mapping. Through individual research, they discover various facts and formulate individual or subgroup hypotheses about system behavior, which they present for collective assessment and rigorous dialectical or conceptual testing. As the practice of learning continues, a kind of shared understanding is built up by the group. When meeting with the commander, the group can present its understanding or the commander can open with his own, formed from the variety of sources available to him. The commander must be open to having his judgments challenged, based on evidence, and the group must be free and willing to defend its views so long as it holds them; otherwise, the group will do the commander no good in testing his evolving understanding.

While the commander may not be present for much of the debate, he must take part enough to take on the nuance of the argument, offer his unique expertise, infuse information from external sources and groups, and manage the search for understanding to meet his needs and timelines. The commander must both keep his distance from the debates—take the “balcony perspective” (position of exteriority), in the terminology of Harvard professor Ronald Heifetz—and get involved, or “go down on the dance floor” (position of interiority), to manage inquiry. As an artifact of its deliberations, the design group should produce a graphic and narrative summary of the basis of its conclusions. This record can be used as a reference to share conclusions with others and to allow the commander and group to reflect on the continued relevance of their understanding as new facts are discovered and new observations of the system reveal more about its behavior.

Success in this sort of discourse does not arise from agreement in interpretation so much as understanding how the parties conclude what they do in light of common evidence. Multiple interpretations are likely. The one that seems more likely to the commander will guide action but rejected understandings are not losses. They are retained to serve as conceptual alternatives later when reframing is required. Finally, both the commander and the various design groups must be self-conscious and reflective about how they learn, while they learn. Observation, reflection, and skepticism must lead all those engaged to challenge their practices and understandings. Commanders must balance their perseverance to see their decisions through in the face of doubts, with a willingness to change course when the balance of evidence turns against their existing understanding. Open to discussion during learning, commanders will still find themselves required to drive their subordinates to overcome doubts and hesitations in execution.

**Design and Operational Art**

In creating operational concepts, and underpinning the conduct of operations, design constitutes the essential preamble for the practice of operational art, especially in an era of persistent conflict. The notion of operational art originated with Red Army theorists in the 1920s. Aleksandr A. Svechin inserted the activity of operational art between strategy and tactics in his 1927 book, Strategy, though others had already written about it. Svechin observed that strategy, which called for a single operation from mobilization to surrender, was no longer feasible. Tactics, he wrote, had to do with maximization of weapon or material capabilities within particular contexts to solve immediate problems. Strategy, he acknowledged, now set broad goals to be achieved over relatively long periods compared with tactics. Operational...
art, between them, translated the broad abstract goals of strategy into discrete tactical tasks and provided the wherewithal to sustain action to accomplish intermediate goals, developing, in the whole, accomplishment of the strategic design. Most useful in Svechin’s taxonomy is the differentiation of tactics as the resolution of problems through maximization of material capabilities, contrasted with the largely cognitive and coordinative operational art, and the goal setting and resourcing (national) strategy.

The U.S. Army adopted the notion of an operational level of war in its 1982 Field Manual 100–5, Operations. A concept of operational art as an identifiable activity was adopted in 1986. That year, three “Key Concepts of Operational Design”—center of gravity, lines of operation, and culmination—were adopted into Army doctrine, reflecting the neo-Clausewitzian cast to Army thinking. The notions of both operational art and the operational level of war were carried into joint doctrine when the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act created a system of doctrine under authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Current doctrinal notions of strategy, operational art, and tactics may need to be rescued from their Cold War connotations and post–Cold War hardening and be returned to the looser, more traditional sense that Svechin captured in order to differentiate activities consisting of maximizing tools to solve practical problems (tactics), setting long-term goals (strategy), and those mediating between the two by creation of imaginative patterns of actions (operational art). (Svechin, it must be noted, focused on major wars between large armies of first-class powers and did ascribe function to hierarchical levels relevant to his frame.)

The performance of a professional is marked by the discretionary application of a special knowledge to achieve purposes of social value. The practice of Operational Design will enhance commanders’ professional talent for creative work in the face of problems that resist simple experiential response. Exploring the basis of instructions from higher authorities will lead to more intelligent obedience. Employment of searching discourse will allow commanders to draw on the knowledge and understanding of others, viewing the same situation from a variety of perspectives, and to test conclusions, theirs and those of others, in the fire of debate. This focused learning would seem as vital in confronting complex strategic and operational issues in conventional war as it does in less conventional “wars amongst the peoples.” As the war in Iraq has shown, apparently simple operational tasks often carry in their consequences complex situations that cannot be ignored. In the end, the commander must move from the edges of learning to the center, avoiding creation of unintended consequences, and reflectively and self-conssciously creating strategies to move unsatisfactory situations within bounds for resolution by other means when they cannot be resolved directly by application of force. The practice of design, translating strategic guidance into tactical acts, is operational art for the 21st century.

NOTES


2. For a more thorough discussion of the contrast between design and planning, see Field Manual (FM) 3–24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3–33.5, Counterinsurgency, chapter 4 (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Army, December 2006), 4–2, 4–3.


4. The term strategy is used here in the generic fashion indicating a pattern of actions intended to achieve a broad goal. Strategem refers generally to “a tactic or maneuver that is designed to deceive an enemy.”

5. The connection to Battle Command was pointed out by Jeffrey Powell and John Lockhart Clark in a draft manuscript, which became a chapter in the School of Advanced Military Studies Art of Design; Student Text, Version 1.0 (September 24, 2008), 48. The concept was briefed to General William Wallace, commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, at the Unified Quest Capstone event in May 2008.


9. Ibid., 297.


15. I am obliged to Colonel Timothy Daniel, USA (Ret.), for pointing out the importance of the discussion of the creation of a model of the Desired System.


24. FM 100–5, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, May 1986), appendix B, 179–180. These were the center of gravity, culminating points, and lines of operation. By 2008, joint doctrine contained 17 terms, and Army doctrine no less than 12 terms, divided according to “Frame/Reframe the Design,” “Formulate the Design,” and “Refine the Design.” See FM 3–0, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, February 2008), 6–7, and JP 3–0, IV–3. The Iraq War—era joint and Army doctrine includes a number of concepts about Operational Design without formulating a comprehensive explanation. The best doctrinal attempt to do so is chapter 4 of FM 3–24/MCWP 3–33.5, Counterinsurgency, 4–1–4–9.
Currently, the U.S. military seems well on the way to repeating its dismal experience with an effects-based approach to operations (EBAO) by adopting major parts of the so-called systemic operational design (SOD) into Army and joint doctrine. This new concept rests on dubious theoretical foundations. Moreover, it clearly failed when it was put into practice by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Lebanon conflict in July 2006.

SOD advocates offered several, sometimes conflicting, definitions of what the new concept really is. These definitions also shifted over time as the concept underwent changes in content. For example, in 2006, SOD was described as an intellectual exercise that draws on the creative vision, experience, intuition, and judgment of commanders to provide a framework for the development of detailed operational plans. Proponents sometimes argued that SOD is a precursor to operational planning and at other times that it is not. More recently, some leading proponents went even further by claiming that their concept is actually operational art for the 21st century. In one definition, it is described as an application of systems theory to operational art. In another, it is an attempt to rationalize complexity through systemic logic. SOD is also explained by its leading advocates as a method that uses critical learning of a shared appreciation of systemic logic to form hypotheses relevant to unique and highly complex situations that evade easy or commonsense solutions.

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Origins

SOD theory goes back to the mid-1990s when the Israeli chief of defense staff established the Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI). In addition, the School for Operational Command was set up to promote creative and critical thinking at the operational level among its military students and then in the IDF. Brigadier Generals Shimon Naveh and Dov Tamari were the founders and codirectors of OTRI until spring 2006. Naveh and several of his colleagues came to the conclusion that existing operational planning was becoming increasingly irrelevant in the Israeli operating environment. In their view, the IDF were in deep crisis because of the lack of knowledge and understanding of operational thinking. Naveh asserted that the IDF in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 showed tactical excellence but no clear understanding of the consequences at the operational level. He and his supporters embraced systems theory as the way to understand and affect the country’s operational environment. The result of the work done by Naveh and his colleagues at OTRI was so-called systemic operational design. They claimed that the new concept was based on epistemology. It was developed as an alternative to the classical Western approach to operational warfare, which is supposedly based on teleology.

Theoretical Foundations

The main theoretical underpinnings of SOD are systems theory, Soviet operational art, French postmodern philosophy, social sciences, psychology, architecture and urban planning, and, more recently, ancient Chinese military thinking. The single most important element behind SOD is so-called general system theory (GST), first explained by the Austrian biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901–1972) in an article in 1945. His major work, General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications, was not published until 1968. Bertalanffy believed there exists a general system of laws that can be applied to any system regardless of the system’s properties and the elements involved. These general laws are broad, diverse, and fluid. He believed the system’s elements and their attributes or characteristics can only be understood as fractions of the total system. In other words, SOD proponents view a system in a holistic way.

Bertalanffy’s main contribution to system theory was the theory of open systems. In his view, traditional closed systems are based on science and the second law of thermodynamics. Because closed systems are in a steady state, they are not applicable to living organisms—hence, the need for a general system theory that can be applied to biology, information theory, cybernetics, and social sciences. At the same time, Bertalanffy recognized the difficulties of applying his theory to social science because of the complexities in the intersection between natural sciences and human social systems. His system theory was extended to history, psychiatry, psychology, sociology, education, anthropology, economics, and political science. However, GST is also controversial. Some theorists, in fact, consider it a pseudoscience.

SOD theory is also supposedly based on the Soviet theory of operational art of the 1920s and 1930s. The apparent reason for this was to impress upon potential supporters that the new concept rests on some viable operational warfare theory. However, despite the claims of its advocates, SOD does not contain, except for some terms, any of these ideas. The leading theorist of SOD falsely reinterpreted the early Soviet writings on operational art in terms of GST. Supposedly, operational art in contrast to strategy and tactics is systemic in nature. This is not the case, however. In the process, Bertalanffy’s ideas were intentionally or accidentally distorted or misinterpreted. A more serious problem is that the Soviet theory of operational art as defined by SOD supporters bore almost no resemblance to what the Soviet theorists actually wrote or implied in their numerous published works. The Soviets were given undeserved credit for essentially creating the modern theory of operational warfare. According to the leading SOD proponent, the development of operational art was a “neoteric” (or modern) field of knowledge provided by the Russian and American examples (actually, the American contribution to the development of operational theory prior to World War II was negligible). For the first time in the history of military thought, an intermediate environment for discourse, which harmoniously bridges the traditional cognitive-conceptual gap between the conventional fields of military knowledge, was discernible.

To reiterate, the Soviet theory of operational art emerged in the 1920s and 1930s. Soviet military theorists studied the character of modern war by analyzing the experiences of World War I and the Russian Civil War. They grappled with the problem of how to restore mobility and maneuver to the relatively stagnant battlefield. However, it is a matter of historical record that they were also greatly influenced by the major theorists of the Imperial Russian Army, notably General Genrykh A. Leer (1829–1904) and Colonel Aleksandr A. Neznamov (1878–1928). Both the Soviet and the Imperial Russian theorists were also influenced by the writings of the German theorists of their era. However, the Soviets were neither groundbreaking nor unique in their approach because similar development took place elsewhere. Western theorists, for example, faced the same dilemmas as their Soviet counterparts but reached different conclusions. Like their Soviet counterparts, French, British, and U.S. theorists
recognized the true nature of modern operations as a series of battles, although they did not treat the operational level of war as a distinct entity. But they, like the Soviets, recognized that operational results emerged as the sum of the results of tactical combat. B.H. Liddell Hart (1895–1970), J.F.C. Fuller (1878–1966), and others developed new concepts of warfare at the operational level. The Germans also developed their so-called Blitzkrieg (or airland) concept in the early and mid-1930s, which they successfully applied at the operational level in 1939–1942.\textsuperscript{14}

By inappropriately using terms from system theory, the leading SOD proponent argued, the Soviets observed that the dialectical nature of warfare defines the need for a practice of command that perpetuates a learning cycle of model reframing. Therefore, the need to ensure the relevance of a particular kind of warfare necessitates the expansion of the definition of warfare from a mere knowledge of forms to a form of knowledge.\textsuperscript{15} Allegedly, by establishing a systems orientation to operational art and science, the early Soviet theorists opened the path to using patterns of abstract thought to develop an understanding of rational and logical thinking within the system in being.\textsuperscript{16} For the leading SOD advocate, the Soviet theory of deep operation (glubokaya operatsiya) seems the gist of all operational art instead of an example of the operational concept for planning and execution of major offensive land operations. A false claim was made that Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevski (1893–1937) replaced the concept of the battle of annihilation, which dominated European military thinking, with the idea of operational shock (udar) of system disruption. Yet Soviet deep operation theory has nothing to do with system disruption or the Soviet use of that term. Moreover, in Soviet theory and practice, disruption was always a means to facilitate destruction, not substitute for it.\textsuperscript{17}

The fact is that the Soviets did not use system theory terms in their numerous writings on operational art. Their approach to operational warfare was systematic, not systemic; there is a difference between the two. This approach to the study of operational art provided the Soviets the scope and limits of the operational realm and direction for research and a comprehensive methodology for achieving better understanding of preparing for and conducting war at the operational level.\textsuperscript{18}

SOD theory was greatly influenced by the writings of the French postmodern philosophers, specifically Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) and Felix Guattari (1930–1992) and, to a lesser extent, Jean-Francois Lyotard (1924–1998), Jean Baudrillard (1929–2007), and Paul Virilio (b. 1932). All these philosophers share to a greater or lesser degree a radical leftist and anti-capitalist ideology.\textsuperscript{19} Critics have pointed out that the literary style of the French postmodern philosophers is essentially a collection of scientific, pseudoscientific, and philosophical jargon. Deleuze’s and Guattari’s books contain a handful of intelligible sentences.\textsuperscript{20} The language is designed to be unintelligible to conceal an absence of honest thought. Baudrillard’s writings are full of nonsense. Numerous scientific and pseudoscientific terms were inserted into sentences that were devoid of meaning. Postmodern philosophers had a total disregard for the definitions of various terms.\textsuperscript{21}

### Systemic Operational Design and Its Variants

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**VARIANT PRIOR TO 2007**

- Rival as rationale
- Command as rationale
- Logistics as rationale

**Operation Framing**

- Conditions
- Effects
- Forms of functions

**System Framing**

- Rival as rationale
- Command as rationale
- Logistics as rationale

**Problem Framing**

- Establish strategic context
- Synthesize strategic guidance
- Describe systemic nature of problem(s) to be solved
- Determine strategic trends
- Identify gaps in knowledge
- Establish assumptions about problem
- Identify operational problem
- Determine initial mission statement
- Obtain approval of problem and mission statement

**Mission Analysis**

- Describe systemic conditions that command must realize to achieve strategic aims
- Identify campaign objectives
- Identify potential for campaign action

**Campaign Design**

- Describe commander’s intent
- Describe approach
- Describe requirements for reframing

**Campaign Plan**

- Analyze mission and develop course of action
- Plan operations and logistics
- Assess plan
- Execute plan
More recently, SOD theorists borrowed some ideas from Chinese military thinking and applied them to their own new method of operational planning. However, they have not only arbitrarily selected certain aspects from the extensive and extremely rich body of Chinese military theory and practice to prove their thesis, but also either misinterpreted or distorted some key elements. SOD proponents contend that Chinese military thinking, in contrast to Western thinking, is not focused on action as the way to reach a certain objective. Since antiquity, Western ways of military thinking were aimed at creating an ideal model and then visualizing how the real situation differed from that model. Afterward, the backward or reverse process is used to construct a sequence of actions as the way to make the model happen. More recently, a leading SOD proponent in the United States asserted that the ancient Greeks thought in terms of creating a vision of a desired end and then overcoming any and all obstacles in order to force that ideal end into the real world. In contrast, the Chinese military focuses on identifying the inherent potential of a situation and subsequently facilitating the emergence of this potential. Expressed differently, instead of forcing one’s will on a situation, one should set the conditions to allow things to happen that are already inherent in a perceived situation.

Allegedly, the Chinese military does not ascribe as much importance to having a detailed, systematically developed plan for a predetermined objective or endstate as do Western militaries. The Chinese think it is not possible to know what an idealized end could be, but it should be easy enough to distinguish better and worse. They supposedly think in terms of a perpetual and ever-changing current of events. SOD advocates explain that a Chinese general would try his utmost to obtain a thorough understanding of the situation he is facing in order to identify which conditions would facilitate a favorable change. This quest for understanding is also one of the key components of systemic operational design. However, what SOD proponents do not explain is whether their interpretation of Chinese military thinking pertains to the modern or ancient era. It is well known that the modern Chinese military largely adopted the Soviet theory and practice of operational warfare combined with many elements of the Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Full understanding of the Chinese way of warfare is difficult to explain accurately and in succinct terms because it underwent numerous changes over many centuries. Nevertheless, it seems that SOD advocates took too much liberty in interpreting and then comparing it to the current Western practice of operational planning. In its essence, Chinese strategic culture revolves around ancient concepts of Shih (power or influence) and its opposite Li (self-interest or material gain). The main elements of Shih strategy were the people (soldiers and their weapons), the so-called context (opportunity, timing, and logistics), and the enemy (relative skill, competence, and the will to fight). In contrast, Li strategy focused on the physical aspects of one’s own and enemy forces.

Ancient Chinese strategic thought applied two approaches to accomplish the end-state. A direct approach, or so-called Li strategy, was aimed at achieving the ultimate strategic objective through the accumulation of a large number of partial or local tactical victories. This strategy envisaged seizing enemy provinces in sequence until the entire enemy territory was brought under control. The main prerequisite for the success of Li strategy was to have a large and powerful army. In the indirect approach, the aim was to apply a strong Shih through Tao (the universal way) in order to continuously weaken the enemy’s own Shih, thus avoiding major battles and ultimately winning without fighting. Because the ultimate strategic objective encompassed all intermediate objectives—Li—combat superiority was not required. The premise was that the power resided in and dwelt among the people. Shih strategy avoided indicating what one’s ultimate objective is. The aim was to change or frustrate the enemy commander’s intent rather than his forces. Also, the deception was the essence of Shih strategy.

SOD and the IDF

OTRI had a major impact on the type of education that future IDF high commanders received prior to the Lebanon conflict of 2006. These commanders were indoctrinated with postmodern ideas, which had little or no relevance to the real education on operational warfare. This was done at the expense of classic military theory. The reading list was heavily based on architectural theory written around 1968. Students read in detail the works of architects such as Christopher Alexander, Clifford Geertz, and Gregory Bateson. The OTRI curriculum included urban studies, systems analysis, psychology, cybernetics, and postcolonial and poststructuralist theory. There was a certain fascination with spatial modes and modes of operations based on the writings of Deleuze and Guattari, who drew inspiration from guerrilla organizations and “nomadic wars.” The Israeli military also used the theories of great architects in conducting urban operations. Israeli officers studied military history and theory but reportedly believed that such studies had little practical value. Classical military thinkers became no more than names whose writings were occasionally cited but not read in depth.

A major (but not the only) reason the IDF failed in Lebanon was overreliance on airpower and modern technology in general and dogmatic application of the U.S. concept of EBAO and, not least of all, SOD. In fact, application of the disparate concepts of EBAO and SOD almost guaranteed major difficulties in the execution of operations. After 2001, the IDF began to embrace the theories of precision firepower, EBAO, and SOD. The EBAO proponents within the IDF came to believe that an enemy could be completely immobilized by precision air attacks against critical military systems. They also hypothesized that little or no land force would be required since it would not be necessary to destroy the enemy. After several alterations and revisions, the new IDF doctrine was endorsed by Air Force lieutenant general and chief of the defense staff Dan Halutz in April 2006. Reportedly, even General Halutz did not understand the new doctrine that he signed. Naveh claimed that Halutz failed to link SOD with other elements and harshly criticized his military acumen. The new IDF doctrine was designed to cover strategy, force transformation, and EBAO, as well as introduce a new military language and new structure for staff work methodology, battlefield analysis, and the structure and contents of orders. Indeed, this new doctrine was not entirely based on SOD theories, but they were much honored. The boundary between EBAO and SOD was blurred. There are some contrary views in the United States to this course of events. It is claimed that in early 2006, the new IDF leadership rejected SOD in favor of EBAO and system-of-systems.
analysis. Allegedly, all plans based on SOD were shelved and their proponents retired. This, in turn, had dire consequences for the way the Israelis then chose to frame the Hezbollah problem they faced that summer. Yet Naveh himself stated that the core of the new doctrine for the IDF was the theory of SOD.

During the Lebanon conflict in July 2006, the major problem the IDF had with SOD was the new terminology and methodology. It was questionable whether the majority of IDF officers could grasp a design that Naveh proclaimed was “not easy to understand . . . because [it is] not intended for ordinary mortals.” Many officers found the entire SOD concept elitist. Other officers could not understand why the old system of simple orders and terminology was replaced by one that few could understand. For example, new terms such as strategic directive, strategic purpose, system boundary, operational boundaries, campaign organizing theme, and rival system rationale were overused in place of traditional military terms. Units were ordered to “render the enemy incoherent,” make the enemy feel “distress” or “chased down,” or “achieve standoff domination of the theatre.” The new vocabulary was heavily drawn from French postmodern philosophy, literary theory, architecture, and psychology. Because of its cryptic character, it is hardly surprising that not every officer in the IDF had the time or inclination to study this philosophy.

**SOD vs. EBAO**

SOD and EBAO, in their essences, are pseudoscientific. EBAO and SOD activities are similar, but their underlying theory and execution are quite different. Both concepts share a systemic, not classical, approach to warfare. SOD is based on both GST and complexity theory. EBAO supposedly treats systems as closed, while SOD considers them as open. They both use system theory language, although SOD language is far less intelligible than that used by EBAO advocates. Both claim to offer a holistic view of the situation, but so does the traditional military decisionmaking process. SOD advocates assert that while the EBAO holistic (comprehensive) approach focuses on disrupting nodes and relationships, SOD attempts to transform the relationships and interactions between the entities within a system. Both SOD and EBAO advocates assert that modern military operations are too complicated for applying a so-called linear approach because the enemy and environment form a complex adaptive system. Yet the traditional approach to warfare always assumed that success can be ensured by applying both linear and nonlinear actions. SOD proponents mistakenly argue that such systems cannot be destroyed but must be pushed into disequilibrium—that is, into chaos and the creation of incoherence.

SOD proponents claim that EBAO is a scientific concept while their concept is “philosophical.” However, this is only superficially true because SOD theoretical underpinnings, as shown above, are based on pseudoscientific and highly controversial ideas of French postmodern philosophers and an utterly faulty reinterpretation of the Soviet operational art. SOD advocates also argue that in EBAO the decision procedures are closed, complete, and decidable, while in SOD critical methods remain open and incomplete. Supporters of SOD also assert that EBAO is based on causation imposed on human behavior, creating false chains of cause and effect. Yet in contrast to EBAO enthusiasts, they acknowledge, at least in theory, that uncertainty is an attribute of complex adaptive systems, which calls for “continuous reframing.”

In contrast to EBAO, SOD proponents contend that their approach does not seek to attain perfect knowledge but emphasizes development and conceptualization of the system, which provides a sound basis for action and learning. Supposedly, SOD injects energy into a system to move it closer to the
desired aim. SOD recognizes that the system will actually change and adapt, in response not just to friendly actions, but also to the rest of its environment. A significant difference between the two concepts is that SOD does not envisage the use of quantifiable methods such as measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.

SOD and Operational Planning

SOD is separated from operational planning because supposedly there are major “cognitive” differences between these two. In the view of SOD proponents, operational design deals with “learning”, while planning is about “action”. Design is a referential framework for redesign, while planning deals with problem-solving. Design creates new patterns, while planning uses existing templates. Supposedly design is holistic but incomplete and not detailed, while planning is complete but partial. Design is an open construct, while planning is a closed one. SOD proponents assert that operational planning focuses on the components of the situation in an attempt to understand the whole. It is solution-focused. It is oriented on the fixed formatted products. It is about enabling action.

Separating operational design from the planning process, however, is a purely arbitrary solution and a potentially harmful one. It unnecessarily fragments the entire operational decisionmaking and planning process. Experience amply shows how dangerous it is to separate planners and executors of an operation. In a traditional operational planning process, operational design is not separate but is an integral part of decision-making and planning. An even more serious problem is that SOD is not what traditional operational warfare theory considers an operational design; it is actually an artificial bridge between policy and strategy on the one hand and operational warfare on the other. It includes many elements normally in the domain of policy and strategy. At the same time, it includes numerous elements of the operational commander’s estimate of the situation and decisionmaking. The entire focus of SOD is on campaign design, while design for major operations (which are an integral part of any campaign in high-intensity conventional conflict) is not addressed at all.

SOD has a completely different focus in campaign planning than traditional operational planning. It advocates a use of forward planning more in line with Chinese military thinking. SOD enthusiasts claim that the forward approach makes it more relevant in the joint operating environment. They explain that forward planning begins with current conditions, lays out potential decisions and actions, and identifies the next feasible step that best approaches the established aim. They assert that by clearly confusing the desired endstate and the objective, the envisioned endstate serves as a distant and general aiming point rather than a specific objective. SOD proponents falsely claim that forward planning is more natural because it is consistent with the direction time moves and the way humans act.

However, SOD clearly violates some of the most important tenets of sound operational planning. Regardless of the scope and complexity of a problem, logic and common sense dictate that one should always start with what ultimately must be accomplished. Traditional operational planning is based on a so-called regressive or inverse process, in which the starting point is the ultimate objective of a campaign or major operation. For a campaign intended to end hostilities, the starting point for planning should be the desired strategic endstate as expressed in the guidance issued by the political leadership. Afterward, the ultimate military or theater-strategic objective should be determined. The properly determined desired strategic endstate provides a sufficient framework in terms of the factors of space and time allowing sufficient flexibility in modifying or altering the ultimate objective of a campaign. In its essence, the desired strategic endstate is the strategic effect that the political leadership wants to see after the end of the hostilities in a given part of the theater. Because that objective cannot normally be accomplished by a single act, the entire effort must be divided into several operational or major tactical objectives; otherwise, there is a real danger of trying to do too much too quickly. The number of intermediate objectives should be neither too large nor too few, but must be adequate to collectively lead to the accomplishment of the ultimate objective. The number and sequence of the accomplishment of intermediate objectives directly or indirectly affect several elements of the operational idea, specifically operational synchronization, phasing, momentum, tempo, and point of culmination.

SOD enthusiasts argue that their theory is intended as an alternative to the current classical campaign design, centers of gravity, and lines of operation. However, this is one of the major flaws of SOD theory and practice, as the Israeli failure in the Lebanon conflict in 2006 conclusively shows. So-called diffused warfare cannot replace the traditional focus on the enemy center of gravity. They also assert that, in contrast to the traditional operational design where the center of gravity is determined at the beginning and remains more or less fixed, SOD assumes a continuous shifting and reframing of the design for a campaign. This is erroneous thinking. The traditional campaign design properly understood always highlighted the need to reevaluate the originally determined objectives and center of gravity in case of a drastic change in the situation.

Traditionally, in planning a campaign or major operation, the operational commanders and their staffs must take nonmilitary aspects of the situation (political, diplomatic, economic, financial, social, religious, informational) fully into account because these comprise the framework dictated by policy and strategy. A plan for a campaign or major operation should be based on a number of operational considerations, collectively called an operational design. A sound operational design should ensure that one’s forces are employed in a logical and coherent manner and are focused on the assigned operational or strategic objectives. The basic plan for a campaign or major operation contains, in rudimentary form, only the most important elements of an operational design. Other elements of operational design are provided in detail in the annexes to the basic operation plan and the plans of subordinate land, sea, air, and special forces component commanders. In generic terms, the main elements of a sound operational design include the desired strategic endstate, ultimate and intermediate objectives, force requirements, balancing of operational factors against the ultimate objective, identification of the enemy and friendly centers of gravity, initial geostrategic positions and lines.
of operations, directions/axes, and the operational idea and operational sustainment. In operational terms, the heart of the operational design is the operational idea (scheme).50

The empirical evidence of successful application of systemic operational design outside Israel simply does not exist. In the Lebanon conflict, SOD was a major, although not the only, factor in the Israel Defense Forces’ distinct failure to achieve victory over a much weaker opponent. This was the reason the IDF subsequently abandoned SOD and returned to a well-proven traditional operational planning process. One has to derive proper lessons from the Lebanon conflict instead of ignoring them.

The vocabulary used by SOD advocates is essentially unintelligible. Experience shows that no doctrine can be successfully applied unless all its elements are written in clear and succinct language understandable to all. Adopting SOD will result in having two sets of terms—one for SOD and another for the traditional military decisionmaking process. Such a situation will be untenable and should never be allowed. The entire decisionmaking and planning process must use the same vocabulary; otherwise, misunderstanding and confusion in both peacetime and combat will inevitably occur. JFQ

empirical evidence of successful application of systemic operational design outside Israel simply does not exist

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6 Epistemology is defined as the scientific study of knowledge, especially the construction of formal models of perception by which knowledge is obtained. See William G. Cummings, Operational Design Doctrine: Hamstrung or Footloose in the Contemporary Operating Environment (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2007), 77.

7 Telology (from the Greek telos: end, purpose) is the philosophical study of design and purpose. A telological school of thought holds that all things are designed for or directed toward a final result—that there is an inherent purpose or final cause for all that exists. Western military thought is based on such a deterministic approach. Telology teaches that the natural and historic processes are determined not only by causality but also by ultimate purposes. See Cummings, 76.


10 For two critiques of general system theory, see <http://iss.org/laslofw.htm> and <http://outbacksoftware.com/systems/systems.html>.


13 Green, 21.


16 DiPasquale, 6.

17 Winston.

18 Glantz, 12.


22 Green, 24.


24 Green, 24.

25 Ibid., 24; Wass de Czeye, 4.


27 Ibid., 12–13, 32–33.


30 Ibid., 10, 13.


33 Matthews, 23–24, 26.

34 Ibid., 26.

35 Wass de Czeye, 2.


38 Matthews, 25.


41 Cummings, 74.

42 Swain, 16.

43 Green, 23.


45 Ibid., 52.

46 Green, 26–27, 40.

47 Ibid., 40.

48 Davison, 46.


50 Operational idea (operative idea) is the German term; the Soviets/Russians use idea of the operation.
In each of the past several years, experts have concluded that U.S. defense spending could grow no more. Despite the fact that the defense budget is now at its highest inflation-adjusted level since World War II, this anticipated leveling off has yet to materialize. Lawmakers, presented with war funding requests still labeled “emergency” after 7 years of war, and motivated by a desire to be seen as pro-defense, have been ready and willing to give the Department of Defense (DOD) everything it asks for and more.

With the United States suffering through economic conditions not seen since the Great Depression, however, the era of $700 billion annual defense budgets may soon be coming to an end. “Any crisis of this nature is going to affect—must affect—other Federal spending,” former chief Pentagon budget official Tina Jonas said about the struggling economy in September 2008. “You cannot look at defense by itself. It is a subset of our macro financial picture.” In a much discussed report, the Defense Business Board concluded recently that “[b]usiness as usual is no longer an option. . . . [T]he current and future fiscal environments facing the [Defense] Department require bold action.” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in September added, “I certainly would expect [defense budget] growth to level off, and my guess would be we’ll be fortunate in the years immediately ahead . . . if we were able to stay flat with inflation.”

The impending decline in defense dollars has been evident to Pentagon watchers for some time. The Bush administration’s future defense plan forecasts a 1.5 percent real reduction in the DOD base budget between fiscal year (FY) 2009 and FY2013. As operations in Iraq wind down and troops begin coming home, supplemental war budgets also will begin to disappear from the budgetary landscape.

A troubled economy, planned base budget reductions, and evaporating supplements, however, are not the only forces exerting downward pressure on defense spending. Declining tax revenues and growing mandatory spending are also clouding the

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fiscal skies. The Bush administration's tax cuts helped increase the gross national debt by over 70 percent (approximately $4 trillion) since FY2001, forcing the Government to spend more on debt interest payments despite generating less tax revenue.\(^1\) Federal spending on both mandatory programs (for example, Social Security) and debt interest payments, if current trends hold, will consume two-thirds of Government revenues by 2015, crowding out other spending priorities such as defense, education, and housing assistance.\(^6\)

In short, a time is rapidly approaching when defense budgets will not only taper off as war supplements disappear, but will also compete against ballooning mandatory spending programs for fewer and fewer tax resources—all, of course, amid economic crisis. But that is not all. The Pentagon’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation estimated that increasing the end strength size of the Army and Marine Corps by 65,000 and 27,000, respectively, would require at least $360 billion in additional spending over the next 6 years.\(^7\) Since there is little flexibility when it comes to providing benefits for these new troops, end strength increases would dramatically increase personnel costs and usurp resources from other DOD priorities such as research and procurement. These are the budgetary tradeoffs required to prepare for the manpower-intensive stabilization and counterinsurgency missions currently favored by top leaders at the Pentagon.

While belts will need to be tightened, defense policymakers should not despair. With a new administration in office, today’s perfect budgetary storm presents an opportunity to fix a problem upon which too many words have been wasted, yet not enough action has been taken. In a time of increasingly scarce defense dollars, it is critical to optimize every penny invested in national security. The United States can only recover from the past and present, while preparing for the future, if the White House, Pentagon, and Capitol Hill repair the broken defense acquisitions process and give taxpayers the return on investment they deserve.

**The Acquisitions Crisis**

Though the end of the war on terror’s gilded age draws nigh, some analysts, unhappy with what they see as boom-and-bust frivolity in American defense budgeting, have drawn a line in the sand and argued that defense spending simply must not decline below a certain point. Advocates of spending 4 percent of gross domestic product on defense exemplify this school of thought.

Without going into detail, the 4 percent crowd should recognize three things about their proposal: it would add $1.4 trillion to $1.7 trillion to deficits over the next decade and provide more funding than is forecast to be necessary;\(^8\) it would allow procurement to drive strategy, rather than the other way around, something Secretary Gates decried in his recent *Foreign Affairs* article;\(^9\) and, most importantly, it is politically unviable in the economic and budgetary environment faced by Washington.\(^10\)

Rather than pointlessly debating proposals that will never see the light of day, defense wonks’ nervous energy should be spent on something more constructive. With an expanded Democratic majority in Congress and a new Democratic President, keeping abreast of developments on Capitol Hill and in the Obama administration is the key to anticipatory, proactive policymaking and advocacy. A growing body of evidence suggests that Pentagon acquisitions reform will rank near the top of this Congress’ and President’s defense policy to-do list.

For anyone in the know, this sounds like a stupid thing to say. After all, while lawmakers love to rail publicly against “fraud and abuse” (to borrow one of their favorite phrases) at DOD, they are all too happy to ally those concerns when it comes time to funnel millions of dollars in earmarks back to their constituents. The reason things finally may be different this time, besides the faltering economy, is that the Pentagon’s acquisitions process is truly at an all-time low. Everyone realizes how flawed the process is right now, even if these problems are glossed over sometimes for political or proprietary purposes.

The five controversial major defense acquisition programs below, well known to even casual followers of defense issues, demonstrate the extent of the crisis. With combined total costs of over $370 billion, these programs are worth over half of what Congress approved to bail out the teetering U.S. financial system.\(^11\)

**KC-X Air Force refueling tanker replacement**: Secretary Gates delayed any decision until 2009 due to errors made during the contract award process.

**DDG–1000 destroyer**: The Navy tried to terminate it due to cost overruns, but a few Members of Congress managed to keep it afloat.

**Future Combat Systems**: Congress continues to balk on a program whose cost, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), has ballooned to $163.7 billion from $91.4 billion, a 79 percent increase since its original estimate in 2003.\(^12\)

**VH–71 Presidential helicopter**: Program delays and some $4 billion in cost growth got the program in trouble, and then Congress cut development funding due to delay risks for the Increment 2 phase.

**F–22 Raptor**: The Air Force wants 381 aircraft, DOD senior leadership does not, and former Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and former Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Moseley are widely suspected to have been fired, at least in part, because they advocated too vigorously and too publicly for the F–22.

The DOD acquisitions crisis is also well documented at the structural level. GAO reported in March 2008 that current programs are delivered 21 months late on average, 5 months later than in FY2000. The total acquisition cost of the major defense program portfolio in FY2000 increased from the initial estimate by 6 percent; by FY2007, the cost growth percentage had more than quadrupled to 26 percent. GAO’s assessment of

**GAO’s assessment of 72 weapons programs concluded that none of those reviewed—not a single one—satisfied its standards for a successful, efficient program**

72 weapons programs concluded that none of those reviewed—not a single one—satisfied its standards for a successful, efficient program.\(^13\)

There are a number of causes underlying the Pentagon’s acquisitions crisis, but three of GAO’s explanations are worth highlighting:
Sixty-three percent of the programs GAO reviewed experienced requirement changes after development began. These systems encountered cost increases of 72 percent, whereas systems with no requirement changes experienced cost increases of only 11 percent.

Since 2001, program managers have served an average tenure of 17 months, less than half of DOD’s preferred term. Such high turnover hampers continuity and accountability. Moreover, the oversight staff at the Defense Contract Management Agency has plunged from some 25,000 employees to only 9,000.13

Of the programs assessed, 48 percent of the staffs were comprised of nongovernmental contractors. By continuing to outsource its oversight operations, DOD sacrifices institutional accountability and transfers responsibility to contractors with loyalty to nothing except their bottom lines.14

Congress has taken notice of this sorry state of affairs. In its joint explanatory statement for the FY2009 Defense Appropriations package, Congress lambasted DOD’s willingness to accept “lower than reasonable proposals for programs from contractors . . . as an opportunity to get major programs started because, once started, history has proven that major programs are rarely terminated.” By constantly accepting purposefully underestimated costs, the statement concluded, DOD “lengthens development schedules, costs the taxpayers additional dollars, and delays fielding critical capabilities to our Nation’s Armed Forces.”25

House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee chairman Representative John Murtha (D–PA) has criticized underbidding as all too pervasive. “Contractors bid low, and it’s a major problem. Every weapons system’s [cost] is underestimated,” Murtha stated in September. Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Senator Carl Levin (D–MI) tried to attach a provision to the FY2009 Defense Authorization bill creating a new Pentagon office that would generate independent cost estimates so that DOD does not have to rely on contractors to provide them. Unfortunately, his legislation did not come up for consideration due to acrimonious end-of-session procedural wrangling.16 President Barack Obama would retain his services at DOD. “We need to take a very hard look at the way we go about acquisition and procurement.”18

Finding a Solution

Based on the problems discussed above, four principles seem logical for guiding DOD’s acquisitions process:

- limit requirement changes made after development has already begun and insist on knowledge demonstration early and often
- keep experienced program managers and support staff in place to provide accountability and continuity
- retain more DOD employees in program development roles so oversight is not entirely outsourced to contractors
- insist on realistic cost estimates from industry and/or start getting estimates from an independent source.

Secretary Gates said in December 2008 after it was officially announced that President Obama would retain his services at DOD, “We need to take a very hard look at the way we go about acquisition and procurement.”18

DOD is already considering additional initiatives to accomplish its goal of only moving forward with programs that both possess well-designed development plans and meet performance benchmarks. These efforts include a new concept decision review: panels to review weapons system configuration changes; portfolio management upgrades; more incentives, support, and stability for program managers to increase retention; and actions to strengthen the link between contract awards and successful outcomes to foster accountability among contractors.22 If enacted, these initiatives would bring the Pentagon into closer alignment with the four principles outlined above.

While these reforms are a good start, they ignore the Pentagon-Congress relationship that is such an important and time-consuming part of the acquisitions process. Some reforms are needed in this area as well. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies has recommended that Congress streamline its oversight process based on the notion that “excessive review by multiple Congressional committees, members and staffers consumed an enormous amount of senior DOD leadership time that could be more effectively spent running the Department.” Beyond Goldwater-Nichols memorandum in September 2007 that required program managers to develop technically mature prototypes prior to initiating system development. The Pentagon also announced in November 2008 that it would add approximately 720 oversight employees in the Defense Contract Management Agency with the specific goal of recruiting younger hires to replace older staffers set to retire soon.21
also recommended that the Office of the Secretary of Defense restore the Service chiefs’ authority over acquisition programs so it could free itself from the daily tedium of program management and congressional relations and focus more on DOD’s strategic vision and architecture. Taking a slightly different view, the Defense Business Board recommended that combatant commanders should be responsible for generating procurement requirements, as opposed to the Service chiefs under the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols plan. Both the Defense Business Board and Beyond Goldwater-Nichols advocated changing the membership of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council by adding the combatant commanders as voting members and revoking the voting privileges of the Services’ vice commanders as voting members and revoking the voting privileges of the Services’ vice chairmen (but retaining them as nonvoting members). These steps require powerful bureaucratic entities to relinquish some of their control. That is never an easy thing, but it nevertheless merits serious consideration.

The United States is at a key juncture in weapons acquisitions. The all-important first step is for the Pentagon, with input from the White House and Capitol Hill, to craft and implement an overarching defense investment strategy. As GAO has recommended, DOD must develop a better procedure to balance carefully scrutinized needs with “the dollars, technologies, time, and people needed to achieve these capabilities.” This investment strategy would help the Pentagon prioritize, from the beginning, between the programs it simply cannot live without and those that must be relegated to the wish list until sustainable funding is available. If the strategy was produced internally, with limited input from industry, DOD would reclaim some of the leadership on procurement that has drifted to contractors in recent years. “I think we have to make the existing structure in the services and in [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] work better. You can’t do these big programs outside the system,” Secretary Gates remarked in December in response to a question about procurement and industry reform. “When it comes to some of the big modernization and capitalization programs . . . it would be a mistake to try and bypass the system.”

The wear and tear of years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq demand investments that recapitalize, repair, and restore existing platforms and assets. At the same time, the United States must invest in advanced technologies to maintain its military edge over potential near-peer adversaries and tailor American options for responding to terrorist organizations, failed states, and regional threats such as Iran and North Korea.

If the defense budget contracts, it is important for the security of the United States that it gets the most bang for every buck invested. Reforming the way the Pentagon buys weapons will maximize security and minimize waste. The taxpayer deserves no less, especially when economic times are tough and the international security environment is as unpredictable as ever.

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10. For a complete analysis of the shortcomings of the 4 percent proposal, see Travis Sharp, “Tying US Defense Spending to GDP: Bad Logic, Bad Policy,” Parameters (Fall 2008), 5–17.
22. Ibid., 11.
DOD
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System
A PATH TOWARD IMPROVEMENT

By ALBERT T. CHURCH and TED WARNER

Sailors from Riverine Squadron 1 patrol Euphrates River
U.S. Navy (Kevin S. O’Brien)
leadership of the investment planning and quarters of DOD, making clear and consistent undoubtedly meet resistance from various sions in the near term—choices that will critical to the overall defense effort.

Choices that are duplicative, underperforming, or less environment will require assessment of risk, associated with the Nation’s ongoing financial constraints, exacerbated by the massive costs brief spectrum of missions. Yet this system to emerging warfighting needs across a budgeting process that effectively responds dynamic planning, programming, and potential contingency operations demand have concluded that PPBES serves DOD and DOD budget. Despite the challenges involved in making this system work, many studies have concluded that PPBES serves DOD and the Nation well.

The need for DOD to acquire the capa-

bilities to achieve the National Defense Strategy, however, has never been greater. Current and potential contingency operations demand forces with the versatility and agility to adapt rapidly to increasingly fluid operational environments. Developing, equipping, and sustaining these forces demand an equally dynamic planning, programming, and budgeting process that effectively responds to emerging warfighting needs across a broad spectrum of missions. Yet this system must simultaneously address growing fiscal constraints, exacerbated by the massive costs associated with the Nation’s ongoing financial crisis. Sustaining military capabilities in this environment will require assessment of risk, resource tradeoffs, and divestiture of programs that are duplicative, underperforming, or less critical to the overall defense effort.

Future success requires difficult deci-
sions in the near term—choices that will undoubtedly meet resistance from various quarters of DOD, making clear and consistent leadership of the investment planning and decisionmaking processes more critical than ever. In a May 15, 2008, article, Loren Thomp-

son of the Lexington Institute projected that the DOD top line, not including supplemental appropriations to fund ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, would end up at $500 billion to $550 billion for the opening years of the new President’s term, down considerably from the roughly $700 billion total annual defense expenditures for 2008 (which included both the annual DOD budget for fiscal year 2008 and the supplemental appropri-

ations for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom). Although some costs associated with the two ongoing wars are reportedly being moved into the annual DOD budget, as long as thousands of U.S. troops are serving in Afghanistan and Iraq, annual supplemental appropriations will almost certainly remain in effect. At the same time, the Government will be scrambling to identify sources of funding to offset the massive costs of addressing the Nation’s financial crisis.

While PPBES is designed to meet these challenges, it will clearly need a stronger governance model and some procedural adjustments to address the range of issues and tradeoff decisions awaiting the Obama administration.

Recent PPBES Changes

Early in his tenure as Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld sought to improve the responsiveness of the DOD planning, programming, and budgeting processes. The new Pentagon leaders did not think that strategic planning, identification of required capabilities, systems acquisition, and budget development were adequately integrated into a comprehensive, resource-constrained decisionmaking process. Several significant reforms were instituted, and changes continue to be incorporated into PPBES in an attempt to improve this integration.

Significant among the changes was the May 2003 implementation of a 2-year PPBES (see figure). This change was intended to reduce the workload associated with annual POM analysis, program development, and subsequent review while permitting an “off-year” to focus on budget execution and program performance. During off-years, Service and agency activities would focus on “fact-of-life” and other necessary changes to the previously approved “on-year” program.

The biennial cycle, while fine in theory, has not fared so well in practice. Annual congressional appropriation changes; large increases in fuel, health care, and manpower costs; and significant cost growth in several major acquisition programs have essentially driven the system back to an annual program submission. In the most recent off-year cycle, well over 300 change proposals from the previous year’s budget were submitted from the Services, combatant commands, Joint Staff, and OSD. The resulting workload, contention about what constitutes a fact-of-life change, and inattention to program performance have diluted the intended objectives of this reform. Change takes time, and this has been a lengthy adaptation process, but as long as Congress maintains an annual cycle, DOD’s moving to a rigid biennial process does not seem practical. The development of an investment strategy and broad guidance on a 2-year cycle may make sense, but the Obama administration should consider returning the program and budget process to an annual cycle.

In assessing the current landscape, it may be useful to review other recent changes made to the PPBES as applied in three distinct, roughly sequential phases of the process: planning and programming, program and budget review (including associated decisionmaking mechanisms), and budget execution.

Planning and Programming

As depicted in the figure, the PPBES process never ends, with each new cycle of analysis, studies, and capability and risk assessments both supporting the previously submitted program and guiding development of the next annual budget submission. In theory, the biennial process begins with guidance issued to the Services and agencies, which then use this guidance to prepare their respective POMs, their comprehensive prioritizations of funding intentions for the President’s next budget submission. Although the titles and precise composition of these key PPBES guidance documents have changed over the years, this guidance is currently provided by the Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF), prepared by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) and the Joint Programming Guidance (JPG), prepared by the Office of the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation (OD[PA&E]). Reviews of the usefulness of these documents are mixed.

The GDF establishes “fiscally informed” capability development priorities and provides risk guidance to inform investment plan-

ning. This, in combination with additional analysis prescribed in the GDF, should inform

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The JPG, which is intended to guide selected portions of Service and defense agency POM development. Although originally envisioned to align investments with strategy and to allow resourceing of rising manpower and operations costs, the GDF has become, according to some, a wish list of programs and priorities for every constituency.

The JPG, also a relatively new document, is intended to translate the strategy and capability priorities of the GDF into program-specific guidance that is fiscally constrained. In practice, however, the guidance provided in the JPG has been limited to a small number of selected programs whose aggregate funding has totaled only a few billion dollars out of a budget of more than $500 billion. Moreover, the JPG has been issued after the majority of Service/agency POM development efforts are complete and, at most, has resulted in modest adjustment and rebalancing of a few program priorities late in the POM development process.

As the employers of the systems, personnel, and hardware procured and sustained via the PPBES, the combatant commanders have an important near-term analytic and operational perspective on how effectively PPBES addresses their warfighting needs. The employment priorities of the combatant commanders are described, in part, by the new Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). The GEF, whose content is linked to the National Defense Strategy, provides these commanders with the framework to develop campaign and operational plans from which near-term capability gaps can be identified. The commanders’ recommendations to address these capability gaps are set forth in annual Integrated Priority List submissions to the Services and Joint Staff and via their inputs to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Program Recommendation, both of which are intended to inform the GDF and JPG.

The products of the planning and programming phase are Service and agency POMs, crafted to meet fiscal and all other guidance. However, they are often criticized for not only failing to comply with various guidance documents and combatant commander requests but also improperly accounting for cost, schedule, and technology risks in their investment programs. They are also cited for underestimating industrial base issues, missing economic opportunity, and focusing more on near-term procurement than on life-cycle costs. This lack of long-term focus is exacerbated by a troubling reluctance to realistically forecast expected manpower as well as operations and maintenance costs in future budgets, called Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) projections. In the aggregate, these behaviors lead DOD to routinely overprogram, a term often used to acknowledge that there is more cost in the programmed force than the actual budget can realistically accommodate in the out years of the FYDP.

It is highly unlikely that either the GDF or JPG, as currently formulated and issued, will support making hard programmatic choices or correct the systemic problems noted above. Consequently, these decisions must traditionally be addressed at the end
of the PPBES cycle at the same time when “must-pay” bills associated with manpower, fuel, and other elements also come due and Service and agency budgets must be balanced. This failure of the PPBES governance process directly contributes to program instability and poor acquisition habits.

As a first step to streamline and reinvigorate this phase of the PPBE system, the Obama administration might look at steps to enhance coordination between OUSD(P) and OD(PA&E) in drafting the GDF or, more radically, transferring the responsibility for drafting the GDF from Policy to PA&E. Given that the JPG has evolved into a document with limited scope and its issuance has occurred late in the POM development process, the new team in DOD should seriously consider radically recasting this document or dropping it altogether.

Program and Budget Review

Prior to 2001, the reviews of Service and agency POMs (“programs”) and their budget submissions were done sequentially by different elements of OSD, with OD(PA&E) overseeing the program review and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)—the USD(C)—overseeing the subsequent budget review. Several changes to this review process were implemented by the Bush administration, with varying degrees of success.

Concurrent Program and Budget Review. In August 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld directed DOD to conduct concurrent programming and budget reviews, a change meant to shorten the PPBES cycle, drive consensus among key players in the process, and allow strategic investment decisions regarding the programs to be made alongside traditional budget compliance and fiscal balancing decisions.

In a related and follow-on DOD directive, the responsibilities and reporting relationships of OD(PA&E) were changed, making that office report directly to the Secretary of Defense rather than keeping it under USD(C). The result was a serious weakening in the link between the offices of USD(C) and OD(PA&E)—with unintended consequences. Although much individual effort goes into deconflicting the reviews conducted by these offices, the resulting Program Decision Memoranda, produced by OD(PA&E), and the Program and Budget Decisions, which are developed by OUSD(C) and document key decisions made in the program and budget review processes respectively, have occasionally been uncoordinated and at odds. This highlights the broader issue that there is currently no single office responsible for the functioning of the entire PPBES process.

Because this combined program/budget review reform has apparently not met expectations and has required repeated personal interventions at senior levels, the Obama administration should consider returning to a modified sequential process, consisting of a roughly 2-month program review followed by a shortened, 6-week budget review intended to allow USD(C) sufficient time to ensure the financial integrity of the DOD budget, but not to provide a forum for addressing program content. Furthermore, it would appear prudent to once again place OD(PA&E) within the Office of the USD(C), which should assist in harmonizing guidance and producing a more coordinated approach to the program and budget reviews processes.

Capability Portfolio Management (CPM). CPM is the latest effort to grapple with competing Service and agency priorities in carrying out capability development. It establishes capability portfolio managers to assess and recommend changes to optimize a wide range of activities associated with broad capability areas. These managers have the opportunity to impact capability development by being proponents for their capability areas, primarily through advocacy of key programs in their portfolios during
program and budget review and in the defense acquisition process.

This portfolio management effort began with the issuance of a charter in 2003 designating U.S. Joint Forces Command as the lead for the Joint Battle Management and Command and Control mission/capability area requirements. It was reinforced by the emphasis placed on CPM in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which led to the creation of four capability portfolio pilot projects centered on Command and Control, Battlespace Awareness, Net-centric Operations, and Logistics. At the beginning of 2008, additional portfolio management pilots were established for Force Application, Protection, Building Partner Capacity, Operational Support, and Corporate Support, thus providing portfolio managers for all nine Tier 1 Joint Capability Areas.

The original four CPM pilots were focused on capability areas marked by significant joint interdependence. Portfolio managers were seen as advocates for the joint “wholeness” within their capability areas, in contrast to Service programers, whose horizons were perceived as limited by the programs of their respective Services alone. It is hard to argue with the idea of employing some form of capability portfolio management in DOD, whose investments should be managed in terms of the development and sustainment of sets of critical joint capabilities to maximize efficiency in resource allocation.

Nevertheless, there are a number of limitations to the current CPM approach. First, Service programs are often highly interdependent, and optimizing one capability area can have significant impacts on other capability areas and capability development efforts, as well as on acquisition process efficiency. Additionally, many programs, such as those supporting multimission platforms, do not lend themselves to a simple portfolio categorization, a problem that will emerge more clearly as portfolio management efforts are expanded into areas such as Force Application or Protection—each of which contains numerous Major Defense Acquisition Programs and multimission platforms.

Rather than attempting to force the entire defense budget into prescribed joint capability portfolios on a line item basis, the main objective of this reform could be accomplished by conducting detailed portfolio reviews in a small number of critical joint capability areas as part of the recurring annual PA&E program review, in which all stakeholders already participate. Identification of the selected critical capability areas to be addressed in a given PPBES cycle would be provided in the GDF at the outset of that cycle.

**Executive Decisionmaking/Program and Budget Review Adjudication.** Major budget issues that surfaced during the program review used to be resolved in a senior DOD leadership forum called the Defense Resources Board. In the Rumsfeld era, this gave way to the Senior Leadership Review Group and, more recently, the Deputy’s Advisory Working Group (DAWG), an element carried over from the conduct and oversight of the 2006 QDR. The DAWG was formally established by a Deputy Secretary of Defense directive in spring 2006.

As portfolio managers begin assessing selected portions of their portfolios during PPBES cycles under the oversight of the DAWG, traditional Service and agency roles will be affected. The DAWG needs to continue to play a key role in the OD(PA&E)-led program review process, most likely as a forum for the senior-level discussion of key issues prior to release of the POMs. The DAWG could also continue to serve as a decision forum outside the PPBES process.

**Budget Execution**

In May 2003, the longstanding PPBS was expanded to include the E in PPBES, thus signifying the addition of a new phase devoted to assessing program and budget execution. As originally envisioned, a robust budget execution review would be conducted during the off-years of the biennial cycle to evaluate if the intent of the budget and defense strategy was being achieved, both in the spend plan and in program performance against the posited objective. However, for a number of reasons, including the time-consuming pressures of ongoing operations and the near-continuous process of seeking and administering supplemental appropriations, the intent of this reform has never been achieved. Measurement of budget and program performance has been a longstanding goal of the Office of Management and Budget. DOD and the Obama administration should devote renewed focus to this area.

Future PPBES cycles will be influenced by a number of trends now clearly evident: managing the costs of ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan; accommodating new missions such as enhanced capabilities for irregular warfare, which includes counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations; maritime domain awareness; increasing cooperative engagement in Africa, Latin America, and Asia; rapidly fielding new technology; managing costs that outpace inflation (fuel, manpower, and health care); resetting the force; and addressing instability in large procurement accounts—all within the context of a DOD budgetary top line that will be under severe pressure. The adjustments suggested in this article are intended to make the process more streamlined and efficient, protect stakeholder equities, and help ensure the best possible DOD budget.

Although the Deputy Secretary of Defense is clearly the focal point for ensuring PPBES delivers needed capability to the warfighter and the Nation, it is equally clear that he needs an executive agent, or a first among equals, to keep PPBES moving on schedule, deconflicting guidance, enforcing decisions, and ensuring decision milestones are met. Since USD(C), as chief DOD financial officer, has overall fiduciary responsibility for the budget, this office is the logical choice to oversee and manage the PPBES cycle for the Deputy Secretary, with other OSD offices (such as Policy and PA&E) leading specific phases. As in many commercial enterprises, a strong chief financial officer is a prerequisite to effective management of investment planning and execution. **JFQ**
Bridging the Strategy-Resources Gap

Defense Planning in a Time of Crisis

By IONUT C. POPESCU

It has become almost a cliché in Washington to deplore the sorry state of defense budgeting. At the end of the Bush administration, the Pentagon’s messy finances persuaded even nonpartisan defense analysts to use harsh words to describe the status of Department of Defense (DOD) ledgers. The International Institute for Strategic Studies recently warned of an “acute planning and budgetary crisis,” while Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) called the current Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) a “poisoned chalice” for the Obama administration. Despite reaching some of the highest levels in real dollars since the end of World War II, DOD’s current forecast nevertheless underestimates the real amounts needed to fund today’s and tomorrow’s military—as it is currently envisioned in the department’s programming documents. Thus, the Obama administration faces either making significant changes to plans or appropriating markedly larger amounts to defense spending over the next 4 years.

In its latest review of planned defense expenditures, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated significant shortages in each of the main categories of the defense budget:
Operations and Maintenance (O&M); Military Personnel; Procurement; and Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E). When all “unbudgeted” costs are considered (which include the costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, in a scenario involving U.S. troop levels declining by 2014 to about 35 percent of their current number), CBO estimates that over the 2008–2013 period, DOD will require $642 billion on average per year, about 24 percent more than the $489 billion estimated by the previous administration. Moreover, CBO also warns of a multitude of worrisome factors, such as the rising costs of entitlement programs and the uncertain state of the American economy, which will limit the amount of funding available to DOD in the near future.

With a large increase in funding unlikely, it seems reasonable that President Barack Obama will attempt to solve the Pentagon’s financial problems by seeking a closer match of budgetary resources with the overall defense and national security strategy. Ideally, the administration should be able to choose from among competing priorities those that are most needed and eliminate the less relevant options to free up funds to make its plan affordable and sustainable. Should this happen, it would be one of the few times in history when the American defense planning process made a great deal of strategic sense. The reasons are twofold: first, the Pentagon’s budgeting priorities are similar to the course of a big ship, where small rudder changes are all that is possible; and second, military procurement plans are more often than not rather impervious to policy direction.

Despite the sorry state of the previous administration’s plans, it would be overly optimistic to hope for a dramatic overhaul from President Obama; the institutional inertia is just too powerful. The best that could be realistically demanded of the national security team is to integrate at least some of the hard budgetary choices into a coherent strategic framework that truly connects means with ends and takes into account both the internal and external factors determining the future of U.S. defense policy. This article is dedicated to providing such a concise analytical framework and suggests some of the critical questions that should be considered during the process preceding the first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of the Obama administration.

The article is grounded in a theoretical understanding of war and strategy strongly influenced by Clausewitzian thought. Thus, an appropriate depiction of future challenges must necessarily employ a holistic understanding of conflict. Descriptions of future war that fail to take into account both its operational grammar and its policy logic are incomplete at best and dangerously misleading at worst. For traditional and historical reasons, American defense planning has too often suffered from a debilitating bifurcation of strategic thinking: debates on war’s grammar have been conducted without regard to political objectives, while policy and strategy debates have rarely considered the actual realities of the battlefield and the suitability of current military means to achieve the specified policy goals. Keeping in mind that strategy-making is above all a continuous process of matching means and ends according to dynamic changes in real-world circumstances, this study focuses on pointing out four interrelated factors—grand strategy, the Bush legacy, the nature of the threat, and the nature of modern warfare—that need to be considered during any strate-
A New Grand Strategy

If, as Clausewitz insisted, wars are acts of policy employed by statesmen to secure certain objectives, then the overall approach to international politics adopted by a polity should tell us a great deal about the types of wars it should prepare for. One might be tempted to analyze the campaign pronouncements of President-elect Obama or his surrogates and tease out his likely plans for the military. After all, it is customary for each new administration to espouse the central tenets of its approach to international security in a National Security Strategy, which serves as an overarching policy guide for the National Defense Strategy and the QDR. The latter two documents are meant to show how the department is “operationalizing” the President’s strategy, and how it shifts its priorities to better accomplish the objectives of the administration.

Of course, anyone even vaguely familiar with U.S. defense budgetary issues would find the model described above, if somewhat logical in theory, rather unrealistic from a practical perspective. And overall this is a good thing for the United States: grand strategies are not supposed to change every 4 or 8 years, and they surely should not be based on a 50-page unclassified document put together by the staff of the National Security Council in the first months of a new administration. The Obama administration will nevertheless attempt to change the direction of U.S. grand strategy, and pundits will probably soon talk of an Obama “doctrine.” The extent to which President Obama will be successful in changing the content and not merely the form of U.S. defense planning, however, depends on whether his administration manages to properly address most of the questions discussed below.

The first grand strategic question President Obama faces is whether he agrees with the diagnosis of the post-9/11 security environment promoted by the Bush administration in recent strategy documents. Are we in a “long war,” a generational struggle against al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists that will require the kind of long-term commitment of resources the Cold War did? Should this be the main organizing principle around which our national security bureaucracy, including our military, must be optimized? If so, the Obama administration has a long and difficult way ahead in shifting national security investments, especially since it is far from clear exactly what the military requirements of such a grand strategy are.

Much depends on the ways in which the Obama administration plans to fight this long war and, consequently, which missions will be assigned to the Defense Department. Each of the Services, albeit with various degrees of enthusiasm, has attempted over the last several years to adapt to the new strategic demands imposed by the Bush administration and to show how their capabilities and investments are relevant to the new missions. However, most of these efforts have been ad hoc, completely additive to their existing missions and programs, and lacking an overarching framework that would delineate specifically what the principal roles and missions of the American military are in defeating the global Salafist network.

The containment of the Soviet Union, if far from perfect, nevertheless represented a useful, coherent grand strategy that provided overall guidance to our military planning during the Cold War. Furthermore, the conventional nature of the enemy made the developments of our defense capabilities a fairly predictable process, based on technical metrics that we understood well. No such monolithic and stable enemy exists today, and thus no consistent strategic guidance exists either. Shaping our national security apparatus to defeat a global terrorist network may well involve a shift in priorities from combat military capabilities to other instruments of U.S. power, such as economic aid, governance and law enforcement assistance, or public diplomacy. While increasing our efforts in such nonmilitary areas is a seemingly logical step in tackling terrorism, the unclassified strategy documents such as the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism do not provide a detailed grand strategic framework to guide the development of such capabilities or to show how all instruments of national power are to be integrated in the pursuit of a common goal. Classified documents such as the National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror are likely to offer more on the necessary connections between means and ends, but the overall strategic quality of it is impossible to judge due to its unavailability in the public domain.

There is not even agreement so far on the basic characteristics of the enemy, as the heated debate between terrorism experts Bruce Hoffman and Marc Sageman showed.1 Are the greatest threats to the United States coming from a “central core” based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, or from many smaller, often homegrown cells in Western Europe, Northern Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere? If we accept the emerging conventional wisdom that the greatest threats

while increasing our efforts in nonmilitary areas is a logical step in tackling terrorism, unclassified strategy documents do not provide a detailed grand strategic framework

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come from weak/failed states and ungoverned territories, then what exactly should the U.S. military be expected to do to promote “good governance” and mitigate these conditions? What is the relationship between the global Salafists and the local insurgent groups threatening various regimes around the world, and, consequently, how far should the United States go in supporting the latter? Is it reasonable to expect that al Qaeda sympathizers could gain control of a key state such as Saudi Arabia or Pakistan? Above all, what is the overall political objective of the United States in this long war: a long-term focus on political transformation of the Muslim world to address the root causes of terrorism, a short-term focus on strengthening current regimes so they are able to deny safe haven to terrorist groups, or some delicate combination of the two? These are only some of the basic questions that need thorough analysis to determine the contours of a military focused on a generational war against Islamic militants.

If, on the other hand, the Obama administration considers the Salafist threat an important national security priority, but not the overarching challenge of this generation, then we are back to the yet-unanswered basic grand strategic question of the post–Cold War era: with the Soviet Union gone, what should be the main role of U.S. power in the world? If, following Clausewitz, acting strategically means using or threatening to use force to secure certain political objectives, then what are the U.S. policy goals most appropriate for military force, and what kind of forces would be most suited for securing them?

A thoughtful discussion on alternative U.S. grand strategies recently took place under the auspices of the Solarium II program, hosted by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), among a significant number of foreign policy experts not entirely convinced of the suitability of the long war paradigm as the new organizing principle for national security policy. In the final chapter of the program’s report, the authors argue for a grand strategy of sustainment: “The United States’ relationship to the rest of the world necessitates a strategy that maintains a degree of basic order in the international system… . It is time for America to renew its longstanding bipartisan commitment to helping sustain the pillars of the modern international system.” This view of the United States as a promoter of global public goods and ultimate guarantor of the global order is neither new nor controversial in Washington circles; the debates between Democrats and Republicans have really been mostly over the ways and means of achieving such goals, with scant attention paid to assessing how available resources fit into the big picture.

When it comes to describing the roles of the U.S. military, the CNAS report is rather disappointing. In addition to securing the global commons (air, sea, and space), something the American military has long done, the report fails to move beyond generalities such as the need to prevail on the “full spectrum of conflict” in the contested land and coastal areas. What missions are to be found on the spectrum and how the military should prioritize among them, the authors do not mention—except to say that leaders should allocate risk more prudently. In fairness to the authors, the wide-ranging scope of their valuable paper may not have allowed for more detailed analysis. Unfortunately, this lack of specificity when it comes to grand strategic debates is prevalent in Washington. Instead of focusing on the connections between means and ends, the discussions are highly skewed toward the policy ends desired and the ways to achieve them, without careful consideration of the means available. As a result, a list of policy goals and ideas about how to achieve them is likely to be more of a strategy “document” does not make it so, unless one also shows convincingly how to employ available means to accomplish those goals. The critique above would hopefully be useful particularly for the Obama administration, which comes into the White House with a world view similar in many ways to that of the CNAS authors.

Despite its lack of detail on implementation, having a coherent set of ideas about America’s goals in the world, and hence basing decisions on a grand strategic framework, is clearly a valuable aim, and CNAS should be commended for its efforts to stimulate debate on this topic. Deploiring the lack of the Obama administration’s grand strategy, it should succeed in having one, is the first factor that should influence the defense budgeting process.

As if the complexity of today’s geopolitical world were not enough, one must also account for its heightened unpredictability in comparison with the Cold War era. As Williamson Murray noted at a National Defense University conference:

[George Kennan could write an article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” that seems so brilliant in retrospect, because the landscape of strategic competition remained so stable. No such article [as Kennan’s], laying out the next forty years could have been written in 1914, or 1938, or 1860, for that matter, because the landscape of the future was to prove so turbulent. And that is why few at best will prove able to capture even glimmers of the emergent future that will confront the United States over the next quarter century.]
To sum up, the Obama administration’s grand strategy, should it succeed in having one, is the first factor that should influence the defense budgeting process. However, for this to occur, it is necessary to be much more precise on how we expect our military forces to contribute to accomplishing national security objectives in today’s world, and to make sure the necessary capabilities are available to achieve such goals.

The Bush Defense Legacy

Even if the Obama administration has a clear vision for its defense policy grounded in a sound appreciation of the means available and of the proper roles of the military in the context of its national security strategy, it nevertheless has to operate in an environment characterized by a highly demanding set of challenges left by the Bush administration. Its options for shaping the budgetary and programmatic decisions are necessarily limited by the effects of recent policies. To take one relevant example, congressional estimates show that the Pentagon may be facing up to a $100-billion tab to repair and replace worn-out equipment from Iraq and Afghanistan; these “reset” costs are unbudgeted in future plans, and funding them would surely hinder any competing defense priorities President Obama may have. Another $100 billion is scheduled to support enlarging the Army and the Marine Corps over the next several years, further restricting resources for other priorities.

A couple of reports from the Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS detail some of the most significant problems of the current defense spending plans that need to be addressed by the new Pentagon team; four are worth mentioning here. First, plans under the Bush administration ignored the future costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. No matter how soon one hopes to diminish the U.S. commitments in these two countries, recent experience, as well as estimates by nonpartisan groups such as the Congressional Budget Office, show that at least for the first years of President Obama’s term, the United States will still have to spend considerable sums for these two missions. A closely related problem is represented by the increasing reliance on “emergency supplementals” for what are obviously costs that could and should be integrated into a coherent multiyear spending plan for issues such as force reset, long-term readiness, increases in manpower, and force transformation. Hence, as Cordesman writes, “There is no clear or coherent plan, program, or budget that reflects the fact the nation is at war and no credible mix of force plans, modernization plans, and procurement plans for the future.”

Second, echoing the theme of the disconnect between grand strategy and defense budgeting, the CSIS studies also deplore this decoupling of U.S. strategy and policy goals on the one hand, and the creation of specific forces and readiness plans to implement them on the other. Despite having some value, efforts such as the QDR process and the various Service-specific strategic reviews too often fail to ensure the necessary connections between means and ends.

Third, as military analyst Frank Hoffman also noted, military manpower costs have been steadily increasing over recent years and are expected to remain very high in the near future. In addition to the costs of recruiting and retention in a challenging wartime environment, a large part of this increase is due to rising health care costs for both Active-duty soldiers and veterans; these latter costs really represent a long-term “de facto military entitlement” that should be properly planned for by the Obama administration.

Finally, there is the much-maligned problem of cost escalation for DOD’s acquisition portfolio. The most recent Government Accountability Office assessment of the Pentagon’s major weapons programs showed that these costs rose from $790 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2000 to $1.6 trillion in FY2007, and outstanding commitments rose from $380 billion to $858 billion. The estimated total acquisition costs growth increased from $42 billion in 2000 to no less than $295 billion in 2007. Furthermore, a budgetary practice called “slipping to the right” compounds the problem: procurement funding increased more robustly beginning with FY2009, which means critical investment decisions regarding affordability were passed on to President Obama. The combined effects of the four factors described above lead Cordesman to conclude that the Obama administration will have to reshape almost every aspect of current defense plans, programs, and budgets.

Nature of Threats

The recent strategy documents elaborated by the Defense Department have often employed a framework of analyzing threats by categorizing them as conventional (traditional), irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic. These attributes, however, are more properly describing ways of threatening U.S. interests, not what are the actual threats to national interests worth defending by force of arms. This process of overvaluing the importance of the grammar of modern warfare relative to its policy logic—a byproduct of “capabilities-based planning”—leads to a poor understanding of the real-world needs of the U.S. military. To talk strategically about the nature of present threats
necessarily requires at first an understanding of the security interests that may need defending, and of the likely political objectives that will be desired in the aftermath of possible conflicts. Colin Gray likes to remind audiences that, ultimately, “war is only about the peace that follows.” This basic tenet of

overvaluing the importance of the grammar of modern warfare relative to its policy logic leads to a poor understanding of the real-world needs of the U.S. military

strategic theory should be one of the starting points for the Obama administration’s efforts at defense reform.

Just as with the case of a new grand strategy, the Obama administration first needs to decide whether it agrees with the emerging conventional wisdom regarding the kinds of threats worthy of military intervention and the extent of commitment likely to be required if the United States intervenes. As Steve Metz and Frank Hoffman observed, the Bush administration made “the war on terror” the main organizing principle of U.S. security strategy, and it decided on a global counterinsurgency framework to address this challenge. The authors rightly conclude that if the Obama administration continues on the same general path, “involvement in irregular warfare and stabilization operations is weak and failing states will be its most common activity—perhaps its only major one.” 22

Depending on its grand strategic priorities, the Obama administration ought to provide clear political guidance to the Pentagon during its first major defense review by addressing some very tough questions: Does countering global terrorism require large-scale military commitments, to include counterinsurgency and stability operations, in failing or failing states? Is the nexus between weapons of mass destruction and global terror networks so dangerous that preemptive strikes will be seriously considered? If so, is regime change, followed by nation-building, a necessary followup measure in the aftermath of such an attack? Leaving the war on terror aside for the moment, how far would the United States go in preventing a would-be regional hegemon from disturbing the current balance of power in a strategically significant region such as the Persian Gulf or East Asia?

The answers to these questions have wide-ranging implications for the prioritization of future resources. For far too long, DOD avoided making tough yet necessary tradeoffs and instead relied on vacuous, all-encompassing concepts such as full spectrum operations, on ill-managed modernization plans, and on stretching the current force to the limit through what Frederick Kagan aptly criticized as “a strategy for heroes.” 23 In the broadest possible grand strategic choice, it is unlikely that the Obama administration will reject the “world-ordering” role the United States has had, in various ways, since the end of World War II. Hence, at least some of the military requirements of the past—such as maintaining the command of air, sea, and space—will likely remain the same. The threats to these goals are fairly well understood, and the U.S. military has so far been successful in countering them. While the level of resources needed to maintain supremacy in these domains remains a matter of intense debate, there is a general agreement inside the U.S. defense community on the proper role of military force in securing the dominance of these realms.

The toughest question for the Obama administration is related to land warfare in general, and irregular/counterinsurgency campaigns in particular. Such campaigns, as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan showed once again, have the potential of becoming costly affairs with uncertain prospects of victory, especially if the end-state goals are expansive (that is, if they include a large number of political, economic, and social reforms usually grouped under the “nation-building” category). If President Obama indeed agrees that present security threats require the military to become involved in protracted land conflicts on a regular basis in various troubled parts of the world, the challenge is to plan for the necessary increases in resources dedicated to ground troops to make such a strategy sustainable. If, on the other hand, a different approach is preferred, one in which the United States attempts to secure its interests in key areas mainly by substituting local allied forces for U.S. troops supported by a small number of U.S. military and nonmilitary advisors, then the challenge is to show that this strategy can bring real, lasting results.

Lastly, President Obama may regard global terrorism as a threat different from insurgency, and hence more suitably addressed by an intelligence and law enforcement campaign than by a counterinsurgency campaign. In this situation, the planning process of the U.S. military would focus mainly on scenarios not dominated by a concern with the long war.

Nature of Modern Warfare

The last factor that ought to play an important role in the effort to improve U.S. defense planning is a better understanding of the predominant characteristics of modern warfare, and also—just as importantly—a more realistic appreciation of our limits in predicting future developments. The emerging conventional wisdom among civilian and military leaders holds that the United States needs to shift its focus away from a traditional vision of conflict toward something that resembles what the American military is facing now in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is alternatively referred to as irregular (or asymmetric, or unconventional) warfare, counterinsurgency, or stability operations. This shift in priorities has not been uncontroversial, and even Secretary of Defense Robert Gates famously noted that important parts of the defense establishment have been less than enthusiastic about this agenda. Some military leaders have expressed concern about a dangerous decline in readiness for high-intensity conflicts, while others worried about the wisdom of becoming involved in such protracted counterinsurgency given the high costs and uncertain benefits. 24

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Even counterinsurgency experts often found much to criticize in the way the U.S. defense community chose to define the basic tenets of modern insurgencies, and warned of the unsuitability of military solutions to many...
of today’s conflicts. Yet other sophisticated experts pointed to the false “conventional versus irregular” dichotomy, and instead suggested terms such as hybrid or multimodal wars, which include characteristics of both, to describe the proper nature of modern conflict. American and British military doctrines are already adapting to such trends, preparing for a future where the distinctions between various modes of warfare will become ever more blurred.

While these debates on the lessons of recent conflicts undoubtedly point out some valuable lessons, the Obama administration is well advised to ground its planning in something more than the illusion that it can discover the one true “nature” of present or future warfare. Current conflicts may be a useful harbinger of future wars, but this is far from certain. A plausible argument could be made that insurgency tactics have been the most useful ways to frustrate U.S. objectives in recent conflicts, not necessarily because the American military was not proficient in irregular warfare, but because U.S. objectives have been so expansive as to necessitate a long-term occupation. The logical extension of this argument would lead us to conclude that, should the United States pursue more limited goals in future conflicts, then those wars would be of a different character than Iraq or Afghanistan. The same would hold true if the enemy were more technologically sophisticated and able to deny access to some U.S. platforms or hold on to its own territory longer than the hapless Taliban and Iraqis. The Secretary of Defense certainly has a point that “next-war-itis” should not prevent the Pentagon from developing the capabilities to win the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but neither should we fall into the trap of thinking that future wars will surely be of a similar nature.

A balanced and flexible approach to force structure is far preferable to investing most resources toward a specific mode of warfare. The challenge for the Obama administration is to build a defense plan that achieves this set of multimodal military capabilities within the constraints imposed by legacy commitments and by a level of financial resources sustainable over the long term. Given the way the defense budgeting process works, with its myriad influences from actors whose interests are only marginally related to the overall national security of the United States, attempting to achieve a closer match between strategy and resources is bound to be frustrating. Nevertheless, the administration cannot escape confronting this massive challenge of putting the Pentagon’s finances on a more sustainable path.

NOTES

8 Ibid., 139.
10 Henry A. Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 25, 27. Kissinger divides the world into four “international systems” at different historical stages: U.S.–Europe–Latin America (21st century), Asia (similar to 19th-century Europe), Middle East (7th-century Europe), and Africa (no precedent in European history).
15 Cordesman, 1.
16 In addition to the CSIS reports, see also Frank G. Hoffman, “Strategic Security Spending,” Armed Forces Journal (March 2008), available at <www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/03/3348179>.
17 Cordesman, 100.
19 Cordesman and Popescu, 30.
20 Cordesman, 1.
22 While the authors find this recent emphasis likely to continue in the Obama administration, they do not agree with the bipartisan consensus regarding the wisdom of increasing the number of U.S. troops to better prepare for more missions such as the one in Iraq. See Steven K. Metz and Frank G. Hoffman, Better not Bigger: Restructuring America’s Ground Forces, Policy Analysis Brief (Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation, September 2007). See also Steven K. Metz, Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, July 2008).
Afghanistan is at a tipping point, and the next 12 to 18 months will prove decisive in determining the country’s future. This has become the view of many scholars, politicians, diplomats, and military leaders around the world. To tip the scale in favor of defeating the insurgency and thus toward improving stability and governance in Afghanistan, the international community will significantly increase the diplomatic, military, and economic resources dedicated to these efforts in the coming year. Part of this resource increase involves expanding the ranks of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) by adding at least four U.S. Brigade Combat Teams and potentially thousands more troops from other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. The primary purpose of this article is to provide an operational design for how these units should execute a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign once
on the ground. This design accounts for the doctrinal principles of Field Manual 3–24, *Counterinsurgency*, yet adapts these principles in light of the current situation in Afghanistan and the hard lessons learned while fighting the insurgency over the years.

**The Mindset**

Counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan have to involve a great deal more than fighting insurgents. They must also include combating terrorists, criminals, warlords, and drug lords; mitigating sectarian and inter- and intratribal conflict; and curtailing government corruption while building governmental capacity and setting the conditions for reconstruction and development. Accordingly, ISAF units must be ready to fight sporadic, high-intensity engagements, often of short duration, and simultaneously to combat criminals and terrorists using police or constabulary tactics. These same forces must also be prepared to operate as armed social workers while facilitating reconstruction efforts, and as referees when coordinating governance development efforts among warring religious, ethnic, tribal, and governmental factions. This type of warfare is contrary to what most, if not all, we, as ISAF, have been prepared to execute. If we are going to succeed, the force has to understand the differences between our training and the realities on the ground in Afghanistan.

We must also focus on the word *succeed* instead of *win* in this campaign, because success is ultimately tied to the will of the Afghan government and people—the only ones who can truly “win.” The definitions of these two words have important distinctions. *Succeed* means “to make good, thrive, prosper, flourish, or progress in order to accomplish a favorable aim or outcome.” *Win* means “to acquire, be victorious, or triumph as a result of a fight.”

At the operational and tactical levels, the distinction implies that we must design our operations with the Afghan people as the focus of effort. They are the center of gravity in this campaign; thus, the prize on the Afghanistan battlefield is the mind of the population. Some have argued, based on Joe Strange’s model for analyzing potential centers of gravity in war, that the will of the populace is not the center of gravity, but rather is merely a critical objective for both sides. We caution strongly against this thinking. The simple fact is that the will of the Afghan people is the key to our success. We can eliminate 1,100, 1,000, and even 10,000 insurgents but will still fail if we do not succeed in the battle for the people’s will. On the other hand, if we succeed in winning the public over, it is also highly likely that, without firing a single bullet, the enemy’s numbers will rapidly drop from 10,000 to 1,000 to potentially fewer than 100 insurgents. This is the mindset that must be instilled in all ISAF personnel, from the most senior leaders to the most junior Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen.

To succeed in the battle for the people’s will, we must commit to attacking the problems within Afghanistan across all lines of operation, using the political, economic, social, informational, and military elements of our nations. The military element of operational design requires a significant mindset shift in our military establishment. Although ISAF leadership should not (and could not) be responsible for executing the nonmilitary elements of the overall COIN strategy, it is responsible for playing a supporting role, and must be prepared to temporarily fill the void in the development of governance and reconstruction, particularly at the district and village levels.

The question now is whether ISAF can adjust its organization, training, and most importantly its corporate mindset to succeed in Afghanistan. We think the answer is yes, if the leaders of our militaries understand, support, and lead units to implement the operational design described herein. The importance of unity of purpose and closely coordinated methods of operation cannot be overstated. Tactical operations in COIN will often have a much greater impact on the operational and strategic outcomes of the campaign than will tactical operations in a conventional war. ISAF units employed incorrectly or in a disjointed manner, or focused on the wrong objectives, will create far more adversaries and problems than they will ever eliminate and thus will negatively impact our efforts to defeat the insurgency.

**Force Composition**

Due to the nature of the Afghanistan operating environment, ISAF units must work as a single, cohesive force, intimately partnered with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The force required under this single unit is a combination of light infantry, artillery, and logistics units working in concert with specialized forces such as intelligence, civil affairs, psychological operations, human terrain teams, military police, explosive ordnance disposal, and engineers. Rotary- and fixed-winged aviation assets must also provide support as an integral part of the team. This force will normally operate under a single infantry battalion task force and will be assigned a single area of operation (AO). These types of forces are general purpose forces (GPF). Above the battalion task force level, all regiments, brigades, and regional and theater level command headquarters must operate under a single concept of operations and must establish objectives, coordinate actions, apportion and control terrain and boundaries, and allocate or aggregate resources as required between and among the GPFs. Finally, special operations forces and other governmental agencies must also play a vital role in the operational design, and these units must synchronize their efforts with the GPF.

The importance of selecting a light infantry battalion as the base force deserves further clarification. Conventional mechanized and armored formations are often counterproductive in conducting COIN, particularly in Afghanistan. These forces often have a mindset that connects them to their equipment and the firepower it delivers. They are frequently predisposed to vehicle-mounted (that is, road-bound) patrols to enhance their speed and survivability—both intuitive qualities of mechanized forces. Unfortunately, this approach only further separates them from the population, while also playing into one of the enemy’s strengths: ambushing road-bound vehicle units. One Russian journalist who embedded with Soviet forces in Afghanistan frequently from 1979 to 1989 described a major reason for the Soviet military’s failures: “During the 9 years of war we were constantly separated from the country by 8 millimeters of bulletproof glass through which we stared in fear from inside our armored carriers.” We can ill afford to repeat past mistakes. If the majority of our mechanized units do not reorganize into light infantry forces, trading their vehicles for good pairs of boots, they will quickly become a detriment to one of the main requirements in COIN: connecting with the population.
AOs that support vehicle movement, there is, however, a need for a motorized and potentially a mechanized task force held in reserve. All AOs must also have a heliborne reserve, and these forces must be available at the regimental/brigade level.

Framework
The operational design framework rests on five essential and sequential tasks: understand, shape, secure, hold, and build. While our GPF understand, shape, secure, hold, and build, they must concurrently assist the Command Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A) advisor in organizing, training, and operating with the ANSF. Finally, the GPF must develop the ANSF to a point where they are capable of largely independent operations.

To understand is to gain an intimate knowledge of the human and environmental dynamics impacting the campaign, particularly within a unit’s AO. To orient to the challenges of our AOs, we must first work to understand not only our enemy, but also the history, culture, traditions, and languages of the Afghan people. Simply studying enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures will leave us with a limited understanding of our AOs. We must also understand the family, clan, tribe, or community organization, and must know who now wields and who has historically wielded power in these groupings.

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likely be at the battalion task force level, must have the ability to anticipate, recognize, and understand the strengths, vulnerabilities, and opportunities available in his AO to shape successfully. Without understanding or, more specifically, without mapping the human terrain so we know who wields power in our AOs, we will never maximize our ability to shape operations.

Securing an AO means to gain possession of an area’s key terrain in order to deny its use to the enemy and also to provide security for the population. We intentionally say secure instead of clear. To secure is “to gain possession of a position or area, with or without force, and to prevent its destruction or loss by enemy action.” To clear, on the other hand, is “the removal of enemy forces and elimination of organized resistance in an assigned zone, area, or location by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces that could interfere with the unit’s ability to accomplish its mission.” Securing is a more appropriate mindset for COIN in Afghanistan. It implies a less confrontational approach, like a policeman handling an uncertain but potentially hostile situation. Clearing implies a destructive or escalatory mindset and may be suited in limited situations, but is more appropriate for warfare against another state army. When the GPF secures an area, it must be done discretely and with precision. Killing insurgents is not the main objective. Large unit clearing sweeps and

Marine surveys terrain from rooftop during patrol in Helmand Province

U.S. Marine Corp (Pete Thibodeau)
**Holding** an AO means that we and the ANSF are present and intend to remain until a legitimate local government is ready to provide security and governance. Both the people and the insurgents must truly appreciate the extent of this commitment; otherwise, the people will never feel safe, and the insurgents will have continuing ability to influence the population. Demonstrating this level of commitment requires the GPF, along with the ANSF, to live and operate among the Afghans. If the ISAF and ANSF team only interacts with the population during cordon and search, vehicle checkpoints, and raid operations, it fails to understand the center of gravity in Afghanistan. Large “secure” bases far from the population are arguably good for force protection and maintaining a “Western” quality of life for our troops, but these remote bases are counterproductive to accomplishing objectives. Living and operating out of such facilities creates an “us versus them” attitude between the GPF and population. It also inhibits the GPF and ANSF from gaining the human intelligence required to succeed. Simply put, the GPF and ANSF must “hug” the population to protect them. This means we must eat and sleep in the villages and towns without displacing a single family to build the relationships required to physically and psychologically separate the insurgents from the people.9

**Building** an AO means maintaining a safe environment for the people and the local government so both can pursue their political, social, and economic goals. At the tactical and operational levels, ISAF building efforts must be focused on facilitating popular support for the district and provincial governments through the clan, subtribal, tribal, and/or village leadership, and providing an atmosphere for political reconciliation. One of the first functions we must accomplish to establish this atmosphere is to identify who the past and current informal and formal leaders are in our AOs, which, once again, requires mapping the human terrain.9 We must then work with the local leadership to develop a legitimate rule of law and help to enforce the laws. Afghanistan has a signed national constitution that is the primary source for the rule of law. However, there are also more traditional rules of law, such as tribal or village jirgas. While not officially sanctioned by the national government, jirgas have long served as an accepted rule of law in specific areas. One of ISAF and the international community’s main challenges in the future is to assist Afghans in integrating national laws with provincial, district, and in some cases village and tribal laws. That said, ISAF units should leverage the experience of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), along with the many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that have operated in Afghanistan pre- and post-2001, to help with all aspects of the building stage. We must appreciate that we might have to serve as a supporting effort to UNAMA, and even to NGOs, when it comes to tasks such as enabling elections and major infrastructure projects.

Working at the local level to stimulate the economy and to improve basic services for the people must also be a priority during the building stage. To this end, monies in the hands of the base unit commander and the ability to immediately use them to enhance peoples’ lives are critical assets in Afghanistan. Young- and middle-aged men who are unemployed for even a limited time represent discontent on which the insurgency can capitalize.10

**Partnering with the ANSF**

Organizing, training, and operating with the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and Afghan Border Police (ABP) are essential tasks for ISAF’s general purpose forces in this COIN campaign. We must avoid performing any operation if we are not partnered with an ANSF unit. We must also resist the inclination to build the ANSF using a Western model. Additionally, we must assist the ANSF in taking the lead in the campaign even before we think they are ready. Much of this transition will have to be carried out while the ANSF are engaged with the enemy and living among the population. This said, ISAF must come to grips with the realization that we cannot succeed alone. The ANSF must play a decisive role to facilitate the Afghans’ trust in their nation’s security forces. This will be at least a 10-year mission that will require patience, significant resources, and ongoing international support.

To begin, we must focus on continuing to build an ANSF that can deal with the internal threats to the sovereignty of Afghanistan. The ANSF, specifically the ANA, must be organized, equipped, and trained to fight the insurgent threat. The ANA must be a light, highly mobile GPF that can operate dispersed in platoon- and company-sized formations. We need not develop an ANA that can fight another state army. That is a mid- to long-term goal the Afghan government will move toward at an appropriate time. We must help the ANSF develop an air force that can provide fire support, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), and heliborne Quick Response Force (QRF) capabilities. Thus far, the ANA is the one bright spot in the ANSF, but with only one-third of the Kandaks (battalions) possessing a capability milestone 1 (CM 1) status,11 the ANA still requires many years of partnering, mentoring, and support.

In conjunction with ANSF tactical training and employment in combat, ISAF must accelerate and heavily fund programs to bring ANA personnel to NATO military academies and war colleges. Furthermore, NATO-staffed professional military schools of shorter duration are needed in greater numbers in Afghanistan to gain momentum in the development of the ANSF professional officer corps. A strong officer corps capable of independent operations is vital to combating the enemy in Afghanistan. To repeat, this is a 10-year fight at a minimum, and a captain at a NATO school today will likely play an instrumental role in ultimately defeating the insurgency.

Simultaneously, ISAF must significantly increase efforts to develop the ANP and ABP, which are frequently viewed as
corrupt, incompetent, and loyal to warlords. An additional challenge is that there is virtually no viable criminal justice system in Afghanistan, which further undermines confidence in the central government and cripples legal and institutional mechanisms for the ANP and ABP to use in prosecuting insurgents and criminals. Establishing a legitimate judicial structure at the national, provincial, and district levels is not a task for ISAF, but it is nonetheless essential if a legitimate, nationwide rule of law is ever to be implemented in Afghanistan.

While waiting for this judicial structure to be created, ISAF must still make developing and operating with the ANP and ABP a top priority and work with the Afghan government to ensure that these units have fortified police stations and border outposts, local jails, plants, schools, main roads, and highways. The police forces, with backing from the local leadership, must be heavily funded with handsome salaries and supported with top equipment to lure any militias and low-level insurgents into an alternative, lucrative, and legitimate profession. It is critical to remember that only a local police force can gain the trust of the local populace and penetrate a community thoroughly enough to gain the intelligence needed to destroy the insurgents' infrastructure permanently.12

**Professional Advisor Force**

Once the ANSF are equipped, trained, organized, and on the verge of being able to conduct independent operations, ISAF must pull back its GPF and transition to an advisor-only force that works closely with CSTC–A to provide logistics, fire support, MEDEVAC, and a QRF until Afghan forces can furnish these services. This marks a shift to an indirect approach by ISAF at which time the ANSF will take the lead and truly become the main effort in the campaign. The GPF base unit commander on the ground must make the assessment as to when the posture of the ISAF unit must change, and when having more overt ISAF units becomes a liability rather than an asset, as “over-partnering” can be detrimental to success. This judgment-based decision is made as the overall situation enters a “gray zone.” Yet in spite of its prolonged state in time, this period will serve as the operational tipping point to the final success of the campaign. In this gray zone, ISAF units become less visible, less intrusive, and less restrictive to the population while the ANA and, more importantly, the ANP and ABP begin to provide the primary elements of security.

In this gray zone and for the remainder of the conflict, ISAF will likely have to increase its advisor requirement, selection criteria, and support for CSTC–A. At this stage, ISAF’s advisors will serve as its decisive element. Accordingly, it is of even greater importance that this force be comprised of career officers with combat experience. This force must be regionally and culturally aware and possess a desire to immerse itself within the ranks of the ANSF, providing advice and support at the brigade, battalion, company, and even the platoon and police station levels.

The transition to the indirect approach, using a professional advisor-only force, facilitates the major drawdown of ISAF units. This will in turn posture the force for the inevitable prolonged COIN mission, and this indirect approach will likely facilitate long-term NATO support.

The Afghan government and ANSF, supported by the ISAF advisor force, will win in the long run by proving their legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people. Through professional training, sound military and policing advice, and robust support, the advisor force will assist the ANSF in driving the insurgency to lower and lower levels of
violence while the insurgents’ political will erodes. When the population looks exclusively to the legitimate government for protection and services, and the ANSF are operating independently, all ISAF military units can be withdrawn from the theater.

Problems to Solve

Success in these areas will set the conditions for ISAF to address three problems that have plagued the COIN effort for years. First, ISAF must focus on creating legitimate and productive village- and district-level governments. Only by providing tangible services and meeting real needs at these levels will the national government gain legitimacy—and then credibility—in the eyes of most Afghans. Unfortunately, poor governance, in part due to the absence of security, has plagued the counterinsurgency effort to this point, especially in the eastern and southern provinces. Polls consistently show that the lack of roads, electricity, and potable water is the main concern of the population, particularly in rural areas. Also, the majority of Afghans believe that corruption is a serious problem, and nearly two-thirds think it is increasing. In particular, the majority of Afghans believe that government officials profit from the drug trade in the eastern and southern provinces.13

This leads to the second major problem, drugs. The Afghan National Development Strategy states that narcotics are the single greatest threat to the country’s future and security.14 Immediate eradication, however tempting it may be, is not the answer. ISAF must start by securing the population in the most important areas that produce these narcotics, and then over time ISAF, with the help of the government, can wean farmers off poppies and to a lesser extent cannabis. This should be done by bringing farmers back to agriculture as it existed prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979. While poppy fields provide a livelihood for farmers, they are also a substantial source of income for the insurgents in eastern and southern Afghanistan. ISAF and the government have made serious mistakes in the past by attempting to implement poppy crop eradication programs without providing an alternate source of income. Worse, past eradication efforts were attempted without securing the people first, which led to prime recruiting seasons for the Taliban. The intricate relationship among narcotics, security, economic development, political reform, and the social aspects of COIN operations is readily apparent in eastern and southern Afghanistan. While poppy production is viewed as a national security problem by both the government and ISAF, it is now a critical part of the socioeconomic fabric of many eastern and southern provinces. Great care must be taken to address the issue, lest the coalition continue to alienate the population and drive more farmers and harvesters into the sphere of the Taliban. Alternate crops such as fruits, nuts, and spices may provide a solution; however, poppies are easy to grow and provide the highest return. For ISAF to fix this problem, it must first secure the population and then work with the government to move to an alternative economic solution. This solution must be agricultural-based and subsidized in the near term, and it must provide development in hydroelectric power, irrigation systems, and roads for the long-term growth of the licit agriculture sector.

The third and arguably most complex problem for ISAF and the government is that insurgent groups have established sanctuaries in Pakistan. These groups have often obtained external assistance from a global jihadist network, including players with a foothold in Pakistan, such as al Qaeda. These groups have also acquired support from tribes and criminal organizations there.15 For the time being, ISAF must accept that it alone can do little about the sanctuaries on the Pakistan side. What ISAF and the ANSF can do is “poison the water” for the insurgents on the Afghan side of the border instead of worrying about “spear[ing] the fish” on the Pakistan side.

Admittedly, this reality does not sound promising. It is important, though, for ISAF commanders to understand the realities, complexities, and opportunities available on the Pakistani side of the border. The new president, Asif Ali Zardari, is the widower of the late Benazir Bhutto, killed by the Pakistani Taliban in December 2007. President Zardari has expressed his commitment to defeating extremism, to include taming extremist madrasas and eliminating training camps that support the Afghan (and Pakistani) insurgency from within Pakistan.16 He has also backed his words with deeds. Recent army operations in the Bajaur tribal region demonstrated President Zardari’s seriousness, as his army destroyed an insurgent stronghold that had long served as a gateway into Afghanistan’s Kunar Province. Multiple tribes within Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas have also shown a desire to fight the Taliban movement.17 Internationally, the Saudi Arabian government has begun to pressure the Taliban to begin political negotiations with the Afghan and Pakistani governments.18 The main takeaway for ISAF commanders concerning Pakistan is that developments over the past year on both sides of the border have provided an opportunity to deliver a significant blow to the insurgency. The number one action ISAF can take to enable this blow is to secure the people in Afghanistan’s eastern and southern border provinces. This will, in effect, trap thousands of insurgents inside Pakistan, where the new COIN efforts of the Pakistani government can defeat them.

Securing Afghanistan’s eastern and southern provinces is no small task. These regions are where the Taliban first established itself in Afghanistan, where it is often strongest, and where it has longstanding relationships with tribes just across the border. One possible approach to securing these regions is to increase ISAF and ANSF presence in a way that embraces the Pashtunwali code. Approximately 45 percent of Afghan society follows a conservative Islamic ideology and adheres to a strict code known as Pashtunwali. This code exists within most of the Pashtun ethnic group, which predominantly lives in eastern and southern Afghanistan and also stretches into Pakistan. The fundamental tenet of Pashtunwali is an honor code that amounts to an unwritten law of the people that guides individual and collective community behavior. Pashtunwali represents a set of moral codes and rules of conduct that impact the daily lives of many Afghans to a greater degree than the tenets of Islam. It promotes self-respect, independence, justice, hospitality, revenge, and tolerance. The use of violence to defend the honor of oneself, the family, or tribe, to the death if necessary, is one of the most significant aspects of Pashtunwali.

The Afghan government, with support from ISAF, should use this code to recruit young Afghans, through traditional village ties, into ANSF units. ISAF should launch an intense recruiting campaign that promotes honor and service to oneself, family, and tribe by belonging to a legitimate local police force, ABP, or ANA. Closely tied to this initiative, ISAF and the ANSF should also work closely with and protect district, village, and tribal leaders and mullahs to gain support in using the Pashtunwali code of honor to bring young Pashtun men into the ANSF. The enemies

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of Afghanistan are using this same code to recruit young fighters into the insurgency. ISAF must support and promote the tenets of Islam together with the Pashtunwali code to beat the Taliban to the punch for this support. The code and the young fighters who fiercely adhere to it may just be the true center of gravity of the Afghan COIN campaign.

The question remains whether the International Security Assistance Force can develop and implement the appropriate operational design to succeed in Afghanistan. We think it can, but a significant corporate mindset shift is needed first. This shift requires recognition of the human and environmental imperatives of Afghanistan and of the fact that ultimately, the Afghan government and its security forces must win the conflict. This campaign is a prolonged struggle that can only be successful with greater investments in talent, time, and treasure by NATO and the rest of the international community. ISAF must first focus on securing and gaining the support of the people instead of hunting down and killing insurgents. At the same time, capacity-building for the government, starting at the local level, and developing the Afghan National Security Forces require significantly greater resources. Only when success grows in these two vital missions will the Afghan people believe they have a legitimate and credible government that, with ISAF support for a limited period, will offer them a brighter and more honorable future than the insurgency. The basic mechanism of conducting counterinsurgency can be summed up as build or rebuild a political machine from the population upward.10

NOTES

3 Lester M. Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali, The Other Side of the Mountain (Quantico, VA: USMC Studies and Analysis Division, 1995); Lester M. Grau, ed., The Bear Went over the Mountain (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996); and Lester M. Grau and Michael A. Gress, ed., The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), provide numerous examples of the disadvantages encountered by Soviet mechanized and armored units when fighting insurgents in Afghanistan. Coalition forces have relearned similar lessons since 2001, and many who have served in Afghanistan over the past 7 years believe that the insurgents’ tactics, techniques, and procedures are primarily designed to kill coalition forces when mounted in vehicles.
6 Ibid.
9 For a cultural operator’s guide to understanding and identifying informal and formal power structures in societies, see Paula Holmes-Eber and Barak A. Salmoni, Operational Culture for the Warfighter (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2008), 155–166.
11 CM I status implies an ANA unit assessed as fully capable of conducting operations at the battalion level and below, while still requiring ISAF’s combat enabling support.
12 Tentative Manual, 68–70; and also see F.J. West, The Village (New York: Pocket Books, 1972), for a detailed description of how U.S. Marines, combined with local indigenous forces, destroyed the insurgent infrastructure in a village in Vietnam.
15 Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, vol. 4 of RAND Counterinsurgency Study (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 37.
19 Galula, 136.
Commercializing USCENTCOM AERIAL PORTS

By JOHN E. MICHEL and JEAN M. MAHAN

Over the last 3 years, commercial aircraft have become a predominant in-theater conveyance for both Department of Defense (DOD) cargo and an increasing number of non-DOD activities. With more and more commercial aircraft converging on a limited number of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) airfields, the need for a robust commercial port handling capability has never been greater.

As we examine ways to make our system operate more efficiently across the enterprise, it becomes readily apparent that the timing is right to address the commercialization of the USCENTCOM aerial port structure—the foundation from which our theater airlift system flows. Consider the potential savings: The U.S. Air Force spends over $14 million per year to run the contract aerial port at Kuwait International Airport alone. A simple extrapolation of the costs associated with running the numerous aerial ports in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, most of which are operated by DOD with large numbers of Guard and Reserve forces, nets our estimate of $150 million a year. This figure does not take into account the effects of extended deployments on personnel in critically stressed career fields such as air transportation management and other core competencies where manning and experience are stretched to meet global requirements. The end effect of our current theater port posture substantially strains U.S. ability to respond to emerging requirements and reliably project global power when and where it is needed most.
USCENTCOM airlift costs exceeded $1.6 billion in fiscal year 2008. The Il-76 contract in Kuwait supporting the distribution of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles exceeded $200 million. Although commercial tenders netted the government hundreds of millions in savings over similar C–130 usage last year, the Air Force is estimated to have spent over $400 million for the “Theater Express” mission in USCENTCOM. Additional C–17 and C–130 support in-theater cost the Air Force another $800 million (see figure 1). When we add the expected $150 million for maintaining a robust aerial port capability, we approach $1.6 billion. These figures do not account for the vast amounts of mail moved by air throughout the theater or the in-theater airlift tender services utilized to expedite movement of World Wide Express (WWX) cargo by the Defense Logistics Agency and the Services.

The paradigm for working with commercial transportation partners has been to contract for individual components of a segmented system. Contracts are structured to benefit and protect the government, but they come at a premium. In traditional contractual arrangements, the government accepts responsibility for providing the real estate, material handling equipment (MHE), and information technology systems to run the operation. The contractor is usually required only to deliver experienced personnel. In support of such programs, performance parameters are established at the inception of the contract. Process modifications during the course of the contract normally result in additional costs to the government. Even when process improvements might yield additional throughput efficiencies, commercial partners are not required or incentivized to consistently exploit opportunities for our collective system to run faster, better, cheaper, or safer. In effect, our traditional means of partnering in the business of theater port management provide no real mechanism or incentive for continuous improvement.

Opportunity

As we transition to long-term, sustainable operations in a rapidly maturing theater, there is an opportunity to leverage the strengths and motivations of current in-theater commercial players. Our Theater Express commercial partners, who provide a significant portion of intratheater airlift, have a vested interest in performance. The carriers are contractually bound and committed to providing world-class service to the warfighter while operating in an environment of increasing systemic turbulence caused by limitations with parking, fuel, and airfield landing permissions. While use of Theater Express has increased nearly fourfold since January 2007, performance has declined steadily. In spring 2008, for instance, the Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center analyzed port velocity with a focus on “What the Customer Feels,” ultimately learning that the airlift system does not provide reliable service to the final destination for many of the busiest city pairs (see figure 2). With the increased challenges the carriers face and declining performance, port velocity is a renewed focus area that is important to each carrier’s future success.

The theater is currently well positioned to reduce DOD presence sooner rather than later, if we focus on leveraging existing relationships with those commercial partners who already have a strong financial incentive for the aerial ports to run at optimum efficiency.

Source: USTRANSCOM Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center briefing, “AOR by the Numbers,” March 2008. The briefing showed $1.5 billion for intratheater airlift costs associated with organic airlift, Theater Express, and Il-76 contract.
In 2004, almost all air freight being delivered to the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan was transported on military aircraft. This is no longer the case. Commercial aircraft have rapidly become the predominant conveyance for theater air cargo delivery. The combined force air component commander’s objectives complement these realities with a goal to move 50 percent of the intratheater cargo commercially. This is in line with the current reality that half of DOD sustainment and contingency cargo is currently being flown by the Theater Express program on any given day. The magnitude of additional cargo flowing on WWX small package delivery (less than 300 pounds), mail contract vehicles, and other government-contracted movements on Skylink Arabia makes the percentage of DOD cargo flown on commercial aircraft higher than 50 percent. Beyond these DOD commercial movements, hundreds of other commercial aircraft are delivering cargo and personnel in support of contractors hired by various elements of the U.S. Government and its allies. With all of these disparate parties converging on a limited number of airfields, the need for a robust commercial port handling infrastructure to support increasingly commercial movements has never been greater. We should make this transition now while the conditions are right.

Indeed, our collective commitment as good stewards of taxpayer dollars requires that we address how to best synchronize military needs with the long-term desire to support the establishment of a viable commercial infrastructure. The commercial port infrastructure must be flexible enough to adapt to emerging requirements while still being both cost-effective for DOD and profitable for our commercial partners. Just as important, the concept must be resilient enough to remain in place as military aerial port capability is redeployed.

**Plan for Change**

The transformation of an essentially military operation into a resilient, enduring commercial operation requires that we address several considerations, such as phased implementation, scope of commercialization, MHE, contractor selection, and cost reimbursement.

A phased port commercialization strategy is necessary to set maturation timelines and refine specifications for success since many ports are less developed in terms of infrastructure and sustainable commercial throughput. These commercialization efforts have implications for the future economic viability of Iraq. To ensure efforts are in sync with the overall development of Iraq’s commercial distribution system, port development priorities and timelines should be defined by USCENTCOM.

To initially explore the concept, we recommend conducting a port commercialization proof of principle at a port with sufficient

inter- and intratheater commercial traffic. A commercial Theater Express partner would be selected who could meet the requirements to handle (load and offload) wide-body civilian aircraft and provide in-transit visibility information. The proof of principle would be evaluated by a team of aerial port specialists to assess the viability of the construct. Documented issues and lessons learned would be used to evaluate the merits of continued implementation as well as to refine the required specifications for follow-on implementation phases. We believe a port such as al Asad provides an ideal location to initially test the commercialization concept. This port does not experience the daily throughput constraints and competition for landing rights associated with Iraq’s busier airfields; it supports both organic and commercial aircraft operations; and al Asad’s location in Iraq provides new multimodal commercial options to the final destination such as the Iraqi Transportation Network.

In March 2008, al Asad was one of several ports evaluated in the joint U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)/USCENTCOM Deployment Distribution Operations Center (CDDOC) study “Connecting the Pipes.” The study was designed to assess the feasibility and benefits of an in-theater reception port to receive direct delivered stateside sustainment cargo, carried on both organic and commercial aircraft. The investigation found that interior reception ports closer to the warfighter, such as al Asad, provided the best results in terms of cost and delivery times. Additional cost savings are possible if there is a multimodal option to transload to commercial surface conveyances when the cargo volume and distances make it cost-effective to secure the convoy. This concept later became the centerpiece of a

CDDOC White Paper examining opportunities to expand and/or accelerate commercialization of distribution across the theater in concert with General David Petraeus’ 2007 “Iraqi First” Program. Specifically, the paper suggests a hybrid proof of principle where

**Figure 2. Port Performance and System Velocity (December 2007–February 2008)**

strategically delivered cargo is moved to its end destination by surface. By our estimates, this initiative offers a 30 to 50 percent savings over current intratheater airlift movement if commercial surface delivery contracts are established to locations such as Balad and Baghdad. If we target the roughly 250 pallets of cargo arriving at these locations weekly in the spring of 2008, this initiative could conservatively save more than $12 million annually while providing immediate relief to an already overtaxed airlift system.

The scope of early phases of commercialization would cover only commercial aircraft performing commercial intertheater strategic lift missions and Theater Express missions. The commercial services would be limited solely to commercial cargo handling operations. These services are envisioned to include marshalling, parking, loading/unloading, in-transit visibility, and managing advanced notification to the proper command and control agencies.

Commercial partners would provide their own MHE based on commercial best practices, with the exception of specialized items required for military aircraft. As the concept matures and if it is determined to be in the best interests of the government, commercial partners could be provided with commercially available, specialized MHE on a cost-reimbursable basis so they can begin to handle military cargo flights. This would ensure that a viable port infrastructure for handing military cargo remains in place during the initial phaseout of deployed aerial port personnel.

Many considerations are important to ensure warfighter interests are protected and legal issues are anticipated. The commercial partner should be selected based on a determination of best value to the theater in terms of airlift and port velocity criteria. The government would need to establish a contractual agreement with the selected commercial partner to work and operate on the installation similar to agreements we have with other businesses operating on military installations outside the United States. The operator would need to sign hold-harmless agreements and comply with all local base regulations in addition to any other legal or contractual requirements. The commercial port operators should also be required to maintain established performance levels to ensure the agreement would not be terminated (within preestablished guidelines).

To ensure real-time, in-transit visibility in accordance with USTRANSCOM policies, the government would provide all necessary training and equipment for port operators to interface with systems specifically required by the government for DOD cargo.

We envision a pay-as-you-go system in contrast to the traditional fixed-price port contract where the U.S. Government assumes all risks and costs. With this system, the commercial partner who runs a port assumes responsibility for the business operation along with the financial risk of initial capitalization costs. Commercial partners would be responsible for all operating support costs associated with their personnel and equipment with reimbursement for additional required base services reflected in an appropriate memorandum of agreement.

The largest paradigm shift in this construct is how commercial operators are reimbursed for services rendered. Instead of the government paying millions in sunk infrastructure and operating costs to maintain port cargo services, commercial partners would be reimbursed by commercial aircraft using their services much the same way it occurs at commercial airports. The prevailing commercial rates for the respective country or region would be charged and validated by the appropriate authority at USTRANSCOM to ensure that they remain in line with industry standards. Theater Express operators would in turn build these additional costs into their airlift rates much as they do now, and these costs would become part of the normal commercial operating costs once military handling was no longer available. This would result in some increase to current tender rates, but it should also eliminate the need for the U.S. Government to continuously invest in ports and personnel for a maturing theater.

This approach is intended to provide a catalyst for maturation of best commercial practices at Iraqi airports, and we hope it will pave the way for other areas of growth—all at no risk to the U.S. Government, which no longer bears the burden of maintaining a fixed-price contract. Moreover, by selecting a commercial operator that is also an airlift provider—one of our Theater Express partners—both the government and the operator would maintain a vested interest in expediting the flow of cargo and aircraft in and out of the port while maintaining high levels of in-transit visibility. Some minimum level of assured throughput might have to be provided by the U.S. Government in the initial stages of port transformation to help incentivize the commercial operator to make necessary long-term systemic investments.

Pay-as-you-go port handling provides the opportunity for substantial cost avoidance in the future. Under this new construct, additional port commercialization would not require establishing multimillion-dollar annual port handling contracts. To ensure a successful transition to commercialization, there would be value in establishing a solid performance-based incentive program for commercial partners. This program would be used to aggressively incentivize carriers to be successful, establish innovative process improvements, and encourage their investments in building world-class port handling capabilities. Although offering this form of incentive represents another departure in how we currently partner with commercial entities, it could be facilitated by including an independent third-party logistics provider empowered to manage the Theater Express program and monitor and report on performance of commercialized USCENTCOM ports.

**Construct for a New Era**

We advocate continued port commercialization and the transition to an approach that leverages commercial airlift partners in the Theater Express program. This new approach offers a win-win situation on many fronts. Commercial operators could begin to assume greater responsibility for servicing commercial aircraft at locations throughout the USCENTCOM theater in the near term, while the military enhances its efforts to reset low-density/high-demand air transportation managers and reduce overall theater operating costs. All efforts support continual commercial investment in infrastructure while netting long-term benefits to the citizens of Iraq (see table 1).

Unlike what it does for traditional contracts, the government would not have
to provide large amounts of resources to get the operation started or make large annual cash outlays to maintain predictable and sustainable levels of service. Furthermore, commercial operators with aircraft and personnel already operating in support of DOD would have a vested interest in quick-turning aircraft—in effect becoming enterprise partners instead of simply providers of a service detached from the outcomes of their efforts. In subsequent maturation phases, these same operators could be leveraged to enhance end-to-end distribution solutions by offering access to viable multimodal alternatives to final destinations via new vehicles such as the Iraqi Transportation Network and Iraqi Theater Wide Trucking contracts overseen by the Commercial Distribution Division at Multi-National Force–Iraq.8

The commercial potential in these markets is significant as stabilization in the region increases. The growth of the Iraqi dinar over the last 18 months is encouraging. Based on conversations with current Theater Express providers during February and May 2008 conferences, and the substantial amount of cargo handled at the top airports shown in Table 2, commercial operators should be willing to assume additional risk upfront for the opportunity to provide transportation services well into the future.9 We recommend that the government evaluate how to best leverage this unique opportunity for pursuing the establishment of a new era of theater port operations—an era of reduced costs, improved support to the warfighter, and the potential to bolster our nation’s strategic goals while helping to propel the Iraqi population toward economic normalization well into the 21st century. JFQ

### Table 1. Bolstering Strategic Goals through Aerial Port Commercialization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Goals</th>
<th>DOD/Contract Ports</th>
<th>Hybrid Commercial Ports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic stabilization</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased local economic infusion</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smaller DOD footprint</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stay-behind capability</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2. Theater Express Program: Cargo Handled at Top 15 Airports in Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airport</th>
<th>Pounds Offloaded</th>
<th>Pounds Onloaded</th>
<th>Total Pounds Handled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Taqaddum</td>
<td>33,328,471</td>
<td>65,370,079</td>
<td>98,698,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Asad</td>
<td>54,697,197</td>
<td>33,926,691</td>
<td>88,623,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait International</td>
<td>31,285,716</td>
<td>42,099,660</td>
<td>73,385,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balad</td>
<td>16,921,687</td>
<td>25,223,861</td>
<td>42,145,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bagram</td>
<td>22,899,702</td>
<td>9,376,877</td>
<td>32,276,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>19,559,410</td>
<td>4,643,077</td>
<td>24,202,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Udeid</td>
<td>3,470,871</td>
<td>16,854,119</td>
<td>20,324,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q West</td>
<td>4,657,390</td>
<td>15,439,779</td>
<td>20,097,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallil</td>
<td>6,375,392</td>
<td>13,717,608</td>
<td>20,093,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Sahra</td>
<td>5,645,053</td>
<td>9,772,265</td>
<td>15,417,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Kut</td>
<td>15,333,059</td>
<td>4,863</td>
<td>15,337,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkuk</td>
<td>7,624,380</td>
<td>3,217,286</td>
<td>10,841,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>4,161,474</td>
<td>4,522,561</td>
<td>8,684,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td>6,539,786</td>
<td>685,420</td>
<td>7,225,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul International</td>
<td>4,047,445</td>
<td>106,538</td>
<td>4,153,983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NOTES

1. Kuwait International Airport’s military side of the base is managed by a commercial entity (CAV International) for $14 million annually. This figure does not account for equipment costs. The lower bound figure of $150 million used in this article reflects a rough extrapolation of this number for more than 20 in-theater ports. When cargo handling equipment and maintenance costs are considered, we estimate the total port operating figure approaches $250 million.

2. Typical deployments of 6 months are followed by 1 year at home prior to redeployment, which is referred to as a 1:2 deploy-to-dwell ratio. This ratio corresponds to one of five Tempo Bands. The Tempo Band has a corresponding risk level characterized/termed as “Significant Risk/Tempo Band D,” which is the risk associated with a functional area’s efforts to train and sustain the force. At Tempo Band D, if combatant commander requirements continue to increase or voluntary Reserve Component participation declines, the Active Component will require additional support by seeking partial mobilization.

3. Another funding source to explore is the government of Iraq. Discussions with the transportation staff at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq indicate that there is potential for the Iraqi government to support airport infrastructure investments where practical and where concession agreements with that government are in the best interests of the U.S. Government.

4. More specifically, this study examines the best way to connect inter- and intratheater distribution systems, as well as commercial and military solution sets across the modal spectrums.

5. They could also be provided with DOD-owned MHE if deemed necessary for the mission. Ultimately, a strategy that minimizes reliance on military force structure (manning and equipment) allows DOD the maximum flexibility for repurposing as required.

6. Current Theater Express program participants are provided a preferential bid allowance of 9 cents per pound to handle a load and 7 cents per pound for the offload of cargo.

7. We recommend the concept of an independent third-party logistics provider be explored to oversee the Theater Express program either forward in the Air Mobility Division or USCENTCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, or as a continental United States reachback organization.

8. Contracts were awarded in spring 2008 and are overseen by Gulf Region Division (GRD) Logistics, which has established a Logistics Movement Control Center for synchronizing scheduled commercial movements (that is, convoy and security team assets) and providing oversight, command and control, and in-transit visibility. GRD Logistics has demonstrated success in providing commercial logistics services to support Iraq reconstruction efforts since 2004.

9. In 2007, 9 of the 15 busiest ports in the area of responsibility had more than 20,000,000 pounds handled when loads and offloads were both considered.
For decades, the imbroglio of illegal immigration has permeated American society due to the Nation’s Southwest border being extremely porous. Today, the topic has reached center stage on Capitol Hill as it receives the necessary attention, especially in a post-9/11 era. Since the attacks of September 11, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has received additional funding, manpower, infrastructure, and resources for border security. For example, there were 9,736 CBP agents in 2001, and the number of agents forecast by the end of 2009 is 18,319. To help reach this aggressive goal, in May 2006, President George W. Bush initiated Operation Jump Start (OJS) under which the National Guard helped bolster the Border Patrol in anticipation of CBP hiring and training additional Federal agents from 2006 to 2008.

As the National Guard takes on a more prominent role in homeland security, we can expect joint operations such as OJS to become more frequent. The onus will be on future forces to unite for mission accomplishment. OJS was unique because it was the first time both the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG) came together in significant numbers in the homeland to conduct a major operation of extended duration. Lessons learned from OJS should prove invaluable to future joint operations. These lessons could preclude organizations from making the same mistakes, thus preventing wasted money, time, and energy. Two areas of emphasis that contributed most to these lessons were organizational cultural challenges and interagency information-sharing and collaboration.

In any operation, unity of effort is a necessity, and this is particularly true where joint operations prevail. Interagency collaboration and cooperation coupled with interagency coordination are essential instruments contributing to homeland security. According to the National Strategy for Homeland Security, homeland security cannot be accomplished by the Federal Government alone, so partnerships need to be established at the Federal, state, and local levels. To achieve this unity of effort, there must be a fundamental cultural appreciation and understanding among the agencies and organizations involved.

**Challenges to Jointness**

During Operation Jump Start, the primary organizations were CBP, ARNG, ANG, and the National Guard Bureau (NGB). The overall success of this operation was a direct result of the aggregate unity of effort that developed among these four organizations. However, a significant problem during the first several months was a tenuous relationship between the two National Guard organizations. A more profound appreciation

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and understanding of each other’s organization at the inception would have benefited both parties and the mission in general. Indeed, we can expect these two components to see more of each other. Since 9/11, “National Guard operations to protect lives and property of American citizens here at home have been joint affairs.”

Even though this was not the first time these two components worked together, the initial rift between the organizational cultures suggested otherwise. With the Army and Air National Guards, we see two different organizations, two cultures, and two ways of doing business. At the beginning of the operation, there was some obstinacy, as each component favored its own organization and did not fully embrace jointness. Both agencies were more concerned about seeking out 2,400 volunteers for the operation than obtaining and practicing unity of effort. Meeting the suspense of personnel fills was the ultimate priority for both agencies. Although there was a coordinating and command relationship between the two organizations under Arizona’s joint task force (JTF), discord still existed in areas such as force structure, personnel and administration, and funding.

In May 2006, President Bush’s visit to Yuma, Arizona, marked the call for the Federal Government to assist CBP through the mobilization of the National Guard in the fight against illegal immigration. Immediately after the President’s declaration of OJS, both National Guard entities were required to come together and work as a joint force. President Bush called for 6,000 Guardsmen for the first year with a drawdown to 3,000 for the second to support CBP across the Southwest border states (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas). Of the four states, Arizona received the bulk of the forces (40 percent) in the form of both rotational and durational forces. Seventy-five percent of the forces were designated as Army Guardsmen, while the remaining 25 percent were Air Guardsmen.

In relation to force structure, Arizona was initially overwhelmed with Army versus Air Force volunteers, thus instantly causing a void in the unity of effort. Key positions such as task force (TF) commanders and senior enlisted positions were all filled by Army personnel. Furthermore, the two top commanders of the Arizona operation were Army officers. As a result, Army culture and temperament dominated. Many Soldiers held that since this was a ground mission, it should be carried out by Army personnel, despite the 75 percent/25 percent branch personnel requirement. In addition, many Army Guardsmen viewed the Air Guardsmen as solely facilitators for the mission. These fallacies, along with the lack of education on the Air Force’s capabilities, impeded unity of effort. This initial absence of jointness resembled a “stovepiped” model, as both agencies “worked and operated independently.” In a joint mission, an imbalance of leadership is apt to cause discord.

As the operation progressed, the Arizona headquarters recognized the need not only to faithfully maintain the Army and Air Force personnel ratio, but also to strengthen the unity of effort between the two. Air Force personnel started to crop up in key leadership positions, strengthening the unity of effort. This reduced the likelihood that either organization could blame the other because it was not included in a particular concept of the operation. As the adage goes, perception is everything, and when a
compilation of both components surfaced, the joint concept began to flourish. The grafting of Army and Air Force personnel in key leadership positions sent a strong message. It also created greater flexibility and productivity as it established a more stable work environment in a joint atmosphere.

The balance of joint personnel within a JTF strengthens its command structure. As we learned from Hurricane Katrina, the partition of command structure between Active-duty forces and the National Guard “hindered their unity of effort.” As a commander, the biggest challenge I faced daily was maintaining cooperation between Army and Air Force personnel, especially as Soldiers and Airmen came and went on a rotational basis. I quickly ascertained that by keeping a mixture of Air and Army personnel in key leadership positions, I was more able to maintain a spirit of joint cohesiveness devoid of cultural antipathy.

Another measure to preclude an imbalanced effort is to schedule routine joint training exercises and events to maintain active joint relationships before the next crisis. The prior integration of Army and Air Guardsmen, both support and operational elements, is the building block for future joint operations. The ongoing interagency training, networking, and relationship-building before an event allow the establishment of unity of effort to be second nature. By training as we fight, the next time a joint operation comes along, the impediments to cohesiveness should be kept to a minimum.

The culture of the two organizations also differed in the area of personnel and administration. On the personnel side, the Air Force relied on the Deployment Requirements Manning Document, while the Army used a Unit Manning Report to source and manage personnel. Initially, many prominent Army personnel did not know how the Air Force monitored Manning requirements and vice versa. While the Air Force centrally controlled its Manning requirements, the Army delegated control of its requirements to the respective units on the ground. Furthermore, while the Air Force filled vacancies strictly according to skill set at the headquarters level at NGB, the Army accepted both volunteers who were already cross-trained and those who were not. Hence, the Army’s Manning document provided more flexibility than the Air Force’s, permitting more decentralization and allowing vacancies to be filled more quickly.

Moreover, both organizations used separate documents and procedures to process such requirements as leave. Each agency had its own regulations and procedures for administrative functions. For example, while the Army was able to process leave at the unit level, the Air Force had to process it through the home unit in the respective state. The unit administrative officers were able to issue leave control numbers to Soldiers but not to Airmen. As a result, the administrative staff at the unit level did not have control and oversight of Air Force leave unless it was personally requested. One unit level administrative officer asserted that he felt his hands were tied since he had no direct control over the flow of Air Force personnel going on and returning from leave.

Through joint training and strengthening interagency relationships, both Airmen and Soldiers could become more acquainted with the others’ procedures and customs. Consequently, interagency interdependence would replace agency independence in joint operations. For example, the complications behind the sourcing of personnel could have been limited if each agency had preliminary Manning procedures. By the Air Force administrative personnel becoming familiar with the Army’s procedures and vice versa, a spirit of interdependence would have been more likely to surface. Basic situational awareness of the opposite branch’s personnel processing system would have contributed to a more sound unity of effort by reducing organizational uncertainty.

Airmen and Soldiers are steeped in their own respective cultures, there has to be faith in the effectiveness of the joint concept. Familiarization with these joint regulations and forms would be achieved through joint training and interagency coordination. There would no longer be two separate administrative and personnel standards, but one standard for all participants in a joint operation.

Another primary difference between the two cultures was in funding and budgeting. While the Air Force received its funding directly from NGB, the Army received its moneys from its respective state. The Army had a more decentralized system of receiving and distributing its funding. Moreover, the Army talked about dollars while the Air Force talked about days when it came to expending funds. This difference contributed to conflict between Airmen and Soldiers. For example, while Airmen were allowed to sell back leave, Soldiers could not without formal approval. While the Air Force calculated leave automatically into Guardsmen’s orders by designating a predetermined end date, the Army had to obligate funding to cover leave that was to be sold back. This variance resulted in Soldiers questioning why Airmen could sell leave back yet they could not. Frustration ensued as Soldiers saw a double standard.

To help settle this funding disparity, the optimal goal should be for both Army and Air Force funding and budgeting transactions to be addressed and taken care of at the unit level. If not, one alternative to help
bridge the gap in the funding difference would be to maintain the separate systems, but to establish a joint training program on Army and Air Force funding and budgeting. If each organization understood how the other distributes and budgets funds prior to a joint operation, interagency uncertainty would be less of an issue when a joint mission occurred. Prior education and training on each other's monetary procedures reduces future tension, thus allowing personnel to be more focused on the task at hand.

Another option is to use one central U.S. Property and Fiscal Officer at the state level for both components working a specific joint mission. With one central funding office at the headquarters level, the unit staffs from both branches of Service could deal directly with that office. This would imply the need for joint training on funding and budgeting issues to allow each branch to become familiar with the other's system. It would also require each component to be receptive to the other's funding and budgeting culture. Hence, cultural egos would have to be set aside. By centralizing funding, money is procured faster, funding requirements are met sooner, administrative processes are less obstructed, and both components share a common system.

One of the most significant lessons learned from 9/11 was that we must have stronger interagency partnerships with incessant and unhindered information-sharing among the different agencies at all levels of government. According to Joint Publication 3–26, Homeland Security, “selected homeland defense missions will require extensive integration and synchronization and may also overlap and occur simultaneously.” The success of the Arizona operation can be contributed to the eventual integration, synchronization, and synergy of information shared among all the agencies involved.

Interagency Trials
Initially, information-sharing and collaboration between the National Guard and Border Patrol was somewhat fragmented. Although both organizations had interaction under the Counter Drug Program, this of the National Guard mission kept the two organizations from instantly embracing one another, freely communicating, and ultimately uniting.

A formal introductory briefing would have given each organization the rudimentary information and education about the other. This would serve as one method of unifying the two organizations under one common cause, and it would also allow the agencies to work toward a common operational picture. Moreover, it would increase appreciation for each other's organizational culture and mission. At the start of the mission, I had only a general idea of the exact role the Border Patrol played in national security. Afterward, I had a more profound appreciation for the role Border Patrol agents play in enforcing border security, especially in the post-9/11 era. In any joint operation, respect for the other organization pays dividends in the long run.

Another area that contributed to the lack of information-sharing at the inception of the operation involved the structures of the task forces. Originally, these units were designated by function and included TF Diamondback for engineers, TF Raven for aviation, TF Maverick for supply and logistics, TF Gila for surveillance duty, and TF Sidewinder for Guardsmen working at Border Patrol stations. This functional arrangement of units distorted and derailed communications because agents in both the Yuma and Tucson sectors had to communicate to several commanders versus one regional commander since all the units had representation in both. As a result, there was not a direct and clear system of information-sharing between the two agencies.

Three months into the mission, Arizona headquarters altered the design of its units by eliminating Task Forces Maverick, Sidewinder, and Gila and then implementing Task Forces Yuma and Tucson to more easily coexist with the Yuma and Tucson Border Patrol sectors. The units became organized strictly around location versus function. The three units disbanded as personnel were redirected into these two units. Task Forces Raven and Diamondback remained unchanged since their areas of operation were spread throughout the Yuma and Tucson sectors.

The difference between designing units around function versus area of operations became evident. The creation of the two regional units ameliorated aspects of command and control for both the National Guard and Border Patrol. From the National Guard perspective, it improved the accountability of personnel and equipment, expedited the reception and outprocessing of Guardsmen, and eased the flow of communication from the ground up. The biggest benefit that it brought to the Border Patrol was that each sector began to communicate with one regional commander rather than several commanders. A greater sense of organization and partnership thus developed.

There were two primary channels of communication during the operation that needed to be fused. For the Border Patrol, each sector headquarters had to commu-
nicate with its respective station. For the National Guard, Arizona headquarters had to communicate with the subordinate units. In addition, the two organizations had to cross-talk to stay on the same level. There were times when agents felt as if Guardsmen were hesitant in communicating with them.14 In several instances, there was a gap in communication on Border Patrol channels between the respective sector and its subordinate outlying stations. There were incidents where the Guardsmen at the outlying stations possessed information and guidelines pertaining to the mission that agents at the sectors did not have. When personnel from one organization possess information that the personnel of another organization should have but do not, misconceptions and uncertainty are prone to abound, thus disrupting the spirit of cohesion.

An alternative to enhance interagency information-sharing and cooperation between the two organizations would have been to hold periodic mandatory meetings at the different Border Patrol stations. The meetings would have included both parties and could have been held daily or weekly depending on operation tempo. Mandatory meetings force both sides to talk to each other and keep one another abreast of any operational or administrative developments.13 There should be a shared situation awareness, common operating picture, and understanding among all parties involved. The primary Guardsmen in charge at each of the Border Patrol stations had important roles. Not only were they responsible for performing their border patrol skill set and managing the other Guardsmen at the station, but they also represented the National Guard as they constantly networked with the Border Patrol. Communication and interagency information-sharing are largely the result of solid working relationships, and these mandatory meetings would have assisted in relationship building.

At the macro level, the gap in interagency information-sharing and collaboration could have been reduced between the two organizations if each border state had a liaison officer working in the Joint Operation Center at the National Guard Headquarters in Washington. The presence of one liaison from each of the four border states at NGB would have strengthened the common operating picture among all the organizations. Ideal liaison officers would have been individuals having experience with the operation who could bring a sense of realism to the headquarters staff to keep it from making uninformed decisions. Without them, National Guard representatives in Washington lacked a complete picture of what was transpiring on the ground and a genuine appreciation of the desert environment and the remoteness of some of the locations where the Guardsmen worked. One Border Patrol supervisor spent several months as a liaison officer at the Border Patrol headquarters in Washington and observed when he returned to Arizona that there should be rotational liaison officers from each of the four states working at the National Guard Headquarters.14 After all, liaison officers from NGB rotated to the four border states and spent time in each one.

One positive lesson learned from the operation in the area of interagency collaboration was that Arizona’s OJS staff maintained a solid working and interdependent relationship with the rest of the Arizona National Guard not participating in the mission. The state Adjutant General encouraged this relationship throughout the operation. From the beginning, the full-time staff supported the operation’s staff as interdependence flourished between the two groups. Moreover, the mission staff sought the assistance of the full-time staff to close out the mission. This collaboration allowed any leftover operational business to be handed over to the full-time staff after the mission staff left. This congenial relationship promoted continuous information-sharing. It also prevented Guardsmen working this operation from having to fend for themselves and to enjoy the total support of the state. Although the Arizona National Guard was heavily engaged in the war on terror and other state requirements, it remained fully involved with OJS over the 2-year period.

From June 2006 to June 2008, Operation Jump Start achieved numerous feats. Fifty-one states and territories supported this operation as nearly 18,000 Guardsmen rotated into Arizona. The state continues to be ground zero for illegal immigration, but the success of the mission has drastically stifled the inflow. The National Guard, in partnership with the Border Patrol,
apprehended thousands of illegal immigrants, confiscated thousands of pounds of illegal narcotics, constructed miles of primary fencing and vehicle barriers, and improved miles of roads for Border Patrol vehicles—in short, doing far more than helping the Border Patrol to enforce border security. OJS set the example for future joint homeland missions, and Arizona acquired valuable lessons learned that can be applied to future joint operations. Two of these lessons learned revolved around an appreciation of the different organizational cultures between the Army and Air Force and the importance of interagency information-sharing and collaboration among agencies.

Although organizational differences between the two National Guard entities continued during OJS, the operation showed that the two cultures can be fused to create a tenable resolution for future joint operations. This mission has manifested the importance of having unity of effort between the two components. The need to have a mixture of Army and Air Force personnel in key leadership positions was one takeaway. The operation also revealed the need to foster joint training events in anticipation of the next joint crisis. This entails each branch learning more about the other’s culture in areas such as joint and operational doctrine, personnel accountability, administrative processes, and funding and budgeting. The basic comprehension of each other’s culture will save time and money and will prevent dissonance in future joint operations.

After the start of the operation, considerable growth occurred with interagency information-sharing between the National Guard and Border Patrol. Both organizations underwent growing pains, but they transcended those obstacles to become a unified team. The two organizations morphed into “one seamless transparent team,” and “this relationship matured to the point where it became one team, one fight.” There is always room for improvement, and Operation Jump Start displayed how collaboration and interagency information-sharing are priorities in joint missions. JFQ

### Notes

4. Author interview with Lieutenant Colonel Michael Rall, National Guard Bureau liaison officer, Phoenix, AZ, January 2, 2008.
5. Author interview with Chief Master Sergeant Roberto Jaramillo, Task Force Tucson senior enlisted advisor, Tucson, AZ, January 10, 2008.
10. Author interview with Agent Shavon Theis, Tucson Sector Border Patrol liaison officer, January 12, 2008.
11. Ibid.
14. Author interview with Staff Sergeant Seth Israel, Arizona National Guard, January 8, 2008.
15. Ibid.
16. Author interview with Agent Mark McKay, Tucson Sector Special Operations supervisor, November 16, 2008.
17. Author interview with Colonel Philip Stemple, Director of Domestic Operations, National Guard Bureau, January 8, 2008.
By 2006, U.S. Iraq policy, based on the 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, appeared to be failing. The February bombing of the al-Askari Mosque sparked a wave of sectarian violence that seemed to push Iraq to the brink of civil war. The United Nations estimated nearly 25,000 Iraqis fell victim to violence over the course of 2006, and nearly 1,000 U.S. troops were killed. Violence had reached record levels and thousands began to flee the country, crippling the entire nation. Analogies to the Vietnam War were increasingly drawn.

On January 10, 2007, President George W. Bush announced a “new way forward in Iraq” that would improve security by focusing predominantly on Baghdad where the majority of the violence transpired.¹ The plan called for intensifying American involvement while simultaneously pressing the government of Iraq to assume a leading role. A “surge” of an additional 21,500 troops would provide breathing room for political reconciliation and economic development. This new strategy would become known as the Baghdad Security Plan, or Fardh al-Qanoon (FAQ) in Arabic.

The preponderance of postsurge analysis is devoted to military operations and their subsequent efficacy in reducing levels of violence by concentrating on troop deployments, tactics, and intelligence. Such studies are valuable, but only to a certain extent. Any holistic appraisal must also consider noncombat countersurveillance strategies that addressed social issues—in particular, essential services. Reminiscent of Lebanon’s Hizballah, militias in Baghdad sought ascendency over services as a means to solidify control and influence. Therefore, the most pragmatic remedy for long-term stability in Iraq was not necessarily countering militants with force, but securing the populace’s allegiance to their government through the provision of services and opportunities for employment.

The fundamental issue was that the average citizen was physically and economically vulnerable to malign influences. It became imperative for the coalition to counter militias by guaranteeing the well-being of Baghdad’s residents. Emphasizing reconstruction projects not only improved the delivery of services, but also, more importantly, provided employment, reestablished the integrity of the Iraqi government, and created stakeholders in the overall process.

Importance of Services

Counterinsurgency (COIN) theorists posit that there is no direct correlation between the availability of essential services and violence.² Specifically in terms of Iraq, some areas had far lower levels of violence and less accessibility to services than others. On the other hand, unemployment and illiteracy in an atmosphere of competing factions made individuals economically vulnerable and thus susceptible to malevolent influences. The vacuum created by political power struggles was certainly not propitious and allowed militias to supersede official institutions in providing public goods and employment. Militants were able to offer employment to those with little work experience, education, or training, and in return the conscripts received a salary, immunity from attack, and a social sense of belonging.

As a result, it became increasingly evident that provision of services would be indispensable in countering both insurgents and militias. A cooperative effort emerged between the U.S. Embassy and coalition forces that emphasized essential services as a central COIN tactic. Jobs generated from official reconstruction initiatives were extremely valuable in thwarting recruitment efforts of malignant actors. At the same time, government-sanctioned projects reduced the public’s dependency on extralegal groups for services and simultaneously strengthened the government’s integrity. Finally, tapping local labor pools engendered stakeholders in neighborhood construction projects and fostered an intolerance to sabotage. The strategy was tremendously vital in enervating the strength of militias in Baghdad.

In contrast, attempts to pass key legislation intended to eliminate political incentives

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Parliamentarians within the secure confines of the International Zone were far too removed from the realities of neighborhood conflict to be effectual.

legislation, however, did not deter the prime minister from devising alternative political solutions and establishing an official cabinet committee to address essential services.

Political Dynamics

Baghdad’s political parties, personali-
ties, and demographics played a fundamental role in shaping the outcome of FAQ and the delivery of services. The political dynam- ics were bewildering and were made even more complicated when accounting for the discrepancies between local and national perspectives. The most salient political partition existed between religious sects. Sunnis were predominantly aligned with the Tawafuq bloc, which was comprised of three separate political parties: the Islamic Iraqi Party, the Iraqi People’s Conference, and the National Dialogue Council. The initial chairman of the FAQ Essential Services Committee, Deputy Prime Minister Salam al-Zoubai, was a notable member of this alliance. Meanwhile, the majority of Shia belonged to the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI) but would often vie with the Sadrist Trend and its mili- tant wing, Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), for political primacy in Baghdad. The power struggle among these differing parties, both internal and external, created a political vacuum that would be detrimentally filled by militants.

Essential Services Committee. In support of FAQ, Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki formed the Essential Services Com- mittee, to be headed by Zoubai. The commit- tee was to facilitate the repair and delivery of essential services immediately following combat activity and would then submit a weekly status report to the prime minister during the Iraq Executive Steering Commit- tee (IESC) meeting. During a meeting with Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Speckhard on January 10, 2007, Zoubai confirmed that he would be responsible for the portfolio and added that he had received full support from the prime minister.

However, on the afternoon of March 23, a member of Zoubai’s security team detonated a ball bearing suicide vest inside Zoubai’s residence. Severely injured, Zoubai spent several months recuperating in Jordan.

A variety of intimidation tactics were employed to secure the obedience of local residents once they had effectively expelled their sectarian adversary. These methods included bribery, verbal or physical assault, assassination, or public execution. After establishing their hegemony, militants would then coopt local officials and hijack government resources.

The JAM militia, and to a lesser extent ISCI, operated a sophisticated extralegal governance network to manage their inter- ests and even set up subordinate offices that focused on administrative tasks including finances, public relations, and technical affairs. Citizens would therefore become artificially beholden to militias for services, employment, and security. These extralegal institutions eroded government credibility and perniciously installed militant leaders who were not accountable to the local population.

Formal government institutions were incapable of stopping or even complicit in the militias’ attempts to manipulate Baghdad’s
services. In particular, corruption was abundant at both national and provincial levels. Officials would simply siphon finances, appoint militants to influential positions, or redirect reconstruction projects to areas dominated by their respective political parties. The Board of Supreme Audit, the independent Iraqi agency that served as a watchdog to monitor financial and administrative operations of the government, was inadequately equipped to investigate the accusations and was equally plagued with political interference, intimidation/assassination of agents, and limited resources.

The combination of institutional ineptitude and inability of Iraqi officials to delineate responsibilities among themselves highlighted the inchoate nature of the government. Many were uncertain of their legal authorities and lacked the conviction necessary to spearhead public policy. This allowed municipal directorates to be held hostage by the actors who sought their control. Representatives of various U.S. Government agencies urged the Iraqis to adopt procedures that would instill transparency and mitigate vulnerabilities, particularly in the delivery of essential services.

**Improving Essential Services**

Perhaps the most significant impediment to rebuilding Baghdad’s infrastructure was the absence of communication among the politicians who managed the city’s institutions. The plethora of independent funding sources precluded synchronization of projects and fostered an atmosphere of haphazard reconstruction. Meanwhile, corruption and militia interference inhibited local access to services. The U.S. Government continuously encouraged the government to implement administrative reforms, and as a result the Joint Planning Committee and Project Clean Delivery were launched as cooperative ventures.

**Joint Planning and Reconstruction Committees**. It became astonishingly evident that Iraqi officials failed to communicate with each other at even the most basic levels. Ministries did not fully appreciate the interdependence of their respective sectors. For example, the delivery of clean water to Baghdad residents required fuel to run electric generators, and subsequently water treatment facilities required electricity to power pumping units. Above all, security was needed to protect the linear infrastructure that actually delivered the product. These requirements clearly encompassed many different ministerial portfolios, the extent of which was not fully appreciated by the Iraqis.

Reconstruction initiatives were also pursued simultaneously by several entities without knowledge of each other’s activities. The efforts were both duplicative and counterproductive. It was not uncommon for one agency to repave a neighborhood street only to see it excavated by another agency the following week to lay new sewage pipes.

To redress the problem, the Department of State and Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF–I) established the Joint Reconstruction Operations Center (JROC) and Joint Planning Committee (JPC). By decree of Fragmentary Order #06–468, the concept of operations stated:

> The Joint Reconstruction Operations Center will be a single-source fusion center that provides a common operating picture of all non-kinetic projects and programs that impact the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP). The JROC will conduct planning that synchronizes and integrates non-kinetic projects and programs in support of BSP. During the execution of a plan the JROC will monitor and track the status of each project and program followed with an assessment of the effect created.

The key deliverable of the JROC was a weekly brief to the JPC, which was intended to provide strategic direction. Committees included a myriad of both government of Iraq and U.S. Government implementing agencies, but more importantly, members were derived from local Iraqi organizations to ensure community interests were adequately represented. The group reviewed neighborhood projects, verified mechanisms were in place to deliver essential services, and adjudicated conflicts between different organizations. In attempting to maximize resources, the JPC concentrated on what became known as SWET–H (sewage, water, electrical, trash, and health). Any conflict that could not be resolved in the JPC would theoretically be elevated to the IESC. In practice, however, this never occurred.

**Baghdad Security Plan Reconstruction Process**

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<tr>
<th>Iraq Executive Steering Committee</th>
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<td>JPC</td>
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<td>Amanat, Provincial Council, Ministries, Brigade Combat Teams, other U.S. agencies</td>
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Ryadh al-Falahi, an advisor to Zoubai, served as JPC chairman and provided national oversight to an otherwise local endeavor. His role was vital in verifying that district councils were actively committed to representing their community. Falahi also had the ability to understand the indigenous mindset, which was often culturally difficult for coalition members to perceive. To satisfy the U.S. Government objective of appearing impartial, Falahi provided a sense of legitimacy and an aura of Iraqi ownership to a committee that was otherwise wholly American.

The JPC offered a forum in which Iraqi leaders vented frustrations and supported local development efforts. Perhaps most notably, it allowed Iraqis to jointly manage financial expenditures with their American colleagues. This was a vital arrangement considering that roughly 30 percent of projects funded by the U.S. Government were disputed by Baghdad’s district councils and/or Amanat. Consequently, the JPC served to counter perceptions of misdirected funding and ensured that demand equitably met supply.

In and of itself, the JPC was a momentous feat, but it admittedly failed to achieve the aspirations originally envisioned by Washington. The lack of a higher Iraqi authority, particularly Zoubai, rendered Falahi powerless to elevate issues to the IESC. Furthermore, absence of the mayor, Provincial Council chairman, and governor meant that decisions made during the JPC were not guaranteed to be enforced by provincial leadership.
Instead, the JPC simply became a medium for situational awareness. This was not necessarily a negative outcome since the government of Iraq had limited knowledge of ongoing projects within the city. The committee also cultivated an environment in which Iraqis became acquainted with one another. State Department attendees frequently witnessed Iraqi officials exchanging contact information for the first time. Most importantly, the JPC introduced an administrative mechanism that encouraged cooperation and dialogue among all Iraqi agencies. Such horizontal linkages were nonexistent during the previous regime. The effect was an improvement in communications among all relevant parties, which the U.S. Embassy considered a significant achievement of the FAQ.

To capitalize on the success, internalization of the JPC was crucial to ensure long-term sustainability. Since its inception, the goal had always been to transfer the JPC to the Iraqi government, but the difficulty was determining who would actually assume ownership. The U.S. Government privately debated the merits of national versus provincial control within the context of the new federalist structure of Iraq. At the same time, the Iraqis grappled with similar questions as they struggled to form their new nation. Until a settlement could be reached, the JPC continued to be managed entirely by the Americans with Iraqi participation.

On March 13, 2008, however, the Baghdad Provincial Council finally took possession of the JPC and hosted the meeting for the first time at its headquarters. The committee would now be chaired by council member Nazar al-Sultani, who in his opening remarks noted the historical significance of the transition. Over the course of the following months, the Provincial Council slowly accepted responsibility for administrative duties, including drafting and distributing meeting notes. Sultani even announced on June 12 a new JPC format in an effort to streamline the overall process.

By the end of 2007, the JROC/JPC had successfully spawned similar forums. The Joint Rural Planning Committee (JRPC) expanded the JPC concept into the outlying Qadas (rural districts) of Baghdad Province. The initiative immediately proved successful by applying lessons learned from the JPC, and was central in reaching out to communities that consisted mainly of Sunnis dispersed along tribal lineages. Meanwhile, the Executive JPC, which had to that point been limited only to coalition members, incorporated provincial Iraqi counterparts to form the Baghdad Provincial Executive Planning Session (BPEPS). Cochaired by Provincial Council chairman Mueen al-Khademy and coalition representatives, the BPEPS was largely restricted to strategic discussions pertaining to economic development and essential services.

By assuming responsibility for municipal reconstruction efforts, the government of Iraq began to demonstrate its functionality and dedication to the people of Baghdad. Iraqi ability to effectively mobilize resources became a source of great pride. Although in many respects the government may not have been entirely proficient by Western standards, it nevertheless strove to improve essential services. The internalization of the JPC symbolized a great step forward in achieving Iraqi goals.

Project Clean Delivery. Corruption was quite pervasive throughout Iraq but was particularly acute in the fuel sector. Security assessments found that the majority of attacks on Iraq’s oil infrastructure were financially motivated. The sale of crude oil derived from interdictions funded the illicit activities of varying groups, including insurgents, militias, and criminals. The interdiction of pipelines forced the government to use tanker trucks as alternative means of distribution, but these too proved to be an easy target for theft and smuggling.

The incapability of the Ministry of Oil to adequately perform administrative functions such as contracting and strategic planning was relentlessly exacerbated by assassinations, kidnappings, and intimidation. A dearth of qualified technocrats to fill critical positions within the ministry did not bode well for other operations. Moreover, the minister, Husayn al-Shahristani, was believed to be incompetent. He was accused of sectarianism and often signed contracts that appeared exceedingly preferential to Iran.

Municipal fuel supplies were highly susceptible to corruption. Databases that recorded deliveries were egregiously fabricated and did not reflect actual quantities. The U.S. Energy Fusion Cell also discovered that ministerial tankers delivered fuel to fictitious gas stations that were later revealed to be abandoned buildings or empty lots. Residents were ultimately forced to purchase from the black market, which funded and perpetuated militia activities.

Project Clean Delivery was a pilot project initiated in December 2007 and entirely led by the Iraqi government via the National Security Advisor’s (NSA’s) office. The U.S. Embassy originally conceived the program but assumed a merely supporting and advisory role during its implementation. The purpose of Project Clean Delivery was to develop the Iraqi capacity to remove malign
actors and corrupt administrators from the supply chain of kerosene delivery in Baghdad. This was achieved through intensive monitoring and by ensuring delivery of product at the government rate. These tactics proved efficacious and ultimately eliminated a key source of revenue for Baghdad’s militant gangs. Overall, the process allowed government participants to understand the value of interministerial coordination and synchronization with security agencies.

In April 2008, the Iraqi interagency team reported that 90 percent of kerosene reached target neighborhoods, equating to 5 million liters delivered to 50,000 families in 12 neighborhoods. This was considered a major accomplishment in comparison to previous statistics, and the militia’s reaction to Project Clean Delivery testified to its success. JAM assassinated two neighborhood council members for their participation and threatened several others. The NSA lead, Saeed Jabour, concluded that “you can’t expect to transform a system that has corrup­ted the nature of the dispute and realized that the matter would have to be resolved internally among the Iraqis as part of the natural growing process of the country. The U.S. Government would instead foster other Iraqi partnerships, most conspicuously with Chalabi.

**Lights Out on Chalabi.** In light of Chalabi’s notorious past, U.S. officials internally disputed how to best approach his new role as head of the Essential Services Committee. Some were eager to establish a rapport with Chalabi, who could potentially petition for requisite services, while others proposed marginalizing him in favor of bolstering existing municipal institutions. The end result was consistent U.S. Government attendance at Chalabi’s committee meetings but refrainment from forging intimate relations. In essence, the State Department merely reported on deliberations within the committee.

By spring of 2008, a plethora of reports began to surface that implicated Chalabi in associating with JAM Special Groups. He was also accused of other nefarious activities, including arms sales and money laundering. Of course, the acknowledged conventional difficulty with information is the inability to substantiate its veracity, but the quantity and consistency of the reporting proved particularly alarming. If the reports were indeed factual, it was assayed that Chalabi’s actions were not likely to have been motivated by malice or sectarianism, but rather personal gain consistent with his modus operandi.

Regardless, the reports compelled both MNF–I and the U.S. Embassy to alter their respective postures and no longer engage with Chalabi or his staff. Furthermore, a moratorium had been placed on the issuance of all International Zone badges for Chalabi’s office, and existing U.S. visa applications were denied to various staff members. The prime minister took a similar course of action by officially removing Chalabi as head of the Essential Services Committee and instructing him to no longer attend the IESC.

The author estimated that the decision to marginalize Chalabi would have only a negligible effect on Baghdad services. He had been a nominal contributor to the city’s development, and his staff infrequently attended various intergovernmental coordination meetings. Moreover, the U.S. Embassy’s Iraq Transition and Assistance Office and the Provincial Reconstruction Team both believed that Baghdad’s essential services should be predominantly led by provincial leaders (governor, Provincial Council chairman, and mayor). Baghdad was unique in that the majority of services were managed by the Amanat rather than ministries, although the ministries still played a critical role.

**A Symbol of Success**

Overall, the government of Iraq proved relatively adept in responding to the enormous challenges faced in Baghdad. A
prominent symbol of its success during the FAQ was the rebuilding of the Sarafiya Bridge. Constructed by British engineers in the early 20th century, the bridge was an important commercial and transportation link over the Tigris River and a source of national pride. Sadly, on April 12, 2007, suicide bombers detonated a truck laden with explosives while driving over it. The blast destroyed the bridge and brought down the main central spans, negatively affecting commerce and municipal traffic flow. Baghdad’s residents were deeply demoralized by its destruction.

Despite some initial obstacles, all efforts to rebuild the Sarafiya Bridge were orchestrated autonomously by the Iraqi government with limited U.S. assistance. Construction, managed entirely by the Ministry of Construction and Housing, was completed on time and within budget and was officially reopened on May 27, 2008. The undertaking demonstrated the government’s capacity to independently pursue emergency reconstruction of crucial infrastructure and became one of the most significant Iraqi accomplishments of the FAQ. Indeed, during the May 26, 2008, IESC, Prime Minister Maliki called the bridge’s reopening a “victory over terrorism.”

Depending on their respective affiliations, American politicians are persistent in their attempts to label the Baghdad Security Plan as either a success or failure. Militarily, the surge could certainly be hailed as a success when juxtaposed against statistical trends, but such operations were only intended to provide space for political reconciliation and economic development. These aspects were the sine qua non of Iraq’s long-term stability but were much more difficult to quantify. In the absence of pivotal legislation or significant expenditures, they could only be measured subjectively, often based on tacit developments. The establishment of horizontal linkages and improved lines of intercommunication among Iraqis as a result of the JPC was a painstaking process that could only be ascertained over a prolonged period and exemplifies the challenge in perceiving such subtleties.

Equally difficult to discern, but of tantamount importance, was the overall capacity of the Iraqi government. By and large, the author noticed measured progress in the cabinet members’ ability to identify and present issues of concern to the IESC. Previously, discussants often were unprepared, and the resultant briefings were haphazard. By January 2008, however, visible improvements began to surface. During the January 11 IESC, the Minister of Displacement and Migration identified specific problems requiring government attention, and on January 25, the Deputy Minister of Communications deftly articulated the current status of his ministry, complete with graphic representation. Both presentations indicated an increasing capability to recognize and convey matters within their respective sectors. Moreover, the IESC Secretariat conducted 6-month and 1-year self-assessments of accomplishments and shortcomings of each FAQ supporting committee, a remarkable feat given the level of maturity of the Iraqi government.

**Military operations that targeted Shia militias in both Basrah and Sadr City and Sunni terrorists in Mosul evinced Maliki’s impartiality**

The author observed a gradual improvement in Maliki’s capability as prime minister. He appeared more confident in his position and became increasingly intolerant of unresponsive cabinet members. Military operations initiated in March 2008 that targeted Shia militias in both Basrah and Sadr City and Sunni terrorists in Mosul evinced Maliki’s impartiality. He proclaimed in April that the events “have proven that we are neutral, not biased, that we did not take the side of this party or this sect against another. We have also proven there is no security for any sect unless other sects can be guaranteed their security.”

These developments were not exclusive to the executive branch, as legislative officials also exhibited maturation. The February 13, 2008, passage of several pieces of legislation demonstrated that the Council of Representative’s speaker, Mahmoud Mashadani, was becoming more comfortable as leader of the parliament and testified to his ability to negotiate between dissimilar political blocs.

Above all, Iraqi officials were cognizant of the value of using essential services as a counterinsurgency tactic. Zoubai asserted to State Department officials at the onset of the FAQ that “security and services cannot be separated.” On June 11, 2008, the deputy prime minister’s chief of staff, Khalid al-Juboori, affirmed the significance of services as a COIN policy, stating that “providing electricity, providing education, and rehabilitating detainees will help solve the problem of militias. . . . We have learned that many join militias simply for money and are not necessarily religious extremists.” Khalid stressed that electrical reconstruction projects would provide employment that would reduce the incentive to join militias and added that “electricity also limits movements of terrorists at nights and opens shops.” Ultimately, “electricity solves security and services problems.” In this respect, President Bush’s January 10, 2007, address proved particularly astute in proclaiming that “a successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see that military operations are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighborhoods and communities.”

Any comprehensive appraisal of counterinsurgency tactics in Iraq must recognize the delivery of essential services as one of the most significant components of a multifaceted strategy. Supported by the United States, the Iraqi government pursued initiatives that eliminated opportunities for malign non-state actors to operate while simultaneously boosting its own credibility. Such policies reinforced other factors to engender overall positive trends in Baghdad that saw a weakening of the influence of militias and insurgents and a strengthening of the legitimacy and efficacy of the government of Iraq during the execution of the Baghdad Security Plan. JFQ

NOTES


3  The Iraq Executive Steering Committee was Congressional Benchmark #8.

4  The Amanat is the Baghdad equivalent to a city hall.

5  The Provincial Council is the executive body that oversees issues pertaining to the entire province of Baghdad, including human rights, energy production, public relations, and essential services.

6  The emergence of Awakening Councils is illustrative of local communities collectively rejecting al Qaeda in Iraq’s draconian tactics.


8  “Fact Sheet.”
Case Yellow and the Modern Campaign Planner

By Brian J. Hanley

Stuka Raid on the Maginot Line, by M.I. Guhl
Perhaps the wisest statement to be found in any official military publication appears in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, *Warfighting*; "A leader without either interest in or knowledge of the history and theory of warfare—the intellectual content of the military profession—is a leader in appearance only." Mastering the art of operational planning depends more on the staff officer’s intellectual ability than on anything else. Breadth and depth of experience are indispensable, but by themselves are inert, a point that Frederick the Great—whose views on the subject are shared by other of the West’s most successful commanders—often expressed in his memorably pithy way. "A mule who has carried a pack for ten campaigns under Prince Eugene will be a no better tactician for it," Frederick once said, "and it must be confessed, to the disgrace of humanity, that many men grow old in an otherwise respectable profession without making any greater progress than this mule."1

A reflective turn of mind has no place in combat, but effective operational planning very much hinges on intellection—particularly the vigorous study of campaigns from the past. History cannot be regarded as a medium for prophecies, nor is it a fable that teaches ironclad lessons in a simplistic way. What military history does resemble is tragedy. The most affecting and instructive narratives

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the French plan, while outwardly sensible in regard to what we today call operational art, suffered from the absence of an intelligent understanding of the enemy’s mind and character

can help sharpen the judgment and inform the intuition of the staff officer in ways that no other professional activity can.

What follows is an analysis of the German operational plan for an invasion of France in 1940—in particular its evolution from an unimaginative and timid version of the German strike through Belgium in 1914 to a plan that exploited the moral and intellectual sclerosis of the French high command.2 The value of studying this campaign—or any other of similar prominence—is that we see in play the insight and intelligent audacity of staff officers, which set the conditions for the Wehrmacht’s victory. By contrast, the French plan was superficially reasonable but devoid of an understanding of the enemy’s character and motivation.

**The Duel Begins**

Eight months after the Allies declared war on Hitlerite Germany in September 1939, the battle for France began. It lasted about 45 days. The ease with which the Wehrmacht liquidated the French army in the late spring of 1940 suggests that there was something inevitable about the lopsided victory. German propaganda films, set to the music of Richard Wagner and Ludwig van Beethoven, feature columns of Panzers on the move partially obscured by dust clouds—bringing to mind a stampeding herd of buffalo—or fanning out un molested on the plains between Sedan and Abbeyville, attended by motorcycle-borne couriers—like pilot fish accompanying sharks. Widely published photographs from the period reinforce the idea of German invincibility and Allied impotence: roads clogged with refugees and routed columns of French infantry; grinning and smartly turned-out German soldiers sightseeing in Paris, which the city’s defenders abandoned without a fight; the British Expeditionary Force, bedraggled and denuded of its equipment, making its escape from Dunkirk in a motley collection of naval and civilian craft.

Though impressive, the German victory was by no means predestined. We should examine the German *plan* from its conception to execution—with particular attention to how the various obstructions were overcome and flaws cast out. The French plan deserves similar scrutiny, for it embodies an approach to planning that, while outwardly sensible in regard to what we today call operational art, suffered from the absence of an intelligent understanding of the enemy’s mind and character.

Because the means of war are force and counterforce—war is essentially a large-scale duel, as Carl von Clausewitz put the matter—and also because weight of effort bears conspicuously on operational planning, it is not unreasonable to begin by surveying the order of battle of the Allied and German forces in May 1940. Both sides fielded about 120 divisions. The Germans had greater numbers of aircraft—which were of high quality—and better trained pilots. The Allies held the advantage in quality and quantity of tanks, but German tank crews and commanders were much more efficient and also had the benefit of recent combat experience. Such differences that existed between the opposing forces in regard to artillery, small arms, and other weaponry were collectively not enough to confer to either side a decisive advantage of the kind the Germans enjoyed over Polish forces in 1939. The equipment of the combatants, then, reflects neither German invulnerability nor Allied feebility; one could not predict with certainty the outcome from a survey of the opponents’ weaponry.

**Plan Origins**

Nor could one speculate with confidence on the outcome based on the origins of the German war plan—which was corrupted by the absence of recent combat experience. Such
by the animosity between Hitler and his generals as well as by competing professional agendas among senior military commanders. “Case Yellow” (Fall Gelb) was the name Hitler gave to the operational plan aimed at liquidating France’s military might. The initial version of Case Yellow submitted by the General Staff in late 1939 amounted to nothing more than an uninspired recycling of the Schlieffen Plan, embodying the letter of the plan that Germany went to war with in 1914 even as it was bereft of its spirit. The Schlieffen Plan called for enveloping the enemy with a sweep through Belgium and pinning him against the German-Swiss frontier; the Kaiser’s armies would then achieve victory by exploiting their own mobility and French military strategy, which was based on an attack through Alsace-Lorraine—far away from the main German effort.

The initial version of Case Yellow was also built around an attack through Belgium and Holland, but its objectives were faint-hearted by comparison. Unlike the Schlieffen Plan, this version of Case Yellow did not seek decisive victory; its objectives were to batter Allied forces, create a protective buffer for the Ruhr industrial region, and occupy strategically advantageous territory so that the war could be more efficiently prosecuted against France and England. For all of its timidity, moreover, the original draft of Case Yellow carried risks that were not in play in 1914. For starters, the strategic surprise of 1914 could not be counted on in 1940. The French expected the Germans to come through Belgium and Holland—hardly surprising given the heavily garrisoned Maginot Line, the difficulty of traversing the Ardennes forest, and the precedent of World War I—which meant that, unlike Schlieffen, Case Yellow would be a frontal rather than a flank attack. There was also the possibility that an aggressive French commander might marshal forces on the exposed southern flank of the advance and cut its lines of communication just at the moment when the German offensive, worn down by breaking through Allied defenses, was running out of steam. The original Case Yellow failed to consider “the scope for maneuver open to a bold and resolute enemy commander,” writes General Erich von Manstein in his memoirs. “One had no right to assume that such leadership would be lacking, particularly in view that General [Maurice] Gamelin [the French army commander in chief] enjoyed with us. He certainly made an excellent impression on General [Ludwig] Beck [German chief of general staff] when the latter visited him before the war.”

A more insidious risk was entailed by violating the neutrality of both Belgium and Holland in pursuit of a military objective of limited value. Whatever else may be said on the subject, the Schlieffen Plan at least weighed the strategic consequences of decisively defeating the French army against attacking a neutral country. By contrast, Case Yellow in its original form would have left the Allies undefeated and might well have provoked the entry of the United States into the war either as a combatant or as a supplier of arms and materiel to the Allies.

So large were the flaws in the original Case Yellow plan that its very submission to Adolf Hitler can be interpreted as a form of insubordination, insofar as Generals Walther von Brauchitsch, commander in chief of the army, and his chief of staff, General Franz Halder, saw nothing but gathering catastrophe in an all-out assault on France before 1942. The point here is that even a well-trained and intellectually gifted staff can produce an insipid war plan—one that was bound to repeat the stalemate that led to Germany’s defeat in World War I.

**Adapting the Plan**

After much debate and bureaucratic maneuvering—envenomed at times by Hitler’s contempt for the General Staff, which was reciprocated, and by reflexive misgivings among a few senior commanders about any audacious stroke against France, “Sickle Cut” (Sichelschnitt), as the revised version of Case Yellow came to be known, was settled upon.

The strategic objective of Sickle Cut was not to conquer territory or seize towns but to destroy the enemy armies in the field. The objective of offensive ‘Yellow’ [that is, the revised plan] is to deny Holland and Belgium to the English by swiftly occupying them; to defeat, by an attack through the Belgian and Luxembourg territory, the largest possible forces of the Anglo-French army; and thereby to pave the way for the destruction of the military strength of the enemy.

Sickle Cut called for the employment of three army groups. The southern army group would face the Maginot Line, thus absorbing the attention of the 400,000 French troops posted there. Possessing no Panzer divisions, this group was the least formidable of the three. The northern army group, which included the weakest 3 of the Wehrmacht’s 10 Panzer divisions, would attack France by way of
of Belgium and Holland, the objective being to divert the heart of the Allied armies away from the main German blow—which was to be delivered south of the Liege/Namur axis. The Luftwaffe would concentrate its efforts in the north as a means of disguising further the location of the Wehrmacht’s main effort. The most powerful of the three army groups, assembled under cover of the Ardennes forest, centered around seven Panzer divisions and was tasked to seize bridgeheads across the Meuse between Dinant and Sedan and from there to drive for the coast—thus trapping the Allied armies in northeast France and Flanders and separating them from French forces on and south of the Somme.

Intellectually marvelous, Sickle Cut reconciled boldness with prudence. It is commonplace among staff officers and commanders, as Helmuth von Moltke observed in his history of the Franco-Prussian War, that no plan survives first contact with the enemy, the implication being that once a plan is set in motion, victory depends on improvisation. Sickle Cut required little in the way of improvisation as it inherently accounted for friction, fog, and chance. Indeed, the plan accommodated both Hitler’s Napoleonic self-confidence and the General Staff’s fear of repeating the catastrophe of World War I—which almost all senior commanders had experienced firsthand. If all went well for the Germans—as it eventually did—Allied forces, assuming that their southern flank was protected by the impassibility of the Ardennes and the impregnability of the Maginot Line, would move northeast to repulse what to them seemed like the only sound avenue of approach. The army group advancing west across the Meuse River would ensnare these forces in one huge pocket. But if the Allies decided to establish a firm line before counterattacking—not an implausible assumption, given their defensive-mindedness—then the fast-moving German armored formations would paralyze the Allied command. This would likely happen even if French resistance along the Meuse was intelligently directed, and even if traffic snarls impeded armored columns making their way through the Ardennes—if only because senior French commanders would likely be unable to determine the main line of attack before it was too late.

Sickle Cut perfectly balanced strategic objectives against strategic risks, it took into account all reasonable possibilities in regard to the enemy’s reaction to attack, and forces were composed and allocated in such a way as to match German strengths against Allied weaknesses. In fact, so renowned is the plan among military historians that its architect, Erich von Manstein, is better known nowadays for Sickle Cut than for his illustrious achievements as an operational commander on the Eastern Front.

The development of the plan demonstrates the productive interplay between conventional thinking and innovation among the German General Staff. The emergence of von Manstein’s ideas was the byproduct of a professional culture that not only tolerated but also encouraged rigorous debate right up until an order was executed. Manstein’s plan, no matter how brilliant, would never have seen the light of day had it not been given a sympathetic hearing not only by Hitler—bold ideas were very much to his liking—but also by Manstein’s rather conservative-minded commander, General Gerd von Rundstedt. Hardly less relevant is that Manstein, Rundstedt, and several other senior commanders embodied the high traditions of the German General Staff. Officers were chosen for such duty based on their intellectual ability rather than on their political views or because advancement in rank absolutely required it. There was no corporate method or formula, or a bandwagon culture, that might have typecast Manstein’s thinking as hopelessly exotic.

Failed Counterforce

The French began planning to repulse a German invasion in late September 1939—at about the same time as Hitler issued “War Directive 6,” the tasking for the original Case Yellow. By the end of 1939, “Plan D,” named after the River Dyle on which the Allied forces would assemble, was decided upon. Because the only expedient line of approach for the Germans was through Belgium—so French commanders thought—Plan D concentrated Allied forces and most of their tanks and motorized transport in northeast France on a line west of the Antwerp/Namur axis. In the south, the Maginot Line was amply provided with infantry and artillery. Thus, the Allied front comprised two strong wings. Between them was a center that was held by forces deficient in ability, numbers, and equipment. These weaknesses, it was believed, were adequately compensated by the rugged upland country of the Ardennes and by the fact that German forces would have to cross the Meuse between Dinant and Sedan—a much more difficult undertaking than establishing bridgeheads on the narrower and shallower rivers in the north.

In devising Plan D, the French worked from the following three assumptions. First, the Germans would attack through Belgium and nowhere else in strength. Second, the Germans must not be allowed to occupy French territory—the battle must be won on Belgian or Dutch soil. Third, despite their success in Poland the Germans would have no choice but to fight the French by fracturing their frontline.

It is worth considering the validity of each of these assumptions. The French understood their center of gravity as residing in the country’s industrial heartland and in its capital, which could—on account of the flat terrain, good roads, and relatively short distance—be most easily occupied by
Driving across the Belgian frontier. Advancing through the Ardennes would be foolish not only because of the ungenial countryside but also because the Germans, in attempting to drive a wedge between two strong wings, would leave their flanks exposed to counterattack. And attacking the Maginot Line would result in a replay of Verdun not for the French but for the Germans; this time there would be no Fort Douaumont.

The second and third assumptions—that France must hold the Germans back from French soil even as they decided to wait for the Wehrmacht to strike—are partially rooted in the experiences of World War I, when France’s misbegotten offensive strategy yielded carnage beyond belief and nearly brought about France’s defeat. But the defensive-mindedness embodied in Plan D also reflected the defeatism that consumed France between the World Wars.

In 1940, France was plainly averse to seeking a military test of strength with Germany. It had turned a blind eye toward Hitler’s flaunting of the Versailles Treaty during the mid-1930s and accepted war with Germany in 1939 with conspicuous reluctance. Why was this so? The unprecedented brutality of World War I spawned in France a school of pathologies that would paralyze its ability and will to fight in 1940: a stubborn popular indifference to strategic matters, particularly in regard to military funding and conscription, and, correspondingly, an ethos of individual pleasure-seeking; the igni-

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resourceful fighters than the Poles; they also were convinced that the Wehrmacht’s Blitzkrieg doctrine was reckless—effective against a feeble, disorganized opponent but ineffectual when set against an enemy whose courage and resolution stopped the Kaiser’s armies at Verdun and on the Marne. There were French officers concerned about the rehabilitated German army—Colonel Charles de Gaulle, for one—but their points of view were peremptorily discounted. 7

Such were the scope and depth of French self-satisfaction that senior commanders actually looked forward to the German attack: the sooner it came, the sooner Germany’s perfidious ambition would be thwarted by French valor and the war brought to a swift, happy end. 8 Even when French reconnaissance identified a German buildup between the Rhine and Moselle Rivers in the early spring of 1940, it was interpreted as an act of strategic deception. That the Germans might take risks that no French commander would dare contingency was never seriously debated.

It is easy to criticize Plan D given the outcome of the battle, but we should not forget that the plan was, by the standards of conventional thinking on operational matters, a competent piece of work. What has been given remarkably little emphasis in the postmortems on Plan D is the failure of the French to ask searching and disinterested questions about the culture of German military leadership.

The French assessed potential German action based on inanimate circumstances: terrain, equipment, doctrine, the proximity of France’s industrial centers to potential avenues of approach, the material conditions of the earlier war, and so on. They also failed to consider the possibility that Germany had learned a great deal from defeat in 1918 and that the leadership in 1940 was of a wholly different cast. 9

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Had the French taken stock of Hitler’s character, which was on display not only in Mein Kampf but also in his conquests leading up to the Polish campaign, they might have been able to predict with greater accuracy the German course of action. Hitler was a gambler. The French generals might well have asked, given the circumstances, how will a gambler likely behave? What is the best way to thwart a gambler who relies on men of caution—Generals Walther von Brauchitsch, Franz Halder, Hans von Kluge—to achieve his ends? The French commanders seemed largely unaware of the enmity and political rivalries that beset Germany’s political and military leadership—weaknesses that, had they been properly understood, might have been exploited once the battle had begun. Who can know what effects a sharp setback—actual or perceived—on the right bank of the Meuse might have had on the morale of senior German commanders and, correspondingly, Hitler’s resplendent but insecure standing as a military genius? Today’s joint planner should ponder issues of this kind with the aim of avoiding the sclerotic thinking that hastened, if it did not foreordain, the French defeat. JFQ

NOTES

6. “War Directive 6” was issued on October 9, 1939; the French General Staff began war planning against the Germans on September 26. Also see Theodore Draper, The Six Weeks War (New York: Viking, 1944), 24.
8. Ibid., 130–131; Perret.
Off the Shelf

As the United States prepared for the 2008 Presidential election and subsequent transition of power, many authors and organizations published books, papers, articles, and editorials addressing challenges that the United States faces or will face. Some address a specific problem, such as poverty or nuclear proliferation, and others attempt to provide all the answers in exhaustive and voluminous tomes. From the many excellent publications available, I selected two books that stood out because of a unique approach or message. One is a short, pithy survey covering the gamut of threats facing the United States and challenging its role as the world’s primary defender of liberty. The other contends that the United States is heading for war with an allied China and Russia. Whether one agrees with the conclusions and recommendations in these two books, they will certainly precipitate interesting debates on national security strategy.

**Liberty’s Best Hope: American Leadership in the 21st Century**
by Kim R. Holmes
192 pp. $12.95

In this short volume, Kim Holmes presents a succinct yet thorough survey of the major challenges facing the United States along with recommendations about how to approach them. Holmes states, “We [Americans] have lost the idea that safeguarding and advancing liberty is the foundation of our claim to leadership” and says that his purpose in writing is to “examine the many challenges to American leadership in the world . . . and to provide recommendations on how to overcome” them (p. xviii). The book is a quick, informative read that provides highlights of the issues it addresses.

Holmes covers the most salient issues across the political, military, social, and economic spectra in the first part of the book and dedicates the second part to recommendations on how to reinvigorate American leadership and improve the international security environment on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. Its topical approach is one of the book’s strengths and should make it attractive to busy policymakers and senior military leaders. This same brevity, however, could be criticized as a lack of depth on any given topic and would thus be considered a weakness by readers who seek more detail.

As might be expected in a publication from the Heritage Foundation, this book takes a conservative perspective on international relations and past and present American politics. This conservative bent is perhaps most visible in a rather worshipful portrayal of Ronald Reagan in the preface and an almost wistful longing for his style of leadership throughout; for example, the “vision of a ‘tamed’ America following the rest of the world is our future unless we restore Reagan’s faith in America” (p. 186). Nonetheless, this book is at least a good starting point or refresher on the current challenges that America faces, and, in the end, Holmes does a good job pulling so many topics together in a short volume.

**The Next Great Clash: China and Russia vs. the United States**
by Michael L. Levin
216 pp. $44.95

A “rising China” and “resurgent Russia” have become common phrases in international relations and defense circles these days. Indeed, we have been surprised by unprecedented events (such as the People’s Liberation Army Navy deploying to the Indian Ocean to join the international effort to combat pirates near Somalia) and witnessed some old things that seem new (such as Russian bombers approaching U.S. Navy ships and U.S. territory). Clearly, China and Russia are high on the list of national security priorities for the United States, and dealing with each separately presents distinct challenges. Over 7 years into the war on terror, and with no clear end in sight, what if China and Russia teamed up against the United States? Michael Levin posits precisely this: “A Sino-Russian alliance against the United States will constitute The Next Great Clash” (p. 8). It is worth noting that Mr. Levin is not a military man, politician, or academic and that he writes from his own perspective, which, after living and working in Russia and China on various business and consulting projects, he believes allows him to be “unfettered by the restrictions placed on government officials, [and] unburdened by the rivalries that stifle academia” (p. 8).

Levin begins the book by analyzing and comparing various economic and international relations theories, including George Modelski and William Thompson’s theory about “long cycles” of global political leadership and economic innovations, John Mearsheimer’s “balance of power” theory, Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” theory, and Michael Klare’s “resource wars” theory. He points out that each of these theories concludes the United States is headed toward war with China. Levin then spends most of the book tracing the history of the relationship between China and Russia from the 1600s to today, culminating in a description of how the two nations have allegedly been conspiring and cooperating to undermine U.S. foreign policy. Levin concludes his argument by cautioning the United States to watch out for China because “even without a decisive military advantage . . . China’s combination of asymmetric capabilities (especially cyber warfare), its continental depth, the overwhelming concentration of its population in rural areas, and the distance across the Pacific could neutralize America’s military superiority, while China’s strategic partnership with Russia provides a protective outer ring shielding its western and northern periphery” (p. 121). Levin may not enjoy universal concurrence among military leaders and civilian policymakers, but he makes a good argument that is strongly aligned with those of several influential thinkers and in accord with some recent events.

—R.E. Henstrand
Military Transformation Past and Present: Historic Lessons for the 21st Century
by Mark D. Mandeles
157 pp. $64.95
Reviewed by
BENJAMIN ARMSTRONG

Military transformation, whether in the form of new doctrine, new technology, or a revolution in military affairs, has been a popular topic over the past decade. However, little has been written on the best way to structure an organization, the Department of Defense (DOD) in particular, to most effectively bring about transformation. Mark Mandeles examines historical examples of military transformation to determine the best way to organize the American military for the future. Military Transformation Past and Present comes out of a study that the author conducted for the Office of Net Assessment within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Mandeles posits that “military transformation will result more effectively from enhancing the interaction among DOD components to experiment, to discuss, and to set priorities” (p. 13). The proper development of what he terms a “multi-organizational system,” which encourages cooperation and competition between organizations and individuals with overlapping responsibilities, is the best way to organize for transformation. This system is the antithesis of modern attempts to organize DOD, which have focused on streamlining, linearity, and reducing duplication of effort.

Bookended between an introduction and conclusion are four chapters that serve as case studies of military transformation, primarily from American history. The first of these substantive chapters discusses the history of American military development from the Civil War to the start of the 20th century. Mandeles relates that a number of factors, including funding cutbacks and the ongoing Indian wars in the West, resulted in the American military being unable to properly develop the structures it needed to analyze and adapt to modern warfare.

The next chapter covers aviation doctrine prior to World War II. Mandeles discusses the development of aviation strategy and doctrine in both the U.S. Navy and the Army Air Corps. While the two Services faced the same budgetary constraints, the author says that the Navy was better prepared for the coming conflict because it was able to use a multi-organizational system to develop sound doctrine. The following chapter compares the development of amphibious warfare doctrine within the U.S. Marine Corps with the lack of development within the Royal Marines prior to World War II. The final case study illuminates the development of the U.S. Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability in the last decades of the 20th century.

Mandeles does a good job of keeping his focus on organizations. He mentions individual leadership, including Major General John Lejeune’s importance in the development of amphibious doctrine. However, he contends that “smart people aren’t enough” (p. 14). His discussion of the interaction between organizations is enlightening, and he uses appropriate historical examples to illustrate his point.

But it is Mandeles’ use of history that left this reviewer disappointed. The case studies lacked depth and at times needed context. In his discussion of military development between the Civil War and the 20th century, he does not mention the fact that the concept of a professional military first entered the American experience during this period. Mandeles claims that it was a “lack of substantial intellectual effort devoted to organizing to learn that created significant design problems for senior army and naval officers” (p. 25), despite the founding of numerous schools, including those at Fort Leavenworth, that would become the Nation’s first staff college and the establishment in 1878 of the Military Service Institution, which published the Journal and became America’s first military professional organization.

In comparing naval aviation with the Army Air Corps, Mandeles chides the Air Corps for its lack of cooperation with other Army organizations in the interwar years. However, this critique is lacking context. Most of the senior leaders within the Air Corps were attempting to break away from the Army and form a completely separate Air Force, which made the development of multi-organizational systems difficult.

Mandeles’ interesting illumination of the Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) documents the interplay between organizations that is an important part of the development of the technology. While the development of CEC illustrates the author’s thesis, it also appears to be a case of comparing apples and oranges. All the other case studies involve the development of strategy and doctrine, but this chapter is a story of technological improvement. At just over 100 pages of text, the book is relatively short and would have been strengthened by the addition of greater historical discussion within the case studies and more clarification of the link between CEC and the other case studies.

Despite the relatively minor problems with historical depth and context, the author has an important thesis. Mandeles singles out the interaction between military organizations as the key element in successful transformation. A multi-organizational system encourages both cooperation and competition. The competition results in an empirical mindset where the organizations must develop quantifiable evidence to support their positions. The accumulation and analysis of that evidence reduces errors and results in the best product. The modern streamlining of the Department of Defense has been an attempt to eliminate competition and overlapping responsibilities. Mandeles tells us that DOD has lost the most important method for finding and eliminating errors: multi-organizational systems.

Mandeles suggests two audiences for his book: senior military and civilian leaders within the national security establishment and the military analysts who serve them and the public. Both groups would be well served to consider this book and its implications for the future organization of the Department of Defense.

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American Power after the Berlin Wall
by Thomas H. Henriksen
216 pp. $79.95
Reviewed by
CLARK CAPSHAW

American Power after the Berlin Wall provides a rich narrative history of the use (and nonuse) of American military power in the nearly two decades following the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989. Thomas Henriksen takes the reader on a detailed journey through the U.S. reaction to crises in Central America, the Persian Gulf, Africa (Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, the Congo, and Darfur), Haiti, the Balkans, North Korea, and ultimately, Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite densely packing his book with information, the author eschews any attempt to explain the history of the past two decades by appealing to grand themes such as those introduced in Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, Thomas Friedman’s The Lexus and the Olive Tree, or Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. As a detailed narrative of the post–Cold War era, the book can be more appropriately viewed as a sequel to Louis Halle’s seminal work, The Cold War as History.

Where Henriksen does venture into theorizing, his ambition is limited to giving the reader “an explanation why the United States chose to intervene in a host of disparate crises” (p. 1) and, by extension, to explain those instances where the United States did not intervene. The author addresses some of the paradigms famously introduced by others—for instance, Huntington’s “clash of civilizations,” “democratization” theories that recommend the use of military power to reform authoritarian regimes and to promote democracy, and the neoconservative proposal (derived from a 1992 Defense Policy Guidance memorandum) arguing that the foreign policy of the United States should be focused on preventing the emergence of any military rival following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Henriksen demonstrates that each of these models is insufficient to explain the decisions made by the three U.S. administrations during the post–Berlin Wall period.

In contrast to what has happened since then, Henriksen argues, the Cold War period was relatively stable. Specifically, in addressing the destabilizing North Korean nuclear weapons issue, the author incisively states that “the Cold War, despite all its tribulations, resulted in a containment of not just the two superpowers but also their proxy states” (p. 125). Those proxy states, when deprived of their benefactors, became ripe for instability, as evidenced by the disintegration of the Balkan states, chaos in several African regions, and the growth of fundamentalist Islamic movements in countries that previously had been allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Henriksen deals courageously with some of the more controversial aspects of U.S. interventions during the period. Concerning the use of American military power to effect regime change even though U.S. vital interests might not be threatened, he argues that this was not a partisan issue—all three post–Berlin Wall administrations viewed it as a viable option: “Regime change became an almost accepted enterprise so that George H.W. Bush, William J. Clinton, and George W. Bush instigated ousters about once every 18 months . . . to secure political tranquility” (p. 33).

No contemporary U.S. military history would be complete if it ignored the lessons of the Vietnam War. Here, Henriksen does not disappoint. He shows how Vietnam shaped the debate in almost every decision to intervene. Of the continuing specter of Vietnam, he writes: “In the [first] Gulf War’s immediate aftermath, the outcome appeared to banish Vietnam malaise from the American psyche . . . [but] ironically, the high-tech, low-casualty war against Iraq, in fact, reinforced the Vietnam Syndrome. [The first Gulf War] re-etched a baseline in the American consciousness for short duration wars with minuscule U.S. deaths that affirmed the immanence of the Indochina ghost, not exorcised it from the nation’s memory bank” (p. 52). This same specter reappears in the semipublic debate over appropriate troop levels for the second Gulf War, when Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki became a casualty of internecine warfare in the Pentagon.

Concerning appropriate troop levels, Henriksen argues that this has been a controversial issue not just in Iraq, but also in every single U.S. intervention where the military had an enduring role beyond combat operations: “Operation Just Cause demonstrated in spades that the United States could project its military force just about anywhere in the post–Berlin Wall era. But it also signaled that Washington was prone to underestimate the required number of forces in postinvasion environments and to underprepare for after-combat operations” (p. 30).

Henriksen’s conclusion is incisive, if perhaps overly optimistic in its assessment of the potential for the spread of democracy: “America’s ‘unipolar moment’ is far from lapsed. But it must brace itself for a different kind of warfare. . . . It must transform its understanding of power to deal with a diffuse and elusive threat, while formulating a new grand strategy. By husbanding its strength, backing its friends, proclaiming an antijihadi message, hunting down terrorists, and keeping faith with humanitarian and democratic values . . . America will prevail over Islamic extremism and see democracy sprout from its own roots across the Middle East” (p. 216).

Probably the book’s greatest liability is that it contains no analysis of the ascent of Asia—without doubt a pivotal shift in the balance of power in the post–Cold War world. The book delays any discussion of China until almost the end, and then treats it only in cursory fashion. Overall, Henriksen’s book is a great read. One recommendation: read Halle’s and Henriksen’s books in sequence. This will be certain to give you a great appreciation for the rich history of the entire period—the Cold War and the post–Cold War—and will place each of the post–Cold War conflicts in context.

Dr. Clark Capshaw is an engineer and evaluator of aerial intelligence systems for the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command and an online instructor for the University of Phoenix.
Abdulkader Sinno, an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Middle Eastern Studies at Indiana University, provides an approach to understanding conflict through an analysis of organizations. His analysis is based on five structures that are able to distribute power within and among organizations. These structures, characterized as centralized, decentralized, patron-client, multiple, and fragmented (p. 11), allow members of the organization to execute vital processes, such as how decisions are made, resources are used, cohesion is maintained, and knowledge is shared. The structure selected and the processes employed in turn will determine if the organization is successful and survives or is eliminated.

Sinno applies this organizational model to make comparisons among the conflicts in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion, and he assesses the various organizational structures that were and have been engaged in violent conflict in North Africa and the Middle East from 1945 to 2001 (and arguably still are), examining revolutionary, resistance, separatist, civil, and ethnic conflicts.

Sinno does a remarkably thorough job of analyzing the Afghan insurgency and tribal interactions from 1978 through the present. This section is insightful, thoughtful, and exceptionally valuable; he reveals a deep knowledge of Afghan politics and rivalries, personalities, and agendas. Sinno’s organizational theory approach to explaining success and failure of rival groups during this period is persuasive. His tables and analysis are clear and direct and provide an excellent starting point for anyone wanting to understand the complexities of events in Afghanistan from the end of the Soviet occupation through the collapse of the Najib regime and the rise of the Taliban. It is doubtful that there is an analysis of events in Afghanistan that is better, more complete, and more useful to a military commander, diplomat, or Provincial Reconstruction Team chief than what can be found in chapters 6 through 8 of this book. This analysis should open some eyes and minds to reassessing the purpose and direction of the current operational activities in Afghanistan—not so much because of Sinno’s organizational theory approach, but simply because he has provided information essential to the development of a comprehensive operational design to address the insurgency and the stabilization of the Karzai government.

Sinno’s analysis of the current coalition strategy in Afghanistan shows that ignorance of the dynamics of Afghan organizations between 1994 and 2001 has led to a flawed ethnic-based strategy of “divide and conquer” to defeat the insurgency that directly counters the concurrent efforts to build a civic nationalist base of support for the Karzai government. The Taliban has adopted a centralized structure while employing a safe haven in Pakistan. The U.S.-led coalition, on the other hand, suffers from a collection of military, United Nations, and nongovernmental entities that often work at cross-purposes with little involvement of the Afghan government. The United States has created a patron-client organization with tribal leaders who initially depend on the United States for resources in exchange for loyalty but can quickly shift loyalties once they believe they can become self-sufficient.

While his analysis of the current situation in Afghanistan is excellent, Sinno falls short in offering little more than a simple generalization for addressing the problem. To be successful, he states, the coalition must adopt a centralized structure immediately “and develop a set of coherent strategies that actually helps the Afghan population while fending off challengers” (p. 276). The author has no recommendations for this centralized structure, and his strategic goals are obvious to any student of counterinsurgency.

In presenting his theory, Sinno sometimes belabor his points, restating his relatively simple conclusions after a wordy analysis and explanation of theories, models, and tables. The reader must make an effort to follow this exposition and is sometimes frustrated to find only a modest amount of substance at the end. The chapter on the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is an example. Sinno makes an elaborate case of explaining all the commonly accepted reasons for the Soviet decision to withdraw. The reader is anticipating that this conventional wisdom will be countermanded with an explanation of organizational structure, yet the author concludes with the relatively obvious point that the Soviets withdrew because they “were faced with a steadfast resistance that benefited from opportunities that emerged on the international scene during the protracted conflict that prevented them from enjoying the strategic benefits they had hoped to gain” (pp. 117–118).

In addition, military professionals may find some of Sinno’s conclusions dauntingly obvious. For example, he observes that “an organization that survives beyond the ability of all its rivals to challenge it practically wins the conflict” (p. 293). He asserts that the proper organizational structure combined with a safe haven is most likely to succeed in conflict. His analysis leads to a general assessment that organizations that have a safe haven can adopt a centralized structure; without a safe haven, organizations must be more decentralized, flexible, and self-sufficient (pp. 44–45). This is not necessarily revealing to those who have current operational experience.

Despite its flaws, Sinno has something here. He has presented an exceptionally valuable analysis of organizations in conflict in Afghanistan, but he is unable to provide the strategic-operational context necessary to move this forward into practical application. It is now up to the joint planning professionals to make use of his insights.

Keith D. Dickson is a retired Special Forces officer and a Professor of Military Studies at the Joint Forces Staff College.
Charles L. Pritchard offers this statement by a North Korean official as evidence of flawed American policy in Failed Diplomacy: “If the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] feels that it could trust the United States, then there is no need for a single nuclear weapon and we will dismantle them.” This book is Pritchard’s insider’s account of the U.S. inability to halt the Korean Peninsula’s nuclearization through the Six-Party Talks. Though Failed Diplomacy is primarily aimed at North Korea watchers, it is also useful for those concerned with counterproliferation in places where multilateral methods have been similarly unsuccessful.

As with the recent The War Within by Bob Woodward, Failed Diplomacy is as much about perceived dysfunction in the George W. Bush administration as it is about policy toward North Korea. However, Pritchard, who was special envoy to North Korea for negotiations until resigning in August 2003 over policy disagreements with the White House, lacks Woodward’s flare for a compelling and consistent narrative. Those who do work their way through the book will find sound policy suggestions regarding counterproliferation in general and the DPRK in particular. Other gems include private information, such as the complete text of less than diplomatic emails between Pritchard and Secretary of State Colin Powell’s office as well as correspondence between Pritchard and his North Korean counterparts.

The first half of the book, Pritchard’s first-hand account of policy toward North Korea from 2000 to 2003, is the most intriguing part as he reveals the kind of unique insider details that are absent from most analysis. Because of Pritchard’s resignation in 2003, the second half of the book consists of his evaluation of the success of the Six-Party Talks as an outside observer. This section includes conclusions relevant to policymakers, though it is marked by rather dry reporting devoid of groundbreaking information. Primary among these conclusions is the belief that Pyongyang’s demands in exchange for denuclearization—including a security pact, provision of a light water reactor, and the removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism (which occurred in October 2008)—have more to do with proving that the United States does not intend to invade North Korea than they do with gaining economic benefits. Pritchard’s regional expertise also comes across in this section, and he provides insightful analysis of the policies of all the members of the Six-Party Talks that is relevant to more than just North Korea watchers.

Pritchard finishes the book by outlining the need for and format of a permanent security forum in Northeast Asia. While this section is less germane to the principal topic of U.S.–DPRK relations than the rest of the book, it offers a novel look at the challenges and opportunities of any potential security framework in the region. Pritchard argues for the institutionalization of the Six-Party Talks to provide a permanent stage for multilateral security cooperation. Critically, North Korea would be not a principal member of this proposed organization, but only a nonvoting observer with the same status as extraregional players such as Singapore or Australia. Though Pyongyang might be reluctant to participate as a less than full member, as an observer it would still be able to have bilateral contact with the United States, while Washington could continue to maintain a veneer of multilateralism.

Based on his personal experience negotiating with Pyongyang and his extensive regional expertise, Pritchard makes three important arguments in Failed Diplomacy. The first is that diplomatic success with Pyongyang has only come through bilateral negotiations. Though Pritchard believes that direct talks are the best way of dealing with the nuclear question in North Korea, such as those that occurred during the Clinton administration that eventually led to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright traveling to Pyongyang, he concedes that even bilateral contacts that occur in the inefficient context of a multilateral setting are better than a hard-line policy of no direct negotiation with the “evil” Kim regime.

In addition, Pritchard makes the controversial case that the growth in North Korean nuclear weapons was caused by the inability of the highest levels of the Bush administration to properly coordinate interagency policy toward North Korea. Pritchard points to a cabal led by Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that inserted itself into North Korean policy by pushing non-hardliners and Clinton-era Korea experts out of the State Department and replacing them with personalities who shared their ideology but had little knowledge of the region. While it is obvious that Pritchard has an ax to grind, he is not partisan, and his case is certainly not without merit.

Pritchard also offers intriguing evidence of the real power of public diplomacy to influence other actors, even unintentionally. According to Pritchard, the White House’s refusal to conduct high-level bilateral diplomacy and the constant drumbeat of belligerence (exemplified by the characterization of North Korea as part of the “axis of evil”) and Vice President Cheney’s comment that the United States doesn’t “negotiate with evil, we destroy it”) convinced Pyongyang that Washington intended to end the North Korean regime. Pritchard writes that Pyongyang’s decision to resume nuclear weapons development in 2005 was rational in the face of this perceived threat and that more refined and nuanced diplomacy could have halted or slowed North Korea’s nuclearization. Such a policy may have prevented Pyongyang from obtaining the nuclear weapons (as many as 10) it has now.

Beyond North Korea, Failed Diplomacy also has particular utility for those officials dealing with Iranian proliferation efforts. Current policy toward Iran—inconsistent and weak multilateral efforts, an almost doctrinal refusal to consider bilateral negotiations, and a public diplomacy that cannot but leave the impression that the United States intends regime change—is sadly similar to the methods that have been tried and have failed with North Korea. Pritchard’s recommendations may keep the United States from facing another, more dangerous instance of failed diplomacy.

Captain Sean P. Walsh, USA, is an Infantry officer currently at the Maneuver Captains Career Course. He wrote this review while deployed to Baqubah, Iraq, with the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment.
Protecting the Past to Secure the Future

The Strategic Value of Heritage Training

By L A U R I E W. R U S H and M A T T H E W F. B O G D A N O S

Inevitably, in the path of our advance will be found historical monuments and cultural centers which symbolize to the world all that we are fighting to preserve.

—Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1944

Given the highly publicized losses to cultural heritage during the last 5 years, and the consequent damage to U.S. prestige, it has become clear that strategic understanding of, respect for, and training in cultural heritage are force multipliers for the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD).1 Add to this the undeniable evidence that antiquities trafficking is funding the insurgency in Iraq (just as opium trafficking is funding the Taliban in Afghanistan) and the U.S. Government’s recent ratification of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property During Times of Armed Conflict, and it becomes clear that we cannot continue with business as usual. A permanent planning and training office within DOD responsible for cultural heritage could combine subject matter experts already employed by DOD with those from the academic community to train troops, assist planners, and provide value to commanders. The benefit would be a deploying force with a more sophisticated understanding of the battlefield environment—one that can recognize and react to cultural heritage features in the landscape, enabling rapid response to previously unexpected cultural heritage events of strategic significance during combat and stability operations.

Failure to Plan

Over the last several years, media headlines in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States have been awash with our forces’ failure to prevent the looting of the Iraq Museum in 2003 and our unintentional, but still serious, damage to Babylon in 2004. The enemy, whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere, recognizes the strategic value of using cultural properties such as cemeteries and mosques as firing points and as placement locations for improvised explosive devices and weapons caches. This approach takes advantage of U.S. rules of engagement, further complicating operations. Indeed, as recently as March 2008, Afghan insurgents were still caching weapons in cemeteries. We owe our personnel the opportunity to train and plan for these contingencies.

The cultural heritage issue has additional strategic importance during stability operations. Examples are legion. In 2006 and 2008, Air Force operations and infrastructure improvements in Kirkuk were delayed by discovery of ancient artifacts.2 In 2007, the U.S. Embassy stopped construction of the U.S.-funded Afghan Defense Intelligence Headquarters in Kabul after the international community complained about damage done to the historic citadel at Bala Hissar (the site of the British last stand during the Afghan wars of the 19th century)—with the result that the project was delayed by several months and more than $2 million was misspent.3 These and many other examples of damage and waste, planned as they were without archaeological expertise, were avoidable. Moreover, a reputation for environmental degradation seriously compromises the ability of the United States to maintain old or to open new installations around the world.

The Solution

Dr. Laurie W. Rush is the Cultural Resources Program Manager at Fort Drum, New York. Colonel Matthew F. Bogdanos, USMCR, is Senior Advisor for Joint Interagency Operations, Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, and a New York City homicide prosecutor.
Joint Interagency Coordination Group, headed by one of the authors, to begin an investigation that led to the recovery of thousands of priceless antiquities in eight countries—was a good start. But we need to do more. Using funding from the Office of the Secretary of Defense Legacy Heritage Management program (OSD-Legacy), DOD has initiated a substantial effort to address these issues through its Heritage Training Program for Deploying Personnel. Designed to coordinate academic assets with DOD commands and resources, this project, first funded in 2006, has made significant strides: the media-friendly archaeological playing cards, reference Web sites for Iraq and Afghanistan, a checklist on the “Dos and Don’ts for Military Operations in the Immediate Vicinity of Archaeological Properties,” and provision of archaeological expertise to both Bright Star and Eagle Resolve exercises.

Other accomplishments include the creation of an Iraq Antiquities Working Group to coordinate with the U.S. Department of State on archaeological issues at U.S. installations in Iraq and the addition of archaeological data to U.S. Army and Air Force Central Command’s Geographic Information Systems. This project has also begun to provide the Human Terrain System with cultural heritage insights as a vital component of human terrain.

One key to the success of this prototype program has been participation of the highly trained archaeologists already in place at every U.S. training installation. As social scientists, they are ready to provide cultural awareness and cultural heritage training through realistic field scenarios that include archaeological sites and cultural heritage properties. As archaeologists, they are uniquely qualified to strengthen DOD partnerships with regional subject matter experts and institutions such as the Archaeological Institute of America, Oriental Institute, and University of Alabama–Birmingham. They are also extremely skilled and experienced in implementing integrated programming across DOD.

Progress to Date

The In-Theater Heritage Training Program has exceeded its proof-of-concept expectations and is ready to be established as a permanent DOD program. The Austrian, Swiss, Polish, and Netherlands Ministries of Defense all have trained Cultural Property Officers to address cultural heritage issues. The United Kingdom’s (UK’s) Ministry of Defence requested planning information from archaeologists during the initial invasion of Iraq and has a bill before Parliament to provide a trained cultural property protection officer at the UK equivalent of every brigade combat team by 2011. Representatives of all of these countries have expressed interest in working directly with the United States on improving cultural heritage protection during both kinetic and stability operations.

The Way Forward

DOD must transform the current training project into a formal Cultural Heritage Planning and Training Office to plan, coordinate, and implement cultural heritage training DOD-wide. A permanent and funded office would ensure, as General Robert Scales has observed, the participation of social scientists critical to helping the United States win any asymmetric war by establishing a formal relationship between military personnel and non-DOD subject matter expert partners and by creating constructive relationships with international and global cultural heritage agencies. The world’s cultural patrimony would be safe, al-Jazeera would have to find another way to show Western indifference, and terrorists would have to find another income source. It is up to DOD to mobilize and support the social science assets it already has.

Notes

1 Cultural heritage is defined as archaeological sites, sacred places, historic structures, and monuments.


6 Other initiatives include the creation of checklists for cultural heritage management, preparation of checklists for field training, development of a combined DOD–Archaeological Institute of America Working Group to address cultural heritage issues, development of an international military cultural heritage working group, and progress on a template for transferring archaeological Geographic Information Systems (GIS) information from universities and other sources into the command-planning GIS databases.

The Joint Doctrine Development Community (JDDC) continues on the leading edge of distilling today’s lessons learned and best practices to prepare the joint warfighter. As joint force experience and capabilities evolve, doctrine, too, must be revised accordingly.

The JDDC conducted its 42nd Joint Doctrine Planning Conference (JDPC) on November 5–6, 2008, at the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Warfighting Center in Suffolk, Virginia. Following the conference, the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Information System (JDEIS) configuration management working group was held on November 7. The conference continues to be a tremendous success with robust representation from the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, Air Land Sea Application Center, Service schools, and many of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies. At this conference, there were four decision briefs and seven information briefs presented.

The first decision brief was presented by the Joint Staff/J7 and recommended eliminating Joint Publication (JP) 3–09.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Laser Designation Operations, and incorporating selected material into other appropriate publications. The primary justification was that JP 3–09.1 had significant redundancies with other joint and Service doctrine and that it contained mostly technical versus doctrinal information. USJFCOM J7’s frontend analysis (FEA) supported the cancellation, and JDPC voting members unanimously agreed to cancel the publication once its relevant information had been incorporated in an approved revision of JP 3–09.

The next decision brief, presented by the U.S. Army Signal Center, TRADOC, proposed developing a new joint publication entitled JP 6–0.1, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO). The briefer stated that a doctrinal void exists due to inadequate treatment of JEMSO planning, management, and execution in joint doctrine. Additionally, he emphasized that the synergistic relationship between electronic warfare and JEMSO, particularly for civil support operations, should be addressed in joint doctrine. The USJFCOM FEA determined that there is no doctrinal void at the operational level with regard to electromagnetic spectrum management and insufficient justification exists to develop a JEMSO JP. USJFCOM recommended examining the necessity and suitability of adding, or modifying, guidance on electromagnetic spectrum management in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3320.01B, Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic Battlespace, and in JP 3–13.1, Electronic Warfare, during its upcoming formal assessment. The JDPC unanimously agreed that the proposed program directive should be further developed, submitted for a new USJFCOM FEA, and presented at the spring JDPC for decision.

The third decision brief, provided by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, proposed developing a new joint publication for stability operations. The briefer stated that there is a need to operationalize unique activities representing soft power capabilities inherent within the joint force.

Additionally, the 2008 publication of Field Manual 3–07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, provides a proven framework for discussing stability operations and should be used as a model for development of a joint publication. The USJFCOM FEA findings concluded the subject warranted a more detailed discussion in joint doctrine. The JDPC members unanimously agreed to accept the proposal for a JP on stability operations. USJFCOM was designated as the lead agent and began development in the first quarter of calendar year 2009.

The final information/decision brief, presented by the Joint Staff/J7, demonstrated and recommended implementation of the Joint Doctrine Development Tool (JDDT). Some of the Services expressed interest in the possible use of this tool for Service doctrine development. The JDPC members unanimously agreed that implementation of the JDDT is approved and all JPs, with revisions that began in February 2009 or later, will use it during development.

The information briefs included the status of joint doctrine, terminology, and the JDEIS configuration management working group, along with proposed changes to logistics related publications, doctrinal developments in combating weapons of mass destruction, integrated missile defense, and cyberspace. The current status of several multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures publications, JP assessment timeline, adaptive planning, unified action projects, and joint tactical environment, and an information brief on the NATO development of counterinsurgency doctrine by a representative from the Netherlands were also presented.

For more information regarding the 42nd JDPC, go to https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jed/template.jsp;?title=document&filename=doctrine.htm.

**JPs Revised or Under Review**

- JP 2–01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
- JP 3–02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
- JP 3–11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environments
- JP 3–14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations
- JP 3–18, Doctrine for Joint Forcible Entry Operations
- JP 3–24, Counterinsurgency Operations
- JP 3–26, Counterterrorism
- JP 3–59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations
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- JP 4–0, Joint Logistics
- JP 4–05, Joint Mobilization Planning
- JP 4–09, Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution
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**Executive Summary**

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