JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES SENIOR ENLISTED ACADEMY
A COUNTERTERRORISM ANALYSIS

THE BALI PARADOX
AN EXAMINATION OF JEMAAH ISLAMIAH 1992-2002

BY
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14. ABSTRACT Counterterrorism (CT) policy is like a game of chess. It often evolves as the result of a terrorist act or campaign. The objective of an effective CT policy is to identify and address the conditions that lead a terrorist group to act. It requires all facets of political, military, intelligence, and law enforcement planning to identify the root causes before a common thread binds these causes into a definable terrorist group. The history of Indonesia is defined by struggle: the struggle for independence from Dutch colonial rule, the struggle to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia, the struggle for self determination by the people of Indonesia from an authoritarian regime. These all play significant roles in the psyche of the population.					
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PREFACE

Counterterrorism (CT) policy is like a game of chess. It often evolves as the result of a terrorist act or campaign. The objective of an effective CT policy is to identify and address the **conditions** that lead a terrorist group to act. It requires all facets of political, military, intelligence, and law enforcement planning to identify the root causes before a common thread binds these causes into a definable terrorist group. The history of Indonesia is defined by struggle: the struggle for independence from Dutch colonial rule, the struggle to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia, the struggle for self determination by the people of Indonesia from an authoritarian regime. These all play significant roles in the psyche of the population.

This paper is simply an academic analysis of the strategic and operational environment in Indonesia prior to the Bali bombings. It is organized into five chapters that focus on the terrorist group *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI). The overall intent of the first chapter is twofold. First, it aims to academically examine the origins of JI in terms of the antecedent conditions that, **collectively**, led to its creation and decision to conduct terrorist activities. Second, it hopes to identify the actors that helped to bond the antecedents together.

The second chapter examines the series of events that occur once the antecedents are fused into Jemaah Islamiyah. The focus of this chapter is the emergence of sub-actors that occurs as a

result of recruitment. Additionally, the evolution from thought and rhetoric to a decision to act is often the result of a reinforcement of ideology that comes from organization. A highly organized structure will promote and maintain the goal of its leader and communicate across lines effectively. Without barriers, the organization will flourish.

The third chapter will primarily focus on the Christmas Eve church bombings of 2000. The intricate details of execution are often the result of the person planning the event. The more experienced the person is in planning, the higher probability of success.

The fourth chapter will examine Jemaah Islamiyah from an academic perspective. Did the group meet the criteria of a terrorist organization prior to the attacks on Christmas Eve 2000? Additional focus is placed on the role of religion and societal conditions that steer a group to commit terrorist acts. Finally, there is an examination of the new terrorist model as it pertains to Jemaah Islamiyah's development.

The fifth and final chapter will evaluate Indonesia's political history and the effect the highly centralized government of Suharto had on the evolution of militant Islamic movements in Indonesia. Attention will be given to the fractured political structure following Suharto's downfall and the emergence of a decentralized political infrastructure. This paper will conclude with the future of Indonesia's CT strategy and how its continual evolution is essential to break the Bali Paradox.

Several key non-state actors and events are deliberately omitted from this paper. These actors either did not come to center stage until after the Christmas Eve church bombings or do not add to the main points specifically addressed in this paper. Events not mentioned, while important to the overall history of Indonesia and conflict, were not required to reinforce the overall objective of this paper.

CHAPTER ONE: ORIGINS OF A CONFLICT: WHO IS JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH?

INTRODUCTION

To know your enemy, you must know yourself. This quip is often used but rarely practiced. The culture of the United States is “instant” everything. From coffee and breakfast in the morning to dinner at night, everything either comes out of a window or out of the microwave. As a culture, we are conditioned to apply these norms to all facets of life. When it comes to intelligence and counterterrorism, we often want the situation reports now. We attempt to establish policy and then immediately put a mechanism in motion in order to assess it, adjust fire, and re-implement. The problem with this concept is the relevant actors to our script do not think this way. They behave and adopt *their* policies amidst societal norms that entirely contradict ours. This said, in intelligence and counterterrorism, many times our greatest enemy is ourselves.

This chapter examines the history of the terrorist group *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI). Particular focus is placed on the origin and organizational structure of JI as well as the events that led to its creation.

ORIGINS

The emergence of militant Islam began with the Darul Islam (DI) movement in 1948¹. It actually began as several separate rebellions that morphed into a common cause. The overarching goal of DI was originally to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia. Particularly germane to our discussion is how DI survived over these many years and how it serves as a model to JI and other militant movements in Southeast Asia. DI's rebellion was primarily inspired by dissatisfaction amongst the local militias regarding concessions made by the newly created Indonesian government to the Dutch former colonial power². DI eventually consolidated its several factions and merged them into the *Negara Islam Indonesia* (Islamic state of Indonesia) (NII) rebellion.

The rebellion lasted thirteen years and cost nearly 20,000 lives³. The rise of communism and the Sukarno regime ushered in a new struggle for DI. The original rebellion was defeated by the Indonesian military in 1962. Its founder was executed and the movement was left with a power vacuum. DI underwent significant organizational changes in the ensuing struggle for control. In 1965, the DI and the United States backed Major General Suharto during a military coup. As Suharto took control, he reversed the previous course of events and denied DI and all other Muslim organizations a seat at the political table⁴. Suharto viewed the Islamic movements in Indonesia as a threat to national power and sought to curb their influence. The Suharto regime forced DI to consolidate its position and develop a new strategy for the future. The most important aspect of the DI movement is its resilience. Its ability to withstand significant loss and still maintain some form of command and control and strategic outlook serves as a model for militant movements today.

ABDULLAH SUNGKAR

Abdullah Sungkar was a Muslim cleric that left the NII movement and founded Jemaah Islamiyah in 1993. A significant rift had developed within NII and Sungkar opted to leave⁵. He was born in 1937 and was of Hadrami descent⁶. Sungkar was a veteran of the Islamic youth and political movement in Indonesia. Abdullah Sungkar was of the hard line Wahhabi sect of Islam. He was the ideological heir of Kartosuwirjo, the original founder of Darul Islam⁷. Sungkar was motivated by the idea that Islam should be the *only* religion with Sharia as its only law and any attempt to subjugate Islam was blasphemy and should be fought. Islamic governments throughout the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia supported the movement though Islamic charity organizations and financial assistance⁸.

¹ International Crisis Group; "Recycling Militants in Indonesia"; 22 February 2005

² *ibid*

³ Ismail, Noor. "Schooled for a house of Islam" 25 August 2005. www.yaleglobal.org

⁴ Abuza, Zachary. "Muslims, Violence, and Politics in Indonesia" 3 September 2004. www.nbr.org

⁵ Eliroz, Giora. "Islam and Polity in Indonesia" 1 February 2007. www.hudson.org

⁶ The Hadrami tribe is of Yemeni origin. Early Islamic merchants from Yemen came to Indonesia in the 15th century. Bin Laden's family is also originally from Yemen. This is important when examining the link to AQ.

⁷ Abuza, Zachary. "The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia", Strategic Asia 2003-2004. www.nbr.org

⁸ Bubalo, Anthony and Fealy, Greg; "Between the Global and the Local; Islamism, the Middle East, and Indonesia" October 2005. The Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Toward the Islamic World

ABU BAKAR BASHIR

Abu Bakar Bashir is probably the most famous member of JI. He was born in 1938 and is also Hadrami. While he was not part of the original DI movement, Bashir was very active in the 1950s with Muslim youth networks. This is where he came to know Abdullah Sungkar. Throughout the 1960s, Bashir became more radicalized and, together with Abdullah Sungkar, founded the Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Surakarta. While Sungkar was violently anti-Christian in nature, Bashir chose a more political path and often strategically considered his next steps. Bashir was violently anti-Western and anti-Christian, but he weighed the consequences of action versus rhetoric. Bashir used rhetoric and his Islamic schools as recruiting tools but also evaluated the political process in Indonesia and looked for ways to promote Sharia law and Islam through the means other than terrorism.

Sungkar and Bashir operated the Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Surakarta for four years and then moved their operation to the village of Ngruki on the island of Solo. In 1973, this movement became the Pondok Ngruki⁹.

RADICALIZATION

Pondok Ngruki is a religious boarding school on Solo Island, Indonesia. The school is noteworthy because it serves as the single source for *every* Indonesian militant with suspected ties to Al Qaeda¹⁰. The school began to develop throughout the mid to late 1970s until Sungkar and Bashir were arrested for trying to form a militant organization. Both men were sentenced to nine years in prison for subversion. The sentences were reduced to just short of four years. Sungkar and Bashir were freed from prison in 1983 and fled to Malaysia in 1985. While in Malaysia, Sungkar and Bashir were neighbors with Fauzi Hasbi, a Free Aceh Movement (GAM) defector with ties to both GAM and the Indonesian Special Forces unit Kopassus¹¹. Several incidents occurred during and after the imprisonment of Sungkar and Bashir that signified a violent shift from theory to operation.

Immediately after Sungkar and Bashir were imprisoned, there was a spike in violent crime that can be attributed to Pondok Ngruki. A murder and several attempted robberies signified the first instance of societal crime for the purpose of Islamic fundraising¹². These crimes were

committed both to demonstrate displeasure with the Indonesian government's actions and to raise funding for Sungkar and Bashir. Additionally, the political climate was beginning to shift and the *Usroh*¹³ activists in central Java were becoming more energized. The climate in Indonesia throughout the 1980s was moving toward the radical end of the continuum at an alarming rate.

⁹ International Crisis Group; "Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia; The Ngruki Group" 8 August 2002

¹⁰ ibid

¹¹ International Crisis Group; "How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates" 11 December 2002

¹² International Crisis Group; "Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia; The Ngruki Group" 8 August 2002

¹³ Human Rights Watch; "Indonesia's Prisoners"; June 1998. www.hrw.org

By 1990, there were more than seven different active Islamic movements. With potential flashpoints at Aceh, Moluccas, Solo and Java, the conditions ripened for extremist ideology to flourish. The strict control of the Suharto regime kept all parties from action. With Sungkar and Bashir both living in Malaysia, they were openly preaching ideologies that paved the way for future events.

THE FOUNDING OF JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, no one could have possibly predicted the amount of support, financing, and fighters the *mujahedin* resistance would receive over the next nine years. Nearly every Muslim in the world felt a duty to defy tyranny and invasion by any means available. For Indonesians already immersed in the Islamic struggle narrative from the DI/NII movement and radicalized by Pondok Ngruki and Usroh ideas, the opportunity to go and fight in Afghanistan was simply too tempting to let pass by.

In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the idea of an Islamic Caliphate resurfaced. Indonesia was never part of the original idea of the Caliphate. However, as the country with the

world's largest Muslim population, Indonesia gained strategic importance as a result of its recruitment base and strategic location. Indonesia lies along the Straits of Malacca, serving as a vital transit point for trade and travel. Following the Afghan campaign, many fighters returned to Indonesia and throughout Southeast Asia battle hardened and unafraid of further conflict¹⁴. Islamic leaders were quick to recognize the strategic importance of Indonesia to the world. With tensions boiling over in the Philippines, Indonesia was quickly absorbed into the vision of a new *Global* Islamic Caliphate. The Islamic world had defeated

the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. They had proven they were capable of triumphing over oppression through Jihad. The loss of a “two-sided” conflict gave way to a shared animosity toward the new perceived oppressors, the United States and the West.

Significant internal arguments within both the DI and GAM movements had also occurred around the same time. Many members in exile in Sweden¹⁵ argued over ideology and the way ahead for both groups. JI founders Bashir and Sungkar saw this as the right time to enact a new vision.

Bashir and Sungkar created JI on 1 January 1993 and published the General Guide for the Struggle of Al Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah (PUPJI)¹⁶. This was a significant advance from previous movements as it had a clearly defined organizational structure and a strategic outcome measured

¹⁴ PBS video “The Al Qaeda Files” discusses the post Afghan conflict and the foreign fighters. Several ICG reports discuss JI members fighting in Afghanistan.

¹⁵ Hasan di Toro and Abu Hasbi Geudong (Fauzi's father who died in 1993) were in Sweden arguing over GAM future while GAM fighters were still active in Aceh. Di Toro would have a stroke in 1999 and GAM would split into two over a power struggle between di Toro and Haseini (the chief of staff of GAM). The result was GAM and MP-GAM. This debate also spilled into the Philippines where ASG and MILF commanders argued over the way ahead. The result was a lot of fighters moving between groups across SE Asia. Omar al-Faruq would arrive in 1999 to organize JI along AQ lines of operation.

¹⁶ Pavlova, Elena. “From Counter-Society to Counter-State; JI according to PUPJI”; 14 November 2006; Singapore Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies.

over three definable phases: Faith's Strength, Brotherhood's Strength, and Military Strength¹⁷. From 1993-1996, Sungkar served as the emir of JI and its spiritual leader. He had always been the political mind of JI with Bashir promoting the group's anti-Western and militant views.

Source: CIA maps. Overlay drawn by Smith on PowerPoint and saved as picture

From JI's inception, it was subdivided in a highly organized structure. The regions were divided into four *Mantiqis* or territories. Similar to a military organization, each Mantiqi reports to the overall JI leadership.

Source: dfat.gov.au/JI/structure/ch4

¹⁷ Ibid. pg 12

Under each Mantiqi is a *Wakalah*¹⁸ (district,) followed by *Kirdas* (sectors) and finally a *Fiah* or individual cell. This highly developed order of battle is strikingly similar to most military organizations. One can infer that JI was established with militaristic objectives to achieve an operational effect furthering the strategic vision of a pan-Islamic Caliphate.

THE CAMPAIGN: ENTER HAMBALI

With the establishment of JI as an operational entity, JI simply needed to find a tactician to take the Jihad concept from ideology to reality. Sungkar and Bashir found that man in Riduam Isamuddin, known by the international community as Hambali¹⁹. He took his name after Imam Hambal, a religious leader (780-855A.D.) and founder of the Hambal school of Fiqh²⁰. Imam Hambal is regarded as the 13th Imam of Islam and is founder of one of the four schools of

Islamic religious law. Hambali lived with Sungkar and Bashir in Malaysia in the early 1990s. He went on to serve as a key member of the Konsojaya import-export company. Little was known of him until his Konsojaya Company surfaced in connection with a terrorist plot to plant bombs on several airliners. This plot was called “Operation Bojinka”²¹. Bojinka was masterminded by the renowned terrorist Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and World Trade

Center bomber Ramzi Yousef. The fact that Hambali was not arrested following this event set into motion a chain of events that would change the face of terrorism in Indonesia in the coming years. Hambali was militaristic in nature and would prove to be an elusive target in the years to come.

The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 resulted in political turmoil across Indonesia. Student

protests and mass demonstrations forced Suharto to relinquish power. With his exit, three decades of control of the Islamic movement had come to an end. In 1999, Abdullah Sungkar died of cancer. This left Abu Bakar Bashir as the spiritual leader and emir of Jemaah Islamiyah. Bashir quickly consolidated power and prepared to move JI forward. The timing between Sungkar’s death, Suharto’s fall, Al Qaeda’s declaration of war against the US, and JI’s rise to power are highly interrelated. Bashir

returned to Indonesia and prepared for the next phase. JI began a masterful campaign of anti-US and anti-Western rhetoric and used conflicts in the Moluccas, East Timor, and the Muslim offensive in the Philippines as a catalyst to move forward. Hambali began significant coordination with key Al Qaeda figures and JI declared allegiance to the Al Qaeda organization. JI used this time to cement relationships with groups such as Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines²² as well as local groups such as the revived Darul Islam movement, Laskar Jihad, and Kompak²³.

¹⁸ A Wakalah is also called a Sariyah. In some Jihadist groups it is similar to a battalion or brigade.

¹⁹ Hambali was known as the Osama bin Laden of Southeast Asia

²⁰ See “The 100 Great Muslims” <http://www.renaissance.com.pk/mjuletfor96.html> It is important to note that the Hambal region includes all of Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabi movement is closely linked to the Hambal School. Based on this analysis, Hambali would likely have the same ideological background as AQ members.

²¹ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hambali>

²² The MILF is an Islamic separatist group in the Philippines. Abu Sayyaf is an offshoot of this group and the MNLF. ASG’s leader Janjalani fought along side the Taliban, Hambali, and other JI members in Afghanistan.

In January 2000, several high ranking Al Qaeda members, along with members of JI and other groups attended a meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia²⁴. The Malaysian authorities took pictures of this meeting but no audio recordings were made. For JI, Hambali and a man named Yazid Sufaat²⁵ attended. Sufaat had attended school in the United States and had obtained a degree in biochemistry. He had also spent time in the Malaysian army. Sufaat had been a loyal member of JI since its inception in 1993²⁶. Based on the widespread attendance, it could have appeared the world was on the verge of a global jihad.

Source: <http://www.tkb.org/> (overlay done by Smith for graphic purposes)
OVERVIEW OF SOUTHEAST ASIA – AL QAEDA NEXUS

CONCLUSION

Every potential enemy is a puzzle to intelligence and counterterrorism officers. It is much easier to look at history and see what is obvious. An understanding of the present and the future continues to prove much more elusive than an understanding of the past. With Bashir and Hambali in close coordination with AQ, the timing was right to launch an offensive. With bin Laden's Fatwa and the increasing momentum of this new global jihadist network, JI had to transition to action. Their next difficult tasks would be selecting the appropriate target set and continuing to develop, recruit, train, and prepare. It proved to be a task JI was equipped to accomplish.

When he returned home, he broke away from the MNLF and began a campaign of hostage taking presumably to secure funding. Both groups provide training and logistical bases to members of JI. JI enjoys a logistical and, at times, C2 relationship with these groups.

²³ Government of Australia; "Report of JI Activities" 5 May 2003. Attach B pg. 2

²⁴ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Al_Qaeda_Summit

²⁵ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yazid_Sufaat

²⁶ Yazid Sufaat will be discussed in the coming chapters so he is important to note as present at this high level meeting in Kuala Lumpur.

CHAPTER TWO: GOING OPERATIONAL; DEVISING THE PLAN

Source: caosblog.com

INTRODUCTION

Hindsight is 20/20 vision. It is easy to say that you should have noticed this or you would have noticed that. The fact remains counterterrorism efforts have failed once the terrorist act occurs. This is what makes this topic so debatable, so nebulous, and so controversial. When dealing with extremist groups, it is difficult to discern between action provoking messages and political rhetoric. One thing is certain, most extremist groups follow a campaign that evolves with the political climate associated with the movement.

This chapter will discuss the events that led to the Christmas Eve church bombings that occurred across Indonesia in 2000. The focus will be the key participants and the political objective of the attack. Finally, we will examine Indonesia's security apparatus at the time of the attacks and set the stage for the Jemaah Islamiyah's first "spectacular."

JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH; RISE TO POWER

As mentioned in chapter one, there were several significant events that contributed to JI's rise to power in the late 1990s. The fall of the Suharto regime significantly aided in the development and radicalization of JI. For thirty years, Suharto's New Order policy²⁷ carefully balanced competing interests and established a hierarchal, highly centralized government with little room for political debate. Islamic movements were suppressed from engaging in significant anti-government rhetoric for fear of repression. Suharto's tight control over his regime also created internal disagreements between the Indonesian Intelligence Organization Bakan²⁸ and the Indonesian police agencies. This lack of communication offered JI members the time to coordinate their next move without interference.

When Suharto resigned from power in 1998, it left a political void in Indonesia. The authoritarian rule that had become ingrained in everyday Indonesian life was replaced by a significantly more decentralized government. The military and security services would devolve and have to relinquish power. Sungkar and Bashir, having already established a thriving JI school in Malaysia, returned to Indonesia and their school at Pondok Ngruki²⁹. What is most important to note is that the political landscape had changed across Indonesia. With democracy in a fledgling state, it was now politically acceptable to openly campaign for reforms. Some Muslim leaders used this time to pressure the government to establish dialogue and concessions. Others, such as Sungkar and Bashir, wanted the establishment of an Islamic State and Sharia law³⁰.

In 1999, Abdullah Sungkar died³¹. Before he died he had developed an almost fanatical obsession with the Christian movement in Indonesia. Conflict between Christians and Muslims had begun in Poso and Maluku³² and infuriated Sungkar. His death served as a critical junction in the operational evolution of JI. With Bashir taking control as the emir of JI, many of the militant members of JI were unhappy³³. They felt that Bashir was too willing to accommodate others and too moderate on key Islamic political demands³⁴. Among those upset were Hambali, Imam Samudra and Mukhlas³⁵. These three created a core of internationally networked extremists.

²⁷ <http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/22.htm>

²⁸ In 2001, Bakan was renamed Badan Intelijen Negara (BIN) or State Intelligence Agency. The organization was reorganized after the 2002 Bali bombings. See

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1599/MR1599.ch4.pdf, for more information

²⁹ Ressa, Maria A. *"Seeds of Terror; an Eyewitness Account of Al Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia"* 2003; Free Press Pg.51

³⁰ See www.wikipedia.com/sharia for more information on Sharia Law

³¹ Sungkar died just three days after arriving back in Indonesia

³² Also called the Moluccas. See http://www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/maps_maluku_resources.php

³³ Sungkar wanted an Islamic state within Indonesia which developed into aspirations of a pan-Islamic Caliphate across Southeast Asia. He was obsessed with Christian missionary efforts across the archipelago while Bashir was more concerned with the evolution of the Caliphate and promotion of anti-Western interests. Bashir did not feel the time was right to begin operations.

³⁴ International Crisis Group; *"How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates"* 11 December 2002

³⁵ Samudra's real name is Abdul Aziz and Mukhlas' name is Ali Gufon. They play a pivotal role in coming attacks.

Born Abdul Aziz in western Java, Imam Samudra was a star pupil during his time at Islamic schools in Indonesia. He was outgoing and charismatic as a youth and was enraged, as were most Muslims, by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He developed a militant demeanor as he completed school and wanted to join the fight against Muslim persecution in Afghanistan. Samudra left home in 1990 and made his way to Afghanistan where he learned to fight from the Taliban. After his time in Afghanistan, he made his way to Malaysia where he taught at a school run by Sungkar and Bashir³⁶. Samudra joined JI in the mid 1990s and would prove to be a valuable member in years to come³⁷.

Ali Gufron [REDACTED] He adopted the name Mukhlas following his time as a student at the Pondok Ngruki School. Muchlas went to Afghanistan and has stated that he met Osama bin Laden in 1987. In 1991, he founded a boarding school in Malaysia modeled after his school in Ngruki³⁸. He would eventually become the commander of JI's Mantiqi I.

Al Qaeda (AQ) recognized the warm relationship with the newly establish JI and sent Omar Al-Faruq to Indonesia to begin coordination and training.³⁹ The importance of Al-Faruq in Indonesia at this time can not be understated. AQ had developed a comprehensive strategy that included phases before and after 9/11. Faruq was instrumental in the development and training of JI fighters and for the close coordination between extremist groups in Southeast Asia.⁴⁰

With Indonesia in political reform and Bashir at the helm, JI organized and continued to develop an extended network across the four Mantiqis and to external groups such as Al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front⁴¹. Hambali was active in both Malaysia and Indonesia and had close ties to AQ operatives. He was appointed as chairman JI's Regional *Shura* Council⁴² and was responsible for coordination of operations and finance for JI. Hambali enlisted his counterparts and together they began to develop a plan.

THE ROAD TO KUALA LUMPUR

It is fairly easy to identify the key links between AQ and JI. Hambali, Muchlas, and Imam Samudra had all been to Afghanistan to either fight the Soviets or to help the Taliban. JI had evolved from a concept in the 1980s to a complete organization with a Shura council, regional Mantiqis, Wakalahs, and a series of cells throughout the region. Many fighters had also been to the southern Philippines to help the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf

³⁶ BBC News; www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2499943.stm Monday, 2 June, 2003

³⁷ Imam Samudra would go on to plan the Bali bombing in 2002 and was captured and sentenced to death in 2006.

³⁸ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muklas>

³⁹ Omar Al-Faruq was sent to Indonesia to serve as a liaison between JI and AQ. He was also responsible for helping the MILF with their struggle against the AFP. He is credited with helping to create the Special Operations Group, a paramilitary arm of the MILF. See Abuza's. "*Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia; Financial Networks of AQ and JI*" December 200 for more information.

⁴⁰ Faruq would be captured and sent to Bagram Air Base, AFG. He would escape and eventually be billed in Basrah, Iraq by UK Special Forces.

⁴¹ Rabasa et al. "Beyond Al Qaeda; The Global Jihad Movement"; 2006; Rand Corporation

⁴² Ratnesar, "*Confessions of an Al Qaeda Terrorist*"; BIN, "Interrogation Report of Omar al-Faruq";

Group (ASG) continue their struggle. Access to conflict was a key ingredient in network development, and there was an abundance of conflict across Southeast Asia⁴³.

RAND MG429-6.1

Source: Rabasa et al. "Beyond Al Qaeda; the Global Jihad Movement"; 2006; Rand Corporation

In 1999, violence erupted in Poso and Maluku, Indonesia. Muslim and Christian communities traded engagements resulting in almost 5,000 dead over the course of the conflict⁴⁴. The violence continued throughout 1999 and into 2000. This led to the creation of two JI paramilitary groups; Laskar Mujahidin⁴⁵ and Laskar Jundullah.⁴⁶ The strategic importance over the creation of these paramilitary organizations was critical to building the combat experience of JI's members that were too young to fight in Afghanistan. On 22 September, the predominantly Muslim village of Iha was destroyed by Christian militiamen⁴⁷. These events enraged Hambali, who was now planning a meeting with senior AQ member Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and others. The meeting was scheduled to take place in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000. Focus of the meeting would

⁴³ With the MILF and ASG battling AFP forces in the Philippines, JI enjoyed a nefarious relationship and access to camps. JI also served as a de facto go between in terms of terrorist groups in SE Asia and AQ. Additional separatist groups were in Bangladesh, Thailand, and Malaysia creating the nucleus of AQ's SE Asia expansion.

⁴⁴ BBC; "Troubled History of the Moluccas"; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/806862.stm> (as of 11 Feb 08)

⁴⁵ International Crisis Group; "How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates" 11 Dec 02

⁴⁶ Abuza, Zachary. "Funding Terrorism In Southeast Asia; Financial Networks of AQ and JI" December 2003.

www.nbr.org

⁴⁷ Sejar Indonesia; <http://www.gimonca.com/sejarah/sejarah11.shtml> ; accessed 3 Feb 08

presumably be the USS Cole attack⁴⁸ as well as preparations for what would become the 9/11 attacks.

JI was in close coordination with AQ through Hambali and Faruq and an effective strategy appeared to emerge. Every terrorist group exhibits several common strategic objectives⁴⁹. Those objectives are threat elimination, compliance, disorientation, attrition, provocation, advertisement, and endorsement. By planning a “spectacular” of their own, JI would effectively achieve most of these goals in one event. Attrition and disorientation of the Christian population would result in threat elimination and eventual compliance. An attack would also serve as advertisement that JI was a force with which to be reckoned and a key ally of AQ. This would gain AQ endorsement and additional funds to continue Jihad.

AL QAEDA COMES TO TOWN

On a quiet morning in January 2000, several AQ members who had just completed training in Karachi, Pakistan accompanied KSM to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. They would stay with Malaysian JI member Yazid Sufaat.⁵⁰ The meeting that occurred over the next few days would steer the course of events to this day. Hambali and Sufaat represented JI at what has been called the “2000 Al Qaeda Summit”. It is believed that this is where AQ’s global plan was explained and the aftermath of the summit correlates with JI’s planned operational activities in the coming months.

It is important to note that the first error in counterterrorism operations occurred at this time. The CIA had intercepted a phone call from one of the AQ operatives and had requested the Malaysian authorities monitor the meeting. Video was taken but audio was not available. Without audio, CT officials were left to guess what was discussed at the meeting. Additionally, it was some time later before anyone noticed Ramzi bin al-Shibh⁵¹ was present. Ramzi was a known AQ member and roommate of Mohammed Atta⁵². Hambali and Sufaat are connected through several lines. Both had been to Afghanistan and fought alongside the Taliban. Both were original members of JI and both owned companies connected to JI and AQ in the 1990s.

Source: www.fbi.gov

⁴⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Cole_bombing

⁴⁹ Drake, C.J.M.; *Terrorist Target Selection*; Macmillan Press, 1998; pg 39-44

⁵⁰ 9-11 Commission Report; pg 168. Additionally, Sufaat was the owner of Green Laboratories Medicine and a company called InfoTech. Green River Medicine was a front company that enabled JI to acquire explosive materials for use across Indonesia and InfoTech hired Zacarias Moussaoui as a consultant. He was paid a monthly stipend and sent to Minnesota to work. Moussaoui attended pilot training in Norman, Oklahoma and would be called the “20th hijacker” as he was selected to replace Ramzi after Ramzi’s visa was denied

⁵¹ Ramzi has often been called the “20th hijacker” as it is believed that he was supposed to be aboard United Flight 93, the only hijacked flight without 5 hijackers. Ramzi applied for a visa to the United States and was denied at least three times.

⁵² Atta was one of the 19 hijackers involved in 9/11

THE EMERGENCE OF MAJELIS MUJAHIDIN INDONESIA (MMI)

Following the January meeting, radical JI operatives began planning for attacks across Indonesia.

Source: www.indonesia-relief.org

Abu Bakar Bashir was concerning about the timing and repercussions of any attacks. This caused significant turmoil within the JI organization as to which direction the group should proceed. The rift between Bashir and Hambali intensified after Bashir and two former political prisoners founded MMI. As Indonesia's political climate had changed over the past two years, Bashir felt it presented new opportunity for dialogue. Hambali and the radicals felt it was in direct opposition to Sungkar's teachings⁵³. Bashir decided that MMI would be the political arm with JI assuming the organization's military role.⁵⁴

Bashir further alienated JI members when he used MMI to bring a lawsuit against the Singaporean government. The recognition of a non-Islamic judicial system defies the principle of Usroh.⁵⁵

Several meetings between MMI and JI leadership took place throughout 2000. Hambali was growing impatient and turned to Omar al-Faruq. Faruq, at the behest of AQ⁵⁶, coordinated with Hambali and Sufaat to identify and engage targets in Indonesia. More than 30 Christian Churches across the country were selected. The motive was twofold; first, retribution for the innocent Muslim victims that were killed by Christian militias in Maluku and Poso. Second, it coincided with the escalation of violence that AQ had begun making preparations. Bashir was still convinced that attacks would bring a wave of repercussions from the Indonesian government and the United States. He wanted to remain a training organization until he was sure the moment was right. Hambali, Faruq, and JI's radical commanders opted to begin preparations and were convinced they had selected the right targets. Now they needed to assign roles to the Mantiqi commanders.

ASSIGNING ROLES AND SETTING GOALS

JI had a well developed structure with far reaching arms. The MMI-JI relationship was established (although strained due to Bashir's reluctance to move forward with attacks). Hambali, as chairman of the *Shura*, opted to prepare for operations. He and a man named Faiz bin Abubakar Bafana⁵⁷ developed responsibilities across JI's four Mantiqis. Mantiqi I was also known as the Malaysian cell and sponsored more than 100 JI operatives ready to carry out attacks throughout the region⁵⁸. Yazid Sufaat, a leading explosives expert, operated the Green Laboratory Medicine and would be an important conduit for upcoming attacks⁵⁹. Mantiqi II comprised the bulk of JI's personnel and served as the political base of MMI as well as an important recruitment region. The paramilitary groups of JI, Laskar Jundullah and Laskar

⁵³ International Crisis Group; "How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates" 11 December 2002

⁵⁴ The tactic of a political and military wing with different names is common across the Islamic world. It is used to offer legitimacy and publicity to the group's cause and serves as an advertising station for operations.

⁵⁵ International Crisis Group; "How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates" 11 December 2002

⁵⁶ Time Magazine; "Confession of an Al Qaeda Terrorist" 15 September 2002; accessed on 3 Feb 2008.

⁵⁷ Bafana was a leading figure in JI's Regional Advisory Council and confessed to his part following his capture during a raid in Singapore in 2002. See "Singapore Government Press Release on ISA Arrests" 11 Jan 02.

⁵⁸ Abuza, Zachary. "War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia" Strategic Asia 2003-2004. www.nbr.org

⁵⁹ *ibid*

Mujahidin⁶⁰, also contributed to the makeup of this Mantiqi. Mantiqi III would serve as a key logistics hub as it included the Philippines and the island of Kalimantan and Sulawesi. These islands were main transit points for JI members going to and from MILF and ASG camps in the southern Philippines. Finally, Mantiqi IV was a recruitment region for Indonesian exiles on Australia and elsewhere.

With the sharp rise in militancy following the fall of Suharto, JI was poised to strike. They had successfully delineated responsibilities across a nebulous command and control structure. Hambali set a meeting for October 2000 to discuss his plan to launch attacks on Christian churches. The intent was to terrorize Christians across the archipelago and seek revenge for atrocities committed by Christians against Muslims. This was also an opportunity to test JI's ability to coordinate a multi-pronged near simultaneous attack. It was a test JI was ready to initiate.

Hambali and Bafana purchased explosives in Manila for \$47,000⁶¹ and prepared to put into a motion a plan that would change the movement from ideology and rhetoric to action and terror.

⁶⁰ *ibid.* Laskar Jundullah and Laskar Mujahidin gained considerable fighting experience during conflicts in Poso and Maluku.

⁶¹ International Crisis Group; "How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates" 11 Dec 02

CHAPTER THREE: FROM WORDS TO DEEDS; JI STRIKES

INTRODUCTION

It can be said that offense is the best defense. If you do not attempt to stop those who seek to destroy all that you have built, then you are forever playing defense. The climate in Indonesia during the latter part of the 1990s was one of rebirth. With Suharto's authoritarian rule ending in 1998, Indonesia's internal security apparatus was limited at best. Decentralizing the national police force from the military would prove a challenge. The intelligence service was undergoing a radical overhaul and the political mindset was one of inclusion and cautious progress. All of these factors played a significant part of the internal dynamic that led to JIs cataclysmic transformation from the Ngruki ideological school in Indonesia and Malaysian Pesantren Luqmanul Hakiem School into a Nationalist-Jihadist-Islamist group capable of waging war.

External factors also played a significant role in JIs development. The introduction of AQ and collapse of the Soviet Union tilted the global perspective from a balance of power to a struggle against the last hegemony, the United States. Terrorist groups were heading to bin Laden's call for war as a way of gaining endorsement for their cause and tying it to *Global Jihad*. JI was organized, trained and equipped for this mission. It was time to act.

CHRISTMAS EVE 2000; JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH SENDS A MESSAGE

Between 8:30 and 10:00p.m., 38 bombs were delivered to Christian institutions across 11 cities in Indonesia⁶². The Christmas Eve church bombings were carefully crafted demonstration of JI's tactical prowess. The bombings were intended to strike fear amongst Indonesia's minority Christian population⁶³. Hambali was the mastermind of the plan and had solicited AQ approval through Omar al-Faruq a few months prior⁶⁴. With AQ's blessing, Hambali carefully assigned each of his counterparts an area of responsibility.

JAKARTA AS GROUND ZERO

Hambali retained overall control of the Jakarta bombs⁶⁵. Six targets were selected across the city⁶⁶. Hambali had scheduled a meeting in November 2000, just six weeks before the bombings to coordinate the timing of the attack. According to a deposition given by Faiz Bafana, Hambali and Bafana met with Bashir and a man named Zulkufli⁶⁷ concerning the plan for the Christmas Eve bombings.

At approximately 7:15p.m., a large explosion occurred in front of Koinonia Church in East Jakarta. Witnesses saw a thick grey smoke rise from the area and the explosion left a crater just over two feet in diameter. The bomb was placed in Microlet van parked just outside of the church. The driver of the vehicle was killed and a woman nearby was injured. The church was guarded at the time and the area was fairly deserted with the exception of a few street vendors⁶⁸. With this explosion, JI had officially changed tactics from rhetoric and threats to acts of terrorism under the banner of Jihad⁶⁹.

Two additional explosions occurred across town at approximately 8:45p.m. at the St. Kanisius Church in Central Jakarta. The church was full of people attending Christmas Mass and wounded five people. According to eyewitnesses, the first explosion caused thick black smoke and the second one created a large red flame. Both explosions occurred just before the mass has ended.⁷⁰ The St. Kanisius Church was significant because it is also a large Roman Catholic school and serves a majority of Central Jakarta's Catholic population.

⁶² International Crisis Group; "How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates" 11 December 2002

⁶³ Ibid. pg 5.

⁶⁴ Time Magazine; "Confession of an Al Qaeda Terrorist" 15 September 2002; accessed on 3 Feb 2008

⁶⁵ DOD Office of Administrative Review for Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 28 Mar 07. Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal - Subject Hambali. Pg 805.

⁶⁶ International Crisis Group; "How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates" 11 December 2002.

Appendix A

⁶⁷ Zulkifli bin Hur remains one of the US most wanted terrorists. As a member of JI's regional advisory council, Zulkifli reported to Bafana. See www.nctc.gov. Zulkifli is also a member of the MILF in the Philippines.

⁶⁸ International Crisis Group; "How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates" 11 December 2002.

Appendix A fig 1E.

⁶⁹ JI had been involved in earlier attacks, such as the attempted assassination of the Philippine Ambassador to Indonesia in Aug 2000 and the bombing of the Jakarta Stock exchange in Sept 2000 but not to this level of coordination.

The next two bombings occurred just after the St. Kanisius Church explosions and were the most significant in terms of meaning and casualties. First, a large bomb detonated just outside of the entrance of the Jakarta Cathedral around 8:55p.m. While it did not cause any casualties, the cathedral is the largest in Central Jakarta and was full of worshippers at the time of the explosion. Police investigators discovered another 8kg bomb outside of the Cathedral that had not detonated. The bomb was rigged with an alarm clock as a trigger.⁷¹ Had this bomb went off,

casualties would most certainly have been more significant. The second explosion occurred at Santo Yosef Church in the Jatinegara District of East Jakarta. The bomb exploded at 8:55p.m., just as patrons were departing the Christmas Mass. The bomb killed four people and wounded at least eighteen others. Particularly significant about this bomb were the substantial bits of metal from the explosion that caused many of the injuries⁷². The detonations also damaged fourteen vehicles, one food stall and a bus stop shelter. The attack at Santo Yosef Church was the deadliest of the Jakarta bombs.

The final two bombs in Jakarta were placed at the Oikumene Protestant Christian Church and the Anglican Church. The Oikumene explosion left a crater one and a half feet in diameter and two inches deep⁷³. Church services were underway and a four-year-old girl was wounded in the attack. Panicked worshippers rushed out of the Church after seeing smoke appear under the front door and through a window. Jakarta police were able to find and diffuse a bomb discovered at Anglican Church, just down the street from St. Kanisius Church⁷⁴.

While the attacks in Jakarta did not have the intended level of destruction, Hambali had succeeded in orchestrating a coordinated near-simultaneous attack across the city. The disorientation and fear spread by his plan surely met JIs expectations.

Source: asiamaya.com

⁷⁰ International Crisis Group; “How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates” 11 December 2002.

Appendix A fig 1B

⁷¹ The Jakarta Post; “Terror Attacks; the Positive Outcomes” 26 Dec 02. Accessed on 8 Feb 08.

⁷² ibid

⁷³ International Crisis Group; “How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates” 11 December 2002.

Appendix A fig 1B

⁷⁴ The Jakarta Post; “Police Baffled by Bombers’ Tactics” 2 Jan 01. Accessed on 10 Feb 08.

MEDAN

If the Jakarta bombs were a signal of JIs coordination strength, the explosions in Medan signaled JIs reach across the country. There was a meeting held by JI operatives in October 2000 and chaired by Hambali. The meeting took place in Kuala Lumpur and, amongst other issues, divided responsibilities for bombings across Indonesia. At this meeting, Yazid Sufaat was given responsibility for Medan⁷⁵. Sufaat was known for housing the Al Qaeda operatives earlier in 2000⁷⁶. His ownership of Green Laboratories Medicine afforded him the resources and access to chemicals to complete his charter. Sufaat made preparations and began to examine Medan. Medan is a large city located on the island of Sumatra. It is home to more than 2.5 million inhabitants and several targets were selected. Confirmed bombs at 11 churches were evidence enough that Sufaat and JI had carefully timed the attacks to coincide with the Jakarta and Java explosions. Fortunately, nine of the bombs had failed to detonate and were discovered and diffused by police⁷⁷.

Two explosions were successful at the Protestant Church of Indonesia and the Cathedral Church, both in Medan. Both explosions resulted in no injuries. Although no one was killed during the Medan bombings, a powerful message was sent. JI had demonstrated the willingness to act.

BATAM

Batam Island is part of the Riau Islands Province of Indonesia⁷⁸. It serves as a major transit hub between Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. It is accessible by both ferry and air travel. Imam Samudra had come to call Batam his second home⁷⁹. It was no surprise when Imam Samudra was given responsibility for the Christmas bombings on Batam. Samudra stated in his deposition several years later that he selected Batam because of its easy access to surrounding counties of Malaysia and Singapore. Hambali came to visit Samudra on Batam just days before the attacks to offer motivation and encouragement. Mantiqi I commander Mukhlas also visited to offer last minute instructions for the campaign⁸⁰. With current instructions and the encouragement from Hambali, Samudra selected four targets for the attack.

At approximately 9:00p.m., there were several explosions observed at the Simalungan Protestant Christian Church, the Bethel Indonesia Church, the Pentecostal church of Indonesia, and the Santo Beato Church. The explosions were small in nature and occurred while Christmas Mass was ongoing. No one was injured in the Batam bombings. Samudra later stated in his deposition

⁷⁵ Turnbull, Wayne "A Tangled Web of Southeast Asian Terrorism; the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network" 31 Jul 03. Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA.

<http://www.terrorismcentral.com/Library/terroristgroups/JemaahIslamiyah/JITerror/WJ2000.html>

⁷⁶ See chapter 2 "Al Qaeda Comes to Town"

⁷⁷ CNN.com "Indonesian President condemns Christmas Eve Church Bombings" 25 Dec 00. accessed of 10 Feb 08

⁷⁸ Wikipedia.org/Batam

⁷⁹ Murphy, Dan; "Cooperation Nets Terrorist Suspect" Christian Science Monitor 5 Feb 03. See <http://www.kabar-irian.com/pipermail/kabar-indonesia/2003-February/006696.html>. accessed on 13 Feb 08

⁸⁰ ibid

to Indonesian authorities that the bombings on Batam were linked to the bombings across Indonesia and served as JIs “coming out party”⁸¹.

AFTERMATH

The aftermath of the coordinated bombings on Christmas Eve of 2000 resulted in 19 people dead and over 150 injured. The targets were spread across the archipelago and spanned thousands of miles. Thirty-Eight bombs were placed at Christian churches and homes and all thoughts pointed to terrorism. Fear and anger spread throughout the Christian community. JI had successfully initiated a plan to further isolate Indonesia’s Christian population from the Muslim majority. Abu Bakar Bashir denied any involvement in the bombings and attempted to infuse a sense of violence in Indonesia’s Muslim population. Fresh memories of the fighting in Poso and Ambon and the conflict in Aceh all played key roles in the destabilization of internal Indonesian relations.

CONCLUSION

Although most of the bombs were unsuccessful in creating the level of destruction and carnage JI had hope to accomplish, the message that JI was a force capable of large-scale coordinated attacks should have been clear. The initial aftermath had police and intelligence agencies looking in every direction. No accusations were directed at JI until years later when the investigation into the Bali bombings of 2002 revealed a common cast of actors that all belonged to JI. JI was not even considered a terrorist group in 2000 despite the many indicators it presented. The fact that these indicators were not discovered and examined remains a significant counterterrorism failure. The most difficult part of counterterrorism is to identify those pieces prior and enact countermeasures prior to the actual act.

⁸¹ ibid

CHAPTER FOUR: TERRORISM; EXAMINING ALL THE PIECES

INTRODUCTION

The intent of this paper is to understand the multitude of issues that allowed the concept of JI to evolve from rhetoric to action. By understanding the political, social, economic, and religious dynamics that drive a subculture to militancy, action can be taken to recognize and address terrorism *before* it has a chance to occur.

This chapter will examine the fundamental aspects of terrorism that JI exhibited *prior* to the Christmas Eve church bombings of 2000. Understanding that terrorism is not just action but the fundamental desire to inflict casualties in order to promote a political agenda (in this case the establishment of NII and alignment with AQ) is paramount. Finally, establishing a groups status as a terrorist group, countermeasures should be applied in the form of an effective counterterrorism policy to, hopefully, prevent the next Bali before it occurs.

DEFINING TERRORISM; THE CASE OF JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

In every militant group like JI, there are flags that appear along the way. These pivotal indicators are often subtle and overlooked. A history of political violence, a struggle for autonomy that no one noticed, an authoritarian ruler, or an intense belief in a charismatic leader all played a pivotal role in the terrorist paradigm and must be examined.

Using JI as a model, there are four elements that should be studied when determining their status as a terrorist group *before* the Christmas Eve church bombings⁸². The four elements are premeditation, political motivation, the targets are noncombatants, and that JI was a sub national group before the bombings. There is no implication that these attacks could have been prevented but rather how to examine the indicators that may have expedited arrests before the events in Bali in 2002. This very important distinction must be made prior to contemplating the range of options against the group.

The first element is premeditation. Did JI intend to commit the Christmas Eve bombings? Based on earlier chapters, it is fair to say that premeditation was obviously present. Hambali had sought approval for the bombings more than four months prior. Securing the funds that would ultimately be used to purchase materials and explosives also qualifies as premeditation. Hambali assigned responsibilities to specific cities and even visited the commanders responsible for the bombings days prior to the attacks. Imam Samudra had arranged for Singaporean JI members to come to Batam and help prepare for the attacks⁸³. Yazid Sufaat had ordered the ammonium nitrate used in Medan through his Green Laboratories Medicine company months prior to the attacks. All of these instances constitute premeditation.

The second element is political motivation. Abu Bakar Bashir's radical teachings at Pondok Ngruki and in Malaysia were, above all, politically motivated. Religious ideology that spawns nationalistic goals is political. Bashir went so far as to sue the government of Singapore for having a non-Islamic legal system⁸⁴. The goal of establishing NII is a macro concern and serves to change a larger order, in this case the *type* of government from a republic to an Islamic State. Hambali's hatred of the West (acquired in Afghanistan from AQ) is also politically motivated. Adopting the AQ model, Hambali was enraged by the presence of United States' soldiers in Muslim lands. This started with the American presence in Saudi Arabia in 1990 and continued through 2000.

⁸² Pillar, Paul R. *"The Dimensions of Terrorism and Counterterrorism"*. 2001. Terrorism and Counterterrorism; Understanding the New Security Environment. Pg 24-27. This entire section is derived from Pillar's definition of terrorism.

⁸³ Christian Science Monitor *"Cooperation Nets Terror Suspect"* Feb 03

⁸⁴ International Crisis Group; *"How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates"* 11 Dec 02

FROM STRUGGLE TO JIHAD; A CONDITIONAL OXYMORON

The struggle for an establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) is not new. Since the Darul Islam Rebellions (1949-1962), a small portion of the Muslim population has pushed for change. The Darul Islam movement was suppressed by Suharto's regime and forced underground in the mid 1960s⁸⁷. It is out of this movement that JIs push for NII was spawned.

Suharto's government was highly centralized and opposition movements were quickly extinguished. The conditions for underground struggle and the development of JI were ripened when Sungkar and Bashir were arrested for teaching what was deemed subversive ideology at Ngruki. The arrests sparked protests and the ensuing political turmoil ended with a reduced sentence for both Sungkar and Bashir⁸⁸. Following their release from prison, Sungkar and Bashir went to Malaysia and founded the Luqmanul Hakiem School. With the creation of this pesantren⁸⁹, JI had just gone international. Known terrorists Mukhlas and Imam Samudra also taught at the Luqmanul Hakiem after in the mid-1990s. It is here in Malaysia where the radical ideology of JI changed from realization of NII to a Jihadist-Islamist-Nationalist hybrid variant. In 1998, Sungkar and Bashir returned to Indonesia but the Luqmanul Hakiem School remained open and continued the ideological teachings of Bashir.

This history of struggle is important when addressing the question of the strategic choice approach to terrorism as a viable political option. Once the decision is made to use terrorism for strategic reasons, most terrorist organizations are impatient⁹⁰. The intense desire to shift from rhetoric and words is caused by dynamic factors such as organizational pressures and the appearance of vulnerability in an adversary.

The organizational pressures were an internal conflict within the core of JIs hardliners. Fresh from the fighting in Afghanistan and reinvigorated by conflicts in Poso and Maluku, Hambali, Mukhlas, and Imam Samudra felt the time was right to begin operations. Bashir was concerned about timing and retaliation from the West as well as the Indonesian government. The era brought enormous pressure to gain AQ endorsement and, more importantly, secure valuable AQ funding

which also fed the sense of urgency to act.

⁸⁷ Koschade, Stuart. "A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah; The Applications to Counterterrorism and Intelligence" 14 Oct 05

⁸⁸ Mobley, Blake. "Jemaah Islamiyah Dossier". 26 Aug 04. Center for Policing Terrorism

⁸⁹ Pesantren or Pondok Pesantren are Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia. According to one popular tradition, the pesantren education system originated from traditional Javanese pondokan; dormitories for Hindus to learn martial arts and meditation. Source: wikipedia.com/pesantren

⁹⁰ Crenshaw, Martha. "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice". 1998. Terrorism and Counterterrorism; Understanding the New Security Environment. Pgs 54-59. This section is derived from Crenshaw's logic of terrorism.

The Indonesian government was in a state of upheaval following Suharto's resignation from power in 1998. As if overnight, the highly centralized government seemed to experience a period of reinvention. The separation of the national police force from the *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI)*⁹¹ provided the incentive for JI to evolve. The decentralization process presented opportunities for opposition movements that had been long suppressed. A political competition began amongst militant Muslim groups to further their respective agendas. JI had evolved from wanting just the establishment of NII to the creation of a pan-Islamic state spanning a significant portion of Southeast Asia. The race to have a place in the political spotlight between movements such as DI, GAM, and JI culminated in a tinder box primed for terrorist development.

USING THE NEW TERRORISM MODEL

A key part of Jemaah Islamiyah's aligning with AQ is the understanding of their part in AQ's *Global Jihad*. How did JI's mindset in 1999-2000 align within AQ's grand strategy? In order to answer this question, we must understand the mindset of the modern terrorist and examine the six key distinctions as they relate to JI⁹².

Today's terrorists are more violent. In the case of JI, the concept of the Darul Islam Rebellions was significantly radicalized by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the teachings of Bashir al-Nur in Nigeria and in Malaysia. The struggle of the establishment of an NII against an oppressive

government gave way to violent anti-West and anti-Christian ideologies. Militant Muslims in Indonesia initially wanted a seat at the political table and avoided significant attacks on civilians to avoid isolating the general public. JI adopted a much more radical approach. Fresh from fighting in Afghanistan and frenzied by Bashir's rhetoric, the new breed of terrorists, figures like Hambali and Mukhlas, adopted a much more violent strategy of killing as many "infidels" as possible without regard to the political process

affected. They did not want a seat at the political table, "they wanted to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it"⁹³.

JI defined the concept of a transnational non-state actor. The ideology of JI was local in terms of the establishment of an NII but had an overarching goal of enveloping Southeast Asia in a greater pan-Islamic Caliphate. Porous borders and frequent travel between JI cells in Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand, as well as training in Afghanistan and Pakistan made JI a global operation. The idea of JI being the Southeast Asia regional head of AQ's nexus seemed to be based on Fortune 500 Company's prospectus. JI had transformed the face of Indonesian militant Islam from local struggle to Global Jihad.

Financing is another key distinction that set JI apart from its predecessors. The original Darul Islam Rebellions relied on local militants to continue the struggle for NII. There was no organized "resistance fund" or any semblance of central coffers with which to wage battle. JI's evolution was intricately tied to funding and organization. As an example, Hambali paid

⁹¹ The ABRI became the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) during a massive reorganization following the Suharto regime. The intent was to remove the TNI from politics which was completed in 2003.

⁹² Howard, Russell D. "Understanding Al Qaeda's Application of the New Terrorism-The Key to Victory in the Current Campaign". 2003. Terrorism and Counterterrorism; Understanding the New Security Environment. Pgs 75-83. This section is derived from Howard's six distinctions of the new terrorist.

⁹³ Quote attributed to former CIA director James Woolsey, 1994.

\$47,000 for explosives used for the Christmas Eve bombings. This is in addition to his front company Konsojaya that was used for operation Bojinka in 1995. Yazid Sufaat had two known front companies in Malaysia and hosted the AQ summit in 2000. AQ is known to have funneled funds to JI for use in terrorist operations. Travel was common to and from the region and on to Pakistan for additional training. The structured organization with Mantiqi I in charge of finances proves JI had the technology, the means, and the desire to move forward with its terrorist agenda.

Senior JI differed from “old terrorists” in terms of training as well. Camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan offered significant experience in hand combat, explosives, weapons, and guerilla tactics. JI benefited from the revolving relationship with AQ. JI often sent new recruits to train in these camps and these new fighters formed the nucleus of JIs militant circle. The creation of Laskar Jundullah and Laskar Mujahedin for operations in Poso and Maluku allowed fighters to rapidly learn techniques and procedures that would prove beneficial in years to come. Recurring training at camps run by the MILF and ASG also offered the remaining requisites that culminated in a dedicated, well-trained fighter capable of waging *Global Jihad*.

One of the most important factors of JI is its resistance to penetration by authorities. This is because of the intricately balanced network of relationships cultivated by interfamily marriages of JI members. This is done for two important reasons. First, it ensures undivided loyalty of the member. Second, it creates a hierarchal family that it nearly impossible to infiltrate. Noordin Mohammad Top also taught at Luqmanul Hakiem with Mukhlas and Bashir⁹⁴. It was here and at Ngruki that JI conditioned its recruits to absolute compliance. When this was achieved, JI carefully crafted a series of marriages between cell leaders and daughters of other JI members. As part of the recruitment phase, friendships were started and family was stressed as the most fundamental important part of JI. This led to arranged marriages to ensure connection to JI as a family. Another reason JI is so difficult to penetrate is its rigid cell structure. Cells report directly up a chain through the Wakalah to the Mantiqi. The Regional Shura Council coordinates all activities and determines courses of action.

⁹⁴ Top's name is purposely omitted from the majority of this paper because he does not become a significant factor until after Bali 2002.

The final distinction between JI and its predecessors is the access to weapons. While JI does not possess actual CRBN WMD, it did have access to large volumes of automatic weapons and chemical used to create explosives. With access to these items and training conducted as mentioned above, JI would prove to be a formidable force to be reckoned with in years to come.

A WORD ON RELIGION

Darul Islam taught of an independent Islamic state. Local villagers gathered and listened as the local Imam spoke of the golden days of Islam. Following World War II, the push for independence from Dutch rule resulted in an oppressive government under Sukarno. When Suharto came to power in 1965, there was once again hope for an Islamic state. This was also dismissed and Suharto dissuaded opposition in the form of swift military or police action. The rise of Pondok Ngruki led to thoughts of militant opposition to any concept other than Islam and Sharia law⁹⁵.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan saw scores of fighters from Indonesia and throughout Southeast Asia flock to join the fight against the infidels. When these fighters returned, they had a renewed fervor and combat experience to counter Indonesia's authoritarian rule. Conditions in the world were changing and the emergence of the media in the form of the internet and satellite television created a cultural revolution of sorts. No longer were skirmishes local in nature, they were now headlines available for anyone to see with the click of a mouse or flip or the remote control.

The ability to promote and spread a militant religious agenda became much easier. Islamic websites and television programs began to appear. Militant Muslims recognized this new front and moved throughout the late 1990s to establish a religious foothold on the new battlefield.

AQs brand of Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadi appealed to young militants. The power of the new Islamic order and defiance of the West portrayed an image of strength. Salafism is often misused interchangeably with Wahhabism. Salafism in its most simplistic form is the rejection of all things West and the establishment of an uncorrupted, pure Islamic religious community⁹⁶. Wahhabism is named after an 18th century reform movement and treats the Quran and Hadith as *fundamental texts*⁹⁷. AQ has taken a hybrid version of both sects of Islam and morphed it to fit its needs. The power of AQ in shaping the fundamental mindset of JI members began in the 1980s when JI members went to Pakistan and

Afghanistan. The militancy and zeal permeated through the ranks and JI members brought that mindset home to Indonesia and Malaysia. This religious zeal, combined with Darul Islam, created the modern JI Jihadi. These key JI leaders spread this ideology at Ngruki and Luqmanul Hakiem creating a new core of JI members.

⁹⁵ Ranstorp, Magnus. "Terrorism in the Name of Religion" 1996. Terrorism and Counterterrorism; Understanding the New Security Environment. Pgs 125-135. This section is derived from Ranstorp's chapter.

⁹⁶ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salafi>. accessed on 15 Feb 08

⁹⁷ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wahhabism>. accessed on 15 Feb 08

Suicide bombing in the name of Islam gained significant notoriety throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s. The terrorist groups Hezbollah and Hamas had successfully countered Israel's arsenal with human weapons. Suicide bombers are the ultimate "fire and forget" smart weapon. They do not require position updates nor abort codes. They can avoid barriers as they arise and

nearly always strike their intended target. The most difficult part of the entire process is conditioning a society to enhance recruitment of new weapons. The campaign began in the madrassa with the local cleric "selling" the notion of Martyrdom. The cleric draws on a few stories from the Quran and translates them into a modern rationalization. The students are slowly conditioned into acceptance. On the second front, the Islamic media does not portray the suicide bomber as a terrorist but rather a Martyr for Islam, one answering the

call to continue the struggle. The terrorist group finances the family of the bomber and celebrates his life and the "achievement" of Martyrdom. Tales of virgins and glorious paradise are circulated to make death seem more attractive. To an oppressed society, this can be an appealing and lucrative option. The choice between living a life in a refugee camp in Gaza with days spent in anonymity and being glorified and celebrated as a hero of the cause becomes much more rationalized. The most perplexing aspect of this phenomenon is the widespread acceptance by Muslims around the world and the proliferation of new suicide bombers outside of the Middle East⁹⁸. JI recognized the value of suicide bombers and prepared them for attacks in the coming years.

CONCLUSION; PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

This chapter examined whether or not JI should have been considered a terrorist organization before commencing the attack on Christmas Eve. Attention was given to the defining terrorism according to four critical elements; premeditation, political agenda, target selection, and an organized group. Understanding the conditions that lead a group like JI to engage in terrorist activities is often the result of an intense desire to act based both on internal organizational

pressure for results and the appearance of weakness in an adversary, in this case the transitioning Indonesian government. Additionally, interaction with AQ developed a new kind of terrorist, one that is more violent than his predecessor, better trained, better equipped, better financed, and part of an organization that is better organized. Finally, special attention was given to the basic role of religion and how it relates to the modern JI Jihadi in terms of historical Darul Islam, to the rise of militancy following participation in

operations in Afghanistan. Emphasis was placed on AQs hybrid Salafi-Wahhabi version of Islam and the role and rationale of suicide bombing.

The goal of this chapter is to understand that JI presented every flag mentioned in this chapter *prior* to the Christmas Eve bombings. While it is easy to dissect the indicators that presented yesterday, there is hope that similar indicators would be recognized today and prevent attacks tomorrow.

⁹⁸ The LTTE actually proliferated suicide bombers as part of their campaign against the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka. This paper focuses on the Muslim propagation of suicide bombers and how they relate to JI's decision to use suicide bombers for their operations in the name of Islam.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE EVOLUTION OF COUNTERTERRORISM

Source: asiatimes.com

INTRODUCTION

In order to understand how JI was so successful until 2005, you must understand Indonesia's ever evolving CT policy and its political history. To better grasp this concept, this paper will very briefly examine Indonesia's political history under President Suharto from 1965-1998. The link between the decentralization of government, politics, the military, and the National Police caused by Suharto's fall and the rapid development of Jemaah Islamiyah is unmistakable.

This final chapter will also examine Indonesia's current CT Policy and formulate a theoretical road map for the future. In order to avoid the Bali Paradox, CT must evolve before an attack based on a sound intelligence program, an effective information operations campaign, and a highly adaptable military and police force capable of responding to the full spectrum of terrorist activities.

POLITICAL HISTORY

On 30 September 1965, six prominent Indonesian generals were abducted and murdered. The regime of President Sukarno was backed by the military and Indonesia's communist party. Sukarno blamed the assassinations on the Indonesian Communist Party⁹⁹. The assassinations and following turmoil became known as Indonesia's "Black September". What followed was a slow coup d'état that resulted in a named Major General Suharto taking control of the country. Suharto quickly consolidated power amongst two distinct groups; the military and the

bureaucratic elite. The first priority was to eliminate dissention amongst opposition groups. The result of this action was one of the world's worst human rights violations with estimates of anywhere from 100,000 to 1 million Indonesians killed¹⁰⁰. What transpired was the creation of a strict political system. Only three political parties were recognized as viable to the central government. They were the government party called the Golkar, the Muslim United Development Party (PPP), and the Christian Indonesian

Democratic Party (PKI). Every person from a local magistrate to national representative had to undergo a background security check and be approved by the government. Suharto's regime had effectively centralized Indonesia's entire government.

Indonesia experienced an economic boom in the 1970s that was due to Suharto's reinvestment of oil revenues into agriculture, infrastructure and education¹⁰¹. The intent of the authoritarian regime was to satisfy Muslim demands and continue to build Indonesia's base as a political entity within Southeast Asia. Suharto was attempting to depoliticize the militant Muslims still present from the Darul Islam Movement.

The Islamic revival of the 1970s can be attributed to the actions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)¹⁰² and the Wahhabi expansion from Saudi Arabia in the form of Islamic charities and relief organizations. The simultaneous expansion of terrorism and Islamism provided a perfect flash point for militant Muslims. The Saudi organizations built mosques and distributed books on Islam according to the Wahhabi view. The ongoing urbanization and increasing middle class in Indonesia made access to these views significantly

more available. In 1971, Sungkar and Bashir had established the pesantren at Ngruki and began teaching a similar form of Wahhabism. They taught

Sharia law was the only law and to object to anything not pure Islam. In 1975, Muslim students at a university nearly 70 miles from Ngruki began to protest the regime and demand changes. Suharto feared this increasingly radical view would gain acceptance in the PPP, the only approved Muslim political party in Indonesia. He sought to prevent the radicals from gaining seats in the upcoming election by having his intelligence chief covertly assist DI members in establishing a group known as *Kommando Jihad*¹⁰³. The onset of "Islamic Terrorism" blamed on Kommando Jihad convinced Indonesia's

⁹⁹ Conboy, Ken. "Kopassus; Inside Indonesia's Special Forces" 2003 Jakarta, Indonesia pg 127-142

¹⁰⁰ Bambang S. et al. "The Devious Dalang: Sukarno and the So-Called Untung Putsch" 1975. An eyewitness account of the military coup in Indonesia in 1965

¹⁰¹ Ressa, Maria A. "Seeds of Terror; an Eyewitness Account of Al Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia" 2003; Free Press. Pg.47

¹⁰² The PLO gained instant worldwide recognition in 1972 for their actions in Munich. While the operation was a failure for the operatives, it was a dramatic success for the PLO in terms of media and message.

¹⁰³ Van Bruinessen, Martin. "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia" 2001

generally moderate population not to vote for PPP members. In effect, Suharto had Kommando Jihad created as a scapegoat and to divert attention from the premeditated security crackdown.

Turning his sights to the university, Suharto's government banned the protests and identified Sungkar and Bashir as DI faction members attempting to subvert Indonesia's population. Both men were sentenced to nine years in prison and released early on appeal in late 1982. In 1984, militant Muslims, some alumni of Ngruki, began to protest and drew the attention of Suharto's regime. When it was discovered that there were links to Sungkar and Bashir, both men were notified their appeals were overturned and they would return to prison to complete their sentences. Sungkar and Bashir fled to Malaysia in 1985.

The mid 1980s saw affluent Muslims graduate to politics and most opted to join the Golkar party¹⁰⁴. These people were students of the 1960s and had protested the Communist party and the old regime of Sukarno. They were also moderate Muslims that would serve as an excellent counterbalance to the radical views of Wahhabi Islam beginning to permeate Indonesia. What Suharto failed to see was what the actual "greening" or infusion of Islamic representation of the Golkar party. The revolution in Iran also changed many of the moderates view on Islam. What had always been about tradition evolved into what change could bring to Indonesia. Finally, the travel of hundreds, if not thousands of Indonesians to Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1980s would ultimately change the political face of Indonesia in coming years¹⁰⁵.

The absolute control of power by Suharto and his inner circle maintained a stranglehold on the Indonesian political climate throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s. As long as there was economic growth and prosperity, it seemed most Indonesians were content to continue with daily life. The mid 1990s saw a significant shift from moderate views and content to more radical views and contempt. The loss of the Soviet Union as a superpower shifted all eyes toward the US as the imperialist country forcing terms for trade and ideals. Radical Islam had found an enemy in the US but Suharto's regime kept this increasing anger at bay. Muslims returning from Afghanistan began to preach a highly militarized version of Islam.

The economic crisis of 1997-1998 in Southeast Asia devastated Indonesia's economy and resulted in widespread unemployment. When Suharto was forced from office, 33 years of authoritarian control on all facets of politics came to an end. The decentralization process would take several years to fully segregate duties and responsibilities. The intelligence agencies were left in shambles, the military and the National Police were decentralized and split into two distinct groups. Political reforms offered the perfect opportunity for militant Islamic movements, fueled by the fatwa of bin Laden, to vie for the political center stage. It would take four years to fully complete the transition of power to the proper agencies within the government. JJ seized this opportunity and unleashed four years of terror.

¹⁰⁴ The primary reason was the PPP had received significant derogatory press coverage due to the actions of Kommando Jihad. It was an easier option to join the government party Golkar.

¹⁰⁵ Van Bruinessen, Martin. "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia" 2002

INDONESIA'S INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS

Indonesia, recognizing the failure of intelligence in the 2002 Bali bombings, conducted a complete reorganization of existing intelligence agencies. They were aligned along three critical venues: the state intelligence agency (BIN), the military's strategic intelligence agency (BAIS), and the national police intelligence, as well as elements in the Justice and Finance Ministries¹⁰⁶. Each of these agencies play a crucial role in counterterrorism operations.

Indonesia's State Intelligence Service (*Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara*) or Bakin was Indonesia's primary intelligence service until its reorganization in 2003. Bakin had little interest

in JI prior to 2001 and did not view them as a direct threat to internal security. Bakin viewed JI as little more than a DI offshoot¹⁰⁷ with similar nationalistic goals. In 2003, the reorganized Indonesian State Intelligence Agency (*Badan Intelijen Negara*) or BIN became responsible for foreign and domestic collection and analysis. BIN agents primary role in the case of JI is the monitoring the activities of foreign jihadists arriving in Indonesia and their association with JI members. This requires extensive cooperation both internally, among the military and national police agencies, and externally, amongst foreign intelligence agencies and

international police agencies such as Interpol¹⁰⁸. BIN agents are also monitoring travel of potential fighters from Indonesia to and from the Middle East. The critical dynamic is the sharing of information in a timely matter between international intelligence agencies and within its own services for domestic operations.

The Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) is the Indonesian equivalent to the United States Department of Defense¹⁰⁹. It consists of departments from the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Additionally, the TNI also contains the Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS). The primary function of BAIS during the Suharto era was counterterrorism. With the collapse of Suharto's regime and the ensuing decentralization of the government, the national police assumed the duties of domestic intelligence and CT. BAIS maintained a somewhat active program but many of the BAIS officers transferred to the national police agency and information gaps made JI's continued development much easier throughout the government transformation in 1998-2000. BAIS has

recently revamped its domestic intelligence capability and, in 2005, developed a domestic CT desk within the agency¹¹⁰. The department consists of six officers that have focused on developing intelligence on potential terrorists, especially those associated with JI, and furthering the relationship with the Territorial Commands. BAIS is also forging better relations with BIN and the national police agencies.

The Indonesian National Police formally separated from the TNI in 1999 and developed its own domestic intelligence agency (POLRI). The agency, however, is primarily focused on organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and more common criminal activities¹¹¹. The POLRI can be of

¹⁰⁶ Wise, William. "Indonesia's War on Terror" Aug 05. United States-Indonesia Society

¹⁰⁷ Conboy, Ken. *Intel; Inside Indonesia's Intelligence Service* 2004 Jakarta, Indonesia pg 204-207

¹⁰⁸ Longwarjournal.com except on cooperation with Interpol during the hunt for Mohammed Noordin Top, a senior JI commander captured in June 2007.

¹⁰⁹ Indonesia also has a Department of Defense. This comparison is for simplification purposes only.

¹¹⁰ Wise, William. "Indonesia's War on Terror" Aug 05. United States-Indonesia Society. Pg. 53

¹¹¹ Ibid pg 53-54

significant value at the local village or city and district level as the agency is the most widespread throughout the country.

Additional CT elements in the Ministries of Justice and Finance play crucial roles to establishing the link between suspected terrorists and funding sources and front companies throughout the region. Indonesia's establishment of the Financial Transaction and Report Analysis Centre (PPATK) proved pivotal in the advancement of CT intelligence in recent years. Dismantling the funding and support structures for JI have remained a top priority for all intelligence agencies in recent years and have led to significant arrests vastly reducing JI's ability to conduct operations.

INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

Indonesia has become a significant participant in several regional and international initiatives that lend to increased counterterrorism support from the international community. Additionally, countries such as the United States, Australia and Malaysia have recognized terrorist groups such as JI as significant threats to national security and instituted measures that coincide with Indonesia's increased security apparatus. Main initiatives include the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)¹¹².

The United States recognizes not only JI but other militant Islamic groups in Southeast Asia as a significant threat to its national security. The US has sent significantly increased intelligence assistance to Indonesia and has sent members of the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigations, the National Security Agency, and Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, Treasury, and the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms to Indonesia to assist in investigations into terrorist activities. The primary focus of US CT assistance is Counter Narco-Terrorism (CNT), terrorist transit, and the financial transactions of transnational terrorists¹¹³. The US also provided Indonesia significant assistance through the US Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program. This congressionally funded program is sponsored by the US Diplomatic Security (DS) service. The ATA program trains civilian security and law enforcement personnel from friendly governments in police procedures that deal with terrorism. DS officers work with Indonesia and a team from the US mission to develop the most effective means of training for bomb detection, crime scene investigation, airport and building security, maritime protections, and VIP protection¹¹⁴.

The Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) and the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) also recognize JI as a direct threat to the safety of its citizens and provides assistance to BIN in the form of information sharing and collection. The ASIO is also responsible for monitoring the movement of transnational terrorists in and around Australia and coordinates closely with the Indonesian, US, and regional governments¹¹⁵. The attacks on the Australian Embassy in 2004 and the second Bali attack in 2005 resulted in a significant increase in cooperation between Indonesian and Australian intelligence agencies with the intended goal of dismantling JI's network.

The Malaysian government made a significant stride toward regional cooperation with the establishment of the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT). The

¹¹² Ibid. pg 63

¹¹³ OSINT - See ASIS.gov.au for further information

¹¹⁴ For more information on the ATA, see www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm

¹¹⁵ OSINT - See ASIO Corporate Plan 2007-2011 www.asio.gov.au

SEARCCT was established in November 2002 under the purview of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a regional CT centre focusing primarily on training, capacity-building and public awareness programs. The Centre was officially launched on 1 July 2003 and is located in Kuala Lumpur¹¹⁶. To date, more than 20 countries have taken part in information sharing and CT courses designed to increase the proficiency of host nation CT forces.

Additional CT intelligence cooperation exists between Indonesia the governments of Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, and Japan. Each step toward a collective CT intelligence apparatus vastly reduces the capabilities of groups like JI.

MILITARY COUNTERTERRORISM

Indonesia has always recognized the importance of a CT force due to its proximity and dependence of the Straits of Malacca and large amounts of oil and natural gas. These targets provide terrorists a significant opportunity to strike at Indonesia's fragile economy and disrupt the government's effectiveness.

Within the TNI, Indonesia established the *Kopassus* or Special Forces Command in 1985¹¹⁷. Kopassus was organized into four operational or strike battalions of 72 men each. Group 1 consisted of two battalions stationed on west Java and would accomplish Unconventional Warfare (UW) operations for western Indonesia. Group 2 consisted on the other two battalions and was stationed on Solo. Group 2 would be responsible for UW operations for eastern Indonesia. From the beginning, Kopassus has been modeled after the British Special Air Service (SAS) and ready to perform a wide range of SOF operations. Group 3 would become the training group for new recruits and provide a pipeline for Indonesian SOF¹¹⁸.

In addition to the Groups 1 and 2, Kopassus also contains the CT unit Detachment 81. Detachment 81 was a significantly smaller unit with the single mission of CT¹¹⁹. US SOF teams

¹¹⁶ Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press statement

¹¹⁷ Indonesian Special Forces had existed since 1950, but Kopassus was the first unit aligned under modern SOF organization. See Conboy, Ken. "Kopassus; Inside Indonesia's Special Forces" 2003 pg 306-315

¹¹⁸ Kopassus grew to 3 battalions in each group by 2005.

played a significant role through the late 1980s and early 1990s in the continued development of Detachment 81. In 1992, the International Military Education Training (IMET) program was suspended in Indonesia. This suspension ended US SOF training with Kopassus and Detachment 81¹²⁰. This lack of interaction occurred during the meteoric rise of JIs organizational operations¹²¹. British and Australian SOF have trained with Detachment 81 and served in an advisory role during the East Timor conflicts in 1995. Following the attacks on 9/11, the Bush administration argued to Congress that the suspension of aid to Indonesia impeded the War on Terror in Southeast Asia. A solution was reached with the US Regional Defense CT Fellowship (RDCF) program. The US used the RDCF to “ earmark” \$3.9 Million for Indonesian CT training¹²² and lines of communication are slowly being reopened.

In addition to the POLRI intelligence arm, the National Police created Detachment 88 in 2003. Its creation was spawned from the Bali bombings in 2002¹²³. This special unit is within the POLRI is funded by the US through the Diplomatic Security Service. The unit is located 30

miles south of Jakarta. Ironically, the majority of Detachment 88’s instructors were former US SOF. Detachment 88 is designed as a domestic CT unit that is capable addressing a wide range of activities, from bomb threats to hostage situations. This 400-person strong special force was fully operational in 2005. The organization consists of investigators, EOD, an assault unit, and a sniper element¹²⁴.

COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY FOR TOMORROW

Counterterrorism (CT) is often thought of as a military issue. This is a faulty assumption as terrorism is, first and foremost, a *political* act. CT strategy must therefore be a political countermeasure using all facets of the instruments of national power. In Indonesia’s case, they have made tremendous progress toward goal since the Bali bombings in 2002. Indonesia must continue to make progress in five key areas: legitimize the government, economic development, religious tolerance, further develop intelligence resources, and evolve military and national police capabilities and interoperability. These fundamental areas strike at the heart of Indonesia’s ability to thwart future terrorist development.

GOVERNMENTAL LEGITIMACY

Indonesia endured 33 years on authoritarian rule under Suharto. The centralization of every function of the government and military prevented terrorist expansion often at the expense of human rights and legal norms. When Suharto fell in 1998, the rapid decentralization of the government came at the expense of legitimacy. Indonesia had four different presidents in the six

¹¹⁹ Ibid 313-315

¹²⁰ An amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act in 1992 suspended all military sales and training to Indonesia in response to human right violations by the TNI in East Timor.

¹²¹ The cancellation of IMET was another antecedent mentioned in the preface that, individually, did not impact JI but when put together with all of the other factors within the Indonesian military created a root cause behind the inability to stop JI *before* they began operations in 2000.

¹²² Wise, William. “Indonesia’s War on Terror” Aug 05. United States-Indonesia Society pg 70-71

¹²³ The number chosen for Detachment 88 comes from the largest number of casualties from any country as a result of the Bali bombings. Australia lost 88 citizens in Bali.

¹²⁴ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Detachment_88

years following Suharto¹²⁵. While a testament to democratic reforms, each president vectored Indonesia in a different direction and lacked the support for significant progress. Another factor in the decentralization process was the lack of true candidates at the local, regional and national levels of government. The removal of the military (TNI) from the national ruling body also played a role in the loss of true progress. These dramatic reforms weakened the presidency, national and local governments, and the military and allowed militant Islam to flourish in its wake. As the government continues to evolve, Indonesia must continue to stride toward establishing all levels as legitimate bodies of law. Addressing the societal woes of Indonesia's disenfranchised groups is paramount to the long term stability of the country. At the local level of government, politicians must begin the process of establishing legitimacy by addressing societal concerns and identifying root causes of strife. All of these factors are absolutely paramount to legitimizing Indonesia's political process.

ECONOMICS AND RELIGION

The 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis wreaked havoc on Indonesia's fragile economy. Indonesia lost 13.5% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1998¹²⁶. The result of this downturn was nearly 10% of Indonesians unemployed. Unemployment bred discontent and this defined one of the core antecedents addressed in this paper. Indonesia has slowly recovered but there is much to be done. The economic aspect of this paper is directly linked to legitimizing the government. All politicians, from local to national, must carefully examine economic factors from rural villages to the sprawling metropolis of Jakarta. The terrorist recruitment cycle feeds on the poor and attracts potential recruits with money and an identity¹²⁷. Terrorist organizations are quick to recognize attractive recruitment areas and often send charity and relief organizations in as part of a conditioning phase. This is used to gain popular support which translates to recruitment and protection during the transit of operatives. By addressing these economic factors, governments can reverse the equation and delegitimize terrorist organizations by gaining the support of the local populace. Economic development is a critical factor in stability and paramount to an effective CT strategy.

On the other end of economic spectrum, Indonesia must continue to develop the capacity to track the financial transactions of JI and terrorist groups. In the US, most organized crime trials center on illegal financial transactions. This avenue is critical to both the development of intelligence agencies and to legitimizing the government. International cooperation is also a vital link to this process.

Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world and nearly 86% Muslim¹²⁸. Under Suharto's regime, The Muslim United Development Party (PPP) was discouraged from playing an overly active role in introducing religion into the *Pancasila*¹²⁹. When Suharto fell, extremist Muslim group across the archipelago raced to the political forefront. This caused significant turmoil within the Christian and Buddhist minorities. While Indonesians are overwhelmingly

¹²⁵ Presidents Habibie was given a no confidence vote after just 18 months in office, Wahid was impeached just under 2 years in office, (Mega) Sukarnoputri was the daughter of Sukarno and Indonesia's first female president, and finally Yudhoyono who was sworn into office in 2004.

¹²⁶ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asian_financial_crisis

¹²⁷ It is important to note that most terrorists from Indonesia were middle class men with decent jobs. This concept addresses one facet of recruitment and local support for terrorist operations.

¹²⁸ Library of Congress, *Indonesia; a Country Study*. 1993 <http://countrystudies.us/indonesia>

¹²⁹ Ibid; <http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/86.htm>. Pancasila insisted on a culturally neutral identity and nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia. It did not recognize Islam as the only religion.

moderate Muslims as a whole, extremist and militant groups have been able to flourish since 1998. A weak central government and high unemployment following the Asian financial crisis paved the way for groups like JI to actively campaign for new recruits. The intricate relationship between religion and government is especially important. Indonesia's CT strategy must balance the Islamic teachings in the Pondok and the rise of political parties like the Justice and Prosperity Party¹³⁰ with the increasing paranoia and vigilantism of Indonesia's Christian minority.

Indonesia must continue to make a concerted effort to promote dialogue and a peaceful coexistence between the Muslim and Christian population. Intelligence, economics, and

government are distinctly linked to the issue of religion and CT. An effective CT strategy must segregate Indonesia's moderate Muslims from the radical fringe consisting of Salafi and Wahhabi Jihadists. Understanding the Muslim ring of faith is imperative when attempting to differentiate actual grievances from terrorist ambitions. If the goal of the jihadist is to establish a pan-Asian super-state and ultimately join the Islamic Caliphate, steal the argument. The objective of an effective CT strategy is not to deny Muslim pride but to celebrate its achievements other than Jihad. Islam spread more rapidly during the original Islamic Caliphate by merchants and education than by the sword. Showcase Muslim

scholars and their achievements like algebra and the advancement of astronomy¹³¹. Breaking the link between religion and militant Islam is an essential element to changing the view of Islam throughout the world.

Economics and religion worked in tandem for the Caliphate throughout its history. CT strategy should compare the differences between modern day Dubai, United Arab Emirates and the caves that house AQ or the safe houses that harbor JI fugitives. Continue to highlight the **Muslims** that were killed during the Christmas Eve church bombings and in Bali. Which ideology is doing more to advance the greatness of the Islamic world? AQs brand of Salafi-Wahhabi jihad proved capable of destroying great works in the Muslim world and the West. In many ways, Dubai

resembles the actual Caliphate far more than any Sharia-governed village. While JI is having enormous difficulty expanding its base, the United Arab Emirates can soon boast of the world's tallest building and is a destination of investors, scholars, and Muslims from around the world. All of this was accomplished without jihad. So the argument starts there: the moderation of Islam based on economics, infrastructure and scholarship leads to greatness without compromise¹³².

¹³⁰ Perlez, Jane; "Spread on Islamic Law in Indonesia Takes its Toll on Women" 27 Jun 06 The New York Times. Accessed on 1 Mar 08. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/27/world/asia/27indo.html>

¹³¹ Muhammed ibn masa al-Khwarizma was a Muslim scholar credited with significant advancements in the fields of mathematics and astronomy. He spent much of his life teaching at the House of Wisdom in Baghdad, Iraq. See <http://www.algebra.com/algebra/about/history/Al-Khwarizmi.wikipedia> for more information.

¹³² This paragraph is based on discussions with David Blair concerning moderation of Islam.

INTELLIGENCE REFORM

Everything begins and ends with intelligence. While Indonesia's State Intelligence Service (BIN) has undergone significant advancements in recent years, there is still much to be done. BIN agents must establish a much better human intelligence (HUMINT) network in order to tie a multitude of antecedent clues together. This is accomplished by working much more closely with local levels of government and growing in size and capacity. BIN's current focus on internal threats should continue to evolve with emphasis on how they relate to external factors such as foreign jihadists and financing. Additional emphasis on mapping (GEOINT) and signals

(SIGINT) intelligence will aid in intelligence driven future operations against militants. This is a very brief examination into the CT portion of BINs capability that is part of a much larger intelligence apparatus. The concept behind the intelligence portion of Indonesia's CT strategy should be to isolate JI and other militant groups from external influences followed by insulating particular groups from each other and

finishing by map tracking and development of potential terrorist suspects. All of this should be done in coordination with the TNI (BAIS) and the national police (POLRI) intelligence services. Operational security and the methods of collection are important aspects of BINs work and it is understandable that there is a reluctance to share sensitive information but not at the expense of an effective CT campaign.

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Finally, with the decentralization of the government in 1998 Indonesia's military (TNI) and National Police were split into two organizations. Critical information on terrorist suspects was fragmented or lost during the segregation. The ensuing four years of infighting and stove piped information allowed JI to evolve into the organization that it became. Following the Bali bombings in 2002, Indonesia has made tremendous strides in both the TNI and the National Police cooperation in terms of CT. Both agencies were instrumental in the apprehension of key JI members. This continued cooperation between both units is imperative to the continued success of the CT campaign.

The way ahead is difficult to predict. CT is just one piece of the larger solution. The US and the West view violent extremism and militant Islam and a direct threat to National Security and should help with strengthening Indonesia's ability to counter terrorist groups before they can develop into the threat JI was able to exhibit. This can be accomplished by employing all five pillars of Irregular Warfare (IW).

Irregular Warfare is defined as a violent struggle between state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population.¹³³ As we peel back the layers of IW

FID is an important piece of the larger IW strategy. As the saying goes, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Due to exchange rates, macroeconomics and the mechanics of guerilla

wfare, a terrorist group like JI will consistently experience positive spending multipliers against the government. A reactive strategy to JIs attacks will only increase those multipliers. One dollar spent by JI may cost the government, whether Indonesia or the US, a thousand dollars in active stabilization, but ten dollars

¹³³ Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept version 1.0, 10 May 07

worth of preemptive stabilization could have rendered that one dollar impotent. Posturing Indonesia against JI and future terror incursions will nearly always be cheaper and often more effective than reacting to JIs acts of terrorism.

The US Department of State is normally the lead agency for FID operations¹³⁴. Traditionally, FID has always been geared toward COIN operations. With the emergence of JI and the Global Jihad, more emphasis should be placed on the internal development portion of FID to prevent those insurgencies before they arise. In the case of Indonesia, this involves a three-pronged approach. First, the US and the West must assist in strengthening the TNI and National Police capabilities. Integral training and development should continue from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security as well as the Department of State. The US military supports this concept through the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program¹³⁵; the Department of Homeland Defense can support this concept through the development of Indonesian Fusion Centers¹³⁶, and the ATA program from the Department of State. Each of these programs offers a significant increase in Indonesia's ability to identify and counter JI operations. The second portion of FID is Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) operations. Repairing a well or immunizing a village against diseases is an important step in gaining support from the local population. If the locals support the government, they are less likely to provide safe harbor to terrorist organizations such as JI. This is a fundamental concept in the "ounce of prevention" strategy and cannot be a one-time "good deal". HCA should be an ongoing operation designed to both gain support and establish presence across Indonesia's 27,000 island archipelago. If HCA is initiated by the US, Indonesians can continue the operation with US assistance. The third piece of FID is equipment under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. With an increased presence through HCA and increased police and military capability through JCETs and the ATA program, Indonesia will require additional equipment to increase their ability to successfully counter JI.

¹³⁴ Joint Publication 3-07.1; Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 30 Apr 04, Pg 34

¹³⁵ JCET programs are exercises designed to provide training opportunities for American SOF by holding the training exercises in countries that the forces may one day have to operate in, as well as providing training opportunities for the armed forces of the host countries.

¹³⁶ In the US State and local authorities have created 38 Fusion Centers around the country. Fusion Centers blend relevant law enforcement and intelligence information analysis and coordinate security measures in order to reduce threats in local communities. See http://www.dhs.gov/xinfo/share/programs/gc_1156877184684.shtm for more information.

In areas where JI has control or support of the local population, the government must examine the fundamental ends, scope, and core grievances of the population. During the clear phase, brief offensive operations may be effective in isolating core members of JI from the population. The increased capability of the TNI (BAIS, Kopassus-Detachment 81) and the National Police (POLRI and Detachment 88), working in concert with BIN and international intelligence communities, would allow the COIN force to engage in previously denied areas. The operation should be limited in scope to apprehending JI or terrorist elements and setting the conditions for FID/HCA operations in the area. The process is cyclic and continual.

The CT continuum is not complete without Information Operations (IO). IO is present in every facet of CT strategy and critically important in this phase. The instruments of power work hand in hand to effectively counter JI and terrorists in Indonesia. Terrorism is like a spider web; it cannot be destroyed unless it is attacked at its anchor points. COIN attacks the inner portions of the web but does not address the roots causes that lead a group like JI to attack. FID addresses Indonesia's CT capability and IO continuously engages the anchor points, those antecedents that led to the creation of JI. If the environment favors the enemy, identify those anchor points that allow him to flourish. By changing the environment, the probability of success is increased.

CONCLUSION; THE BALI PARADOX

The fundamental aspect of any CT strategy is to prevent terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah from committing terrorist acts. Indonesia, a country defined by struggle and conflict, is often reluctant to modify its CT strategy designed to prevent terrorist acts yet evolves after a significant terrorist act occurs. Until Indonesia recognizes the paradox, they will be forever part of it...

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