Analyses of Alternatives (AoAs): Toward a More Rigorous Determination of Scope

11 March 2014

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Analytic Services Inc.

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Analyses of alternatives (AoAs) play an important part in the acquisition process. The act of selecting a set of alternatives to be compared in an AoA can help decision makers understand and manage key tradeoffs or it can prematurely constrict or otherwise distort the solution trade space. It is fairly easy to point to completed AoAs as evidence that many of them have been poorly scoped. But it is much more difficult to spot the problem in real time or to keep it from occurring at all. This report identifies four principles designed to help minimize the occurrence of poorly scoped AoAs. These four principles were arrived at by applying formalisms from the disciplines of systems analysis and systems thinking, in combination with a series of semi-structured interviews with members of the AoA stakeholder community (consumers, sponsors, practitioners, and critics). The principles may be summarized, in systems terminology, as Focus on Outputs and Think Backwards; Start With the Exterior and Work Inwards; Apply Constraints Carefully; and Iterate and Reduce Uncertainty. The report translates these principles into practical terms that can be understood and applied by AoA stakeholders.
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Abstract

Analyses of alternatives (AoAs) play an important part in the acquisition process. The act of selecting a set of alternatives to be compared in an AoA can help decision makers understand and manage key tradeoffs—or it can prematurely constrict or otherwise distort the solution trade space. It is fairly easy to point to completed AoAs as evidence that many of them have been poorly scoped. But it is much more difficult to spot the problem in real time—or to keep it from occurring at all.

This report identifies four principles designed to help minimize the occurrence of poorly scoped AoAs. These four principles were arrived at by applying formalisms from the disciplines of systems analysis and systems thinking, in combination with a series of semi-structured interviews with members of the AoA stakeholder community (consumers, sponsors, practitioners, and critics).

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Keywords: Analysis of Alternatives, AoA, systems analysis, system boundary, systems thinking, trade space, Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, WSARA

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Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy position of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the federal government.
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Analyses of Alternatives (AoAs): Toward a More Rigorous Determination of Scope

Introduction

Background

Analysis of Alternatives

Within the framework of the defense acquisition system (DAS), an analysis of alternatives (AoA) “assess[es] the potential materiel solutions to satisfy the capability need documented in [an] approved” initial capabilities document (ICD). Conducted ad hoc during the 1970s and 1980s under the label of cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA), this type of assessment has been an important feature of the acquisition landscape ever since a major revision in the DoD 5000-series regulations in 1991.

Arguably, this emphasis has proved to be a mixed blessing over the years. On the one hand, the “formality and inevitability” of AoAs has helped guard against the potential for premature selection of a preferred alternative. However, the very complexity of the process has also made it prone to start-up delays, which, when combined with the pressure for timely decisions, leads to the seemingly inevitable result that “the time for actual analysis compresses.”

Something has to give, and a common practice has been to narrow the AoA scope (for example, by constraining the set of alternatives).

Complicating the problem of AoA scoping has been a steady pressure to make the rigorous comparison of alternative solutions a mandatory step that occurs earlier and earlier in the acquisition timeline. The 1996 revision of the DoD 5000 series formalized the requirement for AoAs to be performed before Milestone B (program initiation). And the 2003 revision—which was accompanied by the introduction of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)—included, for the first time, a requirement for AoAs to be conducted during the

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4 Smith & Thompson, 1995, p. 11.
5 Ibid., p. 14.
Materiel Solution Analysis phase, that is, prior to Milestone A.\textsuperscript{7} The earlier the AoA, the wider the set of potential alternatives (see Figure 1) and the more disparate they are. As a result, it is more difficult to decide which of them should be considered in the assessment.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{AoA Scoping in the Context of DAS Phases and Milestones}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Evidence of a Problem}

Unfortunately, there is evidence that the AoAs have not always been properly scoped. In 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed 32 major DoD acquisition programs, 22 of which had included a formal AoA. Of these, 13 AoAs—more than half—were characterized as overly “narrow [in] scope” in the sense that they “focused on a limited number of alternatives.”\textsuperscript{8} Moreover, there was a strong correlation between AoAs with a narrowly scoped set of alternatives and the occurrence of cost growth in the ensuing programs.\textsuperscript{9}

More anecdotally, it has been common in our experience to hear AoAs described as being scoped around a predetermined solution. (“By the time you reach the Materiel Development Decision [MDD], someone has already decided what the solution is going to be.”)\textsuperscript{10} To the extent this is true, the AoA becomes a square-filling exercise or, at best, a process of exploring minor embellishments around a

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
\bibitem{7} USD(AT&L), 2003a, 2003b. The requirement for functional area, functional need, and functional solution analysis spelled out in the CJCS 3170 series of instructions in 2003 can be interpreted as a desire to push this process even further to the left, so to speak, on the timeline. Interestingly, Smith and Thompson had eight years earlier argued the case for “put[ting] the initial [AoA] into the time normally reserved for ‘requirements analysis’”—or, at the least, “import[ing] some of the attributes of [an AoA] into the requirements analysis process that already takes place” (p. 15).
\bibitem{8} GAO, 2009, pp. 7, 9.
\bibitem{9} Ibid., pp. 10–12.
\bibitem{10} See also Husband and Kaspersen (2012), p. 9; Smith & Thompson (1995), p. 11.
\end{thebibliography}
particular type of technology, weapon, platform, or piece of equipment. The potential
to conduct a wide-open look at alternative technology solutions is lost.

2009 WSARA and Other Reforms

The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 included
important changes designed in part to address this problem. A major change in
governance was the designation of the Director, Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (DCAPE)—a Senate-confirmed position—as responsible not only for
formulating AoA guidance but also for the performance of the analysis. This
responsibility includes the authority to reject or redirect an AoA.

WSARA specifies that the AoA study guidance promulgated by DCAPE
should ensure the “full consideration of possible trade-offs among cost, schedule,
and performance objectives.”11 By implication, “proper consideration of tradeoffs
includes ensuring … that a range of sufficiently different alternatives are
examined.”12

To help discharge these responsibilities during AoA execution, CAPE typically
establishes a senior advisory group (SAG) that includes the Office of the Under
Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) as well as Joint Staff
and service representatives. In theory, the SAG provides a mechanism for users,
analysts, and overseers to adjust AoA scope during execution if necessary.

Implementation of WSARA has been accompanied by a push to shorten AoA
timelines. The typical duration of a pre-WSARA AoA has been variously estimated at
16 to 24 months.13 In contrast, several stakeholders interviewed for this project cited
6 to 9 months as the current goal. This shortening of AoA timelines will have
significant impacts—both positive and negative—on the problem of AoA scope;
these are discussed further in the section titled Why are Some AoAs Poorly
Scoped?

The number of completed AoAs conducted entirely within the post-WSARA
timeframe is modest. The consensus within the acquisition community seems to be
that it is still too soon to say exactly how the formal realignment of AoA
responsibilities, the introduction of the SAG, and the push for dramatically shorter
timelines have impacted AoA scoping.

11 111th Congress of the United States, Public Law 111-23, § 201(d)(1).
13 Kowal, in 2009, gave an average of two years with up to six years in some cases. At the other
extreme, information obtained from stakeholder interviews cited an average of 16 months. By way of
corroboration, Lihani (2011) cited USAF Office of Aerospace Studies data on 27 AoAs conducted
from 2000 to 2008; the average length was 20 months. Of the 22 AoAs considered in GAO (2009),
the majority took between 13 and 30 months.
Purpose

This project aimed to identify a set of guiding principles that can be applied by AoA practitioners and sponsors to reduce the incidence of improperly scoped analyses. In particular, we wanted to develop principles that were both (a) grounded in the discipline of systems thinking\textsuperscript{14} and (b) practical, in the sense that they can be readily understood and applied.

In striving for more rigor, we are not proposing to remove all subjectivity or sense of “art” from the job of scoping an AoA. Rather, we sought a middle ground, in which decisions regarding AoA scope can be influenced by considerations more systematic and rigorous than those arising solely from some combination of political, bureaucratic, and programmatic pressures.

Limitations

This paper is not intended as a guide to conducting AoAs or related studies. Many such guides do exist, and the findings and recommendations presented here are meant to be understood and applied in the context of those references.\textsuperscript{15} Similarly, it is assumed that the reader already has a basic familiarity with the DAS and JCIDS processes.

In this paper, the term scope is associated with the set of alternatives. To be sure, there are other dimensions of scope, such as the set of scenarios, assumptions, or study constraints. We considered these other dimensions only insofar as they shape decisions about the set of alternatives.

Factors such as organizational roles and responsibilities, institutional culture, and even the predilections of individual decision makers and executives all contribute to the incidence of improper AoA scoping. While acknowledging the importance of such factors, this paper’s recommendations do not address them directly.

A Note on Terminology

The word system can have many connotations. (Within the opening pages of this paper, for instance, we have already referred to the acquisition system, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, and the weapon systems that may represent alternative solutions to a capability need.) For clarity, the text indicates the specific type of system that is meant in each case. In particular, the ships, aircraft, vehicles, sensors, communications equipment, computers, and so

\textsuperscript{14} See Edson (2008).
\textsuperscript{15} For example, see USAF Office of Aerospace Studies (2010); Joint Staff (2009); and Defense Acquisition University (2013), section 3.3 (Analysis of Alternatives).
forth that may be the objects of study in an AoA are collectively referred to as combat or combat support systems (C/CSSs).

**Approach**

The first step in applying a systems thinking approach is to understand the nature of the problem. Only then can we explore various system views and formulate the resulting insights as a set of recommendations aimed at improving the practice of determining AoA scope. The remaining major sections of the paper (titled Understanding the Problem, Applying a Systems View, and Recommendations and Observations) follow this general outline.

This approach entailed two broad methods of inquiry and analysis. The first method was to leverage the existing body of knowledge by reviewing available documents (DoD and service instructions, guidance, and handbooks; published reports and articles; and other publicly available materials) and conducting interviews with stakeholders representing various roles (that is, identifying the capability needs being addressed in AoAs; overseeing the conduct of AoAs; performing AoAs; and reviewing and critiquing completed AoAs). The second method was to apply formal systems thinking paradigms. These two methods were applied in concert and iteratively: More than once, we used systems thinking formalisms to gain insights into an issue identified during interviews and then used subsequent interviews to test the validity of those insights.

All interviews were conducted on a strict non-attribution basis. Statements derived from interviews are substantiated in this report only to the extent of specifying that a particular view was expressed by one, some, several, most, or all interviewees.

The research and analysis presented herein was conducted from May 2013 through January 2014.

**Understanding the Problem**

So far, we have not specified exactly what it means to say that an AoA is improperly scoped. The following section addresses this key point. We then present some important causes of improper AoA scoping, as identified during stakeholder interviews.

**What Is a “Poorly Scoped” AoA?**

Establishing consensus on this question proved surprisingly difficult. Almost all interviewees, when asked the question directly, preferred to skip over it and proceed straight to a discussion of causes. In some cases, that discussion made it clear how the interviewee was defining the problem; in other cases, it did not.
Guided as we were by a systems viewpoint—including the notion that alternatives represent a set that has a *boundary* (see our discussion of the Conceptagon in a later section)—we consolidated interviewees’ implied constructs in the form of two definitions based on the properties of boundaries. First, an AoA could be too narrowly scoped if its boundary excludes alternatives that should be considered. Second, an AoA could be too broadly scoped if it includes alternatives that should not be considered.16

These definitions, although helpful, still contain more than a little question begging. On what basis can we say that an alternative should or should not be inside the AoA boundary? Here, it is important to remember that the purpose of an AoA is to inform a decision about the materiel solution to a capability need. Thus, poor scoping is that which contributes to a poor decision (for example, by excluding a viable alternative that might have been judged preferable under some reasonable weighing of costs and benefits)17 or otherwise impairs decision making (for example, by presenting so much information on so many alternatives that it is difficult to make a good choice).

The two types of improper scoping are further discussed in the next two sections.

**Too Narrowly Scoped**

Here, one or more viable alternatives have been excluded, inappropriately limiting the solution trade space. The most obvious way to detect this problem is simply to identify one or more of the missing alternatives. If the AoA has not provided a rationale for their exclusion or has simply assumed them out of the picture, we can safely say that the AoA was not well scoped. If a rationale is provided, the test is more difficult: namely, to demonstrate that the alternative might have been preferable under some reasonable weighing of costs and benefits, notwithstanding the stated rationale.

16 Note that under these definitions, a particular AoA could be both too narrow and too broad at the same time! In other words, it could inappropriately exclude some alternatives and inappropriately include others.

17 The use of the word *reasonable* here suggests some parallel with the “reasonable person standard” in tort law. Legal theorists disagree over whether the definition of “reasonableness” should be normative (that is, a reasonable person is one who does what is cost-effective, even if most people would not) or positive (that is, a reasonable person is one who does what most people would do, even if it is not cost-effective; see Miller & Perry, 2012). Fortunately, these distinctions are not so pronounced when it comes to choosing an AoA alternative. The reason is that the choice of a solution path for a DoD acquisition is almost never a completely objective determination, since it requires a weighing of costs and non-monetary benefits based on decision makers’ values and perspectives. Hence, the definition in the text boils down to the question of how likely it is that one could find a decision maker whose values and perspectives would have led them to choose the excluded alternative.
Note that for an AoA in progress—or one that has not yet begun—avoiding an overly narrow scope requires a way of projecting ahead to what the costs and benefits might look like at the end of the analysis. This fact argues strongly for taking an iterative approach to defining alternatives, and for explicitly tracking the upper and lower limits of their likely costs and benefits at every step along the way. These practices are reflected in the recommendations contained in the last section of this report.18

Too Broadly Scoped

Study teams operating under time and resource constraints rarely make a deliberate choice to include more alternatives than they can adequately analyze within those constraints. However, they can miss opportunities to narrow the set of alternatives, thus making less than optimal use of the time and resources available. Another possibility is that AoA guidance may prohibit such narrowing by specifying that certain alternatives must be considered in the final presentation of study results. Again, the opportunity cost of carrying these alternatives all the way through the analysis may be so great as to impair the quality of support ultimately provided to the decision maker.

Testing prospectively (that is, before the AoA is completed) for overly broad scoping is difficult. Since the range of uncertainty around the known costs and benefits of alternatives generally starts out being relatively large, it is easier, early on, to make the argument to leave an alternative in the mix until the uncertainties can be reduced. (And thus easier to show that an alternative has been prematurely excluded.) Stated another way, it takes a certain expenditure of analysis effort to show that no reasonable decision maker would be likely to prefer a given alternative.

Why Are Some AoAs Poorly Scoped?

Our interviews with AoA consumers, overseers, practitioners, and critics disclosed several reasons why AoAs may be improperly scoped.

Inappropriate Treatment of Time Constraints

In the first section, we noted the recent trend toward more stringent time constraints on AoAs. Such constraints, per se, are not necessarily a problem. In fact, they can contribute to better scoping by avoiding the situation in which a protracted analysis or decision-making process fails to keep pace with fact-of-life changes (see the Lack of Agility section). However, AoA stakeholders may deal with such

18 They are also consistent with recognized best practices for screening alternatives. See, for example, USAF Office of Aerospace Studies (2008), section 9.1, which describes not only initial screening for nonviable alternatives, but also “preliminary screening,” “later screening,” and “final selection.”
constraints by compressing the timeline in inappropriate ways. This may occur before, during, or after the AoA itself.

Some types of compression occur well before AoA initiation, during the JCIDS process. For instance, an advocate of a particular new capability may save time by pointing to a prior, approved ICD as inclusive of the unaddressed need for it. The danger is that the new capability in question (for example, hold a particular type of target at risk) may include a constraint (for example, with zero risk of collateral damage) that was not analyzed in the original Capabilities-Based Analysis (CBA). Since the ICD is already approved, further analysis of this constraint is not performed. As a result, alternatives that cause only a little collateral damage are guaranteed to be excluded from the trade space. In short, there is no process check on a narrowing of alternatives that has occurred even before the subsequent AoA has begun.

Immediately before or during an AoA, the timeline can be compressed by summarily excluding certain alternatives, without adequately considering their potential effectiveness, cost, risk, and feasibility. This action is qualitatively different from accelerating the rate at which screening occurs within the analysis process: It simply restricts the trade space based on what is assumed to be true.19 In so doing, it greatly increases the risk of an overly narrow AoA.

Finally, consider the case in which an AoA study team has used a limited amount of time to identify a range of costs and benefits for a set of alternatives. Suppose the resulting uncertainties are such that there is considerable overlap and no clear basis for a decision. If additional analysis could sufficiently narrow the uncertainties, eliminate some of the alternatives, and clarify the decision, then a refusal to extend the analysis timeline may be considered an inappropriate constraint that contributed to an overly broad scope for the prematurely finished AoA.

Inappropriate Focus on Existing C/CSS and/or Operations Concepts

Most interviewees stated a view that can be paraphrased as follows: “Whenever I see something titled ‘[XYZ] Replacement AoA,’ I automatically question whether the scope may be too narrow.” The 2009 GAO study mentioned earlier

19 A recent example: Starosta (2013) cited a senior Air Force official regarding the upcoming “Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent AoA.” “[The] team is starting. We did get re-vectored, though. The department, in this constrained budget environment, would like to do those a little faster with a little less money, and so they have proposed a way to streamline how they’re going to perform that study.” The article goes on to describe the proposed streamlining: “In effect, the narrower AoA will look into fewer modernization concepts than originally planned.” The de-scoping was reportedly performed by a SAG based on “data derived from previous analyses.” Note that we are not in a position to judge the merits of this particular de-scoping or to declare it inappropriate. The point is simply that time constraints can potentially exacerbate the problem of AoA scoping.
made a similar point: An AoA for a helicopter replacement, for instance, could easily be incorporating a premature decision that the underlying capability need is best met by another helicopter of some sort.

The danger can arise not only from an inappropriate focus on existing C/CSS (for example, the notion that a particular platform must be replaced by a similar type of platform), but also a focus on existing concepts of operation (CONOPS). Consider, for example, a sensor that provides input to step 1 of a two-step battlefield decision-making process. An AoA that focuses exclusively on how well the alternatives support step 1 could easily be scoped improperly, as illustrated in Figure 2. Here, instead of a helicopter replacement AoA, we have what might be termed the “Step 1 Replacement AoA.” In this example, Alternative A would certainly be included in the AoA, since it improves the effectiveness of step 1 relative to the base case. However, Alternative B might very well be excluded unless the AoA scope was widened to account for the potential improvement it could bring to step 2.

![Figure 2. Example of Inappropriate Focus on Existing CONOPS](image)

**Inappropriate Focus on a Single Warfighting Domain**

By the time an AoA begins, a DoD lead component (most often, one of the services) has been designated and has been given responsibility for conducting the analysis. That component will have played a key role in analyzing the capability need and developing the ICD; it will also have had to identify a possible range of feasible alternatives in support of the MDD.²⁰ There are many reasons behind the designation of DoD lead component: for example, the availability of technology

²⁰ Per USD(AT&L), 2010.
development expertise, personnel, models and simulations, and budget. Often, the nature of the capability need documented in the ICD makes the choice of a lead service “obvious.”\textsuperscript{21} To explore this phenomenon further would require a detailed look at the role of the services in the various processes that provide input to the definition of capability gaps and needs\textsuperscript{22}—an assessment well beyond the bounds of this study.

Regardless of the reasons, service proponency of AoAs was identified by several interviewees as a potential contributor to overly narrow scoping. Colloquially speaking, “If the Navy is conducting the AoA, the solution is probably going to live in the water; if the Air Force is conducting the AoA, the solution is likely to have wings; etc.” The problem is not necessarily that one service deliberately sets out to exclude solutions that could be developed by another: each particular service simply thinks about capability needs and their solutions in a particular way, corresponding to the warfighting domain it represents. Such viewpoints may not lend themselves well to the full exploration of solutions to joint or coalition warfighting needs.

\textbf{Inclusion of Extraneous Issues}

The national security landscape is such that new concepts and ideas regularly burst into the universe of discourse: consider, for instance, the history of low-intensity conflict, information operations, or supply chain management. For purposes of this report, the risk is that a given concept or issue may be so much in vogue that AoA guidance mandates that it be considered—and therefore that an alternative be included—simply because it is a hot topic.

\textbf{Lack of Agility in Governance and Management Processes}

As noted in the first section, a common complaint is that both AoAs and the JCIDS process take too long. Unfortunately, the result is often a reluctance to make adjustments during AoA execution. For example, even though interim AoA results might suggest that the underlying capability need should be reexamined or articulated differently, this seldom occurs because “too much time has already been expended just to get to this point.” One possible result: AoAs that are improperly scoped because they ignore fact-of-life changes that have rendered some alternatives obsolete or made others feasible.

An associated problem is that governance processes may not be able to keep pace with the need for change. Suppose an AoA study team is able to determine, during the course of an AoA, that the costs and benefits of a given alternative,

\textsuperscript{21} The WSARA stipulates an OSD check on the extent to which requirements approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) have “engaged in consideration of issues of joint portfolio management,” but notes that this was already required by DoD instruction. Cf. Public Law 111-23, § 201(c)(3).
\textsuperscript{22} See, for example, Frittsman, McGee, & Yuhas (2013).
mandated by study guidance, will almost certainly cause it to be dominated by the others. In theory, a SAG could grant a waiver or change of scope. However, if the approval chain leading to the SAG is such that four months’ worth of justification is required to avoid three months of wasted effort, the change is unlikely to happen.

**Applying a Systems View**

**Systems Thinking and the Conceptagon**

We used a soft systems framework, the Conceptagon,\(^{23}\) to derive comparisons and characterizations that helped us better understand the factors that affect AoA scoping. The Conceptagon framework is organized around seven triplets (cf. Figure 3) of system attributes.

We concentrated on four of these triplets:\(^{24}\)

- **Wholes, Relationships, Parts.** The identification of the system at hand, the constituent pieces, and the relationships that bind those pieces.

- **Structure, Process, Function.** The composition, arrangement, or organization (structures) a system employs to support the key activities (processes) necessary to produce the desired system behavior (function).

- **Inputs, Transformations, Outputs.** The items that enter the system (inputs) and exit it as products or deliverables (outputs) and the changes (transformations) that convert inputs to outputs.

- **Interior, Boundary, Exterior.** The perimeter that separates entities that comprise the system from entities outside its control.

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\(^{23}\) Boardman & Sauser, 2008.

\(^{24}\) The remaining triplets (notably, Command, Control, Communication; and Openness, Hierarchy, Emergence) are better suited to identifying organizational or governance solutions, which are not the focus of this paper.
Analysis of Selected Conceptagon Triplets

Wholes, Relationships, Parts

What system are we analyzing when considering the problem of AoA scope? Figure 4 identifies two very different kinds of systems at work. The upper portion of the diagram depicts what might be termed the AoA Management and Execution System. That system comprises the organizational entities responsible for planning, conducting, documenting, and applying the AoA. The lower portion of the diagram depicts an entirely different kind of system. Specifically, the label AoA Object System describes the set of C/CSS(s) that are the object(s) of study in the AoA.

In Figure 4, the focus is on the period that precedes the AoA itself. During this timeframe, the Management and Execution System produces several outputs that impact the scope of the ensuing AoA: documentation of the underlying capability need (in the form of an ICD), documentation of the MDD (via an Acquisition Decision Memorandum\textsuperscript{25}), and formal AoA Study Guidance. All these outputs are based on the assessment of current and programmed C/CSSs, existing CONOPS (not shown), and the resulting mission outcomes. The capability gap documented in the ICD is associated with the particular set of C/CSSs that should have been capable of

\textsuperscript{25} MDD documentation can have an important bearing on AoA scope: USD(AT&L) (2010) required that the MDD be based on evidence of a range of “candidate materiel solution approaches [that] have the potential to effectively address the capability gap(s) ...” and are technically feasible.
producing the required capability. This set will become the baseline alternative in the AoA. The designation of the baseline establishes a boundary for the Object System.

Figure 5 depicts AoA execution. Here, the output of the Management and Execution System is the completed AoA. Each alternative represents a different possible instantiation of the Object System and is assessed based on its outputs: namely, the predicted mission outcomes it would produce or enable. The assessment may deem some alternatives infeasible on the basis of these outcomes; it may also help identify other alternatives that should be considered. Notice that the reconfigurations that give rise to the alternatives may change the definition of the boundary: A C/CSS that was formerly outside the boundary (for example, the helicopter at the bottom right of the collage in Alternatives 1 and 2) may find itself inside the boundary (the same helicopter, dropping a rectangular object in Alternative 3). Thus, the AoA scope is the envelope of the boundaries formed by all the instantiations of the Object System (that is, all the alternatives).
In summary, the AoA scope is a property of a system output (because an AoA is an output of the AoA Management and Execution System). It results from one system (that is, the Management and Execution System) making decisions about the boundary of another (that is, the Object System) both before and during the analysis. Thinking of scope in this way allows us to introduce several other principles of systems analysis (see the last section of this paper).

**Structure, Process, Function**

An AoA lies at the intersection of the three principal DoD decision support systems (JCIDS; the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System [PPBES]; and the DAS). Each of the processes that govern those three systems impacts an AoA—and, in particular, the actions taken by the elements of the AoA Management and Execution System to determine its scope. Figure 6 summarizes the key relationships.

In some cases, it is fairly obvious how these functions impact decisions regarding the scope of an AoA. For example, resource availability can limit AoA scope directly (the fewer the resources available for AoA execution, the fewer the alternatives that can be analyzed to a given level of detail) or indirectly (the fewer the
resources available for solutions to capability needs, the fewer the alternatives that will be deemed affordable). Less obvious are some of the relationships we noted in our discussion of why some AoAs are poorly scoped—for example, the fact that the set of alternatives is profoundly shaped by the way in which a capability gap is articulated. This latter point is taken up in more detail in the last section.

Figure 6. DoD Decision Support Functions That Impact AoA Scope

Inputs, Transformations, Outputs

Figure 7 depicts the notion that AoAs transform information about forces, capabilities, and C/CSSs into information that aids decision-making by characterizing the trade space of alternative solutions. This view extends the previous triplet by identifying additional factors that impact AoA scope. If data and models are not in place, for example, the resulting inability to analyze certain alternatives within time and resource constraints could act to inappropriately limit scope.
The concept of AoA scope as a boundary on the Object System was discussed earlier in this section. The earlier discussion showed the boundary in what might be termed C/CSS space. However, this boundary has other dimensions as well—for example, temporal dimensions. Figure 8 shows that some actions taken before AoA initiation (those on the left side of the figure) generally have broad impacts on AoA scope (for example, by excluding whole classes of technologies or solution approaches). Actions taken during AoA execution tend to impact AoA scope more narrowly (for example, making exclusions within allowable classes).
Figure 8. Timeframe of Actions That Impact AoA Scope

Recommendations and Observations

We have combined insights based on the system formulation of the problem with insights gained during interviews to arrive at a series of recommendations, which are presented below, along with some concluding observations.

Recommendations

The guiding principles that follow are intended to help participants in the AoA Management and Execution System reduce the incidence of improperly scoped AoAs.

**Focus on Outputs and Think Backwards**

An alternative is any potential configuration of C/CSSs that could produce the required output(s): namely, the military outcomes that would address the documented capability gap to some degree. In formulating alternatives, it is tempting to think forwards—that is, to envision a particular set of C/CSSs and determine whether it produces the required outcome(s) (or could be modified or reconfigured to do so).

To some extent, the JCIDS process requires participants to think in terms of particular C/CSSs during the formulation and analysis of capability gaps. Sponsors of capability gaps are directed to consider whether “capability solutions which can satisfy the Sponsor capability requirements exist elsewhere in the Joint force.”26 And CBAs require “the operational assessment of the current and programmed force.”27

Consideration of C/CSSs during gap formulation is actually inevitable: It may be possible to think about a capability without reference to the system that provides

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26 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012, Enclosure A, paragraph 5.b and Figure A-2 (emphasis added).
27 Ibid., Appendix B to Enclosure A, CBA Guide; paragraph 2.e (emphasis added).
that capability; however, it is not possible to think about a capability gap without reference to one or more sets of C/CSSs that fails to do so. Thus, by the time an MDD is reached and an ICD generated, the Object System—including its boundaries and interfaces—has already been conceived … with reference to the current and programmed force. The danger is that this process may induce tunnel vision and drive the AoA to an overly narrow scope.

How to escape this dilemma? At some point before the formulation of AoA study guidance, there should be an attempt to work backward from a (C/CSS-neutral) statement of the required capability to a set of feasible alternatives that could potentially satisfy it. Such an attempt should not be bound in any way by the thinking contained in the CBA.

Formal systems analysis tools and methods can help in drawing the necessary linkages. These methods also show clearly the difference between the forward and backward thought processes alluded to above. Within version 2.0 of the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF), for example, the “forward” progression of thought corresponds to the movement from Operational View (OV) to Capability View (CV).28 It asks, “What is the CV associated with this particular OV?” This process may be used during the assessment of current and programmed forces to identify capability gaps, resulting in an ICD.

What we have termed the backward thought progression can be represented by a subsequent movement from CV-1 (Capability Vision) to CV-6 (Capability to Operational Activities Mapping), as shown in Figure 9. The CV-1 essentially captures the sense of the ICD. Forcing the analyst to carefully translate capabilities to activities, it becomes possible again to work from a clean sheet of paper by asking questions such as “Are there other kinds of activities or combinations of activities that could produce these capabilities?” “How might such activities be performed or linked to do that?” In the end, one is asking, in DoDAF terms, “What kinds of OVs could correspond to this CV?” Or, in other words, “What kinds of C/CSSs, interacting with each other and with the user in what ways, could potentially meet the stated need?”

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28 Note that DoDAF itself does not prescribe a progression of thought. In applying DoDAF, one can start almost anywhere, producing only the views required for a particular purpose.
The backwards thought transition from CV to OV has an additional benefit. By setting up the question of user interaction with the system, it stimulates additional thinking about the Object System boundary and how that boundary contributes to the definition of alternatives (see the next subsection).

**Start With the Exterior and Work Inwards**

The usual thought process is to start with a collection of C/CSSs believed to represent an instantiation of the Object System and move conceptually outwards. Those entities without which the Object System could not exist or function—provided they are within the decision maker’s sphere of influence and authority—are deemed to lie in the interior; all other entities are in the exterior. Although this may be a sound method of **refining** an initial definition, it may not be the best approach to **identifying** alternative instantiations of the Object System.

The suggested approach is to reverse the process—that is, to start by identifying entities that are clearly **not** part of the system and then moving conceptually inwards. If the stated need is to improve the autonomous navigation capabilities of an existing fleet of aircraft, for example, it may be easy to determine that alternatives involving entirely new airframes are unaffordable. The airframes themselves now lie in the exterior of the Object System and impose a set of compatibility constraints. However, it may not be clear whether alternatives that upgrade both navigation and fire control systems are cost-effective. The outside-in
approach might allow both types of solutions among the potential alternatives in an AoA.30

Outside-in exploration of the boundary also helps identify interfaces that “[participate] in constituting the system.”31 The eardrum, for example, “forms the boundary between the inner and the outer ear, but at the same time it exists in order to let the sound waves through.”32 In the same way, the interface constraints identified during an outside-in exploration of the Object System boundary point toward important characteristics of AoA alternatives. They can represent more than simply feasibility constraints. For example, they can uncover important measures of effectiveness.

**Apply Constraints Carefully**

Every constraint imposed or accepted constitutes a decision to exclude some portion of the solution trade space from further consideration. Accordingly, it should be supported by some testable rationale, that is, an explanation of what portion of the trade space is being excluded and why it is not worth considering. An important question to ask: What would it take to change this constraint? To see the importance of asking this question, consider several examples.

The first example considers the well-known constraint termed affordability. For many years, decision makers relied on AoAs to identify cost-effective solution approaches, only to discover that the resulting programs could not be executed with available resources—that is, they were unaffordable. In response, the USD(AT&L) has mandated that affordability be considered at Milestone A.33 An overly restrictive approach would be to define affordability as the difference between expected out-year obligational authority and the expected out-year costs of current and programmed C/CSSs. That approach, however, fails to consider the possibility that the benefits of meeting the capability need at hand may be so great as to be worth terminating or forgoing some current or programmed C/CSSs. Rather than unduly constrict the trade space with this narrow definition, decision makers would be better served by asking, “What other capabilities would we be willing to forgo to achieve this one?”34

Another example was mentioned earlier: The Object System is usually constrained to exclude elements that are outside the decision maker’s sphere of

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30 An interesting parallel in the world of object-oriented software design is the recent interest in what is now being termed outside-in development. For a practical illustration, see Bache (2013).
31 Cilliers, 2005, p. 611.
32 Ibid.
34 Based on the interviews we conducted, there is evidence that this question is now being posed as a way of attaching resource priority levels to DoD capability needs.
influence or authority.\footnote{Oliveira, 1973, p. 3.} Suppose the decision-making authority is organization X and all materiel alternatives are believed to be related to technology A, for which that organization is responsible. Further, suppose that the AoA study team discovers, while developing its study plan, a set of potential alternatives based on technology B, for which the responsible organization is Y (a parallel organization in the hierarchy). The argument that “those aren’t our technologies and we can’t make decisions about them” should not be considered sufficient grounds for dismissing the newly discovered set of alternatives—even though the consequences, in terms of process, may be painful (for example, moving the decision-making authority to a higher level).

Even the capability gap itself can be articulated in such a way as to over-constrain the solution trade space—as, for example, might occur if alternatives that fail to close the gap \textit{completely} are dropped. During the interviews we conducted, we learned that new JCIDS guidance under development will address this point by stating clearly that ICDs should \textit{not} include threshold values for key performance parameters.

\textbf{Iterate and Reduce Uncertainty}

Because the environment can change over time, the boundary of the Object System should be allowed to change as well. Standard AoA practice accounts for such change through the normal screening process. Less common, but equally important, is the occasional need to add alternatives or fundamentally change the nature of the alternative set. Such changes can arise for a number of reasons: For example, during the interval between the CBA and the AoA, the state of technology may have evolved such that alternatives once thought to be infeasible are now feasible.

The recommendation is to take an iterative approach, specifically, to check and recheck the validity of assumptions and constraints throughout AoA preparation and execution. Note that this concept extends to the period before the AoA has actually begun. In the earlier example of the aircraft navigation system (see the subsection titled Start With the Exterior), we remarked that a certain decision might be easy to determine and that another decision might result in a certain outcome. Ideally, these decisions are informed by quick analysis at a low level of detail. Although the analysis results may come with a wide range of uncertainty, they may still be sufficient to allow for the right decision regarding the Object System boundary. If not, the analysis is refined to the point that it does support the decision.

The associated need is for CBA and AoA governance processes that can respond quickly to the need for such adjustments. The establishment of the SAG
(supported by Joint Staff Functional Control Boards) as an ongoing governance mechanism is undoubtedly a step in the right direction—although there is evidence from our interviews that the process is not yet as agile as it needs to be. For example, it is not clear to what extent the SAG can, on its own authority, redirect the execution of an AoA along lines that deviate from the boundaries established by a validated ICD. If the impacts of real-world change can be accommodated only by restarting the JCIDS process from scratch, they are unlikely to be considered at all.

**Summary and Conclusions**

A scheme for applying these recommendations is summarized in Figure 10, which shows the alignment of key principles according to stakeholder roles and process timelines. The absence of an entry does not mean that participant is exempt from that particular principle—merely that it is not necessarily key to AoA scoping at that particular point in the AoA process.

![Figure 10. Summary of Key Principles for Improving AoA Scoping](image)

One important implication of Figure 10 is that systems thinking should not be considered an exercise solely for AoA study team analysts. Senior executives, warfighters, and DoD business process owners can all benefit from applying a systems view to the practice of AoAs. That practice continues to evolve within the DoD, and the challenges of the future will doubtless be different from those of the past. Cultural, organizational, and individual behaviors will continue to frustrate the best process designs. Nevertheless, we are confident that the above principles can
improve the DAS by reducing the incidence of poorly scoped AoAs and thus enable better acquisition outcomes.
References


