**Title:** Pragmatism of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s and European Union’s Strategic Partnership  

**Abstract:** The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union are two of the preeminent international organizations (IO) today. Recognizing the advantages of cooperation, NATO and the EU have formed a strategic partnership. In 2008 piracy became a threat to global commons off the coast of Somalia and both organizations undertook the initiative to develop counter-piracy operations. The development of near simultaneous but separate operations suggests the two IO’s overlooked political and strategic collaboration thus ignoring opportunities within their strategic partnership. A analyze of the challenges for the IO’s planning and execution of counter-piracy operations will provide the framework for the study. The related case study will identify political and military challenges the IO’s dealt with previously and continue to overcome in their response to the piracy crisis off the Horn of Africa. The challenges, conclusions, and recommendations will demonstrate how to ensure the future relevance of both organizations through better integration of the formal principles of the strategic partnership. The recommendations for both organizations and member states to consider are the incorporation of pragmatism into political consultation between the two organizations, the expansion of partnership planning into collaborative planning for both military and civilian crisis management, the exploration of unity of command in support of unity of effort, and the execution of joint training and exercises.

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PRAGMATISM OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION’S AND EUROPEAN UNION’S STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

by

Craig M. Bennett

CDR, United States Navy

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

Signature:

14 April 2015

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ABSTRACT

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union are two of the preeminent international organizations (IO) today. Recognizing the advantages of cooperation, NATO and the EU have formed a strategic partnership. In 2008 piracy became a threat to global commons off the coast of Somalia and both organizations undertook the initiative to develop counter-piracy operations. The development of near simultaneous but separate operations suggests the two IOs overlooked political and strategic collaboration thus ignoring opportunities within their strategic partnership. An analysis of the challenges for the IOs planning and execution of counter-piracy operations will provide the framework for the study. The related case study will identify political and military challenges the IOs dealt with previously and continue to overcome in their response to the piracy crisis off the Horn of Africa. The challenges, conclusions, and recommendations will demonstrate how to ensure the future relevance of both organizations through better integration of the formal principles of the strategic partnership. The recommendations for both organizations and member states to consider are the incorporation of pragmatism into political consultation between the two organizations, the expansion of partnership planning into collaborative planning for both military and civilian crisis management, the exploration of unity of command in support of unity of effort, and the execution of joint training and exercises.
DEDICATION

This is now my second master’s degree along with one professional certificate program I have achieved in the past 12 years. All of it has been possible because of the support and the sacrifices of my wife and kids. I cannot express the extent of my thanks and love to Laura, Abby, and Drew. Sorry for all the missed time.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Appreciation to my elective instructors Dr. Robert Antis and COL Peter Yeager, USMC, for their mentoring, research advice, and patience in creation of this thesis. My research required leveraging of previous work relationship in NATO, so special thanks to LtCdr Paul Eaton, RN, LTC James Johnston, USA, and WgCdr Gordon Pendleton, RAF, for their assistance in obtaining required research material. A deep thanks to Jeff Turner, my writing coach. His insight and professionalism have enabled me to succeed in my current course of study and writing of this thesis. To my elective classmates, thank you for the rich discussions in class and sound challenges to the critical thoughts in this piece.
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Chapter I

Piracy, a Strategic Partnership Challenge

The EU’s relationship with NATO is also essential. The breadth of EU instruments can be usefully combined with the depth of NATO’s role on defense, and our two organizations must continue to reinforce each other’s work.

- Former EU Ambassador to the United States the Honorable João Vale de Almeida

In 2008, there was an increase in the acts of piracy and armed robbery on the high seas off the coast of Somalia. Both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) took notice in their separate security assessments and responded to the crisis. Despite substantial common memberships in both international organizations (IO), their respective interests led each organization to initiate independent counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. In the period since these operations’ were initiated, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) developed and gained member states’ approval of a Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. The EU subsequently initiated an anti-piracy civilian mission in concert with their military operation.

NATO, an intergovernmental organization and the foremost global political-military alliance, consists of 28 member states from North America and Europe.¹ NATO is a treaty organization, initially motivated by common defense interest, as a result of the Cold War against the Soviet Union. At its core, NATO’s mission is the collective defense of its member states. While remaining committed to collective defense, since the end of the Cold War NATO has broadened its missions, adding crisis management and

¹ The members of NATO are Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
cooperative security to its repertoire.

The EU, the leading global political-economic supranational organization, involves 28 member states from Europe. Over the past two decades, the EU, in support of a common foreign policy, has cultivated interest in developing a common security and defense posture amongst its member states. The result of the EU’s efforts is the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The CSDP, a series of declarations, agreements, and treaties, concludes in a bureaucratic organization of civilian and military personnel charged with enacting the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) through prevention, interdiction, and management of crises.

Appreciative of the international theory of institutionalism and its ideal of cooperation, member states of both organizations over the years have developed a series of agreements, commonly referred to as the Berlin Plus Agreements. This series of agreements serves as the foundation of NATO’s and EU’s strategic partnership. Grounded in openness and mutual respect, the NATO-EU partnership’s central principles include a respect for each other’s autonomy, practical cooperation in crisis planning, mutual support in the field, political consultations, and cooperative capability development.³

From a rational standpoint, the obvious question: why did two strategic partners, sharing 22 common member states, of which only 12 have the military capability to participate in open ocean maritime operations, continue to pursue unilateral operations and missions? It is too simple and unfair to suggest the EU is just creating a duplicative

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² The member states of the EU are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
capability to NATO. Therefore, keeping Ambassador Almeida’s sentiment in mind, perhaps the more appropriate strategic question is: why did the principles of the strategic partnership not result in a more cooperative venture by both organizations?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union counter-piracy operations and civilian anti-piracy mission highlight the difficulties in operational cooperation within the NATO-EU Strategic Partnership. In order to ensure the future relevance of these organizations, they must improve collaboration to integrate the formal principles of the strategic partnership based around pragmatic integration, collaborative planning, common use of key organizational leadership positions, and crisis management education.

Solutions should consider the opportunities that exist for the two organizations to improve cooperation. To support these recommendations, this paper will first examine the development of both organizations and their strategic partnership. Then a historical understanding of piracy and the response of the international community (IC) will provide the context in which to judge the pragmatism of the strategic partnership. With the context of the case, four areas of study will analyze the strategic partnership and the effectiveness of its implementation during operational planning and execution. The first study will review the political motivation of several member states in both organizations, in order to understand how each state uses each organization in support of their strategic objectives or goals. Second, a study will examine the strategies of both organizations in order to understand their global perspectives. The third study will return to the case study to consider the military force contribution to the two counter-piracy operations. A review of the states’ force contribution will demonstrate member states’ organizational
prioritization. Finally, an investigation into the tactical coordination occurring at sea and between operational headquarters will provide some insight into the potential for unity of effort. The observations and deductions drawn during analysis will provide conclusions and recommendations towards improved collaboration and further strengthening of the strategic partnership.
Chapter II

The Organizations and their Partnership

Before exploring some of the strengths, weaknesses, or opportunities for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-European Union (EU) strategic partnership, a basic understanding of the organizations and their partnership is required. With an understanding of the organizations and their fundamental differences, the relevance, effectiveness, and challenges for the partnership are explainable. A comprehensive historical recounting of each organization’s development and the evolution of their partnership is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the focus will be on key highlights, such as organizational values, evolution of organizational defense and security motivations, and their unique political processes. An understanding of these areas will facilitate a sufficient analysis.

NATO and the EU are two unique international organizations (IO); therefore, a common grasp of their distinctiveness is required. It is appropriate to label both organizations as an intergovernmental organization. An intergovernmental organization is, “…always founded by governments which recognize that it is in their national interests to obtain multilateral agreements and pursue actions to deal with threats, challenges, or problems that cannot be dealt with effectively at the unilateral level.”

Within intergovernmental organizations, the power of the organization and the decision-making remains squarely with member states. The evolution of the EU has caused a divergence from the general definition of intergovernmental. An appropriate characterization of the EU becomes more complicated as the organization grapples with

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the concept of political integration. Academics often refer to the EU as a supranational organization. The EU’s supranational character does not conform to traditional definitions of supranationalism, their character lies somewhere on a spectrum between the theories of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism. Neo-functionalism defined as,

… is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.\(^2\)

The context for the definition of intergovernmentalism is slightly different for the EU, than compared to NATO. For the EU, “Intergovernmentalists accept that European integration can involve a transfer of functions from the state executive and, to a lesser extent, from the parliaments of the member states, to the European institutions—of the Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in particular.”\(^3\) Going forward with a common understanding of the organizations, these organizational differences will manifest themselves within the challenges of the partnership.

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**

NATO is a political and military alliance, forming one of the most successful intergovernmental organizations in history. NATO is a consequence of the bi-polar international order following WWII, which saw adversarial sides drawn between the Democratic West and Communist East. The alliance has served to link the security of Europe and the trans-Atlantic partners, Canada and the United States, for the past 65

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years. The guiding ideals for the alliance are in the preamble of the Washington Treaty, which established NATO. The member states agreed, “They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the values of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.”

Over the ensuing years, NATO has added the value of human rights.

The alliance’s core principle is Article V of the Washington Treaty, Collective Defense. Since the end of the Cold War and the diminished risk of a state threat from Russia, NATO has transformed the organization’s missions and institutional expertise in order to reap further the benefits of the alliance and maintain its relevance. As recent as the 2010 Strategic Concept and later echoed in the 2014 NATO Heads of State Wales Declaration, the principles of crisis management and cooperative security have come alongside collective defense to define NATO’s role in the international community.

As an intergovernmental organization, NATO’s construct includes 28 national delegations, along with a political staff, military staff, and a military command structure. See figure 1. NATO’s source of legitimacy is the treaty amongst the 28 member states, each of which has Ambassador-led national missions within the organization, referred to as the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The NAC establishes NATO policy and authorizes

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military action. The decision-making within NATO is by a political consultation process to achieve consensus, commonly called the silence procedures. Policy proposals are forwarded to the member states. As long as no state breaks silence and objects, the policy becomes actionable. This process empowers every state in the alliance to have an equal voice. A break in silence is very simple to understand, if a state objects to a proposed policy, it can send the policy back for further consultation. If silence is not broken, a state’s silence can infer agreement or a simple indifference to other member states carrying out a policy, especially in regards to military action, such as counter-piracy.

A senior European civilian leads the organization as its Secretary General. The Secretary General, supported by a civilian International Staff (IS) and an International Military Staff (IMS), provides the NAC with recommended policy and response options to crises, while recording and disseminating the political direction to the organization’s military structure. To support this political process and carry out the direction of the NAC, NATO has a two-pillared military command structure: on one side is Allied Command Operations under the leadership of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), and on the other side is Allied Command Transformation, under the leadership of the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT).

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The EU today, began as a political and economic alliance, and over the years has transformed, to some extent, into a supranational organization. Considering the influence of former U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s economic theory on international trade, and the idea that economic interdependence will reduce the potential of war, the embryo of the EU began with the establishment of the European Steel and Coal Community.\textsuperscript{10} This initiative later evolved and became the European Economic Community with the

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\caption{NATO Organizational Structure\textsuperscript{9}}
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\textbf{European Union (EU)}


Developing in parallel with the theory of economic cooperation was an idea of common security and defense. The polarization of the international order after WWII initially drove Western Europe to define itself as a single entity. Early on, European defense cooperation took form in two treaties, the Treaty of Brussels, forming the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Defense Community (EDC) treaty. These defense initiatives failed to show any utility in the shadow of NATO, and ultimately the EDC failed when France declined to ratify the treaty.\footnote{Robert Dover, “The European Union’s Foreign, Security, and Defence Policies,” In European Union Politics, 4th ed., ed. Michelle Cini and Nieves Prez-Solorzano Borragán (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 243.} The preamble of the Brussels Treaty conveys the early values of the signatory states. These values are human rights, the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, international peace and security, the integration of Europe, collaboration in economic, social, and cultural matters, and for collective self-defense.\footnote{“Treaty of Brussels,” March 17, 1948, United Treaty Series 19, no. 304 (1948), \url{http://www.weu.int/}, (accessed 20 Dec 2014).} In the end, the WEU failed to make any strides, since NATO, with the trans-Atlantic feature, outpaced the aspiration of the WEU for collective defense and the WEU then languished for several decades.

Taking Carl von Clausewitz’s notion that war is an extension of politics by other means, the Europeans appreciated the requirement for common policies, especially in regards to foreign relations.\footnote{Carl von Clausewitz, \textit{On War}, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Everyman's Library, 1993), 99.} The appreciation for Clausewitz notion was reconciled in the Treaty of Maastricht, which formed the EU and established the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993. By putting in place the initial mechanism for a common
foreign policy, the EU took a step further towards becoming a supranational organization. The CFSP encompassed two key tenets, a common EU foreign policy position and joint actions. The initial challenge for the CFSP was any common position required unanimity, which in an intergovernmental structure is problematic since state sovereignty reigns supreme in the political process. To abate the challenge of unanimity, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1996 introduced an EU High Representative, to act as the EU’s foreign minister, and a political process that included qualified majority voting (QMV).15

Armed with a process for development of a common foreign policy, the politics were in place to discuss war, or as suitable, the prevention of war. The process to develop a viable common defense capability came at St Malo, France in 1998. Based on a British and French initiative, the Europeans adopted the proposal for a European Security Defense Policy (ESDP). Through a series of council meetings and the Nice Treaty, the ESDP developed into an institution comprised of a Political and Security Committee for internal decision-making, an EU Military Committee (EUMC), and an EU Military Staff, infusing elements of military and civilian capabilities. The ESDP mission areas included military crisis management, civilian crisis management, and conflict prevention.16 The key point in regards to the nature of the organization is that external decision-making would remain with the states. The outcomes of this process will be relevant to the discussion further in this paper.

The EU achieved its current level of integration in 2007 with the Lisbon Treaty. Falling short of becoming an absolute supranational organization through a constitutional process, the organization did achieve its highest level of state integration within the

15 Dover, 244.
16 The civilian dimension included police operations, rule of law, civilian administration, civil protection, and the European Defense Agency (EDA).
union. Beyond the significant institutional changes throughout every element of EU power, the key for defense concerns were a solidification of the High Representative authoritative position over the CFSP and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) (new name for ESDP), see Figure 2, and means for the common defense against terrorism and response to humanitarian disaster relief. With the Lisbon treaty, the EU subsumed the WEU.

![EU’s CSDP Organizational Structure](image)

Figure 2: EU’s CSDP Organizational Structure

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17 Dover, 248.
NATO-EU Strategic Partnership

The paper’s opening quotation highlighted the essential need to combine the capabilities of both organizations. At the turn of the century, the originality of the sentiment became relevant when certain events started a debate in 1998,

The position of the British and the French had already changed, when Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac in December 1998, agreed to the St. Malo Declaration, which not only opened up for the decision at the Helsinki Council meeting in December of 1999 to establish the [European Security and Defense Policy] ESDP, but also for a dynamic process of defense integration that few had thought possible, but which immediately gave rise to intensified discussions about the nature of the NATO-EU relationship.19

This question was not an endeavor just for academics. “As former NATO secretary general [Javier Solana] and as British former defense minister [George Robertson] who had been one of the architects behind the St. Malo Declaration, both recognized the importance of constructive and institutionalized relations between the two organizations.”20 From this stimulus came the NATO-EU strategic partnership.

The NATO-EU strategic partnership draws on two key documents, the NATO-EU Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the Berlin Plus arrangements. The principles of the partnership are:

- effective mutual consultation;
- equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and NATO;
- respect for the interests of the EU and NATO members states;
- respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
- coherent, transparent, and mutually reinforcing development of the military

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20 Ibid.
capability requirements common to the two organizations.\textsuperscript{21}

The Berlin Plus agreements established the following \textit{ways} to achieve the principles of the partnership:

- A NATO-EU Security Agreement that covers the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules;
- Assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led operations;
- Availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led civil-military operations;
- Procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities;
- Terms of reference for using NATO’s DSACEUR (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe) for commanding EU-led operations;
- EU-NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led operations making use of NATO assets and capabilities;
- Arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing capability requirements, in particular the incorporation within NATO's defense planning of the military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military operations.

**Conclusion**

NATO and the EU have developed two similar, but unique international organizations, NATO remaining true to an intergovernmental definition as the EU is evolving into a pseudo-supranational organization; each carrying out different decision processes, based on various levels of members’ sovereignty and integration. Both organizations are concerned with crisis management, both bring the military

capability of their member states to the table and one brings the added benefit of a
civilian crisis planning capability. The shared values and principles of the strategic
partnership with the background of each organization present all the elements for a
cooperative relationship. With this baseline in place, an analysis of the strategic
partnership and political processes, which led to the two counter-piracy missions,
should illuminate the strategic challenges in the partnership.
Chapter III

Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and the Response of the International Community

This chapter will examine the situation on the ground, or in these circumstances, at sea off the coast of Somalia. The international community’s (IC) response provides a useful case study for an analysis of the strategic partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). A closer appreciation for piracy and its causal factors will frame an understanding of how the IC responded to the threat it posed. Within this response, observations on the decisions and politics, which led to those verdicts, should supply practical material for analysis and discussion.

The situation in Somalia has been grim for several decades. One could attest that as far back as the last decade of the twentieth century Somalia has been a failed state. Piracy is symptomatic of the pervasive poverty and absence of effective governance that emerged in Somalia in the first decade of the 21st century. Gangs and coastal fishermen resorted to attacking and taking maritime commercial vessels hostage off the coast of Somalia. Taking huge risk because of the potential payoff, Somali pirates would take to the high sea in vessels often no bigger than a dhow, a coastal fishing and transport vessel. Then, after several weeks at sea on minimal rations and anywhere from a couple hundred to a thousand miles off the coast, they would attack the largest of commercial vessels with skiffs, ladders, and small arms, such as AK-47’s and rocket propelled grenades, hoping to hijack the vessel and holding it along with its crew for ransom. From 2004 to 2008, data collected by the UN agency, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), shows a 1000% rise in acts of piracy from 13 incidents in 2004 to 134 incidents in 2008,
and at the crisis’ peak in 2010, the Somalia pirates hijacked and held 46 ships for ransom that year alone.¹ These acts threatened the sea-lanes in the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. The threat to sea-lanes caused insurance premiums to soar and merchant companies to change their traditional routes at an increased voyage cost. This threat also directly threatened humanitarian shipments into Mogadishu and sustainment shipments for African Union’s (AU) African Mission Somalia (AMISOM), which was executing a critical peace-enforcement mission in Somalia.

As early as 2007, noting concern about piracy in various United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) on the conditions in Somalia, the UN in June 2008 issued UNSCR 1816, its first resolution urging member states to be vigilant against the threat of piracy off the coast of Somalia.² Then in October 2008, via UNSCR 1838, the UN Security Council called upon member states to actively fight piracy off the coast of Somalia.³

To understand the IC’s response, the initial question to suggest is: what exactly is piracy and armed robbery at sea. Piracy is a criminal act on the high seas, outside of a

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state’s territorial seas; armed robbery is the same act in a state’s territorial seas. In an optimal situation, these criminal acts would fall under the jurisdiction of a maritime law enforcement agency. In this case, the sizeable geography from which the pirates operate and lack of any maritime law enforcement capability in the region, made a law enforcement solution unattainable, see figure 3. The African and Near Eastern regional navies’ sphere of influence and capability were no match for the requirements of persistent reconnaissance, maritime escort, and maritime interdiction operations. Any action against the pirates would require the action of UN member states from outside the region.

Figure 3: Somali Pirate Operating Area

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On a permanent basis, NATO operates naval forces called Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) 1 and 2. Traditionally SNMG 1 and 2 operate in the Northern Seas, Atlantic Ocean, and Mediterranean. In October of 2008, SNMG 2 was scheduled to conduct an out of area deployment to the Middle East, but NATO, responding to the call of the UN Security Council, decided to take up the task of fighting piracy. Under the banner of Operation ALLIED PROVIDER, NATO’s SNMG 2 operated off the coast of Somalia to deter acts of piracy and escort World Food Program (WFP) vessels from October to December of 2008.

In November of 2008, the European Council decided to initiate the EU’s first maritime operations under the auspices of the Common Security and Defense Policy, titled Operation ATALANTA.\(^5\) The mandate was to protect the WFP vessels delivering aid to Somalia and sustainment shipment in support of the AMISOM, deter, prevent, and repress acts of piracy, protect vulnerable shipping off Somalia, and contribute to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia. NATO, in December of that same year, suspended Operation ALLIED PROVIDER. There is no evidence that, per the provisions of the strategic partnership, the two organizations consulted each other in either the EU’s decision to instigate an operation or NATO’s to stand-down. In addition, there is no evidence of an offer of NATO military planning capability or signs of consultation on NATO capabilities contributions to ATALANTA. Despite these shortcomings, NATO publicly praised the EU’s effort to initiate a maritime operation, per

its Minister of Foreign Affairs meeting’s Final Communique that same year.\(^6\)

The next winter, scheduled in early 2009, NATO SNMG was to make a deployment to the Far East, to include Singapore and Australia, the first of its kind. The NAC again decided to take advantage of NATO’s presence in the Western Indian Ocean and contribute to the amelioration of the deteriorating situation at sea off the coast of Somalia. In 2009 the number of piracy incidents for the year reached 222, surpassing 2008’s totals.\(^7\) Shortly after NATO’s naval task force began its out of area deployment, on 8 April 2009, the SS MAERSK ALABAMA incident occurred. Made famous by the Hollywood film, *Captain Phillips*, Somali pirates hijacked the U.S. flagged vessel and took its crew hostage. Within days, the U.S. took direct action by Navy Seals to retrieve the vessel and her crew. This incident motivated the NAC to reach a decision to resume Operation ALLIED PROVIDER by redirecting its naval task force to remain in the region and directed the military command structure to plan for a more robust counter-piracy operation.\(^8\) The planning led the NAC to approve Operation OCEAN SHIELD on 17 August 2009. OCEAN SHIELD’s mandate was, and continues to be, the combatting of piracy, coordination with the civil maritime community for their safe passage, and regional capacity building within means and capabilities.\(^9\) Current approval for NATO’s


As at the beginning of 2009, there is no evidence of mutual consultation between organizations in regards to NATO’s decision to resume their counter-piracy operation and expand its mandate, resulting in a potential duplication of effort.

As a core planner for NATO’s operational Joint Planning Group, the author observed that the duplication of mandates by the two organizations for similar operations and objectives directly created a critical force allocation problem. The exclusive NATO maritime states, such as Turkey, committed to OCEAN SHIELD. The United States committed to OCEAN SHIELD despite leading a coalition counter-piracy task force of its own. Many member-states with both organizations took different approaches to force contribution. Assessment of the force allocation process by member-states will be analyzed in the next chapter, but leads to the following possible reasons concerning states’ motivation for supporting or not supporting OCEAN SHIELD.

First, some states continued to contribute to ATALANTA and went a step further donating forces to OCEAN SHIELD; a possible deduction is these states desired for both organizations to succeed. Second, some states withheld contribution to OCEAN SHIELD, in light of commitment and/or aspirations for ATALANTA. Finally, once NATO decided to make a semi-permanent rotation of its two SNMG as the core of its task force, some states loyal to its SNMG commitment stayed on for the operation, other for various political reasons, withdrew their forces from the SNMG. Usually this withdrawal only occurred once the SNMG assumed OCEAN SHIELD responsibilities; otherwise, the states maintained their obligation to the SNMG.

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By the summer of 2009, three international task forces operated in the region, and several nations had either approved or deployed forces in support of unilateral missions in the region, to include China, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Yemen. In addition to NATO’s and the EU’s operations, the United States, under the authority of U.S. Fifth Fleet, was leading a coalition task force called Combined Task Force (CTF) 151. CTF-151 formed in January 2009 as a mission specific task force, operationally accountable to Commander Combined Maritime Force (CMF), who also is the commander of U.S. Fifth Fleet. CMF forms task forces aligned to the topical UNSCR, in this case the UN counter-piracy resolutions dictated CTF-151’s mission.

Thus far, the case history has only touched on the applicable international military response. Numerous other international stakeholders, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and INTERPOL, also engaged in the IC’s response. At the political level, the IC has strived for a unity of effort in the loosest sense, through a transnational forum called the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). The group meets regularly at the working level and then presents a report of ongoing efforts to the UN on a quarterly schedule.

With the vast array of multi-lateral and unilateral military responses to the threat of piracy, the western states and organizations quickly recognized the need for unity of effort. Any attempt to achieve some level of unity of effort at the tactical level, not only

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helped avoid a duplication of labors, but also afforded the synchronization of activities across a very large geographic area to limit the effects of piracy. Since there was no unity of command amongst the array of participants, the general assumption amongst participating force commanders was any attempt to realize unity would need to start first with shared awareness. The result was a collaborative forum called the Shared Awareness and De-confliction Event (SHADE), which continues to meet today. Interested military parties and several international organizations (IO), like the IMO, continue to come together on a regular basis to share tactical information and initiatives on combating piracy. The SHADE has been a very successful forum, receiving recognition at the CGPCS. The success of this ad-hoc initiative raises the question why the EU and NATO could not develop a unity of command solution through the DSACEUR leadership position, as accepted by both organizations in the Berlin Plus agreements?

The initial reaction of the IC concentrated on either defending shipping from the threat of piracy via convoy operations, deterring the pirates with a naval presence in the region, or disrupting piracy through interdictions at sea by either detention of pirates, or worst-case, lethal action against the pirates. All of these actions focused on the act of piracy. As previously mentioned, piracy grew as a symptom of the root problems ashore in Somalia. Therefore, the fundamental question still relevant today is how to fix the conditions ashore, so piracy no longer provides a preferable alternative to Somali fishermen? In 2009, the feasible solution entailed international navies dealing directly with the symptom of piracy. Western nations’ aspirational goal was for regional states to deal with the problem. To accomplish the goal the alternative was to build regional
states’ capacity and capability for them to take on the responsibility.

From the onset, NATO’s operation was unique in its original mandate for OCEAN SHIELD. The political directives called for the operation to conduct maritime capacity building in the region. Activities to support such an objective involve engaging the political, governance, and naval institutions of the regional states. With the experience of these engagements, the goal of strategies and plans development was to foster a willingness among Western Indian Ocean and Near East regional states to take on the anti-piracy responsibility and to equip and train those states to carry out the mission.

The achievability of this objective challenged NATO from its inception. There was one very large caveat in the political directives, which in the end was unsurmountable; there was no availability of resources outside of staff officer time. NATO’s political intent was to achieve the objective within means and capabilities; therefore, unless a force-contributing nation came to the operation resourced to carry out these types of tasks, the objective was not going to receive the appropriate attention required. What this highlighted is that an intergovernmental organization, such as NATO is limited in what it can do, without significant contribution from its member states.

The EU also recognized that piracy is only a symptom of the larger problems, so they began to explore means by which they could assist with improving the situation ashore. In a series of initiatives, executing the new political mechanisms within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the EU achieved several milestones towards providing ways and means of assisting the region, specifically Somalia, with its challenges.

In their first step, in April 2010, the EU began activities to deal with the security
problem ashore, by initiating the EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia. The mission’s purpose, to train Somali National Army forces, aligned with EU values and respect for international humanitarian law and human rights. In 2013, the mission’s purpose expanded to include strategic advisory and mentoring activities.\textsuperscript{13} These ongoing activities are to assist the government of Somalia with establishing internal security, so development of good governance can occur.

On the heels of EUTM Somalia, demonstrating the power of the organizational political consultation process after the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council approved a foreign policy under the auspices of CFSP and its comprehensive approach concept, termed a ‘Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa’. The member states of the EU agreed to five objectives:

1. Assist all countries in the region to build robust and accountable political structures, including civil and civic institutions, allowing the people of the Horn to express their legitimate political aspirations and ensure that their basic human rights and freedoms are respected;
2. Work with the countries of the region and with international organizations (especially the United Nations and African Union) to resolve current conflicts, particularly in Somalia and Sudan, and avoid future potential conflicts between or within countries;
3. Ensure that, until that is achieved, the insecurity in the region does not threaten the security of others beyond its borders, e.g. through piracy, terrorism or irregular migration;
4. Support efforts to promote the economic growth of all countries and people in the region, to enable them to reduce poverty, increase prosperity and enjoy not suffer from the benefits globalization can bring;
5. Support political and economic regional cooperation and bolster the role of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to tap into positive trends and developments across national borders.\textsuperscript{14}


\textsuperscript{14} European Union, “Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa: 3124th Foreign Affairs Council meeting Brussels, 14 November 2011,” European Union,
This framework provides a much broader set of objectives to seek solutions to problems in the region, which include piracy, and affords the synchronization of efforts between the supranational organization and its member states.

The final and most recent milestone for the EU in regards to piracy and the great Somali problem was the establishment of the Anti-piracy mission, EUCAP NESTOR in July 2012. The mission’s objective, “to offer a solution that covers the whole process ‘from crime to court’ starting with the arrestation and detention of suspects up to the investigation and prosecution of maritime crime.”\(^{15}\) Under the leadership of a Special Representative and as part of its mandate, EUCAP Nestor is to promote regional cooperation in maritime security and coordinate regional capacity building activities.

Piracy off the Horn of Africa has challenged security within the maritime domain the last several years. The response by the world navies has been superb. The tactical forces of OCEAN SHIELD and ATALANTA have achieved some level of ad-hoc coordination between themselves and with the other responders from the IC, but the lack of unity of effort still has not fixed the problem. For the time being, the level of piracy activity has dropped back to pre-crisis numbers, but the root causes of the symptom still exist in Somalia. The critical question: can NATO and the EU find better results from closer cooperation? Are there strategic efforts between the member states of the two organizations and organizational collaboration that can lead to solution sets for the problem?

Chapter IV

Does NATO's and the EU's response to Piracy conform to the agreed principles of their Strategic Partnership?

In earlier sections, a description of the organizations and their relationship within the case study pointed out some divergence between the two institutions. North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) and the European Union’s (EU) decision-making process to initiate operations did not appear to reflect the political consultation aspect of the partnership. The force allocation between the two operations seemed to demonstrate a priority preference between organizations. Despite successful ad-hoc coordination at the theater level, response options did not explore practical elements of the partnership like shared planning capability and potential unified command. In this section, the analysis will look at four areas of interest. First, from the political level evaluate the strategic motivation behind the partnership. Second, analyze the strategic partnership through a side-by-side comparison of the organizations values and interests as found in NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept and the EU’s 2003 Security Strategy. Third, assess the operational realities of force allocation. Finally, highlights from the tactical cooperation and coordination will reveal that some level of success through teamwork is possible. The intent is for these four areas of interest to demonstrate the partnership’s strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities.

Political motivation behind the partnership

An understanding of the motivation for NATO, the EU’s Common Security Defense Policy (CSDP), and in the case study, the reason behind operation initiations, is critical to frame the strategic partnership between the two. Depending on the
international relations point of view presented, there are a variety of questions that could
direct the organizational relationship analysis. The facts remain simple, 22 European
states are members of both NATO and the EU, in which both organizations only have 28
member states. See table 1. Therefore, a realist who does not consider cooperation a
viable ideal may ask the question: why do both organizations require a military
apparatus? An institutionalist may ask the question – what drives both organizations to
maintain a military alliance and how may the two organizations ensure efficiency and not
duplication?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member States and Partners</th>
<th>NATO¹ Year of membership</th>
<th>EU² Year of membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Member Countries,” NATO - Topic,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm (accessed February 1, 2015);
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Partners,” NATO – Topic,
(accessed February 1, 2015).
³ EAPC: Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member States and Partners</th>
<th>NATO¹ Year of membership</th>
<th>EU² Year of membership</th>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: NATO and EU Member States and Partners

This section will utilize the theory of institutionalism in the analysis, because this international relations theory acknowledges cooperation amongst states is possible and does the best to describe the role of international organizations in the world order. Institutionalism, “argue[s] that institutions—defined as a set of rules, norms, practices, and decision-making procedures that shape expectations—can overcome the uncertainty
NATO and the EU are two institutions attempting to do exactly as prescribed in the definition of institutionalism, instill practices and decision-making amongst the member states, and take that ideal a step further and develop practices between the two organizations in their strategic partnership. Through an analysis of some national perspectives, the strengths and weaknesses of the partnership should become apparent and will provide the background for an evaluation of the values and interests of the two organizations in the follow-on section.

The review of national perspectives will focus on the post-Cold War period. Before studying some member states’ perspectives on NATO and the EU’s CSDP, some historical context on states’ relationship, especially within NATO is helpful. Early after the conclusion of WWII in the European Theater, pre-war philosophies on international affairs in regards to isolationism influenced the United States’ perspective on maintaining persistent defense capabilities in Europe. Dr. Matthew Rhodes in his article *U.S. perspectives on NATO*, “At the onset of 1948, the Truman administration still dismissed British proposals for United States’ participation in a European alliance, worrying this could jeopardize the fragile support for economic assistance and perpetuate a disproportionate American burden for the continent’s defense.”\(^5\) Not necessarily a direct cause and effect of U.S. policy, this perspective often illustrates why Western European states sought a cooperative defense agreement amongst themselves in the Brussels Treaty. Historically, all the readers understand eventually that the threat of Communism


drove the policy decisions of the United States and Western European states and NATO grew as an intergovernmental organization in the 1950s and 1960s. The next significant historical event in NATO’s development worth highlighting is France’s withdrawal from the NATO military structure in 1966. In President de Gaulle’s letter of 1966 to U.S. President Johnson, he describes a changing global environment and a need for France to regain its sovereignty.

With the historical context of U.S. involvement in NATO and the French perspective on withdrawal from NATO, let the analysis now consider some states' perspectives on NATO and the EU’s CSDP. The foci of the states’ perspective will concentrate on four states. The four perspectives in review are the United States, based on its historical leadership role in NATO, the United Kingdom, for an Atlanticist point of view, France, for an Europeanist point of view, and Germany, for a state that has shifted perspective over time.

United States

An insight into the current U.S. administration’s views came in 2009 at the Munich Security Conference from Vice President Joe Biden. The Vice President expressed, “we support the further strengthening of European defense, an increased role for the European Union in preserving peace and security, [and] a fundamentally stronger NATO-EU partnership.” The Vice President’s sentiment is consistent with U.S. policy as represented in the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS, in its section on partnership, discusses both NATO and the EU. In respect to NATO, the document

states, “The North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) is the pre-eminent security alliance in the world today. We are committed to ensuring that NATO is able to address the full range of 21st century challenges, while serving as a foundation of European security.”\(^8\) This stance on NATO’s role is very strong and emphasizes the importance the United States places on NATO in supporting European security. To complement this stance, the NSS expresses an equally direct statement about the EU when it says, “Building on European aspirations for greater integration, we [the United States] are committed to partnering with a stronger European Union to advance our shared goals, especially in promoting democracy and prosperity in Eastern European countries that are still completing their democratic transition and in responding to pressing issues of mutual concern.”\(^9\) The order in which these two stances appear in the NSS infers a priority with NATO, but a complementary relationship. In the recently published 2015 NSS, the U.S. Administration builds on the direct language of the 2010 NSS. First, the 2015 NSS expresses a significant commitment to Europe by stating, “A strong Europe is our indispensable partner, including for tackling global security challenges, promoting prosperity, and upholding international norms.”\(^10\) The 2015 NSS goes further to express the United States’ perspective regarding NATO and the EU. The strategy states, NATO is the strongest alliance the world has ever known and is the hub of an expanding security network. Our article 5 commitments to the collective defense of all NATO members is ironclad, as is our commitment to ensuring the Alliance remains ready and capable for crisis management and cooperative security. We will continue to deepen our relationship with the European Union (EU), which has helped to promote peace and prosperity across the region, and deepen NATO-EU ties to

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9 Ibid.
enhance trans-Atlantic security.\textsuperscript{11}

The United States is committed to NATO and desires that it remain predominant, but it also supports the development of a European indigenous security capability. This strategy can only succeed by means of an implied collaborative relationship between the two organizations.

**France**

France is the largest proponent of Europeanism; therefore, it is appropriate to evaluate their national perspective. In his book *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union*, British scholar Joylan Howorth captures well both the historical and current sentiment of the French government. When the French withdrew from the military structure in 1966, France became a staunch proponent of a European solution for European defense and security. Howorth paraphrases Dr Frédéric Bozo, and states, “Yet France remained a member of the Atlantic Alliance and professed herself a firm friend of the US. At the same time, throughout the post-war [WWII] period, France constantly promoted a more robust and autonomous type of European security entity.”\textsuperscript{12} This sentiment carries on today, but in fairness to the French attitude, carries a multifaceted aspect often misconstrued as anti-NATO. France appears to have a dual perspective on the utility of both NATO and the EU’s CSDP. Again as stated by Howorth,

The report [Hubert Védrine report for President Hollande] succeeded in moving the conversation about NATO and CSDP forward. Védrine insisted that there was no longer any question of revisiting the decision on reintegration (which he himself opposed in 2009). On the contrary, the objective had to be for France and the other EU member states to play a much more active and dynamic role in the Alliance – in short to ‘Europeanize NATO’, in order to transcend the dichotomy between

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid. Underlines added for emphasis.

NATO and CSDP.\textsuperscript{13}

The perspective presented by Howorth suggests that France advocate for European states to shoulder a leadership role and influence within NATO in order to find the appropriate alignment between the two organizations. The latest French White Paper on Defense and National Security appears to echo Howorth’s opinion.

Camile Grand in his review of the French white paper echoes the historical French perspective in two regards. In one he states, “Making the European Union a major player in crisis management and international security is one of the central tenets of France’s security policy.”\textsuperscript{14} This point demonstrates France’s desired role for the EU’s CSDP. Grand goes on to draw out from the French white paper the key implementer of this role is for an update of the EU Defense and Security Strategy, when he states, “The French continue to advocate the adoption of a Livre blanc européen on defense and security, which was a formal recommendation of the 2008 white paper.”\textsuperscript{15} Looking forward, Grand does go on and draw the same conclusion about NATO-EU relations as Howorth, when he states, “There is not competition between NATO and European Union. The two are complementary. It is imperative that both organizations come to grips with the complexity of international threats and crises.”\textsuperscript{16}

The separate opinions offered by these academics suggest France does not advocate one organization over the other, but finds utility in both. This poses an interesting dilemma to consider for several reasons. One, as will be apparent later in the

\textsuperscript{13} Howorth, 128.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, 13.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, 9.
force allocation section, France has not supported NATO’s counter-piracy operation with resources. Two, France did not break silence during the NATO decision process, allowing the organization to go forth with its operation initiation.

**United Kingdom (UK)**

The other end of the spectrum from France on NATO and the EU CSDP, from an Atlanticism viewpoint, is the United Kingdom. Coming out of WWII the relationship between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt illustrated the positive, reliant national relationship the United Kingdom and United States possessed. This relationship held through the development of NATO for decades. The strong support for the trans-Atlantic aspect of European defense, though, was questioned when the United Kingdom instigated the dialogue with France, which led to the St. Malo proposal and the reviving of the desire for a European solution for European defense and security. Many at first thought the United Kingdom was changing its priority. Howorth suggest a complex logic, which continues to demonstrate United Kingdom’s strong support for NATO and the obvious relationship for the two organizations. Howorth stated, “In this sense, CSDP, for Tony Blair, was above all a strategy aimed at preserving NATO.”

Howorth’s conclusion has proven correct over time. The United Kingdom’s strong advocacy for the trans-Atlantic alliance plays out in NATO, but the United Kingdom continues to support EU’s security and defense aspirations. The United Kingdom in 2010 issued its first national security strategy. Unlike the last two U.S. NSS that focused a whole section on its European partnerships with NATO and EU, the United Kingdom in several areas of its strategy brings up its relationship with the United States, NATO, and EU, all emphasizing a reliance on collective defense. In the most direct

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17 Howorth, 118.
fashion, the United Kingdom expresses its perspective when it states,

This Strategy outlines the international context in which we can best pursue our interests: through a commitment to collective security via a rules-based international system and our key alliances, notably with the United States of America (US); through an open global economy that drives wealth creation across the world; and through effective and reformed international institutions including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as the anchor of transatlantic security, and our vital partnership in the European Union (EU).\textsuperscript{18}

This extract from the United Kingdom’s strategy indicates a strong commitment to the United States and the trans-Atlantic relationship as captured in NATO, but is also committed to the EU. Similar to France, the United Kingdom seems to desire an environment of multilateral relationships in which both organizations can coexist.

**Germany**

The last national perspective to consider is Germany. Following WWII Germany was a strong proponent of the trans-Atlantic strength of NATO, but over time, that perspective has appeared to change for them. Again, Howorth in his previously mentioned book captures a good outlook of Germany’s perspective when he states,

As the United States slipped effortlessly into its role as the world’s only superpower and began increasingly to project power around the globe, carrying NATO in its wake and imposing on the Alliance a new, more global and more interventionist culture, Germany became less and less comfortable and experienced a growing contradiction in its ontological culture which caused it progressively to distance itself from some of the central pillars of the new NATO at the same time as it began to look elsewhere for a security institution more consonant with its ongoing values.\textsuperscript{19}

Germany has not looked far for another security institute in the EU’s CSDP and demonstrated their support for the EU’s apparatus within the piracy case. Employment of


\textsuperscript{19} Howorth, 122.
German armed forces falls under the Parliamentary Participation Act of 2005. This law requires a parliamentary vote for utilization of German forces outside of Germany. Germany held a parliamentary vote to support the EU’s Operation ATALANTA; they did not for NATO’s counter-piracy operation. There is the possibility that extenuating circumstances existed in spring 2009 when NATO was developing its operations, which precluded a German parliamentary vote on support for the operation. It seems more apparent that Germany was already committed to its preferred security institute, the EU’s CSDP.

Section conclusion

The member states of NATO and the EU remain politically committed to both organizations. With the United States’ continued support of the trans-Atlantic relationship, and both the Atlanticists and Europeanists in Europe demonstrating a political motivation for both intergovernmental organizations, the climate seems to exist for the strategic partnership to succeed. One final conclusion from Howorth summarizing a good perspective on the coexistence of the two organizations, he states,

Gradually, as CSDP acquired substance and as transatlantic relations continued to suffer from the fallout of the 2003 Iraq War, all of these countries [European NATO member states] learned to balance their traditional institutional preference for NATO with an increasing commitment to and belief in CSDP, not as alternative but as a complement to the Alliance.20

With an appreciation for the political climate, now a look at two of the strategic documents will give us a first indication of the political climate translating into reality; or does the strong language about the strategic partnership in the NATO’s 2010 Concept find contradiction in the lack of language in the EU’s 2003 Security Strategy and 2008

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20 Ibid, 118.
Organizational Strategies

NATO and the EU each have an overarching strategy. For NATO, the 2010 Strategic Concept is the latest Heads of State and Government approved strategy for the organization. The closest equivalent from the EU is their 2003 Security Strategy and associated 2008 review, which carries European Council approval. A side-by-side comparison of these two documents as a follow-on from the analysis of the state perspective is important, because analysis rounds out the state perspectives with the organizational perspectives in order to understand the context of the strategic partnership and its application in operations, as in our case study.

Previous in the paper, the background section highlighted the values of NATO and the EU. NATO espouses democracy, individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights. The EU promotes principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, international peace and security, human rights, integration of Europe and collaboration in economic, social, and cultural matters, and collective self-defense. Side by side, the organizational values appear to align very closely. This observation is logical, since over the past century the nations of Europe and North America have demonstrated common values. For both organizations, these values have translated into similar organizational missions. NATO views its mission as collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. The EU under its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDP view its mission as military crisis management, civilian crisis management, and conflict prevention.

A full side-by-side analysis of strategies’ strategic environment, ends, ways, and
means is at the appendix. The analysis show very little difference in the manners by which the IOs view the environment and only minor difference in ends, ways, and means, specific to their individual unique capabilities.

The important aspect of the strategy development to recognize and evaluate is what the two documents say about each other. NATO and the EU both acknowledge each other in their respective prefaces. NATO’s Strategic Concept states, “It commits the Alliance to prevent crisis, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.”21 The EU’s 2008 strategic review states, “The EU and NATO must deepen their strategic partnership for better co-operation in crisis management.”22 As was observed in the political motive section, both organizations are calling for cooperation between themselves. The strategies do reveal a concern; there is a disparity in each organization’s language on the partnership. NATO calls the EU an essential partner and goes on to state, “NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security.”23 The EU strategy states, “One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship.”24 The NATO appears to reflect equality in stature amongst organizations and team building qualities between them. The EU’s strategy appears focused on the trans-Atlantic quality of its own international partnership with the United States, viewing

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21 NATO, Strategic Concept, 4.
23 NATO, Strategic Concept, 28.
NATO as the form of that relationship. This tactic gives the impression of relegating NATO into just an element of military power for the utilization of sovereign entities like the member states of NATO and EU as an organization. This interpretation of the strategy’s language creates a bit of an impasse when evaluating the tenets of the strategic partnership. It appears despite the strategic partnership’s continued theme of cooperation, the strategies miss an element of mutual collaboration on security issues.

It is relevant to consider how this final point and the other observations play out in the counter-piracy operations of the two organizations. In the next section, an analysis of the force contribution of each organization’s member states may reveal a priority of organizational interest and the last section will potentially reinforce the observation about a lack of mutual collaboration in the strategic partnership.

**Member States Force Contributions**

In this section an analysis of the member states’ contributions to Operations OCEAN SHIELD and ATALANTA will afford the opportunity to draw some conclusions on member states’ political priorities in regards to the two organizations.

There are some reference statistics to recall in analyzing force contribution:

- NATO is comprised of 28 member states
- Only 16 NATO member states have the means of supporting this type of operation.
- EU is comprised of 28 member states
- Only 14 EU member states have the means of supporting this type of operation.
- 12 of the states under analysis are in both organizations.
- The United Kingdom has provided the operational Commander and facilities for the EUNAVFOR, the operational HQ for ATALANTA since operation inception.
In table 5 is a simple break down of ships and maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (MPRA) provided by states to the operation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
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<th>EU Assets</th>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1 ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6 ships</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td>9 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2 ships (early in operation)</td>
<td>4 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7 ships</td>
<td>4 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands, The</td>
<td>4 ships and 2 submarines</td>
<td>5 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1 ship</td>
<td>1 MPRA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1 ship</td>
<td>1 ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1 ship</td>
<td>1 ship and 1 MPRA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 ships</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1 ship</td>
<td>13 ships and 1 MPRA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>7 ships</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>1 ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>6 ships</td>
<td>3 ships</td>
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<td>United States</td>
<td>11 ships</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO only</td>
<td>NATO and EU membership</td>
<td>EU only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Member State’s Force Contributions

Notably, France, Germany, and Spain have not contributed forces to NATO’s operation, but have contributed significantly to EU’s operation. In light of the political motives discussed in the previous section, the coincidence is too close not to draw the observation that these three states put a higher priority on crisis response by the EU’s CSDP than NATO.

There are several minor observations to draw from the data. There are states in both organizations that stretched their means to support both organizations, such as Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Denmark has remained committed to NATO,
with its opt-out on defense stance with the EU.\textsuperscript{25}

Based on these observations there are several conclusions to draw and some logical speculation to consider. The force contributions of France contradict the ideals written in the \textit{Livre Blanc Sur la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale}, which emphasized the utility of both organizations. If France considered the EU in a better position to take on this maritime crisis, the logical question is why the IOs did not put an effort did into exercising the tenets of the strategic partnership? Through the mutual consultation and planning tenets of the partnership, the two organizations should have found the means for a non-duplicative operation, or, even more ambitious, a consolidation of efforts into a unified effort. Germany took parliamentary action to vote on its participation in Operation ATALANTA. It did not for NATO’s operation; thus, logical conjecture leads to surmising Germany did not feel compelled as a matter of priority to support NATO’s operation. To draw a conclusion on Spain’s overwhelming EU support, let us consider an excerpt from Dr. Howorth’s book. He cites from the book Democratic Spain: Reshaping Relations in a Changing World edited by Richard Gillespie, F. Rodrigo, and J. Story, a perspective on Spain’s membership in NATO,

Spanish leaders had to tread very lightly in nudging an instinctively anti-American public in the direction of Alliance membership, but PSOE Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales was able, between 1982 and 1986, to achieve precisely that, winning a decisive referendum on Spanish membership with the message that membership of NATO was a necessary springboard to what was perceived as the real prize: EU membership (Gillespie, et al, 1995).\textsuperscript{26}

Considering this perspective, it is simple to draw the conclusion that Spain’s priority security organization is the EU’s CSDP over NATO.

The data is simple, but the observations based on the force contributions are profound in highlighting member-states’ preferences between the two organizations. The divide in force contribution coincides with philosophies of Atlanticism and Europeanism. The division in state philosophies hinders the strategic partnership, because the tension between heavy U.S. influence associated with Atlanticism and the desire for European solutions within Europeanism challenge the idea of cooperation between the two organizations. At the political and strategic military level, there are weaknesses between the two organizations; does the same exist for the tactical level? In the final section of analysis, a review of tactical coordination may shed further some light on the relationship between the two organizations.

**Ad Hoc Tactical Coordination = Unity of Effort?**

This section will analyze the tactical coordination occurring between tactical forces at sea and between operational headquarters. A criterion for achieving effectiveness in any military operation or otherwise is unity of effort. Dr. Noel Sproles defines this ideal as, “unity of effort uses the synergy obtainable from every element of the force when acting in unison to maximize the capabilities of a military force.”\(^{27}\) Unity of command is a strong enabler of the unity of effort concept. When unity of command is not feasible, stakeholders, driven by pragmatism, strive to achieve unity of effort by other means. In the counter-piracy operations off Somalia there are two coordination fora worth analyzing, the SHADE and TRADE.

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Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE)

The first and more significant of the cooperation fora amongst the tactical forces
is the SHADE. Per an article on the periodic event, an EU news release defined the
forum as “…a means of sharing ‘best practice’, conduct informal discussions and de-
conflict the activities of those nations and organizations involved in military counter-
piracy operations in the region.”28 The SHADE has allowed organizations, such as
NATO, the EU, and CMF, along with states, such as China, Russia, and Japan to come
together, share their operational approach to combatting piracy, and collaborate on means
of burden sharing. The forum has achieved a certain level of unity of effort in practices
such as the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) and shared convoy
operations responsibilities. Several states are in the area under a mandate to protect
convoys of their own nationally flagged vessels. Through interaction at the SHADE,
states collaborate and offer up opportunities in their unilateral convoys for other state
flagged vessels to join the convoys, thus getting more utilization out of the protection
force. The SHADE has proven so effective; the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) endorses the forum, which was also lauded at the UN Contact Group on Piracy off
the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) plenary sessions. This forum demonstrated such a
positive impact, operational HQ considered how to utilize the idea in other unity of effort
applications and developed the TRADE.

Training Awareness and De-confliction (TRADE)

The TRADE was a NATO initiative to replicate the coordination of the SHADE
within the context of regional assistance in the development of maritime security.

28 European Union External Action, “8th Shade Meeting Sees Largest International Participation so Far,”
European Union Naval Forces, http://eunavfor.eu/8th-shade-meeting-sees-largest-international-
participation-so-far/ (accessed February 8, 2015).
NATO, along with other organizations and states, held aspirations of building up the Western Indian Ocean regional states’ maritime capabilities to share in the burden of countering piracy.

The 'Training Awareness and De-confliction' mechanism (TRADE) is a voluntary coordination forum attended by governments and organizations involved in assisting nations affected by piracy with an aim to provide maritime tactical training to countries in the Western Indian Oceans Region affected by piracy. The first TRADE was held in March 2010 and TRADE has been held approximately every quarter since then. The TRADE is co-chaired by NATO (JFC Lisbon) and EUNAVFOR, participants are: NATO, EU, CMF/NAVCENT, IMO and others.\(^{29}\)

The TRADE facilitated unity of effort by de-conflicting engagements with the regional states in order not to overwhelm them and attempt to bring stakeholders together in common ventures. One example was U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) maritime exercise CUTLASS EXPRESS. Through the TRADE, personality driven initiatives facilitated the inclusion of NATO, EU, and IMO into the exercise in 2011, with one of its goals being the execution of the protocol in the Djibouti Code of Conduct.\(^{30}\) Despite the disbandment of this forum, its synergy continues as the same stakeholders and goals persist in CUTLASS EXPRESS 2015.\(^{31}\)

At the tactical level, these two fora have demonstrated that through ad hoc endeavors, certain level of unity of effort is achievable, but there is no guarantee of a


\(^{30}\) The Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (the Djibouti Code of Conduct) provides a framework for capacity building in the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean to combat the threat of piracy. It is a partnership of the willing and continues to both deliver against its aims as well as attract increasing membership.


legacy of those labors remaining. Therefore, the question has to be how can successful unity of effort find a lasting effect? There is a positive answer to the question. The solution involves better alignment at the highest military levels and team efforts between the political levels of organizations. Unity of command involves delegation of authorities to an individual, therefore, unity of command is most likely not achievable within the context of two international organizations with some differences in membership. That said strategic military command of multiple task forces from different IOs is a unique opportunity.

With a review of political motives behind each organization, the strategies for each, the force contribution towards their respective operations, and ad-hoc tactical coordination between the organizations there should be an appreciation for the challenges and opportunities. In the next chapter, some of the deductions in this chapter will produce recommendations for more pragmatic execution of the strategic partnership.
Chapter V

Where can the Partnership go from here?

As laid out in the NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept, the EU is “…an essential partner for NATO.”\(^1\) The concept goes further and states, “NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security.”\(^2\) To fulfill these two ideals it is crucial to achieve effectiveness within the NATO-EU strategic partnership. An effective partnership enhances the western views of international order. Based on the analysis and conclusions, there are several recommendations for member states and organizations to consider going forward.

To recap, the conclusions are:

- As international organizations, NATO and the EU share very similar values, and their mission statements closely align the purpose of NATO with the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).
- Both organizations are the most successful outcomes of the international relations theory – institutionalism.
- The ideals of a hegemonic state and a realist world perspective counter the ideals of liberalism. Many European member states, as liberalist states, struggle with the status of the United States as a hegemon in the international world order. Two camps of thought arise in NATO from this point: Atlanticism, a strong cooperative relationship with the United States, and Europeanism, a strong motivation for the EU to develop an independent security and defense capability.

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\(^1\) NATO, Strategic Concept, 2.
\(^2\) Ibid
• From a realist’s perspective - A partnership is built on consultation and respect for members’ autonomy. Partnership from an institutionalist’s perspective is premised on cooperation, coordination, and combined efforts.

• Regardless of circumstances outlining the implementation of the counter-piracy operations and/or missions, the strategic partnership allowed two independent counter-piracy operations to be established, disregarding the theme of avoiding duplication and failing to utilize the full effectiveness of both international organizations’ capabilities.

• NATO and the EU both bring quality capabilities to the partnership, which through collaborative efforts can leverage more effective and efficient team solutions to global crises.

When considering improvements of the strategic partnership, the two themes that need emphasis in modifications are maximizing cooperation and pragmatism. Based on these conclusions, some recommendations needing the attention of NATO, the EU, and their respective member states are: to evaluate the nature of the political consultation, the depth and level of joint planning, the means of achieving unity of effort, and training to improve the partnership.

The mutual consultation of the strategic partnership must evolve. This consultation needs to go beyond the formalities of pleasantries and consider well-formulated – non-fautor – actionable solutions to crises and threats to international order. As demonstrated in this case study, solutions to threats are not always a clear-cut burden on one element of a nation’s or IO’s power. Threats in the 21st century require a symphony of the political, diplomatic, economic, civilian, and military elements of power

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to find solutions. Actionable solutions for joint consideration by NATO and the EU need to consider comprehensive, pragmatic solutions.

To achieve comprehensive solutions, joint planning between both organizations, including appropriate political and military inputs need to inform decision-makers in both organizations. Instead of assured EU access to NATO’s planning capabilities for actual use in the military planning of EU-led crisis management operations, planning needs to advance to include an element of jointness. Planning efforts need to include stakeholders from both organizations, such as political officers, lawyers, law enforcement officers, development specialists, and military officers, whether developing strategic options for political consideration or operational plans. In order to achieve this depth of joint planning, the planning effort will need to better align the contact points between the two organizations. The planning cannot be limited between various offices of the CSDP and NATO International Staff and International Military Staff. Strategic military planners from SHAPE need to be included, potentially even assuming a leadership role in the planning, taking advantage of NATO’s established comprehensive planning process, in order to develop better strategic response options. If political decisions are taken to pursue a crisis response, further planning needs to take full advantage of the NATO comprehensive planning process and merge in the utilities of EU’s CSDP civilian crisis management planning.

The resounding benefit of joint planning is unity of effort. To ensure the success of unity of effort there needs to be some theme of unity of command. Proper unity of command could be problematic, since delegations of associated authorities derive from the political authority, which in the IO’s resides with the member states. However, some
theme of unity of command is critical; an amenable solution is required for the partnership to succeed. One potential idea to consider is leveraging a tenet already in the strategic partnership. A term of reference exists for Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) to act as operational commander for EU led operations. If NATO and EU execute a joint approach, the development of a military command and control hierarchy utilizing DSACEUR as the unified Commander, especially for smaller operations like counter-piracy, is plausible. To execute this command and control by a single Commander, common NATO doctrine on Joint Task Forces provides standard operating procedures and staff contributions can come from both organizations and their member states. If considering complex combat operations, an alternative to DSACEUR may be required, due to the volume of the responsibility.

There are layers of intricacy in all of these recommendations, but the exigency to avoid duplication by acknowledging the total ineffectiveness of redundancy makes their contemplation vital to both organizations. The strategic partnership to achieve a better relationship needs to be informed by the key principles of NATO military doctrine – unity of effort and unity of command.

Finally, training is a vital enabler to any successful organization, business, or military. A good amount of NATO's success is attributable to its expansive education, training, and exercise program. It is also plausible to attribute European Naval Forces’ (EUNAVFOR) success to NATO’s training establishment. For the NATO-EU partnership to find success for the pragmatic solutions proposed here, the two organizations will need to educate each other on their respective capabilities, train for comprehensive planning, and exercise collaboratively, especially under a single
Commander. This training and exercise needs to occur at the strategic and operational level, between civilian and military personnel.
Chapter VI

Final Words

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) are unique organizations, NATO is a traditional intergovernmental organization and the EU is an evolving supranational organization. Between the two, they have recognized the utility of cooperation and developed a partnership at the strategic level. The foundation of the partnership is founded on sensible principles, but seems to have fallen short in regards to the execution of those principles, since both organizations each have ongoing counter-piracy operations to deal with the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia. The analysis and associated deduction took an inclusive approach to determine and conclude how the two organizations can do a better job of implementing the partnership in the future.

The paper proposes four distinct recommendations:

1. Incorporate pragmatism into political consultation between the two organizations, not only between NATO’s Secretary General and the EU’s High Representative, but also between the decision makers in the North Atlantic Council and the Political and Security Council.

2. Expand the partnership’s tenet on EU utilization of NATO military planning capability a step further towards collaborative planning for both military and civilian crisis management.

3. Explore utilization of DSACEUR as a multiple tasked Commander and utilization of EU’s Special Representatives to drive unity of effort.

4. Take advantage of the NATO’s education, training, and exercise program and
expand it to include the EU.

All of these recommendations strive to create pragmatism in the partnership.
Appendix

The core of a strategy involves an assessment of the environment it is addressing and then the description of the goals the organization desires to achieve and the ways to go about realizing those goals. A side-by-side review of the organizations’ respective strategic assessments of the threats and conditions reveals a similar perspective of the environment. The EU’s assessment lacks comment on conventional conflict, but this oversight is understandable based on the limited characteristics of collective defense in the EU’s CSDP. The EU’s assessment highlights organized crime and non-state actors, which is slightly different from NATO’s assessment, even though it is plausible these two points are included in other aspects of NATO’s assessment. The only outlier between the two assessments is EU’s condition on security in support of development. This point is different due to the unique nature of the EU’s strength in development aide, a point to remember and draw on when the two organizations discuss cooperative effects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Environment</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATO’s Perspective</strong></td>
<td><strong>EU’s Perspective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low threat of conventional conflict against member states – but requires preparedness</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles</td>
<td>Spread of missile technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction to include Nuclear</td>
<td>Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Terrorism and Trans-National Criminal organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unstable and Conflict regions that foster violent extremist organizations (VEO) and trans-national criminal organizations (TCO)</td>
<td>• Negative effects of Regional conflicts on human, social, and physical infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• State failure that foster criminal activities, illegal immigration, and piracy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Energy security (security)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conditions</td>
<td>NATO’s Perspective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Cyber attack (Foreign Govt., TCO, Terrorists, VEO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate Change</td>
<td>Risk to lines of communication in global commons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Water Scarcity</td>
<td>Threats in the Electronic Spectrum, e.g. Lasers</td>
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<td>Energy demands</td>
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Table 3: NATO’s and EU’s assessment of the Strategic Environment

Considering the values, mission, and outlooks of strategic environment have translated into ends and ways within the strategies. Diverging from the previous comparisons, the ends and ways do demonstrate some disparity. NATO lists significantly more ways to support its objective of defense and deterrence. This observation is reasonable since NATO’s core mission is Article 5 Collective defense, and the EU’s CSDP mission defense does not highlight a strong defense theme. NATO also allocates several ways against proliferation that the EU does not; this reflection seems odd based on the emphasis both organizations place on the threat from proliferation of weapon of mass destruction (WMD). The EU only speaks of policies against proliferation, which may demonstrate a challenge of integration within the EU’s CFSP. The EU does list several ways and adds some means in its strategy that are beyond the scope of NATO’s strategic concept. The EU identifies specific interests, such as the desire for a solution to the Arab and Israeli conflict, more towards means of executing crisis management, and a philosophy of support for regional organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). These differences suggest that EU does have a dissimilar perspective on interests from NATO in some areas. The one obvious area of a specific EU ways deals with several economic measures in the strategy, such as trade policies. Economic tools are a unique capability of EU that NATO does not possess.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Strategies</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Ends (Strategic Objectives)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ends</td>
<td>Ways</td>
<td>Ways</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense and Deterre</td>
<td>Continues Nuclear Alliance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Appropriate force mix of conventional and nuclear capabilities</td>
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<td>Security Strategies</td>
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<td><strong>Ends</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ways</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Ends (Strategic Objectives)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capability to sustain concurrent Joint operations along with several smaller operations</td>
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<td>Robust, mobile, and deployable conventional force capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training, Exercise, Contingency Planning, and Information Sharing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Broadest participation of alliance members</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ballistic Missile Defense</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Resilience in force and populations against Chemical Biological Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) attack</td>
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<td>Cyber defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
<td>European Arrest warrants</td>
<td>Addressing the threats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Critical infrastructure protection in global commons</td>
<td>Counter-Piracy</td>
<td>Building Security in our Neighborhood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Future War Assessments (identifying emerging threats or means)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense posturing</td>
<td>First line of defense abroad</td>
<td>Addressing the threats</td>
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<td>Obligated national defense spending</td>
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<td>Prevent conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Security through Crisis Management</strong></td>
<td><strong>Manage conflict</strong></td>
<td><strong>Addressing the threats</strong></td>
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<td>(Failed states) restore order (military means) – disaster relief (humanitarian means)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Resolution of regional conflict – political solutions aided by military and policing means</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Prevent conflict</td>
<td>(Failed states) restore order (military means) – disaster</td>
<td>Addressing the threats</td>
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<td>Security Strategies</td>
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<td>Ends (Strategic Objectives)</td>
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<td>relieve (humanitarian means)</td>
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<td>Restoration of civil government – economic (means) and civil crisis management (means)</td>
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<td>Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
<td>Building Security in our Neighborhood</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engage other international organizations and national stakeholders</td>
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<td>Intelligence sharing</td>
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<td>Doctrine and military capability development</td>
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<td>Civilian crisis management capability</td>
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<td>Integrate civilian and military planning</td>
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<td>Training and develop local forces</td>
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<td>Identify and train civilian specialists</td>
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<td>Broadest political consultation amongst alliance members and will interest external partners</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Promoting International Security through Cooperation</strong></td>
<td>Support of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>Create conditions for further nuclear disarmament</td>
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<td>Negotiation with Russia on nuclear stockpiles</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Strengthen conventional arms control regime in Europe</td>
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<td>Work with Policies against proliferation</td>
<td>International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ends Ways</td>
<td>Ways</td>
<td>Ends (Strategic Objectives)</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Community to fight proliferation</td>
<td>Appropriate consultation amongst alliance members on national decisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Open Door</td>
<td>Open invitation for Membership</td>
<td>Enlargement – without creating new security issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Wide network of partners relationships</td>
<td>Barcelona Process</td>
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<td>Political dialogue and practical cooperation with any partners</td>
<td>Engagement with Arab world</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cooperation with UN</td>
<td>Promote ring of good governed neighbors (East on board of Mediterranean)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Strategic partnership with European Union</td>
<td>Promote NATO as an expression of objective</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NATO-Russia cooperation</td>
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<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict</td>
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<td>Encourage widening of membership of World Trade Organization (WTO) and International Financial Institutions</td>
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<td>Strengthening of regional organizations, e.g. OSCE</td>
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<td>Spread of good governance, social and political reform, anti-crafting, establishment of rule of law, and protection of human rights</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Building Security in our Neighborhood</td>
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<td>International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism</td>
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<td>Security Strategies</td>
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<td>Ends (Strategic Objectives)</td>
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<td>Trade and development policies</td>
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<td>Promote inclusiveness</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: NATO and EU Strategic Strategy Ends and Ways Comparison

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2 NATO, Strategic Concept, 14-34; European Council, Security Strategy, 6-14.
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VITA

Commander Craig Bennett was commissioned into the United States Navy in 1990 following graduation from Purdue University with a B.A. in History. His background is in naval aviation, flying carrier-based helicopters conducting Anti-Submarine Warfare and Combat Search and Rescue missions for the first 14 years of his career. He has spent the last 11 years on Service and NATO Joint 3 and 4-Star staffs in either J3 or J5 billets. In his time with NATO he was part of the core Joint Planning Group for NATO’s Operation OCEAN SHIELD and NATO’s lead action officer on Regional Capacity Building as part of that operation. His current assignment is at the Joint Advance Warfighting School. Commander Bennett is a graduate of the Naval War College – College of Distance Learning for JPME 1 and has a M.S. in Global Leadership from University of San Diego.