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THESIS

**ADAPTIVE REORGANIZATION OF GERMAN
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**

by

Lars Werner

December 2013

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**ADAPTIVE REORGANIZATION OF GERMAN
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

According to official statements, German Special Operations Forces (GER SOF) ensure that Germany has military options to cope with specific situations at a strategic level. The Bundeswehr, and thus GER SOF, must be capable meeting current tasks and expected future developments. This thesis evaluates the demands on GER SOF by conducting a defense mission analysis. The results are compared with the current GER SOF force structure and capabilities to determine whether sufficient forces are available to meet current requirements. Based on the findings, this thesis provides recommendations to close gaps between demands and current limitations of GER SOF. It further proposes an optimized organizational structure for GER SOF by using Mintzberg's configurational theory to achieve greater internal coherence, and thus, greater effectiveness for current and future missions.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AJP	Allied Joint Paper
BAAINBw	Federal Office for Equipment, Information-Technology and Utilization (German: Bundesamt für Ausrüstung, Informationstechnik und Nutzung der Bundeswehr)
BMVg	German Ministry of Defense (German: Bundesministerium für Verteidigung)
C2	Command and Control
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CS	Combat Support
CSS	Combat Service Support
CT	Counterterrorism
DA	Direct Action
DG	Directorate-General
EATC	European Air Transport Command
ESB	GER Armed Forces permission to buy military equipment not currently available within the Bundeswehr on the market (German: Einsatzbedingter Sofortbedarf)
EU	European Union
FARRP	Forward Air Refueling and Rearming Point
FM	Field Manual
FüSK	Forces Policy (German: Führung Einsatz Streitkräfte)
GER SOF	German Special Operations Forces
GI	General Inspector of the Armed Forces, Chief of Defense
GPF	General Purpose Forces
HRO	Hostage Rescue Operation
HQ	Headquarters
HVI	High Value Individuals
IO	Information Operations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
KdoFOSK	Special Operations Command (German: Kommando Führung Einsatz Spezialkräfte)

KS	Kampfschwimmer (Navy SOF)
KSK	Kommando Spezialkräfte (Army SOF)
LE	Liaison Element
LoA	Level of Ambition
MA	Military Assistance
ME	Mission Element
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MFR	Military Leadership Council (German: Militrischer Fhrungsrat)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPSEC	Operations Security
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Plg	Planning (German: Planung)
PRC	Police Response Company
R&D	Research and Development
SALIS	Strategic Airlift Interim Solution
SE	Strategy and Operations (German: Strategie und Einsatz)
SO	Special Operations
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFADCC	Special Operations Advisor and Command and Coordination Cell
SMOST	Special Operations Medical Support Team
SR	Special Reconnaissance
TF	Task Force
TTP	Techniques, Tactics, and Procedure
UN	United Nation
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
ZOpInfo	Center of Information Operations (German: Zentrum fr Operative Information)

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The topic of this thesis came up many years ago after many discussions about the employment of German Special Operations forces. The idea to write about an adaptive reorganization of GER SOF strengthened during Professor Gordon McCormick's class on irregular warfare and Professor Hy Rothstein's class on the history of special operations. It became very clear to me that GER SOF's main focus on direct action is necessary to , but only a part of, SOF's spectrum of operations. I would like to thank you both, Professor McCormick and Professor Rothstein, for giving me more inside knowledge about irregular warfare and special operations. I hope it is possible to invite you to Germany to give a first-hand presentation of your very special insight to our SOF leadership. Professor Hy Rothstein, thank you for having patience with my English. I would also like to thank Professor Erik Jansen for teaching me the basics about organizational design. Professor, without your efforts, this thesis would not be possible. Your class should be a required for all students.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the beginning of the nineteenth century, “small wars” were a part of state-on-state conflict (also referred to as “Big Wars”). These small actions comprised the “security operations” to maintain lines of communication, conduct reconnaissance, limited defense actions such as protecting depots, lines of communication, and prisoners, and other limited offensive actions such as raids and ambushes. According to Karl von Decker, troops in small wars always operate at the tactical level, never at a strategic level. Small wars are part of big wars. Thus, a small war started and ended with the big war; a small war without a big war was not likely during this time.¹ Specially trained conventional (light infantry) and unconventional (often indigenous) troops conducted these small wars, mostly with spontaneous actions.

However, the world has changed dramatically in the last two centuries. Despite recent conventional state-on-state conflicts such as Operation Iraqi Freedom or current possible threats by North Korea or Iran, “big wars” are increasing less likely. Even if they occur, post-stabilization operations have become key due to globalization that can affect regional or even global security and stability. Globalization thus blurs national borders.

The globalization of transportation, communication, and finance has benefited not only licit business but also professional criminals and terrorists. Arms dealers, drug traffickers, money launderers, human traffickers, terrorists, and other sundry criminals, enabled by new, affordable technologies, are increasingly organizing into sprawling global networks.²

1.. Karl von Decker, *Der kleine Krieg im Geiste der neueren Kriegsführung (1828)*, Kesselring Publishing, LLC, September 2010.

2. Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think,” *International Security* 33, no. 2 (Fall 2008), 7–44.

Illicit networks, especially terrorist global networks, are seen as one of the most serious threats today. Scott Helfstein states:

Violent extremism presents one of the greatest threats to the citizenry of the United States and its allies. It does not represent an existential threat [...], but committed individuals pursuing political change through violence remain the most likely to strike the homeland and its interests abroad.³

Terror networks like Al Qaeda are able to recruit, sustain and operate transnationally. Iraq and Afghanistan are examples of countries where such terror and crime networks exist. Uprisings in Mali, Egypt, Libya or Syria provide additional evidence of such influence by terror-networks. “Small wars,” or limited military actions against such terroristic networks have become the focus of attention. Globalization has had an impact on how to fight new threats and to maintain stability and peace. The indirect approach has become strategic means to counter asymmetric threats.⁴

A. STRATEGIC UTILITY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

A military force, culturally programmed to respond conventionally (and predictably) to insurgent attacks, is akin to the bull that repeatedly charges a matador’s cape—only to tire and eventually be defeated by a much weaker opponent. While a conventional approach is instinctive, that behavior is self-defeating.⁵

New challenges call for new considerations about military forces, their assigned tasks and structure. Most Western countries have reorganized their forces to cope with these new challenges. However, some political demands require operations that transcend abilities and capabilities of General Purpose Forces (GPF). GPF may be ineffective in cases where situational sensitiveness and political impact. Such operations, called special operations (SO), “differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political

3. Scott Helfstein, “Edges of Radicalization: Individuals, Networks and Ideas in Violent Extremism,” *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, West Point, New York, February 2012, 6.

4. Jake Hartigan, “Why the Weak Win Wars: A Study of the Factors That Drive Strategy In Asymmetric Conflict” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009).

5. McChrystal, GEN Stanley A., and SGM Michael T. Hall, “ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,” Headquarters ISAF, 2009, 2.

risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. SO are conducted in all environments, but are particularly well suited for denied and politically sensitive environments.”⁶

Special operations offer two basic approaches. David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb state that “SOF [Special Operations Forces] missions tend to align with the direct and indirect approach, and each approach requires some degree of specialization that align with SOF’s commando and warrior-diplomat skill sets.”⁷ Table 1 displays U.S. SOF missions in terms of approach: direct or indirect.

Direct	Indirect
Counterterrorism	Unconventional Warfare
Counterproliferation	Psychological Operations
Direct Action	Foreign Internal Defense
Strategic Reconnaissance	Civil Affairs
Information Operations	

Table 1. SOF Can Operate Directly or Indirectly.⁸

Both authors also distinguish between independent SOF operations and SOF operations that support conventional military operations.⁹ Regarding the strategic value of SOF, they conclude that:

In general, when SOF perform in an independent role they provide greater strategic value since they provide the primary effort [for conventional operations]. In a supporting role, SOF make a strategic contribution only to the extent that the conventional force operations depend upon SOF for success. If the overall conventional force campaign plan is critically

6. USSOCOM, Joint Publication (JP) 3-05 *Special Operations*, April 18, 2011.

7. David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, *United States Special Operations Forces* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 155.

8. *Ibid.*, 153.

9. *Ibid.*, 158.

dependent upon SOF's contribution, then SOF's strategic value would be almost as high as when they perform independently, but this is almost never the case.¹⁰

Special operations require forces, SOFs, who are “specially designated, organized, trained, and equipped.”¹¹ Thus, “for SOF to be well prepared for indirect and direct missions, some SOF units must weight their training and equipment toward either the commando or warrior-diplomat skill sets.”¹² According to Tucker and Lamb, the “SOF's core commando and warrior-diplomat skills allow them to operate with discrimination in complex political-military environments that are inhospitable to conventional forces.”¹³

Thus, Special Operations Forces are considered as strategic assets,¹⁴ “because of their ability to achieve political, military, psychological, and international objectives that represent the foundational instruments of national power,”¹⁵ as the NATO SOF Study (NSCC 2008) highlights.

SOF, because of their adaptability, ingenuity, maturity, and organizational size (smaller organizations are more capable of rapid change), will remain the force of choice in a future environment characterized by a diffuse enemy, and ambiguous enemy command-and-control process, and an expanded array of enemy capabilities and methods of employment.¹⁶

Failure in special operations is often equal to a loss of political reputation. If properly employed, SOFs can close the gap between contemporary political demands, and the limitations of GPFs. In order to avoid failure and eliminate shortcomings in the

10. Ibid., 158–159.

11. North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5)* (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2009), 1–1.

12. David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, *United States Special Operations Forces* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 155.

13. Ibid., 177.

14. North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5)* (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2009), xiii.

15. NATO Special Operations Coordination Center [NSCC], *North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study [Nato SOF Study]*, (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2008), ii.

16. Adrian Erckenbrack, “Transformation: Roles and Missions for ARSOF,” *Special Warfare* 15 (December 2002), 2.

German (GER) SOF's role as a strategic tool, continuous scrutiny of GER SOF's structure is thus required. This thesis addresses the strategic utility of GER SOF and its organizational design for meeting German political demands and expectations.

B. HISTORY OF GERMAN SPECIAL FORCES SINCE 1945

In 1956, West Germany began to organize its new Armed Forces, which was now named the "Bundeswehr." Plans already existed to create a maritime unit that was able to infiltrate an enemy's territory by sea in order to establish a bridgehead for follow-on amphibious operations. Called "Kampfschwimmer" (KS) and with a force of approximately 60 men in total (operator and support), this company under the Navy's command was established in 1958. These men were also trained in air and land infiltration tactics. Since 1972, the KS has had frequent personnel exchanges and training exercises with the U.S. Navy SEALs to improve mutual techniques, tactics and procedures.¹⁷ Unlike their U.S. counterparts, the KS are not designated to conduct covert operations or Hostage Release Operations (HRO). Moreover, as a military unit, they are not allowed to operate within Germany.¹⁸

The Munich massacre during the 1972 Summer Olympics revealed that ad hoc formed police forces were not able to free the Israeli hostages taken by the Palestinian terror group known as Black September. Eventually, all the hostages were killed. That disaster required the establishment of an anti-terror unit that was able to conduct hostage rescue operations. Thus, the police unit "Grenzschutzgruppe 9" (GSG9) was founded. Five years later, in 1977, it successfully liberated all hostages from the captured airplane "Landshut" in Mogadishu.

After the outbreak of major uprisings in Rwanda in 1994, rebels took eleven German hostages. Despite the existence of GSG9 and specially-trained military units like the "B1" paratroops companies¹⁹ and the Navy's KS, Germany decided, after intense

17. Ingo Mathe, "Einsatzgruppe See der Kampfschwimmerkompanie—Unbekannte Fähigkeiten der Deutschen Marine," *Marineforum*, 11-2011, 18.

18. German Constitution, Article 87a.

19. This situation can be seen as Germany's first attempt in 1989/1990 to establish Army Special Forces within the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr).

deliberations, not to use German forces to rescue German citizens. Instead, Belgian paratroopers eventually freed the Germans after a bloody fight. This lack of sovereign power resulted in initiatives to reconsider German (military) SOF. Consequently, the Army Special Unit “Kommando Spezialkräfte” (KSK) was founded in 1996. The KSK’s initial task was to rescue German hostages in environments which did not permit the use of regular military forces.

Additional requirements expanded the missions of the KSK. In the Balkan War, the KSK was tasked to capture war criminals for trial before the International Criminal Court in Den Haag, Netherlands.²⁰ In September 2001, the German government decided to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan with Special Forces and thus assigned the KSK to the mission. Placed under U.S. command, the KSK operated in Kandahar and Southern Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. In the same year, General Klaus Reinhardt appealed before the German military high command that the KSK’s manning and structure were not sufficient for its assigned tasks and missions. Still, the KSK was involved in the *Battle of Tora Bora*, as well as *Operation Anaconda*, and were sent to conduct operations in Paktia in Eastern-Afghanistan. In 2006, authority over the KSK transferred to the International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan (ISAF) SOF. Since then, the KSK has remained in Afghanistan under ISAF SOF command. The unit has challenges concerning additional tasks, such as partnering with the Afghan Police Response Units (PRC) and additional missions in Africa.

With only four companies and one combat support company, the KSK has often lacked skilled operators. In 2005, an attempt was made to overcome this shortfall. The Navy’s KS unit became a part of the Bundeswehr’s SOF. Since then, Germany’s military SOF consists of two units, the Army’s KSK and the Navy’s KS. Also since deployments to Afghanistan, their mission now mainly focuses on maritime operations, such as with the European Naval Forces, *Operation Atalanta*, in the Gulf of Aden.

20. Examples are Milorad Krnojelac (Foca, 1998), Radomir Kovac (Foca, 1999), Janko Janijc (Foca, 2000, KIA), and many more.

C. GER SOF'S IMPLEMENTATION IN THE BUNDESWEHR

Bundeswehr's Special Operations Forces are considered forces that are able to conduct tasks and missions of strategic importance. As an instrument of power, GER SOF ensure that the military has options to cope with specific situations.²¹ GER SOF are branches within the services. The German military high command, which is responsible for the Armed Forces' organizational design, placed both units (KSK and KS) under a brigade-level command within the Army and Navy. Once assigned to a mission, operational control of the KSK and KS shifts to the command that is responsible to lead all German forces during missions abroad.

GER SOF are deeply integrated into the Bundeswehr. Beginning at the strategic-political level, the Federal Minister of Defense is the civilian head of the Bundeswehr. His subordinate is the General Inspector of the German Armed Forces (Chief of Defense). As a Four-Star General, he is part of the German Federal Ministry of Defense and represents the military-strategic level, and is therefore connected to the political level. He directs the different services: Army (HQ in Strausberg), Air Force (HQ in Berlin), Navy (HQ in Rostock), Central Medical Service (HQ in Koblenz), Armed Forces Combined Support (HQ in Bonn), and the Operational Command (HQ in Potsdam). Figure 1 displays the strategic and operational level of the Bundeswehr.

21. Deutsches Heer online.




Figure 1. Strategic and Operational Level of the Bundeswehr.²²




Figure 2. Army's KSK Embedded in German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr).²³

22. BMVg, "Die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr," Köllen-Druck Verlag GmbH, June 2012, 27; Ministry of Defense online, "Organisationsübersicht des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung," April 2012, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/HYtBDoAgDMDe4ge2uzd_oV7MMEIWYBBg-H2R9NgWTxwIdXbUOAKF3PG4eTUvmNgdRBau7SmsEUitIb2siv9bSMXRrHOsOZBg9tvyAQzF9c!/.

23. BMVg, "Die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr," 40; Deutsches Heer online, http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/dso/!ut/p/c4/DcLBDYAwCADAWVwA_v7cQv0YtEQJhJpCdX3NH a74c3rpkJTqZDjjcsi4v3Axt61EhSLskZFsxg4aCpGta_aGt07DBzIrDUE!/.

The Army's KSK (as a brigade-equivalent, headed by a One-Star-General) is part of the "Division of Fast Forces," and is one of three military divisions of the German Army (each headed by a Two-Star-General). This division is subordinate to a Lieutenant (Three-Star) General, the Inspector of the German Army (Figure 2).

The Navy's KS is equivalently embedded, as Figure 3 displays. Currently, the Kampfschwimmerkompanie transfers to the "Kommando Spezialkräfte Marine (KSK M)." Both SOF units are assigned to their respective services when not operationally deployed.




Figure 3. Navy's KS Embedded in German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr).²⁵

24. Y-Punkt online, "Im Wasser zu Hause," <http://www.y-punkt.de/>.

25. BMVg, "Die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr," 60.

Details of the KSK and KS are classified. However, official websites²⁶ mention the Army's KSK comprises approximately 1300 men. The KSK itself consists of four elements: mission element, support element, staff and a development section. The mission element is further divided into four mission companies, one combat support company and a training and test company. Each mission company has specific geographical and environmental divisions and associated means of insertion. Thus, platoons are divided by land, air, water, jungle, and arctic/mountain terrain. In addition, each company has a reconnaissance and sniper platoon. Only the mission element consists of operators who are specially selected, trained, and equipped. The Navy's KS contribute approximately 150 sailors, consisting of a classified number of mission teams with approximately 12 to 16 men, a boat support group, a Special Operations Medical Support Team (SMOST), and a command, control, and support group.²⁷ Effectively, they contribute to a company sized organization to GER SOF.

D. PROBLEM STATEMENT

To cope with globalization's challenges for national and international security, the Bundeswehr was significantly restructured and reorganized in 2012. Although the use of SOF as an instrument of German security policy is going to become more important for German security and defense politics,²⁸ the force strength, structure, and chain of command of GER SOF were not adequately structured.

26. Das Heer online.

27. Kampfschwimmer online, <http://www.kampfschwimmer.de>.

28. Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, "Spezialkräfte der Bundeswehr: Strukturerefordernisse für den Auslandseinsatz," SWP-Studie, Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Berlin, September 2007, 7.

1. Hypothesis and Research Question

“The Bundeswehr must be enabled to meet current tasks and expected future developments.”²⁹ Regarding its capabilities,

the Bundeswehr must retain capabilities for operations across the entire intensity spectrum, including observer missions, advisory and training support as well as preventive security measures. Assets must be specifically put together for each mission, they must be quick to respond, flexible and modular and possess both escalation capability and robustness. Cohesion – operating as part of a system – is an essential prerequisite for success on operations and therefore a major determinant in the design of interfaces between organisational areas. Sustainability must be ensured for forces that are earmarked for enduring operations.³⁰

Despite such demands on the Bundeswehr and major adjustments in 2012, the expectations for GER SOF seem to be incongruent with its current structure. Accordingly, GER SOF’s strategic utility is questionable. That leads to the hypothesis:

Gaps exist between German political demands and capabilities of German Special Operations Forces to fulfill such demands.

This thesis is dedicated to examining the overall research question:

“How can German Special Forces achieve greater internal coherence and thus greater organizational effectiveness for current and future missions?”

This question requires that another question to be answered first: “Is the current organizational design congruent with current and future missions of the German Special Forces?”

29. Federal Minister of German Ministry of Defense, “Defence Policy Guidelines,” German Ministry of Defense, Berlin May 27, 2011, 8.

30. Ibid., 13.

2. Methodology

Based on the assumption that gaps exist between political demands and the capabilities of GER SOF to fulfill such demands, this thesis begins with a defense mission analysis drawn from official guidelines, tasks and missions. First we focus on an analysis of German Defense papers that affect GER SOF. Then, threats and risks that influence GER SOF are analyzed. Next, specified and implied tasks for GER SOF that are necessary to accomplish GER SOF's missions are highlighted. In each step, deductions and consequences for GER SOF are drawn.

In a second step, the results of the first part are put side by side with the current GER SOF force structure to determine whether sufficient forces are available to meet current requirements. This comparison answers the supporting question: "Is the current organizational design congruent with current and future missions of the German Special Forces?" Our focus is on currently available assets and existing constraints that limit the use of GER SOF. Furthermore, critical facts and assumptions concerning current and future situations that affect GER SOF's strategic utility are evaluated. This includes the question of the functionality of the current GER SOF's structural configuration. The focus is on GER SOF's organizational configuration according to Henry Mintzberg's configurational theory. When comparing of both, the results of the mission analysis and GER SOF's current force structure, will reveal whether gaps exist between German political demands and capabilities of GER SOF to fulfill such demands.

Finally, the thesis concludes with a summary of findings to propose an optimized organizational structure for GER SOF to achieve greater internal coherence, and thus, greater effectiveness for current and future missions.

3. Scope

The scope of this thesis is on existing German and NATO doctrines, papers and assessments that directly or indirectly affect the employment of GER SOF as an instrument of power in support of Germany's strategic interests.

4. Intent

Since 2012, high-ranking German officers have demanded a new structure for GER SOF. In 2015, it may be possible to adopt a new structure for GER SOF. The intent of this thesis is to contribute to GER SOF reorganization with recommendations and a proposal for an adaptive GER SOF structure with greater internal coherence and thus greater organizational effectiveness for current and future missions.

5. Translation

If not otherwise noted, all translations from German to English are by the author.

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II. DEFENSE MISSION ANALYSIS

A. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT GERMAN AND NATO GUIDELINES

1. Defense Policy Guidelines—Security Objectives and Interests, Intent, and Tasks and Missions for the Bundeswehr

The basis for Germany’s security policy at the political-strategic level are detailed in the “Defence Policy Guidelines” of May 2011. It states that “[Germany’s] interests are not static, but can change in and along with international constellations and associated developments.”³¹ According to the policy guidelines, the current strategic security objectives and interests are as follows:

Germany’s security objectives are:
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The security and protection of German citizens;• The territorial integrity and sovereignty of Germany and its allies;• The fulfillment of international responsibilities.
German security interests include:
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Preventing, mitigating and managing crises and conflicts that endanger the security of Germany and its allies;• Advocating and implementing positions on foreign and security policy in an assertive and credible way;• Strengthening transatlantic and European security and partnership;• Advocating the universality of human rights and principles of democracy, promoting global respect for international law and reducing the gap between the rich and the poor regions of the world;• Facilitating free and unrestricted world trade as well as free access to the high seas and to natural resources.

Table 2. Strategic Guidelines.³²

31. Federal Minister of German Ministry of Defense, “Defence Policy Guidelines,” German Ministry of Defense, Berlin May 27, 2011, 4.

32. Ibid., 4–11.

“Ensuring security for our nation today means, above all, keeping the consequences of crises and conflicts at bay and taking an active part in their prevention and containment.”³³ The policy guidelines emphasize that Germany’s responsibility to protect its citizens “goes beyond the borders of Germany,” especially in the case of “imminent danger abroad.”³⁴

In addition, the guidelines acknowledge Germany’s responsibility in Europe and the world. It states clearly that the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU) are fundamental for Germany’s security and defense policies. “Active participation in international and supranational organizations is of key importance for our [German] national security and also for our prosperity.”³⁵ In doing so, Germany’s Armed Forces (the Bundeswehr) is one of its indispensable tools and also the centerpiece for Germany’s security and protection.

Accordingly, the Bundeswehr is tasked with the following missions and its implied tasks (Table 3).

33. Ibid., 4.

34. Ibid., 5.

35. Ibid., 5–6.

Bundeswehr Missions:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect Germany and its citizens; • Secure Germany’s capability to act in the field of foreign policy; • Contribute to defense of allies; • Contribute to stability and partnership at an international level; • Support multinational cooperation and European integration
Bundeswehr Tasks:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Territorial defense as collective defense within the North Atlantic Alliance; • International conflict prevention and crisis management – including countering international terrorism; • Participation in military tasks for the EU Common Security and Defence Policy; • Homeland security contributions, i.e., defense tasks on German territory as well as administrative assistance in case of natural disasters and large-scale accidents, for the protection of critical infrastructure and in cases of domestic emergency; • Rescue and evacuation operations including hostage rescue operations abroad; • Partnership and cooperation as a part of multinational integration and global security cooperation in the context of modern defense diplomacy; • Humanitarian relief abroad.

Table 3. Mission and Tasks of the Bundeswehr.

Despite the fact that German “Armed Forces follow the changing objectives and interests of security policy, [...] the Bundeswehr must be enabled to meet current tasks and expect future developments.”³⁶ The guideline for the quality and scope for Germany’s military capabilities is a national level ambition that also frames Bundeswehr’s structure. Thus, the Bundeswehr must ensure:

- The option of assuming command responsibility as a framework nation and
- Providing the required capabilities for the entire task spectrum, into which the contribution of other nations can be integrated in a flexible synergetic manner³⁷

36. Ibid., 8.

37. Ibid., 10.

Under this lens, the Bundeswehr must be capable of meeting its prioritized objectives.³⁸ Therefore, the following forces are required in the Bundeswehr:

- forces for collective defense
- forces to serve as a NATO Response Force
- forces to contribute to an EU Battle Group
- a set of forces for international conflict prevention and crisis management (UN and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE)
- force for evacuation and hostage rescue operations (HRO)
- permanent capabilities provided for surveillance and policing of German air space and maritime waters as well as for search and rescue
- forces for homeland security tasks

As a general rule, Bundeswehr missions abroad are planned and conducted in cooperation with allies and partners within the UN, NATO and the EU. Evacuation and rescue operations are generally a matter of national responsibility.³⁹

What does this mean for GER SOF? To fulfill Germany's ambitious security objectives with its armed forces, we draw the first deduction:

Deduction 1: German Special Operations Forces must be properly manned, equipped and resourced to fulfill requirements of NATO, EU, international conflict prevention and crisis management, and for evacuation and hostage rescue operations in the same time to meet current political demands.

Germany must be capable of employing GER SOF to at least four simultaneous missions. To illustrate this deduction, GER SOF must have sufficient forces to simultaneously contribute to a NATO operation like ISAF in Afghanistan and ATALANTA in the Gulf of Aden, an EU operation in Africa like in the Congo in 2006, operations in Syria or Libya and a hostage rescue operation somewhere else.

38. Ibid., 10.

39. Ibid., 11.

2. Current Missions and Tasks for German Special Forces

According to the official website of the Bundeswehr, the current spectrum of German armed forces includes special tasks of strategic interest that cannot be fulfilled by GPF. These tasks require German Special Forces.⁴⁰ These tasks are displayed in Table 4.

Tasks for German Special Forces:
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Rescue and release operations (HRO) of German and/or other hostages abroad as a requirement of national risk provision;• Capture of High Value Individuals (HVI) abroad, even against resistance;• Special Reconnaissance (SR) for the strategic and operational command;• Military Assistance (MA);• Offensive operations against subversive forces and terroristic threats (CT);• Protection of own forces and individuals in specific situations;• Seizing material concerning important interests, even under threat;• Missions against high-value targets of strategic/ operational interest;• Undercover/ clandestine operations.

Table 4. Tasks Specified for German Special Forces.⁴¹

As mentioned in the introduction, SOF are considered as a strategic asset to achieve high political or strategic goals. Accordingly, special operations must be commanded and controlled at the highest level to ensure operations remain synchronized with strategic intentions. In addition, the NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5) suggests that “C2 [command and control] of SOF should be executed within the SOF chain of command. In all cases, commanders exercising command authority over SOF should: [first] provide a clear and unambiguous chain of command, [and second] provide sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct,

40. Deutsches Heer online. “KSK–einsatzbereit, jederzeit, weltweit.”

41. Ibid.

and support the operations.”⁴² Despite the fact that AJP-3.5 is an unclassified NATO paper that cannot issue directives regarding Germany’s approach to establishing GER SOF’s chain of command, NATO provides the framework for Germany’s security considerations. “[...] The strategic requirements set by the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union also have an impact on the form of military service, the task, scope, structure, equipment and organization of the armed forces.”⁴³ Thus, current NATO doctrine should be taken into account. That leads to the second deduction:

Deduction 2: GER SOF must be commanded and controlled at a strategic level with a clear and unambiguous chain of command that possesses sufficient experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and support special operations.

B. ANALYSIS OF THREATS, RISKS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR GER SOF

“The process of globalization is affecting every state and society around the world. [...] The global village is becoming reality.”⁴⁴ Despite the positive effects of globalization, it “also involve[s] new risks that, to a differing degree, can have direct or indirect implications for the external and internal security of Germany and its citizens.”⁴⁵ The demands are clear:

We have to respond to crises and conflicts immediately where they occur and thus deny their negative impacts on Europe and our citizens.⁴⁶

1. Official Guidelines that Affect GER SOF

Two documents are the basis for Germany’s strategic security strategy: the German “White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr,” and the “Defence Policy Guidelines: Safeguarding National Interests—

42. North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5)* (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2009), 3–6.

43. Federal Minister of German Ministry of Defense. “Defence Policy Guidelines,” German Ministry of Defense, Berlin May 27, 2011, 9.

44. Federal Minister of German Ministry of Defense, “White Papers 2006,” German Ministry of Defense, Berlin 2006, 17.

45. Ibid.

46. Franz Joseph Jung, former Federal Minister of the German Ministry of Defense, 23rd International Workshop on Global Security in Berlin, May 18, 2006.

Assuming International Responsibility—Shaping Security Together,” of May 2011. Both documents define Germany’s strategic security environment, risks and threats to Germany, as well as new challenges.⁴⁷ The latter one, because it is more relevant to the present, will be used here. It contains key facts such as the following.

- ***The weakness of failed states*** causes threats such as civil war, regional destabilization, humanitarian crises and related phenomena. Such phenomena are the radicalization and migration movements that support the creation of safe havens and retreats for terrorists and criminals.
- ***International terrorism*** remains a major threat. “International terrorist groups and networks—often in combination with organized crime—pose an immediate threat that can have a wide range of implications for state and society.”
- ***The misuse of advanced technology*** because of rapid distribution due to global interconnectedness poses a threat by state and non-state actors. Especially developments in information technology “have led to the almost instant, worldwide propagation of often unverified information. This gives extremists, too, numerous opportunities for disinformation and facilitates radicalization and destabilization.”
- ***Attacks on critical information infrastructure (cyber attacks)*** “can also destabilize our state with serious repercussions for our national security.” Thus, the possibility of denying such cyber attacks becomes a strategic security issue.
- ***The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [WMD] and improvements in their means of delivery*** are increasingly becoming a threat for Germany.” In order to protect German citizens, Germany requires “credible deterrence, an effective non-proliferation regime, and effective early warning and defence measures to limit the options” of state and non-state actors from illegally acquiring WMD.
- ***Disruption of trade routes and the flow of raw materials and commodities*** “pose a threat to security and prosperity. Thus, the protection of transportation and energy security becomes increasingly important for Germany’s security.”
- Further potential risks are ***the dissemination of hazardous substances, epidemics and pandemics*** because of the effects of globalization and ***climate change*** that can lead to considerable conflict potential, i.e., because of future water scarcity in certain areas.

47. White Papers 2006, 14–15; Federal Minister of German Ministry of Defense, “Defence Policy Guidelines,” German Ministry of Defense, Berlin May 27, 2011, 2–3.

2. Assessment and Deductions for GER SOF

Assessments and deductions consider GER SOF's given tasks. Impacts on the dissemination of hazardous substances, epidemics, and pandemics are not reviewed.

Failed States. How can GER SOF contribute in tackling threats and risks caused by failed states? A failed state is characterized by: "a) loss of physical control of its territory, or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force therein; b) erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions; c) an inability to provide reasonable public services; and d) an inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community."⁴⁸ The potential impact is high if one considers the current number of failed states.⁴⁹

Despite the weakness of such failed states, history provides evidence that those countries do have the chance to win wars against a much stronger opponent. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, in his book "How the Weak Win Wars," examines 197 conflict outcomes between strong and weak actors in terms of their strategic approaches.⁵⁰ It is assumed that the strong actor attacks the weak. The strategic approaches can be direct or indirect. "Direct approaches target an adversary's armed forces in order to destroy that adversary's capacity to fight. Indirect approaches seek to destroy an adversary's will to fight."⁵¹ Arreguin-Toft shows that "strong actors are more likely to win same approach interactions and lose opposite-approach interactions."⁵² Even if same-approach interactions shorten the total time of conflict, indirect conflicts seem to be prolonged. "Opposite-approach interactions (direct-indirect or indirect-direct) imply victory for weak

48. Princeton University, "Failed State," http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Failed_state.html.

49. Compare The Fund For Peace, "The Failed States Index 2013," online, <http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable>.

50. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (Summer 2011), 93–128.

51. *Ibid.*, 105.

52. *Ibid.*, 128.

actors because the strong actor’s power advantage is deflected or dodged.”⁵³ Such conflicts “tend to be protracted;” time favors weak actors. Thus, endurance matters.

Arreguin-Toft offers the following findings:

Same-approach interactions [...] favor strong actors because they imply shared values, aims, and victory conditions. [...] Opposite-approach interactions [...] favor weak actors because they sacrifice values for time. This results in a significant delay between the commitment of armed forces and the attainment of objectives. Time then becomes the permissive condition for the operation of the political vulnerability [for strong actors].⁵⁴

		Weak-Actor Strategic Approach	
		Direct	Indirect
Strong-Actor Strategic Approach	Direct	Strong actor wins	Weak actor wins
	Indirect	Weak actor wins	Strong actor wins

Table 5. Expected Effects of Strategic Interaction on Conflict Outcomes (Win Matrix).⁵⁵

According to Arreguin-Toft, a weak actor will lose a strong actor’s direct approach, if he counters also directly. That sounds logically because it is assumed that a strong actors armed forces and capacity to fight is much higher then it’s weak opponent. With weaker armed forces and capacity to fight, a weak actor should chose an indirect strategic approach. If it is not clear what the weak actor’s reaction will be, a strong actor should approach directly at first, because it is less time-intensive. But the strong actor should immediately switch to an indirect approach, if the weak actor responds indirectly. To win the war, a strong actor should have capabilities for both strategic approaches.

53. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars,” 105.

54. Ibid., 121–122.

55. Ibid., 108.

Germany, however, can be seen as a strong actor because of its economical and political power in the world. As such, Germany contributes to stability and partnership at an international level (Bundeswehr mission). According to David Tucker and Christopher Lamb, Special Operations Forces can contribute perfectly to the indirect approach with their warrior-diplomat skill set. That leads to the following deduction:

Deduction 3: GER SOF must have the capability to function in a warrior-diplomat role over the long run to support an indirect strategic approach.

International Terrorism. According to Louise Richardson, terrorism is marked by seven crucial characteristics, including: 1) politically inspired; 2) involves violence or the threat of it; 3) is intended to send a message; 4) is of symbolic significance (act and victim); 5) is a tool of sub-state groups; 6) distinguishes between victim and audience; and 7) deliberately target civilians.⁵⁶ International terrorism has global implications. To counter immediate threats posed by terrorists or terror networks, SOF first need to know who the terrorists are and what they are going to do. Thus, the focus is on individuals and networks hidden among the population, as well as their physical capacity to fight. Second, acts of terror occur without warning require a time-sensitive response. Third, acts of terror differ, and are rarely predictable. These characteristics require a highly flexible response force. Fourth, globalization, broadens the geographical range of terrorists. Hence, to be effective, SOF must also be able to act on a global range. Thus, we can deduce:

Deduction 4: National-level intelligence must be provided to GER SOF. GER SOF also must have organic capabilities for special reconnaissance and political and strategic Intelligence to conduct quick response operations within GER SOF strategic task frame.

Deduction 5: As a strategic tool, GER SOF must be capable of conducting time-sensitive missions globally.

56. Louise Richardson, *What Terrorists Want: Understanding The Enemy, Containing The Threat*, (New York: Random House Paperbacks, 2007), 4–7.

Misuse of Advanced Technology. The spread of advanced technology demands two essential requirements for SOF. First, according to William McRaven, to keep up with any possible enemy, SOF must be resourced with “cutting edge technology” to achieve surprise and relative superiority. Second, to counter extremists’ opportunities for disinformation, SOF must have the capability to use information operations immediately for its own purposes. Third, McRaven asserts that SOF must achieve operations security to achieve surprise and to avoid mission compromise prior to its own actions.⁵⁷

Deduction 6: GER SOF must use advanced technologies to keep up with or create advantages over their enemies.

Deduction 7: GER SOF must be able to conduct immediate information operations to undermine enemy capabilities and advantages.

Deduction 8: GER SOF must achieve operations security (OPSEC) to protect information regarding own intentions and missions.

Proliferation of WMD. SOF can contribute to disrupt the proliferation of WMD. Such sensitive tasks require a direct link to the high strategic command and control as well as special knowledge about WMD, which normally is not part of SOF training. The guidelines emphasize that Germany “must prevent state and non-state actors from illegally acquiring weapons of mass destruction.”⁵⁸ This requires “[...] defence measures to limit the options of [rogue] actors.”⁵⁹ If SOF is considered as a strategic tool that is able to conduct sensitive missions at the political level, then the next deduction is:

Deduction 9: GER SOF must be prepared to conduct military operations to counter the proliferation of WMD.

57. William H. McRaven, *Spec Ops. Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Presidio Press, 1996), 4–23.

58. Federal Minister of German Ministry of Defense. “Defence Policy Guidelines,” German Ministry of Defense, Berlin May 27, 2011, 9.

59. *Ibid.*, 9.

Attacks on Critical Infrastructure. The use of the military to protect Germany's critical infrastructure is prohibited by law.⁶⁰ However, cyber space is becoming more important and critical to Germany's security; attackers often launch their strikes from other countries. That leads to the following deduction:

Deduction 10: GER SOF should consider options for how to respond militarily against cyber attacks.

Climate Change, Free Trade Routes, and Secure Supply of Raw Materials. These challenges for Germany are related to the section on failed states and terrorism. Climate change can cause regional instability that can affect Germany's security, due to globalization. To support stability, SOF can contribute in its warrior-diplomat role. Free trade routes and a secure supply of raw materials require secure trade routes. SOF can counter piracy or sabotage of air transport, with direct action commando missions that eliminate such threats. Deduction 3, 4, and 5 cover these challenges.

C. SPECIFIED, IMPLIED, AND ESSENTIAL TASKS FOR GER SOF

In conducting the defense mission analysis, a look into GER SOF's specified and implied tasks is necessary. "Specified tasks are those specifically assigned to a unit by its higher headquarters."⁶¹ "Implied tasks are those that must be performed to accomplish a specified task, but which are not stated in the higher headquarters' order."⁶² Moreover, the U.S. Field Manual 101-5 also requires a proposal for essential tasks. Essential tasks are those "that must be executed to accomplish the mission."⁶³

60. German Constitution (Grundgesetz), §87a.

61. U.S. Headquarters, Department of the Army. *Field Manual No. 101-5: Staff Organization and Operations* (FM 101-5). Washington, DC, 5-6.

62. *Ibid.*, 5-7.

63. *Ibid.*

1. Specified Tasks

Specified tasks for GER SOF are previously displayed in Table 4. They include direct actions for offensive operations, with a special focus on hostage rescue operations (HRO), which require the most advanced skills among all direct action missions. GER SOF's tasks also require indirect actions, and hence the skills to conduct military assistance. Special reconnaissance requires both direct and indirect actions to gain intelligence. Both approaches also apply for covert operations.

2. Implied Tasks

NATO's AJP-3.5 provides a broad background about NATO SOF's principal tasks, as well as considerations about Command and Control, employment, and SOF planning for successful special operations. Case studies on four U.S. strategic special operations,⁶⁴ done by Lucien Vandenbroucke, revealed the five following general patterns of special operations' failure: "faulty intelligence, poor interagency and interservice cooperation, inadequate information and advice provided to decision makers, wishful thinking, and overcontrol of missions executed from afar."⁶⁵

In addition, General Carl Stiner, the second Commander in Chief (CINC) of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), which was newly created after the disaster of the Iranian Rescue Mission in 1979, has stated that, "the failure [of that mission] revealed serious shortcomings in the ability of the United States to equip, employ, and command special operations forces effectively in complex, high-risk operations."⁶⁶ "Key problems identified by General Stiner included the ad hoc nature of

64. The four cases are the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Sontay raid, the Mayaguez operation, and the Iran rescue missions (Desert One was known as Operation Eagle Claw).

65. Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, *Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 3–8.

66. General Stiner, briefing, March 1993, in Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institutions Press, 1997), 72.

the task force, unclear command relationships, the lack of dedicated joint forces, and inadequate equipment.”⁶⁷

William H. McRaven, Commander of USSOCOM, determined that successful special operations (with an emphasis on the SOF’s commando role) need “relative superiority.”⁶⁸ And “Relative superiority is a condition that exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy.”⁶⁹ In his book, McRaven defines “three basic properties of relative superiority” as:

- Relative superiority is achieved at the pivotal moment in an engagement.
- Once relative superiority is achieved, it must be sustained in order to guarantee victory.
- If relative superiority is lost, it is difficult to regain.⁷⁰

He further notes, “special operations forces, with their cutting-edge technology, access to national-level intelligence, high quality training, and elite troops, are able to minimize the frictions of war and achieve relative superiority.”⁷¹ According to him, six principles for successful special operations are necessary: “simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose.”⁷²

From the list of GER SOF-specified tasks, and from personal observations about past special operations, the following implied tasks for GER SOF can be deducted (see Table 6).

67. Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington DC: Brookings Institutions Press, 1997), 72.

68. William H. McRaven, Spec Ops. *Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Presidio Press, 1996), 4–23.

69. Ibid., 4.

70. Ibid., 4–8.

71. Ibid., 6.

72. Ibid.

Implied Tasks for A Successful Use of SOF	Source
Acquiring and maintaining SOF skills	McRaven
Providing national-level intelligence, including organic capabilities for “intelligence”	AJP-3.5, Vandenbroucke, McRaven
Smooth interagency, inter-service, and inner-service cooperation	AJP-3.5, Vandenbroucke, McRaven, Gen Stiner
Adequate Command and Control, Leadership and advice	AJP-3.5, Vandenbroucke, McRaven
Operations Security	AJP-3.5, McRaven
Conducting Information Operations	AJP-3.5
Providing and use of advanced technologies	McRaven
Selection of SOF personnel	McRaven
Providing adequate combat and combat service support	AJP-3.5, Gen Stiner

Table 6. Implied Tasks for Successful Use of SOF

Some of these implied tasks overlap with previously drawn deductions, but are not fully discussed. For example, SOF skills shall be acquired and maintained. Additionally, training is most important to gain the skills necessary to accomplish SOF missions. Cross-training is also important and contributes to a flexible use of personnel. Finally, experience, acquired due to employments, is important to demonstrate capabilities as well as create a deterrent.

Also, GER SOF must be able to conduct Information Operations (IO). In supporting Deduction 6, information operations are required for at least four reasons: 1) to counter enemy misinformation; 2) to influence the population within the area of operations to support its own missions and goals; 3) to inform the domestic population and political decision makers about SOF capabilities and limitations; and 4) IO contributes to deterrence. Quick and well-aimed information operations are essential because the enemy’s IO can undermine mission success, regardless of how well SOF have performed.

Lastly, interagency, inter-service, and inner-service cooperation is probably one of the most challenging implied tasks for Special Operations Forces. This is especially true for HRO. “Deliberate HRO are complex multi-agency operations usually with a civil

governmental lead.”⁷³ It requires an organizational design that permits quickly assembled task forces for specific purposes. As General Stiner mentioned, bureaucratic working methods led, among others, to the disaster of Desert One. A following subsection of this thesis is thus especially dedicated to this issue.

However, two more deductions can be drawn from implied tasks for a successful use of SOF.

Deduction 11: Capable personnel shall be carefully selected. A selection shall be effective for all personnel working within GER SOF’s community (including supporters and leadership). The selection process shall be adjusted to designated tasks.

Special Operations Forces are *elite* forces. “Elite” in its sense means especially selected. Contrary to other elite forces, like specially trained and selected infantry, SOF are a tool even for sensitive strategic operations. A failure of a strategic operation has a much higher negative impact than an operational or tactical endeavor. But, as German saying goes, a chain is only as good as its weakest link. Thus, all personnel, including supporters and leadership, shall be especially selected to avoid mission failure of strategic special operations.

Deduction 12: Adequate Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS)⁷⁴ is necessary.

Inadequate CS or CSS, especially in insertion⁷⁵ and extraction,⁷⁶ have a high impact on SOF mission’s success. For example, if Germany were not able to quickly

73. North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5)* (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2009), 2–4.

74. FM 4-0, *Combat Service Support*, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 29 August 2003, 1-1: The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. [...] It includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. [...].

75. Insertion: Placement of troops and equipment into an operational/ tactical area. The placement can be by airplanes, helicopters, vehicles, or vessels. The troops do not have direct control over these crafts.

76. Extraction: Removal of troops and equipment out of an operational/ tactical area. The removal can be by airplanes, helicopters, vehicles, or vessels. The troops do not have direct control over these crafts.

provide airlift insert SOF anywhere in the world, Germany would surely not be able to conduct a hostage rescue operation as prescribed in the security guidelines.

3. Essential Tasks

What are essential tasks for GER SOF? Simple as it sounds, GER SOF have to provide capabilities to conduct missions across the full spectrum of special operations, on short notice and around the globe. This is required for GER SOF to meet existing demands and to be a strategic tool for political leaders.

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III. IS THE CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN CONGRUENT WITH MISSIONS AND GOALS OF GERMAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES?

The Bundeswehr must be enabled to meet current tasks and expected future developments.⁷⁷

Four years have passed since the German Federal Minister of Defense issued this requirement. From a German SOF's perspective, it is time to conduct a mission analysis. Thus, this chapter will compare previously drawn deductions with GER SOF's current situation to determine whether sufficient forces are available. Available assets and constraints for GER SOF are reviewed first, followed by critical facts and critical assumptions. Deductions from Chapter II are then compared with current force structure. The findings summarized in Chapters II and III, as well as current gaps, are also addressed in this chapter.

A. AVAILABLE ASSETS, CAPABILITIES, AND CONSTRAINTS

1. GER SOF's Capabilities as Warrior-Diplomats

Deduction 3 requires GER SOF to operate in a warrior-diplomat role. The two-year basic training, and at least one year of advanced training within mission companies (KSK, KS or similar), do not provide the skills for being a warrior diplomat. Despite GER SOF's use in military assistance missions, training clearly focuses on SOF's commando role. Two foreign languages are required (i.e., French and English), both for multi-lateral missions. However, the language training is not routine. Also, there is limited education on culture or how to interact with indigenous people.⁷⁸ Originally established as HRO forces, the prevailing mindset is commando oriented. Thus, there is a gap in GER SOF's warrior-diplomat skills.

77. Federal Minister of German Ministry of Defense, "Defence Policy Guidelines," German Ministry of Defense, Berlin May 27, 2011, 8.

78. Deutsches Heer online, http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/dso!/ut/p/c4/DcLBDYAwCADAWVwA_v7cQv0YakILINRIq-tr7nDHn9Mjhbo0J8MVt1Pm9EJlvo8cDbKwR4_OZuygoUAjklgeXvDSZfoAxIDOyA!!/.

2. GER SOF's Capability for Special Reconnaissance (SR) and Intelligence

Deduction 4 demands that SOF must provide and maintain an intelligence capability for special operations. However, Army and Navy SOF units do not have organic specialized intelligence units (see Figures 2 and 3). Basic training includes surveillance and reconnaissance, but the focus is on direct action missions.⁷⁹ The KSK's mission companies are divided into land/desert, air infiltration, amphibious infiltration, mountain and arctic terrain, and sniper platoons. The Navy's KS company specializes in underwater operations. However, special reconnaissance is implied in both units' tasks, although there is no designated unit to conduct special reconnaissance or a department to process intelligence. As we will see later, a special reconnaissance, or a human intelligence unit, provides advantages for all special operations organizations. Without such a functional unit, intelligence-gaps can occur.

3. Use of Advanced Technology—The Acquisition Process

The capability to use advanced technologies and systems is vital for SOF to an advantage and to surprise the enemy (Deduction 6). GER SOF, however, do not have sufficient priority in the armed forces acquisition process. As we recall in Figure 2 and Figure 3, GER SOF units are integrated within the services. Any request for new technologies and acquisitions must be passed through the chain of command to Army or Navy Headquarters, respectively. This process calls for understanding, good will and a concerted effort to support GER SOF before the requests are forwarded to the Chief of Defense (General Inspector, GI), who is responsible for the armed forces' readiness. The GI prioritizes incoming demands. He then calls in his Inspectors of the services and military as well as civilian leaders responsible for equipping the forces.⁸⁰ According to Article 87b of the German Constitution, the civilian side of the Bundeswehr, the Bundeswehrverwaltung (Federal Administration for the German Armed Forces), is

79. Deutsches Heer online, http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/dso/!ut/p/c4/DcLBDYAwCADAWVwA_v7cQv0YakLINRIq-tr7nDHn9Mjhbo0J8MVt1Pm9EJlvo8cDbKwR4_OZuygoUAjklgeXvDSZfoAxIDOyA!!/.

80. BMVg, "Customer Product Management (CPM), 2010, Verfahrensbestimmungen für die Bedarfsermittlung, Bedarfsdeckung und Nutzung in der Bundeswehr," Bonn: June 23, .2010, 4.

responsible for military acquisition. In doing so, the Federal Office for Equipment, Information-Technology and Utilization (BAAINBw) is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. BAAINBw's main task is to develop, test, procure and implement military material.⁸¹ The process of development, design, production, and testing new military material often takes years.⁸² As an example, GER SOF requested SOF-capable helicopters for many years.⁸³ Modified versions of the BO-105 (comparable to a MH-6 Little Bird) and CH53 could close be used but are lack adequate radio systems, night-flight capabilities and electronic defense systems. Due to such shortcomings, the use of BO-105 by SOF for missions is not approved.⁸⁴ This year, BAAINBw and Eurocopter signed a contract to acquire fifteen Light Utility Helicopters for GER SOF. Delivery will start by the end of 2015 and will continue until 2017,⁸⁵ almost twenty years after first request. This is not an isolated example, according to the *Financial Times Germany*. It is also true for weapons, night-vision goggles and other vital equipment.⁸⁶

81. Bundeswehr, BAAINBw online, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain!/ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy90tSk1KLSPL2UxGKwgH5BtqMiAO1YLUk!/.

82. Deutsches Heer, "Ausbildung praktisch erleben," Deutsches Heer online, http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/heer!/ut/p/c4/NYxRC4JAEIT_0a1CUvaWCOVrL2Vvl666eO7JumcQ_fjOoBmYh_mYgQdEs12pt0qerYM71A0dny8zIIqxowZ0ziyeWxQdcEL-kUVjrasX86aVHHYBBwncl6NY7BThjt23aBrPqFsqslMXqzG2exF3UaCSCSGWqiTtCySLPkr_eT5rjhtsv2hrIorzNN0-gL-Zr3f/.

83. Deutscher Bundestag, Unterrichtung durch den Wehrbeauftragten, Jahresbericht 2012 (54. Bericht), Drucksache 17/12050, January 29, .2013, 19.

84. Y-Magazin 04/2011, "Special Service mit Abholgarantie," Laupheim, 29.03.2011, online, http://www.y-punkt.de/portal/a/ypunkt!/ut/p/c4/LYvBCsIwEAX_KNvgpXhTbMWLvan1ImmzLqVpEtaNRfDjTcA3MJfhwR0y3rxpMkLBGwc36EfaDqsaVouPT0x-FmVmSeicegkjycwGn4JwLWeLagwepVjQC2VPbCSwioHFIZKYc1Fkoa_0Ya83uvsPf-u2OV6aWuvTue0gLsvuB7_6O2Y!/.

85. Bundeswehr online, "Neuer Hubschrauber für die Spezialkräfte," Koblenz, July 16, .2013, http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde!/ut/p/c4/NYs9D4JAEET_0S1XiMEOQkxslGgQGnPBjfeB1kXr-HHe1c4k7zmzcAIqd58aTVCwRsLDxhmukxRTXFBZd6yo7X4URFJkPEpL3Tooc_HNjiDR8kU9EKJKxsJrLbAYrPZmZNRtMBQ6LbR5-IffVTVvb72p7Jsb00Hm3P1D2600no!/.

86. Financial Times Deutschland online, "Mängel bei der Bundeswehr: Elitesoldaten in Ausrüstungsnot," August 9, 2012, <http://www.ftd.de/politik/deutschland:/maengel-bei-der-bundeswehr-elitesoldaten-in-ausruestungsnot/70073700.html>.

GER Armed Forces are able to buy military equipment available on the market (ESB) to overcome shortcomings, only if tasked with a mission or if deployed, and if the equipment is mission essential and not available in the Bundeswehr.⁸⁷ Hundreds of millions of dollars were spent to get better equipment and technology over the last three years.⁸⁸ Thus, the use of ESB is very restrictive and contains stringent criteria to avoid unnecessary. GER SOF is not an exception to this procedure. In conclusion, there is a huge gap between SOF requirements and the current GER SOF acquisition process to procure new equipment.

4. Immediate Information Operations

Deduction 7 calls for the capability to conduct information operations. The army and navy do not have IO units and lack this capability to plan and conduct IO. The only German military unit that is competent in this area is the “Zentrum Operative Information” (ZOpInfo), including the Battalion Operative Information 950, which is subordinate to the Armed Forces Combined Command (Streitkräftebasis).⁸⁹ The chain of command approval is needed to get IO support and this necessitates a complex and time-consuming process. Furthermore, the different services have their own doctrines on how to use Information Operations; support to SOF operations is not routine. Thus, GER SOF cannot effectively plan and execute information operations in a timely manner.

87. BMVg, “Customer Product Management (CPM) 2010: Verfahrensbestimmungen für die Bedarfsermittlung, Bedarfsdeckung und Nutzung in der Bundeswehr,” Bonn: June 23, .2010, 24.

88. General-Lieutenant Glatz (ret.), former Inspector of the Operations Command, Deutsches Heer online, http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw!/ut/p/c4/LYvBCsIwEET_KNugmOrNkovgyYuNF0matSy2SYIbA-LHm4AzMMzwGLhBcbBvGi1TDHaCHsxAB5eFyx7vSOFI-VNmbY8Vnz66DNd68yiGGJBrMgamkmOyHJNYuKpkjWlQgR5MI3UnVTb5i_53atWm7Pa7PSpu8Ay z8cfMuD7cA!!/.

89. Zentrum Operative Information, “über uns,” Streitkräftebasis online, http://www.kommando.streitkraeftebasis.de/portal/a/kdoskb!/ut/p/c4/Fcs7DoAgDADQE013N0-huJiCBQnSEj6aeHo1b36wwofxCh5bEMYTFtA2jOZWNZot7qIalYLdefVIDuxEdTJUoleY_5wL-oSgWQaL9iDIKU0v4ef4Uw!!/.

5. Adequate Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS)

Deduction 12 associated with Deduction 5 requires GER SOF to have combat support and combat service support capabilities to execute independent and time-sensitive operations at the strategic level. Current combat support and combat service support capabilities are marginal (Figures 2 and 3) and mission enablers must be requested from other services to support individual missions. Such enablers are not designed to, or intended to support, GER SOF. The Bundeswehr, however, follows its internal rotation system to provide supporting forces for missions. Hence, temporarily attached units can vary, which always requires new familiarization regarding common mindset; equipment; techniques, tactics and procedure (TTPs) and so forth. Also, it is highly questionable whether such requested enablers are quickly available, sustainable, or likely to meet SO OPSEC.

Airlift is a severe problem for GER SOF, which do not have organic or designated airlift capabilities. SALIS (Strategic Airlift Interim Solution), the strategic airlift program is marginal, international and executed by civilian contractors who use Russian AN-124-100.⁹⁰ At the operational level, Germany discontinued its air transportation command in June 2010. In its stead, the European Air Transport Command (EATC) in Eindhoven was founded that year and now is responsible to support German operational airlift (C-160). In both cases, requests for airlift have been required well in advance. Such outsourcing can negatively affect demands on OPSEC. For national operational airlift, Germany does not have any experience or doctrine to establish forward air refueling and rearming points (FARRPs). German airborne fire-support platforms are inadequate. German helicopters (EC665, Tiger) were designed as anti-tank helicopters rather than to support airlift and

90. Bundeswehr, "SALIS–im strategischen Luftransport nicht mehr wegzudenken," Bundeswehr online, [http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/NYtND4IwEET_UZea4NdNgiZevQheyEI3pLG0zbKVi_z_e9uBM8i5vB16Q6_FjZxQbPDrooJ_sedzUuBIS-JZEztGqMK2DIR6EU4wEz3LMgyl4kkIhLzZzZpTAKgYWV0xizkZZA32120Yfq_n_099jVt-u-Pu3ae_OAuCyXH0sxisk!/.](http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/NYtND4IwEET_UZea4NdNgiZevQheyEI3pLG0zbKVi_z_e9uBM8i5vB16Q6_FjZxQbPDrooJ_sedzUuBIS-JZEztGqMK2DIR6EU4wEz3LMgyl4kkIhLzZzZpTAKgYWV0xizkZZA32120Yfq_n_099jVt-u-Pu3ae_OAuCyXH0sxisk!/)

fire-support for infantry. Helicopter weapon systems do not meet SOF requirements.⁹¹ All of this leads to one conclusion: GER SOF is not properly supported.

B. CRITICAL FACTS

1. Elite Versus Equality

There is little prioritization for support assets in the German Armed Forces; the principle of equality predominates. This principle is based on ethical, legal, political and social grounds. Equality is an ethical issue.⁹² According to Article 3 of the German Constitution all people are equal before the law. In military matters, however, this should not be the case. Today, German elite units of the Third Reich are seen as criminals that supported the National Socialist (NS) regime. Thus, the term “elite,” which is inherent in SOF, has a negative connotation among most civilian and military leaders. This mindset negatively influences decisions to support SOF. This condition must change.

2. Command, Control, and Leadership

In fact, the GER SOF’s command and control does not meet the needs of Deduction 2. At the strategic level, only a very small staff section (SE I 5, Figure 1) lacking command authority is responsible for Special Operations. In 2012, the Chief of Defense became part of the Ministry of Defense’s Directorate, and is thus the highest representative of the Bundeswehr and the military advisor for the federal minister.⁹³ Since then, three out of nine Directorate-Generals have been subordinate to him to fulfill the following tasks: Planning (Plg), Forces Policy (FüSK) and Strategy and Operations (SE). “SE I 5 Special Forces Operations and National Crisis Management” is part of SE I (Defense Intelligence) that is subordinate to the Directorate-General Strategy and

91. Hasnian Kazim, “Bundeswehr in Afghanistan: Offiziere halten Tiger für unbrauchbar,” Islamabad, in Spiegel online Politik, June 2012, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/bundeswehr-kampfhubschrauber-tiger-fuer-afghanistan-ungeeignet-a-841475.html>.

92. Federal Minister of Defense, Dr. Jung, ZDv 10/1, “Innere Führung: Selbstverständnis und Führungskultur,” (Bonn: BMVg, January 1, .2008), 304.

93. Federal Minister of Defense, “Grundsätze für die Spitzengliederung, Unterstellungsverhältnisse und Führungsorganisation im Bundesministerium der Verteidigung und der Bundeswehr,” in BMVg, “Die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr,” 125.

Operations (SE).⁹⁴ Consequently, section SE I 5 can propose recommendations regarding Special Operations but does not have direct authority to issue directives. This situation results in an extended coordination chain and lengthy administrative processes. As part of the Ministry of Defense, the Chief of Defense can call in a military leadership council (Militärischer Führungsrat, MFR) consisting of the chiefs of the services and experts, if needed. This council contributes to the discussion of common issues of a fundamental nature.⁹⁵ GER SOF, however, are not part of this council.

The Inspectors of the services represent the operational level. They are not part of the Ministry of Defense.⁹⁶ This is also true for Bundeswehr's Operational Command, which is responsible to command and control all Bundeswehr's missions abroad (including SO). Thus, during such missions, services do not have direct influence on SOF. Conversely, the Chief of the Operational Command is not able to issue directives to the Inspectors of the services because they are co-equals (Figure 1). However, as force providers, the army and navy are able to influence SOF indirectly due to SOF's placement in their respective service (Figure 2, 3). This affects GER SOF's armaments requests, personnel requirements, general equipment and supplies, training resources and facilities and budget.

At the tactical level, GER SOF rely on GPF's resources for missions. Adequate support requires much coordination, time and the willingness of the commanders to support SOF at each level of command.

If GER SOF are assigned a mission, authority shifts to the department of Special Operations Command (KdoFOSK) of the Einsatzatzführungskommando (EinsFüKdo, English: Operations Command). The KdoFOSK is subordinate to the Chief of the Operations Command, a Three-Star-General (Figure 4). This command is responsible for planning, leading and evaluating all missions of the Bundeswehr at the operational level,

94. BMVg online, "Organisationsübersicht des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung," April 2012, [http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/HYtBDoAgDMDDe4ge2uzd_oV7MMEIWIYBBg-H2R9NgWTxwIdXbUOAKF3PG4eTUvmNgdRBau7SmsEUitlb2siv9bSMXRSHOsOZBg9tvyAQzF9c!/.](http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/HYtBDoAgDMDDe4ge2uzd_oV7MMEIWIYBBg-H2R9NgWTxwIdXbUOAKF3PG4eTUvmNgdRBau7SmsEUitlb2siv9bSMXRSHOsOZBg9tvyAQzF9c!/)

95. BMVg, Federal Minister de Maizere, "Dresdner Erlass," Dresden, 21.March 2012, 5.

96. Ibid., 125.

GER SOF included. In fulfilling this task, the Operations Command passes mission requirements to the services to provide forces.⁹⁷ Unlike conventional units, KSK and KS, have been constantly deployed for the last decade.




Figure 4. Transfer of Authority to GER Operations Command.

The transfer of authority for conducting SO causes coordination challenges for GER SOF, the services, and KdoFOSK due to a lack of habitual relationships. Preparations for deployment remain the responsibility of the services. Hence, the army and navy (and within them KSK and KS) have to meet the Operations Command’s requirements regarding manning, training, operations security, equipment and support to assemble tailored and ready task force. Direct coordination between SOF force providers and KdoFOSK contributes to OPSEC, but bypasses Army and Navy Headquarters. The Operations Command requests non-organic SOF enablers and support from other services. At a designated point between departure from Germany and arrival in the target

97. BMVg, “Die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr,” 33.

area, the transfer of authority takes place.⁹⁸ Until this point, authority is very fragmented, especially if assembled forces come from different branches and services.

Special operations also require specialized leadership. “Well-integrated, high-performing teams—those that ‘click’—never lose sight of their goals and are largely self-[sufficient].”⁹⁹ In fact, SOF seem to have their own character and style of leadership. Judith A. Ross states, “You [as a leader] can have all the procedures and processes in the world, but without trust, your virtual team or operation is going nowhere.”¹⁰⁰ Trust results from good leadership and a reputation for excellence performance over time. Trust cannot come from improperly employed SOF. Experienced SO leaders are needed to make effective decisions about special operations. According to Phil Harkins, effective leaders:

- [Define] clear goals or a vision of the future in accordance with overall organizational aims (the “big picture”)
- [Create] blueprints for action to achieve those goals
- [Use] language to build trust, encourage forward thinking and create energy within the team (“powerful conversations”)
- [Get] the right people involved (“passionate champions”)¹⁰¹

Does the current system produce adequate SOF leadership? The Bundeswehr’s personnel development system applies to GER SOF. Officers normally rotate between assignments after two to three years. Army and Navy SOF are only small branches within their services (Figures 2 and 3). Thus, the number of fully qualified SO officers is small compared to that of other branches (e.g., Army’s Infantry, Artillery). Moreover, these officers can leave the armed forces after twelve years of service. These situation can lead

98. Bundeswehr online, “Einsatzführung—Alles in einer Hand,” http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pPKU VL3UzLzixNSSqlT9cJBKoEhyfl5qCYgsSc0ryQSS6UWJJflFegX5RSU5IJnSoiKgjF5min6kgaGLk6G5AQwY1piFOHu4eBlaGHR6ufnrF-TmOgIAbcRn5A!!/.

99. Phil Harkins, *10 Leadership Techniques for Building High-Performing Teams* (Burlington, MA: Linkage, 2006–2008), 2.

100. Judith A. Ross, “Trust Makes the Team Go ‘Round,’” in *Managing Teams for High Performance*, *Harvard Management Update Article Collection* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation, 2007), 23.

101. Phil Harkins, *10 Leadership Techniques for Building High-Performing Teams* (Burlington, MA: Linkage, 2006–2008), 2.

to shortages of qualified higher-ranking SO leaders. As a result, personnel who are not qualified have been assigned to positions requiring SO expertise. It is highly questionable whether this practice can produce the institutional trust and operational excellence necessary for successful SO.

In conclusion, GER SOF's command and control does not meet Deduction 2. At strategic level, command and control over GER SOF does almost not exist. Further, it is too fragmented at both, the operational and tactical levels. Leadership and staff positions continue to be filled with people who do not have SOF experience. Thus, there is a gap between requirements and the current capabilities regarding command and control.

3. Selection

Contrary to Deduction 11, the selection process and “Kommando” or “Kampfschwimmer” basic training only affects applicants for operational units. If they pass both of these requirements, candidates become operators.¹⁰² According to the official website, applicants have to be physically fit, willing to operate in teams, willing to learn, psychologically resilient and strong-willed, stress-resistant, responsible-minded, discreet and live in socially-acceptable conditions.¹⁰³ The common goal among applicants is becoming a member of an SOF unit. Selection tests their characteristics, basic training tests their skills. Thus, operators can identify with each other because of their selection and training experience. By contrast, non-operator military personnel are not specially selected nor trained. Staff and support personnel can be assigned by the Bundeswehr to SOF units against their individual. Occasionally, individuals volunteer to serve in SOF support units simply to be geographically close to their families. However, for high performance SO units, the whole “team” matters. It comes down to the simple

102. BMVg, “Entschieden gut, gut entschieden: Spezialkräfte,” Referat Personalmarketing, Bonn, 4 and 9.

103. Deutsches Heer online, http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/dso/!ut/p/c4/JYtBC4JAEeb_0YxSgXRTvHTwEkHpJTZ3sMF1VmanuvTjW-178C6PDwfmIHvz5IyjuIA37Ec-Pj7wJNK7TxE8kyRLRiGQwJxmvG4vTzBGIdtsJMbZkzqLCmtUC1t5qeYC7LEvyrYpDpn_ym_VXepu2O-q9tSccV2W-gf6JHvg/.

question, “Does the group you have assembled view itself as a team?”¹⁰⁴ Paul Michelman quotes the vice president of a performance improvement company:

Often, executives have recruited and promoted a number of executives, all with specific goals and objectives, [...] whether these individuals see themselves as a team is another thing.’ Perhaps they have ‘non-complementary’ goals and are encouraged to compete with each other for resources and recognition.¹⁰⁵

“Performance expectations—and the accountability measures that should ride shotgun with them—must be as clear as those governing behavior. This applies both to the team as a whole and to the individuals who make it up.”¹⁰⁶ As a simple deduction, military personnel within GER SOF, who are not selected regarding their mindset and performance, may not contribute to the high performance and strategic utility of GER SOF. Thus, a performance gap can exist between personnel who have passed the necessary selection process and specialized training and those who have not.

4. Operations Security

The Army’s KSK, in contrast to the Navy’s KS, is located in Calw, approximately thirty kilometers southwest of Stuttgart, Germany. It is the only military base in that area. The base is about one square-kilometer with an additional one point five square-kilometer training area. It is visible from three sides. The Army’s KSK is the only unit at Calw. Military railroad and airport access do not exist. Thus, movement in and out of the base can be easily be spotted and connected with SO activities. Steady activities can create a pattern that can disguise intent. However, if one connects official news with increased SOF activities, one may be able to conclude that the GER SOF is involved. Thus, operational security for the mission is compromised.

104. Ibid., 9.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

5. Proliferation of WMD, and Possible Cyberattacks

Proliferation of WMD, and possible cyberattacks on German infrastructure are considered as current and future threats to Germany's national security. "Activities designed to secure, interdict, destroy, or assist [to] rendering safe [...] chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons are inherently complex, involve restrictive OPSEC procedures, and generally necessitate the employment of specially trained and equipped personnel."¹⁰⁷ On occasion, NATO defers such tasks to countries that possess such capabilities. "In-extremis, however, where specialized forces cannot be brought to bear in sufficient time to prevent the employment of CBRN weapons, or their immediate interdiction is required, the authority to utilize other NATO forces, to include NATO SOF, to capture, deter, secure or assist in the process of rendering safe CBRN weapons, facilities, and associated enemy forces might be sought."¹⁰⁸ For such an in-extremis situation, GER SOF have to be prepared, even if there is no clear task for GER SOF to counter the proliferation of WMD. The same is true for countering cyberattacks. Without directives, GER SOF would probably not be able to consider or develop capabilities to counter such threats in a worst-case scenario. Thus, there is a gap between the possible use of GER SOF and the current capabilities of GER SOF in terms of Deduction 9 and Deduction 10.

C. CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS

A mission analysis not only focuses on hard facts, but also on critical assumptions. The *U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5* defines assumptions as follows:

Assumptions are suppositions about the current or future situation that are assumed to be true in the absence of facts. They take the place of necessary, but unavailable, facts and fill the gaps in what the commander and staff know about the situation. An assumption is appropriate if it meets the tests of validity and necessity.¹⁰⁹

107. NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5)*, 2–3.

108. *Ibid.*, 2–4.

109. US Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual No. 101-5: Staff Organization and Operations (FM 101-5)*, 5–7.

In doing a comparison between demands and the current capabilities of GER SOF, two critical assumptions have to be made because of the absence of clear facts. This section, thus, focuses on GER SOF's force strength and GER SOF's structural configuration.

1. GER SOF's Force Strength

Deduction 1, which was identified in Chapter II, called for an adequate force strength that fulfills requirements for NATO, EU, UN and national crisis management. Thus, there is a necessity for adequate manpower. To test this assumption, some simple arithmetic follows.

The strength of GER SOF is approximately 1400 to 1500 soldiers, including operators, staff and supporters. The Bundeswehr limits deployments times to four and six months; non-deployment has dropped from twenty to twelve months. With a task force of 120 soldiers, GER SOF thus theoretically needs 1440 men to fulfill the demands, as the following example shows:

Mission	Mission Rotation – according to current demands	Total Personnel
NATO	1 Task Force deployed á 120men (6 month) 2 Task Forces at home á 120men (12 month)	360 men
EU	1 Task Force deployed á 120men (6 month) 2 Task Forces at home á 120men (12 month)	360 men
UN	1 Task Force deployed á 120men (6 month) 2 Task Forces at home á 120men (12 month)	360 men
DEU	1 Task Force deployed á 120men (6 month) 2 Task Forces at home á 120men (12 month)	360 men
Total	12 Task Forces	1440 men

Table 7. Level of Ambition—GER SOF-Personnel Ratio.

However, this number ultimately means:

- GER SOF's task forces are limited to a maximum of 120 men
- Current existing structures must be broken up (currently five existing mission companies vs. twelve needed task forces)
- All task forces must provide all required SOF skills sustainably
- All men within GER SOF must participate in rotations
- All supporting services, including intelligence and command and control must be able to support four task forces at the same time abroad and at home for mission preparations

The math may work, but the reality is different. The KSK with only four mission companies, one combat support company, one staff and supply company, one signal company and one medical center (Figure 2) plus the maritime KSK with its three mission platoons and small support elements (Figure 3) are not able to conduct four different missions over the long run. Five warrior companies (including the maritime KS company), with only limited support, cannot adequately conduct four long-term missions. Internals are classified, but it looks like a misfit. It appears clear that current requirements for GER SOF have exceeded capabilities.

2. Analysis of German Special Operations Forces' Structural Configuration

Deduction 5 calls for time-sensitive, contingency missions of global scope. This requires quickly assembled professional forces with multiple skills and capabilities, able to accomplish a specific mission worldwide. The structural design of GER SOF should support such demands. As previously mentioned, the ad hoc nature of the U.S. task force sent to free the hostages in Iran in 1980 was one of the causes of failure. However, GER SOF are deeply integrated in existing service structures; since 2012, even high-ranking officers have demanded a new structure for GER SOF. Currently, GER SOF lacks the required capabilities to rapidly deploy for contingency operations because of its current organizational design.

To test its validity of Deduction 5, this section focuses on examining GER SOF's environment and its organizational configuration according to Henry Mintzberg's configurational theory. The analysis begins by introducing theories concerning the environment, configuration and uncertainty. The findings will help determine whether or not the current structure of the GER SOF is appropriate.

“Organizations, like organisms, are open systems that require inputs (i.e., resources and information) that produce outputs. Their boundaries are open to the environment.”¹¹⁰ The throughput that produces the output involves interactions among organizational subsystems. Jay R. Galbraith describes subsystems in his Star Model, which include strategy, people, structure, rewards, and processes:

The Star Model framework for organization design is the foundation on which a company bases its design choices. The framework consists of a series of design policies that are controllable by management and can influence employee behavior. The policies are the tools with which management must become skilled in order to shape the decisions and behaviors of their organizations effectively.¹¹¹

Figure 5 presents such an open systems model, based on McCaskey and Galbraith's Star Model. GER SOF, as an organization, is an open system that interacts with its environment and follows certain policies.

110. Thomas G. Cummings and Suresh Srivastva, *Management of Work: A Socio-technical Systems Approach* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1977 (republished in 1981 by University Associates, San Diego, CA), XVI.

111. Jay R. Galbraith, “The Star Model,” (n.d.), http://www.jaygalbraith.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11&Itemid=123, 1.




Figure 5. Open Systems Model.

a. Clustering the Environment, Configurations, and Uncertainty

Before we analyze GER SOF’s environmental fit, we must consider the environment of an organization, in general, to determine if its configuration is suitable for its environment and for the uncertainty within the environment. According to Richard L. Daft, “Organization environment is defined as all elements that exist outside the boundary of the organization and have the potential to affect all or part of the organization.”¹¹² To refine this definition, Mintzberg asserts, “The environment of the organization can vary in its degree of complexity, in how static or dynamic it is, in the diversity of its market and the hostility it contains for the organization.”¹¹³ A stable environment requires a mechanistic and bureaucratic structural design for an environment when the task does not change. However, the more unstable an organization’s environment becomes due to rapid changes in its environmental elements, the more the organization must be able to adapt, or become “organic.” A further classification is complexity. A task environment can be seen as simple, if no more than three to four similar external factors influence the organization. A centralized structure is the best fit

112. Richard L. Daft, *Essentials of Organization Theory and Design*, 6th ed. (Cincinnati, OH: South-Western College Publishing, 1998), 48.

113. Mintzberg, “Organizational Design,” 16.

for such an environment. If many diverse external factors interact with each other and influence the organization, a decentralized structure of the organization is the best fit for such a complex environment, all other things being equal. In addition, “organizations must cope and manage uncertainty to be effective.”¹¹⁴

Uncertainty means that decision makers do not have sufficient information about environmental factors, and they have a difficult time predicting external changes. Uncertainty increases the risk of failure for organizational responses and makes it difficult to compute costs and probabilities associated with decision alternatives. Characteristics of the environmental domain that influence uncertainty are the extent to which the external domain is simple or complex and to which events are stable or unstable.¹¹⁵

If uncertainty grows inside the organization’s environment, a shift of the organization’s design can occur to cope with new requirements. Mintzberg’s model, Figure 6, shows how the environment can be clustered and in which direction the organizational design must shift when uncertainty increases. Mintzberg then assigns a specific configuration of an organization’s structure to each cluster. He further characterizes each of his configurations,¹¹⁶ as shown in the overview in Figure 6.

114. Daft, *Essentials of Organization Theory and Design*, 52.

115. *Ibid.*.

116. Mintzberg, “Organizational Design,” 6.




Figure 6. Task Environment.

b. Analysis of Environmental Sectors of GER SOF

Next, it is necessary to review the environment in which GER SOF exists.

The environment of an organization can be understood by analyzing its domain within external sectors. An organization's domain is the chosen environmental field of action. [...] Domain defines the organization's niche and defines those external sectors with which the organization will interact to accomplish its goals.¹¹⁷

Daft divides the environment into the general environment and the task environment. The general environment encompasses sectors that influence an organization's daily operations only indirectly. Figure 7 shows how GER SOF are embedded within larger organizations. These organizations can be seen as layers that encompass the entire German political and military structure.

117. Daft, *Essentials of Organization Theory and Design*, 48.




Figure 7. General Environment of GER SOF.

It seems that the layers in Figure 7 operate as buffers for GER SOF. However, as previously mentioned, these layers influence GER SOF indirectly. The German government, as we have seen, provides guidelines for the Ministry of Defense that divides these political guidelines into strategic guidelines for the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr). Next, the high command of the Bundeswehr provides operational guidelines for the Bundeswehr itself that affect GER SOF, which was discussed previously. However, all three layers influence GER SOF also directly. “The task environment includes sectors with which the organization interacts directly and that have a direct impact on the organization’s ability to achieve its goals.”¹¹⁸ Environmental sectors that influence GER SOF should be reviewed. Table 8 displays the GER SOF’s domain, its field of action, in which external sectors interact with GER SOF. It also sets each sector into one cluster of Mintzberg’s environmental categories. A brief description of each environmental sector clarifies the clustering.

118. Ibid.

Environmental Sectors of GER SOF	Stable?	Complex?
Missions Worldwide – Area of Operations (Enemy, Terrain & Infrastructure, Degree of Development, Religion & Culture, Foreign Government, Distance to Germany)	very unstable	very complex
Single Combat Action (Insertion, Infiltration, Actions at Target, Exfiltration, Extraction)	unstable	simple
Task Environment (Specified tasks and required SOF skills)	Stable	Complex
Training (Designated Countries, Forces, Environments, Equipment, Support)	Stable	Complex
Intelligence Networks (ability to cooperate with domestic or foreign agencies based on classified information)	Unstable	Complex
Politics (Mindset of Citizens & Politicians, Guidelines, Laws, Rules, Local Influence)	Stable	Complex
Finance (Governmental Money-Flow)	Stable	Simple
IO and Media (Influence of domestic and foreign people and governments regarding own goals and missions via media like newspapers, TV, radio, Internet, etc.)	Unstable	Complex
CS and CSS (Support by branches and services of the Bw and other organizations)	Stable	Complex
Chain of Command (Direct Reports)	Stable	Simple
Technology (advanced technology in Air, Land, Water, Jungle, Mountain/ Arctic; TTPs; Weapons; Night Visions; CommSystems; Clothing; Other Special Equipment)	Unstable	Complex
Socio-Cultural Sector (Acceptance for SF within in Armed Forces and German Citizens)	stable	Complex
Human Sector (Selection for Service in SF & its Chain of Command; Cultural Background, rewards, families, Other Services)	Stable	Simple

Table 8. Environmental Sectors of GER SOF.

(1) **Missions Worldwide.** This major environmental sector is categorized as very unstable and very complex. It encompasses the enemy, terrain, infrastructure, degree of development, religion and culture, government and distance to Germany from a certain region or state. As long as GER SOF’s task is to operate worldwide, imagine the vast area with which GER SOF must cope. People, and thus, the enemy, differ because of their dissimilar education, cultural and religious background and behavior. The terrain and environment in which GER SOF must operate vary from underwater, amphibious conditions, arctic conditions, wooden flatlands and high mountains, deserts, jungles or urban terrains depending on the assigned mission. Time matters, especially for hostage release missions. Thus, teams must adapt immediately to cope with a rapidly changing situation on the ground and to handle many diverse interacting external factors that influence GER SOF’s mission.

(2) **Single Combat Action.** This environmental sector is categorized as unstable but simple. It comprises all single actions to accomplish a mission

like insertion, actions at target, and extraction of a SOF mission element. For example, fights on the ground always follow the so-called golden rules of war, such as fire and movement, taking the initiative, use of intelligence, surprise and so forth. The “fog of war” can be lifted by using McRaven’s principles for a successful SO to achieve relative superiority for a SOF team.¹¹⁹ These serve to reduce the complexity. However, as long as circumstances cannot be predicted completely, environmental elements remain unstable.

(3) Task Environment. This sector is considered stable and complex and encompasses GER SOF’s assigned tasks, as well as sub-tasks to accomplish a mission. As mentioned, GER SOF are trained for several core tasks. Hostage Rescue Operations, Special Reconnaissance, Direct Actions, Military Assistance and Unconventional Warfare. Certainly, not all operations are undertaken at the same time, but each is anchored in the operator’s standardized training. However, complexity increases when the circumstances of a specific mission are considered. Does it involve specialized infiltration, combat divers, mountain guides, free-fall jumpmasters, jungle or desert experts? Is combat support very important? For example, trained operators may be required for mechanical and explosive breaching, joint fire support, foreign weapons, sniping, medical or radio support. Alternatively, the mission may depend on experts in optronical or acoustical reconnaissance, dog teams, mini drones or heavy engineers. Nonetheless, the task environment for GER SOF in this sector remains the same, but, as demonstrated, the operators may face a very complex scenario.

(4) Training. This environmental sector also is categorized as stable but complex. Driven by its tasks and missions, training for GER SOF’s operators is established to deal with its broad requirements. However, training areas, such as Germany, Norway, the United States and standard operating procedures (SOPs) remain the same over several months or years.

(5) Intelligence Networks. This sector is considered unstable and complex. In this part of GER SOF’s environment, cooperation with domestic or foreign agencies at a classified level is critical and difficult even within Germany. More

119. William H. McRaven, *Spec Ops. Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Presidio Press, 1996), 4–23.

complexity is added if GER SOF need to negotiate and cooperate with different countries that use their own classifications and intelligence systems. Additionally, every mission that requires information about a hostile environment can be considered unstable because of a lack of reliability from the source, especially in time-sensitive operations. Often, incoming information changes quickly, is false, or not confirmable.

(6) Politics. Politics is a sector that indirectly influences GER SOF. This environmental sector can be considered relatively stable but complex. GER SOF is of special interest to the German government. In contrast to Germany's General Purpose Forces, GER SOF are emphasized because of the importance of their missions. The media, with its ability to pressure politicians, often influence them to act. The politicians often turn to GER SOF because of their flexibility and responsiveness. Examples include some early missions in the Balkans, operations in Afghanistan or Africa.

(7) Information Operations and Media. This important environmental sector is considered complex yet unstable. As a matter of fact, many different types of media such as newspapers, (online) journals, Internet, cell-phones, TV or radio broadcasting make this sector very complex. Media has the capability to influence people and politicians immediately and at global range. But reactions to received information differ among people around the globe due different personalities, knowledge, or culture of people. Public reactions are often not predictable. Thus, this sector can be seen as very unstable. GER SOF depends on media. For example, positive publications about GER SOF can support recruitment and better understanding of SOF missions. Negative publications about GER SOF can lead to long-lasting internal investigations that may hinder GER SOF's effectiveness despite possible incorrectness of such publications.

(8) Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS). This environmental sector is considered stable but complex. The Bundeswehr and external resources, as with certain development institutes or industries, do not often change. However, in contrast to GPF, SOF cooperate with a large number of different organizations. As previously mentioned, even within the Bundeswehr, GER SOF need to

cooperate with and sometimes rely on other services and branches. In addition, GER SOF has close relationships with Special Forces of partner nations, police units and the civil sector. Thus, this sector can be viewed as very complex.

(9) Finance. This sector is considered stable and simple. The money flow is transparent because of political guidelines and remains the same over the years.

(10) Chain of Command. This environmental sector is also considered stable and, even if fragmented in some cases, simple because of the inherent structure of the Bundeswehr.

(11) Technology. This environmental sector is considered highly unstable and complex. Technology changes quickly, which is true for new technological developments, as well as changes in the enemy's techniques, tactics and procedures (TTPs). These elements change rapidly. Thus, one of the biggest challenges for SOF is always to be at the forefront of such developments to cope with the latest threats.

(12) Socio-Cultural-Sector. This sector has an indirect as well as a direct influence on GER SOF. In the long term, this sector can shape the behavior of the GER SOF's entire environment, as well as GER SOF itself. The direct influence can be seen in the willingness of other organizations or people to support SOF. As long as resources, the media and politics are stable, the Socio-Cultural-Sector remains stable. However, this environmental sector can be considered complex because of the highly diverse external organizations that influence GER SOF with which it must cope.

(13) Human Sector. This environmental sector is considered stable and simple. It encompasses the direct human involvement in GER SOF (chain of command, selection process, operators, families, people of other services and so forth). As long as a rather common understanding exists of what SOF are and what tasks they perform, changes to their mindset are not routinely expected.

c. *Environmental Sectors of GER SOF—Findings and Assessment*

In the next step, the categorized environmental sectors from the previous section are combined. Figure 8 clusters the findings in a model based on Mintzberg’s model.




Figure 8. Scatterplot of Findings.

Figure 8 shows that most of the GER SOF’s environmental sectors are complex. Indeed, this complex environment contains the most influential sectors, such as the GER SOF’s missions worldwide, intelligence networks, training, technology and Information Operations that all contribute to the mission’s success. Recall that a complex environment requires decentralization.

GER SOF's environment can be divided into a stable and complex environment as well as an unstable and complex environment (Figure 8). According to Mintzberg, the most effective configuration for a stable, yet complex, environment is a "Professional Bureaucracy."¹²⁰

Most important, because it [Professional Bureaucracy] relies for its operating tasks on trained professionals—skilled people who must be given considerable control over their own work—the organization surrenders a good deal of its power not only to the professionals themselves but also to the associations and institutions that select and train them in the first place. As a result, the structure emerges as very decentralized; power over many decisions, both operating and strategic, flows all the way down the hierarchy to the professionals of the operating core. [...] Complexity requires that decision-making power be decentralized to highly trained individuals, and stability enables these individuals to apply standardized skills and so to work with a good deal of autonomy.¹²¹

Figure 8 also shows that many of GER SOF's important environmental sectors are unstable and complex. The downside of a professional bureaucracy is its inability to adopt and innovate, which is exactly what is needed to cope with challenges in an unstable yet complex environment. The configuration that fits this sector best is a design in which project teams are able to interact. Such a configuration is called an "adhocracy."¹²²

Indeed, adhocracy contradicts much of what we accept on faith in organizations – constancy in output, control by administrators, unity of command, strategy emanating from the top. It is a tremendously fluid structure, in which power is constantly shifting and coordination and control are by mutual adjustment through the informal communication and interaction of competent experts.¹²³

120. Mintzberg, "Organizational Design," 8.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid., 8, 10.

123. Ibid., 10.

Such an adhocracy is a configuration in which trained and specialized experts work together to be innovative rather than becoming experts with near-perfect skills in their own narrow fields. Contrary to a conventional structure “with power based on expertise instead of authority, the line/staff distinction evaporates. And with power distributed throughout the structure, the distinction between the strategic apex and the rest of the structure blurs.”¹²⁴

In assessing the findings, it can be stated that the configuration of GER SOF should be a combination of a professional bureaucracy and adhocracy to fit its principal environment best. The few environmental sectors that can be found in the simple parts of the cluster in Figure 8 do not have the same impact as those in the complex quadrants (e.g., authority can be shifted). Thus, they are not negligible but should not affect GER SOF’s configuration to the same degree as the others.

d. Analysis of the Structure of German Special Operations Forces

“The structure of the organization determines the placement of power and authority in the organization.”¹²⁵ The following analysis of the structure of GER SOF should reveal which kind of configuration GER SOF possesses. As long as the Army’s KSK and Navy’s KS are structured in the same way (Figures 2 and 3), this analysis applies to both units. However, the main focus has been on the Army’s KSK because of its manning and size (approximately 1300 soldiers) compared to its naval sister unit (approximately 60 sailors).

To examine the structure of GER SOF, elements of an organizational structure¹²⁶ such as departmentalization, formalization, centralization, complexity and span of control are analyzed.

124. *Ibid.*, 11.

125. Galbraith, “The Star Model,” 2.

126. Richard L. Daft, *Essentials of Organization Theory & Design*, 2nd ed. (Cengage Learning, 1990), 48.

(1) Departmentalization. “Departmentalization specifies how employees and their activities are grouped together. It is a fundamental strategy for coordinating organizational activities.”¹²⁷ Departmentalization influences organizational behavior through the established chain of command; it “focuses people around common mental models or ways of thinking,” and it “encourages coordination through informal communication among people and subunits.”¹²⁸

For example, the German Army is designed as a divisional structure that focuses on rapid deployment for certain kinds of missions, such as those that require quick intervention for a secure return of German citizens, or long-term stabilizing missions.¹²⁹ However, the Division of Fast Forces as one out of three divisions consists of an airborne brigade, the KSK, and three helicopter regiments. The division of fast forces focuses on functional specialization (skills) rather than mission-types or regions. Thus, the division of fast forces is functionally structured-

A functional structure is a layout of well-defined departments based on functional specialization. In this structure, the information flow tends to follow the hierarchy. Additionally, this structure clearly distinguishes between line and staff.¹³⁰ Focusing only on the KSK, it is clearly divided into four major parts: staff section, mission section, support section and development section. These four sections are subordinate to the commander of the KSK, a Brigadier General. As shown in Figure 6, this section is also structured functionally. First, the staff is divided into its parts, such as personnel, intelligence and security, operations, support, communications, medical support and special support. Second, the mission section is divided into four fighting companies, one combat support company and the training section. The support section is divided into the communication company, a support company, a medical center and a maintenance company. The development section is also divided into functions.

127. Steven L. McShane and Mary Ann Von Glinow, *Organizational Behavior* (Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2007), 238.

128. McShane and Von Glinow, *Organizational Behavior*, 239.

129. Richard M. Burton and Borge Obel, 1998, 45. Quoted in “Lectures in Organizational Design for Special Operations,” Erik Jansen, course MN3121, winter quarter, Naval Postgraduate School.

130. Burton and Obel, “Lectures in Organizational Design,” 286.

According to Thompson's three types of interdependence, the task (or workflow) interdependence is pooled.¹³¹ Sequential, or even reciprocal interdependence, only occurs because of personal connections.¹³² However, the only established horizontal link of Daft's ladder¹³³ of mechanisms for horizontal linkage and coordination between all these elements is an internal information system and direct (personal) contact. The information system consists of normal phone and computer network systems (email, Internal Webpages).

(2) Formalization. Formalization is the degree to which organizations standardize behavior through rules, procedures, formal training and related mechanisms.¹³⁴ The KSK as well as the KS, which are deeply integrated into the Bundeswehr are as highly formalized as any military organization. Each soldier has a duty-description that precisely defines what duties the soldier must perform in his "slot." Standard Operating Procedures, rulebooks and written orders precisely define how the soldiers do their tasks. Even for the SOF units, room barely exists to improvise and for flexible tasks to be performed. Thus, GER SOF are an organization that focuses on work processes and consequently need a great deal of administration ("techno-staff") support.

(3) Centralization. "Centralization is the degree to which formal authority to make discretionary choices are concentrated in an individual, unit or level."¹³⁵ It can be measured in "[...] how much direct involvement top managers have in gathering and interpreting the information they use in decision making and the degree to which top management directly controls the execution of a decision."¹³⁶ Authority within

131. B. J. Hodge, William Anthony, and Lawrence Gales, quoted in "Organizational Design for Special Operations," Erik Jansen, PowerPoint slides for course MN3121, winter quarter, Naval Postgraduate School.

132. This is a personal experience of the author.

133. Richard Daft clusters his "ladder of mechanisms for horizontal linkage and coordination" in to the amount of horizontal coordination required and costs of coordination in time and human resources. His ladder consists of information systems, direct contact, task forces, full-time integrators and teams, in which the lowest requirements and costs information systems and the highest teams are. In: Richard Daft, *Organization Theory and Design*, 8th ed. (Mason, OH: Thomson/South-Western College Publishing, 2003), 131.

134. McShane and Von Glinow, *Organizational Behavior*, 237.

135. Burton and Obel, quoted in "Lectures in Organizational Design for Special Operations," Erik Jansen, PowerPoint slides for course MN3121, winter quarter, Naval Postgraduate School.

136. Ibid.

the Army's KSK strictly follows the lines of the organizational chart displayed in Figure 2. The KSK is not an exception to the strict hierarchy within the whole armed forces. This is also true for the Navy's KS (Figure 3). Thus, only limited vertical decentralization exists.

(4) Complexity. "Complexity refers to both the number of levels in the hierarchy (vertical complexity) and the number of departments or jobs (horizontal complexity)."¹³⁷ The vertical differentiation as "the number of hierarchical levels between top management and the bottom" can be seen as high. The chain of command for a KSK team (when not deployed) is displayed in Figure 9.




Figure 9. Chain of Command.

137. Daft, *Essentials of Organization Theory & Design*, 108.

To task such a mission element, at least six (in the case of the Army's KSK, seven) hierarchical levels and orders must pass from the very top down until it reaches the execution element, which is also true for requests from bottom up. Thus, the vertical differentiation is considered as high. In addition, the horizontal differentiation of KS and KSK is also considered as high because of many different requirements on specializations (compare single combat actions and task environment of GER SOF). Especially up to the company level, "jobs" are very different, special and require a high level of skills. Thus, in the entire organization, quite a bit of vertical and horizontal specialization exists.

(5) Span of Control. "Span of control refers to the number of people directly reporting to the next level in the hierarchy."¹³⁸ Looking at Figure 9, the KSK itself and the surrounding Army can be seen as a tall organization, and this is reflected in its relatively narrow span of control. The span of control varies from four (teams in a commando platoon) to six (companies in the mission section) and seven (brigades/regiments in the Division of Fast Forces of the Army). With one decision level less than its Army counterpart, the Navy's KS face a nearly similar span of control.

e. The Structure of German Special Forces—Findings and Assessment

What kind of configuration does GER SOF have? From the previous section, recall that the GER SOF's configuration is functionally structured with only limited horizontal linkages between its departments. The task flow and workflow can be seen as a pooled interdependence. As in other parts of the military, GER SOF are highly formalized and focused on work processes, which are created and maintained by a large "techno staff." Further, the GER SOF are highly centralized with a strict hierarchy and only limited horizontal decentralization. Lastly, GER SOF are considered to possess horizontal and vertical specialization but only has a narrow span of control.

A mechanistic structure is characterized by a narrow span of control and a high degree of formalization and centralization. Mechanistic structures have many rules and procedures, limited decision making at lower levels,

138. McShane and Von Glinow, *Organizational Behavior*, 236.

tall hierarchies of people in specialized roles, and vertical rather than horizontal communication flows. Tasks are rigidly defined and are altered only when sanctioned by higher authorities.¹³⁹

In assessing the findings of the structural analysis of GER SOF, it can be concluded that the current configuration, according to Henry Mintzberg, a “Machine Bureaucracy” because it fulfills nearly all its criteria.¹⁴⁰ Recalling Figure 6, a machine bureaucracy is the best fit for a stable but simple environment that does not face much uncertainty.

f. GER SOF’s Current Structural Configuration

The findings of GER SOF’s environmental sectors (Table 8) reveal that most are placed in a complex environment. Moreover, the most influencing sectors, such as missions worldwide, technology, intelligence networks and information operations and media are categorized as complex and unstable. Also, this sector is labeled as having the highest uncertainty. In assessing the GER SOF’s environment, it can be concluded that a combination of a professional bureaucracy and adhocracy would be the best fit to cope with GER SOF’s challenges. However, the analysis and assessment of GER SOF’s current structure revealed that the dominant configuration of German Special Forces is a machine bureaucracy; it fulfills most of Mintzberg’s criteria for such an organizational configuration.

According to David Hannah, an environmental misfit occurs if the organization becomes better, and better at what it is doing, as a result of ignoring the environment.¹⁴¹ By using Mintzberg’s theory, the analysis reveals that GER SOF’s environment requires a combination of a professional bureaucracy and adhocracy rather than a machine bureaucracy. However, the structure of GER SOF is exactly the opposite. It is a machine bureaucracy that is the best fit for a stable and simple environment without much uncertainty.

139. McShane and Von Glinow, *Organizational Behavior*, 238.

140. Mintzberg, “Organizational Design,” 6.

141. David P. Hannah, *Designing Organizations for High Performance* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1998), Chapter 1.

g. Evaluation of the Fit of GER SOF's Configuration

An organization fits if the conditions of “all organizational elements are congruent with the intended results.”¹⁴² Two sub-conditions are important. First, an internal fit is required, as well as the coherence of the subsystems with each other. Second, an environmental fit is also required. GER SOF as a living open system interacts with its environment permanently. Our task was to test whether GER SOF meet the structural requirements of its environment. The analysis shows that GER SOF's environment requires a combination of a professional bureaucracy and adhocracy, but GER SOF's structure clearly reveals its design as a machine bureaucracy, according to Mintzberg's theory. Even without looking at the purpose of the system, this analysis and assessment leads to the conclusion that the current organizational design of GER SOF does not fit its environmental requirements. Thus, it is strongly assumed that a gap exists between Deduction 5 and GER SOF's current capability to conduct professional time-sensitive contingency missions.

D. FINDINGS

This chapter was dedicated to comparing previously drawn deductions with GER SOF's current situation by doing a defense mission analysis. The findings show that significant gaps exist between German political demands and capabilities of GER SOF to fulfill such demands. That answers the initially stated hypothesis. In short, the following gaps exist (Table 9).

142. Hannah, *Designing Organizations for High Performance*, Chapter 1.

Deduction 1: *German Special Operations Forces must be properly manned, equipped and resourced to fulfill requirements of NATO, EU, international conflict prevention and crisis management, and for evacuation and hostage rescue operations at the same time to meet current political demands.*

GER SOF is undermanned. With its four Army SOF companies, one NAVY SOF company and marginal organic support units, GER SOF cannot continuously support four required missions.

Deduction 2: *GER SOF must be commanded and controlled at a strategic level with a clear and unambiguous chain of command that possess sufficient experience and expertise to plan, conduct and support special operations.*

GER SOF's command and control is barely integrated at the strategic level. Its leadership is fragmented and not sufficiently SOF experienced in special operations.

Deduction 3: *GER SOF must have the capability to function in a warrior-diplomat role over the long run to support an indirect strategic approach.*

GER SOF's training only focuses on SOF's commando role; gaps exist in GER SOF's warrior diplomat role. Also see Deduction 1.

Deduction 4: *National-level intelligence must be provided to GER SOF. GER SOF also must have organic capabilities for special reconnaissance and political and strategic intelligence to conduct strategic quick-response operations.*

GER SOF's training focuses primarily on Direct Action. There is no SO dedicated for Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Human Intelligence or other Intelligence.

Deduction 5: *As a strategic tool, GER SOF must be capable of conducting time-sensitive missions globally.*

According to Mintzberg's theory, GER SOF's current configuration does not support contingency missions that require inter-agency, inter-service and inner-service cooperation.

Deduction 6: *GER SOF must use advanced technologies to create advantages over their enemies.*

The acquisition-process for GER SOF is the same as for general purpose forces and therefore too slow to acquire up-to-date technologies.

Deduction 7: *GER SOF must be able to conduct immediate information operations to undermine enemy capabilities and advantages.*

GER SOF do not have organic IO capabilities. IO support must be requested.

<p><u>Deduction 8:</u> <i>GER SOF must achieve operations security (OPSEC) to protect information regarding own intentions and missions.</i></p> <p>The Army's KSK, as the only military unit specially assigned for sensitive hostage rescue operations, is located in a small base in Calw without secure access to operational military railroad or airport facilities. The base can be observed from at least three sides. In addition, rotating attached conventional units for support maybe create additional security-vulnerabilities.</p>
<p><u>Deduction 9:</u> <i>GER SOF must start planning to conduct military operations against WMD proliferation.</i></p> <p>No current tasks or guidelines exist to counter the proliferation of WMD.</p>
<p><u>Deduction 10:</u> <i>GER SOF should consider options to respond militarily to cyber attacks.</i></p> <p>No current tasks or guidelines exist to counter cyber attacks.</p>
<p><u>Deduction 11:</u></p> <p><i>Capable personnel for GER SOF, including supporters and leadership, shall be carefully selected.</i></p> <p>SOF selection is only applicable to operators not for all personnel within GER SOF.</p>
<p><u>Deduction 12:</u></p> <p><i>Adequate combat support and combat service support is necessary.</i></p> <p>GER SOF lack adequate Combat Support and Combat Service Support.</p>

Table 9. Defense Mission Analysis—Findings.

IV. HOW TO ACHIEVE GREATER INTERNAL COHERENCE AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS FOR CURRENT AND FUTURE MISSIONS

This chapter is dedicated to presenting recommendations based on the findings in this study. Closing existing gaps between political demands and expectations of GER SOF, and GER SOF's current capabilities through an adaptive reorganization of GER SOF is needed. GER SOF, as part of the Bundeswehr, must reorganize "to meet current tasks and expected future developments,"¹⁴³ as the Federal Minister of Defense demanded in his 2011 guidelines. In doing so, this chapter draws conclusions from deductions and findings as a basis for recommendations on how German Special Forces can adapt and reorganize.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

For the GER SOF, there is much room for improvement. However, first and foremost, the need for such improvements must be acknowledged. That requires an understanding of SOF and their strategic utility, and also the willingness to support special operations. Therefore, "elite" should not be a negatively loaded term in regard to special forces; jealousy must never be a factor among military decision-makers. All German military forces serve the national defense.

1. Recommendation R1

GER SOF shall increase its force strength to reflect MOD's level of ambition to respond to routine challenges and contingency operations. In doing so, GER SOF should first divide its forces into elements designated for routine missions and elements that remain ready for contingency operations. This will ensure sustained, uninterrupted mission execution and readiness. Second, each element designated for missions (ME) shall be manned and equipped to meet MOD's Level of Ambition (LoA) of four simultaneous and protracted SOF missions. Deployment cycles of those ME shall account

143. Federal Minister of German Ministry of Defense. "Defence Policy Guidelines," German Ministry of Defense, Berlin May 27, 2011, 8.

for the need for further education and training, maintenance of equipment, required tests for readiness, healthcare and recreation. The exact numbers of personnel cannot be recommended because of classified internal data of GER SOF. This task needs further internal analysis.

2. Recommendation R2

GER SOF's command and control needs adaptation at all echelons. At the strategic level, GER SOF need an element that is authorized to issue directives to all SOF units and to all services in cases of national crises management. This element also shall coordinate issues at the political/strategic level and advise Germany's Chief of Defense. At the operational level, GER SOF shall establish a German Special Operations Command (GER SOCOM). All SOF units shall be taken out of current service and commands, and united under the new GER SOCOM. Its chief shall be responsible for daily, routine SOF operations. GER SOCOM also needs close links to other services for better coordination. At the tactical level, mission elements have to be clearly assigned to a mission commander. Unit deployment rotation schedules should be synchronized for a better internal coherence and to build trust within deploying units. Support units of other services must be designated to support GER SOF primarily. This will contribute to a "clear and unambiguous chain of command." Furthermore, SOF leadership at all levels must be fully qualified to plan, execute, and support special operations.

3. Recommendation R3

GER SOF shall set up an organic ability to conduct military assistance; GER SOF shall enhance their capabilities to operate in the warrior-diplomat role. At a minimum, this includes training in languages related to target areas, indigenous social and cultural orientations and regional studies, human intelligence operations and psychological warfare. Manning requirements for such a unit may exceed others because of the political requirements for stability operations and protracted deployments that are necessary to build trust with host nation partners. Further considerations are needed to determine the number of personnel required for these units.

4. Recommendation R4

Specific recommendations regarding support of national-level intelligence efforts cannot really be made because of the absence of unclassified data. However, GER SOF needs adequate intelligence support. GER SOF's Intelligence shall also be inter-service and inner-service connected. To achieve synergetic effects, GER SOF shall unite intelligence persons in one unit that will support GER SOF's intelligence staff cell. The intelligence unit shall contain strategic and operational intelligence-collectors and maintain Intel-networks. This unit shall also be responsible for supporting deployed units with standing non-deployable teams in the rear. Furthermore, GER SOF shall set up a separate SR unit that comprises all techniques for tactical surveillance and reconnaissance. As an example, the unit shall include human intelligence teams and female reconnaissance, search, and interrogator teams.

5. Recommendation R5

GER SOF requires an organizational design that combines elements of an adhocracy and professional bureaucracy, according to Mintzberg's theory. Such an organizational design shall have the following characteristics. It shall be designed with low vertical differentiation and hence have a flat chain of command and allow reciprocal interdependence between units for a quick and smooth information flow. Authority shall be based on expertise rather than on rank, but at the same time, the organizational design shall support a clear chain of command (R2). Vertical and horizontal decentralization shall be a characteristic of such a configuration. The design further shall support in-depth knowledge of many different skills but also adapt quickly to uncertain and unstable organizational environments. Access to required capabilities on short notice is fundamental for contingency missions. This access is only possible if one "owns" such units. Required capabilities thus shall be organically established and functionally organized. Mission elements shall be able to cope with the challenges of missions around the globe, including different environments and weather, as well as quick deployments at global range.

6. Recommendation R6

GER SOF shall establish an accelerated acquisition process to develop and introduce new technologies and systems. Existing systems and equipment of the Bundeswehr shall be prioritized to support SOF, if required. Procurement of market-available technologies and systems—not currently existent in the Bundeswehr—shall not exceed the length of deployment (six months) to be useful. GER SOF shall also have their own budget, independent from other services, to serve their own needs.

7. Recommendation R7

GER SOF shall establish organic capabilities to support four separate missions with information operations. Such IO must be closely coordinated with intelligence and analysts measuring IO effectiveness to achieve results. Hence, IO skills and capabilities shall be integrated in to the Intelligence unit.

8. Recommendation R8

GER SOF's units shall be based on larger bases with access to air, land, or sea ports. Operations security can be better achieved if military traffic, exercises or even personal identities become blurred with other military appearances and patterns. In conjunction with R5, fewer attached external support units and a separate chain of command will also contribute to better OPSEC.

9. Recommendation R9

GER SOF shall be tasked to start planning to counter the proliferation of WMD. Such considerations require further analysis.

10. Recommendation R10

GER SOF shall be tasked to start planning to respond militarily against cyber attacks. This, too, requires further analysis.

11. Recommendation R11

GER SOF shall select all personnel to ensure common mindset and goals as well as required skills and personal characteristics. Selection shall be adapted to respective tasks within GER SOF because job profiles differ. The chief of a functional unit together with a selection board shall be responsible to select new candidates. Furthermore, they shall also be empowered to de-select personnel if they do not fit into the team.

12. Recommendation R12

GER SOF shall be adequately supported with organic combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS). Combat Support includes specialized infantry. CS and CSS shall appear as separate units, which are able to support four separate missions and daily duty in the rear simultaneously.

B. ADAPTIVE REORGANIZATION OF GER SOF

The point of departure for an adaptive reorganization of German Special Operations Forces is the finding that GER SOF should be designed as a mix of a professional bureaucracy and adhocracy in order to deal with GER SOF's almost uncertain organizational environment, according to Mintzberg's configurational theory (R5). Figure 10 displays an attempt to incorporate the findings that affect GER SOF's configurational design.




Figure 10. Proposal for A New German SOF Structure.

A mix of a professional bureaucracy and adhocracy does have some characteristics in common. First, both configurations are designed to cope with complexity “that requires that decision-making power be decentralized to highly trained individuals,” as previously mentioned. In other words, it requires a delegation of power down the chain of authority (vertical decentralization), and from traditional decision-makers to experts (horizontal decentralization). With the focus on the tactical and operational levels, GER SOF shall be able to assemble forces for missions in which leadership can be shifted immediately between trained and skilled specialists to cope with the current task. But adhocracy and professional bureaucracy also require highly trained personnel for the full variety of “jobs.” A functional structure enables indepth knowledge and skills.¹⁴⁴ Thus, for training purposes and daily business, GER SOF need to be

144. Burton and Obel, “Lectures in Organizational Design.”

divided into separate functions. Combined, GER SOF shall establish a matrix form that incorporates advantages from a functional structure but also a task-oriented one. In detail, GER SOF shall set up different units with required core tasks. These are Direct Action, Military Assistance (R3), Special Reconnaissance (R4), Information Operations (R7), Air and Boat Support, Combat Support, Combat Service Support (R12), but also a Training Wing, development group and staff. All of these units shall be able to provide elements for four separate task forces for continuous operations (R1). The Training Wing analogously shall be able to prepare four separate missions and task forces. All deployable functional units (ME) shall be capable of operating under various geographic and weather conditions (R5). However, such operations shall be integrated within functional units, especially in DA and SR. Traditional environmental differentiations such as desert, air, water and jungle, mountain and arctic terrain for different tactics and techniques shall remain the responsibility of ME. During missions, Staff, Intel/ IO unit, and Combat Service Support shall facilitate mission continuity to avoid interruptions due to rotating task forces. The Training Wing and Research and Development Group (R&D Group) are normally not assigned for missions.

Command and Control is closely bound up with GER SOF's structure (see Figure 5). GER SOF's C2 shall meet R2. At the political/strategic level, a SOF adviser cell shall be established and directly subordinate to the Chief of Defense while the small cell SE I 5 (Figure 1) shall be terminated. This cell (here called Special Operations Advisor and Coordination Cell, SOFADCC), should advise the Chief of Defense but also the Chief's Directorate-Generals for planning, forces policy, and strategy and operations regarding SOF. It also shall be responsible to coordinate SOF issues with other Directorate-Generals and departments. It shall prepare directives to GER SOF's operational command but also to other operational commands in cases of national crisis management. However, only the Chief of Defense can issue directives to his subordinate commands (black line, Figure 10). The cell should establish a close connection to GER SOCOM (broken red line, Figure 10). Such a SOF adviser cell would contribute to SOF's strategic implementation, strategic command and control and vertical linkage. Furthermore, the implementation would serve as direct contact for all Directorate-Generals and other

ministerial departments, which contributes to better horizontal linkages and reciprocal interdependence.

At the operational level, GER SOF shall become its own service. The new established GER SOCOM shall command and control GER SOF's missions. In doing so, the KdoFOSK, as well as currently existing SOF staff of the Army's and Navy's KSK, shall shift from Operations Command to GER SOCOM. These different staffs shall merge into one joint SOF staff. Raising GER SOF to a service level with a SOF chief equivalent to other service chiefs will provide further advantages. As a separate service, GER SOF will have a voice within the Chief of Defense's military leadership council (MFR) at the strategic and operational level. As a service with organic support, GER SOF can also operate almost independently from other services. Authority and capability thus remain within the SOF service and is not fragmented, which contributes to R2. Furthermore, an independent service better fits David Tucker's and Christopher Lamb's conclusion that "SOF provide greater strategic value [...] when SOF perform in an independent role."¹⁴⁵ Designed, trained and led to conduct special operations, GER SOF may be more "suited for denied and politically sensitive environments,"¹⁴⁶ rather than the current solutions using a mix of SOF and GPF. However, some support for special operations requires close coordination with other services. Thus, SOF liaison elements (LE) shall be sent to staffs of other services to contribute to better horizontal coordination (red line to LE, Figure 10). Liaison elements contribute to R5's demand for reciprocal interdependence. Once assigned to support special operations, the authority over units from other services shall immediately shift to GER SOCOM. That also reduces fragmented command and control.

At the tactical level, the Army and Navy SOF units shall be combined and commanded under GER SOCOM SOF only. This new, recommended structure is flat, which also means a flat chain of command for a faster information flow yet a wider span of control. The recommended design for GER SOF at the tactical level is a matrix form that combines the advantages from functional and task-oriented structures. That creates a

145. Tucker and Lamb, *United States Special Operations Forces*, 158.

146. USSOCOM, Joint Publication (JP) 3-05 Special Operations, April 18, 2011.

dual chain of command. For mission purposes, elements of these units shall be assembled as a task force (TF). If possible, elements of all functional units shall be firmly assigned to certain standing task forces for ongoing missions, headed by a designated task force commander (red lines, Figure 10). Their TF Commanders shall be responsible for their task forces during deployment but also back home for mission preparation, lessons learned and team-building. During missions, TF Commander shall delegate authority to experts to conduct selected combat actions. The TF Commander functions as the coordinator who keeps the mission running. Commanders of functional units shall be responsible to provide TF commanders with the required capabilities (people and material). When not deployed, units stay at home and remain under functional command. For contingency missions, functional units shall provide required assets on short notice. The underlying mindset of all units shall be to prioritize support for any given mission first.

C. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Resources are always scarce, especially when it comes to expensive air and boat assets. The Bundeswehr might not be able to afford additional helicopters, airplanes and boats exclusively for German Special Operations Forces—even if such a solution would be the best for GER SOF. Similar to the recommended new structure of GER SOF, helicopters, air planes and bigger boats shall be “owned” by other services (like functional units) for efficiency reasons and to avoid expensive doubling of capabilities. However, air and boat support must meet GER SOF requirements and standards to be useful. If requested, these units shall primarily support Special Operations Forces because of their strategic impact.

Further considerations shall concern GER SOF’s reward system. How can GER SOF motivate non-operators to join the service? Why should they bear the burden to keep up with SOF’s high requirements but not being an operator? GER SOF’s supporters are not selected. But “a chain is as strong as its weakest link,” the saying goes. In other words, the best operators can fail, if they are not properly supported. Materialistically motivated supporters are not preferable for SOF. However, immaterial rewards serve as

better motivation than materialistic rewards. But there is no immaterial or material reward system at all for them. Thus, a reward system for non-operators thus is surely worth considering.

V. CONCLUSION

The focus of this thesis was to develop recommendations for an adaptive reorganization of GER SOF to achieve greater internal coherence and thus greater organizational effectiveness for current and future missions. It was based on the assumption that gaps exist between political demands and expectations of German Special Operations Forces, and the capabilities of GER SOF to fulfill such demands. This thesis is an approach to answer the questions: “What is wanted?” “What do we have already?” and thus “What is needed?”

As described in Chapter I, “small wars” are not always fought in support of “big wars” anymore. Small wars nowadays can quickly become issues at the political level with strategic impact. Special Operations Forces are considered to be a strategic tool to counter such irregular threats. As such a tool, the German military’s Special Operations Forces (the Army’s KSK) were founded in 1996 after the events in Rwanda 1994. In 2005, Navy’s Kampfschwimmer also achieved the status of Special Operations Forces with similar tasks. Some years later, the 2006 German Defense White Paper and the German Defense Guidelines of 2011 set the stage for the Bundeswehr’s transformation to cope with current and future challenges. However, despite the general view of GER SOF as a strategic asset and the major changes within the Bundeswehr in 2012, German SOF units remained in their services of Army and Navy. A conventional HQ still controls GER SOF’s missions abroad with a subordinate SOF HQ (KdoFOSK).

Official papers state what is required from German Special Operations Forces. But what does it mean? The defense mission analysis of the German official guidelines and additional NATO papers that also affect GER SOF reveal assumptions about how GER SOF should be. In short, GER SOF are supposed to meet the following criteria:

- execute four simultaneous, protracted missions
- be commanded and controlled with a clear and unambiguous chain of command composed of experienced personnel
- function in a warrior-diplomat role to conduct military assistance (in addition to DA missions)

- possess adequate, organic intelligence capabilities
- conduct time-sensitive contingency missions at global range
- possess advanced technology
- possess capabilities to conduct immediate information operations
- ensure operations security
- plan to counter proliferation of WMD, and react to cyber attacks
- select SOF personnel according to their designated roles
- possess adequate combat support and combat service support

These deductions then were set beside GER SOF's current capabilities. The findings reveal that GER SOF's current capabilities do not meet these demands and expectations. Hence, gaps exist between German political demands and the capabilities of German Special Operations Forces to meet such demands. Findings also reveal that the current organizational design is not congruent with the mission and goals for GER SOF. Deeply integrated into their respective services, GER SOF rather look like a tool to support conventional forces and operations rather than a highly strategic tool with an independent role. GER SOF is trapped in a configurational design of a machine bureaucracy, and not organizationally designed to deal with uncertainty and complexity. Thus, German missions similar to U.S. Desert One can face the same destiny, for all the same reasons. In all circumstances, such self-made disasters must be prevented.

The question then is, how can German Special Operations Forces achieve greater internal coherence and thus greater organizational effectiveness for current and future missions? All the recommendations made here were based on findings in order to demonstrate previously drawn deductions. In a second step, recommendations regarding GER SOF structure and command and control are incorporated in a new configurational design according to organizational theories. This is designated to inform the new SOF structure within the Bundeswehr.

Fundamentally, new in this proposal is the implementation of a SOF cell at the strategic level. This cell coordinates SOF-related issues at strategic level and advises the Chief of Defense regarding SOF. Also, GER SOF shall become its own service with its own command that fully commands GER SOF. It shall be very closely linked to other

services and commands for better coordination. GER SOF shall merge Army and Navy SOF units. Manning and equipment shall meet the Level of Ambition. New capabilities in military assistance, special reconnaissance, information operations and human intelligence shall be established. GER SOF shall also establish their own support units for operations. The acquisition and procurement process shall be modified to quickly acquire new technologies and equipment. If not organically inherent in SOF, additional support for SOF shall be prioritized. GER SOCOM shall be located as close as possible to the strategic echelon. SOF leadership must be specially trained and selected. All personnel serving in SOF have to be selected according to their designated positions. An organizational matrix form for GER SOF is recommended. Functional arrangements shall ensure in-depth knowledge regarding sub-tasks and environmental concerns. Any Task Force assembled from these functional units will be tailored to the mission, well trained, quickly deployable, and adequately supported.

Furthermore, planning must be conducted to prevent the proliferation of WMD, and cyber attacks. Concerning adequate personnel for GER SOF, the current reward system shall be reviewed.

There are many more topics regarding GER SOF that might be investigated in the future. It might be appropriate, for example, to unite GER SOF with the GSG9 in order to avoid duplication of capabilities. That possibility requires consideration about the use of (military) SOF within Germany. Also, the possible implementation of a national crisis cell or a Department of Security Policy under the direct command of the German Federal Chancellor might be worth considering.

The proposed structure recommended by this thesis for an adaptive reorganization of GER SOF might challenge the personal attitudes of some high-ranking officers because some of them will lose their command and influence over their best soldiers. The response to this resistance must be that current and future threats have come to the doorstep of the GER SOF. Accordingly, GER SOF must be prepared to meet this threat.

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