ALLEGIANC: EGYPT SECURITY FORCES

by

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### ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

In Egypt, opposition groups challenged the Mubarak Regime and toppled it. More than two years later, demonstrators against the military-backed government that deposed President Morsi were brutally put down and rule stayed with the junta.

This thesis examines those events in Egypt and focuses on opposition tactics used and the response elicited from security force elements. It seeks to discover where, in 2011, security forces were not given or disobeyed the order to shoot protestors and, in 2013, ruthlessly followed that order. This thesis analyzes opposition tactics and questions whether those actions elicited loyalty shifts within security forces and how any such shifts impacted the ability to achieve political change.

The thesis uses a synthesis of objectives developed by Anika Binnendijk, labeled the “Five Strategic Objective” framework, along with social movement theory as they apply it to challenger actions. To these the author adds foreign involvement and internal dynamics. Data is gathered through in-depth review of relevant documentation: published news, discussions, books, and reputable web sources. Analysis of the sources shows that in 2011, a broad based appeal generated sympathy within security forces that precluded obeying a shoot order and that such sympathy was not present in 2013.
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<tr>
<td>SMT</td>
<td>social movement theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>RCC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Command Council</td>
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<td>CSF</td>
<td>Central Security Forces</td>
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<td>State Security Investigation Service</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Democratic Party</td>
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<td>SCAF</td>
<td>Supreme Council of the Armed Forces</td>
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<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>CANVAS</td>
<td>Center for Applied Nonviolent Actions and Strategies</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PRIMARY PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to review opposition tactics used in Egypt in 2011 and 2013. Specifically, this study will focus on security force allegiance shifts and their effect on the trajectory of security force actions during the political movement. This thesis will analyze opposition actions and question whether they elicited loyalty shifts within the security forces and regime loyalists and how any such shifts impacted the overall success or failure to achieve a defined political change.

The thesis uses a synthesis of the “Five Strategic Objective” framework, oppositional objectives proposed by Anika Binnendijk in 2009, along with Social Movement Theory (SMT), foreign involvement and internal dynamics as they apply to challenger actions in 2011 and again in 2013.1 The events in Egypt are reviewed apropos of these theoretical frameworks. Within these cases, the author examines the interrelationships between regime supporters and dissidents regarding actions that exhibit an effort to influence loyalty. Elements that impact decision-making include: legitimacy, repression, social networks, perception and will be factored into this study to establish if Binnendijk’s framework can be applied to this scenario. Further, the thesis looks at how any transfer of allegiance generated violence, and at power shifts that occurred (if any) within the uprising and overall outcome of the movement.

B. IMPORTANCE

The events of 2011 and 2013 happened as a result of multiple factors over an extended time. The 2011 uprisings galvanized a region, creating a popular movement that forced many leaders to abdicate or institute more democratic policies while others weathered the storm for another day. Security force response varied across the region: some did nothing, others initially supported the regime and shifted to the opposition later, and still others staunchly supported the establishment. For example, often security forces

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within a country conducted different actions. Police dealt with the protestors while the military took no action. What explains the variable behaviors of security forces and is there a relationship between opposition tactics and security force actions?

This thesis seeks to better understand the relation between opposition force actions and security force responses within the context of the Arab Spring, focusing on loyalty shifts. A review of tactics used by the opposition to influence security force loyalty is less common; those that do, focus on the Color Revolutions of Eastern Europe. This thesis will review opposition tactics used in Egypt that can be argued as further progressions of the events in Eastern Europe. The study will contribute to the understanding of the effect of position tactics on security force allegiance shifts and the resulting effect security force response has on the movement.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

Analyses of the Arab uprisings, though common, have rarely addressed the tactics regime challengers used to affect security force opinion and loyalty. For example, how to explain loyalty shifts of authoritarian regime supporters and militaries during the Arab Spring? What explains the success of some protests when others failed? In what particular ways, if any, did the security forces change sides? These issues are crucial to understanding regime change, the success or failure of national protests, and the decision-making process of the security forces. Yet, these questions have not been addressed.

This thesis does not concern itself with current conditions and situations in each of the referenced three cases; success is defined as in terms of whether the uprising effected a regime change or met its goal. The purpose of this document is to delve into the tactics used by the opposition that caused loyalty shifts, compare them to tactics found to Anika Binnendijk’s framework, and correlate overall success of the uprising with success of the movement to shift security force loyalty.

The hypothesis of the thesis is that challenger tactics (strict nonviolence, positive interactions with the security forces and efforts to delegitimize) had a direct impact on security force loyalty, causing shifts over time. Anika Binnendijk’s framework establishes an effective series of objectives for regime opposition in order to focus limited resources intended to hobble coercive elements of the regime.3

D. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis will be organized around a historical case study of two events in recent Egyptian history. The paper will review the context and background of each case study in order to process their similarities and differences in how uprising participants affected the allegiance of security forces. In each of the cases, security forces met an opposition group that was challenging the established regime in an effort to gain “freedom, justice, honor, and human dignity,” in a predominantly nonviolent way; yet, each case had a different outcome.4 This study will use Anika Binnendijk’s doctoral dissertation which outlines a five step framework that nonviolent challengers to authoritarian regimes can use. She states that challengers, “are more likely to achieve security force loyalty shifts” if they can accomplish these objectives:

Expose regime legitimacy: by exploiting regime blunders and by communicating distinctions between loyalty to country and regime;

Establish challenger legitimacy: by reaching out to security forces’ communities, by seeking certification of influential allies, by explicitly committing to nonviolent practices, and by garnering diverse appeal;

Raise the costs of repression: by identifying communities and external actors able to impose sanctions, by communicating effectively about incidents of repression, and by avoiding potential pretexts for repression;

Mitigate costs of accommodation: by addressing short term concerns about personal safety and long term concerns about professional security;

Demonstrate likelihood of success: by exhibiting internal unity, building active participation of broad based alliances, creating localized asymmetries, and exploiting security force cleavages.\(^5\)

With the addition of gaining foreign support and managing internal group dynamics and by accomplishing these objectives, opposition elements can increase their probability of security force loyalty shifts that can be used against the incumbent regime and enhancing overall success of the movement.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

Over the course of the Arab Spring there were countries in which hundreds of thousands of people gathered on the streets to protest various issues with the regimes. In some countries, security elements fired live rounds into the crowds while other elements within the same country did nothing. Opposition forces engaged regime support with predominantly nonviolent tactics and in some cases influenced regime supporters to shift loyalty to their side.

This thesis begins by examining the Egyptian uprising of 2011. It will provide history and context to the uprising that had roots in the 2004 *Kifaya* (Enough) movement.\(^6\) Review of key groups that impacted the 2011 uprising, including foreign contacts, training, education, and tactics used in the execution phase of the 18-day revolt will be compared with the objectives Anika Binnendijk concluded are instrumental to create cleavages and influence loyalty shifts in security forces.\(^7\) Analysis will be presented describing how the events of the Arab uprisings compared to or were influenced by elements of Binnendijk’s framework.

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5 Binnendijk, “Holding Fire,” 59.
In conclusion, this thesis will compare and contrast the significant events and tactics highlighting any major contributing factors that may have had an impact on the outcome of the uprisings. Each of these countries had very different results to their particular situations. Security force responses led to different actions and outcomes. Analysis will compare how, if at all, the security force posture and response to opposition tactics affected the trajectory of an uprising.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this review is to analyze the impact of security force allegiance shifts on the trajectories of the uprisings in Egypt in two separate events. The literature review begins with research on the importance of security forces within a regime as a defender of government and protector of the state. The review continues with scholarly discourse from numerous disciplines on rational choice, frames, legitimacy and nonviolence and their potential impact on maintaining allegiance.

A. SECURITY FORCES

The governments of the world rely on the ability of their security forces to maintain order, defend the nation against foreign aggressors, and protect the civilian population; in authoritarian regimes, these roles can often take a backseat to protecting the government. Security forces are considered one, if not the main foundation, of state power.8 Loyalty of these forces is a primary concern to any government, but of particular importance to states that resort to repression, sometimes violent, to control their population.9 Security forces play an important role in the negative sanctions used to subdue opposition groups, by maintaining stability and securing the government from internal threat. Anika Binnendijk asserts states that use coercion are more susceptible to the loss security allegiance. Vladimir Lenin recognized the importance of security force loyalty commenting that some security forces are required for revolution to “triumph.”10 How can this important tool of an authoritative regime be repurposed? Gene Sharp and Robert Helvey ask government challengers to evaluate the regime’s “pillars of support,”

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9 Kurt Schock, Unarmed Insurrections: People in Power Movements in Nondemocracies, vol. 22 of Social Movements, Protests, and Contention (University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 78–79, 115–117. Schock describes uprisings in the Philippines and Burma. In the Philippines there developed a cleavage in the military that produced a mutiny, and while the number of military that shifted loyalty was only about two battalions, it provided a focus for civil discontent. Conversely in Burma, united military forces effectively used coercive techniques to end any potential regime change.

specifically the military, to “induce disobedience.” Binnendijk proposes a novel framework that, if challengers can accomplish, will bring about the desired allegiance transfer opposition forces need to secure success.

Security forces are indoctrinated in government mantra, incorporated as part of a rigorously controlled hierarchy and loyalty is a major focus of the training. Loyalty as defined by Merriam-Webster is “unswerving in allegiance, faithful in allegiance to one’s lawful sovereign or government.” The decision to shift loyalty is difficult within these conservative, state centered organizations, and involves elements of decision making, legitimacy, and framing to influence potential shifts.

B. RATIONAL CHOICE

Decision-making is a well-studied area of social science and required when choosing to stay with the current regime or not. Adam Smith articulated an economic model that can be applied to human behavior. It is founded on the precept that humans are self-interested, an inherent trait of human nature; elements of rational choice theory developed from this initial frame. Rational choice theory argues “rational individuals will compare the benefits and costs of participation with those of inactivity, and choose the best course of action in which their expected utility is maximized.” Muller and Opp address the effects of rational choice on collective action, private interest theory versus public good. Private interest theory postulates personnel incentives such as power or money can influence a rational actor into rebellious activity. Catharine Zuckert points out rational choice adherents evaluate actors without acknowledging social influence.

In an effort to address this deficiency, Gordon Tullock incorporated a variable for “entertainment value” and Morris Silver further expanded the list of incentives by adding a “psychic income” variable; this element includes feelings such as duty, ethnicity, religious motivations and “taste for conspiracy, violence, and adventure.” These arguments fail to compensate for those individuals that do nothing yet benefit from the effects of success, the “free rider” effect. Muller and Opp introduce public goods theory that adds collective identity and social influence into an individual’s decision to rebel. They found public goods incentives have greater impact than private interest incentives when deciding to participate in rebellious collective action. This illustrates the impact of the greater collective good, valued at times above an actor’s self-interest, which gained ground through the 1990s with a variety of studies and suggests the limits of the private interest argument.

Rational choice is based in either economic or political theory and heavily reliant on the concept of a rational actor. The actor has ordinal preferences and goals; the actor shapes actions toward the most efficient way of obtaining desired preferences and goals. The difference between the two schools is the end-state, in economic theory all participants win, in political theory there are losers. Utility theory of the rational choice model breaks decisions into cost benefit of use, in which “utility is a measure on preference” and a way to refine preference order. Forecasting decisions with utility theory requires factoring in probabilities of occurrence to each variable; debate remains whether rational actors maximize utility or minimize regret in utility theory.

Developing as a response to utility theory, prospect theory focuses on risk avoidance rather than asset gain or loss. Actors form decisions around a known point of reference and results are changes from that point.\textsuperscript{24} Actors find it easier to accept risk in losses and tend to avoid risk when there is a possibility to gain; how a problem is framed is a critical consideration to the final decision. Utility theory neglects moral desires where the actor feels an innate drive (absent pleasure) to behave in a particular manner which is difficult to fit into a self-interest niche.

Utility theory’s rationale removes feeling from the decision making process. It is a limitation that is generally atypical of how real people work.\textsuperscript{25} Altruism counters the assumption that actors are motivated to obtain personal goals. Monroe illustrates this potentially dangerous course of action when discussing altruists saving Jews in Nazi Germany.\textsuperscript{26} Often, actors make decisions counter to self-interest, reaffirming research from Muller and Opp; utility theory has a difficult time explaining this.\textsuperscript{27} The ambivalence model is another enigma of rational choice. Monroe presents Johnston’s example of a new mother deciding between going to work and staying with the newborn and the perceived equivocal impacts of either choice.\textsuperscript{28} This theory also adds the emotional implications that a strict interpretation of rational choice allows.

Perception bias is another cognitive process that shapes an actor’s decision. Robert Jervis discusses how exposure and experience create preconceived notions, and actors tend “to see what they expect to see.”\textsuperscript{29} As people grow, their experience, education, and social effects such as bandwagoning unite to create preconceived notions or expectations that are carried and incorporated into decision making. Once created, 

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{25} Monroe and Maher, “Psychology and Rational Actor Theory,” 8.
\textsuperscript{26} Monroe and Maher, “Psychology and Rational Actor Theory,” 9.
\end{flushright}
preconceived notions become expectations that are very difficult for an actor to shed, no matter the veracity of evidence presented to counter the notion. The resilient nature of preconceived notions forces regime challengers into a long term campaign for the hearts and minds of security forces.

C. FRAMES

James Druckman describes frames in communication and thought explaining how communication shapes the ways people think and perceive an argument or event, resulting in a positive or negative response. He elaborates on the framing effect showing how equivalency framing and emphasis framing, through use of symbols and words, can alter how citizens understand the world around them. People reevaluate risk and alter decisions placing emphasis on factors established by those shaping the frames. Druckman elaborates by describing the impact of wording in survey questions. Respondents to a survey on free speech reported “48% of Americans would ‘not allow’ Communist…speech, while… 22% would ‘forbid’” Communist speech. The difference highlights the effects of word placement, even though the key terms in the question are equally defined. Experiments by Beneditto De Martino, Dharshan Kumaran and Raymond Dolan further develop this effect, showing how decisions change based on framing; people “tended to choose the sure option over the gamble option” in the Gain frame of reference and were “risk-seeking in the Loss frame.” Jillian Schwedler shows how cultural and nationalistic actions created meaning for security forces in the 1997 anti-trade fair demonstrations in Jordan. The Committee, demonstration organizers, used frames that appealed to a broad base of people, incorporating “cultural practices” and

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32 Druckman, “Implications of Framing,” 228.
33 Ibid.,” 228–30.
34 Druckman, “Implications of Framing,” 230.
symbols with shared meaning. The demonstration slogans and chants surmounted the riot police’s anti-demonstration role and appealed directly to their nationalistic identity, culminating to a point where the police broke out in song and dance.

D. LEGITIMACY

Legitimacy is a form of political support based in the common perception of subjects or citizens and can be derived from numerous variables. A traditional form of legitimacy, still in use today, is based on repression and bribery; the Arab Uprisings were a direct response to the use of those autocratic tools against a people lacking “freedom, justice, honor, and human dignity.” Through globalization and social interconnectivity, the idea of a social contract with legitimacy, based on a constitution is becoming ubiquitous. Bruce Gilley believes that a state becomes more legitimate as its population sees it as “rightfully” holding and exercising power where “rightfully is the central conceptual challenge.” Ted Gurr and Clark McPhail argue the importance of relative deprivation claiming it as a requirement for any form of social strife. An offshoot of this theory explores the impact of economic growth on a population, illustrating a relation between positive rates of growth with increased regime loyalty. More recent studies into the factors of legitimacy explore social trust, pride, political attitudes, and government performance as less material factors leading to a more emotive, arguably stronger feeling of legitimacy and loyalty. Binnendijk postulates that legitimacy is one

of a set of critical pillars authoritarian regimes use to maintain control of the population and is a foundation for the loyalty of security forces. The “ability to wield tactics to expose the illegitimacy of the incumbent regime is likely to aid a challenger in inducing security force loyalty shifts.”

Stanley Milgram’s experiments vividly show the influence of a perceived authority figure on a naïve “teacher” who has transferred any culpability to the experimenter. The human desire to please is a powerful incentive that facilitates compliance and increases the propensity to act in extreme and fatal ways, so any attempt to co-opt security forces will be one of effort and many years. In Tsarist Russia of 1905, a persistent general condition of military failure, economic malaise, and repression caused military elements to fraternize with opposition forces, and in one case, halt training until opposition members were released from prison. Learning from mistakes in the failed uprisings in Serbia in the late 1990s, OTPOR began a nonviolent campaign to humble the Milosevic government, co-opting rhetoric and routinely capitalizing on regime gaffes while exposing malfeasance. Through this lengthy crusade, a small group of government opposition accentuated a weakness of the regime to effectively de-legitimate the authority and increasing the rate of security force loyalty shifts. Similar tactics were used by PORA, a Ukrainian youth group that achieved regime changing results like Serbia.

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46 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 188–190.
49 Binnendijk, “Holding Fire,” 157–159. As in Serbia, a Ukrainian youth organization took the Ukrainian word Пора! or “its time” as their name.
E. NONVIOLENCE

The perception that violent strategies are a more effective means of resistance than nonviolent means is prevalent, but nonviolent action has developed into a potent method of taking power from a repressive regime.\textsuperscript{50} Ackerman and Duvall argue that a number of conflicts over the course of the twentieth century have used nonviolence as a “decisive mode of engagement” to shape the future of a contested state.\textsuperscript{51} The prolonged use of nonviolent techniques in South Africa successfully lifted apartheid in 1994; Serbia and Ukraine effectively removed their leaders in 2000 and 2004 respectfully.\textsuperscript{52} Security force loyalty shifts are a great aid to government challengers. Many scholars claim that challengers cannot win without support of “at least part of the old regime’s” security elements.\textsuperscript{53}

Coercive sanctions are a primary way authoritarian regimes engage uprisings, and nonviolent tactics interfere with the state’s ability to employ those sanctions. Violent tactics force security forces into a survival mentality. The opposition is viewed as an enemy, and security forces are drilled on how to deal with the enemy. Nonviolent tactics attempt to remove the perception of threat; opposition elements hug and kiss security forces and apply universal unity symbols creating the potential for repressive tactics to undermine the legitimacy of the government the techniques are employed to protect.\textsuperscript{54} Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth argue loyalty shifts are more likely when regime and security force members do not feel threatened. This feeling of reduced physical threat


reduces the risk associated with government and security members shifting allegiance.\textsuperscript{55} “When the regime can no longer rely on the cooperation of its security forces…its grip on power is undermined.”\textsuperscript{56}

Violent attacks against disciplined nonviolent protestors are more likely to cause a phenomenon that Sharp calls “political jiu-jitsu.”\textsuperscript{57} The paradox of repression is that it is intended to subdue any mobilization of the public against the leaders’ agenda; repressive tactics against a nonviolent group can back-fire on the government and drive the population to mobilize even more.\textsuperscript{58} Coercive tactics on nonviolent groups can be framed in a way to delegitimize the government and push security elements toward the opposition. Methods of insubordination may be subtle, but once started, they are hard to eliminate. Violent tactics do not engender the same response from security elements.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{57} Sharp, \textit{From Dictatorship to Democracy}, 32.
III. “ARAB SPRING” OF 2011

In Egypt, Hosni Mubarak was removed from power, his son lost the opportunity of succeeding his father as president, and a new leadership took control of Egypt. Ministry heads were forced from office; some were arrested, others went into exile. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took charge of running the country. While some may argue that the military had been running the country since the coup of 1952, which is considered an argument for another study to address.

A. EIGHTEEN DAYS

Over eighteen days, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians gathered in city squares throughout the country. In Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, Mansura, Beni Suef and Aswan. People from all strata of Egyptian society gathered to contest the regime and its policies, most publically in Tahrir Square in Cairo. The people of Egypt have protested the government in the past. In April 2008, textile workers in Mahalla protested poor wages and rising food prices. The 1977 Bread Riots were a response to Anwar Sadat’s economic “opening” which cut off subsidies. Each of these failed to make substantive gains.

What made the uprising in 2011 successful? In the past, typical regime response to protests had been excessive repressive tactics that used brute force to crush any mobilization combined with an opening of public space, bribes, and popular elections to allow the perception of popular approval and provide a relief valve for the people, a release that allowed the perception of popular voice without allowing for change, The uprising of 2011, however, changed popular mobilization across the region.

Coined the Arab Spring by some and The Rosetta Revolution by others, “the protest—dubbed a ‘day of revolution against torture, poverty corruption and unemployment’” began peacefully on the morning of 25 January 2011. As the day progressed, the repressive state security tactics of the past gradually occurred. But this

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time, the regime’s coercive tactics backfired, serving to strengthen the movement in what Gene Sharp called “Political jiu-jitsu.” The tens of people starting grew to hundreds, the hundreds grew to thousands, and again to hundreds of thousands; what caused this difference?

The uprisings of 2011 will continue to be chronicled and investigated by scholars and journalists across the world. With the notable exception of a few, such as Amy Austin Holmes, Mona el-Ghobashy and Emad el-Din Shahin, very little has been directed at tactics used by the opposition and their effects on the repressive techniques traditionally employed by the state. This chapter surveys the actions of the state security apparatus, specifically the Interior Ministry and the Egyptian military, and their response to opposition tactics. It will then apply Anika Binnendijk’s framework as it applies in Egypt and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

Analysis of the interaction between actors over the eighteen-day period along with external events (United States pressure and perceived success of the Tunisian revolution) show that while the opposition did incorporate tactics to maintain a positive relationship with the military, the other government agencies had a history of abusive tactics that alienated the people and served to negatively impact the stability of the Mubarak regime.

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B. SECURITY FORCES: BACKGROUND

The modern era began with the “French withdrawal in 1801” and subsequent consolidation of power by Muhammad Ali in 1805.64 Adopting lessons learned from Egypt’s interaction with European powers, Muhammad Ali worked to improve military capability and realized a better education system and economy was required.65 He built a national bureaucracy around the “defensive modernization” of the military, creating the foundations of today’s Egyptian state.66 When Major General Mohamed Naguib, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser and eighty other Free Officers deposed the British puppet King Faruq and sent him to the French Riviera in 1952, the line of Muhammad Ali ended. Nasser and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) immediately began to consolidate power, alienating members of the old regime from positions of authority; potential regime competitors were reassigned or suffered convenient “accidents,” even from within the ranks of the Free Officers.67 The eventual power of the interior ministry developed from a disagreement in goals; Naguib wanted the military to get out of politics, and “‘leave it to the politicians.’” Nasser believed the military needed to stay in politics to keep the “‘divisive group of stranglers’ of old elite” out and to reshape Egyptian centers of power.68

65 Springborg, “Egypt: Facing the Challenges.”
66 Ibid.
1. Ministry of Defense

The military is the most respected institution in Egypt. Arguments can be made that the military has been involved in politics since the 1880’s and was the pivotal influence in the Revolution of 1952. Until the election of Mohammed Morsi in 2011, every president has been a military officer. Since the time of the Free Officers, the military has been perceived a defender of the state to be used to restore order, improve the economy, expel the invader, to make life better for all Egyptians and act as a challenge to the president. As the primary fixture of violence in the country, it was the only institution that was able to challenge the presidency and, as such, was a threat to the regime. Since the time of Nasser, the responsibilities of running the government, securing the government and controlling the officers has been separated between the political elite. The Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Defense have competed for political supremacy, and the Ministry of Defense, while still a powerful force, has been on the losing end, but never removed from the triad.

Egypt is divided into four military districts: north, south, west, and central, each with a military headquarters and units. The Second Field Army, Third Field Army, and the Operations Authority have additional headquarters locations that, when combined with district elements, effectively cover the country. Morale is good; a study was conducted after Hosni Mubarak took office to determine how to best insulate the military from religious extremists and resulted in a general increase in living standards and education for even the lowest ranking members. Conscripted forces are paid four times as much as their Interior Ministry counterparts with a service obligation of 18 to 36 months. In 2011, there were 468,500 active duty Army, Navy, Air Defense service

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70 Kandil, Soldiers, 5.


members with an additional 479,000 reservists on the rolls; 280,000 to 340,000 of the active duty members are conscripted. Equipment runs the gamut of traditional military weapons systems such as the M1A1 Abrams tank, licensed to be built in Egypt; F-16 Fighting Falcons, and assorted artillery pieces, along with surface and sub-surface Naval and Coast Guard units.

The intelligence arm, falling under the loose purview of the Ministry of Defense, is the Mukhabarat al-Ammah. The Mukhabarat al-Ammah or General Intelligence Service (GIS) reports directly to the president and was designed after the United States Central Intelligence Agency. It is responsible for coordinating the efforts of all Egypt’s intelligence departments, both internally and externally focused; the number of intelligence personnel is a state secret. Its members are considered the “premier intelligence agency, and…scarcely concealed their contempt for their colleagues in the Ministry of Interior.”

In Egypt, the army is “the ultimate guarantor of the regime’s safety” as put forth in the 1971 Constitution to defend national territory “in accordance with the instructions of the President of the Republic…the commander-in-chief of the armed forces” and has been called to do so on numerous occasions. The Egyptian military is no stranger to the use of internal suppression and coercive tactics. One of the first uses of this was on August 12, 1952 in Kafra al-Dawr, a center of textile manufacturing. Workers protested seeking better pay and work conditions and a live round was fired, injuring military personnel. The regime responded quickly, executing two workers with communist

74 “Country Files, Egypt.”
In 1977, President Anwar Sadat began a policy of economically opening Egypt to the West which led to mandatory subsidy reductions on cooking fuel, rice, bread and other basic goods. As a result, thousands took to the streets in what became known as the Bread Riots. The army was ordered to contain the situation after the Interior Ministry’s forces failed; army intervention killed 160 and wounded 800. Sadat viewed this instance of saving the regime as a threat, and he began strengthening the Interior Ministry CSF and focusing the army on exterior threats. Under Mr. Mubarak, the military became less active with riot control duties, focusing on building a vast military industrial complex that is estimated to account for ten to fifteen percent of the nation’s U.S.$210 billion economy, helping to sustain higher standards of living and loyalty. Even with the shift in focus, the military remained the institution the regime calls to restore order. In February 1986, it was assigned that task again. Central Security Force conscripts rioted, 17,000 to 20,000 men protested low wages and a rumored year increase to their service obligations. President Mubarak called the army to enforce a three-day curfew; the second day saw 107 conscripts dead and 715 injured, proving the army’s ability and discipline. The army would not again be called to control any part of the population until January 2011.

2. Interior Ministry

The Interior Ministry grew from the dual purpose of securing Egyptian public order and minimizing the military thereby redefining the state power structure and


securing the regime. Each president has had an impact on the ministry’s development. Nasser started the coup (or revolution) and shaped the forces, marginalizing any military elements that threatened the new regime.\textsuperscript{84} Anwar Sadat further reduced the influence of military officers in the cabinet reducing their number from a high of 65 percent under Nasser to 20 percent.\textsuperscript{85} The coup possibility created from the 1977 Bread Riots never materialized, but Sadat expanded the Central Security Forces by 200 percent and equipped it with tear gas, armored cars, and automatic weapons in an effort to keep a coup opportunity from happening again.\textsuperscript{86} Hosni Mubarak doubled his Interior Ministry coercive apparatus, and its various elements, outnumbering the Egyptian military more than three to one in 2011.\textsuperscript{87} Their authorities changed with amendments to “Law 109 (of 1971) to 116 (of 1981) which altered language from ‘safeguarding public safety’ to ‘public order,’” greatly expanding the ministry’s powers.\textsuperscript{88}

There are many agencies that form the Interior Ministry security force; they can be categorized under intelligence and force elements. The feared \textit{Mubahath el-Dawla} or State Security Investigations Service (SSIS) is the internally focused security arm of information gatherers, intelligence providers, and interrogators formed out of the remnants of the king’s political police.\textsuperscript{89} The SSIS manages a nationwide system of surveillance “using both plainclothes agents and a network of informers,” often recruited after arrest or detainment.\textsuperscript{90} The force side of the Interior Ministry is the Central Security

\textsuperscript{84} Kandil, \textit{Soliders}, 71.


\textsuperscript{86} Kandil, \textit{Soldiers}, 123. Kandil goes further explaining that Sadat had the Interior Ministry eliminate any need to call the military into internal action again. Plan 2000 was developed out of this effort and details how the country will be managed in the face of other popular revolts.

\textsuperscript{87} Springborg and Henry, “Army Guys,” 17.

\textsuperscript{88} Kassem, \textit{Egyptian Politics}, 40.

\textsuperscript{89} Kandil, \textit{Soliders}, 19, 123; Sirrs, \textit{Egyptian Intelligence Service}, 31.

Force (CSF), and was the primary known element confronting protestors in the 2011 uprising.\textsuperscript{91}

The CSF is equivalent to a light infantry force that is responsible for counter insurgency and is called upon when traditional police response is not effective at “dissuading” protestors.\textsuperscript{92} Initially created by Nasser in 1969, the CSF, also known as riot control, was to shift regime protection responsibilities from the politically marginalized military. Within a year, the CSF numbered 100,000 members.\textsuperscript{93} Presidents Sadat and Mubarak expanded the CSF manning to 300,000 and 325,000 conscripts respectfully; the majority are poorly paid, undereducated, minimally trained, low-ranking peasants turned down from the regular military, all having a three-year service obligation.\textsuperscript{94} Interior Minister Habib al-Adly (1997–2011) instituted a policy of selecting personnel that were not well educated “because they were not as easy to manipulate.”\textsuperscript{95} Conversely, the officers were the “cream of the crop,” chosen through a difficult acceptance protocol. Officer candidates were selected based on intelligence and aptitude test scores, physical standards, and the \textit{kashf al hay’a}, or family and social specific assessments conducted by the SSIS. The officers were also paid poorly. However, this changed with increase in rank, due to compensation through public influence and increasing status and power.\textsuperscript{96} The CSF is equipped with a variety of weapons: armored personnel carriers, water cannons, automatic weapons, tear gas, mortars and other riot control gear.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{91} “World Armies, Egypt.” Numbers reflect CDF composition in 2011. Changes have been made to the Interior Ministry as a result of the Egyptian Uprising of 2011.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{93} Kandil, \textit{Soliders}, 71.


\textsuperscript{95} Elmeshad, “Recent Clashes Highlight.”

\textsuperscript{96} Aclimandos, “Healing without Amputating.”

\textsuperscript{97} “Country Files, Egypt.”
The Interior Ministry, through time, has developed into the primary coercive tool used by an Egyptian authoritarian regime, no matter who is in charge. The SSIS is known and hated for its “harassment, incommunicado detention, interrogation and torture,” and a network of surveillance that reaches all aspects of life.98 State Security can detain and question on a whim and is well trained on torture techniques, ranging from physical electric shocks to psychological threats of sexual assault on the person or family.99 Central security forces are the visible threat posed to Egyptians, often used to obstruct polling centers while overseeing ballot counting, ensuring that the regime maintained at least 75 percent of the popular vote.100 Riot and protest control was the primary mission of the Interior Ministry police and CSF, and they have a long history of successfully using coercive measures to control protestors. Labor and student protests in 1968 were violently suppressed with live ammunition, killing 21 and injuring 772.101 In 1984, declining real wages, subsidy reductions, and elimination of guaranteed employment caused workers in Kafr al-Dawar to riot. The CSF responded with tear gas and live ammunition, killing three and arresting 220.102 As economic pressure and abuses continued, strikes and protests became more prevalent with 86 occurring in 2003 and “over 700 in 2010.”103 An estimated two million people have taken part in strikes since 2001, Protest experience was gathered over this period by a younger generation that “cut its teeth” on the use of technology in the modern world, providing ample training for what to expect and how to react to the CSF in the 2011 Uprising.104

99 Ibid.
100 Kassem, Egyptian Politics, 41, 66–67. Kassem highlights two methods used by CSF to prevent voters from accessing polling centers. The more obvious tactic was to physically block entrance to the station with uniformed officers. The second was more subversive using plainclothes officers or paid thugs to start a fight, giving the CSF on site an excuse to close the station, and manipulating polling as deemed necessary.
101 Kandil, Soldiers, 73.
102 Kassem, Egyptian Politics, 105.
103 Kandil, Soldiers, 158.
C. SECURITY FORCE: RESPONSES

This section details the Interior Ministry and Ministry of Defense responses to opposition tactics. The opposition element in the Egyptian Arab Spring was made up of an association of various youth groups and organizations that were initially coordinated online. Members of groups like the 6 April youth movement and “We are all Khaled Said” learned, over ten years, how to effectively protest and what likely responses to expect from the different security forces.105 Due to experience combined with networking, and protest education from Project on Middle East Democracy, United States Government sponsored International Republican, National Democratic Institutions, and Freedom House, activists from OTPOR, and from Tunisian demonstrators, allowed Egyptians to learn tactics and skills that would mitigate any coercive responses and potentially shift allegiance of the security elements they would confront.106

1. Interior Ministry

The behavior and responses of the Interior Ministry was a product of years of training and rehearsal. All members supported the regime as a result of experience, indoctrination, personal influence or gain. Hosni Mubarak and his regime did not expect the size of protest that would be created from the 2011 movement. The regime had complete control of Interior Ministry and its body of CSF conscripts used to its traditional role as a tool of suppression and intimidation.

Protest organizers had been planning a type of event since the failure of the Kefaya! (Enough!) Movement in 2004 and the 6 April textile revolt in 2008.107 Approximately two weeks prior to events, word of a protest was made available; coinciding with a national holiday celebrating police, 25 January 2011 was selected to

105 Kandil, Soldiers, 158; Shahin, “Spirit of Tahrir Square,” 54.
become a “Day of Anger.” Online, the April 6 Youth Movement signed up 90,000 Egyptians to protest, “We are all Khaled Said” had 400,000 members. With 20 to just over 28 percent of Egyptians online—connection reliability unknown—word had to get out further. Enlisting public transportation drivers helped protest information spread farther and deeper into Egypt by word of mouth, cell phones. Distributing 50,000 leaflets and flyers ensured widest circulation. While precautions were taken to limit information that was available to security forces, the protest organizers knew their communications were being monitored. One organizer, Asmaa Mahfouz, unmasked herself a week before the protest. She believed she could get a greater response to a more personal entreaty to the people of Egypt, and she was right. In her uploaded video, she connected the situation in Tunisia to events in Egypt and appealed to the honor of Egyptian men to protect her from the traditional suppression of the state.

Across Cairo and further into Egypt, there was common knowledge of an impending event going to happen in Tahrir Square. The Interior Ministry was unaware of accurate protest start points; the organizers provided multiple false meet sites throughout the city to spread the CSF forces thinly, and identified actual locations only the day prior. There is limited documented information available that provides insight into the

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111 Husain, “How Facebook Changed the World.”

112 Husain, “How Facebook Changed the World;” Mahfouz, “Meet Asmaa Mahfouz.”

actions of the SSIS, but there is no reason for the higher leadership to know this revolt would be different requiring a change tactics. The officers worked their respective sources and monitored Internet and cellular communications as best as they could, deploying across Cairo and other cities in preparation for the morning protest.

The first day of the protest began with police out in force, blocking routes around the city and directing protestors, but not interfering with their movement, “showing unusual restraint.” Police observed the protests allowing people to march in a release of political pressure claiming they were under orders not to interfere. Due in large part to the history of the CSF, there was little positive interaction between the protestors and police. Protestors asked police “you are our brothers, why do you beat us and gas us?” Others chanted “peacefully, peacefully,” “down with Mubarak” and “freedom,” demanding an end to the regime of government corruption and abuse “as police charged...beating them with sticks.” The day progressed and the crowds only grew, upwards of 30,000 people in Cairo and 20,000 in Alexandria. Police and CSF began to intervene. Interior Ministry riot police attacked with tear gas, water cannons and armored vehicles as “thousands of protestors stood their ground,” some responding by throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails. The predominantly nonviolent protestors were met with human walls of police that blocked and beat protesters as they marched through the city. The experience of the “ultras” die hard soccer fans played a particular role in

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114 Catrina Stewart, “Violence on the Streets of Cairo as Unrest Grows; Protestors Rise up against Mubarak in Cities throughout the Nation as Spirit of Uprising Spreads from Tunisia,” The Independent, 26 January 2011, sec. World.


118 “Egyptians denounce Mubarak;” Khalil, “Protestors Cling to Hope.” Although largely peaceful, the demonstrators did defend themselves with knives, sticks, and Molotov cocktails.

combating the tactics of CSF on the way to Tahrir. The decision to pick numerous start points throughout the cities served to reduce the concentration of police forces attacking protestors in any one area while clashes occurred across the country.

As the protests continued over eighteen days, elements of the Interior Ministry, and by extension the regime, seemed caught off guard by the demonstrators and failed to take the protest seriously. The president neglected to address the people of his country until 28 January, listening to his advisors and relying on tactics of the past. The hubris of the regime flowed into the police ranks with an officer quoted saying, “whoever raises his head today, we [police] will stamp on it with our feet.” The use of traditional coercive measures seemed only to stir up greater support for the people in the square, the very definition of political jiu-jitsu. The CSF commanders continued to press protestors, often using lethal force. The battle on the Kasr al-Nil bridge footage exhibited riot police running over peaceful demonstrators with cars, shooting them with water cannons and tear gas as they stopped to pray. The activist dispersion tactic worked, drawing thousands out of their homes. A push of demonstrators later in the day forced the CSF to the east side of the bridge. By the evening of 29 January 2011, Al Jazeera English reported “108 dead…some by live ammunition.”

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120 Teresita Cruz-del Rosario and James M. Dorsey, “Street, Shrine, Square and Soccer Pitch: Comparative Protest Spaces in Asian and the Middle East,” (working paper, Nanyang Technological University S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies 8 November 2011, 14, http://hdl.handle.net/10220/7570.

121 Shahin, “Spirit of Tahrir Square,” 66, 64.

122 Ibid., 64.


124 Sharp, Dictatorship to Democracy, 32–33.

125 Shahin, “Spirit of Tahrir Square,” 64.


127 Husain, “How Facebook Changed the World.” Organizers began in poorer sections of town after prayers. Thee narrow streets gave the impression of a larger group gathering hundreds as they progressed through the muhallas. Estimates put the number of protestors on 28 January at more than 100,000 people from all classes and religions of society.

128 Peterson, “Crackdown on Protesters.”
A few events seem to stick out as desperate moves by a regime on the edge –by cutting off the Internet Mr. Mubarak sought to control the flow of information, going so far as to attack foreign journalists at one stage. Observing recent events in Tunisia and the impact of the Internet and mobile phones on that regime’s unrest, he shut most of Egypt’s Internet and cellular connections to the world early in the morning of 28 January 2011. While the regime’s intention was to intimidate and control what the population heard, saw, and was able to transmit to the rest of the world as well as preempt protestor coordination later that day, the government unintentionally helped the anti-government movement. Protest organizers met the night before, coordinating movement specifics, protest starting points, and sharing tactics gathered from other activists; there was no real need of the Internet the morning of the “The Day of Rage.” One of the main objectives of the protest was to get people on the street, and the president helped. People were less able to see what was going on or check on friends and family from their homes. In an attempt to fill this information gap they flocked outside to see what was going on, where family members were, and if they were okay. The communication shutdown had a negative impact on the very forces it was designed to aid. After hours of fighting, supplies and manpower depleted or “got lost.” Security personnel were unable to use cell phones as backup communications, causing less effective security movements and coordination.

Another event was the seeming evaporation of visible Internal Ministry and police personnel in Cairo and much of the country on 28 January. The CSF had been fully deployed for four days throughout Egypt, specifically Cairo and Alexandria, conducting


131 Husain, “How Facebook Changed the World.”


aggressive operations. After hours of fighting with demonstrators, conscripts were tired and bereft of sleep, food, ammunition, and batteries; they melted away under the constant pressure.\textsuperscript{134} The security vacuum created by the lack of police turned to chaos when Mr. Mubarak authorized the release of approximately 8,000 inmates from jails in Alexandria, Suez, and Cairo. In an effort to reaffirm President Mubarak as “guarantor of security,” criminals and plainclothes security personnel looted and caused violence across Egypt in an attempt to panic the population.\textsuperscript{135} Events on 2 February added to this scene. Known as the Battle of the Camel, approximately 3000 pro-government supporters—off duty police, paid thugs (otherwise known as \textit{bultagiya}), criminals, and poor—led to believe a quick end to the protests would bring a renewed tourist economy—charged into the square. Supported by snipers and thugs on rooftops and men on horses and camels, these supporters violently attacked the demonstrators in Tahrir Square as army personnel watched.\textsuperscript{136} Across the Nile from Tahrir, an estimated 20,000 “angry but…peaceful” pro-government supporters held a rally in an attempt to sway popular perception, and support, behind Mr. Mubarak.\textsuperscript{137} Protestors were forced to defend themselves, forming vigilante patrols to protect neighborhoods and rescue demonstrators. “With every death of a demonstrator, popular sympathy mounted and more people rushed to support the protestors.”\textsuperscript{138}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{134} Shahin, “Spirit of Tahrir Square,” 160.
  \item \textsuperscript{135} Holmes, “There are Weeks,” 405; James Hider, “Prison Breaks and Looting ‘Set up by Mubarak Regime,’” \textit{The Times (London)}, 1 February 2011, sec. News. Several cases of wounded thugs and looters that arrived in local hospitals for care were found to have police identification.
  \item \textsuperscript{137} “Chaos in Cairo as Mubarak Backers, Opponents Clash,” \textit{The New Zealand Herald}, 3 February 2011, sec. World; David Wroe, “Tahrir Square Enemies Find Common Ground,” \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, 3 September 2011, sec. International News; Mark Austin, “I Watched Mobs Trade Molotov Cocktails, Rocks and Gunfire. On the Streets Mubarak’s Thugs were looking for Western Journalists to take our Cameras.. to silence us’,” \textit{Sunday Mirror}, 6 February 2011, sec. News; Sherif Tarek, “Bosses, Enforcers and Thugs in Egypt’s Battle of the Camel to See Harsh Retribution,” \textit{Ahram Online}, 19 April 2011, \url{http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/10293/Egypt/Politics-/Bosses,-enforcers-and-thugs-in-Egypts-Battle-of-th.aspx}; The Battle of the Camel was masterminded and coordinated by Mubarak elites. Safwat el-Sherif, Minister of Information “is understood” primary architect and supported by the president’s son Gamal Mubarak, National MPs Abdel-Nasser el-Gabri and Youssef Khattab, parliament speaker Fathi Sorour and Mubarak chief of staff Zakaria Azmi.
  \item \textsuperscript{138} Shahin, “Spirit of Tahrir Square,” 65.
\end{itemize}
2. Ministry of Defense

The Egyptian Military has dutifully cultivated an image of “protector of the nation” for over sixty years. While the senior leadership and commanders at the time supported the regime, (Defense Minister, Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi was referred to as “Mubarak’s poodle,”) midlevel officers and lower enlisted were dissatisfied and responded positively to protestor supplications of support. Some U.S. Embassy cables from 2008 tell of aggrieved midlevel officers upset with stodgy senior leadership concerned with loyalty more than ability. There were real concerns as to whether the military would support the president and if the rank-and-file, if ordered, would suppress the protestors.

After four days of protest and hours of battle throughout the country, a tired and beaten force of riot police withdrew from the field; a worried President Mubarak ordered the army to enforce a curfew and suppress the protestors on the evening of 28 January. For the first time in almost twenty-five years the military was sent to restore order. By the time the military was in place protecting state buildings, protestors had already burned six Cairo police stations and the National Democratic Party (NDP) headquarters. As the military entered the scene the demonstrators had mixed opinions, many protestors welcomed them while others were scared, believing the military would fall in line behind the regime. Activist organizers understood from history and their training that “no revolution succeeds as long as the old regime’s military is willing and capable of


143 Kirkpatrick, “Mubarak Orders Crackdown;” Husain, “How Facebook Changed the World.”

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suppressing it” and took measures to impact army capability. Protestors wanted the military to act in their favor or at least remain neutral, but were prepared to hinder operations if required.

Organizers decided to use a method of engagement some dubbed “hug a soldier.” The demonstrators sought to win the rank and file over to their side so that if ordered to enforce the curfew or use violence, rank and file soldiers might hesitate, drag their feet, or disobey the order entirely. To this end, protestors showered the soldiers with affection, spoke with them, sang the national anthem, gave flowers, shouted slogans of inclusion like, “Stand for Your Country,” “Long Live Egypt,” “Let injustice and corruption fall,” or “the people and the Army are one hand!” The movement’s top priority was to remain peaceful and nonviolent all while presenting a unified, unbiased front. The intent was to ensure Egyptians felt safe to participate in the demonstration and reduce fear in soldiers so they would have no reason to shoot. Any attempt to shift the dynamic or perception of the movement was quickly altered by the masses. The soldiers on the ground interacted with the protestors first hand while senior leaders dealt with pressure from international benefactors, taking into account multiple outcomes and judging how best to maintain power.

144 Kandil, Soldiers, 2.
145 How to Revolt,” Tahrir Documents, last modified 27 March 2011, accessed 11 December 2013, http://www.tahrirdocuments.org/2011/03/how-to-revolt/. Protestors were advised to carry bags of liquid soap or soapy water to throw under tank tracks to hinder movement.
148 Ibid.
149 Fletcher, “The People have Spoken,” sec. News. A man began chanting “Allahu Akbar,” and was over taken by the national anthem. The protestors worked diligently to ensure the demonstration maintained a “remove the regime” stance. Calls to God could be seen by the military as Islamist in nature and give the perception of Muslim Brotherhood ownership of the event, a historic enemy of the military.
150 Bumiller, “Divided Military.”
The military, as an institution, was not on the protestors’ side at first, but the activists worked hard to sway their opinion.\footnote{Hashim,”The Egyptian Military, Part Two” 116–117.} “Hug a soldier” seems to have worked on some if not most soldiers; the first day military units were shown on \textit{Al-Jazeera} being greeted by protestors.\footnote{“Egyptian military protects state TV in Cairo - REVOLUTION.mp4” \textit{Al-Jazeera}, 28 January 2011, \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18TeyIKMLvU}.} In his book \textit{Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen: Egypt’s Road to Revolt} Hazem Kandil chronicles:

A group of demonstrators threw themselves over an army jeep before it reached Downtown Cairo, crying frantically: ‘Are you here to shoot us.’ A colonel descended from the vehicle and wrapped his arm around a demonstrator’s shoulders and replied: ‘You have nothing to fear. We would cut our hands before firing one bullet. Your demands are legitimate. Go ahead, and don’t turn back.’\footnote{Kandil, \textit{Soldiers}, 160.}

Another shouted from a speaker, “I don’t care what happens, but you are the ones who are going to make a change.” Soldiers took photos with protestors and allowed graffiti on their vehicles denouncing the president. The curfew the military had been deployed to enforce was completely ignored.\footnote{David D. Kirkpatrick, “Egyptians Defiant as Military Does Little to Quash Protests,” \textit{New York Times, International Herald Tribune}, 29 January 2011, \url{www.nytimes.com/}; Holmes, “There are Weeks,” 399.} Some soldiers remained firm against the protest; Amy Austin Holmes relates an interview where a witness saw “a soldier kill…twelve people.” In other interviews, soldiers joined the uprising out of uniform, a treasonous offense.\footnote{Holmes, “There are Weeks,” 399.} The final test of the tactic’s success came on the evening of 30 January; President Mubarak ordered the “Egyptian Third Army to crush the demonstrators in Tahrir.” Tank commanders were reportedly seen removing their headsets, and calling their fathers—as it later turns out—for advice; they were told to disobey, and they did.\footnote{Robert Fisk, “As Mubarak Clings on…What now for Egypt?” \textit{The Independent}, 11 February 2011, \url{http://www.independent.co.uk}.} The front line troops had sided with the protestors, “hug a soldier” served its purpose.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Hashim116} Hashim,”The Egyptian Military, Part Two” 116–117.
\bibitem{28} “Egyptian military protects state TV in Cairo - REVOLUTION.mp4” \textit{Al-Jazeera}, 28 January 2011, \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18TeyIKMLvU}.
\bibitem{Kandil160} Kandil, \textit{Soldiers}, 160.
\bibitem{Holmes399} Holmes, “There are Weeks,” 399.
\bibitem{Fisk399} Robert Fisk, “As Mubarak Clings on…What now for Egypt?” \textit{The Independent}, 11 February 2011, \url{http://www.independent.co.uk}.
\end{thebibliography}
When senior military leaders declared on 31 January, “the armed forces will not resort to use force against our great people” as long as protestors remained peaceful, it was largely because they were unable to guarantee anything else. The military held to its word, but just because soldiers would not fire on the crowds did not mean they would protect the crowds either. On 2 February, military units around Tahrir Square passively watched as thousands of pro-Mubarak thugs and plainclothes police got off busses and entered the square. The demonstrators formed a human chain to separate the groups, but thugs broke through and attacked the largely peaceful protestors. After an hour of battle activists began to defend themselves, throwing concrete and rocks; they observed soldiers taking refuge behind tanks and armored personnel carriers. In another area, two tanks moved forward and a soldier fired into the air and gave the pro-Mubarak supports pause in their advance. Anti-government protestors begged the tank crews for protection and an officer asked “you want me to fire at Egyptians?” Completely confused by the lack of military assistance, activists asked what was going on and their response was simple, “we don’t have orders to [help]…go home.” The military wanted to gauge the activists’ desire and see if Mubarak’s thugs would cow them. Protestors in the square and around the country rose to the challenge and took responsibility for their own protection. They united and formed groups that fought, evacuated and treated causalities, brought food and water, ferried rocks to the fighters, and vigilante groups to protect their neighborhoods and help others in trouble.

157 Tarek Masoud, “The Road to (and from) Liberation Square,” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 3, (2011): 23; David D. Kirkpatrick, “Mubarak’s Grip on Power is Shaken,” New York Times, International Herald Tribune, 31 January 2011, www.nytimes.com/; Anthony Shadid, David D. Kirkpatrick, and Kareem Fahim, “As Tactics Shift, Egyptians are on Edge,” New York Times, International Herald Tribune, 03 February 2011, sec. News; Kandil, Soldiers, 160. The Defense Minister clearly defined this stance to President Mubarak and his top aides. Masoud points out that the military had no problem firing on protestors on 12 April (Tahrir) and 15 May (embassy building). While out of the scope of this paper, one of several explanations is the there was a more loyal or a unit with no social connections in Cairo was repositioned to Tahrir; increasing obedience. While very plausible, without access to military documents, this is speculation.


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Throughout the week, soldiers on the sideline saw the valor of the activists and began to more visibly side with the protestors in the square. After the army separated the opposing sides, Major Ahmed Ali Shuman, and later Major Amr Metwally and Major Tamer Badr, along with thirteen other military officers dramatically turned in their weapons and joined the movement.\textsuperscript{161} The tenacity of the protestors over the eighteen days gradually had an effect on military leadership and elite. After vicious attacks and heavy repression, protestors retained a largely nonviolent stance able to characterize violence that did occur as self-defense as hundreds of thousands of people remained in Tahrir Square and more arrived daily. General officers turned politicians, Vice President Omar Suleiman and Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq, sought guidance from outside the regime to help explain and resolve the confusion in the streets.\textsuperscript{162} Ultimately, military support to President Mubarak collapsed in the face of activists, and the regime fell with it.\textsuperscript{163}

D. ASSESSMENT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

The events in Egypt’s 2011 Uprising fit into Anika Binnendijk’s strategic framework explained earlier, specifically by aiding the shifting the allegiance of the military. The protestors focused efforts on creating and maintaining a positive relationship with the military, building on a nationalist ideation held by Egyptians about the Ministry of Defense. Demonstrators knew their efforts would not be as effective on Interior Ministry forces and wore them out, driving them off the streets and forcing the regime to rely on military intervention. The regime had delegitimized itself with years of

\textsuperscript{161} Husain, “How Facebook Changed the World;” Austin G. Mackell, “Family and Supporters of Dissident Army Officers Gather in Tahrir Ahead of Trial,” The Moon Under Water (Blog), 7 January 2012, accessed 11 December 2013, http://austingmackell.wordpress.com/2012/01/07/family-and-supporters-of-dissident-army-officers-gather-in-tahrir-ahead-of-trial/. The officers that sided with the protestors turned themselves over for military trial and as of the date of this blog, were still waiting to see a judge.


\textsuperscript{163} Joby Warrick, “Defiance Surprises White House, Threatens Chaos,” The Washington Post, 12 February 2011, www.washingtonpost.com/. The plan decided upon was that President Mubarak would announce he was stepping down on 10 February. His defiant speech left the military no choice; Mr. Mubarak was “asked” to step down and sent to Sharm el-Sheikh on 11 February. Vice President Suleiman announced it to the people of Egypt at 1804 that evening. The protestors succeeded in ending a 30 year dictatorship.
corruption, greed, and repression made manifest in the death of Khalid Said. The movement mobilized an estimated 15 million people, elevating coercive costs dramatically.164 Accommodation costs were negligible when the military could negotiate a way to maintain power in any regime that came after. Likely success was initially found in Tunisia and the successful struggle in that comparative country, and grew with every person that arrived in Tahrir and every day the square was occupied.

1. **Expose Regime Illegitimacy**165

The Mubarak regime went a long way toward delegitimizing itself; the activists just had to make the average Egyptian realize and act. In the decades prior to the 2011 Uprising, Egyptians had faced years of economic and political corruption. The state was under the control of the Interior Ministry and the ministry was with the president. The military had allowed its own economic machine which required senior leader time and conscript manpower, to account for estimates of ten to fifteen percent of the Egyptian economy.166

The economic effects of Mr. Mubarak’s policies became a constant reminder of his felonious presidency. Efforts to liberalize the Egyptian economy generated great profits for the elite, but further reduced the already limited resources available to the poor, 47 percent of which lived on less than U.S.$2 a day. Agricultural reforms effectively removed seven million families from land they had lived off for generations, stealing their livelihoods. Subsidies were reduced by 20 percent. Diminished access to clean drinking water made life that much more difficult.167 The growing youth population could not find work, 40 percent of men and 50 percent of women were unemployed, all this with an economy growing six percent per year since 2007.168 The elite got richer through statewide corruption. The president and his cronies sold, and

164 Shahin, “Spirit of Tahrir Square,” 60.
165 Binnendijk, “Holding Fire,” 59. Binnendijk’s terminology will be used throughout this thesis’ headings.
166 Stier, “Egypts Military Industrial Complex.”
sometimes gave, his country away for pennies; Minister of Agriculture gave 11,556 feddans of land to an elite who later sold 8,000 of those feddans for EG£350 million.\textsuperscript{169} In another instance, property worth EG£8,000 was sold for EG£300.\textsuperscript{170} The burden of this institutionalized corruption was passed on to the backs of the poor and bribery often used to make up the difference.\textsuperscript{171}

Voting laws prevented real political competition, Law 114 of 1983 changed Egypt’s political system to a proportional representation system. Legally, a party wanting to get into government had to obtain eight percent of the national vote or all their votes went to the party with the largest percentage or the NDP. The law effectively blocked any opposition party seeking office and simultaneously alienated independent candidates from running.\textsuperscript{172} The Interior Ministry ensured the political system was stacked against change, it supervised all voting and vote counting for presidential, legislative, and local elections to ensure political victory, a visual reminder of the regime’s influence.\textsuperscript{173} Parliamentary elections of 2010 were particularly fraudulent; the regime obviously “rigged” the election. Witnesses captured numerous images of blatant intimidation and vote fixing throughout Egypt; they were put online for all to see. Any pretense of including the opposition was ignored as the election concluded with almost no opposition in Parliament.\textsuperscript{174} Egypt had one way of political expression, the protest.

The regime’s disdain for the people of Egypt was a visible fact of everyday life that just needed a voice. Egyptians’ ability to contest the status quo was severely restricted; any party that was able to contest the NDP suffered harassment and banning. The other parties were fractious and unable to gain a base of support or were co-opted by the government. The NDP increasingly monopolized political space preventing any expression of contestation. Activists sought other methods of expression that

\textsuperscript{169} Kandil, Soldiers, 156. A feddan is an Egyptian land unit of measure equal to 1.038 acres.
\textsuperscript{170} Kandil, Soldiers, 156.
\textsuperscript{171} Masoud, “The Road,” 20; Kandil, Soldiers, 158.
\textsuperscript{172} Kassem, Egyptian Politics, 59, 60.
\textsuperscript{173} Kassem, Egyptian Politics, 41.
\textsuperscript{174} Shahin, “Spirit of Tahrir Square,” 53; Holmes, “There are Weeks,” 393.
incorporated their ideas for change. Protests and demonstrations emerged as the singular political space increasingly made available to Egyptians, and opportunities for activists to train grew from numerous protests and movements throughout the last decade that emerged “from structural failure, growing political discontent…and a strong desire for reform.”\textsuperscript{175} 

\textit{Kifaya!} can be traced as the progenitor of the 2011 Uprising, the first time people spoke out against the regime and seen as the first opening of political space.\textsuperscript{176} As one of the more popular movements with a wide base of support that sought to end a “Mubarak dynasty” before it began, \textit{Kifaya} exposed activist leaders of 2011 to the potential of popular protest.\textsuperscript{177} The student supported textile workers’ strike in 2008 provided the training backdrop for the 6 April Movement, Khalid Said and Tunisia did the rest.\textsuperscript{178}

Khalid Said was a middle-class businessman who captured video of police officers dividing the spoils from a drug bust. In an effort to obtain the footage and punish him for filming, police found him in a cyber café. Dragging him out into the street, police beat him to death; witnesses quote police saying, “‘you are dead anyway.’”\textsuperscript{179} The police say that he carried drugs. Attempts were made by officials to ignore the crime, but the gruesome murder was captured and posted online. Outraged family and friends did not believe the police version of events; they pointed out that it is the police job to arrest, not punish.\textsuperscript{180} Khalid’s face became a rallying cry for the youth of Egypt, many understanding that he was “everyman.” “All of us are Khalid Said. Because we can face

\textsuperscript{175} Shahin, “Spirit of Tahrir Square,” 49; Kandil, \textit{Soldiers}, 158. Kandil highlights the increasing numbers of protests throughout the decade that provided experience to Egyptians; in 2001 there were 161 strikes and 660 in 2010.


\textsuperscript{177} Shahin, “Spirit of Tahrir Square,” 52.

\textsuperscript{178} Aditya Nigam, “The Arab Upsurge and the ‘Viral’ Revolutions of Our Times,” \textit{Interface} 4, no. 1, (2012), 166. The Strike in 2008 refers to the 6 April 2008 strike in Muhalla that was joined by students throughout Cairo.

\textsuperscript{179} “Two witnesses affirm Alex Victim Beaten by Police,” \textit{Egypt Independent}, 19 June 2010, \url{http://www.egyptindependent.com/}.

\textsuperscript{180} Ashraf Khalil, “Anger in Alexandria: ‘We’re afraid of our own government,’” \textit{Egypt Independent}, 25 June 2010, \url{http://www.egyptindependent.com/}.
or might face, or might face the same destiny at any point in time." Khalid was killed in 2010 and his death moved the population. For young activists, raised in the shadow of Kifaya! and 6 April, Khalid’s death elevated awareness of repression in Egypt through the Internet. Wael Ghonim began a Facebook page, created in Khalid’s honor to keep the memory of his sacrifice alive and gathered hundreds of thousands of friends. YouTube and Twitter were also used to spread word of the plight of Egyptians; #khaledsaid has over 430,000 followers. Social ties from the Internet merged with stronger interpersonal social connections that spread news of Khalid across the country through word of mouth, and cell phones. The fuse was lit.

Tunisia was the second spark that started a blaze of mobilization in Egypt. The success of the Tunisian Revolution (Jasmine Revolution) demonstrated to the people of Egypt that change can happen in an authoritarian regime. President Zin El Abidine Ben Ali was forced from office on 14 January 2011 after almost four months of protest and violence. Tunisia’s spark was the death of Muhammad Bouazizi in Sidi Bououzid. His self-immolation was a testament to the frustration that the people felt under an authoritarian ruler who held control through the application repression and incentives, much like that of Egypt’s President Mubarak. President Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia with his family after 23 years in office. The Tunisian Revolution left a distinct impression on organizers in Egypt who learned and got advice from counterparts in Tunisia. Activists shared movement goals and slogans and the concept of linking groups

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184 Arab Republic of Egypt Ministry of Communication, ICT Indicators in Brief, February 2011. 86.5 percent of Egyptians had a cell phone in 2011.

185 Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings, 42, 43.

of people to the desire for regime change and economic benefit. This influence tied youth and labor which became a decisive factor in the movement.187

2. Establish Challenger Legitimacy

The primary legitimizing factor for the Opposition was public participation in the protests of 25 January that fed off the violence visited upon it by security forces. In order for Egypt to experience the same effects as Tunisia, activist leaders realized that they had to mobilize people. The Activist leaders researched successful uprisings and received training from around the world learning that regime change can happen through peaceful methods.188 They learned the importance of building alliances and shaping public perception. *Kifaya!* and 6 April showed them that mobilization could be carried out and Tunisia showed them it could be successful.

Protest leaders shaped their argument in ways for it apply to the most people, linking politics with economic problems. They outlined four main demands:

(1) Address the problem of poverty by increasing minimum wages, improving education and health services, and providing unemployment benefits to the youth; (2) end the state of emergency, put an end to torture, and respect court sentences; (3) dismiss the Minister of Interior; and (4) limit the president to only two terms.189

These demands resonated with the population. With 47 percent of the population living on less than U.S.$2 dollars and the complete disregard shown the people during the 2010 Parliamentary elections, Egyptians had a clear understanding of their position in the regime. Khalid Said’s death proved a vivid reminder of the potential fate of all Egyptians who stood against corruption. The messages were out in the country, spoken about in taxis and on busses.190 People had to know they were not alone in their fight for change.

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187 Gelvin, *The Arab Uprisings*, 44.
188 Nixon, “U.S. Groups Helped Nurture.”
190 Husain, “How Facebook Changed the World.”
Egyptian Law Number 162 of 1958, otherwise known as the Emergency Law in 2011, had been in force since 1981, President Mubarak’s entire presidency.\textsuperscript{191} Intended to help maintain stability during short periods of time, this law effectively stifled political freedom and speech. The law made it illegal for more than a “handful of people to gather” without permission, and gave security forces the ability to arrest almost anyone, potentially detaining them for years with or without trial, carte blanche.\textsuperscript{192} Activist leaders devised ways of working within the constraints of this suffocating political system. Called “silent stands,” these events became ways for unknown members that supported a cause, linked only by an idea and a web page, to show solidarity with one another. Operating like a flash mob, protestors received information on when and where to gather via the Internet or by cell phone. Participants wore a certain color, performed a certain task, or both; they did not gather in groups and were separated by a distance from one another. The Emergency Law was not violated, but protestors could look around and see others wearing a black or white shirt standing on the shore of the Nile or alone on a bridge and know that they were one of many who wanted change. Silent stands were held throughout Egypt protesting the death of Khalid Said, images posted online reinforced the perception of an illegitimate state seeking to punish its people for doing the right thing.\textsuperscript{193}

Protest leaders strictly framed their protest in nonviolent terms throughout the 2011 Uprising. They sought to maintain a positive image fearing violence would play into the regime’s hands.\textsuperscript{194} They continually incorporated slogans of inclusion, used national songs and flags, and stressed the peaceful nature of the movement.\textsuperscript{195} The


\textsuperscript{193} “Silent Stand,” We are all Khaled Said, accessed 20 August 2013, \url{http://www.elshaheeed.co.uk/tag/silent-stand/}.

\textsuperscript{194} Shahin, “Spirit of Tahrir Square,” 62.

disciplined protestors ensured others stayed on message and policed themselves, ensuring that security forces had no reason to attack them. The effects of this tactic combined with the timing of protests, worked for the people of Egypt. Hundreds of thousands of people of different ages, status, and religion went into the streets in support and solidarity. The regime saw the effects of the mollifying tactic and made efforts to disrupt it. Events on 2 February demonstrate the lengths the regime went to break this peaceful demeanor; by that time it was too late, the perception of the demonstrators as peaceful had already been cemented in the minds of Egyptians as images of police brutality inundated the population. Total participation over the eighteen days was estimated between twelve and fifteen million people. The number of people involved in the protest correlated with the perceived legitimacy of the group. Rank-and-file members of the military were the first regime elements to show a break in loyalty. By the end of the day on 31 January, senior military officials confirmed the institution would not interfere with protests and the crowds grew further, secure in their faith in the military. Well-known people from political, entertainment and religious communities added the weight of their influence to the swelling numbers of people in the streets. The public relations spokesman of Al-Azhar University, Mohammed Rafah Tahtawy commented, “My position is a position of support to the revolution…till the last drop of my blood.” The people of Egypt kept coming to Tahrir Square, and other public squares around the country, with no end in sight.


197 Kirkpatrick and Cowell, “To Crowd’s Joy,” New York Times, International Herald Tribune, sec. News; Kandil, Soldiers, 161. Article mentions how the “Day of Rage” protest held on 28 January 2011 coincided with the end of mid-day prayers. Thousands of people were already outside of the home and it was easier to convince them to join the march to Tahrir.

198 Husain, “How Facebook Changed the World.”


200 “Chaos in Cairo,” The New Zealand Herald, sec. World. While this move itself was not a complete break with the regime, it signaled to the rest of Egypt a near guarantee of safety from traditional regime repression if they did.

3. **Raise Repressive Costs**

In the past, repression was more acceptable to authoritarian regimes largely due to a state’s ability to control media and repress information, preventing any images or reporting from getting out of the country. The rapid expansion of technological capacity in Egypt and the Middle East has reduced the authoritarian state’s ability to effectively repress the flow of information. As more information is able to leave the country, external actors have a greater potential role in a state’s internal decisions by employing sanctions or other punishments. An activist’s ability to push information outside the country may not have any effect on the country’s policies, but it provides a clear increase to repressive costs.

While Egypt had a significant and growing Internet presence in 2011, television and newsprint were still major sources of information for Egyptians. “Almost 90 percent of Egyptian households have televisions” while newspaper circulation is approximately “55 papers per 1000 people” across the country.\(^{202}\) Since the 1990s, Egypt has gradually increased space for political discourse on television and in newspapers. Arab satellite stations based throughout the region appeared and created an opening for more privately owned firms.\(^{203}\) While the private firms were able to get licenses to produce profit-making newspapers, they were still subject to prosecution under secretive laws that had arbitrary enforcement records for any violation. These newspapers were the first to report actual events in the country, contrary to state run media.\(^{204}\) Television (TV) operated in a similar way; state-run TV reported the state line of “facts,” private stations were subject to arbitrary rules and regulations. As the state progressively lost control, room was created for a freer press. The international press is free of sanctions outside of the state, but government ministries could withhold access to bandwidth or power and sanction Egyptians speaking against the regime.\(^{205}\)

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\(^{202}\) Springborg, “Egypt: Facing the Challenges.”

\(^{203}\) Shahin, “Spirit of Tahrir Square,” 60.

\(^{204}\) Peterson, “Egypt’s Media Ecology.”

\(^{205}\) Ibid. Arbitrary rules are derived in and from the Emergency Law.
The regime’s attempt to regain control of information by harassment, arrest, and shutting down access not only backfired in the streets, but alienated external actors, state supporters, and the media personalities and companies themselves. Attacks on foreign media degraded any pro-Mubarak bias TV personalities may have had.\textsuperscript{206} Many found ways around the near total communication shut down, and information still got out. \textit{Al Jazeera} continued to show the world what was happening in Egypt by broadcasting through other carriers, even after their people were arrested.\textsuperscript{207} Obtaining the moniker “Voice of the Revolution,” \textit{Al Jazeera} played a large role in reporting events taking place in Egypt, both within and outside the country, often being the only source available. The United States was a particular consumer of this resource.\textsuperscript{208} Videos and podcasts uploaded to the web showed the regime’s repressive tactics being used on largely peaceful protestors.\textsuperscript{209} As the eighteen days continued, the United States was forced to move further and further away from President Mubarak, a key regional ally. However, when the protestors were being more violent in response to the repressive tactics of the regime, a perception of self-defense was attributed to anti-government demonstrators, and the response was accepted as necessary.

Egypt had made itself a regional leader in Internet usage and technology with 20 to just over 28 percent of Egyptians online in 2011, and 86.5 percent of Egyptians with cell phones.\textsuperscript{210} The combination of cell phones with the Internet gave a portion of that 86.5 percent the ability to take pictures and video, uploading those images to various websites across the Internet. While the state offered money to thugs and Interior Ministry

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Shahin, “Spirit of Tahrir Square,” 66; Peterson, “Egypt’s Media Ecology.” Peterson explains the regime arrested six essential personnel, shut off the power, and confiscated equipment; the broadcast kept going.
\item Peterson, “Egypt’s Media Ecology.”
\item Shahin, “Spirit of Tahrir Square,” 61; Husain, “How Facebook Changed the World;” Egypt Population, Trading Economics, last modified 19 August 2013, \url{http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/population}; Arab Republic of Egypt Ministry of Communication, \textit{ICT Indicators in Brief, February 2011}. The Ministry of Communication claim versus the 20 percent claimed by Mishal Husain; her program also states that of these Egyptian Internet subscribers, 5 million were on Facebook. Assuming that each subscription is a home, it is unknown how many people within each household use the Internet.
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personnel had increased privileges in Egyptian society, technology offered the opposition the ability to sanction security and pro-Mubarak protestors, and they did. Images of CSF and pro-Mubarak thugs were taken throughout the eighteen days and posted on a Flickr based “group pool” called Piggipedia. Anti-government protestors were able to take pictures and other images were found in raided offices during the uprising. The pictures were uploaded for all to see and could be used as a resource for others to identify and ostracize people who “kept files on the people of Egypt on behalf of the regime.”

Media reports coming out of Egypt forced the United States into a conundrum, continue to support Mr. Mubarak’s regime and violate democratic ideals professed since World War II, or support protestors that hold little love for the United States, and risk regional instability while alienating other authoritarian regimes. The United States has a long history with Egypt; most administrations saw the Egyptian government as a moderating regional force. The close relationship of the two countries has helped guarantee Arab-Israeli Peace since 1979, and has provided almost U.S.$100 billion in economic and military aid to Egypt. On television, feed from Al Jazeera broadcasts, rebroadcast by other agencies, provided images of unarmed protestors being beaten by armored riot police. Video of religious protestors bowing to pray being hit with tear gas siphoned away regime support. In light of the media coverage, on 28 January, the U.S. said it would reassess assistance, but U.S. support to the regime did not change.

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211 Peterson, “Egypt’s Media Ecology.”
213 Peterson, “Egypt’s Media Ecology.” Al Jazeera’s footage was used by CNN, BBC and others.
215 Holmes, “There are Weeks,” 401.
On 30 January, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, “We want to see an orderly transition…that will bring about a democratic participatory government.”

President Mubarak’s attempts at acting as if in a democracy allowed space for elements of democratic practice to be expressed. The opening of media in the 1990s had allowed a greater variety of news available to the public, not all state controlled. The nonstandard practice of rule enforcement allowed some the ability to get away with speaking out. Technological advancement further increased space for public discourse, but now private individuals could blog. While the state did its best to control information, it sometimes failed. The SSIS agents and police involved in beatings could be caught on tape and pictures published on the web. Piggipedia became a way to ostracize government thugs and agents within their own neighborhoods. Groups were able to communicate online and further disseminate tactics through more traditional means. Once the uprising began, the protestors just had to stay in the streets, countering the repression of the CSF, a government response that presented international media a visible target. Other Egyptians witnessed their government’s repression and added their numbers to the uprising. The potential cost of repressive tactics became too great due to the crowds and media coverage. The final straw was the addition to the uprising of more conservative professional groups and labor. Labor decided to add its significant numbers and economic impact to the protest on 8 February which broke the back of the regime. After days of protesting, violent repression, offers of concession from the regime, and refusals of the people, labor unions joined the fight. Workers had suffered the brunt of negative effects created by the economic reform policies enacted. While a common practice, work strikes and stoppages had become exceedingly popular in 2007. The 6 April protest of 2008 in Mahalla at the state owned Misr Helwan Spinning and Weaving Company protested high prices, low wages, delays in payments, and privatization;


217 Holmes, “There are Weeks,” 406.

security force repression, a typical response, led to the death of a 15-year-old bystander, Ahmad Ali Mabrouk. In 2011, President Mubarak ordered Egyptians back to work on 8 February, adjusting curfews to facilitate their movement. The economic demands made full circle as thousands of Egyptians refused to work and demanded Mubarak’s ouster. “Six thousand workers walked out in the Suez Canal Zone and twenty-five hundred textile and steel workers went on strike in Suez…Twenty-four thousand textile workers in Mahal[l]a…In Assyut, eight thousand protestors blocked the main highway and railroad to Cairo.” Professional associations joined and the threat to Egypt’s economy became very real.

4. Reduce Accommodation Costs

Throughout the protests, while U.S. military and political officials spoke to their counterparts urging the military to not fire on civilians, there was no discussion of cutting of aid in the administration. The media coverage created the perception that the U.S. administration supported the Egyptian dictator, counter to the obvious desires of Egypt’s people, or it was hedging its bets between the two camps. By 1 February, President Barack Obama is reported saying “It is time to present the people of Egypt its next government,” to President Mubarak in their last conversation. By all reports, Mr.

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220 Holmes, “There are Weeks,” 406.


222 Holmes, “There are Weeks,” 407. Leading Egyptian businessmen understood the risks to the regime and Egypt’s changing economic environment and were planning accordingly.


224 Helene Cooper, Mark Landler and David E. Sanger, “In U.S. Signals to Egypt, Obama Straddled a Rift,” New York Times, International Herald Tribune, 12 February 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/. Members of the administration were very divided, U.S. Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. did not see President Mubarak as a dictator. Secretary of State Clinton thought Mr. Mubarak should stay to ensure an “orderly” transfer of power others in the White House do not want to be “on the wrong side of history.”
Mubarak just ignored the stern language, although the fact that a longtime supporter of the regime had made the statement was sure to cause concern; military leaders would see things differently.

President Obama’s public comments and other administration-authorized communications gave tacit approval from the U.S., which gives U.S.$1.3 billion in Egyptian military aid, to the Egyptian military to plan for the stability of Egypt, with or without Mr. Mubarak.\textsuperscript{225} While there is no evidence that U.S. opinion was a significant contributing factor in the decision to remove Mr. Mubarak from office, it was a consideration.\textsuperscript{226} From the moment the Egyptian Army was called in to secure the population there was the question if the men in the streets and on the tanks would obey the orders of senior leadership.\textsuperscript{227} Of primary concern was the military’s place in the current regime and its possible place in any future regime.

The military continued to be pushed out of positions of influence within the regime. All Egyptian presidents had gradually pushed military influence out of the cabinet; officers in the cabinet fell from a high of 66 percent with President Nasser down to a low 9.1 percent in 1977 which was maintained through the 2011 Uprising.\textsuperscript{228} Additionally, President Mubarak and the NDP had been working since 2004 to push his youngest son, Gamal Mubarak into the head executive position.\textsuperscript{229} As the uprising continued, it presented an opportunity for the military to regain power and shape its...


\textsuperscript{226}Military Decision Making Process is designed to ensure all factors are reviewed, no matter how insignificant a factor, opinion, or placements of forces may appear to be.


\textsuperscript{228}Kandil, \textit{Soldiers}, 70, 107.

\textsuperscript{229}Kandil, \textit{Soldiers}, 152, 153; Springborg and Henry, “Army Guys,” 18. In 2004, six of Gamal Mubarak’s compatriots were placed in charge of ministries that “directly related to their businesses… [and] a number of prominent neo-liberal intellectuals.” Gamal’s supporters took the cabinet and spread throughout the NDP and government all working toward a presidency for Gamal Mubarak. The Kefaya! Movement in 2004 started as a result.
influence within the system. Military leadership appears to have worked behind the scenes—getting President Mubarak to appoint Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq and Vice President Omar Suleiman both with military ties—so it could regain some power and influence within the Mubarak government. When the senior leaders realized the protestors were not going anywhere and an ordered crackdown was disobeyed, the military proceeded on a course that provided it with the best outcome while maintaining popular support of the protestors.

The large crowds of demonstrators created strength and safety. The initial protests on 25 January surprised protest organizers who scheduled a larger protest on 28 January scheduling it for just after midday prayers on a Friday at a time when most Muslims go to prayer. Start points were determined the night before and distributed face-to-face. The communications shutdown that occurred in the early hours of the 28 January forced curious people onto the streets. The protest started in the poorer sections of town. In Cairo, they started in the Imbaba neighborhood around the mosques, gathering people as they marched; activists left the area with 30,000 to 100,000 people, all headed to Tahrir Square. Once they occupied Tahrir they consolidated, creating popular committees with specific tasks. Some occupied buildings creating makeshift clinics for wounds acquired in the march, others were formed to protect against criminals and thugs, and still others collected and distributed food and water. The protestors maintained a predominantly nonviolent posture and welcomed soldiers with open arms, songs and slogans of unity, hugs, and flowers. Observers identified with the protest, were able to

233 Husain, “How Facebook Changed the World.”
see on TV or the Internet, when they came back on, that the military was not using force. More and more people came out believing in their safety assured by their knowledge the military would not fire.236

5. Highlight Success Potential

Egyptians would not have been as willing to join the protest if events in Tunisia had ended differently. People in Egypt identified with the repression and fear of those living under the Tunisian regime. Through TV and the Internet, the people of Egypt watched President Ben Ali try to ban the Internet and had his police shoot his people. Protestors posted tactics, like rubbing tear gas strained eyes with Coke instead of water, on the Internet for others to use.237 They saw a largely leaderless group of people come together under duress and saw a former president flee a country. They watched as a group of regular people made a profound change.238

Protest organizers knew that the internal security forces were going to be less inclined to support them because of their historic interactions with the CSF and SSI. Leaders understood that there efforts of inclusion would have greater efficiency if used on the military which had the tense relationship with the Interior Ministry that culminated in the violent repression of the CSF in 1986,239 If they played up the “protector of the realm” perception the military had fostered and identified with for 60 years, used slogans and actions of inclusion, they would make any order to attack the protestors difficult to obey.240 With an estimated 15 million in the crowd—there was a high probability that some of their families were in the mix.241

238 Howard and Hussain, “The Role of Digital Media,” 37.
239 Sirrs, Egyptian Intelligence Service, 161.
240 Quote is author’s terminology; Aclimandos, “Reforming the Egyptian Security Services.”
As the people conquered and reconquered Tahrir Square, the police seemed to vanish. The security vacuum coincided with a prisoner “escape” intended to create fear and keep people indoors. This, too, backfired as Egyptians used their created committees to further protect the city, bringing people out to help each other. The “hug a soldier” welcome the Egyptian Army received from the protestors gave the impression of unity built upon a perceived trust of the military. The increasing size of the crowds demonstrated popular consent of the people in support of the movement and gave soldiers comfort that they were doing right for their country and families by not harming the protestors. The military announcing it would not use force reinforced this belief and caused more people to go into the streets. Hundreds of thousands of people of all ages, status, and religions, came to squares throughout the county. Estimates of total participation over the eighteen day period are around 15 million. Subsequent strikes that occurred in the 2011 Uprising: worker parties, lawyers, doctors, judges, Suez Canal workers, many people of different social strata joining in, cemented success in the minds of the people.

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242 Shahin, “Spirit of Tahrir Square,” 160; Holmes, “There are Weeks,” 405. January 25 protestors were cleared out after many hours. They retook the square on 28 January and held it.


IV. REGIME CHANGE OF 2013

The second case in this thesis applies the strategic framework to opposition and security force interactions in Egypt two years and four months after President Hosni Mubarak was removed from office. After 500 days of military rule under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Mohamed Morsi was sworn in as Egypt’s first democratically elected president. The hope of the “country’s first free and fair” election faded over time. General Abdul Fattah el-Sisi and the SCAF, prompted by the support of a large segment of the population, removed Mr. Morsi from elected office after a series of policy decisions alienated a majority of Egyptians. Pro-Morsi supporters, the current opposition, took to the street using tactics similar to those effectively used in 2011, but failed to influence any shift in allegiance. This thesis will focus on four incidents over a 41-day period in 2013 to illustrate an opposition’s inability to achieve any of Anika Binnendijk’s strategic objectives and the resulting security responses.

A. ELECTIONS, RIOTS AND MILITARY INTERVENTION

A member of the Islamist Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political arm of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Morsi defeated his opponent Ahmed Shafiq by a 3.7 percent margin or approximately 900,000 votes. President Morsi and his party were installed to rein in corruption, increase food security, bring economic improvements, and promote stability. Over time, Morsi’s policies were met with resistance, leading to increased tensions between the government and opposition groups. The combination of poor economic performance, political repression, and the perceived threat to traditional values by Morsi’s policies eventually lead to a wave of protests and a crackdown by security forces.


parity, and reduce widespread unemployment. In spite of his Islamist favoritism and background in the Muslim Brotherhood, an overall majority of Egyptians gave Mr. Morsi and his party an opportunity to improve their current situation; after decades of military rule, Egyptians were excited and hopeful for the future of their country.

Anti-Morsi and anti-Muslim Brotherhood protests began in August after the President issued a series of policy decisions restricting personal freedoms, press freedom, and placed Islamists in key government positions. His actions provided the impression that an Islamist takeover of Egypt was in the offing. Protests reminiscent of those in 2011 began in earnest on 22 November; President Morsi gave himself pharaoh-like authority by issuing “a constitutional declaration which puts him beyond the bounds of judicial supervision;” the decree also prevented dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and Shura Council. The democratic hope of the 2011 Uprising and subsequent elections were swept aside by policies imposed by a leader who saw fit to arbitrarily

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expand presidential power to eliminate “weevils eating away at the nation of Egypt” while alienating non-Islamists and youth.  

Presidential support fell from a high of 57 percent in 2011 to 28 percent for the “disaffected plurality” a year later. Egypt witnessed little improvement during Mr. Morsi’s year in office. The economy grew only 2.3 percent in the first nine months of fiscal year 2013, the deficit grew 48 percent, public debt reached U.S.$188 billion by January 2013, and unemployment rose to 13.2 percent in the first quarter. While the president still represented hope to 96 percent of Egyptians with Islamic affiliations, a clear divide in the population based on ideology and religion caused massive protests throughout the country. Millions took to the streets in 2013, protesting a Muslim Brother who sought to rule as a “pharaoh,” create an Islamist theocracy, and do whatever it took to make those ideas real. Unverifiable sources estimate crowds swelled to “between 14 to 33 million people,” one third of the nation, that participated in countrywide protests calling for Mohamed Morsi to step down from the presidency.


257 Zogby, “After Tahrir,” 2. According to polling in 2012, 57 percent said Morsi’s victory “was either ‘a positive development’ or ‘the result of a democratic election and the results need to be respected.’” That number fell to 28 percent a year later. Islamic tendency represents Egyptians who support the FJP and al-Nour Parties.

While that figure is high and difficult to verify, crowds were large and reminiscent of Egypt’s 2011 “Arab Spring.”

After a 48-hour ultimatum to comply with public demands, military forces, directed by the SCAF, forced President Mors 

i out of office and presented a “road map” that was to lead to an expedited democracy. Thousands of pro-Morsi supporters set up camps and demonstrated against the military takeover. The first reported “mass killing” of Egyptian protestors occurred outside of the Republican Guard Headquarters on July 2013 in Cairo; the Ministry of Health reported 51 civilians dead, 435 wounded. Security forces would lethally engage pro-Morsi protestors, killing more than 30 civilians at three additional times over the next 40 days. Although it killed over 700 civilians the military retains its positive image of national protector. Intervening on the side of anti-Morsi protestors has only slightly detracted from the positive perception of the military

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among the majority of adult Egyptians. A Zogby poll conducted in the latter half of July 2013 noted 93 percent of Egyptians “still retain confidence in the military as an institution.” The fact that they used live ammunition on protestors in one of the four incidents, just before the poll, seems to have deflated that number only by a single point from previous polls conducted the month prior.

B. SECURITY FORCE RESPONSES

The security force response to opposition tactics and its corresponding loyalty decisions greatly contrast with security force decisions of 2011. The opposition of 2011 was composed of a healthy mix of secularists, liberals, socialists, and Islamist youth that integrated a wide cross-section of the population; that cross-section of the population narrowed significantly in 2013. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists dominate the current opposition that supports the deposed president and seem to have adopted an attitude that has affected their ability to gain supporters. Additionally, tactics so effectively used in 2011 were ineffectively applied or ignored in the events of 2013.

The discussion in this section is broken into three parts describing the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and specific incidents. The ministry subsections will summarize any changes that occurred between the fall of President Mubarak and the mass killings. The incident discussion will describe each event, focusing on security actions and opposition tactics. The Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense forces worked in concert during these operations, but any divergence will be highlighted.

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264 Zogby Research Services “After Tahrir,” 11.

1. **Interior Ministry**

Security reforms that many expected after the uprising of 2011 never truly materialized; the Interior Ministry instituted various cosmetic changes, but its basic construct and operation remained unchanged. In March of 2011, Interior Minister Mansour al-Issawi disbanded the dreaded SSIS and in the same statement announced the formation of the new National Security Agency (NSA) which has a similar set of specified tasks. The Interior Minister Habib el-Adly and other senior leaders within the former SSIS were relieved of their responsibilities and several former officers were acquitted of all charges and returned to the new agency with a clean record. The Ministry of Interior offered little else to highlight any change in procedure or operations: pay for the majority of personnel remained low, very few benefits eased any economic disparity, and a negative perception of police continued. Numerous senior members of the former SSIS remain in positions of power and attempts at real reform within the organization are weak at best. The CSF still functions and operates as it did in the past, a hammer the regime uses to dissuade and control protests and riots. Amnesty international noted that after the 25 January Revolution “no reform of the police was initiated and the authorities employed tactics reminiscent of the Mubarak era;” pointing


“Notorious SSIS Officers Reinstated After Court Acquittal,” *Al-Masry Al-Youm*, 15 June 2013, [http://www.egyptindependent.com/](http://www.egyptindependent.com/). Al-Adly was initially sentenced to 12-years for money laundering, profiteering and corruption; five years, fined, and ordered to return U.S.$32 million for squandering public funds; and a life sentence for failing to protect the lives of protestors. The 12-year and life sentences were overturned by the Court of Cassation in March 2013 and a retrial is underway as of the date of this writing.


269 “Notorious SSIS Officers Reinstated;” Kremer, “‘Old Habits Die Hard.’”

out that the majority of all police arrested for crimes during the 2011 Uprising were acquitted. Former president Morsi favored a gradual reform of security elements because he feared they would go AWOL when he needed most. To date, security force practices throughout the post-Mubarak period remained largely unchanged.

2. Ministry of Defense

In the aftermath of the 2011 Uprisings, the Egyptian Military held the esteem of the nation for its part in removing Hosni Mubarak and his cronies—popularly termed feloul—from power; the Egyptian military held an 88 percent approval rating in April of that year. The ruling council, having worked for the Egyptian people to remove a repressive president, found itself in an ideal position. The council capitalized on this by taking control and moving toward elections thereby solidifying a positive perception with the public. In the months that followed, many pundits argued that the military worked harder to regain the prestige, power, and influence it had lost in the Mubarak years while seeking to protect its personnel from prosecution rather than trying to improve the country and its people. The Ministry of Interior was marginalized and co-opted into accepting negative press for government actions; the Ministry of Defense maintained a consistent, positive approval rating and held power throughout. The SCAF preserved

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273 Kassem, Egyptian Politics, 55. Elections before 2011 and 2012, and some would argue those fit this description also, in practice were only a tool to legitimize the regime. Voting presented an appearance of democracy that created the perception of the Egyptian people’s participation in government without any risk to the regime; the regime controlled everything.


the oppressive tactics of the former regime by keeping Law Number 162 of 1958, the Emergency Law in effect, bringing approximately 12,000 civilians to military courts, conducting virginity tests, and limiting civilian assemblies. Anti-SCAF protests pressured the government throughout early 2012 resulting in a faster transition toward a civilian government. The first democratic election in Egypt’s long and storied history took place in June of 2012 and culminated with Mohamed Morsi being sworn into office.

C. INCIDENTS

1. 8 July 2013

When the SCAF issued its ultimatum on 1 July, and enforced it three days later, there was little doubt that the military, security services, and judiciary were not in full control.

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278 Azzam, “Transition to Democracy,” 4–5; “Tracking the Revolution,” The Midnight Sun: Observation on the Middle East (Blog), 7 June 2012, accessed 11 December 2013, http://laselvaoscura.wordpress.com/2012/06/07/tracking-the-revolution/; The Editors, “Egyptian elections,” The Immanent Frame, accessed 23 October 2013, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/07/02/egyptian-elections/; A Voice From Egypt, “Making Sense of the Egyptian Elections: A Political Analysis,” MuslimMatters (Blog), accessed 28 June 2012, http://muslimmatters.org/2012/06/28/making-sense-of-the-egyptian-elections-a-political-analysis/; Marco Vicenzino, “Egypt’s Military Still Plays Kingmaker,” Huffington Post: The Blog, 13 December 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marco-vicenzino/egypts-military-still-pla_b_2296229.html; Glain, “Egypt at War with Itself.” It is widely believed that the Muslim Brotherhood and military colluded to give the Brotherhood the presidency while the military retained its independence, but a “vast majority of observers” concluded the elections were “free and fair,” a win for all sides. The runoff between Ahmed Shafik, a former Air Force officer and feloul, and Mohamed Morsi, a U.S. trained Muslim Brother, presented the military with two options. Allowing Mr. Shafik to win would present the impression to a large majority of the population, that the election was rigged, potentially reducing military popular support and control. Mr. Morsi would put a domestically persecuted enemy of the military – and some would argue country also– in charge of Egypt and risk Islamist takeover. Allowing Mr. Morsi to win ensures that a majority of the public will believe elections were fair, attempts to reign in the military can be argued as an attempt by the MB to Islamize Egypt, and provides a legitimate excuse for the military retake power, if necessary.
agreement. The Interior Ministry notified the public on 10 June that the CSF and police would stay away from anti-Morsi protest locations and police officers, in and out of uniform, were clearly seen participating in the demonstrations at the end of the month. In the predawn hours of 8 July soldiers and police officers engaged pro-Morsi supporters in front of the Republican Guard Headquarters in Cairo. There are widely conflicting stories of what occurred and how things started. Muslim Brotherhood spokesmen claim that “peaceful protestors were performing the Fajr (dawn) prayers when the army fired teargas and gunshots at them without any consideration for the sanctity of prayers or life.” Dr. Hassan Ahmed of the Qast al-Aini Hospital claimed that a young child and woman were among the dead. Abdel-Rahman el-Sakka, chief of the Health Insurance Authority saw no evidence of women or children that suffered injury. The military provided an alternative description of events claiming, “an ‘armed terrorist group’ attempted to break into the Republican Guard headquarters in the early hours of Monday and ‘attacked security forces.’” An unnamed doctor who witnessed the event stated that gunfire that started after his prayers drew him to a window where he observed men on motorcycles “coming from behind the protestors” toward the Republican Guard building and the military forces located there. The masked men appeared to be shooting and the army responded, shooting back. Whatever the stories


282 Ibid.

283 Ibid.

and their bias, Egyptians died; the Ministry of Health reported 51 civilians’ dead, 435 wounded while the military claimed one officer dead, 42 soldiers wounded.285

2. 27 July 2013

A skirmish ensued between security forces and Morsi supporters, who were based around the Rabaa mosque in the al-Adaweya Square. As pro-Morsi protestors “approached the off ramp of...6th of October Bridge,” they were met by a group of CSF accompanied by armored vehicles and a large group of civilians that believe the protestors were expanding their camp into a major thoroughfare.286 The animosity between pro- and anti-Morsi camps had brought much violence to the streets in recent days.287 The police claim they intervened between the predominantly Islamist protestors and a group of residents displeased with the “encampment on their doorstep.”288 Witnesses said protestors were seeking to expand the encampment in an attempt to deal with overcrowding, others thought they were preparing for another march.289 Protestors say they were unarmed when they met with police, but began using evocative language directed at the police before getting to the bridge. When the police responded with tear gas, protestors threw rocks, built barriers in the street, and shot back.290 The Brotherhood claims that the civilians and police fired live rounds to disperse the crowd; a spokesman for the organization accused the Minister of Interior of issuing the order.291 Dr. Ahmed

285 “Death toll rises to 51 in Monday clashes between Egypt Army and pro-Morsi Protesters,” Ahram Online, 8 July 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/.
Abdullah said, “They [police] aimed at killing people.”

A Dr. Fouad highlighted a pattern of wounds that indicated specifically targeted shots from an elevated position, that he saw a greater number of these when compared to the incident on 8 July. The Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim adamantly denied that any police officer had fired on the protestors saying, “his officers ‘have never and will never shoot a bullet on any Egyptian;’” He placed blame squarely on the shoulders of the Muslim Brotherhood, “we had to stop them.” The incident lasted several hours beginning around 2230 Friday evening and lasting through mid-morning on Saturday, bodies stopped arriving at the Rabaa al-Adawiya field hospital between 0700 and 0800. The Ministry of Health confirmed 74 dead and 748 wounded, the Muslim Brotherhood claimed 120 dead and over 4,000 wounded; Interior Minister Ibrahim reported police losses as two shot in the head and 14 wounded.

3. 14 August 2013

The largest and most significant security force operation against pro-Morsi protestors, resulting in the majority of dead and wounded, occurred when military and police forces moved into the Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda Squares in the early morning of 14 August. Police and civilian fired at protestors and protestors fired back. Doctors on scene report treating many injuries to the head, chest, and neck as best they could.


295 Fahim and El Sheik, “Crackdown in Egypt;” Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Many Protestors Shot in Head or Chest.”

296 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Many Protestors Shot in Head or Chest;” “Clashes Toll Rises to 74 Killed, 748 Injured,” Aswat Masriya, 27 July 2013, http://en.aswatmasriya.com/; “Over 80 Dead, Hundreds Injured;” Nelson, “Egypt Clashes;” Botelho, Alkhshali, and Wedeman, “Bloodshed.” The video on the RT webpage claims the Ministry of Health revised their reported number of deaths to 74, the words on the page report 72; numbers include those in Alexandria and Cairo. Human Rights Watch report police force losses as one officer killed and several wounded, NYT article reports 2 officers killed; there is no differential between commissioned officer and police officer (all conscript type) in articles researched.
morning to disperse the sit-ins and remove the camps. The military backed government had been warning Morsi supporters of probable government action designed to clear the sit-in sites for more than two weeks when the incident took place; the government considered the supporters a threat to national security. In near simultaneous operations, police and military forces moved to cordon off the sit-in sites at dawn. While the army maintained security on the perimeter, the police began the al-Nahda Square operation with a bulldozer maneuvering to clear wooden barriers and sandbags protestors erected to protect the camp; the first sound of tear gas was heard about an hour later. Witnesses report that the police “informed demonstrators that they were clearing the sit-in and ordered them to leave peacefully.” They allowed safe passage for women and children. The majority of protestors fled into the Orman Botanical Gardens or into the Giza Zoo across the street or disappeared into Cairo University while at least four were caught by residents and turned over to police. The smaller camp was quickly dispersed by midday, left a burnt mess that was secured and sealed off from the


299 “Egypt: ‘People were Dying All Around Me,’” Amnesty International Publications, 16 August 2013, 5, http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/egypt-people-were-dying-all-around-me testimoniesso- from-cairo-violence-on-14-august-2013; Noah Rayman and Jacob Davidson, “RECAP: Egypt Declares State of Emergency as Security Forces Evict Morsi Supporters; Dozens Dead, Hundreds Injured,” Time World, accessed 14 August 2013, http://world.time.com/2013/08/14/live-blog-egypt-declares-state-of- emergency-as-security-forces-evict-morsi-supporters-dozens-dead-hundreds-injured/. Near-simultaneous operations began around 0600 at both sites; police and military secured each site, vehicles were moved into position, loudspeaker announcements ensued and things escalated at various rates from there. Some protestors report that they did not hear any announcements or warnings, others heard warning in the late afternoon and not the morning, or vice-versa.

300 Charlie Miller and Joel Gulhane, “Al-Nahda Sit-In Dispersal: Eyewitness Accounts,” Daily News Egypt, 14 August 2014, http://www.dailynewseye.com/. Robert Mackey and Liam Stack, “Updates on Security Crackdown in Egypt,” The Lede (Blog), 14 August 2013, accessed 11 December 2013, http://thedele.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/14/updates-on-security-crackdown-in-egypt/. Video on The Lede page shows unarmed soldiers escorting the bulldozers to do their work and police doing shooting. In the background at a few sections one can hear sounds similar to clapping and applause. Men were also allowed passage, but were vetted to see if they were wanted before being allowed through.


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public. Later in the afternoon, demonstrators attempted to retake al-Nahda Square but were held up in the Giza Zoo. Bursts of “machine guns, AK-47s, and shotgun fire” could be clearly heard throughout the afternoon spreading across Giza; at least 26 local neighborhood residents reportedly fought alongside police. The second, larger camp located outside the Rabaa al-Adawiya mosque, on the other side of the city, proved to be a more difficult objective to clear.

Events at Rabaa al-Adawiya Square began as those at al-Nahda Square, with a wakeup call between 0600 and 0700; approximately 85,000 demonstrators emerged from their shelters listening to a police loudspeaker imploring them to leave peacefully, finding themselves surrounded by police and military units. Shortly after, the CSF began shooting tear gas and rubber bullets into the crowd; the army provided security as the police moved to disperse the dissident crowd and armored bulldozers maneuvered to clear several stone and sandbag barriers erected to defend protestors from government action. No one knows who fired first, but the security elements on the ground responded in kind; smoke and tear gas made visibility difficult and gunfire made traversing the

302 Rayman and Davidson, “RECAP;” “Egyptian Troops Move Against Pro-Morsi Sit-ins.”
square dangerous. Protestors reported police snipers engaging protestors from the rooftops and that police fired automatic weapons into the crowd from helicopters circling the site and atop armored vehicles as demonstrators, and others, sought protection behind the nearest object. Witnesses reported hearing instructions on how to safely get out of the area via Tayaran Street, but intense gunfire made moving difficult. Medics and doctors treating the wounded at the Rabaa al-Adawiya medical clinic describe a period in the afternoon when directed fire prevented access to the facility, “live fire at the entrance to the medical center meant…the wounded had no safe way of getting medical help.”

Pro-Morsi activists were not exactly innocent of violent acts. While the vast majority only tried to get away from security forces, a dedicated few carried clubs, burnt tires, or brandished and fired guns that added to the din of gunfire in the square. Violence spread across Waraq, Kerdassa, and Giza as Islamist supporters attacked government buildings and security force members. Local residents largely supported government forces in this part of Cairo, too. Increasingly annoyed with the growing encampment and worried about their safety, a crowd gathered behind government forces cheering, “the


309 Ibid.

310 “Egypt: ‘People were Dying All Around Me,’” 5.
army and the people are one hand,” reminiscent of slogans from the 2011 Uprising. Interior Minister Ibrahim told reporters that his men recovered, “10 machine guns, 29 shotguns, 6 grenades…9000 rounds of ammunition…molotov cocktails…and other instruments of torture.” All told, this had been the deadlest day of violence in Egypt’s recent history. After the sites were cleared, Rabaa al-Adawiya took about 12 hours, 638 people were declared dead, and 3,994 wounded.

4. 18 August 2013

The government published several different stories describing the events of 18 August 2013 illustrating how prisoners had died, alternate explanations that further confused and created suspicion about the situation. The group of prisoners was arrested when security forces cleared out the al-Fateh mosque the day prior, and joined a group of approximately 600 detainees traveling to Abu Zaabal prison in the northern section of Cairo. Ministry of Interior spokesman Hany Abdel Latif stated that the prisoners attempted to escape from a police transport van and captured three officers in the attempt. The officers on site subdued the detainees with tear gas fired into the van, suffocating the men inside. Another news outlet stated that the MoI claimed the convicts were trying...


312 Rayman and Davidson, “RECAP;” “Egyptian Troops Move Against Pro-Morsi Sit-ins.”


to escape the prison, taking one officer hostage; prisoners died as a result of tear gas and crowding (stampeding). State media claimed that security forces and “armed men” fought close the prison. In another report, the trucks came under attack and “detainees came under fire while attempting to escape,” implying they were shot, but stating that officers responded with gas. Unofficial stories from other sources made more sense, but remained unverifiable. The Al-Watan newspaper attributed an “unnamed police major” responsible for the convoy saying the prisoners rioted after being subjected to horrible conditions. Detainees traveled in cramped, poorly vented vans in 90 degree temperatures. After waiting in the vans for almost three hours, an officer opened the door and was accosted but subsequently rescued by a fellow officer. The prisoners were subdued with gas, but there was no gunfire. Most sources are consistent about the number who died and how prisoners rioted. The stories became convoluted when trying to determine where and under what circumstances the riot occurred.

Clearing the sit-ins opened a flood of support for both the military and police forces responsible for shooting the protestors and the Muslim Brothers in the camp, a manifest division highlighted in polling now appeared. The level of violence on 14 August spread dramatically throughout Egypt as deposed President Morsi’s supporters retaliated against the government’s actions, releasing the social pressure that had been building for months, and added an additional 173 deaths in three days. To that point, government forces had engaged and killed more than 30 people in three separate


319 Loveluck, “Egypt Clashes;” “Egypt Opinion Polls Reveal Dissatisfaction with Morsi,” Ahram Online, 2 July 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/; Zogby, “After Tahrir,” 1–3, 7, 14. A majority of Muslim Brotherhood supporters believe their lives have improved, 80 percent of the rest of the population disagree. 93 percent of Egyptian people believe the FJP was attempting to Islamize the country while 92 percent of MB supporter reject that idea. On 14 August, Islamist supports of Mr. Morsi destroyed 32 Christian Churches in nine cities.
instances, and all told, over 1000 Egyptians had died since police cleared the sit-in locations.\textsuperscript{320} Police forces suffered too, losing 24 officers in a “terrorist” attack on a police convoy in the Sinai.\textsuperscript{321} The fourth “mass killing of civilians” on 18 August was different; the 36 Islamists that died on that day were in police custody at the time of their deaths.\textsuperscript{322}

D. ASSESSMENT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Challengers to the regime establishment in this case failed to accomplish any of the Five Strategic Objectives listed earlier and were subsequently unable to elicit any shift in loyalty based on dissent within the security establishment.\textsuperscript{323} The military quickly acted when it noticed signs of dissent, mitigating any potential loyalty shifts before the opposition could capitalize on those shifts. Challenger leadership in 2011 employed tactics successfully to inspire dissent in the military, but were unable to effectively translate those tactics in the 2013 uprising. Traditional views merged with what Egyptians saw taking place, creating a narrative the Muslim Brotherhood could not overcome. As illustrated below, the pro-Morsi opposition failed to address the five strategic objectives initially and has yet to achieve its goals.

1. Expose Regime Illegitimacy

Legitimacy remains important and shaped the events of both phases of Egyptian recent history discussed in this work. In 2011, over eighteen days and with a variety of influences, mass mobilization, and the “hug a soldier” program conducted on a mass scale by a diverse group of people created “the narrative of military backing” for the


\textsuperscript{321} Stack and Mackey, “Egyptians Share Gruesome Images.”

\textsuperscript{322} Norland, “Islamists Killed While in Custody.”

\textsuperscript{323} Binnendijk, “Holding Fire,” 59.
public when initially that narrative was very uncertain. Islamists had substantial political victories in the 2011 parliamentary election followed by a presidential election, with the quiet acquiescence of the SCAF along with the popular support of a country that saw Morsi as the “lesser of two evils,” believing him a change from his feloul opponent. A year later, 50 percent of Egyptians saw Mohamed Morsi’s victory as “a setback for Egypt.” The military removed the sitting president, shut down Islamist media outlets and jailed hundreds of Muslim Brothers, targeting senior leadership, with the support of a majority of Egyptians. With this beginning, challengers who opposed the military takeover in 2013 were unable to surmount the military’s popularity manifested in the “Cult of el-Sisi,” the legitimacy of protests versus elections, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s traditional role as a threat to the nation.

Much like Gamal Abdel Nasser, Defense Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is arguably the most beloved and popular person in Egypt. He is often heard echoing the former leader’s themes and rhetoric and he continues to gain a following. A “cult of personality” has developed around the general, as it did around Nasser, and his military can almost do no wrong. General el-Sisi has pledged to lead a stable Egypt into new elections and has made progress on a new constitution, easing concerns that the military will not transition to a


325 Kandil, “Soldiers Without Generals,” 13, 16; Zogby, “After Tahrir,” 2, 9–12, 20–21; “NDP Founder Rejects ‘Feloul’ Label;” Brown, “Egypt’s Failed Transition,” 48. There was a clear Islamist win in both elections but by June of 2013, 27 percent of all polled Egyptians had confidence in the presidency, 26 percent in the FJP and MB, and 26 percent believed the MB capable of administering the state; conversely the military retained a 94 percent confidence – from all Egyptians.


civilian government; he “has not shown himself power-hungry.” When, in 2013, he announced the military takeover to the Egyptian people, he surrounded himself with leading Muslim and Christian clergy, politicians such as liberal Mohamed el-Baradei, Galal Morra from the al Nour Party, and two prominent members of the Tamarrod (rebel) movement to convey the popular approval of the move, immediately establishing an inclusive atmosphere. His resulting popularity has soared, overshadowing his critics consequences of the events described previously, even when security cleared the pro-Morsi camps on 14 August 2013. His likeness adorns posters, banners, cookies, cakes, and chocolates; his initials “CC” are baked into pastries and molded into jewelry, children and sandwiches have been named after him. A “Sisi” inspired Tumbler account chronicles all the ways people have honored the General. He is seen by many as the savior and grantor of security in the country that favors security over injustice, and the opposition has been unable to effectively counter this popular impression of someone many consider a national hero that saved “the country from an ailing economy and

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330 El-Shenawi, “‘Brand Sisi.’”


religious autocracy.” General el-Sisi has used his popularity to gain popular approval for security action; on 26 July 2013 he called on Egyptians to march in support of the military. In his speech he highlighted the army’s neutral position in Egypt asking for such a visual mandate to combat “terrorism.” Thousands marched which “was widely seen as a green light…to increase their repression on Islamists;” 74 people were killed. Effective tactics that were implemented to remove Mubarak have had little impact on General el-Sisi’s wellspring of countrywide adulation. The popular reaction to the 14 August 2013 killing of protestors has had minimal effect on his and the military’s popularity. In one case, a Cairo chocolatier decided to created her pro-Sisi delights after the camps were cleared, her “show of support” for the leader; social media sites dedicated to counter the appeal of General el-Sisi have failed to create a following, reiterating the massive popularity of the military leader and what the Muslim Brotherhood is up against.

Pro-Morsi demonstrators have centered their position on the legitimacy of the elections versus the legitimacy of the protests. Elections and democratic display are not unknown in Egypt, and were a common occurrence under colonial rule; there were

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335 Kingsley and Awad, “Egypt’s Army Chief Rides Wave;” Lynch, “Will Egypt Stay Sweet.” ‘Said Sadek, a political sociologist in Cairo said, ‘[Egyptians] have tolerated injustice for centuries, but they cannot tolerate insecurity;’” who went on, “‘This is a very important cultural issue people do not understand.’”


ten elections between 1922 and 1952 when President Gamal Nasser introduced a single party system. Popular legitimacy is also known from Nasser’s time where policy is presented to the people, “a mechanism borrowed from Gaullist France to legitimize...political powers” on how popular actions are with the people, the “Egyptian version of Bonaparteism.” Popular protest has been fully legitimized as an effective method of public voice in these last three years; major demonstrations have brought about three ruling party changes in as many years. Popular protest influenced military action to bring down President Mubarak, facilitated elections in 2012, and allowed the military to step in to remove President Morsi in 2013. Elections have a spotty record best.

The elections in 2011 and 2012 were freer than earlier ones, and seemed to progressively improve. The Presidential election of 2012 had better campaigning controls and enforcement than the parliamentary elections in December and January, but elections were unable to match the legitimacy held and conveyed by mass mobilization. Egypt’s spotted history with voting is replete with abuses because the regimes have controlled everything. All Egyptian political parties were licensed and monitored through the Political Parties Committee and subject to sanctions if they violated any rules. The Interior Ministry supervised the election process and the Ministry took proactive measures to maintain the existing regime. Police often “fixed” the vote by stuffing ballot boxes and blocking entrances to polling centers, ensuring the NDP received no less than

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339 Kassem, *Egyptian Politics*, 52, 53. Traditionally in Egypt, elections were a tool to legitimize the regime. Voting presented the appearance of democracy that created the impression of Egyptian participation in government without any risk to the regime. The 2012 Presidential Elections were seen to be more fair and free than previously known in the country, although numerous accusations of fraud and rigging have been reported.


343 Lina Khatib, “Political Participation and Democratic Transition in the Arab World,” *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law* 34, no. 2,(2013), 325.
75% of the cast ballots.\textsuperscript{344} Results of post-Mubarak elections are consistently ignored by the SACF when there is a result the party disagrees with. On 19 March 2011, Egyptians voted on and approved constitutional amendments that the SCAF later disregarded, preferring to implement its own version of a constitution. In the December 2011 to January 2012 parliamentary elections, Islamists won a majority of the votes, and the SCAF vacated the results. The party chooses to enforce the Supreme Constitutional Court’s order that dissolved the unconstitutional parliament.\textsuperscript{345} President Morsi took office in the fourth election; the SCAF removed him after a year in response to his failed power grab and the largest public demonstrations in Egypt’s history.\textsuperscript{346} Finally, there was the constitutional referendum in December 2012 that was disregarded on 3 July 2013 in answer to the “will of the people.”\textsuperscript{347}

A more legitimate tool, until democratic institutions and the electoral processes mature, has proved to be mobilizing a large number of people to gather in the street because of the danger and difficulty involved in getting people to participate. People, busy with their own lives, often risked imprisonment, physical abuse, injury, and death venturing out of their homes to participate in protests.\textsuperscript{348} The military reaction in the 2011 Uprising removed some of the fear, making all types of people from all realms of life participate. The crowds on 30 June 2013 were seen as larger than those in 2011; a

\textsuperscript{344} Kassem, \textit{Egyptian Politics}, 41, 66–67.


\textsuperscript{348} Kassem, \textit{Egyptian Politics}, 66–74; Mona el-Ghobashy, “The Dynamics of Egypt’s Elections,” \textit{Middle East Research and Information Project}, 29 September 2010, accessed 11 December 2013, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero092910. As mentioned in chapter three of this text, coercive action taken on 12 August 1952 in Kafra al-Dawr, the 1977 Bread Riots, the 1986 CSF riot all resulted in some being killed. Kassem relates that past elections were just as risky to participants as protests. In the 2011 and 2013 demonstrations family members were in the crowd and provided an additional emotional connection to the protest.
larger crowd lends greater legitimacy.\textsuperscript{349} Public consensus for regime change provided opportunity for the military, at that time the most popular and trusted institution in Egypt and the dominating coercive power to remove the elected president form power. In the Presidential Election of 2012, non-Islamist Egyptians gave Mr. Morsi the “benefit of the doubt” believing him a better option than his \textit{feloul} opponent, yet, in time, he lost popular approval.\textsuperscript{350} When the military acted to remove President Morsi, it was acknowledged by a majority of the population to be acting on the people’s behalf, and the military has not lost that support.\textsuperscript{351}

The final hurdle hindering the opposition from delegitimizing the government was that the Muslim Brotherhood was understood and referred to in terms of a threat. The current challenger is largely made up of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist organization that has contested Egyptian regimes, sometimes violently, for the past eighty years and represents those in the population hostile to the state.\textsuperscript{352} The Muslim Brotherhood is a tenacious group that has survived years of torment in Egypt since its founding in 1928. Originally a social association, the Muslim Brotherhood grew into a civil society organization that offered basic services, and later addressed politics; they built an immense grass roots network.\textsuperscript{353} This organized network current actions have not helped its popularity among the rest of the population. A doctor and MB supporter in Port

\textsuperscript{349} Kouddous, “What Led to Morsi’s Fall.”

\textsuperscript{350} Pew Research Center, “Egyptians Increasingly Glum,” Global Attitudes Project, 16 May 2013, accessed 22 October 2013, 2, \url{http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/05/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Egypt-Report-FINAL-May-16–2013.pdf}; Zogby, “Egyptian Attitudes,” 3, 6; Zogby Research Services “After Tahrir,” 11–12, 20–22. In poll conducted May 2013 by Zogby, 63 percent of Egyptians favorably viewed the MB, down 12 percent from 2011; the SCAF rated a mere four points higher, but unchanged from 2012. By June, 75 percent of those polled did not believe the Morsi Government was unable to improve the economy and 73 percent did not believe they were capable of “administering the state.” Hope that the 2011 Uprising was going to bring about positive change fell 46 points from a high of 82 percent. After President Morsi was deposed, 68 percent of the polling population had their hope back. Military popularity has remained in the low to mid 90’s since 2011.


\textsuperscript{352} Gregg Carlstrom, “Morsi’s Struggle for ‘Legitimacy,’” \textit{Al Jazeera}, 3 July 2013, \url{http://www.aljazeera.com/}. There are non-MB members that do not support the military take over, but they are overshadowed by the vast numbers of the Muslim Brotherhood.

\textsuperscript{353} Eric Trager, “Policywatch 2049: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Set to Prevail Despite Policy Failures,” \textit{The Washington Institute}, 13 Mar 2013, \url{http://www.washingtoninstitute.org}.
Said commented, “It is very hard to be walking down the street to buy groceries and hear passerby’s saying things like ‘we will clean Port Said of the Muslim Brotherhood.’”

There is a long history of animosity between the Muslim Brotherhood and security forces beginning with Brotherhood’s support of the 1952 coup. Two years later a man named Mahoud Abdel Latif of the Muslim Brotherhood, shot at President Nasser; in 1981, Islamists succeeded in killing President Sadat. The 2013 government actions mirror those of Nasser’s time including massive roundups, arrests, and incarceration of Brotherhood members. While adhering to a policy of formal state support before the military removed the president, after the events of 3 July 2013, military representatives and state and independent media outlets call MB members “‘terrorists who seek to destroy Egypt.” This narrative and terminology has spread into the popular vernacular creating a further frame of threat attached to the Brotherhood. In the aftermath of the security clearance operations, Amira Said Aghoul commented “The Muslim Brotherhood is a gang that is controlling Egypt,” and the violence was their fault and “I thank God and General Sisi for getting rid of them.” An Imbaba resident said that people that died on 14 August did not matter to him, “It’s about the security of the country.” Another resident simply said, “It [security clearing the camps] was necessary;”

355 Karawan, The Political Role, 117–118; Hashim, “The Egyptian Military, Part One,” 106–107. Islamist organizations have routinely attempted to infiltrate the military and it is a task considered to be a “key goal of Jihad. The Egyptian military has a policy of investigating soldiers for that possibility seeking to prevent another assassination.
357 Cook, “Echoes of Nasser.”
359 Collard, “Egypt Chaos.”
elsewhere in the streets people openly praised the army for clearing the streets. The head of the Tamarrod, a popular Egyptian youth movement stated, “the Muslim Brotherhood says they’ll burn Egypt if they don’t get what they want” and Brotherhood members around the country have lived up to that. The response of MB adherents has been to burn a number of police stations, buildings, cars, and specifically to lash out at Christians. Participants were heard calling for Egypt to become an “Islamic state,” and 30 churches have been attacked and burned. Members have been abiding to the Muslim Brotherhood motto “‘Allah is our objective; the Prophet is our leader; the Quran is our law; Jihad is our way; dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.’”

2. Establish Challenger Legitimacy

Challengers to the 2013 regime lost their legitimacy during the presidency of Mohamed Morsi and failed to regain it once the military took over. The inability of the elected Islamists to pull Egypt out of its economic morass, admittedly a difficult task for any group, was compounded by Islamist failure to include other groups in the political process and therefore ostracized a portion of the electorate. In the parliamentary elections of 2011, Islamist parties were overwhelmingly elected; the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the Nour Party received a combined 61 percent of the vote from the 62 percent of registered voters that participated in parliamentary elections; the FJP received 51.7 percent of the vote in a presidential election where approximately 51 percent of the


361 Fadel, “Despite Bloodshed.”


364 Much like the popularity of General Abdul el-Sisi, Mr. Morsi is the face of the MB, and judgments of the party’s ability to govern are founded in the state’s experience under his rule.
registered voters turned out. Those elections were close, and in Mohamed Morsi’s first remarks he spoke of inclusion: “We believe in the importance of the new Egyptian government upholding universal values, and respecting the rights of all Egyptian citizens — including women and religious minorities such as Coptic Christians,” but he failed to live up to that promise.

Shortly after the election, the President recalled an Islamist dominated parliament which had been dissolved days before the presidential runoffs by a judicial order enforced by the SCAF. A militant attack on a security checkpoint had allowed Mr. Morsi to retire several senior military leaders, allowing him to place Islamist sympathizers in their roles, and removed the SCAF’s self-given constitutional powers granted before the elections. Over the year he centralized power in the executive branch, launched investigations on numerous critics, fractured a nation along largely sectarian lines, favored an Islamist agenda, sought to limit democracy, and forced an Islamist constitution on a population where 63 percent of those polled opposed it. Though Morsi’s political moves may have been a ploy to gain support, the public inferred

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366 Kirkpatrick, “Named Egypt’s Winner.”


While relations between Christians and Muslims have never posed a hazard to the Egyptian state, interactions between religions post February 2011 have significantly increased tension.
them an Islamist plot. Anti-Morsi demonstrations began in August 2012 as Egyptians begin to wonder about an Islamist takeover; suspicion was confirmed in November when protests really began. 370 Meanwhile, little improved in Egypt; the economy remained largely dependent on foreign support, there was no improvement in unemployment, and basic services were becoming more expensive. “[Morsi] failed to honor every one of the promises he made in order to be elected. He…behaved as though he had somehow legitimately inherited the old Mubarak Regime with a veneer of piety.” 371 Increased violence, sectarian and non-sectarian, combined with a general lawlessness that deterred business interests and investment; collateral damage from the violence destroyed the existing economic capabilities. 372 Islamist parties performed well in elections so Mohamed Morsi and his party took that as a mandate by the public that the people wanted an Islamist regime in charge. When the people realized his intent, as state security went down, they knew from the last years’ experience that the MB did not and could not deliver. This realization had a direct impact on the people’s need for a legitimate alternative to the regime.

The primary strength in the Muslim Brotherhood lay in numbers and its ability to mobilize, as “thousands of people clustered” in support of Mohammed Morsi on 1 August. 373 The membership selection process for the Muslim Brotherhood, designed to deter security force infiltrators, created a cadre of dedicated members; there was an estimated 600,000 members that the Brotherhood was able to mobilize with a phone call and this translated into results in the electoral process. 374 This base of guaranteed support could be called upon to motivate support. The civic arm of the MB helps provide basic

371 Kouddous, “What Led to Morsi’s Fall.”
services: education, food, and health services, to hundreds of thousands of people. Providing these services creates a bond with the population, and with Brotherhood members in the daily lives of the people it helps.\textsuperscript{375} As political involvement became easier, the civic arm was used to influence voter turnout and candidate selection, arguably bribing Egyptian voters.\textsuperscript{376} These factors coalesced in a dedicated center that could mobilize quickly. The tactic of mobilizing into large crowds to dissuade the military from their actions was based on the previous successes when the leading elements in Egypt changed predominantly with violence coming from the CSF. Participants believed that the military would not fire on the crowds. The pro-military crowds, centered in Tahrir Square were larger, and while the military did not want to take over, it did.\textsuperscript{377} Protestors spent approximately six weeks in the Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda squares and only garnered disdain from the local residents and ultimately hostile fire from security forces that saw the Islamists as a threat. The large crowds failed to intimidate the security services that viewed the throngs of people as enemies of the state that needed to be expunged.

Inability of the MB to effectively gain a more popular following outside of the organization has also been impacted by state media bias. Islamist stations and media outlets were censored within 24 hours of the takeover and the remaining independent stations and papers returned to the policies of previous military regimes; the Islamist voice had been silenced.\textsuperscript{378} The MB affiliated personnel President Morsi placed in office have been removed and the “free media” that followed the 2011 uprising has largely returned to its former ways of supporting the state. Traditionally, media outlets in Egypt reinforced the supremacy of the state with varying degrees of government intervention that minimized political discourse.\textsuperscript{379} Over time, efforts to maintain the appearance of

\textsuperscript{376} Siam, “Welfare Outreach,” 91.
\textsuperscript{377} Eric Trager, interview by Michael J. Totten, “The Truth About Egypt.”
\textsuperscript{379} Peterson, “Egypt’s Media Ecology.”
democracy and concessions have forced openings in formally controlled spaces that allowed media outlets greater freedom of discourse. The rapid expansion of technological capacity in Egypt in the last ten years created a regional leader in Internet usage and technology and a reported 20 and 28 percent of Egyptians online in 2011, and 86.5 percent of Egyptians with cell phones.380 Since the 2011 Uprising, private individuals have blogged and submitted their own commentary, but the Interior Ministry SSIS, turned NSA, exists and jails offenders of the emergency laws.381 Generals within the Ministry of Defense voiced concern over the effects of a free press on Egyptian society’s view of the military; there are 25 owners of media outlets in Egypt. In a released video clip a SCAF general says, ““we have been concerned with controlling the media… we are yet to achieve what we want,” implying that the military government is working toward a modified version of state control.382

Efforts to control the foreign media have returned Egypt to a security state model. Turkish reporters Metin Turan and Abdhllah Shami were “arrested” in mid-August 2013 and have yet to be released; a female correspondent Hibe Zekeriya captured with Mr. Turan was released eight hours later. In a similar incident France 2 had a crew of four arrested and held for 10 hours on August while Jared Malsin, who works for Time Magazine and freelance photographer Cliff Cheney were subjected to “violence and intimidation” on 16 August.383 In a statement from the official foreign press coordination

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center, “Egypt is feeling severe bitterness towards some Western media coverage that is biased to the Muslim Brotherhood and ignores shedding light on violent and terror acts that are perpetrated by this group in the form of intimidation operations and terrorizing citizens.”\textsuperscript{384} In another instance, however, two \textit{Wall Street Journal} reporters were attacked by mobs and rescued by soldiers; one reporter commented, “Today, I feel like the army and I are very much on one hand.”\textsuperscript{385} Media has been allowed greater openness, but state control and sanctions still exist, and a majority of the independent outlets and all of the state media now maintain a “party line” that is popular with their audience and conveniently keeps them open in the state’s good graces.

\textbf{3. Raise Costs of Repression}

Within 24 hours the military led government had reduced the opposition voice in Egyptian society significantly; arrest warrants for 200 Islamists were issued, including Mohamed Badie and his deputy Rashad Bayoumi, four Islamist TV stations were shuttered, Al Jazeera, Mubasher Misr, Muslim Brotherhood owned EGYPT-25, and Islamist run Al-Hafiz and Al-Nas, while state media controls reestablished almost overnight.\textsuperscript{386} The state intervention of numerous media outlets severely restricted the mass distribution of the opposition narrative. The media highlighted opposition action while it ignored or reshaped the context of negative government activity thereby increasing negative perceptions of the opposition. As time progressed, the popularity of military intervention increased largely because people were not exposed to political alternatives, combined with the inept governance under the Muslim Brotherhood.


\textsuperscript{385} Hersh, “Egyptian Government Slams Foreign Press.”

The rhetoric the Muslim Brotherhood has used throughout the period was indicative of a hostile organization that was unwilling to work with others. In President Morsi’s speech of 2 July, he warned of violence if his legitimacy was not guaranteed.\footnote{Mackey, “July 2 Updates.”} Brotherhood spokesman Gehad el Haddad stated that the MB would not work with the post-Morsi leadership, the implication of such an action would grant default legitimacy to the military action.\footnote{Kouddous, “What Led to Morsi’s Fall;” Trendis Myname, “Interview Muslim Brotherhoods Gehad El Haddad speaks out Against Army Crackdown....,” \textit{Al Jazeera}, accessed 1 November 2013, \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R0pNX1YPMl}.} He continued later “At this point it’s a zero-sum game: it’s either the Brotherhood or the old regime. Everyone else is too small to matter.”\footnote{Robert F. Worth, “A Familiar Role for Muslim Brotherhood: Opposition,” \textit{New York Times}, 28 July 2013, \url{http://www.nytimes.com/}.} Sentiment echoed in the streets, “What the army did, they have unleashed hell on Egypt.”\footnote{Gregg Carlstrom, “Despondent Scenes at Pro-Morsi Rally,” \textit{Al Jazeera}, 4 July 2013, \url{http://www.aljazeera.com/}.} Protestors chanted: “Wake up, don’t be afraid, the army must leave!,” “The Interior Ministry are thugs!” and “Egypt is Islamic, not secular!”\footnote{“Thousands of Pro-Morsi Supporters Take to the Streets in Egypt,” \textit{NBC News}, 30 August 2013, \url{http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/}.} In the Siani, a crowd chanted, “No more election after today.”\footnote{David D. Kirkpatrick and Ben Hubbard, “For Islamists, Dire Lessons on Politics and Power,” \textit{New York Times}, 4 July 2013, \url{http://www.nytimes.com/}.} The repeated sentiment reinforced the narrative of threat created by the military regime and reinforced by the state media: “the Muslim Brotherhood is a threat to the stability of the nation, a threat the military has dealt with before; the military can give you the stability you want.”

Symbols are often used to galvanized and unite a population of mobilization. In 2013, the symbol of a raised hand with four fingers extended and a bent thumb crossing the palm has become a symbol of the Muslim Brotherhood—not the Islamist movement “R4bia” as intended. “R4bia” references the Rabaa al-Adawiya Mosque and government
clearing the sit-in located there. The first use was reported in Turkey; soon after Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used it in support of Islamist protestors, providing a boost to its worldwide popularity. The issue here is again, inclusion, an attribute not demonstrated in the Morsi presidency or by his supporters in the streets that speak and in some cases act in violence. Islamists and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood are the primary users of this symbol limiting any value the symbol has to unite a diverse population. Attempts to refocus the R4bia sign’s narrative toward anti-authoritarian tactics have not taken hold; the R4bia sign would then be a much more effective confederate symbol. The opposition of 2013 has yet to create a broad based appeal that the 2011 protests so effectively generated.

Pro-Morsi protestors inconsistent use of nonviolence provides a reason for using more and more repressive methods of crowd control and dispersal. Months before Mr. Morsi left office, pro and anti-Morsi protestors had been fighting in the streets. An Islamist protest outside the Egyptian Supreme Court in April degraded into violence as each side threw rocks and Molotov cocktails. Islamists set fire to buses and at least 39 people were injured. In May 2013, Friday prayers released thousands that marched to Tahrir, fights erupted as pro and anti Morsi demonstrators voiced their opinions. “The people and the army are one hand,” was heard provoking those that did not want military intervention. On 1 July 2013, a clash between protestors killed seven and wounded


394 “‘Four-Finger Salute.’”

395 David D. Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim, “Signs of a Shift Among Egyptian Protesters to Antigovernment, From Pro-Morsi,” New York Times, 30 August 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/. This type of shift would resound very well with Egyptians, but the MB still needs to work on inclusion. In the article, the Mohandiseen March was protesting against the ‘legitimacy’ and ‘mandate’ to act perceived by the military installed government. Brotherhood spokesmen directed journalists to other protests, missing the opportunity to include non-Brotherhood elements in a more inclusive protest against authoritarianism.


397 “Several Thousand Rally in Tahrir.” Events were reported on 17 May 2013.
more than 600 across Egypt\footnote{Gregg Carlstrom, “Anti-Morsi Protests Sweep Egypt,” \textit{Al Jazeera}, 1 July 2013, \url{http://www.aljazeera.com/}.} As 3 July came and went, pro-Morsi supporters camped around the mosques and the anti-Morsi protestors held Tahrir Square, a symbol in itself, and events narrowed to the protest camps at the Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda square. The protestors continued defiance of calls to disperse. The heated rhetoric, combined with the violence conducted by MB members maintained the group’s role of antagonist and justified hostile actions taken by security forces on the ground that are conditioned to defeat the protestors.\footnote{Fadel, “Despite Bloodshed;” Sarah el-Deeb and Tony G. Gabriel, “Millions Rally in Egypt, Responding to Army Call,” \textit{Yahoo News}, 26 July 2013, \url{http://news.yahoo.com/}; “Egypt Protesters Defy Cabinet Threat to End Sit-Ins,” \textit{BBC}, 1 August 2013, \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23527015}.} After the clearance operation, running battles across Cairo, Giza, and Alexandria reconfirmed the violent threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood and an additional 173 were reported dead.\footnote{Kareem Fahim and Mayy El Sheikh, “Soldiers Storm a Mosque in Cairo, as Egyptian Leaders Struggle for Order,” \textit{New York Times}, 17 August 2013, \url{http://nytimes.com/}.} The repression used on 14 August seemed to have worked as subsequent protests had a lower number of participants and stayed out of central Cairo.\footnote{Kristen Chick, “Low Turnout at Egypt’s Protests Highlights Islamists’ Disarray,” The Christian Science Monitor, 23 August 2013, \url{www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/0823/Low-turnout-at-Egypt-s-protests-highlights-Islamists-disarray}.} General el-Sisi and the military government maintain they were acting on “the will of the people” and “could not ignore the widespread protests against Morsi’s rule.”\footnote{“Egypt Army Chief Vows to Use Full Force,” \textit{Al Jazeera}, 19 August 2013, \url{http://www.aljazeera.com/}.} The general is seen by many as the savior and grantor of security in the country that favors security over injustice.\footnote{Kingsley and Awad, “Egypt’s Army Chief Rides Wave;” Lynch, “Will Egypt Stay Sweet.” ‘Said Sadek, a political sociologist in Cairo said, ’[Egyptians] have tolerated injustice for centuries, but they cannot tolerate insecurity,’’ who went on, ‘’this is a very important cultural issue people don’t understand.’’} The violence witnessed by the men on the ground in the days and months prior to the heavy handed incidents eliminated any hesitation and justified to the soldiers and public the necessity to clear the Islamists. The security services were praised for the action.

\footnotesize{398 Gregg Carlstrom, “Anti-Morsi Protests Sweep Egypt,” \textit{Al Jazeera}, 1 July 2013, \url{http://www.aljazeera.com/}.} 
\footnotesize{399 Fadel, “Despite Bloodshed;” Sarah el-Deeb and Tony G. Gabriel, “Millions Rally in Egypt, Responding to Army Call,” \textit{Yahoo News}, 26 July 2013, \url{http://news.yahoo.com/}; “Egypt Protesters Defy Cabinet Threat to End Sit-Ins,” \textit{BBC}, 1 August 2013, \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23527015}. Since that initial incident, the military has largely let the MoI do its dirty work. In the four mass killing events described, the military was an active participant in just the 8 July defense of the Republican Guard Headquarters; key word in this is \textit{defense} of the building and the people inside. All other operations were performed by the CSF who acted to defeat a “terrorist” organization that intended to harm the state.} 
\footnotesize{401 Kristen Chick, “Low Turnout at Egypt’s Protests Highlights Islamists’ Disarray,” The Christian Science Monitor, 23 August 2013, \url{www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/0823/Low-turnout-at-Egypt-s-protests-highlights-Islamists-disarray}.} 
\footnotesize{402 “Egypt Army Chief Vows to Use Full Force,” \textit{Al Jazeera}, 19 August 2013, \url{http://www.aljazeera.com/}.} 
\footnotesize{403 Kingsley and Awad, “Egypt’s Army Chief Rides Wave;” Lynch, “Will Egypt Stay Sweet.” ‘Said Sadek, a political sociologist in Cairo said, ’[Egyptians] have tolerated injustice for centuries, but they cannot tolerate insecurity,’’ who went on, ‘’this is a very important cultural issue people don’t understand.’’}
4. **Reduce Costs of Accommodation**

After securing Morsi, General el-Sisi asserted the legitimacy of the security establishment by stressing a theme of protecting the nation and following the will of the people, “The army and police right now are the guardians of the will of the people” while maintaining “there is room for everyone.”404 Framing the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat resounded well in the security forces which held the role of defender of the state; the threat frame was consistently reinforced by the scenes of increasing violence and bloodshed in the days leading up to the incidents of the mass killings.405 Security and stability needed to be established and who better to do that than the defender of the state? The security establishment moved slowly using consistent delays and pronouncements to conduct operations “within the law and constitution” before clearing the camps. Additional time allowed Egyptians to infer that security crackdowns were not unilateral actions conducted by a hostile police state; demonstrators knew they were coming and had time to get out.406 A theme of “the government is simply doing what it takes to restore security” resounds well for many Egyptians, and keeps security forces in a positive light.407

Traditional methods of securing long term loyalty were reestablished as the military resurgence took hold. During President Morsi’s term he appointed 17 regional governors, seven of whom were from the MB, increasing the total number of MB

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governors to 11 out of 27. The tactic was a method Gamal Nasser used as a method of consolidating power upon taking over. Anwar Sadat used the same tactic to remove potential rivals and it eventually became a way of co-opting the loyalty of senior leaders. President Mansour, upon assuming office, appointed a total of 25 governors, replacing all MB and Islamist affiliated governors with loyal judges and generals, in some cases known for their more coercive approach to dealing with protestors. The generals have more benefits staying with the military, and soldiers find little desire and motivation in actively defying the secular institution in favor of an Islamist organization it has been fighting for years. Morsi chose to side with Islamists instead of the people who called the military.

General el Sisi and the Egyptian military are the dominant political force in Egypt and throughout the post-Mubarak period the military has worked to retain the independence and power it gained, going so far as to codify its separation and special benefits in the new constitution. Of significant impact is the Egyptian military industrial complex, a wide economic entity that touches nearly every sector of the Egyptian economy and gives the military an additional method to insert itself into various Egyptian collectives and tribal networks. As one of the largest employers in the country, the pools of people who are tied to and sympathize with the military encompass a significant number of Egyptians whose livelihood and welfare depended on it as one time or another. The work product of this enterprise is vast. It is responsible for building Jeep brand vehicles, basic sustenance items, clothing, military equipment, as well as controlling some of the most valuable land in the country. While the actual numbers are a state secret, some estimate the military industrial complex constitutes 10–15% of the Egyptian economy.

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408 Sarah Lynch, “Morsi Governor Appointments Frighten Some Egyptians,” USA Today, 19 June 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/. One of the governors appointed, Adel Asaad Al-Khayat of the Construction and Development Party, the political wing of Gamaa Islamiya who was responsible for a terrorist attack at Luxor in 1997 that killed over 60 people, mostly tourists; he later resigned.

409 Kandil, Soldiers, 3, 107. Mubarak appointed fewer military leaders into governorates, reducing its political role in the country as more MoI and other personnel were selected.

Money created by these endeavors allows a better livelihood for soldiers and access into the formal political sphere; there are plenty of loyal workers, soldiers, and money to reinforce the military’s presence in politics. This economic independence provides privilege and status to elements within the military that have a greater impact on or influence over security service loyalty.

Security members, specifically the officers, wish to preserve their privileged status within Egyptian society. Within days of being sworn in, Mr. Morsi and the military establishment escalated their struggle for power. The military sought to maintain its autonomy from civilian interference while President Morsi maneuvered for civilian control of an Islamist state. Maintaining loyalty to the security establishment ensures the access to privileges to which the elements within the organization have grown accustomed including, hospitals, social clubs, homes, children’s schools, vacations, and food centers. Senior leaders comment that it is the military’s responsibility to protect its members from the “caprice of market forces,” and that the military is “duty bound to provide…a decent living.” Police officials are not unaccustomed to special privileges either. A force to be reckoned with, according to Robert Springborg, “besides the Brotherhood, they are the only real cohesive institution in the country.”

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412 “Timeline of Turmoil in Egypt after Mubarak and Morsi,” New York Times, 2 July 2013, http://www.nytimes.com; el Fadl, “The Military, the Courts, and the Struggle.” The two initially formed an alliance with the groups agreeing to stay out of the others interests. Contestation began in July 2012 when President Morsi reinstalls the Islamist heavy Parliament that the military and judiciary had dissolved earlier in 2012. In August 2012, Mr. Morsi forced the retirement of several senior generals and nullified a military enacted constitutional declaration that removed several authorities from the Office of President. On 22 November Morsi granted himself powers that superseded the judiciary. The President’s intent was extrapolated from his actions while he was in office.

413 Hubbard, “Military Reasserts;” Kandil, Soldiers, 131–133, 139. Remarks were made by Major General Ahmed Fakher under President Mubarak’s regime and there were times when the military had to consider reducing salaries “severely” post 1979.

414 Hubbard, “Military Reasserts.”

415 Ibid.
5. **Demonstrate Likelihood of Success**

Nothing the pro-Morsi activists did led security personnel to believe they were going to succeed. For each of the thousands of people that took to the streets in support of President Morsi there was a matching crowd, some would argue larger, that was protesting against him.\(^{416}\) Tahrir Square (Liberation Square in Arabic), the very symbol of Egyptian liberty, reminiscent of the successful protests of 2011, was occupied by the anti-Morsi demonstrators, despite numerous attempts to alter that.\(^{417}\) Soldiers, police, and civilians alike heard comments in the media and on the street classifying the MB as terrorists. Amal, a civil servant in Al-Ittihadiya said, “I think that the Muslim Brotherhood are terrorists; I did not used to think of them this way but now I do;” she continues that she believes the Brotherhood’s threat to “burn the country” and calls for General el-Sisi to “eradicate the terrorists.”\(^{418}\) When General el-Sisi announced that President Morsi had been removed he was flanked by senior members from Al-Azhar, the Coptic priesthood, the Nour Party, liberals and the Tamarrod, highlighting to all the inclusive nature and unity of the military’s action.\(^{419}\) When General Sisi asked for “honest Egyptians to take to the streets…to reveal their will and authorize the army and police...” people came by the thousands.\(^{420}\) The continued popularity of el-Sisi, the representative of the military, in the streets, is a vivid reminder that the military is in charge and will win.


\(^{418}\) Ezzat, “Voices From Pro, Anti-Morsi.”

\(^{419}\) “Army Ousts Egypt’s President.”

V. CONCLUSION

This paper defines success in terms of a shift in regime; President Mubarak was removed and President Mansour, supported by the military, remains in power according to the demands of the people.\textsuperscript{421} In 2011, Egypt’s anti-government opposition was able to capitalize on the mistakes of Mr. Mubarak’s regime to mobilize millions of people onto the streets. Once in Tahrir, activists simply had to wear down the CSF and maintain an all-inclusive, nonviolent presence in the physical space. In 2013, Egypt’s opposition is easier to define and the majority of opposition participants identifies with the Muslim Brotherhood and an Islamist lifestyle or belief structure.\textsuperscript{422} By self-identifying, the 2013 opposition casts itself in a preconceived light, known well to fellow Egyptians. This interferes with creating a greater support base from those outside the Brotherhood. The violence that is attributed to members of the 2013 opposition further separates challengers from greater support within the Egyptian population. Opposition in the first case was able to accomplish each of the objectives in Anika Binnendijk’s Strategic Framework, by highlighting regime illegitimacy, legitimizing the opposition, increasing personnel costs to repression, making it easier to shift, and demonstrating success of the movement which increased the likelihood of security force loyalty shifts that occurred. In the second case, the Muslim Brotherhood’s self-reliance and inability to incorporate a greater diversity of Egyptians, which would have diluted the perception of threat created by the state media and reinforced by interaction on the street, ensured security forces had no hesitation dealing with a threat to the state they are trained to defeat.\textsuperscript{423}

Over the 30 years of President Mubarak’s reign, the regime largely illegitimated itself, economic reforms alienated the public, opposition party voice in government was pushed out, and efforts by the political elite to place Gamal Mubarak on a throne further


\footnotesize{422} Hubbard, “Military Reasserts;” Kirkpatrick, “Army Ousts Egypt’s President.” There are members of the minority religious and ethnic groups that are pro-Morsi and there are a number of Islamists that are not, but the vast majority is from the Muslim Brotherhood.

\footnotesize{423} Karawan, The Political Role, 112.
alienated the population and concerned the military. In 2011, opposition activists presented themselves as peaceful Egyptians fighting for what is right by carrying Egyptian flags, singing patriotic songs, using basic slogans of political and economic change, and ingratiating appeals to the military. Youth groups came together online highlighting the injustice that was amplified by Khalid Said’s death at the hands of police; he gave injustice a face that all Egyptians could identify with. The government believed in repressive tactics that had worked for decades, and thought those tactics would continue to be effective. The opposition movement’s tactic of maintaining a nonviolent disposition, even under the most stressful periods, highlighted the illegitimacy of repressive acts. While state media ignored the first days, media outlets that covered that time presented images of peaceful Egyptians walking for legitimate reasons, being beaten by the state; devout people easy to identify with.

President Morsi was the face of a Muslim Brotherhood in power. In his year in office, the country’s economic growth remained low, debt increased, unemployment grew, the Egyptian pound decreased in value which made everything cost more; shortages on fuel and electricity swept the country and the bread subsidization program enacted to curb smuggling was ineffective. Journalist Sarah Lynch of USA Today summarizes:

In late June, millions of people protested what they said was a hijacking of their new democracy by Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed Morsi, the first freely elected president of Egypt who had given himself sweeping powers over the judiciary, launched investigations against his critics and sought to regulate pro-democracy groups. Morsi’s opponents accused him of forcing an Islamist constitution on the people, pushing a religious agenda and ignoring the crumbling economy. Crime rates had risen under Morsi and militant attacks on government outposts persisted in the restive Sinai Peninsula.

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425 Peterson, “Egypt’s Media Ecology.”
426 Al-Ghitany, “The Performance of the Egyptian Economy.”
427 Lynch, “Will Egypt Stay Sweet.”
Morsi’s lack of popularity followed his supporters on the streets and into the camps at Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda squares. Residents in the neighborhoods around the camps grew annoyed at Morsi supporters, and reports of kidnapping and torture in Rabaa al-Adawiya only strengthened the argument that participants were terrorists. Violence and chaos seemed to accompany the MB members wherever they went, destabilizing the country. Creating legitimacy through crowds, exceedingly large numbers of people gathered around Egypt calling for Mr. Morsi’s removal. On 26 July General el-Sisi, the face of the military, asked for a similar gathering of people to support military action against terrorists and got it.

*Kefaya!* opened the eyes of protest leaders and the 6 April textile strike gave them hope of success. Youth groups built an online presence, forming networks of supporters. Khalid Said’s death presented an opportunity to protest the ills of corruption and vice by silent protest. Hundreds and then thousands stood apart in silence, visibly supporting each other without giving authority reason to arrest or harass. Hundreds of thousands joined online sites, and these supporters could have been anyone. When the 25 January protest took place, organizers were surprised at the turnout. A protestor commented, “From the very first day we felt we could win because of the huge numbers of people involved.” The crowds in Tahrir and the other squares around the country began to legitimize themselves. *Al Jazeera* showed clips of the abuse these crowds suffered at the hands of thugs and police. Multiple thousands of people, an estimated 20 percent of Egypt, participated in this uprising; the sheer diversity of the participants was staggering. The longer the crowds were in the square, the more people came, and when the unions and professional groups began to strike, success was assured.

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430 Husain, “How Facebook Changed the World.”

431 Shahin, “Spirit of Tahrir Square,” 47.

432 Kirkpatrick, “Wired and Shrewd.”
The Brotherhood is one of the two most organized and stable institutions in the country, the other is the military, and the military used its considerable numbers to mobilize consecutive political victories.\textsuperscript{434} The authoritarian structure, with a rigid chain of command, disaffected a significant portion of the post-Mubarak population.\textsuperscript{435} The MB’s political success has not effectively translated to broad based street support among minorities and liberals. The rhetoric that flowed throughout the country in the weeks prior to 14 August was framed around the legitimacy of a leader by election versus those in the public square and further simplified pro- and anti-Morsi. By comparison, the anti-Mubarak protests of 2011 were synonymous with anti-authoritarian policy and corruption. By focusing the argument so narrowly, challengers automatically limited their potential support population to a specific segment and gave the people an easy decision, “do I like Morsi or not?” As pro- and anti-Morsi protestors clashed, perceptions of a “terrorist” threat further were reinforced by a resurgent state media; who instigated the violence was less a factor than maintaining the state theme.\textsuperscript{436} Egyptians turned to the only institution seen as capable of securing the state. The military learned from the mismanagement of the post-Mubarak SCAF and may have not wanted to come out of the barracks. However, once there, they saw a public willingly supporting domestic security policy that focused on crushing an old nemesis.

Repressive costs were elevated by the Mubarak regime opening, however slowly, public political discourse and technology. Throughout the 1990s, the regime wanted to play at democracy and loosened its restrictions on media so new private stations and papers were established. While they may have been difficult to run, there was more room for discussion. Television that was not subject to state censoring was more available so a different perspective was discussed.\textsuperscript{437} Internet and cell phone usage grew and protestors were able to increase personal costs of repressors through various websites. Finally, \textit{Al Jazeera} coverage showed the world, both inside and outside of Egypt, the true nature of

\textsuperscript{434} Trager, “Unbreakable,” 10.
\textsuperscript{436} Fahim and El Sheikh, “Crackdown in Egypt.”
\textsuperscript{437} Peterson, “Egypt’s Media Ecology.”
the regime. External actor influence is difficult to judge, but military consideration of U.S. desires for the military not to attack civilians was certainly a consideration; the effects of a U.S. decision to cut military aid to Egypt would have been a factor in any decision.438

Days before President Morsi was taken into military custody, crowds gathered in squares throughout the country in numbers argued larger than those two and a half years prior asking for it to happen. On the stage General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was flanked by “Egypt’s top Muslim and Christian clerics…political leaders including Mohamed ElBaradei, the Nobel Prize winning diplomat and liberal icon, and Galal Morra, a prominent Islamist ultraconservative…all of whom endorsed the takeover.”439 He declared, “The Egyptian Armed Forces….stands distant from political forces, and “has been called by the Egyptian people for help;” the military, justified as “by the will of the people,” removed the elected president.440 On 26 July 2013, before much of the security force crackdown occurred, el-Sisi asked for the people’s support again. The repressive measures taken were seen as approved prior to execution; between 30 June to 30 August 2013, security forces encountered little domestic backlash that would hinder future repressive measures against the pro-Morsi demonstrators. Signs of a coalescing “anti-authoritarian tactics” movement were reported, and any movement formed around this had broader appeal and increased the potential feedback from future use of coercive tactics.441

The opposition to Mubarak in 2011 did not succeed by itself, but the actions of demonstrators allowed the regime to be its own worst enemy. Events outside of demonstrator control lead to the military decision to remove President Mubarak, acquiescing to the massive crowds demands.442 The primary task the demonstrators needed to accomplish was to mobilize large numbers to face security forces, voice the

438 Bumiller, “Divided Military.”
439 “Army Ousts Egypt’s President.”
441 Kirkpatrick and Fahim, “Signs of a Shift Among Egyptian Protesters.”
442 Spencer, “Battle of the Nile;” “Egyptians Denounce Mubarak.”
crimes of the regime, and respond to security tactics in a nonviolent manner. The growing crowds of protestors forced open a public spaces (central squares). Their tactics, multiple start points, starting in poorer sections of town with narrow streets to gather numbers, and starting after midday prayers helped mobilize the population. The violent repressive state reaction by the CSF was expected and fought off for four days throughout the country; the variable was the military. Activist targeted the rank-and-file of the military because they knew they would have a higher likelihood of success. Any protest success is predicated on the primary coercive institution’s desire to repress.443

The purpose of the Egyptian military is to support the regime, and it did that, initially.444 It responded to the president’s call to deploy, reinforced battered riot police, resupplied police units with ammunition along with reports of soldiers shooting protestors.445 On 2 February, they watched as men on horses and camels charged crowds, thugs attacked, and sniper shots and rocks from rooftops rained down. These actions were not universally practiced throughout Egypt over those eighteen days. A greater number of reports highlight the soldiers’ positive interaction with the crowds. The “hug a soldier” efforts of inclusion helped soldiers identify with the crowd and when the order came to shoot, military commanders on the ground disobeyed.446 There was a clear divide in the actions of soldiers that eventually reached the senior leadership, and changed a regime.

This divide was less prominent in 2013; the Muslim Brotherhood had been characterized as a threat to the state by generations of soldiers and officers throughout the security forces. The homogeneous nature of the opposition ensured that the security force element would not, or had a reduced likelihood to, injure an Egyptian. The opposition was not made of Egyptians; the opposition were terrorists that needed to be eradicated.447 The failing of the opposition was the inability to combine disparate groups of people under a banner appealing to all. President Morsi understood the victories at the polls as a

445 Holmes, “There are Weeks,” 399.
446 Fisk, “As Mubarak Clings.”
447 Ezzat, “Voices From Pro, Anti-Morsi.”
mandate from the people of Egypt to bring religion into the rule of the country, and while a number of Egyptians wanted Egypt’s laws to follow a strict interpretation of the Quran, a significant minority does not. A year after the election, more than two years since President Hosni Mubarak was ousted, the goals of the Arab Spring had still not been reached; Morsi had gone too far, too fast, seemingly taking away the voice of the people, as did those who ruled before. His supporters, likewise, failed to develop a popular platform to include a greater percentage of the population. Stability degraded as violence spread, police were attacked in the Sinai reiterating the threat the MB posed. As long as the military continues its trajectory, securing the nation and progressing toward a transition to a civilian state led by a civilian government, it will maintain its popularity and power. “The most important thing from the military’s perspective is preserving its place as the locus of power and influence in the system.”

A. ADDITIONAL VARIABLES

Although Binnendijk’s framework provides an excellent tool to evaluate the success or potential for success of a nonviolent revolution, the thesis author suggests adding “International Support” to the framework. Even though the support of a foreign actor [a state actor, government organization (GO), or non-government organization (NGO)] is not required for regime change it is a potentially significant addition to the challenger toolbox. In the two examples specified in this work, the opposition in 2011 incorporated a broad base of foreign actors, from various GOs, NGOs, and some states, whereas regime challengers of 2013 limited their overall exposure to foreign influences and had less foreign support from a narrower group.

Establishing and maintaining NGOs in Egypt has always been managed by the state and been a difficult process; Law 32 of 1964, governing civil associations has been a tool used to deny legal standing of any NGOs the state finds threatening. Political parties had to distinguish themselves from others, be unconnected to foreign influences, and not conflict with “national unity, or public order,” enforced by the interpretation of

449 Hubbard, “Military Reasserts.”
the political parties’ committee; all to isolate to prevent any idea of political change from entering the dialog of the population.\textsuperscript{450} The opposition to Mubarak’s regime skirted constitutional and legal difficulties by going to the NGOs. In 2008, Muhammad Adel, a senior leader in the April 6 Movement trained in Belgrade for a week under the tutelage of an OPTOR NGO known as the Center for Applied Nonviolent Actions and Strategies (CANVAS), learning the tactics that effectively brought down Slobodan Milošević in 2000.\textsuperscript{451} American GOs, such as the International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute promote democracy around the world and helped set up and fund some of these training opportunities.\textsuperscript{452} The European Union (EU) had similar policies laid out in their Action Plan of 2004. Saudia Arabia condemned the protestors.\textsuperscript{453} Some NGO’s like Freedom House and the Project on Middle East Democracy similarly funded travel and classroom instruction in non-violent protest, networking skill training.\textsuperscript{454} Online, Tunisian bloggers posted tactics to help the Egyptian movement. The success of the Tunisian Revolution gave hope that change could happen in Egypt. Even with the dwindling influence of the United Sates, opinions of President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton were weighed in the Egyptian military decision making at senior levels; this was done even though the decision to remove President Mubarak was based largely on a cost benefit analysis.\textsuperscript{455}

\textsuperscript{450} Kassem, \textit{Egyptian Politics}, 53, 119–120; Gamal Essam El-Din, “Inside Egypt’s Shura Council, New NGO Law Brings Controversy,” \textit{Ahram Online}, 26 March 2013, \url{http://english.ahram.org.eg/}. Law transitioned to Law 84 of 2002, and was then modified in 2013 to allow the MB to be conferred NGO status and tightened foreign funding. NGOs are managed and licensed by Egypt’s Social Affairs Ministry and need permission from the ministry to obtain any type of foreign funding.

\textsuperscript{451} Gelvin, \textit{The Arab Uprising}, 54.

\textsuperscript{452} Nixon, “U.S. Groups Helped Nurture;” About Us, The International Republican Institute, accessed 6 November 2013, \url{http://www.iri.org/}; About Us, The National Democratic Institute, accessed 6 November 2013, \url{http://www.ndi.org/}.


\textsuperscript{454} Nixon, “U.S. Groups Helped Nurture.”

Much like the lack of broad based support displayed in their street demonstrations, the MB protestors in 2013 largely stuck to their own experiences and the tactics they had learned over their long history. In 2011, a rift developed between young and old members; the Muslim Brotherhood youth wanted to join the protests while the leadership decided not to. Later in the protests, the MB allowed the youth to participate, but the organization stayed out. The Muslim Brotherhood did not come out in support of the anti-Mubarak demonstrations until 28 January 2011—three days after the protests started.\textsuperscript{456} While there has been little evidence uncovered of foreign support for the MB during this time, state support for the military government is prevalent. The military-backed government received atypical praise and a “blank check” from Saudi Arabia which pledged to “shower it with money as needed,” as the United States and EU considered aid reductions.\textsuperscript{457}

While the impact of foreign intervention, destabilizing factors such as monetary support, direct intervention, training, and the intent of action could be placed in other categories, the true implications and significance on the overall movement warrants a more directed categorization for study and inclusion in this framework.

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