BALANCING THE TRINITY: U.S. APPROACHES TO MARGINALIZING ISLAMIC MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN

by

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Pakistan ranks among the top recipients of U.S. foreign aid in the world, yet accounts for nearly 20 percent of the terrorist groups identified on the U.S. State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism Foreign Terrorist Organizations list. As a major non-NATO ally and valued U.S. partner in the Global War on Terrorism, Pakistan thus gives the appearance of being ineffective in its efforts to defeat Islamic extremism and militancy.

This study aims to discover how the United States can better assist Pakistan to marginalize select militant Islamic groups that threaten regional and international security. Specifically, it investigates three possible strategies for mitigating violent extremism: counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and foreign aid. These strategies are used to analyze U.S. and Pakistani efforts to marginalize four terrorist groups since 2001: the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.

This study offers suggestions for the United States and Pakistan to counter the effects of select militant Islamic groups through improved counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and foreign aid strategies. Additionally, this study provides general recommendations for enhancing the U.S.-Pakistan relationship by improving Pakistani security forces' capabilities, disbursement of reliable U.S. foreign aid for economic development, and encouragement of Pakistan’s democratization process.
ABSTRACT

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CIA Central Intelligence Agency
COIN counterinsurgency
CSF coalition support funds
CT counterterrorism
DoD Department of Defense
DoS Department of State
EPPA Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act
FATA federally administered tribal areas
FMF foreign military funds
FTO foreign terrorist organization
GDP gross domestic product
HQN Haqqani Network
ISAF International Security Assistance Forces
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JCET Joint Combined Exchange Training
JuD Jamaat ud Dawa
LIC low intensity conflict
LJ Lashkar-i-Jhangvi
LeT Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
MDI Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PCCF Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund
PPP purchasing power parity
SOC(FWD)-PAK Special Operations Command Forward, Pakistan
SSP Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
SVBIED suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive device
TNSM Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi
TTP Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

In 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued before the U.S. Congress that Pakistan “poses a mortal threat to the security and safety of our country and the world” (Shapiro & Fair, 2010). Pakistan is of vital interest to U.S. national security because of its geographic proximity to Afghanistan, China, and India, its nuclear capabilities, and because of the growing threat of domestic, regional and transnational terrorism emanating from the country, particularly in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Terrorist groups such as the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, and al-Qaeda present complex challenges for diplomatic and counterterrorism efforts headed by the U.S Departments of State (DoS), Defense (DoD), and intelligence agencies. According to Bruce Riedel, former senior presidential advisor on Middle East and South Asian affairs, Pakistan has “more terrorists per square mile than anyplace else on earth, and it has a nuclear weapons program that is growing faster than anyplace on earth” (Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, 2011). Riedel further asserts that the combination of a burgeoning nuclear weapons program and the growing threat of militant Islamist groups make Pakistan “the most dangerous country in the world today” (Riedel, 2008, p. 31).

The challenges presented by Pakistan to the U.S. Government are deeply embedded within the tenuous 65-year relationship between both countries, which began in 1947 with the Truman administration recognition of Pakistan as a new state. Although significant U.S. assistance to Pakistan did not begin until the Eisenhower administration in 1954, Lyndon B. Johnson cut off all U.S. assistance to Pakistan and India in 1965, when both countries went to war, as an attempt to bring an end to the fighting (Riedel, 2011, p. 12). Riedel contends “this came as a great blow to Pakistan, which had a longer and deeper arms relationship with the United States than India did. Pakistanis felt betrayed” (Riedel, 2011, p. 15). It was not until Richard Nixon became president in 1968 that the relationship between the United States and Pakistan began to improve, although, the effects were short-lived due to the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. Riedel argues that the
Pakistanis felt the United States had again let them down in a conflict against their greatest enemy, further stressing an already troubled relationship (2011, pp. 15–16).

The United States renewed its relationship with Pakistan during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, using Pakistan to indirectly provide funding and arms to the mujahedeen to defeat the Soviet Army. However, with the 1989 defeat of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan, the birth of Pakistan’s unsanctioned nuclear weapons program in 1990, and the end of the Cold War with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States again terminated all aid to Pakistan for the third time in 40 years.

The attacks on September 11, 2001 prompted the United States to resume a security partnership with Pakistan as a major ally to defeat extremist groups in the Global War on Terrorism, eventually recognizing Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally in 2004. Despite a renewed relationship between the United States and Pakistan over the last decade of war, significant challenges exist in levels of trust and cooperation between the two countries. According to Patrick Seale, a British journalist specializing in the Middle East and South Asia, “the U.S. insists that [Pakistan] should join in American’s own anti-terrorist campaigns. It would like Pakistan to break relations with Mullah Omar; with the Jalaluddin Haqqani Network; and with the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba militant group” (2011, p. 20). However, Pakistan sees the situation from a very different perspective; one of constant threat from India. Seale argues that “many in [Pakistan’s] government consider that its national interests demands that it maintain close links with the Taliban and other radical Afghan Muslim networks as useful allies once U.S. forces go home – as they will sooner or later” (2011, p. 21).

Ultimately, the Pakistan government perceives the United States as an unreliable ally, providing aid that is strongly motivated by self-interests and security objectives in the context of the Cold War and the Global War on Terrorism. According to a 2013 Pew Poll, “anti-Americanism has been widespread in Pakistan in recent years, and today just 11 percent have a favorable view” of the United States (Pew Research Center, 2013). This perception is justified by the termination of U.S. foreign aid to Pakistan three times in their 65-year relationship. Once U.S. short-term security objectives have been accomplished in the region, the United States has historically abandoned Pakistan and
refocused security resources elsewhere. The dynamic created by the United States’ immediate and one-sided view on security objectives, contrasted by Pakistan’s frustration with the United States’ erratic foreign assistance commitments has warranted relative suspicion between both countries.

B. DEFINING THE PROBLEM

Although ranking among the top recipients of U.S. foreign aid in the world and recognition as a major non-NATO ally, Pakistan accounts for nearly 20 percent of the terrorist groups listed on the U.S. State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism foreign terrorist organizations (Anderson, 2011; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013). Pakistan has received more than $10 billion since 2001 in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Coalition Support Funds (CSF) as a U.S. counterterrorism partner. These funds are designed to compensate for the costs of Pakistani army operations and coalition forces’ use of Pakistani ground supply lines, airfields, and seaports (Anderson, 2011; Grevatt, 2009). Despite this, Pakistan appears to be generally complacent in their efforts to defeat terrorism. In addition, Pakistan struggles with instability caused by limitations in domestic security, mounting demographic pressures, economic decline, and deterioration of public services. All of these challenges make U.S. efforts to construct an effective foreign policy towards Pakistan to improve regional stability and international security difficult.

Contributing to the increasingly dangerous security environment in Pakistan is the variety of types and the interconnectedness of Pakistani terrorist groups. According to Ashley J. Tellis, a senior associate at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Pakistani terrorist groups can generally be categorized into six distinct factions: “sectarian, anti-Indian, Afghan-Taliban, al-Qaeda and its affiliates, Pakistan-Taliban, and secessionist groups” (U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Assassination, Instability and the Future of U.S. Policy, 2008). Of the six terrorist groups identified, sectarian, Pakistan-Taliban, and secessionist groups generally focus internally on Pakistani matters. Of the remaining types—anti-Indian, Afghan-Taliban, and al-Qaeda factions—there is speculation that some within the Pakistani government, military, and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) are
complicit in the creation and persistence of these groups to achieve national security objectives by presenting themselves as transnational threats. However, according to Steve Coll, “there has been a pattern of some of these groups previously under state patronage, breaking away from the state … Pakistan's security establishment is now trying to figure out how to control them” (as quoted in Bajoria & Masters, 2012).

Against the militant Islamic groups Pakistan has attempted to defeat, the government’s performance has been mediocre at best. For example, since 2001, Pakistan has deployed more than 140,000 army troops to the federally administered tribal areas (FATA), which hosts several terrorist groups. However, despite the huge military effort to hunt terrorists, and estimated losses of 3,000 Pakistani soldiers, the security situation has deteriorated significantly from pre-2001 conditions (Lalwani, 2013, p. 221). Limitations on Pakistani security forces’ capabilities are further demonstrated by the fact that:

security forces, especially the army and the police, have increasingly become the target for the militant groups. In October 2009, militants attacked the army headquarters in Rawalpindi and held around forty people hostage for over 20 hours, much to the army's embarrassment. (Bajoria & Masters, 2012)

Moreover, militants kidnapped nearly 250 army personnel in 2007, which caused the government to release 25 hardcore militants for their exchange (as cited in Khan, 2008).

In addition to the threat posed by militant Islamic groups to Pakistani security forces, instability is perpetuated by violence against Pakistani civilians. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, much of the violence in Pakistan has occurred within the last four years, spilling over from the tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as Northwest Frontier Province) and Baluchistan into other regions of the country, accounting for nearly 90 percent of the attacks since 2001 to present (South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.). Overall, Pakistan has experienced more than 10,000 civilian deaths at the hands of militant Islamic groups since 2001 (Brulliard, 2011). Demonstrating a significant increase in violence, 8,953 Pakistani civilians were killed in terrorist attacks from January 2009 to September 2012, compared to nearly 1,600 civilian deaths from 2003 to 2006 (South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.). Moreover, Pakistan has
experienced a sharp increase in suicide bombings from just one incident before 2001 to a total of 335 by 2011 (Brulliard, 2011). As Pakistan’s militant Islamic groups continue to threaten the security environment and cause regional instability, it challenges the legitimacy of the government and exposes the limitations in Pakistani security forces’ ability to protect the population.

Although violence against civilians plays a role in regional instability, Pakistan’s governance problems have played a central role as well. According to Adeel Khan (2008), despite becoming a country in 1947, Pakistan continues to experience political instability created by a lack of functional cooperation between the prime minister, president, parliament, and judiciary. Just within the last 10 years, Pakistan witnessed a struggle for executive power between the prime minister and president, resulting in a coup d’état in 2000, in which Pervez Musharraf toppled the elected government of Nawaz Sharif and temporarily dismissed 18 judges, including the chief justice, after they refused to take an oath to accept a provisional constitution (Khan, 2008). Pakistan reached a new level of political and religious instability in 2007 with the seizure of the Red Mosque in July, resulting in the death of 91 militants, 11 Pakistani soldiers, and 14 civilians, in addition to the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December of the same year in retaliation for military action against the Red Mosque seizure (Khan, 2008).

Pakistan’s flailing economy is another key variable that is negatively affecting the country’s stability. According to the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook (2012), “Pakistan’s tax-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio remains one of the lowest in the world. Used as an indicator of Pakistan’s standard of living, Pakistan’s GDP per capita (PPP) ranks 173 out of 226 countries in the world at $2,800.” Further exacerbating its economic struggles, Pakistan continues to suffer from natural disasters, such as the 2010 monsoon that was considered by many to be among the worst catastrophes in Pakistan’s history. In 2012, it was estimated that six million people still remained in need of vital resources such as food, shelter, and water (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012).
Because of Pakistan’s struggle to deliver public services, highly professional militant Islamic groups, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, have come forward to fill the void by mobilizing over 2,000 to 3,000 relief workers in areas affected by natural disasters (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2012). Militant Islamic groups have used this political void to increase their legitimacy by providing much needed humanitarian assistance where government services do not exist.

A solution is needed to sever Pakistan’s ties to select militant Islamic groups, while improving regional stability and promoting U.S. long-term strategic interests. According to Maleeha Lodhi (2006), Pakistani political scientist and diplomat, “there is no silver bullet that can address global terrorism in all its complexity … a comprehensive, multifaceted strategy is needed that encompasses law enforcement, political, social, cultural, financial, and diplomatic measures.” Recognizing Pakistan’s limitations in providing security, its political shortcomings, and extensive economic challenges, Pakistan warrants a long-term strategic partnership with the United States and reliable security and economic assistance well into the future.

C. RESEARCH QUESTION

What is the United States’ current strategy for aiding Pakistan in countering its terrorist problems? How effective has this strategy been? What is needed to improve the U.S. approach to aiding Pakistan in its counterterrorism efforts?

D. METHODOLOGY

This thesis will explore three strategies employed by the United States and Pakistan to counter Pakistan-based violent extremist groups since September 2001: counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and U.S. foreign aid to Pakistan. Counterterrorism strategies include terrorist leadership targeting as a means of disrupting or destroying terrorist networks. This strategy is often conducted by officially designating terrorist groups on the foreign terrorist organization list and U.S. drone strikes in the FATA. Counterinsurgency strategies embrace positive engagement of the population with civil-military resources to address the core grievances that fuel an insurgency. This strategy is designed to increase the legitimacy of the Pakistani government in the FATA while
addressing the root causes of terrorism. U.S. aid to Pakistan is intended to promote U.S. influence through economic and civilian assistance programs, while achieving U.S. security objectives in the region.

This thesis will conduct a comparative case study examination of four Pakistani-based militant Islamic groups, specifically the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. These groups were purposefully selected because: they are identified on the U.S. State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism foreign terrorist organizations list, they accurately demonstrate the complexity of Pakistan’s relationship with proxy forces, and they represent the complexity of group interconnectedness with regional to transnational objectives.

Additionally, this thesis will consider U.S. and Pakistani strategies aimed at countering these violent extremist groups, focusing specifically on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and U.S. aid given to Pakistan. Specifically, it will consider if these approaches to reducing the threat of militant Islam have been successful or not. The examination of the three strategies to counter Pakistan-based violent extremist groups, combined with comparative case studies of the four militant Islamic groups will, in turn, provide the foundation for offering recommendations for creating a comprehensive strategy for the United States and Pakistan to promote long-term regional security and stability.

E. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

Chapter II begins by reviewing literature on three approaches to reducing violent extremism: counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and foreign aid.


Chapter IV traces U.S. and Pakistani counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and foreign aid strategies executed since 2001 to marginalize select militant Islamic groups,
including the formal designation of terrorist groups, leadership decapitation through drone strikes, foreign aid, national legislation, peace talks, and full-scale military operations.

Chapter V offers key points presented in this thesis, and then offers recommendations for U.S. and Pakistani strategies moving forward.
II. COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTERINSURGENCY, AND NATIONAL AID

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents three U.S. strategies aimed at countering Pakistan-based terrorism: counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and national aid. The United States’ counterterrorism (CT) strategy includes targeting terrorist groups’ operational capacity, directly and indirectly, through lethal and non-lethal means. Counterterrorism includes attacking terrorist group leadership, foot soldiers, weapons, funds, communication, and propaganda operations (White House, 2006, pp. 11–12). U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy emphasizes a combination of civilian and military efforts to engage a population, while simultaneously isolating insurgents. Counterinsurgency lines of effort generally include security, political, economic, and information functions to promote governmental control and legitimacy. Lastly, national aid is used as a means to directly bolster military and economic development, while indirectly influencing behavior aimed at supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives. This discussion will produce a framework for evaluating U.S. and Pakistani counterterrorism measures aimed at combatting the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.

B. COUNTERTERRORISM

On May 23, 2013, at a speech at the National Defense University, President Obama commented on the principles of a comprehensive U.S. counterterrorism strategy describing it as “targeted action against terrorists, effective partnerships, diplomatic engagements and assistance” (White House, 2013). Counterterrorism measures encompass a wide range of actions that can be broken down into non-kinetic and kinetic measures. Non-kinetic actions include creating legislation that attempts to prosecute terrorists as criminals, freezing terrorists’ financial assets developing de-radicalization programs that seek to re-educate and rehabilitate terrorists, deploying information campaigns that aim to counter terrorist recruitment efforts, and collecting intelligence to better understand and undermine terrorist actions (White House, 2006, pp. 1, 3, 4, 10,
Kinetic actions include military action aimed at disrupting and destroying terrorist groups’ supplies, military operations that seek to deny safe haven to terrorists, and killing and capturing terrorist leaders, what is often called a decapitation strategy (White House, 2006, p. 11, 16).

Leadership decapitation has become the cornerstone of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Specifically, the United States has pursued a robust effort to kill terrorist group leaders through drone strikes. While other counterterrorism methods may be employed by the United States in Pakistan, this thesis will focus on leadership decapitation via drone strikes because of the accessibility of data and estimates of their lethality widely available in open source literature. Other types of U.S. activities, such as capture raids, intelligence gathering, penetrating groups, and covert actions in general lack the necessary open source information to make investigating these actions and their successes or failures possible.

There is considerable evidence for the success of the U.S. drone campaign. For example, in a letter captured in the 2011 raid on bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan, bin Laden writes, “We could lose the reserves to enemy’s air strikes. We cannot fight air strikes with explosives” (White House, 2013). Further communication between al-Qaeda operatives confirms that “dozens of highly skilled al-Qaeda commanders, trainers, and bomb makers and operatives have been taken off the battlefield,” significantly contributing to the disruption of terrorist plots and reducing the chances of large-scale attacks on the homeland (White House, 2013).

Despite the vital role leadership decapitation plays in U.S. counterterrorism strategy, there is much debate on the overall effectiveness of these attacks. In fact, terrorism scholars generally endorse one of three approaches to counterterrorism strategies involving terrorist group leadership decapitation: they believe it is effective, or that it works only under specific conditions, or that it does not work at all.

The first group of scholars on leadership decapitation, who represent the majority opinion, argue that it can be effective under specific conditions. Daniel Byman in his 2006 Foreign Affairs article “Do Targeted Killings Work?”, presents a case study of
Israel’s counterterrorism strategy against Hamas, Hezbollah, and various Palestinian groups. Byman claims that targeted killings have reduced the number of Israeli civilian and soldier deaths, deducing that the reduction “occurred partly because Israel’s targeted killings have shattered Palestinian terrorist groups and made it difficult for them to conduct effective operations” (Byman, 2006, p. 103). Although Byman contends that a targeted killing policy is less effective against decentralized groups where true decapitation is no longer possible, he believes that targeted killings can “help manage terrorism … embedded in a broader counterterrorism program with better defenses and improved intelligence” (Byman, 2006, p. 111).

Further bolstering Byman’s position that targeted killings are less effective against decentralized groups is Michael Freeman (2010), who argues that leadership targeting can be ineffective if “inspirational and operational guidance has become institutionalized through routinization, bureaucratization, and/or decentralization” (p. 13). Freeman further claims “leadership targeting is most likely to be effective when leaders are operationally and/or inspirationally important” (2010, p. 32).

Applying decapitation as an effective counterterrorism strategy to al-Qaeda, Bruce Hoffman endorses the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate that claims “al-Qaeda is and will remain the most serious threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities” (as cited in Hoffman, 2008). As it applies to al-Qaeda’s core leadership, Hoffman endorses the top-down approach to countering the threat of terrorism through leadership decapitation.

In his article, “Testing the Snake Head Strategy,” University of Maryland professor Aaron Mannes argues that leadership decapitation may be useful in certain circumstances; however, it is difficult to assess the overall utility of the strategy (2008, p. 43). Mannes endorses the approach that leadership decapitation may have a causal effect on the outcome of a campaign and reduces the level of violence caused by the terrorist organization (2008, pp. 43–44). However, given the limited effects of the decapitation strategy, Mannes has doubts about the overall effectiveness as a valid counterterrorism strategy (2008, p. 43).
The second group of scholars argues that targeting leadership is largely ineffective in ending terrorist groups or terrorist threats. Jenna Jordan (2009) makes the observation that “leadership decapitation seems to be a misguided strategy …” (p. 36). Using a large-n data set, Jordan’s study suggests that a group’s “age, type, and size are critical to identifying when decapitation will result in the cessation of terrorist activity. As an organization becomes older and larger, it is much more likely to withstand attacks on its leadership” (Jordan, 2009, p. 36). Jordan discovers that organizations decline at a higher rate absent of leadership decapitation, and therefore deduces that decapitation is not a productive counterterrorism strategy against large, old, religious, and separatist groups (2009, pp. 27–28). Rather, decapitation as a counterterrorism strategy is more likely to be effective against smaller, younger, and more ideological based organizations (Jordan, 2009, p. 30). Jordan points out, however, that rarely are groups known at this stage or are they understood to be a threat; therefore targeting groups at this point in their development is unlikely.

Audrey Cronin (2006) argues that not enough analysis has been done on the effectiveness of leadership decapitation and much of the conclusions are over-reliant on comparative case studies (pp. 16–17). Because the study of leadership decapitation is still in its infancy, Cronin criticizes the U.S. counterterrorism policy and obvious reliance on decapitation strategy as ill formed. She notes that, in addition to lack of concrete evidence on leadership targeting’s effectiveness, the U.S. strategy is flawed on account of limited experience in dealing with terrorism on its territory. According to Cronin, “U.S. counterterrorism policy has been formulated organically and instinctively, in reaction to external stimuli or on the basis of unexamined assumptions with a strong bias toward U.S. exceptionalism” (2006, p. 41). She further asserts, “Formulating U.S. counterterrorism strategy as if no other state has ever faced an analogous threat is a serious blunder” (Cronin, 2006, p. 41). Instead, Cronin contends that policy should be based on the “full range of historical lessons learned about which policies have worked, and under which conditions, to hasten terrorism’s decline and demise” (2006, p. 41).

Much of Cronin’s analysis is based on Martha Crenshaw’s *How Terrorism Declines*, in which she argues that the “decline of terrorism results from the interplay of
three factors: the government’s response, the choices of the terrorist group, and the organization’s resources” (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 80). Suggesting that terrorist groups can play a role in their own decline through innate factors and choices, void of government response such as decapitation strategies. Ultimately, Crenshaw argues that “in some cases, terrorism is self-defeating,” and for this reason, “government actions must be seen in context of the internal organizational dynamics and strategy of the opposition groups using terrorism” (1991, p. 69).

The last group of scholars endorses the overall effectiveness of terrorist group leadership decapitation. Among the leading scholars that endorse decapitation is RAND analyst Patrick B. Johnston (2012), who argues that, “decapitation increases the chances of war termination, increases the probability of government victory, lowers the intensity of militant violence, and reduces the frequency of insurgent attacks” (p. 50). Supportive of Byman’s argument, Johnston claims that leadership decapitation is “more likely to help states achieve their objectives as an operational component within an integrated campaign strategy than as a stand-alone strategy against insurgents and terrorist organizations” (2012, p. 50). Through case studies and employment of data-driven analysis, Johnston claims to disprove the central claims that leadership decapitation does not work based on the arguments of organizational durability, martyrdom effects, and decentralizing effects. Furthermore, Johnston contends that critics of leadership decapitation purposefully select research designs and methodologies that make it difficult to draw credible conclusions, use restrictive coding criteria with unrealistic definitions of success, and demonstrate selection bias to exploit research designs with misleading correlations (Johnston, 2012, pp. 48–49). Johnston concludes that the United States should “continue to aggressively target individual members of insurgent and terrorist organizations—including midlevel operatives who can potentially lead to senior leaders, and continue to invest in intelligence capabilities and Special Operations Forces dedicated to kinetic and non-kinetic targeting” (2012, p. 78).

In summary, despite criticism and problematic results against al-Qaeda, leadership decapitation strategy continues to serve as the cornerstone of U.S. counterterrorism strategy through direct action raids and drone strikes. With quantifiable
effects on disrupting and dismantling terrorist groups, including leadership attrition, degradation of leadership talent, and disruption in operational command and control, the decapitation approach will likely remain the preferred U.S. counterterrorism strategy to defeat terrorist organizations in the near-term. However, the shortcoming of relying heavily on leadership decapitation as a subset of a larger counterterrorism strategy is that it does not engage the wider population to address core grievances and ultimately defeat the underlying causes of terrorism.

C. COUNTERINSURGENCY

The conflict between the state and insurgents often manifests itself through irregular warfare, defined by *Joint Publication 1-02 on Military and Associated Terms* as “a violent struggle … for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches … in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010, p. 189). In other words, the conflict between insurgents and the state is condensed to which side influences and controls the population, thus securing that side’s legitimacy. The state’s inherent challenge is to avoid heavy-handed tactics that result in high collateral damage and civilian casualties that can alienate the population. The state’s tendency for overreaction presents the opportunity for insurgents to exploit these actions, and threaten the state’s legitimacy, which it seeks to preserve. The challenge presented to the insurgents is to, first, establish their own legitimacy, then mobilize enough of the population for fighters, weapons, and money to effectively threaten the state’s legitimacy.

The struggle between insurgents and states is a complex topic that many scholars have addressed over the last century. In 1916, at the time of the Arab Revolt against the Turks, T. E. Lawrence (1917) presented a formula for irregular warfare as a science of mathematics, biology, and psychology that could lead to success if properly employed (pp. 246–247, 250). Claiming, “guerrilla warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge,” Lawrence’s scientific factors contested the axioms of twentieth century military strategy that only regular armies could win wars (p. 250).
During the time of Ottoman occupation of the Levant and Arabian peninsula, Lawrence presents the Turkish mathematical dilemma of how to defend 140,000 square miles from Arab revolt with only 100,000 of the necessary 600,000 soldiers (1917, p. 246). Further exacerbating Turkish constraints in manpower to control the environment, Lawrence claims, “Rebellions can be made by two percent active in a striking force, and 98 percent passively sympathetic” (1917, p. 251). In other words, the Arab rebellion can be successfully executed with only one-fifth the Turk’s manpower by having five times the mobility of the Turks and a passively sympathetic population (Lawrence, 1917, p. 248).

Lawrence’s biological factors within irregular warfare address physical factors that affect warfighting capabilities. Lawrence argues that Turkish army materiel was scarce and men were more plentiful than equipment. Furthermore, men were tied to outposts, which had long and vulnerable logistical lines. Under these conditions, the Turkish army was “like plants, immobile as a whole, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head” (Lawrence, 1917, p. 246). Contrarily, Arab forces were few in numbers and could not afford casualties, but understood the terrain and were not tied to outposts. Lawrence considered them to be like a “vapor, blowing where they listed” (1917, pp. 246–247). Therefore, according to Lawrence, the most effective strategy employed by the outnumbered Arab army against the conventionally superior Turkish army was:

Contain the enemy by the silent threat of a vast unknown desert, not disclosing themselves till the moment of attack. This attack need be only nominal, directed not against his men, but against his materials: so it should not seek for his main strength or his weaknesses, but for his most accessible material. (1917, p. 247)

By utilizing desert terrain for tactical advantage, employing speed and endurance to attack Turkish materials identified through intelligence, the Arab army rarely engaged the enemy directly or gave Turkish soldiers a target to hit (Lawrence, 1917, p. 247). Lawrence further claims that the Arab army possessed a strategic advantage in that they had nothing material to lose; therefore, “they were to defend nothing and shoot nothing. Their cards were speed and time, not hitting power, and this gave them strategic rather
than tactical strength” (1917, p. 248). In other words, Lawrence’s guerilla strategy played to the strengths of the Arabs (knowledge of terrain, mobility, invisibility) while attacking the vulnerabilities of the Turks (materiel and logistical dependencies).

Although not offering abundant detail on the psychological factors of irregular warfare, Lawrence mentions the role of the mental state of the population, the Arab army, and the enemy. Lawrence claims the insurgents “had won a province when the civilians in it had been taught to die for the ideal of freedom: the presence or absence of the enemy was a secondary matter” (1917, p. 248). Further demonstrating the importance of psychology, Lawrence comments that the Arab command spent much more time concerning itself with the thoughts of their soldiers, rather than their overall actions (1917, p. 247).

French officer David Galula (1964) focuses on the factors of population, geography, and politics in insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. Galula defines insurgency as “a protracted struggle conducted methodically … in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order” (1964, p. 288). These necessary conditions include “a cause, a police and administrative weakness in the counterinsurgency camp, a not-too-hostile geographic environment, and outside support in the middle and later stages of an insurgency” (1964, p. 306).

Examining the importance of the population, Galula claims the battle for the population is a major characteristic of an insurgency. Suggesting:

… if the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness. (Galula, 1964, p. 289)

Furthermore, “an insurgency is a two-dimensional war fought for the control of the population” (Galula, 1964, p. 300). Galula makes the argument that geography also plays a significant role in insurgency and counterinsurgency. He suggests if insurgents are unable to leverage geography, they are condemned to failure. The primary geographic factors that effect insurgencies include location, size, and configuration of
A large land-locked country shaped like a blunt-tipped star, with jungle-covered mountains along the borders and scattered swamps in the plains, in a temperate zone with a large and dispersed rural population and a primitive economy. The counterinsurgent would prefer a small island shaped like a pointed star, on which a cluster of evenly spaced towns are separated by desert, in a tropical or arctic climate, with an industrial economy. (1964, p. 303)

Further discussing the importance of geography, Galula claims “the border areas are a permanent source of weakness for the counterinsurgent whatever his administrative structures, and this advantage is usually exploited by the insurgent, especially in the initial violent stages of the insurgency” (1964, p. 302).

Beyond the importance of population and geography, Galula asserts that insurgencies are essentially political in nature and “political action remains foremost throughout the war … becoming an active instrument of operation” (1964, p. 290). For this reason, Galula claims that every military move made by the counterinsurgency force must be “weighed with regard to its political effects, and vice versa” (1964, p. 290). With synchronization of political and military objectives, the counterinsurgency force must effectively leverage the “political structure, the administrative bureaucracy, the police, and the armed forces” to successfully protect the population and deny it from insurgent control (1964, p. 298). Galula therefore recommends that a counterinsurgency force ratio of “ten or twenty to one insurgent in order to effectively address an insurgency when it develops into guerrilla warfare” (1964, p. 300).

Where Galula may lack in his observations in counterinsurgency warfare is placing emphasis on the importance of quality intelligence for counterinsurgency forces to effectively operate in a COIN environment. The Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM 3-24) on Counterinsurgency provides greater emphasis on the role of intelligence for counterinsurgency forces for modern application. FM 3-24 offers historical case studies that address common characteristics within insurgencies, providing guidelines for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations to U.S. Soldiers and Marines (U.S.
Department of the Army, 2006, p. vii). Specifically, the manual presents imperatives necessary for the design, execution, and sustainment of successful COIN operations (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006, p. vii). According to FM 3-24, “COIN is a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations,” the portion of effort devoted to each aspect of COIN is changed over time and significantly influenced by intelligence (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006, pp. 1-19). In a COIN environment, intelligence collection priorities emphasize protection of the populace while reinforcing the legitimacy of the host nation government, and ultimately to generate effective operations (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006, p. 3-1). Good intelligence is considered to be “timely, specific, reliable, gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible level,” thereby assisting counterinsurgent forces to exploit insurgent weaknesses without causing unnecessary harm to the population (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006, p. 1-23).

According to FM 3-24, intelligence is necessary to exploit insurgent vulnerabilities, which includes “insurgents’ need for secrecy; inconsistencies in the mobilization message; need to establish a base of operations; reliance on external support; need to obtain financial resources; internal divisions; need to maintain momentum; and informants within the insurgency” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006, p. 1-17). Ultimately, it is through the support of the population for counterinsurgent forces that provides the intelligence necessary to identify and defeat insurgents (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006, p. 1-29).

FM 3-24 recognizes that “Western militaries too often neglect the study of insurgency. They falsely believe that armies trained to win large conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, unconventional ones” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006, p. ix). Therefore, counterinsurgent forces that succeed in “developing COIN doctrine and practices at the local level, establishing local training centers, learning the foreign political, cultural, social situations, coordinating closely with governmental and nongovernmental partners, and soliciting advice from the local populace” are more likely to succeed in COIN operations (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006, p. ix).
FM 3-24’s points are echoed in Kalev Sepp’s best practices in COIN operations. Through examination of selected twentieth century insurgencies, Sepp (2005) presents successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency practices. Among the most vital counterinsurgency practices include:

Emphasis on intelligence, focus on population (their needs and security), secure areas established and insurgent sanctuaries denied, single authority, effective psychological operations, amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents, diversified police in the lead: military supporting and reoriented for counterinsurgency, and Special Forces advisors embedded with indigenous forces. (2005, p. 10)

Sepp further claims that “the focus of all civil and military plans and operations must be on the center of gravity in any conflict – the country’s people and their belief in and support of their government” (2005, p. 9). According to Roger Trinquier in La Guerre Revolutionnaire, failed counterinsurgency operations “emphasized killing and capturing enemy combatants rather than on engaging the population” (as cited in Sepp, 2005, p. 11).

In support of Sepp’s observations, Gordon McCormick claims that conventional forces often focus on direct action against insurgents instead of initially controlling the population, which eventually leads to populace support and improved intelligence (as cited in Dyke & Crisafulli, 2006, p. 42). In McCormick’s “diamond model,” also known as the “Systems Model for Insurgency,” (see Figure 1), he demonstrates the complex interactions between the population, state, counter-state, and international community during an insurgency (as cited in Dyke & Crisafulli, 2006, p. 41). According to McCormick, the population is comprised of “all non-combatants and neutral individuals in the disputed area that have the ability to support the state or counter-state” (as cited in Dyke & Crisafulli, 2006, p. 41). The state is comprised of the current government, and includes the occupying force that is serving in a counterinsurgent role within the disputed country or region. According to McCormick, “In addition to military measures, the state also uses civil, diplomatic, informational, and economic means to counter the insurgents” (as cited in Dyke & Crisafulli, 2006, p. 41). The counter-state is defined as “any individuals passively or actively supporting the insurgent force, striving to remove the
current government or occupying forces” by any means possible (as cited in Dyke & Crisafulli, 2006, p. 41). Lastly, the international community plays an important role as “external nation states and international organizations that have the ability to support the state or counter-state during the insurgency” (as cited in Dyke & Crisafulli, 2006, p. 41).

 Appropriately identifying the key players within an insurgency, McCormick then offers the strategies by which the state and counter-state are able to achieve their objectives. This includes “gaining support of the population, disruption of opponent’s control over the population, and direct action” (as cited in Dyke & Crisafulli, 2006, p. 42). According to McCormick, victory lies in the ability of the state and counter-state to win the support of the populace in order to gain intelligence and support (as cited in Dyke & Crisafulli, 2006, p. 42). Because of the critical role the population plays in the insurgency, both the state and counter-state attempt to disrupt each other’s support or link with the population as an effort to delegitimize authority.

 The last counterinsurgency strategy offered by McCormick is direct action, “violently striking against the opponent to disrupt operations, destroy or capture forces, and overall weaken the opposition’s means to continue” (as cited in Dyke & Crisafulli, 2006, p. 42). McCormick further asserts that direct action should only occur after the support of the population and good intelligence has been secured.
Gordon McCormick’s Diamond Model (from Dyke & Crisafulli, 2012)

According to McCormick, the strategies identified in Figure 1 should be executed sequentially if they are to be effective against an opponent (as cited in Dyke & Crisafulli, 2006, p. 42). McCormick further claims, “Typically, conventional forces make the mistake of immediately conducting the third strategy [direct action] before accomplishing the first strategy [controlling the population]. The result is often poor intelligence, excessive collateral damage, exhaustion of resources, and unnecessary civilian casualties” (as cited in Dyke & Crisafulli, 2006, p. 42).

In sum, counterinsurgency strategies employed by the state must be population centric if they are to be effective in maintaining legitimacy and defeating an insurgency. In order to do this, COIN operations need to apply instruments of national power to protect the population militarily, economically, and politically in an effort to establish positive influence while denying insurgents’ ability to gain support and legitimacy.
D. NATIONAL AID

Since World War II, foreign aid has been considered a key component to American foreign policy and among the many instruments of U.S. statecraft. According to Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley (2010), “this instrument has been a primary way for the United States to engage other nations in pursuit of its foreign policy goals” (p. 200). Ng to Milner & Tingley, “The U.S. gave over $20 billion in foreign development assistance in 2004, the most of any donor country,” confirming “aid is not an insignificant part of American foreign policy” (2010, p. 203).

The goal of U.S. foreign assistance is to promote global development through economic growth, reduction in poverty, and combating of global pandemics (Tarnoff & Nowels, 2004, p. 2). There are five major categories of foreign assistance: bilateral development aid, economic assistance supporting U.S. political and security goals, humanitarian aid, multilateral economic contributions, and military aid (Tarnoff & Nowels, 2004, p. 1).

The United States provides various forms of foreign assistance to nearly 150 countries, reflecting the current priorities and interested of the United States foreign policy (Tarnoff & Nowels, 2004, p. 12). The question often posed between international relations scholars is whether foreign aid is used to buy influence or reward client-countries (Stone, 2010, p. 15). Debating the overall effectiveness of foreign aid, scholars generally fall into three distinct categories: foreign aid is effective in achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives; foreign aid has strategic limitations with questionable effectiveness; or foreign aid contributed in calculated moderation can be effective in accomplishing U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Scholars supportive of foreign aid effectiveness consider it a strategic investment, serving an “indispensable role in furthering America’s strategic, economic, and moral objectives throughout the world” (Foreign Policy Initiative, 2013, p. 1). By donating foreign aid to targeted countries, the United States advances national security, prosperity, and global leadership, while accounting for less than one percent of the total federal
budget (The Foreign Policy Initiative, 2013, p. 1). According to the 2013 Foreign Policy Initiative, foreign aid is intended to address three strategic, economic, and moral imperatives:

- Promote national security by helping to fight the causes of terrorism, stabilize weak states, and promote regional-level security and global stability.
- Promote prosperity and self-reliance by encouraging economic development, private enterprise, and developing international markets for the United States.
- Advance America’s moral values and humanitarian interests by saving lives, fighting poverty and hunger, combating infectious diseases, promoting education, and bolstering democratic institutions. (The Foreign Policy Initiative, 2013, pp. 2–3)

The fundamental goal of U.S. foreign aid is to promote self-reliance in countries with similar interests that promote the strategic and economic objectives of the United States. Ideally, a recipient country of U.S. foreign aid becomes a valued American trading partner, a regional donor of their own foreign aid, and allied against countries that threaten U.S. national interests. According to Paul D. Miller, former National Security Council Director for Afghanistan:

Foreign aid helps countries whose interests align with our own increase their capacities … like their ability to provide public security, defend their borders, or buy and sell goods. Aid is hard power. It is a weapon the United States uses to strengthen allies [and partners] and, thus, ourselves. (as cited in The Foreign Policy Initiative, 2013, p. 3)

Critics of foreign aid generally cite limitations in transparency, accountability, and overall effectiveness in influencing choices. For this reason, the U.S. State Department and institutions such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation are committed to instituting innovative programs with “measurable and verifiable metrics to ensure development funds are received and effectively used by the projects and people they were intended to assist” (The Foreign Policy Initiative, 2013, p. 3).

Among the second category of scholars who address the strategic limitations and ineffectiveness of U.S. foreign aid is leading international relations scholar Stephen Walt, who examines case studies on the impacts of foreign aid on alliances between Middle
Eastern countries, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Walt (1987) contends that foreign aid can enhance alliances between states with similar interests and serve a variety of national security objectives, but it is not an especially effective instrument by itself, and has limited lasting effects (1987, p. 261). Walt states, “Wealthy states prefer to support regimes that are either already friendly or likely to become so, and they are reluctant to provide extensive support to those they believe are irredeemably hostile” (1987, p. 221). Walt claims, “in the absence of shared political interests, economic and military aid can do little to produce effective alliances” (1987, p. 225). Moreover, economic or military aid provided by a superpower to an ally is usually greater in response to a particular external challenge, such as the emergence of a common enemy, instead of consistent foreign aid in the absence of mutual external challenges (Walt, 1987, pp. 221–223).

Through the comparison of case studies on foreign aid provided by the United States and Soviet Union to Middle Eastern countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and South Yemen, Walt discovers that foreign aid did not create significant leverage over “loyal satellites,” but rather independent countries directly benefiting from payments and material assistance (1987, p. 225). According to Walt, there is correlation between foreign aid and political system alignment; however, “testing the hypothesis that aid causes alignment is not easy” due to the unreliability and scarcity of evidence (1987, p. 219). Therefore, Walt claims “it is impossible to draw direct inferences about the impact of aid with confidence” (1987, p. 219). This claim is grounded in David A. Baldwin’s argument that there is a connection between aid and influence; however, “there is very little agreement on the precise nature of this connection or on analytical methods to be used in studying the problem” (Baldwin, 1969, p. 426). Ultimately, Walt concludes “foreign aid can make an existing alignment more effective, but it rarely creates reliable allies by itself” (1987, p. 242).

Another group of scholars who support Stephen Walt’s argument on the strategic limitations and self-serving interests of U.S. foreign aid is Milner and Tingley. By examining foreign aid policy in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1979 to 2003, Milner and Tingley (2010) determine that “foreign aid policy is not driven solely by
American foreign policy objectives, but also responds to underlying domestic political conditions,” such as U.S. jobs and manufacturing of capital-intensive goods (p. 228). According to former USAID director James Atwood, “growth in U.S. exports to countries in transition from state-dominated economies to free market economies supported 1.9 million jobs in the United States. That translates to over four million jobs for Americans [worldwide]” (as cited in Milner & Tingley, 2010, p. 204). For this reason, U.S. politicians generally endorse foreign aid policies that prove beneficial to their constituents and for re-election purposes. Moreover, in the context of the Heckscher-Ohlins’ international trade model, Milner and Tingley claim that foreign aid contributes to self-serving domestic interests, such as benefiting certain groups within the donor country, which makes donor governments more willing to provide aid (2010, p. 206). As a result of the benefits associated to contributing foreign aid, “almost all U.S. aid is given to low- and middle- income countries, and U.S. exports to these countries tend to be concentrated on capital-intensive goods” (Milner & Tingley, 2010, p. 208).

Randall Stone echoes the arguments of Walt, Milner, and Tingley by examining the limitations and counter-productiveness of U.S. foreign aid. According to Stone (2010), because of the Cold War and Global War on Terrorism, it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of economic aid that does not have underlying security motives from donor countries (p. 1). For this reason, Stone examines the ten-year period of relatively low international tension immediately following the Cold War to September 11, 2001 to explain why aid is not more effective in accomplishing humanitarian, economic, and strategic interests for donor and recipient countries (p. 1). According to Stone, “U.S. foreign aid has significant effects, but the benefits are strictly limited to countries that are well governed; the effect of U.S. aid on low-capacity countries is to retard growth” (2010, p. 22). The negative effects from restraining growth in low-capacity countries include the inability to overcome governance problems, build institutional capacity, or promote reform (Stone, 2010, pp. 22–23). Among the self-serving limitations of U.S. foreign aid that Stone identifies is that “aid is allocated primarily to meet the donors’ economic and strategic priorities rather than the recipients’ development needs” (2010, p. 19). Stone claims that “foreign aid is not distributed impartially, … commercial and
geopolitical agendas of the donors are critical and shift aid away from need-based allocation” (2010, p. 6). The primary reason the United States provides aid is largely based on geopolitical concerns and is conditioned to how closely the recipient is aligned with the United States (Stone, 2010, pp. 11, 14). To illustrate the observation of foreign aid serving commercial and geopolitical agendas, Stone highlights aid being distributed disproportionately to wealthier countries, such as Israel and Egypt rather than to poorer ones in Africa (2010, pp. 7–8). Ultimately, Stone claims foreign aid is marginally productive in buying donor influence in smaller countries that are receptive to economic reform and aid that can credibly be withheld (2010, pp. 3, 9).

Another group of scholars argues that foreign aid in calculated moderation can be effective in accomplishing U.S. foreign policy objectives. One proponent of this argument is Army Special Forces officer Gregg Merkl, who asserts that too much or too little aid can worsen the situation. According to Merkl, “Too little aid can leave a broken state in the violence of desperation. Conversely, too much aid can drown a fledgling legal and political system in corruption. A ‘sweet spot’ exists where the structure of the financial incentives encourages cooperation according to the rule of law” (Merkl, 2013, p. 22). As it pertains to the United States’ and Afghanistan’s relationship over the past decade, the United States has substantially overshot this sweet spot of foreign aid, spending “hundreds of billions of dollars, [and] inspiring counterproductive behavior within Afghan society” (2013, pp. 22–23). Also according to Merkl, “The influx of cash into the Afghan system of social and commercial relationships has not only overwhelmed its modes of accountability, but actually encourages unethical and anti-social behavior” (2013, p. 23).

Merkl’s observation on the effects of overwhelming a country with aid reinforces the importance of Baldwin’s discussion of non-aid, which suggests that knowing how and when not to give aid to a country is as equally important as giving aid to influence a country to do something they would not otherwise do (1969, pp. 429–430). Relying on game theory principles to illustrate the “Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Merkl demonstrates the incentive structure of foreign aid inevitably leads to competition instead of cooperation, which garners the worst possible mutual outcome due to inaccurately perceived unilateral
advantage (2013, p. 23). Instead, cooperation results in the best mutual outcome for both parties involved, yet is a less prevalent behavior among most societies (Merkel, 2013, p. 23). Merkl further discusses the “tragedy of the commons,” in which self-interested players pursue outcomes that enrich only themselves in the short-term, but hurt the community at large for the long-term (as cited in Merkl, 2013, p. 23). The long-term damage sustained by the community from a distorted incentive structure is the undermining of power and the inability to enforce cooperation between individuals for mutual benefit (Merkl, 2013, p. 26). Merkl argues that the significant levels of U.S. aid spent in Afghanistan undermines a community’s ability to enforce cooperation between its people, negates punishments for bad behavior, and ultimately encourages corruption. Instead, the United States should commit “just enough aid to restore power to the community government and to avert catastrophic loss” (Merkl, 2013, p. 28). Stone echoes this observation: “when leaders know that they are too important to U.S. policies for the United States to allow them to fail, aid creates moral hazard problems and perpetuates the rule of corrupt regimes (2010, p. 23). Ultimately, “investments beyond this sweet spot may curry favor with a minority of the community, but they do not build an enduring, self-reliant society” (Merkl, 2013, p. 28). In order to promote healthy economic development that generates a self-reliant society, incentives must be created for the government to pursue growth-friendly public policies (Stone, 2010, p. 18).


… there have been periods of intense friendship followed by long bouts of neglect and even alienation. Over time, the two sides have developed an unhealthy distrust for each other. Americans fear and resent Pakistan, and Pakistanis think American friendship is fickle and transient. (p. 68)

Bruce Riedel (2011) echoes Nasr’s observation on the tenuous periods in the relationship between the United States and Pakistan by stating, “U.S. administrations have undermined civil government in Pakistan, aided military dictators, and encouraged the rise of extremist Islamic movements that now threaten the United States at home and
abroad” (p. 3). As a result of the unpredictable relationship between the United States and Pakistan, the United States has less influence in shaping the future of a growingly “dangerous and troublesome” Pakistan (Nasr, 2013, p. 65).

E. CONCLUSION

In summary, foreign aid remains a key component of U.S. foreign policy as a means to influence foreign governments in pursuit of U.S. national interests. Intended to promote U.S. national security, economic development, and humanitarian values, the United States contributes foreign aid to over 150 countries around the world. Despite foreign aid’s significant role in U.S. foreign policy as a strategic investment, it is not without its limitations and questionable effectiveness in buying influence and promoting self-reliance. Scholars critical of the effectiveness of foreign aid cite the limited lasting effects, self-serving interests influenced by U.S. domestic politics, failure to address the recipient countries economic development needs, and the potential to encourage government corruption.

In the next chapter, I will examine the history, organizational characteristics, stated goals, base of operations, alliances, financing, state sponsorship, and nature of threat posed by four specific militant Islamic groups in Pakistan. The groups selected represent four of the six categories of extremist groups offered by Ashley Tellis that “ought to be legitimate targets of Pakistani law enforcement and military operations” (U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Assassination, Instability and the Future of U.S. Policy, 2008). Tellis’s six categories include: sectarian, anti-Indian, Afghan-Taliban, al-Qaeda and its affiliates, Pakistan-Taliban, and secessionist groups (U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Assassination, Instability and the Future of U.S. Policy, 2008). The specific groups to be examined in the next chapter include the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. Through this investigation, this thesis will explore previous U.S. and Pakistani efforts to marginalize the groups in the last 10 years and offer military and policy ideas to improve the situation in terms of regional and international security.
III. PAKISTAN-BASED MILITANT ISLAMIC GROUPS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the origins of four Pakistani-based militant Islamic groups that represent national and transnational objectives. The specific groups to be examined are designated by the U.S. State Department as foreign terrorist organizations and include the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. The purpose of investigating these groups is to better understand their origins, organizational make-up, leadership, rank-and-file, and the threat they pose to regional and international security. The justification for selecting these particular extremist groups is that they may appear very similar to the United States in terms of policies and strategies to counter their effects. However, Pakistan’s extremist groups are distinctly unique in many ways, thereby presenting a challenge to the United States to develop a counterterrorism strategy towards Pakistan that is not one-size fits all.

B. BACKGROUND TO PAKISTAN’S TERRORISM PROBLEM

As previously discussed, despite ranking among the top recipients of U.S. military and security funding in the world, Pakistan accounts for nearly 20 percent of the terrorist groups on the U.S. State Department foreign terrorist organization list (Anderson, 2011; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013). With a growing presence of militant Islamic groups, there is speculation that some members within the Pakistani government and military are complicit to the existence of select groups. This alleged complicity is largely due in part to historic relationships between Pakistan’s Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) and the growing complexities among the terrorist groups. These militants Islamic groups were intended to serve as an extension of Pakistan’s foreign policy for the purpose of regional security and strategic depth against a conventionally superior Indian military.

The Pakistani government allegedly maintains a harmonious balance of plausible deniability and domestic security pressure on select militant Islamic groups to appease the international community, while denying allegations of complacency and official
sponsoring. An unintended consequence of Pakistan’s alleged complacency is a loss of influence and control over some Pakistani-based terrorist groups. According to Steve Coll, “since the bloody encounter between Pakistan’s security forces and militant Islamic students in Islamabad’s Red Mosque in 2007, there has been a pattern of some groups previously under state patronage, breaking away from the state … Pakistan’s security establishment is now trying to figure out how to control them” (as cited in Bajoria & Masters, 2012). Since the strategic partnership between the United States and Pakistan in the Global War on Terrorism, the Pakistani government’s efforts to reclaim control over select terrorist groups have resulted in a deteriorating domestic security environment.

Among the greatest contributors to Pakistan’s dangerous security environment is the violence caused by militant Islamic groups, which exposes the government’s inability to protect the people and discredits the overall legitimacy of the government. Pakistan’s significant cost in human capital arguably ranks among the highest of any country supporting the Global War on Terrorism. The South Asia Terrorism Portal demonstrates a sharp increase in terrorist violence against Pakistani civilians over the last three years, accounting for 8,953 civilians killed from January 2009 to September 2012 (South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.). In 2012 alone, over 2,000 Pakistani civilians and 680 security forces personnel were killed throughout Pakistan in terrorist-related incidents that targeted military units, police stations, border checkpoints, military installations, tribal elders, peace committees, and anti-Taliban government officials (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013). The increase in Pakistan’s domestic terrorist attacks is potentially correlated to an increase in Pakistani army operations and U.S. drone strikes in the FATA, combined with the ineffectiveness of Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies, and overall poor security force apparatus to impede terrorist violence (Jones & Fair, 2010, p. 25).

Before analyzing the effectiveness of U.S. and Pakistani strategies, it is necessary to examine the origins and objectives of the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Founded</th>
<th>Haqqani Network</th>
<th>Lashkar-e-Tayyiba</th>
<th>Lashkar-i-Jhangvi</th>
<th>Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size</strong></td>
<td><strong>Several hundred core members</strong></td>
<td><strong>Upwards of 300,000 cadre</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 to 300 militants</strong></td>
<td><strong>Estimated strength of 35,000 militants</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Base of Operations</strong></td>
<td><strong>Miram Shah, North Waziristan, Pakistan</strong></td>
<td><strong>Muridke, Punjab, Pakistan</strong></td>
<td><strong>Punjab, Karachi, FATA, and Balochistan</strong></td>
<td><strong>South Waziristan, Pakistan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Leaders</strong></td>
<td><strong>Jalaluddin Haqqani</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hafiz Mohammed Saeed</strong></td>
<td><strong>Akram Lahori</strong></td>
<td><strong>Baitullah Mehsud</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recruiting</strong></td>
<td><strong>Zadran Tribe</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mostly Punjabi and some Afghans</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mostly Punjabi</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mostly Mehsud tribesmen, Uzbeks, and AQ affiliates</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stated Goals</strong></td>
<td><strong>Establish Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td><strong>Force accesion of Kashmir to Pakistan</strong></td>
<td><strong>Establish Islamic Emirate in Pakistan</strong></td>
<td><strong>Establish Islamic Emirate in Pakistan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targets</strong></td>
<td><strong>Afghan government buildings, foreign embassies, &amp; ISAF facilities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indian Security Forces, Hindu civilians, Indian Parliament Building, Luxury hotels in India</strong></td>
<td><strong>Shia Muslims, Pakistani Security Forces, Iranian Nationals</strong></td>
<td><strong>Pakistani Security Forces, Shia Muslims, Secular Candidates, ISAF, U.S., Europe</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financing</strong></td>
<td><strong>Gulf States</strong></td>
<td><strong>Gulf States, Middle East, Europe (U.K.)</strong></td>
<td><strong>AQ</strong>, <strong>Saudi Arabia</strong>, <strong>Pakistani Donors</strong></td>
<td><strong>AQ</strong>, <strong>Pakistani diaspora</strong>, <strong>Criminal Activities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td><strong>AQ, TTP, IMU, LJ, JeM, Afghan-Taliban</strong></td>
<td><strong>AQ, United Jihad Council, Jaish-e-Mohammed, HJI</strong></td>
<td><strong>AQ, TTP, HQN</strong></td>
<td><strong>AQ, HQN, LJ, IMU, Afghan-Taliban</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Sponsorship</strong></td>
<td><strong>Allegedly serves as proxy force for Pakistan’s ISI</strong></td>
<td><strong>Allegedly serves as proxy force for Pakistan’s ISI</strong></td>
<td><strong>None</strong></td>
<td><strong>None</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Comparison of Militant Islamic Groups (from Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2013; South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013).

C. SYNOPSIS OF PAKISTAN’S MILITANT ISLAMIC GROUPS

According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, there are more than 50 domestic and transnational terrorist groups presently active in Pakistan; more than any other country in the world (South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013). Given the broad spectrum of objectives, increasing levels of operational coordination, and ideological influence from al-Qaeda, it has become difficult to differentiate between many groups. This chapter will examine the history, objectives, alliances, and capabilities of four terrorist groups from Tellis’s following categories: Afghan-Taliban (Haqqani Network); anti-Indian (Lashkar-e-Tayyiba); sectarian (Lashkar-i-Jhangvi); and Pakistan-Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan). These groups deserve special attention because they have a similarity in Islamic objectives, common
influence by al-Qaeda, and sufficient capability for long-term threat to the security environment of Pakistan, South Asia, and Western countries. This thesis will not investigate al-Qaeda and secessionist groups, such as Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF) because they are dissimilar organizations to Pakistan’s extremist groups and exist beyond the scope of this thesis.

1. Afghan-Taliban: Haqqani Network

In September 2012, the Haqqani Network became the most recent addition to the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization list. The network is considered among the most powerful and politically creative militant Islamic groups to threaten U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan (Gopal, Mahsud, & Fishman, 2013, p. 132). Characterized as Afghan-Taliban, the Haqqani Network is headquartered in Miram Shah, North Waziristan in Pakistan’s federally administered tribal areas. Established in 1979 by veteran mujahideen leader Jalaluddin Haqqani, and operationally led by his son Sirajuddin, the Haqqani Network is mainly comprised of ethnically Pashtun from the Zadran tribe, who generally live in Paktiya, Paktika, and Khost Provinces in eastern Afghanistan. According to U.S. State Department assessments, the Haqqani Network “is believed to have several hundred core members, but it is estimated that the organization is also able to draw upon a pool of upwards of 10,000 fighters with varying degrees of affiliation” (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013). According to Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman, the Haqqani Network consists of four factions:

1) Those who served under Jalaluddin during Soviet era.
2) Those from Paktiya Province who joined the movement after the U.S. invasion in 2001.
3) Those from North Waziristan associated with Haqqani and his Madrassas.

With goals and objectives predominately focused in Afghanistan, the Haqqani Network conducts operations and cultivates relationships that transcend the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This includes conducting cross-border attacks from staging
areas in North Waziristan into Paktiya, Paktika, and Khost Provinces of eastern Afghanistan, in addition to increasing its presence in Logar Province and Kabul (Bajoria & Masters, 2012).

According to Sirajuddin Haqqani, the network’s “immediate objective is the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan, and the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan through the overthrow of the Karzai administration” (as cited in Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2013). With objectives supportive of Mullah Mohammed Omar’s Afghan-Taliban, the Haqqani Network is closely aligned to the Quetta Shura and integrated into their leadership structure.

Despite the Quetta Shura alliance, the Haqqani Network operates autonomously within the context of the Afghan-Taliban movement, carrying out complex and coordinated attacks with suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs), suicide bombers, and small-arms directed at urban centers and coalition facilities. The most notable attacks took place in September 2011, when the Haqqani Network attacked foreign embassies, government buildings, and security compounds in Kabul, Afghanistan. The attacks resulted in the death of 16 people and, strategically, exposed the inability of Afghan security forces to deliver security and stability to Afghans (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2013).

Recognized as a nexus group with ties to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al-Qaeda, along with Uzbek, Chechen, and Uighur militants, the Haqqani Network plays an influential role in mediation between Islamic groups (Bajoria & Masters, 2012; Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2013). Haqqani further functions as an “enabler for other groups and as the fountainhead of local, regional, and global militancy” (Bajoria & Masters, 2012). Moreover, the Haqqani Network provides safe haven in North Waziristan for militants fleeing U.S. and Pakistani military operations, in addition to providing a staging ground for cross-border attacks (as cited in Bajoria & Masters, 2012).

Although the Haqqani Network maintains ties with other militant Islamic groups, the group does not advocate attacking the Pakistani government or security forces as a means of promoting the creation of an Islamic Emirate in Pakistan. Rather, the
Haqqani Network advocates attacking International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) facilities, government buildings, foreign embassies, and urban centers in Afghanistan.

The Haqqani Network is known to have a long-standing relationship with the Pakistani military and ISI, dating back to the Soviet-Afghan War. According to Bajoria and Masters, “the network has helped Islamabad manage militant groups in the FATA, and provided leverage against India in the struggle over Kashmir” (2012). However, in September 2011, U.S. officials alleged that the Haqqani Network was receiving direct assistance from Pakistan’s ISI in their fight against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2013).

2. Anti-Indian: Lashkar-e-Tayyiba

As an anti-Indian terrorist organization mostly composed of Pakistani Punjabis, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is considered among the most “capable and high-profile militant groups currently active in South Asia … with the capability and intent to carry out both targeted and mass-casualty attacks” (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2012). Founded in 1990 by Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi and Hafiz Mohammed Saeed in Konar Province, Afghanistan, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba traces its origins to the Sunni charitable organization of Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI). This is significant because Lashkar-e-Tayyiba was initially created as the armed wing of Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad; however, its roots are drawn from charitable and humanitarian work, which promotes popularity through building ties among the population throughout Pakistan in the absence of government services.

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba was created to apply lessons from the Soviet-Afghan war and become a “vehicle for continuing the struggle to reclaim what the group considers Muslim lands under occupation by foreign infidels …” (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2012). The organization’s primary objective is to create “Islamist-run administrations on the Indian sub-continent,” by executing three phases:

1) Force the accession of India-administered Kashmir to Pakistan.
2) Create a new Islamist-run state for Muslims in northern India.
3) Create an Islamist-run state for Muslims in southern India (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2012).

According to the Strategic Foresight Group, as early as 2005, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba’s assets included:

A 190-acre campus in Muridke, outside of Lahore, complete with 500 offices, 2,200 training camps, 150 schools, 2 science colleges, 3 hospitals, 34 dispensaries, 11 ambulance services, a publishing empire, garment factory, iron foundry, and woodworks factories. It had more than 300,000 cadres at its disposal and paid salaries to their top-bracket functionaries that were 12-15 times greater than similar jobs in the civilian sector. (as cited in Padukone, 2011)

According to Steve Coll (2008):

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba draws some very talented people from urban professions … with its hospitals, universities, and social-service wings, Lashkar is akin to Hezbollah or Hamas; it is a three-dimensional political and social movement with an armed wing, not merely a terrorist or paramilitary outfit.

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba has deep ties to al-Qaeda and is supported by donations from the Gulf States, the Middle East, and Europe (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013). On December 13, 2001, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba extended their operational reach beyond India-administered Kashmir into mainland India, attacking the Indian parliament building in New Delhi and killing six police officers and one civilian (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2012; Riedel, 2011, p. 83). From 2001 to 2008, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba waged a campaign of terror throughout India, conducting hundreds of attacks on Indian Security Forces and non-Muslim civilians that left over 600 dead and 800 injured (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2012). These attacks culminated with the 2008 attacks on hotels in Mumbai, which left 172 dead and 248 injured.

Following the complex and coordinated Mumbai attacks, Pakistan and India went to the brink of an Indo-Pakistani war. The crisis was ultimately diffused without conflict and appeared to have forced a reduction in Lashkar-e-Tayyiba’s violence. According to Coll, “Lashkar-e-Tayyiba clearly knows what it must do to protect the Pakistan government from being exposed in the violent operations that it runs in Kashmir and elsewhere” (2008). The Indian government has long since alleged that
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba serves as a proxy force for Pakistan’s ISI, intended to wage a low intensity conflict by supporting anti-Indian insurgents in the disputed territory of Kashmir (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2012). Despite allegations, Pakistani officials appear tolerant of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba’s role as a credible threat to Indian national security and permit the group to operate openly as a political and charitable wing known as Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD) (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013).

3. Sectarian: Lashkar-i-Jhangvi

As a Punjabi-based anti-Shia terrorist group, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi is considered among the most secretive and violent Sunni militant groups operating in Pakistan (Farooqi, 2013). Lashkar-i-Jhangvi was established in 1996 by veteran mujahideen leaders Akram Lahori and Riaz Basra as a militant derivative of the Sunni Deobandi sectarian group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP); a group allegedly responsible for introducing sectarian violence to Pakistan in the 1980s (Farooqi, 2013; South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.).

In the 1990s, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi established multiple training camps in Afghanistan during the Taliban regime to train anti-Shia militants (Farooqi, 2012). Today, the organization is comprised of approximately 100 to 300 militants loosely organized into small cells throughout Punjab, the FATA, Karachi, and Baluchistan (South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013). Lashkar-i-Jhangvi receives ideological direction from al-Qaeda, funding from wealthy Saudi Arabian and Pakistani donors, and maintains similar objectives as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, which is to create an Islamic emirate under sharia in Pakistan (U.S. Department of State, 2013). Lashkar-i-Jhangvi rejects joining mainstream politics to transform Pakistan into a Sunni Islamic Emirate, instead promoting their sectarian objectives through violence targeting Shia Muslims, Pakistani military, Iranian interests, and Iranian nationals (Fishman, 2013, p. 366; South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.). Unlike al-Qaeda and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi does not conduct operations against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan.
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi gained notoriety in 1997 when the group killed the Iranian consul general in Lahore, in addition to several Iranian Air Force cadets training in Pakistan (Khan, 2011, p. 221). In January 1999, the organization unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shabaz Sharif, Chief Minister of Punjab Province (South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013). Between June 2000 and June 2002, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi was responsible for the assassination of more than 100 Shia doctors, lawyers, religious scholars (Ulama), teachers, students, politico-religious party leaders, and government officials in Pakistan (South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.). In February 2002, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi conducted joint operations with al-Qaeda in Pakistan that included the kidnapping and beheading of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl, and the bombing that killed 11 French naval engineers in Karachi on May 8, 2002 (Farooqi, 2013). In 2007, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan militants were implicated in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto (South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.). From January to June 2013, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi claimed responsibility for three separate attacks that involved car bombings, shootings, and suicide attacks in predominantly Hazara neighborhoods and commercial areas of Quetta, Baluchistan that killed over 220 Shia civilians and injured an additional 327 (BBC News Asia, 2013).

According to the U.S. State Department, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi members have become active in aiding other terrorists groups, including Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and al-Qaeda, providing safe houses, false identities, and protection in Pakistani cities, including Karachi, Peshawar, and Rawalpindi (2013). Moreover, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi’s alliance with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan has delivered the FATA-based organization valuable access to the organizational infrastructure and funding in Pakistan’s Punjabi heartland (Fishman, 2013, p. 365). Through alliances with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and al-Qaeda, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi remains capable of undermining the Pakistani government’s legitimacy with large-scale attacks and demonstrating the government’s inability to protect the Shia population.
4.  **Pakistan-Taliban: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan**

Characterized as Pakistan-Taliban, the Pashtun-based militant Islamic group known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan was formed in December 2007 by Baitullah Mehsud from previously disparate militant tribes in the federally administered tribal areas to enable numerous pro-Taliban groups to coordinate activities and consolidate influence (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2013; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013).

With an estimated strength of 35,000 fighters, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan is comprised of FATA-based tribesmen, Uzbek, and al-Qaeda affiliated militants. “The heartland of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan is South Waziristan, where the Mehsud tribe of founder Baitullah Mehsud is based” (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2013). Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s primary objectives include:

1) Uniting various pro-Taliban groups currently active in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
2) Assisting the Afghan-Taliban in its campaign against President Hamid Karzai’s government and US/NATO forces
3) Reproducing a Taliban-style Islamic emirate under sharia in Pakistan and beyond (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2013).

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan predominantly focuses operations within Pakistan, seeking to replace Pakistan’s democratic system with an Islamic state by consolidating pro-Taliban groups operating in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2013, p. 18).

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan has conducted countless suicide attacks, killing and injuring more than 4,000 Pakistani civilians and security personnel, and accounting for nearly 20 percent of all reported terrorist violence in Pakistan from 2007 to 2012 (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2013). Of significance, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan was implicated in two of the most significant domestic attacks in Pakistan’s history: the siege of the Red Mosque in Islamabad, Pakistan in July 2007 which left 11

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1 Although Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan emerged as a militant group in 2007, factions of Pakistan-Taliban such as Tehreek-e-Nafaz-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) were active in the FATA prior to 2007, and targeted by U.S. drone strikes beginning in 2004.
Pakistani soldiers, and 14 civilians dead, and the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2013). The primary targets of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s attacks include Shia Muslims, political opposition (secular candidates), and Pakistani security forces (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2013; South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.). In addition to religious and political targets, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan militants conducted sophisticated attacks on Pakistani naval aviation facilities in Mehran, Karachi in May 2011, and again in August 2012 at the Minhas air base in the Kamra area of Punjab Province (Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, 2011).

Not limited to domestic attacks, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan demonstrated transnational objectives closely aligned with al-Qaeda. In 2008, militants “inspired by and acting under the orders of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan” failed in their plot to conduct suicide attacks in the subway of Barcelona, Spain (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2013). In 2009, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan was responsible for the suicide attack on a CIA station in Khost Province Afghanistan, which killed seven CIA officers (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2013). In 2010, a militant who previously received training with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan failed to detonate a car bomb in New York City’s Times Square (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2013).

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan “draws its ideological guidance from al-Qaeda, while al-Qaeda relies heavily on Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan for safe haven in the Pashtun areas along the Afghan-Pakistan border” (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013). Considered a force multiplier for al-Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan considers it their religious duty to wage a defensive jihad against the secular governments of Afghanistan, India, Palestine, Bosnia, Iraq, Great Britain, and the United States to achieve “revenge for the global American interference and terrorism in Muslim countries” (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2013).

Despite Baitullah Mehsud’s death by a U.S. drone strike in August 2009, and the death of his successor Hakimullah Mehsud in November 2013, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan remains an active and credible threat against sectarian, political, and security targets domestically and internationally because of its decentralized structure (Jane’s
Moreover, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan remains highly capable of degrading Pakistan’s security environment and undermining the legitimacy of the Pakistani government.

D. CONCLUSION

All four terrorist groups showcased in this chapter possess similar tactical and operational capabilities to employ suicide bombers, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and coordinated small arms attacks to inflict mass casualties or precision targeted killings. Moreover, the groups demonstrate exceptional proficiency in decentralized planning and execution with skilled intelligence gathering and surreptitious infiltration techniques for complex and coordinated attacks.

The groups differ, however, in their objectives, location, and ethnic composition. The nature of threat presented by the Afghan-Taliban, such as the Haqqani Network, is strictly directed towards U.S. / NATO forces, Afghan security forces, and Karzai’s government in Afghanistan. Pakistani-based sectarian terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, pose a direct threat to all non-Sunni Muslims within Pakistan, but rarely operate beyond the scope of national objectives external to Pakistan’s borders. Conversely, anti-Indian and Pakistan-Taliban possess transnational objectives that extend beyond Pakistan. Anti-Indian terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, pose a direct threat to Indian security forces in Kashmir, in addition to all Hindus and mainland India. Lastly, the Pakistan-Taliban, such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, not only pose a legitimate threat to the Pakistani government, security forces, and non-Sunni Muslims in Pakistan, but also demonstrates their transnational objectives with planned attacks in Afghanistan, Europe, and the United States.

Because of the similarity in tactical and operational capabilities of each terrorist group combined with national and transnational objectives, both the United States and Pakistan need to construct countermeasures to protect the regional interests of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, in addition to the international interests of Europe and the United States. The next chapter will explore the United States’ and Pakistan’s efforts to counter the threat posed by these terrorist groups since 2001.
IV. THE AMERICAN AND PAKISTANI RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

A. INTRODUCTION

The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon compelled the United States to resume a previously tenuous relationship with Pakistan. The renewal of aid and influence came after nearly a decade of abandonment following the Afghan-Soviet War and Pakistan’s pursuit of an unsanctioned nuclear weapons program. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the United States recognized Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally and considered a security partnership with the government as strategically vital to defeat extremist groups in the Global War on Terrorism. Since 2001, the United States has contributed significant resources to Pakistan in the form of “targeted action against terrorists, effective partnerships, diplomatic engagements and assistance” (White House, 2013).

This chapter considers the actions taken by the United States and Pakistan to counter violent extremists groups in the wake of September 11. Specifically, it looks at three broad types of actions taken by each government: counterterrorism, including the formal designation of extremists groups as terrorist organizations and U.S. drone strikes in the FATA; counterinsurgency, including U.S. Special Operations Forces as counterinsurgency advisors and Pakistan’s conventional military operations; and U.S. foreign aid to Pakistan and its application by the Pakistani government. The chapter looks specifically at how these actions have affected the four terrorist groups described in Chapter III—Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.

B. U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM IN PAKISTAN

The United States has taken several measures aimed at countering the threat posed by terrorist groups in Pakistan since September 11, 2001. Examples of counterterrorism actions in particular include the formal designation of extremist groups to the U.S. State Department foreign terrorist organization list; unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) drone
strikes in the FATA; and direct action raids. Despite the U.S. Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan in May 2011, direct action raids have not been a common occurrence and are not representative of the overall U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Pakistan. Therefore, this section will focus specifically on the process of naming terrorist groups and the use of drones to target specific terrorists in Pakistan.

Among the most important aspects of U.S. counterterrorism in Pakistan is the formal designation of select terrorist groups to the Foreign Terrorist Organization list, which began on December 26, 2001 with adding Lashkar-e-Tayyiba to the list. Subsequently, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi was added to the foreign terrorist organization list on January 30, 2003, followed by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan on September 1, 2010, and the Haqqani Network on September 19, 2012 (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013). According to the U.S. State Department, “Foreign terrorist organization designation plays a critical role in the fight against terrorism as effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities” (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013). For a terrorist group to be eligible, it must be a “foreign organization, engage in terrorist activities, and must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States” (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013). Official designation of terrorist groups provides the legal authorities and framework for the United States to employ instruments of national power to disrupt and defeat terrorist groups that pose a threat to national security. This is accomplished through restricting terrorist financing, freezing financial assets, denying material support or resources, increasing international visibility and pressure, and preventing travel to and from the United States (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013).

Although designating foreign terrorist organizations is considered important to combating terrorism, some scholars argue that it is not entirely effective and may be counterproductive. In debates over adding the Haqqani Network to the U.S. foreign terrorist organization list, Hameed and Gilsinan claim that “designation relies largely on its expected financial effects, on the diplomatic pressure the designation might exert on Pakistan to oppose the group more vigorously; and the perceived need for the United
States to use ‘all available tools’ to curtail the group’s activities” (Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2012). Hameed and Gilsinan further contend that terrorist group designation “at best is unhelpful to financial, diplomatic, and military efforts on the ground, and at worst counterproductive” (Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2012). Ultimately, the shortcomings in officially designating a foreign terrorist group resides in limiting jurisdiction to restrict terrorist financing outside the United States, discouraging the likelihood for peace talks, and potentially alienating foreign governments, such as Pakistan, in the process.

The second major aspect to the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Pakistan is the CIA-led drone campaign that began in 2004 (Bergen & Rowland, 2013, p. 229). The United States considers lethal targeted action against terrorist groups to be the cornerstone of counterterrorism strategy, which often includes leadership decapitation and network disruption through drone strikes and direct action raids. Specifically focused on targeting Taliban, Haqqani, and al-Qaeda leadership in the FATA, “the drone campaign has become the “linchpin of the Obama administrations’ counterterrorism strategy in Central Asia” (Shah, 2013, p. 239). The multipurpose function of U.S. drone strikes in the FATA is denying enemy safe havens from the Global War on Terrorism, including the war in Afghanistan, reducing the U.S. domestic threat of terrorism, and assisting Pakistani security forces to suppress terrorist attacks derived from the FATA (Bergen & Rowland, 2013, p. 234).

Between June 2004 and June 2012, there were a recorded 307 U.S. drone strikes in the FATA, with 70 percent conducted in North Waziristan, considered “home to factions of the Pakistani Taliban [TTP] and the Haqqani Network” (Bergen & Rowland, 2013, p. 230). According to the New America Foundation, an estimated 80 percent of those killed in U.S. drone strikes were militants, accounting for the death of approximately 1,562 to 2,377 suspected militants and 476 civilians (Bergen & Rowland, 2013, p. 230; as cited in Out of the Blue, 2011). However, according to some sources, of the total suspected militants killed by U.S. drone strikes in the FATA, only 35 militants were recognized as senior-level leadership (Out of the blue, 2011). Another estimate has the number of al-Qaeda and Taliban senior level leadership killed in Pakistan closer to
100 (Roggio & Mayer, 2013). The discrepancy between numbers of senior leaders killed may be due in part to differences in definitions of senior leadership, inaccuracies in reporting, and the convolution of regional extremist groups operating in the FATA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Lashkar-e-Tayyiba</th>
<th>Lashkar-i-Jhangvi</th>
<th>Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>- Nek Mohammed (Senior Taliban Commander)</td>
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<td>- Liaquat Hussain (TNSM)</td>
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<td>- Abdul Rehman (Local Taliban Commander)</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>- Maulvi Ismail Khan</td>
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<td>- Baitullah Mehsud</td>
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<td>- Kifayatullah Aniskhel</td>
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<td>- Khwaz Ali Mehsud</td>
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<td>- Haji Omar Khan</td>
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<td>- Saifullah Haqqani</td>
<td>- Mohammed Haqqani</td>
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<td>- Ibn Amin</td>
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<td>- Inayatullah</td>
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<td>- Badruddin Haqqani</td>
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<td>- Osama bin Ali bin Abdullah bin Damjan al Dawarsi</td>
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<td>2011</td>
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<td>- Hazrat Omar</td>
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<td>- Haizam Ullah</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>- Abdul Reham</td>
<td>- Maulvi Hamidullah Haqqani</td>
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<td>- Qari Hussain Mehsud</td>
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<td>- Maulvi Ahmed Jan</td>
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<td>- Mullah Sangeen Zadran</td>
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<td>2013</td>
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<td>- Hakimullah Mehsud</td>
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<td>- Waliur Rehman</td>
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<td>- Faisal Khan</td>
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<td>- Mullah Nazir</td>
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Table 2. Comparison of Senior Leadership Killed by Group (2004–2013) (after Roggio & Mayer, 2013)

Drawing from the higher estimation of 2,377 total militants to 35 senior leaders killed, this establishes a ratio of nearly 1 senior level militant leader killed for every 67 low-to-mid-level militants killed by one U.S. drone strike. This figure therefore suggests a less than two percent success rate at killing senior level Taliban, Haqqani, and al-Qaeda leadership with each U.S. drone strike.

Although the U.S. drone campaign in the FATA remains the linchpin of U.S. counterterrorism strategy in disrupting terrorist networks, it is not without criticism in both the United States and Pakistan. Some critics view the strategic shortcomings of U.S.
drone strikes as a “catalyst for suicide attacks against Pakistani security forces in the FATA,” and the unintended consequences of civilian casualties are unacceptable (Jones & Fair, 2010, p. 25). Because of the controversial level of civilian casualties and ongoing debate over the value in killing substantial numbers of low-to-mid-level militants, the U.S. drone program has not surprisingly become largely unpopular among Pakistanis and contributed to anti-American sentiments throughout Pakistan (Pew Research Center, 2012, p. 1). To further complicate the U.S. drone campaign, Pakistani officials publicly denounce the drone strikes, but privately endorse the program to continue in moderation with additional Pakistani oversight. Despite elements of duplicity and controversy, the U.S. drone campaign in the FATA remains the most predominant U.S. counterterrorism strategy to marginalize militant Islamic groups in Pakistan.

There are several limitations in the United States’ counterterrorism strategy in Pakistan. Among them include targeting only groups who are geographically located within five of the seven agencies in the FATA (North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Kurram, Orakzai, and Khyber) (Bergen & Rowland, 2013). U.S. drone strikes may be an effective means of counterterrorism to disrupt groups who claim the FATA as a base of operations and threaten U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, such as the Haqqani Network and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. However, the U.S. drone campaign does little to affect the approximately 48 other militant Islamic groups outside the FATA, some of which who pose a transnational threat (South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013). Of the four groups studied in this thesis Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi are located in Punjab, not the FATA, and therefore are unaffected by this counterterrorism effort. Furthermore, despite the number of leaders killed within Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Haqqani Network, these organizations continue to operate, recruit and plan attacks. Therefore, despite nearly a decade of drone attacks on terrorist groups in Pakistan, these groups are still functional.
C. PAKISTAN’S COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

1. Official Designation and Counterterrorism Legislation

In August 2001, the Pakistani government formally designated Lashkar-i-Jhangvi as a terrorist organization. Subsequently, Pakistan designated Lashkar-e-Tayyiba in January 2002, and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in August 2008 as terrorist organizations (South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.). Similar to the U.S. foreign terrorist organization list, Pakistan’s designation of terrorist groups works to promote public awareness, prevent outside assistance, block terrorist group financing and, in some cases, appease international pressure to take decisive action against the group.

Despite designating militant groups to their terrorist organization list, Pakistan has been the target of criticism for deficiencies in its anti-money laundering procedures (Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 2013). Although a member of the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering, Pakistan lacked the legislation to empower authorities to “prosecute terrorist financing, as well as to identify, freeze, and confiscate terrorist assets” (Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 2013). It was not until 2012, the Pakistani Cabinet approved the National Counter-Terrorism Authority Act, greatly improving “counterterrorism coordination and information-sharing between security agencies and provincial police, while providing a vehicle for national counterterrorism policy and strategy” (Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 2013).

Also in 2012, Pakistan’s National Assembly approved the Fair Trial Act, greatly improving legal authorities for intelligence and law enforcement agencies to submit electronic intercepts and surveillance as evidence in the court system to “detect, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist activities and organizations” (Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 2013). Finally, in March 2013, Pakistan passed the National Counter-Terrorism Authority Bill, which “provides for the establishment of a national authority to devise counterterrorism strategy and to help integrate and coordinate counterterrorism efforts among various agencies” (Ahmad, 2013).

Although Pakistan recently experienced significant achievements in passing counterterrorism legislation, critics may point to the Pakistani government’s previous
reluctance to take action. After nearly a decade at war with significant costs in civilian and security forces casualties, the question remains why Pakistan has passed legislation now to legally define terrorism, devise a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, increase intelligence coordination between agencies, and improve legal authorities to prosecute terrorists.

Furthermore, critics may address Pakistan’s previously high acquittal rate in Anti-Terrorism Courts. According to the U.S. State Department, “Witnesses routinely recanted their statements or failed to appear because of threats against them and their families” (Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 2013). Moreover, prior to the 2012 Fair Trial Act, the Anti-Terrorism Courts would not accept evidence collected by electronic surveillance or intercept. Pakistan’s previous lack of adequate counterterrorism legislation contributed to the acquittal of four Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan militants who assisted in training Faisal Shahzad, responsible for the failed car bomb in New York City’s Times Square in 2010 (Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 2013). In addition, lack of sufficient counterterrorism legislation created difficulty to conclude trials for seven alleged Lashkar-e-Tayyiba terrorists in the 2008 Mumbai attack that nearly brought Pakistan and India to the brink of war.

Pakistan’s anti-terrorism legislation is too new to determine if it has had any significant effect on terrorism in general, and the four groups studied in this thesis in particular. However, legislation that allows for better surveillance and evidence gathering is a necessary first step in bringing these groups to trial.

2. **Pakistan’s Military Operations**

For the first time since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Pakistan’s army deployed to North Waziristan in 2001 to support Operation Enduring Freedom, with the objective of targeting al-Qaeda and other foreign militants fleeing U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan (Jones & Fair, 2010, p. 36). Since 2001, more than 140,000 Pakistani troops have been deployed to the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to defeat al-Qaeda, foreign fighters, and Taliban militants. Pakistan’s military operations have cost nearly 13,000 Pakistani army casualties, which includes more than 3,000 killed and 700 permanently
wounded (Lalwani, 2013, p. 221). Much of the high costs and limited operational success can be attributed to Pakistan’s lack of a counterinsurgency strategy. According to Shuja Nawaz (2009), the Pakistani military decided to conduct:

Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), rather than COIN operations, which demands no more than a ‘well trained infantry soldier,’ whereas COIN operations require indoctrination of both soldiers and officers, in addition to civil-military collaboration, to win over the general population and isolate the insurgents. (as cited in Nawaz, 2009).

During Operation Al-Mizan, the Pakistani military employed between 70,000 and 80,000 security forces from 2002 to 2006, which included approximately 25 major operations in South Waziristan to kill or capture al-Qaeda and foreign militants (Jones & Fair, 2010, p. 46; Lalwani, 2013, p. 205). One of the most infamous operations took place in March 2004 in Wanna Valley. Known as Operation Kalosha, the Pakistani army conducted a major conventional offensive against 2,000 well-prepared and heavily armed militants, “deploying heavy artillery, helicopter gunships, and fighter-bombers …” (Lalwani, 2013, p. 205). The operation was considered a disaster, resulting in the death of nearly 200 Pakistani security personnel, 400 civilians, and displacement of over 50,000 locals (Lalwani, 2013, p. 205).

In June 2004, shortly after the initial setbacks in Wanna Valley, the Pakistani military committed additional forces to Shakai Valley to continue pressure on al-Qaeda and foreign fighters (Lalwani, 2013, p. 205). Again, with overreliance on large-scale operations and heavy firepower resulting in significant collateral damage, the Pakistani army ultimately failed to clear South Waziristan of foreign militants and hold cleared territory.

Since 2001, counterterrorism efforts by the Pakistani military have been geographically specific, targeting Pakistani Taliban factions prior to the formation of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and al-Qaeda throughout the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Similar to the limitations of the U.S. drone campaign, the Pakistani military has done little to direct counterterrorism efforts beyond the FATA against groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, which claim their base of operation in Punjab, Pakistan. Moreover, despite the several extremist groups being based in the FATA, the
Pakistani military has not conducted major military operations against the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan. This is significant because it demonstrates Pakistan’s unwillingness to apply pressure against militant Islamic groups such as the Haqqani Network in the FATA and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba in Punjab that function as a proxy force within the context of Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives.

D. COUNTERINSURGENCY

1. U.S. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan

Beyond the designation of foreign terrorist organizations and drone strikes, the United States employs counterinsurgency techniques as partners with Pakistani security forces to protect the population from violence created by militant Islamic groups. As described in Chapter II, counterinsurgency is defined as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010, p. 85). Counterinsurgency doctrine suggests this is accomplished through applying the instruments of “national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010, p. 85).

Although not highly publicized for reasons of political sensitivity, limited numbers of U.S. Special Operations Forces have deployed in an official capacity to Pakistan as part of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy since 2008. Serving in Special Operations Command Forward, Pakistan (SOC(FWD)-PAK), less than 100 U.S. Special Operations Forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations personnel conduct Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) with the Pakistani army and Frontier Corps units to train on counterinsurgency techniques for employment against Taliban and al-Qaeda militants throughout the FATA (Roggio, 2010).

Officially, the mission includes equipping and training the Pakistani army and Frontier Corps, coordinating civil affairs and humanitarian assistance projects, enhancing intelligence sharing, and providing embedded support during Pakistani operations as requested. Embedded support is delivered in the form of advising, and assisting the Pakistani security forces during operations, in addition to providing fire support and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets (Roggio, 2010). The objective of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy is to assist Pakistani security forces in addressing the grievances of the civilian population in the FATA, which often includes concerns of underdevelopment and lack of security. By isolating the insurgents militarily, economically, and politically, Pakistani security forces are more likely to protect the population, and address the core grievances of economic development, thereby successfully marginalizing FATA-based militant Islamic groups.

Although counterinsurgency doctrine appears rather straightforward, in practice it becomes extremely complex to execute and requires significant resources. There are currently not enough counterinsurgency forces available in Pakistan to successfully execute the mission. Drawing from David Galula’s recommendation to effectively address an insurgency with “ten or twenty counterinsurgent forces to one insurgent,” there would need to be anywhere from 300,000 to 600,000 Pakistani security force personnel in the FATA (1964, p. 300). Given that this figure accounts for nearly the entire Pakistani army on active duty, combined with the existential threat from India, it is unlikely that the prescribed number of Pakistani counterinsurgency forces will be dedicated to defeating militant Islamic groups in the FATA. Moreover, Pakistan’s chief of army staff General Kayani has often stated that the “Pakistani army would not become a counterinsurgency force; rather, the bulk of the army would remain deployed along the Indian border, ready to defend Pakistan in the event of an Indo-Pakistan war” (as cited in Jones & Fair, 2010, p. 37).

Challenges are further compounded by political sensitivities and public perceptions in Pakistan. Allowing U.S. Special Operations Forces to support Pakistani security forces is politically controversial because of Pakistan’s widely-held negative public opinion of foreign military forces operating within Pakistan’s sovereign borders (Roggio, 2010). This negative sentiment was demonstrated in periods of delays for U.S. Special Operations Forces to obtain approvals for visas prior to entering into Pakistan between 2008 and 2010. This condition assures that less than 100 U.S. Special Operations Forces are allowed to advise and assist Pakistani security forces at any time. Moreover, shortly after the Osama bin Laden raid in May 2011, U.S. military advisers
were expelled from Pakistan as a symbolic gesture of strained U.S.-Pakistan relations. According to Sameer Lalwani, because of anti-Americanism and opposition to U.S.-Pakistan cooperation, it appears that Pakistan will be “constrained to a ‘learning by doing’ process, with incremental rather than revolutionary improvements in its approach to counterinsurgency” (2013, p. 203).

Again, both U.S. and Pakistani COIN efforts have focused exclusively on the FATA, which accounts for only two percent of Pakistan’s population, and have not been employed in other impoverished regions of Pakistan that could benefit from assistance, such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan (Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 2013). U.S. COIN efforts in the FATA are most likely to impact several of the major Pashtun tribes such as Zadran, Mehsud, and Darwesh Khel Wazirs, which are largely sympathetic if not supportive of the Haqqani Network and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Zissis & Bajoria 2006). However, given the low-profile nature of U.S. COIN support in these areas, and the small number of U.S. troops participating, the chances that these efforts are having a substantial effect on these tribes and deterring their support of terrorist groups is suspect.

U.S. COIN efforts in the FATA are also doing little to address militant Islamic groups outside the FATA, including Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi in Punjab, Pakistan. Punjab is the most populous state in Pakistan, home to 55 percent of the country’s total population.

2. Pakistan and Counterinsurgency

Critics of the Pakistan military’s performance in the Global War on Terrorism claim the “Pakistani military lost 70 percent of its battles with the Taliban” from 2001 to 2009 (Lalwani, 2013, p. 207). Lacking a counterinsurgency strategy, Pakistani security forces were not manned, trained, or equipped to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations in the FATA. According to Seth Jones and Christine Fair, many of the challenges experienced by Pakistani security forces during Operation Al-Mizan can be attributed to the lack of an official counterinsurgency doctrine and strategy (2010, p. xiv). Furthermore, according to Riedel, “for a half-century or more, the Pakistani military has
been structured and armed for one overriding mission: war with India” (2011, p. 133). Riedel further observes that Pakistan has devoted little attention to developing the strategies, tactics, and equipment for fighting counterinsurgency and counterterrorism (2011, p. 134).

In addition to Pakistan’s lack of counterinsurgency strategy to conduct population-centric operations that clear and hold terrain, Pakistan’s government set a poor precedent of using negotiations and peace accords with militants to avoid further conflict, instead of resolving core grievances. According to Riaz Mohammad Khan, “the army’s realization that it was faced with a determined adversary that enjoyed local support, led to efforts for piecemeal agreements with local militia leaders through local jirgas” (Khan, 2011, pp. 225–226). Moreover, “each high-intensity Pakistani military campaign was followed by a cease-fire and a short-lived peace agreement, rather than sustainable political solutions” (Lalwani, 2013, p. 206). For example, the 2004 Shakai Agreement set the precedent for additional peace agreements between the Pakistani government and militants, such as the 2005 Srarogha Peace Agreement, the 2006 Waziristan Accord, and the 2008 Swat Valley Agreement (Khan, 2013, p. 206; Khattak, 2012). According to Khan, the piecemeal agreements were faulty because “it placed the government of Pakistan and the local tribal jirgas at the same level and accorded a degree of respectability to the insurgents” (2011, p. 228). Khan’s observation is further endorsed by Daud Khattak, claiming that “all of the agreements were signed from a position of government weakness, and thus militants were able to achieve significant concessions” (2012).

With each subsequent breakdown in peace, Pakistani security forces resumed military operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa against Taliban militants. Beginning in 2007, “the Pakistani military launched a second round of major operations in the South Waziristan and Bajaur agencies in the FATA and the Swat Valley of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa” (Lalwani, 2013, p. 207). By 2009, it was estimated that approximately 120,000 Pakistani regular army, Frontier Corps, and Frontier Constabulary troops were located in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Jones & Fair, 2010, p. 36). During this particular period, the Pakistani army and Frontier Corps greatly improved in their ability
to clear and hold territory, while integrate operations with local tribes. Acknowledging
the necessity to reduce civilian casualties, Pakistani security forces “attempted to isolate
the insurgents and to cordon and search areas repeatedly to draw them out for
elimination. At the same time, medical aid and food supplies were delivered to the
people in affected areas” (Nawaz, 2009).

These operations have had some effect on Pakistani terrorist groups. With
additional emphasis on population-centric counterinsurgency missions, the Pakistani
army and Frontier Corps experienced positive effects against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
in 2008 during Operation Sher Dil in Bajaur, in 2009 during Operation Rah-e-Rast in
Swat, and 2009 to 2010 during Operation Rah-e-Nijat in South Waziristan. Evidence of
this success includes approximately 1,600 Taliban fighters killed during Operation Rah-
e-Rast in Swat between April 27 and June 30, 2009, while hundreds more surrendered to
the government (Bergen & Rowland, 2013, p. 234). In 2012, Pakistani security force
operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa resulted in the detention or arrest of
thousands of militants, including the seizure of large weapons and explosive caches
(Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013). Moreover, the Pakistani military
began to experience support from local tribes in select areas of the FATA, such as the
Salarzai tribe in Bajaur Agency, who wanted to reassert their status against the Taliban
(Nawaz, 2009).

The improved operational effects Pakistani security forces had on militants from
2008 to 2012 likely derived from a blended counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
strategy, placing additional emphasis on population security, cooptation of militias, and
Greater success was also credited to “better cooperation along two fronts: between the
Frontier Corps and the Pakistani army, and between Pakistan and the United States”
(Jones & Fair, 2010, pp. 68–69). Cooperation with the United States came in the form of
relief supplies for internally displaced persons and intelligence on militants along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Ultimately, Pakistani security forces have gained
considerable knowledge and experience through success in counterinsurgency operations
over the last five years disrupting Islamic militant group command, control, and logistics
in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Although, Pakistani security forces have benefited from learning valuable lessons in counterinsurgency, Islamic militant groups in the FATA have not been completely defeated (Shawaz, 2009). Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan among others remains a credible threat to the security and stability of Pakistan, requiring additional measures to successfully defeat the terrorist organization. Also, these operations had little effect on the Haqqani Network because they did not take place in their base of operation in North Waziristan and had no effect on the two groups operating in Punjab.

E. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

1. U.S. Foreign Aid

As previously mentioned, Pakistan ranks among the top recipients of U.S. foreign aid in the world, receiving nearly $30 billion in the past 65 years; one-third of this aid was given in the last 12 years during the Global War on Terrorism (Anderson, 2011). Moreover, in 2010, “Pakistan ranked second among top U.S. aid recipients, after Afghanistan and before Israel” (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013, p. 10). Defined as “assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies …,” U.S. foreign aid takes on three forms: development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010, p. 144).

Although the United States contributes development assistance to Pakistan in areas of energy, economic growth, community stabilization of restive areas, education, and health; more than 50 percent of U.S. aid has been committed to security assistance for the modernization of conventional defensive capabilities during the Cold War and improvement of security programs during the Global War on Terrorism (Anderson, 2011; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013). From 2002 to 2012, some $15.8 billion has supported security assistance in Pakistan, in comparison to the $7.8 billion in economic assistance during this same time period (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013, p. 10). In 2009, the Obama administration passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA), authorizing a tripling of nonmilitary aid to Pakistan for five years (Epstein &
Kronstadt, 2013, p. 13). Specifically, the EPPA authorizes $1.5 billion annually for economic and development aid to Pakistan from 2010 to 2014, intended to improve the lives of the Pakistani people, focusing on conflict-affected regions, combat militancy, and further democratization in Pakistan. The EPPA also includes specific initiatives for development programs in the FATA, improving the quality of education, healthcare services, roads, and increasing the opportunities for economic growth. Ultimately, the legislation was intended as a “landmark expression of the U.S. Administration’s and Congress’s intent to provide significant, long-term support for its Pakistani allies” (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013, p. 13).

Despite long-term U.S. support to Pakistan, EPPA amounts “fell short by $414 million in 2011, by $433 million in 2012, and by $428 million in the 2013 request … due mainly to budgetary constraints” (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013, p. 6). Moreover, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF), intended to strengthen Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities, also fell significantly short of its original allotment. Of the $400 million identified in the PCCF, a total of $125 million has been received by Pakistan since 2009 (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013, p. 11). This is largely due to the inability of the U.S. Secretary of State to certify that among many stipulations, Pakistan is actively cooperating with the United States in “counterterrorist efforts against Haqqani Network, Quetta Shura Taliban [Afghan-Taliban], Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and other domestic and foreign terrorist organizations …” (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013, p. 32).

In addition to falling short of the EPPA amounts, the United States withheld $800 million in Coalition Support Funds (CSF) from Pakistan in May 2011, following the U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Shortly after the Coalition Support Funds withhold, White House Chief of Staff William Daley stated, “Pakistani authorities had taken some steps that have given the United States reason to pause on some of the aid which we are giving to the military” (as cited in Anderson, 2011). In November 2011, the United States again chose to withhold $1.1 billion in CSF in response to Pakistan’s closure of the NATO supply lines after the Salala cross-border shooting incident between U.S. / Afghan forces that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers (Anderson, 2011; Nasr, 2013, p. 66).
Although the U.S. disbursed over $3.55 billion in development and humanitarian assistance to Pakistan between October 2009 and July, criticism exists for the low civilian assistance figures in comparison to military aid (U.S. State Department, 2013). In a justified criticism of U.S. foreign aid effectiveness, Pakistan’s finance minister and eventual foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar told American Diplomat Richard Holbrooke:

Most of the money never gets to Pakistan; it is spent in Washington. Of every dollar you say you give to Pakistan, maybe ten cents makes it to Pakistan … you never ask us what we need and what you should give aid to. (As cited in Nasr, 2013, p. 81)

Hina Rabbani Khar’s statement illustrates the United States’ strategy to commit foreign aid with stipulations, overemphasize security assistance funding, and ultimately become unreliable in the delivery of foreign aid initially promised.

There is little evidence to show that U.S. foreign aid is having any direct effect on Pakistani terrorist groups, despite a good portion being given for that purpose. Notwithstanding U.S. attempts through the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act and Counterinsurgency Capability Fund to strengthen support for economic development projects in the FATA, the priority for U.S. foreign aid is to bolster regional security objectives. This goal is manifested through prioritizing U.S. aid for modernizing Pakistan’s conventional military capabilities and enhancing intelligence collection, while being less focused on addressing the long-standing core grievances that continue to promote extremism and the existence of militant Islamic groups in the FATA (Anderson, 2011; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013).

According to an International Crisis Group report on Pakistan’s tribal areas, “the FATA has been neglected for decades and is one of Pakistan’s poorest regions, with high poverty and unemployment and badly under-developed infrastructure” (International Crisis Group, 2006, p. i). Although former Pakistani President Musharraf announced in 2006 that the government will spend $16.5 million in the FATA, with an additional $150 million over five years to integrate the FATA into the national economy, little has been done to follow through on these pledges of support (International Crisis Group, 2006, p.
According to one economist, “the government’s lofty claims notwithstanding, it has neither the capacity nor the willingness to undertake a mini-Marshall plan” in the FATA (as cited in International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 10). It is logical to deduce that Pakistani officials may be hesitant to commit valuable resources from Pakistan’s struggling economy to promote economic development in a remote non-integrated region that is home to less than 2 percent of the country’s total population (Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 2013).

Tables 3 and 4 summarize U.S. and Pakistani counterterrorism, COIN, and U.S. foreign aid efforts since September 11.
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<th>CT</th>
<th>COIN</th>
<th>U.S. Aid</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
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<tr>
<td>Haqqani Network (HQN)</td>
<td>- U.S. drone strikes (since 2004).&lt;br&gt; - 8x HQN CDRs designated under Executive Order 13224 to freeze assets and prohibit financial transactions with HQN (2008).&lt;br&gt; - U.S. offered $5 million reward for arrest of Sirajuddin under Rewards for Justice Program (MAR 2009).&lt;br&gt; - NATO: OPN Shamsur &amp; OPN Knife Edge in RC-East, AFG (DEC 2011).&lt;br&gt; - U.S. added HQN to FTO (19 SEP 2012).</td>
<td>- Ongoing ISAF COIN operations in RC-East, Afghanistan (Paktya, Pakrika, Khost Provinces).&lt;br&gt; - 100 U.S. Army Special Forces advisors working with the Pakistan army and Frontier Corps in the FATA (since 2008).</td>
<td>- $15.8 billion in Coalition Support Funds (since 2001).&lt;br&gt; - Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act for $1.5 billion annually (2009)&lt;br&gt; - Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund for $400 million (2009).</td>
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<td>Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)</td>
<td>- U.S. added to LeT to FTO (26 DEC 2001).&lt;br&gt; - U.S. offers $10 million reward for Haifiz Saeed (APR 2012).</td>
<td>- No known COIN operations attributed to marginalizing LeT.</td>
<td>- Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act for $1.5 billion annually (2009)&lt;br&gt; - Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund for $400 million (2009).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ)</td>
<td>- U.S. added LJ to FTO (30 JAN 2003).</td>
<td>- No known COIN operations attributed to marginalizing LJ.</td>
<td>- Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act for $1.5 billion annually (2009)&lt;br&gt; - Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund for $400 million (2009).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)</td>
<td>- U.S. drone strikes (since 2004).&lt;br&gt; - U.S. added TTP to FTO (01 SEP 2010).&lt;br&gt; - 100 U.S. Army Special Forces advisors working with the Pakistan army and Frontier Corps in the FATA (since 2008).</td>
<td>- $15.8 billion in Coalition Support Funds (since 2001).&lt;br&gt; - Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act for $1.5 billion annually (2009)&lt;br&gt; - Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund for $400 million (2009).</td>
<td>- U.S. strategy is predominately CT through drone strikes with minimal COIN and aid.&lt;br&gt; - U.S. drone strikes in South Waziristan account for less than 30% of total strikes in the FATA.&lt;br&gt; - U.S. aid is mostly security assistance and focused on conventional capabilities. Less U.S. aid is spent on Pakistani development (some aid is withheld).</td>
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<th>CT</th>
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| Haqqani Network (HQN) | - No known Pakistani operations or CT legislation directly targeting HQN.  
- Not on Pakistan’s terrorist organizations list. | - No known Pakistani COIN operations against HQN in North Waziristan. | - No identifiable Pakistani CT or COIN strategy being employed by Pakistani security forces against HQN.  
- Pakistani military operations during OEF (2001-2002) in North Waziristan was intended to capture al-Qaeda and foreign fighters fleeing from U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Operations were not intended to target HQN. |
| Lashkar-e-Taayylba (LeT) | - PAK added LeT to FTO (JAN 2002).  
- PAK security forces conducted operation against LeT / JuD to arrest suspects of 2008 Mumbai attacks.  
- PAK security forces temporarily placed Hafiz Saeed under house arrest (DEC 2008). | - No known Pakistani COIN operations against LeT in Punjab, Pakistan. | - Pakistani strategy is predominantly CT legislation with limited law enforcement actions to disrupt LeT.  
| Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) | - PAK added LJ to FTO (AUG 2001). | - No known Pakistani COIN operations against LJ in Punjab, Pakistan. | - Pakistani strategy is predominantly CT legislation with limited law enforcement actions.  
- Riaz Basra killed by Pakistani Police (MAY 2002).  
- Akrarn Lahori detained by Pakistani Police (JUN 2002).  
- Malik Ishaq released from prison due to lack of evidence (JUL 2011).  
- Pakistani law enforcement arrested LJ leader of Karachi chapter (MAY 2013). |
| Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) | - PAK military conducted OPN Al Mizar in South Waziristan (2002-2006).  
- PAK military conducted OPN Sher Dil in Bajaur Agency (2008-2009).  

Table 4. Pakistan’s Efforts to Marginalize Select Militant Islamic Groups Since 2001 (after Jones & Fair, 2010; Khattak, 2013; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013)

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Table 3 summarizes the United States’ counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and foreign aid strategies to counter extremist groups in Pakistan since 2001. First, the United States has formally designating the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan to the U.S. State Department foreign terrorist organization list. This action has provided the legal grounds for targeting these groups, including through the CIA-led drone campaign. The United States has killed 30 senior leaders from the Haqqani Network and Tehrik-e-Taliban in the FATA since 2004 (Roggio & Mayer, 2013). However, despite killing its senior leaders, these two groups are still operational and do not appear to be significantly degraded. It is possible that a continued leadership decapitation strategy could degrade these organizations over time, but currently they have not solved the threat posed by these transnational groups.

Finally, the majority of U.S. aid has gone towards bolstering conventional Pakistan forces, with less than 50 percent of aid going towards development. Furthermore, as described, aid designated for development is not reaching its target. In other words, U.S. COIN efforts remain small. Current U.S. counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies have done virtually nothing to target groups outside the FATA, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. Despite U.S. strategies and efforts to counter militant Islamic groups in Pakistan since 2001, including the death of approximately 1,562 to 2,377 suspected militants by U.S. drone strikes and the commitment of over $15.8 billion in security assistance funding, Pakistan’s extremist groups still exist today and continue to pose a significant threat to regional and international security (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013, p. 10; as cited in Out of the Blue, 2011).

Table 4 summarizes Pakistan’s major counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies to counter extremist groups in Pakistan since 2001. Although Pakistan has formally designated Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan as terrorist organizations, and has passed the National Counter-Terrorism Authority Bill and Fair Trial Act, it is too early to measure the effectiveness of Pakistan’s legislation and its effects on countering violent extremist militant groups. Moreover, it appears that Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan is the only group that Pakistani security forces are
willing to target with counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies; this is most likely due to the fact that Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan continues to pose a threat to Pakistan’s security. The Pakistani army’s approach to counterterrorism in the FATA, specifically large-scale conventional operations with heavy reliance on firepower and the displacement of large numbers of persons, is highly intrusive to the local population. Furthermore, the Pakistani army’s heavy-handed approach may lend more justification to the people’s grievances towards the government. In other words, Pakistan’s counterterrorism approach appears to be working at cross purposes with COIN efforts.

Furthermore, Pakistan’s COIN efforts have only been employed in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; there have been no COIN efforts in Punjab, where Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi are based. The learning curve has been steep for Pakistani security forces, and evidence suggests that military leaders are learning the value of a COIN approach. However, despite the Pakistan military’s learning curve, it does not appear to be keeping pace with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. As long as counterinsurgency doctrine remains secondary to Pakistan’s low intensity conflict against India, it is unlikely that sufficient resources will be allocated to counterinsurgency operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to achieve long-term success against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. Moreover, as Pakistani officials remain willing to conduct peace talks and negotiations with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and tribes that are sympathetic to the group, it remains unlikely that Pakistan security forces will be employed with enough civil-military resources to have an enduring impact towards addressing the people’s core grievances in the FATA.

F. CONCLUSION

From these findings of U.S. and Pakistani efforts to counter the four terrorist groups studied, the next chapter will offer recommendations on how to improve Pakistani security forces’ capacity and U.S efforts aimed at countering the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. The chapter will also identify future challenges in generating a calculated United States – Pakistan strategy to counter violent extremists groups and improve regional security.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

This thesis focused on three strategies employed by the United States and Pakistan to counter Pakistan-based violent extremists groups since September 2001—counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and U.S. aid to Pakistan—and investigated their effects on four militant groups based in Pakistan: the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. Within these strategies, this thesis paid particular attention to the effects of the U.S. formal designation of terrorist groups on the terrorist list, leadership decapitation through drone strikes, Pakistani efforts to create national legislation aimed at prosecuting terrorists, population-centric operations in the FATA, full-scale military operations, and U.S. foreign aid to Pakistan aimed at counterterrorism efforts.

B. ANALYSIS

Chapter IV’s investigation of U.S. and Pakistani strategies aimed at countering the terrorist groups studied revealed the following: First, official designation of terrorist groups on the U.S. State Department’s foreign terrorist organization list provides the legal framework and authorities for the United States to take action against terrorist groups. However, skepticism exists regarding the overall effectiveness of designating terrorist groups to the U.S. foreign terrorist organization list. The jurisdiction to freeze financial assets is limited to the United States, while other countries can continue to provide financial assets to these groups. Furthermore, naming groups on a terrorist list could compel these groups to go deeper into hiding, making them more difficult to monitor. Therefore, designating terrorist groups to the U.S. State Department foreign terrorist organization list is useful for legal action against these groups; however it is not without drawbacks.

Second, U.S. counterterrorism strategy has relied heavily on a decapitation strategy, or leadership targeting as a means of destroying the terrorist organizations studied. Despite killing a significant number of leaders, especially in Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan and the Haqqani Network, these groups still continue to recruit, attack, and operate. Furthermore, these attacks only targeted Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Haqqani Network. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi were untouched by these efforts, which have their base of operations outside the FATA. Therefore, despite being touted for its utility as the cornerstone of U.S. counterterrorism, leadership decapitation through drone strikes in the FATA has yet to eradicate these groups. According to an International Crisis Group report, *Drones: Myths and reality in Pakistan*, “drones are not a long-term solution to the problem they are being deployed to solve – destruction of local, regional and wider transnational jihadis who operate out of Pakistan’s tribal belt” (2013, p. ii). Polling data further suggests that Pakistanis are angered by these drone strikes, which could be a recruitment tool for these groups. Therefore, drone strikes may be less effective in achieving long-term security objectives against groups that have a popular base of support in the FATA.

Third, Pakistan has recently created legislation aimed at combating terrorism through the legal process. With the passing of the Fair Trial Act in 2012 and the National Counter-Terrorism Authority Bill in 2013, Pakistan established a national counterterrorism policy intended to strengthen the legal apparatus in the Anti-Terrorism Courts and promote information sharing between security forces to combat terrorism. However, because of the recent implementation of Pakistan’s counterterrorism legislation, it remains too early to confirm if these efforts to empower the legal process and improve counterterrorism coordination between Pakistani security forces will be effective. As long as Pakistan is able to make improvements in prosecuting terrorism, including accepting electronic intercepts and surveillance as evidence, and protecting individuals who to testify against terrorist groups in court, there is likelihood Pakistan will be successful in the future in combating terrorism; but it is too soon to tell.

Fourth, U.S. and Pakistani COIN efforts to counter terrorist groups have been minimal and have only focused on the FATA. Since 2008, as part of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Pakistan, less than 100 U.S. Special Operations Forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations personnel have worked with the Pakistani army and Frontier Corps on counterinsurgency training, equipping, and civil affairs projects to
specifically counter Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and al-Qaeda militants in the FATA. In 2002, during initial counterinsurgency efforts in the FATA, the Pakistani military employed low intensity conflict doctrine with heavy firepower and large-scale clearing operations that resulted in significant civilian casualties and internally displaced persons. Not until 2007 did the Pakistani military incorporate counterinsurgency techniques that included better coordination between the Pakistani army and the Frontier Corps, integrated local tribes into operations, focused on reducing civilian casualties, and provided medical aid and food supplies in areas affected by the conflict. Despite the Pakistani military’s improvement in counterinsurgency operations against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and al-Qaeda in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistani military operations have not taken place in North Waziristan to target the Haqqani Network. Moreover, the military has not attempted population-centric operations in areas of Punjab to counter the influence of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. Therefore, the best result of the last twelve years of operations in the FATA may be that Pakistani military has gained considerable experience and valuable lessons in counterinsurgency operations; these lessons could be applied in Pakistan in the future.

Finally, despite being identified as security assistance funding, U.S. Foreign Military Financing and Coalition Support Funds have focused heavily on Pakistan’s conventional defense capabilities. According to Epstein and Kronstadt’s congressional report on U.S foreign assistance to Pakistan, “the Pakistani military maintains an institutional focus on conventional warfighting capabilities oriented toward India and it has used U.S. security assistance to bolster these capabilities while paying insufficient attention to the kinds of counterinsurgency capacity that U.S. policy makers might prefer to see strengthened” (as cited in Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013, p. 20). Specifically, “of the $2.1 billion in U.S. Foreign Military Financing disbursed to Pakistan from 2002 to 2012, more than half has been used by the Pakistani military to upgrade P-3C maritime patrol aircraft and F-16 combat aircraft, and for the purchase of TOW anti-tank missiles and launchers,” which arguably serves limited value in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations (as cited in Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013, p. 20). Additionally, large portions of the Coalition Support Funds have likely been mismanaged
and wasted because of inadequate control mechanisms and lack of U.S. and Pakistani oversight (as cited in Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013, p. 18).

At present, there is no evidence to suggest that U.S. security assistance funding to Pakistan has contributed to degrading or reducing the threat posed by the four groups studied. Ultimately, U.S. assistance has focused heavily on security aid that has been committed to Pakistan’s conventional defense capabilities, failing to improve Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency performance (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013, pp. 2–3).

From these findings, the thesis has the following recommendations for countering the four groups in this study. First, the current U.S. strategy for targeting the Haqqani Network in Pakistan is not effective in accomplishing long-term U.S. objectives in the region. Although the United States has designated the Haqqani Network as a foreign terrorist organization, Pakistan has not done the same. Moreover, the Pakistani military is unwilling or unable to conduct operations in North Waziristan against the Haqqani Network, which has impelled the United States to rely on a unilateral counterterrorism leadership decapitation strategy through drone strikes. As discussed in Chapter IV, targeting the Haqqani Network accounts for 70 percent of all U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan (Bergen & Rowland, 2013, p. 230). However, the Haqqani Network has demonstrated the ability to regroup, rearm, recruit, and continue cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest the U.S. counterterrorism strategy against the Haqqani Network has been effective in eliminating the threat posed by this terrorist group.

Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that U.S. or Pakistani forces are engaging in COIN efforts that target the population in North Waziristan and the Haqqani Network; rather the relatively modest COIN efforts posed by both countries have occurred only in South Waziristan Bajaur Agency, and Swat. Moreover, U.S. foreign aid to Pakistan is heavily dominated by security assistance funding that promotes Pakistani military conventional capabilities to address regional threats, including India. Therefore current U.S. aid is not considered an effective strategy to counter the Haqqani Network as well.
U.S. and Pakistani efforts to counter the Haqqani Network should focus on operational containment and negotiation. Because the ISI and Pakistani military maintain a long-standing relationship with the leadership of the Haqqani Network, it is unrealistic for the United States to expect Pakistan to take genuine military action against the group. Therefore, it is more feasible to request the Pakistani military commit more resources to contain the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan. It should do this by directly attacking the network’s alliances with other militant Islamic groups, and help negotiate a peace-deal while the United States remains active in Afghanistan.

Second, there is no evidence to suggest that U.S. counterterrorism efforts to target Lashkar-e-Tayyiba through official designation to the foreign terrorist organization list have been effective against the group. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba continues to openly flourish in Punjab without obvious pressure from Pakistani security forces. This suggests the group has been unaffected by U.S. or Pakistani designation as a terrorist group. Moreover, there is no specific evidence to suggest U.S. counterinsurgency and foreign aid efforts have had any tangible effect on the group as well. Because Lashkar-e-Tayyiba serves as a proxy force to the ISI and Pakistani military for the special purpose of contesting India-administered Kashmir and strategic depth against India, it is unlikely that Pakistan will take decisive action against the group.

In the short term, it is feasible for the United States to launch an information operations campaign to portray a violent image of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and attempt to sever the population’s reliance on Lashkar-e-Tayyiba’s humanitarian relief services. The United State could help do this by strengthening Pakistan’s legitimacy through increasing U.S. aid with emphasized stipulations in economic development. The devastation caused by massive flooding in Pakistan in 2010 was a missed opportunity for the United States to bolster Pakistan’s ability to deliver services to people in need, thereby improving overall legitimacy of the state. Although there were U.S. humanitarian assistance efforts committed to Pakistan during this time, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba was more consistent and effective in delivering relief to people affected by the flooding.

As a long-term goal, the United States should begin the process of marginalizing the Deobandi interpretation of Islam, pursuing a resolution over Kashmir, and improving
the relationship between Pakistan and India. These measures are intended to strike at the root causes for Pakistan’s state sponsorship of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba through effective deradicalization and education of multiple generations of Pakistanis throughout the country. Adjusting Pakistan’s strategic calculus against India and regulating Deobandi Islam are not easily attainable goals. It could take generations to improve relations between Pakistan and India. However, the consequences of not beginning the process could be detrimental to regional stability in the future.

Third, the United States’ and Pakistan’s strategy for targeting Lashkar-i-Jhangvi has been ineffective up to this point. Both countries have added the group to their terrorist organization lists and Pakistan has recently improved counterterrorism legislation in Pakistan with the aim of targeting groups like Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. However, there is a lack of evidence to openly suggest more is being done to target the group. As a potential solution, given the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi’s relatively small size and mid-level age, it could be possible to threaten the relevance of Lashkar-iJhangvi by directly attacking the group’s alliances and support to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and al-Qaeda. Isolating Lashkar-i-Jhangvi from other militant Islamic groups, as well as targeting the group’s ability to provide safe houses, false identities, and security, may deny the group necessary recruits, weapons, and funding to grow. Furthermore, degrading Lashkar-i-Jhangvi will affect transnational groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. However, given Lashkar-i-Jhangvi is not directly threatening the Pakistani government or security forces, it is unlikely that Pakistani security forces will prioritize this group above those who pose a more significant threat that warrants immediate attention.

Fourth, recent U.S and Pakistani counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts have had some success in countering Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan over the last five years in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Both the United States and Pakistan formally designated Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan as a terrorist organization, demonstrating cooperation and willingness to target the group. Approximately 30 percent of U.S. drone strikes have focused on Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan leadership in South Waziristan, combined with the positive effective of five major Pakistani counterinsurgency operations in the region (Bergen & Rowland, 2013, p. 230). This combined U.S-Pakistan
success against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan is likely attributed to Pakistan’s willingness to target groups who threaten the legitimacy and stability of Pakistan’s government. However, peace talks and negotiations between Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Pakistani government have had limited success against the group. Although peace treaties may encourage a reduction in attacks from Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, it does not address or resolve the group’s overall objectives and justification for violence. Instead, the peace negotiations with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan undermine the ability to effectively disrupt and dismantle the group, further emboldening the organization and ceding territory to the organization.

Rather than peace talks, the Pakistani military should continue to exploit the successes of counterinsurgency operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while addressing the core grievances of the people, promoting economic development, and integrating the FATA into Pakistan. Furthermore, the United States should support Pakistani security forces during counterinsurgency operations through intelligence sharing, advising and assisting from U.S. Army Special Forces, and U.S. Army Civil Affairs humanitarian assistance programs. By doing so, the United States would be helping Pakistan better manage the lawlessness of the FATA throughout all phases of counterinsurgency operations.

As described in Chapter II, the first phase of defeating a militant Islamic group, such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, in a counterinsurgency campaign is population engagement aimed at addressing core grievances (Gregg, 2009, p. 18; McCormick, 2012). COIN operations may include improving governance, civil services, security, infrastructure, education, and economic development opportunities. The first phase is intended to establish the legitimacy of the state, reinforcing rule of law, and reestablishing civil services while denying the enemy’s ability to influence or coerce the people.

Once accomplished, it becomes possible to transition into the second phase: stability operations. This phase should be implemented while attacking the terrorist group’s ability to engage the population for support against the state, which mainly includes recruiting, financing, and weapons (Gregg, 2009, p. 18; McCormick, 2012).
Once the terrorist group is effectively isolated from the population and is no longer able to coerce or acquire sufficient resources, it becomes possible to transition to the third phase: creating a functioning state, while attacking the terrorist group directly with the aim of total insurgent group defeat (Gregg, 2009, p. 18; McCormick, 2012). During this phase, it remains essential to dismantle and defeat the enemy to the point that they no longer pose a threat to the state, and are not able to reorganize at a later point in time. Ultimately, defeating the enemy in a counterinsurgency campaign promotes the foundation of a stable and functioning state that provides for its people.

Throughout the campaign, select counterterrorism operations should be executed with the intended purpose of disrupting and dismantling critical elements of enemy networks and creating a safer operating environment for counterinsurgency forces, such as the Frontier Corps, tribal police forces, and U.S. Army Special Forces. Moreover, counterterrorism efforts in the form of drone strikes and direct action raids by Pakistan’s Special Services Group and U.S. Special Operations Forces should concentrate on terrorist foreign fighters, facilitators, and mid-level to senior-level leadership. Targeting below the mid-level leadership threshold leads to an excess of special operations missions, which affects the population through collateral damage and overall insecurity. This atmosphere, in turn, may create sympathy for the terrorists and animosity towards the state.

Based on current levels of capacity and competency, light infantry units within the Pakistani army and U.S. Army Special Forces should be the ideal forces to advise and assist population-centric counterinsurgency operations with the Frontier Corps and tribal police forces that focus on improving the capacity of the organizations, in addition to enhancing political and economic development at the district or provincial level. If and when serving in a direct action counterterrorism capacity, Pakistani regular army forces should target insurgent logistical support, such as recruiting efforts, propaganda operations, and weapons caches. Additionally, due to the limited intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets available to regular army forces, it is useful to target low-to-mid level militants affecting their regions who are not necessarily time sensitive high value targets.
C. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

From the investigation of efforts to counter these groups, this thesis concludes with more general observations and recommendations for the U.S. and Pakistani relationship. Despite counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts being more operationally focused, the lack of success in countering these groups is also the result of an overall lack of strategy for countering militancy, both with the United States and with Pakistan.

It was not until the attacks on September 11, 2001 that the United States resumed a strategic security partnership with Pakistan as a major ally to defeat extremist groups in the Global War on Terrorism. Prior to 2001, the 65-year U.S.-Pakistan relationship was beleaguered by U.S. rhetoric and behavior that exhibited a message of inconsistency, unreliability, and contradiction that included sanctions and three periods of U.S. foreign aid severance (Riedel, 2011, pp. 14–16, 27, 41). Despite a renewed relationship over the past decade, significant challenges exist with the trust and cooperation between the two countries. Although Pakistan may be culpable of duplicity and a reluctance to fight the Global War on Terrorism militarily, U.S. State Department’s Foreign Affairs Policy Board member Vali Nasr argues that the U.S. government is equally as guilty of pursuing multiple agendas often with competing interests (2013, p. 78).

Furthermore, according to former Pakistani ambassador to the United States Maleeha Lodhi, U.S. “policymaking tends to be impulsive, chaotic, erratic and overly secretive” (as cited in Riedel, 2011, p. xi). Moreover, the United States’ behavior insinuates an overall lack of a comprehensive strategy towards Pakistan that signifies a vision for a long-term partnership. In return, Pakistanis justifiably perceive the United States as an unreliable ally. An example of this distrust is visible in a July 2010 Pew Poll in which 59 percent of Pakistanis saw America as an enemy, with only 11 percent viewing the United States as a partner to Pakistan (as cited in Riedel, 2011, p. 122). It is worth noting that this poll was taken before two critical events in 2011: the bin Laden raid, and the Salala cross-border shooting incident, which killed 24 Pakistani troops.
Following the raid and the cross-border shooting, the United States was faced with two diplomatic options for dealing with Pakistan; approach Pakistan with positive diplomatic “engagement” or treat Pakistan with “coercion and confrontation” (Nasr, 2013, p. 64). According to Nasr, the United States chose to engage Pakistan from an adversarial position of “coercion and confrontation” (2013, p. 64). Combined with an increase in U.S. drone strikes in the FATA, “Washington’s pressure-only policy threw relations into a downward spiral that put the United States at great risk. America quickly learned that Pakistan could be even less cooperative … Pakistan did not reward coercion with cooperation” (Nasr, 2013, p. 88). Shortly after the bin Laden raid, Pakistan expelled 100 U.S. military trainers and made efforts to close down a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) facility at Shamsi airfield in Baluchistan Province (Anderson, 2011). Once the Salala cross-border shooting incident took place and the United States refused to apologize, Pakistan temporarily closed valuable NATO ground supply lines through their country to support the war in Afghanistan. The closure of NATO supply lines inflicted additional costs to the U.S. military of nearly $100 million every month to find new ground supply lines to continue the war (Bokhari, 2012).

Because of the shortsighted counterterrorism focus of U.S. regional security objectives in Pakistan, the United States has failed to recognize the grander importance of common ground and long-term strategic interests. According to Nasr, “Pakistan would change its foreign policy only if something more than America’s immediate counterterrorism needs bound us together” (2013, p. 93). Nasr further suggests that most Pakistanis “want to see a long-term relationship with the United States – a commitment of friendship not limited to the duration of our engagement in Afghanistan” (Nasr, 2013, p. 82).

If the United States and Pakistan are to make any real progress in countering Pakistani-based violent extremist groups with regional and transnational objectives, both countries need to cooperate to resolve the current trust deficits that exist within their relationship. Former special advisor on Pakistan and Afghanistan Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke suggests that “you get more out of Pakistan if there is a positive trajectory,” as opposed to making the relationship worse through pressure and coercion (as cited in Nasr, 2013, p. 85).

An easily instituted recommendation to demonstrate long-term partnership between the United States and Pakistan is to increase the number of U.S. State Department officials in the Islamabad Embassy and consulates, extend tours beyond the standard one-year length, and incentivize with special compensation two-year tours and second-tour officers to promote expertise and continuity (Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, 2010). This simple change in U.S. State Department standard operating procedures will likely establish the framework for a U.S.-Pakistan relationship built on trust, reliability, and consistency, demonstrating the United States is committed to a strategic and enduring long-term partnership with Pakistan.

Furthermore, the preponderance of U.S. foreign military assistance over economic and civilian development has worked at cross purposes that negate the overall effectiveness of U.S. aid in Pakistan. In the FATA, where U.S. economic and civilian development aid is needed most to counter Islamic extremism and militancy, less than six percent of U.S. economic aid was allocated from 2001 to 2007 (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013, p. 12). Despite the Obama administration’s passing of the 2009 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA) to authorize $1.5 billion annually through 2014 for schools, roads, and hospitals and to strengthen Pakistani democracy, actual amounts delivered have fallen significantly short due to U.S. budgetary constraints and unsatisfied stipulations related to security and non-proliferation (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013, p. 6; Riedel, 2011, p. 123).

Not only did Pakistanis unequivocally denounce the EPPA due to the number of U.S. stipulations, but the federal and provincial governments of Pakistan continued to deny the FATA sufficient development resources to “adequately assist internally displaced persons, or engage in other efforts to secure the support of locals” (Jones & Fair, 2010, p. xv). In 2009, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa governor himself “complained that very little new assistance funds were reaching the tribal belt” (as cited in Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013, p. 12). Demonstrating a classic vicious cycle of security versus
development, former USAID Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force Director James Bever asserts, “aid efforts in the FATA have been hampered by the limited presence of Pakistani federal ministries and constrained provision of services” (as cited in Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013, p. 12).

Ultimately, Pakistan requires U.S. economic and civilian assistance if the country is to develop the FATA and combat the negative effects of Islamic extremism and militancy through rehabilitation, de-radicalization, and improvement in education and employment opportunities. To economically integrate the FATA, U.S. foreign aid needs to place consistent long-term economic and civilian assistance priorities above short-term U.S. security objectives, thereby striving to achieve a balanced “sweet spot where the structure of the financial incentives encourages cooperation according to the rule of law,” and inspires productive democratic behavior (Merkl, 2013, p. 22). According to Richard Holbrooke, “the key to winning over Pakistan is simply giving Pakistan much more aid (not just military) for far longer, in order to change the dynamic of the relationship ... We should do our best to be seen giving it, and to make sure that it improved the lives of everyday Pakistanis in meaningful ways” (as cited in Nasr, 2013, p. 80). Further endorsing long-term reliable assistance free from U.S. stipulations is former Pakistan ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani, who suggests “a more modest aid package delivered steadily, aimed at key sectors of the Pakistani economy, would not raise Pakistani expectations and could, over time, create a reliable pocket of influence for the United States …” (2005, pp. 324–325).

Furthermore, the Pakistan military currently lacks a comprehensive counterinsurgency doctrine, and instead prioritizes doctrine and training towards conventional low intensity conflict against India. According to Shuja Nawaz, “a key factor hindering Pakistan’s ability to fight insurgents has been its own forces’ lack of training and indoctrination necessary for fighting an insurgency within its own borders. Still clinging to its self-image as a conventional army, Pakistan’s military has not fully nor speedily accepted the need to change to counterinsurgency doctrine” (Shawaz, 2009). With Pakistan’s tentative transition towards counterinsurgency doctrine only within the last five years, Jones and Fair claim that “Pakistan will not be able to deal with the
militant threat over the long run unless it does a more effective job of addressing the root causes of the crisis and makes security of the civilian population, rather than destroying the enemy, its top priority” (2010, pp. xiii–xiv).

Among the recommendations Jones and Fair offer is to establish a population-centric approach that aligns better with effective counterinsurgency doctrine. Specifically, this would include improving the capacity and competency of the Pakistani Police, to “serve as a key ‘hold’ force over the long run” (Jones & Fair 2010, p. xv). However, according to Hassan Abbas, “the capacity of the Pakistan Police Service to address rising crime rates, deteriorating law-and-order, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism is severely diminished by political manipulation, lack of forensic services, inadequate training and equipment, corruption, and weaknesses in the judicial sphere” (Abbas, 2011).

The lack of Pakistan’s fully competent and capable police service extends beyond their limited influence in the FATA and is readily proven by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s growing influence and sectarian violence in Karachi. Home to 20 million people, Karachi is responsible for approximately 60 to 70 percent of Pakistan’s national revenue and site of Pakistan’s central bank and stock market, yet ranks among the worst metropolitan cities in the world for crime (Rehman, 2013, pp. 1–2). With 2,000 people killed and over 100 people kidnapped in 2010, Karachi’s excessive crime rate is largely due to the under-staffed and under-paid Karachi police units that maintain a dismal ratio of one police officer for every 2,000 people (Nasir, 2012).

Because Pakistan’s police-to-citizen ratio is below the rate of most healthy democracies, the United States should direct adequate security assistance resources to improve Pakistan’s existing law enforcement institutions, including Manning, equipping, and training. The redirection of U.S. security assistance to Pakistan’s police force would directly improve its ability to conduct population-centric operations, upholding the rule of law, and promote the democratization process, while circumventing the military’s overemphasis on a conventional war against India. The concept of improving Pakistan’s police force is supportive of Kalev Sepp’s best practices of counterinsurgency operations,
signifying the importance of “a diversified police force in the lead, with military supporting and reoriented for counterinsurgency” (as cited in U.S. Department of the Army, 2005, p. 10).

Moreover, an enhanced and empowered police force could bridge the gap between civilian and military agencies, coordinating and synchronizing Pakistan’s national efforts to counter the challenges presented by Islamic extremism and militancy. According to Nawaz (2009), “civilian efforts, especially on the political and economic fronts, will be needed to make civil-military collaboration effective in the long run.” Ultimately, “better law enforcement will not only increase security and improve governance, but also create more space for development projects to be implemented and help stir economic growth” (Abbas & Qazi, 2013).

In addition to improving Pakistan’s law enforcement institutions, the United States should consider prioritizing additional security assistance to Pakistan’s Frontier Corps, a federal reserve military force in the FATA that is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (Abbas, 2007; Nawaz, 2009). Composed of local tribesmen and led by Pakistani active duty army officers (mainly Punjabi), the Frontier Corps has approximately 80,000 soldiers. The purpose of the Frontier Corps is to serve as a local peacetime militia that assists local tribal police in the maintenance of law and order and anti-smuggling operations along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (Miller, 2007; Nawaz, 2009).

However, according to Nawaz, the Frontier Corps has “lost its efficacy over the years through neglect, lack of training, and failure to upgrade arms and systems,” resulting in the inability to “aggressively patrol or fight the well-armed and trained militants” (2009). In addition to the adverse effects of neglect by the Pakistani military, the Frontier Corps has performed rather poorly during its encounters with militants, “proving unable or unwilling to fight their fellow tribesmen” (Nawaz, 2009). Much of the dismal performance can be attributed to the “Frontier Corps receiving the dregs of the officer corps from the Pakistani army … with little incentive for officers to excel during their short rotation” and the failure to charge the Frontier Corps with the responsibility to lead their own forces (Abbas, 2007; Nawaz, 2009).
Recognizing the opportunity for improvement, in 2006 the United States surveyed the condition of the Frontier Corps and began to support the organization with equipment and funding. The challenge with providing assistance, according to Hassan Abbas (2007) remains establishing the “mechanisms to closely monitor implementation of the reforms and progress.” Beyond establishing mechanisms to measure progress, far more U.S. security assistance should be directed towards the Frontier Corps to greatly improve the organization’s capacity and legitimacy throughout the FATA. This will not only extend legitimacy of the Pakistani government into the FATA, but also will greatly contribute to the integration of the FATA into Pakistan, and ultimately promote the democratization process. The primary reasons for the Frontier Corps to become the United States’ sponsored force of choice is because the organization is indigenous to the region that remains the epicenter of Islamic extremism and militancy, is inherently population-centric and ideal for counterinsurgency operations, and is more likely to positively incorporate advancements in capacity as a premier counterinsurgency force from the Ministry of Interior.

In the context of U.S. military partnership, a force uniquely suited to facilitate training, transformation, and professional mentorship is the U.S. Army Special Forces. Although taking place in limited capacity since 2008, U.S. Army Special Forces should continue to cultivate their relationship with the Frontier Corps and further extend their advising and assisting to local tribal police forces. Ultimately, U.S. Army Special Forces should work towards increasing their involvement in the FATA as strategic relationships between the United States and Pakistan improve over time.

The United States could also help Pakistan develop a more robust strategy and capability to marginalize select militant Islamic groups. With the downsizing or withdrawal of U.S. forces in Afghanistan starting in 2014, the U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan will only become further compounded by incoherency. Existing U.S. counterterrorism efforts along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and FATA are heavily reliant on unilateral drone strikes. Although somewhat effective in short term disruption
of enemy freedom of operation, strategically the unilateral drone campaign is not working towards permanent denial of safe havens and achieving mid-to-long-term security objectives in Pakistan.

To influence mid-to-long-term security objectives, the United States needs to promote an enduring counterinsurgency campaign in the FATA that is complimented by bilateral U.S.-Pakistan counterterrorism assets to continue disruption of militant Islamic group leadership. Among the counterterrorism assets that would be most beneficial to Pakistan include a drastic increase in the number of troop transport helicopters (i.e. UH-60s and/or CH-47s) and providing Pakistan with their own drones, equipped with intelligence-collection and weapons systems (Riedel, 2011, pp. 134–135).

As the United States begins to downsize in Afghanistan in 2014, more resources and intelligence sharing capabilities should transition into combined U.S.-Pakistan military operations in the FATA. When possible, U.S. drone strikes should be substituted by partnered direct action raids conducted with Pakistan’s Special Services Group Counterterrorism Teams. If and when U.S. drone strikes prove absolutely necessary, Pakistani military command and control functions should be integrated into the drone targeting process from beginning to end. This U.S.-Pakistan operational arrangement may look similar to the current model provided by the Afghanistan Operation Coordination Group, which maintains joint representation from Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and National Defense Services that approve, fuse intelligence, and monitor all special operations missions in Afghanistan. With a Pakistani version of the Operation Coordination Group established, the United States drone campaign should be phased out with responsibility transitioned to the Pakistan military over the course of several years. Over time, the Pakistanis should be able to demonstrate the capacity to effectively conduct unilateral counterterrorism special operations that compliment the greater counterinsurgency campaign in the FATA.

Although India may protest the development of a Pakistani drone and transport helicopter program, the escalating threat that militant Islamic groups present to India should generally mitigate these concerns. In other words, the current transnational threat
environment presented by flourishing Islamic extremism and militancy arguably outweighs the concerns of India’s military superiority in a conventional low intensity conflict against Pakistan.

D. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, although Pakistan maintains a parliamentary democratic republic system of government with an executive, legislative, and judicial branch, the single organization with the greatest political and economic power is the Pakistani military. According to Pakistani military scientist and security analyst Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan has a politically powerful military that exercises control of the state and society through established hegemony that penetrates the economy” (2007, p. 18). Acknowledged as a dominant economic player, Siddiqa claims, “Pakistan’s military today runs a huge commercial empire … [with an] estimated worth that runs into billions of dollars” (2007, p. 2). The involvement of Pakistan’s military in the national economy “is both a cause and effect of a non-democratic political system,” which lacks transparency and accountability. Ultimately, the Pakistani military’s heavy influence on politics, economy, and society prevents the strengthening of civilian institutions (2007, p. 3, 23). Therefore, “under military leadership, Pakistan has defined its national objectives as wresting Kashmir from India and, in recent years, establishing a client regime in Afghanistan,” instead of redefining objectives to “focus on economic prosperity and popular participation in governance” (Haqqani, 2005, p. 326).

Despite the Pakistani military’s entrenchment in the economy, according to Haqqani, “a planned withdrawal of the military from political life is essential for Pakistan to function as a normal state” (2005, p. 314). Haqqani further suggests that “Pakistan’s military needs to be persuaded to turn over power gradually to secular civilians and allow the secular politics of competing economic and regional interests to prevail …” (Haqqani, 2005, p. 312).

The United States should encouraging a strong “mass-based political movement” by supporting domestic political parties that aim to end the dominance of Pakistan’s armed forces (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 24). By supporting Pakistan’s democratization process
and strengthening of civilian institutions it “allows secular politicians to compete freely for power, it is more likely to reduce the influence of radical Islamists,” therefore assisting in the accomplishment of U.S. security objectives in the region (Haqqani, 2005, p. 313). However, U.S. support to Pakistan’s political parties runs the risk of undermining their credibility and making them appear like U.S. puppets. Therefore, the United States should provide backing through covert means or by using an Islamic proxy country with a similar system of government such as Turkey to promote the democratization process in Pakistan.
LIST OF REFERENCES


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