AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

READY FOR TFI PRIME TIME?

A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE DUAL COMPONENT COMMANDER

AND THE INTEGRATED WING

by

Michael R. Knowles, Lieutenant Colonel, Air National Guard

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Colonel Kathleen Hightaian

17 February 2015

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government, the Department of Defense, or Air University. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

Biography

Lt Col Michael R. Knowles is assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. He is a member of the Idaho Air National Guard. Lt Col Knowles is a senior navigator with over 3,800 hours in the C-130, B-1B, and B-52H. Prior to his attendance at Air War College, Lt Col Knowles served as the Executive Officer in the 124th Fighter Wing and as the Commander of the 124th Force Support Squadron at Gowen Field, Boise, Idaho. He received his commission through the Reserve Officer Training Corps at the University of Utah and served 10 years in the United States Air Force before transferring to the Idaho Air National Guard where he has been serving since 2002.

Abstract

Tight budgets compel the USAF to create associations with Active Component (AC) and Air Reserve Component forces that can share airframes, resources, and basing when performing like missions. Inspired by the idea of a more closely associated wing, the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (NCSAF) proposed the Integrated Wing (i-Wing) construct, similar in spirit to the “blended” wing, and adds the idea of a Dual-Component Commander (DCC) that has the command authority to lead both AC and Reserve Component (RC) forces.

This paper argues that the implementation of the i-Wing construct within the AC and Air National Guard is impracticable at this time until it can overcome commander authority and selection challenges, administrative control (ADCON) system incompatibility between the components, funding and fiscal challenges, and cultural differences. However, the paper advocates a starting point that moves the three components closer to Total Force Integration through selectively assigning DCC to existing associations, by creating supporting instructions and systems that increase ADCON compatibility between AC and RC, and by slowly integrating wings where it leads to efficiencies and effectiveness.

Introduction

When the 116th Air Control Wing (ACW) was created in 2002 at Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, the Georgia Air National Guard (GANG) took ownership of the E-8 Joint Surveillance Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft and mission from the active component (AC). Compared to other AC and ANG associations that reflected separate component chains of command, the 116th was asked to create the first “blended” wing with a singular organizational structure. But by 2011 the AC and ANG forces de-“blended” to return to a more familiar association hosted by the ANG. This search for the right association reflects the United States Air Force’s (USAF) goal of Total Force Integration (TFI) which strives for unity of effort through efficiency, effectiveness, and total force awareness. Tight budgets compel the USAF to create associations with AC and Air Reserve Component (ARC) forces that can share airframes, resources, and basing when performing like missions. Inspired by the idea of a more closely associated wing, the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (NCSAF) proposed the Integrated Wing (i-Wing) construct, similar in spirit to the “blended” wing, and adds the idea of a dual-component commander (DCC) that has the command authority to lead both AC and RC forces.

Thesis

This paper argues that the implementation of the i-Wing construct within the AC and ANG is impracticable at this time until it can overcome commander authority and selection challenges, administrative control (ADCON) system incompatibility between the components, funding and fiscal challenges, and cultural differences. However, the paper advocates a starting

point that moves the three components closer to TFI through selectively assigning DCCs to existing associations, by creating supporting instructions and systems that increase ADCON compatibility between AC and RC, and by slowly integrating wings where it leads to efficiencies and effectiveness.

Total Force Integration Objectives and Constructs

To more fully integrate the force, the USAF created TFI associations (TFIA) “to improve productivity, increase or retain mission capabilities, and/or to achieve synergy in the use of Total Force¹...by aligning equipment, missions, infrastructure, and manpower resources within the Air Force (AF) to enable a more effective and efficient use of these assets.”² In a TFIA Active Association (AA) the RC organization hosts the AC, like in Georgia. The reverse is true in a Classic Association (CA).³ The guiding principle of TFI is that “command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort.”⁴ Unity of command means “all forces operate under a single commander with requisite authority to command” while unity of effort means all forces, not necessarily of the same command structure, work in cooperation towards a common objective.⁵ The host component assumes responsibility for mission accomplishment and management over aircraft and facilities while each component maintains their own ADCON which provides the “direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support” to include distinct unit manning documents (UMD) and designed operational capability (DOC) taskings.⁶ To achieve unity of effort, host TFIA commanders give operational direction (OPDIR) to assign day-to-day tasks and empower personnel from either component to complete the daily operations.⁷ Coupled with memorandums of agreement (MOA), OPDIR defines the working relationship between the components that typically have redundant chains of command. The success of OPDIR in

enhancing unity of effort is highly dependent on the leadership and personality strengths of the commanders and supervisors exercising it. Because OPDIR defines relationships and cannot replace command authority, the key question is whether the CAs and AAs can best realize the TFI objectives of synergy, efficiency, effectiveness, and mission capability without having true unity of command. The NCSAF's introduction of the i-Wing construct explored that very question.

The Integrated Wing

The NCSAF was commissioned to “undertake a comprehensive study of the structure of the Air Force (active, reserve, guard) to determine whether, and how, the structure should be modified to best fulfill current and anticipated mission requirements for the Air Force in a manner consistent with available resources.”⁸ The i-Wing was conceived as “an integration model that combines Active and Reserve elements within one organizational structure and chain of command, with members of all components contributing to a common unit mission.”⁹ Its objective is to create a leaner more efficient organizational structure, to create a scalable force to meet changing demands, and to provide the AC opportunities to gain confidence in the ARC's capabilities.¹⁰ A key component of the i-Wing construct is the creation of the DCC who has the

Figure 1 (NCSAF Report, 31 January 2014, p. 28)

legal authority to command both Title 10 and Title 32 forces simultaneously (see Figure 1).

DCCs would be appointed at the wing, group, and squadron levels from either component with vice or deputy commanders from the opposite component.

Dual-Component Command

The need to establish DCC authority is not new. It is important because each USAF component derives their authorities from different sources, the AC from the President of the United States (POTUS) through Title 10 authority and the ANG from the governor of their state through Title 32 authority. Both titles inhibit cross-component command authority. In responding to homeland emergencies like a hurricane, the restriction on cross-component command authority in the past has degraded the unity of effort because there was no unity of command. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 exposed the flaw in the disunity of command between the National Guard (NG) and federal military forces.¹¹ Post-Katrina, the General Accounting Office found that “the [NG] and federal responses were coordinated across several chains of command but not integrated, which led to some inefficiencies and duplication of effort.”¹² Following lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, in 2011 the Council of Governors and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) sought to improve the unity of effort between the NG and federal military forces by approving a Joint Action Plan which recommended a Contingency Dual-Status Command (DSC)¹³ that would “streamline operations under one commander who serves the state and federal chains of command and directs operations for both Title 10 and Title 32 military members working together.”¹⁴ As part of a Joint Task Force, DSC would then be “appointed at the mutual consent of the governor and president and serve in two separate chains of command, both state and federal.”¹⁵ Changes to 32 U.S.C § 315 reflect this language codifying the appointment of a DSC in a major disaster or emergency inside of a state.¹⁶ During Hurricane

Sandy in 2012, the DSC successfully integrated the response efforts of state, local, NG, Department of Defense, and other federal agencies. The DSC was lauded as “simply the best command and control (C2) construct that exists for responding effectively and efficiently to complex disasters, because it can bring the full weight of the DoD response to the worst man-made or natural disasters while maintaining the authority of state and local governments.”¹⁷ The success of the DCC in state emergencies leads one to ask whether it could be applied to peacetime AC and RC associations, specifically in an i-Wing. Testing the strength of the DCC in an i-Wing is difficult since the concept is still theoretical. However, the 116 ACW in Georgia came the closest to replicating the i-Wing concept and serves as a useful case study to examine the utility of the i-Wing concept for achieving unities of command and effort.

JSTARS and the “Blended” Wing

To measure the unity of effort in an associated wing, this paper examines the efficiency, effectiveness, and TFI cultural awareness between components. In 2002 ANG and Air Combat Command (ACC) jointly agreed that the GANG would assume host responsibilities for the E-8 JSTARS flying mission with the AC.¹⁸ The unit was given six months to reach agreement on an MOA between the AC and GANG and design a “blended” wing without the benefit of supporting regulatory guidance in Air Force Instructions (AFIs). One commander reflected that “we were left to just make it up.”¹⁹ In contrast to a CA and AA with a separate command and organizational structure, the 116 ACW had a single command structure with ANG and AC personnel “blended” throughout every unit. Commanders and deputies at the wing, group, and squadron were mixed by component.

In the “blended” wing environment, commanders lacked the legal authority to give orders or discipline airmen from the opposite component. Instead, in lieu of command direction, they

used OPDIR to support each other to accomplish the mission. Despite having linear chains of command, lack of DCC authority led to a shadow chain of command structure that supported each component's unique ADCON. ADCON differences included pay, personnel, deployment sourcing and taskings, promotion, funding, and discipline which each operated under incompatible systems, authorities, and rule sets. When conflict or discipline issues arose, commanders through OPDIR directed each component leader to handle their own problems. This shadow ADCON apparatus oftentimes confused airmen as to who their real bosses were. Finally, cultural disparities between the AC and ANG caused conflict. These disparities are typical for TFI wings especially when considering the incompatible systems listed above. Their cultural differences were reflected in contrasting views on professional development, promotions, fitness, deployment taskings, training focus, professional military education (PME), part time/full time status, performance evaluations, etc.

With no true unity of command, the "blended" wing led to tactical efficiency and unity of effort when the leadership was strong and proactive. Their inefficiencies came when dealing with ADCON issues and when leadership was weak. Each of the commanders I interviewed commented that over time the effectiveness of the "blended" wing association broke down because of disagreements over C2, ADCON, and cultural differences regarding career development, discipline, and expectations.²⁰ In addition, and perhaps most importantly, the "blended" wing construct was not supported by any AFI guidance.

In 2011 by mutual agreement of the MAJCOMs and leadership at Robins, the "blended" wing concept was disbanded and an AA was created with the GANG assuming host responsibilities. ACC created the 461st Air Control Wing for the AC with accompanying operations and maintenance groups and squadrons. The AA structure simplified the

administrative issues for both components and brought the “shadow” government out of hiding. It allowed both components to refocus on their specific priorities. For the AC they refocused on professional and personal development, leadership experience, PME participation, and career enhancement. For the ANG they addressed the federal technician grievances by some guardsmen who were frustrated with the style and inexperience of some AC supervisors in dealing with union rules.²¹ As before, GANG leaders use OPDIR and the spirit of cooperation to pursue unity of effort in day-to-day operations as they shared mission and resources.

When asked if DCC authority would enhance unity of effort through unity of command, the response was mixed. The AC commanders felt that the DCC authority would not guarantee a focus of their priorities of professional development and career enhancement. They prefer the autonomy within the AA construct.²² Most of their concerns centered on cultural differences with the ANG. Both components acknowledged the sentiment that the AA is “self-inflicted redundancy of the two separate organizational structures.”²³ However, some maintenance organizations are still functionally integrated since they have no redundancy in certain specialties. The integration within maintenance still displays cultural and systems disparities evident under the “blended” wing environment. Conversely, the ANG felt that the unity of command achieved through a DCC would help solidify unity of effort and would certainly be more efficient. However, they felt their interests are also better protected through the AA.²⁴ Georgia’s experience with the “blended” wing leaves it unclear whether a DCC in an integrated wing would be enough of an enabler to resolve the issues of effectiveness, ADCON systems differences, and cultural disagreements. Because unity of effort in any association is a function of leadership and personality, perhaps a strong DCC with a supporting organization and leadership team could overcome the several system and cultural differences.

Integrated Wing in Application

Georgia shows the inherent challenges in integration especially when not supported by guidance, authorities, and design. But design must move past concept and theory and be examined in its practical application. The i-Wing as envisioned by the NCSAF is noble in theory, but in practice the question is whether it measures up against the desired end-state of efficiency, effectiveness, and positive total force awareness. The answer depends largely on what is meant by integration. The NCSAF described an i-Wing with integration throughout the entire organization and DCC authority to enhance unity of effort. But integration can be viewed by degrees as well. In examining the i-Wing as presented by the NCSAF, it's clear that i-Wing has several challenges in command authority and selection, ADCON systems and support, funding and fiscal concerns, and cross-component cultural issues.

Challenge #1: Command authority and selection

A key component of the i-Wing is DCC authority which is complicated by restrictions on cross-component command between Titles 10 and 32 forces. However, changes to 32 USC § 325 and special agreement between the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the affected governors have enabled AC and ANG commanders to exercise DCC authority. Outside of an ad hoc DCC appointment for a state emergency or the like, the application of DCC authority in the peacetime associated wing is complex and cumbersome, especially for the ANG officer. For the ANG officer to assume DCC authority, his/her orders must cite 10 USC § 12301 (d) and 32 USC § 325 (a)(2). Both orders give the ANG officer DCC authority.

The above ANG officer example assumes full-time military duty as the DCC. But when considering dual-status military technicians for DCC, 32 USC § 709 (e) currently prohibits giving them DCC authority because it classifies them as civilian employees.²⁵ However,

theoretically the senior AC commander to the DCC (Numbered Air Force Commander in the case of a wing commander) could allow a technician to assume implied authority as a civilian and be placed on Title 10 orders when needed to exercise military command duties. A technician DCC must always be conscious of what authorities s/he is acting under, whether in civilian, Title 10, or Title 32 status.²⁶ This consciousness requires the ANG officer and staff to perpetually document the commander's duty status. "A failure to do so could result in posse comitatus violations, lack of courts-martial jurisdiction, or issuance of unlawful orders."²⁷ Culturally, ANG and AC view the question of civilian command differently. Restriction technicians from acting as DCC would shut out a significant class of ANG technicians from DCC. The AC would need to accept the concept of a civilian/part-time military commander. It's seems unlikely that AC MAJCOMs would endorse this idea. But the legal opinions are mixed. Currently, this very question is being staffed for legal sufficiency to AF/JA and SAF/GC.²⁸

Lastly is the commander selection process of DCCs in an I-Wing. The AC and ANG approach commander selection and grooming from completely different perspectives for both system and cultural reasons. An AC commander candidate meets a HAF-directed commander's selection board where the candidate's record is evaluated for command potential, professional military education (PME) in-residence experience, joint or staff experience, deployments, previous squadron or group command, etc. AC commanders generally serve for two years. The ANG commander candidate is selected by The Adjutant General (TAG) of the state. As the senior military member in the state, the TAG generally is very familiar with the candidates, evaluates their experience in the guard or active duty, their relationships within the guard, command potential, etc. S/he may give extra consideration for in-residence PME or HQ staff experience but recognizes that those opportunities are rarer in the guard. The ANG commander

may serve for several years. Neither component's views are right or wrong. They're just different. It's one of several differences that would have to be resolved between the MAJCOM and Director of the Air National Guard (DANG) who works with TAGs.

DCC authority in an i-Wing is complex and challenging for the AC and ANG. Commander status (Title 10, Title 32, technician) and commander selection are the hottest touch points. Appointment of DCCs realizes minor cost saving by eliminating duplication in the commander positions. However, the reduction has the potential of eliminating several command billets for each component which could negatively affect professional development and grooming of general officers. Its effectiveness is complicated by the difficulties in navigating the execution of Titles 10 and 32 authorities appropriately. The DCC wing commander must also report to two separate chains of command (POTUS and governor).

Challenge #2: ADCON issues within each component

In addition to command authority constraints in an i-Wing, ADCON issues between the AC and ANG components create several challenges not easily overcome, and in some ways exacerbated, through integration. The NCSAF recommends a number of pilot i-Wing programs before seeking full implementation Service wide.²⁹ As I've studied the feasibility of the i-Wing, the ADCON issues are far more than just challenges but are serious barriers to achieving unities of command and effort within this construct. AFI 90-1001 states that each TFIA must maintain separate and distinct ADCON from the other components in several areas.³⁰ At this stage of the Total Force Concept none of the AC and ANG ADCON support systems and structures are interchangeable. The first ADCON disparity relates to the promotion systems. The SAF gives direction to the components through AFI 36-2501 (Promotion of Airmen) and AFI 36-2502 (Promotion of Officers). On the SAF's behalf AFPC implements the AC promotion program

which dictates method, frequency, and standards of the promotion systems.³¹ Following broad direction from the AFIs, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) provides amplifying instructions which dictate a different process, timing, and routing. ANG promotions are routed through the TAG on behalf of the Governor and are managed by NGB. The CNGB acts on behalf of the SAF to federally recognize all promotions.³²

Another key ADCON difference relates to military discipline. AC commanders discipline Title 10 airmen following the UCMJ while ANG Title 32 commanders discipline Title 32 airmen following the state's distinct code of military justice. The separate authorities inherent in Titles 10 (POTUS) and 32 (governor) dictate the rule sets which are supported by separate systems. In an associated wing this discipline disparity between the UCMJ and state codes can cause great confusion and disruption as members observe different standards being administered. Though the state codes are often parallel to the UCMJ, they're unique to their own states. In an i-Wing DCCs would need to exercise great precision and care in administering punishment that withstands legal review from the appropriate jurisdiction yet is perceived as fair by all unit members.

Like promotions and discipline, several other ADCON issues require supporting systems and organizations. These include and are not limited to the personnel management systems, pay systems, distinct UMDs, sourcing for DOC taskings, Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) reporting, and civilian personnel support.³³

The NCSAF envisioned significant manpower savings and efficiencies consolidating overlapping forces.³⁴ However, all of the ADCON responsibilities require trained personnel, organizations, and structures to administer systems that support each component. Anticipated manpower reductions in personnel, finance, logistics, and communications units are therefore unrealistic. CAs and AAs have the advantage over fully integrated wings because their ADCON

chains of command are supported from top to bottom. An i-Wing would lose the advantage of ADCON simplicity because it would still need to create a pseudo or shadow ADCON structure to support the ADCON systems. Though not impossible the administering and controlling part of ADCON would tax the organization from top to bottom and likely fail at efficiency and effectiveness. Though not an officially integrated wing, the 116 ACW de-“blended” back to an AA largely because of ADCON breakdowns.

Challenge #3: Fiscal and funding considerations

Fiscal and funding considerations in an i-Wing are wrought with potential legal landmines. Congress appropriates operations and maintenance (O&M) and personnel funds for the express purpose of supporting the individual components independently.³⁵ Therefore, “appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law.”³⁶ Also, the Antideficiency Act (ADA) “prohibits federal employees from making or authorizing an expenditure from, or creating or authorizing an obligation under, any appropriation or fund in excess of the amount available in the appropriation or fund unless authorized by law.”³⁷ Violations of these provisions could result in fines, removal, and imprisonment.³⁸ AFI 90-1001 states the importance of creating sufficient safeguards to ensure that RC and AC funds are not spent to support the other component’s mission.³⁹ The same criterion applies for supporting the other component with training. The level of training support will generally match the ratio of RC personnel to AC members. So if the ANG makes up 30% of the full-time support, they can support the AC with the same ratio.⁴⁰ These principles apply to dispersal of O&M funds for equipment purchase, office expenses, service contracts, etc. Fiscal awareness extends to execution of flying hours and fuel accounts which are allocated to each component separately. In order to avoid ADA or Purpose violations

these fiscal safeguards are important in any association but are absolutely critical for an i-Wing that is functionally and structurally integrated in personnel, programs, and facilities. The i-Wing may realize some cost savings as facilities and equipment are shared (appropriately) but the level of effort to stay on top of the fiscal situation would be daunting and time-consuming affecting both efficiency and effectiveness.

Challenge #4: Cultural differences

The last challenge this paper briefly addresses is the cultural differences between the components.⁴¹ The cultural differences serve as a lens through which all of the above challenges are viewed. In addition culture is manifest in views on professional and personal development, deployment expectations, fitness, work rules, PME and training priorities, traditions, command and personal relationships, and several other areas. The culture of an organization has two levels: “The invisible level is made up of shared values that tend to persist over time and are harder to change. The visible level of culture includes behaviors and actions, which are easier to change.”⁴² The NCSAF seems to acknowledge both levels of culture while focusing on the unifying elements of our collective culture: “The Airman’s component is neither apparent nor important. In the Total Air Force we envision, the seamlessness of Airmen, their skills and expertise is critical.”⁴³ The Commission sees the i-Wing as one way to gain the cultural awareness and shared vision that lead to true unity of effort throughout the total force. Unity of effort in a wing, regardless of association type, is highly dependent on the strength of the leadership. Through the lens of a TFI-enabled culture a strong leadership team could begin to remove or solve some of the systemic barriers to i-Wing success.

Analysis

Before the AC and ANG embark on the i-Wing quest, they must first ask, “What do we hope to achieve with an i-Wing?” The NCSAF envisioned increased efficiency, effectiveness, and total force awareness, all worthy goals. But is the i-Wing the best model to achieve those objectives or would another existing association construct do so more effectively? At this stage of the TFI timeline, unity of command in a DCC-enabled i-Wing will have a hard time achieving an effective unity of effort. A Wing DCC can establish unity of command within his/her command but up the chain s/he cannot achieve it effectively because s/he must serve two masters: POTUS and the governor. As the clearinghouse for two mutually exclusive sets of orders, Titles 10 and 32, the unity of effort gets bogged down in trying to overcome the challenges of authority, ADCON, fiscal concerns, and cultural differences. When compared to a CA or AA, an i-Wing overpromises on cost savings and efficiency because it still requires several qualified personnel and supporting organizations to manage the disparate ADCON systems. CAs and AAs support their component ADCON systems through much clearer chains of command. Finally, does the i-Wing increase TFI cultural awareness in positive ways? The answer is mixed compared to the other TFIAs. In the short term the cultural differences could hamper the unity of effort because of inexperience with DCC authority and ADCON systems incongruities. However, over time and with the strength of dynamic leadership enabled by DCC authority, the TFI cultural appreciation would improve the unity of effort just as it does when the AC and RC deploy and work together as Title 10 warriors. Is this enough of a reason to create an i-Wing? No, not until the systems and guidance supporting integration catch up to the concept. Collectively the total force enterprise is not ready to implement the i-Wing concept in full. Readiness requires a collaborative and synchronized effort from the Department of Defense,

USAF, and Congress to provide the supporting legislation, authorities, instructions, funding, and systems integration before the i-Wing can be fully implemented.

Recommendations

If the i-Wing is to ever be implemented, several things must happen first. At the headquarters (HQ) level much is already being done to tackle several of the obstacles I've listed. The Total Force Continuum team in AF/A8 is led by three brigadier generals representing the AC, Air Force Reserve, and ANG.⁴⁴ There is a Council of Colonels with representatives from SAF/GC, SAF/FM, AF/REC, ANGRC/JA, NGB/FM, and AF/JA who are working on several TFI initiatives including the legal issues with DCC authority.⁴⁵ Assignments to the various Offices of Personal Responsibility (OPR) reflect a phased approach to the i-Wing.

- **First recommendation (OPR: AF/A8X):** Build a team of experts to understand the strategic direction, understand the operational environment, and define the problem.⁴⁶ This step has already begun with the Total Force Enterprise Evaluation Group.⁴⁷ Next expand the team to include stakeholders from the field representing each component. Update applicable AFIs and the Commander Integration Guide to reflect the DCC and i-Wing concepts.
- **Second recommendation (OPR: AF/A1):** Identify and place Wing commanders as DCCs in existing AAs or CAs. This step has already begun in the 180 FW in Toledo, OH with a AC DCC in a non-associated ANG unit and will happen similarly in the 120 AW in Great Falls, MT. The next step is to identify an existing CA or AA and assign a DCC as the Wing Commander which will help the AC and RC identify the limitations and challenges of exercising DCC authorities, addressing ADCON issues, and building positive cultural awareness.

- **Third recommendation (OPR: AF/A1 and DANG):** Establish a DCC selection criteria in coordination with the AC and DANG who should seek input from state TAGs. Start with the premise of what makes a DCC credible within a cross-component environment.⁴⁸ For wing command, AC DCC candidates should ideally have TFI experience from a previous tour in a CA or AA or have served on a NGB staff. Selectees should attend an ANG Commander's Orientation Course. ANG DCC candidates should have AC experience whether on active duty or on an AC HQ staff. Candidates should have squadron or group command experience. Intermediate or Senior Development Education in-residence should be encouraged and used as a substitute for someone lacking AC experience. Consideration should be given to those with HQ staff experience at the ANG or AF level. Civilian experience should use as comparisons to military experience where appropriate. Selectees should be sent to an AC commander's course prior to assuming command. ANG Field Grade Officers should be given more opportunities to attend PME in-residence.
- **Fourth recommendation (OPR: AFPC/ARPC):** Award TFI credit in an officer's personnel records for members with TFIA or TFI staff experience similar to how Joint credit is awarded. This would allow the selection board to identify TFI experience.
- **Fifth recommendation (OPR: AF/A8X):** Move towards compatibility in personnel, pay, deployment tasking, SORTS reporting, and other systems that would support closer ADCON systems integration at the wing and HQ levels.⁴⁹
- **Sixth recommendation (OPR: AF/A3O-A):** Start a phased approach to the i-Wing after incorporating the experienced gained by DCCs, improving guidance and ADCON systems, clearly developing an Association Plan (A-Plan), and creating flexible TFIA

MOAs. Step 1: appoint a DCC at wing level in a CA/AA. Step 2: appoint a DCC in the wing and group(s). Integrate the wing and group staffs but keep squadrons segregated by component. Step 3: integrate one full group. Step 4: integrate the wing with DCCs at each level. Evaluate the effectiveness throughout the process. Similar concepts drafted at the action officer level reflect this phased approach regarding an i-Wing construct between the 388 FW and 419 FW at Hill AFB, UT. This uncoordinated A-Plan draft is currently being staffed for review.⁵⁰ This phased approach to an i-Wing could and probably should take several years.

Conclusion

When the AC and RC deploy in support of the President, they demonstrate the finest capabilities of the Air Force. They do so with a unity of effort supported by unity of command. The desire to achieve that same unity and synergy has spurred the idea that our AC and RC forces can operate the same way in their home units. Due to constrained budgets and dwindling resources the Air Force continues to search for integration models that synergize the force. The NCSAF's proposal to create the i-Wing moves the Air Force closer to TFIAs that achieve cost efficiencies, increased mission effectiveness, and positive TFI awareness. However, this paper has demonstrated that the i-Wing concept as envisioned by the NCSAF is nowhere near ready for implementation because of lingering questions about command authority and commander selection, ADCON system incongruities between the components, and cultural differences. The USAF should build slowly towards TFI by enabling DCC within mature CA and AA to gain TFI experience and work to overcome the challenges of command authority and selection, ADCON systems issues, and cultural differences. The Higher HQs should build a supporting infrastructure that allows for a slow phased build up towards a fully functioning i-Wing. By taking these

incremental steps the AC and RC forces will work towards becoming a True Total Force that is unified in its effort.

Notes

¹ AFI 90-1001_AFGM2015-01, *Air Force Guidance Memorandum to AFI 90-1001*, 15 January 2015, 1.0.

² AFI 90-1001, *Responsibilities for Total Force Integration*, 29 May 2007, Incorporating Change 1, 25 April 2008, 1.3.

³ The Hybrid Association is also defined but is irrelevant to this paper. See AFI 90-1001_AFGM2015-01, 15 January 2015, 4.2.1.

⁴ Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United State*, 25 March 2013, V-1, 1a.

⁵ Ibid., V-1, 1b.

⁶ ADCON includes “the organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.” See AFI 90-1001, Terms, 30.

⁷ Ibid., Terms, 36.

⁸ The NSCAF was commissioned by the U.S. Congress. See National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force. “Report to the President and Congress of the United States.” January 30, 2014, <http://afcommission.whs.mil/public/docs/NCSAF%20WEB220.pdf> (accessed October 2, 2014), 7.

⁹ Ibid., 85.

¹⁰ Ibid, 29.

¹¹ This paper is effective in addressing the challenges of unity of effort without unity of command. See Caroline Ross Prosch, *Getting to One from Title 10 + Title 32: Unity of Effort in the Homeland* (Monterey: Naval Post Graduate (U.S.). Department of National Security Affairs, 2011).

¹² “Hurricane Katrina. Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters,” May 25, 2006. <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06808t.pdf> (accessed December 13, 2014), 9.

¹³ Dual-status command and DCC are essentially the same thing. DSC is the dual command relationship between the AC and NG forces.

¹⁴ “Hurricane Katrina. Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters”, 44.

¹⁵ Ibid., 45.

¹⁶ 32 U.S.C § 315 defines the authorities of the DSC. However, it does not define the trigger event for invoking DSC in an emergency or the delegated approval authorities for authorizing the DSC. See 32 U.S.C § 315, *Detail of Regular Members of Army and Air Force to Duty with the National Guard*.

¹⁷ GEN Charles H. Jacoby, Jr. and GEN Frank J Grass, "Dual-Status, Single Purpose: A Unified Military Response to Hurricane Sandy," March 13, 2013, <http://www.ang.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123339975> (accessed December 13, 2014).

¹⁸ I conducted several interviews with Georgia Air National Guard leaders to include the 116 ACW/CC, 116 OG/CC, 116 MXG/CC, and 116 FSS/CC and with the active duty leadership in the 461 ACW to include the 461 ACW/CC, 461 OG/CC, 461 OG/CD, 461 OSS/CC, and 461 MXS/CC. Where possible I will try to attribute specific comments to the individual.

¹⁹ Col John Verhage (116 OG/CC), interview by the author, 5 December 2014 at Robins AFB, GA.

²⁰ Confirmed by the 116 ACW/CC, OG/CC, MXG/CC and the 461 ACW/CC, OG/CC, and MXS/CC, interview by the author, December 5, 2014 at Robins AFB, GA.

²¹ Col Henry Cyr (461 ACW/CC), interview by the author, 5 December 2014 at Robins AFB, GA.

²² 461 ACW/CC, 461 OSS/CC, 461 MXS/CC, interview by the author, 5 December 2014 at Robins AFB, GA.

²³ Similar views by each commander I interviewed. Quote is from 116 MXG/CC, interview by the author, 5 December 2014.

²⁴ 116 ACW/CC, 116 OG/CC, 116 MXG/CC, interview by the author, 5 December 2014 at Robins AFB, GA.

²⁵ Dual-status military technician means that to be a technician s/he must retain a military, part-time status. See OpJAGAF 2014-20, Air National Guard 30 September 2014 v2, 4.

²⁶ OpJAGAF 2014-20, Air National Guard 30 September 2014 v2, see note 8.

²⁷ Ibid., see note 15.

²⁸ Lt Col Maren Calvert (Administrative Law Directorate Command and Doctrine Office of the Judge Advocate General, Pentagon), interview by the author, 4 February 2015.

²⁹ National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force. "Report to the President and Congress of the United States." January 30, 2014, 29.

³⁰ AFI 90-1001, *Responsibilities for Total Force Integration*, 29 May 2007, Incorporating Change 1, 25 April 2008, 4.2.2.

³¹ See AFI 36-2502, *Officer Promotion and Selective Continuation*, 16 January 2004 and AFI 36-2501, *Airmen Promotion/Demotion Programs*, 12 December 2014.

³² ANGI 36-2504, *Federal Recognition of Promotion in the Air National Guard (ANG) and as a Reserve of the Air Force Below the Grade of General Officer*, 28 July 2004 (Certified Current 19 August 2013), 1.2.2.

³³ AFI 90-1001, *Responsibilities for Total Force Integration*, 29 May 2007, Incorporating Change 1, 25 April 2008, 4.2.2, 7.2.5.

³⁴ The NCSAF envision a reduction of 200-300 full-time billets in the Mobility Air Forces and 100-200 in the Combat Air Forces. See National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force. "Report to the President and Congress of the United States." January 30, 2014, 32.

³⁵ AFI 90-1001_AFGM2015-01, *Air Force Guidance Memorandum to AFI 90-1001*, 15 January 2015, A4.7.

³⁶ 31 U.S.C. § 1301 (a), *Application*.

³⁷ 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A), *Limitations on Expending and Obligating Amounts*.

³⁸ 31 U.S.C. § 1350, *Criminal Penalty*.

³⁹ There are some exceptions when the support is incidental or doesn't interfere with one's primary mission. See AFI 90-1001_AFGM2015-01, *Air Force Guidance Memorandum to AFI 90-1001*, 15 January 2015, A4.7.1.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, A4.1.

⁴¹ This topic deserves its own extensive study and is beyond the focus of this paper.

⁴² Lisa Haneberg, "How Leaders Can Optimize Organizational Culture," *MPI Consulting*, April 2009, 2, <http://managementcraft.typepad.com/Culture%20Whitepaper%204-09.pdf>. (accessed 10 February 2015).

⁴³ National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force. "Report to the President and Congress of the United States." January 30, 2014, 2.

⁴⁴ Brig Gen Timothy J. Cathcart, (Special Assistant to the Director of the Air National Guard, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.), interview by the author, 23 September 2014.

⁴⁵ Lt Col Maren Calvert (Administrative Law Directorate Command and Doctrine Office of the Judge Advocate General, Pentagon), interview by the author, 4 February 2015.

⁴⁶ Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, 11 August 2011, III-7.

⁴⁷ AFI 90-1001_AFGM2015-01, *Air Force Guidance Memorandum to AFI 90-1001*, 15 January 2015, 2.2.

⁴⁸ The following paper adds some useful insight into what makes ANG officers strategic leaders. See Lt Col Dallas F. Kratzer II, "Growing Strategic Thinkers for the Air National Guard." (Maxwell AB, AL: The School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2010).

⁴⁹ The NCSAF made several proposals to streamline organizations, staff, and systems. They are too numerous to list but are found in Recommendations 6, 13, 34, and 35. See National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force. "Report to the President and Congress of the United States." January 30, 2014, 55-59

⁵⁰ This report was provided to the author by email by Brig Gen Cathcart on 3 October 2014, "Hill F-35 I-Wing Concept, Draft Organizational Views with Options," 22 June 2014 version 1 (uncoordinated draft).

Bibliography

31 U.S.C. § 1301, *Application*.

31 U.S.C. § 1341, *Limitations on Expending and Obligating Amounts*.

31 U.S.C. § 1350, *Criminal Penalty*.

32 U.S.C § 315. *Detail of Regular Members of Army and Air Force to Duty with the National Guard*.

AFI 36-2501. *Airmen Promotion/Demotion Programs*, 12 December 2014.

AFI 36-2502. *Officer Promotion and Selective Continuation*, 16 January 2004.

AFI 90-1001. *Responsibilities for Total Force Integration*. 29 May 2007, Incorporating Change 1, 25 April 2008. April 25 , 2008.

AFI 90-1001_AFGM2015-01, *Air Force Guidance Memorandum to AFI 90-1001*. 15 January 2015.

ANGI 36-2504. *Federal Recognition of Promotion in the Air National Guard (ANG) and as a Reserve of the Air Force Below the Grade of General Officer*, 28 July 2004 (Certified Current 19 August 2013).

General Accounting Office. "Hurricane Katrina. Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters," May 25, 2006.
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06808t.pdf> (accessed December 13, 2014), . n.d.

Grass, Gen. Charles H. and Jacoby, Gen. Frank J. "Dual-Status, Single Purpose: A Unified Military Response to Hurricane Sandy." March 11, 2013.
<http://www.ang.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123339975> (accessed September 22, 2014).

Haneberg, Lisa. "How Leaders Can Optimize Organizational Culture," MPI Consulting, April 2009, 2, <http://managementcraft.typepad.com/Culture%20Whitepaper%204-09.pdf>. (accessed 10 February 2015).

"Hill F-35 I-Wing Concept, Draft Organizational Views with Options," 22 June 2014 version 1 (uncoordinated draft).OpJAGAF 2014-20, Air National Guard 30 September 2014 v2.

Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 25 March 2013.

Joint Publication 5-0. *Joint Operation Planning*. August 11, 2011.

Kratzer, Lt Col Dallas F. II. "Growing Strategic Thinkers for the Air National Guard." (Maxwell AB, AL: The School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2010).

National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force. "Report to the President and Congress of the United States." January 30, 2014,
<http://afcommission.whs.mil/public/docs/NCSAF%20WEB220.pdf> (accessed October 2, 2014).

Prosch, Caroline Ross. "Getting to One from Title 10 + Title 32: Unity of Effort in the Homeland." Monterey: Naval Post Graduate (U.S.). Department of National Security Affairs, 2011.