Problems with Interagency Integration in Contemporary Operations

A Monograph

by

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Problems with Interagency Integration in Contemporary Operations

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An increase in the number of stability and foreign disaster relief operations since the end of the Cold War placed a growing demand on the Department of Defense to integrate operations with outside actors such as the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, and agencies within the United States government. New doctrine emphasizes the Army’s role as influencing, shaping, preventing, and deterring in an attempt to avoid costly, protracted conflicts. As the United States Army emerges from two prolonged counter insurgency operations, improvements in establishing quick and effective integration with the interagency and other actors is necessary to fulfill the Army’s role. Integration however, remains a challenge and often requires time to establish efficient systems. Case studies of the Haitian earthquake in 2010 and the Provincial Reconstruction Team effort in Afghanistan offer an insight into the sources of integration friction. Unclear objectives, poor information sharing, and undefined roles created conflict in civil-military relationships. These issues are due to poor use of existing doctrine to facilitate integrated planning. Past and current doctrine offers guidelines and principles to direct planning. Use of these principles and creating a more integrated Army education system will improve future civil-military relationships in stability and disaster relief operations.

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Abstract

Problems with Interagency Integration in Contemporary Operations, by MAJ Raymond A. Maszarose, 46 pages.

An increase in the number of stability and foreign disaster relief operations since the end of the Cold War placed a growing demand on the Department of Defense to integrate operations with outside actors such as the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, and agencies within the United States government. New doctrine emphasizes the Army’s role as influencing, shaping, preventing, and deterring in an attempt to avoid costly, protracted conflicts. As the United States Army emerges from two prolonged counter insurgency operations, improvements in establishing quick and effective integration with the interagency and other actors is necessary to fulfill the Army’s role. Integration however, remains a challenge and often requires time to establish efficient systems. Case studies of the Haitian earthquake in 2010 and the Provincial Reconstruction Team effort in Afghanistan offer an insight into the sources of integration friction. Unclear objectives, poor information sharing, and undefined roles created conflict in civil-military relationships. These issues are due to poor use of existing doctrine to facilitate integrated planning. Past and current doctrine offers guidelines and principles to direct planning. Use of these principles and creating a more integrated Army education system will improve future civil-military relationships in stability and disaster relief operations.
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<td>Civil Military Coordination Center</td>
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<td>IBM</td>
<td>International Business Machines Corporation</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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Introduction

The whole of government approach in conducting warfare is not a new method or theory. The United States military conducted several campaigns and operations throughout its history that included military and government agency interaction. The United States Army, however, typically viewed these types of operations as less important than operations that solely involved combined arms warfare. A member of the Strategic Studies Institute, Dr. Antulio Echevarria II, argued this was a regular pattern. He stated that the United States Army made a habit of focusing only on conventional warfare until after the first Gulf War. Up until this period, “the U.S. [United States] military… published doctrine covering counter-insurgency operations and military operations other than war; however, these missions were intended to be dealt with by forces specially trained for the purpose, or as a lower priority mission.”1

Research fellow and project director of the Institute for National Security and Counter-Terrorism at Syracuse University, Nicholas Armstrong, stated the recent importance placed on stability operations and the whole of government approach is because of the realization that combat force alone cannot achieve stability effects. He specifically cited the, “trial-by-fire role the United States has played over the last two decades in its involvement in seven major post conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations (Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Iraq) with varying results.”2 The question then arises, what caused difficulty in fully integrating United States military operations with the United States Government interagency


and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) despite the renewed importance of stability operations and the need for a whole of government approach?

First, it is necessary to analyze why exactly integration is important. According to the United States Army doctrine of Unified Land Operations, the threat to United States interests is an enemy that fights in both conventional and unconventional methods.\(^3\) As the Joint Force member largely responsible for land power, the Army defines its role as influencing, shaping, preventing, and deterring adversaries and threats as well as addressing the consequences of catastrophic events – both natural and manmade – to restore infrastructure and reestablish essential services.\(^4\) The Army and the Joint Force alone are incapable of accomplishing this.

Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, states that all current and future military operations involve interagency coordination.\(^5\) The complex operations of shaping, preventing, and deterring require more interagency coordination as these operations address the human dimension of warfare and therefore require Joint Forces to work with foreign governments, militaries, and humanitarian assistance organizations. Operations with these complex lines of effort require the military, the interagency, and NGOs to coordinate to ensure operational objectives achieve strategic end states. Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan, 2001-2014) is an excellent example of complex lines of effort that require Joint Force, interagency, and NGO integration.\(^6\)


The unpredictability of threats in the strategic environment also demands integration. Threats will not allow planners to predict precisely where, when, or in what magnitude the next challenge will appear due to their ability to adapt and change. This unpredictability and varied scope of effort is similar to the response of a natural disaster. The Joint Force must integrate quickly with the interagency and NGOs at the onset of a crisis in order to seize, maintain, and exploit the initiative in an effective manner. Initiative in foreign disaster relief allows planners and those executing the plan to collect information that feeds assessments and allows relief efforts to anticipate demands. Foreign disaster relief operations such as Operation Unified Response (Haitian earthquake of 2010) are increasing since the end of the Cold War and show how crucial integration is in an uncertain environment.7

Examination of the case studies of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Unified Response determine common issues that inhibited interagency and NGO integration across different types of operations. These cases studies provide contemporary examples of interagency integration. They also provide distinct differences in operating environments, established relationships, and time available that draw out overarching problems and solutions. The focus of analysis on these case studies confines evidence of integration difficulties to structures and processes in order to fit these large and complex operations in a monograph style paper. The review of Operation Unified Response narrows evidence to Department of Defense and interagency command structure, additional structures used to facilitate interaction, and practices of integration before the disaster. Review of Operation Enduring Freedom focuses on the role and structure of Provincial reconstruction Teams (PRT) and their interaction with partnered actors.

These aspects of the case studies allow for the examination of interagency coordination without expanding on context that detracts from the overall purpose of the monograph. The purpose of analyzing these two different operations is to draw out common problems with integration across different problem sets and activities. Identification of common integration problems in Operations Unified Response and Enduring Freedom allow for a broader discussion of possible Army and Joint Force adjustments to organization, leadership, and training. Focusing on these overarching issues allows commanders to create a training plan for integration that enables them to respond and effectively integrate in a wide variety of situations.

Primary source material regarding these two case studies is largely still classified or labeled For Official Use Only. Secondary sources make up the majority of information that is available to the public. David DiOrio gives a comprehensive historical overview of Operation Unified Response in *Operation Unified Response- Haiti Earthquake 2010.* Prominent after action reviews conducted include Guha-Sapir’s *Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake* and the Joint Center for Operational Analysis’s *USSOUTHCOM and JTF Haiti… Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force.* Both studies analyze the issues experienced in the early stages of the operation.

Additional studies provided by the Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute, the United

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States Government Accountability Office, and RAND provide supplemental information that outline lessons learned and problems with integration.10

Major case studies conducted on civil-military relations in Operation Enduring Freedom come from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Andrea Yodsampa’s study for International Business Machines Corporation’s (IBM) Center for the Business of Government entitled, *Coordinating for Results: Lessons from a Case Study of Interagency Coordination in Afghanistan*.11 The USAID study covers the struggle of integration within PRTs before 2006 from the civilian perspective and the IBM study gives an independent review of the operation up to 2013. Both agree the lack of civil-military coordination and unclear objectives hampered PRTs early in the operation and these issues carried over to other areas. RAND’s study in *Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations* provides a historical background of the PRT purpose and the issues experienced in making the PRT idea work.12

Journal submissions by Tucker Mansager and Major David Spencer in *Interagency Lessons*


Learned in Afghanistan and Afghanistan’s Nangahar INC illustrate how integration was successful in Afghanistan in some cases and provide a good contrast to determine why other PRTs did not succeed. 13

Operation Unified Response occurred with no forewarning of the event and involved a joint headquarters responsible for directing a large and complex relief effort with interagency, NGOs, host nation, and international forces. The Haitian earthquake of 2010 illustrated some of the common problems of integrating the Department of Defense, the interagency, and NGOs in complex environments. This disaster required one of the largest foreign disaster responses in United States history. The complexity and the scale of this disaster made it an ideal case study to analyze the friction in integrating organizations. The amount of resources and synchronization efforts required for relief efforts give multiple avenues of analysis. The complexity of the situation also stressed systems of integration and helped identify the causes of friction in integration. It is important to note that overall, this relief operation successfully saved many lives and developed ad hoc systems to overcome complex problems.

Operation Enduring Freedom provides a case study to compare integration issues identified in Operation Unified Response. Operation Enduring Freedom is different from Operation Unified Response because it is a protracted operation involving interagency and NGO coordination within the execution of stability operations. This operation is historically significant in that it is the longest operation in US history. The length of the operation allowed the military and interagency to develop their relationship over time and provided a greater source of lessons


learned or mistakes. It also provided a complex environment with many United States and international actors with differing objectives attempting to achieve the end state of a legitimate and capable Afghan government.

Friendly organizations within Operation Enduring Freedom developed relationships over a period of thirteen years, allowing them to refine their practices of integration. The interactions, motivations, and differing objectives of these actors over an extended period provided a unique case study to determine best practices of integration in a protracted operation. A unique example within this operation is the PRT. The United States Government created the PRT in 2003 to address the growing need for specialization in reconstruction efforts. Teams typically consisted of representatives from the Department of Defense, interagency, Afghan government, and sometimes NGOs. The concept meant to provide a joint effort within a small cell focused on providing unity of effort among lead actors operating within a designated territory. PRTs provided a unique role in operating at the tactical level to accomplish operational and strategic objectives. This aspect of their mission gives an opportunity to analyze integration of Operation Enduring Freedom at the tactical level.

The framework for military, interagency, and NGO integration established in *Joint Publication 3-08* provides the lens and criteria to evaluate these case studies and determine overarching issues present in integration. *Joint Publication 3-08* in its 1996 version gives fundamental guidelines and recommendations for interagency coordination. The 2008 and 2011 versions expanded on these but the fundamental ideas are unchanged from version to version. The criteria used in this paper come from these principles. They include: the establishment of clearly defined objectives amongst all parties involved, development of systems of information sharing that allow for a common operating picture, and defined roles for each participant to determine responsibilities.
The Joint Force and the interagency create clearly defined objectives through planning that includes major stakeholders to help create agreed upon objectives and a clearly defined end state. Integrated training facilitates relationships and builds interoperability. A consideration during this process includes the difference in military planning and civilian agency planning. Military planning tends to focus on short term objectives that meet a military end state. Civilian agencies within and outside of the United States Government tend to focus on goals that take longer to develop and are more human or politically centered. Approaches to problems possess different immediate and intermediate objectives as different viewpoints of time available determine different lines of effort. Institutional differences do not only occur in The Department of Defense and civilian agencies. Differences occur between, among and in some cases within civilian agencies. The same is true with the Department of Defense.

Knowing that these differences occur necessitates venues to establish common objectives that incorporate stakeholders - intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), the interagency, NGOs, and host nation agencies - within the operational environment. The integration of planning helps to eliminate or provide an opportunity to mitigate bias of individual actors and helps to identify important planning assumptions. All of these different viewpoints help inform the evaluation of the current situation and lead to the development of shared objectives, end state, and transition criteria. The planning phase establishes these early on and evaluates them as conditions within the operating environment change. Not all organizations will share these same ideas due to differing military, economic, or diplomatic backgrounds, motivations, or values. In particular, NGOs commonly prefer to remain neutral actors and may possess objectives specifically contrary to

United States military objectives. Planning must address these different motivations and develop methods of coordination to keep other organizations informed. The benefit of the collaboration establishes common lines of efforts by those who participate and an understanding of purpose of action by those who do not. The understanding of purpose helps mitigate opportunities for misinformation or misinterpretation of United States actions.

Other methods to integrate planning and establish common objectives are through combined joint training exercises. Training should focus on identifying and assessing agency capabilities and core competencies, identifying procedural disconnects and attaining unity of effort. Opportunities for Department of Defense units to incorporate interagency and NGOs into training can be coordinated through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Interagency Training Coordinator Working Group under the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorate J-7 (Joint Force Development), the Inter Action program at the Joint Readiness Training Center, and through senior service training programs. Integrated training helps actors from civilian agencies learn how the Joint Forces conduct the planning process and vice versa. More importantly, it facilitates relationships, understanding of the culture of counterparts, and improves interoperability.

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16 Ibid., I-11-14. This portion of JP 3-08 outlines eight actions that facilitate interagency integration with military activities.
17 Ibid., III-13.
18 Ibid., III-13
Establishing inclusive information systems enhances integration established through planning and training. They enable shared understanding of objectives among stakeholders, communicate emergent challenges during execution, and synchronize efforts to allow effective use of resources. *Joint Publication 3-08* (1996) identifies the Civil Military Coordination Center
(CMOC) as a common method to incorporate IAs, NGOs, HN agencies, and other organizations located within the operating environment into operational planning (See Figure 1). There is no standard organization of a CMOC, as each center addresses specific concerns within specific operating environments.\(^{19}\) In large-scale humanitarian operations, the CMOC becomes the focal point for coordination between military and civilian agencies.\(^{20}\) Establishing voice and digital systems with published operating procedures understood by all actors facilitates timely sharing of information within the CMOC and the Joint Operating Environment. Additionally, classification procedures that allow the interagency and NGOs to have access to information that involves planning, execution of operations, and the ability to maintain the initiative develop legitimacy of the team.

Clearly understood roles and responsibilities are necessary to execute successful interagency operations.\(^{21}\) This includes a definition of supported and supporting relationships at each level. Development of detailed lines of authority at the strategic and operational level mitigates the risk of confusion and helps achieve unity of effort.\(^{22}\) This applies not just to the interagency, but also to the UN, NGOs, and host nation organizations. Additionally, understood roles and responsibilities within DOD structures create clear internal coordination points that in turn allow outside agencies the ability to understand where their points of contact within the DOD structure exist.

These ideas establish the criteria to evaluate the preceding case studies in Section II (Operation Unified Response) and Section III (Operation Enduring Freedom). Evaluation of the case studies demonstrates that a lack of common objectives, poor information sharing, and

\(^{19}\) JP 3-08 (1996), III-16.
\(^{20}\) Ibid., III-16.
\(^{21}\) Ibid., I-1.
\(^{22}\) Ibid., I-13.
undefined roles and responsibilities are major causes for problems in integration between the
Department of Defense and the interagency. Outlined within Joint Publication 3-08 are
guidelines to fix these problems. All complex situations contain a degree of uncertainty and the
dynamics of where, when, and the cause of the crisis introduce friction into any plan. In addition,
Carl von Clausewitz points out that human interaction and their interpretations of information
exacerbate friction at all levels.23 The focus of this analysis is to illustrate ways to mitigate
sources of friction in integration through use of existing doctrine. In addition to following
document, creation of a common interagency planning method and career incentives to participate
in interagency schools would also help facilitate long-term integration.

Integration Issues in Foreign Disaster Relief

On January 12, 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck the island of Haiti twenty-five
kilometers southwest of Port-au-Prince. The massive earthquake destroyed infrastructure across a
radius of over forty kilometers and killed an estimated 230,000 people, injured almost two
hundred thousand, and displaced over one million in Haiti (See Figure 2). The government of
Haiti declared a national emergency and requested United States aid. On January 13, the
Department of Defense tasked the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to support
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and its Office of Disaster
Assistance.24 Lieutenant General Ken Keen established JTF Haiti on January 14 and began
Operation Unified Response. Unified Response consisted of over seventeen thousand United
States military personnel, thirty-three naval vessels, and over three hundred aircraft. Major

23 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard,
24 Checcine, The U.S. Military Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, 1-5.
participating units were the 22nd and 24th Marine Expeditionary Units, 2nd Brigade 82nd Airborne Division, and XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters.25

Unified Response consisted of five phases.26 Phase I began on January 14 and consisted of the initial response focused on immediate lifesaving actions, situational assessment, and crisis action planning.27 This phase lasted until February 5. Phase II focused on supporting USAID and on immediate disaster relief of the affected population. Humanitarian efforts continued throughout the entire operation but Phase III transitioned to infrastructure restoration as the center of operations in mid-March. JTF Haiti planned a phase IV but never implemented it. Phase IV planning involved support to the Haitian government with the intent to restore rule of law and local governance. This portion of the plan went unexecuted because the Haitian population was largely cooperative throughout Operation Unified Response.28 The last phase of operations provided support to civil governance. The operation terminated on 1 June once NGOs and the Haitian government provided effective humanitarian assistance to the population without significant Department of Defense assistance.29

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti conducted operations in Haiti before the earthquake and provided a Joint Operations Tasking Center to coordinate the cluster system of NGOs grouped along lines of effort such as logistics, health, nutrition, etc. The Joint Operations Tasking Center’s purpose was to operate in coordination with the Humanitarian Assistance

28 Ibid., 42.
29 Ibid., 37-38.
Coordination Center established by JTF Haiti to coordinate and allocate humanitarian assistance resources throughout Haiti (See Figure 3).\textsuperscript{30}

![Map of Haitian Earthquake](http://www.usaid.gov/gsearch/haiti%2Bmaps)

Figure 2. Map of Haitian Earthquake


Figure 3. Organization of Humanitarian Assistance in Haiti


Operation Unified Response was a successful humanitarian and disaster relief operation but problems during the initial period of relief efforts hampered integration. These issues were the initial command structure of SOUTHCOM, the lack of coordination between the Joint Operations Tasking Center and the JTF Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, and the lack of clear objectives between USAID and JTF Haiti. The initial configuration of SOUTHCOM provided a major obstacle to planning and coordination. This created two direct negative impacts.

The first impact effected JTF Haiti’s ability to communicate effectively with SOUTHCOM. SOUTHCOM reorganized its staff in 2008 from a traditional joint staff configuration to a functional configuration (See Figure 4). The purpose of this was to develop an organizational structure that facilitated collaboration with the interagency and other stakeholders in the region. This method of staff organization was largely successful in everyday operations but
caused great confusion at the onset of operations in Haiti. JTF Haiti organized in a traditional joint staff method and could not communicate effectively with SOUTHCOM. The functional departments of SOUTHCOM split and integrated the traditional joint staff departments. Disorganized lines of responsibility between the SOUTHCOM and the JTF Haiti staff caused confusion in reporting, making the already difficult task of forming a JTF even more challenging. Additionally, the SOUTHCOM structure “lacked a division to address planning for future operations, which… is necessary to proper planning cycles and divisions of labor, and to develop the necessary guiding documents for operations occurring over 30 days.”

In addition, there was also no plan to augment the SOUTHCOM staff to meet the growing requirements of operations. The staff configuration and the lack of an augmentation plan prevented the initial few augmentees that did arrive from other Combatant Commands and agencies from effectively integrating. The SOUTHCOM structure eventually reorganized into traditional joint staff departments on day five of operations (See Figure 5) but initial confusion created a negative impact on operations.

31 Joint Center for Operational Analysis, USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti, 2.
Figure 4. Initial SOUTCOM structure


Figure 5. Adjusted SOUTCOM structure

The second negative impact of SOUTHCOM’s initial configuration was on control and coordination of logistics. Initially there was little awareness at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels of what supplies were available in logistic caches, specifically medical supplies. Movement and distribution of supplies was very slow and disorganized until a Joint Logistics Center was established later in the operation. Confusion of logistical reporting between the JTF and SOUTHCOM facilitated a poor logistics common operating picture that hampered effective distribution of much needed supplies early on in the operation. This issue affected not only US military efforts, but also the interagency and NGO organizations that relied on the effective distribution of supplies to assist in relief efforts. In particular, the significant lack of awareness regarding medical capabilities available and the capacity of facilities led to uneven or ineffective distribution of medical supplies. SOUTHCOM and JTF Haiti provided an overall effective response but, “planning and coordination shortfalls hindered its efficiency and, potentially, its effectiveness.”

The Department of State also had trouble in establishing its roles and responsibilities among the many agencies in Haiti. The National Security Council designated USAID as the lead agency, but USAID found it difficult to enforce its authority. United States Government agencies that responded to Haiti chose to primarily report to and act upon the guidance of their individual department heads back in Washington, DC rather than coordinate their actions through USAID. Agency representatives generally chose not to follow instructions from USAID due in part to


35 Ibid., 11.

interagency rivalries. The lack of communication and information sharing created a poor common
operating picture amongst the interagency. 37

One specific example was the conflict between USAID and the Office for Reconstruction
and Stabilization. The expertise “in the United States State Department’s Office for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), for instance, were not employed due to an internal rift
between USAID and S/CRS stemming from competing mission sets, budgetary considerations,
and personalities.” 38 Even within USAID there were conflicting command structures that,
“created friction, complicated the response, and weakened the coordination.” 39

Problems with initial command structures created confusion in establishing roles and
responsibilities in SOUTHCOM and USAID. This prevented proper integration at the operational
level and delayed necessary planning. Interagency integration with USSOUTHCOM during
steady state operations worked well due to their functional staff organization. 40 They did not take
into consideration that with a new problem, a natural disaster, that they would have to reassess
their staff organization. Instead, they continued with the functional organization and created
unclear roles and responsibilities between themselves and JTF Haiti. This not only created
integration problems within these two headquarters, but also created a confusing organization that
hurt the military’s unity of effort with other agencies. 41 Actors at the SOUTHCOM, JTF, and
interagency did not possess a shared understanding of the military lines of responsibility at the

39 Guha-Sapir, Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake, 64.
41 Michael T. Koch, HA/DR Lessons Learned (Newport: Joint Military Operations Department, 2011), 9-10, accessed April 24, 2014,
operational level that *JP 3-08* states must exist in order to mitigate risk and achieve unity of effort.\textsuperscript{42} USAID’s problems with defining roles and responsibilities within the interagency exacerbated this problem.

Information sharing during Operation Unified Response was one of the bright spots in coordination and integration but still had its issues. Lieutenant General Keen decided early on to keep as much information as possible unclassified in order to share it with other civilian actors. The JTF established a system of communication with USAID and NGOs through Blackberry text messaging. They also developed a humanitarian assistance common operating picture through Google Earth that identified displaced person locations and capabilities or resources needed at these locations.\textsuperscript{43} The use of All Partners Access Network also helped synchronize the relief efforts of NGOs and the interagency by providing an unclassified common user network that proved to be a good source of networking and information sharing.\textsuperscript{44} JTF Haiti also initiated an effective strategic messaging campaign by establishing a Joint Interagency Information Center that coordinated talking points, themes, and messages to provide a unified front to the people of Haiti and the world.\textsuperscript{45}

Despite all of these successes, issues still hampered information sharing. The largest source of friction was between the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center and the Joint Operations Tasking Center. JTF Haiti established the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42} *JP 3-08* (1996), I-13.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Guha-Sapir, *Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake*, 79. All Partners Access Network is an online network accessed through the common internet that enables the Department of Defense to interface with non Department of Defense agencies and groups. For more information on APAN, go to https://www.apan.org/pages/about.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Peace Keeping, *Observations and Recommendations Concerning HA/DR Operations Conducted in Haiti January-March 2010*, 8.
\end{itemize}
Center at the United States embassy while the UN established the Joint Operations Tasking Center at its logistics base. The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center provided a coordination node with USAID, the Joint Operations Tasking Center, and NGOs to create a common humanitarian operating picture. The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center also conducted other tasks that included providing security for NGO food distribution and creating a prioritized list of requirements. The Joint Operations Tasking Center also provided coordination efforts and provided tactical security to NGOs. This created a duplication of efforts where the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center focused on United States military missions and the Joint Operations Tasking Center focused on the cluster system and NGOs. Security clearance concerns at the embassy deterred NGOs from working directly with the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center. A seventeen-person liaison element from the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center established a link to the Joint Operations Tasking Center but personnel were unfamiliar with UN procedures and coordination was limited during the first weeks of operation.46

The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center also failed to use the Mission Tasking Matrix system commonly used by USAID and United States military forces in disaster relief situations. The matrix system compiles all requests for relief and resources in order to prioritize distribution. It also tracks completed missions and which ones are still outstanding or emerging. During the initial period of relief, this was acceptable as systems were not in place and demand for resources necessitated an ad hoc distribution system. However, the Mission Tasking Matrix still went unutilized resulting in wasted resources as the operation moved into February. In several instances, United States military airdropped food and other resources into urban areas that

caused rioting. In other cases, the military established displaced persons camps without the support of the local government or NGOs.\footnote{Guha-Sapir, \textit{Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake}, 68-71.}

Another issue that complicated coordination between the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center and Joint Operations Tasking Center was the overuse of the For Official Use Only classification in report generation. For Official Use Only is an unclassified designation that places restrictions on where information can be stored or distributed. The use of this classification limited the amount of information shared between the military, NGOs, and the UN. In turn, this created problems with integration and prolonged transition of operations from the United States military to NGOs.\footnote{Peace Keeping, \textit{Observations and Recommendations Concerning HA/DR Operations Conducted in Haiti January-March 2010}, 2-3.}

The Joint Operations Tasking Center and Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center suffered from miscommunication, duplication of efforts, and over classification of information. These areas of poor information sharing created problems with integration. JTF Haiti failed to create effective systems to share information with the UN Joint Operations Tasking Center. The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell did not follow doctrine and establish a common system for sharing information. As described earlier, a system was available but went unused because of lack of communication. The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell provided a similar role to the CMOC as outlined in \textit{JP 3-08}.\footnote{JP 3-08 (1996), III-16.} Even though the military provided a supporting role within this operation, Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell still had the responsibility within doctrine to integrate the Joint Operations Tasking Center into military operations and ensure duplication of effort did not occur. The Mission Tasking Matrix system was not present in doctrine at the time of this operation. \textit{JP 3-29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance}
Assistance currently address the Mission Tasking Matrix as the USAID method to request for assistance. This inclusion emphasizes the fact that the military is responsible for attempting to incorporate outside organizations and their systems of information sharing into operations to prevent redundancy.

Admittedly, JP 3-08 in its 1996 version does not go into significant detail regarding information management in foreign relief efforts. The 2006 and 2011 versions expand on this topic and provide much more detail. The 1996 version does state however, that proper conduct of information management prevents NGOs and other agencies from feeling alienated or used only as information sources. This was not always the case in Haiti. This doctrinal consideration provides guidance to help make proper decisions on locations of coordination centers to encourage outside agency participation and avoid the over classification of information.

Failure to create common objectives among the United States military, USAID, NGOs, and the UN for SOUTHCOM response to disaster relief disrupted integration during the initial stages of the operation. SOUTHCOM successfully integrated the interagency and NGOs into its steady state operations but never exercised its augmentation and response plan to a large natural disaster. An after action review conducted by the Government Accountability Office recommended that SOUTHCOM review these plans and assess them through training exercises.

Exercising the plan may have recognized the problems inherent in conducting a large contingency


operation in SOUTHCOM’s steady state organization and identified the need to rehearse transitioning the headquarters from steady state to traditional joint staff organization. As described earlier, integration and augmentation for JTF Haiti also suffered from poor planning. The plan also lacked a concept of operations with an associated Time Phased Deployment Data built for disaster relief. The lack of adequate planning allowed for the development of different objectives among the actors in Haiti. One example is the focus of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center on short-term objectives and its failure in many instances to coordinate with the Joint Operations Tasking Center to provide long-term solutions to humanitarian problems.

SOUTHCOM missed an opportunity to refine its disaster response plan by not conducting an exercise with NGOs and the interagency to examine it. As JP 3-08 describes, conducting exercises with other agencies facilitates understanding of partner organization procedures and includes them in the overall planning process. A combined effort in planning allows the actors involved to determine initial objectives if they were to implement the plan. SOUTHCOM failed to develop initial agreed upon objectives to facilitate timely coordination between agencies at the onset of operations.

Issues in clearly defining roles and responsibilities, sharing information, and establishing clear objectives hindered initial United States military integration with the interagency, NGOs, and the UN. The original structure of SOUTHCOM, the inadequate information sharing between the coordination centers, and an underdeveloped plan contributed to these issues. JTF Haiti and SOUTHCOM overcame these issues through their prior relationships with the host nation and local agencies but the initial uncoordinated response caused time to be wasted figuring out how to

54 Joint Center for Operational Analysis, USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti, 6-7.
fix these problems. Doctrine, *JP 3-08* in this case, helps to identify these problems before they happen and gives planning guidelines to avoid these issues. Evaluation of the next case study, Operation Enduring Freedom, finds these same problems found in foreign disaster relief are also resident in stability operations.

**Integration Issues in Stability Operations**

Operation Enduring Freedom began in 2001 in response to the Al Qaeda attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September of 2001. The Taliban government of Afghanistan facilitated these attacks by harboring Osama bin Laden and allowing him to freely operate against the United States. The United States initiated military activities in Afghanistan when the Taliban refused to hand bin Laden over to the United States for prosecution. United States and British Special Forces made up the majority of allied ground forces. They advised and assisted the Afghan Northern Alliance in the overthrow of the Taliban to prevent the continued use of Afghanistan as a terrorist safe haven.

Operations evolved into stability and reconstruction operations that required capabilities and resources outside of Special Forces ability. US and allied Civil Affairs units began to arrive in theater to assume this role and formed the core of Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells. These units provided humanitarian assistance, small-scale reconstruction projects, and a means to coordinate with NGOs, the UN, and other United States agencies operating in given areas. These teams did not possess the capability to create stability across a wide area and often found their efforts duplicated by other actors. To address this problem, Combined Joint Task Force 180, with the assistance of USAID and the United States Embassy Team in Afghanistan, established Joint Regional Teams in 2003, later renamed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).  

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Organization (NATO) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) later expanded the PRT program to over 20 teams at their height of execution in 2006 to 2007 (See Figure 6).  

The formation of these teams represented an ad hoc, improvised response to a capability gap. Teams suffered from a lack of clear strategic, operational, and tactical objectives until after 2006 when products such as the *ISAF PRT Handbook* and the Integrated Civil-Military Action Group developed specific guidance for PRTs. Objectives at the tactical level became confused because of the unclear roles and responsibilities within the team. The predominance of military personnel within the PRT structure caused some teams to deviate from the task of reconstruction and place the focus on security missions. In other cases, the bias of landowners toward security missions prevented PRTs from focusing on reconstruction. The confused roles and unclear objectives created stovepipe reporting and caused duplication of efforts. The overall military presence in PRTs deterred some NGOs from cooperating with them. The PRT system steadily improved over the thirteen-year experience in Afghanistan, especially after 2006, but early problems lost time and wasted resources.


60 Yodsampa, “Coordinating for Results,” 28-29.
Neither the Department of State nor Defense ever clearly defined the objectives of PRTs.\textsuperscript{61} Initial objectives came from Combined Joint Task Force 180 but these were “common conceptual understandings” never specifically defined to the teams.\textsuperscript{62} The PRT steering committee charter of 2004, before its revisions in 2006 and 2008, outlined broad strategic goals for the committee itself, but never directed objectives and tasks for the tactical teams on the


\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 51.
ground. As a result, wide differences existed in each team’s definition of its mission and objectives with each agency within the team drawing their own conclusions. The ISAF PRT Handbook finally provided specific guidance in 2006 after three years of PRT operations in Afghanistan.

The unorganized structure of the PRTs also contributed to unclear objectives. PRTs generally consisted of 50-100 personnel but varied greatly, most often described as, “a CMOC on steroids.” Ideal composition of a team consisted of civilian representatives from various interagency groups, a representative of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, and United States military members designated to provide Civil Affairs assistance and security (See Figure 7). The idea behind this structure was to create situational awareness and understanding among diverse stakeholders to “develop a common operating picture in order to produce intelligence and civil information for efficient resource allocation.” Within the team, “DOD was assigned responsibility for improving security in their area of operation, all logistical support, and providing force protection for all PRT members, including civilians. USAID was given the lead on reconstruction; and DOS was responsible for political oversight, coordination, and


64 Yodsampa, “Coordinating for Results,” 13.

65 Szayna, Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability, 49.


67 Szayna, Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability, 54.
Personnel availability sometimes limited the number of civilian representatives on the team. Commanders and the military staff often had little experience with reconstruction operations. Most of their training came from a three-month train up at Fort Bragg, North Carolina directly before deployment. Teams did not form until they met in theater, usually with unsynchronized individual deployment rotations. Lack of experience, training as a team, and the general ad hoc nature of the group led to a lack of civil-military coordination, no establishment of standard operating procedures, and unclear objectives for the team.

The Department of Defense did not coordinate with the Department of State at the operational level to provide clear obtainable objectives for the PRTs. The objectives available from the PRT Steering Committee did not inform military training at Fort Bragg. Furthermore, Combined Joint Task Force 180 and ISAF failed to translate the Steering Committee’s strategic guidance into military objectives that supported the diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives of the Steering Committee. *JP 3-08* describes this as a necessary step in creating success in joint operations and unified actions. It also points out that even though the Department of Defense may have little control over individual agency agendas, it is still responsible to interface with those agencies to ensure mission accomplishment. Military planning and establishment of objectives for the PRTs did not follow these guidelines and therefore contributed to the difficulties in establishing effectively integrated teams.

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The PRT ad hoc organization created disjointed efforts within the team and with other partners that confused roles and responsibilities. As noted earlier, the majority of the PRT personnel and its resources were military. The military dominance within the team created a largely military culture that focused on security missions rather than reconstruction. The little training that most military members of the PRTs received on reconstruction also caused them to focus PRT efforts towards security and not reconstruction. Some PRT commanders saw the civilian members of their team as advisors rather than members of a team that held a specific role.
to direct reconstruction efforts. These commanders believed their authority was final within the
team and often times overruled civilian representatives on issues of reconstruction. 72

Failure to follow established roles also led to ad hoc project implementation informed by
higher headquarters demands rather than local dynamics. 73 The uncoordinated use of project
funds provides an example. The Commander Emergency Response Program developed by the
Department of Defense and funding supplied directly by USAID comprised the two main
methods of project subsidy within the PRT. The Commander Emergency Response Program
provided military commanders of PRTs funding up to $25,000 and allowed rapid completion of
projects. 74 USAID required that all funding requests moved through its headquarters in Kabul.
This system of approval sometimes took more than six months. 75 The slow process for approving
funds decreased USAID’s worth to military commanders. 76 As a result, commanders focused on
CERP funds and ignored USAID concerns. As pressure mounted for PRTs to produce results,
commanders began rapidly spending money to create projects without a proper understanding of
the environment or the negative impacts the project might create. PRT commanders created a go-
it alone attitude “which resulted in wasteful duplication of efforts and working at cross-purposes
with civilians.” 77

A 2013 case study on interagency integration by the IBM Center for the Business of
Government highlights this problem. A military unit planned and executed a school building

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72 United States Agency for International Development, Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, 13.
73 Ibid., 10, 14.
74 Yodsampa, “Coordinating for Results,” 20.
75 United States Agency for International Development, Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, 16.
76 Yodsampa, “Coordinating for Results,” 20.
77 Ibid., 34.
project for a village without coordinating with civilian agencies or the local PRT. Local villagers never used the building for its intended purpose and instead used it as a barn to shelter goats. 78 Lack of coordination made mistakes like this common as the military tended to sacrifice sustainability for speedy results. 79

Issues with roles and responsibilities did not solely rest between the military and interagency. As in Haiti, undefined authorities amongst the civilian agencies degraded unity of effort. National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization within the Department of State in 2004. This office holds the responsibility for coordinating reconstruction and stabilization efforts among government agencies. 80 The current language within NSPD-44 does not give the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability the authority or the budget necessary to accomplish the tasks assigned and only creates another line of bureaucracy without the capacity to lead. 81 The inability for this office to coordinate efforts led interagency team members to report their analysis and findings directly to their own department heads at the United States embassy in

Afghanistan. The Department of State did not create a shared interagency problem statement or a system of accountability to support coordinated reconstruction efforts. Roles and responsibilities between civilian and military actors blurred because some military commanders did not understand their role within the PRT or the function the PRT provided. Part of planning for integrated operations is creating clearly defined roles and responsibilities to ensure a mutually agreed understanding of objectives to pursue, the means to accomplish them, and who will do what within policy operation coordination. Military commanders at the operational and tactical levels did not clearly articulate to PRT commanders their role in supporting reconstruction efforts. Operational commanders also failed to ensure Brigade Combat Team commanders used PRTs within their designated role or did not provide guidance to utilize them properly. Failure to define clearly the role of PRTs in planning resulted in military commanders using teams for unintended purposes and helped prolong efforts at reconstruction. The lack of defined authorities among civilian agencies and the slow process of attaining USAID funds served to reinforce the reliance on military methods and further degraded civilian authority in reconstruction.

The divide in military and civilian coordination also manifested itself in reporting and information sharing. Some PRTs limited their information sharing with NGOs under the perception that NGOs might share that information with insurgent elements. This in turn deterred NGOs from sharing information with the PRTs. It also provided incentive not to work with PRTs because the object of retaining an impartial image outweighed the meager benefits of cooperation.


83 Irwin, *Disjointed Ways, Disunified Means*, 216.

Lack of communication caused duplicated projects and wasted resources. Coordination sometimes lacked even on simple ideas such as designated locations of PRTs. Brigade Combat Team commanders on occasion made decisions to move PRTs or to consolidate them within a Forwarding Operating Base without consulting USAID or the Embassy on their movement. Some Brigade Combat Team commanders conducted key leader engagements and made decisions that affected PRT projects without disseminating the results to the team. In one case, a commander took a newly appointed governor to meet with local officials without bringing along a Department of State member who had specifically asked to go.

Communication also lacked within civilian agencies. Agencies that started projects at the national level did not communicate the purpose or existence of these projects to agency representatives at the PRT level. USAID’s initiation of the Rural Agricultural Market Program provides one example. USAID’s national program provided an alternative agricultural livelihood to poppy growers in an attempt to interrupt the drug trade and cut funding to insurgents. USAID and other government agency members at the PRT received little information about the project and experienced difficulty coordinating local agricultural efforts with the national program. The opposite problem occurred as well. PRTs did not coordinate with national programs at times because their focus remained at the local level. An early case demonstrated this problem. PRTs developed schools in areas absent sufficient educational structures but did not coordinate with the Afghan government to determine the availability of teachers and school supplies. A poor common

87 Ibid., 14.
88 Ibid., 15-16.
operating picture of local and national projects among civilian agencies representatives degraded their credibility within the PRT and reinforced their perceived role as advisors to the military.89

The lack of communication directly led to integration difficulties. JP 3-08 describes communication and coordination as necessary to overcome unclear objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personal limitations.90 Dialog and interdependency are two of the most important factors that lead to lasting bonds between agencies and organizations.91 Operational leaders in Afghanistan attempted to find a solution by establishing venues to encourage communication. The formation of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan in 2003 helped coordinate interagency efforts. Major General David Barno took command and received a mandate “from General John Abizaid, Commander of CENTCOM [United States Central Command], to strengthen civil-military coordination. United States Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad arrived six weeks after Barno with a parallel mandate that extended to President Bush.”92 General Barno placed his office and headquarters at the embassy in Kabul to facilitate communication with the Ambassador. The two developed an outstanding working relationship and implemented programs to enhance interagency coordination. The Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan Commander and the United States Ambassador to Afghanistan created a Joint Interagency Task Force composed of an embassy interagency planning group and an interagency resources cell. These two bodies coordinated resources and planning at the theater and regional level.93 The ambassador also instituted a regular meeting among high-level leaders in Afghanistan known as the “Core Group.” This body met regularly and consisted of the

89 United States Agency for International Development, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 9.
90 JP 3-08 (1996), I-4-5.
91 Ibid., I-10.
92 Yodsampa, “Coordinating for Results,” 16.
93 Ibid., 16-18.
Commander Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan, the Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation Afghanistan, the Central Intelligence Agency Chief of Station, and sometimes the USAID Mission Director along with the Ambassador.\textsuperscript{94}

Unfortunately, the follow-on commander and ambassador, Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry and Ronald Nueman, shut down the Joint Interagency Task Force. Eikenberry also moved his office from the embassy to Camp Eggers in 2005. While the two leaders still collaborated on issues such as road construction and electricity, the breakup of the Joint Interagency Task Force was a significant loss to interagency coordination.\textsuperscript{95} Military leaders did not create a new venue to coordinate interagency action until 2007. The Civil-Military Action Group provided joint planning on a temporary basis focused on reconstruction efforts. Two members of the Office for Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability headed the panel that included input from USAID and other agencies.\textsuperscript{96} The group met in 2007 and 2008 to establish an integrated joint civil-military plan at the operational and tactical levels and included individual PRTs in planning process. The planning group’s success in clearly communicating objectives and sharing information across multiple levels facilitated its formal inclusion as a permanent planning body within the embassy. \textsuperscript{97}

Establishment of this group created a venue for dialog and created interdependence among civil-military actors. It met the guidelines for interagency integration described in \textit{JP 3-08} as clearly defining objectives, establishing a common frame of reference, and developing courses of action designed to accomplish unity of effort.\textsuperscript{98} It also provided a focal point for civil-military

\textsuperscript{94} Mansager, "Interagency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan," 82.
\textsuperscript{95} Yodsampa, “Coordinating for Results,” 23.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., 28.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{98} JP 3-08 (1996), I-12.
considerations tailored to the specific mission set of the PRTs that supported overall mission accomplishment.99 The organization and function of the PRT in Nangahar Province, Afghanistan also provides a good example successful integration.

The PRT in Nangahar Province from 2007 to 2008 enjoyed a positive working relationship with the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (Task Force Bayonet). Members of both groups traveled to the United States Embassy in Kabul and established a sixty-two page business plan that outlined specific objectives, roles, and methods of operation to improve the economic situation in Nangahar Province. The planning group identified two major problems specific to Nangahar. Up to thirty percent of crops rotted in farmer’s fields due to insufficient road networks. They also identified electricity as critical. Over thirty-eight businesses closed within a year due to high fuel costs to run generators. The business plan developed quick impact as well as long-term projects along lines of effort that addressed their problems. The group effectively created a problem statement, an operational approach, and shared them with stakeholders in the Nangahar area.100

The planning group also created a system known as district mapping. District mapping provided a common operating picture of projects underway, completed, and anticipated within the province. Coordination with the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, the interagency, and the Afghan National Government made this system successful and kept it up to date. The up-to-date operating picture reduced redundancy and waste of resources.101

Agreed upon roles and the collocation of the PRT with Task Force Bayonet contributed the most to overall success. The PRT held regular meetings that involved the PRT commander, a Department of State representative, and a member of USAID. Together they planned and

100 Spencer, "Afghanistan’s Nangahar INC,” 38.
101 Ibid., 38.
coordinated projects to synchronize efforts with their collocated Brigade Combat Team.

Collocation also helped the PRT quickly react to emerging problems. In one example provided by a 2013 IBM case study of interagency cooperation in Afghanistan, riots erupted in Jalalabad, Nangahar, after rumors spread that Task Force Bayonet soldiers threw Korans into toilets. The PRT quickly created a message in response to the accusation and vetted it through the Brigade Combat Team, USAID, and Afghan authorities before releasing it.102

Overall, the PRT program and interagency coordination in general experienced many challenges during Operation Enduring Freedom. Initially, no clear objectives for the PRTs existed. The ad hoc structure of the PRTs and the limited training both civilian and military members of the team received before deployment exacerbated the problem. Theater level bodies issued vague tactical guidance, if any at all, and caused PRTs to create their own objectives or default to the objectives of their Brigade Combat Team landowners. The overwhelming military composition of the teams created civil-military tensions. Some military commanders often overruled USAID’s and the Department of State’s established roles of leading reconstruction and coordinating civilian agencies. These commanders believed they had final authority and civilian members of the team served only as advisors. The civil-military divide created in these situations spilled over to interactions with NGOs. These issues of ill-defined or adhered to roles, lack of information sharing, and a lack of coordinated objectives at the tactical and operational levels facilitated a poor common operating picture, redundancy, a waste of resources, and overall poor civil-military integration. Doctrine available at the time of this operation provides guidelines and planning considerations to mitigate these problems.

102 Yodsampa, “Coordinating for Results,” 17, 19, 23.
Analysis and Conclusion

Analysis and Recommendations

Operation Unified Response and Operation Enduring Freedom experienced successes in interagency coordination but initial conflicts and friction caused an ineffective start. A lack of clearly defined civilian and military roles of authority, poor information sharing, and conflicting or absent unifying objectives created conflict that caused disruption in interagency integration. Both case studies displayed many examples of these problems. There are also extenuating circumstances that contributed to these problems. Natural disasters are unpredictable and occur without warning. Stability and reconstruction operations occur in areas of conflict that by their very nature breed confusion. Despite these extenuating circumstances, a simple review of past and present interagency doctrine can help mitigate the major problems of interagency integration. Considerations outside of doctrine also exist that should be addressed by the Army to help strengthen the relationship between the Department of Defense and other agencies.

Poor use of doctrine in planning created problems in integration in both case studies. SOUTHCOM developed an inadequate plan to address a natural disaster situation and never validated it through a joint exercise involving interagency partners. Using this plan, the JTF staff did not understand the roles and authorities within the functional organization of the SOUTHCOM staff. This also prevented other agencies from integrating with SOUTHCOM and the JTF. Integration between JTF Haiti’s Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center and the UN’s Joint Operations Tasking Center suffered because liaisons from the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center did not know how the UN operated in the field. The UN conducted operations within SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility for some time before the earthquake occurred in 2010. Ample time existed to incorporate UN peacekeeping operations into exercises and rehearsals to allow leaders and planners at the tactical and operational level to understand their standard operating procedures. Including the UN and other agencies into a
prepared plan of response to a natural disaster also helps identify areas of conflict. The OPLAN that existed did not have a deployment plan or a plan to augment their staff. A review of this plan with local UN leaders may have identified these issues and identified better ways to integrate with the UNs Joint Operations Tasking Center.

Operation Enduring Freedom also demonstrated poor integrated planning. During the operation, many military commanders did not understand the role civilians played on the PRTs or at worst, ignored USAID and Department of State roles and used the PRTs in roles outside of stability and reconstruction missions. The Department of Defense and the Department of State failed to coordinate and publish comprehensive guidance and objectives to the PRTs or to other military commanders that interacted with them. This caused agencies to debate over PRT objectives at the operational and tactical level. As a result, disagreements and the military’s larger control over the PRTs caused degraded cooperation and mistrust. This coupled with the natural cultural disparity between the Department of Defense and civilian government agencies produced uncoordinated results.103

Following doctrine can prevent these issues from happening in future operations. Current doctrine shows that understanding and following the roles of supported and supporting relationships helps integration.104 Clear lines of authority help define what roles and responsibilities each agency is responsible for and how they should support each other.105 SOUTHCOMs OPLAN did not include this. SOUTHCOM may have been able to retain their functional staff organization if a published and practiced understanding of how interaction would occur with the JTF staff existed.

103 Yodsampa, “Coordinating for Results,” 32.
105 Ibid., II-11.
A technique to accomplish this is to create memorandums of agreements among participating organizations and agencies. Creating an agreed upon understanding of what each organization’s responsibilities are helps to create unity of effort. Understanding the capabilities of the interagency, IGO, NGO, and host nation capabilities is also important. Other agencies normally request Department of Defense assistance because of its robust organization for planning and the material capabilities it possesses to execute and support operations.\(^{106}\) The reliance of United States Government agencies and other bodies on Department of Defense resources can create confusion in the supported and supporting roles as in the case of the PRTs. Military commanders must honor their function and not make decisions outside of their areas of responsibility when they are not in a particular lead role.\(^{107}\) Commanders at higher levels can mitigate this by clearly communicating to their subordinates how they should interact with or support other agencies. Commanders accomplish this through verbal or written orders that outline the roles, responsibilities, and decision-making authorities of agencies involved in operations.

Once authorities and roles are established, the military and other agencies can begin to create shared objectives. Integrated planning must include all stakeholders and be conducted as early as possible.\(^{108}\) Where applicable this can also include local territorial leaders and private sector representatives.\(^{109}\) Diverse viewpoints help inform the evaluation of the current situation and lead to the development of a shared problem statement. Creating an agreed upon problem statement produces a shared understanding to focus the efforts of each organization and bring attention to available or unavailable capabilities. This also helps to facilitate shared objectives, end state, and transition criteria. This was absent in the development of PRT objectives and the


\(^{107}\) Ibid., I-15.

\(^{108}\) Ibid., II-5, 7.

\(^{109}\) Ibid., I-2.
planning for natural disasters at SOUTHCOM also failed to include stakeholders such as UN representatives.

Training exercises also help define roles and objectives through rehearsal and understanding of agency operating procedures. Training must be comprehensive and include audiences such as the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, Joint Logistics Operations Center, liaison sections, NGOs, the UN, and government agencies. The purpose of training exercises is to identify capabilities, competencies, procedural disconnects, and improve awareness of agency missions. This creates standard operating procedures and prevents the problems experience by the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center and Joint Operations Tasking Center in Haiti.

Doctrine alone cannot solve all problems with integration. The interagency community does not possess the capacity that the Department of Defense enjoys. As an example, the Department of State employed only 6,500 Foreign Service officers and 2,000 members of USAID in 2012 as compared to the Department of Defense employment of 23,000 personnel for planning at the Pentagon alone. The Department of State and USAID cannot maintain their domestic operations and decisively participate in multiple stability or reconstruction operations at one time. The Army must be prepared to operate in stability operations without agency representatives at each echelon.

One solution is to establish a combined joint and interagency professional education system. The school system should require the Department of State and the Department of Defense to select officers and noncommissioned offices to attend joint schooling in order to advance in their career. This solution does not require a large overhaul of organizations and can use facilities

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already present at Department of Defense or State training centers such as the Army Command and General Staff College, any one of the joint War Colleges, or the Foreign Service Institute. Lead agencies would select their representatives based on performance and promotion potential. Curriculum in the school would teach joint and interagency planning techniques with the purpose of creating a common method of planning. Following the instructive period, exercises would emphasize integrated planning in natural disaster and stability scenarios. The school could also divide participants into tactical, operational, and strategic level class groups based on rank and future position. Individuals selected within the Army would attend the course as a follow on from the Captain’s Career Course, Command and General Staff College, the Pre-Command Course, or the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course. Expansion of these education opportunities to include planners from the UN and NGOs would create wider integration and a comprehensive learning experience.

Creation of this course as an instructor-led online course is an alternate option. This method provides more flexibility as military and civilians can sign up for the course and complete it while still occupying their current job. It is also less expensive and creates less overhead than opening a physical school. While this option is cheaper and more accessible, it does not provide the in class discussion attendance at a physical creates or facilitate in depth exercises. This education system creates a common method of planning across all agencies and exercises it through joint training. Civilian familiarization with planning techniques would prevent reliance on military staff’s. In turn, military participation would help to create a better understanding of how commanders and staffs need to operate in a supporting role vice the familiar supported role. The independent planning capability of civilian agencies would allow military planners to focus on security tasks that support stability and civilian planners to focus on creating effective reconstruction projects.
Another solution is to make attendance or participation in an interagency school a necessary gate to promotion for officers between the ranks of captain to colonel. The Army bases potential for promotion on performance in key and developmental positions. Once this key position is complete, a second requirement to attend a current interagency school, such as the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State or the UN Civil-Military Coordination Course, to advance in rank would force Army officers to take integration seriously. It also would assist in creating shared understanding amongst the interagency as officers spread Army ideas and bring back new ideas from other agencies. An alternate option to act as an instructor in programs such as the USAID Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation Learning and Outreach Team could also satisfy the requirement. Another way to fill this requirement is participation in Army mobile training teams to teach other agencies about the Army and gathers tactics, techniques, and procedures of the agency groups they teach. Consolidating these observations quarterly and distributing them in an Army publication or posting them to an online Army interagency information site keeps the force updated on changing concerns and interests of the interagency.

Using current doctrine to inform planning and creating an emphasis in interagency education helps close the gap between civilian and military cultures. It also creates standard operating procedures with partnered units and helps commanders on both sides visualize, describe, and direct their subordinates in reconstruction and stability operations. Planning methods become common and the exercise of these methods in joint training creates shared understanding of operating procedures. Training and education creates common objectives and promotes exchange of information. All of these ideas and methods lead to better interagency integration and prepare the United States to protect its interests abroad.
Conclusion

Consideration of common points of friction is important for planners and leaders. The major points of friction in interagency integration are creating common objectives, establishing clear roles and responsibilities, and effectively sharing information. In most instances, paying attention to doctrine and lessons learned help avoid these issues. Interagency integration is important to future operations as the Army currently assesses its operating environment as a complex, interactive system that requires multiple capabilities across all domains to gain influence threats that vary in shape and form. The Army has identified integration as fundamental to address this environment.

The current Capstone Concept for Joint Operations identifies partnership with outside agencies and allies as critical to future success. Two of the key ideas presented in this document call for discrete, low signature operations that provide swift and adaptable responses. This implies a need to effectively respond to a problem and then quickly disengage. The United States cannot afford to commit to irreversible policy obligations that drain resources and distract from larger national interests. The Department of Defense and State cannot afford to lose time trying to establish working interagency systems. The case studies of Operations Unified Response and Enduring Freedom show that proper planning and understanding of the interagency process is critical to avoid disjointed operations. The United States is entering an uncertain period in its foreign and martial policy. Agencies operating within these policy frameworks must find a way to work effectively together and protect American interests.

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