How Can We Best Achieve Contracting Unity of Effort in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility?

20 November 2013

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Graduate School of Business & Public Policy
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# How Can We Best Achieve Contracting Unity of Effort in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility?

The purpose of this research is to investigate how to better achieve contracting unity of effort in the U.S. Central Command area of operations and the implications for other combatant commands in similar contingency situations. In the U.S. Central Command area of operations, numerous contracting agencies operate in Afghanistan, each with its own contract authority, but these agencies have little synchronization and no common operating picture. In contrast, there is only one overarching operational command authority in this area with a clear chain of command to help accomplish common objectives and achieve operational unity of effort. After completing a literature review of our topic, we conducted in-depth interviews with senior Department of Defense individuals who were knowledgeable and/or experienced with contingency contracting in the U.S. Central Command area of operations. This approach allowed us to gain detailed information and examples from our respondents. After a detailed analysis of selected interview data, we made our final recommendations on improving contracting unity of effort and increasing the effectiveness of operational contract support across the department.
The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Research Program of the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.

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Abstract

The purpose of this research is to investigate how to better achieve contracting unity of effort in the U.S. Central Command area of operations and the implications for other combatant commands in similar contingency situations. In the U.S. Central Command area of operations, numerous contracting agencies operate in Afghanistan, each with its own contract authority, but these agencies have little synchronization and no common operating picture. In contrast, there is only one overarching operational command authority in this area with a clear chain of command to help accomplish common objectives and achieve operational unity of effort.

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Keywords: Operational Contracting Support, Contracting Unity of Effort, US Central Command, Contingency Contracting, Joint Theater Support Contracting Command.
Acknowledgments

We would like to thank our spouses and children for their tremendous love, support, and encouragement in our writing efforts of this MBA joint research project. We would like to thank the Acquisition Research Program team, Karey Shaffer and Tera Yoder, for providing the resources and editing services to ensure the success of our thesis. We would like to thank our Naval Postgraduate School thesis advisors, Professors E. Cory Yoder and Bryan Hudgens, for their mentorship, guidance, and support.

Finally, we would like to thank the following senior Department of Defense acquisition leaders, whose insights helped shape our final recommendations (in alphabetical order):

- Brigadier General Joseph Bass
  Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement)
- Anna Carter
  Director, Operational Contract Support Plans & Programs, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support)
- Lynn Conners
  Acquisition Operations Specialist, Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office
- Charles Driscoll
  Operational Contract Support Planner, Operational Contract Support and Services, Joint Staff, J-4
- Major General Harold Greene
  Deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
- Brigadier General Theodore Harrison
  Commanding General United States Army Expeditionary Contracting Command
- Colonel Mike Hoskin
  Division Chief, Operational Contract Support and Services, Joint Staff, J-4
- Rear Admiral Nicholas Kalathas
  Deputy Director Contingency Contracting, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy
- iv -

- Charles (Dan) Matthews
  Policy and Doctrine Analyst, Office Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement), Expeditionary Contracting Support Plans Directorate

- Charles (Chuck) Maurer
  Doctrine Branch Chief, Acquisition, Logistics & Technology Integration Office

- Major General Camille Nichols
  Commanding General, Army Contracting Command

- William (Bill) Reich
  Acquisition Professional, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

- Victor Solero
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Major Torres' military decorations include the Bronze Star Medal, the Army Meritorious Medal with oak leaf (OLC), the Army Commendation Medal with Valor, the Army Commendation Medal with two OLCs, the Army Achievement Medal with OLC, the National Defense Service Medal, the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, the Combat Infantryman’s Badge, the Expert Infantryman’s Badge, the Ranger Tab, and the Parachute Badge. MAJ Torres is Contracting Level II DAWIA Certified.

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Major Ross’ military decorations include the Bronze Star Medal, the Army Meritorious Medal with two oak leaf (OLC), the Army Commendation Medal with three (OLC), the Army Achievement Medal with two (OLC), the National Defense Service Medal, the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, and the Combat Infantryman’s Badge. Major Ross is Program Management Level III DAWIA Certified and Certified Acquisition Corp member.
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Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy position of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the federal government.
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<td>ACC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Contracting Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALU</td>
<td>Army Logistics University</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASA–ALT</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of the Army–Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>AL&amp;T</td>
<td>Acquisition, Logistic &amp; Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>AL&amp;T–IO</td>
<td>Acquisition, Logistic &amp; Technology–Integration Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>Army Techniques Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPLAN</td>
<td>Base Plan</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<td>CAAF</td>
<td>Contractors Authorized to Accompany the Force</td>
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<td>CAC</td>
<td>Common Access Card</td>
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<td>CASCOM</td>
<td>Combined Arms Support Command</td>
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<td>CASM</td>
<td>Contingency Acquisition Support Module</td>
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<td>CCDR</td>
<td>Combatant Command Commander</td>
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<td>CCO</td>
<td>Contingency Contracting Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>Contingency Contracting Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHU</td>
<td>Containerized Housing Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJOA</td>
<td>Combined/Joint Operations Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Coalition Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>C–JTSCC</td>
<td>CENTCOM–Joint Theater Support Contracting Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Contractor Manager</td>
</tr>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
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<td>CoE</td>
<td>Center of Excellence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>Concept Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>Contracting Officer Representative</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>Contracting Support</td>
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<td>CSB</td>
<td>Contracting Support Brigades</td>
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<td>CSI</td>
<td>Contract Support Integration</td>
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<td>CST</td>
<td>Contract Support Team</td>
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<td>CUE</td>
<td>Contracting Unity of Effort</td>
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<td>CWC</td>
<td>Commission on Wartime Contracting</td>
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<td>DALF</td>
<td>Direct Authority for Logistics</td>
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<td>DAR</td>
<td>Defense Acquisition Regulation</td>
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<td>DASA–AP</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy–Acquisition &amp; Procurement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAU</td>
<td>Defense Acquisition University</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCMA</td>
<td>Defense Contract Management Agency</td>
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<td>DFARS</td>
<td>Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement</td>
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<td>DLA</td>
<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoDD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
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<td>DoDI</td>
<td>Department of Defense Instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPAP</td>
<td>Defense Procurement Acquisition Policy</td>
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<td>EA</td>
<td>Executive Agent</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECC</td>
<td>Expeditionary Contracting Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Federal Acquisition Regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCIB</td>
<td>Functional Capabilities Integration Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRAGO</td>
<td>Fragmentary Order</td>
</tr>
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</table>
LSC      Lead Service for Contracting
LSCC     Lead Service for Contract Coordination
LTG      Lieutenant General
MG       Major General
MILCON   Military Construction
MNF–I    Multi-National Forces–Iraq
NDAA     National Defense Authorization Act
NGO      Non-Governmental Organization
NORTHCOM Northern Command
NPS      Naval Postgraduate School
NSC      National Security Council
OCS      Operational Contract Support
OCSSD    Operational Contract Support Service Division
OEF      Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF      Operation Iraqi Freedom
OMB      Office of Management and Budget
OMI      OCS Mission Integration
OPCON    Operational Control
OPLAN    Operational Plan
OPORD    Operations Order
ORHA     Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
OSCIC    OSC Integration Cell
OSD      Office of the Secretary of Defense
OUSD     Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
PCO      Project and Contracting Office
PEO      Program Executive Officer
PSC      Private Security Contractor
RC       Regional Command
SIGAR    Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGIR    Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOT</td>
<td>Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRO</td>
<td>Stabilization and Reconstruction Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAA</td>
<td>Total Army Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBC</td>
<td>Theater Business Clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE</td>
<td>United States Army Corps of Engineers</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>United States Forces–Afghanistan</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Contracting operations are changing at a rapid pace. For the past 13 years, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the enormous changes and challenges in conducting operational contract support (OCS). According to the Commission on Wartime Contracting (Schwartz & Church, 2013), an estimated $31 billion to $60 billion “was lost to fraud, waste, and abuse in contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan” (p. 8). Additionally, according to 2012 figures from the Department of Defense (DoD), “contractors in Afghanistan exceeded 109,000 compared to the approximately 84,200 military personnel present at that time” (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2013, p. 1). It is generally agreed that many OCS problems were due to insufficient OCS planning, poor strategic OCS management, and minimal oversight of contractors (Schwartz & Church, 2013). The DoD’s increased need for contract support and inadequate preparations to execute OCS led to an overall lack of contracting unity of effort (CUE) across Central Commands’ (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

In response to the overwhelming need for CUE in the early days of the Iraq war, the concept of OCS emerged and the DoD established a new contracting command structure. In 2004, the Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC–I/A) was created in an effort to unify contracting activities within Iraq and Afghanistan (Joint Contracting, 2006). In 2010, JCC–I/A was re-designated as the Central Command Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C–JTSCC). Although the military has used contracted support for centuries, Joint Publication 4-10 (JP 4-10; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2008), Operational Contract Support, was the first publication to address joint doctrine. JP 4-10 (CJCS, 2008) defined successful OCS as the “ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contracted support and management of contractor personnel providing that support to the joint force in a designated operational area” (p. I-2). As operations decline in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is critical that we learn from past operations to avoid repeating the same challenges in future military engagements.

B. PURPOSE

The purpose of this research is to investigate how to successfully achieve CUE in the CENTCOM AOR and the implications for other combatant commands in similar contingency situations. Unity of effort is closely related to unity of command and is necessary to achieve effective and efficient processes during military operations. As a subset of unity of effort, CUE addresses the unique challenges of contingency contracting where multiple agencies have contracting authority in a
given AOR. Contracting authority is not the same as command authority. Contracting authority gives the contracting officer the authority to obligate the United States government, whereas command authority gives a combatant commander the authority to employ forces (CJCS, 2008).

In the CENTCOM AOR, numerous contracting agencies operate in Afghanistan, each with its own contract authority, but these agencies have very little coordination and no procurement common operating picture. In contrast, there is only one overarching operational command authority in the CENTCOM AOR with a clear chain of command to help accomplish common objectives and achieve operational unity of effort.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The primary and subsidiary research questions are designed to address the numerous disparate contracting activities operating in the CENTCOM AOR and to discover possible solutions that achieve greater contracting efficiency and effectiveness. Subsidiary research questions are closely related to the primary research question and attempt to explore the interviewees' responses to obtain clarifying examples and to define important themes. Our questions are as follows:

**Primary Research Question**

1. How can we achieve better contracting unity of effort in the CENTCOM AOR?

**Subsidiary Research Questions**

2. What steps has C–JTSCC taken to synchronize current contracting activities and to what extent are these efforts effective?

3. Are there any discussions, initiatives, or measures currently in development to help achieve better contracting unity of effort for future similar operations?

4. In order to prevent the same lessons learned, are there any OCS doctrinal changes that need to be made to ensure we have better contracting unity of effort?

D. METHODOLOGY

1. Introduction

In this section, we describe the methods and investigative techniques used to answer our research questions. Specifically, we describe the process we used to conduct an extensive literature review, how we developed our questions, our method for choosing interviewees, the technique for conducting interviews, and how we
categorized the data collected. We also discuss the framework used to analyze our findings and present our recommendations.

2. Literature Review

We conducted a literature review to obtain a complete understanding and identify the leading documents within our research area. In The Literature Review (Machi & McEvoy, 2009), the authors explained that a literature review presents a logically argued case founded on an extensive understanding of the current state of knowledge about a field of study. We conducted numerous database searches and discovered a wealth of information concerning the last decade of contingency contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specific examples include, but are not limited to, GAO resources, Naval Postgraduate School and War College thesis documents, resources published through the DoD, Special Inspector General resources, publications by the Congressional Research Service, and resources published through the U.S. Army. We also received numerous newly emerging documents concerning our topic from our interviews.

In order to guide our process, we found it useful to utilize the six-step Literature Review Model (Machi & McEvoy, 2009; see Figure 1). This model helped us manage the review process and focus on the most recent and significant literature.
3. Interview Design and Structure

We determined that we needed to conduct qualitative interviews with individuals who were knowledgeable and/or experienced with contingency contracting in the CENTCOM AOR. Our primary tool for gathering these data was an in-depth interview style called responsive interviewing. This interviewing style emphasizes searching for context and richness while remaining flexible in design (Rubin & Rubin, 2012).

In compliance with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) guidelines, we ensured that all interviews were conducted in accordance with the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) IRB protocol. We conducted our interviews on a volunteer basis and allowed interviewees to address their concerns or reservations at any time during our research. At all times, interviewees were given the option to terminate discussions. We ensured the entire process remained within the IRB process and was done without harm to the interviewees.
To maintain depth and clarity from respondents, we remained flexible in structure and listened more than we talked. Taking a semi-structured approach, we always began our interviews with our main research question but tailored our subsequent questions based on the responses of our interviewees. In order to keep the interviews on target or seek clarification, we often introduced probing responses or questions, all related to the primary or subsidiary questions. Rubin and Rubin (2012) described probes as “questions, comments, or gestures used by the interviewer to help manage the conversation” (p. 118). We used follow-up questions to seek further detail and clarification on significant concepts, themes, and ideas. Upon completion of our interviews, our recordings were professionally transcribed by the NPS Acquisition Research Program. A list of our research questions can be found in Section C of this chapter.

4. Key Organizations and Individuals

We developed our list of key organizations and individuals with help from our advisors and professional mentors. We interviewed all key organizations within the DoD and subordinate frameworks to gain a complete and thorough understanding of our topic. We quickly discovered that our topic touched a wide variety of DoD organizations due to the complex nature of OCS. As OCS cuts across multiple organizations and functional areas, we focused our interviews on the following organizations:

- C-JTSCC
- Joint Staff (J4) Operational Contract Support & Services Division (OCSSD)
- Joint Contracting Acquisition Support Organization (JCASO)
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy—Acquisition & Procurement (DASN—AP)
- Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology; ASA[ALT])
- Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology—Integration Office (ALT–IO)
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics (OUSD[AT&L])
- Army Contracting Command (ACC)
- Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC)

To help us establish initial communication with key individuals, we relied heavily on our professional mentors and advisors. With their assistance, we were
able to interview past C–JTSCC commanders and several other general officers and senior DoD leaders regarding the numerous changes in conducting OCS. A complete list of our interviewees can be found in Chapter III.

5. Analytical Process

In order to analyze the data gathered from the literature and interviews, we utilized the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities–Policy (DOTMLPF–P) framework. Easily understood throughout the DoD, the DOTMLPF–P framework allowed us to categorize our major finding and place them in the correct DOTMLPF–P grouping (see Figure 2). Finally, upon completion of this analysis, we were able to develop our final recommendations and recommendations for further research.

![Figure 2. DOTMLPF–P Framework Matrix](image)

E. SCOPE

Although we limited our research focus to CUE within the CENTCOM AOR, we quickly discovered the broader connection to OCS. Specifically, we discovered through our literature review and interviewees that improving CUE cannot be done without improving the overarching concept of OCS. Within the CENTCOM AOR, we focused on the contingency operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Although we detail the evolution of C–JTSCC from its beginnings as the Project Contract Office in 2003, we honed in on the
significant OCS documents that effected CUE after the release of the Gansler Commission Report in 2007 (Gansler et al., 2007). This was the first landmark report to identify and highlight the vast problems of contract support in the CENTCOM AOR. Finally, we relied heavily on the data we collected during our interviews to capture the strategic direction for OCS across the DoD.

F. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT

This report is organized into five chapters. In Chapter I, we provide the overarching structure and direction of our research. In Chapter II, we review the concept of unity of effort, the evolution of C–JTSCC, significant lessons learned, and the history of OCS. In Chapter III, we present selected raw data found during our in-depth interviews. In Chapter IV, we identify common themes and categorize them using the DOTMLPF–P analysis framework. Finally, in Chapter V, we present our recommendations and areas for further research.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we provide background on C–JTSCC and explore published research, government reports, and various other documents to gain a clear picture regarding how the C–JTSCC evolved into the organization it is today. First, we cover the concept of unity of effort and its importance to contracting in the CENTCOM AOR. Second, we present the history and evolution of C–JTSCC from its beginnings in Iraq and Afghanistan to its precursor organization, the Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC–I/A). Third, we examine the key literature that addresses lessons learned with a focus on the primary research question. Finally, we cover the history of OCS while highlighting existing DoD doctrine, policies, and initiatives to help us understand why and how C–JTSCC operates in its current state.

B. UNITY OF EFFORT

Unity of effort is a universal principle of war that is essential when conducting military operations. Unity of effort is closely related to unity of command and is necessary to achieve effective and efficient processes during military operations. Planning for and executing this concept helps determine the success or failure of a commander’s mission. According to Alberts and Hayes (2006), commanders see unity of effort as being associated with unity of command. This section investigates how unity of effort impacts the efficiency and effectiveness of organizations. In addition, this section examines the concept of unity of effort as presented in doctrinal sources and government reports.

1. Joint Publication (JP 3-0) Joint Operations

Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0), Joint Operations (CJCS, 2011b), outlines operational guidance for the joint force commander (JFC) and subordinates in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing joint military operations. JP 3-0 defines unity of effort as “the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization (CJCS, 2011b, p. A2). This definition is significant because it addresses the need for the various organizations to move toward common objectives. With so many contracting agencies operating in the CENTCOM AOR, it’s important to achieve CUE to reduce operational inefficiency and redundancy.
2. Joint Publication (JP 5-0) Joint Operational Planning

Joint Publication (JP 5-0), Joint Planning (CJCS, 2011c), summarizes planning guidance for the joint task force commander and subordinates during joint military operations. JP 5-0 is vital to commanders and their staff in providing the doctrinal foundation for planning and executing joint operations. In terms of interorganizational planning, JP 5-0 provides the following unity of effort example:

Interorganizational planning and coordination is the interaction that occurs among elements of DOD; engaged [United States Government] USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; IGOs; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the private sector for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. Successful interorganizational coordination of plans facilitates unity of effort among multiple organizations by promoting common understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and civilian actions. (CJCS, 2011c, p. xviii)

Although JP 5-0 does not specifically say anything concerning contracting organizations, the example provided can apply to various contracting agencies operating in the CENTCOM AOR. JP 5-0 is the key joint planning document that highlights the importance of unity of effort throughout the joint military operation planning process.

3. Understanding Command and Control

In Understanding Command and Control, Alberts and Hayes (2006) described unity of effort as a complex task that is seldom achieved. The authors elaborated on this concept by stating,

This point has also been made by those who seek to replace the classic principle of war “unity of command” with the principle “unity of effort.” Even unity of effort is, from what we have seen in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and humanitarian assistance efforts around the world, an ideal that is seldom achieved in practice. We have concluded that what is achievable in coalitions, humanitarian, reconstruction, and peace operations is unity of purpose. (Alberts & Hayes, 2006, p. 88)

Despite the initial low success rate of CUE in the early stages of CENTCOM contracting, commanders and their staff remain vigilant in achieving this concept as it provides effectiveness and efficiency in their operations. They have continuously improved their organizational abilities and have incorporated the numerous lessons learned to seek better CUE.
4. **Contracting Unity of Effort**

As a subset of unity of effort, CUE addresses the unique challenges of contingency contracting where multiple agencies have contracting authority in a given AOR. These challenges were identified in Joint Publication 4-10 (JP-4-10), *Operational Contract Support* (CJCS, 2008), as follows:

Multiple contracting authorities support (either directly or indirectly) any given contingency. In most situations, the JFC will have limited direct control over external support contracts and very little influence over decisions related to the use of systems support contracts. (p.ix)

In the CENTCOM AOR numerous disparate contracting agencies operate in Afghanistan, each it’s their own contract authority, but these agencies have very little synchronization and no common operating picture. For example, as of January 2013, there were 29 different contracting organizations executing contracting operations in Afghanistan (M. D. Hoskin, personal communication, January 17, 2013). In contrast, there is only one overarching operational command authority in the CENTCOM AOR with a clear chain of command to achieve common objectives and operational unity of effort.

**C. EVOLUTION OF C–JTSCC**

From the beginning of OIF, contracting organizations and leadership have continuously adapted to better support the warfighter while simultaneously working toward minimizing inefficient practices and creating better unity of effort. According to Cunnane (2005), “As an austere theater matures, contracting operations naturally evolve from a pure contingency focus to a sustainment-based strategy” (p. 47). The following paragraphs capture the significant historical highlights of C–JTSCC and provide background information for understanding our research questions.

1. **Operation Iraq Freedom: Project and Contracting Office**

Before the official start of OIF in March 2003, the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) was established in December 2003 to work with the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and then the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA; Williams & Roddin, 2006). This office was created to assist with reconstruction efforts and had very little coordination with the military contracting teams assigned to maneuver units. As the Department of State (DoS) transitioned from the ORHA to the CPA in April 2003, it became clear to CPA leadership that there was a need for additional contracting staff members (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction [SIGIR], 2009).

Although the U.S. Army was responsible for staffing, resourcing and running the PCO, it had a dual reporting relationship with the DoS and DoD (see Figure 3). Under this structure, the PCO was responsive to the U.S ambassador to Iraq
“concerning the requirements and priorities for projects … and to the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) commanding general with respect to requirements and priorities concerning training and equipping the Iraqi military forces” (SIGIR, 2009, p. 157). Although this construct attempted to clarify roles, it actually exacerbated the ambiguous management situation, making it more difficult to achieve CUE.

Figure 3. Project and Contracting Office Reporting Structure  
(Hess & Taylor, 2004)

2. Operation Iraq Freedom: Contracting Support to Forces

Contracting unity of effort was non-existent in the early phases of OIF (Houglan, 2006). As the invasion of Iraq began, numerous contracting activities operated in the AOR, but few military contracting teams supported the vast influx of forces. In May 2003, there were just four joint contracting teams (four-person teams) stationed in Kuwait and four contingency contracting teams embedded with Third Army tactical units (Cunnane, 2005). By July of that year, there were a total of 24 military contracting personnel from the Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF) supporting 120,000 U.S. forces (Cunnane, 2005).

The primary mission for these teams was contingency contracting. As forces quickly advanced throughout Iraq, these contracting teams provided critical warfighter needs in the fastest, most efficient way possible. Operating throughout
Iraq with no CUE, some of these personnel worked alongside their respective units while others were positioned in major military hubs (Cunnane, 2005). Cunnane (2005) further indicated that through “June 2003 there was no contracting leadership or presence at the CJTF HQ level providing command, control and oversight of contracting personnel and operations” (p. 49).

3. Operation Enduring Freedom: Contracting Support to Forces

There is little published literature and few documents regarding the early contracting days of OEF. This section relies primarily on after action reports conducted by contingency contracting officers and research conducted by D’Angelo, Houglan, and Ruckwardt (2008).

Contracting support in Afghanistan displayed many of the same problems as in Iraq, including “a lack of a contracting organizational structure, inefficient resource allocation, and minimal training to the incoming contingency contracting officers” (D’Angelo et al., 2008). By June 2003, just 23 military contracting personnel supported over 40,000 troops across five installations in Afghanistan (D’Angelo et al., 2008). Although these numbers are slightly better than those for the initial invasion into Iraq, they highlight the lack of operational contract support planning.

Captain B. A. Rockow (2003), a contingency contracting officer in Kandahar, highlighted the challenges associated with managing the initial phases of contracting in OEF. As one of the first contracting officers to support OEF, Rockow arrived in Kandahar to find no resources available to offer advice or synchronize contracting throughout the area (Rockow, 2003). He was, therefore, forced to learn how to develop a system of management and support for OCS. According to D’Angelo et al. (2008),

although a theater-wide system of synchronizing efforts between the contracting offices did not exist, he [Rockow] tapped into the resources of contingency contracting officers already located in Karachi, Pakistan, and Seeb, Oman, to obtain the essential supplies not available in Afghanistan. (p. 74)

CPT Rockow’s report identifies the lack of contracting synchronization during these early days and his reliance on communication and collaboration to bring about greater CUE.

4. Other Contracting Support

By the summer of 2003, there were numerous other agencies providing contracting support to OIF and OEF. In addition to the PCO and CJTF military contracting officers, these other agencies operated independently with little to no coordination or communication between organizations. These contracting activities included the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), providing
infrastructure and basic services; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), focusing on construction and civil engineering projects; the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), coordinating the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP); and Special Operations contracting teams, conducting focused procurements in support of their mission (Cunnane, 2005). With no centralized contracting command or leadership to coordinate contracting activities across the AOR, DoD leadership began discussing the idea of a joint contracting command.

5. Establishment of the Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan

As operations and military systems matured in Iraq, contracting support also matured to support this new transition. In “The Evolution of Contracting in Iraq,” Cunanne (2005) outlined the reasons driving the transition to a more mature contracting environment:

- growing demand for complex contracting actions;
- growing need for theater-wide acquisition visibility and consolidated procurements;
- constant struggle to recruit a capable contracting workforce;
- need for a contracting organizational structure that could support the (then) developing MNF–I four-star headquarters; and
- ability to track nonperforming contractors (bad actors) across theater, and emerging army leadership’s guidance to move away from LOGCAP to direct contracting (p. 51).

Early in 2004, CENTCOM and MNF–I considered the idea of a Joint Contracting Command–Iraq (JCC–I) in order to bring about greater CUE. JCC–I would bring coordinated contracting support to theater-wide operations under the direction of a single commander. B. G. Seay, already the PCO Head of the Contracting Activity, would become the JCC–I’s first commander on November 12, 2004 (Houglan, 2006). JCC–I subsequently became a major subordinate command of MNF–I (see Figure 4; SIGIR, 2006).
In July 2005, CENTCOM issued FRAGO (a fragmentary order is an abbreviated order that eliminates redundant information) 09-790, Contracting and Organizational Changes, in order to bring the Afghanistan contracting support under the control of JCC–I (D’Angelo et al., 2008). With this order, JCC–I became JCC–I/A. Although the installation of JCC–I/A was seen as a significant upgrade over previous methods of controlling contracting activities in a contingency environment, the organization continued to experience difficulties in managing the various contracting activities operating in the AOR (see Figure 5). Developed out of necessity to address the quickly growing contracting efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, JCC–IA provided the structure required to increase CUE.
JCC–I/A continued to evolve by developing efficiencies and improved management systems to support coalition forces (see Figure 6). In another attempt to achieve better CUE in Iraq and Afghanistan, CENTCOM issued FRAGO 09-1117, which directed all commanders in OIF and OEF to update their contracting organizations and relationships within CENTCOM’s AOR (D’Angelo et al., 2008). The FRAGO’s three primary objectives were to

integrate warfighter campaign plans and strategy and achieve effects, achieve unity of effort and economies of scale that exemplify best business practices, and create synergy with economic activities in local private and public sectors, serving as a catalyst for economic growth. (D’Angelo et al., 2008)
Through continuous improvements to its managerial system, the establishment of JCC–I/A proved vital for contingency operations. The organization has not only directed the DoD in new approaches for conducting business, but also revolutionized the way in which the DoD operates on a daily basis. Each improvement helped lead to the overarching success of producing CUE.

6. Establishment of C–JTSCC

Despite the JCC–I/A’s capabilities, the drawdown of combat operations in Iraq eventually led to CENTCOM’s decision to re-organize contracting support. On April 20, 2010, CENTCOM directed the transition to the C–JTSCC (Beall & Bolls, 2010; see Figure 7). This change also aligned in-theater contracting organizations with revised joint doctrine to increase contracting unity of effort.
Figure 7. C–JTSCC Organization  
(M. D. Hoskin, personal communication, January 17, 2013)

7. C–JTSCC Today

Given the direction to end combat operations in Afghanistan, C–JTSCC is preparing for a diminished workload as the withdrawal of forces begins in 2014. Although the changing structures of CENTCOM contracting have increased synchronization, there still exists a lack of CUE across the AOR. Today, there remain many independent contracting agencies with contracts in Afghanistan, but there is no overarching command and control (see Figure 8). These contracting activities include systems support, external support, theater support, and non-DoD agencies. Within Afghanistan, there exists little contracting synchronization, no contracting common operating picture, and no ability to achieve CUE for theater-wide contracting (M. D. Hoskin, personal communication, January 17, 2013).
D. LESSONS LEARNED

Over the last 13 years, numerous after-action reports, government reports, and lessons learned have highlighted the need and importance of OCS. Although there are countless documents on the subject, this section highlights only the key operational and strategic observations over the past six years.

1. Gansler Report

The Secretary of the Army established an independent Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations to review the lessons learned in current operations and make sound recommendations to achieve increased effectiveness and efficiency (Gansler et al., 2007). Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, or the Gansler Commission Report (Gansler et al., 2007), was the first landmark report to identify a contracting environment with inexperienced personnel, increased workloads, and institutional neglect across Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. Although the Army was the focus of the report, Secretary Gates said the recommendations should be applied to all military services (DoD, 2013).
The commission conducted in-depth interviews with more than 100 experienced Army acquisition professionals and senior leaders throughout the CENTCOM AOR. According to Gansler et al. (2007),

The most notable characteristic of the testimony is a nearly unanimous perception of the current problems, their gravity, and the urgent need for reform. The people in the field understand the issues and identified the necessary solutions, and the Commission recommendations reflect these valuable lessons learned.

The *Urgent Reform Required* report outlined four overarching recommendations to improve Army acquisitions in expeditionary operations:

1. Increase the stature, quantity, and career development of military and civilian contracting personnel (especially for expeditionary operations).
2. Restructure the organization and restore responsibility to facilitate contracting and contract management in expeditionary and CONUS operations.
3. Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in expeditionary operations.
4. Obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable contracting effectiveness in expeditionary operations (Gansler et al., 2007).

All these recommendations provided better CUE for CENTCOM contracting and provided the necessary hard look at the contingency contracting environment. They quickly gained momentum throughout the DoD and subsequently helped make the necessary first steps towards increasing OCS efficiency and effectiveness.

2. **Transforming Wartime Contracting**

Congress created the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) in Iraq and Afghanistan in response to numerous allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse throughout the CENTCOM AOR. In 2008, the CWC began extensive research to document observations and make key recommendations. Its final report, *Transforming Wartime Contracting*, revealed as much as $60 billion in overseas contracting dollars wasted in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC, 2011). In its report, the CWC made 15 recommendations to improve contingency contracting operations in the future:

1. Use risk factors in deciding whether to contract in contingencies.
2. Develop deployable cadres for acquisition management and contractor oversight.
3. Phase out use of private security contractors for certain functions.
4. Improve interagency coordination and guidance for using security contractors in contingency operations.
5. Take actions to mitigate the threat of additional waste from unsustainability.
6. Elevate the positions and expand the authority of civilian officials responsible for contingency contracting at the DoD, DoS, and USAID.
7. Elevate and expand the authority of military officials responsible for contingency contracting on the Joint Staff, the combatant commanders’ staffs, and in the military services.
8. Establish a new, dual-hatted senior position at OMB and the NSC to provide oversight and strategic direction.
9. Create a permanent office of inspector general for contingency operations.
10. Set and meet annual increases in competition goals for contingency contracts.
12. Strengthen enforcement tools.
13. Provide adequate staffing and resources, and establish procedures to protect the government’s interests.
14. Congress should provide or reallocate resources for contingency contracting reform to cure or mitigate the numerous defects described by the Commission.

The biggest contributors to CUE are recommendations 2, 4, 7, and 13. Recommendation 2 directly affects CUE and discusses those cases where performance by contract is appropriate and the role of government to provide acquisition management and contractor oversight. Recommendation 4 also directly affects CUE and highlights the need to have cooperation among the various disparate contracting agencies to incorporate best practices. Indirectly affecting CUE, recommendation 7 indicates the need for full involvement of senior leadership to have changes in agency structures and practices that affect culture and behaviors. As a final example, recommendation 13 directly impacts CUE by
highlighting the lack of sufficient staff and resources to enable adequate management of all aspects of contingency contracting.

3. **Special Inspector General Iraq Reconstruction**

   The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) was created in October 2004 by a congressional amendment to Public Law 108-106 (SIGIR, 2013). SIGIR was mandated to provide oversight of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund and all obligations, expenditures, and revenues associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Iraq. SIGIR’s final report, *Learning from Iraq* (2013), brings together a wealth of information and analysis to identify important lessons learned:

   Drawing from numerous interviews with past and present Iraqi leaders, senior U.S. policymakers and practitioners, members of Congress, and others who were involved with Iraq, this report lays out in detail the enormous U.S. reconstruction effort, which completed thousands of projects and programs since 2003, but in which there were many lessons learned the hard way. (SIGIR, 2013)

   *Learning from Iraq* (SIGIR, 2013) made these important final recommendations:

   1. Create an integrated civilian-military office to plan, execute, and be accountable for contingency rebuilding activities during stabilization and reconstruction operations.

   2. Begin rebuilding only after establishing sufficient security, and focus first on small programs and projects.

   3. Ensure full host-country engagement in program and project selection, securing commitments to share costs (possibly through loans) and agreements to sustain completed projects after their transfer.

   4. Establish uniform contracting, personnel, and information management systems that all Stabilization and Reconstruction Operation (SRO) participants use.

   5. Require robust oversight of SRO activities from the operation’s inception.

   6. Preserve and refine programs developed in Iraq, like the Commander’s Emergency Response Program and the Provincial Reconstruction Team program, that produced successes when used judiciously.

   7. Plan in advance, plan comprehensively and in an integrated fashion, and have backup plans ready to go. (SIGIR, 2013, p. xii)
Although all these items provide valuable lessons learned for Iraq, recommendations, 1, 4, and 7 have a direct impact on achieving better CUE. Recommendations 1 and 4 address the current inadequate system of executing contingency rebuilding activities. The SIGIR report (2013) suggests that an integrated civilian-military office “would provide clarity about who is responsible for planning and executing rebuilding activities, truly resolving the dual systemic weaknesses of the Iraq program: the lack of unity of command and poor unity of effort” (p. 129). Recommendation 7 impacts CUE by addressing the need for planning in advance using an integrated approach. In this manner, many different agencies can develop an integrated plan to achieve a common purpose.

4. Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction: Quarterly Reports

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 established the SIGAR (NDAA, 2008). SIGAR’s three key mission areas are as follows: (1) to conduct audits and investigations relating to Afghanistan reconstruction operations; (2) to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in operations and programs; and (3) to keep the secretary of state and the secretary of defense informed about current or potential problems and deficiencies (NDAA, 2008).

SIGAR submits a quarterly report to Congress to summarize key activities, audits, and investigations. The reports also provide an overview of reconstruction activities in Afghanistan and include a detailed statement of all obligations, expenditures, and revenues associated with reconstruction. The latest SIGAR quarterly reports made the following significant CUE observations:

- Quarterly Report—July 30, 2013: An investigation revealed widespread contractor oversight issues across the various contracting agencies operating in Afghanistan. Exacerbated by the drawdown of forces, the ongoing challenges of oversight by the DoD, Department of State, and USAID were highlighted in this report (SIGAR, 2013). This is important to CUE because it highlights the effects of non-cooperation and not working towards a common objective.

- Quarterly Report—October 10, 2012: An audit found that the DoD could not accurately account for over $1.1 billion in fuel it provided to the Afghanistan National Army. SIGAR learned that no single office within the U.S. or Afghan governments had complete records of Afghanistan National Army fuel ordered, purchased, delivered, and consumed (SIGAR, 2012b). This report shows the lack of CUE as it...
highlights the DoD’s challenges in having a centralized system to track contract information.

- Quarterly Report—July 30, 2012: An inspection revealed the Army accepted inferior contracted construction that prevented some multimillion-dollar border police bases from being used as intended. One of SIGAR’s recommendations was for the Army to ensure the contractor has developed an effective contractor quality control program, which is adequately monitored and assessed (SIGAR, 2012a). Although not directly related to CUE, this could have been addressed with interagency cooperation working towards the common objective of reducing waste.

These reports, investigations, and findings all revealed serious problems across the contracting support spectrum. Ultimately, problems in planning, oversight, and management led to billions of dollars of waste and fraud in OIF and OEF.

5. Government Accountability Office

Over the past decade, the GAO has produced several reports to address the challenges faced with OCS. Since the early 1990s, the GAO has identified the DoD’s contract management as a high-risk area (GAO, 2010). The following GAO reports identify key concerns associated with OCS and related CUE challenges.

- GAO Report 10-829T, Waterfight Support: Cultural Change Needed to Improve How DOD Plans for and Manages Operational Contract Support (GAO, 2010): This 2010 report identified several steps to institutionalize OCS within the DoD. Key steps relating to CUE include developing joint OCS polices, planning for contractors in ongoing and future operations, tracking contractor personnel and providing oversight, training acquisition personnel, and developing a department-wide lessons learned program.

- GAO Report 12-1026T, Operational Contract Support: Sustained DOD Leadership Needed to Better Prepare for Future Contingencies (GAO, 2012): This report found three main areas for DoD leadership to focus on in order to prepare for the next contingency operation: (1) planning for OCS to help the DoD clarify priorities and unify towards common objectives; (2) having the right people (acquisition and non-acquisition) with the right skills to effectively manage OCS; and (3) improving the tools to account for contracts and contractors.
• GAO Report 13-212, *DOD Needs Additional Steps to Fully Integrate Operational Contract Support Into Contingency Planning* (GAO, 2013): This recent report made several recommendations regarding the DoD’s effort to integrate OCS into contingency planning. The four overarching recommendations all work to increase the institutionalization of OCS and indirectly increase CUE during contingency operations: (1) the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force provide OCS planning guidance; (2) the Joint Staff provide OCS training for all planners; (3) joint planners broaden their focus to include areas beyond logistics; and (4) OCS expertise and education is offered to service components.

These key reports from the last three years highlight the DoD’s challenges in integrating OCS and its continued efforts to improve this capability. Our interviewees echoed many of the recommendations mentioned in these reports.

**E. OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT**

OCS is a strategic capability that is rapidly changing and adapting to lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan. This section focuses on defining OCS, examining congressional legislative policies and DoD directives that have revolutionized OCS over the last decade, and, finally, discussing significant OCS initiatives that are important in meeting today’s merging capability requirements.

1. **What Is Operational Contract Support?**

Lacking formal doctrine prior to 2008, the contracting community fell short in its planning and integration of contract support at the joint operational level. Although the military had used contract support since the onset of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Joint Publication 4-10 (JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*; CJCS, 2008) was the first publication to address joint doctrine. The purpose of JP 4-10 was to provide the joint OCS staff with tools for planning, conducting, and accessing OCS within a joint operations environment. JP 4-10 (CJCS, 2008) defined successful OCS as the “ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contracted support and management of contractor personnel providing that support to the joint force in a designated operational area” (p. I-2). This first version of JP 4-10 was significant because it standardized information and guidance for improving operational contract management.

Over the last five years, OCS has evolved to meet new challenges from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As such, the DoD is currently revising JP 4-10 with an anticipated release date of early FY2014. This new JP 4-10 (CJCS, 2012a), which begin the revision process in 2012, defines OCS as
the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services and construction from commercial sources in support of CCDR directed operations along with the associated contingency contracting and associated contractor personnel management functions. It is important to note that OCS applies to the full range of military operations to include contract operation to Phase 0. (p. 6)

Unlike the older definition, this update from previous definitions acknowledges “associated contingency contracting” and gives more attention to the contractor by emphasizing “personnel management functions.” Additionally, this definition stresses the importance of Phase 0 planning. According to Yoder, Long, and Nix’s (2012) Phase Zero Contracting Operations, the top-level planner is known as the integrated planner and executor (IPE) contingency contracting officer. Having the highest training and experience, this IPE should be placed and involved at the joint staff or strategic planning levels to assist with Phase 0 planning efforts (Yoder et al., 2012). It is at these strategic levels that the IPE can effectively assist with annex W development and other various OCS-related activities. The annex W is the primary way commanders and their staffs integrate OCS into planning and is defined as follows:

[The Annex W] is the primary means used by … planners to document OCS in OPLANs [operational plans]/OPORDs [operations orders]. The Annex W is normally required for all CONPLANs [concept plans] with TPFDD [time-phased force and deployment data], OPLANs, and OPORDs, but usually not required for GCC’s [geographical combat command’s] Commander’s Estimates, BPLANs [base plans], and CONPLANs without TPFDD. The level of detail included in Annex W varies based on information available and level of command. (CJCS, 2012a, p. 44)

According to a GAO (2013) report, there were 45 approved annex Ws of the 95 plans reviewed. This is seen as a vast improvement over the previous review in 2010, where only four of 89 plans included approved annex Ws (GAO, 2013).

Created in 2011, the J4 Operational Contract Support Services Division (J4 OCSSD) helps institutionalize OCS across the elements of DOTMLPF–P. According to J4 OCSSD, OCS can be defined as “the ability to plan, orchestrate and synchronize the provision of contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management. These three functions are inextricably linked to achieving favorable operational and acquisition outcomes” (C. D. Driscoll, personal communication, June 24, 2013; see Figure 9).
Developed by J4 OCSSD, Figure 9 is a depiction of OCS that is logically organized with three supporting functions. According to this figure, contract support integration (CSI), contracting support (CS), and contractor management (CM) are all required in order to conduct OCS. The rings tie these functions to illustrate the overlapping of the capabilities, and when used properly, the results are efficient and effective CS (C. D. Driscoll, personal communication, June 24, 2013).

2. Evolution of Operational Contract Support

Prior to the drawdown of military forces in the mid-1990s, the United States was able to sustain itself with its own organic capabilities. As the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union was no longer seen as a threat to our national security, the DoD began decreasing its forces by diminishing its military infrastructure and logistic capabilities footprint. According to a recent Congressional Research Study report (Schwartz & Swain, 2011), this loss in capability made the military dependent on contract support. Schwartz and Swain (2011) further concluded that “after the Cold War, reliance on contractors further increased when DOD cut logistic and support personnel” (p. 1). As a result of these cuts, “DOD lost in-house capability and was
forced to rely even further on contractor support” (Schwartz & Swain, 2011, p. 1). In addition to this diminished logistic support, military doctrine did not adapt to support this capability gap. Ultimately, this deficiency led to an inefficient contracting process that was exacerbated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

3. Congressional Legislation

Prior to 2007, there was very little legislation concerning OCS. The Gansler Commission report, numerous GAO findings, and inspectors general studies provided the backdrop for Congress to hold oversight hearings and enact legislation aimed at improving OCS. Key congressional legislation affecting OCS over the last few years is summarized here.

- **National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2007**: This act was important because it was the first time Congress directed the DoD to “develop joint policies for requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting during combat operations and post-conflict operations” (Schwartz & Church, 2013, p. 28).

- **National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2008**: This act was significant to CUE for three reasons: (1) it first authorized the inspector general (IG) office to perform audits on contracts with Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) it authorized the first tools to track theater-wide contractors through the Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT); and (3) it mandated contingency contracting training for non-acquisition DoD personnel under the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME; Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense–Program Support [OSD P&S], 2012).

- **National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2009**: The NDAA 2009 was relevant to CUE because it established senior officers’ billets, and policies that provided guidance to ensure the acquisition workforce is properly trained and developed. Most importantly, it assigned personnel to the right positions, and it finally incorporated a government-wide contingency contracting corps to facilitate emergency, major disaster, and contingency operations (Schwartz & Church, 2013).

- **National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2011**: This act was important to CUE because it established policy, assigned responsibilities, and provided procedures for the regulation of the selection, accountability, training, equipping, and conduct of private security contractor (PSC) functions under a covered contract during contingency operations, humanitarian or peace operations, or other
military operations or exercises. It also assigned responsibilities and established procedures for incident reporting, use of and accountability for equipment, rules for the use of force, and a process for administrative action or the removal, as appropriate, of PSCs and PSC personnel (Schwartz & Church, 2013).

- **National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2012**: The NDAA 2012 was relevant to the CUE because it amended the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), which allowed contracting officials to access contractor and subcontractor records within CENTCOM. Additionally, it facilitated a single contracting authority capability to support overseas contracting (Schwartz & Church, 2013).

- **National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2013**: This recent act further improved contracting efficiencies and effectiveness within OCS. First, it required COCOMs to develop a risk management strategy for all operational and contingency plans. Second, it designated a single contracting authority for domestic “reachback” capabilities to support overseas contracting. Third, it required the DoD to issue and develop guidance on responsibility and authority for the planning and executing of OCS contingency functions. Fourth, it required the insertion of OCS within the DoD’s planning, joint professional military education, and management structure. Finally, it mandated the establishment and maintenance of a database on price trends of items and services (Schwartz & Church, 2013).

The increase in lawmakers’ interest provided the statutory framework for institutionalizing OCS across the DoD services. As a result of these NDAAs, the DoD issued several key policies designed to improve OCS and increase CUE within CENTCOM’s AOR.

4. **DoD Policies**

Prior to 2005, there were no comprehensive DoD policies pertaining to OCS. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted the need for additional OCS guidance, the DoD began issuing several key policies affecting OCS and related CUE concerns. The following policies are significant in that they improve OCS activities and aid in achieving better CUE in the CENTCOM AOR:

- **Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3020.41**: This DoDI was key because it was the first DoD policy to provide comprehensive OCS guidance. It established procedures for contractor personnel authorized to accompany the U.S. Armed Forces (CAAF). Prior to
2005 there were no DoD policy-recognizing contractors on the battlefield (OUSD[AL&T], 2005).

- **Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3020.49**: This directive was significant because the policy gave guidance and assigned responsibilities for leading OCS efforts to include OCS planning, organizing, staffing, and executing to meet the joint force commanders objectives (OUSD[AL&T], 2009).

- **DoDI 1100.22**: This instruction was significant because it updated the DoD’s policy and procedures for determining workforce mix through manpower criteria and guidance of military, DoD civilian, and private-sector support (OUSD[AL&T], 2010).

- **DoDI 3020.41 Revision**: This key policy updated the 2005 policy authorizing contractors to accompany the force. It also established and defined the roles and responsibilities for managing OCS (OUSD[AL&T], 2011).

- **DoD CJCSM 3130.03, 2012**: This document is essential because it updated joint OCS policy in many non-logistical functional areas, such as intelligence, personnel, and engineering (Schwartz & Church, 2013).

- **JP 4-10 (Revision pending)**: This document will improve on the 2008 version of JP 4-10 and incorporate many of the recent OCS lessons learned (CJCS, 2012a).

As a result of DoD policies, legislation, and evolving doctrine, the DoD continues to improve OCS capability for the current and future fight. These policies and legislation not only improved the contracting management of OCS, but they also provided oversight and transparency in order for staff to better support the commanders and their staff through efficient and effective processes. A summary of the key OCS documents is depicted in Figure 10.
F. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we provided a background for C–JTSCC and examined published research, government reports, DoD policies, and various acquisition professional journals and newsletters to gain an understanding of how the C–JTSCC has evolved. We first examined the concept of unity of effort and its importance to contracting in the CENTCOM AOR. Next, we presented the history and evolution of C–JTSCC from its beginnings in Iraq and Afghanistan to its predecessor organization, JCC–I/A. Then, we examined key literature that addressed OCS lessons learned, observations, and findings. Finally, we provided key documents that shed light on the development of OCS.
III. INTERVIEWS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter contains selected raw data collected from our in-depth interviews. We determined that we would need to conduct qualitative interviews with individuals who were knowledgeable and/or experienced with contingency contracting in the CENTCOM AOR. This approach allowed us to gain detailed information and examples from our respondents. Our primary tool for gathering these data was an in-depth interview style called responsive interviewing. This interview style “emphasizes searching for context and richness while accepting the complexity and ambiguity of real life” (Rubin & Rubin, 2012).

To maintain depth and clarity, we remained flexible within IRB protocol and listened more than talked. Taking a semi-structured approach, we always began our interviews with our main research question but tailored our subsequent questions based on the responses of our interviewees. In order to keep the interviews on target or seek clarification, we often introduced probing responses or questions.

Follow-up questions were directly related to our primary and subsidiary questions, and were used to seek further detail and clarification on significant concepts, themes, and ideas. Upon completion of our interviews, we had our recordings transcribed. The following sections are the raw data responses to our primary question and subsequent questions. Each of the following headings corresponds to one of our specific research questions and the interviewees’ responses to those questions. Individual interviewee responses are in no particular order.

B. PRIMARY QUESTION ONE

This project’s primary research question, “How can we achieve better contracting unity of effort in the CENTCOM AOR,” was intended to address the lack of CUE and associated efficiency and effectiveness from the existing disparate number of contracting authorities operating in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. With this context in mind, the interviewees’ relevant thoughts and opinions on the matter are provided in this section.

Primary Question 1: How can we achieve better contracting unity of effort in the CENTCOM AOR?

Response from Contracting Professional, office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Contracting), Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition):

[Organization]: I believe we should be focused on achieving overall unity of effort for the operation and not necessarily on achieving
contracting unity of effort. These are not necessarily the same thing and achieving better contracting unity of effort may actually be counter to overall unity of effort for certain operations. If I’m trying to achieve better contracting unity of effort, the best way to do this is to have command and control (C2) of all contracting within a JOA [joint operation area]. This allows for the integration of all service/agency contracting authority under a single head of contracting activity (HCA) and command structure. However, doing this means you create two separate C2 structures for executing BOS, and base/installation commanders no longer have C2 of a critical enabling capability (contracting) needed to accomplish their assigned missions.

This does not mean that achieving better contracting unity of effort and overall unity of effort for the operation will never parallel each other. In operations where economic lines of operation are most critical to mission accomplishment, achieving unity of contracting effort by having a separate contracting C2 structure may be consistent with achieving overall unity of effort for the operation. In operations where military lines of operation are most critical to mission accomplishment, achieving unity of contracting effort by having a separate contracting C2 structure can actually be counter-productive to achieving overall unity of effort for the operation.

Therefore, the focus should always be on achieving overall unity of effort for the operation and not necessarily contracting unity of effort. How we organize within CENTCOM or any GCC really depends on the operation and whether the economic lines of operation or military lines of operation are most critical to mission accomplishment.

[Managing, process, and authority]: Since OCS is a multi-functional enabling capability and is not owned by a single functional area, it’s much easier to manage if you can break it down into its process elements and have accountability for each element. Like most processes, OCS consists of three basic elements: inputs (requirements), processing (contracting), and outputs (contractors).

Planning for and executing OCS requirements and contractor support/oversight is controlled via command authority while planning for and executing contracting is controlled via contracting authority. Therefore, you must hold the command chain accountable for OCS requirements management and contractor support/oversight and you must hold heads of contracting activities (HCAs) accountable for contracting. Too many times we lump all of these basic elements together and call it OCS and then try to hold the HCA accountable for all of OCS even though the HCA does not own or manage the requirements nor do they provide or control the contracting officer representatives (CORs) who coordinate contractor support and provide/document contractor performance oversight.
OCS requirements are the inputs in the process, and managing these inputs, which are controlled via command authority, is essential in achieving overall unity of effort and successfully integrating and synchronizing OCS. It’s like the old saying, “Garbage in, garbage out!” We must proactively manage contract support requirements by planning for them and establishing an efficient/effective structure for execution to validate, prioritize, and consolidate when appropriate. We also have to determine which requirements need to be centrally managed JOA-wide and which can be managed at the base/installation level. For those centrally managed JOA-wide requirements, it’s imperative to identify who is responsible for managing them to know who to hold accountable.

The real thing we struggle with is that OCS requirements are owned by every functional area (logistics, intelligence, operations, communications, etc.), and there is no designated organization on the GCC/JTF [joint task force]/service component staffs to establish structure and accountability for OCS requirements and contractor oversight/support. We need a multi-functional organization/cell properly staffed with personnel who are trained in OCS to do this.

In addition, it is impossible to determine how best to organize the processing element (contracting) until we know the type of operation and how OCS requirements will be managed. As mentioned, it really depends on the criticality of the economic lines of operation in determining which contracting organization structure is most appropriate. In many operations, a hybrid organization structure may be most appropriate. For example, centrally managed JOA-wide requirements may be executed by a JTSCC [joint theater support contracting demand] and decentralized BOS requirements may be executed by the service designated the BOS lead for a specific temporary base/location.

To do this, we need to identify which OCS requirements need to be managed JOA-wide at the operational level to centralize control of the requirements, enforce JOA-wide standards, prevent competition for limited resources, take advantage of economies of scale, etc. Assume we decide to centrally manage OCS requirements for power generation equipment, security services, theater-wide transportation, information operations, MILCON [military construction], bottled water, containerized housing units, etc. Managing OCS requirements JOA-wide helps avoid duplication of effort and allows the combatant commander to exercise directive authority for logistics (DAFL) for OCS.

All other requirements can then be executed in a decentralized manner at the base/installation level whereby the contracting activity is under the C2 of the base/installation commander. This empowers the base/installation commander with the enabling capabilities necessary to fully accomplish their mission. Also, if external contracts, such as
LOGCAP, are properly delegated to the BOS contracting activity, the base/installation commander has the ability to exercise some type of control over the OCS supporting BOS for that base/installation. When it’s time to drawdown operations and close the bases, this becomes very important.

Finally, the most important thing required for effective management of OCS requirements and contractor support/oversight is culture change whereby commanders and non-contracting functionals [personnel] recognize and embrace their roles/responsibilities in executing OCS. Commanders rely primarily on military, civilians, and contractors to accomplish their mission. They still own the portion of their mission that is accomplished by contract support. Therefore, they have to properly plan for managing contract support to include requirements as well as contractor support/oversight. (Air Force contracting professional, personal communication, June 27, 2013)

Response from William (Bill) Reich, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics:

[Theater business clearance (TBC)]: So if you go back to 2007, General Scott was the commander of JCC–I/A and he was having trouble with contractors showing up all around in theater. No one knew who they were or where they came from … and they needed support. From 2007 to today, there has been a series of updates to TBC (see TBC memo dated 27 July 2012). It is really a tool any combatant commander can use. So, at this point in time, I would say that TBC is really focused on what I would call the mechanical aspects. Basically just ensuring compliance with the commander’s requirements and whatever information and data they want to collect.

So, basically, if you had a contract or a quote for performance in, for example, Afghanistan, (1) you need to go look at FAR 225.74 1, which talks about requirements for foreign acquisition; and (2) there’s a checklist in there about all the things that you need to make sure your requiring activity does. [For example], you need to comply with the business clearance requirement and then it references you to CENTCOM webpage.

[CASM]: Nirvana to me would be the use of the Contingency Acquisition Support Module (CASM). CASM could be required DoD-wide, and it complies with procurement data standards. It could allow you to do the Theater Business Clearance (TBC) back when that requirement package is being built. That’s a huge deal because you could figure out where in the workflow that belonged and make it part of the workflow such that before it’s even approved TBC has already been done. You would avoid the need to do TBC. (W. Reich, personal communication, June 26, 2013)
Response from Major General Camille Nichols, Commanding General, Army Contracting Command:

[Authority]: A commander, at certain phases of operation should be given certain levels of authority ... or better the COCOM [Combatant Command] could retain that authority. But someone has to have the authority and someone needs to direct the services and other agencies to do certain things. You need to have the overarching intent of the doctrine and then the functional execution should be situation dependent.

So, whichever service is the lead for contracting must be able to direct everyone in DoD to do certain things in support of a senior mission functional contracting commander, whatever service it is. (C. Nichols, personal communication, July 8, 2013)

Response from Craig Spisak, Director of the U.S. Army’s Acquisition Support Center:

[Doctrine]: In a perfect world, your solution would be there if there was only one contracting agency in theater. And that contracting agency was properly resourced to do all the necessary contracting and everybody who was in theater knew that if they wanted something done, that’s where they had to go. Now, if that existed, the problem would go away. So, how do you solve it? You find all the things that prevent that from existing. To me that is the disparate authorities to have people in theater doing contracting. You can easily solve that with policy. You really want to have it institutionalized. To me, that’s doctrine. (C. A. Spisak, personal communication, May 9, 2013)

Response from Brigadier General Joseph Bass, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement):

[Procurement authority]: If you really want unity of effort, you’d use the COCOM commander—the procurement authority comes through the COCOM for his theater and then he could put out policy and those kinds of things that say that you can’t execute a contract in my theater. We don’t tell an infantry brigade ... take your missions from home station, but report to Afghanistan. We wouldn’t do that with any other function, but in contracting we decide the process is to report back to wherever your authority came from. It doesn’t make sense to me. It would be cleaner to have a single line of procurement authority aligned with the command authority ... Then the COCOM CDR is responsible for everything in his AOR.

I think it seems logical to me. If you want unity of effort, you have the procurement authority flow through the combatant commander, and then he’s responsible for the procurements in his AOR. If somebody else comes in the AOR, at least he can hold them
accountable because he’s the commander. You can’t have the
contracting commander trying to hold somebody accountable that’s not
under their command. We have to go back to the combatant
commander and try to get them to help us, and that’s why it’s hard to
get that unity of effort. (J. L. Bass, personal communication, June 24,
2013)

Response from Charles (Chuck) Maurer, Doctrine Branch Chief,
Acquisition Logistics & Technology Integration Office:

[Doctrine]: There is future work with the JTSCC, which is called the
Theater Support Contracting Construct. It is about both unity of
command within certain aspects of the contracting world, but more
importantly unity of effort and leveraging a JTSCC to do that. At the
end of the day, JTSCC is an optional construct … because there are
both command and coordination constructs that are applicable to
certain types of operations.

Nowhere in current or revised doctrine do we ever discuss an
AOR-wide JTSCC. The JTSCC, as we know it, has been really
schizophrenic when it comes to that. Remember it was JCC-I/A? But
yet they supported two JOAs … a significant violation of the principle of
unity of command. They had some problems with that. Then they
pulled it up to the combatant commander level and now it is a direct
supporting subordinate joint force for the combatant command, yet
only has contracting authority in one joint operations area. Again this
command arrangement is not joint doctrine. More specifically, JP 4-10
stipulates a JTSCC normally operates at the JOA or the JFC type
level.

Doctrinally a JTSCC is a functionally focused JTF, but in the
purest doctrinal sense is not a functional component command like the
JFLCC [Joint Force Land Component Commander]. The JTSCC only
commands theater support contracting elements. ... This is the key
point and this has not changed in the revised JP 4-10 drafts. It does
not command any other contracting outfit or have contracting authority
over any other contracting outfit other than itself.

JTSCC’s second mission-essential task is all about coordinating
common contracting actions that may be competing for the same local
vendor base or be duplicative to contracts already in place. The
revised JP 4-10 says explicitly that for every joint operation, the
combatant commander should designate a lead service for contracting
coordination. So you have got some type of [Joint Contracting Support
Board] JCSB process identified with a leader and combatant
command-designated contracting organizations required to participate.
You need to have a [Lead Service for Contracting] LSC where one
service provides all theater support contracts to the joint force, [Lead
Service for Contract Coordination] LSCC, or a JTSCC construct. You
need one of those three in every joint operation to ensure there is some type of common contracting coordination. At a minimum a rudimentary JSCB that is only looking maybe at certain functions at certain thresholds, but at least establish that. (C. Maurer, personal communication, June 26, 2013)

**Response from Rear Admiral Nicholas Kalathas, Deputy Director Contingency Contracting, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy:**

[Lessons learned and planning]: We are starting to figure out that we need to study what we have done. We haven't studied it. Every COCOM has got a shoebox full of lessons learned. I've got them; everybody has got them. We have never looked at all the lessons learned and actually compared them. We have done no analysis. I really think that everybody has got lessons learned, but nobody has really vetted those lessons learned to see if we really learned anything. Every geographic combatant command has experienced a contingency. Let's get the baseline and figure out the common denominators. Imagine how much easier it would be to prosecute the next contingent operation if we had a plan and if that plan was based on lessons learned.

[Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB)]: Do you really want just one command contracting for everything? The reason why it works out that way is really how we operate now. I mean, the PEOs [program executive officers] do what the PEOs do. They have the folks that buy the systems. That is what they do. You don't want anybody else buying that stuff. Does it really make sense for me to go do aircraft maintenance on C-130s when the Air Force has been doing it for years, they know what they are doing. Likewise, you don't want me taking over the port operations in Bahrain for the 5th Fleet. My contingency contracting folks don’t do that for a living. So the commander really does need a common site picture for all the requirements that are coming up in his sandbox. That goes back to requirements with an integration cell concept or the JARB process. (N. T. Kalathas, personal communication, June 27, 2013)

**Response from Victor Solero, Joint Contracting Acquisition Support Office Planner, U.S. Central Command:**

[Lead service for contracting]: The intent of a JTSCC is basically for long-term complex operations. We don’t necessarily foresee, at least in all our planning efforts here, anything long-term. We would basically go through a lead service for contracting (LSC) construct. There would be a lead service identified, and then maybe down the road if and when it’s determined this is going to take a lot longer, it’s getting a lot more complex, and it’s a lot bigger, then we need to go ahead and morph into a JTSCC. Both the Air Force and the Army, obviously, they’ve got the bulk of the contracting assets and the expertise, and
they are already working towards, sort of building a foundation for having a JTSCC. So maybe the [Contract Support Brigade] CSB from an Army perspective would go in and then that would be the nucleus for a JTSCC. But in the initial stages, it would just be a lead service.

One of the things that has confused people, for instance, when we talk about constructs and say, “Hey, you’re the lead service for contracting,” well, everybody seems to think, “Well, does that mean I have to contract for everybody?” That is not the case. That was never meant to be. The lead service is supposed to be to support their own service and to synchronize and coordinate all the contracting actions in the CJOA [combined/joint operations area] to make sure that everybody is leveraging the contracts that already are in place without necessarily setting up new ones ... No duplication of effort.

[Synchronization cell]: I think the wave of the future is some kind of synchronization cell … and when COCOM commander says, “I want this to be my contracting thing,” then the integration cell says, “Okay, we’ll help integrate.” They help set it up, and do all the things necessary to stand it up. Obviously, if you’ve already got an organization already structured to do those kinds of things then they would basically form the nucleus. So it would most likely be a contracting support brigade or an Air Force contracting squadron. (V. Solero, personal communication, June 26, 2013)

Response from Lynn Connors, Acquisition Operations Specialist, Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office:

[Lessons learned and training]: You have to realize and remember how C–JTSCC was created in the first place and then take those lessons and try to either create that standing JTSCC template so that way you can pull it off the shelf and then you can man it. There really is no career field for OCS. ... That’s part of the problem.

Over the last 10 years, we’ve had a lot of initiatives as far as training, and education, and joint exercises. JCASO has an exercise planner assigned to the JS J7 Joint Exercise Division (South) and is responsible for developing OCS training events into the Combatant Command-sponsored joint exercise program (JEP).

OCS is not a career field. The idea of establishing an OCS accreditation program is possible. A way to go about that would be to weave together programs that currently exist from DAU [Defense Acquisition University], JKO, and Army Logistics University (ALU), and JS J4 OCS Services Division, and identify an organization to manage the requirements and issue the certifications. Since there is no overall organization for OCS training, finding an organization to manage the certification is a challenge. Organizations for consideration could include National Defense University, deputy assistant of secretary of defense (program support), USD(AT&L), director of defense
procurement and acquisition policy (DPAP), Defense Acquisition University, etc.

Currently, JCASO has core and functional training for their personnel. The training is similar to an OCS certification. The training includes distance learning courses from JKO, DAU, and SPOT [Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker] webinar training. Core training is for all personnel and consists of 17 hours of training. Courses review OCS doctrine, contracting basics, interagency, and Synchronized Pre-deployment Operations Tracker (SPOT). Functional training in in addition to core training and focuses on keeping our planners, logisticians, engineers, and quality assurance personnel current. Planners take 18 hours of distance learning in contracting and operations from JKO and DAU and 80 hours of resident training at the newly established Joint OCS Planning & Execution Course (JOPEC) offered by the JS J4 OCS Services Division. Engineers take four hours of distance learning in operations (JKO) and 40 hours of resident training at the Naval Civil Engineer Corps Officers School. Logisticians take five hours of distance learning in operations (JKO) and 80 hours of resident training at the JOPEC course. Our quality assurance specialists take 36 hours of distance learning courses from JKO and DAU in operations, joint logistics, and contracting officer's representative (COR) training.

The JCASO training program can be offered as a type of certification program for non-acquisition personnel. It is now a requirement by the Joint Chief of Staff to teach OCS and that was in the NDAA fiscal year language. Section 845, NDAA 2013, [titled] Inclusion of OCS in certain requirements for DoD planning, joint professional military education (JPME), and management structure, [requires the] DoD to measure, on an annual basis the capability of OCS to support current and anticipate wartime missions of the armed forces. [It also] adds OCS to JPME [and requires] the USDAT&L, secretaries of military departments, the heads of the defense agencies, and commanders of combatant commands to determine the OCS requirements of the armed forces and resources to improve and enhance OCS for armed forces and planning for OCS. (L. Conner, personal communication, June 26, 2013)

Response from Major General Harold Greene, Deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology:

[Control measures]: It’s a command responsibility, and you can’t fix a command problem with a staff organization unless the command who owns it is putting out the policy and there is a doctrine that underpins it that makes it all work. The purpose of CJTSCC being there is to provide a capabilities service, a function, to support the operational
commanders’ need. So I think you’ve got to go back to starting with the operational commander and where are those requirements coming from and having appropriate control measures in place.

What you’re really talking about is contracting monitoring actions. They don’t necessarily even have control over the requirements, and so it’s tough for them to monitor unless they’re given that role and there’s a policy from the appropriate command that says, “To all of you who are making requirements that drive the need for contractors, you have to do these things and that includes coordination with C–JTSCC for these things.” As with anything else, you have to have management controls. We know you’re going to have lots of contractors on the battlefield ... so go back to the source of the requirement. What is the source of the requirement? It would be really easy if you could say that all contracting goes through the C–JTSCC, but that’s not realistic.

If you had a troop unit come in, you’d damn sure know where they were. You’d have them on a map and you’d be tracking and it would be commander’s business. Okay, so now what’s our solution to field our contractors? What control measures did you put in place in the contract in your organizational structure with the COR to report back how many are here, where they are, and what they’re doing? It’s not the C–JTSCC’s business. … It’s that of commander and his staff. Unless he says, “C–JTSCC, you’re my special staff officer responsible for tracking this and here’s the OPORD and it has all of the staff and subordinate elements on how you will support that mission. (H. J. Greene, personal communication, July 11, 2013)

Response from Colonel Mike Hoskin, Division Chief, Operational Contract Support and Services, Joint Staff, J-4:

[Planning and OCS exercise]: A lot of it starts with planning. Eighteen months ago, the GAO reported that there were only two annex Ws in existence. During the last 18 months we have focused on this challenge and currently have about 50% of the problem solved. For example, PACOM [Pacific Command] and NORTHCOM [Northern Command] have both requested shelf ready like FRAGOs and orders that they can pull off the shelf in times of a national emergency to give them specific contracting authorities. Increasing unity of effort and unity of command starts with the actual plans. The plan should stipulate that when a particular event or trigger happens, we will go to lead service for contracting or to a JTSCC. We will be exercising this concept and standing up a JTSCC in the JAN 2014 exercise with NORTHCOM.

If a JTSCC is decided upon, unity of effort and unity of command are increased within DoD. In the CENTCOM AOR, there
are challenges with multiple contracting organizations, but coordination is better today than in the past.

[Directive authority for contracting]: I’ll give you an example of where C2 was done very, very quickly and the problems we ran into and how we fixed them. During Operation Tomodachi, much of Hawaii was alerted and took precautionary actions to a potential tsunami hitting the islands. Colonel Jay Carlson (USAF counterpart in Hawaii) and I quickly assessed the situation and decided that command and control of contracting should be quickly established because we both expected the United States to quickly flow forces to Japan to assist in this natural disaster. Based on long-standing agreements that the USAF would conduct the majority of the contracting in Japan, it made sense to declare the USAF as the lead service for contracting in support of Operation Tomodachi. We quickly informed PACOM and assisted PACOM with issuing the contracting C2 FRAGO. The FRAGO and contracting command and control were instrumental in working the requirements and managing scarce resources.

One of the services initially did not want to follow the command and control FRAGO but quickly came on board when the humanitarian funds were tied to the JRRB [joint requirement review board], organized by contracting leadership, PACOM, and USAID. (M. Hoskin, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

Response from Dan Matthews, Policy and Doctrine Analyst, Office
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement), Expeditionary
Contracting Support Plans Directorate:

[OCS joint concept and integration]: I think it’s probably a little late to do defibrillation on JTSCC, but let’s talk about the concept. It’s an OCS joint concept that’s tied to the new national strategy that’s tied to the chairman’s drive to do the joint force 2020 thing of how do we support the force in the future for expeditionary and contingency operations given the fact that because of the national strategy we are not going to be a stabilizing force? In other words, we’re not going to do nation building with U.S. forces like Iraq and Afghanistan, to some extent, and not size the force to do that.

Let’s go back to Gansler [Report] in 2007. It specifically earmarked the Army and said, “There’s an institutional side of the Army, if you will ... and an operational side of the Army, and we need to make sure we integrate those efforts.” I’m not sure we’re there yet in the Army. We’re better than we were in 2007, but it’s not just the JTSCC. I think it’s an overall DoD capability or mentality about the capability itself and the understanding of it. (C. D. Matthews, personal communication, June 24, 2013)
Response from Brigadier General Theodore Harrison, Commanding General United States Army Expeditionary Contracting Command:

[Theater business clearance]: This issue is something that I really struggled with as I was coming back from JCC–I in 2006 … and I teed up this very issue with DPAP. As a result of a briefing I gave to Mr. Assad, the DAR [Defense Acquisition Regulation] Council finally put that clause in the DFAR in terms of contracting performed. The theater business clearance is now a requirement throughout CENTCOM. That never existed before.

You know it started off just in theater. ... These are contracts that we write in JCC–I for performance in Iraq. Then to compound the problem a little bit more, you have got numerous players in theater writing contracts. You have got the State Department, USAID, Corps of Engineers, and SOCOM [Special Operations Command] and none of these guys belong to us. Then to really compound the problem you have got all these people from outside the area, the external support contracts, that are either sort of theater contracts if you will, but being written outside. LOGCAPs are probably, the single best and biggest example, ... and then the systems contracts that are even a little bit more below the radar or were at the time.

So that whole concept of theater business clearance came about just to help solve some very practical issues. The contractor that shows up with his copy of his contract saying the government will provide him full logistics support and he is showing it to the mayor of Taji [for example] and saying, “Hey where are my [containerized housing units] CHUs? Of course the mayor doesn’t know anything about this. So you know without having one person in charge of all federal government contracting, there is no way you are going to have perfect C2 on this. So the challenge became okay, given we can’t do that, what framework can we put in place to try to get at this? That theater business clearance process was our first stab at doing that and it has evolved a lot over time. (T. C. Harrison, personal communication, August 20, 2013)

C. SUBSIDARY QUESTION TWO

Closely related to our primary research question, many interviewees offered their opinions regarding measures C–JTSCC has taken to synchronize their contracting activities over the past years. The intent behind this question was to discover C–JTSCC’s current practices at creating unity of effort and the extent to which these steps were effective. Responses from interviewees who covered this aspect of unity of effort in their responses to the primary research question are not included.
Subsidiary Question 2: What steps has C–JTSCC taken to synchronize current contracting efforts, and to what extent are they effective?

Response from Air Force Contracting Professional:

[TBC]: Some of the biggest challenges we previously faced with OCS are (1) we often lacked visibility and accountability for contractors; (2) we failed to coordinate with BOS providers at the installation/base level to ensure there is adequate government-furnished life support (GFLS) available for the contractors; and (3) external and systems support contracts lacked the appropriate JOA clauses implementing GCC/JTF policies. Many times contracting is accomplished by a service/agency contracting activity outside the AOR, and contractors would just show up in the AOR without any coordination with the base/installation responsible for providing their life support.

Therefore, C–JTSCC implemented the theater business clearance (TBC) process for external and systems support contracts. This process ensures that C–JTSCC reviews solicitations and contracts to ensure they include the appropriate local clauses implementing GCC/JTF policies. The TBC process was recently amended to ensure there is communication/coordination with BOS providers to ensure adequate GFLS is available when contractors show up. C–JTSCC is also accomplishing TBC through the Joint Contingency Contract System (JCCS) module and if TBC is not accomplished, contractors are unable to get letters of authorization (LOAs) issued via the synchronized pre-deployment and operational Tracker (SPOT). Since the LOA is what authorizes a contractor to receive GFLS, such as MWR, food, billeting, etc., it helps with enforcing the TBC requirement. (Air Force Contracting Professional, personal communication, June 27, 2013)

Response from Major General Camille Nichols:

[TBC, SPOT, and LOA]: Theater business clearance and SPOT are used to align procurement trackers to help codify who had clearance or who didn’t. What we did though was we really took some dramatic steps to not allow people in and to remove people who didn’t have a validated letter of authorization (LOA), as it related to their contract.

[JCSB]: The JCSB was the mechanism that I started to try and go beyond the community of the willing to give them the perspective on the ground where we could do collaboration, and where we could do alignment. So that was my attempt to go a little bit beyond just a willingness to share information. It didn’t go far enough, but it started to make some headway. (C. Nichols, personal communication, July 8, 2013)
Response from Brigadier General Joseph Bass:

[Contract boards]: It’s tough. You know, we tried by establishing those joint contract support boards and the JLPB, the Joint Logistics Procurement Support Board ... Forums to kind of get your arms around that. I was over there in 2007. You basically hope that everyone will cooperate. … It’s like the coalition of the willing.

[TBC]: Theater business clearance is a policy from CENTCOM that says you will not do a contract here without us first approving it. You know, you’ve got to send your solicitation and we’re going to make sure all the right clauses are in there and then when you get an award you’ve got to notify us. That was their attempt to try to get unity of effort. But what if you’re not in DoD? TBC is okay, … but what if you don’t comply? What happens? I mean, there really are no teeth to it to make people do it. (J. L. Bass, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

Response from Charles Maurer:

[JCSB]: The doctrinal mission for coordination is really the Joint Contracting Support Board. From our office’s view, this effort has been a real hit and miss. The forcing function for that are two things for a JCSB. The first is combatant commander directives. It directs the Service and combat support agency (CSA) contracting organizations to participate in the JCSB. Now the problem is that there are many DoD contracting organizations, especially those executing external support contracts from outside the JOA, that are not under the combatant commander’s command. And in all cases, the combatant command has no direct control on their contracting authority which is part of the challenge in orchestrating contracting in a JOA.

But talking with the contracting folks and the other people that have been involved with OCS, they do believe the JCSB doctrine is about right and we have just got to be able to be mature enough to make it work. The combatant commander’s logistical-related directives have been problematic when it comes to logistics since the combatant commanders were formed because combatant commands, by design, don’t have full logistics authority. The combatant command USC Title 10 authority is restricted to approving logistical plans and coordinating emergency actions while the Service USC Title 10 authorities include all aspects of logistics for their forces; … and while DoD continues to clarify and emphasize this challenging doctrine, it remains very much misunderstood and often a contentious friction point between the combatant commands and the services.

[TBC]: The theater business clearance process was developed by the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics (AT&L) staff to provide the combatant commander an acquisition authority “hammer” to enforce combatant commander OCS-
related directives. More specifically, OSD(AT&L) has directed that TBC “applies to every DoD contracting organization awarding a contract with area performance in or delivery to the designated JOA.”

TBC processes currently being executed in operations in Afghanistan are generally restricted to contractor management issues with much of the focus on ensuring (1) the appropriate contractor employee deployment clause (DFARS 225.74) is in place, and (2) synchronizing government-furnished support (GFS) to deployed contractor personnel requirements. TBC in the optimum world includes much more than the deployment clause and GFS synchronization; it would include a pre-award JCSB process where the LSCC, LSC, or JTSCC could lead a pre-award JCSB process (think first right of refusal for common contracted commodities and services), thus maximizing the efficiency and reducing the cost of contracts in support of a particular JOA.

And in any case, observations, insights, and lessons from recent operations strongly indicate that TBC, while potentially a very useful tool, is difficult to implement and still requires additional refinement in the TBC processes and training of both the combatant command OCS staff and executing contracting organizations. Also, actual TBC implementation actions require additional contract oversight manpower that may not easily be acquired in the future with the expected reductions in various operational and contracting organization staffs across DoD. (C. Maurer, personal communication, June 26, 2013)

Response from Rear Admiral Nicholas Kalathas:

[TBC]: Theater business clearance was one forcing mechanism to herd all the cats and dogs that are out there. It is not perfect, but it is good.

[SPOT]: SPOT itself in concept makes a lot of sense. We should be able to track everybody, know where everybody is. Why not? We knew where all of our soldiers and sailors and airmen and marines were, right? We all have CAC [common access card] cards, right? But we found that we weren’t able to do that very well and so SPOT has fixed a lot of those problems and in fact one of the positive things is that SOUTHCOM wants to implement SPOT at its headquarters in the United States for all of its contractors.

[Integration cell]: There are opportunities and there are times when we should have unity of effort and I think that the best example was developed by General Casey Blake, my deputy in Afghanistan. He came up with a concept called integration cell that was pioneered in Regional Command East. We saw that we were doing all these projects that were kind of lying on top of each other and his contracting officers were working 20 hours a day to satisfy all these requirements.
in Afghanistan, ... and they were seeing requirements that we were doing over and over again, ... which led to duplications, inefficiency.

Finally he blew the whistle and he said, “Hey, wait a second.” He met with the [regional command] RC East commander and convinced him that there should be a board process. Anybody who had a requirement, any colonel or any one star that had a requirement sat around a table with all your J codes and you looked at it and said, “All right, what do you got? Why is this important? Why do we have to do this? What is the value?” The important thing is that it forced the requirements community to sit around the table and say, “What are we doing here? Are we walking on top of each other? Are we building in efficiency?” (N. T. Kalathas, personal communication, June 27, 2013)

Response from Victor Solero:

[TBC, SPOT, and LOA]: Theater business clearance has to have more teeth. SPOT and the issuance of LOAs have got to have more teeth. Everybody has got their own contracting authority, and they basically say, “Well, I can write a contract and I don’t need your permission.” You’ve got to have some enforcement mechanism to say, “Okay, if you feel that way (I’m speaking for the commander because I’m the belly button) then I’m going to tell you, go home.” Not only do I have to be able to mean it, I’ve got to be able to actually do something that enforces that. Like the LOA, the letter of authorization that is given to contractors ... or something that says that I can deny you having a letter of authorization and not even allow you into the country.

[Authority]: Those are the things that have to be worked through. Coordinating authority is something that requires you to coordinate ... [but] doesn’t necessarily mean you have to follow. But, for the most part, most people know that if you’re the guy who is speaking for the commander then unless you have a very, very good reason for not doing something, you’re going to follow along. Having said that, in certain cases I think the JTSCC has the needed authorities, but they just don’t have any enforcement mechanism and I think that has hurt them.

In some cases you have to force unity of effort ... because it’s not like contracting authority has just one chain so you almost have to force it. You know, it’s one thing when you’re a commander. You can force your subordinates to do whatever you want them to do. They work for you and they belong to you. Contract authority is different and that’s what makes it so difficult. Until we change that, you basically have to force unity. (V. Solero, personal communication, June 26, 2013)
Response from Colonel Mike Hoskin:

[TBC]: Currently, the CENTCOM JTSCC commander controls theater business clearance in Afghanistan to manage what contracts and contractors are to work within Afghanistan. TBC continues to be a critical tool to maintain unity of effort and unity of command. The use of TBC is pretty mature in overseas operations. We are still exploring how TBC would be used for a domestic disaster mission.

[JCSB]: The Joint Contracting Support Board is established to manage requirements and the various contracting activities. It is important for the COCOM to publish an order mandating the various contracting entities to be part of this board to minimize duplication of effort and mitigate problems associated with scarce resources. (M. Hoskin, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

Response from Dan Matthews:

[Drawdown cell and doctrine]: We are seeing C–JTSCC and the JCASO Drawdown Cell teaming to work contractor drawdown for U.S. forces Afghanistan. There are two monthly meetings held to discuss progress, issues, and the way ahead. One is an SVTC held with Army’s DASA (P) as the chair using the DoD authority for Army as the contracting executive agent in that nation. The OCS and procurement communities come together to discuss and ensure unity of effort in drawdown. Secondly, the same organizations hold a second meeting [at the (0-6/GS 15) action officer level] to work issues or get them in the open prior to the GO/SES SVTC. They use the JCSB, a Joint Contracting Support Board from existing doctrine to do this. So, bottom line, doctrine is taking hold and being used. (C. D. Matthews, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

D. SUBSIDIARY QUESTION THREE

During the course of the interviews, many interviewees discussed current measures taking place to help achieve better contracting unity of effort with respect to the DoD as a whole. The intent of this question was to capture the latest and emerging DoD measures aimed at increasing effectiveness and efficiencies across the department.

Subsidiary Question 3: Are there any discussions, initiatives, or measures currently in development to help achieve better contracting unity of effort for future similar operations?

Response from Air Force Contracting Professional:

[JP 4-10 Revision]: It’s a start. I think we’re getting more fidelity to what OCS is and where we’re going. No doubt about that. Do I think we’re there? No, because ultimately it’s going to take a cultural
change whereby all commanders/planners recognize OCS is just one of several means to accomplish their mission. If a commander decides to utilize OCS, they must properly plan for it and manage it.

[OCS mission integration]: As of right now, GCCs/JTFs may have ad hoc OCS integration cells that are essentially a pick-up game. The OCS Joint Concept identified the need for an OCS Mission Integration (OMI) cell at the GCC/JTF levels that is deliberately resourced with multi-functional members trained on OCS. The OMI will focus on establishing structure and accountability for OCS requirements management and contractor support/oversight. (Air Force Contracting Professional, personal communication, June 27, 2013)

Response from William (Bill) Reich:

[DCMA]: Early on with JCC–I/A, an MOA existed with DCMA ... where DCMA agreed up front that there were certain kinds of contracts that they would take on ... either theater-wide or high-risk contracts. Then upfront, when that TBC package came in, it was actually the [contracting officers] KOs who could propose the DCMA to take it on for administration and then DCMA would evaluate the package and figure out what it needed and then they would either accept it or not.

In the updated JP 4-10, the intent is that DCMA in the future (with a future JTSCC) would not deploy as an independent command to perform contract administration; rather, future JTSCCs will have that ... DCMA and services will provide IAs to man. DCMA would provide the leadership and the reach back support associated with DCMA, but, again, the [JTSCC] commander basically would have cradle-to-grave responsibility for JTSCC contracts and then any other external contracts which it may make sense for JTSCC to take on. (W. Reich, personal communication, June 26, 2013)

Response from Major General Camille Nichols:

[JP 4-10]: You know doctrine—if nobody reads the doctrine, it doesn’t matter what the doctrine says. The Army would augment where necessary and would start teaching it at every level at every school and more importantly, start exercising it. But without the doctrine, you know the way our Army works, we aren’t going to get there. (C. Nichols, personal communication, July 8, 2013)

Response from Brigadier General Joseph Bass:

[Contract support teams]: The Expeditionary Contracting Command has a proposed Force Design Update that would create Contract Support Teams (CSTs) that would be aligned with the operational units such as Corps, Div, TSC/ESC and other type units to give them a team of contracting and OCS experts to support their OCS planning and execution. Right now it’s a pickup game for most units to try and do
OCS during exercises and real-world deployments. This CST concept would go a long way in synchronizing contracting and gaining unity of effort. I’m not sure if the Army will support this under the current force structure constraints. (J. L. Bass, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

Response from Charles Maurer:

[JOPEC and CON 334]: There are several main efforts to improve OCS and related contracting support actions in future operations. The first effort is the new Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course (JOPEC) currently being developed by the J-4 with significant Army assistance. This course, while focused mostly on combatant command and service component command OCS staff, also applies to selected members of operational focused contracting organizations such as USAF Expeditionary Contracting Squadrons and Army contracting support brigades. The JOPEC was successfully piloted in July and will be offered in numerous mobile training team actions over the next FY [fiscal year]. There also is an emerging initiative between DAU and the J-4 to revise the current Contracting (CON) 334 to include various new contracting support tasks such as how to run a JCSB, how to stand up a JTSCC, etc. This CON 334 enhancement effort will be directly tied to the JOPEC, but unlike the JOPEC, CON 334 will remain an acquisition officer-focused course vice a general OCS staff training course. (C. Maurer, personal communication, June 26, 2013)

Response from Rear Admiral Nicholas Kalathas:

[Drawdown cell]: [Based on lessons from Iraq], the operational contract support drawdown cell in Afghanistan is a big, big win for the OCS community because we never even used the term OCS when we were in Iraq. Now, the OCS drawdown cell is paying attention to the contractors, we are paying attention to the property; all the issues that we were faced with in Iraq, we are now looking at methodically so there are no surprises. The SPOT database now has a requirement that if you are a contractor and you are bringing stuff into country, it has to go into the SPOT. You have to actually report how many CONEXs you are bringing in, the volume, etc. ... Whatever you are bringing in it has got to be reported in the SPOT database so that it just doesn’t disappear; it will stay there.

[SPOT and TBC]: Now the PEOs are supposed to also be doing this, but I don’t know if we have gotten to the point where the PEOs are actually using SPOT to report.

COCOMs have been watching CENTCOM, and how they have evolved, what they have done. You know, not necessarily one size fits all and maybe some of it won’t apply now, but they are raising interest now that they are supposed to be planning for this. So all those questions are being asked; should we have SPOT now? Should we
have TBC now? What do we have so that if we do get hit with something, we are ready? What is important to start off with? (N. T. Kalathas, personal communication, June 27, 2013)

Response from Victor Solero:

[OCS integration cell]: One of the things that they’re talking about is having an integration cell or center at each of the COCOMs that would be, in certain cases, a permanent organization, but it would only be three or four or five people ... and that could be the nucleus if something did happen of setting up a JTSCC or to assist a CSB or another contracting organization to do those kinds of things.

[OCS vision for the 2020 force]: Basically, the charter is to forget about how things are done now. How do you want it to be? What is it that we want OCS to look like? (V. Solero, personal communication, June 26, 2013)

Response from Colonel Mike Hoskin:

[OCS joint concept]: There’s two big pieces with the joint concept. One piece is called the OMI, which is an OCS integration cell that is at each geographic combatant command. Then at each service component you also [have] LNOs or people who focus on OCS integration. The way we have it built right now is that at least one person is a contracting professional. In an OMI, there’s about five or six people; at least one contracting person, probably an engineer who’s smart in construction and a logistician ... people who are professional planners.

Now, the other piece of the joint concept is the EA [executive agent]. EA is not a popular word in the Pentagon right now, and it stands for executive agent. So, you can get away from the term, EA, but, really, I put it in three buckets. One bucket is human capital or human resources management. What agency or what organization is going to be responsible for managing the “1103,” or whatever the civil service equivalent is of an OCS planner (we don’t have one yet). [For example], just like your field artillery branch, you have a proponency or you have a branch for field artillery that says that you need this many colonels, this many civil service, this many of this and that. We need to have the same thing for OCS.

Next you have a training piece. The Air Force does a great job training them, and the Navy does a great job training them, and the Army does, but there’s no unity of effort there. The AL&T–IO guys teach the 3 Charlie course and we (J4 OCSS) just wrote the next level of that, and it’s called JOPEC (Joint Operation Planning and Execution Course). We call it the 4 Charlie course, and it’s to teach people to be planners. Well, guess what? We are not a schoolhouse, so we need a schoolhouse to be owner of the whole training piece.
The last piece of the EA to me is who is going to be the owner of all the toys, all the systems? There are all these IT systems owned by all kinds of different people. So, we are actively looking right now ... and talking with all the services and defense agencies, and asking, “Would a service or agency want to take on this whole responsibility or a piece of it?”

[JOPEC]: The Joint OCS Planning & Execution Course is a higher level course that helps answer questions like, when do you make the decision to go LOGCAP or not? When do you make the decision for lead service versus a JTSCC? One thing that has helped us recently with this (JOPEC) class is that the last NDAA has mandated it. So with that, instead of saying, “Hey, we’ve built all the task conditions and standards for all this training for you.” … “But guess what? Congress has just told you, you will do this.”

[Authorities working group]: The services got together a couple of months ago to look across the world and decide which service or multiple services would be the go-to senior business advisor in a time of emergency or conflict. For example, the Navy has said that they desire to be the senior business advisor for Africa; the Air Force has said that they desire to be the senior business advisor for PACOM and EUCOM. This effort is still work in progress, and each COCOM has unique contracting command and control challenges. (M. Hoskin, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

Response from Dan Matthews:

[OCS joint concept]: An OCS joint concept that’s striving to look to the future on how we’re going to support that force…while achieving unity of effort, achieving effective and efficient contracting, in support of an operation that’s designed for the future. There are pieces of it that are controversial, but don’t get hung up on that fact. But we’re learning so fast, I think, that we’ve got to strike while the iron’s hot and write it back into the appropriate documentation guidance and instruction to get it out to the field so they can start working with it, get their hands on it, and actually do some of this and then come back to us. The ultimate end on this joint concept is it will be signed in the fall, but PACOM has already ponied up and said, “You guys want to experiment and want to run a pilot course on some of the pieces once you get the capabilities prioritized and gaps identified and all that stuff.” They’ve offered themselves up as a candidate to do so.

[OMI]: It’s not the same thing as the OSCIC (OSC Integration Cell). It’s an integration cell on steroids. It’s tailored for that geographic combatant command. Besides a contracting person, engineer, and a logistician, I will tell you that there are a couple of others that you’ve always got to have that expertise on. Although not resident in the OCS Integration Cell or the OMI and one is a lawyer. You’ve got to have the
legal guys. You may not have a standing JAG sitting there in the thing, but the ability to run it through JAG. The second one we’ve learned and taken right into the joint concept and we need to hit harder and harder and harder is the financial management. The Army’s doctrine on financial management picks up on that. That’s new doctrine coming out of the Army, 1-06, I think. It’s called the fiscal triad—law, operation, dollars.

[OCS exercise]: We’re working now on an exercise with NORTHCOM to see and identify the steps for setting up the JTSCC. We will validate [these steps], and see whether or not the need is there for that particular operation … based on the scope of it. But that is a command and operational decision … not a contracting and not an acquisition, if you will, only decision. (C. D. Matthews, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

Response from Anna Carter, Director, Operational Contract Support Plans & Programs, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support):

[Functional Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB)]: It grew out of the need for a single DoD senior executive forum to address increased congressional interest in OCS, emerging and evolving doctrine and policy issues. Specific issues from the Commission on Wartime Contracting and concerns over use of private security contractors (PSCs) also accelerated the effort to establish this forum. Today, this joint forum continues to oversee, guide, and direct collaborative efforts of multiple stakeholders working to institutionalize OCS across DoD. Our role in OSD, is to encourage collaboration and make sure there is cooperation across the department, and we’ve done a lot better with this than in the past. (A. Carter, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

Response from Brigadier General Theodore Harrison:

[OCS joint concept]: I don’t know exactly where that is [in development], but it is getting worked with the Joint Staff J4.

[Force structure]: AL&T–IO is helping us take a look at our force structure. Again, as we go through this total Army analysis (TAA) over the next several years, especially as the Army downsizes, we are not even sure we have got our structure right. That makes us very vulnerable when the Army is taking cuts, especially if we are being asked to take more cuts than the overall percentage share of the Army’s force structure. So we are working as quickly as we can. … For instance, if the four-man teams are the right structure, could it be different, who should we align with, who are our workload drivers.

[Center of Excellence]: When we stood up our force structure, we really didn’t build a Center of Excellence like other warfighting
capabilities have. Many people I talk with say, “Yes, I know. Contracting has really become a warfighting capability.” I mean we have got to have it in a war. But you know the logistic guys have [combined arms support command] CASCOM, the maneuver guys have Fort Benning, and the fire support guys have got Fort Sill. They developed doctrine, they work force structure, they make sure that training is well constructed, and they have got a good framework for officers, enlisted professional development, and education. Well, we are on our own because we don’t have that school that integrates all this. It is done by a bunch of disparate folks at the Acquisition Sustainment Center, Acquisition Management Branch, and AL&T–IO. They are helping a little bit. ECC is certainly doing a lot of heavy lifting, but it is hard to synchronize these like a schoolhouse would do.

The thing that I try to point out, during the total Army analysis, as we are reducing force structure in combat service support units and combat support units, what is the Army going to do to mitigate those structure losses? Well, one of the things that they said is, well, we will contract for it. Well, what are you doing to create the capability to contract for it? Are you deep enough in your contracting as you simultaneously downsize units? (T. C. Harrison, personal communication, August 20, 2013)

E. SUBSIDIARY QUESTION FOUR

Many interviewees provided their thoughts on the doctrinal way ahead for OCS. The intent of this question was to identify gaps in doctrine that should be addressed in order to provide official guidance for commanders who use OCS. Responses from interviewees who have already covered this aspect of unity of effort in other question areas are not included.

Subsidiary Question 4: In order to prevent the same lessons learned, are there any OCS doctrinal changes that need to be made to ensure we have better contracting unity of effort?

Response from Air Force Contracting Professional:

[Total force]: Treat contractors as part of the total force. They’re part of the total force and they enable us to accomplish our mission. We have to integrate OCS into our established processes, structures, training, systems, etc., and avoid creating something separate to manage OCS. For example, we created a separate system, the Synchronized Pre-deployment Operational Tracker (SPOT) and process for tracking and accounting for Contractors Authorized to Accompany the Force (CAAF). In my opinion, we should have modified our reception process and systems to account for CAAF in a similar manner as we do for military and civilians. If we establish separate OCS processes, structures, training, systems, etc., it’s very difficult to hold the normal
command chain accountable and ultimately drive the culture change that needs to occur.

[OCS is multifunctional]: If there’s one thing you can take away from this is a lot of people will try to say “OCS” and then want to know “who’s responsible.” It’s a multifunctional process that involves all functional areas/joint codes. You’ve got to at least break OCS into its process elements and have accountability for the inputs (requirements), processing (contracting), and outputs (contractors). (Air Force Contracting Professional, personal communication, June 27, 2013)

Response from William (Bill) Reich:

[TBC]: In 2007–2008, we were aware of TBC, ... but it was not far enough advanced for us to put it into doctrine. Part of the problem is, like I said, the theater business clearance requirement originated in the DPAP letters and PGI. There was never really anything issued to combatant commanders to tell them, “Hey, this tool is available for you.” You know, of course, that’s the intent with the updated joint doctrine. (W. Reich, personal communication, June 26, 2013)

Response from Major General Camille Nichols:

[Contractor accountability]: At the strategic level, with a four-star in Iraq and Afghanistan, they wanted to know how many contractors were on the ground and, of course, I said, “Why are you asking me? If it’s a personnel issue, we should go ask the J1.” So, you try to put all the pressure on the KO when you really need the people who own the terrain to be responsible for the terrain. You need the people who had the requirement for purchasing, because it’s their requirement, it’s their need, it’s their contract, and it’s their success of their mission that’s counting on the service that’s being provided.

That change in perspective is dramatic, and in 13 years in combat contracting it’s not going to change, and that’s why it’s got to be in the new doctrine. You can’t make that KO be responsible for the literal execution of bedding [arrangements] for contractors A, B or C, especially in combat.

Someone needs to understand where all contractors are, what they’re doing, how much money is being spent, and what they’re doing to local economies. All that analysis is essential for the mission commander, the tactical mission commander, and we weren’t able to do hardly any of that for him. The new doctrine gives me some say in that role and a little bit more control. I don’t think it goes far enough though. (C. Nichols, personal communication, July 8, 2013)
Response from Brigadier General Joseph Bass:

[Lessons learned]: I think that the AL&T–IO folks are doing a tremendous job in identifying, capturing, and addressing many of the OCS doctrinal issues. They are working a number of rewrites of current regs [regulations] and putting together a new reg to address OCS issues. The key is getting all of the lessons learned into these regs so that the issues and actions are institutionalized and codified so that the next generation of OCS folks (contracting, logistics, warfighters, whoever) understand the issues and actions that need to be addressed before, during, and after any exercise or deployment. That’s been the problem from my perspective; … we have to continue relearning these important lessons. I have copies of AARs dated in 1991 from contracting officers who served in Desert Shield/Desert Storm with the 18th ABC who identified the exact same issues that I dealt with in OIF in the 2007 timeframe … It’s clear to me that we didn’t learn or document the lessons. (J. L. Bass, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

Response from Charles Maurer:

[Lessons learned and Way Ahead for Doctrine]: While there is no formal joint operational contract support lessons learned program, the J-4, the Army AL&T–IO office, [Defense Logistics Agency’s] DLA’s Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office, and various OSD(AT&L) staff work together to share OCS-related observations, insights, and lessons emerging from current operations around the globe. The results of this informal joint OCS lessons learned effort are being incorporated into the revised JP 4-10 along with numerous other JPs and Service doctrinal publications. The most significant changes to current OCS doctrine are the clarification of the following three OCS mission-focused areas: (1) contract support planning and integration, (2) contracting planning and coordination, and (3) contractor management. Major related initiatives being codified in some detail in JP 4-10 include the idea of a joint force command OCS integration cell as already seen in most geographic combatant commands and in [United States Forces–Afghanistan] USFOR–A today, along with the contracting support-related LSCC, LSC, and JTSCC constructs. The revised JP 4-10 also includes clarification and more detailed text related to OCS boards such as the joint requirements review board (currently referred to as the joint acquisition review board or JARB) and JCSB. Again, this revised doctrine is the basis for the emerging JOPEC and will be the basis for the revised CON 334. (C. Maurer, personal communication, June 26, 2013)

Response from Rear Admiral Nicholas Kalathas:

[Drawdown operations]: Number one, there was no guideline in doctrine. So the JP 4-10, which talks about OCS and contingency
contracting, has nothing in there about how to get out of a conflict. It has got everything from Phase 0 and 1 and 2 and you get to sustainment, but as far as leaving, it doesn’t have anything in there.

Ever since the Gansler Commission came out in 2007 and said we needed to have general officers in command in these situations because we are exposed to having contractors on the battlefield, we are doing things now in a very different way than we used to do them.

[Lessons learned analysis]: If we were to look at all the lessons learned and say, what did we do right? What did we do wrong? What should you avoid for the next contingency? So when you go about your exercises and you build up your annex Ws, your annexes for your CONOPS and your O Plans, you are prepared to avoid those pitfalls and you are able to capitalize on the good things that you have done in the past. We have never seen that. We have never looked at that.

[Phase 0 planning]: If you look at just contracting alone, just the contracting piece, I am willing to bet that no matter what the contingency, we are probably buying bottled water, we are probably buying some comfort items, generators, port-a-potties, etc. If we know that is going to be the case, we could be putting that stuff on long-term contracts ahead of time so there is not as much contracting needed. A lot what we were buying could have been bought back in the states on large delivery order-type contracts that are already pre-negotiated and pre-existent. But when you are in the fight you don’t have a lot of time to do that. (N. T. Kalathas, personal communication, June 27, 2013)

Response from Victor Solero:

[OCS integration cell]: That’s not mentioned in the old doctrine, but it’s supposed to be in the one that’s coming out about an integration/coordination cell. (V. Solero, personal communication, June 26, 2013)

Response from Major General Harold Greene:

[Authority]: Okay, so now what’s our solution to field our contractors? It’s commander’s business, … not the C–JTSCC’s business. It’s that commander and his staff. Now, if he says, “C–JTSCC, you’re my special staff officer responsible for tracking this and here’s the OPORD, and it has all of the staff and subordinate elements on how you will support that guy in executing that mission”—[then its C–JTSCC]. [This should be] based on doctrine, polices or written orders.

[CORs and structure]: So if I go out and I’m at a command headquarters and there’s an organizational structure, right? And you can track that and you know when everything goes down, right? Okay, so you’ve got a PCO and an ACO and a COR, where’s the doctrine on CORs in theater? The people who can actually—are in that chain directly, what’s the relationship between the CORs on these contracts
and these requiring activities and whoever the commander’s staff officer, who’s responsible for contracting? One of the things we did is we said, “Okay, PEOs, [if] you’re going to have presence forward, have a COR for them.” So what’s the organizational structure for CORs? It’s to give you the ability to impact and track and actually give proper legal guidance to those people on the ground. (H. J. Greene, personal communication, July 11, 2013)

Response from Colonel Mike Hoskin:

[Command and control]: Clearly identify who’s in charge. In many cases DoD will not be in charge of the mission. For example, if it’s an HA/DR mission outside of CONUS, the State Department and USAID are in charge and we are a supporting force. If it is a war fight, the DoD is in charge. If it is CONUS-based HA/DR mission, the governor of the state that’s impacted and FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency], would be in charge, and we’ll be a supporting effort to that. It is important the command and control be clearly articulated and defined in operations and contingency plans.

I just want to give you this one other quick little analogy to show you how far we have come in the last few years. During JCC–I/A, it probably took six months to actually establish the authorities and the orders and, you know, getting services to play nice. The afternoon that Hurricane Sandy was making its way toward NY and NJ, NORTHCOM called the Joint Staff requesting increased acquisition dollar thresholds for the pending natural disaster. The Joint Staff agreed with NORTHCOM and worked with OSD to issue the needed guidance. OSD quickly acted upon the request and provided NORTHCOM with the authorities needed within one day. The quick actions by NORTHCOM, OSD, and the JS ensured that DoD contracting organizations responding to Hurricane Sandy had the flexibilities needed. (M. Hoskin, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

Response from Dan Matthews:

[Doctrine and planning]: You’ve got to remember that this doctrine is less than five years old, and we’re already changing it and making some fairly significant changes in it.

In that doctrine, we start to attack across the spectrum of operations. Frankly, in 2008, JP 4-10 was written kind of focused on planning phases 3, 4, and 5, and it’s good there. There are a lot of good roots there. Now we are backed up and now we’re looking at theater campaign plans, we’re looking at shaping operations and pure peace time and what’s the impact of OCS there, and we’re still learning a lot. We’re still, if you will, kind of guiding each other by the hand for what we can do in shaping operations where there’s potentially one contractor, one uniform, and one bag man. There’s a whole world out there that I think needs to be explored.
[OCS cell]: In the new JP 4-10, you’ll see us talk about an OCS integration cell. We’re seeing, even without the doctrine being out there, we’re seeing some of the field armies establishing an operational contract support integration cell. U.S. Army Africa has an established one with a four-man cell; U.S. Forces, Korea is talking about establishing an operational contract support integration cell, not only at the JTF level, but also down at the field Army level. (C. D. Matthews, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

Response from Brigadier General Theodore Harrison:

[Deployable ECC]: One of the capabilities that DoD probably needs to have is a deployable expeditionary contracting capability. As an example, Expeditionary Contracting Command [ECC] was designed to be able to deploy as a headquarters and be a deployed HCA in theater, but you really won’t find that in doctrine anywhere, either Army doctrine or joint doctrine.

[Army Techniques Publication 4-92]: We are also redoing ATP 4-92. ATP 4-92 is another piece of doctrine that we are trying to get right. We never, when we set up the ECC, we never really aligned well enough in terms of where our key mission demand drivers were. We basically said one [contingency contracting team] CCT per [brigade combat team] BCT, two for a sustainment brigade and that was about it. I think what you are going to see is it is going to be a more holistic expeditionary contracting document that is going to cover ECC, the brigade, the battalion, and the team. (T. C. Harrison, personal communication, August 20, 2013)

F. CONCLUSION

This chapter presents our data collected from our in-depth interviews with senior DoD leaders. Our interviews were transcribed by the NPS Acquisition Research Program and sorted according to their corresponding research questions. These data, along with our literature review, provide us the information to conduct an analysis using the DOTMLPF–P framework in our next chapter.
IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A. INTRODUCTION

Using the literature review as a knowledge base for our topic, we first examined interview data to identify common themes for our research questions. We next analyzed our data using the DOTMLPF–P framework (see Figure 11) to provide easily understood solutions and approaches for our respondents’ answers. In this chapter, we provide the common themes for each question and organize them within the DOTMLP–F framework.

![Figure 11. DOTMLPF–P Framework Matrix](image)

B. COMMON THEME ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Upon completion of our interviews, we identified common themes for each respective research question. Using a simple spreadsheet to capture each respondent’s answers, we were able to visualize which answers most often appeared (see Figure 12).
Figure 12. DOTMLPF–P Framework Matrix

For each question, we calculated the number of times our pool of respondents were adamant about a particular theme. Themes were scored based on the number of times they were mentioned. Next, we calculated the overall highest scores for the entire data set. High scores for each question are highlighted green and overall high scores are highlighted blue. Using the DOTMLPF–P framework, we organized each theme into its corresponding category for ease of identification. Each of the following headings corresponds to one of our specific research questions and the corresponding common themes to those questions. Individual interviewee responses are in no particular order.

**Primary Question 1: How can we achieve better contracting unity of effort in the CENTCOM AOR?**

Overwhelmingly, respondents felt strongly about clearly establishing contracting command and control from the start to achieve better CUE. Due to the complex nature of procurement authority in the CENTCOM AOR (disparate...
contracting agencies and authorities), establishing clear lines of contracting C2 is a necessary first step in all contingency contracting operations. The specific C2 organization should be based on size, scope, expected duration, available vendor base, and various other mission factors.

I believe we should be focused on achieving overall unity of effort for the operation and not necessarily on achieving contracting unity of effort. If I’m trying to achieve better contracting unity of effort, the best way to do this is to have command and control (C2) of all contracting within a JOA. This allows for the integration of all service/agency contracting authority under a single Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) and command structure. However, doing this means you create two separate C2 structures for executing BOS, and base/installation commanders no longer have C2 of a critical enabling capability (contracting) needed to accomplish their assigned missions.

This does not mean that achieving better contracting unity of effort and overall unity of effort for the operation will never parallel each other. In operations where economic lines of operation are most critical to mission accomplishment, achieving unity of contracting effort by having a separate contracting C2 structure may be consistent with achieving overall unity of effort for the operation. In operations where military lines of operation are most critical to mission accomplishment, achieving unity of contracting effort by having a separate contracting C2 structure can actually be counter-productive to achieving overall unity of effort for the operation.

Therefore, the focus should always be on achieving overall unity of effort for the operation and not necessarily contracting unity of effort. How we organize within CENTCOM or any GCC really depends on the operation and whether the economic lines of operation or military lines of operation are most critical to mission accomplishment. (Air Force Contracting Professional, personal communication, June 27, 2013)

A commander, at certain phases of operation should be given certain levels of authority …. whichever service is the lead for contracting must be able to direct everyone in DoD to do certain things in support of a senior mission functional contracting commander, whatever service it is. (C. Nichols, personal communication, July 8, 2013)

In a perfect world, your solution would be there if there was only one contracting agency in theater. So, how do you solve it? You find all the things that prevent that from existing. To me, that is the disparate authorities to have people in theater doing contracting. You can easily solve that with policy. You really want to have it institutionalized. To me, that’s doctrine. (C. A. Spisak, personal communication, May 9, 2013)
I think it seems logical to me. If you want unity of effort, you have the procurement authority flow through the combatant commander and then he’s responsible for the procurements in his AOR. If somebody else comes in the AOR, at least he can hold them accountable because he’s the commander. You can’t have the contracting commander trying to hold somebody accountable that’s not under their command. We have to go back to the combatant commander and try to get them to help us, and that’s why it’s hard to get that unity of effort. (J. L. Bass, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

It’s a command responsibility and you can’t fix a command problem with a staff organization unless the command who owns it is putting out the policy and there is a doctrine that underpins it that makes it all work. (H. J. Greene, personal communication, July 11, 2013)

During Operation Tomodachi … I quickly assessed the situation and decided that command and control of contracting should be quickly established because we both expected the United States to quickly flow forces to Japan to assist in this natural disaster. (M. Hoskin, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

Subsidiary Question 2: What steps has C-JTSCC taken to synchronize current contracting activities efforts and to what extent are they effective?

The preponderance of responses for question two concerned improving the use of TBC, SPOT, and LOAs and ensuring they are updated in new OCS doctrine. Many interviewees thought having these tools in place aided CUE but indicated a need for them to be expanded and enforced.

Some of the biggest challenges we previously faced with OCS are (1) we often lacked visibility and accountability for contractors, (2) we failed to coordinate with BOS providers at the installation/base level to ensure there is adequate government-furnished life support (GFLS) available for the contractors, and (3) external and systems support contracts lacked the appropriate JOA clauses implementing GCC/JTF policies. Many times contracting is accomplished by a service/agency contracting activity outside the AOR, and contractors would just show up in the AOR without any coordination with the base/installation responsible for providing their life support.

Therefore, C–JTSCC implemented the theater business clearance (TBC) process for external and systems support contracts. This process ensures that C–JTSCC reviews solicitations and contracts to ensure they include the appropriate local clauses implementing GCC/JTF policies. The TBC process was recently amended to ensure there is communication/coordination with BOS providers to ensure adequate GFLS is available when contractors
show up. C–JTSCC is also accomplishing TBC through the Joint Contingency Contract System (JCCS) module, and if TBC is not accomplished, contractors are unable to get letters of authorization (LOAs) issued via the Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT). Since the LOA is what authorizes a contractor to receive GFLS, such as MWR, food, billeting, etc., it helps with enforcing the TBC requirement. (Air Force Contracting Professional, personal communication, June 27, 2013)

Theater business clearance and SPOT are used to align procurement trackers to help codify who had clearance or who didn’t. What we did though was we really took some dramatic steps to not allow people in and to remove people who didn’t have a validated letter of authorization (LOA), as it related to their contract. (C. Nichols, personal communication, July 8, 2013)

Theater business clearance is a policy from CENTCOM that says you will not do a contract here without us first approving it. That was their attempt to try to get unity of effort. But what if you’re not in DoD? TBC is okay … but what if you don’t comply? What happens? I mean, there really are no teeth to it to make people do it. (J. L. Bass, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

TBC in the optimum world would include much more than the deployment clause and GFS synchronization; it would include a pre-award JCSB process where the LSCC, LSC, or JTSCC could lead a pre-award JCSB process (think first right of refusal for common contracted commodities and services), thus maximizing the efficiency and reducing the cost of contracts in support of a particular JOA. And in any case, observations, insights, and lessons from recent operations strongly indicate that TBC, while potentially a very useful tool, is difficult to implement and still requires additional refinement in the TBC processes and training of both the combatant command OCS staff and executing contracting organizations. (C. Maurer, personal communication, June 26, 2013)

Theater business clearance was one forcing mechanism to herd all the cats and dogs that are out there. It is not perfect, but it is good. SPOT itself in concept makes a lot of sense. We should be able to track everybody, know where everybody is. Why not? We knew where all of our soldiers and sailors and airmen and marines were, right? (N. T. Kalathas, personal communication, June 27, 2013)

Theater business clearance has to have more teeth. SPOT and the issuance of LOAs have got to have more teeth. Everybody has got their own contracting authority, and they basically say, “Well, I can write a contract and I don’t need your permission.” You’ve got to have some enforcement mechanism to say … “Not only do I have to be able to mean it, I’ve got to be able to actually do something that enforces
that.” Like the LOA, the letter of authorization that is given to contractors ... or something that says that I can deny you having a Letter of Authorization and not even allow you into the country. (V. Solero, personal communication, June 26, 2013)

Currently, the CENTCOM JTSCC commander controls theater business clearance in Afghanistan to manage what contracts and contractors are to work within Afghanistan. TBC continues to be a critical tool to maintain unity of effort and unity of command. The use of TBC is pretty mature in overseas operations. We are still exploring how TBC would be used for a domestic disaster mission. (M. Hoskin, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

Subsidiary Question 3: Are there any discussions, initiatives, or measures currently in development to help achieve better contracting unity of effort for future similar operations?

The majority of interviewees indicated the need to create or improve existing organizations to enhance OCS synchronization at the COCOM and service levels of command. Many identified the need for a variety of OCS organizational changes and measures designed to enhance CUE going forward. Organizational enhancements mentioned included OCS integration cells, drawdown cells, contracting support teams, a center of excellence, and a deployable Expeditionary Contracting Command.

The Expeditionary Contracting Command has a proposed Force Design Update that would create Contract Support Teams (CSTs) that would be aligned with the operational units such as Corps, Div., TSC/ESC and other type units to give them a team of Contracting and OCS experts to support their OCS planning and execution. Right now, it’s a pickup game for most units to try and do OCS during exercises and real-world deployments. This CST concept would go a long way in synchronizing contracting and gaining unity of effort. I’m not sure if the Army will support this under the current force structure constraints. (J. L. Bass, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

[Based on lessons from Iraq,] the operational contract support drawdown cell in Afghanistan is a big, big win for the OCS community because we never even used the term OCS when we were in Iraq. Now, the OCS drawdown cell is paying attention to the contractors, we are paying attention to the property, all the issues that we were faced with in Iraq we are now looking at methodically so there are no surprises. (N. T. Kalathas, personal communication, June 27, 2013)

One of the things that they’re talking about is having an integration cell or center at each of the COCOMs that would be, in certain cases, a permanent organization, but it would only be three or four or five people, ... and that could be the nucleus if something did
happen of setting up a JTSCC or to assist a CSB or another contracting organization to do those kinds of things. (V. Solero, personal communication, June 26, 2013)

[OCS joint concept]: There are two big pieces with the Joint Concept. One piece is called the OMI [OCS mission integrator], which is an OCS integration cell that is at each geographic combatant command. Then at each service component you also have LNOs or people who focus on OCS integration. The way we have it built right now is that at least one person is a contracting professional. In an OMI, there’s about five or six people; at least one contracting person, probably an engineer who’s smart in construction and a logistician ... people who are professional planners. (M. Hoskin, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

[OCS mission integrator (OMI)]: It’s not the same thing as the OSCIC (OSC Integration Cell). It’s an integration cell on steroids. It’s tailored for that geographic combatant command. Besides a contracting person, engineer, and a logistician, I will tell you that there are a couple of others that you’ve always got to have that expertise on, ... one is lawyers. ... The second one ...is the financial management. (C. D. Matthews, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

[Functional Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB)]: It grew out of the need for a single DoD senior executive forum to address increased congressional interest, in OCS, emerging and evolving doctrine and policy issues. Our role in OSD is to encourage collaboration and make sure there is cooperation across the department, and we’ve done a lot better with this than in the past. (A. Carter, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

When we stood up our force structure, we really didn’t build a Center of Excellence like other war fighting capabilities have. It is done by a bunch of disparate folks at the Acquisition Sustainment Center, Acquisition Management Branch, and AL&T–IO. They are helping a little bit. ECC is certainly doing a lot of heavy lifting, but it is hard to synchronize these like a schoolhouse would do. (T. C. Harrison, personal communication, August 20, 2013)

**Subsidiary Question 4: In order to prevent the same lessons learned, are there any OCS doctrinal changes that need to be made to ensure we have better contracting unity of effort?**

The main answer for this question related to the overall concept of change. Interviewees identified the need to improve and change the way the DoD manages, integrates and plans for OCS. Planning for OCS needs to be seen as multifunctional and not just a logistical or contracting function. Several respondents indicated this entire process, to include better OCS planning and management, as a cultural change or an institutionalization of OCS.
If there’s one thing you can take away from this is a lot of people will try to say “OCS” and then want to know “who’s responsible.” It’s a multifunctional process that involves all functional areas/joint codes. You've got to at least break OCS into its process elements and have accountability for the inputs (requirements), processing (contracting), and outputs (contractors). (Air Force Contracting Professional, personal communication, June 27, 2013)

[Contractor accountability]: If it’s a personnel issue, we should go ask the J1. So, you try to put all the pressure on the KO when you really need the people who own the terrain to be responsible for the terrain. That change in perspective is dramatic and in 13 years in combat contracting it’s not going to change, and that’s why it’s got to be in the new doctrine. You can’t make that KO be responsible for the literal execution of bedding [arrangements] for contractors A, B, or C, especially in combat. … The new doctrine gives me some say in that role and a little bit more control. I don’t think it goes far enough though. (C. Nichols, personal communication, July 8, 2013)

A lot of it starts with planning. Eighteen months ago the GAO reported that there were only two annex Ws in existence. During the last 18 months we have focused on this challenge and currently have about 50% of the problem solved. Increasing unity of effort and unity of command starts with the actual plans. The plan should stipulate that when a particular event or trigger happens, we will go to lead service for contracting or to a JTSCC. (M. Hoskin, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

Let’s go back to Gansler (Report) in 2007. It specifically earmarked the Army and said, “There’s an institutional side of the Army, if you will,” … “and an operational side of the Army, and we need to make sure we integrate those efforts.” I'm not sure we're there yet in the Army. We’re better than we were in 2007, but it’s not just the JTSCC. I think it’s an overall DoD capability or mentality about the capability itself and the understanding of it. (C. D. Matthews, personal communication, June 24, 2013)

If you look at just contracting alone, just the contracting piece, I am willing to bet that no matter what the contingency, we are probably buying bottled water, we are probably buying some comfort items, generators, port-a-potties, etc. A lot that we were buying could have been bought back in the states on large delivery order-type contracts that are already pre-negotiated and pre-existent. But when you are in the fight you don’t have a lot of time to do that. (N. T. Kalathas, personal communication, June 27, 2013)
C. DOTMLPF–P ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

During the analysis, we placed each common theme in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, and policy categories. Facilities and personnel categories were considered but were not identified by our interviewees during our research.

1. Doctrine and Policy

The majority of answers fell within the categories of doctrine and policy. As mentioned before, OCS doctrine and policy were nearly absent prior to DoDI 3020.41 (DoD, 2005) in 2005 and JP 4-10 (CJCS, 2008) in 2008. Doctrine is the set of “principles that guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective” (CJCS, 2012b, p. A4). Military leaders use doctrine to apply military power in conjunction with policy and strategy. Policy refers to those documents that impact one of the other DOTMLPF components. The following common themes can be addressed using doctrine and policy approaches:

1. Ensure new OCS doctrine incorporates the latest lessons learned so there is an overall improvement of current OCS doctrine.
2. Ensure doctrine is updated to reflect the TBC, SPOT, and LOA process.
3. Ensure doctrine and policy address the need to establish clear command and control of the contracting mission for any given operation.
4. Ensure that policies improve the use of contracting boards (JARB, JCSB, etc.), TBC, and SPOT, especially with non-DoD organizations and system/external support contracts.

2. Organization

The majority of respondents provided organization solutions for question three. Organization refers to the structure through which personnel collaborate to work towards common objectives. “This includes the joint staffing (military, civilian, and contractor support) required to plan, operate, sustain, and reconstitute … capabilities” (CJCS, 2012b, p. A5). The following common themes can be addressed using organizational approaches:

1. Create an OCS integration cell/mission integrator for each geographic combatant command. JCASO currently has two OCS planners at each COCOM. Additionally, create a similar organization for each service.
2. Establish an OCS center of excellence.
3. Create contract support teams (CSTs) that would be aligned with the operational units such as corps and divisions. This team of contracting and OCS experts would support OCS planning and execution.

4. Create an OCS drawdown cell for the final phases of an operation.

3. **Training, Leadership, and Education**

   Several respondents were adamant about training, leadership, and education solutions to achieve better CUE. Training refers to an individual’s or unit’s training of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Leadership and education refer to the professional development of leaders to “produce the most professionally competent individuals possible” (CJCS, 2012b, p. A5). The following common themes can be addressed using training, leadership, and educational approaches:

   1. Improve OCS training for non-acquisition personnel to enhance planning for OCS.
   2. Improve integration of OCS into ongoing exercises, military professional development, and leadership courses.
   3. Provide greater focus on improvements in OCS training and integration in order to bring about institutional change.

4. **Materiel**

   Many interviewees mentioned the need to improve our current process for capturing lessons learned. A materiel solution could be identified to capture OCS lessons learned for incorporation into doctrine and other related publications. Materiel are those items required to operate, equip, and support military activities (CJCS, 2012b). The following common themes can be addressed using materiel approaches:

   1. Provide a way to capture OCS lessons learned into the various doctrine publications.
   2. Create a formal joint OCS lessons learned program.

**D. CONCLUSION**

This chapter presented our analysis and findings for the data we collected during our in-depth interviews with senior DoD leaders. We conducted an analysis of the responses to our questions, found common themes, and then placed them in the correct DOTMLPF–P category. In our next chapter, we present our final recommendations and final summary.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

The focus of this chapter is to provide our final recommendations. In this research, we sought to examine key documents and capture the strategic thinking of senior DoD leaders regarding OCS and CUE. We provided the purpose, research questions, a literature review, selected interview data, and the final results of our analysis and findings. This final chapter first presents a summary of our research and then identifies our final recommendations. Last, we provide areas for further research.

B. SUMMARY

As contracting operations continued to change at a rapid pace over the last 13 years, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted the enormous changes for conducting OCS. The increased need for contract support during OIF and OEF showcased the DoD’s reliance on contract support. The DoD’s increased need for contract support and inadequate preparations to execute OCS led to an overall lack of contracting unity of effort.

The purpose of this research was to investigate how to better achieve contracting unity of effort in the U.S. Central Command area of operations and the implications for other combatant commands in similar contingency situations. In the U.S. Central Command area of operations, numerous contracting agencies operate in Afghanistan each with its own contract authority, but these agencies have very little synchronization and no common operating picture. These numerous contracting organizations include CJTSCC, DCMA, LOGCAP, USAID, USACE, Special Operation Command, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Army and Air Force Exchange Service, U.S. Army Medical Command, and various non-governmental organizations, which make contracting unity of effort difficult to maximize. In contrast the overarching operational command authority lies with one single organization, U.S. Central Command. Having this unified command authority in place allows U.S. Central Command to work towards common objects and to achieve unity of effort.

To conduct thorough research on our selected topic, we completed a careful examination of existing literature and conducted several in-depth interviews with senior DoD leaders. After identifying the common themes for our research questions we completed an analysis of selected interview data using the DOTMLPF-P framework to arrive at our final recommendations.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS

During the course of our interviews, we specifically asked each interviewee how to better achieve contracting unity of effort in the CENTCOM AOR. Although the focus of our investigation was achieving better CUE, our respondents indicated the need to address the overarching concept of OCS. We quickly discovered that improving certain aspects of OCS also strengthened CUE in contingency situations. Additionally, our respondents indicated the need to improve existing JP 4-10 doctrine as a start point. Improved doctrine provides the necessary foundation on which to plan and train effective OCS activities. We have identified the following four recommendations to increase CUE in the CENTCOM AOR and other combatant commands in similar contingency situations.

1. **Recommendation #1: Create organizations that help OCS synchronization at the COCOM and service levels.**

   Effective OCS synchronization requires more than an OCS planning cell within the COCOM J-4 planning staff. The need for joint OCS integration cells across all COCOMs and service components at the earliest planning phases is critical to mission success and subsequent CUE. Within the DOTMLPF–P framework, the following recommendations can be addressed using organization-level solutions.

   **OCS mission integrator:** Although JCASO provides two OCS planners to the COCOM staffs, we recommend a more robust integration cell to bring about greater CUE. Mentioned several times throughout our interviews, the OMI provides an example of this integrated team. The OMI consists of four to six OCS integration planners, which can include a contracting professional, logistician, financial manager, engineer, and lawyer. The purpose of this integration team is to assist in OCS planning efforts and could be tailored to meet the specific needs of a geographical combatant command. Additionally, the OMI could serve as the nucleus for establishing a contracting organization in a given combatant commander’s area, should a contingency take place.

   **Contracting Support Teams:** CSTs are currently being discussed within the Army as a way of integrating OCS planning and execution at the corps- and division-level headquarters. The current practice of integrating OCS within the Army is done ad hoc and does not facilitate synchronization or CUE. We recommend all services incorporate CSTs with the purpose of assisting OCS planning and training efforts. Services can tailor their CSTs to fit their specific missions.

   **Center of Excellence:** Until recently, the acquisition community lacked a center of excellence to help synchronize the rapidly developing capability of OCS. In 2011, the Army established the Army Acquisition Center of Excellence to provide
OCS leadership, education, and best practices to aid OCS planning and execution activities. We recommend sustaining this organization to assist with institutionalizing OCS and codifying OCS lessons learned. Finally, this center can be utilized to establish acquisition educational courses to non-acquisition personnel involved with OCS planning activities.

2. **Recommendation #2: Establish clear contracting command and control for any given operation.**

   In order to achieve better CUE, we recommend senior DoD leaders establish clear contracting command and control for various mission types at the earliest planning phase. This C2 structure should be reinforced with operational orders and backed by doctrine. Using the DOTMLPF–P framework, this can be accomplished by taking doctrine and policy approaches. According to the unpublished version of JP 4-10 (CJCS, 2012a) and many of our respondents, OCS planners can choose from three different contracting constructs: lead service for contracting coordination, lead service for all theater support contracting, and joint theater support contracting command (CJCS, 2012a). The specific C2 organization chosen should be based on size, scope, expected duration, and various other mission factors. Many of our respondents mentioned there is not a “one-size-fits-all” contracting construct. Additionally, as the operation progresses to different phases, the situation may dictate the need to change contracting constructs to provide the contracting commander with more authority.

3. **Recommendation # 3: Institutionalize OCS to create more efficient OCS planning, training, and execution.**

   Although the DoD has made significant progress in institutionalizing OCS, additional improvement and changes are required. Our research and interviews highlight the importance of bringing about cultural change in OCS. Taking a holistic approach, the acquisition community will have to address several categories of the DOTMLPF–P framework to improve OCS.

   **Leadership and Education:** Beginning in 2005, significant strides have been made in integrating OCS policy, regulation, and doctrine. However, many within the DoD still view OCS as a contracting and logistical function. To change this view, the culture of the military needs to view OCS in a different light. We recommend senior DoD leaders continue to provide active support for OCS education and awareness. Recent legislation from Congress has mandated joint OCS education, which many of our respondents identified as key to reinforcing change and improving OCS. Finally, to bring about greater institutionalization, we recommend OCS education be provided at the basic and advanced courses for officers and non-commissioned officers. These OCS courses should be offered to non-acquisition and acquisition personnel.
Training and Exercises: Institutionalizing OCS can also be improved with training and exercises. The joint OCS planning and execution course is an effort currently being developed by the J-4 to teach military members on how to be OCS planners. This course, while focused on combatant command and service staffs, can also apply to operational contracting organizations. This course will focus on contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management. We recommend OCS training be provided to planners in all functional areas to stress the importance of OCS and bring about greater CUE.

Many interviewees stressed the importance of including OCS into exercises to enhance CUE and improve OCS. Given the extent to which contractors support the warfighter, we recommend incorporating OCS into exercises to stay within the “train as you fight” guideline. The OCS joint exercise, scheduled for January 2014, provides a great opportunity to train OCS at the joint level. This exercise will provide contracting support and contract support integration training to deployable contracting officers, and OCS planners from U.S. Northern Command. Although this exercise is at the joint level, training events like this can be done at the service levels to raise the stature of OCS and enhance CUE during contingencies.

4. Recommendation # 4: Improve existing OCS tools and processes.

Due to the many potential contracting agencies operating in a given COCOM area during a contingency, the DoD’s ability to achieve CUE depends on having the appropriate tools to manage contracts and contractor personnel. Tools such as TBC, SPOT, LOA, JARB, and the JCSB can provide the DoD with effective ways to increase CUE, mitigate risks, manage contracts, track contractor personnel, and assist in identifying vendors working against U.S. interests. Based on our research, we recommend improving these tools to increase CUE and improve OCS in future contingencies. Within the DOTMLPF–P framework, this recommendation can be addressed by taking doctrine and policy approaches.

D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Throughout the course of our study, we discovered various areas for further OCS research. Some of the areas requiring further research include the following:

1. Examine the impact of external and system support contracts on contracting unity of effort in a given geographical combatant command.
2. Examine the advantages and disadvantages of giving HCA authority to a geographical combatant commander.
3. Conduct a cost–benefit analysis for establishing an acquisition center of excellence for the Army or joint wide.
4. Determine the efficiency and effectiveness of capturing OCS lessons learned and subsequent integration into doctrine and policy.

5. Examine the feasibility of establishing an acquisition branch within the Army.
REFERENCES


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). (2012a). *Operational contract support* (Joint Publication 4-10). Unpublished manuscript.


