RELATING OPERATIONAL ART TO THE NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

A Monograph

by

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Relating Operational Art to the National Guard State Partnership Program

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The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) has the potential, at the partnership level, to serve as an operational level integration point for whole of society efforts with their partnered countries. The National Guard partnerships currently serve as a tactical means to achieve a strategic goal but there are more potential resources at the state level that the nation could leverage. The dual role of the National Guard as a traditional national defense force and as a state controlled defense force makes it inherently suited for a whole-of-society effort. It is logical to provide the National Guard partnerships with the authority and dedicated operational level staff, the SPP could link whole of society tactical actions at the partnership level toward achieving a greater strategic impact in support of the Geographic Combatant Commands. The National Guard’s operational level integration of whole-of-society resources presents an opportunity to deepen the country planning dialogue with the GCC, increase staff training opportunities for the National Guard, and provide the appropriate capabilities to build partnered nation capacity through unified action.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
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The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) has the potential, at the partnership level, to serve as an operational level integration point for whole of society efforts with their partnered countries. The National Guard partnerships currently serve as a tactical means to achieve a strategic goal but there are more potential resources at the state level that the nation could leverage. The dual role of the National Guard as a traditional national defense force and as a state controlled defense force makes it inherently suited for a whole-of-society effort. It is logical to provide the National Guard partnerships with the authority and resources to influence the operational level and leverage the entirety of resources within their states. The assessment of the overall SPP strategy combined with the individual case study of the Missouri National Guard partnership with the Republic of Panama confirmed an opportunity for operational art at the partnership level. Given the authority and dedicated operational level staff, the SPP could link whole of society tactical actions at the partnership level toward achieving a greater strategic impact in support of the Geographic Combatant Commands. The National Guard’s operational level integration of whole-of-society resources presents an opportunity to deepen the country planning dialogue with the GCC, increase staff training opportunities for the National Guard, and provide the appropriate capabilities to build partnered nation capacity through unified action.
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<td>State Partnership Program Coordinator</td>
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<td>Global Employment of the Force</td>
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Figure 1. National Guard State Partnerships by Geographic Combatant Command.......................16
INTRODUCTION

The contemporary global environment has shifted the United States toward an enduring national security strategy of multilateral engagements and shared global security. More specifically, the U.S. National Security Strategies over the past twenty years expressed a need for increased diplomatic action and global engagement.¹ The shift toward diplomacy and global engagement pre-dates the past twenty years however; the focus on increased diplomacy by Department of Defense leaders marks a distinct emphasis. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, along with the past two Secretaries of Defense, Mr. Robert Gates and Mr. Leon Panetta, have called for an increase in diplomatic capabilities in both the civilian and military sectors.² The increase in widespread global threats presented a challenge that required more security than the U.S. could offer alone. Moreover, the U.S. fiscal environment characterized by massive government spending cuts presented a limitation to the scale of diplomacy efforts. President Barack Obama’s directed review of defense priorities stated that “[w]hen possible, we will


²Center for Strategic International Studies, “Global Security Forum 2013: Opening Session” (video), November 5, 2013, http://csis.org/multimedia/video-global-security-forum-2013-opening-session (accessed December 8, 2013). In this speech, Secretary Hagel emphasized the need for the DoD’s capability to build capacity among U.S. partners and allies in spite of defense budget cuts; “U.S. Defense Chief Urges Greater Use of ‘Soft Power,’ ” Agence France-Presse, November 26, 2007. In a speech at Kansas State University Secretary Gates advocated an increase in civilian diplomatic capability. He went on to say that he wanted more integration of hard power and soft power capabilities; During Secretary Panetta’s speech addressing the nations of the Western Hemisphere, he spoke of the many threats that faced the area. He said, “we cannot deal with these threats alone or in isolation, we can only deal with them if we work together.” Leon Panetta, “10th Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas” (lecture, Punta Del Este, Uruguay, October 8, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1726 (accessed December 8, 2013).
develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives.”³ For the United States Armed Forces, this guidance meant that efficient engagement and security cooperation efforts were necessary to develop mutual global security.

Over the past twenty years, the National Guard provided a security cooperation model defined by the exact characteristics called for in the present environment; low-cost, small footprint, enduring partnerships that fostered increased global security capabilities. The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) is a Department of Defense (DoD) security cooperation program that is administered by the National Guard Bureau and executed by the Adjutant General (TAG) of each state National Guard.⁴ Joint doctrine defines security cooperation as “DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”⁵ The SPP is focused toward achieving security cooperation goals of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) and the Chiefs of Mission (COM) through capabilities and expertise that exist within the National Guard.⁶ There are currently sixty-five partnerships among state and territory National Guards and partner countries collectively within the GCCs. The National Guard’s State Partnership Program has served the goals of the GCCs very efficiently, but it has the potential for a more profound strategic effect.


⁶The U.S. Department of State defines Chiefs of Mission (COM) as a generic term for the person in charge of the department’s diplomatic mission for a given country. They are also commonly referred to as Ambassador, High Commissioner, Permanent Representative, or Consul.
The National Guard is a logical means for diplomatic efforts but the scope of the SPP effort limits the strategic impact. The dual role of the National Guard as a traditional national defense force and as a state controlled defense force make it inherently suited for a whole-of-society diplomacy effort. The United States would benefit from a SPP operational level focus at the individual state partnership level. An operational level focus with comparable authority and staff allows the state’s Adjutant General to leverage the state’s whole-of-society resources toward achieving strategic goals. The SPP “conducts military-to-military engagements in support of defense security goals but also leverages whole-of-society relationships and capabilities to facilitate broader interagency and corollary engagements…”7 The latter part of this mission statement holds immense potential and significant challenges for the National Guard. Each of the states and territories represent a microcosm of the nation’s resources for the governance, security, and welfare of its constituents. A state has resources that are capable of building country capabilities far beyond a military security focus. However, the National Guard only has the authority and resources to conduct tactical level military partnership exercises.

Given the authority and dedicated operational level staff, the SPP could link whole of society tactical actions toward achieving a greater strategic impact in support of the Geographic Combatant Commands. A whole-of-society effort not only includes the National Guard and state government resources, but it also encompasses non-government, civilian resources as well. There are many examples of individual state initiatives that have leveraged the whole-of-society of a state, working in concert through the SPP, with very promising strategic results. A goal of the SPP is to encourage civil security cooperation. However, the SPP partnership/state level is limited by authority and lacks the resources to fully institutionalize whole-of-society unified efforts. The partnership level of the SPP is currently viewed and resourced as a tactical military means, but

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7National Guard Bureau, “National Guard State Partnership Program.”
given the opportunity to lead, plan, and assess at the operational level the state could organize whole-of-society potential toward achieving the strategic goals of the combatant commands.

The concept of a military operational level of war emerged in the late eighteenth century when the size of armies grew drastically. The expanded size and complexity of military operations created a large gap between tactical engagements and strategic goals.\(^8\) The operational level served as a point where multiple tactical actions were synchronized to ensure the achievement of strategic outcomes through operational art. According to joint doctrine, operational art “promotes unified action by helping Joint Force Commands (JFCs) and staffs understand how to facilitate the integration of other agencies, and multinational partners, toward achieving strategic and operational objectives.”\(^9\) The operational level of war is not a defined echelon of an organization. A cognitive level is reflective of the authority and resources necessary to conduct operational art. In other words, the authority and staff is present to develop innovative strategies that leverage all available resources in creative ways to ensure tactical actions translate into strategic goals. An operational level focus at the state allows the state National Guard to leverage all the state’s resources and the long-term relationship of the partnership through operational art. A review of the SPP strategy from the ends, ways, and means construct provided insight into the potential impact of the SPP as an operational level asset.

This study reviewed the National Guard State Partnership Program strategy and found unique potential in the ends, ways, and means. First and second hand sources confirmed the National Guard SPP met the objectives that the Department of Defense proposed it would in 1992. It is a low cost, low-threat, and efficient means for conducting partnership engagements.


The expansion of the program from three partnerships to sixty-five over a period of twenty years has increased the scope of the operation, but the program has accommodated the growth well. The most important revelation of the program assessment is that the SPP has created potential in the ends, ways, and means that has significant impact for the partnership level, most notably for the mobilization of whole-of-society resources and the development of significant training opportunities for the National Guard.

This strategy assessment included an in-depth case study of the Missouri National Guard partnership with the Republic of Panama. The focus on the partnership, as opposed to the program, allowed for a closer examination of the tactical and operational ways and means within the SPP strategy. The partnership assessment confirmed a suitable strategy that contained significant opportunities. Although it was extremely difficult to determine objective causality, it appeared that the Missouri National Guard (MONG) and the Republic of Panama Ministry of Defense made significant impacts on each other. MONG Soldiers and Airmen received invaluable training while the Panamanian Ministry of Defense built increasingly complex capabilities in line with the Combatant Commander’s objectives. From a means perspective, the partnership assessment revealed encouraging opportunities for unified action. Military and civilian resources from the state of Missouri have rallied around the relationship between the Missouri National Guard and the Panamanian Ministry of Defense. The seventeen-year relationship added an incomparable depth to the partnership that presents a valuable strategic opportunity.

It was the revelation of significant opportunities at the program level combined with the confirmation of these opportunities at the partnership level that led to the logical opportunity for operational art. Currently, the state level of the SPP is staffed for partnered activity execution and planning, not operational planning. The extensive and unique resources accessible to the National Guard at the state level provide a valuable opportunity. Use of these resources would reflect a
whole-of-society approach and an opportunity to deepen the country planning dialogue. Redefining the operational level of the National Guard SPP at the state level provides more opportunity for the strategy, the Combatant Command, and both members of the partnership. It provides an opportunity to capitalize on the logical strategy of the SPP program while providing critical staff development opportunities for the National Guard.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Achieving the objectives of security cooperation requires a multifaceted strategy that leverages whole-of-society resources. General Sir Rupert Smith retired from the British Army in 2002 and last served as the Deputy Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe from 1998-2001. In his book *The Utility of Force* he characterized a more complex form of warfare he called “war amongst the people.”\(^\text{10}\) According to General Smith, greater strategic challenges exist in this type of environment, where strategic objectives are changing from hard and defined objectives, typical of conventional war, to malleable conditional objectives.\(^\text{11}\) Developing a strategy in this environment requires means beyond military force in order to achieve strategic objectives.

Although General Smith was referring to war, the logic applies even more as the military gets involved with diplomacy in peace. Using a military force in a diplomatic manner requires a fine sensitivity to political goals and the population. Security cooperation requires comprehensive strategic thought about the force needed to achieve the goals. The strategy for security cooperation is multifaceted. It must integrate diverse resources and techniques toward meeting objectives that match the desires of the host nation and U.S. interests. The SPP is a security cooperation effort that regularly encounters this complexity and must have the depth of resources and agility to contend with it.

Recent literature on the SPP has made a case for the SPP capability to integrate unique resources toward meeting security cooperation objectives. Lieutenant Colonel James Williams, a 2012 Army War College student, noted the “smart power” of the SPP by demonstrating its low


\(^{11}\) Ibid.
cost and ability to leverage both civilian diplomacy and military engagements. He explained that there is no single institution in the U.S. government that is charged with integrating all the security cooperation capabilities of the nation toward building another nations’ capacity. He claimed that the SPP has served to fill that missing role and is a model for furthering “whole-of-society” diplomacy efforts.

Colonel John Jansen, a 2010 US Army War College student emphasized the “whole-of-government” impact that the SPP makes toward building partner capacity. His study demonstrated the three engagement pillars of the SPP: military-to-civilian, military-to-military, and civil security cooperation. The study explained that the three pillars are based on the operational construct of lead, support, and enable, respectively. The study referenced the 2008-13 SPP program goals, which presented the idea that the SPP is a lead DoD agency for civil-military relationships, supports the GCC through military-to-military exchanges, and enables civil security cooperation. Colonel Jansen used several examples of state partnerships that have demonstrated success across all three pillars in a whole-of-government approach. He noted seven issues and recommendations, among them, growing the program and expanding efforts in civil security cooperation. In his recommendation to expand civil security cooperation, he explained that the National Guard is only “scratching the surface” of this component. He also addressed the nuance of differing authorities to execute civil security activities.

Lieutenant Colonel Brian Bergeron, an Oregon Air National Guard officer attending the Air War College, wrote that the program should undergo increased expansion into the Pacific

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13Ibid.


15Ibid., 34.
Command (PACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). The officer claimed that the small footprint of the program and its record of accomplishment for diplomacy, made it a perfect candidate for expansion into this sensitive AOR.\textsuperscript{16} He stated that the model of trust and long-term continuity, afforded by the SPP, is unsurpassed by all other American diplomacy efforts, to include, embassy staffs, which rotate every few years. Lieutenant Colonel Bergeron provided a case study of Oregon’s two partnerships with Bangladesh and Vietnam. These case studies presented whole-of-government success stories that leveraged many civilian resources, from the state of Oregon, through the initiative of the SPP. He stated that the dialogue between state and country allowed for an engagement that deepened the relationship beyond just military-to-military engagement.\textsuperscript{17}

Other research focused on the challenges of the program. Some SPP studies focused on the need to quantify and manage the program’s strategy. A 2011 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report stated that “the SPP’s rapid expansion led to congressional scrutiny of; the conformity of some SPP activities with the law, the effectiveness of the program, and the relationship of SPP activities to priorities of U.S. geographic combatant commanders and U.S. ambassadors abroad.”\textsuperscript{18} In 2012, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) ordered a report of the SPP from the Comptroller General, which then resulted in a Government Accountability Office (GAO) study that contained similar concerns as the 2011 CRS report. The National Guard Bureau began implementing procedures to address the congressional concerns before the GAO and CRS studies were even published. The update of the State Partnership Program Department of Defense Instruction 5111.20, dated December 2012, addressed the main

\begin{footnotes}
\item[17]Ibid., 12-15.
\item[18]Lawrence Kapp and Nina M. Serafino, \emph{The National Guard State Partnership Program} (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 1.
\end{footnotes}
administrative and managerial issues of concern.\textsuperscript{19} However, the GAO concluded that the SPP required a completed oversight framework, guidance to achieve reliable data, and additional training and guidance on the use of DoD funding for the program, including activities involving civilians.\textsuperscript{20} Meanwhile, three Army War College research projects directly responded to these reports and provided recommendations for the management of the program.\textsuperscript{21}

One Army National Guard Colonel used the GAO study as a reference point to direct a study of opportunities and challenges within the SPP. The Colonel noted the changes that have taken place in the program since the GAO study. Specifically, the release of SPP guidance and policy (DODI 5111.20), improved professional development opportunities for the SPP staff, and work done to improve funding and reporting in conjunction with DoD. The management and assessment challenges of the SPP were also noted, with the caveat that these are problems across DoD security cooperation efforts in general, not just the SPP. The complexity of determining metrics for defining SPP success was noted, as well as the difficulty with multiple funding streams and security cooperation training opportunities. The primary recommendation was to formally define the SPP mission as a third mission of the National Guard.\textsuperscript{22}

The dual role of the National Guard has provided state government officials intimate access to the SPP and, hence, their proposal for unique initiatives. In his article, Strategic Democrat\textsuperscript{23}y Building: How U.S. States Can Help, former Colorado governor Bill Owens stated that the SPP served as a foundation and model for other strategic diplomacy initiatives. He stated,

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{19}United States Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction 5111.20, \textit{State Partnership Program} (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012).
    \item \textsuperscript{22}Daniel, 10.
\end{itemize}
“the most intriguing lesson for the future is how the program leverages the power of individual states to serve the national interest.” Former Lieutenant Governor Barbara Lawton of Wisconsin also championed the SPP as a model to promote the efforts of citizen and state diplomacy toward achieving national strategic goals during a roundtable discussion at the US Summit & Initiative for Global Citizen Diplomacy. Lieutenant Governor Lawton’s initiative is further explored during the program assessment of this research.

The current study focuses on relating operational art at the state level of the SPP. In order to fully realize the strategic potential of the SPP, the state must be able to efficiently synchronize whole of society resources toward a unified effort. Operational level capability would provide the state an ability to closely assess progress of the mission, integrate multiple resources, and provide developmental training opportunities for the National Guard. The National Guard SPP can serve as an operational level conduit for civilian and military resources. The focus at the program and partnership level through the ends, ways, and means construct provided a clear view of the potential of expanded operational level partnerships. The complex environment, coupled with the significant potential of the SPP at the state level, made the opportunity for operational art at the state level apparent. Joint doctrine directly addresses the need to consider a complex environment and the integration of various resources to meet theater-shaping goals. The GAO presented the oversight of the program as a challenge, however an operational level partnership also helps to

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mitigate that challenge. The SPP provides a significant opportunity to capitalize on diverse capabilities toward the achievement of strategic goals in support of the combatant commands.

METHODOLOGY

This study employed a case-study research methodology to assess the strategy of the National Guard State Partnership Program. It involved an in-depth study of the partnership between the Missouri National Guard and the Republic of Panama. The case study methodology supported an analysis of the tactical level of the National Guard State Partnership Program. The case study first broadly examined the strategic and program levels through first and second hand sources then moved to the partnership level for a more focused view of the strategy in action. Past observational, and survey methods of research, made inferences for the partnership level. The focus on the partnership level provided an intimate view of the ways used to mobilize resources toward strategic goals.

This case study was divided into three parts. The first part provided the strategic context and historical perspective of the SPP. It included the history of the National Guard State Partnership Program and a description of the programs growth into the present day. The second part of the study focused on the program strategy through the examination of ends, ways, and means. The current policies and authorities that govern the SPP were presented in this portion of the study, as well as a continued survey of SPP literature to determine challenges and opportunities that exist in the overall program.

The last part of the case study focused on the SPP at the partnership level. This part of the case study involved direct observation of the planning processes between the Missouri National Guard and the Republic of Panama. The ground truth of the SPP was captured through the partnership level strategy assessment using the ends, ways, and means construct. The partnership
assessment of the case study involved interaction with the Missouri State Partnership Program staff, the National Guard Bureau, the Bilateral Affairs Officer at the Panamanian Embassy, and Panamanian Ministry of Defense officials. The case study focused on the period from July 2013 until January 2014. During this time, two planning conferences were observed: the Pre-Annual State Partnership Program Planning Meeting (Pre-ASPPPM) in August 2013 and the Annual State Partnership Program Planning Meeting (ASPPPM) in January 2014. These conferences offered a firsthand view of the planning processes between the State Partnership Program Coordinator (SPPC), the bilateral affairs officer (BAO), Missouri National Guardsmen and Panamanian country officials.

The findings and analysis of the case study compiled the challenges and opportunities at the partnership and program levels. The observed partnership portion of the strategy and the program level strategy were both analyzed through the ends, ways, and means construct. The impact of a proposed operational level partnership were then summarized and analyzed in this section to determine if operational art had the potential to overcome challenges and capitalize on opportunities at the partnership level.

The method of this study facilitated an investigation into the operational art behind the SPP strategy. The method employed program level research, as well as firsthand accounts of the ends, ways, and means behind the strategy. The primary goal was to discover the links between SPP tactical actions and strategic goals. The strategy assessment provided insight into the benefits of the SPP strategy and helped to determine the profound opportunities for operational art at the partnership level.
The historical context and significance of the SPP helps to illustrate the suitability of this program and the necessity for operational art at the partnership level. The underlying logic that conceived of the SPP is the same logic that supported its rapid expansion and continues to support its further development. The National Guard is a relatively low-cost force that provides multiple capabilities at home and abroad. The theory behind the SPP was that developing democracies would benefit from the skills and civil-military relationships inherent to the National Guard. The National Guard would also obtain a training benefit from shared experiences with foreign countries. The successful practice of this theory has led to a program that spans across the globe and into the security cooperation strategy of every Geographic Combatant Commander.

The SPP developed through the increased role of the National Guard in the international community and a reciprocal interest, by members of the international community, in the United States National Guard. The National Guard initiated a program called the International Training Activities Program (ITAP) in 1991. This was the precursor to the SPP and the first program response to the National Guard’s expanded reach in international activities. This program began after the National Guard increased humanitarian assistance operations in Central and South America in the mid to late 1980s. ITAP was a joint Air and Army National Guard program that was managed by the National Guard Bureau’s Foreign Liaison (now International Affairs) section. ITAP provided training opportunities to guardsmen while assisting the development of third world countries. According to LTG (R) John Conaway, former Chief of the National Guard

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Bureau, the National Guard’s performance in the Persian Gulf furthered a global interest in the U.S. model of reserve forces.28 The National Guard’s ability to project forces globally, respond to domestic emergencies, and forego the cost of a large standing army held a particular interest for the international military community.

The SPP was initially established in 1993 as a means to augment the liaison capability of the DoD Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP). The JCTP used military-to-military engagements in former Soviet republics to promote democratic values and to help developing nations realize the role of their militaries in a democratic society. The DOD first employed the National Guard in the JCTP because it best suited the host nations’ requested capabilities and it subdued the political sensitivities of the former Soviet region.29 Lieutenant General Conaway, with the strong support of General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, led the effort to partner Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania with Michigan, Maryland, and Pennsylvania respectively.30 These three partnerships were the precursor to the National Guard State Partnership Program.

The success of this confined effort led to a dramatic expansion of the SPP. In 1993, the National Guard Bureau developed partnerships with every country participating in the JCTP.31 Over the past twenty years, the SPP has developed sixty-five partnered relationships in seventy-one countries across the globe (Figure 1).32 This number will increase as requested partnerships are approved. The program that began as a regional effort with three countries, formerly part of the Soviet Union, and three states’ National Guard has grown to include the National Guard of

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28 Conaway and Nelligan, 200.
29 Cossaboom, 1.
30 Conaway and Nelligan, 222-223.
31 Cossaboom, 19.
32 The partnerships between Florida and the U.S. Virgin Islands are referred to as the Regional Security System (RSS). Florida and the U.S. Virgin Islands partner with multiple Caribbean islands to include Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.
nearly every U.S. state and territory. It supports the strategic goals of the nation and every geographic combatant command of the Department of Defense. This once regional effort to help promote specific goals is now shaping U.S. strategic foreign policy goals in over one-third of the countries of the world.

Figure 1. National Guard State Partnerships by Geographic Combatant Command.


33There are 65 partnerships with 71 countries. Many states have more than one partnership. Nevada formerly had a partnership with Turkmenistan, but it is currently the only state without a partnership.

34U.S. Department of State, “Independent States in the World,” Department of State Homepage, last modified January 3, 2012, http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm (accessed November 3, 2013). The U.S. State Department recognizes 195 independent countries in the world, of which 71 equals just over one-third. Sources vary on the number of independent countries in the world, however, the U.S. State Department provides the most applicable figure for a statistic that refers to U.S. diplomacy.
This case study reviewed the SPP from a broad program level to help determine the links between the SPP strategy and national strategic goals. The doctrinal method of ends, ways, and means was adopted for the program strategy assessment. The findings of this case study revealed that the logic behind the initiation of the SPP proved effective. The National Guard is a logical means to achieve security cooperation goals. The SPP helped to achieve the strategic goal of shared global security through activities aligned with the GCCs intermediate military objectives (IMO) and country campaign plans (CCP). The program assessment also revealed additional potential in the ends, ways, and means that could provide further strategic advantages. There are opportunities that are typically associated with the SPP that still lie outside of the program’s stated goals and focused efforts. The integration of all these resources through operational art could enhance the SPP’s ability to achieve national strategic goals.

Ends

The SPP is focused toward achieving the goals of the Geographic Combatant Commands and the Chiefs of Mission. The purpose of the National Guard SPP, according to the 2013 program management guidance, is to “enhance combatant commander ability to establish enduring military-to-military relationships that improve long-term international security while building partnership capacity.” Each SPP event supports at least one of the four established goals of the SPP; 1) advance geographic combatant commander and ambassador security

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35U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, III-1.
cooperation goals 2) sustain and strengthen enduring partnerships and build partner capacity 3) organize, train, equip, and sustain military forces to conduct SPP activities 4) posture for future requirements. The SPP’s purpose and goals reflect an activity that is very focused toward the GCC.

The SPP supports the GCC through partnership activities that are nested within the overall Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). The CJCS Manual 3130.13, Campaign Planning, and the OSD Security Cooperation Planner’s Handbook help to transition the national strategic guidance into the CCMD TCP. The TCP provides guidance for the entire region while the CCMD Country Cooperation Plans (CCP) are specific to each country. Guidance from the National Guard Bureau Joint Staff, International Affairs (NGB-J53), known as the SPP Strategic Plan helps to guide partnership activities at the country level. The state’s role in this process is to provide individual state partnership 5-year plans that support the goals of the NGB Strategic Plan and the CCMD CCPs.

Combatant Commanders strongly support the strategy of the SPP. Senior leaders continuously praise the model of the SPP. In March 2013, General Carter Ham, Commander of U.S. Africa Command, and Admiral James Stavridis, Commander, U.S. European Command, testified to the House Armed Services Committee that the National Guard's State Partnership Program is an extraordinarily effective, enduring, low-cost tool to advance the national security objective of building partnership capacity. Combatant Commanders have discovered that the National Guard offers a cost effective and enduring means to achieving their goals. The SPP helps to shape the Combatant Commanders regions through continuous nested security

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37 National Guard Bureau, International Affairs Division (NGB-J5/IA), “FY13 SPP Program Management Guidance.”

cooperation efforts. The National Guard may present even greater opportunity through other unique assets.

The bigger potential for the National Guard lies in unified action.\textsuperscript{39} The SPP not only serves the military goals, but it is a model and starting point for several diplomacy efforts. The success of the SPP spawned ideas for a new paradigm with expanded objectives that included civilian and state government agencies. As mentioned above, former Wisconsin Lieutenant Governor Lawton proposed the “State Partnership Framework,” during her 2010 \textit{Role of States in Global Diplomacy} roundtable discussion. This framework tied the capabilities of the state, the Department of State, US Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Defense, and other agencies into an integrated strategy that expanded security, diplomacy, and economic goals.\textsuperscript{40} She recommended, “expanding the current SPP to develop a framework, authorized and embraced by federal and state governments, capable of connecting and integrating individual citizen and institutional capacity for genuine diplomacy towards the ends of higher-level contributions to national security strategies.”\textsuperscript{41}

The expanded objectives of this idea are also represented in the proposed National Guard State Partnership Program Enhancement act. This act was proposed in February 2013 to solidify the funding and objectives of the SPP. The objectives in this act and the state partnership framework not only supported the Combatant Commanders and the Chiefs of Mission through building international partnerships and security capacity, but also other United States Government agencies, foreign governments and their agencies, and state governments.\textsuperscript{42} The objectives

\textsuperscript{39}U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, I-8. JP 3-0 defines unified action as a comprehensive approach that synchronizes, coordinates, and when appropriate, integrates military operations with the activities of other governmental and NGOs to achieve unity of effort.

\textsuperscript{40}Lawton, 23-24.

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., 18.

\textsuperscript{42}National Guard State Partnership Program Enhancement Act, H. HR 641, 113th Cong., 1st sess. (February 13, 2013).
proposed by these ideas represented a whole-of-society approach by the states within their established partnerships. They also provided a greater opportunity to invest in the most valuable aspect of the SPP, a trusting long-term relationship.

Trust is the foundation to furthering the goals of security cooperation. SPP relationships are long lasting unions that have invested in mutually beneficial interests. The United States built an interoperable coalition, through the SPP, while the partnered nations expanded their capabilities to advance security and stability in the world. The National Guard has the personnel stability and force structure for continued substantive long-term relationships with other nations. Personnel in the Army and Air National Guard are far less likely to move outside of the state compared to their active component counterparts. Ultimately, these long-term relationships form a more secure global environment. Partnership activities that include military-to-military, military-to-civilian, and civilian-to-civilian exchanges deepen the mutual benefit and advance global security. The SPP not only builds on external security cooperation goals but also offers a benefit to the National Guard.

The SPP offers a valuable training opportunity for the NCOs and officers of the National Guard. One of the primary goals of the SPP is to provide a training venue for National Guard Soldiers in Joint, Interagency, International, and Multinational (JIIM) operations. Over forty Joint Capability Areas and over ninety Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMET) are embedded within the SPP mission. The National Guard training benefit is often underrepresented when discussing the value of the program in a national strategic context. The National Guard training inherent in the SPP mission contains a valuable opportunity. This opportunity is not explored to its fullest potential.

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Relying on a state National Guard partnership to act at the operational level would require operational art. It would require a fully integrated staff working together to comprehend the strategic direction, understand the operational environment, define the problem, and develop an operational approach. Traditional mobilization day (M-day) NCOs and officers rarely get the opportunity to work through the joint operational planning process (JOPP), let alone the opportunity to design creative operational approaches through operational art and design.

Ways

The National Guard is a logical integration point for the achievement of unified action. The greatest potential of the SPP lies in its ability to integrate vast resources toward common goals that hinge on leadership and trusting long-term relationships. The management science of the program is much improved, however a greater focus on the leadership and art will help to achieve the full operational potential of the SPP. The expanded goals described above are within the scope of the National Guard SPP with some adjustment in ways and means. The SPP could realize the greater opportunities and resources through expanded authority and a full operational staff at the state level focused on the partnership(s). This would provide the opportunity to efficiently synchronize various resources toward a unified effort that further meets the strategic goals of the nation.

A major challenge for achieving unified action and expanded objectives lies in authorities and funding. The National Guard Bureau’s recent efforts have focused primarily on the organization and management of the program. The SPP operates under Title 10, United States Code (Armed Forces), Title 32, United States Code (National Guard), and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authority. The typical funding mechanism for SPP activities is

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44U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, III-7.
through National Guard Bureau International Affairs Division or Traditional Combatant Commander’s Activities (TCA). In other words, official SPP activities are funded and authorized through the Department of Defense. Title 32 provides National Guard funding for National Guard Soldiers conducting SPP activities within the United States. Title 10 provides funding for military personnel, including activated National Guardsmen conducting SPP activities outside of the United States. There are several other funding mechanisms and authorities that could reinforce National Guard activities but these are not officially SPP funding authorities. For instance, the Department of State (Title 22, United States Code), universities, and private industries all have requirements that parallel SPP efforts. These funding mechanisms fall under civilian funding authorities in support of diplomacy efforts. In the 2012 SPP GAO study, 36 State Partnership Program Coordinator’s (SPPC) responded to a questionnaire saying that the program has to do a better job at facilitating civilian activities. This majority response is because civilian activities rely on separate funding and authorities that make National Guard synchronization efforts difficult. The GAO noted other difficulties in the SPP strategy.

The GAO’s May 2012 report titled “State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training Needed for National Guard’s Effort with Foreign Partners” stated that the SPP needed an improved oversight framework that included clear goals, objectives, and metrics. The GAO went on to say that, the lack of this oversight framework limits the ability to assess the program. Meanwhile the NGB was developing metrics and regulatory guidance two years before the study began. The following metrics were developed and are currently used to conduct annual assessments of the SPP; operational mission support to the GCC, doctrine and training of

46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
the SPP workforce, and governance and business practices. These metrics were developed based on the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) end-states, Joint Mission Essential Tasks, and the doctrine, regulations and legislation that support and govern the SPP. The NGB was also in the process of correcting the oversight framework through regulatory guidance. As mentioned earlier, the result of this effort was Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5111.20, which outlined the responsibilities of the stakeholders and underlined funding guidelines for program activities. The improved oversight and management of the SPP is necessary for good stewardship, management of the program, and Congressional support. The oversight ensures that the program is meeting its responsibilities. However, while the science of the overall program continues to develop, it is also important to maintain a creative outlook on the potential opportunities at the partnership level. While funding authorities, oversight, and metrics present challenges for the management of the program, there may be opportunity in the operational art.

Tensions with funding, oversight, and assessment of the program are actually opportunities for leadership and art at the partnership level. Operational art assists a commander in fully understanding and assessing the operational environment and the most efficient approach toward achieving objectives. Political scientist, Joseph Nye, refers to the integration of many forms of power and resources as “smart power.” He says it is our ability to convert those resources into desirable outcomes that measures our power. Nye goes on to say that “public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief, military-to-military contacts-are scattered around the government, and there is no overarching strategy or budget that even tries to integrate them.” Each states’ National Guard has served in many roles

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49United States Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction 5111.20, 12.

that are congruous with diplomacy and security cooperation activities. The dual role of the National Guard is the reason that it served so well for the JCTP. Experience in missions like stability operations, defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), counterdrug, agricultural development teams, border control, and homeland security have made the National Guard a logical node for a multitude of resources and capabilities.

The National Guard has the inherent experience to overcome complex environments and to leverage the capabilities of international and domestic government and non-government resources. Joint doctrine states, “[u]nity of effort is essential to meet the complex challenges facing the US. The need to embrace the participation of interagency and multinational partners in the interest of a comprehensive, unified approach to operations is as important as the commander’s effort to build a coherent operational approach.”51 In other words, the commander must have a significant capability to synchronize various resources toward a unified approach. The standardization and organization of the SPP may resolve congressional concerns about the program, but the National Guard can provide much more to the combatant commands through the creative integration of multiple resources.

Several State Partnership Program studies have focused on the ability of the program to influence not only military-to-military relationships but also military-to-civilian and civilian-to-civilian interactions as well.52 The SPP must maintain and expand the ability to leverage government, non-government, civilian, and military capabilities. Much like its role in defense support to civil authorities, the National Guard will achieve desirable outcomes through the ability to coordinate with civilians and other government agencies. The National Guard must

51U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, III-4.

promote and further develop the ability to promote unified action toward achieving security cooperation objectives through operational art.

Means

In an era of rapidly declining defense budgets means are a closely watched entity. The 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA) mandated a decrease of $487 billion in defense spending from 2012 to 2021. A strategy that simply calls for increased funding will certainly not be well received. However, the oversimplification of the statement, do more with less, is also not a fruitful venture. The key is to efficiently use all the resources available to the SPP, and re-align disassociated resources to more common goals. The resources officially dedicated to the State Partnership Program are a fraction of the resources normally associated with the SPP. The National Guard has the potential to integrate a vast amount of personnel, economic and diplomatic resources through an integrated approach enabled by operational art. Rather than just doing more with less, or increasing funding, relating operational art to the SPP may provide the opportunity to do things more efficiently. The integral resource for the realization of the SPP’s full potential is a full staff at the state level focused on the partnership(s). The National Guard SPP has many examples of partnership success revolving around the program, but some of the resources owing to that success are not actually a product of the official strategy. Developing a whole-of-society effort through operational art aligns far more resources toward common strategic goals than presently exist within the SPP.

Case studies of the SPP revealed several individual state initiatives that fostered an integrated diplomatic effort. In 2001, LTC Thomas Simpson, a student at the Army War College, interviewed leadership in the New Jersey, Maryland, and Pennsylvania National Guard and found they strengthened their partnerships through the coordination of unique state resources. New Jersey sent their State Judge Advocate General to assist with writing the Albanian constitution.
The New Jersey Governor also approved the assistance of NJ State Troopers, working in coordination with the National Guard, to assist Albanian officers with search and rescue training.\textsuperscript{53} The Pennsylvania National Guard invited key government officials of Lithuania to visit the Pennsylvania legislature, Philadelphia city government officials, and the Army War College. These are just a few examples of coordinated whole-of-society efforts spawned by the SPP.

Several other partnerships have participated in a whole-of-society approach, which incorporated various resources throughout the state. The Maryland-Estonia partnership was a well-documented whole-of-society partnership that spawned from the SPP. Estonia became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004 due, in part, to the mentorship from the Maryland National Guard.\textsuperscript{54} Not only did the Maryland National Guard serve as a mentor and advisor for Estonian Defense Forces, but several other city and state agencies participated in exchanges as well. Cities in Maryland developed sister-city relationships with cities in Estonia.\textsuperscript{55} The Maryland National Guard also began an education reform exchange that blossomed into an active civilian education initiative referred to as the Maryland-Estonia Education Consortium. It paired several Maryland and Estonia universities for degree program and faculty exchanges. There were many other partnerships like Maryland-Estonia that leveraged unique state resources through civilian exchanges.


\textsuperscript{54}Howard, 190-193.

\textsuperscript{55}Sister Cities International, “Mission and History,” http://www.sister-cities.org/mission-and-history (accessed December 29, 2013). Since its inception, Sister Cities International has played a key role in renewing and strengthening important global relationships. Sister Cities International was created at President Eisenhower’s 1956 White House conference on citizen diplomacy, where he envisioned an organization that could be a champion for peace and prosperity by fostering bonds between people from different communities around the world.
Many of these activities were associated with the SPP but not officially funded by the program. According to the National Guard fiscal year 2014 State Partnership Program funding guidance, the SPP does not fund “engagements designed to enable and facilitate broader relationships,” however, the guidance does encourage these activities as an outgrowth of the partnerships.\(^\text{56}\) It would be difficult for the NGB to justify the funding of relationship building, under their current authority, however, the importance of these outgrowths are pivotal to the success of the program. The SPP funds events for Army and Air National Guard personnel costs, US government or National Guard civilian personnel (Title 5, Title 32 technician) costs, associated travel, and conference costs. In 2012, with NDAA Public Law 112-81 Section 1085, Congress afforded the SPP up to $3,000,000 for the cost of civilian personnel participating in SPP partnership activities.\(^\text{57}\) The expanded use of civilian funds is encouraging, however, the use of these funds is cumbersome and the amount is limited. There are several other potential resources dependent on the leadership of the SPP that could integrate a more holistic approach while providing a mutual benefit to all those involved.

A significant amount of potential government and non-government resources exist for broadening diplomatic engagements within the scope of the SPP, but outside the official SPP authority. Official military-to-military and military-to-civilian activities within the SPP are historically budgeted at approximately $13 million, while other government opportunities, which closely relate to SPP activities, total close to $35 billion.\(^\text{58}\) This total reflects only those activities


typically within the purview of SPP partnerships but completely separated by authority. It does not include any DOD funding. The funding sources ranged from requirements for Department of State foreign assistance to private cyber and infrastructure efforts to civilian diplomacy efforts by universities.\(^5^9\) These funding sources represent a significant potential for developing integrated efforts like the Maryland-Estonia whole-of-society approach already described. The framework of an operational level SPP partnership could assist in understanding these efforts while facilitating unified efforts in support of the Combatant Command.

The principal means for harnessing the full potential of the SPP through operational art is the leadership and staff at the state level. Currently the program affords one State Partnership Program Coordinator (SPPC) at the state level to plan, coordinate, and execute the program.\(^6^0\) This officer is responsible for all budget, reporting, and administrative requirements of the program. Most partner nations also have a Bilateral Affairs Officer (BAO) who works at the embassy of the partnered nation. This officer is provided by the partnered state’s National Guard but is funded by the Combatant Command. In order to organize the full SPP potential into an integrated approach facilitated by operational art, a full staff is required. Expanding the potential of the SPP requires a deep understanding of a very complex environment. Not only are there various authorities and resources within the United States, but the same applies for understanding the resources and authorities of the partnered nation. A logical and holistic approach must synchronize all the available resources toward commonly understood objectives. The combatant command staff is usually responsible for this level of analysis, however, a staff at the state level is better able to leverage the significant potential civilian and government state resources and provide informed input at the country level from multiple perspectives.

\(^5^9\)Braun, “Alternate Funding Sources to Support NG Security Cooperation Efforts,” 1.

\(^6^0\)Kapp and Serafino, 11.
The assessment of the program revealed a massive potential funneled through a resource, manning, and authority limited program. The challenges of authority, funding, and staffing prevented the full potential of state resources at the partnership level. Some states widened the funnel through their own initiative but the congressionally authorized program was tactically focused. The limit of one coordinator bounded by DoD authority alone prevented the coordination and integration of other potential state and national resources. Given the authority and staff to function at the operational level, the SPP partnerships could take advantage of a whole-of-society approach toward developing shared global security. The assessment of the partnership provided a deeper understanding of what it means to execute the strategy of the SPP given the opportunities and challenges presented by the program.
THE PARTNERSHIP

This case study focused on the individual Missouri National Guard (MONG) state partnership with the Republic of Panama. In order to understand the National Guard State Partnership Program’s (SPP) impact on national strategic goals, it was important to understand the actions at the partnership level. From an ends, ways, and means standpoint, initiatives existed at the partnership level that partially took advantage of the opportunities described in the program assessment. The MONG remained highly focused on the intermediate military objectives and country cooperation plans of the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). The Panamanian Ministry of Defense made notable progress in the increased sophistication level of their partnership activities. The Missouri National Guard developed a trusting relationship with both the country of Panama and the institutions within the state of Missouri. These relationships presented significant challenges and opportunities congruent with the overall program assessment.

The Missouri National Guard partnership history with the Republic of Panama was deeper than its official SPP history revealed. The Missouri National Guard began participating in humanitarian assistance and training exercises in Central America in the mid-1980s. Panama and many other Latin American countries benefited from National Guard combined engineer and medical training exercises referred to as Minuteman (1984-85), Blazing Trails (1985-86), and Fuertos Caminos (1986-95).61 The MONG participated in all of these exercises and led Fuertos

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Caminos in western Panama in 1995.⁶² These overseas deployment training (ODT) exercises in Central America maintained readiness for the National Guard and promoted national security interests for the United States. According to Lieutenant General John Conaway, then Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau, these road building and medical training exercises were a natural fit for the National Guard because “the primary objective in peacetime has always been to add value to the community and build support among the local populace.”⁶³ Lieutenant General Conaway also stated that the use of the National Guard fostered hometown support of national policies, introduced a less threatening force into the Latin American countries, and helped to train the National Guard. These exercises throughout the 1980s and 90s began the informal relationship with the Missouri National Guard and the Republic of Panama.

The historic involvement in humanitarian exercises led to the official SPP partnership of the Missouri National Guard and the Republic of Panama in 1996. The partnership began at a slow pace. The partnership began at a time when Panama was still attempting to rebuild their democracy after years of dictatorship under Brigadier General Omar Torrijos and General Manuel Noriega. Between the years 1996-1999, no partnership activities were conducted.⁶⁴ A 2002 Naval Postgraduate School comparison study even recommended that the partnership should end due to a lack of participation from both the Government of Panama (GoP) and the state of Missouri.⁶⁵ This comparison study focused on the partnerships’ first six years. In the years after this study was conducted, the political situation in Panama greatly improved and the success of the partnership since has proven that the study author’s recommendation was premature. The MONG

⁶²Ibid.


⁶⁴Todd Cantwell, Assistant State Partnership Program Coordinator, “ODT and SPP Events by Year,” spreadsheet for Missouri National Guard, Jefferson City, MO, August 16, 2013, 1.

participated in over sixty-five partnership activities in the last four years alone.\textsuperscript{66} An NGB assessment, conducted by Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM) consultants, reflected a significant increase in Panama’s capabilities within all of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) security cooperation focus areas.\textsuperscript{67}

The purpose of the individual partnership strategy assessment was to understand the operational art behind the SPP strategy by directly observing tactical level operations and linking them to the strategic goals of the nation. Like the program assessment, the partnership strategy was assessed through the ends, ways, and means construct. Through the strategy assessment, significant opportunities and challenges were noted. Similar challenges and opportunities were noted at the partnership level. Most notably a disconnect between the potential for unified action and the operational level authority and resources to support the partnership initiatives.

\textbf{Ends}

The Missouri National Guard has a more ambitious strategic outlook but is currently resourced and authorized to provide a tactical military means. The goals of the MONG-Panama partnership are primarily focused on the goals of the Combatant Command. However, the long-term vision and initiatives of the Missouri National Guard SPP reflect the desire to expand the partnership to support the unified action of the CCMD with more civilian partnership activities.\textsuperscript{68} The MONG-Panama partnership currently facilitates other efforts within the state government

\textsuperscript{66}Cantwell, 1.


\textsuperscript{68}Brigadier General David Newman, Missouri National Guard, Joint Chief of Staff. “Opening Remarks, Annual State Partnership Program Planning Meeting” (Westin Crown Center, Kansas City, KS, January 28, 2014).
and civilian agencies that are aligned, but not fully integrated with the SPP. The deliberate effort to synchronize these efforts at the state would provide credibility to all the stakeholders involved and better shape the holistic effort to achieve the strategic goals of the nation.

Missouri National Guard Soldiers and Airmen conduct military-to-civilian exchanges in support of the CCMD’s intermediate military objectives for Panama. These are military-to-civilian exchanges only because Panama has no military forces. In 1990, just after the American military invasion, Operation Just Cause, Panamanian military forces were disbanded by President Guillermo Endara and replaced by Panamanian Public Forces (PPF). The PPF, which fall under civilian authority within the Ministry of Public Security consist of four law enforcement and security oriented forces; the Panamanian National Police (PNP), the National Frontier Service (SENA-FRONT), the National Aero-Naval Service (SENAF), and the Institutional Protection Service (SPI).69 The GoP also has an organization similar to the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) called the National Civil Protection System (SINAPROC). MONG partnership exchanges are primarily directed toward building partnership capacity within these public forces. These events focus on supporting the CCMDs Panama Country Cooperation Plan and the theater campaign plan intermediate military objectives, through four primary objectives, which include; combating transnational organized crime, senior leader engagement, effective crisis management, and professional development of Panamanian law enforcement organizations.70

A holistic effort to assist the Panamanian Public Forces to build capacity and inherently develop shared global security lacks the assistance of government and non-government civilian

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70Rebecca Segovia, MONG State Partnership Program Coordinator, “Status Update Missouri-Panama State Partnership Program,” report to National Guard Bureau International Affairs Division, Arlington, VA, August 2, 2013, 1.
resources. The integration of civilian resources would certainly give credibility to all the stakeholders involved and develop a more concentrated effort toward achieving strategic goals. Civilian organizations in Missouri use the MONG-Panama partnership initiative to pursue their own initiatives. Three memorandums of understanding (MOU) were signed between 2008-2011; the Children’s Mercy Hospital with the Panama Children’s Hospital, State of Missouri Higher Education with the Panama Counsel of the Institute for the Formation & Betterment of Human Resources (IFARU) and the Missouri Rotary District #6080 with Panama Rotary District #4240. The Missouri SPPC and BAO were also working toward two additional agreements between the Missouri Civil Air Patrol and Kansas City fire departments with their Panamanian counterparts. These MOUs were a direct result of the SPP. They not only help develop civilian institutions but they also help deepen the trusting long-term relationship between Missouri and Panama. There are undoubtedly more potential civilian-to-civilian partnerships among Panamanian and Missouri civilian institutions. Exploring a whole-of-society relationship among business and state organizations is worth the effort that the MONG is making.

The MONG also has the potential to better inform the objectives of the Combatant Command’s Panamanian Country Cooperation Plan through a whole-of-society effort. According to JP 3-0, “[w]hile CCDRs and national leaders may have a clear strategic perspective of the problem, operational-level commanders and subordinate leaders often have a better understanding of specific circumstances that comprise the operational situation.” A multi-faceted whole-of-society partnership provides several contact points and multiple perspectives of the operational environment. Not only would subordinates have a better picture of the operational situation but it would also be holistic. The integration of multiple perspectives would provide a very informed picture of a constantly changing and complex operational environment. This holistic

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71Segovia, 1.

72U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, III-1.
understanding would serve to identify both long-term and short-term objectives that directly influence strategic goals. For example, a Missouri state government partner activity may identify a GoP policy change that affects water pollution. The SPP could inform the CCMD CCP and have the ability to respond by requesting partnership support from the Missouri Department of Natural Resources. This is just one example of the many opportunities inherent in a whole-of-society approach. Before any of this integration is achieved at the state level, the ways and means of the program must adjust to support operational level partnership agility.

Ways

The Missouri National Guard should continue to bridge military and civilian capabilities toward integrated diplomacy efforts. Dr. Derek Reveron is an expert on security cooperation and U.S. foreign affairs and defense policy. He is currently the Director of Security Strategies and Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.73 In his book, *Exporting Security*, he argued for the military’s increased diplomacy role in the global security environment. When discussing the necessity for the assistance of civilian expertise Reveron stated that “[t]he military has been out front in adapting to the new security landscape. Its size and resources— National Guard and Reserve personnel, in particular— enable it to cut across the civil– military divide.” 74 The MONG SPP supports Reveron’s statement but the cut across civil-military authorities is not complete. The MONG SPP staff discovered ways, like memorandums of understanding between civilian organizations, to leverage various resources but

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these opportunities were not institutionalized. They reflected the random initiatives of the SPPC or the motivated actions of specific civilian organizations.

The Missouri National Guard, like every other state and territory’s National Guard, resides among several potential resources. The state, county, city governments, federal agencies, civilian agencies, and universities are readily accessible to the National Guard. The Adjutant General and Joint Force Headquarters are usually located in the capital city of their host state. Most of the states’ resources are within the same city as the commander and his staff; this includes the State Partnership Program Coordinator (SPPC), who is the principal coordinator for SPP partnership activities. The Missouri National Guard TAG and JFHQ are located in the state capital, Jefferson City, Missouri. The National Guard JFHQ is a neighbor to most Missouri government and civilian resources that are able to contribute to security cooperation and nation building activities. The potential for a well-coordinated whole-of-society partnership exists, and the resources are within reach, but not all agree that the military should lead diplomacy efforts.

One of the criticisms of Reveron’s argument to expand the military’s role in diplomacy was that the military does not have the inherent civilian expertise for this role. The CEO of InterAction, the largest alliance of U.S.-based international nongovernmental organizations, argued that a gap in civilian diplomacy capabilities does not necessarily mean that the military should fill that role.75 The direction of the MONG SPP supports both Reveron’s argument and critics of the militarization of diplomacy. The SPP could serve a traditional security cooperation role while fostering and synchronizing civilian expertise that provides more skilled and experienced diplomacy capabilities. A whole-of-society strategy would garner the support and confidence of many potential resources, while allowing a shared civilian/government role in diplomacy.

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Means

To realize the full potential of the National Guard in a whole-of-society integration role the core of the SPP must be strengthened to reflect the operational level. The restricted authority of the partnership limited the options of the partnership to military operations that support the CCP and IMOs of the Combatant Command. Extending Title 22 authorities to the SPP would provide the state Adjutant General with additional government resources and capabilities. The state National Guard maintains a position of advantage through a strong relationship with all of the state’s whole-of-society resources within close proximity. This, combined with the fact the state National Guard served as a trusted advisor to the partner nation through a long-term relationship, revealed a missed opportunity for the state National Guard to better serve the operational level in support of the CCMD.

The complement of a full staff is critical to any operation above the tactical level. If the SPP aspires to anything greater than a military tactical means, then a staff is needed to ensure a planned integration of all the available resources toward achieving the objectives. The precursor to the SPP, the JCTP, had an exhaustive staffing procedure for the execution and planning of security cooperation activities. It involved USEUCOM staff sections, quarterly scheduling conferences that included the country desk officers, chiefs of each liaison team, and the senior host country liaison team members. The country desk officer arranged for translators, lodging, in-country support, travel plans, visas, and transportation.\textsuperscript{76} The Missouri National Guard is currently funded for one State Partnership Program Coordinator who manages all the staffing of the partnership from planning and budgeting to execution and administrative tasks. This holds the full strategic potential of the SPP to a tactical action with limited shots at the full strategic

\textsuperscript{76}Cossaboom, 1.
potential. The SPP should serve at the operational level with the staff and authority necessary to broaden the strategic potential.

The partnership level of the SPP cannot function at the operational level without a full staff. The Missouri National Guard has two additional officers to assist with the administrative efforts. However, these officers were not funded by program funding, they were funded by the state. The state funded these officers to provide additional assistance for administrative issues like passports, travel arrangements, and budgeting. The SPPC was then able to focus more time toward operations versus administration. This was not a function of the overall program, but a state using its own resources to fill a need. The Bilateral Affairs Officer (BAO) also assisted the efforts of the SPP, but the Combatant Command funded this officer. The BAO worked at the Panamanian embassy in Panama City, but had other responsibilities beyond the SPP. The BAO helped to align SPP activities with the Country Cooperation Plan through several meetings and conferences, which included the Annual State Partnership Program Planning Meeting (ASPPPM), but this officer had several other responsibilities to the CCMD. Because of this lack of focused staff, the operational level and operational art must reside at levels above the partnership. This leaves the leverage of a long-term relationship and accessible state resources as a potential, rather than kinetic, diplomatic assistant.

Strengthening the core of the SPP at the partnership level assists the Combatant Commander to visualize the problem and create agile solutions to achieve desired outcomes. The long-term relationship with Panama allows the partnership staff to exchange meaningful dialogue that addresses the primary challenges and opportunities. The staff helps the commander visualize the problem and identify the ways and means necessary to address it. An operational level state partnership could enable unified action to help address civilian government issues, transnational criminal organization security issues, or issues involving a humanitarian need through the means

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77Kapp and Serafino, 11.
available at the state level. A full staff at the partnership level allows the commander to understand the problem, direct the appropriate action and resources, and assess the effectiveness of the action.

In summary, a strengthened SPP core entails the means necessary for individual partnerships to act at the operational level. Specifically, a full staff and expanded civilian funding authority provides the opportunity to leverage and integrate all the potential resources within the state toward achieving national diplomacy goals. The program assessment revealed several opportunities within government and civilian budgets that parallel SPP efforts. A staff that is capable of finding, appropriately tracking and integrating these resources could remove a major limiting factor for the SPP. Equally important, is the training opportunity that this staff work provides the Missouri National Guard. Every mission within the scope of the National Guard’s dual role will involve a complex environment that demands a staff fluent in joint, international, interagency, and multinational planning operations. The opportunity for a staff to work through complex, real time operational problems is vital to the success of future National Guard operations.
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

The program analysis of the SPP uncovered challenges and opportunities that had significant impact on the partnership level. The program has the opportunity to expand the ends, or goals, to include the goals of other government agencies and civilian organizations in support of the partnered nation through a whole-of-society effort. The program guidance expressed the desire to leverage whole-of-society resources but the staff, funding and authority to do so are limited in execution at the partnership level. The National Guard’s dual role as a traditional national defense force and as a state controlled defense force made it inherently suited for a whole-of-society diplomacy effort. These traditional roles of the National Guard are fully supported by funding, authority, and staff, however the SPP is not. The whole-of-society effort for the SPP role was still limited to individual motivations at the partnership level.

The partnership level of the National Guard SPP provided intimate access to the partnered nation and state resources. Like the program assessment, the partnership assessment found vast potential in ways and means. Driving initiative down to the partnership level would more holistically support the goals of the CCMD, also better inform, and expand the effort through a multitude of government and non-government resources. Identifying the SPP as an integration point for a multitude of efforts supports the argument that the military should have a greater role in diplomacy and negates the counter argument that the military does not have the professional civilian resources necessary for diplomacy efforts.

The Missouri National Guard (MONG) had already taken steps toward leveraging whole-of-society opportunities but authority and manning constraints limit the scale and synchronization
of that effort. The presentation of whole-of-society opportunities at both the program and partnership levels led to a key determination; the operational level authority of the SPP resides at levels beyond the partnership level. Achieving the full potential of the SPP requires the authority to integrate all the accessible state resources where the long-term partnership relationship has the most influence. The state National Guard should have the agility and adaptability to commit separate efforts toward a unified operational direction that better assists and informs theater security cooperation efforts of the GCCs.

There is also an expanded training objective for the National Guard. Not only is the SPP a great tool for National Guard soldiers to gain experience in a JIIM environment, but an operational level partnership also adds an invaluable staff training experience. The SPP mission exercises several Joint Capability Areas and Joint Mission Essential tasks. The difficulties expressed by the GAO and RAND studies are primarily a staff function. Providing the opportunity for a National Guard staff to work through training management, measures of effectiveness and performance, and the joint operations planning process has profound value for National Guard NCOs and officers.
CONCLUSIONS

The increased emphasis on global engagement and shared global security has endured in US national strategy for nearly two decades. As global threats become more widespread, the United States must invest in a strategy that builds international relationships and security capacity that spreads even farther. Drastic fiscal constraints for the Department of Defense increase the necessity for shared global security efforts. The link from security cooperation tactical efforts to the strategic goal of increased global security must be efficient and effective. The National Guard State Partnership Program worked for the past two decades developing and maintaining long-term trusting relationships with partner nations while building security capacity. This program serves as a model for shared global security and has even greater potential for strategic success.

Security cooperation efforts, like the SPP, require efficient strategies that take advantage of the operational level. For the SPP this means empowering the state National Guard at the partnership level. This includes the staff, authority, and funding necessary to serve as an integration point for a whole-of-society effort. The state National Guard built trust through long-term relationships and has access to whole-of-society resources by way of its dual role. Operational art at the partnership level enables an integrated smart effort that leverages the appropriate resources based on a clear understanding of the operational environment. None of this is possible without a staff capable of fully deciphering the operational environment and designing an operational approach that fully appreciates the nuances of that environment.
The challenges and opportunities of the State Partnership Program create the most potential at the individual partnership level. The science and management of the program has evolved but the greatest opportunity of the SPP revolves around creative ways to mobilize resources at the partnership level through leadership and operational art. The ability to act at the operational level not only unlocks resource and strategy potential but it also provides a greater ability to tend to those challenges that were of concern to the GAO. The oversight, training, and assessment of the SPP are more visible through a partnership level staff than at the overall program level. More importantly, an unprecedented diplomacy potential hinges on the ability to operationalize and integrate state resources toward foreign diplomacy efforts. US government leadership must not only recognize the SPP as a model for the integration of state, national, citizen and public diplomacy, but must also take action to ensure that the operational art evolves with the model.


CANTWELL, Todd, Assistant State Partnership Program Coordinator. “ODT and SPP Events by Year.” Spreadsheet for Missouri National Guard, Jefferson City, MO, August 16, 2013.


