ADVISING HOST NATIONS AND HOST NATION SECURITY FORCES: THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISORY EFFORTS THROUGH 2020

A Monograph

by

COL David M. Wood

United States Army

Advanced Strategic Leadership Studies Program
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2014-01

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
ADVISING HOST NATIONS AND HOST NATION SECURITY FORCES: THE UNITED STATES MILITARY

COL David M. Wood

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
100 Stimson Ave.
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

14. ABSTRACT

The Army is well acquainted with advising Host Nations (HN) and Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF). Major General Marquis de Lafayette from France and Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben from Germany advised the United States’ Continental Army under General George Washington during the Revolutionary War. And the US Army can trace its advisory history to the Philippine War in 1899 with the establishment and training of the Filipino constabulary police force. In the Army’s 238 year history, it has fought eleven years of conventional war with the myriad of remaining conflicts characterized as stability operations.

As the Army looks to 2020, given budget and force structure reductions, it must determine how to best employ forces to advise HNs and HNSFs. In order for the Army to do so, it is essential it look at its past in order to address its future. In February 2007, the Department of the Army (DA) announced the advisor mission as its top priority. In 2009, then Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) select, General Martin Dempsey, and US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, both proclaimed the importance of building HNSF capacity and the advisor mission as an enduring requirement. However, despite these proclamations, the Army never placed the requisite emphasis on the advisor mission. Given its long history of advising HNs and HNSFs, stability operations and Security Force Assistance (SFA), the US should have had the capability to develop an advisor mission characterized as stability operations.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

ADVISING HOST NATIONS AND HOST NATION SECURITY FORCES: THE UNITED STATES MILITARY
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: COL David M. Wood

Monograph Title: Advising Host Nations and Host Nation Security Forces: The United Army Advisory Efforts through 2020

Approved by:

__________________________________________, Monograph Director
Dan C. Fullerton, Ph.D.

__________________________________________, Deputy Director, Academics, School of Advanced Military Studies
G. Scott Gorman, Ph.D.

__________________________________________, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Henry A. Arnold III, COL

Accepted this 22nd day of May 2014 by:

__________________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The Army is well acquainted with advising Host Nations (HN) and Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF). Major General Marquis de La Fayette from France and Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben from Germany advised the United States’ Continental Army under General George Washington during the Revolutionary War. And the US Army can trace its advisory history to the Philippine War in 1899 with the establishment and training of the Filipino constabulary police force. In the Army’s 238 year history, it has fought eleven years of conventional war with the myriad of remaining conflicts characterized as stability operations.

As the Army looks to 2020, given budget and force structure reductions, it must determine how to best employ forces to advise HNs and HNSFs. In order for the Army to do so, it is essential it look at its past in order to address its future. In February 2007, the Department of the Army (DA) announced the advisor mission as its top priority. In 2009, then Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) select, General Martin Dempsey, and US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, both proclaimed the importance of building HNSF capacity and the advisor mission as an enduring requirement. However, despite these proclamations, the Army never placed the requisite emphasis on the advisor mission. Given its long history of advising HNs and HNSFs, stability operations and Security Force Assistance (SFA), the US should have had the requisite expertise, plans, authorities, and organizational solutions readily at hand to address the full range of advising and partnership activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department of Defense (DOD) must act now to avoid future advising and SFA difficulties and ensure that it does not disregard the hard-won lessons of recent experience. To address future advising, the Army should first capture and implement valuable lessons learned from the Iraq and Afghan wars while leaders experienced in advising are still serving.

With the Army’s implementation of the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept in support of Geographic Combatant Commands, unit leadership will have some level of future responsibility advising HNs and HNSFs. With 9/11 and the attack by terrorists on American soil, US Army Special Operation Forces (US Army SOF) realized the importance of establishing interdependencies with General Purpose Forces (GPF) in conducting SFA, Foreign Internal Defense and Counterinsurgency missions—bridging the human and land domains along the Army’s range of military operations. The emerging RAF concept coupled with the US Army SOF-GPF interdependency will definitely aid in future advising missions. However, structural shortfalls in how the Army conducts operations and missions still remain and require immediate attention. To address these drawbacks, the Army must conduct a thorough doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education and personnel review to address advisory capability gaps and in setting favorable conditions for the 2020 future force.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A special recognition goes out to several organizations and one former Army officer for informing this monograph. I would be remiss without mentioning the myriad of Combined Arms Center departments on Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to include the Combat Studies Institute, the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance and the Center for Army Lessons Learned, for the plethora of advising references, transcripts, After Action Reviews, briefings, handbooks and manuals. Additional gratitude goes to LTC (Ret) Jeremy Moore, a former augmented advisor, a key leader at the Army’s advisor training base and a five year veteran of advising and Security Force Assistance, for his valuable insights and for filling in the gaps; LTC Moore was a fountain of knowledge.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ACRONYMS** ................................................................................................................................ vii

**ILLUSTRATIONS** ........................................................................................................................ xii

**TABLES** ....................................................................................................................................... xiii

**INTRODUCTION** ............................................................................................................................ 1

**HISTORICAL ARMY ADVISING OVERVIEW** ............................................................................. 11

  - Lack of General Purpose Force Advisor Doctrine ................................................................. 15
  - Manning Shortfalls .................................................................................................................... 19
    - WIAS-Sourced Advisors ........................................................................................................ 21
    - Unit-Sourced Advisors ......................................................................................................... 24
  - Advisor Equipping Shortfalls .................................................................................................... 25
  - Advisor Training ....................................................................................................................... 26
    - WIAS-Sourced Advisor Training ......................................................................................... 27
    - Theater COIN Academies ..................................................................................................... 28
    - CONUS Replacement Center Training .............................................................................. 29
    - SFAB and AAB Training ....................................................................................................... 30
    - Ministerial Team Training .................................................................................................... 31
  - Command and Control Issues ................................................................................................... 32

**CURRENT ARMY ADVISORY EFFORTS** .................................................................................. 37

  - Budget and Force Structure Reductions .................................................................................... 38
  - Afghanistan and the SFAB ....................................................................................................... 39
  - Regionally Aligned Forces ...................................................................................................... 41
    - RAF Defined and Described ................................................................................................. 42
    - The Four Phases of RAF Training ....................................................................................... 43
    - 2/1 ABCT—The Army’s RAB Proof of Principle ................................................................. 45
    - 1/4 ABCT—A “RAB-Like” Mission ..................................................................................... 49
    - Rebalance to the PACOM AOR ............................................................................................ 50
  - US Army SOF: Interdependencies with the GPF .................................................................... 53
  - Future Advisor Training ........................................................................................................... 56

**FUTURE ADVISORY RECOMMENDATIONS** ............................................................................. 57

  - Analysis ..................................................................................................................................... 58
  - Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership and Education and Personnel (DOTLP) Considerations .......................................................................................................................... 60
    - Organization .......................................................................................................................... 64
    - Training .................................................................................................................................. 72
  - Leadership and Education ....................................................................................................... 76
  - Personnel ................................................................................................................................... 76
    - Identifying the Right Personnel to Serve as Advisors .......................................................... 78
    - Foreign Area Officer (FAO) ................................................................................................... 80
    - Department of State Liaison Officer (LNO) ......................................................................... 80
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A2B</td>
<td>Advise and Assist Battalion (Training)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAB</td>
<td>Advise and Assist Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABCT</td>
<td>Armored Brigade Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACFTA</td>
<td>ASEAN-China Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>African Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCENT</td>
<td>US Army Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASI</td>
<td>Additional Skill Identifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWG</td>
<td>Asymmetric Warfare Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN</td>
<td>Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSI</td>
<td>Battlespace Integrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSO</td>
<td>Battlespace Owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>Combined Arms Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALL</td>
<td>Center for Army Lessons Learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Country Campaign Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>Course of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>CONUS Replacement Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREL</td>
<td>Culture, Religion and Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Combat Studies Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combat Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Decisive Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Direct Action (when referencing US Army SOF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCO</td>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLI</td>
<td>Defense Language Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOTLP</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership and Education and Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERB</td>
<td>Enlisted Record Brief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETT</td>
<td>Embedded Transition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FET</td>
<td>Female Engagement Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRTM</td>
<td>Fort Riley Training Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSF</td>
<td>Foreign Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GiRoA</td>
<td>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPF</td>
<td>General Purpose Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWV</td>
<td>High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNSF</td>
<td>Host Nation Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRC</td>
<td>Human Resources Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAG</td>
<td>Iraq Assistance Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB</td>
<td>Infantry Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSC</td>
<td>Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCISFA</td>
<td>Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLF</td>
<td>Kuwaiti Liberation Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMAG</td>
<td>Korean Military Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBE</td>
<td>Leave Behind Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDESP</td>
<td>Leader Development and Education for Sustained Peace Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOE</td>
<td>Lines of Effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC-V</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command-Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBASFA</td>
<td>Modular Brigade Augmented for Security Force Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>Medical Evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METL</td>
<td>Mission Essential Task List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC-I</td>
<td>Multinational Corps-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNSTC-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoDA</td>
<td>Minister of Defense Advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Minister of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupational Skill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRAP</td>
<td>Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTT</td>
<td>Military Transition Team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NCO  Non-Commissioned Officer
NGO  Non-Governmental Organizations
OC/T  Observer Controller/Trainer
OCO  Overseas Contingency Operations
OE  Operational Environment
OER  Officer Evaluation Report
OGO  Other Governmental Organizations
OPCON  Operational Control
ORB  Officer Record Brief
ORF  Operational Readiness Funds
OSC-I  Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq
OTERA  Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild and Advise
OTERA-A  Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild and Advise-Assess
PACOM  Pacific Command
PDSI  Personnel Development Skill Identifier
PDSS  Predeployment Site Survey
PKSOI  Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute
PMAG  Provisional Military Advisor Group
POLAD  Political Advisor
PSD  Personal Security Detachment
RAB  Regionally Aligned Brigade
RAD  Regionally Aligned Division
RAF  Regionally Aligned Force
RAND  Research and Development Corporation
RIP  Relief in Place
SA  Security Assistance
SASO  Stability Operations and Support Operations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SBCT</td>
<td>Stryker Brigade Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECFOR</td>
<td>Security Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFAAT</td>
<td>Security Force Advise and Assist Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFAB</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFAT</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJA</td>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLE</td>
<td>Senior Leader Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STT</td>
<td>Stability Transition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWCS</td>
<td>Special Warfare Center and School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>Tactical Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOA</td>
<td>Transfer of Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Training and Doctrine Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSOC</td>
<td>Theater Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>Transition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tactics, Techniques and Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAH</td>
<td>Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASOC</td>
<td>United States Army Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>Video teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIAS</td>
<td>Worldwide Individual Augmentation System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.</td>
<td>FORSCOM Recommended Regionally Aligned Force Training Model</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.</td>
<td>US Army Special Operations Command: A Shared Responsibility</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Recommended US Army to Host Nation Security Force Advisor Requirements</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>US Army Security Force Assistance Training Considerations</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

As the last two United States Quadrennial Defense Reviews have stated, building the security capacity of partners is a priority for the U.S. military as a whole. It helps lessen the necessity of costly and controversial military intervention, and, failing that, allows for a deliberate and responsible drawdown of international force.¹

— Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

The United States (US) Army is no stranger to advising Host Nations (HN) and Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF). During the Philippine War in 1899, the U.S. Army was heavily involved in training and advising Philippine Scouts in combating an insurgency and in executing President William McKinley’s “Benevolent Assimilation” policy, founded on protecting the populace while executing civil projects.² During WWII, 500 US Army advisors trained over 260,000 French troops, the equivalent of twelve divisions, for combat operations in Italy and France. Additionally during WWII, 4,800 US Army advisors integrated with thirty Chinese Divisions in efforts to improve Chinese capability in fighting the Japanese Army. In 1949, 500 US Army advisors, as part of the Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG), were responsible for activating and training eight South Korean Divisions due to the pending war with North Korea. In 1953, with approximately 300 Army advisors, the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) successfully reorganized the Republic of Korea Army of over 20 divisions into an effective combat force.³ During the Vietnam War, the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam

---


³Ibid., 5.
(MAC-V) employed 10,054 U.S. Army field advisors by the end of 1968 to build capacity and capability in the South Vietnamese Army in fighting the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong.\textsuperscript{4} And in the latest conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Army employed thousands of soldiers in an advisory capacity not seen since the Vietnam War, all in efforts to increase HN and HNSF capability and capacity in both countries. In 2008 alone, over 6,000 advisors were operating in the Iraqi theater.\textsuperscript{5} As evidenced here, past Army advisory missions were numerous, and with each conflict, the US Army faced advisory challenges and managed ways to meet mission requirements.

As the Army looks to 2020, given budget and force structure reductions, it must determine how to best employ forces to advise HN and HNSFs. In order for the Army to do so, it is essential it look at its past in order to address its future. In February 2007, the Department of the Army (DA) published an All Army Activities (ALARACT) message declaring the advisor mission its top priority.\textsuperscript{6} In 2009, then Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) select, General Martin Dempsey, characterized advising other nation counterparts as an enduring mission.\textsuperscript{7} As the US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, so eloquently stated in 2009:

> the U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches—primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces—to prevent festering problems from turning into a crisis that require costly and controversial direct military intervention. In this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States’ allies and partners may be as


\textsuperscript{7}Marc D. Axelberg, “Enhancing Security Force Assistance: Advisor Selection, Training and Employment” (Strategic Research Project, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2011), 7.
important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.\textsuperscript{8}

Nicholas Armstrong, from the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSC) and former US Army officer, warns “There are deep concerns among many that ‘COIN is dead’ and that US forces will soon discard the hard-won lessons of the last decade in favor of protecting budgets and institutional relevance.”\textsuperscript{9} Given its long history with this type of mission, the United States should have had the requisite expertise, plans, authorities, and organizational solutions readily at hand to address the full range of partnership activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department of Defense (DOD) must act now to avoid future advising and SFA difficulties and ensure that it does not disregard the hard-won lessons of recent experience.\textsuperscript{10} To address future advising, the Army should first capture and implement valuable lessons learned from the Iraq and Afghan wars while leaders experienced in advising are still serving.\textsuperscript{11}

US Army advising efforts have evolved over time, particularly the past twelve years due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Active duty Army strength was at a recent high of 570,000 soldiers and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds augmented unit budgets to meet deployment requirements.\textsuperscript{12} In both theaters, given the requirement to establish large HNSF units, US Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) lacked the capacity to advise and assist at the tactical

\textsuperscript{8}Theresa Baginski et al., \textit{A Comprehensive Approach to Improving Security Force Assistance Efforts} (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2009), 1.


\textsuperscript{10}Baginski et al., \textit{A Comprehensive Approach to Improving SFA Efforts}, 2.


\textsuperscript{12}House Armed Services Committee, Chief of Staff of the Army briefing on “Planning for Sequestration in Fiscal Year 2014 and Perspectives of the Military Services on the Strategic Choices and Management Review,” September 18, 2013, 113th Cong., 1st sess., Cong. Rec. 3.
to strategic levels, a mission set it was responsible for since the end of hostilities in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{13} Instead, US Army SOF focused predominately on direct action (DA) missions and worked to establish Iraqi and Afghan Commando and SOF units.\textsuperscript{14} To meet advisor requirements, the obligation fell to US Army General Purpose Forces (GPF). Initially, meeting advisor requirements in both theaters, the Army relied heavily on the Worldwide Individual Augmentation System (WIAS).\textsuperscript{15} Most WIAS augmentees formed as Transition Teams (TTs) at a Continental US (CONUS) based training location, trained for no more than ninety days then deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan to serve as advisors at the tactical to ministerial levels.\textsuperscript{16} Through the use of GPF WIAS taskings, advising was imperfect since working with HNSFs and HN ministries were not common core tasks for conventional army forces.\textsuperscript{17} Forming GPF TTs with officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) was at the cost of deploying Brigade Combat Team (BCT) manning.\textsuperscript{18} In many cases, BCTs lacked company grade officers, field grade officers and senior NCO in key staff and command billets, all to meet DOD TT theater requirements.\textsuperscript{19} While deployed, BCTs focused largely on offensive and defensive operations, while advising

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotesize{\begin{enumerate}
\item Wuestner, \textit{Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance}, 7.
\item Moore, interview.
\item For simplicity and the purpose of this monograph, the author uses the term Transition Team (TT) generically throughout as opposed to the myriad of advisor team terms used in both Iraq and Afghanistan. TTs are referred to as Military Transition Teams (MTT) or Stability Transition Teams (STT) when referring to Iraq and as an Embedded Transition Team (ETT), Security Force Assistance Team (SFAT) or Security Force Advise and Assist Teams (SFAAT) when referring to Afghanistan.
\item Todd Harrison, \textit{Impact of the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan on the US Military’s Plans, Programs and Budgets} (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009), 18.
\item Moore, interview.
\item Department of the Army, All Army Activities (ALARACT) 033/2007.
\end{enumerate}}
\end{footnotesize}
HNs and HNSFs and stability operations remained principally the TT’s responsibility. Several additional issues existed: GPF advisors lacked requisite skills, advisory training bases were immature with most cadre members having never deployed as advisors, equipment was lacking at training bases, advisor deployments were based on dwell time as opposed to experience working with a HNSF and a HN and frequent branch and grade mismatches existed between the US Army advisor and his HNSF or HN counterpart. Once in theater, BCTs often lacked the needed command and command support relationships with TTs resulting in a lack of unity of command and unity of effort. Additionally, TTs would traverse a BCT’s battlespace with internal movement assets often without informing the unit. As the US Army full spectrum operations focus changed predominately from offensive and defensive operations to largely stability operations, so too did the GPF advisor effort.

In 2008, advising HNSFs evolved predominately from WIAS-based to the BCTs deploying as Advise and Assist Brigades (AAB) to Iraq and in 2011 as Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB) to Afghanistan. WIAS requirements remained, but largely in providing advisors at the strategic and ministerial levels. AABs and SFABs conducted predominately

---

20 Moore, interview.

21 Brennan Cook, “Improving Security Force Assistance Capability in the Army’s Advise and Assist Brigades” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2010), 3-4; Moore, interview.

22 Ibid., 30.

23 Moore, interview.

24 The Army refers to a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) deploying to a theater of operations for the purpose of advising or providing Security Force Assistance (SFA) to HNs and HNSFs as a Modular Brigade Augmented for Security Force Assistance (MBASFA). For the purpose of this paper, the author will refer to units deploying to Iraq as an AAB and those units deploying to Afghanistan as an SFAB.

stability operations, transitioning offensive and defensive operations to HNSFs.\(^{26}\) Even with the advent of the AAB and SFAB, advisory challenges remained. Despite AABs and SFABs receiving up to forty-eight officers and NCOs to assist with advising HNSFs, some of the previous WIAS-based issues remained and new sets of challenges emerged. GPFs still faced advisory challenges at the HNSF strategic and ministerial levels based on GPF advisor inexperience and rank mismatches between junior US company grade officers and senior HNSF officers were common.\(^{27}\) Additionally, most advisors at the strategic and ministerial levels attended a short CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) training program, which lacked advisory training.\(^{28}\) Clearly defined command and command support relationships between the SFAB/AAB and the TT remained a friction point.\(^{29}\) AAB/SFAB leadership often did not bring their advisors “on board,” ensuring each understood how advisors were to serve as a conduit between the SFAB/AAB and the HNSF/HN.\(^{30}\) AABs/SFABs would often augment the advisors with a Security Force (SECFOR) for movement causing junior leaders, specifically platoon leaders and company commanders, to balance mission demands between the advisor and organic commands.\(^{31}\) In some cases, the AAB/SFAB provided branch specific subject matter experts to “round-out” the team. With AAB and SFAB noted shortcomings, advising efforts continued to evolve to meet conditions in theater.

\(^{26}\) Moore, interview.


\(^{28}\) Moore, interview.

\(^{29}\) Thomas Roe, No. 11-41, Advise and Assist Brigade Observations, Insights and Lessons (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, September 2011), 47, 73.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 46.

\(^{31}\) Moore, interview.
In 2012, the Army employed two variants of advisor efforts in Afghanistan, both designed to build Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) capability. In Iraq, US forces redeployed by the end of 2011 and the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) was activated on January 1, 2012. The OSC-I served as the command node focused on the continued equipping and training of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in order to build capability. However, in Afghanistan, the Army adjusted SFAB manning levels to meet conditions in theater. The first variant of advisor effort saw the SFAB transition from serving as the battlespace owner (BSO) to the battlespace integrator (BSI), in the case of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. The BSI provided US enablers in extremis to ANSF while advisors focused on developing ANSF critical asset capability. The SFAB included key organic brigade, battalion and company level leaders and critical, low-density Military Occupational Skills (MOS) designed to improve ANSF artillery, logistics, engineers, explosive ordnance detachment (EOD) and military intelligence capabilities. As of June 2013, the SFAB focused predominately on advising and SFA while the ANSF assumed lead on providing security as the BSO. A noted shortcoming was SFABs deployed with just over 50 percent of their assigned strength leaving a large rear detachment at homestation.


Team, 1st Cavalry Division (4/1 CAV) and the 1st Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division (1/101 AASLT) deployed as this variant of SFAB. In the second form of advisor effort, BCTs and battalion (BN) leadership deployed as TTs. The intent of these unit-sourced teams was to augment the SFAB in order to increase ANSF capability, not as a BSI, but strictly as TTs. As with the SFAB, the unit deployed at minimal strength, less than 50 percent, which resulted in a large rear detachment. Second Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division (2/3 ABCT) and 2nd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division (2/101 AASLT), deployed their formations as TTs in support of the BSI. In both cases of advisor sourcing, leaders and staff organic to the organizations served as the primary advisors of ANSF, not an externally-sourced TT.

Starting in 2013, to address ongoing global challenges, the US Army began employing a force to contend with regional challenges and concerns in respective Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) AORs. To address those concerns, the Army implemented the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept. RAFs consist of forces from Army Corps, Divisions, BCTs—known as Regionally Aligned Brigades (RAB)—and reserve component forces to assist the GCC Commander in meeting mission requirements in the respective AOR. The RAF provides scalable


37 Timothy M. O’Brien, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Unit Interview Report of Key Leader Interviews (KLI) with 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, February 6, 2013), 8.


and tailorable capabilities to enable the GCC to shape the environment.\textsuperscript{41} Within the RAF concept, the RAB is the cornerstone organization and has some responsibility in providing advisory efforts in support of GCC requirements.\textsuperscript{42} In the African Command (AFRICOM) AOR, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 1\textsuperscript{st} Infantry Division (2/1 ABCT), serves as the RAB “proof of principle” providing valuable lessons learned and informing the force of this new concept for future RAB deployments.\textsuperscript{43} With the pending troop withdrawal from Afghanistan by the end of calendar year 2014, the future use of the SFAB terminology remains undetermined.

With the recent introduction of the RAF concept, it seems likely the Army will utilize this means to address future HNSF advising efforts.\textsuperscript{44}

With ongoing budget and force structure reductions, the Army must address future advising requirements through 2020. SOF is in the process of determining future advisory mission requirements and how it can better work in concert with and improve relations with GPFs—a shared advisor responsibility between the two forces.\textsuperscript{45} With Special Operations Command (SOCOM) placing Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the GCC, this initiative will improve unity of command and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{41}Department of the Army, “Regionally Aligned Force (RAF)” (briefing, RAF Seminar, Washington, DC, Irregular Warfare Center, November 7, 2013).}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{42}Peter Shull, interview by author, Topeka, KS, January 27, 2014.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{43}Gus Benton, \textit{2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 1st Infantry Division, Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) Interim Lessons Learned Report} (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Irregular Warfighting Center, October 31, 2013), 1.}


\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{45}Charles Cleveland, “Army Special Operations Forces 2022,” \textit{Special Warfare} 26, no. 2 (April-June 2013): 11.}
unity of effort between SOF and GPFs.46 Additionally, the Army must address which organization or institution provides future advisory training to the force, since the 162nd Infantry Brigade (IB) is scheduled to deactivate by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2014.47 The Army faces a myriad of advisory adversities in the near future. However, the Army is accustomed to challenges as it has contended with several over the past twelve years with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This monograph will consider training institution, unit, TT and government agency after action reviews (AAR), joint and army doctrine, official army documentation and briefings, newsletters, professional articles and other advisor related publications and manuals in shaping future force advising recommendations. Section I, Historical Advising Overview, provides a synopsis of the US Army advising effort from the onset of both the Iraq and Afghan wars and highlights challenges in doctrine, manning, the advisor training base and command and command support relationships between the TT and the BCT battlespace owner in theater. Section II, the Current Advisory Effort, covers the SFAB concept in Afghanistan and the introduction of the RAF model in support of the six GCCs. With 2/1 ABCT deployed as the RAB “proof of principle” in support of the AFRICOM AOR, initial insights are available as to how the unit prepared for deployment, conducted a myriad of advisory tasks in theater and how these recent lessons learned apply to future RAB forces. Also, 1/4 ABCT provides recommendations to the force based on the unit’s recent “RAB-like” deployment in support of Army Central (ARCENT) in 2013. Last, an overview of GPF and US Army SOF interdependencies will show how the two forces can share the adviser effort and conduct shared mission requirements in counterinsurgency (COIN), Security Force Assistance (SFA) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Section III, Future


Recommendations, provides a synopsis of noted advisor shortcomings and a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership and Education and Personnel (DOTLP) overview with proposals to improve future advisor requirements.

HISTORICAL ARMY ADVISING OVERVIEW

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in the US Army implementing an approach to advising HNs and HNSFs not used on such a large scale since the Vietnam War. In 2003, with the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, the George W. Bush Administration made a conscious decision to disband the existing Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and build a new ISF from scratch.48 With the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, an Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) was required to reinforce the newly-formed Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).49 Since 1975 and the end of the Vietnam War, US Army SOF’s mission was to advise and assist HNSFs, but all that changed with 9/11 and the bombing of the World Trade Center buildings in New York.50 Due to the magnitude of both theater requirements, US Army SOF could only fulfill minimal advisory efforts and focused predominately on direct action (DA) against high value targets as well as advising HNSF Commando and SOF units.51 GPFs absorbed the majority of advising at the HNSF tactical through HN ministerial levels for both theaters. At the onset of assuming this volatile mission, GPFs were not prepared to conduct


50Wuestner, Building Partner Capacity/SFA: A New Structural Paradigm, 6.

51Harrison, Impact of the War in Iraq and Afghanistan on the US Military’s Plans, Programs and Budgets, 28.
advising at any HN or HNSF level, since advising was traditionally and doctrinally a US Army SOF task.\textsuperscript{52} The collective Army had to address several concerns and implement solutions.

Although not all encompassing, the Army experienced five points of friction as a result of inheriting the majority of the advisor mission. First, there was no GPF advisor doctrine available.\textsuperscript{53} As late as 2008, training bases and deploying units initially had to refer to US Army SOF doctrine and limited lesson learned handbooks until which time the conventional force and its institutions developed advisory publications and further handbooks geared towards GPF units and advisors.\textsuperscript{54} Unfortunately, once doctrine was developed, units and advisors often failed to use them, either by choice or unaware of its existence.\textsuperscript{55}

Second, the Army experienced numerous individual, unit and training cadre manning challenges. Initially, the Army used the WIAS to identify advisors for deployment, but several issues existed with this method. Human Resources Command branch managers selected advisors based on dwell time, not advisor experience. The WIAS taxed the total force. Advisors were either in training, deployed to one of two theaters or having just redeployed, costing the Army threefold in manning.\textsuperscript{56} This strain on manning resulted in BCTs deploying short in important command and staff billets since most advisors were field grade and company grade officers and

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{52}Daniel P. Bolger, No. 07-28, \textit{Advisor Tactics, Techniques and Procedures} (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, August 2007), 1.

\textsuperscript{53}Steven E. Clay, \textit{Iroquois Warriors in Iraq} (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2007), 213.

\textsuperscript{54}Moore, interview.


\textsuperscript{56}Moore, interview.
\end{flushleft}
senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs). In 2008, the Army identified units for deployment with the main emphasis of conducting stability operations, advising and providing Security Force Assistance (SFA). Each deploying unit received an augmentation package of up to forty-eight advisors to assist in advising HNs and HNSFs. However, issues remained, although not as severe as under the WIAS method since advisors were assigned to deploying units. Early on, advisor training bases experienced manning concerns, predominately due to 96 percent of instructors having never served as an advisor. This impacted training base credibility and often left the advisor without adequate training and understanding of his theater mission.

Third, branch and grade mismatches existed between advisors and their HN and HNSF counterparts. In some instances, lieutenants served as a primary advisor on a TT since specific branches ran out of more senior officers to fill both TT and BCT billets. This proved troublesome at times as the junior officer, in some cases with less than one year in the Army, lacked the rank, experience and the clout to advise his counterpart effectively. Once deployed, the teams soon discovered their HN/HNSF counterparts were almost always higher ranking, often a Colonel or even a General Officer. In one case, a US Army 2nd Lieutenant, fresh out of the Signal Corps basic course, served as the primary advisor to an Iraqi one-star general at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Justice in Baghdad. In the case of Iraq, several Iraqi officers fought the Iranians in the 1980s. In the case of Afghanistan, several fought as part of Mujahedeen or

---


59 Based on the author’s personal experience.


61 Based on the author’s personal observations.
Northern Alliance against the Soviets in the 1980s. This manning mismatch often resulted in a junior officer advising a seasoned and experienced counterpart on “what right looks like.”

Fourth, advisor equipping shortfalls at the training base were initially significant, specifically in Up-Armored vehicles. Often, TT members used non-Up-Armored vehicles to train on since these assets were all forward in theater. Advisors experienced issues conducting crew drills since operations in an Up-Armored vehicle are significantly different than a non-Up-Armored vehicle.

Fifth, several advisor command and control issues transpired once TTs deployed to respective battlespace in theater. At the beginning of the advisor mission, TTs lacked a clearly defined relationship with the US BCT battlespace owners. The lack of established relationships caused many issues to include TTs would traverse the BCT’s battle space often without informing the unit. However, the biggest concern was TTs and BCTs seldom communicating, resulting in infrequent nesting of HNSF to US unit campaign plans.

---


64 Moore, interview.

65 Differences between Up-Armored (UAH) and non-UAHs are largely in weight and mobility. Non-UAHs weigh approximately 5,900 pounds compared to 12,100 pounds for UAHs. UAHs must reduce speed sooner to come to a complete stop and it takes UAHs longer to accelerate and build speed. Additionally, the training base lacked the myriad of communication systems to mount in vehicles the team would use in theater. The training base had the majority of the communications assets in a classroom environment for instruction. The team experienced differences in vehicle weight, mobility and equipment availability in training compared to what the team would experience while deployed.

66 Thomas P. Odom, No. 07-28, Advisor Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, August 2007), 3.

67 Moore, interview.

68 Roe, Advise and Assist Brigade Observations, Insights and Lessons, 52.
The Army experienced numerous deficiencies at the onset of assuming the GPF advisor mission. The five prominent challenges were in doctrine, manning, command and command, GPF to HNSF grade mismatches and training base shortfalls. For the advisor and the training base, the most glaring deficiency of the five was the general lack of GPF advisor doctrine.

Lack of General Purpose Force Advisor Doctrine

The absence of an identifiable SFA doctrine affected our training. We were unable to point to any single document that could help us understand how to function and operate as an advisor.\(^\text{69}\)

Even though US Army history is replete with advising efforts, GPF advisor doctrine was non-existent at the onset of both the Iraq and Afghan wars. Without this mission essential doctrine, those individuals, teams and units advising HNs and HNSFs lacked the proper direction, guidance, understanding and needed competence to build capacity and capability within the ISF and ANSF. And even more disturbing, once the Army provided doctrine to the force, the advisor either willfully did not use it or was unaware of its existence.\(^\text{70}\) It was not until 2008 that the Department of the Army, training institutions and the training base began publishing Field Manuals (FM) and handbooks placing emphasis on advising HNs and HNSFs. Until 2008, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (SASO), published in February 2003, was the only GPF doctrinal reference that mentioned advising. Out of the 232 page SASO manual, only one passage made mention of advising:

> However, Army units and soldiers participate in Security Assistance (SA) programs through peacetime military engagement activities and by training, advising, and assisting allied and friendly armed forces.\(^\text{71}\)


\(^\text{70}\)Ibid., 32.

In October 2008, five and a half years after the initial publication of FM 3-07, and through several hard lessons learned by advisors in the field, the Army revised and renamed the manual, *Stability Operations*. This updated publication mentioned the importance of organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising (OTERA) varying components of HNs and HNSFs. With these five areas, the Army provided the advisor a general focus and direction. First, the advisor assists the HNSF in organizing new institutions from ministerial level to the smallest maneuver unit. Second, the advisor provides assistance in training to the HNSF—individual, unit or train-the-trainer cadre programs—at training centers and academies. Third, the advisor has the requirement to potentially equip the HNSF through traditional security assistance, foreign military support and donations. Fourth, after combat operations, and in working with HNSF, the advisor may determine it necessary to rebuild, or build, infrastructure to support HNSFs. Last, the advisor advises the HNSF, ministerial departments or training institutions.\(^2\) Although OTERA covered five broad areas, the Army provided the advisor a frame of reference of the potential duties and responsibilities required in interacting with a HNSF.

In May 2009, six months after the release of the revised *Stability Operations* FM, the Department of the Army published the long awaited FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* (SFA). SFA, a relatively new term in the Army’s doctrinal lexicon and a subset to Security Cooperation (SC), provided US Army GPFs more insights and an understanding of advising HNs and HNSF as well as providing a clear definition:

> Operations, actions, or activities that contribute to unified action to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions; the bolstering of a Foreign Security Force (FSF) or institution’s capabilities or capacity in order to facilitate the achievement of specific operational objectives shared with the United States Government.\(^3\)

\(^2\)Ibid., 6-14.

\(^3\)Baginski et al., *A Comprehensive Approach to Improving SFA Efforts*, 52.
After eight years in Afghanistan and six in Iraq, the Army finally realized the importance of SFA and advising and developed this long overdue FM in just ninety days.74 The intent of SFA activities is to improve the capabilities of allies and partners, as well as the quality of the relationship between the United States and partners. Each SFA effort is unique and framed to accommodate both US objectives and the concerns and constraints of foreign partners.75 Key to FM 3-07.1 was the emphasis placed on SFA spanning the full spectrum of conflict, from Stable Peace, Unstable Peace, an Insurgency to General War.76 The manual further details how SFA is a subset to Security Cooperation (SC) and supplies an overview of how SFA overlaps with Security Assistance programs to include HNSF education and training, foreign military sales, peace operations and antiterrorism. Last, the FM provides a summary of how SFA integrates with FID—directly, indirectly and during combat operations.77

In January 2013, the Army published FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, which provides three detailed chapters respectfully dedicated to Advisor Preparation and Execution Considerations, Considerations for Brigade Operations and Considerations for Working with Foreign Security Forces (FSF). The primary audience for FM 3-22 is theater army security cooperation planners, division and brigade leaders and staffs and soldiers assigned or attached as advisors to brigades that execute security cooperation missions.78 The manual added the requirement of “assess” to OTERA-A, emphasizing the importance of advisors in conducting

74Potter, American Advisors: SFA Model in the Long War, 9.

75Baginski et al., A Comprehensive Approach to Improving SFA Efforts, 5.


77Ibid., 1-7.

78Department of the Army, FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, January 2013), iii.
assessments of the HNSF against desired capabilities. Once determined, the advisor can develop an OTERA-A plan to aid the HNSF in building capability and capacity.\textsuperscript{79} This manual provides the doctrinal guidance and direction for how the Army trains, advises, assists, equips and assesses a HNSF and will greatly aid units deploying in support of the Army’s Regionally Aligned Force concept.\textsuperscript{80}

Notwithstanding, other worthy advisor handbooks and newsletters were published by Army institutions, previously deployed units, former TTs and the advisor training base. As with doctrine, the Army released a majority well after the wars started and after many hard lessons learned. The US Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) published the earliest handbook of value in 2007 titled Advisor: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). This newsletter, written by deployed advisors, focused on valuable TTPs for the GPF advisor preparing to deploy. This document was enlightening to the conventional force, since the employment of GPFs in an advisor role was somewhat foreign at the time.\textsuperscript{81} CALL also published The First 100 Days OIF TT Handbook in August 2008. This handbook, much like the Advisor TTP handbook published by CALL the year prior, provided valuable insights for the advisor in preparation for deployment. It stated that advising is no longer just a SOF mission, but one for GPFs and the first 100 days in theater sets the tone for the remainder of the team’s time in theater. At the time, CALL recommended that advisors read this handbook over all other advisor documentation.\textsuperscript{82} In 2011, CALL published the Advise and Assist Brigade (AAB) handbook.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 4-3.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 3-24 and 3-25.
\textsuperscript{81} Steven Mains, No. 07-28, Advisor: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, August 2007), 1.
\textsuperscript{82} Steven Mains, No. 08-45, The First 100 Days, OIF Transition Team Handbook (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, August 2008), 1.
manual primarily focused on SFA and employment of the AAB and was geared towards assisting not only units deploying to Iraq, but providing valuable insights to SFABs deploying to Afghanistan. In 2011, LTC Josh Potter, an Iraqi Security Force Division TT leader, published *The American Advisors, Security Force Assistance Model in the Long War*. Potter provides valuable insights not only as an advisor, but as a member of one of the initial AABs that deployed to Iraq. Not to discount the plethora of other advisor reference material, but the aforementioned publications, although not references in doctrine or used to revise SFA and advising manuals, provided valuable information, lessons learned, best practices and reference material to assist deploying advisors and units.

Despite the surge of Army advisor doctrine and handbooks from 2008 to 2013, units, TTs and advisors often failed to utilize them. Based on a survey conducted by the Research and Development (RAND) Corporation, at the bequest of the Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) between January and April 2013 in Afghanistan, 58 percent of those units and teams that interacted with ANSF stated they were either unaware of SFA doctrine or they failed to use it.

**Manning Shortfalls**

At the onset of GPFs assuming the advisor mission, units experienced key leader manning shortages due TT sourcing. Initially, deploying units lacked key critical personnel to fill command and staff billets due to the Army’s requirement to form TTs. With the WIAS, all branches and units felt the pinch of this personnel intensive sourcing method. Unit manning levels improved with the advent of the AAB and SFAB due to the Army assigning a nominal

---


package of augmented advisors to deploying units and due to the reduction of WIAS requirements to form operational and tactical level TTs. Since advisor requirements for the AAB and SFAB were senior leader intensive, the overall savings to the Army in company grade officers and NCOs was astronomical.\textsuperscript{86} Army manning deficiencies at the GPF training base had more to do with the lack of advisor-experienced cadre rather than an actual manning shortage. At Fort Riley, upon assuming the majority of the Army’s advisor training mission, 1\textsuperscript{st} Brigade, 1\textsuperscript{st} Infantry Division had only 3 percent of assigned personnel with prior TT experience.\textsuperscript{87} It was not until a year later the first wave of TTs from Iraq and Afghanistan redeployed and the Army assigned former advisors to Fort Riley for the purpose of supporting the advisor mission. The 1\textsuperscript{st} US Army experienced a lot of the same issues when training National Guard teams for deployment. They too awaited the arrival of the first round of trained advisors to redeploy in order to augment their lack of advisor experienced cadre.\textsuperscript{88} There were reserve component training cadre assigned to select CRCs, such as Fort Benning, but the cadre did not provide any advisor training prior to deployment, only basic shoot, move and communicate training, an issue addressed under advisor training in this section. The only training base with former advisors was the Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS), since advising was historically a US Army SOF mission. However, through time GPF training bases had the required advisor experienced personnel, lending credibility and standing to their organizations.

\textsuperscript{86}Moore, interview.

\textsuperscript{87}Based on author’s personal experience as the Brigade Operations Officer in 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, KS, from 2007 to 2009.

\textsuperscript{88}Moore, interview.
WIAS-Sourced Advisors

ANSF should be in the lead in everything they do; withstand the pressure to take over unless someone’s life is in danger.89

Initially, the Army determined the best method to source GPF advisors for both theaters was through the Worldwide Individual Augmentation System (WIAS). WIAS was costly and led to manning shortfalls within the total Army force.90 Often, HRC selected an advisor based on dwell time and not on experience.91 With WIAS, officers and NCOs from varying branches in both the active and reserve component would report to a CONUS-based training location, form as a ten to fifteen man team, conduct a predetermined amount of training not to exceed ninety days, then deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan as a TT. The purpose of these teams was to advise HNs and HNSFs at the tactical to ministerial levels.92 TTs were to assist the HNSF in leadership, staff, and support functions, planning, assessing, supporting, and execution of operations and training doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. In addition to training and mentoring HN and HNSFs, TTs provide the HNSF access to combat enablers such as close air support (CAS), indirect fires, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and quick reaction forces (QRF).93 The goal of forming teams under the WIAS was provide Army captains to colonels and sergeants from across the force to serve as combat, combat support and combat service support subject matter experts as a team member, or to serve as TT chiefs.94 The Army rounded out teams with NCOs from all

89Steve Boesen, 3rd Battalion, 1st Brigade, 203rd Afghan National Army Corps, Embedded Transition Team Lessons Learned (Bagram, Afghanistan: Regional Command-East, 2007).

90Moore, interview.

91Cook, Improving SFA Capability in the Army’s Advise and Assist Brigades, 4.

92Department of the Army, All Army Activities (ALARACT) 033/2007, 1-2.

93Randy Brown, Lessons-Learned Integration (L2I) for the Iowa Army National Guard (Des Moines, IA: Iowa National Guard, 2007), 5.

branches. NCO sourcing was not a personnel strain on the overall force for two major reasons. First, the Army has more enlisted soldiers than officers. Second, the NCO team requirements were minimal compared to officer requirements. WIAS impacted all branches. Military Intelligence, Signal Corps and Field Artillery branches began sourcing lieutenants in lieu of many team requirements due to a shortage of officers; some of these young officers were fresh out of their respective basic course. These branches, like many others over time, simply ran out of Captains and field grade officers to provide in support of the TT mission and meet BCT deployment requirements.\footnote{Moore, interview.} The issue with providing a lieutenant as an advisor is the lack of experience, rank and clout the officer possesses when interacting and advising an HNSF.\footnote{Ibid.} WIAS, an imperfect method of advisor sourcing, was taxing on the US Army as a whole.\footnote{Donnelly and Kagan, \textit{Ground Truth}, 38.} With advisors in training, in two theaters fulfilling HN and HNSF advising requirements and those that recently redeployed, the overall cost to the Army was threefold.\footnote{Based on the author’s personal experience while deployed as an XVIII Airborne Corps staff member, 2008-2009.}

Another WIAS sourcing concern was that DOD directed US sister services to provide personnel in support of the advisor mission due to manning shortfalls in the Army.\footnote{Moore, interview.} The US Navy and US Air Force filled the majority of the requirements, since the US Marines Corps provided its own advisor efforts in Anbar Province, Iraq, and Helmand Province, Afghanistan, as BSOs. Sailors and airmen filled largely strategic, ministerial and training institution advisor billets.\footnote{Ibid.} Since the Air Force and Navy lacked the necessary competence in ground combat, this
had an adverse impact on HNSF Army operations and US Army advisor efforts. Advisors at the strategic and ministerial levels made decisions that impacted advisors at the operational and tactical levels, most of which were filled by the Army.\textsuperscript{101}

Despite the expansive and exhaustive use of WIAS to form external teams, deployed battalion sized units often had to create at least one internal advisor team “out of hide.” Already covering a large battle space, many of these units utilized staff personnel to create and round-out the internally sourced TT. With frequent company level changes of command, select members from the internal team would often rotate to new positions resulting in continuity issues in advising a HNSF counterpart. Additionally, “out of hide” TTs received no advisor training prior to deployment since the mission requirement was unforeseen.\textsuperscript{102} With two active combat theaters of operation, and the Army straining to provide manpower in support of externally sourced TTs, deployed units had no alternative but to provide an internal advisor team due to the expansive capacity and capability building requirements of the HNSF.

WIAS sourcing of TTs resulted in several total force manning issues. However, by late 2008 in Iraq and 2011 in Afghanistan, the Army addressed this shortcoming and assigned the bulk of the advisors to deploying units.\textsuperscript{103} The need for WIAS requirements at the strategic and ministerial remained, but not at the tactical and operational levels. This change in personnel sourcing provided over 3,000 officers, mainly company grade officers, and 3,000 NCOs back to the force.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{101}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{103}Roe, \textit{Advise and Assist Brigade Observations, Insights and Lessons}, 47.

\textsuperscript{104}Moore, interview.
Unit-Sourced Advisors

Under conditions of active conflict where we have direct responsibility for security - as in Iraq and Afghanistan – tactical commanders will have a security force assistance mission to train, advise, and assist tactical host nation forces.\textsuperscript{105}

With the introduction of the AAB and SFAB, the Army assigned deploying brigades with forty-eight field grade officers for Iraq, and twenty-four field grade officers and twenty-four NCOs for Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{106} The Army learned a valuable lesson providing all officer advisors to deploying AABs, since most of the ISF was comprised of NCOs. US Army NCOs were required for advisor team composition in order to address HNSF NCO empowerment; the Army fixed this noted shortcoming by assigning 50 percent NCOs to the Afghan bound SFABs. This change in sourcing assisted in the professional development and capability building in the ANSF, specifically the Afghan NCO Corps. Augmented advisor rank structures ranged from Major to Colonel and from Staff Sergeant to Sergeant Major. The intent of these forty-eight additional personnel was to create up to twenty-four, two-man teams and then augment them with critical, low-density MOS personnel from the unit.\textsuperscript{107} Organic unit personnel such as logisticians, communication specialists, medics, fire supporters, intelligence specialists and maneuver were necessary to round-out the advisor teams.\textsuperscript{108} It was important that unit personnel augmented the advisor teams, since the Army no longer provided WIAS-sourced advisors at the tactical and operational levels and stability operations became the primary focus for AABs and SFABs.\textsuperscript{109} However, each unit’s AOR was different, not the same approach in each AOR, and in many

\textsuperscript{105} Axelberg, \textit{Enhancing SFA: Advisor Selection, Training and Employment}, 1.


\textsuperscript{107} Moore, interview.


\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
cases, twenty-four advisor teams were not necessary. AAB and SFAB commanders determined the number of teams required, utilized assigned advisors to form the groundwork of needed teams, then augmented teams with additional unit personnel, to include a SECFOR for movement.\textsuperscript{110} AAB and SFAB manning was a much more efficient means compared to the WIAS. The Army assigned advisors to the units in battlespace, not to an in-theater higher headquarters.

AAB and SFAB implementation alleviated many of the manning points of contention. Stability operations were no longer the predominant focus for only the advisor, but a key distinction now for brigade and battalion commanders, respective staffs and subordinate units.\textsuperscript{111} The Army not only received a relief in manning, but received an advising boost when unit missions changed to stability operations and offensive and defensive operations transitioned to the HNSF.

**Advisor Equipping Shortfalls**

With WIAS, the training base initially lacked some key pieces of equipment with which to train, specifically Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (UAH) and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) carriers. The Army deployed all Up-Armored assets forward in one of the two respective theaters, leaving the training base short. Over time, after hundreds of advisor teams had deployed having received training on non-Up-Armored wheeled assets, the Army addressed the shortfall by providing training sets to the training base.\textsuperscript{112} As one Afghan advisor noted, “Availability of equipment that you actually will encounter in theater is a

\textsuperscript{110} Moore, interview.

\textsuperscript{111} Chadwick Clark, No. 10-17, *Security Force Assistance Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, December 2009), 10.

\textsuperscript{112} Moore, interview.
definite limiting factor with respect to training since the equipment in many ways defines the training. A convoy lane with up-armored HMMWVs is a great deal different than with normal HMMWVs. “113 Of all equipment shortages, Up-Armored assets were the most mission essential, since they provided survivability capabilities to team members. Without these vital assets, teams had to wait until arriving in theater to gain familiarization and to draw their deployment set.114 Conducting crew drills in a non-UAH during training is not the same as in an MRAP with a plethora of communications and weapon systems in combat. Valuable time was lost.

With the implementation of the AAB and SFAB, deploying units had two methods of providing equipment to augmented advisors. First, units could provide assigned AAB and SFAB equipment to the advisors from the organization’s leave behind equipment (LBE), since there were only forty-eight personnel. Second, if not using assigned equipment, the unit had to submit an Operational Needs Statement (ONS) to the Department of the Army requesting an equipment augmentation package for its forty-eight advisors, a time consuming and laborious process. However, as unit task organizations decreased for deployment, many units opted to provide advisors with LBE, thus reducing equipping frustrations.115

Advisor Training

From a historical perspective, the Army can categorize advisor training during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars into one of five areas. First, WIAS-sourced advisors were provided training at Fort Riley, Kansas or Fort Polk, Louisiana, to obtain basic skills of how to advise a HN or HNSF.116 Second, advisors received training in Iraq and Afghanistan at one of the theater

---

113Brown, Lessons Learned Integration for IA Army National Guard, 18.

114Moore, interview.

115Ibid.

COIN Academies providing additional insights to the operational environment (OE).\textsuperscript{117} Third, at
the CRC training locations, advisor training was not part of the curriculum.\textsuperscript{118} Yet, CRCs trained
advisors deploying at the strategic and ministerial levels to both Iraq and Afghanistan. Fourth,
select ministerial level advisors received no training prior to deployment.\textsuperscript{119} Fifth, units identified
to deploy in the capacity of an SFAB/AAB received advisor and unit training modules from the
advisor training base.\textsuperscript{120} The United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) provided
training guidance for the TT, AAB and SFAB missions, but the Army did not have a system of
checks and balances in place to ensure all advisors received training prior to deployment. This
caused a sense of uneasiness in the advisor realm as some advisors filling some of the higher TT
billets either received inadequate training or none at all.\textsuperscript{121} Yet these were the same advisors
assisting the newly-formed governments with policy, which also impacted the HNSF.

WIAS-Sourced Advisor Training

As aforementioned, the advisor training base at Fort Riley lacked advisor-experienced
cadre at the onset of the WIAS-sourced TT training mission. Only 3 percent of assigned
personnel had prior TT experience, resulting in less than adequate advisor specific training.\textsuperscript{122}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{117}John R. Studt, \textit{Phoenix Academy Program of Instruction} (Taji, Iraq: Multi-National Corps-Iraq
                  Phoenix Academy, April 25, 2006), 4-36.
  \item \textsuperscript{118}CONUS Replacement Center Prerequisite Requirements, April 2, 2012, https://rdl.train.army.
                  mil/catalog/view/100.ATSC/E481FEC2-1D26-4DFE-B368-13DA5A6C4275-1311106146516/index.htm
                  (accessed February 16, 2014).
  \item \textsuperscript{119}Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), \textit{Roles and Functions of
                  Senior Advisors: Perspectives on Institutional Level Advising} (Fort Leavenworth, KS: JCISFA, February,
                  2012), 1-3 and 7-2.
  \item \textsuperscript{120}Potter, \textit{American Advisors: SFA Model in the Long War}, 42.
  \item \textsuperscript{121}Moore, interview.
  \item \textsuperscript{122}Based on author’s personal experience.
\end{itemize}
The advisor did not receive adequate training in subjects such as culture, religion, language, key leader engagements, negotiations techniques, the art of influencing, or just how to be an effective advisor to a HNSF counterpart. The training base provided soldier common core training tasks, such as weapons qualification and medical training with little to no issue. But until the training base received prior advisor experienced personnel assigned to the organization, advisor specific training was a constant struggle. Externally WIAS-sourced TTs trained predominately at Fort Riley through 2011, then the advisor mission relocated to Fort Polk, Louisiana and the 162nd IB. With the relocation, training improved due to the application of many lessons learned and having an experienced cadre, many with prior advisory assignments.

Theater COIN Academies

Upon completing training at CONUS-based training locations, most advisor teams were required to send representation, if not the entire team, to attend an in-theater COIN Academy in Kabul, Afghanistan and Taji, Iraq. These academies were required prior to the inbound team conducting relief-in-place and transfer of authority (RIP-TOA) with the outbound advisor team. It was at these theater COIN Academies the advisor learned more about his operational environment, higher coalition command directives, communications training and additional Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) training. Additionally, the advisor received additional HN culture, religion, language and customs training. At the COIN Academy in Kabul, Afghanistan, not only did US Advisors attend, but coalition force leaders as well as Afghan leaders were often in attendance. Theater leaders and unit representatives served as

123Moore, interview.
124Cook, Improving SFA Capability in the Army’s Advise and Assist Brigades, 30.
125Studt, Phoenix Academy Program of Instruction, 4-36.
126Ibid.
special guests during the seminars and provided guidance and insights in order to assist the advisor team in their upcoming endeavors.\textsuperscript{127} The COIN Academies served as a building block to CONUS-based training.

**CONUS Replacement Center Training**

CONUS Replacement Centers (CRC) provided training to the more senior level advisors that deployed for the purpose of filling select strategic and ministerial level advisor billets.\textsuperscript{128} The issue with CRCs was they provided no advisor training. Therefore, from an advisor standpoint, the CRCs were of little value in preparing an individual to engage a HN or HNSF leader.\textsuperscript{129} The CRC’s focus was primarily weapons qualification, medical training, receipt of clothing and equipment for deployment and C-IED training; basically a week long soldier readiness processing (SRP).\textsuperscript{130} Some advisors filling ministerial level billets did not even go through a CRC prior to deployment and had no idea on how to engage a HN ministerial leader, and thus the learning curve was steep.\textsuperscript{131} Advisor ranks at the strategic and ministerial levels were senior in nature, but time in service does not always equal experience. Advisor decisions at the HN ministerial and HNSF strategic levels impacted the advisors at the operational and tactical levels. Advisors at the lower echelons attended advisor training prior to deployment and often possessed a higher level of understanding than the more senior ranked advisors at the strategic and ministerial levels. Unfortunately, the Army had no established system to ensure all advisors received training prior

\textsuperscript{127}Moore, interview.

\textsuperscript{128}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{130}CONUS Replacement Center Prerequisite Requirements.

\textsuperscript{131}Kevin J. Palgutt, *Lessons Learned: 13 Months as the Senior Military Advisor to the Minister of Interior* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2010), 2; Gates, *Duty*, 214.
to deployment, which leads to a lack of an institutionalized and standardized advisor training base.  

SFAB and AAB Training

As the training mission migrated from the Fort Riley Training Mission (FRTM) to Fort Polk in 2011, advisor sourcing changed as well. With the TT sourcing switching from WIAS to advisors assigned directly to the AAB and SFAB, advisor training opportunities improved. Now advisors were able to conduct shoot, move and communicate training as well as a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation with the unit in which they would deploy. The CTC rotation provided synchronicity, unity of command and unity of effort between the SFAB/AAB and TTs, especially when the unit interfaced and engaged HNSFs. The rotation also allowed the unit to integrate advisors into the organization, determined command and command support relationships and allowed the augmented advisors to understand how the unit operated.

The 162nd IB provided two training packages to SFABs and AABs, one for advisors and one for unit level leadership and staff. The first training package was a two-week advisor academy designed specifically for the forty-eight augmented advisors, taught by previous advisors. The advisor academy was extremely successful and prepared advisors for deployment. The second training package was a four to five day SFA Seminar for all unit leaders that would

---

132 Moore, interview.

133 As Fort Riley and the 1st Infantry Division assumed the large part of the advisor mission from 2007 to 2011, the Army referred to it as the Fort Riley Training Mission (FRTM). 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, which had recently deployed seven, 170 man SECFOR Companies to Iraq and the Horn of Africa, as well as the 1st Engineer Battalion to Iraq, used the remaining personnel assigned, which was predominately Brigade and Battalion level commands and staff, to serve as the lead proponent for providing advisor training at the FRTM.

134 Moore, interview.

135 Potter, American Advisors: SFA Model in the Long War, 43.
potentially interface with a HN agency or HNSF once deployed.\(^{136}\) Training attendees were predominately junior leaders, usually lieutenants and staff sergeants. Unfortunately missing from the training audience in a majority of the seminars were brigade, battalion and company-level leaders and respective staffs. The Advisor Academy and SFA Seminar focused on culture, religion, history, language, key leader engagements, negotiations, influencing a HNSF, rapport building and how to be an effective advisor or partner. Since 2008, the FRTM and 162\(^{nd}\) IB have provided both training packages to all deploying AABs and SFABs, totaling over eighty-five brigades.\(^{137}\)

Ministerial Team Training

Even with the emergence of the SFAB and AAB, select WIAS taskings remained predominate in sourcing ministerial teams. The 1\(^{st}\) US Army provided the majority of ministerial-level advisor training at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. An even smaller number of teams received training from either the Fort Riley training base or the 162\(^{nd}\) IB at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Unfortunately, a substantial number of ministerial-level advisors conducted the minimal deployment requirements at a CRC without receiving any advisor training. This proved troublesome as those tactical, operational and strategic level advisors who had conducted advisor training attempted to establish an “Observer-Controller” type relationship with ministerial teams, but to no avail.\(^{138}\) Many ministerial level advisors received no training at all, basic or advisory, prior to deployment, resulting in the advisor performing “on the job training” in order to learn how to engage a HN leader.\(^{139}\) In 2010, of the twenty-two ministerial level advisor entering

\(^{136}\)Ibid., 42.

\(^{137}\)Moore, interview.

\(^{138}\)Ibid.

Afghanistan, only five received some sort of advisor training. Unfortunately, the twenty-two advisors departing Afghanistan received no training at all prior to deployment. However, on a positive note, DOD implemented the Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) program in 2010 to overcome the advisor shortcoming, for both the Minister of Defense (MOD) and Minister of Interior (MOI). The DOD developed the MoDA program as a result of operational requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq. MOD Advisors were all GS-13s with over twenty years of experience. Each advisor attended a seven week course and provided reach back capability once deployed. The MoDA program efforts resulted in long-term relationships with HN ministries. Regardless, of all the variety of teams that deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, the ministerial level teams were the most unprepared resulting in lack of unity of command and unity of effort with advisors at the strategic and lower levels. This gradually changed with the implementation of the MoDA program.

Command and Control Issues

Under the TT WIAS sourcing, once advisor teams arrived in theater, command and control issues were numerous. There are six areas of friction worth mentioning. First, Afghan advisor teams were either assigned to Task Force (TF) Phoenix or Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). Iraq advisor teams were either assigned to Multi-National Corps-

140 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), Ministerial-Level Advisor Training Effectiveness Study Phase I: Initial Impressions (Fort Leavenworth, KS: JCISFA, October, 2010), 11, 22.


142 Moore, interview.

143 Fox and Stowell, “Professional Army Advisors—A Way Ahead,” 12.
Iraq (MNC-I) or Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I). MNC-I and TF Phoenix were operational headquarters, where MNSTC-I and CSTC-A/NTM-A provided HNSF training, advisors to the training institutions and ministerial advisor teams. In both theaters, the BCT BSO did not have adequate command and control resulting in inadequate unity of effort and unity of command.\textsuperscript{144}

In Iraq, teams were under the Administrative Control (ADCON) of the Iraq Assistance Group (IAG), which was a subordinate headquarters to MNC-I. In battlespace, select teams were “modified” TACON to the BCT BSO for administrative and logistical support. This caused a significant breakdown in communications and blurred command and control; advisors operated in a BCT’s AO, but reported to a higher theater headquarters, resulting in brigade and division leaders often not having the needed HNSF or advisory effort situational awareness. Iraqi advisor teams also had a coordinating relationship with the next higher level advisor team and often had a relationship with advisor teams from MNSTC-I, since MNSTC-I provided the training and logistical support to the ISF.\textsuperscript{145} Teams lacked a clear unambiguous chain of command. An Iraq advisor impressions report stated the following:

Advisor teams operated under multiple chains of command, which caused confusion in roles and authority. The teams were assigned to MNC-I, ADCON to the Iraq Assistance Group, had a command relationship with the next higher TT and select teams were “modified” TACON to the battlespace owner only for logistical and administrative support.\textsuperscript{146}

Advisor teams in Afghanistan had their share of issues as well. As teams arrived in the Afghan theater, TF Phoenix would often split up trained, cohesive teams and disperse them to various

\textsuperscript{144}Moore, interview.

\textsuperscript{145}Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT), No. 06-26, \textit{Transition Team Initial Impressions Report} (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, May 2006), 4.

\textsuperscript{146}Ibid., 43.
units, staffs and headquarters throughout Afghanistan. As one ANSF Brigade Team chief states:

We departed the training base on 15 May (2007) and on 16 May, I contacted the commander of U.S. troops advising the 203rd ANA Corps, with whom coordination had previously been made to tell him of our progress. He returned my email and informed me that TF Phoenix had changed their minds on manning. He informed me the infantry team and combat support team would remain assigned to the 203rd Corps. However, the 203rd didn’t need a brigade team, but wanted a Corps team. Our Brigade team was not appropriately manned to do a corps job. TF Phoenix then assigned the brigade team to the 207th Corps in Herat. Because I was an O-6, they didn’t need me in the 207th Corps, but needed my services in the 209th Corps as the Regional Police Advisor. This is how we came to be where we are now. The infantry and CS team kept their general assignments that were discussed throughout mob station. The BDE team didn’t know their assignments until they arrived in Herat. There has been some minor shifting of everyone’s assignments since we’ve been here. I would anticipate there will be more shifting over time to match skills with requirements. I would say very few of our soldiers will work as part of a team.

Another advisor frustrated by the splitting of trained teams deploying to Afghanistan stated, “Take everyone in a room and have them draw their duty position out of a hat, regardless of their MOS or rank.”

Second, MNSTC-I advisors provided ISF with training and logistics. Additionally, MSNTC-I provided advisor teams to ISF garrison support units, training institutions and Government of Iraq (GOI) ministerial level organizations. All MNSTC-I teams interfaced with the ISF, but seldom with the operational-level advisors assigned to MNC-I whose primary task was advising the ISF. Advisors assigned to MNSTC-I and those assigned to MNC-I often displayed an “us versus them” mentality when dealing with one another resulting in simple tasks often going unresolved. The same issues were experienced in Afghanistan between advisors assigned to TF Phoenix and those to CSTC-A/NTM-A. The primary issue in both theaters was

---


148 Ibid.

149 Ibid., 10.
that two equal, higher-level advisory commands existed, resulting in a lack of unity of effort and unity of command.\textsuperscript{150}

Third, in both theaters, tactical and operational TTs received their own movement assets, often resulting in teams traversing a BCT’s battlespace in many occasions without prior coordination or the unit’s knowledge. This was extremely dangerous and caused confusion since the BCT provided support to a unit or team operating in their battlespace. BCTs provided support in the form of air MEDEVAC, route clearance and a QRF to assist units during movement. With lack of awareness, BCTs often had to provide reactionary support to TTs rather than planning ahead and having assets available to support the team’s movement.\textsuperscript{151}

Fourth, TTs were the primary interface with their respective HNSF counterpart, not the BCT leadership. BCT and HNSF campaign plans lacked nesting since the TTs did not have a clearly established command relationship with the BCT. The BCT had a campaign plan and the HNSF had a campaign plan. However, the advisor, acting as a conduit between the two, often did not ensure synchronization existed between both campaign plans.\textsuperscript{152} Without doing so, this impacted unity of effort between coalition and HNSFs.

Last, due to the lack of a clearly-established command and control architecture, TTs often felt they were “cannon fodder” for a senior rater’s profile.\textsuperscript{153} Most senior raters did not know the advisor teams in respective battlespace due to an inherent lack of communications between the

\textsuperscript{150}Moore, interview.
\textsuperscript{151}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{152}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{153}Ibid.
two. This often resulted in the advisor often received a ‘center of mass’ officer evaluation report (OER).\textsuperscript{154}

Command and control issues were numerous under the WIAS sourcing system for both theaters. In both theaters, multiple chains of command and several breakdowns in communication existed between TTs and the units. However, the Army addressed a majority of these issues with the implementation of AABs and SFABs.

Advisors were assigned to deploying units with the implementation of the AAB and SFAB, not to a theater higher headquarters such as TF Phoenix or an MNC-I. However, the augmented advisors did have one major challenge; teams often wondered which platoon or company was going to provide movement support, a Security Force (SECFOR) or Personal Security Detachment (PSD), to and from their HNSF counterpart, since augmented advisor teams did not have their own internal transportation assets.\textsuperscript{155} Often, there was no clearly defined command support relationship for the advisors. Fortunately, teams knew where they would receive administrative support. No longer was there worry about all the varying levels of command and control that existed under WIAS sourcing. TTs served as a conduit between the AAB or SFAB and the HNSF ensuring synchronization of campaign plans. Units had ownership of their advisors. Command and control for the advisor improved drastically under the AAB and SFAB concepts.\textsuperscript{156}

The historical overview provides several lessons learned the Army should apply to both the current and future advisory force efforts. Key is the Army embracing those best practices and

\textsuperscript{154}Serving as an advisor and receiving a “center of mass” report often decreased the officer’s selection for promotion and the next level of command. For officers, often serving as an advisor was not necessarily desirable.

\textsuperscript{155}Moore, interview.

\textsuperscript{156}Ibid.
TTPs from Iraq and Afghanistan and ensuring their integration into not only RAFs, but any deploying unit that will interface with a HN or HNSF. The Army should not discount these hard learned lessons. History shows that the majority of Army operations conducted to date have been predominately stability operations, not conventional war.157 Upon reflection of each major conflict, whether WWII, Korea, Vietnam and as recent as Iraq and Afghanistan, one thing was prevalent—a significant advisory effort. The Army must apply these recent lessons learned to the future force while it is still fresh in leader thought, while it still has advisor-experienced leaders.

CURRENT ARMY ADVISORY EFFORTS

Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police—once the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole.158

— Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, October 10, 2007

Current US Army advisor operations are at a crossroads, consisting of several initiatives and challenges. This section will focus on five important areas involving the current advisory mission. First, with recent announcements of both budgetary and force structure reductions, the Army must consider innovative approaches in accomplishing its assigned missions, to include how it will advise HNs and HNSFs. Second, as operations conclude in Afghanistan, the employment and use of the SFAB will likely diminish. Third, the RAF is an emerging concept allowing for a regional alignment of a GPF brigade-sized unit to GCCs. Although in its infancy, the RAF has already made a positive impact. RAB AAR comments provided by 2nd ABCT, 1st ID, along with insights from 1st Armored Brigade Combat (ABCT), 4th Infantry Division’s


“RAB-like” deployment in support of ARCENT are essential in informing future RABs deploying to respective GCCs. Fourth, US Army SOF is implementing measures on how it can better work in concert with GPF in meeting or at least sharing the SFA and advising load—creating interdependency. A first step in the right direction is the recent announcement that the TSOCs will fall OPCON to GCC commands, allowing for better synchronization of operations, unity of effort and unity of command between GCCs, GPFs and SOF. Fifth, with the 162nd IB scheduled to deactivate by the end of FY14, the Army is at a pivotal point in determining which unit or organization will inherit the advisory training mission, if at all, or if the requirement and onus will fall to the deploying unit to coordinate for its own advisor training. The Army will always experience challenges, but through applying lessons learned from the past twelve years of conflict, advisory efforts through 2020 appear favorable.

Budget and Force Structure Reductions

On September 18, 2013, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Raymond Odierno, addressed the first session of the 113th Congress in regards to “Perspectives of the Military Services on the Strategic Choices and Management Review.” During the discussion, the CSA made it quite apparent two major areas of discourse were force structure and budget reductions. General Odierno informed Congress the United States Army is in the process of shrinking the Active Army by 14 percent from a war-time high of 570,000 to 490,000 by the end of Fiscal Year 2015. The Army National Guard will remain relatively constant, with a 2 percent

---

159Joel Tyler, Center for Army Lessons Learned Interview, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division Commander, Military-to-Military Engagement Activities with Host Nation Security Forces (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, October 18, 2013).

160Thomas and Dougherty, Beyond the Ramparts, the Future of US Special Operations Forces, 83.

161United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), 162nd Infantry Brigade Task Transfer COA (Decision Brief to the FORSCOM Commander, Fort Bragg, NC, December 9, 2013), 2-13.
reduction from 358,000 to 350,000, and the Army Reserves will remain at 205,000. The Army will reorganize forty five Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) into thirty two BCTs. In doing so, the Army will eliminate excess headquarters infrastructure while reinvesting the greater combat power of ninety five of ninety eight combat battalions across the remaining BCTs. General Odierno further stressed that if additional discretionary cap reductions continue, the Army will face further reductions to the Army endstrength of 420,000 in the Active Army, 315,000 in the Army National Guard and 185,000 in the U.S. Army Reserves. This will represent a total Army endstrength reduction of more than 18 percent over seven years. With regard to budget reductions, General Odierno stated the Army will trim $170 billion of DOD provided funds over a ten year period, reduce $1.7 billion in reset funding and approximately $484.7 million in deferred maintenance and depot level funding.162 Given these force reductions, the Army must seek an innovative approach to conduct and support unit deployments in support of GCCs. There must also be a heavier reliance on Army interdependencies, specifically between GPF and US Army SOF, in conducting Security Force Assistance (SFA), advising HNSFs, Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions.

**Afghanistan and the SFAB**

With pending theater force structure reductions in Afghanistan by the end of calendar year 2014, the SFAB requirement will likely diminish. Even with the successes the SFAB brought with regard to focusing on SFA and advising, significant differences and challenges exist from when first employed. First, current SFABs deploy with fewer troops, largely consisting of

---

162House Armed Services Committee, Chief of Staff of the Army briefing on “Planning for Sequestration in Fiscal Year 2014 and Perspectives of the Military Services on the Strategic Choices and Management Review,” September 18, 2013, 113th Cong., 1st sess., Cong. Rec. 3.
key leaders with security and enabler assets. This allows the unit to provide focused advising efforts on ANSF enabler assets in order to increase Afghan capability. However, deploying with reduced task organization, units left very large rear detachments back at home station, as high as 60 percent, posing command and control challenges. Second, due to smaller SFAB task organizations, interfacing with a HNSF is quite limited. With the main emphasis on SFA and advising, the ability to interact with a HNSF has migrated primarily to ANA Brigades, Corps, the Afghan Ground Forces Command (GFC) and select ANP Provincial Headquarters. Eventually, the advisor requirement, due to continued theater manning reductions, will migrate even higher to ANA Corps, the GFC and ministerial levels. To combat the tyranny of distance, the use of a mobile assistance teams is a solution in overcoming such challenge. However, materiel challenges in the form of air and ground movement assets must be readily available to transition advisors to and from the HNSF location. Third, select units such as 2/101 AASLT and 2/3 ID, provided key leaders and force protection assets to create TTs in support of SFABs. Brigade and battalion commanders, staff personnel, critical low-density MOSs and security elements filled the requirement. These teams augmented SFABs in placing the additional emphasis on SFA and in


165ISAF implemented ANSF levels of advisor coverage in 2013. Level 1 is daily coverage by the advisor on an ANSF unit, whether collocated or traveling to the ANSF location daily. Level 2 advising is when the advisor receives movement assets, air or ground, and conducts periodic engagements with an ANSF unit. Level 2 coverage is usually a result of the ANSF capable of conducting independent operations with minimal to no US support.


building HNSF capability and capacity.\footnote{Afghan War News, “Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams,” http://www.afghanwarnews.info/units/sfaat.htm (accessed February 8, 2014).} As with the SFAB concept, the same challenges existed for the augmented SFATs—a large rear detachment and the key leaders forward deployed.\footnote{Pickup, \textit{Security Force Assistance}, 11.} The current SFAB and unit-sourced TT augmentation concepts have been effective in advising ANSF. As 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division (4/4 IBCT) voiced prior to redeploying in 2012, “before SFABs conduct their prescribed mission, they must make the mental paradigm shift that ANSF are the land owning units, not the US force.”\footnote{O’Brien, \textit{4/4 IBCT CALL Interview}, 8.} Advisor efforts have made an impact in Afghanistan in building ANSF capacity and capability. The Army should take these current advisory challenges into consideration when determining future SFA and advisor missions.

\section*{Regionally Aligned Forces}

As part of the Army’s November 7, 2013 RAF Seminar the Department of the Army G3/5/7 discussed the CSA’s decision to realign Army forces geographically. The G3/5/7 made three key points. First, the RAF must support GCC strategies to prevent, shape and win through the human domain, through relationships. Second, he emphasized the importance of embracing interdependencies between the Total Army Force and SOF after twelve years of conflict. Third, the Army must optimize resources using innovative approaches by providing regionally

\footnote{The author refers to capacity building as increasing HNSF personnel and equipment strength. Capacity building is the creation of additional units, providing individual and unit equipment and individual clothing—organizing unit formations. Capability building is showing the HNSF how to employ their assigned equipment and learn their Military Occupational Skill (MOS). Capability building is HNSFs learning and becoming more proficient at their assigned duty position and as a unit.}
responsive, tailored and scalable capabilities. These three points support two very important initiatives that will assist in current advisory efforts—the implementation of RAF as a tailorable, scalable unit, and GPF and US Army SOF interdependencies in accomplishing mission requirements. Given force structure and budget reductions, the RAF concept is a viable approach to addressing regional and global challenges. This section will focus on five areas in respect to the RAF: the RAF described and defined, FORSCOM RAF training proposals, 2/1 ABCT as the Proof of Principle, 1/4 ABCT Lessons Learned in support of ARCENT and the Rebalance to the PACOM AOR.

RAF Defined and Described

So what is a RAF? In accordance with FM 3-22, “Regionally aligned forces are those forces that provide a combatant commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable the combatant commander to shape the environment.” They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, those Army units allocated to a combatant command, and those Army capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for

---


174 Department of the Army, FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, 1-6.
combatant command regional missions. RAfs include the total Army force and forward-stationed capabilities, operating in a GCC’s AOR, supporting from outside the AOR to include reach-back and prepared to support from outside the AOR. GCC requirements determine regional missions. RAfs are required to maintain proficiency in wartime fundamentals, but require a regional mission and training focus that includes an understanding of the languages, cultures, geography, and militaries of the countries where potentially deployed. RAfs assist HNSFs in developing individual and unit proficiency in security operations. Army generating forces assist HNSFs in developing institutional capacity for training, professional education, force generation, and force sustainment. RAfs assist partners in developing security sector programs that professionalize and strengthen their ability to synchronize and sustain security operations.

The Four Phases of RAF Training

As figure 1, the proposed FORSCOM RAF Training Model displays, the RAB conducts four phases of training in preparation for deployment in support of a respective GCC—Decisive Action, Regional Focused Training, SC Skills, and SFA Skills. The first year is oriented towards Decisive Action (DA) training focused on Individual/Crew/Squad Movement and live fire

---

175 Assigned Force: Forces placed under the GCC (command authority) of a Combatant Commander (CCDR) by direction of the SECDEF in his “Forces for Unified Commands” Memorandum. Allocated Force: Forces provided by the SECDEF to a CCDR not already assigned to that CCDR for execution in accordance with the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG). Service Retained, CCMD aligned: Those Army forces and capabilities in the available period that are under ADCON of the Secretary of the Army and not assigned to CCDRs, but provide support to CCDRs. CCDRs have no authority over these forces. The Army informs CCDRs of the specific capabilities oriented on the AOR via a Mission Alignment Order for training, planning and reach-back purposes. CCDRs access these capabilities in accordance with GFMIG and Army Service Combatant Commands (ASCC) have the responsibility to provide theater specific training requirements to drive METL training focus and readiness reporting. Apportioned Force: Forces and capabilities distributed as a starting point for planning. Apportionment informs a CCDR of those forces available for planning, but not necessarily an identification of the actual forces for allocation when a contingency plan transitions to execution. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs apportions forces to CCDR based on the SECDEF’s Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF); the GFMIG documents the apportionment.

176 Department of the Army, FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, 1-6.
proficiency; platoon maneuver and live fire proficiency; BN mission command proficiency and BCT Mission Command Proficiency. Phase I culminates with a CTC rotation validating the unit’s Decisive Action METL proficiency and the unit moves from the “train and ready” to the “available” pool. The second year, the RAB conducts the remaining three phases of training, which are stability operations focused and based on GCC requirements.177

Figure 1. FORSCOM Recommended Regionally Aligned Force Training Model

Source: Joel Grantham, Meeting Combatant Command Requirements through Prepared Regionally Aligned Forces (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Forces Command, November 12, 2013), 1.

---

177 Joel Grantham, Meeting Combatant Command Requirements through Prepared Regionally Aligned Forces (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Forces Command, November 12, 2013), 1.
2/1 ABCT—The Army’s RAB Proof of Principle

Currently, 2/1 ABCT, the Dagger Brigade, serves as the RAB proof of principle for the Army in support of the AFRICOM GCC. Its mission is to conduct Theater Security Cooperation activities within the AFRICOM AOR to develop and protect American interests. The purpose of its mission is to build long lasting relationships that promote specific U.S. interests and develop African-partnered land forces military capabilities for self-defense and/or regional stability to help establish a secure environment. Upon receipt of the mission, 2/1 ABCT received four Lines of Effort (LOEs) from the AFRICOM GCC, which were: Crisis Response, Operational Missions, TSC activities and Joint Exercises. Within each of these LOEs, 2/1 ABCT has conducted several missions. In regards to Crisis Response, 2/1 ABCT provided a company-sized QRF in support of the East Africa Response Force (EARF) at Camp Lemonier, deploying to South Sudan December 14, 2013, to assist in evacuating American citizens and ensure the safety of embassy personnel. The Dagger Brigade initially conducted one operational mission, providing a security force battalion in support of CJTF-HOA based out of Camp Lemonier. In reference to TSC missions, 2/1 ABCT provided training support to the African-led US lead

---

178 Benton, 2/1 ABCT RAF Interim Lessons Learned, 2.

179 Ibid.


International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) contributing countries, such as Niger.  

Additionally, 2/1 ABCT received options to provide the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)/African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) with training support for the United Nations - African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in FY14. Recently, 2/1 ABCT provided training and equipping support to Ugandan Military Police (MP) in preparation for United Nations peacekeeping missions on the African continent. In regards to joint exercise, 2/1 ABCT provided support to Operation Western Accord in Ghana and Operation Shared Accord in South Africa, working in concert with the South African National Defense Forces.

Based on the ongoing, diverse theater mission requirements, 2/1ABCT conducts monthly educational universities (“Dagger” Universities, named after the unit) to assist in on going

182The African lead International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) is an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) organized military mission sent to support the government of ECOWAS member nation Mali against Islamist rebels in the Northern Mali conflict. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2085 authorizes this mission. UNSCR 2085 passed on December 20, 2012, which authorizes the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).

183US Army G-3/5/7, “Regional Alignment of Forces”; The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a U.S. Government-funded security assistance program intended to enhance international capacity to effectively conduct United Nations (UN) and regional peace operations (POs) by building partner country capabilities to train and sustain peacekeeping proficiencies; increasing the number of capable military troops and formed police units (FPUs) available for deployment; and facilitating the preparation, logistical support, and deployment of military units and FPUs in support of POs. The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) is a program within the Office of Regional and Security Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs at the DOS. It began as the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in 1997 with the mission of enhancing the capacity of African partner nations to participate in worldwide multinational peace operations. ACRI re-designated as ACOTA in 2002 and incorporated into the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) when GPOI activated in 2004. The United Nations established the African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur on July 31, 2007 with the adoption of Security Council resolution 1769. Commonly referred to by its acronym UNAMID, it has the protection of civilians as its core mandate, but is also tasked with contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR).

184Benton, 2/1 ABCT RAF Interim Lessons Learned, 2.

deployment preparations and troop situational awareness.\textsuperscript{186} Sources used for the culture, religion and language (CREL) training include the Leader Development and Education for Sustained Peace program (LDESP), the Asymmetric Warfare Group, the 162nd IB, Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) Cultural Knowledge Consortium, TRADOC’s Culture Center, the Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and the Kansas State University African Studies Program.\textsuperscript{187} This training promoted favorable conditions given the sundry nature of RAB requirements.

Since assuming the AFRICOM mission, 2/1 ABCT has conducted GCC-directed missions in twenty-five African countries, leading to valuable interim AAR comments to inform the force in support of future RAF deployments.\textsuperscript{188} The unit provides useful insights to future RAB deployments with nine related to interfacing with a HN and HNSF. The first, personalities matter when interfacing with a HNSF. A soldier should not deploy as part of the RAF in an advising role if uncomfortable engaging HNSFs.\textsuperscript{189} Second, the RAB should leverage US Army

\textsuperscript{186}Jeffery D. Broadwater, Memorandum of Response, Government Accounting Office RAF Discussion Question Responses, January 3, 2013, 2.

\textsuperscript{187}2/1 ABCT coordinated with the 162nd IB for Dagger University venues. Kansas State provided an African Studies program containing subject matter experts for each of the countries 2/1 ABCT deploys. TRADOC’s Culture Center provided culture, religion and language insights. TRADOC’s Cultural Knowledge Consortium provided information in regards to interaction and collaboration it can provide among social science communities of interests and reach back capability for 2/1 ABCT while deployed. The U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) conducted an overview of how it provides operational advisory and Solution Development support globally to the Army and Joint Force Commanders to enhance Soldier survivability and combat effectiveness, and enable the defeat of current and emerging threats. The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) discussed how it serves as the Army’s Center of Excellence for Stability and Peace Operations at the strategic and operational levels in order to improve military, civilian agency, international and multinational capabilities and execution. The Leader Development for Sustained Peace Program (LDESP) discussed regional, geopolitical, and cultural frameworks for understanding the challenges of conducting full spectrum operations in the AFRICOM AOR while promoting whole-of-government approaches to achieve unity of effort.

\textsuperscript{188}Shull, interview; Benton, \textit{2/1 ABCT RAF Interim Lessons Learned}, 1.

\textsuperscript{189}Benton, \textit{2/1 ABCT RAF Interim Lessons Learned}, 20.
SOF experience by coordinating plans and operations with applicable SOF HQs. Third, RAF commanders and staffs must use doctrine in mission planning and execution. The 2/1 ABCT further recommends incorporating training on FM 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation* into leader development and education. Fourth, RAF units should leverage country teams for expertise and situational understanding. RAFs should coordinate early with country teams to discuss significant security concerns in the environment. Fifth, RAFs must use Predeployment Site Surveys (PDSS) to confirm site support, training requirements and meet key personnel. Sixth, 2/1 ABCT states the Army should consider aligning divisions and subordinate BCTs to better balance global availability and higher unit enabler assets under the RAF concept. Seventh, the Army needs to develop a practical means for deploying and deployed units to integrate lessons learned into leader development, training, planning and execution. Additionally, the Army must provide a collaborative means to share recommendations with the force as well as supporting timely changes to the Doctrine, Organizational, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facility (DOTMLPF) construct. Eighth, RAF units should use multiple sources to provide education and training for the overall CREL program. Last, RAFs must receive funding and budget classes related to the respective GCC to better understand how to support mission requirements, such as Theater Security Cooperation Management Information

---

190Ibid., 18.
191Ibid., 15.
192Ibid., 7.
193Ibid., 15.
194Ibid., 12.
195Ibid., 11.
196Ibid., 6.
System (TSCMIS) and Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management’s (DISAM) online Security Cooperation Familiarization Course.¹⁹⁷

Not to discount the remaining AAR comments, however, the nine aforementioned directly relate to SFA and advising HNSFs. The Dagger Brigade’s deployment as a RAB in support of the AFRICOM AOR is a valuable learning tool for the current and future Army advisory efforts. Many of the interim AAR comments are reflective of those provided by past advisors once deployed to the Afghan and Iraq theaters. LTC Peter Shull, the 2/1 ABCT Deputy Commander (DCO), remarked with regard to the RAB concept, “we received no augmented advisors. The emphasis on advising is exactly where it needs to be—in the hands of commanders and respective units.”¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁷Ibid., 9.
¹⁹⁸Shull, interview.
¹⁹⁹Tyler, ¹⁄₄ ABCT Lessons Learned, 1.
²⁰⁰Ibid., 2.
include senior leader engagements (SLE), in order to set favorable conditions when engaging a HNSF. 201 Third, RABs must understand the budgeting process, by country, to include Official Representation Funds (ORF) and DISAM. Units must understand the budgeting process, to prevent cancellation of missions. 202 Fourth, RABs should consider establishing a partnership cell to coordinate and streamline military-to-military engagements. 203 Fifth, the Department of State (DOS) should consider providing an LNO to the RAB to assist in country team coordination and in meeting Country Campaign Plan (CCP) goals and objectives. 204 Sixth, RABs must ensure to receive passports and VISAs early on, prior to deployment, to prevent possible missed military-to-military training opportunities. 205 Last, RABs should coordinate with LDESP to conduct a leadership seminar in order to gain additional insights to the respective AOR. 206 1/4 ABCT’s recommendations coupled with 2/1 ABCT’s will set favorable conditions for future RABs as the US military refocuses its efforts to the Asia-Pacific region.

Rebalance to the PACOM AOR

With operations coming to a close in Afghanistan and the preponderance of US Forces slated to redeploy by the end of calendar year 2014, and an Office of Security Cooperation established in Iraq, the conditions are right for the military to “rebalance” to the PACOM AOR. Since the 1990s, the US considered a rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region due to China’s increasing influence. However, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan prevented the US from doing so

201 Ibid., 3.
202 Ibid., 5.
203 Ibid., 13.
204 Ibid., 2.
205 Ibid., 5.
206 Ibid., 4.
until now. As early as 2009, the then US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, characterized the U.S. effort to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region as an action moving along six key lines: strengthening our bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.207

To consider this rebalancing solely a military centric action would be misleading. According to David Lai, an Asian Security Affairs expert from the Strategic Studies Institute, the intent is for the US to counterbalance and reduce China’s influence in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) and other China-led or China-involved regimes in East and Southeast Asia, and to establish rules and codes of conduct for China to follow. Lai states, “The US will maintain roughly sixty percent of its armed forces in this region and will follow an Air-Sea Battle concept to deal with China’s Anti Access/Aerial Denial (A2/AD) strategy.”208 Lai provides additional remarks stating, “The U.S. Army, along with the Pacific Command, should deepen its theater cooperation and engagement programs with all the actors in this region and military-to-military exchange with the Chinese military in particular. An effective engagement, supported by a strong U.S. military commitment, is the ultimate guarantee for peace and stability in this region.”209

General Vincent Brooks, the US Army Pacific (USARPAC) Commander, has something other than an Air-Sea Battle concept in mind. General Brooks refers to the rebalancing as “Pacific

207David Lai, “Asia-Pacific: A Strategic Assessment” (Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, May 2013), 12.
208Ibid., 14.
209Ibid., 15.
“Pacific Pathways” and plans to assert Army relevance in the Pacific region.\textsuperscript{210} To overcome what General Brooks refers to as “the tyranny of distance,” he is working to establish USARPAC forces as more maritime and expeditionary and is seeking authorization to send key elements of a US-based infantry brigade to Asia and keep them there for months at a time, relocating every few weeks to different nations to conduct joint training exercises and Theater Security Cooperation missions. Brooks states, “We can no longer afford to build [combat] units and put them on a shelf to be used only in the event of war.”\textsuperscript{211} A portion of that strong Army commitment will come in the form of both GPF and US Army SOF advisors. Organic leadership will engage HNs and HNSFs in order to strengthen US relations with current and future partners in the Asia-Pacific region. As with 2/1 ABCT in AFRICOM, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) from the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Infantry Division (3/2 SBCT) will serve as the initial RAB in the PACOM AOR.\textsuperscript{212} Additionally, Brooks plans to use brigades from across the I Corps footprint in support of the RAF mission, rotating RABs out on a periodic basis, every three to four months, conducting joint exercises and Theater Security Cooperation missions. Over the course of a year, USARPAC will deploy up to three or four RABs at varying times to conduct interactions with HNSFs.\textsuperscript{213}

The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region provides a myriad of advisory opportunities for numerous brigade-sized units in support of the PACOM AOR. A rebalancing to the Pacific does not mean the US and the Army are abandoning Western European allies or discounting operations


\textsuperscript{211}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{213}Edward Croot, interview by author, Topeka, KS, January 29, 2014.
in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{214} With operations winding down in Afghanistan, the Department of the Army removed all brigades assigned to the PACOM GCC from the “patch chart,” in order to support the “Pacific Pathways” concept devised by General Brooks and a rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{215} Implementing the RAF design in the PACOM AOR will provide opportunities for GPF and US Army SOF interdependencies.

\textbf{US Army SOF: Interdependencies with the GPF}

With recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, LTG Cleveland, the Commander of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), understands the importance of GPF and SOF interdependency. He states in the US Army Capstone Concept, ARSOF 2022:

\begin{quote}
The Army must achieve SOF and conventional force interdependence to lock in the advances of the last decade of conflict, more effectively counter future threats and shape the operational environment. The Army must establish a range of personnel, training and command and support relationships between SOF and Conventional Forces.\textsuperscript{216}
\end{quote}

LTG Cleveland plans to establish and implement this interdependence in two very distinct ways. First, Cleveland will exploit Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM) assignment of the TSOC under the OPCON of the GCC Commander. OPCON will provide effective unity of command, unity of effort and the ability to synchronize operations between US Army SOF and GPFs. Second, Cleveland plans to employ efforts for a shared responsibility in COIN, SFA and FID with GPFs along the Army Range of Military Operations. US Army SOF looks for GPFs to assist in shouldering the advisory load as a combined effort. Additionally, to place added emphasis, of the four current USASOC priorities, one is to further Army SOF/GPF


\textsuperscript{215}Croot, interview.

\textsuperscript{216}Cleveland, “Army Special Operations Forces 2022,” 20.
Interdependence.\textsuperscript{217} Also, of the six ARSOF 2022 priorities, the second specifies the importance of optimizing SOF and GPF interdependence.\textsuperscript{218}

In February 2013, former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta approved SOCOM’s plan to place the TSOCs under the operational control (OPCON) of the GCCs.\textsuperscript{219} With the RAF OPCON to the GCC, and now the TSOC, this command relationship will aid GCC Commanders in unity of effort, unity of command and mission synchronization between US Army SOF and GPFs.

The second means to accomplish a US Army SOF-GPF interdependency is through a shared responsibility in regards to FID, SFA and COIN operations—a proposed seventh Warfighting Function (WfF). During the Iraq and Afghan wars, US Army SOF realized they could not conduct all the three aforementioned missions without GPF assistance. US Army SOF forged relationships with GPFs that resulted in operational effectiveness unparalleled in recent Army history.\textsuperscript{220} And with the DOD emphasizing the importance of advising and assisting HNs and HNSFs, a shared responsibility was necessary due to the magnitude of mission requirements. Due to the shared successes in previous conflicts, LTG Cleveland, the USASOC Commander, proposed that in future operations, US Army SOF focus on the human domain and the SOF core competencies of Unconventional Warfare (UW), Counter-Terrorism (CT) Counter-Proliferation (CP) whereas GPF focus on the land domain and the core competency of Combined Arms Maneuver. LTG Cleveland believes both US Army SOF and GPFs should combine their efforts

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{217}Ibid., 9.
\item \textsuperscript{218}Ibid., 18.
\item \textsuperscript{219}Thomas and Dougherty, Beyond the Ramparts: The Future of US SOF, 83.
\item \textsuperscript{220}Cleveland, “Army Special Operations Forces 2022,” 9; LTG Cleveland proposes adding a seventh Warfighting Function (WfF) to the existing six. The purpose of the seventh WfF is to place emphasis on the efforts provided the past twelve years in conflict in regards to advising and assisting HNs and HNSFs and a shared US Army SOF-GPF interdependency in COIN, FID and SFA. LTG Cleveland feels adding the seventh WfF will leverage the Army's recent wartime experiences to help ensure the future Army is well-suited to perform its roles in prevent, shape, and win.
\end{itemize}
in addressing SFA, COIN and FID, bridging both the human and land domains across the Army’s Range of Military Operations. See figure 2. The Army may not accept a seventh WfF, but what LTG Cleveland recommends is a proven method.

![Figure 2. US Army Special Operations Command: A Shared Responsibility. Source: Charles Cleveland, “Army Special Operations Forces 2022,” Special Warfare 26, no. 2 (April-June 2013): 11.](image)

US Army SOF is determining its future advisory mission requirements and how it can better work in concert with and improve relations with GPFs—a shared advisor responsibility between the two forces. With ongoing force structure and budget reductions, the maturation of the RAF concept, both the TSOC and RAF OPCON to the GCC, and US Army SOF returning back to a regional alignment of respective SF Groups, interdependency between the two forces seems achievable.
Future Advisor Training

With the 162nd IB from Fort Polk, Louisiana, scheduled to deactivate by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, the Army must determine how it will meet GPF advisor deployment requirements. The 162nd IB’s sole focus is to prepare GPF advisors and units for deployment, predominately SFABs to Afghanistan and RABs in support of the GCCs. However, with an operating budget of $118 million, of which 90 percent is Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funded, the 162nd IB will not survive current Army force structure reductions.221 The Department of the Army (DA) believes a unit can conduct approximately 70 percent of the requisite predeployment training, such as shoot, move and communicate requirements, leaving the Army to determine how to use the remaining 30 percent of largely advisor-related training.222

To address the advisor training shortcoming, FORSCOM provided the Department of the Army two courses of action (COA). The first COA proposed the transfer of OEF training tasks to TRADOC, CTC Operations’ Group and 1st Army. TRADOC, FORSCOM and USASOC would conduct RAF training tasks with the majority of training taking place at the RAF’s homestation, to include SFA and advisory training. The 1st US Army would serve lead in this COA. The second COA proposed an Advise and Assist Battalion (A2B) of 175 personnel from the remnants of the 162nd IB to conduct advisor-specific training. This COA transfers the OEF training tasks to a combination of TRADOC, CTC OPS GRPs and the newly-created Advise and Assist BN (A2B). TRADOC, FORSCOM, and USASOC would assume responsibility of the majority of RAF training tasks taking place at the Unit’s Home Station with the exception of SFA and advisory training.

221 United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), 162nd Infantry Brigade Task Transfer Course of Action Decision Brief to the FORSCOM Commander (Fort Bragg, NC: FORSCOM, December 9, 2013), 4.

advisory training. The A2B would have SFA and advisory training responsibility as well as the overall lead on this COA. A constant with both recommendations is USASOC will have the responsibility of providing training to strategic and ministerial level advisors.\textsuperscript{223} Regardless of the selected COA, a dedicated unit focused on SFA and advisory training is an absolute must for institutionalizing the advisor training base and standardization of training requirements.

The current advisor effort continues to evolve. As the last of the SFABs redeploy from Afghanistan by the end of the calendar year, the focus will shift from the US Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR, to PACOM. As the Army looks to 2020 and advising requirements for the future force, challenges exist in budget and force structure reductions and in determining the institutional lead on advisor training upon the deactivation of 162\textsuperscript{nd} IB. Opportunities are available in GPF and US Army SOF interdependencies as well as in the maturation of the RAF concept. Key is the Army’s ability to reduce the challenges and exploit the opportunities in order to reduce the volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity posed in today’s modern contemporary environment.

**FUTURE ADVISORY RECOMMENDATIONS**

Advising is not a unique one-off of a war we are leaving. It is likely the face of most conflicts we will face in the future, and it needs to be embraced. As the military reduces in size, it needs to exploit every force multiplier it can, and advisors are a critical one.\textsuperscript{224}

— Major Carl Forsling, three time US Army Advisor, January 22, 2014

\textsuperscript{223}United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), 162\textsuperscript{nd} Infantry Brigade Task Transfer Course of Action Decision Brief to the FORSCOM Commander, 6-11.

Analysis

This monograph has highlighted several issues and concerns with the Army advisor mission over the past twelve years. The Army should not discount the hard lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan rather apply them to future force considerations through 2020, especially with ongoing budget and force structure reductions. History shows that the majority of operations conducted in the Army’s 238 years of existence have been predominately stability in nature, with only eleven years of true conventional war.\footnote{Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, 1-1.} In February 2007, the Department of the Army (DA) published an ALARACT message declaring the advisor mission its top priority.\footnote{Department of the Army, All Army Activities (ALARACT) 033/2007.} The ALARACT informed all brigade level commanders to provide a formal response through the chain of command to the DA G1 as to why a soldier could not report to Fort Riley as a TT member.\footnote{Ibid., 2.} Human Resource Command (HRC) provided monthly updates to the DA G1 on TT Manning and of those soldiers on orders that failed to report to the training base.\footnote{Ibid., 3.} In 2009, both former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and then the CSA select, General Martin Dempsey, proclaimed both advising and building HNSF capability as enduring missions.\footnote{Baginski et al., A Comprehensive Approach to Improving SFA Efforts, 1; Axelberg, Enhancing SFA: Advisor Selection, Training and Employment, 7.} However, despite these proclamations, the advisor mission encountered numerous challenges and obstacles. Several GPF issues existed as the Army assumed the advisor mission; some still remain today. Army doctrine was non-existent, and once developed, advisors and units were either unaware or seldom used it.\footnote{Brown, Lessons Learned Integration for IA Army National Guard, 13.} The Army as a collective organization did not wholly accept the
advisor mission, stability operations or SFA since these types of requirements are not as enticing as Decisive Action. The initial sourcing of TTs using the WIAS was extremely costly in manning, resulting in command and control issues between advisors and units, key command and staff shortages in deploying BCTs and advisor shortfalls in key HN ministerial and HNSF strategic billets. Once the Army assigned advisors to AABs and SFABs, command and command support relationships were often lacking. As SFABs transformed in Afghanistan and key leaders deployed filling the advisor roles, units had to contend with large rear detachments at home station, often greater than 50 percent of assigned strength. Fortunately, the recent implementation of the RAF shows promise as units are now responsible for providing advisory requirements to HNs and HNSFs from assigned personnel within the organization. And given budget and force structure reductions, the timing is right for rebalancing to the PACOM AOR.

Advisor training suffered in the beginning due to the lack of advisor experienced cadre. With the advent of the AAB and SFAB, unit leaders often failed to attend the SFA Seminar. Now, with the 162nd IB deactivating by the end of FY 14, it leaves the Army to determine which organization will provide advisory training requirements for future deploying forces. In accordance with the current RAF training model, units conduct stability operations, SFA and advisor training during phases two through four; however, the emphasis in stability operations during the Decisive Action training phase is virtually non-existent.

Prior to deployment, leaders must understand what doctrine is readily available to assist in train-up and in conducting theater designated missions. Additionally, advisor lessons learned,

---

231 Moore, interview.
232 Shull, interview.
233 US Army National Training Center (NTC), 3/2 SBCT and 1/1 CAV NTC Training Objectives for Rotations 14-03 and 14-04 (Fort Irwin, CA: NTC Operations Group, February 2014), 1-6.
best practices and TTPs are abundant and easily accessible. Unfortunately, the Army assumes that units use doctrine and discuss prior unit AARs, but that is much too often not the case.

In regards to personnel concerns, the Army does not necessarily place the right soldier in a given advisor position; not everyone can advise. Additionally, the Army historically has not conducted an adequate job addressing promotions for those officers serving in advisor positions. DA Pamphlet (PAM) 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, provides guidance in regards to advisor KD credit for field grade officers. Without the Army adequately addressing personnel shortcomings or establishing TT incentives, serving as an advisor lacks attractiveness.\(^{234}\)

The Army can address advisor shortcomings by revising DOTLP and provide solutions to set favorable conditions for the 2020 future force.\(^{235}\) With the pending troop withdraw from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 and the initial stages of RAF implementation ongoing, there is no better time than now to conduct a thorough review.

**Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership and Education and Personnel (DOTLP) Considerations**

As the Army faces significant budget and force structure reductions, advising HNs and HNSFs through 2020 will call for a creative, shared approach. The employment and maturation of


\(^{235}\)In accordance with Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), dated January 10, 2012, the Army defines Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) as prescriptive guidance on how the force operates. For the Army to revise DOTMLPF, it is due to an identified gap in materiel or non-materiel capability. For the purpose of this monograph, the author recommends a revision of DOTLP allowing the Army to update advisor capability gaps with recommend solutions. The Army defines doctrine as the way the force fights. It defines organization as the way the Army organizes to fight or conduct operations. It defines training as how the force prepares to fight tactically; basic training to advanced individual training, various types of unit training, joint exercises, etc. The Army defines leadership and education as how the force prepares its leaders to lead the fight from squad leader to 4-star general; professional development. And last, the Army defines personnel as the availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, and various contingency operations.
the RAF concept is essential. US Army SOF and GPFs “shouldering” the advisor requirements is a must. To date, advising and SFA efforts have been largely ad hoc ventures.\textsuperscript{236} The Army must now act to build upon the expertise, plans, authorities and organizational solutions to address the full range of future force partnership. The DOD must avoid future advising and SFA difficulties and ensure that it does not let the hard fought lessons learned of Iraq and Afghanistan all but disappear. The DOD is long overdue for a comprehensive approach to SFA and advising that supports GCCs’ Theater Campaign Plans (TCP) and contingency operations in a manner that integrates U.S. military assistance activities from the ministerial through tactical levels.\textsuperscript{237}

**Doctrine**

I wish I could have gotten my hands on some doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for being an advisor.\textsuperscript{238}

Recommended doctrinal improvements are necessary and include four areas. First, revisions to existing SFA and Stability Operations manuals are paramount. And with these revisions, GPF and SOF must incorporate interdependencies. Second, adding advising HNSF tasks to GPF MTPs are a must. Third, the incorporation of three tasks to a unit’s Mission Essential Task List (METL) will provide an additional focus in HNSF capability and capacity building as well as establishing long term relations with the partnered nation. Fourth, the time is right for the addition of SFA tasks into Phase 0 (Shape) and Phase IV (Sustainment). With these advancements and improvements, the proper focus will provide direction and guidance in regards to future force advising.

\textsuperscript{236}Moore, interview.

\textsuperscript{237}Baginski et al., *A Comprehensive Approach to Improving SFA Efforts*, 2.

\textsuperscript{238}Mains, *First 100 Days Transition Team Handbook*, 3.
Stability, Security Force Assistance and advisory-related doctrine currently exist; units, leaders and advisors not only need to familiarize themselves with these manuals, but also need to use them. Periodic revisions of select FMs, such as FM 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, and FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* are a must. With a recent emphasis on US Army SOF and GPF interdependency, FMs need to consider conventional forces working more closely with SOF and vice versa. Historically, prior to Iraq and Afghanistan, SOF advised and assisted the majority of HNSFs from the end of Vietnam to 9/11. However, in the recent past, there has been a role reversal between US GPFs and SOF. SOF has conducted more direct action missions while only advising HNSF Commando and SOF units. US Army SOF has extended the invitation to exploit GPF-SOF interdependencies in future operations. And given the CSA’s recent announcement of ongoing budget and force structure reductions, interdependencies will only maximize capabilities of both forces by sharing the COIN, FID and SFA responsibilities in accordance with the Army’s Range of Military Operations. As operations wind down in Afghanistan, the RAF concept emerges and while the institutional knowledge exists, the time for revising doctrine is now.

As part of doctrinal revisions, GPFs should add advising HNSF-related tasks to branch specific Mission Training Plans (MTP) much like those found in US Army SOF MTPs. This will ensure the Army places the needed emphasis on advising HNSF and SFA across the force.

In the case of AFRICOM, the current RAF LOEs consist of Theater Security Cooperation, Joint Exercises, Crisis Response and Security Operations. Given the past twelve

---


240 Cleveland, “Army Special Operations Forces 2022,” 11.

years of advising in excess of 600,000 ANSF and ISF, and given the nature of the RAF mission of interacting with HNSFs, the Army should consider adding three tasks to the RAB’s Mission Essential Task List (METL) due to the unit’s advisory focus. The first, ‘conduct military training team visits,’ allows for advisors to check on HNSF capability building. As experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq, to foster relations and increase a HNSF’s ability to conduct effective operations, training team visits are essential. The second, ‘institutionalization of security forces training capacity,’ allows for advisors to check on the training status, recruiting practices, equipping and the manning of HNSFs. For HNSFs to have a capable force, they must first have the capacity. The third, ‘sustained engagement and long-term advisor presence,’ allows continuous engagement with host nations in order to maintain positive relations and build rapport. In looking at the 2/1 ABCT commander’s intent, the three recommended METL tasks nest with three of his four key RAB tasks. Given that the Army uses the RAF to forge positive relations with HNSFs, these three METL tasks seem fitting for an organization deploying with the purpose of increasing partner capacity and capability while building on long term relations.\(^{242}\)

The addition of SFA into Phase 0 (Shape) and Phase IV (Sustainment) is justifiable and paramount.\(^{243}\) With the implementation of the RAF, the addition of SFA into doctrine should be nothing more than a formality, since one of the (RAF) mission requirements is to establish long term relationships with HNSFs. In order to do so, a commitment of personnel is necessary, which the RAF provides. Given the RAF concept, implementing SFA in Phase 0 will likely prevent hostilities.

\(^{242}\) Baginski et al., *A Comprehensive Approach to Improving SFA Efforts*, 7.

The four aforementioned doctrinal improvements are essential for standardizing advisory requirements and ensuring the force has the requisite documentation to meet standards. The proponents for each document should take lead in revising field manuals and MTPs while the institutional knowledge and advisor experienced leaders in the total force are still available and serving.

Organization

Maintain scalable organizations to train and advise foreign security forces and security institutions (unilaterally or as part of civilian-military teams) in permissive and uncertain environments.\textsuperscript{244}

The US Army requires an organizational paradigm shift in its way of thinking with regard to SFA and advising. A foundational challenge now exists in regards to how the Army perceives, values, and incentivizes advising as an organization compared with how it perceives, values, and incentivizes other military occupation specialties.\textsuperscript{245} The United States has extensive experience advising and partnering with HNSFs. The most challenging missions have been the large-scale advisory and partnering efforts associated with major wars, such as Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. The most recent large-scale efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq suffered from initial inefficiencies and reduced effectiveness related to “reinventing the wheel” for advisory and partnering efforts. This is indicative of the absence of enduring institutional and organizational support for SFA activities to rationally manage the realms of DOTMLPF.\textsuperscript{246}

\textsuperscript{244}Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, \textit{Irregular Warfare} (Washington DC: Department of Defense, December 1, 2008), 8.

\textsuperscript{245}Payne and Osbury, \textit{Leveraging Observations of SFA in Afghanistan for Global Operations}, 1.

\textsuperscript{246}Baginski et al., \textit{A Comprehensive Approach to Improving SFA Efforts}, 8.
For the foreseeable future, the military does not plan on conducting the magnitude of operations as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to Robert Gilpin in Robert Betts’ *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments and Causes of War and Peace*, he states that an imperial, hegemonic state must balance commitments and resources. The imperial power does so in one of two ways: increase the resources devoted to maintaining its commitments and position in the international community or, by reducing existing commitments that does not jeopardize the hegemonic states position in the international community. One could argue the US is doing both by reducing commitments in the Middle East while increasing commitments through the RAF concept to maintain its position in the international community, such as in the AFRICOM and PACOM AORs. More than likely, and based on the Army’s long proud history, stability operations will remain the predominant mission focus. The Army must make SFA an organizational priority and not discount advising operations as not being as important or attractive as Decisive Action. SFA operations and advising will likely dominate Army operations through 2020.

When assessing organizational improvements, the Army should consider six key areas. First, the Army must have a dedicated unit solely focused on providing training specifically for advisors. Second, regardless of unit type, all leaders must be prepared to interface with and

---


250 Moore, interview.

251 Ibid.
advise a HNSF. Third, history shows that having more than one advisor higher headquarters in theater leads to a catastrophe and is counterproductive. Fourth, if a unit receives external augmented advisors, set favorable conditions as an organization to ensure the commander’s intent is clear and understood. Fifth, based on the nature of the RAF mission, the unit must consider special teams required for deployment as well as unit and staff organizational functions when engaging and advising a HNSF. Sixth, the Army must identify a single organization to serve as the advisor and SFA AAR, lessons learned and best practices repository in order to streamline data to deploying units. Currently, the Army possesses a host of establishments that gather deployment and post deployment data, which causes future deploying units to “data mine” in order to obtain a needed source. Seventh, Dr. John Nagl and Andrew Krepinevich propose two alternate courses of action in efforts to adequately address SFA and advising, which are the creation of a 20,000 person Advisor Corps for advising HNs and HNSFs and the use of thirty BCTs for the purpose of conducting stability operations.

A Permanent Advisor Training Base

The Army must maintain an organization, or organizations, which specialize(s) solely in advisor training. Whether the 1st US Army with an emphasis on reserve component training, an A2B from the remnants of 162nd IB for the RAF advisor training or the SWCS for US Army SOF and ministerial level advisor team training, all are essential organizations and have a purpose in the larger Army organization, and a very small force structure and budget footprint. It has taken seven years for GPFs to establish and improve upon the advisor training base, initially at Fort

---

252Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT), No. 06-26, Transition Team Initial Impressions Report, 42-43.

253Moore, interview.

254Dr. John Nagl, a former Army Lieutenant Colonel, commanded the 1st Battalion, 34th Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas, which trained Transition Teams for Iraq and Afghanistan.
Riley, and now at Fort Polk. If the Army does not provide a primary advisor training base, it would serve as a hard lesson learned since this is a key component to providing institutionalized and standardized advisor training beyond 2020.255

**Leader Preparation to Advise a HN or HNSF**

Regardless of the theater, all senior level leaders, company commanders and staffs need to be prepared to interface with a HNSF and advise if necessary. If assigned, units should not leave the responsibility to a small band of advisors to shoulder the entire advisor effort. Currently, commanders at varying levels have this requirement given the RAF concept, and this is unlikely to change prior to 2020. Unit leaders, advisors, commanders, staff and any other soldier identified for HNSF engagements should conduct an academic university and attend an advisor academy as part of leader preparation.256

**Theater Command and Control**

Organizationally, units should not split advisory efforts between two higher level theater commands, as with MNC-I and MNSTC-I in Iraq and TF Phoenix and CSTC-A/NTM-A in Afghanistan.257 Dividing the advisory effort blurs command and control, causes confusion, allows egos to get in the way, breeds an “us versus them” mentality and discontent, prevents synchronicity, violates unity of command and unity of effort.258 Keep all advisors under one command; streamline the command and control.

---

255Moore, interview.

256Benton, 2/1 ABCT RAF Interim Lessons Learned, 7.

257Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT), No. 06-26, Transition Team Initial Impressions Report, 42-43.

258Moore, interview; Gates, Duty, 206, 209, 478.
Additionally, if receiving augmented advisor support, it is essential that personnel understand the internal command and command support relationships and are welcomed as a vital member of the team. Advisors will more than likely be assigned to the parent organization and further attached to a subordinate unit in order to receive administrative and logistical support. Additionally, advisors should receive movement support to and from HNSF engagements. The unit placing the movement support assets Tactical Control (TACon) to the team is optimal. The advisor should understand the (advisor) role in the organization and the unit’s mission in relation to the HNSF’s objectives and campaign plan. It is the advisor’s job to serve as the link between the HNSF and the US unit and to nest campaign plans and objectives. Last, there must be a clear understanding of the rating scheme for officer and NCO evaluations, a point of contention in past advisory missions. The Army will implement a new officer evaluation report (OER) by April 01, 2014. With the implementation, the advisor must be informed who his or her rater and senior rater are since each have a responsibility to either counsel, provide performance remarks during the rated period or discuss officer potential for further advancement.

---

259 Ibid.

260 Potter, American Advisors: SFA Model in the Long War, 43.


262 Moore, interview.

Task Organizing to Meet Mission Requirements

Future deploying units, whether as part of a RAF or under another brigade designation, should organize based on HNSF requirements and GCC directives. Table 1, although not all encompassing, provides a list of potential mission support requirements a HNSF may require when conducting an advisory mission. Units should consider what critical low density Military Occupational Skills (MOS) from within the parent organization are needed in order to conduct the advise and assist mission. Specific MOSs such as maintenance, logistics, medical, communications, intelligence, maneuver, field artillery, engineers and MPs are essential and represent the key players the organization will need in order to increase capability within a HNSF, all while maintaining flexible, low-signature capabilities.264

Table 1. Recommended US Army to Host Nation Security Force Advisor Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host Nation Security Force Requirements</th>
<th>US Army Assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop an Intelligence Common Operating Picture</td>
<td>Military Intelligence assets (BDE S2, Military Intelligence unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a Maneuver Common Operating Picture</td>
<td>Unit Level Commanders and Operation’s Sections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Staff functions/planning</td>
<td>Unit level staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish effective Policing Capability</td>
<td>MP Assets, Brigade Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct range operations</td>
<td>Unit level leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish effective Rule of Law</td>
<td>Brigade SJA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish effective administrative procedures</td>
<td>Unit level Administrative personnel/sections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish effective Communications/Command and Control</td>
<td>Unit Communications’ sections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish effective Sustainment Operations</td>
<td>Unit Logisticists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain equipment</td>
<td>Unit Mechanics and Logisticians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ Medical Assets</td>
<td>Medical Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Direct and Indirect Fire Support</td>
<td>Field Artillery BN, Fire Support Element</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to LTC Matthew Denny’s article, *Security Force Assistance: Supporting Joint Force 2020*, Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) use of flexible, low-signature capabilities allows for a small US footprint, provides strategic flexibility and global responsiveness. Perhaps most significant, the Army’s use of regional forces prevents a large scale US military presence that in some parts of the world is politically unpopular.
### Host Nation Security Force Requirements vs. US Army Assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host Nation Security Force Requirements</th>
<th>US Army Assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implement Religious Support</td>
<td>Religious Ministry Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Sniper Operations</td>
<td>Sniper section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct non-lethal operations</td>
<td>Unit Fires Section, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Public Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve/Establish Women’s Rights/Equality</td>
<td>Female Engagement Teams (FETs)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Created by the author. Jeremy Moore, interview by author, Topeka, KS, January 26, 2014.

In a follow-up interview with LTC Peter Shull he states, “The Army should consider the use of a division headquarters, or Regionally Aligned Division (RAD), to support future RAB missions. If the Army earmarks multiple brigades as RABs from a respective division, this is optimal. This will allow the RAD to better balance the training for global availability with regionally aligned tasks. The RAD could then assign smaller missions or leadership intensive missions in accordance with an established training management cycle as well as provide surge capability when and where needed. It also allows the RAD the flexibility to manage and forecast requirements.”

**Central Repository is Required**

Currently there are several organizations in the Army that collect advisor and SFA AARs, lessons learned, best practices and conduct post deployment unit and TT interviews. The Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth contains JCISFA, CALL and CSI, to name a few. However, the Army requires a single organization to gather comments from deployed and redeployed units in order to streamline access to future deploying organizations.

---

265 Shull, interview.

266 Moore, interview.
Alternate Advisor Organizational Recommendations

There have been other proposals in regards to how the Army can organize for the advisor mission, two which are noteworthy. Dr. John Nagl, from the Center for a New American Security and former Army officer, recommends the Army create a permanent standing Advisor Corps of 20,000 Combat Advisors—men and women organized, equipped, educated, and trained to develop HNSFs.\(^{267}\) The Advisor Corps composition would consist of 750 advisory teams of twenty-five soldiers each, organized into three 250-team divisions. An Army two star general would command the Advisor Corps. Advisor Corps requirements include developing advisor doctrine, overseeing advisor training and tracking deployment of advisor teams. Team composition would be leader intensive—company grade and field grade officers. Andrew Krepinevich, the President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, alternately proposes converting fifteen active component BCTs and fifteen reserve component BCTs into Security Cooperation brigades for the purpose deploying for a twelve to fifteen month period allowing the remainder of the brigades in the Army inventory to prepare for deployment. However, given the reduction of active component BCTs from forty five to thirty two, this recommendation is not likely since Krepinevich’s recommendation would consume almost 50 percent of the active BCT force.\(^{268}\) Although potentially logical when written, both recommendations currently are not feasible, acceptable or suitable given the current force structure and budget constraints.

There is much to ponder with regard to organizational considerations. The essential Army requirement is having a dedicated advisor training unit. The Army has worked too hard in the


recent past to build an advisory training base that is relevant and current. Whether receiving an advisor augmentation package or not, it is essential for all personnel who will interact with a HNSF organize their formations for the purpose of advising; HNSF training recommendations are provided to assist with team considerations.

When assessing organizational improvements, the Army should consider the five key areas previously covered. First, the Army must have a dedicated unit solely focused on providing training specifically for advisors. Second, regardless of unit type, all leaders must be prepared to interface with and advise a HNSF. Third, history shows that having more than one advisor higher headquarters in theater is catastrophe, counterproductive and dysfunctional. Fourth, if the unit receives external augmented advisors, they should set favorable conditions as an organization to ensure the commander’s intent is clear and understood. Fifth, based on the nature of the RAF mission, the unit must consider organizing special teams when advising an HNSF.

Training

An absolute training start point for any organization deploying with the intent of conducting advising or SFA missions is FM 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*. FM 3-22, provides a list of SFA considerations for deploying units and personnel in the capacity of an SFAB, a RAF or under some other BCT designation. Although not all encompassing, it provides

269 Moore, interview.

270 Benton, 2/1 ABCT RAF Interim Lessons Learned, 7.

271 Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT), No. 06-26, *Transition Team Initial Impressions Report*, 43.

272 Lawrence H. Saul, No. 06-01, *Advising Foreign Security Forces* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, November 2005), 2.

273 Moore, interview.
an initial reference point for units supporting a GCC. See Table 2, SFA Training Considerations from FM 3-22, *Army Support to Security Cooperation*.

### Table 2. US Army Security Force Assistance Training Considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advisor Training and Characteristics</th>
<th>Culture and Language</th>
<th>Vehicle Operator Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Counterterrorism Training</td>
<td>Negotiations Training</td>
<td>Assessments Training using Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance (metrics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor Training: Staff, Military Decision Making Process, Warrior Leader Course, Troop Leading Procedures, small unit tactics, Military Occupational Military Occupational Skill, Weapons, Range and Safety</td>
<td>Country brief from theatre to include: country plan with current assessment and objectives, strategic communication messages and themes, travel briefing, visa requirements and coordination, transportation (cooperative security locations, aerial ports of departure [APOD], and ports of departure [SPODs]), medical health support, and communications</td>
<td>Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-corruption Training</td>
<td>Counter-narcotics Training</td>
<td>Gender perspective training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range Operations (individual and crew served weapons qualification and employment)</td>
<td>Survival, escape, evasion, and resistance (SERE), level A.</td>
<td>Law of War and Rules of Engagement (ROE) training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Communications</td>
<td>Media Training</td>
<td>Fire support planning and terminal control of supporting arms (surface-delivered fires and close air support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater and Service force protection and Level 1 Antiterrorism Training</td>
<td>SERE, Level C, mandatory for advisors identified as high risk of isolation or high risk of capture</td>
<td>Foreign Disclosure Training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Additionally, a unit should conduct the following additional training to set favorable conditions during predeployment train-up and while deployed. Given the RAF concept, the unit will deploy to a given geographic region and should conduct training based on directives from the respective GCC.²⁷⁴ Select unit personnel should attend an advisor academy to gain insights and TTPs on interfacing with HNs and HNSFs.²⁷⁵ As part of the unit’s Decisive Action (DA) CTC rotation, it should coordinate to have stability operations, SFA and advising as part of the training scenario. The unit’s predominant CTC focus should not solely be on offensive and defensive


²⁷⁵ Moore, interview.
operations, since stability operations is part of full spectrum operations. Units should conduct SLE training as part of train-up incorporating role players and interpreters to add realism. Unit language training should include the use of the DLI and Headstart2, not just the use of a Rosetta Stone CD. Since working with HN and HNSFs usually is a layered approach in advisor coverage, attending a CTC Observer Controller/Trainer (OC/T) Academy allows unit members to understand the importance of how to establish the OC/T network in coverage of a HNSF to improve situational awareness. Time permitting and after attending an OC/T Academy, unit personnel should provide coverage on a rotational unit as an OC/T augmentee at one of the CTCs. Select unit personnel should attend budget courses specific to the region it will deploy in order to gain the necessary understanding of the various funding methods and procurement procedures. Additionally, this will prevent mission cancellations once in theater. A unit should conduct an academic university capitalizing on organizations such as LDESP, PKSOI, AWG, a local university for geographic and regional subject matter experts the unit will deploys, the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth for a higher level of assistance from such establishments as the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) and CALL. During the unit’s PDSS, it should confirm any additional training requirements or equipment needs as prescribed or recommended by the GCC or country teams.

276US Army National Training Center (NTC), 3/2 SBCT and 1/1 CAV National Training Center (NTC) Training Objectives for rotations 14-03 and 14-04, 1-6.

277Tyler, 1/4 ABCT Lessons Learned, 4.


279Moore, interview.

280Benton, 2/1 ABCT RAF Interim Lessons Learned, 14.
deployment, the unit should conduct periodic video teleconferences (VTC) with the GCC, country teams and other key players in theater to maintain situational awareness and in keeping the lines of communication open.281 Last, the unit should incorporate prior advisor, AAB, SFAB and RAF AARs to garner lessons learned.282

The Army must address ministerial level advisor training shortfalls. Even with the pending redeployment of forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, ministerial level advisors will likely remain to assist GIRoA in developing HN capacity and capability. Additionally, the employment of a RAF in support of a GCC may call for the use of ministerial-level advisors. Former ministerial-level advisors recommend the following six topics for inclusion into training: (1) The incorporation of current National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS) and appropriate service doctrine; (2) the addition of current Department of State (DoS) and NATO policy, guidance and goals; (3) the study of the latest COIN and SFA doctrine and policy; (4) receipt of a higher headquarters command brief, campaign plan overview and the program budget process; (5) incorporation of ministerial situation updates—includes overview of systems, doctrine, key personalities, stakeholders, national goals and internal structure and roles of the MoD and MoI; and (6) include cultural considerations—history, customs, courtesies, standards, basic language and ethnic issues.283 The Army’s SWCS and the DOD’s MoDA training programs are two institutions capable of addressing ministerial-level advisor (training) shortages.

281Michael Evans, Recommendations for Security Forces Assistance Team Home Station Training Guidance (Fort Polk, LA: 162nd Infantry Brigade, April 18, 2012), 1.

282Moore, interview.

283Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), Ministerial Level Advisor Training Effectiveness Study: Phase I Initial Impressions, 11, 22.
Leadership and Education

The American military experience suggests that stability operations are not just “fads,” “aberrations,” or “second class” operations; rather, such operations can determine whether the United States achieves the objectives outlined in its National Security Strategy. Thus, military leaders should view stability operations and requisite skill sets needed to undertake them, as critical core competencies.284

With regard to Leadership and Education, the importance of applying doctrine is essential. As part of leader development and education for units deploying in an advisory role or providing SFA to HNs and HNSFs, the Army should implement a review of doctrine as a predeployment training requirement for leaders.285 Key manuals for consideration include FM 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation; FM 3-07, Stability Operations (emphasis on Chapter 6, The Advisor); and FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance. By reviewing established doctrine, this provides the unit with a baseline of knowledge in setting favorable conditions for deployment.

Personnel

I am directing that the Major’s positions on these teams be immediately designated and codified in DA PAM 600-3, for all branches, as Key and Developmental (KD). Any officer holding one of these positions will be considered “KD” for his or her branch as a Major. Additionally, these officers will be afforded the opportunity, should they desire, to hold an additional 12/24 months of a branch specific KD position (e.g. XO, S-3, etc). Our promotion board guidance already stresses the importance of these positions and this additional information will be added to all upcoming board instructions. Additionally, because the success of these teams requires our best leaders, I have directed HRC to award Centralized Selection List (CSL) Credit for LTCs serving

\[^{284}Lawrence\ A.\ Yates, Global\ War\ of\ Terrorism\ Occasional\ Paper\ 15 The\ US\ Military’s\ Experience\ in\ Stability\ Operations,\ 1789-2005\ (Fort\ Leavenworth,\ KS:\ Combat\ Studies\ Institute\ Press,\ 2006),\ 38.\]

\[^{285}Benton, 2/1\ ABCT\ RAF\ Interim\ Lessons\ Learned,\ 15.\]
specifically in the TT Commander positions that have direct leadership responsibility for a training/transition team.286

There are six areas of interest in regards to personnel considerations. First, not everyone can advise. The Army must identify the right GPF personnel to fill advisor requirements. Second, the Army may need to consider assigning a Foreign Area Officer (FAO) to RABs deploying under the RAF concept to assist with country team coordination. Third, the DOS should provide an LNO to units deploying under the RAF concept to assist with embassy team and Political Advisor (POLAD) coordination. Fourth, to serve as an advisor warrants incentives, such as the receipt of an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) and the creation of a separate advisor functional area. An ASI and functional area will allow the Army to easily identify those personnel that are advisor trained to support future SFA missions. Fifth, the Army should reinforce an advisor receives key developmental (KD) credit allowing the officer to remain competitive for promotion. Sixth, selection boards should neither discriminate against those officers and NCOs that have served in the capacity of an advisor, nor should the advisor’s evaluation report reflect adversely.

---


289Tyler, 1/4 ABCT Lessons Learned, 2.


291Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, February 1, 2010), 16.

292Moore, interview.
Identifying the Right Personnel to Serve as Advisors

The Army must identify the right GPF personnel to advise and assist HNs and HNSFs. US Army SOF uses a psychological exam, such as the Dispositional Resilience Scale (DRS) to determine the right soldiers for the mission. DRS questions cover demographic and background information as well as several psychological and mental abilities tests.²⁹³ As Nicholas Armstrong from INSC states, “There is a common misperception across the international donor community that any soldier, police officer, or other expert, can be an effective advisor with a certain level of cultural and language training. This is simply false. In fact, in many cases the wrong person for the job can do more harm than no person at all.”²⁹⁴ Additionally, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and The Attentional and Interpersonal Style (TAIS) inventory are two more examples of personality assessment tools to identify personnel who might be better suited for advisor duties.²⁹⁵ US Army leadership should consider implementing the same for GPF advisor candidates. Not everyone can serve as an advisor. It is not as easy as one might think. By implementing a psychological profile test, this will ensure the Army places the “right” soldier or leader in the “right” advisory position.²⁹⁶

As General J. F. Dunsford, the ISAF Commander stated with regard to selecting the right advisor, “Rigorous vetting and selection of advisor personnel is critical to ensuring that those personnel directly engaged in SFA possess not only the required knowledge, skills, and abilities, but also the right temperament and attitude required to work closely with foreign military


personnel, often for extended periods without respite.” He further remarks, “The senior members of the team must meet the rank and grade requirements in order to build rapport and a healthy dynamic between the advisors and the HNSF Commander and his staff. Not all of these personnel have many of the personal traits that make an effective advisor: empathy; the ability to work through HN forces counterparts; patience; the ability to generate influence without formal authority; and the ability to work ‘within shades of gray.’ No matter how competent they are in their professions, avoid selecting personnel who cannot adopt these principles, as well as personnel who do not show a genuine interest in other people irrespective of cultural differences. Keep in mind, selecting the wrong people can have a more negative impact than having no advisor at all.”

Additionally, turning to sister services for assistance to fill select advisor billets is not always the right answer. In 2012, an Air Force Colonel, a navigator by trade, served as the senior advisor to the Afghan Ground Forces Command (GFC) commander, a three-star general. An Air Force navigator advising the senior GFC commander is not the right solution. The GFC is responsible for the command and control of not only six Afghan Corps and one separate Division, but all ground combat operations. An Air Force Colonel has little to no knowledge of ground operations and when engaged by other advisors and US General Officers, it became glaringly apparent. This type of advisory mismatch can significantly hamper HNSF capacity and capability building causing angst and frustration with not only a HN counterpart, but coalition organizations as well.


298Based on author’s personal experience during a deployment to Regional Command (East), Afghanistan, 2012-2013.
Foreign Area Officer (FAO)

The Army should consider attaching an FAO down to the brigade level, and possibly the division, to coordinate with country teams, assist in the facilitation of CREL training prior to the unit’s deployment and to serve as a subject matter expert for the respective region in which the unit will deploy. Having a FAO attached to deploying units will provide exponential dividends in country specific CREL training and country team coordination that without routinely challenges the organization.299

Department of State Liaison Officer (LNO)

The DOS should consider providing an LNO to units deploying under the RAF concept. This would permit a linkage to POLADs in each respective country, a lead to coordinate with embassies and to provide situational awareness of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Other Government Organizations (OGOs) and DOS representatives in the geographic area in which the unit will conduct operations.300

Advisor Incentives

There are two means in which the Army could incentivize the advisor program and establish a means of accountability in the process. The Army could provide advisor trained soldiers and leaders with an ASI and develop an advisor functional area. HRC should provide an ASI to those soldiers and leaders that have received advisor training, deployed and advised a HN or HNSF.301 An ASI would provide the advisor an incentive and promotion boards would recognize it on the soldier’s record brief as an accomplishment. In accordance with Military

299Moore, interview.

300Ibid.

Personnel (MILPER) Message 08-113, as early as 2008, advisors received a Personnel Development Skill Identifier (PDSI) for having attended a CONUS-based or theater COIN Academy training program. However, the PDSI is not reflected on the Officer Record Brief (ORB) or Enlisted Record Brief (ERB). The Army only adds ASIs to ORBs and ERBs. Given that advisor training easily exceeds the minimum 40 hours of training the Army requires to receive an ASI, an ASI is easily justified. Additionally, the Army should consider creating an advisor functional area to not only place emphasis on the importance of the advisor program, but incentivize it in the process. A functional area would also establish a system of accountability to manage personnel, much like other functional areas do, such as Strategists and FAOs.

Key Developmental Credit

In accordance with DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, states, “assignments to transition teams are considered key developmental opportunities for officer career development.” However, this is not common knowledge, especially when time for promotions. The Army should not penalize the soldier for having previously served as an advisor, but rather reward him for job performance. Advising a HN or HNSF is challenging and requires a myriad of skills. As Carl Forsling, an Army officer and three-time advisor states: “Advisor duty is as relevant to warfighting as any other job—it teaches the skills modern warfare requires, including tactical proficiency, cross-cultural skills,

---

302 Department of the Army, Military Personnel (MILPER) Message 08-113 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, April 21, 2008).


304 Cook, “Improving Security Force Assistance Capability in the Army’s Advise and Assist Brigades,” 34.

305 Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, 16.

306 Moore, interview.
and appreciation for the operational and strategic levels of conflict.” He further states, “If victory rests on the shoulders of host nation forces, then advisors need to be given the support they deserve.” After completing an advisor training program, a deployment to a respective theater and a tour advising a HN or HNSF, an advisor completes roughly twelve to twenty-four months in advisory role. The Army needs to ensure the total force is aware of KD credit for officers serving as advisors and enforce fair and equitable promotions.

Additionally, the Army should continue to instruct promotion boards to look favorably upon advisor assignments and promote. If Soldiers perceive advisor assignments as beneficial to their careers, they will more readily pursue them.

Evaluations and Promotion Boards

Officers and NCOs who served as advisors should receive just recognition on evaluations and promotion boards. The Army must conduct fair and equitable promotion boards to ensure the appropriate percentage of those that served as advisors receive just recognition. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates identified an enduring issue for the military as, “whether personnel and promotions systems designed to reward the command of American troops will be able to reflect the importance of advising, training, and equipping foreign troops–something still not considered a career-enhancing path for the best and brightest officers.” Army advisor requirements are not going away and more than likely will increase with the future force.

307 Forsling, “Giving Advising Its Due.”
308 Ibid.
309 Moore, interview.
All six of the aforementioned will aid in having the right person in an advisory billet, in
streamlining advisor accountability, in incentivizing the advisor program and in facilitating
situational understanding and awareness for a given AOR in which the unit will deploy. The most
important aspect of the advisor mission is people and their ability to build relations with partner
nations in order to meet US national interests.

Providing an in-depth DOTLP review will assist the Army in setting the requisite
conditions for units deploying with the purpose of advising HNs and HNSFs in support of a
respective GCC. Given historical and current advisory efforts, several best practices, TTPs and
lessons learned, the Army can educate and inform the future force. The goal is to prevent units
from repeating noted shortcomings experienced the past twelve years in the Afghan and Iraqi
theaters. Units must utilize established doctrine, organize and task organize accordingly to meet
mission requirements, receive the necessary training as to not experience shortfalls in theater,
study the appropriate advisor, stability operations, SFA and Security Cooperation manuals and
man the force with the right personnel. To address these concerns, the Army should conduct a
thorough DOTLP review to set conditions for the 2020 future force.

CONCLUSION

With the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the current merging RAF concept, it is quite
apparent that advising has relevance and will remain as a mission essential requirement beyond
2020. The institutional knowledge and advisor-experienced leaders currently exist. Before these
assets are lost, it is imperative the Army garner the hard advisory lessons learned from the
previous twelve years of conflict and apply it to future force operations. The Army must take the
time and revise the current DOTLP as the military is in a period of transition where emphasis
shifts from operations in the CENTCOM AOR to PACOM.
History has shown that in the Army’s 238 year history, Stability Operations, which includes SFA and advising, encompassed the majority of missions and operations.\(^{312}\) And as opposed to considering history, leadership tends to fall back on that which they feel comfortable, which is typically offensive and defensive operations.\(^{313}\) Yet, despite the ongoing force structure and budget reductions, the Army has opportunities, such as capitalizing on US Army SOF and GPF interdependencies through shared advisor responsibilities. The conditions are set, both RAFs and TSOCs are OPCON to the GCCs, resulting in unity of effort and unity of command. The Army must incorporate SFA, stability operations and advisory requirements into CTC rotations, as opposed to focusing predominately on offensive and defensive operations. And with the employment of the RAF concept, the RAB is the advisor effort. It is a unit responsibility to interface, engage, partner and advise respective HNs and HNSFs. Gone are the days of sourcing large groups of augmented advisors and TTs. Now, leaders, commanders and staff have the advisory lead in efforts to increase HN and HNSF capability.

A paradigm shift is required in the Army leadership’s train of thought with regard to advising.\(^{314}\) No longer should soldiers and leaders consider an advisor-related mission as undesirable in relation to Decisive Action.\(^{315}\) The Army should ensure soldiers filling advisor billets are competitive for promotion, provided future command opportunities and receive a fair evaluation—much needed incentives. Working to strengthen relations with partnered nations is the mission, which requires interfacing and advising HNs and HNSFs. In six short months, 2/1 ABCT has conducted missions and exercises by, with and through twenty-five different African

\(^{312}\)Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, 1-1.


\(^{315}\)Moore, interview.
countries. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates provided the following comments to West Point cadets on February 25, 2011 in regards to future conflict:

The odds of repeating another Afghanistan or Iraq–invading, pacifying, and administering a large third world country–may be low. But in what General Casey has called “an era of persistent conflict,” those unconventional capabilities will still be needed at various levels and in various locations. Most critically to prevent festering problems from growing into full-blown crises which require costly–and controversial–large-scale American military intervention.

As the force looks to 2020, the Army has implemented the RAF concept and SOF-GPF interdependencies in efforts to increase HNSF capability and capacity, strengthen relations with partnered nations to prevent a large-scale intervention to which Secretary of Defense Gates alludes and set favorable conditions in meeting the nation’s vital interests.

---

316 Shull, interview.
317 Gates, Speech to United States Military Academy cadets.


Bednarek, J. Michael. “1st Army Security Force Assistance Team Lessons Learned/Best Practices, Forming through Phase 1 Homestation Training.” IWF Senior Mentor


Bolger, Daniel P. No. 07-28, Advisor Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, August 2007.


———. “Regionally Aligned Force (RAF).” Briefing, Department of the Army RAF Seminar, Washington, DC, Irregular Warfare Center, November 7, 2013.


Kaplan, Fred. “Secretary Gates Declares War on the Army Brass, Unfortunately He Won’t Have Time to Fight That Battle.” *Slate Magazine*, October 12, 2007.


———. No. 08-45, First 100 Days, OIF Transition Team: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, August 2008.


O’Brien, Timothy M. *Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Unit Interview Report of Key Leader Interviews (KLI) with 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, February 6, 2013.


Palgutt, Kevin J. *Lessons Learned: 13 Months as the Senior Military Advisor to the Minister of Interior*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2010.


Saul, Lawrence H. No. 06-01, Advising Foreign Security Forces. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, November 2005.


Tyler, Joel. Center for Army Lesson's Learned Interview, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division Commander, Military-to-Military Engagement Activities with Host Nation Security Forces. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, October 18, 2013.


Secondary Sources
