RECONSTITUTION AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE TO US ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE: HIGH RISK OR PRUDENT HEDGE?

A Monograph
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**14. ABSTRACT**

Reconstitution is the creation of new military capability that either was once part of a military’s force structure or represents completely new capabilities. Reconstitution is a principle employed throughout US history in practice if not in name. The two most recent uses of the principle occurred following the Cold War in 1991 and then in 2012 as the United States drew down from two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The common themes during these two recent periods included strategic uncertainty and a search for budgetary savings or a “peace dividend”. The key difference between 1991 and 2012 was that, in the most recent evaluation, the United States faced more active and different threats and enemies. Reconstitution, if executed as a broad and integrated process, does offer the United States a means to mitigate these risks. The United States is uniquely positioned to take advantage of reconstitution. Its materiel wealth and industrial and personnel resources are substantial. In order to convert these resources into actual capability when needed requires a disciplined approach that accounts for the doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P) requirements of force structure planning. Ultimately, reconstitution must be planned, led and managed by a central agent to synchronize several activities, processes and disciplines that touch a broad scope of government, industrial and military activities.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

RECONSTITUTION AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE TO US ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE: HIGH RISK OR PRUDENT HEDGE? by LTC Andrew Morgado, United States Army, 49 pages.

Reconstitution is the creation of new military capability that either was once part of a military’s force structure or represents completely new capabilities. It consists of three major sub­components and these are: military force reconstitution, industrial reconstitution and mobilization. Reconstitution is a principle employed throughout US history in practice if not in name. The two most recent uses of the principle occurred following the Cold War in 1991 and then in 2012 as the United States drew down from two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The common themes during these two recent periods included strategic uncertainty and a search for budgetary savings or a “peace dividend”. The key difference between 1991 and 2012 was that, in the most recent evaluation, the United States faced more active and different threats and enemies. Where a possibly resurgent Soviet Union was the driver for reconstitution in 1991, the likelihood and nature of future wars were more diverse in 2012. The United States faced three problems: how to maintain readiness for the current fight and short-term contingencies, determining what threats for which to account and what resources to allocate for preservation as some capabilities were put at a lower condition of readiness. Policy-makers and force planners tackled the challenge of preserving capability while large swaths of the overall military superstructure were being removed. Reconstitution, if executed as a broad and integrated process, does offer the United States a means to mitigate these risks.

The United States is uniquely postured to take advantage of reconstitution. Its materiel wealth and industrial and personnel resources are substantial. In order to convert these resources into actual capability when needed requires a disciplined approach that accounts for the doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P) requirements of force structure planning. US policy-makers and force planners must emphasize structural over operational readiness which sacrifices some readiness in the present for capability in the future. Army doctrine must focus on a broad mission range while organizationally it must invest in the reserve component. Training must focus on maintaining proficiency on common tasks. Materiel readiness must leverage “good enough” technology and investment in industrial base readiness. Personnel policies must strengthen the bonds between Active, National Guard and Reserve components. Ultimately, reconstitution must be planned, led and managed by a central agent to synchronize several activities, processes and disciplines that touch a broad scope of government, industrial and military activities.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISTORY OF RECONSTITUTION</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CURRENT CONDITIONS</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPLICATIONS</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF-P CONSIDERATIONS AND ANALYSIS</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC/RC</td>
<td>Active Component / Reserve Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVF</td>
<td>All-Volunteer Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMC</td>
<td>Brigade Modernization Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARL</td>
<td>Combined Arms Research Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Congressional Budget Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Command and General Staff College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combat Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF-P</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOTMP</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, and Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMR</td>
<td>Graduated Mobilization Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMSR</td>
<td>Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMAS</td>
<td>Master of Military Art and Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG</td>
<td>National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIE</td>
<td>Network Integration Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OOTW</td>
<td>Operations Other Than War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPBES</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
<td>Revolution in Military Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMS</td>
<td>School of Advanced Military Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCMR</td>
<td>Strategic Choices and Management Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDL</td>
<td>Time-phased, Force Deployment List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

In January 2012, the United States’ Department of Defense issued new strategic and budgetary guidance to orient the nation’s national security posture for a new period of uncertainty. With the conclusion of the war in Iraq and the forecasted drawdown for the war in Afghanistan within sight, the United States faced a transition to a new strategic posture not seen since the end of the Cold War during the late 1980s and early 1990s. An enlarged and possibly redundant force structure created in a time of war, negative budgetary pressures and a vague future operating environment were common features faced by planners in both periods; so it is not surprising that some common approaches emerged in the 2012 guidance. The most significant of these recycled principles was that of reconstitution. Reconstitution, in simplest terms, is the creation of new military capability that either was once part of a military’s force structure or represents completely new capabilities.¹ The significance of reconstitution is measured by the high level of risk that policy-makers and planners accept when a proven capability is put into deep storage in anticipation that this capability will not be needed or can be put back into a useable configuration in time to meet an adversary at some unknown time in the future. Reconstitution is based on the key assumptions that a threat can be detected, resources can be marshaled in time, in the right quantity, and that the correct capability can be generated to defeat the given threat. Though there are many similarities to the conditions following the Cold War and the current day, there are sufficient differences that should give a policy-maker and planner pause as reconstitution is developed as a principle in national security strategy.

In 1990, the principal enemy, the Soviet Union, was in decline and not expected to re-emerge as a viable threat for several years. Additionally, US forces were completing a massive modernization effort. Today, the threat of terrorism remains high and US forces have significant

modernization and refurbishment needs that are largely unfilled. ² This monograph will explore what lessons have been learned with respect to the principle of reconstitution in the post-Cold War drawdown and explore if this principle is still useful in the modern day. This monograph will demonstrate that, given the strategic circumstances and domestic political climate, reconstitution does offer a mechanism to mitigate risk incurred by drawing down US force structure. The United States, with its many resources and wealth, is perhaps uniquely positioned to take advantage of reconstitution. The key differences, however, come in how the US Defense establishment must prepare for and apply reconstitution. In order to be effective and truly return capabilities to the force, reconstitution must be planned, managed and validated in a comprehensive manner. It should also anticipate that some of its underlying assumptions may prove to be false. If implemented as a resourced program, it will be a viable means to return capability and serve more than a vague concept to justify and obfuscate a reduction in defense spending.

Reconstitution, if successful, can help deter enemies, prevent defeat, and lower the cost of war in blood and treasure. If not successful it can lead to waste of resources, fail to deter, lead to high casualties and ultimately, defeat.³ President Barack Obama included reconstitution among the five tenets he established within Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense published in January 2012. These tenets included a rebalance towards Asia, sizing forces to defeat one threat while simultaneously denying another, protecting key technologies for the future, precluding the sizing of forces based on sustained stability operations and “structure major adjustments in a way that best allows for their reversal or regeneration of capabilities in the future if circumstances change.”⁴ The latter four tenets all dealt with key force structure questions while

the last, using the terms regeneration and reversal, clearly introduced the concept of reconstitution as a key part of the overall strategy. The fact that the President released his strategic priorities the same day the Pentagon issued its *Defense Budget Priorities and Choice* is telling; budget considerations are near the top of reasons for pursuing a potentially cost-effective approach in reconstitution.\(^5\) It is this later document that explicitly stated the need to “reconstitute quickly or grow capabilities as needed.”\(^6\) While the strategic direction was clear in these five tenets and one can surmise the prime motivator to economize, the ways and methods of implementation of a complex concept were not clear. The George H. W. Bush Administration was much clearer in its articulation of the concept in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS) Net Assessment of 1992. In it they defined reconstitution as a broad principle that

involves forming, training, and fielding new fighting units. This includes initially drawing on cadre-type units and laid-up military assets, mobilizing previously trained or new manpower, and activating the industrial base on a large scale. Reconstitution also involves maintaining the technology, doctrine, training, experienced military personnel, and innovation necessary to retain the competitive edge in decisive areas of potential military competition.\(^7\)

At the policy level, such an expansive and relatively high risk concept requires foresight, political will and key decision making based on early strategic warning.\(^8\) In order to incorporate and implement this concept at the strategic planning level planners and policy-makers require a clear framework for application.

Richard Betts, a noted scholar on national security issues, provides such a model for strategic planners to consider and implement reconstitution. In his book *Readiness: Concepts, Choice and Consequences*, Betts studies the concept of military readiness. Betts describes three types of readiness. These are structural, operational and mobilization readiness. Structural readiness is concerned about mass and organization. Operational readiness deals primarily with

\(^5\)Ibid., 1
\(^6\)DOD, *Defense Budget Priorities and Choices*, 1.
\(^7\)CJCS, *Joint Military Net Assessment*, 2-5.
\(^8\)Ibid., 3-9.
efficiencies, while mobilization readiness addresses the convertibility of resources into capability.\(^9\) In order for a state to maintain an adequate level of readiness, there must be a mix between the three types. When war is expected in the short term, the focus is on operational readiness while, when expectations of war are far off, structural and mobilization readiness take precedence.\(^10\) Reconstitution clearly fits into this latter case as it applies as a principle when planners perceive the time required for a threat to emerge as growing longer.\(^11\) In Betts’ critique of US military readiness following the Cold War, he noted that policy-makers tend to focus on operational readiness at the expense of the other two.\(^12\) Operational readiness is generally straightforward to apply and deals with tangible weapons and systems. The main challenge with this type of readiness is that it is often perceived as linear. Ready units and equipment do not stay ready. Readiness peaks and then erodes as the readiness period is prolonged.\(^13\) In order for reconstitution to work, current readiness must often be sacrificed for structural readiness. It is through structural readiness, later converted through mobilization readiness, that a military maintains the capability to reconstitute forces. The Betts model of readiness offers a means to analyze the structural changes made to the United States’ national security apparatus as outlined in the 1991 and 1993 National Security Strategies. It also serves as a guide to assess the concept of reconstitution as it is likely to be applied following the 2012 statement on US Defense priorities.

While structural readiness provides the over-riding concept, planners and policy-makers must consider other mechanisms to address the challenges of reconstitution. Reconstitution considerations include the defense technology base, units, doctrine, manpower, installations and


\(^10\)Ibid., 47.


\(^13\)Ibid., 82.
facilities. Capturing reconstitution needs in the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) format will help both planners and policy-makers consider all applicable facets and insert them into the governments planning and programming systems. Reconstitution and regeneration are still valid concepts, but must be considered in an entirely new way based on current and expected security conditions. This monograph will appraise reconstitution from an Army land power perspective only and further limit its DOTMLPF-P assessment to the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel and personnel (DOTMP).

This monograph will be divided into seven sections. Chapter 1 will establish a definition of reconstitution and review its main components. Chapter 2 will review the traditional US models of readiness. Chapter 3 will study current conditions within the US national security and political structure that is driving a reconsideration of reconstitution. Chapter 4 will introduce and detail Betts’ concepts of readiness and how they factor into force planning. Chapter 5 will study mobilization and deployment of the force in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to illuminate the modern DOTMP challenges. Chapter 6 reviews the force planning considerations for current strategic planners using the Doctrine-Organization-Training-Materiel-Personnel construct. The final chapter will summarize and capture the conditions for employment of reconstitution.

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14 Goldich, Reconstitution: Strategic Context and Implementation, 14.
HISTORY OF RECONSTITUTION

The United States has historically conformed to two traditions when it comes to readiness for war. The first is a chronic lack of readiness followed by a massive catch-up conducted at great cost. The second is the maintenance of a high level of readiness, for prolonged periods, where forces are brought to bear episodically. Prior to the Cold War, the United States generally conformed to the former while during the Cold War; the United States followed the latter tradition. For the greater part of its history, the United States has been comfortable in spending very little on readiness in times of peace and then risking a costly and lengthy mobilization to defeat its enemies as they arose. Historian Samuel Huntington remarked “throughout American history, the country has been slow to respond to security threats and mobilization has proceeded more slowly than anticipated” and he questioned the nation’s ability to reconstitute given the “historic inability of policy-makers to predict crises and respond to them in a timely manner.” Marvin Kreidberg and Merton Henry’s classic survey of military mobilization from the nation’s inception through the end of World War II confirms Huntington’s position that the lack of “coordination between military and foreign policy” has been a detriment to timely and effective mobilization. At times, the nation assumed great risk in maintaining low levels of readiness in anticipation of timely political decisions to mobilize. Given these historical patterns, the decision by the George H. W. Bush administration to pursue a strategy underpinned by reconstitution could be seen as a return to riskier times. From the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War, the United States accepted a large force and its associated cost as a strategic

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17 Ibid., 14.
necessity and acceptance of a broad world role. Reconstitution denoted lesser cost but also a lesser level of immediate readiness.

Don M. Snider, a noted scholar on strategy, reveals that there were two main challenges that drove the Bush Administration in that direction. These were “the need to answer the urgent calls for a ‘peace dividend’, and the need to understand the rapidly changing security environment well enough to choose the strategy and forces needed in the future.” The collapse of the Soviet Union made the maintenance of a large force structure seem redundant and the domestic pressures for decreased spending quite logical. RAND national security scholar Chad C. Serena, in his book *A Revolution in Military Adaptation*, attributed a driving force in the adoption of the new strategy to the “Manthorpe Curve” named after the then deputy director of the Office of Naval Intelligence that “described a post-Cold War world where the aggregate rest-of-the-world threat would never surpass the threat formerly posed by the Soviet Union.” However positive this prognosis was, policy-makers were still wary of a resurgent Soviet Union and of the potential security threats that loomed in the unknown. Reconstitution was the strategic hedge.

Reconstitution was first introduced in the 1991 National Security Strategy (NSS) and joined strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence and crisis response as the “four fundamentals of a new era.” The strategy posited that the US could “safely and selectively scale back” and that “this difficult task will require us to invest in hedging options whose future dividends may not always be measurable now.” Published in August of 1991, the NSS was

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23 Snider, 20.
25 Ibid., 29.
followed in January 1992 with the publication of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS) National Military Strategy (NMS) of 1992 that incorporated the concept into the military parlance. The NMS of 1992 created a “Base Force” consisting of Strategic, Contingency, Pacific and Atlantic forces and listed reconstitution as one of the four “supporting capabilities” along with transportation, space and research and development. Reconstitution dealt specifically with the forces required for a global war or those forces needed above the base force. The lame-duck Bush Administration reaffirmed these principles in the NSS in 1993, but more importantly were also acknowledged and adopted in the Clinton Administration’s Roles, Missions and Functions Review of February 1993. When the Clinton Administration issued its Bottom Up Review in October of the same year, the topic received little mention, but largely reaffirmed the Base Force structure, but with greater reductions in current capability. Adopted as a supporting capability to US national security strategy, reconstitution was a new concept that presented its own novel challenges.

Reconstitution consists of three major sub-components. These are military force reconstitution, industrial reconstitution and mobilization. As the US reduced its ground forces by twenty-five percent between 1991 and 1997, policy-makers and planners questioned the mechanics of how reconstitution would actually work. Working with the assumption that capability would not have to be reproduced within an eight to ten year window, challenges emerged within each of the major subcomponents. Central to these challenges was how to preserve capability while large swaths of the overall military superstructure were being removed.

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Specific programmatic concerns hinged on the reliance of cadre units and stored equipment, selective protection of the defense industrial and technological base and preserving the capability to maintain and acquire manpower needed for new force structure. Leaders in these anticipated cadre divisions lost proficiency over time, industrial know-how evaporated without experienced workers and ongoing production and stored equipment must not only be maintained, but ultimately met obsolescence if not periodically updated. The CJCS Joint Military Net Assessment of 1992 acknowledged these limitations to a degree and also offered a means to mitigate their impact. The Chairman’s assessment concluded that the nation’s technological base was adequate, but that product innovation was slipping. Similarly, it deemed the industrial base as adequate, but declining budgets and limited procurements would have an impact on closing production lines. The assessment offered additional qualifiers on military manpower and critical skills; finding that, though adequate, the military still enjoyed an abundance of residual experience as it migrated from either active or reserve forces to lower categories of readiness. The Net Assessment also developed a system to monitor and execute reconstitution and mobilization known as the Graduated Mobilization Response System (GMR). The GMR was a three-staged system of progressively more proactive measures consisting of planning and preparation, crisis management and national emergency or war stages. Stage Three, the planning and preparation stage, included the key reconstitution functions of maintaining a ready manpower pool, continuing low rate production, stockpiling and exploring technological innovations, developing prototypes and regularly validating authorities and action plans were in place to allow for mobilization of previously reduced capabilities. From a theoretical perspective, the mechanisms to implement reconstitution were in place, but additional political considerations intervened to

31CJCS, Joint Military Net Assessment, 12-4.
32Ibid., 10-4.
influence how it was applied. The long time horizon of reconstitution decisions and the general uncertainty associated with political decisions produced some challenges to its execution.

Don M. Snider, in his study of the development of the new national security posture following the Cold War, highlighted a significant and unique feature of the political process that surrounded strategy development in this period. The passing of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 was of signal importance—it created for the first time in the Republic's history a period of three consecutive fiscal years within which a President and his civilian and military leadership could plan for the future confident of the level of defense appropriations they would receive. This stable environment for FY91, FY92 and FY93, at high but declining levels, provided the Bush administration time to plan and execute an orderly build-down of the nation's cold war military capabilities, with only a few further difficulties from Congress.33

This agreement between the executive and legislative branches provided a high level of consistency and injected some rationality into the process as the Bush administration reconfigured the force structure. At least for a period, the long term needs of establishing a base for reconstitution were not sacrificed for short term political needs. All was not in harmony; however, as Congress studied various aspects and details of the reconstitution process with high levels of scrutiny. Specifically, difficulties arose in 1992 when Congress balked at further reduction of the Reserve Forces.

In its reduction of forces, the Bush Administration reduced force levels proportionally across the active and reserve components (Army Reserve and National Guard). Congress, a long time proponent of the National Guard and heavily influenced by the National Guard Association, was reluctant to reduce reserve structures. National Guardsmen and federal reservists represented a strong, local political support base.34 The administration resisted keeping excess force structure,

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33Snider, Strategy, Forces and Budgets: Dominant Influences in Executive Decision Making, Post-Cold War, 1989-91, 27.
particularly to one where Congressional direct influence and access was frequently challenged by state governors who laid claim to these forces in their state role. The Congressional Budget Office provided additional pressures by advocating greater cuts in the active forces and concurrent increases in reserve forces to produce greater savings. In the end, the Bush Administration’s plans were adopted, but not without modifications to Reserve Component force structure.

The modern application of reconstitution faces similar challenges experienced in the immediate Post-Cold War period and new challenges as well. Ultimately, the United States faces three problems: how to maintain readiness for the current fight and short-term contingencies, determining what threats for which to account and what resources to allocate for preservation as some capabilities are put at a lower condition of readiness. Without immediate dangers to face, maintaining a strategic focus among the competing branches of government is difficult at best. It is much easier to gain traction on present dangers and readiness issues than to maintain congressional and public interest on vague potential threats of the future. The first challenge of a planner or policy maker may be to convince the general public that current expenditures are required to ensure the availability of a capability at some unknown time in the future.

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CURRENT CONDITIONS

Reconstitution faces similar challenges in the modern strategic environment, but unlike the Post-Cold War period, US ground forces are still at war. In a statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond T. Odierno remarked, the need for a standing military has been scrutinized by Americans and today is no different. Throughout our history, we have drawn down our military forces at the close of every war. This time, however, we are drawing down our Army before the war is over and at a time when there is grave uncertainty in the international security environment.37

General Odierno’s challenges are far more serious than his predecessors in 1991. The similarities of both time periods are clear; a drawdown of forces being driven by the conclusion of war and strong budgetary pressures to reduce military spending. The key difference in these circumstances is that the imperatives of near term readiness are more significant and harder to ignore than the long term planning and restructuring required by reconstitution.38 Therefore the assumption that undergirds reconstitution, that the threat is far off and that time exists to recreate capability, may not be valid. General Odierno’s testimony highlighted several problem areas with the land forces structure that were caused by the sequestration of resources and the drive to reduce budgets.39 Key among these was that the diminished size of the overall force put the nation at “high risk for reacting to any strategic surprise” and research and modernization programs were being delayed or cancelled. He also stressed that training at the Army’s Combat Training Centers (CTC) were to be scaled back, depot level maintenance reductions were eroding resident industrial base capabilities and maintenance on pre-positioned stocks of equipment were being deferred with

greater frequency. General Odierno’s testimony suggests the nation’s strategy to maintain structural readiness must be reassessed for practical means of implementation.

The Obama Administration’s Priorities for 21st Century Defense published in January 2012 established eight principles to guide force structure decisions. Of these principles, five dealt directly with the concept of reconstitution. The Administration warned in its first principle that “wholesale divestment of the capability to conduct any mission would be unwise, based on historical and projected uses of US military forces and our inability to predict the future” and therefore the Department of Defense (DOD) “will manage the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities.” In subsequent principles, it stated the need to keep an eye on reversibility within the industrial base, maintaining a ready force even as overall capability decreased, finding a good balance of reserve and active forces and finally, maintaining sufficient investment in the industrial base and in technology development. The fact that the administration placed the need for operational readiness, “maintaining a ready force”, next to structural demands, “an eye on reversibility”, highlighted the tension between two approaches. The fact is both processes, though both valid and required, cannot be pursued in equal measure. In order to resolve this dilemma, the Administration indicated in the same document that the operational force would be structured and oriented differently than the force deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan over the preceding eleven years. The strategy stated “whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives” and that “…US forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.” The Obama Administration’s strategy offered details on what kind of force the United States would maintain, what goals the nation would pursue and named reconstitution as a

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40 House Committee on Armed Services, Planning for Sequestration in Fiscal Year 2014 and Perspectives of the Military Services on the Strategic Choices and Management Review, 5-7.
42 Ibid., 7-8.
43 Ibid., 3-6.
guiding principle. How reconstitution would actually be implemented requires further examination.

The Administration’s strategy is clear on what kinds of wars it wants to fight and therefore seeks to tailor forces appropriately. Building a force for the war a state desires is a far easier task than building a force for the war a state may actually fight. Steven Metz, director of research at the US Army’s Strategic Studies Institute, identifies three myths of US war planning. These are: (1) the US only need prepare for short wars, (2) the US qualitative superiority will overcome all opponents and (3) US allies will pick up the slack as the nation’s land power declines.44 The Priorities for 21st Century Defense appears to incorporate some of these myths. The United States has long assumed that its technological advantages and stand-off weapons would be decisive factors in any conflict. The American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan that evolved into prolonged, challenging stability operations following an initial, brief, high-intensity fight, have pushed decision makers to avoid such conflicts in the future. Such a stance may have serious future consequences. Metz remarks

…the danger is that slashing the Army now will make a revival of U.S. power more difficult or even impossible in the future. If the United States gets rid of its military capabilities, particularly land power, too hastily and with little regard for the long-term implications, American decline may become impossible to reverse.45

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ The Military Balance 2012, the United States enjoys a comparative advantage in personnel, budgets and capability of almost four to one against the next ten nations in the aggregate. This advantage allows the United States to do many things in many places.46 In the intended strategy, the US aims on capitalizing on a lower scale of war and foregoing capabilities designed for stability or counter-insurgency operations. In his classic on military readiness and capability, The War Potential of Nations, Klaus Knorr

indicates that a more balanced approach, though not perfect, may offer the best return on
investment. A state, in planning for future war, must make not only assumptions, but predict
likely trends. The frequently used safety device is constructing balanced forces which are not
particularly well suited to whatever contingency arises. Knorr writes “it is less wasteful to keep
the balanced force relatively small until the need for expansion is urgent and what is needed can
be more clearly foreseen.”47 Studying previous patterns of demobilization may provide useful
guides as the US enters another era where reconstitution again serves as a guiding principle.

Retired General Dennis J. Reimer, as a co-chair of a panel commissioned to study the
employment of reserve forces, cautioned that the demobilization from the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan could not follow the nation’s historic pattern. The US military was drastically cut
following both World Wars, Korea and Cold War only to see a return of capabilities, completed
at great cost and time, when the needs of the next war became apparent. The paradigm of “fight-
win-demobilize-return-mobilize” was far too costly in blood and treasure to be contemplated in
meeting the challenges of the future.48 In order to avoid a repetition of this pattern, reconstitution
plans must account for the needs of the future. The greatest potential danger is squandering the
time available. Retired Brigadier General John S. Brown paraphrased General George C.
Marshall from a previous interwar period when he stated that prior to war the nation had plenty of
time, but no money; while in the war, the nation had plenty of money but no time.49 This is a
lesson relearned in the nation’s recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In critiquing the Obama
Administration’s 2013 Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR), Army Chief of
Staff, General Raymond T. Odierno, noted it took thirty-two months to grow the Army as

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48Dennis J. Reimer, Roger C. Schultz, and James R. Helmy, The Independent Panel Review of
Reserve Component Employment in an Era of Persistent Conflict, Report to the Secretary of the Army and
Chief of Staff (Washington, DC: GPO, November 2, 2010), 54.
directed by the Bush Administration and approved by Congress to meet the demands of the Global War on Terror. Recruiting, training, equipping and employing new forces takes significant time and money. The United States is faced with a period where time and money are both at a premium. In order to focus strategic efforts, planners and policy-makers must understand the dynamics of readiness and put systems in place that minimize risk and maximize efficiency. Understanding what comprehensive readiness entails is of critical importance and then translating requirements into a comprehensive plan which addresses the needs of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, personnel, facilities and policy are essential. Planners must understand available resources and comprehend how resources are converted into actual capabilities. There are several sources that can help establish this foundation for use in US reconstitution plans.

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Richard Betts, in two works entitled *Military Readiness* (1995) and *Surprise Attack* (1982), presents the challenges faced by the military force planner with respect to readiness. The three primary questions to resolve are: (1) readiness *for when*? (2) readiness *for what*? and (3) readiness *of what*?51 These questions are particularly challenging when dealing with reconstitution. By trying to assess requirements in the future, the danger is predicting the requirements incorrectly, being overcome by the unexpected and ultimately suffering defeat due to the resultant surprise. This is what he addresses in his work *Surprise Attack* when he writes:

> Modern military systems are complex amalgams of interdependent elements: manpower, weaponry, logistics, command organization, and operational plans. The uncertainties of how these variables would interact on the battlefield are tremendous, and the battle is the payoff.52

Betts argues that, based on these limitations, surprise will very likely occur. Betts concludes that it is best to develop force development plans that are effective when surprise occurs than reducing the probability of surprise happening.53 Ready and capable units today do not guarantee ready and capable units tomorrow, or more precisely, when they are needed. As Colonel (Retired) John Collins writes in his classic *Military Strategy*, “armed forces cannot be equally prepared for every eventuality.”54 Where the armed forces are now consciously reducing force structure, operational readiness must take a back seat to structural and mobilization readiness. In building structural and mobilization readiness, planners and policy-makers must consider the nation’s war potential, balance current and future readiness, consider the quantity and quality of force to be created and have flexible means to make the conversion from potential to capability. Meir Finkel, director of

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53 Ibid., 4.
the Israeli Defense Force Development and Doctrine, terms these considerations changeability, balance, diversity and versatility.55

Changeability is the most fundamental capability required in reconstitution and answers Betts’ question of “for when”? It is how a nation converts from peacetime force planning to wartime commitment. It is the movement from latent to actual capability. The United States is a resource rich state, but sufficient resources do not equate to success. Power, or the ability to pursue ends, is the product of resources and the ability to convert these resources into combat capability. In light of quickly emerging threats, speed of change or conversion is of the essence. Potential strength is only of real value if it is sufficiently fast enough to come to bear while hostilities are ongoing. Klaus Knorr, in his classic study of war potential, assesses the problem as

The speed of conversion in the face of need depends, first, on the ease with which manpower and productive resources can be released from previous employment and, secondly, on the ease with which the existing armed forces can absorb this influx of men and materiel and weld them into an efficient fighting organization…expansion of a very small force is a formidable task, requiring many years for building up cadres of officers and other personnel, creating efficient organization, planning and acquiring equipment, providing, facilities for housing and training, etc.56

This passage reveals that changeability is not only a question of speed, but also of the pre-existing structure that it is expanding. The condition, type and readiness of the force already in being help determine what is mobilized and how. Reconstitution is therefore dependent on the existing force structure and its ability to accommodate expansion.

A focus only on the operational or structural ends of the readiness spectrum poses risk to overall readiness. Focusing on war potential alone opens a nation up to painful initial defeats from which it may never recover while a focus on operational readiness drains resources quickly and provides no depth to contingencies that may sprout into larger problems.57 In the American

57Ibid., 7-8.
traditions of mobilization, a reliance on only measuring potential resulted in costly first battles. In their study of American first battles from the Revolutionary War to Vietnam, historians Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft edited a compilation of historical essays capturing America’s first battles. In its concluding section, historian John Shy concluded: “of the ten first battles, the US Army suffered five defeats…and won five victories. Four of those victories were very costly...some might say too costly for the gains achieved…Won or lost, the first battle almost guarantees that inexperience will be paid for in blood.”

The United States has a long history of prolonged unpreparedness followed by intense periods of massive mobilization to meet the demands of a looming war. The nearly one-year gap between the declaration of war in April 1917 to full commitment of forces to World War I in the spring of 1918 is the first of these periods in the last century. A similar gap existed between the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the introduction of forces into Guadalcanal in August 1942. Of greatest notoriety is the introduction of Task Force Smith from occupation force duty in Japan to the Korean peninsula in 1950 where an unprepared and overmatched force suffered high casualties against a determined North Korean foe.

In all three of these examples the conditions were similar; namely, a long period of very low relative readiness required time and a large infusion of resources to attain an acceptable level of readiness. Traditionally, Congress has deferred investment until the need for security was acute. This resulted in long delays and ultimately, higher costs in both blood and treasure. In their comprehensive review of US Army Mobilization from 1775 to 1945, Army Officers Marvin Kreidberg and Merton Henry note "it has been abundantly proven in all the wars in which the United States has engaged that time cannot be bought at any price." The current

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60 Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 695.
force must be constructed in such a manner that the reconstituted force of the future can be manned, equipped and trained in a timely manner and enter the fight under conditions where it contributes to securing the national objectives. In the increasingly complex security environment, the right kind of force is just as important as a ready force.

The wide variance of threats dictates a diverse force capable of meeting multiple challenges. This entails grappling with the question of “readiness for what”. A large military force has the luxury of specialization while smaller forces must be able to either do fewer tasks or more tasks less well. There must be some mix of quantity and quality of forces to deal with multiple threats. Is the threat a heavy mechanized force or an insurgent force? The answer to this fundamental question drives the type and amount of force to be reconstituted. A force of good quality may suffice for short conflicts, but longer conflicts must account for attrition of resources. When considering quantity, “good-enough” type solutions must be on hand.61 Traditionally, American planners have contended with the “three myths” as noted above by Steven Metz (short wars, quality will prevail and allies will pick up the slack) and have under-estimated required capabilities.62 Metz's critique rests on clear evidence. Whether considering the Army's reluctant implementation of counter-insurgency in Vietnam, the military's acceptance of the Powell-Weinberger Doctrine or the current strategic aversion to stability operations, the preference for short, decisive wars is clear.63 Similarly, the US military's fascination with the 1990’s tech-centric Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) offers support to Metz's myth of qualitative superiority. Finally, United States' active promulgation of international security institutions and formation of "coalitions of the willing" provide evidence to support its search for willing and able allies to shoulder larger portions of the security load. A large, quality armed force is expensive, but even a

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63Ibid., 6.
small quality force may impose unacceptable financial burdens on the polity. This cost analysis will also factor in on the versatility or flexibility of the force that is generated. Returning the readiness “of what” is a key question of versatility. Meir Finkel suggests force planning frequently overlooks versatility as a means of analysis or usefulness. Military procurement orients on producing weapons and systems to support a given capability and achieve a particular outcome. When the resultant tool fails to address the given problem, the developed weapon or system is obsolete or resolves the tactical or operational problem in a manner that is not strategically acceptable.64

This issue crosses into the realm of industrial preparedness, a neglected portion of reconstitution. John Brinkerhoff, a former associate director for national preparedness, describes the challenge as

It has been tacitly accepted by many government officials and defense intellectuals that there will never be a need to mobilize again; the argument now is over how fast to eliminate the function from the government. Despite the obvious necessity for having weapons and ammunition in sufficient quantities to fight, there is skepticism about even the need for industrial preparedness. Support for industrial preparedness is limited to actions necessary to support current production, modernization, and perhaps some minor surges in output. The military services themselves do not really subscribe to a substantial program of industrial preparedness. They would rather have a plane or a tank in the hand than two in the plan.65

An additional challenge to maintaining a piece of hardware in storage is its progressive obsolescence. The pace of modernization makes the constant replacement of equipment in storage onerous and economically prohibitive.66 The act of mobilization will then incur additional inertia as the required expenditures to bring the force to the required level of readiness may exceed the populace’s desire or ability to pay for mobilization costs.67 If the common perceptions indicate the threat is not credible then the incentive to innovate or commit resources will be very low. In

64Finkel, On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise On the Battlefield, 8.
67Ibid., 89.
order to address materiel needs in previous mobilization periods, planners relied heavily on procurement initiated at the time of mobilization. Not only were industries not postured to produce the required war-time equipment, but any new equipment that entered the force was received by soldiers untrained in using the given equipment. Following World War I, the creation of the War Industries Board, Munitions Board and the development of Basic Procurement Plans helped organize the procurement process and identification of key items needed for war and plans to coordinate efforts in the event of mobilization. These measures were still very reliant on planning only for the commencement of hostilities and provided few practical measures to employ before the outbreak of hostilities.

It is clear that policy-makers and force planners have several conceptual and practical hurdles to negotiate to implement the principle of reconstitution. Richard Betts’ structural readiness and Meir Finkel’s force planning considerations offer two conceptual guides, but to cover the problem in a more comprehensive manner, planners require an additional framework. Finkel suggests four “strata” of analysis to assist with flexible planning and his model is appropriate for the study of reconstitution application as a whole. Finkel names these four strata as: (1) conceptual and doctrinal, (2) organizational and technological, (3) command and cognitive skills and (4) fast learning and rapid circulation. The conceptual and doctrinal strata have profound effects on how plans develop and how forces are organized and trained. A dogmatic or inflexible approach at this most fundamental stratum will negatively affect the entire enterprise. The second stratum, relying heavily on the first, is concerned with a balance of elements and versatility within organizations. The third and fourth strata deal primarily with leaders and

69Ibid., 505.
70Finkel, *On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield* 2-4.
71Ibid., 55.
72Ibid., 73.
soldiers and how the doctrinal and organizational tools from the previous strata are applied in
actual practice and how lessons learn are developed for evaluation and reinsertion back at the
conceptual and doctrinal level.\textsuperscript{73} Decisions and policies adopted at the higher levels therefore
have a path-dependent effect on the later levels.

Aligning these principles in a “strata” indicate that conceptual and doctrinal
considerations are the most important components of the analysis while fast learning and rapid
circulation are at the bottom of the scale. The military force planner may recognize these
principles in a different form; namely, the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership,
Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) functional analysis tool. The DOTMLPF-P is
also a prioritized “strata” used to analyze force development problems and solution
implementation. When coupled with structural readiness and flexible force planning
considerations DOTMLPF-P offers a comprehensive framework to study and implement
reconstitution. For the purposes of this monograph, doctrine, organization, training, materiel and
personnel will serve as the foci of the analysis.

\textsuperscript{73}Ibid., 98 and 111.
IMPLICATIONS

It was not until the Obama Administration’s January 2012 Priorities for 21st Century Defense that the concept of reconstitution returned to the American strategic lexicon. Ostensibly, reconstitution remained a guiding principle through the Clinton Administration and into the George W. Bush Administration until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 drove the largest deployment and use of US armed forces since the Vietnam War. The mobilization and deployment of forces to both Afghanistan and Iraq merit review in light of reconstitution practices to identify lessons for future mobilizations. In 2003, nearly half of the Army’s active duty forces and a quarter of reserve forces were deployed into a combat theater. 74 This significant employment of forces did not include rotational, institutional and generating force units employed to support or replace the committed forces. Strategists employed in developing future reconstitutions of capability can draw five main lessons from this period. They touch upon doctrine, organization, training, materiel and personnel issues. These primary lessons include the structure and organization of forces, the mix of active and reserve forces, mobility and use of in-lieu-of forces.

The US committed forces to the Middle East in 2002 and 2003 designed for the initial phases of the war. In a RAND study of OIF, the authors note:

the major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom played to the organizational strengths of the U.S. military. Post-invasion operations...have been much more awkward for U.S. forces. Designed for major combat, it is no mystery why existing military organizations were not ready for COIN, either structurally or in capabilities, which tend to reflect organization. 75

Chad Serena’s critique went further citing the post-Cold War structure was a “facsimile” of its Cold War structure. These formations were not easily modified given “sclerotic planning and

acquisition system, bureaucratic inertia, congressional ties to lobbyists in the defense community, and equipment designed for combat” that resisted any significant doctrinal, organizational or training reform.76 Despite the numerous deployments into Bosnia for operations other than war (OOTW) and a shift to an unpredictable threat environment, US land forces maintained structures nearly identical to their Cold War formations. It took the institution nearly three years to fully adapt to the full spectrum capabilities required. Chad Serena also challenges the premise of post-Cold War strategies when he writes

> the adaptations that the army made to produce Iraq’s tenuous stability have raised serious questions regarding the efficacy of post–Cold War and post-9/11 strategies, force structures, doctrine, training, and, ultimately, the army’s institutional and organizational capacity for adaptation in light of stable security interests, strategic requirements, and institutional legacies.77

The doctrinal and organizational stagnation found in this analysis offers a warning for planners developing reconstitution concepts. Creating and outfitting units based on present templates may not meet the demands of the future conflict. Doctrine and organization must be tailored to expected threats, not current capability.

In addition to the organizational limitations, American land forces were not specifically trained and, arguably, not initially ready to execute the stability-type operations required in Afghanistan and Iraq. The focus on greater lethality, speed of deployment and smaller logistical footprint allowed the United States to dominate the upper end of the conflict spectrum, but left a doctrinal and training gap in the force. Chad Serena noted "combat readiness did not translate into full-spectrum dominance, and enduring stability does not flow from success in combat. A failure to train for stability did not obviate the responsibility for providing it; failing to prepare necessitated significant adaptation to achieve organizational goals."78 Despite extensive experience in low intensity conflicts, most recently in the Balkans and Vietnam, US forces paid

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77Ibid., 3.
78Ibid., 69.
only marginal attention to its requirements as evidenced in its doctrine, organization and training.\textsuperscript{79} Active and generated forces required in-stride training and re-task organization to meet the demands of both combat theaters.

The organizational mix of active and reserve components was also problematic. The Iraq Study Group, charged with writing the initial history of the early stages of OIF, concluded the active/reserve mix is “inappropriate to meet Post-Cold War realities”.\textsuperscript{80} The study group strongly encouraged a review of the mobilization and employment concepts for the reserves. Congressional hearings at the time also revealed that reserve units arrived at training bases without their full complement of personnel and equipment and lacking the minimum training.\textsuperscript{81} Organizationally, the land power generation process seemed to lack structural strength to generate the correct forces in the required time. General Tommy Franks, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee for an After Action Review (AAR) of OIF, noted, “deployment planning and execution were cumbersome and were much more closely akin to those required during the Cold War than those required for force projection by our country in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century.”\textsuperscript{82} Though not creating new units in a reconstitution sense, the structures required to generate the required capabilities struggled. Some of these difficulties were the product of deployment decisions made by senior defense leaders.

Another challenge closely related to AC/RC mix, was the time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL) driven deployment process. The inflexibility of the process and reliance on the reserve component for logistics units highlighted the pitfalls of an unbalanced system. As part of

\textsuperscript{79} Gordon and Gompert, \textit{War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency}, 84.

\textsuperscript{80} Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen and David Tohn, \textit{On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom}. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press; 2005), xix.

\textsuperscript{81} House Committee on Armed Services, \textit{The Use of in Lieu, Ad Hoc and Augmentee Forces in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom}, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 2008, 35.

the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES), units are apportioned to support planned operations and contingencies in a comprehensive, automated planning system designed to provide the correct combat and support forces and allocate sufficient transportation for their movement into theater.\textsuperscript{83} Then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's dissatisfaction with the rigidness of the model and the military's dependence of service and support structures he deemed superfluous led him to scrap the TPFDL portion of JOPES to tailor forces deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. The result was a degradation of logistics capabilities that, if the more conventional portion of the campaign lasted longer, could have severely restricted the operational reach of the combat force.\textsuperscript{84} Secretary Rumsfeld's modifications had both positive and negative lessons with respect to US force structure. It did highlight excess capability in the force structure and reduced both time and cost of deploying unnecessary force into theater; however, it failed to recognize essential warfighting capabilities only found within the reserve component. It also illuminated the need to update structural force planning models.

Structural investments in the materiel preparedness produced mixed results in the ramp-up to OEF and OIF. One clear success story was the return on the investment of strategic lift made after the Cold War. The Post-Cold War Navy purchased eight fast sealift ships and twenty Large, Medium Speed, Roll-on Roll-off (LMSR) vessels that greatly enhanced the United States' ability to project large amounts of equipment into the most shallow of ports. The US Air Force also made significant investments in strategic air lift that included one hundred and thirty four C-17 cargo planes that gave US land forces significant advantages in both inter and intra-theater lift.\textsuperscript{85} Though this lift ability granted the United States the ability to move large amounts of equipment and personnel quickly to where they were needed, other materiel policies limited some other capabilities. In an effort to reduce the “iron mountains” of redundant supplies for the First

\textsuperscript{83}Fontenot, Degen and Tohn, \textit{On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom}, xvii.
\textsuperscript{84}Ibid., 74.
\textsuperscript{85}Ibid., 17-19.
Gulf War planners sought to pursue a “just-in-time” logistics approach. Instead of relying on pre-positioned stocks of supplies, requisition from forward units would prompt individual supply actions. In practice, this approach created shortages in forward units. The reluctance to build pre-positioned stocks of equipment and supplies for the sake of efficiency and cost savings may prove problematic in pursuing reconstitution that depends on the ready availability of supplies when needed. The land forces may face similar shortages in personnel with the right specialty.

The shortage of high-demand occupational specialties became so acute that the US Army prompted defense leaders to adopt an “in-lieu-of” policy that drew in Air Force and Navy personnel to fill traditionally Army specialties. These included signal, engineer, intelligence and ordnance personnel and units as well as more ground combat needs such as infantry and artillery. A House of Representatives hearing revealed that in 2008, there were 17,376 individuals required to fill in-lieu-of requirements. Services filled these positions in one of three ways, which were: (1) finding a unit in another service that is trained to perform the required capability, (2) re-mission units with a defined skill set to perform other skills and (3) retrain individuals from across all services to fill the requirement as an individual replacement or augmentee. Congressional concerns centered on the strain placed on other services’ readiness, the risk assumed in national security by taking service members away from their core roles and the potential negative effect placed on recruiting and retention. The in-lieu-of process itself and the three sourcing solutions all indicate that planners did not posture the land force with the correct personnel structures and specialties to meet the war-fighting requirement. These all must be considerations as the armed forces reconstitute personnel for future conflicts.

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86 Ibid., 409.
87 House Committee on Armed Services, The Use of in Lieu, Ad Hoc and Augmentee Forces in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, 82-83.
88 Ibid., 1-2.
89 Ibid., 22.
90 Ibid., 72.
The deployment and performance of US forces during OEF and OIF offer a means to analyze US readiness and mobilization practices. By generating forces to meet the challenges of these two wars, readiness and mobilization systems sometimes proved inadequate. Doctrinal, organizational, training, and personnel issues all worked to erode overall US capability. As the United States implements policy to reduce warfighting capabilities in the present with the intention of reconstituting them in the future, these challenges must be addressed in the future application of reconstitution.
The sequencing of the force analysis tool is important to understanding the logic of the overall model. All of these elements are intertwined and necessary for a complete force development plan, but it all begins with doctrine. Doctrine and organization determines how a force will fight, which in turn drives the training methodology and required equipment to carry out the doctrinal approach. These items in turn drive the leaders and personnel specialties required to fill units, operate equipment and employ the doctrine. Finally, facilities are made available to house and support the personnel and equipment. Policies serve to govern the overall force employment and govern administrative authorities to operate. General Frederick Kroessen, a former commander of US Forces Command in the post-Vietnam era (1976-1978), cites in Remembering the Sine Wave how the Army recovered from the “hollow” force following the Vietnam War as an example of the required synergy between these organizational principles. It was not a materiel solution or the All Volunteer Force (AVF) that transformed the Army, but the right doctrinal approach, organization, training and infusion of the right equipment that made the difference. The process requires a comprehensive approach and it all begins with doctrine. RAND Scholar Chad Serena, in A Revolution in Military Adaptation, writes “doctrine is to provide fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. Doctrine is a guide that is informed by operational actions and learning”. Doctrine is the most important concept to the process, but it is also likely the most difficult to divine within the current strategic context.

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91 Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The US Army in the Iraq War, 70.
93 Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The US Army in the Iraq War, 64.
Strategic objectives and threat capabilities are the two most critical factors in doctrine development. In a perfect world, a planner assesses the possible threats, weighs the probability of a scenario’s occurrence with its severity and then builds a force to meet the eventualities. In the current operational environment, this is not an easy task. Having completed its direct commitment in Iraq and facing a drawdown in Afghanistan, the United States is at a doctrinal crossroads. The current strategic guidance from the President downplays future, large-scale stability commitments, but is not clear on what actual threats will manifest themselves that will require application of military land power. The Army itself is torn between building a force that can partner with allied powers to rekindling atrophied, traditional war-fighting skills lost in the decade of fighting counter-insurgencies. Finkel’s principle of flexibility is a useful guide in this case. He warns that focusing doctrinally on one type or a preferred type of war creates an imbalance in a force structure that could not only have severe implications in whether a state is militarily successful, but also has significant down-stream impacts on the capability of the force in organization and training. Rigidity in doctrine could lead a force to being completely unprepared for the war that may arise. Being prepared for every contingency is also not feasible from both economic and political points of view. As David Betts warns, “To hedge against everything is to commit oneself against nothing.” Ultimately, choices must be made and risk incurred based on the given facts.

RAND experts John Gordon and David C. Gompert, in their RAND study entitled War by Other Means, offer a useful doctrinal construct. The authors assess the probability of a “peer” or peer-like competitor challenging US interests on a global scale as quite remote. They conclude

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96 Finkel, On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise On the Battlefield, 66-68.
97 Betts, Surprise Attack, 285.
that a large, conventionally-minded land force is frankly ineffective against the types of war the United States is likely to face. Given this condition, Gordon and Gompert stress that stability and counter-insurgency should form the doctrinal foundations for US land forces. They recommend US capabilities focus on three categories of capability:

First, the United States needs the competence and capacity to prepare indigenous security services to perform effective COIN. Second, it needs forces equipped to enable indigenous forces by providing critical support in operations. Third, it needs capabilities to operate directly in those tasks only U.S. forces can perform.98

The latter category could be quite expansive, but at a minimum the United States would need to conduct counter-terrorist activities on a global scale, sever global-local insurgent lifelines and act to defeat the conventionally-minded sponsors of insurgent groups.99 These three doctrinal divisions -- advise/train host nation forces, support host nation forces in campaigns and maintain capabilities to defeat conventional threats -- inform both the current and future forces for reconstitution. Doctrinally, the current force must be prepared to perform all three tasks. From a reconstitution perspective, each of these divisions must be configured to expand as current conditions change. The implications to the US force structure are clear, namely reduced quantities of heavy forces and a military organized and trained to meet hybrid threats. Doctrinally, these three requirements are not drastically different from US land forces current competencies. Current organizational structures and possible changes in light of reconstitution may require more substantive changes.

The pertinent questions on organization, and how they affect reconstitution, deal primarily with types of unit to maintain, what balance to strike between capability within the active or reserve force and how to build expandability when required into the overall force structure. In addressing the first of these questions strategists from the private think-tank,

98 John Gordon and David C. Gompert, War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency, vli.
99 Ibid., 71.
American Enterprise Institute, Frederick Kagan and Thomas Donnelly, offer a compelling organization for the types of land forces to maintain in their work *Ground Truth: The Future of US Landpower*. Kagan and Donnelly suggest six force “blocks”, which are: (1) a counter-insurgency or stabilization force, (2) a force for two lesser but significant campaigns, (3) a partnership force, (4) a counter-proliferation force, (5) a strategic reserve and (6) an institutional base capable of training for the current fight and as a means to expand the overall force structure.\(^{100}\) Donnelly and Kagan derive their "blocks" by assessing the broad range of enemies and threats the United States is likely to face.\(^{101}\) These enemies and threats range from active, world-wide terrorist networks employing non-conventional means to conventionally armed state actors.\(^{102}\) Their recommended force blocks offer a balanced structure to deal with a wide range of potentialities. Though the size of these respective blocks far exceed the projected size of the force and are unlikely to be adopted, the overall structure offer a conceptual guide. The conventional force modeled around the brigade combat teams would serve to provide the bulk of forces in the stabilization, two-campaign and partnership blocks while special operations forces would be employed in the counter-proliferation force. The National Guard would serve as the strategic reserve while the institutional force would be an amalgamation of active, reserve and National Guard members.\(^{103}\) Donnelly and Kagan’s blocks allow for a mixture of forces and do not build a force focused on just one end of the conflict spectrum. This construct also serves to guide the balance of active and reserve components.

Since the onset of the current and recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the reserve forces of the United States have been employed as an operational force to meet pressing

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\(^{101}\) The authors define enemies as those entities that are actively combating the United States and threats are defined as those entities with objectives antithetical to the United States that have means to pursue them. See Donnelly and Kagan, *Ground Truth: the Future of U.S. Land Power*, 16


\(^{103}\) Ibid., 118-121.
commitments and not been held as a strategic reserve. This is a substantial change in the
traditional relationship between Active and Reserve Forces and will shape how reconstitution can
be employed. Force planners for Operation Iraqi and Enduring Freedom expected a higher level
of operational readiness from the reserve component than historical trends as the reserve
component moved away from the traditional “mobilize-train-deploy” model of mobilization to a
“train-mobilize-deploy” posture.\(^\text{104}\) This is consistent with a global trend where many nations are
no longer keeping reserve forces as a strategic hedge. Reserves have largely served
complementary roles in active posture as opposed to supplementing active component capabilities
in times of crisis.\(^\text{105}\) In the United States, the National Guard and Army Reserve constitute fifty-
two percent of the total force. These reserve components provide thirty-seven percent of the
Brigade Combat Teams, sixty-two percent of sustainment capability above the brigade, nearly
seventy percent of the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability above the brigade
and almost ninety percent of the Civil Affairs personnel within the entire force.\(^\text{106}\) The reliance
has become so great that there are multiple calls to “rebalance” the active and reserve
components.\(^\text{107}\) With such a dependence on Reserve forces to meet current, operational
requirements the challenge of reconstitution comes in how to retain the right balance of unit types
in each component, what skills to take off-line to reconstitute later and how much latency the
nation can afford before a particular capability is brought back into service.

The problem of balance is particularly challenging as it involves both political and
organizational biases. Leaders of the post-Vietnam Army developed the Total Force Army partly

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\(^{105}\) Richard Weitz, *The Reserve Policies of Nations: a Comparative Analysis* (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute/U.S. Army War College, 2007), 123.

\(^{106}\) John Bonin, *Army Organization and Employment Data* by (Carlisle, PA: US Army War
College, 2013), 19.

\(^{107}\) Celeste Ward Gventer, John D. Winkler, Kristy N. Kamarck, and Michael L. Hansen,
*Reshaping the Army's Active and Reserve Component* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2011), xvii.
as a means to tie the Army to the populace. The Total Force tied the commitment of active, combat organizations to reserve combat support and combat service units to ensure a deployment of a large overseas force made a direct impact on local communities. This was partly seen as a measure to mitigate the commitment to an unpopular war. One of the consequences of this concept was increased Congressional interest in the size, composition and, particularly, location of Reserve forces. Congress has always resisted the reduction of the reserve component both as a hedge to uncertainty but also as a means to support their constituent-based politics.¹⁰⁸ Congressmen are reluctant to remove Reserve force structure based within their districts and forgo the economic and other benefits that flow into their constituent’s home towns. The Guard is a ready-made national, political network that exerts considerable influence on law-makers.¹⁰⁹ This becomes particularly troublesome when cuts in the active combat force drive a need for a complementary cut in reserve support structure. Failure to reduce this reserve structure due to political considerations keeps the force structure and costs unnecessarily high. The second challenge of the Total Force concept is the active forces’ institutional bias towards the reserve component that doubts its true readiness.¹¹⁰ A recent panel chaired by retired former Chief of Staff of the Army Dennis Reimer (that also included two former reserve component General Officers), though stressing the need for continued operational reliance on the Reserves, questioned the general state of readiness among the reserve component. The panel rejected an “active component only” solution as too expensive, but strongly advocated for increased training days and greater readiness posture for the reserves. The panel was clearly concerned that placing too much capability in the reserves, with their lower rates of operational readiness, constituted an

¹⁰⁹Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 32.
unnecessary risk. Other contemporary critiques include doubts as to the true cost savings of reserves. Retired Army Colonel Kevin Benson found it “ludicrous” that a reservist could be maintained and then trained to the same level as an active component soldier. Central to this critique is the fact that reserve forces are not self-sustaining, self-assessing or self-deploying. These political and organizational biases are obstacles to striking the right balance necessary for reconstitution, but they are also not new.

Policy-makers and planners faced similar concerns when considering the balance of active and reserve components within a reconstitution framework. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) studied these features and offered alternatives in a report entitled *Structuring U.S. Forces after the Cold War: Costs and Effects of Increased Reliance on the Reserves*. From the CBO’s perspective, the George H. W. Bush Administration’s strategy and incorporation of reconstitution as a main principle did not go as far as it could to cut costs. The Bush Administration’s risk mitigation measure was keeping a relatively large contingency force while it cut back both total active and reserve force structure proportionally by twenty-five percent. The CBO questioned the efficacy of the plan that reduced forces proportionally and failed to increase the reserve component. The overall theme of the CBO report was to increase reserve forces while taking substantially larger cuts from the active force. The CBO proposed three additional options for consideration advocating particularly for the increased use of cadre divisions to serve as the organizational basis for reconstitution if and when needed. The Administration’s plan called for the formation of two cadre divisions located in the National Guard while CBO options proposed up to ten with corresponding stockpiles of stored equipment for more rapid

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reconstitution. In comparing the various documents of the era that addressed reconstitution (Joint Net Assessment, National Security Strategy, and National Military Strategy), the CBO report offered the most detailed assessment on options. In contemporary scholarship, arms control and security specialist Lynne Davis, though studying a slightly different problem in a RAND report entitled *Stretched Thin: Army Forces for Sustained Operations*, reviews the use of reserve forces. Davis concluded that an investment in the reserves, both to improve current operational readiness and investments into the overall reserve and mobilization structure were the best investments in time and resources.

As the Obama Administration’s publications on reconstitution offer little insight as to the future of organizational structure, both the CBO’s assessment of 1992 and Davis’ most recent work offer guides for future organizational components. They are particularly helpful because their studies on component balance also deal with expansibility. The heart of reconstitution is the ability to grow units when needed. A well-developed and thought-out reserve structure provides a skeleton for expansion. A policy that uses active forces as a contingency hedge focuses too narrowly on current operational readiness at the expense of longer term structural readiness. Reconstitution requires a short term investment in building the right framework, whether they are cadre organizations or more conventional reserve forces that could be brought to a higher level of readiness when needed. Whether cadre or other reserve entity, training becomes the key component in transferring this resource into true capability.

Reconstitution poses two primary challenges to training. First, the land force needs to ensure it has programs in place to translate and reinforce doctrine in the existing force and secondly be able to train more units to an adequate standard as the demand increases. Failure to do the first could result in the entire force being incapable of defeating adversaries while failing

114Ibid., xi.
in the second could result in the required units or capabilities reaching the battlefield too late or unprepared. A RAND study entitled *Preparing and Training for the Full Spectrum of Military Challenges: Insights from the Experiences of China, France, the United Kingdom, India, and Israel*, provides some insights to train a force that must maintain proficiency in a broad range of tasks and be ready to expand. The authors of the study cite the United Kingdom and France as the two most useful models. From the United Kingdom, they offer the use of “adaptive foundation” training followed by specialization later in training cycles and training in the joint arena from the inception of training as opposed to a later stage preparation effort.116 The objective is to train all formations to a baseline competency, as a joint force, and then build upon the theater specific requirements just prior to commitment. From the French model, their emphasis on extensive command post training at all echelons can help maintain proficiency across a broad spectrum of contingencies.117 The combination of these three points; basic skills to specialty progression, joint from inception and staff training, offer a flexible and economical approach. They do not, however, account for the required throughput in the event of crisis.

Even in the train-mobilize-deploy paradigm of modern reserve component forces, the underlying proposition is that the mobilized force will require some level of training before ultimate commitment to theater. In the current training program, all deploying organizations must complete a mission rehearsal exercise at a Combat Training Center (CTC) for deployment certification. With only three CTCs, two in the United States and one in Europe, this creates two potentially large choke points.118 In order to support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, reserve component brigades required, on average, six months of preparation time before deploying into

117Ibid., 236.
118The three combat training centers are: (1) the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California; (2) The Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana; and (3) the Combined Military Training Center, Grafenwoer, Germany.
Increasing the demand for units without increasing the level of readiness at which reserve units enter the final phase of training will only lengthen this delay. Alternatively, land forces could assume risk by shortening the preparation time without a validation of readiness, but also incur the possibility of mission failure. The Reimer report suggested adding up to twelve additional drill days for the reserve component, an addition that seems wholly inadequate to meet realistic training requirements. A plausible alternative would be to monitor reserve component readiness closer through periodic evaluations, expand training days for non-mobilized periods and invest active duty resources such as cadre personnel to add currency and rigor. These are relatively small, short term investments for longer term or structural readiness for training reconstituted forces. Ensuring structural readiness for materiel may be a much more costly investment.

Problems with materiel considerations in the reconstitution process will fall within two primary areas. The first, and likely more difficult of the two, deals with the maintenance of the industrial base required to design, test and build the military hardware employed by the armed forces. The second challenge is ensuring useful equipment, in the correct quantities, is available when needed. The first problem is particularly thorny in that it deals with an area not immediately in the military’s purview and is subject to a high degree of political scrutiny. Congressional constituencies and politics often interfere with the true challenge of maintaining the knowledge, technology and skills required to operate an assembly line at some indefinite and unknown time in the future. Congress is reluctant to reduce forces, particularly heavy forces, and the requisite industrial base. This is driven by the concern of losing a capability and a constituency that may

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depend on a particular factory for employment within their districts. The military may continue production on a particular system, not because it is still required, but to satisfy a non-military concern of Congress. Politics aside, industrial preparedness to assist in reconstitution is of critical importance.

John R. Brinkerhoff, in an article entitled “The Strategic Implications of Industrial Preparedness”, provides a prescient view of the problems and future of industrial preparedness. Brinkerhoff defines industrial preparedness as the process that “seeks to ensure that the combination of peacetime stocks and mobilization production will be sufficient to meet the needs of military units during a war.” His prognosis for industrial preparedness is “grim” as few measures are in place to see mobilization into fruition. Brinkerhoff described the three purposes of industrial mobilization as filling shortages at the outbreak of hostilities, augment current stocks and finally produce additional or new versions of weapons systems to meet a new or increasing demand. This later purpose fits most directly in the reconstitution model, but all are closely inter-related and concern the supply of capability. Eliminating a unit or piece of equipment from the force structure or placing stocks of it in storage may likely close a production line and send specialized workers off to be retrained. In an industry run by profit, the expectation cannot be that research and development funding make up for production. In a forum debating the implications of reconstitution in 1992, an executive from the Loral Corporation stated “research and development without production is misguided…in an environment where production was not rewarded…firms would simply sell assets.” This places the military in a dilemma where it may be forced to buy things it may not immediately need, but for the sake of keeping a production line

124Ibid., 38-47.
open. This is an act not unlike the inefficiencies of Congressional action to keep unnecessary factories open. Military planners must balance these “required” inefficiencies to maintain flexibility in the industrial preparedness process.

Industrial preparedness is also closely linked to the second challenge of materiel readiness in the reconstitution process namely; ensuring sufficient quantities are on hand. The amounts of equipment required can be substantial. The Army estimates the cost of equipping a new heavy brigade combat team at nearly one billion dollars with an additional $350 million in annual operating costs.\textsuperscript{126} Maintaining stocks of equipment to support current organizations and contingencies is also a costly enterprise. The United States has relied heavily on pre-positioned stocks and equipment, particularly in the First Gulf War and as recently as Operational Iraqi Freedom.\textsuperscript{127} The United States currently maintains five pre-positioned stocks of supplies and equipment throughout the world that are both sea and land based.\textsuperscript{128} These stocks include multiple brigade sets of heavy and wheeled equipment as well as project and sustainment stocks to supply contingency operations.\textsuperscript{129} The challenge with maintaining stocks is similar to that of maintaining assembly lines and skills; both move to obsolescence over time. Replacing or upgrading stored equipment is costly, particularly if technological advancements drive frequent modifications. There are also real operational hazards in not undertaking the equipment upgrades. If stored stocks are not upgraded, trained units may fall in on equipment that is not only obsolete, but also on equipment on which they have not been trained. Solutions to materiel readiness within reconstitution will have to rely on compromise.

\textsuperscript{127}Brinkerhoff, “The Strategic Implications of Industrial Preparedness,” 38-47.
\textsuperscript{128}Prepositioned stocks and equipment are as follows: APS-1 Continental United States, APS-2 Europe, APS-3 Afloat, APS-4 Pacific and APS-5 Southwest Asia.
\textsuperscript{129}Bonin, \textit{Army Organization and Employment Data}, 36-37.
In order to invest in the structural readiness of materiel issues, military planners and policy-makers will have to invest in the current force with emphasis on built-in modernization, find “good enough” technological solutions, invest only in “breakthrough” capability and balance the force between quantitative sufficiency and qualitative superiority with an eye on compatibility. Each of these elements is mutually dependent and supporting. Clearly, spending on the current force keeps production lines open and personnel trained, but design and production must pre-program modernization and allow for “block” progressive upgrades.\textsuperscript{130} This will help alleviate some costs associated with keeping pre-positioned equipment modernized and keep some equipment specialists employed for long term periods. Determining what technological advances are actually adopted needs to be a combination of employing what is “good enough” and only investing in the technology that gives the United States a marked advantage over its adversaries. The annual catalogue of military capability produced by the International Institute of Strategic Studies indicates the United States, even with projected cuts, still outpaces the budget outlays of the next ten nations combined and leads in all major equipment categories by a ratio of almost four to one.\textsuperscript{131} The United States has both preponderance in quality and quantity, a luxury which no other nation enjoys.

Acquisition programs have been moving towards more capability-based portfolios that are satisfying not maximizing in nature and this is a trend that would have to continue.\textsuperscript{132} Similarly, when evaluating technologies for employment, the acquisition system must discriminate on the maturity of the technology, its general utility and whether adopting the new

equipment will grant a marked advantage.\textsuperscript{133} The Army’s Brigade Modernization Command (BMC) and its bi-annual Network Integration Evaluations (NIE) where network and other materiel solutions are tested and evaluated offers a proven model for identifying equipment with great merit for employment.\textsuperscript{134} Finally, structural readiness requires a balance in quality and quantity with compatibility serving as the final arbiter of the requirement. In long-time Congressional Research Service analyst John Collins’ classic text \textit{Military Strategy}, qualitative sufficiency, qualitative superiority and compatibility constitute three of his nine principles of readiness. Collins’ key descriptors are “adequate” force levels and “competitive” technologies.\textsuperscript{135} In a world of diminishing resources, it is compatibility with other systems in the inventory that should drive procurement decisions. Adequate resources and competitive technologies will only be effective if compatible across the joint force and can be employed jointly to multiply effects. Materiel reconstitution requires some balance of quality and quantity. The approach to reconstitution of personnel requires a similar analysis and approach.

The personnel demands of reconstitution are two-fold; these are first, maintaining sufficient numbers of men and women, from both active and reserve components, with the requisite skills necessary to expand the force structure and secondly, drawing in the additional manpower to fill out new organizations. Under current manning, the reserves consist mostly of former active duty soldiers that transition to reserve status after serving on active status for some duration. Though the reserves do recruit directly into their ranks for both officer and enlisted positions, they rely on former active duty soldiers to fill their unit rosters with experience and capability. As active forces contract in size, an initial glut of active duty soldiers seeking reserve assignments will eventually subside and leave the reserves with the task of recruiting fifty percent \textsuperscript{133}\textsuperscript{O’Hanlon, \textit{The Science of War: Defense Budgeting, Military Technology, Logistics, and Combat Outcomes}, 174.\textsuperscript{134}Army Capabilities and Integration Center, “Directorates: Brigade Modernization Command”, http://www.arcic.army.mil/Directorates /brigade-modernization.aspx (accessed January 24, 2014).\textsuperscript{135}Collins, \textit{Military Strategy}, 100-101.}
of their force directly from civilian life into drilling reservists. As experience levels drop in reserve formations it may demand greater active force oversight of reserve operations and more direct involvement in mobilization activities. The second issue, filling out expanded ranks, is closely tied to the first. Depending on the size and the gravity of the threat faced by the nation and speed in which soldiers are required, policy-makers will have to debate the efficacy of resuming conscription to match reconstitution needs. Conscription is a highly politicized issue, difficult to implement and may fall well short in providing personnel in the time required. In a contingency less than global war, planners will have to contend with local officials who may limit access of deployable reserve forces, particularly of the state-based National Guard. Policy-makers and planners may be left to fall between two stools; namely, rely on a potentially unfeasible conscription option or draw on reserves protected jealously by state governments. As the active and reserve forces contract, structural adjustments will be necessary to allow for the proper functioning of the personnel system.

Charles Heller, in a US Army War College monograph studying the reserve policies of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), argues that the United States should adapt a truly Total Force concept to mitigate the pressures of reconstitution on the personnel system. The IDF’s army policies allow for officers and enlisted personnel move back and forth between active and reserve service. Policies that will remove the career and personal obstructions to US military personnel will assist in leavening the quality between components and bring much needed experience into the reserve component ranks. In a comparative study of international reserve forces, national securities scholar Richard Weitz also suggests a continuum of reserve service that lasts for longer periods. He also recommends creating new classes of reserves that require varying and verifiable

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degrees of readiness. Rewarding reserve service, prolonging the duration of reserve service and verifying readiness will help create the necessary conditions to rapidly build personnel strengths of reconstituted organizations.

This review of DOTMP considerations offers a practical start point for the creation of policies and plans to implement reconstitution at the national strategic level. Reconstitution requires a comprehensive and integrated plan that accounts for all facets of military force structure planning. Policy-makers and planners are left with the challenge of making sound projections across broad areas of both military and political competence. Retired Army Colonel Kevin Benson cautions

The dark art of force design, planning and anticipating where the next war will happen is not precise. The object is really to be not too badly wrong and have enough resilience in the active force to buy time for reserves to activate and to allow doctrine, tactics and techniques to adapt to the demands of the ongoing fight. Where the DOTMLPF-P assessment provides some guides in the process of applying these “dark arts”, a reconstitution strategy requires political will for implementation.

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\ref{139}Kevin Benson, “Establishing a Floor under the Army’s End-strength,” *Small Wars Journal* (January 14, 2014), 2.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The premise of reconstitution is uncertainty. The United States must reappraise reconstitution in light of uncertainty about threat capabilities, uncertainty in the future size of US land forces and the nation’s poor track record of initial expansions of its land force capabilities in the face of crisis.140 In *America’s First Battles*, historian John Shy attributes much of this historically poor initial performance on political realities and myopic perspectives accumulated by senior military leaders. On political conditions, he writes, “political circumstances appear to have two major effects on first battles: limiting the military possibilities to certain resources and locations, and pushing strategy in certain directions at certain times.”141 This is further complicated by the perception of military senior leaders whose “experiences are…dictated largely by peacetime needs, not by war time probabilities.”142 Both of these historical habits must be shed as the United States prepares for its next conflict. The United States must address reconstitution in a comprehensive manner that deals with structural rather than immediate operational readiness and address all components of the DOTMLPF-P construct, but pay close attention to the doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel and personnel considerations. Additionally, the US must be flexible in its application of reconstitution principles while adding some rigor to how the nation reviews and validates its structural readiness.

Structural readiness involves investment in future capacity and a means of converting this capacity into actual battlefield capability when required. Structural readiness, as is the overall concept of reconstitution, is fraught with risk and potentially great inefficiency. The policy-maker and planner who invest in structural readiness today are likely to never see the profit (or failure) of this investment at some undetermined time in the future. For reconstitution and structural

142Ibid., 331.
readiness to succeed, planners must consider and employ it comprehensively. The DOTMLPF-P construct provides such a tool for analysis. Doctrinally, planners must avoid the temptation to configure forces for future reconstitution which are based on current conditions. Planners must project into the future and provide some balance to warfighting methodologies while not hedging for all possibilities. Similarly, organizational structures must be balanced between reserve and active forces to form a basis for reconstituted growth. Training structures must be in place to indoctrinate and rehearse new units and individuals into the expanding force. Materiel considerations must focus on maintaining the viability of the industrial base and striking a balance between qualitative superiority and quantitative sufficiency. Finally, any personnel administration measures must consider a truly total force interface between active and reserve components making them as indistinguishable as possible. Reconstitution will not serve as a viable principle without a DOTMLPF-P integrated approach.

Reconstitution will also not succeed unless US national security planners inject adaptability into the current force development process. The defense establishment’s rigid adherence to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES), which prizes procedure over substance, will become even more of a liability in the future. The Defense Science Board, in reviewing Department of Defense procedures, noted that adaptability “must include the ability and willingness to anticipate the need for change, to prepare for that change and to implement changes in a timely and effective manner in response to the surrounding environment.”\textsuperscript{143} The Board’s findings indicate such adaptability is not within the current DOD procedures and recommended the department shed its risk averseness. They concluded that the nation’s adversaries will operate at a higher tempo than the current procurement enterprise can generate solutions.\textsuperscript{144} The Science Board cited the current PPBES system as a rigid, time-driven

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 15.
process that was grossly inefficient. The process separates the customer, developers, testers, trainers and other stake-holders into single function entities and does not create a working cross-functional team that is required. This process moves at a pace which is easily surpassed by our enemies and is an anachronism in our technology-enabled, enterprise-driven society.\footnote{Ibid., 16.} DOD must focus more on outcomes than process.

If the Department of Defense requires less bureaucracy and less risk aversion, the reconstitution process must conversely adopt more rigor if it is to survive as a guiding principle. In addition to the structural guides and DOTMLPF-P considerations already noted, reconstitution would benefit from a single “owner”. Reconstitution will fall into neglect if there is not a dedicated office focused on a reconstitution programs’ needs and execution.\footnote{Goldich, Reconstitution: Strategic Context and Implementation, 15.} The needs of reconstitution are so multi-faceted and cut across so many entities, a decentralized approach without a degree of unity of effort will only lead to unsynchronized effort. Certainly, the aim is not to create more bureaucracy, but establish clear responsibilities and constitute some means to actually observe and validate reconstitution readiness. President Ronald Reagan established the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the lead integrator of mobilization efforts in November 1988 with Executive Order 12656.\footnote{Ronald W. Reagan, Executive Order 12656, Federal Register, Vol. 53, No. 228 (November 18, 1988): 1, \url{http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/EO12656.htm} .} The Obama Administration modified its provisions with an executive order of its own, Executive Order 13603 published in March 2012, that named the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the cabinet level integrator of the whole-of-government effort.\footnote{Barack H. Obama, Executive Order 13603, Federal Register Vol. 77, No. 56 (March 16, 2012): 2, \url{http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/EO-13603.pdf} .} Nominally, the mobilization and readiness processes have a mechanism, through the National Security Council, to plan and coordinate activities. Reconstitution, with its many interrelated but often divergent parts, must be proactively
monitored. John Brinkerhoff, in his study of industrial preparedness, suggests some measures that could be applied to the reconstitution enterprise as a whole. These measures include: (1) designating a lead agency for reconstitution, (2) establish clear authorities for rules implementation and oversight, (3) include the mobilization plan, written with a higher level of detail as part of the actual national security strategy published by the DOD, (4) conduct periodic reviews, exercises and rehearsals of the mobilization provisions and (5) specifically earmark funds to invest in structural readiness measures.\textsuperscript{149} Until the United States establishes this unity of effort, reconstitution will be nothing more than an unfulfilled concept.

In the face of diminishing resources and an inevitable contraction of the size of US land forces, recycling reconstitution as a principle from the Post-Cold War era makes strategic sense. The concept will only be useful, however, if it is considered in its totality and in a comprehensive way. Investing in structural readiness, considering the DOTMLPF-P dimensions, maintaining adaptability and unifying efforts will assist in ensuring reconstitution’s viability.

\textsuperscript{149}Brinkerhoff, “The Strategic Implications of Industrial Preparedness”, 47.


51


