THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND THE SERGEANT PROBLEM: THE ARMY’S SYSTEMIC INABILITY TO PRODUCE ENOUGH SERGEANTS AND A PROPOSAL TO FIX IT.

A Monograph

by

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The United States Army and the Sergeant Problem: The Army’s Systemic Inability to Produce enough Sergeants and a Proposal to fix it.

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Over the past sixty years, the Army has had a systemic inability to produce enough trained sergeants. The Army repeatedly lowered the standards for promotion to sergeant during periods of rapid expansion or conflict in order to produce sufficient sergeants. This resulted in sergeants who did not have the institutional training that the Army repeatedly concluded is a prerequisite for promotion. The next time the Army needs to expand rapidly it will be faced with a shortage of Sergeants. The Army used several methods of mitigating this problem which met with varying degrees of success. This monograph proposes an updated method of recruiting and training sergeants faster than current methods allow.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND THE SERGEANT PROBLEM: THE ARMY’S SYSTEMIC INABILITY TO PRODUCE ENOUGH SERGEANTS AND A PROPOSAL TO FIX IT, by MAJ Lee North, 48 pages.

Over the past sixty years, the Army has had a systemic inability to produce enough trained sergeants. The Army repeatedly lowered the standards for promotion to sergeant during periods of rapid expansion or conflict in order to produce sufficient sergeants. This resulted in sergeants who did not have the institutional training that the Army repeatedly concluded is a prerequisite for promotion. The next time the Army needs to expand rapidly it will be faced with a shortage of Sergeants. The Army used several methods of mitigating this problem which met with varying degrees of success. This monograph proposes an updated method of recruiting and training sergeants faster than current methods allow.
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<td>After Action Review</td>
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<td>AEF</td>
<td>American Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>ANCOC</td>
<td>Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course</td>
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<td>ASVAB</td>
<td>Army Skills Vocational Aptitude Battery</td>
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<td>Army Training Requirements and Resource System</td>
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<td>BNCOC</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
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<td>CJS</td>
<td>Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>COL</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<td>CPL</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff of the Army</td>
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<td>CSM</td>
<td>Command Sergeant Major</td>
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<td>DA PAM</td>
<td>Department of the Army Pamphlet</td>
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<td>DL</td>
<td>Distance Learning</td>
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<td>DMDC</td>
<td>Defense Manpower Data Center</td>
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<td>DOA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>GED</td>
<td>General Equivalency Diploma</td>
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<td>GEN</td>
<td>General</td>
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<tr>
<td>INCOC</td>
<td>Infantry Noncommissioned Officer Course</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JROTC</td>
<td>Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps</td>
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<td>KATUSA</td>
<td>Korean Augmentee to the United States Army</td>
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<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed In Action</td>
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<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupational Specialty</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Noncommissioned Officer</td>
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</table>
NCOC  Noncommissioned Officer Course
NCOCC  Noncommissioned Officers Candidate Course
NCOCS  Noncommissioned Officers Candidate School
NCOPDS  Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Study
OCS  Officer Candidate School
OJT  On the job training
OPORD  Operations Order
PFC  Private First Class
PLA  Peoples Liberation Army
PLDC  Primary Leadership Development Course
PNCOC  Primary Noncommissioned Officers Course
PME  Professional Military Education
PV1  Private
PV2  Private
ROTC  Reserve Officers’ Training Corps
SGT  Sergeant
SFC  Sergeant First Class
SGM  Sergeant Major
SLC  Senior Leaders Course
SPC  Specialist
SSG  Staff Sergeant
TIG  Time in Grade
TIS  Time in Service
UCMJ  Uniform Code of Military Justice
WLC  Warrior Leaders Course
WWI  World War I
WWII  World War II
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MONOGRAPH

We have good corporals and sergeants, …and those are far more important than good generals.

—General William Tecumseh Sherman

Said England unto Pharaoh, “I must make a man of you, That will stand upon his feet and play the game: That will Maxim his oppressor as a Christian ought to do,” It was not a Duke nor Earl, nor a Viscount- It was not a big brass General that came; But a man in khaki kit who could handle men a bit, With his bedding labeled Sergeant Whatisname.

—Rudyard Kipling

INTRODUCTION

The United States Army has a systemic inability to produce enough trained sergeants (SGT) during times of growth or conflict. This monograph examines methods the Army employed to fix this problem, and makes recommendation to better deal with these problems in the future. This problem was evident throughout American military history. The US Army has not overcome this issue despite the creation of an entire system of institutional training and education for enlisted Soldiers and NCOs. This monograph will prove this is a systemic problem by reviewing the history of enlisted institutional training from before the American Revolution to the present. It will also compare US practices with the institutional training and education of NCOs in several foreign militaries. It will make a recommendation on how the Army can overcome this issue using a method adapted from the Vietnam War matched with a deliberate apprenticeship at a gaining unit.

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1For clarity, this monograph refers to sergeants in the grade of E-5 as SGTs.
LITERATURE REVIEW

The United States Army has used several different methods for dealing with shortages of enlisted personnel. In early conflicts officers simply promoted the most senior or best performing Soldier available. The Army created its first NCO school during World War I.\(^2\) The Army conducted extensive investigation into the effectiveness of foreign NCOs, foreign military NCO schools, and foreign military NCO professional education during security force assistance training after World War II. The Army performed relatively little research and investigation into its own NCO training and education system. During the Vietnam War, the Army experimented with the Noncommissioned Officers Candidate Course to take brand new enlistees from Basic Training, and Advanced Individual Training, and send them through specialized training to become an NCO. When this training concluded Soldiers were promoted to SGT or staff sergeant and immediately deployed to Vietnam.\(^3\) After that conflict, the Army transitioned to an all-volunteer force. To professionalize the NCO corps the Army developed an entire system of noncommissioned officer training and education to provide the sergeants the Army needed. Since before World War I, the Army’s personnel and administrative programs consistently failed to provide one hundred percent of the sergeants it needed.\(^4\)

Noncommissioned officer training and doctrine throughout American military history

The military tradition of the United States derived from the colonial militia system. This system used a manual published in 1759 written by George Townshend called *A Plan of Discipline for the Militia of the County of Norfolk*, a document used for militia training in the


Northern colonies. There was also a publication written by Edward Harvey called *The Manual of Exercise of 1764*, referred to as “the Sixty-Four.” These two publications were used for militia training within the American colonies before the War of Independence.⁵ Officers of the colonial militia usually read Humphrey Bland’s *Treatise on Military Discipline*. Reprinted in the colonies in 1772, Bland’s work was considered the leading English tactical manual of that time, and it was most popular in Southern colonies. Northern colonies used Townshend’s 1759 *A Plan of Discipline*.⁶

George Townshend’s *A Plan of Discipline for the Militia of the County of Norfolk* was a British Army drill manual which provided instructions for marching, firing, and the mounting of guards in the British Army.⁷ The manual categorically stated that officers are the trainers of Soldiers and units.⁸ The manual is largely composed of step by step instructions for marching and firing weapons individually and collectively. It also contained some detail about the duties and manner of performance of corporals and sergeants. Specifically, *The Plan for Discipline* described the activities of corporals and sergeant supervising men conducting exercises. It also described the duties of a corporal in supervising guard details. The sergeant had more duties than the corporal. The sergeant was required to inspect encampments, the mess, conduct company logistical duties, see after the company trains, and ensure accountability of all Soldiers. The sum

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⁸Ibid., 22-25, 37.
of all instructions for corporals and sergeants was six pages out of 382 pages of text. Townshend only mentioned the qualities a corporal or sergeant must have.

The Duty of a Corporal.

He is to be perfectly skilled in the use of his arms, that he may teach the use of them with the utmost exactness, to the recruits of his command.

The principal Parts of the Duty of a Sergeant.

He is to be strictly honest and sober; diligent, active, and resolute, in every part of his duty; to be tight and clean in his dress, without soppery; and, in his outward carriage, sedate and manly, without affection.

Townshend gave no other guidance about the selection and promotion of NCOs.  

Edward Harvey’s *The Manual of Exercise of 1764* was a drill manual that contained almost no practical instructions for NCOs. The manual, in its entirety, was a set of step by step instructions for the manual of exercise. These exercises prepared units for the conduct of combat according to the English methods of warfare of the time. Instructions for NCOs were limited to those steps taken by NCOs during marching or firing of muskets by individuals or by units. There was no discussion of how to select or train NCOs.  

Humphrey Bland’s *A Treatise of Military Discipline* was a British Army manual which gives step by step instructions for the manual of arms, firing and marching individually and in units, and the organization of the Army in garrison posts and encampments. The Treatise provided details of many different ceremonies as well as extensive explanations of the appearance, duties, and conduct of officers. Specific NCO instructions were rare. Most involved the support given to officers in the execution of their duties. The most detailed instructions included NCO duties during parades, and marching, and duties required during guard duty. There was no guidance for the selection, promotion, or training of NCOs. The Treatise explicitly stated

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9Ibid., 180-186.
officers are responsible for the training of Soldiers and units.\textsuperscript{11} The next influence examined is Prussian.

General Friedrich Wilhelm Ludolf Gerhard Augustin Baron von Steuben first standardized NCO duties and responsibilities for the United States Army in 1779 when he published his \textit{Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States}. The \textit{Regulations} represented Prussian methods of organization and training. General von Steuben’s work served as a basis for NCO duties for the next thirty years. In four brief pages, this document described the duties of the sergeant major, quartermaster sergeant, first sergeant, sergeant, and corporals. This information was in the form of guidance, with no step by step instructions for NCOs. There was no guidance for the selection or training of NCOs. The majority of the manual consists of step by step instruction for the manual of arms, battle formations, and marching. General von Steuben was intimately familiar with Prussian drill and tactics and he adopted them to the nature of American society\textsuperscript{12} The American military tradition was also influenced by the French.

In 1812, the War Department published an English version of \textit{Les Réglements Concernant l’Exercise et led Manoeuvres de l’Infantrie, du ler. Aout 1791} translated from French and abridged by General Alexander Smyth.\textsuperscript{13} The next year the \textit{Handbook of Infantry Tactics} was written by William Duane and published by the War Department.\textsuperscript{14} Both these documents

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\footnotesize
  \bibitem{Duane} Fisher, \textit{Guardians of the Republic}, 47-48; William Duane, \textit{A Handbook for Infantry: Containing the First Principles or Military Discipline, Founded on Rational Method: Intended to Explain in a Familiar and Practical Manner, for the Use of the Military Force of the United States, the Modern Improvements in
represented French methods of instruction and organization reflective of the recent French Revolution and Napoleonic warfare.\textsuperscript{15} Neither of these documents replaced von Steuben’s \textit{Regulations}. Brevet Major General Winfield Scott codified the two previous French influenced manuals with what was known as “Scott’s Exercises” or “the system of 1815” which supplanted von Steuben’s instructions.\textsuperscript{16}

The \textit{Abstract of Infantry Tactics}, published in 1829, provided directions for the instruction of NCOs. This book ensured NCOs had the practical knowledge to instruct their Soldiers in movement, firing, and exercises.\textsuperscript{17} The above-mentioned documents provided for operational training of NCOs, but there was no formalized school system to date. The first sergeant conducted training newly promoted NCOs. The captain of the company was ultimately responsible for ensuring NCOs were trained. The field-officers and adjutant were responsible to provide practical and theoretical instruction to NCOs. The \textit{Abstract of Infantry Tactics} did not describe any of the training the these NCOs should receive.\textsuperscript{18} Colonel William Hardee published a manual in 1855 called \textit{Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics}. \textit{Infantry Tactics} was the primary manual for NCOs until the American Civil War. \textit{Infantry Tactics} was composed completely of step by step instructions for the maneuver and fighting of companies and battalions. There was no

\textsuperscript{15}Fisher, \textit{Guardians of the Republic}, 47.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., 47-48, 55-57, 60, 115.


material on the selection, training, or instruction of NCOs. This practice continued until the establishment of permanent NCO schools after World War II.

During the American Civil War, both armies benefited from the experience of immigrants who had experience in foreign armies, and veterans of the Mexican-American War. These men served similar to modern day drill sergeants except they resided at the unit level. While the instructional methods of the day saw more reliance on NCOs, company grade officers were still considered the primary instructors for their company. The only new publication for the instruction of NCOs and Soldiers was General Silas Casey’s work in 1862 titled *Infantry Tactics*, which was equally popular with Colonel Hardee’s earlier work. Casey reaffirmed that captains were the Primary trainers of the company and squads, but he directed that sergeants were responsible for training individual Soldiers. The reason for this was the lack of officers for training every individual Soldier.

The first major revision of NCO doctrine occurred when Captain M. B. Stewart of the eighth U.S. Infantry published his *Handbook for Noncommissioned Officers of Infantry* in 1903. A more modern form of von Steuben’s instructions developed in 1909 with the publication of *The NCO Manual*. This manual expanded on a number of ideas provided by von Steuben. It included instruction on customs and courtesies of the Army, and more technical aspects of modern

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21 Ibid., 117, 133-135.

22 Ibid., 116.

23 Ibid., 115.


The Manual for Noncommissioned Officers and Privates of Infantry of the Organized Militia and Volunteers of the United States superseded both these manuals in 1914. The War department published another version called The Manual for Noncommissioned Officers and Privates of Infantry of the Army of the United States in 1917. This manual led the American Expeditionary Force into combat in France with greater emphasis on offensive forms of maneuver, and cautioned enlisted men against insubordination toward NCOs.27

The first school established for training NCOs in the U.S. Army was the Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Virginia. This school was established in 1824. The next school for NCOs was the Signal School at Fort Whipple (later Fort Myers, Virginia) established in 1870.28 The Army required both these schools because some NCOs needed advanced technical knowledge in order to operate complex equipment, which had complex instructions. They were not leadership schools.29 There were several attempts to provide more education to NCOs but these all failed because Army leaders felt experience was the best instruction for NCOs.30 The Artillery School was closed in 1835, but was reopened in 1858. The Artillery School was temporarily suspended due to the Spanish-American War in 1898.

American NCOs did not have as much responsibility or technical competence as their foreign counterparts at the beginning of World War I in 1914.31 In addition, the overall experience level of NCOs degraded over time between the end of the Spanish-American War and the beginning of WWI due to the growth of the Army. During the war, units were stripped of half

27Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 186.
of their NCOs in order to constitute new units. New, inexperienced Soldiers were promoted to fill in the gaps in the NCO ranks. This diluting of experience and ability happened repeatedly in some instances. The War Department drafted some men from the National Guard, and due to their prior military experience, many were given immediate promotion to NCO and officer candidate ranks. While this did relieve some of the stress of growing the Army, it did so in a relatively insignificant way. Just over one percent of the federal military came from the National Guard during WWII. There was no formal institutional training for NCOs until WWI. General of the Armies John J. Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, directed the development of schools for NCOs after the commitment of American forces into WWI. He did this because he saw a difference between foreign and US NCO prestige and ability, and he wanted to fix this difference and relative lack of ability before Americans reached the front lines.

American experience of building up a large force rapidly in WWII was similar to WWI. The Army had to grow very quickly resulting in a dilution of experience and ability as the NCO corps grew to match the growth of the Army as a whole. Experienced NCOs were killed in combat and resulted in a further degradation of NCO experience and ability. In addition, NCOs accounted for twenty percent of the total enlisted force before WWII. During the war, not only

did the Army increase in size, but also the percentage of NCOs within that force grew to fifty percent. This was largely the result of changes in the structure, manning, and leadership of infantry squads. Officers selected Soldiers who showed potential for promotion to replace lost NCOs. Promotions occurred with little to no institutional training. General of the Armies John J. Pershing realized the overall reduction in experience and quality and saw the need for additional institutional training in order to improve NCO performance.

The beginning of the United States Army’s noncommissioned officer education system began during occupation duties in post war Germany. In June 1947, the United States Army Second Constabulary Brigade created an NCO school in Munich, Germany. In 1949, the seventh Infantry Division took over this school and designated it as an NCO academy. In 1957, the Army established force-wide standards for NCO training and education based off the NCO academy in Germany. This represented the birth of the Army’s NCO academy system. It was the first time the Army established a permanent system for institutional training and education for NCOs. Previous NCO schools only existed for short periods and for very specific reasons, such as

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the growth of the Army for WWI and WWII. The Army looked at other options for developing the NCO Corps.

The Army also focused on developing enlisted Soldiers through civilian education. Soldiers were encouraged to earn the equivalent of their high school diploma and in some instances took college courses to improve their academic background. By 1952, the Army also developed a system for enlisted Soldiers to receive academic credit for Army training and education.  

During the Korean War, the Army faced several issues. The president decided not to conduct a national military mobilization to deal with the Korean War. The National Guard and reserves did support the war effort, but not on a national scale. The active Army had to grow in order to fight in Korea. While this occurred, the Army also had to grow in size in order to fulfill congressional mandates to create a sizable military force in Germany to deter Soviet aggression in Europe. Because of the Korean War and this growth, there were not enough SGTs to fulfill all the needs of the Army. Very few Soldiers stayed in beyond their initial obligation, which made the shortage of sergeants even more acute. The manning issue was so pronounced the Army actually made an agreement with the Korean government to take some of their conscripts as conscripts as
enlisted augmentees to the United States Army. KATUSA Soldiers did not serve in NCO ranks but their presence was evidence of the overall manning issues within the enlisted force.\textsuperscript{43} The Army tried something new during the Vietnam conflict. The Army created a route for volunteers to go directly from basic training and advanced individual training to a new Noncommissioned Officer Candidate Course.\textsuperscript{44} After twelve additional weeks of training at an NCOCC, these Soldiers performed ten weeks of on-the-job training as a junior NCO in basic training companies. NCOCC graduates assisted drill sergeants with the instruction of recruits in basic soldiering skills. After this training and education, these SGTs deployed to Vietnam with no operational experience.\textsuperscript{45} The majority of senior NCOs looked down on these new Sergeants because they felt they reduced the prestige of the NCO corps. Many referred to these new NCOs with the derogatory title “Shake-n-Bake” sergeants or “Instant” NCOs.\textsuperscript{46} Sergeant Major of the Army William O. Wooldridge often heard some of the Army’s senior most NCOs griping about the poor quality of shake-and-bake sergeants, but he never once heard one of these alleged poor quality NCOCC graduates identified by name.\textsuperscript{47}

The first time the Army developed a permanent institutional system of noncommissioned officer professional military education was after the creation of the Training and Doctrine

\textsuperscript{43}This program still exists today, known as Korean Augmentees to the United States Army (KATUSA). KATUSA Soldiers are exclusively lower enlisted, the equivalent of E1 through E4. See also Donnelly, “The Best Army That Can Be Put in the Field in the Circumstances," 820-821.

\textsuperscript{44}Also known as the Noncommissioned Officers Course (NCOC) and the Infantry Noncommissioned Officers Course (INCO). See also Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 325-328; David H. Hackworth and Eilhys England, Steel My Soldiers' Hearts: The Hopeless to Hardcore Transformation of 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry, United States Army, Vietnam (New York: Touchstone, 2003), 429, 434; U.S. Department of the Army, FM 7-22.7, The NCO Guide, 15; Arms, A Short History of the Noncommissioned Officer, 38; Choudhri, "The NCO Candidate Course", 3-4; Elder, Educating NCOs, 21-24; Anderson et al., Implementing ARFORGEN, 45.

\textsuperscript{45}U.S. Department of the Army, FM 7-22.7, The NCO Guide, 15-16; Elder, Educating NCOs, 21-27; Anderson et al., Implementing ARFORGEN, 45.

\textsuperscript{46}Horton, The Shake 'N Bake Sergeant, 36; Elder, Educating NCOs, 25; Anderson et al., Implementing ARFORGEN, 45; ibid., 182-183.

Command (TRADOC) in 1973. During the decade that followed, TRADOC led the way for the Army transforming from a draft Army to an all-volunteer force and developed an entire system of institutional training for NCOs. \(^{48}\) The Army created courses for each NCO rank. It created the Sergeants Major Academy to train sergeants major and command sergeants major. The Sergeants Major Academy also had a First Sergeants Course that was later discontinued. It developed the Primary Leadership Development Course for brand new sergeants. The Army created the Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course and the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course for staff sergeants and sergeants first class respectively. \(^{49}\) Even with all this development, institutional education was not a prerequisite for promotion until 1986, and the Army suspended this requirement during periods of conflict in order to produce more Sergeants. \(^{50}\)

For more than sixty years, the Army lacked the required number of SGTs more than two-thirds of the time (See figure one). The x axis of figure one represents calendar years; the y axis in figure one shows the percentage of SGTs within the enlisted force by calendar year. The

\(^{48}\)Ibid., 13-16.

\(^{49}\)The Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) is now referred to as the Warrior Leaders Course (WLC). The Basic Non-Commissioned Officers Course (BNCOC) is now referred to as the Advanced Leaders Course (ALC). BNCOC had previously been referred to as the Primary Noncommissioned Officer Course (PNOC). The Advanced Non-Commissioned Officers Course (ANCOC) is now referred to as the Senior Leaders Course (SLC). See also Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 368; U.S. Department of the Army, FM 7-22.7, The NCO Guide, 13-16; Arms, A Short History of the Non-Commissioned Officer, 39; Andrew Sanders Ayers, "The "Shake and Bake" Noncommissioned Officer" (course paper, United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, 2007), 5; Rob Canterbury, "Transformation and the Professional Military Education System" (course paper, United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, 2007), 3-4; James Dewar et al., Expandability of the 21st Century Army (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2000), 6; Elder, "Shake and Bake"; Elder, Educating NCOs, 32-34, 37-38, 40-42; Maxwell, "Preparing the NCO Corps for the 21st Century," 40-42; Debbie Reed et al., An Effectiveness Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis of Registered Apprenticeship in 10 States (Oakland, CA: Mathematica Policy Research, 2012).

remaining one-third represents periods where the Army had the required number of SGTs, but this is a misrepresentation. Almost every year the Army had the required number of SGTs, it reduced the requirements for promotion and did not require institutional training before promotion due to lack of SGTs.\textsuperscript{51} This resulted in lower quality NCOs who were not truly qualified to serve as SGTs.

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Percent of SGTs within enlisted total end strength by year, 1954-2013}
\label{fig:sgt_percent}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source:} By the author based on data from the Defense Manpower Data Center\textsuperscript{52}


\textsuperscript{52}The NCO Professional Development Study established that SGTs represent eighteen percent of
The first major effort to study and reform the noncommissioned officer education system occurred during the Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Study (NCOPDS) published in 1986. The Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General John A. Wickham, Jr., commissioned the study because he felt the need for major changes in the education system for NCOs. This study was instructive in that it established the Army requirements for individual NCO competency, and made significant recommendations to overhaul the noncommissioned officer education system. Figure 2 depicts the seven requirements of an effective NCO as determined by this study.

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Figure 2. Requirements of an NCO

Source: Clifford Bernath.54

These requirements are instructive because potential candidates must have similar attributes before enlistment. The NCOPDS made forty-five recommendations to improve the Army noncommissioned officer education system. One of the most important recommendations the study repeatedly stressed was the requirement to train a potential NCO first, and then promote them to the new rank for utilization. The study referred to a paradigm of “train, promote, and utilize.”55 The Army implemented this recommendation in 1986, Soldiers had to graduate from PLDC before promotion to SGT.56 This is important because the research shows the Army repeatedly violated this requirement when it did not have enough SGTs from 1986 to present.57

- Job proficiency
- MOS competency
- Physical fitness/ military Baring
- Basic educational skills/ leadership skills
- Training skills
- Commitment to professional values/ attributes
- Responsibility and accountability of actions.

54Ibid., 48.
55Ibid., 168.
56Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 368.
57Tice, "Sergeant, Captains Top Manpower List; Tice, "NCO Promotions at Highest Level since 1999; Tice, "Sergeants Wanted; Tice, "A Banner Year; Tice, "Promotions Push Army Policy; Jim Tice, "Declining Sergeant Vacancies Mean Fewer NCO Promotions," Army Times, March 25, 2002; Tice, "Record Promotions; Tice, "Targeted Re-Enlistment Program Pay Off; Jim Tice, "PLDC Making Room for More Sergeants - 5,100 Need Class to Make Grade " Army Times, February 22, 1999; Tice, "NCO
Summary

The Army encountered numerous periods where they were short personnel in general, and SGTs specifically. This occurred due to growth and reduction from conflicts, economic and societal issues, and an inability to produce enough SGTs during periods of stability. In some cases, this lack of SGTs was due to natural variances and in others it is due to mismanagement and army wide administrative mistakes. When the Army had enough SGTs, most of these NCOs were not institutionally trained, and they lacked skills required to serve as NCOs. Based on the information presented above, the question arises, could the Army do better than it is doing now?

RESEARCH METHOD

This monograph uses a combination of content analysis and comparison, and historical analysis research methods to demonstrate a NCOCS program followed by an apprenticeship at a gaining unit can relieve personnel shortages of SGTs. It involves a review of the history of enlisted institutional training for the United States Army. It reviews the development of institutional training during major conflicts, and the development of a permanent system of institutional training after WWII. It looks at the growth and development of noncommissioned officer institutional training in the wake of the Vietnam War, and the trends associated with the requirement for this training for promotion.

This is followed by a detailed explanation of the invention and implementation of the Noncommissioned Officer Candidate Course. Then there is an analysis of the effectiveness of the program. Then, this monograph reviews the influence of the new Training and Doctrine Command on the institutional training of NCOs. This monograph examines the type of individual

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Promotions Hit Six-Year High."

that represents the ideal candidate for a potential new method of producing Sergeants. It looks at the baseline for civilian education, athleticism, and leadership. It identifies current military programs that draw on a similar pool of potential candidates and differentiates between ideal candidates for this new program and other competing programs. This monograph examines the Noncommissioned Officers Candidate Course during the Vietnam conflict. It looks at the effectiveness of the program and its strengths and weaknesses, and compares it to the present day Warrior Leaders Course. This forms the basis for a modern version of the Noncommissioned Officers Candidate School. Next, this monograph examines apprenticeship programs used in and out of the military. It will look at their apprenticeship effectiveness in transferring knowledge and skills. It will determine the ideal duration and composition of an apprenticeship program to produce a new SGT. It will also identify the prerequisites for mentors, and supervisors of this program, and the new NCOs it will produce. Next, this monograph examines when the Army will find this program useful. It will determine when the Army should implement it. It will determine to what degree this program will supplement or replace current selection, promotion, and education programs. Finally, this monograph will draw a conclusion about this potential program and make recommendations for future study and implementation of it throughout the Army.

WHAT HAS THE ARMY DONE BEFORE?

The Army repeatedly encountered periods of personnel shortage in the past. When faced with a crisis and during periods of stability, the Army has not been able to fill its junior NCO ranks to one hundred percent of the requirement. The Army used several methods for dealing with this problem. During earlier wars, regimental commanders would simply promote Soldiers to NCO ranks to fill the need, but this resulted in many NCOs with no additional skills to match
their newfound duties. In some cases, these new NCOs were just out of training and had no experience to match or justify their new rank. All training was “On the job training.” Friedrich von Steuben first standardized NCO duties and responsibilities in 1779 when he published his *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States*. In the last century, the Army developed schools in order to train new NCOs and give them the skills they needed to serve as leaders. The best example of a school that takes a brand new Soldier and turns him into a sergeant is the Noncommissioned Officers Course during the Vietnam War.

**Vietnam and a crisis of manpower and leadership**

Colonel Hackworth, in his self-promoting autobiography, took credit for the creation of the NCOCC. Colonel Hackworth, as an official representative of the Chief of Military History, accompanied retired General S.L.A. Marshall to Vietnam to assist in preparing and writing an official history of Vietnam for General Harold K. Johnson, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army. General Johnson and Marshall both felt that the Army and the nation had mismanaged the Vietnam War, and they both feared that the Army as an institution was failing to record and disseminate the lessons that could be learned from the conflict. Marshall’s task, while preparing

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the history, was to train officers in after action review (AAR) as he did during WWII.64 During their travels, S.L.A. Marshall and Colonel Hackworth came to several conclusions about the war effort.

S.L.A. Marshall and Colonel Hackworth’s most important conclusion is that the United States Army in Vietnam had completely run out of NCOs.65 Young draftees were running squads and old, experienced NCOs were rare. The NCO corps had been attritted by death and injury, and most surviving NCOs viewed the war as another Korea, a war the US did not intend to fight through to a complete victory. As a result, many of the most experienced NCOs were leaving the Army, and the Army’s institutional base was incapable of producing enough replacements to counter the loss.66 During the five years NCOCC produced sergeants, SGT reenlistment in the Army was below 10 percent three different years, and all other NCO ranks experienced below normal reenlistment.67 Colonel Hackworth discussed this problem with an old friend of his, Colonel Hank Emerson, in the autumn of 1967, and by the end of the conversation, they had developed the idea behind the Noncommissioned Officer Candidate Course.68

Hackworth and Emerson modeled NCOCC after the Infantry Officer Candidate School (OCS), at Fort Benning, Georgia. They felt OCS graduates did a better job as platoon leaders in Vietnam because they had more hands on training.69 OCS graduates were commissioned as

64Hackworth and Sherman, About Face, 553-554.
68Hackworth and Sherman, About Face, 593-594.
69Ibid.
Second Lieutenants. They were meant to perform duties as a Platoon Leader, but due to shortages of officers, they often performed more senior company grade jobs like Company Commander.  

The US Army created the Noncommissioned Officers Candidate Course in 1968 to mitigate a severe shortage of SGTs in Vietnam. NCOC was modeled after the Officer Candidate School (OCS), which produced new officers from experienced, prior service enlisted men and new Soldiers. The program consisted of two phases, phase one included NCOC institutional training, phase two consisted of 10 weeks of practical experience training privates at basic training companies. NCOC was a twelve-week course Soldiers attended after completing their Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training. NCOC screened potential candidates based on the OCS criteria, except that NCOC accepted slightly lower IQ scores. At the time, there was a large population of individuals who could not enter OCS based on IQ scores who were deemed acceptable for NCOC. The first month of the course was the most difficult, mentally and physically. NCO candidates were subjected to intense physical and emotional pressure in order to elevate their ability to perform under combat conditions. During this period, the candidates participated in a three-week block of instruction provided by the Ranger Training Program. This course focused on combat skills and field craft to prepare candidates for field
conditions and combat in Vietnam. In essence, this block of instruction was a mini-Ranger course
tailored to the operational environment in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{74}

The remaining two months of NCOCC was structured similar to OCS. The high intensity
environment was maintained, but not to the same level as the first month of the course.
Instruction included leadership, communications, survival techniques, weapons, and infantry
combat leadership.\textsuperscript{75} The course also continued emphasizing physical conditioning, squad combat
drills, and bayonet fighting.\textsuperscript{76} The initial success of the Infantry NCOCC caused the Army to
implement two more schools for other branches.

The Army created three Noncommissioned Officer Candidate Courses. The first school
was the Infantry NCOCC was at Fort Benning, Georgia. The second school was the Armor
NCOCC at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The third school was the Artillery NCOCC at Fort Sill,
Oklahoma.\textsuperscript{77} The Infantry Noncommissioned Officer Candidate Courses produced over 20,000
Infantry SGTs and SSGs over five years, and all NCOCC courses produced just over twenty-six
thousand SGTs and SSGs.\textsuperscript{78} Table 1 shows the total number of NCOCC classes and graduates by
year as well as the number of casualties from each year group of the graduates.

\textsuperscript{74}Horton, \textit{The Shake 'N Bake Sergeant}, 38, 40; Ayers, "The “Shake and Bake” Noncommissioned
Officer", 1-2; Elder, \textit{Educating NCOs}, 24.

\textsuperscript{75}Horton, \textit{The Shake 'N Bake Sergeant}, 38, 40; Elder, \textit{Educating NCOs}, 24.

\textsuperscript{76}Horton, \textit{The Shake 'N Bake Sergeant}, 38; Fisher, \textit{Guardians of the Republic}, 325-326; Elder,
\textit{Educating NCOs}, 24.

Guide}, 15; Adams, "Shake and Bake", 3; Arms, \textit{A Short History of the Non-Commissioned Officer}, 38;
Choudhri, "The NCO Candidate Course", 3-4; Duane, "NCO Candidate Course", 5.

\textsuperscript{78}Horton, \textit{The Shake 'N Bake Sergeant}, 40; Elder, "Shake and Bake"; Richard L. Vaillancourt,
“NCOCC” (course paper, United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, 2004), 1.
Table 1. Infantry NCOCC classes, graduates, and casualties by year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>41 Classes</td>
<td>5,640 Graduates</td>
<td>453 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>49 Classes</td>
<td>6,572 Graduates</td>
<td>343 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>30 Classes</td>
<td>4,150 Graduates</td>
<td>192 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>17 Classes</td>
<td>2,595 Graduates</td>
<td>14 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>7 Classes</td>
<td>1,111 Graduates</td>
<td>1 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>120 Classes</td>
<td>20,068 Graduates</td>
<td>1,003 KIA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dr. Jerry Horton⁷⁹

Table one proves the Infantry NCOCC produced thousands of additional NCOs per year to fulfill Army requirements. The next topic is OCS.

Officer Candidate School was used as a template for the NCOCC.⁸⁰ OCS, during the Vietnam War, was a twenty-two week course that took both prior service enlisted men and recruits fresh out of basic training, and trained them to perform as officers. During OCS, candidates were given intense training on everything from Army leadership, to communications and logistics. OCS in the past was specialized, graduates of OCS at Fort Benning were infantrymen, and graduates of OCS at Fort Sill were artillerymen. The present day Branch Immaterial Officer Candidate Course is a twelve-week course, and is not branch specific.⁸¹ Once Soldiers graduated from OCS, they went to an officer basic course to receive branch specific instruction to prepare them for their specialization. Figure 3 shows the training schedule and topics for OCS as of 2012. This establishes the training topics and weekly schedule for NCOCS proposed later in this monograph.

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Next, this monograph discusses the requirements a person must fulfill to enlist and the differences between the average recruit and a potential candidate for NCOCS.

**Figure 3. OCS curriculum by week.**

*Source: John Best and Brian Severino.*

The Army recruits Soldiers based on standards which ensure weed out undesirable potential recruits.. In order to enlist in the Army a person must pass several screening criteria to ensure they are a person worth having in the Army. A recruit must have a clean criminal record, which indicates moral and ethical behavior. They must have a high school diploma, which

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82 John Best and Brian Severino, "Officer Candidate School Command Brief," (Fort Benning, GA: U.S. Department of the Army Officer Candidate School, 2012), 24.
indicates academic success and an ability to learn. They also cannot have physical conditions that preclude a level of physical fitness and conditioning needed in combat. The Army is also particular when it recruits potential officers.

There are those who said that the NCOs produced by NCOCC were not good leaders. Many senior NCOs claimed a “Shake-n-Bake Sergeant” was worthless, incapable of leading a squad of Soldiers in combat due to a lack of experience. Despite this belief and attitude, the vast majority of “Shake-n-Bake” sergeants served with distinction in Vietnam. Of the more than 20,000 graduates of the NCOCC, over 1,000 were casualties in Vietnam, and four were awarded the Medal of Honor. Colonel David Hackworth, a highly decorated officer who served in the Korean War and the Vietnam War said:

In 1968, the US Army was running out of sergeants in Vietnam. Throughout military history, at least as far back as the Revolutionary War, sergeants were the backbone of the Army. This shortage of sergeants meant disaster in Vietnam. The NCO candidate school was created to solve this serious problem by doing one thing – train [S]oldiers to lead men in combat. It was modeled after the Officer’s candidate school but streamlined to meet this critical need for leaders in half the time. Graduates were known as “Shake ‘N Bake sergeants” “Instant NCOs” since they got their rank fast from going to school.”

83When the Army cannot recruit enough Soldiers, some criminal convictions can be waived, and a GED is acceptable. See also Moore, "Low Quality Recruits", 6, 31-32.


86Horton, The Shake 'N Bake Sergeant, 3, 39-40; Elder, "Shake and Bake".

The chief complaint by most critics was the NCOCC graduates performed poorly in a garrison environment. There is some credibility to this criticism because NCOCC curriculum was entirely focused on tactical combat in Vietnam. The program included almost no instruction on maintaining discipline in a garrison environment.88

Colonel Hackworth acknowledged that NCOCC was never meant to develop the exceptional NCOs that the Army was accustomed to having. The course was meant to produce sufficient NCOs that were “Good enough” to win the war.89 Hackworth wanted to avoid a draftee private first class with no leadership training being placed in charge of a squad because there were no competent NCOs available.90 General Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, was concerned with the number of derogatory comments he heard from the field regarding NCOCC graduates. The unusually high combat casualty rate of 34 percent for graduates from the first class was also a concern.91 Johnson commissioned an investigative team he sent to Vietnam to determine the overall quality of NCOCC graduates. The team conducted their research by reviewing casualty figures and conducting extensive interviews from the platoon through the division level. The evaluation team concluded NCOCC was a very successful program despite the perverse hatred some senior NCOs and officers had for NCOCC graduates. NCOCC satisfied a critical need the Army was previously unable to fulfill. It got the Army through Vietnam by producing sufficient NCOs of acceptable quality.92 The Army may benefit from a similar program in the future, and there are several examples of similar programs in foreign armies.

88 Vaillancourt, "NCOCC", 3; Hackworth and Sherman, About Face, 636-636, 638; Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 327, 340.
89 Hackworth and Sherman, About Face, 594.
90 Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 325-327; Hackworth and Sherman, About Face, 593-594.
91 Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 328.
92 Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 327; Hackworth and Sherman, About Face, 594.
Foreign military insights

The Army spent a lot of time and money improving the governments and militaries of many nations that were at risk of communist revolution, or invasion by communist states. Some of the time and money were spent studying and improving upon foreign militaries’ enlisted men and their NCO corps. In particular, this monograph found evidence of security force assistance (SFA) activities in the South-East Asia area emphasizing study and improvement of NCO education. Foreign militaries used programs similar to NCOCC for recruitment and training of NCOs. These armies had difficulty filling junior NCO ranks due to their size, organization, or the nature of their military service. To solve these issues they developed programs that would take volunteers, send them through basic training, advanced individual training, and move them directly to an NCO school.93 There were also programs to take Soldiers who decided to make a career of the military and send them through the same program.94 Examples of these include Thailand, the People’s Republic of China, Israel, and Switzerland. The programs met varying degrees of success but each country found them useful and necessary depending on each country’s situation and needs at the time. These militaries required the use of universal military service or conscription due to the size of the nation and the nature of the threats to that nation. However, the method of recruitment is irrelevant: the fact that they produced NCOs out of recruits is what is instructive.

The Kingdom of Thailand is a constitutional monarchy that relies on conscription for its military forces.95 The vast majority of conscripts served a two-year obligation and are released from military service. Any conscript can reenlist at the end of their two-year obligation to become

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93Parker, "Front & Center," 246, 259.
94Ibid.
a career Soldier. Any volunteer may designate himself or herself as a career Soldier, before they are drafted. This includes brand new enlistees who have not yet attended basic training. Once a volunteer or re-enlistee volunteers for career status, they are sent to one of several Thai NCO schools. These schools last about three months and upon completion, the graduates are promoted to sergeant. New sergeants are sent to their first assignment. Prior service Soldiers are sent back to their original unit. China has a similar program, but with noted differences due to its communist nature.

The People’s Republic of China is a communist state that relies on selective compulsory service for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Draftees serve a two-year service obligation. The PLA did not have NCOs until as recently as 1999. Officers did the majority of duties that are usually reserved for NCOs in other armies, and because of this, there were a larger percentage of officers compared to western militaries. The vast majority of NCOs in the PLA are former conscripts who reenlisted after their two-year service obligation was over. Less than five percent of NCOs are recruited into the PLA without having served two years of conscripted service. These individuals are usually graduates of civilian universities or three-year technical colleges. They complete basic training and NCO school before promotion to sergeant. Israel also has an Army that requires conscription and uses an NCOCC like program.

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97David Johnson et al., Preparing and Training for the Full Spectrum of Military Challenges: Insights from the Experiences of China, France, the United Kingdom, India, and Israel (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 30-32.

98"The World Factbook 2013-14.".

99Almost one-third of the People’s Liberation Army is Officers. See also Johnson et al., Preparing and Training for the Full Spectrum of Military Challenges, 32.

The State of Israel is a parliamentary democracy that requires three years of compulsory service in its military forces beginning at the age of eighteen.\textsuperscript{101} Israel’s active enlisted force is entirely conscripted, which means it does not have NCOs who serve more than three years.\textsuperscript{102} Israeli Army Reserves have NCOs who serve many years and achieve greater levels of proficiency than their active duty counterparts. Active Army officers are required to do many of the tasks usually reserved for senior NCOs in the US Army. Most new Soldiers have an opportunity to become an NCO after three or four months at their first unit.\textsuperscript{103} Promising candidates are sent to one of several NCO academies throughout the country. There are no service academies in Israel so their officer corps is recruited and trained from NCOs in a similar fashion using similar schools focused on commissioned officer requirements.\textsuperscript{104}

Switzerland is a constitutional confederation that has long maintained neutrality in world conflict.\textsuperscript{105} The Swiss use universal military conscription into their reserves to deter aggression and ensure their continued neutrality. At the age of nineteen, qualified Swiss youth are formed into groups of about fifty for recruit training. At the age of twenty, Swiss youth attend four months of basic military training.\textsuperscript{106} Near the end of basic training, potential NCOs are identified and sent to an NCO school, which is one month long. If the Soldier graduates from this school, he is promoted to corporal and serves four months of active duty as an instructor in basic training. Once this is complete, the corporal joins his unit, and enters into reserve status. Switzerland used

\textsuperscript{101}The World Factbook 2013-14.”.
\textsuperscript{102}Johnson et al., \textit{Preparing and Training for the Full Spectrum of Military Challenges}, 211.
\textsuperscript{103}Israeli airborne units are special because every new Soldier attends the NCO school immediately after basic training. See also ibid; Gideon Shaker, "Becoming a Golani Soldier" http://onjewishmatters.com/2013/07/27/becoming-a-golani-soldier (accessed November, 24, 2013).
\textsuperscript{104}Johnson et al., \textit{Preparing and Training for the Full Spectrum of Military Challenges}, 211.
a similar process to select potential officers from the NCO ranks. Candidates are sent to a four-month long school. Those who successfully complete OCS spend four months active duty in a basic training unit and are commissioned lieutenants and sent to their unit in reserve status.107

NCOCC conclusion

The United States Army developed the NCOCC to produce NCOs in a time of critical need during the Vietnam War. When the Vietnam War ended, and the Army transitioned to an all-volunteer force. The critical need for junior NCOs abated. As a result, the Army cancelled the NCOCC program in 1972, but it used the program as a basis for the development of the Primary Noncommissioned Officer’s Course.108 Israel, China, Thailand, and Switzerland used similar programs for several decades to support the needs of their militaries. The key weakness of these programs is the belief held by senior military officials that NCOs produced by these schools lack real world experience. Senior NCOs, who earned their rank through long service, postulated and propagated this theory. Many Army leaders, during the Vietnam War, believed that the Army could not produce a SGT or SSG through schooling alone.109 The issue is it traditionally takes several years to produce a competent SGT, and this is time the Army usually does not have due to conflict or rapid growth.110

108Elder, Educating NCOs, 30-32; Fisher, Guardians of the Republic, 375, 379-381.
Problems with NCO training

Leadership ability takes time to develop in individuals.\textsuperscript{111} During modern times, the U.S. Army takes about three years to produce a competent SGT.\textsuperscript{112} Army promotions are dependent on qualification in a military occupational specialty and a combination of time in service (TIS) and/or time in grade (TIG).\textsuperscript{113} Time in service is the total amount of time the Soldier was a member of the military. Time in grade is the amount of time a Soldier held their present rank. The average recruit enters the Army as a private in the grade of E-1 (PV1), and takes a minimum of 34 months time in service to be considered for SGT. Some individuals enter the Army with advanced rank. This is either because they have a certain amount of college credit or they have achieved a youth leadership award that grants them advanced promotion.\textsuperscript{114} Advanced promotion is to the rank of private in the grade of E-2 (PV2), private first class (PFC) which is grade E-3, or to the rank of specialist (SPC) which is the grade of E-4. Depending on their rank, when they initially enter the Army, this small pool of individuals could make SGT quicker, in exceptional circumstances, in as little at sixteen months time in service. This establishes that it normally takes the Army three years to produce a SGT, but that the Army has an acceptable method of producing a SGT in as little as sixteen months.


\textsuperscript{113} U.S. Department of the Army, AR 600-8-19, Enlisted Promotions and Reductions, 15.

\textsuperscript{114} Examples of youth leadership awards include the Boy Scouts of America Eagle Scout rank, and the United States Air Force Auxiliary Mitchell Award. Graduates of Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps programs also fall into this category. See also U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 601-210, Active and Reserve Component Enlistment Program, 2013. 16.
A Soldier went through a relatively short amount of institutional training during the normal three-year period between recruitment and promotion to SGT. A brand new recruit at the Maneuver Center of Excellence stayed about one week at the reception station, ten weeks in basic combat training, and three to five weeks in advanced individual training. Basic Training and AIT qualifies the Soldier in their MOS. Next, the Soldier went to his first unit. He was promoted according to his TIS and TIG. If a Soldier showed potential for promotion to SGT, the owning unit sent him to the Warrior Leaders Course, a four-week course that qualifies the Soldier for promotion to SGT. The Soldier was then considered for promotion to SGT when they reached the appropriate TIS and TIG. This means that the Army traditionally requires an infantry SGT to have only seventeen to nineteen weeks of institutional training out of three years of service. The rest of this time (about two-and-a-half years) is spent in the operational Army as a member of a unit. They are constantly supervised by NCOs and officers and repeatedly subjected to formal and informal mentorship, training, coaching, and counseling.

Apprenticeship, mentorship, internship, and on-the-job training

Mentorship can take many forms. Humans used mentorship throughout history. As human culture and knowledge developed, knowledge was shared between individuals of a society. Habitualization and institutionalization transferred the knowledge to succeeding

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generations. As more and more knowledge was discovered, society stratified into castes, and specialized occupations. The knowledge within those occupations was initially transferred via an apprenticeship. A master artisan took a young person as an apprentice and, in the course of helping the master artisan; the youth would learn the knowledge the artisan had available. Specialized knowledge passed on to a specialist in the next generation. Peter Berger, pre-eminent American sociologist, refers to this as an intermediate form of re-socialization or secondary socialization. A person’s family and community institutionalize the youth into the society, and then he receives a second socialization as an apprentice to a master artisan. In some ways, this is similar to on the job training (OJT).

OJT is similar to apprenticeships, but the two have clear delineations. Apprenticeship is meant to take a non-specialist and develop his skills and abilities, through hands on experience, to make him an artisan in a craft. OJT is meant to take a person who has some level of specialization, and develop greater ability in that specialization. Training the individual in one single task usually does this. OJT is the process an average Soldier undergoes to prepare them for promotion. Duration is also important; OJT could be the training of one limited skill in a day while some apprenticeships could last years. By definition, knowledge is transferred between two individuals in both OJT and apprenticeship.

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There are more modern versions of apprenticeship. Attending physicians graduated from medical school and completed an apprenticeship known as a residency. Most vocational technology schools were regimented forms of apprenticeship. The vast majority of modern apprenticeship programs were in the construction and automotive repair industries.\textsuperscript{121} In the United States, about fifty percent of carpenters graduated from a certified apprenticeship program.\textsuperscript{122} Graduates of these programs usually received better salaries than non-graduates with the same specialization, but apprenticeships do not just benefit the student.\textsuperscript{123}

The benefits of apprenticeship are many. Businesses that sponsored an apprentice program enjoyed greater profits, higher quality work, a safer workplace, higher employee satisfaction, better employee loyalty, and better community relations.\textsuperscript{124} Highlighting an apprenticeship program was one of the best ways to publicize a business. This made stronger ties between the community and a business, and boosted the revenue of the business locally. Apprentices were seven-and-a-half percent more productive than non-apprentices and they made


more money than non-apprentices over the course of a career.\textsuperscript{125} Additionally, apprenticeship was one of the best ways to fill a shortage of skilled labor.\textsuperscript{126} Many programs in third world countries emphasized improvement of the individual as a whole. This emphasis led to the development of programs within apprenticeships that improved literacy, and gave the apprentice basic skills necessary to participate in business.\textsuperscript{127} Apprenticeship programs are often partnered with trade unions to increase union participation.\textsuperscript{128} Many apprenticeship programs are also partnered with local school districts or community colleges to reduce the costs associated with providing classroom instruction.\textsuperscript{129} Many apprenticeship programs also achieved higher education accreditation assisting participants in earning an Associate’s degree or contributing to a Bachelor or Masters degree.\textsuperscript{130}

Apprenticeship had some detractors. Possibly the biggest detractor was perception. Apprenticeship was associated with the indentured servant systems of the early modern era.\textsuperscript{131} Most American secondary schools are expressly preparing their students for college;

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{126} Florida Department of Education, "Benefits of Apprenticeship"; Erica Smith, "Australian Employers' Strategies to Improve the Quality of Apprentices," \textit{Education + Training} 49, no. 6 (2007): 462.
  \item \textsuperscript{127} Evawoma-Enuku and Mgbor, "National Directoratae of Employment's Open Apprenticeship Sheme in Nigeria," 330, 335; Rudney, "Automobile Mechanic Apprenticeship Program," 20.
  \item \textsuperscript{128} Glover and Bilginsoy, "Registered Apprenticeship Training in the US Construction Industry," 338, 343; Rudney, "Automobile Mechanic Apprenticeship Program," 20.
  \item \textsuperscript{130} Glover and Bilginsoy, "Registered Apprenticeship Training in the US Construction Industry," 344-345.
  \item \textsuperscript{131} Ibid., 343., Alison Fuller and Lorna Unwin, "What Counts as Good Practice in Contemporary Apprenticeships?: Evidence from Two Contrasting Sectors in England," \textit{Education + Training} 49, no. 6 (2007): 448. 448
\end{itemize}
apprenticeship for a trade is viewed as an academic failure for a school and school district.\textsuperscript{132} Another is attrition. About thirty percent of all apprentices fail to complete their program of instruction for various reasons, which is lower than the failure rate for college students.\textsuperscript{133}

Apprentice attrition depended on several factors. Trainees tend to fail more when they had a low level of educational attainment and if they were unemployed before entering into the apprenticeship. Most trainees left their apprenticeship within the first three months of the program.\textsuperscript{134} In addition, apprenticeships composed entirely of OJT type pedagogy tended to have higher attrition rates.\textsuperscript{135} Successful apprenticeships had a combination of theoretical instruction and practical hands on training. This combination was usually twenty percent classroom, and eighty percent hands on.\textsuperscript{136} Trainees usually start with a significantly lower wage compared to a journeymen craftsman (typically fifty percent during the first year). This is another reason for early attrition.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{132} Fuller and Unwin, "Good Practice in Contemporary Apprenticeship," 448. Hamilton, \textit{Apprenticeship for Adulthood}, 13, 75.

\textsuperscript{133} This is less than comparable attrition rates in higher education. According to the Department of Education only about twenty percent of students who enter an Associate degree program complete it within three years, and only forty percent of students who begin a Bachelor degree program finish it within six years. See also William G. Bowen, Matthew M. Chingos, and Michael S. McPherson, \textit{Crossing the Finish Line: Completing College at America's Public Universities} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 83; Roger Harris and Michele Simons, "Exploring the Notion of Retention in Apprenticeship," \textit{Education + Training} 47, no. 4/5 (2005): 354; Jean Johnson et al., \textit{With Their Whole Lives Ahead of Them: Myths and Realities About Why So Many Students Fail to Finish College} (New York: Public Agenda and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 2009), 2; Reed et al., \textit{An Effectiveness Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis of Registered Apprenticeship in 10 States}, 30-31; Smith, \textit{Apprenticeship Program Is Beneficial, but Its Ability to Meet State Demands Is Limited}.

\textsuperscript{134} Harris, "The US Zone Constabulary", 354.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 354-355; Darryn Snell and Alison Hart, "Vocational Training in Australia: Is There a Link between Attrition and Quality?," \textit{Education + Training} 49, no. 6 (2007): 509.


An effective apprenticeship system tends to have the following features. A workplace setting that is used as a learning environment. Curriculum must link work place experience to academic learning. The program must give youth constructively ambiguous roles as workers and learners with real responsibilities. The work place should foster close relationships between youth and their adult mentors. \(^{138}\) A balance of classroom and work experience is important. Too much classroom instruction and the student acts more like a pupil, they do not learn from having responsibilities. Too much emphasis on work and the student is being exploited and does not learn as much. \(^{139}\) Apprenticeships are similar to internships, but they have clear differences.

A program of OJT training for white-collar jobs defines internships. \(^{140}\) Internships may be paid or unpaid, and paid internships are usually at a salary below that of a full employee. \(^{141}\) Internships usually last three- to six-months and they are often used by businesses as a method of evaluating a potential employee for employment. \(^{142}\) Internships are meant to take someone who achieved an academic goal and transition them into the workplace by broadening their knowledge base and providing them an opportunity to gain vital experience in a career field. Unfortunately, internships lacked any form of standardization or oversight, which leaves the term vulnerable to broad application. Internships are differentiated from apprenticeships in that internships were often for shorter duration, typically three-months to one year, but there was greater potential for an intern to become an employee at the end of the program. Internships are similar to

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\(^{139}\) Ibid., 62; Margaret A. Miller, "Intellectual Apprenticeship," *Change* 38, no. 3 (2006): 6.

\(^{140}\) Apple Inc., *Dictionary*.


apprenticeships in that they were both meant to develop skills and provide hands on experience in a career field.\textsuperscript{143} Internships were also known for abuse by the parent company. Interns were unpaid or paid below the level of work they performed. This abuse is so common that congress recently passed legislation to counter unethical companies taking advantage of their interns.\textsuperscript{144}

The United States military used apprenticeship programs and internships in a variety of ways. These are usually associated with development of a specialization or specific category of skills. The United States Navy used internships to develop supply officers with specialized skills in petroleum management, contracting, and political liaison as part of a master’s degree producing program.\textsuperscript{145} Some Army Military Police battalions developed internship programs with local civilian police in order to increase the military police officer’s level of experience in community policing and community relations.\textsuperscript{146} The United States Air Force experimented with internship programs to work in an active duty environment while still a cadet in ROTC.\textsuperscript{147} The US Army marketed the Reserve Officer’s Training Corps Leader’s Training Course as an internship in an effort to boost participation and recruitment.\textsuperscript{148} The Army also has a three-year program that takes officers through a university to earn a Master’s degree and then utilizes them in two internships, one in the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Department of Defense staff, and one in the


\textsuperscript{144}U.S. Department of Labor, \textit{Fact Sheet #71}, 1-2.


\textsuperscript{146}Lisa Baum, "Civilian Policing Internship," \textit{Military Police Journal} 1, no. 12 (2012).

\textsuperscript{147}Doug Kveene, "Air Force Internship Program," \textit{The Officer} 74, no. 9 (1998): 54.

Department of the Army. Historically, the Army had an extensive apprenticeship program for mechanics, electricians, carpenters, and other MOSs. This program was discontinued and replaced by more extensive AIT programs.

Outside of apprenticeships, internships, and on the job training, merely having held a job was beneficial for most youth. Employment while attending secondary school helped to develop responsibility, accountability, social skills, punctuality, diligence, and leadership potential. These are a set of characteristics described by the German word arbeitstugende, which means work ethic, or virtues of work. Work ethic is critical for a potential NCO, but there are other virtues that modern employment encouraged and potential NCOs required: social interaction skills, the ability to continue learning, and the ability to be supervised. These were skills modern employment developed in potential NCOs. Therefore, prior successful employment was a positive criterion for potential leadership. In addition to successful employment, volunteer community service and participation in youth leadership programs gave youth a chance to develop work ethic.

Volunteer work provided a critical opportunity to gain experience, boosted youth ability to work with others, prepared them to work in a hierarchy of leadership, and greatly developed their sense of responsibility. Volunteer service developed youth leadership ability and prepared them for positions of responsibility over others. These programs developed youth who tend to act as leaders in a community. Volunteer service tended to improve punctuality and reliability among participants, and promoted a sense of citizenship. Volunteer work prepares youth for entry

149 Hamilton, Apprenticeship for Adulthood, 14.
150 Walker, Phase III, 1, 13, 20, 65.
151 Hamilton, Apprenticeship for Adulthood, 14.
153 Hamilton, Apprenticeship for Adulthood, 14.
into the paid workforce, and helped youth determine the type of employment they desired. Essentially, volunteer work functioned like an exploratory form of apprenticeship. One form of volunteer service emphasized development of leadership skills, youth leadership programs.

Youth leadership programs like the Boy Scouts of America, Girl Scouts, The United States Air Force Auxiliary, 4H, and Junior ROTC produced millions of youth with exceptional leadership skills and potential. This monograph looked at the Boy Scouts as a representative organization for youth leadership programs. Eagle scouts are over sixty percent more likely to volunteer in their community. Eagle scouts are seventy-six percent more likely to hold a leadership position in the community and fifty-five percent more likely to hold a leadership position in the workplace when compared to non-scouts. In addition to leadership training, participants had a long history of volunteer service associated with scout membership.

President Ronald Reagan recognized the value that youth leadership programs had for the nation.

I applaud your many efforts and programs encouraging character development and leadership among American youth. By sponsoring many useful physical, mental, and social activities designed to promote self-responsibility, the Scouts strengthen the cornerstone of individual freedom in our nation. These programs develop the youngster’s confidence in his ability to deal with nature, society, and a challenging world.

154Ibid., 43.
155Ibid., 44.

157Jang et al., Eagle Scouts, 15-16.
WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE

The Army needs a Noncommissioned Officer Candidate School (NCOCS). This need is based on the demonstrated historical inability of the Army to produce enough trained and experienced SGTs during periods of growth or conflict. This section of the monograph proposes a new school structured after NCOCC called NCOCS. The number of classes and participants in NCOCS can vary depending on the degree of need. Since WLC and OCS were not branch specific, NCOCS is not branch specific. NCOCS is composed of four phases, phase zero includes preparatory training conducted via distant learning before a candidate enters into military service, phase one includes institutional training including basic training and advanced individual training, phase two includes NCOCS, phase three is an apprenticeship at a gaining unit. Phase zero is not mandatory. It is meant to prepare a candidate with no exposure to the military for military life.

NCOCS curriculum should be structured after OCS, it should be only twelve weeks long, and it is focused on leadership skills at the squad level. Curriculum should include administrative and logistics processes at the platoon and company level and familiarize students with military law, non-judicial punishment, and the uniformed code of military justice. Other blocks of instruction should include leadership, communications, wilderness survival and field craft, land navigation, first aid, advanced weapons marksmanship, the Army enlisted promotion system, supervision of subordinates, counseling of subordinates, and army writing.
Table 2. Proposed NCOCS curriculum.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week 1</th>
<th>Week 2</th>
<th>Week 3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial APFT</td>
<td>Call for fire trainer</td>
<td>Planning and supervision classes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confidence course</td>
<td>Writing</td>
<td>Military justice</td>
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<td>Class opening activities</td>
<td>Rule of engagement</td>
<td>Ethics</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Military intelligence</td>
<td>Personnel management systems</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cultural awareness</td>
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<td>Week 4</td>
<td>Week 5</td>
<td>Week 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Troop leading procedures</td>
<td>Supply management</td>
<td>History</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPORD development</td>
<td>Training management</td>
<td>Warrior tasks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrain walk</td>
<td>Military justice</td>
<td>Battle drills</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactics and operations</td>
<td>Ethics</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Personnel management systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>Week 7</td>
<td>Week 8</td>
<td>Week 9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Field leadership exercise I</td>
<td>Field leadership exercise II</td>
<td>Field leadership exercise III</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fire team battle drills and tasks</td>
<td>Squad operations</td>
<td>Platoon operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land navigation</td>
<td>Patrol base operations</td>
<td>10 mile tactical foot march</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tactical assembly area operations</td>
<td>Redeployment and recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Week 10</td>
<td>Week 11</td>
<td>Week 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simulations training</td>
<td>Mentor sessions</td>
<td>Out processing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mentor sessions</td>
<td>Soldier team development</td>
<td>Graduation formal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial management briefings</td>
<td>Noncommissioned officer seminars</td>
<td>Graduation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Final inspection</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: By the author based on NCOCC and OCS curriculum

The ideal candidate for NCOCS should be a high school graduate with strong academic performance and demonstrated potential for leadership positions. They should maintain a high grade point average and they should have high enumeration on the ASVAB test. They must have some level of demonstrated leadership potential. Candidates could demonstrate this by graduating from a Junior ROTC program, being a member of their high school student leadership, being a captain of a high school sports team, or having achieved a youth leadership award. They are physically fit having been a member of their high school band or a high school sports team. They may have some amount of college credit although that is not required, and they are competitive for acceptance to most colleges. They should not require any form of waiver for criminal
background, or physical or mental disqualifier. In addition, holding a job in the secondary services market is also beneficial although not required. This is more stringent than the basic criteria for an average enlistee.

Once a Soldier graduates from NCOCS, they should travel to their gaining unit. There, they enter into an apprenticeship, are promoted to corporal, and are assigned as a team leader with one experienced squad leader as a mentor for the duration of the apprenticeship. The Soldier would receive OTJ training from their mentor, and gains vital hands on experience in the operational army. The apprenticeship should cover certain material in order to ensure the candidate has the necessary skills to succeed when the apprenticeship is complete (see figure 4). After at least six months, the unit leadership considers the Soldier for attendance at a local NCO promotion board. If the Soldier passes the board, he is promoted to SGT and is considered as having completed the entire NCOCS program.

- Counseling, and supervising subordinates.
- Scheduling, planning, preparing for, and executing Sergeant's Time Training.
- Physical fitness and military bearing.
- Supply accountability at the platoon and squad level.
- Basic rifle marksmanship instruction.
- 20 level MOS specific skills.
- Sergeant of the quarters and staff duty NCO.
- Supervision vehicle and equipment maintenance.
- Other training as determined by the gaining unit.

Figure 4. Proposed apprenticeship curriculum

Source: By the author based on curriculum from NCOCC and OCS.
The NCO selected as the candidate’s mentor must be the highest quality leader available, and it is critical that they remain together for the duration of the apprenticeship. The ratio of mentors to mentees should be no greater than one mentor to two mentees. A low quality mentor limits the potential of their subordinates. Furthermore, repeatedly reassigning the candidate to different mentors degrades their potential for success. Mentorship is an investment in an individual and can pay huge dividends down the road for the Army, and mentoring can be a deeply rewarding experience. It is critical that the mentor have the interests of his new mentee at heart. Successful program completion should be an exceptional discriminator for the mentor during evaluations. Effective mentorship consists of counseling, coaching, and mentoring. Dr. Ted Thomas explained the relationship between counseling, coaching, and mentorship.


160 U.S. Department of the Army, Army Mentorship Handbook (Rosslyn, VA: Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, 2005), 5.


162 Dr. Ted Thomas and Jim Thomas, Mentoring, Coaching, and Counseling: Toward a Common Understanding (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Command), 4.
Mentoring looks at the future and at potential; coaching looks at the present and how to improve to a future state and is more skill focused; and counseling looks at the past and how to improve for the future. Counseling is part of coaching, and coaching is part of mentoring.

An exceptional mentor can also influence the candidate’s likelihood of reenlisting. See Figure 5 for a graphic representation of the nested nature of counseling within coaching, and coaching within mentorship.

Figure 5. Graphical representation of mentorship and component parts with respect to time.

Source: Dr. Ted Thomas and Jim Thomas.

If the Soldier is not considered for promotion to SGT within twelve months after arriving at their first unit, they should retain their present rank and stay at the unit for the remainder of their enlistment. If the candidate establishes a pattern of misconduct the unit could discipline them using counseling, non-judicial punishment, or UCMJ. If a candidate demonstrates indiscipline requiring non-judicial punishment the gaining unit can remove them from the internship and punish the Soldier accordingly. This can include all punishments available under

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164Thomas and Thomas, Mentoring, Coaching, and Counseling, 4.
non-judicial punishment and, depending on the severity of the infraction, court-martial. Should they reform, they are considered a WLC graduate and they can be considered in the future for promotion to SGT depending on the nature of their previous indiscipline.

This monograph found evidence that Infantry Soldiers could use Ranger School in lieu of NCOCS for the institutional portion of this program. A Division level Command Sergeant Major described Ranger School as a premier leadership course for the United States Army. 165 It is possible that an infantry Soldier who graduated from Ranger school could attend WLC and enter into a phase three apprenticeship similar to NCOCS proposed above. Alternatively, an NCOCS style program could be used as the primary method for attaining required SGTs for the army.

The Army invested millions of dollars in distance education capabilities at all levels of leadership. 166 It is possible that a prospective candidate in a no-pay status enters a preparatory course delivered by distance learning before a candidate enters into military service. This makes the classroom instruction easier, gives the candidate some familiarity with classroom subjects covered in NCOCS, and increases the potential for retention. In addition, JROTC could adapt its curriculum for senior cadets who enlist under the delayed entry program for NCOCS.

CONCLUSION

The United States Army has a systemic inability to produce enough SGTs. This is a historic problem and occurred repeatedly due to many factors. It occurred due to combat loss. The Army had issues during past wars when it could not replace the high quality NCOs it lost in combat. The Army had retention difficulties. This occurred because the Army fought wars that

165 Command Sergeant Major Michael A. Grindston, Command Sergeant Major for the First Infantry Division, once said, “Ranger School is a leadership school. If I had my druthers, I would send a Soldier to Ranger School over PLDC any day. The skills he would receive and his ability to lead when he got back would be superior in every way.”

lost popular support and the wars were fought without national mobilization. This also occurred
due to growth of the Army. Because of combat requirements and strategic threats, the Army had
to grow very rapidly. As a result, units were stripped of experienced NCOs in order to constitute
new organizations.

The Army used a variety of methods to deal with these issues. Commander’s used to
promote the senior most individual, or an individual showing the greatest leadership potential to
fill a vacancy, but this occurred with little or no training. The Army developed temporary NCO
schools to prepare junior leaders for their newfound positions of responsibility. The Army tried to
adapt an existing school for officers, to produce NCOs from a population of new volunteers who
showed potential as leaders. The Army eventually developed a large institutional system of
schools to prepare Soldiers for future positions of responsibility. In 1986, the Army made a
paradigm of professional military education, based on the NCOPDS, referred to as “Train,
promote, and utilize” a requirement, but it suspended this requirement during periods of
personnel shortage. The system the Army uses today still follows this model, but it failed to
produce the required number of trained and experienced SGTs for the past sixty years of its
history.

Foreign nations used methods similar to the NCOCC model from Vietnam. Although the
examined foreign militaries required universal military service or conscription, they demonstrate
that a force can institutionally train NCOs. China recruits and trains about five percent of its
NCOs with this type of program. The Israeli Army trains all its NCOs using a program that is a
hybrid of the U.S. Army’s Vietnam era NCOCC. All Israeli Soldiers were evaluated during the
first few months at a new unit. Soldiers demonstrating leadership potential were sent to an NCO
school for training and promotion. Israeli airborne units use a method identical to NCOCC,
except every airborne Soldier was sent to NCO school immediately after basic training and
advanced individual training. Thailand uses a program similar to Israel’s hybrid model. The Swiss also use a program similar to the Israelis.

The Army still cannot produce enough SGTs. The current draw down of personnel will mask the problem and hide it within the statistics of enlisted personnel strength. At some point in several years, the Army will grow again, and this problem will reappear within the aggregate of data. If the Army does not look at a way to train more high quality SGTs in a shorter period of time it will resort to the practices of the past that resulted in a shortage of SGTs, or an abundance of SGTs who do not have required institutional training.

The status quo of the past is unacceptable. Present enlisted training and education models work, but they are not ideal, and they deal with adaptation poorly. The Army has an opportunity to leverage the leadership potential within the nation’s youthful population by creating a program that takes exceptional people and provides them with training and experience that more rapidly produces the leadership American Soldiers deserve. The potential produced by youth leadership organizations is strategically significant for America’s Future.

Using the NCOCS model, or a model like it, the Army could produce corporals using institutional training, and the gaining units can produce the SGTs they need through an operational apprenticeship. The gaining unit can have a fully qualified and experienced SGT in one-half to one-third of the time it normally takes to produce a SGT using traditional methods. Depending on the degree of need for SGTs, the Army could use this program to supplement, match, or even replace the normal methods of producing SGTs, providing junior NCOs that are good enough, and in the quantities sufficient to match the need.
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