TRANSITIONING TO OCCUPATION AND LIBERATION: WHAT WENT RIGHT IN WORLD WAR II AND WRONG IN IRAQ

A Monograph

by

MAJ Timothy Mahoney
United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2014-01

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
The occupation of Germany after World War II and the liberation of Iraq resulting from Operation Iraqi Freedom were two entirely different approaches to ending each conflict. The Army during World War II benefitted from several years of extensive whole of government planning and preparation for the transition from combat operations to military occupation in the European Theater. In approaching Iraq, political and military leaders neither prepared the policies nor provided the resources necessary to achieve the strategic objective. Additionally, the U.S. government and U.S. Central Command incorrectly framed the operation as a liberation. The liberation approach constrained the Army’s ability to control the environment, ultimately ceding the initiative gained through the invasion. The dissonance between the strategic objective and the strategic and operational planning and resourcing contributed to the early failures of the Army’s transition to stability operations.

The utility of comparing lessons from both conflicts is in the development of relevant recommendations for future military, and specifically Army planning and preparation for transitions from offensive operations to stability operations. Operation Iraqi Freedom revealed both the associated complexity and critical importance of planning for the transition from offensive to stabilization operations. U.S. Central Command primarily focused on planning and preparations for combat, and was ill prepared to transition to stability operations. Why were World War II civil affairs and military government operations in Germany successful and initial stability operations in Iraq not? Analysis of this question includes evaluations of U.S. national and strategic policy, military planning and resourcing, and Army doctrine from the time of each campaign.

As the major factor that led to success in World War II and failure in the early stages of Iraq, coherence at the national level is the starting point for any future campaign. At the national strategic level there must be a unity of purpose and effort, and common understanding of the objective between senior political and military leaders. There must also be a stronger linkage between U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and Combatant and Army Component Commands. Training and Doctrine Command has the ability to aid these commands in developing both their environmental understanding and operational approach. The Army would also greatly benefit from a stability operations training and resource center established at the Army’s Maneuver Support Center of Excellence at Fort Leonard Wood.
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ Timothy Mahoney

Monograph Title: TRANSITIONING TO OCCUPATION AND LIBERATION: WHAT WENT RIGHT IN WORLD WAR II AND WRONG IN IRAQ.

Approved by:

________________________________________, Monograph Director
Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D.

________________________________________, Seminar Leader
Michael J. Swanson, COL

________________________________________, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Henry A. Arnold III, COL

Accepted this 23rd day of May 2013 by:

________________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT
TRANSITIONING TO OCCUPATION AND LIBERATION: WHAT WENT RIGHT IN WORLD WAR II AND WRONG IN IRAQ, by MAJ Timothy Mahoney, 58 pages.

The occupation of Germany after World War II and the liberation of Iraq resulting from Operation Iraqi Freedom were two entirely different approaches to ending each conflict. The Army during World War II benefitted from several years of extensive whole of government planning and preparation for the transition from combat operations to military occupation in the European Theater. In approaching Iraq, political and military leaders neither prepared the policies nor provided the resources necessary to achieve the strategic objective. Additionally, the U.S. government and U.S. Central Command incorrectly framed the operation as a liberation. The liberation approach constrained the Army’s ability to control the environment, ultimately ceding the initiative gained through the invasion. The dissonance between the strategic objective and the strategic and operational planning and resourcing contributed to the early failures of the Army’s transition to stability operations.

The utility of comparing lessons from both conflicts is in the development of relevant recommendations for future military, and specifically Army planning and preparation for transitions from offensive operations to stability operations. Operation Iraqi Freedom revealed both the associated complexity and critical importance of planning for the transition from offensive to stabilization operations. U.S. Central Command primarily focused on planning and preparations for combat, and was ill prepared to transition to stability operations. Why were World War II civil affairs and military government operations in Germany successful and initial stability operations in Iraq not? Analysis of this question includes evaluations of U.S. national and strategic policy, military planning and resourcing, and Army doctrine from the time of each campaign.

As the major factor that led to success in World War II and failure in the early stages of Iraq, coherence at the national level is the necessary starting point for any future campaign. At the national strategic level there must be a unity of purpose and effort, and common understanding of the objective between senior political and military leaders. There must also be a stronger linkage between U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and Combatant and Army Component Commands. Training and Doctrine Command has the expertise, material, and training available to aid these commands in developing both their environmental understanding and operational approach. Additionally, the Army would greatly benefit from a stability operations training and resource center established at the Army’s Maneuver Support Center of Excellence at Fort Leonard Wood.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORLD WAR II: TRANSITION PLANNING, PREPARATION, AND EXECUTION</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANALYSIS OF WORLD WAR II TRANSITIONS</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF: TRANSITION PLANNING, PREPARATION, AND EXECUTION</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANALYSIS OF OIF TRANSITIONS</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFLCC</td>
<td>Coalition Force Land Component Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSSAC</td>
<td>Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORHA</td>
<td>Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASO</td>
<td>Stability and Support Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The unexpected termination of the war in the autumn of 1918 and the consequent occupation of German territory had not been foreseen until a relatively late date. For this reason no adequate preparations had been made to institute a civil government in the territory to be occupied. No corps of specially trained officers existed to handle civil matters and, in consequence, each American policy had to be developed bit by bit, with the inevitable mistakes and failures which must ever follow in the wake of lack of organization and inexperience.

—Colonel I. L. Hunt, Third U.S. Army Civil Affairs Officer, 1920¹

The occupation of Germany after World War II and the liberation of Iraq resulting from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were two entirely different approaches to ending each conflict. The successful occupation of Germany after the war resulted from a unified governmental effort to planning and preparation. Before the U.S. entry into World War II, there was critical thought on preparing for a potential post-war Europe, and the extent of U.S. participation. This early thought catalyzed into efforts across the government, including within the Army, to prepare the needed policies and resources to achieve the war’s objectives and set conditions for the post-war environment. These efforts culminated in the Army’s success in establishing the military and civil conditions necessary to retain operational momentum and initiative, and transition to the Allied occupation of Germany in 1945. The U.S. government chose a different approach for the campaign in Iraq, despite having a similar objective in the removal of the established government and its replacement by a new one.

In contrast to World War II, political and military leaders did not prepare the policies or provide the resources necessary to achieve the strategic objective for the campaign in Iraq. Additionally, the U.S. government incorrectly framed the operation as a liberation as opposed to the more appropriate military occupation. This enabled the Defense Department and U.S. Central

Command (CENTCOM) to assume that a high tempo campaign, conducted by a relatively small force, could remove the Ba’athist regime and then quickly leave the country to a new Iraqi government. In choosing a liberation approach the military, and primarily the U.S. Army, constrained its ability to control the environment, ultimately ceding the initiative gained through the invasion. The dissonance between the national objective and the strategic and operational planning and resourcing contributed to the early failures of the Army’s transition to stability operations. The utility of comparing the transitions in Germany and in Iraq is in the reflection on what enabled success in one and failure in the other.

Analyses of post war operations generally use the post-World War II U.S. military occupations of Japan and Germany as the standard to judge all others. The RAND Corporation’s 2003 book, America’s Role in Nation Building argues that this was due to the level of effort the U.S. government put into the planning and execution. These occupations were comprehensive efforts that enabled the military, primarily the Army, to commence reconstructing societies immediately after combat operations. The Army, however, during its initial operations in North Africa was initially reluctant to embrace a role not primarily focused on combat operations. This changed in 1942-1943 when military commanders found themselves dealing with issues associated with large civilian populations, and the overall stability of villages, towns, and cities. Commanders on the ground realized that ignoring civil concerns degraded their ability to conduct future combat operations.\(^2\) This lesson ensured the incorporation of stabilization considerations into overall military planning, as well as contributing to the unified governmental and military approach to transitioning from offensive operations to stability operations.

\(^2\)James Dobbins et al., America’s Role In Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), xix, 8-10.
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) revealed both the associated complexity and critical importance of planning for the transition from combat to stabilization operations. CENTCOM’s successful invasion of Iraq and removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime was an impressive exhibition of operational capability. Following this initial success however, was a period of intense struggle leading to the loss of overall momentum and initiative. A New York Times article from 11 April 2003, written by John Burns, captured the puzzlement of average Iraqis sensing something was missing after the overthrow of the regime. Burns wrote, “One Marine officer standing atop a tank at a checkpoint in east Baghdad said that he had been asked repeatedly by Iraqis why his unit had done nothing to stop the looting and that he had explained that he had no orders to respond.” In his book Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco, David Phillips wrote, “After the statue of Saddam was toppled in Firdos Square on April 9, 2003, Iraqis could not believe that the formidable U.S. military was able to vanquish Saddam’s Republican Guard yet lacked the capabilities to prevent looting and civil strife.” Absent from the Iraq war plan was a comprehensive governmental transition plan. There was no unifying plan with clear lines of authority and responsibility, combining the post-conflict work done by several U.S. government agencies, including the Departments of State and Defense. CENTCOM instead primarily focused on planning and preparations for offensive operations, and was ill prepared to transition to stability operations.

---

3U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 5-0, Joint Operational Planning (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), III-39. In joint phasing from Phase III (Dominate) to Phase IV (Stabilize).

4ADP 3-0 Operations defines initiative as, “To seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, Army forces strike the enemy, both lethally and nonlethally, in time, places, or manners for which the enemy is not prepared. To seize the initiative (setting and dictating the terms of action).” U.S. Department of the Army, ADP 3-0: Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2012), 5.


Why were World War II civil affairs and military government operations in Germany successful and initial stability operations in Iraq not? What were the differences in the approaches of the government and military in both campaigns that accounted for the different outcomes? Joint Publication (JP) 3-07: Stability Operations, published in 2011, clearly expresses the importance of stability operations in current Joint doctrine. “The conduct of stability operations is a core U.S. military mission that the Armed Forces are prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.” It does this while acknowledging the difficulty that the Joint Force experienced with stability operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Army doctrine similarly expresses the importance of stability tasks, “Winning battles and engagements is important but alone may not be the most significant…In many joint operations, stability or defense support to civil authorities’ tasks often prove more important than offensive and defensive tasks.” The lesson from Iraq, compared against the Army’s planning and resourcing efforts in World War II, was that the approach to a military campaign should include the transition from offensive operations to stability operations. Additionally, it should be a whole of government approach, to ensure a coherence from national policy through tactical execution.


7Civil Affairs were military operations in liberated countries, whereas military governments were operations conducted in occupied countries. The School of Military Government Charlottesville, Virginia, Cases & Material on Military Government (Monterey, CA: Civil Affairs Holding and Staging Area, 1945), 30.


Approaching the Problem of Post-Conflict Stabilization

Analysis of how the U.S. government and military approached planning for the post campaign periods includes evaluation of U.S. national policy, governmental planning, military planning, preparation, resourcing, and relevant Army doctrine. The Army doctrinal manuals relevant to each war provide a way to evaluate the planning and execution of transition from combat, as well as providing lessons learned for future military operations. For World War II the relevant manual was the 1940 Field Manual (FM) 27-5: Basic Field Manual on Military Government. For Iraq the relevant manual was the 2001 FM 3-0: Operations. FM 27-5 offered five policy objectives that every plan should conform to: Military Necessity, Welfare of the Governed, Flexibility, Economy of Effort, and Permanence. FM 3-0 had six considerations for planning and executing stability operations: leverage interagency, joint, and multinational cooperation; enhance the capabilities and legitimacy of the host nation; understand the potential for unintended consequences of individual and small unit actions; display the capability to use force in a nonthreating manner; act decisively to prevent escalation; and apply force electively and discriminately.

Using the criteria from each manual to analyze the plans and execution of transitions can help to determine what made Army forces successful, or conversely what hindered their success. The utility of comparing lessons from both conflicts is in the development of recommendations.

---

10Army Doctrinal Publication 1-02 definition of Doctrine: “Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” U.S. Department of the Army, ADP 1-02: Operational Terms and Military Symbols (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2012), Glossary-1.


for future military, and specifically Army planning and preparation for transitions from offensive to stability operations. The Army during World War II benefitted from several years of extensive whole of government planning and preparation for the transition from offensive operations in the European Theater, through the surrender and military occupation of Germany. Prior to the start of World War II, FM 27-5 provided the basis for planning the transition from offensive operations and the Army subsequently updated it during the war to account for lessons learned and needed changes. Most importantly, the Army was able to leverage the resources of the government, and guided by a coherent policy, modify its operational concepts to enable a successful transition from offensive operations to military occupation.¹³

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, neither CENTCOM nor the Coalition Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) had a comprehensive whole of government plan to guide the transition from offensive operations to stability operations. Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, there was also no comprehensive Army doctrinal approach to transition planning. FM 100-20: *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflicts* (1990) and FM 100-23: *Peace Operations* (1994) dealt with aspects of what would become stability operations, but did not frame them in a way to enable fluid transitions between phases. FM 3-0: *Operations*, published in 2001, introduced the concept of Full Spectrum Operations (offense, defense, stability, support) and stressed the importance of transitions between types of operations to maintain initiative. The Army published FM 3-07: *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (2003) just one month prior to the March 2003 invasion. This manual expanded on the discussion of stability operations from the 2001 FM 3-0, but its timing did not make it useful for planners or commanders. Coupled with a problematic doctrinal hierarchy, and lack of detailed whole of government plan, CFLCC’s

---

transition from offensive operations to stability operations was under resourced and haphazard. The inadequacy of CFLCC’s transition from offensive operations led to a loss of momentum, and overall U.S. initiative in Iraq during a critical time in the campaign.

**World War II: Transition Planning, Preparation, And Execution**

**Guiding Doctrine**

The doctrine that shaped the initial development of transition planning from combat was the July 1940 FM 27-5: *Military Government*. The War Department’s G1, Brigadier General William Shedd, recommended the publication of this manual to help address an identified gap in existing Army guidance on military government. Until that point, the only publication guiding post-combat operations was FM 27-10: *Rules of Land Warfare* (1934). This manual only addressed the legal aspects and requirements of a military occupation and not the execution. The publication of FM 27-5 addressed this gap.

The development of doctrine followed from lessons learned as Allied forces began transitioning from offensive to stability operations in North Africa and Italy. Most significant of these lessons was the control of civil affairs and military governmental operations. This focus emerged from confusion in North Africa between U.S. State Department administrators and military commanders concerning lines of authority and coordination responsibilities. The confusion resulted from a lack of clear standards of control and methods to coordinate operations with local civilian officials. The situation concerned General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allied

---


15Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, 7. The War Department JAG did not think a new manual was necessary believing that FM 27-10 addressed the Army’s current need. The War Department’s G1 and Provost Marshal General thought otherwise and recommended the new manual and the development of an associated Army training program.
Military Commander, enough that he wrote to General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, requesting his assistance in clearing up the situation. “No one is more anxious than General Clark and myself to rid ourselves completely of all problems other than purely military, but the fact remains that, at this moment and until North Africa is made thoroughly secure...everything done here directly affects the military situation.”16 The 1943 version of FM 27-5 clarified for the military its authority in the period immediately after a successful invasion.

The 1943 FM 27-5 makes clear the aspect of military control over liberated or occupied territory in a defined area of operations. The first page of the document stated, “The term ‘military government’ is used in this manual to describe the supreme authority exercised by an armed force over the lands, property, and the inhabitants of enemy territory, or allied or domestic territory recovered from enemy occupation, or from rebels treated as belligerents.”17 The FM also leaves the period of military control undefined, linking it directly to the fulfillment of national policy objectives. This version of FM 27-5 is critical for its recognition of the importance of the military in stabilizing an area during and immediately after offensive operations.

**European Transition Planning and Preparation**

U.S. government post-combat planning commenced in 1939 when the State Department began considering and studying potential scenarios. The department formed an Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations led by Undersecretary Sumner Welles. Welles enjoyed a close relationship with President Franklin Roosevelt and did not want him to be in a

---

16 In *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, Coles and Weinberg show, that the main source of this tension were several missions sent to North Africa by the U.S. State Department to address political and economic issues. Additionally General Eisenhower worried that the State Department degraded the unity of effort and authority in North Africa by having all of their missions and individuals report to Mr. Robert Murphy, the head of his Civil Affairs Division. See pages 30-65; Eisenhower concern on page 43. General Clark was Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, Eisenhower’s deputy commander.

17 FM 27-5, 1943, 1.
similar position as President Woodrow Wilson was in 1918-1919. Welles believed that the nation’s unpreparedness for the sudden end of World War I undermined President Wilson’s position in post-war negotiations. While focusing on political and economic matters, Welles believed that a strong military capability enhanced the nation’s pursuit of its overall objectives.\textsuperscript{18} There were occasionally military representatives at the State committee meetings, but by this point in 1939 U.S. policy was only in the earliest stages of development. Critical, however, was evidence of a burgeoning whole of government approach, and one that included considerations of the expected military role. Efforts to prepare for a post-war period within the War Department and Army General Staff began in 1940 with the publication of FM 27-5: \textit{Military Government} and the development of an associated training program. Framing the Army’s approach to planning for transition from offensive operations was its experience in World War I.

As Colonel L.L. Hunt made clear in his World War I Report, the American Expeditionary Force was unprepared for the task of occupation of enemy territory.\textsuperscript{19} This specifically influenced the Army’s Judge Advocate General, Major General Allen Guillon, who directed the development of FM 27-5 based primarily from Colonel Hunt’s report. Additionally, on 3 Dec 1941, the Army G1, Brigadier General Shedd, tasked the Provost Marshal General to establish a military government-training program. With Major General Guillon and the G1 as the best examples, there was a general recognition amongst many senior Army officers that the Army would be required to execute a military occupation. This notion came from the experience of World War I and an expectation that the Army would possess the most resources and capabilities in the immediate post-war period.\textsuperscript{20} Major General Guillon in a phone conversation with

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{18}Christopher D. O’Sullivan, \textit{Sumner Welles Postwar Planning and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937-1943} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), xiii, 43 - 45.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{20}Coles and Weinberg, \textit{Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors}, 12, 28.
\end{flushright}
Secretary of War Henry Stimson stated, “No doubt about it. If we’re going to win this war, we’re
going to have to occupy some countries.”21 The Japanese attack on 7 December 1941 catalyzed
the War Department’s planning and began the allocation of resources against developing plans.

In May 1942, the School of Military Government opened on the campus of the University
of Virginia in Charlottesville, under the direction of Brigadier General Cornelius Wickersham.
The course focused on educating soldiers and civilians on the laws of war, case studies of military
government, public administration, familiarization with geo-politics, and technical studies and
current issues.22 The school would alter its curriculum throughout the war as lessons learned
came in from the various theaters of war. The school proved to be very successful in providing a
core of trained soldiers and civilians for the future Army Military Government Detachments and
Corps and below staff G5s. The Army’s proactive actions concerning military government did
not occur, however, without bureaucratic conflict.

Many senior administration officials, to include at a time President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, did not believe that the military should have such a prominent role in a post-combat
period. In an October 1942 memorandum to Secretary Stimson the President stated, “The
governing of occupied territories may be of many kinds but in most instances it is a civilian task
and requires absolutely first class men and not second-string men.”23 President Roosevelt’s
attitude along with many others eventually changed based on three factors. First were the


22Office of the Provost Marshal General, *Office of The Provost Marshal General: World War II*
Become Governors*, 9-11. The military government-training program expanded throughout the war beyond
the school in VA and would include training for Military Police in Fort Oglethorpe, GA and military and
civilian specialists at several colleges and universities. These included the four month course in VA and a
thirty day Civil Affairs Training School at several military installations followed by two months at several
participating civilian universities (Harvard, Yale, Pittsburgh, Michigan, University of Chicago,
Northwestern, Wisconsin, Western Case, Stanford, and Boston University). Training also took place in

generally positive assessments of the military government training programs by several War Department Inspector Generals. Second was the participation of several high profile academic institutions in the training. Finally, and most significantly influencing the President and other senior leaders, were the experiences and lessons emerging from North Africa and the Mediterranean Theater.24

Planning for the Invasion of Europe

A brief description of the War Department and Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) efforts to establish civil affairs sections, and establish initial transition plans, is important in framing the approach later taken by Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).25 By March 1943, lessons learned from Operation Torch in North Africa influenced the War Department to establish a Civil Affairs Division under the direction of Colonel John Haskell. A little over one month later, the division shifted to Special Staff under General Marshall with a new director, Major General John Hilldring. This new Civil Affairs division served as the single point of contact within the War Department and Army on all matters relating to civil affairs and military government.26 Up to this point, the Office of the Provost Marshal General was the primary agency doing the planning. This change recognized the increased importance of civil affairs and the need to give it greater influence inside the Army, in the War Department, and with respect to other U.S. government agencies.27 This decision was

---


25COSSAC, a combined British and American staff, organized in January 1943, under Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan was to begin planning an attack across the English Channel. COSSAC’s staff and work would eventually form the core of SHAEF. Forrest C. Pogue, United States Army in World War II The European Theater of Operations: The Supreme Command (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, Department of the Army, 1996), 58.


27There continued to be issues of control and responsibility between the War and State Departments until Nov 1943. At this time, the President directed the War Department the lead agency in
also significant in shaping the efforts of COSSAC in planning the invasion of Europe.

In both North Africa and Italy, civil affairs and military government operations were largely independent of normal channels of command, reporting instead through civil affairs channels. Many senior Allied military officers saw this as detrimental to the overall military operation, denying tactical commanders influence over these operations. Some officers argued for separate chains of control, arguing that tactical commanders would focus on combat at the expense of military government, or simply not know how to employ these assets. Those arguing against the existing structure believed that the overall military situation required one line of communication and command, and that tactical commanders must be involved. The final civil affairs and military government plan issued in May 1944 was a compromise between the sides, orchestrated primarily by senior officers within SHAEF.28

SHAEF issued Standard Policy and Procedure for Combined Civil Affairs Operations in North West Europe on 1 May 1944, just over one month before the planned invasion. It stated on its first page, “The conduct of Civil Affairs operations is the responsibility of each Commander in accordance with the policies laid down by the Supreme Commander.” The document also attempted to address skeptical commanders on why civil affairs was critical to them. It stated, “The primary objective is to ensure that conditions exist among the civilian population which will

the immediate postwar period. He stated in a letter to Secretary Stimson, “You may take this letter as my authority to you to call upon all other agencies of the Government for such plans and assistance you may need.” Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, 108-109. Influencing this decision were the reports of General Eisenhower from theater and the general ineffectiveness of civilian agencies and officials in North Africa and Sicily in delivering supplies and coordinating overall policies and activities.

28The plan was SHAEF’s Standard Policy And Procedure For Combined Civil Affairs Operations In North West Europe, 1 May 1944. Those for status quo were Brigadier General Frank McSherry (he had been Chief American Military Government for Naples region in 1943) and Brigadier General Julius Holmes (he had been Chief of the Military Government Section Allied Force HQs, Mediterranean). Those for change were Lt. Gen. A.E. Grasett (CAN), SHAEF G5; Major General Sir Roger Lumley (former UK Governor of Bombay), and Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, COSSAC Civil Affairs Branch. Preceding from Pogue, The Supreme Command, 80-84. Additionally General Hilldring communicated the War Department’s views supporting the change to Bendetsen, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, 110.
not interfere with operations against the enemy, but will promote those operations.”

In these two statements, SHAEF made clear to Allied commanders that they had to plan for, transition to, and execute civil affairs and military government operations. In addition to this guidance, commanders received soldiers trained specifically for civil affairs and military government operations. There were dedicated civil affairs and military government staffs from Army Groups through Division level, with Brigade and below having civil affairs and military government tasks assigned to their staff G5s.

**Transition Execution**

The focus of transition operations in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Netherlands was on civil affairs operations, as these were the countries liberated from Nazi occupation. The execution of these operations took place in three general phases: initial contact with combat forces focused on military necessity, initiation of civil affairs and military government operations by unit G5 sections, and finally transition of operations to Civil Affairs Detachments. Contact between front line units and the civilian inhabitants of towns and cities initiated this sequence of events. The military situation dictated the immediate tasks of soldiers, but normally they included setting up roadblocks to control access to the area, clearing out any remaining German soldiers or units, and making contact with local officials to determine the immediate needs of the population. Division and Corps G5 sections were often the initial contact between civilians and soldiers for specific civil affairs purposes.

---


31Standard Policy And Procedure for Combined Civil Affairs Operations in North West Europe, 14: the first object for commanders was establishing security, re-establishing law and order and then enabling Civil Affairs Detachments to assume the overall military government mission.
tactical units, assessed security needs and the health and welfare of local inhabitants. After this initial contact and the commencement of civil affairs operations, Civil Affairs Detachments attached to Army level organization assumed the mission.\textsuperscript{32}

Civil Affairs Detachments from the 1st European Civil Affairs Regiment assumed the mission as early as the military situation allowed, and thus freed the tactical units to continue offensive operations elsewhere.\textsuperscript{33} In the liberated countries, the civil affairs mission was intentionally limited as civil authorities from the liberated government assumed the overall relief and reconstruction mission as soon as they could. Aiding this final transition, from Allied forces to the legitimate government, were negotiated agreements between the U.S. and UK with each country occupied by Germany.\textsuperscript{34}

These negotiated agreements meant that civil affairs operations in liberated areas focused primarily on addressing the immediate needs of the populace following combat operations, as long-term needs were the responsibility of the legitimate civilian government. Typically the short term needs were establishing local security, civilian food distribution, and civilian medical care. Generally, the Army’s civil affairs detachments stayed in place until the local government could assume responsibility for basic security and civil services. For example, in France the transition to civil authority occurred rapidly, releasing civil affairs detachments to prepare for duty in

\textsuperscript{32}By July 1944, First U.S. Army and Third U.S. Army each had approximately 50 Civil Affairs/Military Government Detachments totaling 500 officers and 1300 Soldiers. The primary duty of these detachments was the distribution of food and medical supplies, and in coordination with Free-French authorities the reestablishment of civil agencies. 12th Army Group Headquarters, Report of Operations, (Final After Action Report) Volume I Summary, 31 July 1945, World War II Operational Documents, U.S. Army Combined Army Center: Combined Army Research Library, 27-29.


\textsuperscript{34}Pogue, The Supreme Command, 139-140. Agreements with Norway and the Netherlands were complete prior to 6 June 1944; agreements with Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and Denmark after the invasion of France.
Germany. As long as military operations continued, military necessity remained the concern of military commanders, and allowed a commander wide latitude in action.

In September 1944, European Civil Affairs Division moved its headquarters, and the 2nd and 3rd European Civil Affairs Regiments, from England to Eastern France to prepare for operations in Germany. Many military government detachments by this time knew their pinpoint assignments and were aware of lessons from the initial occupation of the German towns after the Rhineland Campaign. Similar to operations in France the transition from offensive operations to military government focused on immediate civilian needs, local security, and clearance of remaining enemy personnel. As a matter of policy, however, military government operations in Germany differed substantially from civil affairs in liberated areas. The main difference occurred in the treatment of civilians and interaction with German civil institutions. President Roosevelt adamantly believed that the German people bore some responsibility for the war and this shaped the Allied approach to German occupation. In the December 1944 SHAEF *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*, one of the basic principles was, “Germany will always be treated as a defeated country.”

One of the first actions directed to military commanders after seizing control of a German

---

35 Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 65-66, 75. Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, 319-325. Assisting transitions in the liberated countries was the extensive work of COSSAC and SHAEF country teams prior to the D-Day invasion. The SHAEF country teams provided tactical units extensive background material on the areas they anticipated operating within. This material included information on the local government, economy, population statistics etc. It enhanced situational understanding and allowed commanders and the Civil Affairs detachments to better prepare for post-combat operations.

36 For example, after the U.S. recognized the French Provisional Government, due to military necessity the U.S. requested to retain control over key roads from ports along the coast to the German border. *Pogue, The Supreme Command*, 325-328.

37 Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 133-144.

38 *Pogue, The Supreme Command*, 354.

town was to post two proclamations on behalf of General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied
Commander. The first explained the creation of an Allied military government in the area, while
the second listed laws immediately declared under the authority of the military government. The
proclamations clearly established military authority and the expected relationship between the
Allies and German civilians. “We come as conquerors, but not as oppressors...Supreme
legislative, judicial and executive authority and powers within the occupied territory are vested in
me as Supreme Commander…and the Military Government is established to exercise these
powers under my direction.” The responsibility of action from this proclamation fell to the
various military government detachments and combat units in the occupied areas.

This dual employment, between military government detachments and tactical units,
supported the overall concept for military government in Germany, called the “carpet plan.” This
concept called for pinpointed military government detachments to follow front line troops, and in
coordination with the tactical commander establish military government as soon as practical. In
actual execution, however, the concept faced the reality of a finite amount of trained military
government detachments available in theater. As the pace of the Allied advance through
Germany picked up from winter to spring 1945, more tactical units became involved in military
government operations.

As the war against Germany approached its conclusion, several important factors
influenced the transition from offensive operations to the Allied occupation of Germany. The
Army’s relatively rapid advance through Germany in the late winter and early spring of 1945
taxed available military government assets. Unlike in liberated countries where civil affairs
operations were limited in duration and military resources made available for use elsewhere, in

---

40Handbook For Military Government In Germany Prior To Defeat Or Surrender, 31.
41The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, Civil Affairs and Military
Germany, military government operations were long-term commitments. The impact was that tactical units created provisional military government units to fill the void, usually under supervision of the Division, Corps, or Army G5 sections. Trained military government soldiers augmented the provisional military government units as they became available. This occurred at a delicate time as there was a large increase in the surrenders of entire German Army units and large amounts of displaced persons moving throughout Germany.\textsuperscript{42} Predominantly it fell to tactical units to handle these situations, and overall they did so in an efficient manner. The experience of Captain Charles MacDonald, a company commander in the 23\textsuperscript{rd} Infantry Regiment, offers an example.

Captain MacDonald’s experience provided an individual company’s view of the transition away from offensive operations as the war in Europe was culminating. Consistent in his account was having to deal with large numbers of displaced persons, recently freed allied prisoners of war, and the large numbers of German civilians living in the towns occupied by invading U.S. Army units. Of note concerning his experiences with German civilians was that they did not appear to be a security risk for him. His company consistently established security and cleared each town they entered, but the main concern of German civilians was for their own welfare. On several occasions he described the consternation these civilians had after vacating their homes to provide billeting for U.S. soldiers. Captain MacDonald also received the surrender of large numbers of both individual German soldiers and complete units. In one instance,

\textsuperscript{42}Robert Wolfe, ed., Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Press, 1984), 56-59. Displaced persons were persons of the United Nations outside their national boundary. In Germany displaced persons were primarily Russians and Poles sent there as slave labor. They were a major concern, as their welfare fell almost exclusively on the U.S. Army. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 52. On availability of military government detachments, “Early in April the supply of Military Government detachments was completely exhausted. . . Authority was obtained and given to the armies to organize provisional Military Government detachments.” 12th Army Group Report of Operations, (Final After Action Report) Volume I Summary, 31 July 1945, 31-32.
Generalmajor de Polizei Wilhelm von Gorlmann, Polizei Commander of Leipzig, attempted to surrender his force of over 600 men. Captain MacDonald attempted to negotiate the surrender but due to its complexity had to pass it to the Corps Military Government staff. A report from a unit of the 5th Armored Division provides a similar account to MacDonald’s but from a larger unit’s perspective.

From March through May 1945, the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion, 5th Armor Division, advanced east from the Netherlands. Along the way, the Battalion established several military governments and dealt with many issues common to units at the time. Companies from the 46th established military governments in the German cities of Huls, Tonisgberg, and Schuephuysen on 5 March 1945. The Battalion controlled these areas until 1 April when it continued movement east to the city of Herford. After establishing a military government in Hereford and turning over operations to elements from the 84th Infantry Division, the Battalion continued east. Along the way, the roads were “crowded with a mixture of Russians, Poles, PW’s (Prisoners of War), and other displaced persons.” The Battalion had to clear the roads as much as possible to continue their attack east. This particular task was resource intensive and effective cooperation between tactical commands and military governments set conditions for Allied freedom of movement. The Battalion’s cycle of attack, establishment of military government, transfer to follow-on forces, and clearance of roads continued through the end of April until reaching Waddenweitz, Germany, along the western banks of the Elbe River. Here the Battalion had the mission for organizing military governments in thirty-six area towns. The experiences

---

43Charles B. MacDonald, *Company Commander* (New York: Bantam Books, 1978). For incidents of displaced persons and prisoners of war, 221-222, 252-257, 292-293. For Leipzig, 323-341. The surrender of the Polizei was undermined by the local Wehrmacht Commander’s desire to continue fighting; the two organizations were not associated and thus the U.S. Army would not accept Generalmajor Gorlmann’s surrender.

of the 75th Infantry Division and 82nd Airborne Division were similar as the 46th’s but on a larger scale.

The 75th Infantry Division combat report highlights the importance of its G5 section following offensive operations. “The non-military aspects of the campaign were so conducted as to let the troops go unimpeded on their way. G5 set up military government in the wake of battle, and no civilian disturbances were encountered once an area had been seized.” 45 Similarly, in his After Action Review for the month of May 1945, Major General James Gavin, Commander 82nd Airborne Division, reported that the mission of military government grew increasingly complex. As the war’s end approached the amount of displaced persons, prisoners of war, and liberated Allied prisoners of war increased exponentially. Through the coordination of the Division’s G1 and military government detachment, with execution by tactical units, there was an effective processing and transportation system established. One particular mission of the division’s military government detachment was to coordinate the burial of Wöbbelin concentration camp victims by local citizens. After completing the task, the local citizens had to remain for a memorial service by the division’s chaplain. 46

The surrender of the German Government on 8 May 1945 did not drastically change the immediate functions of military government detachments. From large to small detachments, they continued to address the immediate needs of the many people in their areas: German civilians, displaced persons, liberated prisoners of war, and German prisoners of war. It quickly became apparent that there were tremendous food shortages across Germany, as well as a significant lack

---


of adequate housing. As detachments addressed these issues, the overall military effort transitioned from its war structure to its occupation structure. From the beginning of June until 10 July, American forces moved into their allocated zones of occupation. As the Army began moving out some units used in the offensive phase, they continued to deploy trained military government detachments, and eventually formed a Constabulary force to aid in the security and policing of occupation zones.

**ANALYSIS OF WORLD WAR II TRANSITIONS**

**FM 27-5**

To analyze the effectiveness of both the planning and execution of transitions during World War II, FM 27-5 provided useful criteria. The FM has five basic policies that it states, “Any plan of military government should conform to.” The policies are: military necessity, welfare of the governed, flexibility, economy of effort, and permanence. A brief analysis of planning and execution using these policies frames an overall assessment.

The FM’s use of military necessity was to make clear that military government operations were subordinate to accomplishment of the military objective. The concerns of many senior military leaders during the North African and Italian campaigns reveal that military necessity may not have been the driving concern for some Civil Affairs and Military Government Officers. This became evident in the 1943 and 1944 discussions at SHAEF over planning for the invasion of Europe. The ultimate decision to ensure that tactical commanders had the responsibility for these operations, and allowing for only one communication chain, supported military necessity. Commanders responsible for achieving military objectives now had to plan for the

---

synchronization and execution of both offensive and civil affairs operations. In execution, this synchronization appeared effective looking at the examples from the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion, 75th Infantry Division, and the 82nd Airborne Division. Welfare of the governed, the next policy, is not as clear as military necessity.

The Army’s experience in post-World War I Germany shaped the FM’s approach to welfare of the governed. The FM advocates “considerate, and mild treatment of the governed by the occupying army.” The final guidance issued by SHAEF on 1 May 1944, Standard Policy And Procedure For Combined Civil Affairs Operations In North West Europe, had a temporal view of transitions in liberated countries. The handbook stresses that commanders remain focused on operations against the enemy and ensuring that conditions amongst the population did not interfere with their operations. The focus on civil affairs in liberated countries was to support the military objective of getting into Germany. Once in Germany, the military government approach crossed the original intent in the 1940 FM 27-5 to be mild towards the occupied. As previously noted, the President wanted the German populace reminded that they were partly responsible for the war. While learning from World War I, the approach by 1944 and 1945 was sterner than originally anticipated in 1940. Years of intense conflict and the emergence of Nazi atrocities invalidated the mild approach of 1940. Flexibility was the next policy concern from FM 27-5.

Flexibility was evident throughout the planning and execution of Civil Affairs and Military Government operations. From the beginning of planning in 1940 by the War Department through the establishment of military governments in Germany in 1945, responsiveness was emblematic of the overall effort. The Washington bureaucracy was agile enough to allow for the establishment of quality training programs and for lessons learned from

---

the combat theaters to guide the development of policy. This proved to be beneficial for the Army as it received the assets it needed to execute operations, along with the national strategic guidance needed to develop plans.

Economy of effort is one policy that the FM got wrong in 1940, as it advocated using only the minimum amount of soldiers possible for the effort.\(^{51}\) SHAEF’s approach in 1944 and 1945 was different from this concept, as by this time the transition to military government was the mission of the tactical commander. The lessons from North Africa and Italy were that to be effective military government required both resources and the focus of tactical military commanders. As shown with the examples of units from 1944 and 1945, tactical units were deeply involved in executing military government operations. Military necessity drove the level of involvement but SHAEF realized that a stabilized rear area enabled continued offensive operations further into Germany. This recognition required the use of a large amount of resources, and to economize it came at the expense of overall security and stability. As the campaign approached its end in May 1945, many tactical units executed military government functions exclusively, beginning the overall Allied transition to the formalized occupation of Germany.

Permanence focused not on the physical nature of the occupation but on the continuity of policy. There were several early disputes over policy, such as President Roosevelt’s 1942 concern about the use of the Army to govern liberated and occupied countries. The military, politicians, and bureaucrats settled these disputes, however, and policy went forward with general support from all involved. An example of this was SHAEF’s adjustment to the control of civil affairs and military government operations from civil affairs officers to tactical commanders in 1944. Another example was the President’s and Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau’s,

views on hardening the military government approach to Germany.\textsuperscript{52} In each case, once the President or General Eisenhower made their decision, all involved supported the policy.

The transition from combat operations to civil affairs or military governments in World War II was a success from both a planning and execution standpoint. This was possible for three main reasons: unified governmental policy, adequate resources and training, and flexibility in planning and execution. The Army began its planning early and ensured that it nested these plans within developing national policy. Key leaders addressed disputes at both the strategic and operational levels early enough to ensure continuity to planning and operations. The Army already had the basic outline of civil affairs and military government operations established before the war began. The first iteration of FM 27-5 came out in 1940 and the Provost Marshal General already proposed a training program before the attack on Pearl Harbor.\textsuperscript{53} These Army efforts initiated the U.S. government’s approach to planning and preparing for the post-combat period, one that while oftentimes was contentious, did ultimately produce a unified plan.

Adjustments to the plan during the campaign resulted from a comprehensive involvement of the U.S. government, including key leaders like the President and General Eisenhower. The Army training programs and training centers also ensured cadres of trained soldiers were available by May 1944, in time for the invasion of Europe. Finally, because the strategic framework existed for civil affairs and military government early in the war, this allowed SHAEF flexibility in developing and adjusting its plan for Europe. The most important adjustment was the determination that tactical commanders had responsibility for the execution of civil affairs and military government. This change forced military commanders to plan for the transition from offensive operations to either civil affairs or military government in their operational areas.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{52}Ziemke, \textit{The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany}, 102-103.

\end{footnotesize}
Theater wide this enabled SHAEF to execute a coherent strategy for the transition from offensive operations to occupation. This coherence from the top levels of government through individuals like Captain MacDonald contributed greatly to the U.S. Army’s success in Europe, and established a standard by which to judge all following major military campaigns. With the Army’s experience in World War II as a frame, the experience of Iraq contrasts sharply due to the lack of unification within the government, and the Army’s lack of preparation for the campaign.

**OIF: TRANSITION PLANNING, PREPARATION, AND EXECUTION**

**Guiding Doctrine**

The key U.S. Army doctrinal manuals available to guide planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were FM 3-0: *Operations* (2001), FM 100-20: *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflicts* (1990), FM 100-23: *Peace Operations* (1994), and FM 27-10: *The Law of Land Warfare* (1976). The Army published FM 3-07: *Stability and Support Operations* just one month prior to the March 2003 invasion and it superseded FM 100-20 and FM 100-23. Both FM 3-0 and FM 3-07 attempted to capture lessons learned from the Army’s experiences of the previous decade, specifically operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Before discussion of lessons learned from the 1990s, it is important to understand how international and U.S. law set conditions for operations in OIF.

FM 27-10 (1976) dictates in detail the responsibilities of an occupying power to include administration of governmental services and the establishment of public order and safety. Whether the administration is civil affairs or military government is dependent on the relations between the United States and the lawful government. The difference in civil affairs and military government is similar to the construct from World War II. Civil affairs was a temporary administrative state where a foreign government in coordination with the lawful government administers an area. The foreign government administered the area until the lawful government assumed the responsibility. A military government occurred either when there was no lawful
government to coordinate with, or because of an occupation following an invasion. In either case, the immediate roles and responsibilities of the foreign power remained the same.\textsuperscript{54} In the case of OIF the operational environment called for a military occupation and the establishment of a military government. The 2001 FM 3-0 introduced a new operating concept, which stressed the force’s ability to transition not only between types of operations, but also between operational phases.\textsuperscript{55}

The 2001 FM 3-0 introduced the concept of Full Spectrum Operations to the Army, “offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations…missions in any environment require Army forces prepared to conduct any combination of these operations.” This operating concept emerged after a decade of Army involvement in multinational and joint stability and support operations in places like Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo. These operations required a flexible force capable of quickly transitioning from delivering humanitarian assistance to a show of force, or even further to offensive operations. With this construct in mind, while maintaining the predominance of offensive operations, FM 3-0 stressed the need for effective transitions between operations to maintain momentum and retain operational initiative. In the Foreword, then Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric Shinseki wrote, “Mastering Transition is key to maintaining momentum and winning decisively.”\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{54}FM 27-10 \textit{The Law of Land Warfare} (1976), 138-141. The manual is clear however, that “territory subject to civil affairs administration is not considered to be occupied.” The manual continues however, “If circumstances have precluded the conclusion of a civil affairs agreement with the lawful government of allied territory recovered from enemy occupation or of other territory liberated from the enemy, military government may be established in the area as a provisional and interim measure,” 139.

\textsuperscript{55}The operating concept of FM 100-5 (1993) was full-dimensional operations, “the application of all capabilities available to an Army commander to accomplish his mission decisively and at the least cost across the full range of possible operations.” U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5: \textit{Operations} (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1993), Glossary-4.

Of significance for OIF in FM 3-0 is chapter 6, “Conducting Full Spectrum Operations.” This chapter emphasizes the development of branches and sequels to both develop flexibility in the base plan, as well as set conditions for transitions. There is also a substantive discussion of Army forces planning to exploit success, which might occur in unanticipated ways or in a quicker manner than anticipated. Again, the focus was for Army forces to prepare to transition between operations and seek to maintain momentum and thus retain initiative.\(^57\) In response to a new operating concept that included stability and support operations, the Army had to update other doctrine to reflect the change.

FM 3-07 Stability and Support Operations (2003) combines and updates the concepts from FM 100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflicts (1990) and FM 100-23 Peace Operations (1994). The timing of this manual was problematic, as it was only one month prior to the invasion in March 2003. FM 3-0 published in 2001 had one chapter for stability operations and one for support operations, yet FM 100-20 and FM 100-23 remained standing doctrine until February 2003. Due to this overlap, a tension existed in Army doctrine between the concept of Full Spectrum Operations as described in FM 3-0 (2001) and the specific manuals that discussed stability and support operations. In both FMs 100-20 and 100-23 there is not a focus on Army forces transitioning from offensive operations to the next phase of an operation, whether stability operations, peace-enforcement or peacekeeping.\(^58\)

\(^{57}\)Exploit success, FM 3-0: Operations, 6-12. Branches and Sequels on 6-5. “Army forces prepare branches to exploit success and opportunities, or to counter disruptions caused by enemy actions...Sequels are operations that follow the current operation. They are future operations that anticipate the possible outcomes—success, failure, or stalemate of the current operation.”

\(^{58}\)FM 100-20 discusses four operational categories for Low Intensity Conflict on pg. 1-6: support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping, and peacetime contingency operations. FM 100-23 listed the three types of Peace operations on pg. iv: support to diplomacy (peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy), peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.
OIF Transition Planning and Preparation and Execution

President George W. Bush initiated the government’s planning for an invasion of Iraq in November 2001 asking then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to review existing Iraq plans. The initial U.S. war plan for Iraq was CENTCOM’s Operation Plan 1003-98, last updated in 1998 under then CENTCOM Commander General Anthony Zinni. The plan called for an invasion force of 500,000 followed by an occupation force of at least 400,000. The primary missions of the occupation force were to counter external threats, maintain law and order, protect threatened groups, control civil unrest, develop local security, and facilitate reconstruction and governance, with an expected mission duration of approximately ten years. Lieutenant General Greg Newbold, Chief of Operations on the Joint Staff, briefed this plan to Secretary Rumsfeld in November 2001.

Secretary Rumsfeld did not agree with the basic tenets of the plan and asked General Tommy Franks, CENTCOM Commander, to develop a new concept for an invasion of Iraq. He wanted General Franks to look for ways to reduce the size of the invasion force, accelerate deployment timelines, take advantage of advanced military capabilities and Special Forces, and finally to reduce both the size and expectations for any post-conflict force. In a speech a month before the invasion Rumsfeld stated, “If the United States were to lead an international coalition

---

61Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 2-3. Franks, American Soldier, 329 – 335. In his book, General Franks agreed that the planned needed updating, calling it on pg. 325 “Desert Storm II.” In addition to increased military capabilities, especially in precision weapons and satellites, General Franks believed that Afghanistan offered positive lessons in using a lighter footprint than originally envisioned in 1003-98. President Bush echoes these thoughts in Decision Points, taking as a lesson learned from Afghanistan the advantage of using less conventional forces and therefore not being viewed as occupiers, pg. 234.
in Iraq…it would be guided by two commitments. Stay as long as necessary, and to leave as soon as possible.” This framework guided the planning and led to a major focus on the invasion and short consideration for the post-conflict period. From November 2001 when Secretary Rumsfeld first received the plan, until December 2002, there was continuous adjustment of the operational plan, forces allocated, and force deployments. The final plan, which General Franks termed the Hybrid 1003V plan, called for 210,000 soldiers for Phase III, with continued deployments raising the force for Phase IV to approximately 230,000 to 250,000. Consistent amongst the plan’s revisions, however, were the Bush administration’s minimalistic post-conflict expectations.

The Bush administration’s vision for the post-conflict period emerged from its view of U.S. military operations in the 1990s, particularly Bosnia and Kosovo. President Bush thought these missions were too taxing on the military and not one of its fundamental missions. Administration officials, led by Secretary Rumsfeld, believed these two specific operations showed how supported states became dependent on international assistance. In a speech at the Citadel in 1999 then Governor Bush stated, “I will work hard to find political solutions that allow an orderly and timely withdrawal from places like Kosovo and Bosnia. We will encourage our

62 In the same speech, he stated concerning Afghanistan, “The United States does not aspire to own it or run it. This shaped how we approached the military campaign. General Franks would not send a massive invasion and occupation force as the Russians had…Instead he keeps the coalition footprint modest.” Donald Rumsfeld, “Beyond Nation Building,” (speech, Intrepid Sea-Air-Space Museum, New York City, February 14, 2003), http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=337 (accessed 21 November 2013).

63 Franks, American Soldier, 409-410. On page 366 General Franks states that Phase IV levels “would continue to grow – perhaps to as many as two hundred and fifty thousand troops, or until we are sure we’ve met our endstate objectives.” The progression of planning concepts went from Generated Start, Running Start, to the final Hybrid Concept. The overall concept went from large invasion force built up in theater to smaller invasion force with quicker deployments into the region and commitment to the invasion plan. This process is explained in several sources but very clearly in Catherine Dale, CRS Report for Congress: Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008) CRS-10 to CRS-14. Secretary Rumsfeld approved COBRA II, the name of the final revision of the plan, in December 2002. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 93.

64 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 495.
allies to take a broader role…we will not be permanent peacekeepers, dividing warring parties. This is not our strength or our calling.” Coupled with this view was a focus on modernizing the military to make it smaller, highly deployable, and more lethal.65 These beliefs along with the military success in Afghanistan, which appeared as a proof in concept of military transformation, shaped the administration’s construction of a planned invasion of Iraq and its vision for the post conflict period.66

In developing the government’s plan for the invasion of Iraq the President relied heavily on the Secretary of Defense, and by extension on the military component of the plan. There was, however, an effort to formulate a whole of government approach at the start of the planning process. The National Security Council’s Deputies Committee began forming initial ideas on the scope of a post-conflict period in the spring of 2002. At this time, the defining theme was a “liberation model”, in which Iraqis assumed control of the country through a provisional government as quickly as possible after military action. This model fit with the administration’s view of military force, as well as the need for countries to gain self-sufficiency with only limited international assistance.

In an effort to synchronize the government’s effort, Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, established in August 2002 an Executive Steering Group. The purpose of this group was to discuss, plan, and coordinate the strategy for a post-conflict Iraq. A problem that crippled this effort however, was the bureaucratic infighting between the State and Defense Departments. This issue also affected the ability of the Joint Staff to link CENTCOM planners with the


66In a speech at the Citadel on 12 December 2001, the President stated, “Afghanistan has been a proving ground for this new approach. These past two months have shown that an innovative doctrine and high-tech weaponry can shape and then dominate an unconventional conflict.” George W. Bush, “President George W. Bush addresses the Corps of Cadets” (speech, The Citadel, South Carolina, December 12, 2001), http://www.citadel.edu/root/presbush01 (accessed 21 November 2013).
interagency work occurring in Washington. The effort that ultimately emerged as the primary source of U.S. governmental strategy was the Defense Department’s Office of Special Plans, led by Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith. The State Department at this time, however, still had lead responsibility for planning the post-conflict period.

State Department post-conflict planning began in April 2002 with the establishment of the Future of Iraq Project under the supervision of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ryan Crocker. The group’s purpose was to develop recommendations across several key areas for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. Its members came from across the U.S. government, as well as including several prominent Iraqi exiles. It was not until after the invasion began in March 2003 that the group produced a one-thousand page report. Significant for the military in this report, was the State Department’s concern over post conflict security, and the anticipated importance of the Iraqi army in stabilizing the country. The report’s timing, size, and the bureaucratic infighting, prevented it from having an impact on Defense Department planning.

The NSC effort was troubled by infighting between the State and Defense Departments. President Bush acknowledged this, “I concluded that the animosity was so deeply embedded that the only solution was to change the entire national security team after the 2004 election.” Bush, Decision Points, 90. The Joint Staff effort failed primarily due to a lack of influence within CENTCOM. The Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 2009), 7-10. The Joint Staff established Task Force IV, a headquarters intended to form the core of a Phase IV CENTCOM headquarters. It was never fully embraced by CENTCOM however, and eventually disbanded by April 2003. From Nora Bensahel, et al., After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), xxi. For CENTCOM’s view, General Franks regularly disparaged the Joint Staff and the Service Chiefs. In one passage he argued that they inhibited planning and cohesion stating, “The presence of the Service Chiefs at my daily secure VTC with the Secretary is not helpful. They do not have sufficient Joint background or understanding. . . . ‘to be operationally useful,’” American Soldier, 441.

According to the U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction, this report constituted “the single most rigorous assessment conducted by the U.S. government before the war.” Quote and report reception from Hard Lessons: 15. Group establishment and concern over security from Phillips, Losing Iraq, 37 and 51. Many sources reference an intense distrust and jealousy between officials from the State and Defense Departments. Typical was this from Lieutenant General (ret) Jay Garner, head of ORHA, “My specific set of problems was number one, the in-fighting before I left between DoD and the State Department. The warfare between Rumsfeld and Powell permeated everything we did.” Jay Garner, “Iraq Revisited,” in Turning Victory Into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign, ed. Dr. Lieutenant Colonel Brian M. De Toy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI, 2004), 261.
the summer of 2002 through the invasion, the focus of governmental efforts and attention of key administration officials shifted to the Defense Department, and then primarily towards CENTCOM.

The administration’s focus on CENTCOM resulted from three primary factors: first was a familiarity resulting from the ongoing military campaign in Afghanistan, second was the opportunity to implement new military capabilities and concepts, and third was the fragmented state of post-conflict planning within the rest of the government. The familiarity between administration officials and CENTCOM, especially the President and Secretary Rumsfeld with General Franks, facilitated a process that almost exclusively focused campaign planning within CENTCOM. This is partially because General Franks supported the administration’s views on military transformation and its minimalistic post conflict views for Iraq.\(^6^9\) Finally, the government’s fragmented approach to the post conflict period created space for Secretary Rumsfeld to position the Defenses Department for control of the overall planning process.

The military ascendancy began in earnest when Secretary Rumsfeld sought to place all post conflict efforts under management of one department. In October 2002, Douglas Feith briefed the National Security Council on a proposed military administration of post-conflict Iraq. It was to be a Combined Joint Task Force task organized under CENTCOM with a three-star general in charge of military matters, and a civilian Iraq coordinator. The President eventually formalized this with slight modifications on 20 January 2003 issuing National Security Presidential Directive 24. This directive created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), headed by retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, which reported

---

\(^6^9\) General Franks saw OIF as an opportunity, like Secretary Rumsfeld, to alter fundamentally modern military operations. “I knew we would win the fight….The campaign I envisioned would in fact be a ‘revolution in warfare’….We would conduct fast and flexible maneuver, coupled with precise, lethal firepower.” *American Soldier*, 371. In addition he did not favor a long-term military occupation of Iraq believing that it would lead to “improved security…under control of a *perceived occupying bully*” and lead to “near term efficiency. . . giving rise to *longer term dependency*” [emphasis original], 422.
through CENTCOM to the Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{70} ORHA was to be a mixture of civilian and military officials with an initial focus on preventing famine and epidemics, maintaining and restoring the electric grid, and ensuring the sewage system in major urban areas was operational. In accomplishing these tasks, General Garner had to make many of the same assumptions that guided CENTCOM planning.\textsuperscript{71}

CENTCOM’s post conflict plan or Phase IV of the Joint phasing construct relied on four key assumptions. The first was that the coalition would utilize existing Iraqi infrastructure, both physical and governmental, to establish and maintain stability. This included use of the Iraqi Army and Iraqi police forces. Second was that De-Ba'athification would affect only the most senior Iraqi military officers and governmental officials. Third was that additional U.S. Army units, and later international peacekeeping forces, would flow into Iraq upon completion of Phase III offensive operations. Additionally, a new military headquarters would assume control of operations during Phase IV from CENTCOM. Fourth was that Washington would provide the specific policy guidance and resources for Phase IV.\textsuperscript{72} These assumptions framed General Franks and CENTCOM’s approach to Phase IV.

General Franks saw a distinct separation between Phase III and IV to the point that he viewed instructions or guidance from policy makers as intrusive to his management of the

\textsuperscript{70}Hard Lessons: Feith’s proposal and Rumsfeld’s desire pg. 12, NSPD 24 pg. 24. Also in Cobra II: pg. 141 for NSPD 24 and on pg. 149 authors’ view that Secretary of State Powell did not object to the proposal. This view was also captured in Hard Lessons as well on pg. 33, quoting Secretary Powell, “State does not have the personnel, the capacity, or the size to deal with an immediate postwar situation in a foreign country that’s eight thousand miles away from here.”

\textsuperscript{71}Jay M. Garner, “Iraq Revisited” in Turning Victory Into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign, ed. Dr. Lieutenant Colonel Brian M. De Toy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI, 2004), 253-257.

campaign. He believed CENTCOM’s responsibility lay primarily with Phase III. In a letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz two days prior to the invasion he wrote, “You pay attention to the day after I’ll pay attention to the day of” [emphasis original]. This did not mean that there was no military Phase IV planning. CFLCC, which was responsible for executing the ground component of the Iraq invasion, attempted to plan for all phases of the operation, including Phase IV.

The pressure from Secretary Rumsfeld felt by the CENTCOM planning staff affected the CFLCC planning staff in their attempt to plan the operation. CFLCC planners found themselves consistently altering their work to accommodate the changes in the invasion force size, and associated method and mode of deployments. The impact on post-conflict planning was to minimize it at the expense of completing Phase III planning and to rely on the Phase IV guidance and assumptions from CENTCOM. In two articles written concerning his experiences with planning for Phase IV, Colonel Kevin Benson, the CFLCC G5, articulates the impacts of pressure from higher. He argued that the consistent adjustments to the invasion force size, adjustments to policy, and the complex Joint method for requesting and coordinating deployment, time-phased force-deployment lists, overwhelmed his small staff of officers. The latter issue proved increasingly problematic as units with specialties necessary to stability and support operations, such as Military Police and Civil Affairs Battalions, were at the end of the initial deployment lists. Due to the recognition of these issues and the results from war-gaming Phase IV, CFLCC began a sequel to the COBRA II plan, one specific to Phase IV. CFLCC planners started ECLIPSE II on 17 March 2003, three days prior to the invasion. They completed it 12 April

---

73 Franks, American Soldier, 441.
2003, about a week after CFLCC first entered Baghdad.\textsuperscript{75}

The transition guidance that Coalition ground forces went into the campaign with came from CFLCC’s COBRA II operational plan, and specifically from General McKiernan’s Phase IV intent. He envisioned a “rolling transition to post-hostility stability and support operations.”

Specific tasks were:

- Unity of military command.
- Unity of effort with Coalition Government Agencies/International Organizations/Non-governmental Organizations through HOC/HACC/CMOC structure.
- Utilization of existing Iraqi organizations and administration.
- Before Regime collapse V Corps and I MEF exercise military authority in the wake of combat operations. MSCs engage with and utilize existing Iraqi Provincial administration.
- Following Regime collapse an interim authority is established that interfaces with Iraqi Ministries.
- Initially, stability operations are conducted within CFLCC zones. After Regime removal, the battlespace is reorganized to include the whole of Iraq.\textsuperscript{76}

The CFLCC end state for Phase III was the removal of the existing Iraqi regime and the isolation of the Iraqi capital, Baghdad. Upon achieving these conditions, CFLCC transitioned wholly to Phase IV, and in accordance with CENTCOM’s overall plan, began to transfer control to ORHA and another military headquarters, which had responsibility for overseeing Phase IV.\textsuperscript{77}

**OIF Transition Execution**

Operation Iraqi Freedom began on 20 March 2003 with air attacks on key regime targets, and CFLCC’s ground campaign commencing from Kuwait on 21 March 2003. The campaign

\textsuperscript{75}For Military Police and Civil Affairs: Dr. Lieutenant Colonel Brian M. De Toy, ed., “Fishel and Benson Question and Answer Session” in *Turning Victory Into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI, 2004), 200-201. Branches and Sequels see footnote 54. Colonel Benson notes that his staff’s war gaming of Phase IV revealed it increasingly complex and that it needed to be sequel. He informed General McKiernan on 17 March who agreed and delegated responsibility for supervising the effort to his Deputy Commanding General, Major General Albert Whitley (UK). Benson, “OIF Phase IV,” 62. Plan publication in Dr. Donald P. Wright and Colonel Timothy R. Reese, *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI, 2008), 73.

\textsuperscript{76}Benson, “Phase IV” CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,” 182.

\textsuperscript{77}Benson, “Phase IV” CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,” 184; Benson, “OIF Phase IV,” 63.
culminated visually on 9 April 2003 with a U.S. Marine armored vehicle helping to topple a statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. On 1 May 2003, President Bush publically announced the end of major combat operations from the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln. Between those two dates, CFLCC’s U.S. Army and Marine Divisions executed their versions of General McKiernan’s rolling transitions to stability and support operations. CFLCC’s fast operational tempo and focused maneuver put ground units within major Iraqi cities before the full deployment of all units, most critically Civil Affairs and Military Police units. Additionally, each division discovered that many of the CENTCOM planning assumptions for Phase IV were problematic, complicating their stabilization efforts.

Of the four main CENTCOM planning assumptions, most problematic for ground units was the reliance on existing Iraqi infrastructure, the continued flow of U.S. forces into the country, and specific guidance for post-conflict operations. While CENTCOM intentionally limited Air Force targeting of critical infrastructure during the invasion, it did not account for the massive amount of destruction inflicted to these sites by Iraqi civilians after the fall of the Ba’athist regime. Additionally, many Iraqi bureaucrats and civil service workers, to include a majority of the Iraqi Army and Police forces, left their occupations and did not return when American forces arrived. These dual factors removed much of the foundation, both physical and civic, units expected to utilize. Amongst these challenging conditions, the size of the Coalition Force stopped growing in accordance with established plans as the Defense Department stopped deploying forces into the region. Finally, due to the rapid advance of the ground campaign,

---

78Franks, American Soldier, 461, 471, 553-524.
there was neither specific policy guidance from the Bush administration nor specific instructions from CENTCOM or CFLCC on how to conduct the transition to stability operations. In addition to facing these emerging realities, ground units found themselves fighting an unanticipated enemy, irregular forces and criminal elements.\textsuperscript{81} The experiences of the 1st Marine Division and the 3rd Infantry Division are characteristic of this time.

The 1st Marine Division executed rolling transitions from Phase III in two of Iraq’s major cities, the eastern half of Baghdad and Tikrit. The division began their attack into Eastern Baghdad on 3 April fighting the remnants of the Iraqi regime as well as paramilitary elements. It was both their introduction to a major population center and to the complexities of transitioning to Phase IV. In the division’s official history of the campaign, it noted, “The changing nature of the fight was apparent, even as early as 8 April. The transition from liberation to stabilization in Baghdad would be a gradual process, but had obviously begun.” To begin this transition, while continuing to pursue military objectives, the division established Civil Military Operations Centers to both establish military authority and begin coordination with local civilians. One of the main issues the center faced, however, was the increasing looting in and around the city.\textsuperscript{82}

Concerning the looting the 1st Marine Division history noted, “The people of the city took the opportunity to take their vengeance out on the buildings and property of the former Iraqi government. Looters streamed out to pick clean these areas. Too often, as they would finish clearing out a building, they would set fire to it.” One of the main requests at the Civil Military


\textsuperscript{82} Lieutenant Colonel Michael S. Groen and Contributors, \textit{With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003: No Greater Friend, No Worse Enemy} (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 2006). Quote on 304 and establishment of centers on 319, 327. The CMOCs were staffed jointly by Marine Civil Affairs and ground units; in some cases establishing a CMOC was tasked to combat units, such as Combat Service Support Group Eleven, a brigade sized unit.
Operations Centers from civilians was for American security for their neighborhoods. The division’s main tactic in attempting to provide security was to establish military checkpoints, along with dismounted and mounted patrolling to gain an understanding of the environment. While working to provide security, the division acknowledged that the area and population were too large for them to completely control. Task Force Tripoli, an ad-hoc unit established to attack into Tikrit, offers another example of the complications of transitioning from offensive operations.

The Task Force’s attack on Tikrit commenced on 13 April 2003 and was complete by 15 April. After defeating regime elements in Tikrit the Task Force Commander, Brigadier General John Kelly faced a similar situation as the one in Eastern Baghdad. He met regularly with a group of local tribal sheikhs to coordinate security and stability operations for the city. As the history noted, General Kelly was wary of the sheiks, seeing them as having “the same repressive and inhibiting tendencies the dictatorship had.” His preference was to work with technocratic Iraqis, those who “actually had the management skills to restore order to the daily life of the Iraqis.” This issue was particularly important as General Kelly informed the Sheikhs it was their responsibility to restore basic services (power, water, food, and medical) themselves and Americans would only assist as necessary. Whether intentional or not, General Kelly’s logic was consistent with the Bush administration’s disdain for the dependency created by robust peacekeeping missions, as well as evidence of a general lack of cultural understanding.

Unfortunately, the Marines of Task Force Tripoli had to adjust their approach based on the realities of the situation.

Similar to Eastern Baghdad, security became the overriding civilian concern. Outside the limited areas of direct Marine control, lawlessness was the norm. Over several days, the Marines

---

83 *With the 1st Marine Division*, quote on 318, acknowledgement 319, and tactics 327-329.

84 *With the 1st Marine Division*, tribal sheikhs on 358 and quotes on 359.
succeeded in quelling violence in parts of Tikrit they directly controlled through aggressive dismounted patrolling, and leader engagement with tribal leaders in Civil Affairs Operations Centers. Additionally, the Marines had to assume much of the responsibility for restoring basic services due to the severity of the destruction to the local infrastructure, and a lack of Iraqi capability or willingness to attempt it themselves. On 21 April 2003, the Task Force handed over control of the city to the 4th Infantry Division, which the 1st Marine Division history noted was very problematic and ultimately “shattered” the peace in the city. From the 4th Infantry Division’s perspective, the Marines were being too passive. Colonel Gian Gentile, a Brigade Executive Officer in the Division said, “The Marines’ velvet glove covered some dangerous problems that we were soon to face.” The difference in approach by these units reveals the lack of a unifying plan from higher, one that would have synchronized the transition efforts of major subordinate elements like combat divisions. The Marines did think highly of the 3rd Infantry Division, who they turned over eastern-Baghdad to a week prior. The unit history noted that the two divisions “had similar mindsets about both combat operations and SASO.”

The 3rd Infantry Division transition to Stability and Support Operations (SASO) experienced many of the same basic issues as 1st Marine Division, but it took a different approach. The division expected intense fighting in Baghdad, as it was the country’s capital and center of the regime’s power, and it focused on these operations at the expense of stability.

85*With the 1st Marine Division*, demand of sheikhs, 359, shattered peace on 370. The history noted of the 4th ID on 369: “4th ID had missed the combat phase of OIF, and were determined to have a share in the ‘fighting’. They characterized their recent road march to Tikrit…as an ‘attack’, and remained convinced that the situation in Tikrit required a very stern military enforcement posture. The dichotomy between the two peacekeeping strategies was unsettling for the Marines.”

86Colonel Gentile quoted in Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006), 143. The 1st Marine Division’s full assessment of 3rd ID, “Without written orders, instructions, or doctrine of any kind, the members of these proud Divisions who had fought side-by-side in the assault on Baghdad, quickly worked out the details of an urban reconstruction effort without precedent.” *With the 1st Marine Division*, 381. This statement is revealing for emphasizing the lack of guidance from higher headquarters on the transition, as well as reaffirming that it came down to units themselves to develop a transition plan.
The fall of Baghdad and the regime’s collapse began in earnest on 7 April 2003 when the second of the division’s armored thunder runs put American forces in the heart of the city, where they ultimately stayed. Similar to the experiences of the Marines across the Tigris River, many Iraqis began looting governmental and private buildings, thoroughly destroying many of them. Due to continuing military objectives and its force size, the division could not, nor did it try to secure the entire city.

The widespread looting in Baghdad occurred at the same time as continued resistance from former regime elements and paramilitary forces. In an interview on 15 May 2003 from Iraq with media representatives in the United States, the 3rd Infantry Division Commander, Major General Buford Blount, attempted to answer questions on the large scale looting evident in the capital in early April. He indicated that his soldiers focused completely on military objectives and even if he had more, which reporters assumed inhibited his efforts to stop the looting, it would not have made a difference. In answer to a question he stated, “Well, with more soldiers, we still would have been focused on combat at that time. As the looting was going on, we were still fighting in the areas that we were in. In the other areas, if we'd have had more soldiers, they would have been fighting, too, focused on military targets.” He does later mention that it took two to three days for the division to transition from a combat mindset to a security mindset. Major General Blount additionally announced in this press conference the start of a new operation to get soldiers out into neighborhoods. Operation Neighborhood was an attempt to bring security and governmental services to more areas of the capital and counter civilian perceptions that the

87On Point: Baghdad as center of gravity, 345. The Division’s 2nd Brigade conducted two Thunder Runs into the city to demonstrate American freedom of movement, 336.
Americans did not care about them. From the division’s first entrance to the city in early April, until 15 May 2003, there seemed a lack of coherence amongst the division’s staff on how to transition from offensive operations to stability operations.

The 3rd Infantry Division’s After Action Review, written in July 2003, contained a common complaint amongst the staff, the lack of any transition plan or guidance from higher headquarters. In a section on Civil Military Operations it stated, “3ID (M) did not have a fully developed plan for the transition to SASO and civil military operations in Baghdad prior to entering the city.” The lack of plan also inhibited the development of a standard approach for dealing with looters. The Staff Judge Advocate’s section is particularly harsh in its criticism of the lack of a higher plan.

The division’s Staff Judge Advocate argued that many of the problems that later emerged during Phase IV stemmed from the lack of an initial plan. “3ID (M) transitioned into Phase IV SASO with no plan from higher headquarters. There was no guidance for restoring order in Baghdad, creating an interim government, hiring government and essential services employees, and ensuring the judicial system was operational.” The section finished with some implicit self-criticism stating that perhaps someone should have tasked the division’s planners to consider a transition to Phase IV. Criticism of the transition planning came from others sources too. In an

---

89Major General Blount: Operation Neighborhood was a V Corps program begun on the day of the interview, 15 May 2003. He stated, “it’s an effort to get more help out to the Iraqi people, to the different neighborhoods out there that would see the Humvees drive by or see the security force out, but aren’t getting direct help.”


91Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. This section from Chapter 31: Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), Introduction.
interview with the Combat Studies Institute, Major Andrew Hilmes, then a company commander in the 3rd Infantry Division, noted that his unit did no stability training prior to the invasion, and their plans did not go beyond the isolation of Baghdad. He stated in the interview, “We had rehearsed this fantastic plan taking us all the way up to Baghdad, and all the planning basically stopped when we circled Baghdad….That’s where it ended and we never discussed the SASO piece of the mission….There were no “what-ifs.”

**ANALYSIS OF OIF TRANSITIONS**

**FM 3-0: Operations (2001)**

To analyze the effectiveness of both the government and Army’s planning and execution of transitions during OIF, FM 3-0 provided six Stability Operations considerations. These were: leverage interagency, joint, and multinational cooperation; enhance the capabilities and legitimacy of the host nation; understand the potential for unintended consequences of individual and small unit actions; display the capability to use force in a nonthreatening manner; act decisively to prevent escalation; apply force electively and discriminately.93

The first consideration contained a framework that assumed there was a unity of effort within the governmental planning. It recommended that Army planners share their plans and objectives with other agencies to enable a unified and complementary effort. In Iraq, this framework never existed in a meaningful way, either in the initial planning or after the invasion. At the top of the government, the tension between the State and Defense Departments precluded united work. Secretary Rumsfeld severed the links between the Defense Department and all other governmental agencies, essentially isolating military planning. Within the military, the invasion planning also became isolated. CENTCOM and CFLCC planners focused almost all of their...  

---

92Major Andrew Hilmes, “Transcript. Interview of Andrew Hilmes, Jan. 24, 2006”, Interview by Operational Leadership Experiences Project team with Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  
attention on the invasion size and scope, ultimately at the expense of Phase IV planning. General Franks, similar to Secretary Rumsfeld, sought to keep outside influences from interfering in the invasion planning. He was not interested in the opinions of the Joint Staff or the Defense Department, and viewed their input as counterproductive. Even with an agency specifically created for Phase IV under his control, ORHA, General Franks did not empower or resource Lieutenant General (Ret) Garner appropriately. The impact from the lack of coherence at senior political and military levels, on the tactical level planning, was significant in creating conditions conducive to operational failure. Army and Marine units found themselves in a space between Phase III offensive operations and Phase IV stabilization operations, with no specific guidance or specialized resources to enable a transition between the two.

The next consideration, enhance the capabilities and legitimacy of the host nation, as explained in the FM captured the essence of a main issue in the policy for Iraq. “Commanders must not allow stability issue solutions to become a U.S. responsibility. Within their capabilities, the host nation must take the lead, in both developmental and security activities.” This statement captures succinctly how the President, Secretary of Defense, and even General Franks thought about the transition to Phase IV. It facilitated the assumptions thatCENTCOM and CFLCC made with respect to the utilization of Iraqi infrastructure and the expected rapid stabilization of the immediate post-combat environment. As much as the Balkans experience shaped the political and military approach in terms of what not to do, it also led to an assumption that contributed to the failure.

Unlike in Bosnia or Kosovo where military ground forces enforced an existing peace treaty and deployed only after the agreement, in Iraq, the U.S. invaded the country and removed the regime with no established political agreement for what came next. According to

---

international law, and specifically from FM 27-10 (1976), the U.S. was an occupying power and had the responsibility to provide security and essential services. The CENTCOM and CFLCC assumption that the U.S. would rely on the civic and physical infrastructure had a faulty premise; the invasion delegitimized the Iraqi civic infrastructure. Similarly, the inability of U.S. forces to provide adequate security had the unintended consequence of the physical destruction of much of the actual infrastructure.

The next consideration, understand the potential for unintended consequences, focused on two key things, the public nature of a stability operation and the associated complexity. To mitigate unintended consequences the FM recommended that every soldier understand the strategic and operational nature of the campaign, and the culture of the people in the environment. From the perspective of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, the framework for the Iraq invasion led to unintended consequences at each level. At the strategic level, the liberation model that guided policy makers was wrong for the situation created by the invasion. It enabled the lack of unity at the governmental level and facilitated optimistic predictions concerning the stability of post-combat Iraq. At the operational level the focus on the invasion, and the subsequent CFLCC tempo did not allow the time for planners to focus on Phase IV. General McKiernan constructed an intent for Phase IV and his guidance was for rolling transitions, but in execution, it was up to the corps and divisions to determine the policy and subsequent plans. The impact at the tactical level was the collision between the public nature of a stability operation and its associated complexity. The massive looting in major Iraqi cities, and the Army and Marine Corps’ divergent responses created conditions favorable to the emerging insurgency. This specific situation leads to next three considerations from FM 3-0.

The next three considerations concern the maintenance of operational initiative at the tactical level in a stability operation. In order to enable conditions conducive to stabilizing the situation Army forces must have the capability and will to use discriminate force. In Iraq, the
strategic context of a liberation and the lack of a transition framework led to disparate actions by CFLCC’s units. As Major Hilmes discussed in his interview, his unit did no phase IV planning or training and did not have a framework for transition. General Blount in his 15 May 2003 interview discussed his division’s overriding focus on completing its military objectives during the time looting was occurring in Baghdad. Finally, the competing approaches of the 1st Marine Division and 4th Infantry Division towards the situation in Tikrit revealed the lack of a unified approach to transitions. The initiative generated by the quick invasion and defeat of the Iraqi armed forces was lost in the complex situation following the regime’s collapse. In the absence of guidance and with limited resources, many commanders either did not, or could not utilize the force necessary to establish credibility amongst the population. In this situation, units ceded the initiative, became reactive, and let events dictate their actions.

The stability considerations from the 2001 FM 3-0 reveal why the transition to stability operations in Iraq was problematic. The unifying theme of liberation with its associated assumptions enabled an environment that disregarded the complexities of Phase IV. The focus instead became on constructing a plan that could conduct the invasion with the smallest force at the highest tempo possible. The government as a whole, and the military specifically, ignored the complexities of Phase IV. The State Department’s Future of Iraq project, the most comprehensive look at the needs of a post-combat Iraq, elicited no momentum amongst policy makers or military planners to consider in detail the post invasion stability of Iraq. The result of this failure was that after the fall of the regime there was no coherence either between political and military actions or inside CENTCOM itself. This lack of coherence led to a significant loss of initiative at both the strategic and operational levels, and at the tactical level a widely perceived sense of paralysis, or worse American indifference.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

The utility of comparing the transition from offensive operations in Europe and Iraq is in the reflection on what enabled success in one and failure in the other. The difference between the two was in the coherence of the strategy, and understanding of the nature of the war, from the President through the company commanders on the ground. Carl Von Clausewitz’s maxim on understanding the nature of the war about to be undertaken proves true in these cases. In the campaigns against Germany and Iraq the ultimate strategic goals were the removal of the established governments. From these common points each campaign diverges dramatically in approach, and ultimately in results. What made U.S. operations in Germany a success was a coherence in policy, strategy, and operations. What made initial operations in Iraq a failure were the lack of coherence amongst the three: policy, strategy, and operations. This lack of coherence was not limited to the military, it was characteristic of the entire U.S. government’s approach.

From the start of planning for World War II there was a shared understanding that the U.S. policy was the removal of the Nazi German government. This early agreement on the policy created a framework that allowed all the agencies of the government, to include the military, to develop their own strategies and operations. The framework also ensured that the individual work of governmental agencies stayed within established bounds and contributed to a unified effort. Guided by its experience in World War I, the Army began very early to plan for an occupation of Germany. This planning resulted in a sequence of events that culminated with the successful transition to the occupation of Germany. It began with the establishment of military government training centers and continued through the integration of lessons learned from different combat theaters, and into the individual transition from offensive operations to military

government operations by units like the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion and 75th Infantry Division. Military commanders at each level understood their responsibilities for military government, and they had at their disposal invaluable resources in attached Civil Affairs and Military Government Detachments, as well as from their own staff G5s. At the individual unit level, and through the overall SHAEF effort the result was the maintenance of initiative in pursuit of the end state. The failure of the government and military to achieve the same coherence in Iraq directly contributed to failures in 2003.

There was an initial coherence in policy for the Iraq campaign, in the removal of the Ba’athist regime. From this point, the development of strategy fractured and the government’s efforts became primarily limited to the Defense Department. The result was that Secretary Rumsfeld’s strategic and operational vision drove the planning to focus only on the invasion. The military was not as responsive to the approaching war as their counterparts were prior to World War II. Despite understanding that the goal was the removal of the current regime, there was not a concerted effort to prepare for what came next. Most of this was attributable to CFLCC’s planners having to respond to changes in the size of the force, and then correspondingly updating the Phase III portion of the overall plan. There was an acknowledgement before the invasion by CFLCC’s planners, Colonel Benson most notably, that the complexities expected for Phase IV required more intensive planning. This did not result, in an effort across the U.S. government to develop a more cohesive plan for Phase IV.

There was no Army organizational training or resourcing for the management of civil institutions, or understanding of Iraqi governmental systems specifically. Additionally, unlike their World War II counterparts, military commanders in Iraq did not have military government detachments or officers educated and trained specifically for civil affairs operations in Iraq. As the focus was primarily on offensive operations, once the Ba’athist government fell, CFLCC did not have the organizational agility to quickly transition to stability operations. Based on FM 3-0
(2001), the Army was supposed to be capable of operating and transitioning across the full spectrum of operations (offense, defense, stability, support). CFLCC could not do this with its resource constraints, lack of environmental understanding, and most critically without a comprehensive U.S. government occupation and stabilization plan.

The occupation of Germany after World War II and the liberation of Iraq resulting from OIF were two entirely different approaches to ending a conflict. The successful occupation of Germany after the war resulted directly from a unified governmental effort to planning and preparation. The government’s efforts before and during the war allowed for a comprehensive application of governmental, primarily U.S. Army, resources. SHAEF, and primarily the U.S. Army, were able to quickly establish the military and civil conditions necessary for stabilization following offensive operations. Cumulatively this enabled the Army to retain operational momentum and initiative and transition the overall campaign to the Allied occupation of Germany. In Iraq the U.S. government and military framed the operation as a liberation. This framework enabled a narrow approach to achieving the strategic objectives. It assumed that a high tempo campaign, conducted by a relatively small force could remove the Ba'athist regime and then transition the stabilization mission quickly back to a new Iraqi government. This framework did not match the strategic goal. The removal of the existing regime required an occupation similar to World War II, a comprehensive government approach with clear unity of purpose and effort.\textsuperscript{96} In choosing the liberation approach the military, and primarily the U.S. Army, constrained its ability to control the environment, ultimately ceding the initiative gained through the invasion. Instead of the war being one characterized by liberation, it became clear it was something else, something the military was not prepared for.

\textsuperscript{96}U.S. Department of the Army, ADRP 3-07: \textit{Stability} (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2012), 1-4 to 1-5. Unity of effort and unity of purpose are one of four stability principles, the other three are: conflict transformation, legitimacy and host-nation ownership, and building partner capacity.
Recommendations

The following recommendations are grouped on three levels: strategic, operational and institutional, and tactical. At the strategic level they focus on enabling a comprehensive and whole of government approach, to achieve a unity of purpose and effort. At the institutional level they seek to increase the Army’s regional expertise and improve the linkages between the institutional and operational components of the Army. At the operational level the recommendations focus on resourcing the Army appropriately for stabilization missions. Finally, at the tactical level the recommendations focus on the need for Army units to incorporate the transition to, and execution of, stabilization operations.

As the major factor that led to success in World War II and failure in the early stages of Iraq, coherence at the national level is the first recommendation. At the strategic level there should be a unity of purpose and effort, and clear understanding of the objective between senior military and political leaders. This occurred prior to World War II with leaders from the War and State Departments, and ultimately the President. It simply did not occur for Iraq. In the future the National Security Council should ensure unity of effort between the various departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. If a single person or entity has responsibility for a coming mission the intent remains the same, to ensure unity between all agencies involved. This unity should also include a clear understanding of the mission’s objective. The U.S. government framed the invasion of Iraq as a liberation, but in fact it was an occupation. Achieving coherence at the national level on a conflict’s purpose and objectives, enables the construction of an appropriate framework within which the government ensures unity of purpose and effort. Operating inside this framework, the military should also have a mechanism that ensures a comprehensive and unified approach.

In World War II there was a positive relationship between General Eisenhower, General Marshall, and the War Department. In OIF General Franks held much of the Joint Staff and
Defense Department in disdain. Combatant Commands, and their associated Component
Commands, should integrate with the Joint Staff, Service Staffs, and Defense Department when
planning for major stabilization operations. The Combatant Commanders answer directly to the
Secretary of Defense, but in the case of General Franks he ignored the advice and inquiries of
others to the detriment of the Iraq planning. The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint
Staff should ensure there is unity of effort and purpose within the military. Similar to the
National Security Council’s role as the unifying element for the U.S. Government, a unifying
element between the Department of Defense and Joint Staff can enable unity of purpose and
effort. An example would be something similar to World War II’s Combined Chiefs of Staff, an
entity that linked the U.S. President and British Prime Minister to their Allied military Forces.\textsuperscript{97}
In this case the group would have members from the Joint Staff, Defense Department, and
Combatant Commands. This entity would better link the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Secretary
of Defense, and the Combatant Commander. The resulting direction and guidance better
positions the Army for its planning and execution of stabilization operations. The following
institutional recommendations are specific to the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command.

manual are necessary toward achieving sustained peace. The U.S. Army has devoted most of its
effort, over its 237-year history, conducting those tasks.”\textsuperscript{98} Informed by the failure of Iraq and
the success in World War II there needs to be a stronger linkage between the institutional Army,
primarily U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the Army Component Commands.
When an Army Component Command is conducting planning for a campaign or major stability
operation, an appropriate school or institute within Training and Doctrine Command should assist
the command in developing an understanding and design of an operational approach. For

\textsuperscript{97}Pogue, \textit{The Supreme Command}, 37-41.

\textsuperscript{98}ADRP 3-07: \textit{Stability}, v.
example, the U.S. War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Institute providing experts and planners to Army Central Command in anticipation of a campaign similar to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Similarly, if the situation warrants, Training and Doctrine Command should establish linkages with civilian academic institutions to augment military training.

Linkages between the Army and civilian academic institutions would not only remove some of the burden from the military infrastructure but also enable a whole of government approach. Additionally, Training and Doctrine Command benefits from the connection to the Army Component Command and civilian institutions. These linkages keep soldiers, civilians, and military faculty directly connected to the current realities faced by the operational commands along with new ideas from academia. An example from World War II is the Military Police Corps establishment of a Military Government School at the University of Virginia. The Army could look to both the Military Police and Civil Affairs branches again to help better prepare the Army for future stabilization operations. The Military Police Corps, in coordination with Army Civil Affairs and Engineer branches, could once again provide training to the Army on the primary stabilization tasks. This training would occur at the Army’s Maneuver Support Center of Excellence at Fort Leonard Wood, home to the Military Police and Engineer training schools.

At the operational level there are three recommendations relating to the resourcing of stabilization missions. First is to apply the appropriate type and amount of resources required for the anticipated military operation. For example, in World War II the Army received a large amount of trained military government detachments. The determination of required resources is dependent on the anticipated operational environment. This leads to the second recommendation, adequately organizing the force before commencing operations. This recommendation builds from the first in that it constructs the needed force in time to appropriately plan, prepare, and then

---

99ADRP 3-07: Stability, iv. These tasks are: establish civil security, civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development.
execute the operation. In the case of Iraq, the mission commenced without many of the resources needed for the transition to stabilization operations, such as Military Police and Civil Affairs units. An important component of this recommendation is the close management of unit deployment schedules. The third recommendation is that operations should not commence without a campaign or operational plan that includes the transition to the stabilization phase.

A thorough plan for the transition to stabilization operations accomplishes two critical things. First it makes clear to subordinate tactical commanders their responsibilities and the assets they have available to them. Second it serves as the linkage between the national, theater, and operational objectives. An example is SHAEF’s plan for military government in Germany, handbooks on military government, and the Supreme Commander’s proclamation to the German people establishing military authority for occupation. In publishing these plans and handbooks SHAEF ensured that tactical commanders knew their responsibilities and were in fact planning operations that nested with the strategic objectives. The execution of these operations leads to two recommendations for the tactical level.

The first tactical recommendation is that commanders at the Corps level and below understand when they need to transition between operations. Transitioning between types of operations is a critical part of the Army’s Unified Land Operations concept. Effective transitions maintain momentum and help retain the initiative. In order to be able to effectively execute the transition between operations, for example between offensive and stability operations, the Army should train for it. Many exercises, field exercises and staff exercises typically focus on only one phase of an operation, Phase III. Exercises should include transitions between phases and especially from offensive to stability operations. Units that practice this transition, and appreciate the associated complexities, would be better postured to both plan for, and execute it in an actual

\[100] ADRP 3-0: Unified Land Operations, 4-8.
mission.

These recommendations all seek to better enable the Army to plan for and conduct transitions to stability operations. As ADRP 3-07: Stability (2012) noted in its introduction, stability operations have been more a part of Army history that any other type of operation. Understanding this history and the critical factors that contributed to success or failure in major stabilization missions can aid in setting conditions for future military campaigns. As both World War II and the campaign in Iraq show, the long term view of successful offensive operations rely more on what follows them than on their conduct alone. “Winning battles and engagements is important but alone may not be the most significant. . . In many joint operations, stability or defense support to civil authorities’ tasks often prove more important than offensive and defensive tasks.”

---

102 ADRP 3-0: Unified Land Operations, 2-3.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Memoirs


Magazine Articles


Journal Articles

Benson, Colonel Kevin C. M. “OIF Phase IV: A Planner’s Reply to Brigadier Aylwin-Foster.” *Military Review* 86, no. 2; (March/April 2006): 61-68.

Interviews/Speeches


Hilmes, Major Andrew. “Transcript of Interview of Andrew Hilmes, Jan. 24, 2006.” Interview by Operational Leadership Experiences Project team with Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.


**Online Databases**


**Unit AARs**


**U.S. Government Publications**


———. *JP 5-0, Joint Operational Planning*. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011.


**Secondary Sources**

**Books**


**Periodicals**


**U.S. Government Publications**


