

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FAILURES OF THE KOREAN WAR

A Monograph

by

MAJ Charles M. Azotea
United States Army



School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Name of Candidate: MAJ Charles M. Azotea

Monograph Title: Operational Intelligence Failures of the Korean War

Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Jeffrey J. Kubiak, Ph.D.

_____, Seminar Leader
Uwe F. Jansohn, COL

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Henry A. Arnold III, COL

Accepted this 22nd day of May 2013 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FAILURES OF THE KOREAN WAR, by MAJ Charles M. Azotea, 79 pages.

This monograph addresses the failures of United States military operational intelligence regarding the invasion of South Korea by the North Korean Peoples' Army and the subsequent intervention by the Chinese Communist forces. These operational intelligence failures were a result of post-World War II policies that reduced the size of the military, cut systems and training, and reorganized intelligence services responsible for those failures.

Reorganization of intelligence structures and training cutbacks produced ineffectual intelligence soldiers deployed to Far East Command and Korea. Personnel shortages in intelligence analysis, communications, signals and photographic intelligence, and linguistics further reduced intelligence collection and production. Poorly trained analysts, were unable to determine North Korean and Chinese intentions at both the strategic and operational level, which contributed to poor predictive analysis. United States strategic policy's focus on the threat posed by the Soviet Union to Western Europe further exacerbated intelligence failures in the Far East.

General MacArthur's assessments, as Far East Commander and Commander of United Nations Forces in Korea, proved decisive in shaping political and military strategies. Major General Willoughby, MacArthur's senior intelligence officer (G-2), shared MacArthur's views and propagated them throughout the intelligence communities of both the Far East Command and Washington, DC. Analysts at all levels underestimated the Peoples' Republic of China, largely as a result of cultural bias and a lack of understanding of Chinese operational art and tactics.

Operational intelligence failures, created by post-World War II policies, led to poor readiness and lack of capability. This operational unpreparedness produced an inability to determine appropriate indicators and warnings of both North Korean and Chinese intentions. The results of these failures carry on to this day more than 60 years later.

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ACRONYMS

AFSA Armed Forces Security Agency

INTRODUCTION

The United States, since its inception as a nation, has reduced the size of its military services at the conclusion of its wars. This tendency has myriad motives, yet the primary, and prevalent argument is the financial rewards reaped from such actions. Post-conflict, the stock refrain is one of cashing in on a peace dividend. Politicians are very aware of the benefits derived from ensuring the American public that tax reductions will follow in the wake of military downsizing. Military downsizing comes at a cost though. War's exorbitant costs are heightened by higher casualty rates as military personnel relearn the ways of war and the requirements needed to refurbish dilapidated combat forces.

Military intelligence failures regarding the 1950 invasion of South Korea by the North Korean Peoples' Army and the subsequent intervention by Chinese Communist Forces resulted from post-World War II executive and Department of Defense policies. The reduction in personnel, training, and combat systems was further exacerbated by the strategic policy focusing on the Soviet Union and placing Korea outside of the United States defense perimeter. Lastly, intelligence analysts' training focused on enemy order of battle and capabilities instead of intentions and objectives. This produced an inability to determine North Korean and Chinese capabilities and intentions. These intelligence failures were a conglomeration of United States strategic political and military policy failures.

Reductions in personnel, systems, and financial resources, compounded by the confusion engendered by the same rapid reductions and reorganizations, impeded the military's intelligence services' ability to adequately prepare its intelligence personnel. Second, post-war reorganization failed to create a distinctive military intelligence branch, especially for the Army. This failure hindered efforts to regulate and professionalize military intelligence soldiers. Third, analyst assignment and training was in constant flux and universally sporadic throughout all the intelligence specialties. Force reductions hampered military intelligence efforts, and drove

reassignment of urgent missions with the limited resources available. Numerous threat regions lacked the requisite intelligence coverage and analysis due to these retrenchments. At the end of the 1940s, the military intelligence community failed to provide its political and military leadership the necessary indications and warnings of regional threats pertaining to United States' strategic and operational interests in the Far East.

This study posits that post-World War II, Department of Defense, and service branch policies further exacerbated by national strategic policy, negatively impacted military intelligence personnel, training, systems availability, and readiness. As a result, operational intelligence failed to provide the proper indications and warnings of the invasion of South Korea by the North Korean People's Army and the subsequent intervention by Chinese Communist Forces.

The purpose of this project is to identify the causes of operational intelligence failures during the Korean War. This paper's hypothesis is that these failures were due to post-World War II political decisions, as well as the military service branches' strategic and operational decisions. The argument starts with an examination of the role of intelligence doctrine during and post-World War II, and its evolution from 1949 to 1951. Next, the devolution of operational intelligence at the end of World War II until the Korean War is examined. Third, operational intelligence failures as they pertain to the North Korean invasion and subsequent Chinese Intervention are discussed. Finally, the negative impact General MacArthur and his senior intelligence officer, Major General Willoughby, had on operational intelligence is highlighted.

The budget sequester of March 2013, threatens to repeat the trend and consequences of budget cuts that followed World War II.¹ The Defense Department has already initiated significant cuts which would yield the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest number of

¹The White House, "What You Need to Know About the Sequester," WhiteHouse.gov, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/sequester> (accessed March 22, 2014).

ships since 1915, and the smallest Air Force in United States history.² Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta explained that “war efforts would be adversely affected by the severe disruption in the base budgets . . . the threats to national security would not be reduced.”³

It is unclear what these defense cuts mean for the various service branches. What will the impacts be on readiness, training, systems, and research and design? Another looming issue is the inevitable competition between the services as monies and resources dwindle in a time of fiscal austerity. As the services shrink, what is the impact to the institutional knowledge of service members that remain in the ranks? This is most alarming in light of the ongoing crisis in Syria, Sino-Japanese relations over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, a possible cyberattack on critical United States infrastructure, and the burgeoning Ukrainian-Russian confrontation. Will operational intelligence become a vulnerability over the next decade?

Respectable portions of the American people are tired after more than a decade of war. Myriad similarities exist between the post-World War II and post-Overseas Contingency Operations eras. Examining the causes of intelligence failures prior to, and during, the Korean War allows for some insight into the potential impacts of similar circumstances. Budgetary constraints, force reductions, government restructuring, and interservice rivalry must be mitigated to prevent intelligence failures in the next conventional or unconventional conflict in which the United States engages.

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence doctrine states that intelligence functions to support commanders and their staffs by providing situational understanding of threats, the effects of terrain and weather on

²Leon Panetta, Letter to Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=9692f972-eb86-46da-bc8d-ff4d461e6c00 (accessed March 22, 2014).

³Ibid.

personnel and systems, and civilian considerations.⁴ Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Field Service Regulations - Operations* (August 1949), explains that the “gathering of information and the production of intelligence must be based not only upon our own plans and intentions but also upon a consideration of enemy capabilities.”⁵ It also states that the essential elements of information describe “what is the strength, composition, and disposition of the enemy; what courses of action that can affect our mission are within the physical capabilities of the enemy; when and under what circumstances can he put each course of action into effect; and whether, when, and in what strength, can he be reinforced?”⁶

The regulation explains that enemy intelligence is deduced from numerous indications of the enemy’s activities, collected by organic reconnaissance and other agencies. It goes on to inform the commander that any combat unit under his command serves as an information collection agency, with primary focus placed on ground and air units for reconnaissance and observation. Additional agencies include Air Force and Naval elements operating in support of, or with the commander. Assigned or attached intelligence personnel, and intelligence elements liaison with the headquarters of higher, lower, or adjacent units. Finally, it informs the commander that the Department of the Army provides the principal sources of intelligence to field forces prior to operations.⁷

In 1951, new intelligence doctrine was released in Field Manual (FM) 30-5, *Combat Intelligence*, covering strategic intelligence and combat intelligence. These two forms of

⁴Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 2-0, *Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 2-1.

⁵Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Service Regulations 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government printing Office, 1949), 34-37.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., 36.

intelligence are concerned with the military significance of foreign powers and covered the areas of actual or possible operations. FM 30-5 further stated that, “many of the subjects of interest to combat intelligence and strategic intelligence are closely related. In some instances, they are identical.”⁸ FM 30-5 divided intelligence production into four steps: the collection of information, its processing to produce intelligence, using the resultant intelligence, and directing the intelligence effort.⁹

With FM 30-5, we see another evolution of intelligence doctrine, which is closer to today’s doctrine than FM 100-5 (1949). When FM 30-5 was published, the Korean War was a stalemate, which continued until the signing of the armistice in 1953.¹⁰ Delving further into FM 30-5, one sees the impact of the Korean War on the development of intelligence doctrine.

Intelligence doctrine, drawn from FM 100-5, was largely based on experiences from World War II and was not designed for limited war. It mixed strategic and tactical intelligence. The publishing of FM-30-5 was due to issues that came about during the course of the Korean War.

THE ROAD TO FAILURE

During World War II the various services supported their combat forces by developing significant intelligence capabilities. Army intelligence, operating under the auspices of the Military Intelligence Service conducted collection missions the world over. These included human intelligence, communications and signals intelligence interception, and photographic reconnaissance. The Military Intelligence Service provided intelligence analysis to United States and Allied commands. Concurrently, intelligence elements were assigned in direct support of

⁸Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Service Manual 30-5, *Combat Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1951), 3-6.

⁹Ibid., 23.

¹⁰Ibid., 3-6 and 23.

tactical field forces. The Army Air Corps conducted aerial reconnaissance, while the Army Counterintelligence Corps, created in 1942, provided human intelligence support both stateside and overseas. Army signals analysts broke and exploited Imperial Japanese Army codes and provided support to the ULTRA mission, which came from the decoding of German Enigma cipher machines.

In the Pacific theater, the Navy's intelligence unit began work deciphering the Japanese Fleet code, JN25. This effort paid dividends at the Battle of the Coral Sea, April 1942, with the JN25 code completely deciphered by May 1942. This assisted in the defeat of the Japanese at the Battle of Midway and provided countermeasures against Japanese efforts for the war's duration. Army human intelligence efforts created the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, American Nisei soldiers, who exploited captured Japanese prisoners and documents. Another effort consisted of the Alamo Scouts, comprised of long distance reconnaissance teams, and Australian and Filipino guerilla forces. The Marines created and deployed the Navajo Code Talker Program in May 1942. By 1945, Navajo Wind Talkers were operating in both the Pacific and European theaters.¹¹

The United States and Allied commanders commended the intelligence support provided them during World War II by numerous organizations and systems. What occurred to the United States military intelligence structure in the five years between World War II and the Korean War? What caused such a severe degradation of military intelligence capabilities and capacities?

At the conclusion of the war, American defense policy became centered on nuclear weapons as a deterrent to war due to the emergence of the Cold War. Nuclear deterrence policy brushed aside the prospects of nuclear parity or regional conflicts requiring a military response

¹¹Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, "The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community – A Historical Overview," March 1, 1996, Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/int022.html> (accessed March 22, 2014).

that would be less than total devastation. The Soviet Union's detonation of a nuclear weapon in 1949 ended American nuclear hegemony, which surprisingly did not alter American policy. The United States failed to modernize its conventional military forces, with the Air Force being the sole exception.¹²

At the conclusion of World War II in the Pacific, the United States armed forces numbered over 12 million men and women. The Army began its force drawdown of about 8.3 million soldiers in May 1945.¹³ President Truman stated in August 1945 that the Army would release five to five-and-a-half million men.¹⁴ This reduction occurred within 12 to 18 months. Major General Stephen Henry, Army Deputy Chief of Staff, testified to the House of Representatives, that the Army planned to reduce the force by six-and-a-half million men within one year. Surprisingly, Henry's testimony also occurred in August of 1945, shortly after President Truman's statement.

By the end of 1948 the Army had whittled its forces down to 554,000, approximately one-sixteenth of its earlier size.¹⁵ Political concerns enabled the rapid reduction of the military. This force reduction was neither measured nor balanced and ignored requirements outlined in regional threat assessments as well as requirements to respond to exigencies. This injudicious drawdown of men, materiel, and capabilities precipitated a major shift in the United States defense policy.

¹²Adrian R. Lewis, *The American Culture of War*, 2nd Ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 72. A presidential Air Policy Commission, set up in 1947, embraced the possibilities that air power promised. They advocated the importance of airpower. The final report put forth by the commission emphasized the theory of massive retaliation, the need to reject former methods of the conduct of war, and sustained readiness. Lastly, the commission concluded that ground combat was a thing of the past.

¹³John C. Sparrow, *History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army* (New York: the Free Press, 1984), 21.

¹⁴David McCormick, *The Downsized Warrior* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 10.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

The drawdown cast the die and the Army rapidly withered on the vine during the subsequent years. As an organization, the Army garnered minimal attention and monies, maintaining the lowest personnel levels possible.¹⁶ From 1945 to 1950, the Army also suffered cutbacks in training and materiel authorizations. In 1948, budget cutbacks reduced basic training from 14 to eight weeks.¹⁷ Furthermore, the post-World War II Army relied on stockpiles of materiel and equipment from World War I. Budget cuts hampered the procurement of modern equipment and research and development of state-of-the-art equipment. The United States government and the Army discarded the lessons learned post-World War I downsizing. Lieutenant General Ridgeway, commander of the Eighth Army in Korea during the war stated it best; “We were, in short, in a state of shameful unreadiness.”¹⁸ By 1950, the Army was a shadow of its former self. Serving as an occupation force around the world, but primarily in Europe, the preponderance of overseas units remained undermanned, insufficiently trained and equipped, and unprepared for the coming conflict.

From 1945 to 1950, the United States changed radically, both militarily and politically, while global events reshaped the Allies’ vision of the world order post-World War II. President Truman’s “actions during the events that took place laid the foundation not only for United States foreign and military policies but also for the structure of world politics, and war in the latter half of the twentieth century.”¹⁹ He saw the end of World War II and the inception of the Cold War, which ended in 1990. He also advocated the policy of containment, which became the major

¹⁶McCormick, 73.

¹⁷Roy K. Flint, “Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950,” in *America’s First Battles, 1775-1965*, eds. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 1986), 269.

¹⁸Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: First Anchor Books, 1989), 271.

¹⁹Lewis, 66.

United States policy designed to deter the spread of communism. According to historian Lawrence Freedman, “Throughout the cold war the concept of deterrence was central to all strategic discourse. Every strategic move of the West was made with reference to its requirements.”²⁰ This policy responded to a number of stratagems employed by the Soviet Union to enlarge communist influence in Eastern Europe, China, and Korea. In 1945, President Truman told the American people in a “Special Message to Congress:”

In short, we must be prepared to maintain in constant and immediate readiness sufficient military strength to convince any future potential aggressor that this nation, in its determination for a lasting peace, means business.²¹

While President Truman accepted the new role and responsibilities now required of the United States, he failed to truly understand the enormity of the task that lay before him. His administration’s foreign policy concentrated on the containment of the Soviet Communist threat. The United States remained predisposed to containing the spread of Communism, communist doctrine, and communist influence globally. The Iron Curtain divided Germany and all of Eastern Europe fell into Soviet hegemony by 1946. The situation in the Far East was not much better. In 1949, Chinese Communist forces, led by Mao Zedong, forced Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government to flee to Formosa, known later as Taiwan, as China fell under Communist rule. The Republican Party mocked Truman’s administration for having lost China by not adequately supporting Chiang Kai-shek’s forces and the perception of a ‘soft’ stance against Communism.

This was not the case. The administration’s primary effort was aimed towards the Soviet threat in the European theater. The Chinese Communist menace in the Far East became a secondary effort at best. Communist threats to United States security materialized both at home and abroad. The Second Red Scare, in 1947–1954, also known as McCarthyism, transpired

²⁰Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), 1.

²¹Harry S. Truman, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, April 12 to December 31, 1945* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1961), 549.

concurrently with the Berlin Blockade, the Chinese Civil War, and the formation of the People's Republic of China. Domestically, concerns over communism reached a fever pitch due to atomic spies.²²

When the United States entered World War II, it allied itself with Stalin's Soviet Union in order to defeat the Axis Powers. "The price of that alliance was giving the Soviets control of half of Europe after the war."²³ Part of that price included Korea, which is much less well known. According to historian, Kathryn Weathersby, this created the foundation of the Korean War as a component of wartime negotiations.²⁴ The United States' and the Soviet Union's plans differed on the postwar settlement regarding Europe and the Far East. America and its European allies saw the Soviet Union as the primary combatant, as opposed to Germany, intending to establish a buffer zone in Eastern Europe. "The United States played a secondary role militarily and had relatively little interest in expanding its sphere of influence into Europe through the postwar political settlement."²⁵ The conflict in the Far East consisted of the United States as the main combatant against Japan. The Soviet Union was not involved in this conflict at all; however, like the Soviet Union in Europe, the United States had territorial plans in the Far East.²⁶

Notwithstanding, the United States' continued solicitations for the Soviet Union to engage Japan afforded Moscow a postwar political position to negotiate terms. Stalin's minimal

²²Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America—the Stalin Era* (New York: Random House, 1999), 172-222. Testimony provided during an investigation by the House Un-American Activities Committee, stated that Soviet spies and communist sympathizers had served in various capacities as United States government officials.

²³Gideon Rose, *How Wars End* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 7.

²⁴Kathryn Weathersby, Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 8, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence From Russian Archives," Branislav Slantchev, <http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/nss/documents/weathersby-soviet-aims-in-korea.pdf> (accessed October 4, 2013), 9.

²⁵Ibid, 9.

²⁶Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950," 9.

demands in the Far East contrasted sharply compared to his European demands. His demands in the Far East, excepting the Kuriles, amounted to Russia's holdings before its defeat by the Japanese in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War. Interestingly enough, he made no demands regarding Korea, and agreed to Roosevelt's offer of dual occupation, artificially decided along the 38th Parallel.²⁷ His only concern revolved around the interactions of United States military forces stationed in Korea.

Soviet forces quickly established an occupation zone and aggressively sealed northern Korea from its southern half. Furthermore, the Soviets severed rail traffic, coal shipments, mail delivery, and blocked the delivery of electricity from northern hydroelectric plants. Soviet forces refused United States overtures to meet and end the stalemate to obviate the discomfiture it caused in the south. Despite the Soviet blockade of services, the Korean people maintained virtually unrestricted movement in either direction.²⁸ These factors, in addition to the establishment of opposing regimes in the north and south, the suppression of communists in the south, and the victory of Chinese Communist forces in China, set the stage for the Korean War.

The United States' perception was of a Moscow-controlled Communist monolith consisting of the Soviet Union and China. This perception shaped major policy resolutions, global and regional assessments, and thereby resource apportionment. Consequently, the policy of containment focused on Western Europe as the main effort resourcing manpower, materiel, and financial subsidization. These actions occurred at the cost of the Far East Command. Truman's decision to weigh political, military, and economic efforts against Western Europe forced the United States to sacrifice resources in Asia. The United States and its European allies developed a myriad of contingency strategies in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, but

²⁷Rose, 7-10.

²⁸Weathersby, 13.

neglected the possibility of a mission in Korea. In fact, the United States only possessed a plan for the evacuation of American civilians. As the state of affairs in Korea escalated, the United States' military and civilian intelligence organizations, at home and abroad, remained focused on developments in the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Concurrently, civil-military and inter-service competition encouraged the total reorganization of the United States national security structure. The National Security Act of 1947 resulted in the major restructuring of the United States government's military and intelligence agencies following World War II. The National Security Act combined the War Department, later known as the Department of the Army, and the Department of the Navy. This combination resulted in the Department of Defense. Under the National Security Act of 1947, the National Military Establishment fell under the purview of a single Secretary of Defense. It also separated the Army Air Forces branch into a separate service, the United States Air Force.

The political climate in the United States acutely influenced military readiness. The collectively understood threat of Soviet global subjugation influenced American political and military leaders' judgments. The era's political climate, wracked by fear and uncertainty, focused the military's intelligence collection efforts. Legitimate apprehension of Soviet proliferation became the catalyst that drove intelligence efforts and analysis of global events, much to the Far East Command's frustration.

THE NORTH KOREAN INVASION

On June 25, 1950, the North Korean People's Army crossed the 38th Parallel and crushed the poorly manned, trained, and equipped army of the Republic of Korea.²⁹ Trained by Soviet advisors and equipped with Soviet armor and artillery, they followed Soviet doctrine of the time.

²⁹Kathryn Weathersby, trans., "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7, Wilson Center, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACF1A6.pdf> (accessed October 4, 2013).

This allowed the North Koreans to overwhelm the South Korean army and capture Seoul. President Truman immediately committed United States military forces to the defense of South Korea. These ground forces assembled and moved, in a piecemeal sequence, to Korea from the Japanese mainland. Task Force Smith was the first and most notable element of United States forces to face disaster.

How were the North Koreans able to achieve such surprise at both the strategic and operational level? What part did intelligence play, or not play, in assessing North Korean intentions? The seeds of the initial ruinous military undertakings of the United States were planted in the aftermath of World War II. In hindsight, the reasons for the various intelligence failures are easily comprehensible. The United States' evolving foreign policy removed Korea from its national defense plans, resulting in Korea receiving less of everything than areas deemed more vital to United States interests. It must be noted though, that an intelligence effort in Korea did exist.

From 1945 until 1949, General MacArthur's Far East Command led intelligence collection efforts pertaining to the Korean Peninsula. Major General Willoughby, the Far East Command senior intelligence officer, established the Korean Liaison Office, a human intelligence gathering organization, on his own initiative in June 1949. Commanded by Major Lawrence Abbot, it maintained six agents headquartered in Seoul.³⁰ An additional 16 agents were operating in North Korea at the time of the North Korean invasion.³¹

This agency coordinated with the Korean Military Advisors Group, the South Korean armed forces, and other United States government agencies, like the Central Intelligence Agency.

³⁰Peter G. Knight, *MacArthur's Eyes: Reassessing Military Intelligence Operations in the Forgotten War, June 1950- April 1951* (Columbus: Ohio State University, 2004), 33.

³¹William B. Breuer, *Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996), 20-21.

The Korean Liaison Office collected information on the actions of the North Korean government and military, Soviet support to North Korea, and communist activities south of the 38th Parallel. Willoughby coordinated laterally with United States military attaches in the various Far Eastern countries for mutual exchange of intelligence requirements and pertinent intelligence.

Willoughby's intelligence requirements for the whole peninsula included thorough order of battle information on the North Korean People's Army and all Korean paramilitary forces. These requirements also encompassed the strength, training readiness, organizational structure and equipment, and morale of the North Korean military. Additional demands included monitoring anti-United States activities, as well as scientific, technical, economic, and political activities in both North and South Korea.

Willoughby's intelligence collection requirements hinted at an impressive array of collection assets and a fully manned and integrated staff, but this was not reality. He managed two intelligence staffs for General MacArthur in 1945; both located in Tokyo, Japan. The first was the Far East Command G2 and the second was the Supreme Commander Allied Powers G2. The Far East Command's G2 concentrated its efforts on military intelligence within the Far East region. The Supreme Commander Allied Powers' G2 oversaw civil intelligence and counter-intelligence duties that related solely to an occupied Japan.³² The 441st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment fulfilled this responsibility, since it was the largest intelligence component in all of the Far East Command. It reported to General MacArthur in his role as the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, not as the Far East Commander.³³

³²General Headquarters, Far East Command (hereafter referred to as GHQ, FEC) "Far Eastern Intelligence," September 20, 1947, Record Group 6: Records of Headquarters Far East Command (FECOM); 1947-1951 (hereafter referred to as RG 6), Box 15, MMA, Douglas A. MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA, 1-14.

³³John P. Finnegan, "The Evolution of US Army HUMINT: Intelligence Operations in the Korean War," *Studies in Intelligence* 55, no. 2 (June 2011): 58, Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-55-no.-2> (accessed November 13, 2013).

Unfortunately, post-war defense budget reductions had decimated both of these intelligence staffs. In December 1945, these two staffs had numbered 3,872 military and civilian personnel. By June 1950, 898 personnel composed these two staffs and executed intelligence operations, with further cuts anticipated.³⁴ MacArthur placed command emphasis on the reconstruction and restoration of Japan. Willoughby facilitated MacArthur's command emphasis by weighing his intelligence efforts to support the Japanese occupation effort.³⁵ To that end, Willoughby assigned approximately 60 percent of the Far East Command's remaining intelligence personnel to support that mission. That decision resulted in the degradation of the Far East Command's intelligence collection priorities. Furthermore, Willoughby also managed over 1,300 United States Army Counter Intelligence Corps and linguist personnel, who performed peacetime counterintelligence missions in Japan, assigned to the Supreme Commander Allied Powers' G2.

Interestingly enough, while this was occurring, the command's G2 Allied Translator and Interrogation Service section struggled to perform its primary mission. It was only a skeleton of its former World War II capabilities, it too, a victim of the aforementioned budget cuts. The Allied Translator and Interrogation Service section lacked sufficiently qualified linguists to process and analyze information gathered from the Soviet Union's one-and-a-half million newly repatriated Japanese prisoners of war. The interrogators' analysis of the information gathered from these former prisoners was slowed because of the lack of linguist support. The intelligence produced was a cursory intelligence assessment at best due to this lack of support. The

³⁴Matthew M. Aid, "U.S. HUMINT and COMINT in the Korean War," in Richard J. Aldrich, Gary D. Rawnsley, and Ming-Yeh T. Rawnsley, *The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda and Special Operations*, Cass Series--Studies in Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 19.

³⁵Oral debrief of General (ret.) James H. Polk by Lieutenant Colonel Tausch, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, "General James H. Polk Papers," U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/AHEC/USAMHI/researchinquiries.cfm> (accessed December 1, 2013), 28-29.

information that should have been collected from knowledgeable Japanese prisoners regarding developments in the Soviet Union was lost. This intelligence could have proven extremely useful to the Far East Command, since monitoring the Soviet Union's military activities was the G2's number one strategic collection priority.³⁶

Strategically, the Far East Command integrated the Defense Department's intelligence requirements into its own as well.³⁷ This meant that within the Far East Command's area of responsibility the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Japan succeeded Korea in importance. This remained the situation even after the last United States Army units left Korea in July 1949.³⁸ European and the Soviet Union targets within the Far East Command's area of operations took a higher precedence regarding national collection priorities, and received a larger apportionment of collection assets.³⁹ Though this was the case, the Far East Command's purview was represented by all aspects of intelligence collection capabilities. These included Human Intelligence, Signals and Communications Intelligence, Photographic Intelligence, and Technical Intelligence. Human Intelligence operations were the mainstay for United States military operations on the Korean peninsula, while other assets focused elsewhere within the region.

Far East Command lost primary responsibility for intelligence collection operations in Korea in January 1950 due to two different intersecting circumstances. The first was the Truman administration's declaration that placed Korea outside of the United States defensive perimeter in the Pacific region.⁴⁰ The Truman administration determined it needed to maximize the use of

³⁶Aid, "U.S. HUMINT and COMINT in the Korean War," 20.

³⁷James F. Schnabel, *Policy And Direction: The First Year, United States Army In The Korean War* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1992), 25.

³⁸Aid, "U.S. HUMINT and COMINT in the Korean War," 29.

³⁹John P. Finnegan, *Military Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1998), 113.

⁴⁰Aid, "U.S. HUMINT and COMINT in the Korean War," 29.

resources elsewhere within the Far East Theater, dedicated to the defense of Japan against Soviet and Chinese Communist influences.⁴¹ The second circumstance was the departure of United States armed forces from the Korean peninsula, followed by the formation of the United States Army's Korean Military Assistance Group, designed to train the South Korean Army. This came about because of the changing United States foreign policy toward the Republic of Korea, aiming to avoid military entanglements. John Muccio, the United States ambassador to Korea from 1949 to 1952, stated that, "United States policy since 1947 was against getting involved militarily [in Korea]."⁴² Niles Bond, a member of MacArthur's political advisory staff echoed this sentiment. "The military never felt, and I don't think the political side of the government did either, that we had any long term interest in Korea."⁴³ During this transitional period, the United States took on a more advisory role in South Korean defense, dedicating fewer military assets, including intelligence assets, to the Korean peninsula.

The Korean Military Advisors Group officers worked with every echelon of their Korean Army counterparts in collecting data on North Korean activities. They provided this information to Washington periodically and generated special reports. Furthermore, the Korean Military Advisors Group, working under the auspices of the State Department, had the responsibility for securing intelligence data on Korea, not MacArthur.⁴⁴

While human intelligence was the primary intelligence operations within Korean peninsula, interagency turf wars complicated information collection and sharing. MacArthur and

⁴¹Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1969), 116.

⁴²Richard D. McKinzie, Oral Interview of John J. Muccio, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/muccio.htm> (accessed January 12, 2014).

⁴³Richard D. McKinzie, Oral Interview of Niles W. Bond, Washington, DC, December 28, 1973, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/bond.htm> (accessed January 12, 2014).

⁴⁴Schnabel, 61.

Willoughby maintained a hostile relationship with the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency. MacArthur and Willoughby denied the agency access to intelligence reports or facilities in Japan, as both remained unimpressed with its human intelligence operations.⁴⁵

This situation was further exacerbated by the Far East Air Force's disdain for the Army's human intelligence efforts. The Far East Air Force created its own 12-man interrogation unit in May 1949, and conducted its own human intelligence collection through its Office of Special Investigations. It performed daily counterintelligence activities and overt and covert intelligence collection via district offices at both Kimpo Airfield in South Korea and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines.⁴⁶ The Office of Special Investigations competed directly with Willoughby's Korean Liaison office and the Central Intelligence Agency despite primarily focusing on the North Korean Air Force. No matter its best efforts, the Office of Special Investigations lost its most reliable human intelligence contacts, receiving intelligence from sources with low credibility.⁴⁷ In the end, the Office of Special Investigations performed as poorly as Willoughby's Korean Liaison Office, both failing to produce quality intelligence assessments of a looming North Korean invasion.⁴⁸

The Korean Liaison Office mission was "to penetrate North Korean governmental, military, and industrial agencies."⁴⁹ The Korean Liaison Office submitted almost 1,200 reports

⁴⁵Knight, 32.

⁴⁶Ibid., 33.

⁴⁷Richard J. Aldrich, Gary D. Rawnsley, and Ming-Yah T. Rawnsley, *The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda and Special Operations*, Cass Series—Studies in Intelligence. London: Frank Cass, 2000, 21-39.

⁴⁸John P. Finnegan, "The Evolution of US Army HUMINT," 58.

⁴⁹Patrick C. Roe, "The Ghost Armies of Manchuria," Chosin Reservoir. http://www.chosinreservoir.com/ghost_armies_of_manchuria.pdf (accessed March 17, 2014), 3.

from June 1949 to June 1950,⁵⁰ and shared their reporting with the other intelligence organizations operating in theater. ⁵¹ Reports generated by the Korean Liaison Office received little attention within the Far East Command, which focused on the Japanese occupation.

Republic of Korea and National Chinese human intelligence agents provided some of the best intelligence, unfortunately, it was seen as self-serving, and therefore, unreliable. Willoughby's staff distrusted South Korean intelligence agents, as a result of past experiences; which created the perception that they considered South Korean intelligence efforts and products highly politicized, childish, and ultimately, prone to creating false alarms.⁵² Conflicting information and intelligence provided to the Far East Command further confounded this problem. Intelligence personnel stationed at the Far East Command Headquarters in Japan had been misled too often to believe that the North Koreans would invade.⁵³

North Korean deception efforts enabled this misleading assessment. The North Korean People's Army often rotated units along the 38th parallel for rest and refit, as well as occasional unit re-designation. Some analysts understood that re-designation reports indicated North Korean attempts to "hamper hostile recognition and assessment of troop strengths in critical areas."⁵⁴ Problematically, the reports could not confirm new unit designations, strength percentage increases, or the number and caliber of artillery in these units.

⁵⁰U.S. Army Intelligence Center, "Charles Willoughby: World War II Intelligence in the Pacific Theater," Masters of the Intelligence Art, The Official Homepage of Fort Huachuca, AZ, http://huachuca-www.army.mil/files/History_MWILLOU.PDF (accessed March 23, 2014), 1-9.

⁵¹Memorandum "Korea Liaison Office Report," Record Group 23: Records of Headquarters Far East Command (FECOM); 15 May 1951 (hereafter referred to as RG 23), Box 14, Folder 4, MMA, Douglas A. MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA.

⁵²Phillip B. Davidson, *Secrets of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990), 94.

⁵³Finnegan, "The Evolution of US Army HUMINT," 58.

⁵⁴Knight, 46.

South Korean agents actively reported on events throughout the Korean peninsula from 1945 through 1950. These reports provided definite indicators of an imminent North Korean invasion. No one in the Far East Command truly considered the importance of these reports, and did not investigate them further. The failure of the verification effort of North Korean order of battle demonstrated the lack of concern for Korea in the opening stage of the Cold War.⁵⁵

From the perspective of the United States Naval Forces–Far East, interrogations of prisoners of war were conducted according to United States Army directives during the war. Republic of Korea navy personnel partially filled the void created by a lack of trained interrogators, especially in connection to those intelligence teams sent ashore. The majority of United States Army interrogation reports lacked points, or items, pertaining to navy interests. By May 1951, the 200 interrogation reports completed at that time failed to mention any North Korean navy or naval concerns. These reports frustrated United States Naval Forces–Far East as some of the prisoners had lived in, trained at, or moved through ports such as Songjin, Hungnam, Wonsan, Hamhung, and Yanggang.⁵⁶ A lack of intelligence acumen was equaled by a lack of human intelligence sources, backed by hard data.

MacArthur’s Far East Command quickly realized that its intelligence personnel and capabilities had seriously atrophied when the North Koreans invaded. The 441st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment only possessed two Korean linguists for the G-2’s use. As a stop-gap measure, the Far East Command used personnel from the 441st Detachment to quickly build a more robust human intelligence organization using Willoughby’s Korean Liaison Office as its

⁵⁵Knight, 47.

⁵⁶CPT Wyman H. Packard, *A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Historical Center, 1996), 128.

base.⁵⁷ Willoughby remained in control of this organization while it supported Eighth Army and subordinate commanders.

In order to carry out its human intelligence mission, the Korean Liaison Office quickly recruited Korean peasants, provided superficial and incomplete training, and airdropped them behind the North Korean's lines with orders to return with intelligence reports. This organization also established Tactical Liaison Offices at the division level to recruit Koreans as line-crossers to covertly obtain human intelligence. This served as a poor substitute for the lack of organic counterintelligence capabilities in the four Army divisions stationed in Japan prior to hostilities.

Agent fatalities remained high and the intelligence produced was either unsatisfactory or deemed of little value. Additionally, the methods utilized by the Korean line-crossers were inherently dangerous, as was the requirement to exfiltrate through enemy lines and infiltrate through friendly lines. Amphibious infiltrations required Republic of Korea naval support, which was not always forthcoming. Amphibious requirements of the Inchon Landing halted this technique for a period.⁵⁸

Human intelligence duties and responsibilities were severely fragmented within the Far East. This was due to concurrent intelligence operations and confrontations between the armed services and the Central Intelligence Agency, prior to and during the Korean War. Each of the armed services fought to keep their respective tactical and operational intelligence missions while attempting to adjust for the intelligence needs for their respective service. Rival missions created insular infighting and redundancy of effort. Furthermore, any human intelligence gathering successes became more problematic by the quick collapse of the North Korean People's Army.

⁵⁷James L. Gilbert, John P. Finnegan, and Ann Bray, *In the Shadow of the Sphinx: A History of Army Counterintelligence*, vol. 1 (Fort Belvoir, VA: History Office, Office of Strategic Management and Information, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, 2005), 112.

⁵⁸Finnegan, "The Evolution of US Army HUMINT," 58-59.

This collapse coincided with the Inchon Landings and the breakout of the United Nation's forces from the Pusan Perimeter. The intelligence elements that supported the rapidly advancing United Nation's forces displaced as well in order to keep up, desynchronizing their human intelligence efforts. This caused additional disorganization within the human intelligence structure and nearly incapacitated its operational capabilities.⁵⁹ These same problems would hamper other specialty intelligence efforts as well.

Photographic intelligence provided another means to confirm or deny human intelligence collected by the Far East Command, and other services, focusing on Soviet targets. Aerial missions over Korea conducted routine terrain mapping reasons,⁶⁰ resulted in a dearth of photo-reconnaissance missions along the 38th parallel, which failed to conclusively provide evidence of a North Korean invasion.

Similar to the United States Army and Marine Corps, the United States Air Force was subject to force reductions at the end of World War II. Thousands of experienced pilots, technicians, and flight crews were released from service, which slowed the training of new personnel in the art of photo-reconnaissance. Strategic reconnaissance squadrons, such as the 91st, "continued to develop its photographic capabilities through training and lessons learned during World War II missions."⁶¹

Tactical photo-reconnaissance capabilities were not present in Korea prior to the North Korean invasion because the need for this capability did not exist and the finite number of available fixed-wing photographic platforms and trained photo-interpreters remained tasked to other missions in theater. It was not until the North Korean People's Army invaded that these

⁵⁹Finnegan, "The Evolution of US Army HUMINT," 57-59.

⁶⁰Knight, 53.

⁶¹RB-29, "Notations on the History of the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance," Rb-29.net, <http://www.rb-29.net/html/06CWMConn/LinksPgs/02.Hist91stSRS.htm> (accessed March 22, 2014).

assets were provided to South Korea and tasked to provide photo-intelligence along the 38th parallel, the Yalu River and other locations designated by commanders.⁶²

Unfortunately, photo-reconnaissance, like other military intelligence missions in Far East Command, had numerous limitations, including the number of collection platforms and trained personnel, lacking pilots skilled in photographic missions, navigators with dead reckoning skills to enable night reconnaissance flights, and photographic interpreters.⁶³ Furthermore, Far East Air Force suffered from shortages of specific personnel with the requisite training, which amplified materiel shortfalls and reduced combat effectiveness. This is especially true of intelligence officers, whose duties were performed on a part-time basis by flying officers.⁶⁴

The 162nd Squadron experienced numerous problems in meeting photographic intelligence demands. Inaccurate weather and wind forecasts hampered night navigation, as did the lack of accurate small-scale maps, and dependence on preflight plans.⁶⁵

A paucity of equipment existed as well. For example, the 31st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron and the 6204th Photo Mapping Flight had no authorization for personnel or equipment to process aerial photography. Reconnaissance units functioned severely understrength and poorly equipped because of a “series of dangling and disconnected minorities.”⁶⁶ These minorities comprised four separate reconnaissance squadrons flying a mixed collection of aircraft from

⁶²National Museum of the United States Air Force Education Division, *Korean War 1950-1953: Teacher Resource Guide*, National Museum of the United States Air Force, <http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-111230-008.pdf> (accessed February 24, 2014).

⁶³Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, “United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict 25 June – 1 November 1950,” U.S. Air Force, <http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/history/korea/no71-112.htm> (accessed March 22, 2014).

⁶⁴Albert Simpson and Robert F. Futrell, “United States Air Force Historical Study, No. 71,” 1 July 1952, Air Force Historical Studies Office, <http://www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-101202-22.pdf> (accessed December 27, 2013), 3.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 1, 97, 100, 545.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 545.

Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. Far East Air Force formulated policy, drew up specifications, and controlled the supply of specialized equipment to compensate for the lack of a mutually commanding headquarters. The occupational reconnaissance force converted to a war-time footing overnight. No other Far East Air Force element was as unprepared for that transition as were Far East Air Force reconnaissance units.⁶⁷

The Far East Air Force reconnaissance units operated understrength and poorly equipped. A lack of qualified and trained photographic personnel in these units resulted in minimal requests for film. Although the use of T-6 aircraft assisted in providing photographic intelligence support, both Willoughby and the Air Force staff prioritized requests for aerial reconnaissance. The shortage of trained photographic interpreters was called “the most obvious and readily observable deficiency in the Intelligence Process.”⁶⁸ Regardless of the number of photo-intelligence reconnaissance flights flown, or the cost, the intelligence production rate depended on photo interpretation personnel. Since most Air Force photo-interpreters left the service at the end of World War II, and the jobs lacked desirable rank, few active Air Force officers chose this field as a career path. Reserve photo-interpretation units had not been created to provide a pool of readily available manpower either. “Thus the 548th Squadron had only 32 fully qualified photo interpreters (12 officers and 20 airmen) to share with FEAF headquarters, the tactical units, and to perform its own functions.”⁶⁹ With its own organic assets, the Eighth Army possessed photographic interpretation capabilities at the divisional level, consisting of either one officer, or an enlisted man. Other divisions had none. The Eighth Army received two small teams on

⁶⁷Simpson and Futrell, 545.

⁶⁸Ibid., 99.

⁶⁹Ibid.

September 6 and 18, 1950. Even with this newly acquired capability, the 548th Squadron still provided most of the ground evaluation.⁷⁰

The United States Navy had only one or two officers aboard their larger carriers trained to conduct photographic interpretation. “It appears, moreover, that the few available photo interpreters were at times poorly utilized because of failures in interservice coordination regarding capabilities.”⁷¹ Colonel Charles P. Holstein, Far East Air Force Director of Reconnaissance, concluded, “The overall lack of qualified photo interpretation personnel required an excess of large-scale photography to be flown, thus causing a waste of photographic supplies and expenditure of numerous flying hours of critically short reconnaissance aircraft.”⁷² Many reconnaissance requests were required to be flown immediately in order to be of value to ground commanders. This placed the tactical reconnaissance commander in the problematic position of prioritizing requests, even though he was not typically notified of future operations.⁷³ These issues increased exponentially, as the entirety of the Far East Command rushed to deal with the war in Korea. Nor was the United States Navy immune from intelligence failures.

The Navy suffered a drastic reduction in capability and personnel following the end of World War II as well. Naval intelligence requirements increased due to the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula. Seventh Fleet possessed a single intelligence officer when the conflict erupted on June 25, 1950. The Navy gathered 16 intelligence officers from Pearl Harbor and flew them to Seventh Fleet to augment its intelligence staff.⁷⁴

⁷⁰Simpson and Futrell, 99.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Packard, 28.

The production and dissemination of photographs presented another problem for the Navy. Experience proved that expedient processing and record keeping were essential to the exploitation of intelligence. The lack of personnel reduced print reproduction and real time film cataloguing, which subsequently limited the dissemination and proper usage of the intelligence.⁷⁵ In an attempt to correct the problem, Seventh Fleet sent the film to Pearl Harbor theater facilities which proved unable to meet requirements. “The Korean War demonstrated the Navy’s need for an adequate number of carrier and heavy photographic aircraft capable of performing day and night photo reconnaissance. Of equal importance was the need for adequately equipped facilities, staffed by properly qualified personnel to process and interpret the photographs obtained.”⁷⁶

Communications intelligence proved to be the saving grace of the Far East Command compared to the overall performance of intelligence, and this was just barely so. It must be noted that while communications intelligence is a subset of signals intelligence, communications intelligence, was the term most used during the late 1940s and early 1950s when referring to radio intercepts and direction finding operations.⁷⁷ Communications intelligence, which had been the United States’ most reliable form of intelligence during the World War II, also failed to provide indications and warnings of an imminent North Korean invasion. Within several years of the end of World War II, the United States cryptology service was a shadow of its former glory. As the Soldiers and Sailors mustered out of service, so too did the cryptologists.⁷⁸ “All SIGINT

⁷⁵Packard, 29.

⁷⁶Ibid., 27-29, 402.

⁷⁷Communications Intelligence is one of two smaller intelligence sub-disciplines of signals intelligence which in 1950 amounted to radio and telegraph communications along with electronic intelligence which deals with enemy air, air defense, and the term most often used in the late 1940s and early 1950s in reference to radio intercept and direction finding activities.

⁷⁸Thomas R. Johnson, “Opening the Door a Crack – American Cryptology During the Korean War” (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2010), <http://foia.cia.gov/KoreanWar/EstimatesMisc/CSI/2001-01-01.pdf> (accessed October 18, 2013), 30.

operations suffered from this significant loss of personnel, especially those that relied heavily on men and women in uniform.”⁷⁹

The services’ communications intelligence organizations suffered under the force structure and budget reductions, and their capabilities languished as well. Furthermore, in early 1950, these debilitated communications architectures were spread out over the Pacific and Far East to focus on Soviet targets and activities. United States interests in Korea revolved around Soviet actions on the peninsula.⁸⁰ The 111th Signal Service Company collected against the Soviet 25th Army. Both units were positioned directly across from each other, separated only by the 38th parallel. When the Soviet 25th Army departed the peninsula in July 1948, so too did the 111th. The loss of the 111th Signal Service Company reduced United States communications intelligence activities and coverage of Soviet Union and North Korean military and diplomatic radio traffic to practically nothing.⁸¹

The entire fabric of the United States’ signal intelligence network suffered massive changes. The Secretary of Defense created the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) on May 20, 1949. This amalgamated the cryptologic capacities of the United States Army and Navy into one organization under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The AFSA controlled and operated all communications intelligence and communications security activities within the Department of Defense, except the armed forces. Department of Defense agencies greeted its inception negatively. The AFSA received mostly negative reactions, primarily due to unifying controversies and jurisdictional issues pertaining to intelligence authorities and relationships. The

⁷⁹Jill Frahm, “So Power Can Be Brought into Play: SIGINT and the Pusan Perimeter” (Fort Meade, MD: National Security Agency), http://www.nsa.gov/korea/papers/power_into_play_pusan.htm (accessed October 12, 2013), 2.

⁸⁰Johnson, 3.

⁸¹Matthew M. Aid and Cees Wiebes, *Secrets of Signals Intelligence During the Cold War and Beyond*, Cass Series--Studies in Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 32.

AFSA failed to centralize the communications effort and it ignored national civilian agencies, including the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Furthermore, before the AFSA became functional, the Joint Chiefs of Staff curtailed most of its already limited authority.⁸²

In early 1950, the AFSA had no technical expertise on the Korean peninsula. The one self-trained Korean linguist possessed no Korean dictionaries, typewriters, or books pertaining to Korea. Furthermore, until April 1950, no communications intelligence personnel conducted communications intelligence collection or analysis against North Korean targets.⁸³ The agency, like most other national and operational level communications intelligence organizations, focused on Soviet military communications targets. “As a result of the effort directed toward Moscow and elsewhere, North Korean codes had of necessity been grossly neglected by AFSA.”⁸⁴ When the war began the AFSA only had two Korean linguists available. Youn P. Kim and Richard Chun, assigned to the Army Language School at Monterey, California, served in World War II and had been employed by the AFSA due to their Japanese language skills.⁸⁵

At the start of hostilities the AFSA had been operational for six months.⁸⁶ William W. Weisband severely hamstrung the AFSA through his efforts as a Soviet spy inside the agency. Weisband was recruited by the *Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti*, more commonly known

⁸²Thomas L. Burns, “Origins of the National Security Agency,” *United States Cryptologic History, Series 5, vol. I* (Washington, DC: National Security Agency, 1990), http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologiv_histories/origins_of_nsa.pdf (accessed November 15, 2013), 59-75.

⁸³Johnson, 3.

⁸⁴Blair, 171.

⁸⁵David A. Hatch with Robert L. Benson, “The Korean War: The SIGINT Background,” *United States Cryptologic History, Series V: The Early Postwar Period, 1945-1952, Volume 3* (Fort Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2000), http://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic_heritage/center_crypt_history/publications/koreanwar_sigint_bkg.shtm#16 (accessed February 23, 2014).

⁸⁶Burns, 76.

as the KGB, in 1934. He provided highly classified documents that detailed United States successes in deciphering Soviet ciphers. This resulted in a communications intelligence blackout from 1948 and into the Korean War. The loss of this intelligence could have confirmed the North Koreans intentions to invade South Korea.⁸⁷ The North Koreans mimicked the Soviets communications security. This added layer of communications security made it unlikely that any intercepted North Korean traffic would expose North Korean intentions. The North Koreans used landlines in order to keep their most important communiques off of the airwaves. The AFSA and military services cryptology units would not have been able to collect against this form of communication.⁸⁸

Much of the communications intelligence collection conducted prior to the start of hostilities were not identified, nor deciphered, as North Korean communications until after hostilities had started. The Army Security Agency, the Army component that operated under AFSA, operated the largest signals intelligence operation in the Far East Command. Headquartered in Tokyo, it maintained four listening stations throughout the Far East. Personnel shortages forced these elements to operate on a nine-to-five schedule, staffed primarily by conscripts with a high turnover rate. From May 1949 until April 1950, they intercepted some North Korean communiques accidentally because the North Koreans followed Soviet communication protocols. Upon realization that the communications emanated from a non-Soviet source coverage was halted. The Army Security Agency embarked upon a limited research and development study of North Korean traffic. Two sites intercepted North Korean communications

⁸⁷Robert Louis Benson, *Soviet Espionage and the Korean War* (Fort Meade, MD: National Security Agency, September 2000), 1-2.

⁸⁸Aid, "US HUMINT and COMINT in the Korean War," 40.

and provided about 200 messages for analysis. However, by the time the conflict commenced none had been processed for exploitation.⁸⁹

The Army Security Agency was as unprepared as were all the other agencies. Initially, General Walker, the Eighth Army Commander, had little or no communications intelligence support. The first element from the Army's signals intelligence branch did not arrive until September 9, 1950, six days before Operation Chromite. The agency's intention was to support Eighth Army directly with a communications reconnaissance battalion and assign an additional battalion to each of its three subordinate corps. However, the first designated Army signals intelligence unit, the 60th Signals Service Company, out of Fort Lewis, Washington, arrived four months later than expected.⁹⁰

When the United States entered into the Korean War, the United States Air Force Security Service was understaffed. It contained a total complement of 3,050 moderately trained personnel.⁹¹ Even so, the United States Air Force communications intelligence representatives arrived in Korea almost two months ahead of the Army Security Agency's personnel. First Lieutenant Edward Murray arrived in Taegu on July 19, 1950 and borrowed equipment from the Air Force Security Service unit stationed in Tokyo, to establish a tactical signals intelligence operation in order to support the 5th Air Force. He quickly discovered that the 5th Air Force already had communications support due to the efforts of Donald Nichols. Nichols lived in Seoul, earned a reserve commission as an Air Force major, and was placed in charge of the local Office of Special Investigations. Nichols, on his own initiative, established a hip-pocket signals

⁸⁹Langeleben Reunion Association, untitled document from UK Signals Unit Historical Society, http://www.langeleben.co.uk/gallery_pages/misc/Korea%20is%20often%20seen%20as%20a%20Sigint%20failure%20but%20was%20it.pdf (accessed January 5, 2014).

⁹⁰Frahm, 8.

⁹¹Air Force ISR Agency, *Brief History: From USAFSS to AIA – A Legacy More Than Half a Century Old Continues*, U.S. Air Force, <http://www.afisr.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-061130-022.pdf> (accessed February 23, 2014), 2.

intelligence intercept and reporting service using native Koreans. One of the two best operatives was a North Korean radio operator who defected and the other was a captain in the Republic of Korea's navy. Nichols reported the communications under the guise of human intelligence. First Lieutenant Murray quickly discovered that the 5th Air Force only desired his equipment, and upon seizing it, he was sent back to Japan.⁹²

The United States Marine Corps did not have organic communications intelligence capability during the Korean War. In 1950, the Corps had a Marine Radio Company at Camp Pendleton. However, this unit did not deploy because it was not deemed combat ready and because it lacked equipment. Senior Marine Corps commanders had access to this form of classified material at higher headquarters; pending further research it does not appear that the Marine Corps had this capability at the tactical level.⁹³

General Walker faced a nearly impossible challenge. His forces, surprised, overwhelmed, and thrust back into a harried retreat, withstood the North Korean forces at what is now known as the Pusan Perimeter. Fortunately for General Walker, signals intelligence assets and personnel available improved their methodologies and capabilities, which enabled the defense of the Pusan Perimeter. "With interior lines but inferior forces, Walker frantically shuttled his troops to points of North Korean attack."⁹⁴ Walker's success is attributed to knowing where the North Koreans were going to attack.⁹⁵ "Aiding him in this desperate situation were detailed enemy intercepts that provided crucial information on the North Korean Army's capabilities and plans. With this priceless information, Walker was able to determine North Korean intentions and commit his

⁹²Johnson, 31.

⁹³Hatch with Benson.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Patrick D. Weadon, "SIGINT and COMSEC Help Save the Day at Pusan," National Security Agency, http://www.nsa.gov/korea/papers/sigint_comsec_pusan.htm (accessed September 2, 2013).

embattled forces with maximum efficiency.”⁹⁶ Additionally, his own communications were kept secure through the efforts of his communications security personnel. From the end of July until the success of Operation Chromite and the Inchon landings, General Walker continued to hold the line against the North Korean assaults armed with information gathered from their message traffic.⁹⁷

At the theater and national levels, communications intelligence collection and analysis started the Korean War unprepared. The Far East Command’s command over the various services reflected the United States national communications intelligence community of the time. Through this functionality, the Far East Command’s communications intelligence organizations garnered a variety of successes and failures. The practice of counterpart coverage enabled each service to focus its efforts on intercepting and processing the communications of its enemy counterpart. This reliance on counterpart coverage produced the majority of communications successes in the arena of tactical support, not operational. Both the Army and Air Force achieved tactical success by focusing on the low-grade communications of enemy targets, despite working independently. This was most evident as the North Korean lines of communication extended due to their successes and the requisite need to rely on radio, not landline communications. Field commanders valued the exploitation of North Korean traffic, via voice and plain text, which proved of great value.⁹⁸ Unfortunately, the isolated and neglected indications and warnings gathered by communications intelligence provided little assistance to Willoughby and, consequently, MacArthur.

⁹⁶Weadon.

⁹⁷Johnson, 32.

⁹⁸Burns, 76-77.

Even with excellent North Korean Peoples' Army order of battle data,⁹⁹ analysis failed commanders at both the operational and tactical levels for both the United States Army and Air Force. Two examples of these failures were the ingenuity of the North Korean soldier and a lack of understanding of the capabilities of the Soviet designed T-34 tank used by North Korean armor units. North Korean infantry tactics demonstrated an excellent understanding of terrain and guerilla tactics. North Koreans commonly used deception to infiltrate friendly lines disguised as refugees, often with women and children in tow. Destroyed armor and vehicles were made more prominent by poor camouflage, which often caused aircraft to expend ordnance.¹⁰⁰ Initially, the T-34 tank proved effective against piecemeal American forces facing a North Korean advance; however, the 75 millimeter recoilless rifle and 2.36 inch bazooka, developed in World War II, proved ineffective against the T-34 tank.¹⁰¹ Though both the 2.36 inch bazooka and the T-34 tank were created during World War II, only the bazooka had been rendered obsolete in the same war that had seen its creation. The T-34's capabilities should have been known from its heavy use during World War II and the intelligence disseminated to friendly forces prior to engaging North Korean forces.

Although, the various military intelligence agencies of the Far East Command correctly assessed the buildup of North Korean forces, they struggled to determine when the North Koreans would invade South Korea. In April 1950, the Far East Command intelligence analysts believed

⁹⁹Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 19.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁰¹Arthur W. Conner, Jr., "The Armor Debacle in Korea, 1950: Implications for Today," *Parameters* (Summer 1992): 66-67, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College and U.S. Army War College Press, <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/1992/1992%20connor.pdf> (accessed February 25, 2014); John C. Chapin, *Fire Brigade: U.S. Marines in the Pusan Perimeter* (Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series) (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 2013), 7.

that “there will be no civil war in Korea this spring or summer.”¹⁰² In June 1950, it knew that North Korea had the military capability to attack South Korea at will, though theorized that it would only do so if it met Soviet strategic aims.¹⁰³

This inability to determine a North Korean timetable caused strategic surprise in Tokyo and Washington. Tactical intelligence successes prevented the withdrawal of United States forces from the peninsula, while operational intelligence failed consistently. Operational intelligence improved as the Far East Command and United Nations forces gained traction against the North Korean People’s Army. These gains, that proved so successful against the North Koreans, proved catastrophic against the Chinese and their intervention into the conflict.

THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS’ INTERVENTION

On September 29, 1950, General MacArthur restored South Korean president Syngman Rhee as the political leader of South Korea. The remnants of the North Korean Peoples’ Army fled north towards the Manchurian border. Victory seemed so assured that MacArthur’s staff began planning the return of some Eighth Army troops back to Japan to resume occupation duties.¹⁰⁴ President Truman signed National Security Council memorandum 81/1 on September 11, 1950. This memorandum authorized United Nations forces to occupy all of North Korea in order to eventually reunite the two Koreas. The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized MacArthur to conduct operations above and below the 38th parallel on September 28, 1950. The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized MacArthur to take these actions provided that neither Chinese nor Soviet forces had entered Korea. MacArthur’s orders also explicitly emphasized the inviolability of the

¹⁰²James P. Finley, *U.S. Army Military Intelligence History: A Sourcebook* (Fort Huachuca, AZ: US Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca, 1995), 382.

¹⁰³Futrell, 19-20.

¹⁰⁴Message C-67065 CINCFE to DA WASH (for JCS), 21 October 1950, “Korean War Files Nos. 1 and 2,” FECOM, RG-6, Box 9, MMA.

Manchurian border, only allowing South Korean units to conduct operations in the provinces bordering China and the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁵ A month later, the United Nations General Assembly approved a British sponsored resolution which authorized United Nations Command forces to occupy all of North Korea to unify Korea and hold national elections upon the destruction of the North Korean Peoples' Army.¹⁰⁶ Having both presidential and United Nations' blessings, MacArthur wasted no time in attacking the North Korean Army's remnants. Unknown to all, the Chinese were already in Korea in large numbers, waiting for MacArthur's troops. The Chinese Communist forces launched its Phase One Offensive on October 28, 1950.

The second fateful example of operational intelligence failure by the Far East Command's service component intelligence personnel was failing to detect the infiltration of formidable lead units of the Communist Chinese and its full intervention in November, 1950. This failure, the interpretations of United States national intelligence officials and MacArthur's personal agenda gave the Chinese Communist forces operational and tactical surprise in the first encounter with Eighth Army forces. This surprise had strategic repercussions.

The Chinese intervention remains the greatest military defeat suffered by United States military forces since the Battle of the Bulge. The Far East Command intelligence operations and analysis had failed calamitously; failed to identify the considerable Chinese buildup along its southern border with North Korea, failed to identify Chinese forces within Korea, failed to predict the Chinese intervention, and failed to realize that Chinese tactics were considerably different

¹⁰⁵William M. Leary, ed., *MacArthur and the American Century: A Reader* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 538.

¹⁰⁶Alexandre Y. Mansourov, trans., "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16 – October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," *Translated Document #19, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6/7, Winter 1995/1996* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1996), 101.

from North Korean tactics.¹⁰⁷ Due to the Chinese Communist intervention, the United States objectives instantaneously changed. Instead of completing the reunification of Korea, the objective became to avert the complete defeat of its ground forces.

On the heels of the North Korean invasion, the Chinese recognized the need to assess both combatants' operations. The Chinese Communists sent Chai Chengwen, Director of Military Intelligence for the Southwestern Military District, and five other officers to garner intelligence.¹⁰⁸ Prior to the Chinese Communist full-scale intervention, numerous indications and warnings were readily apparent to civilian and military decision makers at the strategic level, initially and not just in retrospect. As early as July 11, 1950, Willoughby reported "the presence of Communist Chinese forces among the North Koreans."¹⁰⁹

Diplomatically, the United States government and its military received information and intelligence from several other states, including China itself. "On 5 September, the United States Consul General in Hong Kong, James Wilkinson, sent a memo to (Secretary of State, Dean) Acheson stating that Zhou Enlai warned, if UN forces approached the Yalu River, his government would fight them outside Chinese territory."¹¹⁰ This statement should have been deemed extremely credible given that Zhou Enlai served as China's foreign minister and was the first Premier of the People's Republic of China at that time. Chairman Mao reacted to MacArthur's successful Inchon landing. Hoping to avoid war, Mao attempted to convince both the United Nations, through the Soviet Union, and the United States to halt their advance at the 38th parallel.

¹⁰⁷John F. Schmitt, "What is an Intelligence Failure? A Case Study of Korea, 1950," *Marine Corps Gazette* 81, no. 10 (October 1997): 60.

¹⁰⁸Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953*, Modern War Studies (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 1995), 71-72.

¹⁰⁹Leary, 269.

¹¹⁰Alexander Ovodenko, "(Mis)interpreting Threats: A Case Study of the Korean War," *Security Studies* 16, no. 2 (April-June 2007): 262, Princeton University, <http://www.princeton.edu/~ovodenko/research/misinterpreting-threats.pdf> (accessed September 5, 2013).

Mao's words fell on deaf ears as Washington leadership strongly believed that North Korea could be defeated with MacArthur's success at Inchon and the Pusan breakout. This would allow for the reunification of Korea under a non-communist government.

China reacted quickly to President Truman's decision to authorize United States forces across the 38th parallel on September 29, 1950. Zhou Enlai, on September 30, publicly warned: "The Chinese people. . . will not supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors savagely invaded by the imperialists."¹¹¹ Indian diplomatic channels conveyed additional diplomatic signals to the United States government.¹¹² "On October 2, 1950, Premier Zhou formally notified the Indian ambassador, Panikkar, that if American forces entered North Korea, China would intervene in the war."¹¹³ Subsequently, Chinese war preparations were monitored by Westerners that still lived in China. These preparations included air raid drills and the evacuation of key personnel. Additionally, troop movements were tracked fairly accurately.¹¹⁴ The Chinese knew that large troop redeployments provided an indicator to Far East Command and the United States. While the Chinese attempted to conceal the actual size of troop relocations, these actions did not escape the attention of the Far East Command or United States intelligence assets. Unfortunately, intelligence analysts quickly dismissed these relocations as Manchurian based units returning to their original garrison post-Chinese Civil War hostilities.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, *China's Decision to Enter the Korean War* (London: Cambridge University Press, SOAS, <http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/Hao%20Chinas%20Decision.pdf> (accessed December 13, 2013), 102.

¹¹²Richard W. Stewart and Korean War Historical Series, *The Korean War: The Chinese Intervention* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 2008), 6.

¹¹³Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, 102.

¹¹⁴Eliot A. Cohen, *The Chinese Intervention in Korea, 1950* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, approved for release September 22, 1993), Internet Archive, <https://archive.org/details/ChineseInterventionInKorea1950> (accessed November 24, 2013), 51.

¹¹⁵Patrick C. Roe, *The Dragon Strikes: China and the Korean War, June –December 1950* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 2000), 112.

Militarily, Chinese soldiers had been detected, captured, and killed on the Korean peninsula as early as October 25, 1950.¹¹⁶ The Eighth Army had captured nearly 100 prisoners prior to the Second Phase Offensive, which occurred in late November. Furthermore, the Chinese attacked Eighth Army's two corps and a regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division at Unsan. The lines stabilized on November 5, 1950 and aerial reconnaissance reported Chinese forces withdrawing northwards.¹¹⁷ The Chinese continued to attack until November 6, 1950 when they unexpectedly broke contact.¹¹⁸ General MacArthur's daily intelligence summaries "contained detailed accounts of the day's fighting in Korea, a good deal of political material on all the countries in the FEC region, including Japan and China, and tactical reports provided by both Eighth Army and X Corps."¹¹⁹ Willoughby provided these daily summaries to MacArthur. Willoughby had access to human intelligence (both interrogations of enemy prisoners and foreign intelligence), photo reconnaissance, communications intelligence, translated captured enemy documents, and open sources, to include Chinese newspapers and radio.

Operationally, MacArthur and Willoughby had access to Panniker's warnings concerning the inevitability of a Chinese intervention in the daily intelligence summaries.¹²⁰ The Far East Command's intelligence regularly reported the possibility of a large-scale Chinese intervention in the days that followed Panniker's warning. Numerous incidents drove this intelligence concern "including an account of an escaped American POW who reported an interrogation by a Soviet

¹¹⁶The first Chinese soldier was discovered among captives taken on October 25 by the I Corps' 1st ROK Division and units of the ROK II Corps. Richard W. Stewart, "The Korean War," *American Military History, Vol. II* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 2005), 231.

¹¹⁷Roe, *The Dragon Strikes*, 176.

¹¹⁸Ibid.

¹¹⁹Cohen, *The Chinese Intervention in Korea, 1950*, 51.

¹²⁰Jian Chen, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation*, US and Pacific Asia: Studies in Social, Economic, and Political Interaction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 169.

colonel which concluded with a warning about a ‘Soviet Alliance’ intervention in the war.”¹²¹

The increase of Chinese forces in Manchuria caused grave concern and was regularly reported. Estimates assessed the increase from 116,000 troops in July 1950 to 246,000 by September, with a possible end strength as much as 450,000 troops.

The best indications and warnings of Chinese intentions came by way of Chinese Nationalists. Unfortunately, analysts in both the Far East Command and in Washington, DC tended to discount these warnings. One reason for dismissing these warnings was the supposition that the Nationalists were motivated to generate reports that would cause concern about the Chinese Communists. The second reason was that some of the intelligence from the Nationalists consisted of data that the Far East Command had provided them at an earlier time.¹²²

Tactically, the primary sources of intelligence in Korea were the local populace, prisoners of war, and communications intelligence, augmented by some photo-reconnaissance.¹²³ Though the prisoners of war proved to be a wealth of tactical intelligence, United States intelligence efforts were still handicapped by a lack of interpreters and linguists and combat patrols severely disappointed commanders as well. Lieutenant General Ridgway expressed his own disappointment, “They (American infantry) no longer even think of operating on foot away from their transportation and heavy equipment.”¹²⁴ Infantry reconnaissance elements or frontline forces were rarely debriefed after patrols or engagements.

¹²¹Cohen, *The Chinese Intervention in Korea, 1950*, 56.

¹²²*Ibid.*, 52.

¹²³*Ibid.*, 51-56.

¹²⁴Letter to General J. Lawton Collins, 8 January 1951, Folder, “Special File -12/1950-03/1951,” Box Korean War-Special File, December 1950-May 1952 (plus July 1950), U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, “General Matthew B. Ridgway Papers,” Internet Information Service, <http://usahec.polarislibrary.com/polaris/search/title.aspx?pos=1> (accessed January 3, 2014).

The United States suffered from the same shortcomings that hampered intelligence operations during the North Korean invasion at the time of the Chinese intervention. Interpreters, Mandarin linguists, photo-reconnaissance aircraft, and photo-interpretive specialists remained in short supply. Full exploitation of these assets was limited as well, due to delays both organizationally and materially. Even with these shortfalls, it is surprising that the United States intelligence community at the strategic and operational levels failed to deduce the Chinese intention to intervene. Likewise, United States government officials also failed to discern China's intentions, as clearly as they had been pronounced by both Mao and Zhou Enlai.

Prior to the Chinese intervention the United States strategic policy makers and strategic and operational intelligence analysts held varying degrees of bias and prejudice regarding China. Both the United States and China transmitted numerous signals to each other via official and unofficial means, which were often misinterpreted. The United States maintained a "propensity to dismiss as propaganda any and all communications from the Communist bloc had a clear effect on their evaluation."¹²⁵ Declassified documents demonstrate this by showing that United States policy makers made little or no distinction between communist bloc members. The United States failed to examine the contrasts between the various regimes and its propensity at the time, to view all things communist as emanating from the Soviet Union, caused the United States to interpret Chinese communications and intentions through a Western Cold War lens.¹²⁶ Alan K. Abner, an American pilot who wrote about his time in psychological operations during the Korean War, corroborated this propensity of the United States:

¹²⁵Gary Rawnsley, "The Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea': How Beijing Sold the Korean War- Media, War, & Conflict,"(Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications, 2009), Academia, http://www.academia.edu/404327/_The_Great_Movement_to_Resist_America_and_Assist_Korea_How_Beijing_Sold_the_Korean_War (accessed December 10, 2013), 292.

¹²⁶Ibid.

The factors that determined the selection of our targets came from many sources, but they all started with the dominant theme that *our ultimate target was the USSR*, and the desired results of our efforts were to damage *our real enemy's* activities in waging a proxy war in Korea.¹²⁷

In this context, it is understandable that the United States viewed the Peoples' Republic of China as a nation unwilling or reluctant to go to war. China only recently experienced its first year of peace after decades of war since the Chinese Revolution in 1911. Strategically, China's "new leadership needed to strengthen its authority over all of China, rebuild its economy, and begin a comprehensive transformation of Chinese society along Communist principles."¹²⁸

This is a classic example of mirror-imaging, which is the process of basing assessments of an enemy's intentions upon one's own assumptions. This mindset can be quite dangerous, especially when neither side shares the same assumptions. The condition between the United States and China most certainly exemplifies this phenomenon.¹²⁹

Operationally, the Far East Command intelligence was hampered by the same shortages in personnel and equipment that had plagued them during the North Korean invasion. More damning was the fact that Far East Command viewed the Chinese communist forces as a weaker version of the North Korean Peoples' Army, instead of a completely different enemy. The Far East Command and its service components soon learned the magnitude of that error.

The Far East Command intelligence assessed the lethal effects of United Nations air interdiction and close air support against North Korean Peoples' Army units. They determined that the Chinese could be dealt with in a similar manner. MacArthur's belief in the Far East Air Force's lethality was reinforced by this assessment. MacArthur believed that the Far East Air

¹²⁷Alan K. Abner, *Psywarriors: Psychological Warfare during the Korean War* (Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street Press, 2001), 63.

¹²⁸Rawnsley, 293.

¹²⁹Lonn A. Waters, *Secrecy, Deception and Intelligence Failure: Explaining Operational Surprise in War* (Boston, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005), 71.

Force would deal with the Chinese infantry as the North Koreans had been dealt with.

Willoughby's staff also determined that one North Korean Peoples' Army division required 200 tons of supplies per day to maintain combat operations. Friendly air interdiction efforts had only allowed one-tenth of that amount to get through. North Korean offensive operations were severely hampered by these efforts. Analysts also concluded that nearly 33 percent of enemy casualties and 50 percent of equipment losses were due to air interdiction.¹³⁰ Prisoner of war interrogations confirmed that close air support of ground forces was the greatest factor in the success of the ground campaign to date.¹³¹ MacArthur declared that his air power would annihilate the Chinese, should they decide to intervene.

National Security Council memorandum 81/1 went into effect on September 27, 1950. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not authorize air or naval support north or south of the 38th parallel, against Manchuria or Soviet territory.¹³² This stipulation proved problematic for MacArthur and Willoughby. First, it provided a sanctuary for some elements of the retreating North Korean army. Second, it provided safe staging areas for the Chinese Communists to prepare for the movement of follow-on forces into Korea. Lastly, denying these areas to friendly non-ground forces continued to deny Willoughby access to photo-reconnaissance and photographic intelligence.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff restrictions did not dictate any new constraints from an intelligence perspective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff restrictions were put into place to limit the conflict to the Korean peninsula and prevent the fighting from incurring either Soviet or Chinese

¹³⁰Cohen, *The Chinese Intervention in Korea*, 57.

¹³¹G-2, GHQ, FEC/UNC Staff Section Report, November 1950, "Summary of Enemy Activity," in Bryan R. Gibby, *The Will to Win: American Military Advisors in Korea, 1946-1953* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2012), 85.

¹³²JCS Message 92801 to CINCUNC, 28 September 1950, Folder: "Korean War File No. 2," FECOM, RG-6, Box 9, MMA.

intervention. Simultaneously, the negative aspects of these restrictions increased the difficulty of intelligence collection, in light of the proximity of friendly forces to both Soviet and Chinese ground and air forces. Friendly forces received little, or negligible, indications and warnings of an attack.

The lack of photo-reconnaissance hampered the Far East Command intelligence efforts. “Photo-reconnaissance, so highly developed by American forces during World War II, had nearly vanished during the postwar period. As a result, it took a long time for both the Army and Air Force to reconstitute the skilled photo-interpretation teams required for this means of intelligence gathering.”¹³³ MacArthur directed the few available photo-reconnaissance aircraft available to the Air Force to focus on bombing targets in the vicinity of the Yalu River and critical infrastructure of North Korea. Far East Air Force units flew day and night reconnaissance missions along key lines of communication that led north to the main Yalu crossing sites. The limited number of aircraft created an inability to cover all crossing sites as well as the lines of communication, which was the primary challenge.¹³⁴ Daylight missions recorded very little activity as the Chinese recognized the need to move only at night. This enabled the Chinese to mass numbers of troops in Korea before the air campaign, which was unknown at the time.¹³⁵ The Chinese Peoples’ Volunteer Army’s superb camouflage and tactical discipline only magnified this problem.

The Chinese had already begun crossing the Yalu River between October 12 and 14, 1950, and had done so with masterful use of camouflage techniques and efficacy.¹³⁶ It is

¹³³Cohen, *The Chinese Intervention in Korea*, 53.

¹³⁴U.S. Army Intelligence Center, “Clint Tarkenton and Bob Fergusson: The Korean War G-2s,” *Masters of the Intelligence Art*, USAIC, <http://www.usaic.army.mil.History/PDFS/MTARKFerg.PDF> (accessed July 29, 2013), 12.

¹³⁵Futrell, 228.

¹³⁶Roy E. Appleman, *Disaster in Korea: the Chinese Confront MacArthur* (College Station, TX: Texas A & M Press, 1989), 12-14.

questionable whether aerial reconnaissance could have discerned the location of the Chinese troops, given the heavily wooded and mountainous terrain and their superb camouflage discipline. These efforts combined with “their brown uniforms matched the prevailing color of the Korean environment – brown hills, brown villages – and this made the troops difficult to detect.”¹³⁷ They also moved into Korea at night, on foot, without trucks or armored support.¹³⁸ Upon crossing the Yalu, the Chinese troops avoided the major road networks. They also stayed in low lying areas and kept close to the mountainous terrain. The restrictive terrain, in conjunction with fog and haze that permeated low lying areas, made night reconnaissance and photography extremely difficult. Far East Air Force reconnaissance and photography platforms did not cover these areas to reduce the risk of crashing.¹³⁹ Reconnaissance aircraft did not focus their cameras on the high ground, which was also problematic.¹⁴⁰ Through the expert use of camouflage, cover and concealment, and bypassing areas under surveillance, Chinese forces moved tens of thousands of troops into North Korea undetected. Other issues still plagued Far East Air Force as well.

Air Force economy programs from 1946 to 1950 critically undermined the development of reconnaissance systems, including aircraft, cameras, and skilled technicians. These platforms had not been brought forward into the jet air age either, compounding this problem. The 31st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron supported the Far East Air Force Bomber Command with both target and bomb damage assessment photo intelligence since July 1950; however, operating in obsolete RB-29s along the Yalu provided easy targets for MiG interceptors.

¹³⁷Brian Catchpole, *The Korean War 1950-1953* (New York: Carrol and Graf Publishers, Inc., 2000), 75.

¹³⁸McGovern, 41.

¹³⁹Futrell, 228-229.

¹⁴⁰Catchpole, 75.

On 9 November two MIG's jumped a flak-damaged RB-29 over Sinuiju; in the aerial dogfight, Corporal Harry J. LaVene, the tail gunner, shot down one of the MIG's, but the other hostile plane further crippled the RB-29, which limped home to Johnson Air Base, where a crash landing killed five crewmen.¹⁴¹

Following this experience, the Far East Air Force stopped utilizing the RB-29's along the Yalu. The 5th Air Force began to use the RF-80A photo planes to conduct the reconnaissance missions in the area.¹⁴²

Another significant issue stemmed from the difference between the K-17 camera systems used on-board the RF-80A jet photo-reconnaissance aircraft and the aircraft itself. The camera, designed to operate at conventional aircraft speed, required the RF-80A pilots to reduce speed to capture the necessary exposures to produce large, overlapping scale photos for stereoscopic viewing. This caused two further problems for the pilots as they conducted these missions. First, the speeds required for proper exposures left the RF-80A vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire. Second, the RF-80A was already 200 miles an hour slower than its Soviet MIG-15 counterpart, which began operations over the Yalu River on November 1, 1950. Subsequently, the RF-80A missions devolved into crazed sprints to the Yalu to get the needed photographs, while avoiding MIG-15s.¹⁴³

The 8th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, which used the RF-80A, had limited numbers of this particular type of aircraft. It also reduced its coverage to areas immediately adjacent to main roads between the Yalu River and the Eighth Army and X Corps' front lines. The Chinese typically avoided these areas. The Chinese superior camouflage techniques enabled the concealment of personnel and equipment during daylight hours in village huts, caves, and

¹⁴¹Futrell, 228-229.

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³Ibid., 244, 289, 546, 548.

haystacks. The 8th Tactical Squadron's daytime missions showed numerous tire tracks in the snow, but nothing consequential regarding troop concentrations.¹⁴⁴

The Chinese set forest fires in North Korea to provide a concealing smokescreen to hide any daytime tactical movements they were required to make. They also pretended to be Republic of Korea soldiers while marching during the day, exploiting enemy pilots' inability to differentiate between the two. These actions indicate an excellent awareness of the capabilities and limitations of various intelligence platforms.¹⁴⁵

Lastly, the 162d Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron used flashbomb technology in their RB-26L reconnaissance aircraft. This technology was used to photograph key road networks and crossing sites along the Yalu River at night. Unfortunately, a high failure rate existed in the flashbomb stocks of the nighttime camera systems.¹⁴⁶ Chinese anti-aircraft fire from the Manchurian side of the Yalu River made these missions all the more dangerous. The Far East Command required additional aerial reconnaissance assets. Until their arrival in theater, other intelligence assets were required to monitor the Chinese mustering areas and the Yalu River crossing sites. Those sites were not properly monitored due to the overall lack of intelligence assets.

Once again the Far East Command found itself in the unenviable position of performing guesswork to ascertain Chinese intentions because it still lacked the necessary intelligence resources required to solve this problem. Manchuria had been deemed off-limits to photographic reconnaissance due to diplomatic concerns and aerial surveillance of Korea was still unproductive. Collection methods targeting the Korean language issue also lacked the linguistic

¹⁴⁴Futrell, 229; McGovern, 41.

¹⁴⁵McGovern, 42; Bong Lee, *The Unfinished War: Korea* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2003), 160.

¹⁴⁶Futrell, 546.

and technical capability to switch to Chinese.¹⁴⁷ Neither the Far East Command nor United Nations forces actually searched for Chinese in the North Korean mountains, further compounding the problem.

At first, it seemed that individual Chinese soldiers had joined the North Koreans. Interrogation of prisoners failed to convince the Far East Command that China committed a major force into the conflict. “The Chinese, as dedicated students of Sun Tzu, had one other great asset – guile. If the UN Command could be made to believe the Chinese had deployed only token forces, UNC forces could be led to advance into the mountainous [mountains] where the terrain would offset some of the Chinese disadvantage.”¹⁴⁸ Here began a coordinated military deception plan with the objective to convince the United Nations that Chinese elements in Korea were much smaller than their actual size. This created the illusion that the forces in place appeared greater than they were when the main offensive was launched.¹⁴⁹

Willoughby and his staff were unable to verify single source human intelligence reports against other intelligence sources. The available human intelligence reports caused a chaotic understanding of events beyond friendly front lines. Neither the Far East Command nor Willoughby put much stock into reports derived from South Korean or Chinese Nationalist sources, which further hampered human intelligence efforts. General Matthew Ridgway wrote: “MacArthur’s G-2 staff did not rate its Asian agents as reliable because they felt “that South Korean especially had a tendency to cry ‘wolf’ when there was no beast in the offing.”¹⁵⁰ Human

¹⁴⁷Roy E. Appleman, *The U.S. Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1961), 769-770.

¹⁴⁸Roe, “The Ghost Armies of Manchuria,” 2.

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge, How All-Out Asian War Was Averted, Why MacArthur Was Dismissed, Why Today’s War Objectives Must Be Limited* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1967), 28.

intelligence, consisting of reports from prisoners and Korean civilians, was ignored because it could not be confirmed by photographic intelligence.¹⁵¹ Chinese Nationalist sources from within China reported that Chinese troops had crossed the Yalu River from Manchuria, but this report, like others received from Chinese Nationalists, was deemed politically motivated and dismissed.¹⁵² Colonel James Polk, Willoughby's executive, reported, ". . . no one trusted what they produced because it was invariably biased or self-serving."¹⁵³ Willoughby's own human intelligence organization, the Korean Liaison Office, which had failed to identify the North Korean invasion, again failed to detect the movement of Chinese forces into Korea in October and November 1950.¹⁵⁴

Far East Command forces were not prepared to produce quality tactical intelligence. Post-World War II cutbacks removed linguistic specialty teams from units' table of organization and were now quickly formed from scratch. This situation became especially problematic with the Chinese Communist intervention. Two factors further compounded the human intelligence problem. First, a lack of Mandarin speaking linguists hobbled prisoner interrogation, normally a productive source of raw intelligence. Interrogations were primarily conducted through the use of interpreters, as the few available Mandarin speakers had difficulty understanding Communist Chinese military terminology. Second, in some cases, Chinese prisoners provided bogus unit designations, highlighting that some Chinese soldiers had been briefed prior to capture. This

¹⁵¹The Official Home Page of Fort Huachuca, Arizona, "The Uncertain Oracle: Some Intelligence Failures Revisited," U.S. Army, http://huachuca.army.mil/files/History_UncertainOracle.pdf (accessed November 2, 2013).

¹⁵²Korean War Message Forms, September 1950, FECOM, RG-6, Box 9, MMA, reel 628.

¹⁵³Roe, "The Ghost Armies of Manchuria," 3.

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*

integral part of the Chinese deception plan proved effective enough to confuse Willoughby and Lieutenant Colonel Tarkenton, the Eighth Army G-2, for several weeks.¹⁵⁵

With the advent of the First Phase Offensive, October 25-November 6, 1950, and the Second Phase Offensive, November 25–December 24, 1950, Eighth Army retreated and the Far East Command desperately needed human intelligence. Unfortunately, the Korean Liaison Office, now officially known as Far East Command Liaison Group, Korea, was unable to fill that void. No human assets operated within Chinese occupied areas and movement corridors. The Korean Liaison Office used the Aviary program in an attempt to fill this void, though it operated under extremely difficult conditions. The Aviary program used C-47s to parachute agents in blind-drops. Unfortunately, as with the North Korean invasion, the Chinese intervention ensured that agent training was substandard. The available radios were also unsuitable for mission requirements and agents remained untrained in radio operation. The Korean Liaison Office resorted to blind-dropping 12 two-man teams, equipped with smoke grenades, north of United Nations' frontlines in an attempt to locate Chinese forces. Only a few teams managed to signal Air Force spotter planes and those that did produced negative results. The agents of the Tactical Liaison Office teams, which provided human intelligence support at the divisional level, suffered high casualty rates as well. In an effort to overcome the same challenges of the Korean Liaison Office, the Tactical Liaison Office established Salamander. Salamander used Korean fishing boats, and later upgraded to faster, more seaworthy, American watercraft. Significant advances in agent training, communications, and insertion eventually provided positive results, but not until June 1951.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁵Roe, "The Ghost Armies of Manchuria," 3-6.

¹⁵⁶Finnegan, "The Evolution of US Army HUMINT," 60-61.

Tactical communications intelligence elements were still arriving in theater in early October 1950. These elements operated in a constant state of catch-up in order to ensure that newly trained operators acclimated and gained some modicum of proficiency pertaining to North Korean military affairs. The 60th Signal Service Company, from Fort Lewis, Washington, arrived in theater October 9, 1950, but did not begin to support Eighth Army until October 16, 1950.¹⁵⁷ The Chinese struck just as these communications intelligence elements began to make strides against the North Koreans. Analysts' attempts at breaking Chinese communications proved abortive. Having no Mandarin Chinese linguists, and minimal enemy radio transmissions to analyze, Eighth Army or X Corps assets were unable to provide any early warning to the units they supported. They fell back in disarray, mirroring their supported elements during the Chinese Second Phase Offensive.¹⁵⁸

Strategically and operationally, communications intelligence began providing greater coverage of China after the Communists came to power in 1949. By March 1950, the United States Communications Intelligence Board apportioned personnel and resources aligned against Chinese targets. An incredible amount of ground had to be made up, even with expanded coverage. These collection efforts provided intelligence on the position of military units, the economy, and transportation and logistics matters within China.

The AFSA tracked the movements of Chinese units to the Manchurian-North Korean border during the summer and fall of 1950. This intelligence stream ran dry once the Chinese Communist forces crossed into North Korea from Manchuria because the Chinese maintained strict radio silence. Chinese forces only carried radios at the regimental level and above due to austere equipment levels. Below the regiment, the Chinese used field telephones, couriers, bugles,

¹⁵⁷Frahm, 17.

¹⁵⁸Hatch with Benson, 10.

whistles, flags, and flares.¹⁵⁹ The Chinese understood the United States' technological advantages and knew about its reliance on signals intelligence. They proved shrewd enough to turn that technological advantage into a disadvantage as part of their overall deception plan. They succeeded by generating false transmissions of bogus unit identifiers, false order of battle data, and false data regarding units mustering in Manchuria. They also falsely identified the potential commander of Chinese forces in Korea, in order to confuse and deceive communications intelligence analysts. They were extremely successful. In the First Phase Offensive they deceived analysts to identify divisions as battalion-sized elements. Conversely, in the Second Phase Offensive, they reversed this tactic, creating the illusion that six armies appeared to be 20.¹⁶⁰

The unexpected and calamitous Chinese intervention was seen by many in the United States government and the media as a clear intelligence failure. This amplified the original intelligence failure to predict the North Korean invasion in June 1950. The AFSA deemed it a failure because readily available intelligence was not used. A signal intelligence report in November of 1950 noted that China had ordered 30,000 maps of Korea for its forces in Manchuria. This report did nothing to alter the opinions of political or military leaders concerning Chinese intentions of intervening in Korea.¹⁶¹ A second declassified Top Secret report, from the AFSA, also provides some insight into MacArthur's and Willoughby's pre-Chinese intervention understanding of the situation. "No one who received COMINT product, including MacArthur's own G-2 in Tokyo, should have been surprised by the PRC intervention in the Korean War."¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹Guy R. Vanderpool, "COMINT and the PRC Intervention in the Korean War," *Cryptologic Quarterly* (October 1998): 8-9, National Security Agency, http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files?cryptologic_quarterly/comint_prc_intervention.pdf (accessed July 29, 2013).

¹⁶⁰Roe, "The Ghost Armies of Manchuria," 2, 6, 8.

¹⁶¹David Hatch, "SIGINT Against the Chinese Intervention in the Korean War," *Cryptologic Almanac 50th Anniversary Series*, National Security Agency, http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/files/crypto_almanac_50th/SIGINT%20Against%20the%20Chinese.pdf (accessed July 29, 2013).

¹⁶²Vanderpool, 1.

Instead of retreating from a million Chinese troops, the Eighth Army fled in disarray from 18 tired, understrength, undersupplied, and non-mechanized divisions. This force totaled about 180,000 men, reinforced by reconstituted North Korean elements and “a small group of Chinese radio operators pretending to be the oncoming *Ghost Armies of Manchuria*.”¹⁶³ This was in large part due to superb Chinese tactics, techniques, procedures that demonstrated a clear knowledge of both the capabilities and limitations of United States intelligence platforms, systems, personnel, to include cultural biases. It was only after multiple human intelligence sources and other intelligence disciplines revealed consistency that Willoughby, and by extension, MacArthur, chose to accept that the Chinese had intervened in Korea.

MACARTHUR AND WILLOUGHBY

The two most important decisionmakers in the Far East Command were General Douglas MacArthur and Major General Charles Willoughby. As Far East Command’s commander and senior intelligence officer, each contributed significantly to American efforts during the first year of the Korean War. They maintained a long professional association from 1940 until MacArthur’s relief by Truman in 1951. This history also included the exclusion of other intelligence agencies from their domain, especially the Central Intelligence Agency.¹⁶⁴

MacArthur, seen as the United States’ proconsul in the Far East, was an American hero during World War II, courageously defending Bataan and Corregidor, and returning to conqueror the Japanese Empire as the foreign Shogun of the Japanese.¹⁶⁵ Willoughby was not well liked, nor was he considered a competent intelligence officer. Egotistical and resentful of those who interfered in his domain, Willoughby’s intelligence assessments proved significantly correct or

¹⁶³Roe, “The Ghost Armies of Manchuria,” 8; Vanderpool, 11.

¹⁶⁴D. Clayton James and Anne Sharp Wells, *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Free Press, 1993), 43.

¹⁶⁵Stewart and Korean War Historical Series, 7.

incorrect, due to his subjective evaluation of the available data.¹⁶⁶ Willoughby provided solid operational level intelligence estimates, integral to MacArthur's planning, when given reporting from multiple intelligence sources.¹⁶⁷ Brigadier General Elliott Thorpe, who served as MacArthur's chief of counterintelligence during World War II, shared this opinion of Willoughby. "Willoughby has the best hindsight of any intelligence officer in the Army."¹⁶⁸

Strategically, Korea fell outside the United States' defensive perimeter, as the United States desired to avoid military entanglement in Korea,¹⁶⁹ and the military had no long-term interest there either.¹⁷⁰ Operationally, Korea remained in the purview of Far East Command's area of interest, while the Korean Military Advisory Group reported directly to Washington, DC on the Korean situation and the status of South Korea's army. Willoughby focused intelligence assets against North Korea and by late 1949, the Far East Command accepted the inevitability of a North Korean invasion,¹⁷¹ based on more than 1,500 reports generated from June of 1949 to June 1950.¹⁷² MacArthur's grip over intelligence production increased exponentially with the

¹⁶⁶Finley, 198; Roe, "The Ghost Armies of Manchuria,": 5-9. This variance is demonstrated by his evaluation of troop data at both Luzon, against the Japanese, and the Chinese prior to and during their First Phase Offensive.

¹⁶⁷U.S. Army Intelligence Center, "Charles Willoughby," 1-9.

¹⁶⁸General Elliott R. Thorpe, *East Wind, Rain: The Intimate Account of an Intelligence Officer in the Pacific, 1939-1949* (Boston, MA: Gambit, 1969), 95.

¹⁶⁹McKinzie interview of Muccio.

¹⁷⁰McKinzie interview of Bond.

¹⁷¹Schnabel, 63.

¹⁷²Courtney Whitney and Douglas MacArthur, *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 320.

onset of the Korean War.¹⁷³ General Lawton, the Army Chief of Staff, estimated that 90 percent of intelligence came by way of the Far East Command before and during the war.¹⁷⁴

The North Korean invasion found the Far East Command less than ready. Between 1947 and 1950, the Far East Command forces had been reduced by more than half.¹⁷⁵ Worsening the matter, the underfunded Far East Command forces received primarily obsolete World War II equipment.¹⁷⁶ Yet, in a few short months, MacArthur and his commanders drove the North Koreans into Manchuria. MacArthur's image climbed to even greater heights with the success of Operation Chromite. David Halberstam stated: "The more successful the United States was in the South, the harder it was to set limits going north."¹⁷⁷ Halberstam noted that MacArthur and his inner circle shunned those who spoke against the Inchon landings for lacking loyalty.¹⁷⁸

These same successes led to MacArthur's defeat, exemplifying the intelligence failure of the Korean War. MacArthur understood and appreciated the element of surprise in his operations, attested by the success of Operation Chromite. Yet, even with that success, MacArthur asked, "Have we seen or heard anything of the Russians or Chinese?"¹⁷⁹ He seemingly ignored the available intelligence and information, doing nothing to protect his own forces from succumbing to operational and tactical surprise as they attacked north to the Yalu.

¹⁷³D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur, Vol. III: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 436-441.

¹⁷⁴Roe, *The Dragon Strikes*, 98.

¹⁷⁵Jerry N. Hess, Oral Interview of Karl R. Bendetsen, New York, NY, November 21, 1972, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/bendet3.htm> (accessed January 12, 2014).

¹⁷⁶Roe, *The Dragon Strikes*, 7.

¹⁷⁷David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 18.

¹⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 22.

¹⁷⁹Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 115.

A critical aspect of intelligence production was that MacArthur's subordinates' intelligence assessments aligned with his views and never contradicted them. MacArthur, and by extension Willoughby, believed in the inevitability of a Western victory. To this end, both men downplayed or denied any intelligence analysis deemed too provocative or in conflict with MacArthur's views. Willoughby's staff further exacerbated this situation. They failed to accurately estimate, or attempt to understand, the intentions and capabilities of the Chinese. They erroneously assessed the Chinese should have entered the war in August 1950 to assist the North Koreans in eliminating United Nations forces from the Pusan perimeter. Why would they enter the war when the North Korean army was in full retreat? United Nations forces controlled over half the peninsula and had marshalled much greater strength. This reasoning drove the dismissal of reports of Chinese intentions. The Department of the Army's Intelligence section's assessment reinforced this reasoning.¹⁸⁰

Willoughby labelled the Chinese messaging as "diplomatic blackmail," though he did qualify that Chinese intervention was "Beyond the purview of collective intelligence: it is a decision for war on the highest level . . ." ¹⁸¹ MacArthur echoed this sentiment to President Truman when they met at Wake Island.¹⁸² MacArthur believed that the United States' national intelligence agencies had the responsibility to determine the likelihood of a Chinese or Soviet Union intervention. Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins contravened MacArthur's assessment of national level intelligence assets providing an overall strategic picture, because General Collins

¹⁸⁰U.S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, "Weekly Intelligence Report (U)," Number 85, 6 October 1950, National Archives, <http://research.archives.gov> (accessed February 6, 2014), 1.

¹⁸¹Charles A Willoughby and John Chamberlain, *MacArthur, 1941-1951* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1954), 378.

¹⁸²US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. 7 Korea* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 953.

estimated that 90 percent of its Far East intelligence came from Far East Command sources in 1950.¹⁸³

MacArthur believed that the Chinese would not intervene at this point in the conflict, and in any case was not concerned by the potential for a Chinese invasion thanks to his faith in aerial intelligence and the lethal capability of Far East Air Force. Willoughby produced MacArthur's daily intelligence summary and shared this opinion. Interestingly enough, Willoughby, while responsible for the Daily Intelligence Summary, seldom reviewed the document.¹⁸⁴ Their personal disdain for the Chinese Communists eventually thwarted their combat and intelligence operations.¹⁸⁵

MacArthur completely disregarded the effects of North Korean terrain on combat operations with his desire to crush the fleeing North Korean forces. A Far East Command area study assessed the adverse effects of this region on combat operations, and designated the area a "barrier area unsuited to large scale military operations."¹⁸⁶ MacArthur ignored a myriad of terrain analysis issues. These included the need for friendly forces to remain road bound due to the nature of mechanized forces, terrain compartmentalization which rendered units isolated and unable to mutually support one another, and the loss of radio communications, to include communications intelligence, due to mountainous terrain.¹⁸⁷ The Chinese took full advantage of these issues in the opening phases of their offensives.

¹⁸³Roe, *The Dragon Strikes*, 98.

¹⁸⁴Davidson, 96.

¹⁸⁵Hess interview of Muccio.

¹⁸⁶Roe, *The Dragon Strikes*, 128.

¹⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 128, 135-137.

Eighth Army had reported the capture of Chinese soldiers by October 25, 1950,¹⁸⁸ but MacArthur failed to exercise caution. MacArthur's personal agenda, enabled by Willoughby's intelligence summaries, and the failure of the service components intelligence analysts to discern Chinese capabilities and intentions, created a commonly held disbelief that the Chinese would intervene. Niles Bond stated it succinctly, "There was . . . tremendous unhappiness when the Chinese attack came across the Yalu River. This was something Willoughby had said would not happen."¹⁸⁹

Chinese Communist force estimates ranged from two regiments to two divisions of regular troops. The Eighth Army G2 reported the former, and I Corps' G2 reported the latter. Willoughby rejected I Corps' estimate, claiming that Republic of Korea Army units exaggerated the size of Chinese forces they faced in order to explain its poor performance. Willoughby truly believed that the Chinese, still uninvolved, only provided the North Koreans a token effort.¹⁹⁰ Willoughby's intelligence monopoly directly contributed to a dearth of independent analysis and assessment at the national level, emphasized during MacArthur's congressional relief hearings.¹⁹¹

Chinese Communists clearly understood MacArthur's disdain for them, as well as his underestimation of their capabilities, which created advantageous conditions for China.¹⁹² General Peng, commander of Chinese Communist forces in Korea, explained his actions in the Phase One Offensive, including exploiting the enemy's technical superiority to achieve deception

¹⁸⁸Truman, 373.

¹⁸⁹McKinzie interview Bond.

¹⁹⁰Zhang, 163, 167-168, 171-172.

¹⁹¹Harvey A. DeWeerd, *Strategic Surprise in the Korean War (P-1800-1)* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1962), Defense Technical Information Center, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/612431.pdf> (accessed October 27, 2013), 7.

¹⁹²Hao and Zhai, 108.

and constrain his follow-on operations.¹⁹³ Phase One Offensive operations concealed Chinese Communist force strength, deceived the enemy, and enabled Peng's forces in preparing his forces for a harder, more decisive strike against MacArthur's forces.¹⁹⁴

Given that the Chinese proved willing to engage MacArthur's forces, MacArthur and Willoughby should have expected them to engage in tactics similar to those used against the Chinese Nationalists during the Chinese Civil War.¹⁹⁵ The plan for the Chinese Intervention lay within the pages of Mao's seminal work, *On Protracted War*, describing mobile warfare, over an extended, shifting, and indefinite front, while avoiding early decisive battles.¹⁹⁶

One can argue that neither MacArthur nor Willoughby caused the intelligence failure of the North Korean Peoples' Army invasion. Shortfalls in personnel, assets, and training resulted from policies driven at the national and strategic level. Second, the Korean Military Advisory Group was responsible for producing intelligence for Washington, not the Far East Command. Nonetheless, MacArthur and Willoughby do retain responsibility for the initial defeats suffered by United Nations forces at the hands of the Chinese. MacArthur holds responsibility for these initial defeats by virtue of his position as the Commander of United Nations forces and United States Far East Command. His desire to crush the North Korean's, disbelief of Chinese intervention, and an unshakeable faith in airpower ensured the defeat of his field forces.

Willoughby's continued support of MacArthur's personal agenda, instead of performing his duties as his senior intelligence officer, only enabled MacArthur. Willoughby's reports assessed the possibility of the Chinese intervening, yet never addressed the probability of

¹⁹³Hao and Zhai, 114.

¹⁹⁴Ibid.

¹⁹⁵Waters, 58.

¹⁹⁶Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung* (Peking, China: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 193.

intervention or advised caution.¹⁹⁷ Willoughby dismissed the Chinese force build-up in Manchuria, as well as the large number of mustering troops belying a defensive posture and the capture of Chinese troops in early October 1950. Willoughby failed to determine enemy capabilities and intentions, not just capabilities.¹⁹⁸

MacArthur's desire for victory, based on "Mars last gift to an old warrior,"¹⁹⁹ his faith in aerial intelligence and the lethal capability of Far East Air Force, and disbelief in a Chinese intervention proved his undoing. Willoughby's lack of appreciation of Chinese intentions and capabilities, combined with his unquestioning loyalty to MacArthur, blinded him to possible alternatives. MacArthur's and Willoughby's long-standing relationship, as well as their personal and professional trait, perpetuated terrible consequences for MacArthur's forces.

CONCLUSION

Several factors negatively impacted the Far East Command's military intelligence capabilities, which contributed to their failures and magnified the obstacles created during the Korean War. Massive post-World War II personnel reductions had far reaching impacts for all the services. The people of the United States desired a return to normalcy and for the troops to return home.²⁰⁰ The Truman administration obliged its constituents' desires which caused a massive loss of experienced military service members. The size of the United States military decreased from about 12 million in 1945 to approximately one-and-a-half million by June 1947, creating a

¹⁹⁷Schnabel, 234.

¹⁹⁸Stanlis D. Milkowski, "MacArthur's 1950 Campaign in Korea: Operational Art on the Strategic Margin" (National Defense University Strategic Study, National War College, Washington, DC, 1986), 19, 29-30.

¹⁹⁹Marcus Cowper, "Commander: Douglas MacArthur," *Osprey Military Journal: The International Review of Military History* (July 1, 2002). Osprey Publishing. http://ospreypublishing.com/articles/world_war_2/commander:douglas_macarthur/ (accessed March 25, 2014).

²⁰⁰Robert A. Pollard, *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 20.

shortage of skilled professionals in the services' intelligence disciplines. Experienced military intelligence specialists departing the service removed invaluable institutional knowledge and experience. These across-the-board cuts eroded the effectiveness of military intelligence units even more than numbers might suggest.²⁰¹

Second, defense budget cutbacks were instituted to reduce the national debt. "The economic dislocation and high inflation attendant upon the end of the war, coupled with the President's own fiscal conservatism, discouraged experimentation at home or abroad."²⁰² These policies created a cascade effect, which resulted in an overall lack of research and design for the services' intelligence systems and reconnaissance platforms. Exceptions to these cutbacks existed in both the Air Force and Navy. The first was due to the development of the atomic bomb and the requisite long-range bombers. These obviated the protective qualities of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Second, the Navy continued its mission of protecting foreign sources of vital resources.²⁰³

Third, the shrinking manpower pool and the defense budget forced the services to scale back the breadth of their operations and focus on high priority threats to national security. Consequentially, the services focused their limited assets against the Soviet Union, primarily in Western Europe. Intelligence assets directed against China focused primarily on discerning Chinese Nationalists codes, not Chinese Communists. This remained the case until after the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, garnering minimal interest until their intervention.

Fourth, the Truman administration expanded the United States' national security apparatus. The National Security Act of 1947 created an independent Air Force and brought the

²⁰¹Pollard, 22.

²⁰²Ibid., 21; Gert Krell, "Capitalism and Armaments: Business Cycles and Defense Spending in the United States 1945-1979," *Journal of Peace Research* 18, no. 3 (1981): 230.

²⁰³Pollard, 20.

Army, Navy, and Air Force together under the Department of Defense. Additionally, the creation of the Air Force drew off former United States Army Air Corps intelligence personnel, furthering weakening the Army's strategic and operational intelligence capabilities. The Central Intelligence Group evolved from the World War II Office of Strategic Services and became the Central Intelligence Agency. The Central Intelligence Agency siphoned off additional Army intelligence personnel, while only receiving direction from and providing intelligence to the President of the United States. This grand reorganization brought about a myriad of intelligence turf wars that negatively affected the Far East Command and are still a pertinent issue today.

In 1949, the establishment of the AFSA consolidated the signals intelligence efforts of the services' cryptologic agencies into a single organization. Administrative and congressional expansion of the nation's intelligence and security bureaucracy increased competition for already scarce budgetary resources. This competition fostered resentment among military agencies toward the newer organizations, perceived to be invading into domains that they deemed proprietary.

The resultant turf wars created distrust between the intelligence organizations. It also led to redundancy of effort, loss of efficiency, withholding of information, and circular reporting. "The elaborate, compartmentalized, interallied system passed intercepted messages to Washington and London code-breakers and analysts (both penetrated by Soviet agents), and the Central Intelligence Agency and AFSA did not return the analysis to theater commanders without considerable filtering."²⁰⁴The North Korean invasion multiplied these issues exponentially, forcing the United States to quickly assemble and deploy largely untrained military intelligence troops and equipment piecemeal to support combat operations.

²⁰⁴Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came From the North*, Modern War Studies (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 173.

Regrettably, the operational and tactical intelligence achievements that supported successful combat operations against the North Koreans did not last long. Overcome by victory disease, American policymakers, the Joint Chiefs, and General MacArthur failed to appreciate the strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence provided to them prior to the Second Phase of the Chinese Communists intervention. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further compounded this lack of appreciation by denying overflights of China and the Soviet Union.²⁰⁵ The Chinese intervention demonstrated the Far East Command's intelligence architecture inability to differentiate between different antagonists' styles of combat. The Far East Command and United States political and military leadership further exacerbated the problem by mirror-imaging the Chinese Communists and Chinese Nationalists, and viewed their enemies and allies through a cultural bias and prejudicial lens.

Operational intelligence underestimated the Chinese Communist Forces ability to counter the capabilities of the United States Air Force, allowing the infiltration of a huge ground force. The Chinese Communists fought in a manner completely different from that of the North Korean Peoples' Army. The United States viewed Chinese Communist Forces as a weak version of the North Korean Army, instead of a unique and distinct force, with its own capabilities and intentions. Although intelligence professionals provided a clear picture of the Chinese Communist Forces order of battle and numbers in Manchuria, they failed to discern how the Chinese operated based on their capabilities and intentions. Chinese tactics transformed their own weaknesses into strengths and the United States' strengths into weaknesses. "Few intelligence failures in recent history have had such drastic results. The effects are still with us today."²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵Millett, 173.

²⁰⁶Roe, "The Ghost Armies of Manchuria," 2.

MacArthur and Willoughby possessed traits that negatively impacted the conduct of combat and intelligence operations. “MacArthur had ‘regionalitis, for him a long term disease.’”²⁰⁷ MacArthur’s low opinion of the Chinese Communists and his unshakeable belief in air power were his undoing. Willoughby mirrored MacArthur’s opinion. His poor assessments of Chinese intentions and his unquestioning loyalty facilitated MacArthur’s understanding of the war. MacArthur’s flawed assessments came at key moments during the war.²⁰⁸

The United States’ rash political and strategic decisions in the early years of the post-World War II era set the stage for the Korean War, which became the opening salvo of the Cold War. Military intelligence operations prior to and during the Korean War must be viewed within a systemic context. When done so, it is easier to articulate military intelligence shortcomings, as opposed to failures. Military intelligence capabilities atrophied, along with the rest of the United States military, during the periodic quest to save taxpayers’ dollars and attempting to do more with less.

The United States is currently wracked by fiscal uncertainty, constraints, and downsizing. Force reductions are expected to resemble force levels unseen since before World War II. One wonders how these fiscal constraints and force reductions will impact the services’ intelligence personnel numbers, training, systems availability and maintenance, and research and development of new systems.

Military intelligence has had, and continues to have, a consistent and expansive role in United States foreign policy. Intelligence cannot operate in isolation from the political spectrum from which war materializes. Intelligence failures are never exclusive. The Korean War is a clear example of the inclusiveness of politics and intelligence. The military intelligence failures of the

²⁰⁷Millett, 439.

²⁰⁸Ibid.

Korean War were not absolute failures, but systemic failures that included strategic, political, and military policy failures that collectively reinforced one another.

Today's situation differs from that prior to the Korean War, although many similarities exist. Wars appear more like each other than anything else.²⁰⁹ "The dangerous implication of this truth lays in the proclivity of large and successful military organizations to see all wars as pretty much the same. They are not, and what Clausewitz called 'the first of all strategic tasks' requires careful consideration of the uniqueness of the individual conflict."²¹⁰ The United States' lacked knowledge pertaining to various aspects of Iraqi and Afghan cultures, especially evident early on in both conflicts. The ensuing insurgencies created the need to develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures, and new intelligence systems and platforms. These conditions highlighted the need for linguists and translators to support strategic intelligence agencies, operational and tactical commanders, which were in short supply as well. These requirements will only increase as the United States continues to pursue its strategic agenda.

The technological superiority of the United States is not, and will not, be underestimated by its enemies. The Korean War serves as a lesson for the United States military. Maintaining well trained and equipped intelligence service members, and intelligence capabilities costs less than operational failures. "The basic study of all warfare is the mind and nature of the probable enemy, compared to which a technical competence in the handling of weapons and engines of destruction is of minor importance. Failing in the first, one will most likely fail in everything."²¹¹ Tomorrow's enemy will endeavor to turn our technological advantages against us. A strategy

²⁰⁹Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," *Parameters* 11, no. 1 (March 1981): 13.

²¹⁰Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: Free Press, 2006, 1990), 195.

²¹¹S.L.A. Marshall, *Sinai Victory : Command Decisions in History Shortes[t] War, Israel's Hundred-Hour Conquest of Egypt East of Suez, Autumn 1956* (New York: William Morrow, 1958), 6.

advocated by Chinese officers, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, considers a three warfares model, consisting of psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare.²¹² Seen in this light, it is imperative that the United States takes every advantage available to it.

The failure of intelligence is an internal flaw of the United States civil-military system. Fundamentally, it is a systemic problem that can be corrected by improved civil-military understanding and communication. Lastly, the civil-military organizations of the United States must collect the most challenging type of intelligence—knowledge of themselves.²¹³

²¹²Liang Qiao and Xiangsui Wang, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999); Timothy A. Walton, Delex Special Report-3, “China’s Three Warfares,” January 18, 2012, Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis, Delex Systems, Inc., <http://www.delex.com/data/files/Three%20Warfares.pdf>, (accessed March 26, 2014), 4.

²¹³Cohen and Gooch, 195.

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