DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN THE KENYA ARMY: BRIDGING THE GAP

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General Studies

by

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Doctrine Development Process in the Kenya Army: Bridging the Gap

MAJ Roba Wario, Kenya Army

The use of military doctrine as a basis for preparing armies for war is evident throughout military history. It dates back to as early as 350 B.C., when Sun Tzu advanced the fifth factor of war, the laws and regulations, which was subsequently translated to mean doctrine. However, to date doctrine remains a term with various definitions, descriptions, and interpretations. These varied definitions and interpretations, have not only caused terminological confusion between doctrine and other related terms; concepts and doctrine, but also caused confusion in their applications. This confusion often results in a flawed doctrine development process.

The Kenya Army currently prescribes to maneuver warfare as a basis of its doctrine. However, while maneuver warfare may appeal to many military organizations, consensus has not been reached to either classify maneuver warfare as doctrine, an operational concept, or an operational approach. The purpose of this thesis is therefore, to analyze the Kenya Army doctrine development process with a view to recommending a viable and an enduring doctrine development process.

A major finding of this thesis is that a viable and an enduring doctrine development process has to begin with the establishment of a capable lead organization. The organization must eliminate terminological and utility confusion among doctrine, concepts, and principles. It must broadly follow three doctrine development phases: the collection/information gathering phase; the formulation and validation phase; and the promulgation and dissemination phase.

The research’s major recommendation is for the KDF to establish a joint doctrine organization which is capable of eliminating terminological and utility confusion between doctrine and other related terms. The organization must remain guided by the three broad doctrinal phases as established by this research.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN THE KENYA ARMY: BRIDGING THE GAP, by MAJ Roba Bonaya Wario, 114 pages.

The use of military doctrine as a basis for preparing armies for war is evident throughout military history. It dates back to as early as 350 B.C, when Sun Tzu advanced the fifth factor of war, the laws and regulations, which was subsequently translated to mean doctrine. However, to date doctrine remains a term with various definitions, descriptions, and interpretations. These varied definitions and interpretations, have not only caused terminological confusion between doctrine and other related terms; concepts and doctrine, but also caused confusion in their applications. This confusion often results in a flawed doctrine development process.

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Finally, I dedicate this work to all my KDF colleagues who paid the ultimate price while defending Kenya and the Kenyan population in the operation Linda Nchi.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

- Background ................................................. 1
- Definitions and Military Perspectives of Doctrine ................... 4
- The Purpose ............................................. 5
- The Issues ............................................. 6
- The Problem Statement .................................. 7
- The Research Questions .................................. 7
- Assumptions ............................................ 8
- Definition of Terms ..................................... 9
- Limitations ............................................ 12
- Scope and Delimitation .................................. 12
- Significance of the Study ................................ 13
- Summary and Conclusions ................................ 14

## CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

- Introduction ............................................. 15
- The relationship Between Military Doctrine, Concept and Principle .......... 16
- The Nature, Character and Role of Military Doctrine ........................... 19
  - Offense, Defense, and Deterrence: An Enduring Nature of Military Doctrine .......... 21
  - Innovation and Integration: The Dynamic Character of a Military Doctrine .......... 23
- Sources of Military Doctrine ................................ 28
- Doctrine Making Process: The Basic Steps ........................................ 32
- Conclusion .............................................. 35
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY ................................................................. 37

Introduction .................................................................................. 37
Methodology .................................................................................. 38
Analysis .......................................................................................... 41
  Step 1: Identification and Isolation of the Problem ....................... 41
  Step 2: Review of Relevant Information ........................................ 42
Military Doctrine Development Process ........................................ 43
  Step 3: Collection and Classification of Data ............................... 44
  Step 4: Data Analysis .................................................................. 44
Drawing of Conclusions and Recommendations ............................ 46
Chapters Arrangement .................................................................... 46
Summary ....................................................................................... 47

CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 48

Introduction .................................................................................. 48
Section 1: The U.S. Army Doctrine Development Process ............... 49
  Background ................................................................................. 49
  The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) ......... 51
  Guide to Doctrine Development in the U.S. Army ......................... 52
  The U.S. Army Doctrine Development Process ............................ 60
  Analysis of U.S. Army Doctrine Development Process ............... 63
  A Capable Lead Organization ..................................................... 63
  A Viable Doctrine Process .......................................................... 65
Section 2: The British Army Doctrine Development Process ............. 69
  Background ................................................................................. 69
  The Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Center (DCDC) ......... 72
  Guide to Doctrine Development Process in the British Military .... 74
  Management and Direction of British Military Doctrine ............... 77
  The British Joint Doctrine Development Process .......................... 78
  Analysis of British Army Doctrine Development Process ............ 79
  A Capable Lead Organization ..................................................... 80
  A Viable Doctrine Process .......................................................... 83
Section 3. The Kenya Army Doctrine Development Process ............... 86
  Background ................................................................................. 86
  A Capable Lead Organization ..................................................... 87
  The Kenya Army Doctrine Development Process ....................... 89
Conclusion .................................................................................... 91

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................. 92

Conclusions ................................................................................... 92
  The Implications of the Case Studies on the Kenya Army ............... 94
  Doctrine Development Process ................................................... 94
Recommendations .......................................................................... 96
A Capable Lead Organization................................................................. 96
A Viable Doctrine Process................................................................. 97
Recommendation for Further Research ............................................. 98

REFERENCE LIST ................................................................................. 99
### ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Publications</td>
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<td>Army Doctrine Reference Publications</td>
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<td>AH</td>
<td>Assistant Head</td>
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<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied Joint Publications</td>
</tr>
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<td>AR</td>
<td>Army Regulations</td>
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<td>Army Techniques and Procedures</td>
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<td>CALL</td>
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<td>Capabilities-Based Approach</td>
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<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
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<td>CJSI</td>
<td>Chairman Joint Staff Instructions</td>
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<td>Development, Analysis, and Research Team</td>
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<td>Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Center</td>
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<td>DIME</td>
<td>Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economy</td>
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<td>DJDH</td>
<td>Developing Joint Doctrine Hand Book</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>Doctrine, organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities</td>
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<td>Defense Staff College</td>
</tr>
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<td>ET</td>
<td>Equipment Table</td>
</tr>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSR</td>
<td>Field Service Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCSC</td>
<td>Higher Command and Staff Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCN</td>
<td>Joint Concept Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDCB</td>
<td>Joint Doctrine and Concepts Board</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Joint Doctrine Publications</td>
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<td>Joint Doctrine Steering Committee</td>
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<td>JTTP</td>
<td>Joint tactics, Techniques, and Procedures</td>
</tr>
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<td>KA</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Kenya Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMD</td>
<td>Kenya Military Doctrine</td>
</tr>
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<td>Millennium Challenge 2002</td>
</tr>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-commissioned Officer</td>
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<tr>
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<td>National Defense College</td>
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<td>OPFOR</td>
<td>Opposing Force</td>
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<td>PD</td>
<td>Program Directive</td>
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<td>PDF</td>
<td>Portable Document Format</td>
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<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<td>SO1</td>
<td>Staff Officer 1</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures</td>
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<td>USACAC</td>
<td>United States Combined Arms Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIS</td>
<td>Visual Information Specialist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

Figure 1. The U.S. Army doctrine hierarchy.................................................................57
TABLES

Table 1. Assessment of the elements of a viable doctrine development process........45

Table 2. The U.S. Army doctrine publications, doctrine proponents, and approval authorities.................................................................60

Table 3. Summarized assessment of the U.S. Army doctrine development process .....69

Table 4. Summarized assessment of the British Army doctrine development process .................................................................................86

Table 5. Summarized assessment of the Kenya Army Doctrine Process ...............90

Table 6. Summarized assessments of the case studies........................................91
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Background
The application of the military instrument of national power to achieve the strategic end dates back to ancient times. As early as 350 B.C, Sun Tzu argued that warfare was a matter of vital importance to the state; the basis of life and death; a path way to either survival or extinction that must be thoroughly pondered and analyzed (Sun Tzu 1994, 167). Probably, influenced by this argument, and others, states have historically resorted to their militaries as the final tool to achieving political ends. Preparation and effective employment of the military forces then became a core issue for the states. In doing so, military doctrine in whatever form, took centre stage. The term “military doctrine” has since become the subcomponent of grand strategy that explicitly deals with military means (Posen 1984, 13).

The use of military doctrine as a basis for preparing armies for war is evident throughout military history. Sun Tzu’s fifth factor of war, the laws and regulation, is translated to mean organization, a system of command, and the management of supplies, referring to what is currently practiced as military doctrine (Sun Tzu 1994, 167). In Europe, the eighteenth century saw military professionalism rise in parallel with the formation of nation states and national bureaucracies, the product of the Age of Reason, and rise in doctrinal masterpieces (Paret 1986, 72-73). Napoleon's victories resulted from his genius application of written doctrine. Both Jomini and Clausewitz interpreted Napoleon, examining cognitive, procedural, moral, organizational, and material components of his system (Hope 1999, 20).
Doctrine is a term that has many interpretations. The word emerged in 1382 when John Wycliffe used it in a religious sense to define the teaching of a body of instruction. In 1848, I. E Holmes mentioned doctrine as it pertained to President James Monroe’s speech to the congress in 1823. However, the use of doctrine in a modern military sense appeared only during the second half of the nineteenth century (Kretchik 2011, 5). The intellectual and industrial revolutions, and the rise of enormous national armies, produced great challenges in war planning and warfare could no longer be understood or practiced from the narrow perspective of tactical procedures. Mass conscript armies, weapons industry, railroads, telegraph communications and the expansion of military staffs combined to allow for the rapid mobilization and distributed maneuver of very large armies, over distances too vast for a single commander to exercise control (Schneider 1994, 32-53). This made necessary the introduction of a distinct echelon of command to link the desires of the national leadership to the actions of the military field commanders. More recently, scholars have further added three important aspects of military doctrine for close scrutiny: its offensive, defensive, or deterrent character; its coordination with foreign policy (political-military integration); and the degree of innovation it contains (Posen 1984, 14). The Jomini/Clausewitz interpretations, combined with these three doctrinal aspects will form the basis of this research.

While the significance of military doctrine is widely acknowledged, varying perspectives about its definitions and roles persist. Probably, stimulated by these varying perspectives, and accelerated by other factors, the world’s militaries have adopted and pursued different paths and approaches in developing their own doctrine. Whichever way it follows, in its developmental stages doctrine is merely a theory. No matter how sound
it is based on past experience, and solid staff work, there are no guarantees that it will achieve success. Only under the rigors of combat, with its infinite possibilities for mischance and confusion can doctrine be thoroughly and definitely tested (Brown 1992, 364).

However, a sound theoretical doctrinal approach in peace time is believed to significantly reduce the chances of failure in war time. The main use of theory is to analyze constituent elements of war. It becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls (Clausewitz 1989, 141). Theory is synonymous with sound ideas and ideas matter, sometimes fundamentally. The right idea in the right situation can trump superior numbers and technology (Mattis 2009). Historical evidence exists to support this argument. In the spring of 1940, the German military still materially stunted by restrictions imposed at Versailles at the end of World War I, routed a larger French military that was widely accepted as the best in the world, famously overrunning France in six weeks. France, with her British allies, had numerical superiority, more and better tanks, and an impressively fortified defensive system. In contrast, the outmanned and outgunned Germans had a better idea, an innovative warfighting concept that merged the infiltration tactics developed during the Great War with the internal combustion engine, radio communications, and the German tradition of mission-type tactics. The result was a true revolution in military affairs (Mattis 2009). These German victories were the result of better tactics, training, leadership and organization, bound together by a coherent operational concept (Corum 1992, 202-203). It is on this basis that this thesis focuses on
the roles and the relationships of doctrine in determining a viable doctrine development process that is enduring.

Definitions and Military Perspectives of Doctrine

Dictionaries define doctrine as a set of ideas or beliefs that are taught or believed to be true. The U.S. Army defines doctrine as a systematic body of thought on how Army forces intend to operate as an integral part of a joint force. It is also a statement of how the Army intends to fight (Department of the Army 2011, 1-2). The British Army defines doctrine as a set of beliefs or principles held and taught. It provides an Army’s central idea based on common sense; that is actions adopted to circumstances (Ministry of Defense 2010, 2-3). The Kenya (KA) Army defines doctrine as the fundamental principles by which military forces or components thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives (Kenya Army 2004a, 1-1 – 1-2).

The conceptual aspect of doctrine is clearly discernible in all the definitions. Common to all three definitions are the terms ideas, beliefs, thoughts, and principles. All these words, though different, either collectively or individually, relates to concepts as inherent components of doctrine. The U.S Army defines concepts as unauthoritative and unproven ideas, but which when done properly propose solutions to challenges for which no doctrine exists or propose alternatives to existing doctrine (Mattis 2009). Therefore, concepts, once fully dissected and fledged out lead to the development of a sound doctrine. Given these definitions, it is pretty clear that concept and doctrine have a very close relationship and that a very thin line separates the two. Although it is generally agreed that both concepts and doctrine shape organizations, functionally they are remarkably different. Therefore, unless a viable process to develop and apply them is
defined, the prospect of doctrinal ambiguity remains high. Apparently, development of such a process remains a major challenge to many militaries of the developing nations, Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) included.

The KA currently prescribes to maneuver warfare in what appears to be a borrowed practice from the British Army. British Army doctrine is officially based on maneuver warfare. The first tenet of the British Army’s capstone doctrine is the maneuver approach to operations. This is an indirect approach which emphasises understanding and targeting the conceptual and moral components of an adversary’s fighting power, as well as attacking the physical component (Ministry of Defense 2010, 0502). In describing doctrinal concepts, the Kenya Army applies the attrition-maneuver dichotomy. Consequently, it advances the attrition theory and maneuver warfare concept, but favors the later. It is in the process of adopting the maneuver approach to operations and the emerging concept of Mission Command. It argues that the highest and purest application of the maneuver approach is to pre-empt the enemy, that is, to disarm or neutralize him before the fight rather than destroying his mass by attrition (Kenya Army 2004a,1-7 – 1-8). Clearly, by interchangeably referring to maneuver warfare as an operational approach, operational concept or doctrine world militaries have not been able to clearly categorize maneuver warfare. Consequently, the context in which maneuver warfare is adopted and applied in the Kenya Army remains a matter of varied interpretations.

The Purpose

The focus of this thesis is on the Kenya Army Doctrine Development process with specific reference to combined arms maneuver warfare theory. The purpose is to
stimulate critical thinking and debate in this critical area of the application of military
element of national power. Its key target audience is those within the KA concerned with
military doctrine development. Its other target audiences includes the wider officer corps
of the Kenya Defense Forces, who may find this thesis a thought-provoking document. It
is neither the intent nor the purpose of this thesis to criticize for the sake of criticism, or
lay blame on any individual(s) or organizations that may be discussed in the study.
Objectivity and balance remains the guiding factors of this thesis, as it seeks to generate
valuable debate regarding military doctrine process. The study will not delve deeper into
the merits of the maneuver warfare, other than how it is necessary to answer the research
questions.

The Issues

The Kenya Defense Forces have hitherto, had little operational experience since
the country’s independence in 1963. The Kenya military’s strategic issues came under the
umbrella of the British Imperial policy until independence, and under the strategic
direction of the political leadership ever since after the independence. While the Kenyan
soldiers have extensively and successfully participated in internal security operations, and
have significantly contributed to both the African Union and the United Nations peace-
keeping missions around the world since 1989, the KA has never held any major
operational level responsibility before the launch of Operation LINDA NCHI (Protect the
Country) against the Al-Shabaab militants in Somalia in 2011. The Kenya Army’s
experience in conventional operations has therefore been limited. Lack of experience at
the operational level, and lack of experience in campaigns, has probably precluded the
need for a viable doctrine development process that produces a distinctly Kenya Army
doctrine for the conduct of conventional land warfare operations. The Kenya Army doctrine has therefore always been based on borrowed practices, which heavily focused upon the conduct of tactical level battles and engagements. Consequently, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) are adopted without a solid doctrinal foundation.

The Problem Statement

A flawed doctrine development process has commonly been associated with failure by militaries to clearly differentiate and establish the relationships between operational concepts and doctrine. Beginning early 2000, the KA adopted maneuver warfare as its doctrine. This is in spite of the fact that no consensus has, as of yet been reached, as to whether maneuver warfare is a concept, an operational approach or doctrine. Further, it appears that the Kenya army has not established a clear relationship between concept and doctrine. Resultantly, it remains debatable whether maneuver warfare, as currently practiced in the Kenya Army, is a concept or doctrine. This may have created a gap in the Kenya Army doctrine development process.

The Research Questions

The primary question that this thesis aims to answer is what enduring and viable process can the KA adopt to develop an effective doctrine that best serves the national needs in the 21st century and beyond. The secondary questions, that when addressed will collectively answer the primary question, are:

1. What are the roles and the relationships of doctrine, concepts and principles in the use of the military element of the national power?
2. What are the primary sources of military doctrine?
3. What basic steps does a viable doctrine process follow, and at a minimum what does an effective doctrine contain?

4. Doctrine or concept, which guides the Kenya Army currently?

5. What process does the Kenya Army use to develop its doctrine or operational concept?

6. What are the limitations and challenges (if any) of the Kenya Army concept and doctrine development process?

7. What best practices can the Kenya Army emulate to strengthen its doctrine development process?

Assumptions

This thesis is premised on a number of assumptions: First, it’s assumed that the KA, while building on its victory in the two years of war against Al-Shabaab, will give due priority to military doctrine as a means of preparing the army for war. Second, that maneuver warfare, whether as doctrine or an operational concept continues to be practiced in the KA; Third, it is assumed that the Kenyan economy can effectively support all aspects of its military’s doctrine development process; Fourth, the experiences of operation Linda Nchi in Somalia, has generated some valuable doctrinal lessons learned. Lastly, it is assumed that the Kenya national grand strategy will support the Kenya Army doctrine development process in terms of finance, training, and organizational structure.
Definition of Terms

**Alliance:** Alliance means the relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g. treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long time objectives that further the common interests of the members (Department of the Army 2013, 1-2).

**Combined-arms:** Synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater than if each arm was used separately or sequentially (Department of the Army 2012a, 2-10).

**Defense:** Defense means a combat operation conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favourable for offensive or stability tasks (Department of the Army 2012a, 4-1).

**Deterrence:** Deterrence means the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. It is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction (Department of the Army 2009, 58).

**Diplomacy:** Diplomacy as an instrument of national power means a nation's relations and engagements with other states and foreign groups to advance national values, interests, and objectives, and to solicit foreign support for military operations. It is a principle means of organizing coalitions and alliances, which may include states and non-state entities, as partners, allies, surrogates, and or proxies (Department of Defense 2013, 1-12).

**Doctrine:** Doctrine, as defined by the author in this thesis is a systematically developed, integrative, officially approved, authoritative but dynamic, and documented guides to military actions based upon accumulated experiences, and recorded numerous instances that have led to generalizations.
**Echelon:** Echelon means a sub-division of headquarters or a separate level of command (Department of the Army, 2013, 1-20).

**Economy:** Economy as an instrument of national power means prudent use of a nation’s economic resources as a fundamental engine of the general welfare and the enabler of a strong national defense. The economic instrument of power aims to encourage economic growth, raise standards of living, and predict and prevent to the extent possible, economic and financial crises (Department of the Army 2013, 1-13).

**Ends:** Ends are defined as fundamental expressions of goals, objectives, and ideals (Carey 2006, 1).

**Indirect Approach:** Indirect approach means an operational approach that applies combat power to attack enemy weak points while avoiding enemy strengths (Department of the Army 2013, 1-30).

**Information:** Information as an instrument of national power means communication synchronization that entails focussed efforts to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests, policies, and objectives by understanding and engaging key audiences through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, and products (Department of Defense 2013, 1-12).

**Instruments of National Power:** The tools a country uses to influence other actors, whether state or non-state, national or international. They are diplomacy, information, military, and economy (DIME) (Department of Defense 2013, 1-12).

**Means:** Expressions of intention, or actual employment of instruments of national power and other resources to achieve national goals/objectives (Carey 2006, 1).
**Military**: Military as an instrument of national power means the employment of national military as a coercive means that generates strategic effects through the application of force or threat of application of force to compel an adversary or potential adversary to agree to a nation’s terms in pursuit of national interests (Department of Defense 2013, 1-13).

**Mission**: Mission is the task, together with the purpose that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor. A duty assigned to an individual or a military unit (Department of the Army 2009, 122).

**Mission Command**: Mission command means the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of military operations (Department of the Army 2012, 1-1).

**National Interest**: National interest means a nation-states’ expression of its wants, needs, and desires, both domestically, and internationally. It is desired end-state of a nation categorized in terms such as survival, economic well-being, and favorable world order, and enduring national values (Carey 2006, 1).

**National Objectives**: National objectives are broad activities and outcomes a nation pursues to promote, protect or attain its interests. Objectives are usually more tangible/concrete than interests (Carey 2006, 1).

**Proponent**: Proponent is the agency or command responsible for initiating, developing, coordinating, and approving content; issuing a publication; and identifying a publication for removal (TRADOC 2012, 69).
**Strategy:** Strategy is defined as the integration of ends, ways, and means to secure national interests (Yarger 2006, C204RD1).

**Tactics:** Tactics are defined as the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other (Department of the Army 2009, 122).

**Ways:** Ways are defined as policies, programs or commitments to attain specific objectives (Ends) (Carey 2006, 2).

**Limitations**

Many scholars, both military and civilian, have written books and articles on military doctrine and operational concepts. However, no specific scholarly or academic work on the Kenya military doctrine is available. Consequently, the official KA doctrinal documents in use are still in draft form. These documents, which constitute critical part of this research’s primary data, may not generate enough data as desired. Owing to time constraints, this research study will be limited to two main case studies: the United States (U.S.) Army; and the British Army doctrine development processes.

**Scope and Delimitation**

Based on the two case studies, the research will focus on the land warfare doctrine development process. Joint doctrine will only serve as a reference point, to the extent that it impacts on land warfare doctrine development. It is not the subject of this study. Maneuver warfare currently guides the Kenya Army. Its study will be limited to determining the context of its application. It’s not within the scope of this research to delve deeper into the historical application of maneuver warfare or determining its merits. Given that there is no consensus on whether maneuver warfare is a concept or a doctrine,
it is desirable to deeply analyze maneuver warfare. Likewise, more than two doctrinal case studies would have been most appropriate for the purpose of this thesis. However, given that the time available for the study is limited, it is not possible to make an in depth analysis of all these relevant issues. For this reason, the scope of the study is limited to that which best answers the research question in the available time frame.

The focus of this thesis is on the military doctrine development process. As such, it does not aim to prescribe a specific doctrine for the Kenya Army; rather it aims to propose a relatively enduring frame work for development of an effective doctrine that best serves the Kenya’s national interests.

Any discussions of specific military doctrine inevitably extends to considerations of some aspects of national security matters. This is necessary because military doctrines are critical components of national security policy or grand strategy (Posen, 1984, 13). With full recognition and appreciation of this fact, this thesis will strictly be confined to matters of general nature and no classified item or matters considered prejudicial to national security of any state will be discussed.

**Significance of the Study**

This study will probably be the first scholarly work that directly addresses the KA doctrine development process. While it may not completely solve all KA doctrinal challenges, it might serve as a foundation for further study into the Kenya Army doctrine development process. It is intended that this research will provoke thought and generate honest and healthy debate about the Kenya Army doctrine development frame work. For the first time in fifty years of the county’s independence, the Kenya military independently and successfully prosecuted a campaign beyond the country’s border. This
is the operation *Linda Nchi* against the Al-Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia, executed between October 2011 and October 2012. The operation put to test the Kenya Defense Forces’ operational capability, as well as its doctrine’s suitability. Certainly lessons were learned. This thesis, therefore, comes at a prime time when the desire for a doctrinal debate is presumed to be at its peak.

**Summary and Conclusions**

Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter. It broadly introduced the research study topic, which is the Kenya Army doctrine development process. It outlined the purpose of the study, the issues for consideration and stated the research problem under consideration. To solve the stated problem, the chapter identified one primary question and seven secondary questions that collectively aim to solve the research problem. The chapter made a number of assumptions on which the study is based, while anticipating possible limitations within which the study is conducted. The chapter also defined the research scope and the delimitations. Finally, the chapter sought to explain the significance of the study to the potential scholars of the subject in general, and to the Kenya Army in particular. The next chapter will review the literature on this topic and provide an assessment of the significance of that material to this study.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of the study is to stimulate critical thinking and debate in the Kenya Army doctrine development process, with a view to recommending the most suitable and enduring doctrine development process for the Kenya Army. Chapter 1 of this thesis was an introductory chapter. It broadly introduced the research study topic, the Kenya Army doctrine development process. It outlined the purpose of the study, the issues for considerations and stated the research problem under consideration. To solve the stated problem, the chapter identified one primary question and six secondary questions that collectively aim to solve the research problem. The chapter made a number of assumptions on which the study is based, while anticipating possible limitations within which the study is conducted. The chapter also defined the research scope and the delimitations. Finally, the chapter sought to explain the significance of the study to the potential scholars of the subject in general, and to the Kenya Army in particular.

This chapter will review and discuss relevant available literature related to the key research question of this study. It will review literature that relates to concepts and military doctrines, largely focusing on military doctrine development process. The study will present the information reviewed under four major study areas, namely: the relationship between doctrine, concept and principle; the nature, character and role of military doctrine; the sources of military doctrine; and the basic steps of doctrine development process.
The relationship Between Military Doctrine, Concept and Principle

The terms concept, doctrine and principle have constantly remained too close in usage to an extent that they cause terminological confusion in military organizations. It is not uncommon to encounter military publications and articles that equate doctrine with principles of war or concepts. However, in reality the three terms, though related, are remarkably different in the ordinary English meanings as well as in the applied military terms. It can easily be argued that failure to clearly define and differentiate these terms heavily contributes to a flawed doctrine development process. Before discussing their relationships, it is important to differentiate them.

A concept is simply an idea. To conceive an idea is to formulate it in words in the mind. In the mind it is notional; it exists only as a theory, an idea yet unproven. To conceptualize is to devise a mental construct, a picture in the brain that eventually is expressed in words. It is speculative, tentative. Concepts spring from a creative and critical imagination. It is a hypothesis, an inference that suggests that a proposed pattern of behavior may possibly lead to a desired result. Concepts are therefore not authoritative (Holley 2004, 19-22).

Doctrines on the other hand are, authoritative and officially approved teachings based upon accumulated experience, numerous recorded instances that have led to generalization. To generalize is to infer inductively a common pattern from repeated experiences that have produced the same or similar results. They consist of rules or procedures drawn by competent authority. For this reason, this thesis, defines military doctrine as a systematically developed, integrative, officially approved, authoritative but
dynamic, and documented guides to military actions based upon accumulated experiences, and recorded numerous instances that have led to generalizations.

Principles are truths that are evident and general. One can lay down a rule, somewhat arbitrarily based on observed experience. In contrast, one cannot lay down a principle arbitrarily; one can only declare it. Rules, and hence doctrines, are within the power of properly constituted military authority; principles are not (Holley 2004, 19-22).

Both concept and doctrine, however, constitute a body of knowledge about how military forces ought to operate. Done properly, concepts propose solutions to challenges for which no doctrine exists or they propose alternatives to existing doctrine. Unlike doctrines, concepts freely explore new methods of military operations without restrictions of policies, treaties, laws or even technology. As a product of creative and critical thinking, concepts provide the basis for experimentation. Ordinarily, and logically speaking, an idea, a creative and critical imagination must precede any viable action. For this reason, it can be argued that the express purpose of military concepts is to provide the basis for developing a new doctrine where none exist or for making a major change to an existing one. However, it is important to understand that not all doctrinal changes require a concept. When changes exist within the framework or paradigm of an existing doctrine, for example, when they constitute changes in emphasis, clarifications, or elaborations of an existing doctrinal statement, there is no need for a new concept. Such changes are merely improvements to the existing doctrinal paradigm. It is only when doctrinal framework is none existent, or the existing one is deemed completely ineffective that a new concept is required (Mattis 2009). The underlying point is that
military concepts are a foundation, a base or a pillar upon which military doctrine anchors its genesis.

To truly serve as a concrete doctrinal base, military concepts must themselves be subjected to some form of scrutiny and tests before they are accepted. The scrutiny and tests of military concepts are exclusively in the form of intellectual, academic and professional debates, and nothing practical at that stage. However, the debates inevitably incorporate the practical outcomes of the past military activities. A military organization that best promotes such debates stands a higher chance of success in war. Although they lost the war in the World War II owing to other factors, in an operational and tactical sense, the Germans innovated with armor better than anyone else, partly for tolerating and encouraging such debates. Like the French, they studied the last war and interwar developments in considerable depth. Unlike the French, however, they tolerated a high degree of debate within the officer corps about war, tactics, and operations. The Germans proved surprisingly willing to tolerate outspoken officers, Guderian being a prime example. The French, on the other hand, especially under Gamelin, shut down such debate, and the recorded outcome was a quick and total defeat of the French forces (Murray and Millet 1996, 47).

Through the conceptual scrutiny, test and validation process, operational military concepts develop into an authoritative doctrine. First, a raw but an interesting and undeveloped notion develops into a mature concept. Second, the mature concept finally develops into an authoritative doctrine. This is a seemingly simple process that many in the military organization fail to understand or deliberately or unconsciously ignore. It is, therefore critical for all military officers, in general, and doctrine developers in particular
to pay particular attention to this simple process, if only to guarantee full institutional utility of a military doctrine.

The concept development process may result in three possible outcomes: invalidation; partial validation worthy of continued development; and total validation. A concept is invalidated if it is determined that it does not adequately contribute to solving an identified military problem or is not a preferable alternative to an existing doctrine. A concept may be partially validated if it is concluded that it has some potential merit, but that this merit has not been fully demonstrated. In this case the concept can be returned to the development process for substantive refinement. This is an option exercised not routinely, but by exception when a concept is deemed to exhibit genuine, but unrealized potential. Finally, a concept may be totally validated if it is determined that it provides a value-added alternative to current doctrine. In this case, the concept should be transitioned expeditiously into doctrine through the established doctrinal change process (Mattis 2009).

The Nature, Character and Role of Military Doctrine

Nations strive to safeguard their national strategic interests through the employment of what is commonly referred to as the instruments of national power. These instruments are comprised of diplomacy, information, military and economy (DIME). The principal role of the military is to provide the means by which external as well as internal armed threats are countered or deterred in pursuit of vital national interests. As one of the national instruments of power, the military coordinates with all the other complimentary instruments of national power. The four instruments are coordinated and integrated at the highest level of national leadership within a national strategy. Although
complimentary in employment, in effect the military remains a critical facilitator of the other instruments through the potential employment of lethal force within the confines of the national strategy. This unique role makes the military the most critical instrument for safe-guarding the national interests.

Nations fulfil their coordination role of their elements of national power (DIME) by developing a grand strategy. A grand strategy is a political-military, ends-ways- means chain; a state’s strategy about how it can best promote and protect its national interests. A grand strategy must identify likely threats to the state’s interests and it must devise diplomatic, economic, military and other remedies for those threats (Posen 1984, 13). The grand strategy, the highest level of strategy, is virtually synonymous with a national strategy. It refers to coordination and employment of all the instruments of national power (diplomacy, information, military and economy) in pursuit of strategic objectives of a nation. The grand strategy often describes the remedies in very broad terms, while the specifics are left to the three dominant elements: Diplomatic (political), the military, and economic power. To successfully play its critical role, the military devises its specific approaches through the development of national security strategy. The national security strategy is a sub-component of the grand strategy. It involves the selection of military objectives. The national security strategy is concerned with the military ends sought and the means to attain those ends (Holley 2004, 8). Military doctrine bridges the gap between the military ends and means by describing the ways. Traditionally, the military ways have largely focused on combat operations, describing those operations in terms of offense, defense and deterrence. The offense, defense, and deterrence remains an enduring nature of military doctrines to date. In contrast, in terms of responsive,
innovative and integrative character, most effective military doctrines have remained dynamic.

Both by nature and character, military doctrine is directly related to strategy. If the strategy is broadly concerned with what is to be done, military doctrine broadly describes how it is to be achieved. Manifestly therefore, by both the political and military appropriateness of the means employed, a military doctrine affects the security of the state it belongs to. A military doctrine may harm the security interests of the state if it is not integrated with the political objectives of the state or if it fails to provide the politicians with the tools suitable for the pursuit of those objectives. A military doctrine may also harm the security interests of the state if it fails to respond to the changes in political circumstances, adversary capabilities or available military technology or if it is insufficiently innovative for the competitive and dynamic environment of international or regional politics. If the war comes, such a doctrine may lead to defeat (Posen 1984, 16).

As earlier mentioned, it is the view of the author that offense, defense, and deterrence are the enduring nature of military doctrine, while responsiveness, innovation and integration are the dynamic characters of military doctrine. It is therefore the underlying point of this thesis that the army must best incorporate both the enduring nature and the dynamic characteristics of military doctrine in its doctrine development process in peace time for it to stand a better chance of victory in war.

Offense, Defense, and Deterrence: An Enduring Nature of Military Doctrine

Doctrine enables the military to perform its combat role in two ways. First, it enables the military to deter aggression by demonstrating superior potential to dissuade a
would-be aggressor from making any hostile move. Second, it enables the military to resist aggression by direct application of force, either offensively or defensively. Offensive doctrines aim to disarm an adversary, to destroy his armed forces. Defensive doctrines aim to deny an adversary the objective that he seeks. Deterrent doctrines aim to influence a potential aggressor to seriously consider his costs without reference to reducing one’s own (Posen 1984, 14). There is no doubt that offense, defense, and deterrence remain important and enduring aspects of a military doctrine. The offensive, defensive or deterrent quality of a military doctrine is important because it affects the military’s perception of, and reaction to an adversary. All of the land powers on the eve of World War I held offensive doctrines. However, Germans, through the employment of Blitzkrieg, perfected the method of combining tanks, motorized infantry, and combat aircraft to achieve rapid victory in the 1930s. The equipment has since significantly changed, but the method of combining different types of forces for high-speed warfare has remained the same (Posen 1984, 14).

A well-known example of a defensive doctrine is the French Maginot Line. In what is considered as Maginot-Line-thinking, in the 1950s, the U.S. planned to protect part of its strategic bomber deterrent with concrete blast shelters. In 1973, Egypt employed such shelters against Israel, discouraging a 1967 style aerial pre-emption. Like the Maginot Line, the Great Wall of China played an important role in a defensive doctrine. For the British Empire the English Channel, a large fleet and a small army provided the elements of what was essentially a defensive doctrine (Posen 1984, 15).

Examples of deterrent doctrines are those of present-day France and modern Switzerland. Referred to as Force de Frappe, France maintains a small-sized nuclear
force that is vulnerable to surprise attack, but which it believes is capable of destroying small but important parts of Russian cities, its most probable adversary. Switzerland, on the other hand, maintains a small conventional force for deterrence. The Swiss army and air force are deliberately and carefully structured so as to make the price of action against Switzerland very high (Posen 1984, 15). The underlying point of the offense, defense, and deterrence argument is not to claim that these factors alone can make a military doctrine effective, or that any one of the elements can exclusively lead to a military victory. Rather it is to argue that the offense, defense and deterrent nature of military doctrine, while enduring, is insufficient to make military doctrine a viable tool.

Innovation and Integration: The Dynamic Character of a Military Doctrine

Given the ever-changing character of politics, the threat, and technological revolutions, it is erroneous to view military doctrine as solely limited to tactical combat operations. Similarly, a narrow view of offense, defense, and deterrence is highly deceptive and misleading. In order to have a comprehensive institutional utility, the modern military doctrine must serve the needs of all aspects of the force preparation for both combat and non-combat tasks especially at both the tactical and operational levels. Besides the combat-based doctrines, there can, and should be, doctrines guiding military actions in the acquisition process, logistical operations, training, and to some limited extent rebuilding, civil-military interactions and governance. The best doctrine therefore, is that which remains continuously and flexibly innovative, and integrative in response to the changes in geo-political, technological, and adversarial factors. For this reason, military doctrine must remain dynamic in character.
Innovation in military doctrine, if well applied increases the chances of victory on the battlefield. In retrospect, innovation misapplied can be militarily disastrous. Unfortunately, there are no simplistic answers to the questions posed by innovation in an uncertain world. Innovation, like most complex human endeavors, occur in military institutions in an opaque and unclear landscape (Murray and Millet 1996, 45). The large number of possible changes in operating environment, including the character of threat, and a speedy technological changes in military hardware contribute to the complexities in innovations in military doctrines. Historically, military innovations occur in peace time, or just after war, with the aim of incorporating lessons learned in those doctrinal changes. Besides low budgetary allocations, military institutions are often confronted with the difficulties of learning from the past wars, during such periods. First, not all elements of the past can be replicated in future battles. Second, not all experiences of the battles can be accurately interpreted in same way all across the military organization. Consequently, instead of innovating in response to the realities with which they are actually confronted, they attempt to mould conditions to fit peace time perceptions and assumptions. Recently scholars have suggested that the British Army in World War I, and the U.S. Army in Vietnam may have followed this pattern (Murray and Millet 1996, 46).

Fast moving technological advancements, no doubts add to the complexities of military doctrinal innovations. Owing to technological advances, what was tactically possible yesterday can turn impossible overnight, hence obsolete today. The relationship between technologies of weapons and doctrine is an interactive one that cuts both ways. War, being a human endeavour, demands reconciliation of human activities with unique performances of the machine. No war has ever been won by a mere introduction of new
weapons, but by sound employment of those weapons. For this reason, technological advances in weaponry, to be effective, must be accompanied by an appropriate doctrine. The unique characteristics of new weapons must be exploited by developing appropriate tactics. This is why doctrine is as important as or probably more important than technology (Holley 2004).

Given the speed at which technology changes, not all the militaries have the capacity to cope with that speed. The role of the military organizations therefore, is to identify and prioritize which technologies are worth exploring and at what rate they are to be explored. They must also determine if a technological response is in order and how soon the response can be effected. The military also determines if the response is to imitate or to develop a significantly different counter-technological measures. Finally, and most importantly, the military determines the most appropriate time and conditions for response. Under certain conditions, especially when war is imminent, it may be dangerous to make major doctrinal changes. Changing doctrines takes time; it disorients a military organization. A war during such a period of transition can be very dangerous. Hitler caught the Soviet Army during such a change in 1941. At Jena, Napoleon caught the Prussians in the midst of such a reorganization (Posen 1984, 30-31).

Clearly, many factors affect innovations in military doctrine. The strategic and political environment can indeed create a climate conducive to innovation. The elements in such change, however, occur within organizations themselves. It is the interplay between past experiences, individual leaders and innovators, and the cultural climate within military organizations that determines how successfully innovations proceed. Not all innovations are successful. The Germans Blitzkrieg is a unique example of successful
innovation. Others, such as the Maginot Line, appear to be unsuccessful. Similarly, even
direct experience in war is not a guarantee that doctrine will see essential points and
move military organizations in the correct directions. The French, despite serious study
and analysis after World War I, entirely misconstrued the future path toward which
warfare was moving (Murray and Millet 1996, 46). Despite all these complexities, there
are no alternatives to an innovative military doctrine, for innovation in military doctrine
affects national security.

In order that it fully serves its institutional utility, a military doctrine must
comprehensively integrate all elements of a military organization. It is multifaceted:
cognitive; procedural; organizational; material; and moral (Hope 2000, 19). The cognitive
elements of an army articulates an approved operational concept relevant to the specific
time. It is this official concept that conveys the central theme of the particular doctrine
and forms the basis for a common understanding of war. The cognitive elements
communicates the army’s understanding of its role in the higher purposes of operations:
their relationship with strategy and national policy; and the army’s philosophy of
command and control. The procedural elements of doctrine guide teaching and practice
of the operational concept. They provide guidance in tactics, techniques and procedures
(TTPs), and are often presented in the form of field manuals or regulations. The
organizational component of doctrine ensures that the army structures and systems
adequately conforms to the demands of the operational concept. Material elements, which
are closely related to the organizational elements, ensures the proper equipping of an
army to conduct operations in accordance with the operational concept. Finally, the moral
component of military doctrine focusses on the human capital as a critical resource in
fulfilling the military’s role. It is concerned with how best to make soldiers fight successfully. It includes sound and ethical leadership, soldier welfare and maintenance of morale and ethical conduct in the battle field, among others (Hope 2000, 19).

The U.S. Army force management approach is probably the best example of an approach that attempts to incorporate all of the above aspects. In managing Army changes, the U.S. Army employs a capabilities-based approach (CBA) rather than a threat-based approach. The CBA is a deliberate process of analysing vision documents; adding details; and converting them to concepts, plans, and ultimately solutions for combat capability. Capabilities are developed using the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (commonly referred to as DOTMLPF). DOTMLPF is a problem-solving construct for assessing current and future force capabilities, while managing change. Doctrine development, in its simplest form, articulates the approved official concept and captures in writing, the tactics techniques, and procedures to be used. Organizational development produces the organizational designs to carry out the doctrine. Training development produces the training documents, devices, courses, and techniques to teach organizations and individuals to employ the doctrine and equipment to execute missions. Materiel development, often referred to as acquisition, produces and maintains equipment required to fill organizations, and execute doctrine. Leader development includes education and training programs designed to inculcate or enhance soldier and officer leadership effectiveness. Personnel development focuses on those individuals in either a military or civilian capacity to accomplish the assigned mission. Facilities refers to the real property,
installations, and industrial facilities that support army forces (U.S Army Command and General Staff College 2013, 3-4).

Overall, doctrine remains at the heart of everything that the military does. It includes the preferred mode of a group of services, a single service, or a sub-service for fighting wars. It reflects the judgements of professional military officers, and to a lesser but important extent, civilian leaders and scholars, about what is and is not militarily possible and necessary (Posen 1984, 14). Doctrine, however, is simply a guide to action rather than a set of fixed rules. Capstone doctrine establishes the army’s view of the nature of operations, the fundamentals by which army forces conduct operations, and the methods by which commanders exercise mission command (Department of the Army 2011, 1).

**Sources of Military Doctrine**

Many theories and perspectives regarding the essential sources of military doctrine have been advanced. These perspectives are as many as the military professionals and other scholars who take interest in this subject. Consequently, many explanations of what is considered the most suitable models of military doctrine have been offered. Consensus has neither been reached, nor expected, given the dynamic character of military doctrine. The wide review of literature, that included both published and unpublished scholarly works, monographs, thesis, journals, military manuals and publications, provided valuable information regarding the sources of military doctrine. The start point was the review of the works of Barry Posen, Williamson Murray and Allan Millet, and Michael Howard and Peter Paret which simply formed the basis for
further exploration of this part of the thesis. The three works merely served as a basis but in no way did they limit the scope of the study.

Barry Posen, in *The Sources of Military Doctrine* conducted a comparative analysis of the development of French, German, and British doctrines of Maginot Line, *blitzkrieg*, and air defense respectively. In his analytical approach, Posen incorporated a balance of power theory and organizational theory. The balance of power theory argues that the recognizable patterns of behaviour in states, combined with geopolitical context, explain the development of military doctrine. The organizational theory on the other hand, focuses on recognizable patterns of behaviour common to military organizations. Such patterns includes military relationship with external organs such as civil government, as it relates to military doctrine development. Posen concludes that balance of power theory provides a better tool than organizational theory in understanding doctrinal developments between the two wars. Posen goes further to describe doctrine as an organizational reaction to geopolitical considerations (Posen 1984, 34-80).

By favoring a balance of power theory, Posen appears to suggest that long range national interests, perceived long range challenges to national security and long range missions of the armed forces constitute the basis of military doctrine. Sound intellectual and professional judgements of both the military officers, civilian leadership and other scholars, serve as the most common sources of military doctrine. Such judgements are based on appraisals of military technology, national geography, adversary capabilities and the skills of one’s own military organization (Posen 1984, 14). In general, the research identifies a few factors that causes changes in military doctrine. These factors includes: the perceptions of the political leadership; reassessment by the military
establishment; radical changes in military technology; defense commitment and resources; the threat assessment; experience in active service; and research and development (R&D) components of an organization, whether they be military or civilian (Posen 1984, 34-80).

In all cases, it is clear that both in peace and in war, military doctrine has many primary sources. However, it appears there is a general agreement that the primary source of military doctrine are recorded combat experiences. This is so because doctrine is simply a compilation of those things that have generally been successful in the past. The combat experiences referred to includes those of the state’s own armed forces as reviewed by the participants and the observers, as well as those of other armies. Unfortunately, as earlier discussed, it is a common knowledge that not all past experiences are relevant to the present, and not all interpretations of the past experiences are either common or accurate. This is why it is increasingly becoming crucial for the military organizations to develop some means of studying the causes of the past successes and failures, some systematic ways of analysing the past wars while relating to the present.

The other primary sources of military doctrine are the observed outcomes and analysis of full scale maneuvers, military units’ field training exercises and service tests, war games, and command post exercises. All these sources, while important have their own shortcomings. Generally, it is never possible to fully replicate war time conditions in peace time, and so there is no guarantee that the military doctrine developed on this basis leads to victory in war time. In regard to full scale maneuvers, possible lack of a fully effective relationship between those staging maneuvers and those responsible for the
development of doctrine can be one of the shortcomings of military maneuvers. Second, the desire to please the high command can easily mask the truth. Lastly, possible defects in the records resulting from inept or unwilling analysis on the part of participants or observers may impair the value of an exercise as a source of military doctrine. Unit exercises and service tests, in the absence of a full context of all arms, are unavoidably flawed as sufficient sources of doctrine. There is always a danger of confusing a true service exercise with a mere demonstration. A demonstration is a set piece of an operation, entirely pre-planned, which allows little or no room for command initiatives. If such likely confusion occurs, unit exercises and service tests serves no meaningful purpose as sources of military doctrine. War games and command post exercises may be useful to the extent that they permit free play and initiatives. The greatest shortcoming of war games and command post exercises is the frequent absence of meticulous record keeping for close subsequent analysis, replay and critique. Such analysis is otherwise more important than the play itself (Holley 2004, 10).

An example of a flawed and a manipulated war game exercise is the U.S. military’s Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02). MC02 was a major, probably the largest war game exercise in history, conducted by the United States armed forces designed to test its capability against the Iraqi forces, in preparation for the second Iraqi war of 2003. In the exercise, retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Van Riper played the commander opposing force (OPFOR). In the first few days of the exercise, using surprise, and unorthodox tactics, the willy-64 year old Vietnam veteran sunk most of the U.S. expeditionary fleet in the Persian Gulf, bringing the U.S. assault to a halt. Faced with an abrupt and embarrassing end to the most expensive and sophisticated military exercise in
the U.S. history, the Pentagon top brass pretended the whole thing had not happened. At this point the exercise was suspended (Borger 2002).

After the war game was re-started, all the sunk U.S. ships were “re-floated”, the dead troops were ordered back to “life” and the rules of engagement were changed. The exercise participants were forced to follow a script drafted to ensure a pre-determined U.S. victory. The enemy forces were literally instructed to look the other way as the U.S. Marines performed amphibious landings. The war game turned from an honest, open free test of America’s warfighting capabilities into a rigidly controlled and scripted exercise intended to end in an overwhelming American victory. Van Riper, who was extremely critical of the scripted nature of the new exercise got so fed up with all the cheatings that he resigned from the exercise in the middle of the war game. Throughout the remaining portion of the exercise he remained on the side lines making abrasive remarks, until the war game came to a conclusion on August 15, 2002, with an overwhelming U.S. “victory” as expected. Van Riper persistently argues that nothing was learned from the Millennium Challenge. He argues that a culture not willing to think hard and test itself does not augur well for the future. He concludes that the Millennium Challenge was rigged from the onset that it did not serve its intended purpose (Borger 2002).

**Doctrine Making Process: The Basic Steps**

The early part of this chapter was dedicated to determining the role, the relationships and the sources of military concepts and doctrine, and the many variables that affect military doctrine. In this part of the thesis, the author will attempt to determine the possible basics steps of military doctrine development process. To fully meet the institutional needs discussed earlier, a military doctrine must be developed in a clear,
systematic and coordinated way. A suitable organization, methods and procedures to develop doctrine must be established. The starting point therefore, is to put in place an organization primarily responsible for doctrine development. The task of doctrine development is daunting. It is resource-intensive, lengthy, extensive and demanding. For this reason, the organization charged with this heavy responsibility must be reasonably empowered. It must be adequately resourced, funded and equipped. It must have a competent and professional staff.

The first task of doctrinal organization is to pin down and clearly define the keyword, doctrine. As discussed earlier, this term is often loosely employed, sometimes as if it were synonymous with principle, and at others, as if it were interchangeable with concept. In the absence of clear understandings of the definitions of, and the relationship between these terms, the chances of missteps in doctrinal development process are high. The second broad task of doctrinal organization is to establish and document a method of conducting a continuous, comprehensive, and systematic search of the available professional, historical, and technical literature that relates to doctrine. The third broad task of the organization is to provide continuous and effective liaison with appropriate agencies, both within and outside the armed forces. The doctrinal organization must continuously liaise with military schools where doctrine is taught and often extensively experimented. Other possible institutions of liaison includes: operational research agencies and organizations, both military and civilian; historical organizations of services; and those universities where military history is seriously studied. Within these broad tasks, the aim of the doctrinal organization is to discover the best way to arrive at sound generalizations about tactics and techniques.
The research indicates that there are three broad phases in the doctrine development process. These may be described as the collection phase, the formulation and validation phase, and the promulgation and dissemination phase. The collection or information gathering phase involves tapping the widest possible range of sources of doctrinal information, most of which have been discussed earlier. Doctrine development staffs use professionally prescribed procedures to gather information from published, and unpublished sources, journals, monographs, memoirs, biographies, manuscript sources, and whatever else that add to doctrinal knowledge (Holley 2004, 8-9).

The formulation and validation phase is the phase during which doctrinal statements are actually devised, revised, and perfected. This phase involves analysis that leads to sound generalization. This analysis includes a systematic comparison of experiences to identify common or uncommon patterns. Analysis then leads to the formulation of a draft doctrinal concept statement. This is actually a draft concept which finally produces an authoritative doctrine. The concept is then subjected to a verification and validation process through professional, intellectual, and academic debates, with a view to obtaining as much feedback as possible. The debates can be conducted in appropriate forums, like military symposiums, and through appropriate media. The feedbacks are incorporated in the analysis process to produce a refined concept. The final phase is the promulgation and dissemination phase. This phase involves official acceptance, and authorization of doctrine for circulation within the military organization. The dissemination is done through documented doctrinal manuals (Holley 2004, 8-9).

It is evident that military doctrine development process is complex, laborious, and above all resource intensive. Military doctrine therefore is a luxury that many nations can
ill-afford, but which is inescapable if a military organization is to remain credible and capable of fulfilling its role. It is a critical tool of force preparation that any military organization can ignore, or relegate to a back burner at its own peril.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study is to stimulate critical thinking and debate in the Kenya Army doctrine development process, with a view to recommending the most suitable doctrine development process for the Kenya Army. This chapter of the study reviewed literature related to doctrine under four major topics: the relationships between doctrine, concept, and principle; nature, character, and role of military doctrine; the sources of military doctrine; and basic steps of doctrine development process. Doctrine is enduring in nature but dynamic in character. Offense, defense, and deterrence constitute the enduring nature of doctrine. Responsiveness, innovation and integration in response to geopolitical and operational environment, and technological changes is the dynamic character of doctrine. A process that best incorporates the enduring nature and dynamic character produces a more viable doctrine. A viable doctrine integrates cognitive, procedural, organizational, material and moral elements of a military force. The primary source of military doctrine is recorded past military experience. Other sources are the outcomes and analysis of: full scale maneuvers; military units’ field training exercises and service tests; and war games and command post exercises.

Doctrine, concept and, principle, though related are not one and the same and should not be used interchangeably. Concept is simply an idea. It is a hypothesis, an inference that suggests that a proposed pattern of behavior may possibly lead to a desired result. Concepts, however provide foundation or base for a doctrine. Military doctrines
are systematically developed, integrative, officially approved, authoritative but dynamic, and documented guides to military actions based upon accumulated experiences, numerous recorded instances that have led to generalizations. Principles are truths that are evident. The start point in a doctrine development process is to establish an organization whose primary role is to develop a doctrine. This organization must be adequately resourced, equipped, funded, and staffed with competent and professional military officers. Broadly, a doctrine development process falls in three phases: collection phase; formulation and validation phase; and promulgation and dissemination phase.

The next chapter will outline the research methodology used during the conduct of this research. The research will employ a qualitative research method to identify the existing gaps in the Kenya Army doctrine development process. Case studies of two major world Armies, will be central to this research. These are the U.S, and the British Armies. Maximum use will be made of the locally available sources at Fort Leavenworth, both primary and secondary, to obtain the required data.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Chapter 1 of this thesis was an introductory chapter. It broadly introduced the research study topic, the Kenya Army doctrine development process. It outlined the purpose of the study, the issues for considerations and stated the research problem under consideration. To solve the stated problem, the chapter identified one primary question and seven secondary questions that collectively aimed to solve the research problem. The chapter made a number of assumptions on which the study is based, while anticipating possible limitations within which the study is conducted. The chapter also defined the research scope and the delimitations. Finally, the chapter sought to explain the significance of the study to the potential scholars of the subject in general, and to the Kenya Army in particular.

Chapter 2 reviewed and discussed relevant available literature related to the key research question of this study. It reviewed literature related to doctrine under four major topics: the relationships between doctrine, concept and principle; the nature, character and role of military doctrine; the sources of military doctrine; and the basic steps in doctrine making process.

This chapter outlines the research methodology to be used during the conduct of this research. The research will employ the qualitative methodology using case studies as a way of analyzing the military doctrine development process. Case studies of two major world armies, will be central to this research. These are the U.S. Army and the British Army. The study will largely focus on the doctrine process, rather than the doctrine itself.
The outcomes will form the basis for recommendations of improvements to the Kenya Army doctrine development process. Maximum use will be made of locally available sources at Fort Leavenworth, both primary and secondary, to obtain the required data. The work will largely generate data via a wide review of the existing literature, including, but not limited to credible internet sources. Using the two case studies, the research will analyze the relationships between concept and doctrine, focusing on the role of concepts in developing an effective military doctrine. The research will base its study on the content analysis of primary and secondary data. The primary sources will include all the U.S. and the British Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs), Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRPs), and Field Manuals (FMs). The Kenya military draft doctrine will also form part of the primary sources. Books, data from journals and publications, magazines, and other unpublished sources will form part of the secondary data. In addition, the study will use all relevant and available data obtained from the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL).

**Methodology**

The overall methodology used for this research is the qualitative methodology using case studies. Two major factors guided the selection of the case studies. First, historically the Kenya Army has for long continued to borrow much of its tactics, techniques and procedures from both the U.S. and the British armies, hence the two armies’ doctrine will likely form the basis for any effort to strengthen the Kenya Army doctrine development process. Second, both the armies have, in the recent past, been to war and the lessons learned have been incorporated into their doctrine development processes, hence valuable to the Kenya Army The primary purpose of the case studies in
this research is to examine the military doctrine development process, with specific focus on the role of concepts in developing an effective military doctrine that can best respond to all forms of threat. The intent is to use the results to strengthen the Kenya Army doctrine development process and make the resultant doctrine more enduring, relevant and responsive to the Kenya Army needs.

The case study methodology emphasizes a detailed conceptual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and determines how they relate to each other in a particular period. Case study, as a methodology, helps explain both the process and outcome of a phenomenon through complete observation, reconstruction and analysis of the cases under investigation (Zainal 2007). The qualitative research method involves an interpretive and systematic inquiry into meanings. It is the study of things in their natural setting in an explanatory and realistic approach in an attempt to interpret the phenomena as viewed by people, in order to establish patterns and themes (Ospina 2004). When using a qualitative methodology comprising case studies, at times new variables not considered previously may surface. The new variables, if they arise, can aid toward a better understanding of the phenomena that may lead to a more conclusive analysis. The qualitative analysis method involves analysis of data such as objects, pictures, artifacts and words. This makes the researcher the main data-gathering tool.

Qualitative research is one of the two major approaches to research methodology in social sciences. Qualitative research involves an in-depth understanding of human behavior and the reasons that govern human behavior. Unlike quantitative research, qualitative research relies on reasons behind various aspects of behavior. Simply put, it investigates the why and how of decision-making, as compared to what, where and when of quantitative research. Hence, the need is for smaller but focused samples, rather than large random samples by which qualitative research categorizes data into patterns as the primary basis for organizing and reporting results. Unlike qualitative research, which relies exclusively on the analysis of
numerical or quantifiable data, data for qualitative research comes in many media including text, sound, still and moving images. (Free Dictionary 2010)

Some of the strengths associated with the qualitative research method include the flexibility to follow unexpected ideas during the study and explore processes successfully. The conduct of the research in the natural setting of the subject allows an undisturbed observation within the actual context. The study of multiple data streams in the literature expands the exploration of the phenomena and relevance in the process increases the credibility of the findings. Further, the method is inductive and involves the synthesis of raw data into themes and categories (Creswell 2007). In the review of literature in this study, common variables will be determined and will form the basis for the analysis of the case studies. The analysis will inform the research, the validity of the variables and possibly introduce more variables.

Some of the weaknesses associated with this type of research include the perceived lack of rigor. The inherent flexibility of the qualitative method makes researchers sometimes consider it not well defined and creates difficulties in demonstrating rigor (Claire 2011). The results are therefore subject to scientific challenges lessening their credibility. Additionally, preconceived notions by the researcher can twist the interpretation of the data. A mixture of procedures can help mitigate these weaknesses. In this case, the study is context-specific; the researcher will analyze the data to ascertain its relevance to the research questions and the topic, while at the same time minimize his own partiality to avoid misrepresenting the results (Wiersma 1991).
Analysis

This research will follow the five steps as articulated by William Wiersma. First, identification and isolation of the problem and case studies identification. Second, reviewing of available information and determining the factors relevant to military doctrine development process. Third, collection and classification of data and case studies review. Fourth, data analysis and determination of the prospects of the Kenya Army doctrine development process as the most suitable process that can produce an effective military doctrine. Lastly, the researcher will draw conclusions resulting from the study and make recommendations (Wiersma 1991).

Step 1: Identification and Isolation of the Problem

As discussed earlier in chapters 1 and 2, obtaining a standard definition and perspective of military doctrine has remained elusive for a long time. Failure to pin down and clearly define doctrine has somewhat caused confusion between the true meanings, scope, and military utility of concept, doctrine and to a lesser extent principle. As indicated in chapter 1, militaries continue to define doctrine in terms of concept and principle. Notably, the British Army view and define doctrine as a concept and principle all at once. The British Army defines doctrine as a set of beliefs or principles held and taught. It provides an Army’s central idea based on common sense; that is actions adopted to circumstances (Ministry of Defense 2010, 2-3). Similarly, the Kenya military defines doctrine as a body of principles, practices and procedures, the understanding of which provides a basis of action. The literature review, however, indicates that principle, an idea, which refers to a concept, or practices and procedures, do not exclusively define or constitute a military doctrine. Although each of those elements do relate to, and make
contributions to a doctrine, they all have completely different military utility. These definitions and perspectives are confusing at a minimum. This confusion appears to significantly contribute to a faulty or total absence of a suitable doctrine development process within some of the world’s militaries, the Kenya Army included. In an attempt to ameliorate this problem, this thesis suggests to define military doctrine as “a systematically developed, officially approved, integrative, authoritative but dynamic, and documented guides to military actions based upon accumulated experiences, and numerous recorded instances that have led to generalizations.” The Kenya Army currently prescribes to maneuver warfare as its presumed or declared doctrine. However, historical evidence shows that no consensus has so far been reached to classify maneuver warfare either as a doctrine or as a concept. Consequently, it remains debatable whether maneuver warfare as adopted and practiced by the Kenya Army is a concept, or a systematically developed and authoritative doctrine.

Step 2: Review of Relevant Information

Chapter two of this research reviewed the literature that relates to military doctrine, concept, and principle with primary focus on doctrine development process. From the literature reviewed, it is evident that doctrine remains the most important tool available to military organizations to prepare a military force for war. However, not all militaries have successfully developed viable doctrines that best guides them in war. The literature review revealed that a seriously defective military doctrine can harm the security interests of a state. The most important findings of the literature review is that military doctrine is enduring in nature but dynamic in character, and that the military that best incorporates the two in its doctrine development process will likely produce a viable
doctrine that should lead to a decisive, less costly, and less bloody victory in war. Evidently, many militaries fail in this task, for two main reasons. First, failure to define and describe what constitutes an effective doctrine (end product). This results from failure to establish a capable lead organization that clearly establishes the differences and relationships between doctrine and related terms concepts, and principles. Second, failure to establish and document a viable process that lead to that product (the process). The focus of this thesis is on the process rather than the product. For this reason, the variables of a viable doctrine development process as identified in the literature review will guide the research criteria of this study. In general, it is hoped that the results of the analytical process will, in whatever form or shape, contribute to the body of knowledge that relates to the military doctrine and its development process. In particular, the researcher will seek to apply the results to the Kenya Army doctrine development process with a view to suggesting ways of strengthening it, thereby increasing its doctrinal viability.

Military Doctrine Development Process

The study will examine military doctrine development process through the key elements as identified in chapter 2. For the purpose of clarity, a viable doctrine development process must start with the establishment of a capable organization with the primary purpose of leading doctrine development process. Firstly, this organization, must as a matter of requirement, be capable of eliminating any terminological confusions by clearly defining and describing doctrine, concept, and principle. Secondly, it must establish and document a basic doctrine development process that broadly falls within this research’s three broad phases. These phases are: the collection phase; the formulation and validation phase; and the promulgation and dissemination phase. The collection or
information gathering phase involves tapping the widest possible range of sources of doctrinal information. The formulation and validation phase is the phase during which doctrinal statements are actually devised, revised, and perfected. It involves analysis that leads to sound generalization resulting in the formulation of a draft doctrinal concept statement. The promulgation and dissemination phase involves official acceptance, and authorization of doctrine for circulation within the military organization, often through documented doctrinal manuals (Holley 2004, 8-9).

**Step 3: Collection and Classification of Data**

The study primarily employed the literature review method to answer both the primary and the secondary research questions. The literature aims at determining the already available information and identify knowledge gaps. The study used both primary and secondary data to focus on the research questions. The research reviewed the data collected under four broad topics:

1. The relationship between doctrine, concept and principle.
2. The nature, character and role of military doctrine.
3. The sources of military doctrine.
4. The basic steps in doctrine development process.

**Step 4: Data Analysis**

The basis of the analysis of the Kenya Army doctrine development process will be the two case studies: the U.S. Army and the British Army doctrine development processes. As earlier mentioned, this two case studies were selected for two reasons: For their historical and practical connections with the Kenya Army, as Kenya Army
continued to borrow its tactics and procedures from the two; and for the fact that the two militaries have in the recent past been engaged in operations that have generated vital lessons useful to the Kenya Army as it confronts the Al-Shabaab threats. The research will then display the analysis of the two case studies in a matrix form indicating the presence, partial presence or total absence of the various aspects as summarized in step two. In the matrix a “yes” represents presence of a particular key element, “partial” represents partial presence of the element but which requires further improvement, and a “no” represents the absence of it. Table 1 below shows the matrix to be used.

Table 1. Assessment of the elements of a viable doctrine development process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of a Viable Doctrine Development Process</th>
<th>The U.S. Army</th>
<th>The British Army</th>
<th>The Kenya Army</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capable Lead Organization</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Defines and describes doctrine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Establishes and documents basic doctrine</td>
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<tr>
<td>development guides</td>
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<tr>
<td>Viable Doctrine Process</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Collection process</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Formulation/validation process</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Promulgation/dissemination process</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Drawing of Conclusions and Recommendations

Based on the analysis of the data in step four, the study will draw conclusions regarding the Kenya Army doctrine development process; the gaps; and the challenges. The researcher will finally recommend ways of bridging the gaps.

Chapters Arrangement

This study is composed of five chapters, each of which covers a specific part of the analytical research conducted. Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter. It broadly introduces the research study topic, the Kenya Army doctrine development process. It outlined the purpose of the study, the issues for considerations and stated the research problem under consideration. The chapter presented the background of the problem, particularly as it relates to the various understandings and perspectives of military doctrine and concepts. In this regard the chapter presented the various definitions of doctrine as advanced by the different militaries. It further defined some key terms frequently used in the study. Chapter 2 covers the literature review. This chapter reviewed and discussed relevant available literature related to the key research question of this study. It reviewed the literature related to the doctrine, concept and principle under four major topics: the relationship between concept, principle and doctrine; the nature character and role of military doctrine; the sources of military doctrine; and the basic steps in doctrine development process. Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology that the study will follow, and further discusses the characteristics of qualitative methodology including strengths and weaknesses. The chapter will focus on the two case studies: the U.S. Army doctrine; and the British Army doctrine. Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the two case studies and relates them to the Kenya Army doctrine development process.
Eventually, the chapter will make an examination of the Kenya Army doctrine development process to determine the gap and limitations. Chapter 5 will present a summary of the analysis and recommend ways of strengthening the Kenya Army doctrine development process.

**Summary**

The study will use a descriptive qualitative methodology to analyze the variables of a viable doctrine development process. It will use the two case studies in the analysis of the variables relating to the military doctrine development process, with a view to recommending the best practice for the Kenya Army. It’s hoped that the research’s findings will positively contribute to any effort that aims at strengthening the Kenya Army doctrine development process.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The purpose of the study is to stimulate critical thinking and debate in the Kenya Army doctrine development process, with a view to recommending the most suitable doctrine development process for the Kenya Army. Chapter 1 of this thesis was an introductory chapter. It broadly introduced the research study topic, the Kenya Army doctrine development process. It broadly presented the background of the problem, while seeking to explain the significance of the study to the potential scholars of the subject in general, and to the Kenya Army in particular. Chapter 2 reviewed and discussed relevant available literature related to the key research question of this study. It reviewed literature that relates to concepts and military doctrines, largely focusing on the military doctrine development process. Chapter 3 discussed the qualitative methodology that will be employed throughout the study.

This chapter is the analytical chapter. It analyzes the doctrinal case studies, and the Kenya Army doctrine, in an attempt to solve the research’s primary question. The chapter will be presented in three sections. Section 1 will present the U.S. Army doctrine case study, and analyze it based on the identified doctrine development variables of: a capable lead organization; and a viable doctrine process. Section 2 will present the British Army doctrine case study, and analyze it based on the identified doctrine development variables of: a capable lead organization; and a viable doctrine process. Section 3 will critically analyze the Kenya Army doctrine development process.
Section 1: The U.S. Army Doctrine Development Process

Background

The history of the evolution of the U.S. Army doctrine is probably one of the longest as well as the oldest in military history. It dates back to close to over two and a half centuries. Although the colonial American Army had some informal practices whose origin is arguably Dutch as early as 1500, it was not until 1779 that what is considered distinctly an American formal doctrine came into being. The process began in early 1778 when Major General George Washington appointed Frederich Wilhelm Ludolf Gerhard Augustin Von Steuben as the army’s Inspector General, without the appropriate rank. Von Steuben was an experienced Prussian military officer-turned opportunistic mercenary intimate with the inner workings of the successful Prussian Army of the period. Given the Prussian Army’s success on the European continent from 1756 to 1760, it was considered that having an officer intimate with the inner workings of such a successful army was not only valuable but also fortuitous. Following Washington’s glowing report on Von Steuben’s efforts, the Congress, on 5 May 1778, promoted Von Steuben to the rank of a major general effectively confirming his appointment as an inspector general. As expected, Von Steuben worked against many odds throughout 1978, and by early 1979 he had produced the first Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States, Part 1. On 29 March 1779, the Congress approved this manual thereby announcing the birth of the first American Army doctrine. From this point onwards, U.S. Army doctrine progressively went through periods of significantly recorded evolution. Historical accounts indicate the development of U.S. Army doctrine largely through an examination of keystone doctrinal documents such as
the Manual of the Hardee, Field Service Regulations of 1905, the FSR Field Manuals beginning with the first 100-5 until the last (Kretchik 2011, 6-22).

However, FM 100-5 of August 1982 named *AirLand Battle* probably served as a turning point in the U.S. Army doctrinal thinking thereby setting the foundation for the post-Cold War doctrine. The broad doctrine in force between 1982 and 1993, AirLand Battle was the American Army doctrine of the final period of the Cold War. It is considered one of the most significant intellectual developments in the history of the U.S. Army that provided a credible and initiative-oriented war winning doctrine to confront Soviet threat to the Western alliance. The *AirLand Battle* doctrine grew out of a vigorous debate and re-thinking of fundamental Army doctrine between 1977 and 1981. The debate focused on the 1976 *Operations* manual and the *Active Defense* doctrine it presented. The *Active Defense* doctrine emphasized heavy fire power, concentration tactics, and exacting training to enable U.S. units to wear down the numerically superior Warsaw Pact echelons. However, after subjecting it to a thorough debate and analysis, it was concluded that the *Active Defense* doctrine over emphasized heavy firepower and the defense, allowed for inadequate reserves, disregarded maneuver, and was over dependent on high-risk concentration tactics. This led to the adoption of FM 100-5, the *AirLand Battle* Doctrine in August 1982 (Romjue 1997, 16).

*AirLand Battle* doctrine introduced a deeper view of the battle field. It aimed not only at hitting the enemy’s attacking force but also simultaneously striking his follow-on echelons. Integrating air-land operations, the doctrine broadened the army vision beyond the physical dimension of battle to the human and moral dimension of combat. It emphasized maneuver and the fundamentals of war. The tenets of depth, initiative,
agility, and synchronization therefore became the guiding factors in implementing the
doctrine. Most importantly, *AirLand Battle* doctrine introduced a new delineation of the
levels of war by including the operational level between the strategic and tactical levels
of war. Within this context, the doctrine strongly fused air and land battle into closely
concerted operations of air power and ground forces. Although it subsequently underwent
various reviews and adjustments owing to dynamism in strategic and operational
circumstances, *AirLand Battle* doctrine continued to provide the conceptual basis for
development of U.S. Army doctrine. Notably, the 1986 adjustments to the AirLand Battle
simply expanded and refined the idea of the operational level of war, better balanced the
offense and defense construct, and highlighted the synchronization of the close-deep-rear
battles. Finally, it evolved into the first ever U.S. Army post-Cold War doctrine of 1993
that encapsulated the idea of full-dimension operations (Romjue 1997, 17-130).

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

US. Army Regulation (AR) 5-22 designates the U.S. Army and Training
Command (TRADOC) headquartered at Fort Eustis, Virginia, as the lead combat,
doctrine, and training developer. The Commanding General (CG) TRADOC, therefore
serves as the lead doctrine developer for the Army. He approves TRADOC doctrine
policy, also serves as the approval authority for select doctrine. To accomplish this role,
TRADOC periodically develops and publishes TRADOC regulations. One of these
publications is the TRADOC Doctrine Publication Program. This is the program that
establishes regulatory standards to ensure consistency and standardization of doctrine
publications. Its purpose is to prescribe policy for TRADOC’s management for
development of Army publications as well as for TRADOC’s role in developing joint,
multi-service, and multinational doctrine. It defines responsibilities for all aspects of the Army doctrine process. It assigns responsibilities to Army and branch proponents within TRADOC and non-TRADOC organizations that develop Army doctrine publications when applicable. In this regard, the (CG), United States Army Combined Arms Center (USACAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has been assigned the TRADOC lead for doctrine. As such, he serves as the doctrine proponent for selected Army doctrine publications (ADPS). He manages the TRADOC Doctrine Publication Program. The CG USACAC assigns responsibilities to the TRADOC doctrine proponents and may designate a TRADOC organization as doctrine proponent for areas not specified in AR 5-22. As the TRADOC lead for doctrine, USACAC executes staff management for Army doctrine policy and is the TRADOC lead for joint, multi-Service, and multinational doctrine development (TRADOC 2012, 1-9).

Guide to Doctrine Development in the U.S. Army

TRADOC Regulation 25-36 dated 15 June, 2012, is the regulation that is currently in force in the U.S. Army. It is a document that guides doctrine development in the U.S. Army. It is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1(Introduction) introduces the regulation and explains its purpose. It explains abbreviations and key terms used in the document. It also lists the functions of doctrine proponents in managing records for doctrine materials. Chapter 2 (Responsibilities) deals with proponent assignments. It assigns duties and responsibilities to all those individuals and organizations that are involved in doctrine development. Chapter 3 (Foundation of Doctrine) makes differences between concept and doctrine by way of definitions and elaborate descriptions of each. It establishes the number and contents of the U.S. Army doctrine publications, while
determining the hierarchy of those publications. Most importantly, the chapter describes
the characteristics of an effective doctrine (TRADOC 2012, 5).

    The U.S. Army defines military doctrine as a systematic body of thought
describing how Army forces intend to operate as a member of the joint force in the
present and near term, with current force structure and materiel. Army doctrine
standardizes fundamental principles, tactics, techniques, procedures, and terms and
symbols throughout the Army. Army doctrine forms the basis for training. It applies to all
operations, describing how (not what) to think about operations and what to train. It
provides an authoritative guide for leaders and Soldiers, while allowing freedom to adapt
to circumstances. For the most part, U.S. Army doctrine is descriptive rather than
prescriptive. The U.S. Army believes that doctrine is composed of fundamental
principles, tactics, techniques, procedures, and terms and symbols, and concepts and so
demands that doctrine developers must understand the definitions of, and distinctions
among these factors. It also requires that doctrine developers understand characteristics of
an effective doctrine, and where doctrine fits among other sources of information for the
conduct of operations, both present and future (TRADOC 2012, 17-18).

    The U.S. Army defines a concept as a notion or statement of an idea, an
expression of how something might be done. A military concept is the description of
methods (ways) for employing specific military attributes and capabilities (means) in the
achievement of stated objectives (ends). Concepts are not doctrine. After a concept is
validated, it may become a basis for doctrine and force planning. Fundamental principles
provide the foundation upon which Army forces guide their actions. These principles
reflect the Army’s collective wisdom regarding past, present, and future operations. They
provide a basis for the Army to incorporate new ideas, technologies, and organizational designs. They provide the philosophical underpinning for adaptive, creative military problem solving. Principles apply at all levels of war. Fundamental principles are found in ADPs and ADRPs (TRADOC 2012, 18-19).

Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy in order to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. Effective tactics translate combat power into decisive results. Tactics vary with terrain and other circumstances; they change frequently as the enemy reacts and friendly forces explore new approaches. Applying tactics usually entails acting under time constraints with incomplete information. Tactics always require judgment in application; they are always descriptive, not prescriptive. Employing a tactic may require using and integrating several techniques and procedures. Tactics are contained in Field Manuals (FMs) (TRADOC 2012, 18-19).

Techniques are non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks. They are contained in Army Techniques and Procedures (ATPs). Terms and symbols are the specific language and graphics used to issue orders and control operations. They provide a common language used to communicate during the conduct of operations. Establishing and using terms and symbols with common military meaning enhances communication among military professionals in all environments and makes a common understanding of doctrine possible. Terms and symbols are prescriptive. Terms are words defined in doctrine publications specifically for Army use,
while symbols are those graphics defined specifically for military use and are codified in ADRPs (TRADOC 2012, 18-19).

U.S. Army doctrine is hierarchical in design and the hierarchy is reflected in various doctrinal publications. Following the established order of seniority in the hierarchy, U.S. Army doctrine is contained in Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs), Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRPs), Field Manuals (FMs), and Army Techniques and Procedures (ATPs). It is distributed to the force in both electronic media and hard copy. An Army doctrine publication is a Department of the Army publication that contains the fundamental principles by which the operating forces, and elements of the generating force that directly supports operations, guide their actions in support of national objectives. An ADP provides the intellectual underpinnings of how the Army operates as a force. ADP 1 (The Army) and ADP 3-0 (Unified Land Operations) constitute the U.S. Army capstone doctrine. Capstone doctrine acts as the primary link between joint and Army doctrine. ADP 1, prepared under the direction of the Chief of Staff Army (CSA), summarizes the Army’s purpose, roles, and functions. It is the CSA’s vision for the Army and establishes doctrine for employing land power, in support of national goals. ADP 3-0 contains the central Army operational doctrine for all echelons. It links Army doctrine with Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 and provides the foundation for all other Army doctrine. The remaining ADPs establish the base doctrine for a warfighting function; an offensive, defensive, stability, and defense support of civil authorities’ task; or specified reference documents. These ADPs are the doctrinal foundation for the rest of Army doctrine. These publications integrate their subject doctrine with Army capstone doctrine and joint doctrine. These ADPs contain broadly applicable information that
focuses on synchronizing and coordinating the varied capabilities of Army forces to accomplish assigned missions (TRADOC 2012, 19).

An ADRP is a Department of the Army publication that provides a more detailed explanation of the principles contained in the related Army doctrine publication. An ADRP provides the foundational understanding so everyone in the Army can interpret the ADP the same way. CG USACAC approves all ADRPs. They fully integrate and comply with the ADPs. ADRPs explain the fundamental principles of the subject and how these fundamental principles support ADP 3-0. A field manual is a Department of the Army publication that contains principles, tactics, procedures, and other doctrinal information. It describes how the Army and its organizations conduct operations and train for those operations. FMs describe how the Army executes operations described in the ADPs. They fully integrate and comply with the fundamental principles in the ADPs and the tactics and principles discussed in the ADRPs. FMs are approved by the CG USACAC as the TRADOC proponent for Army doctrine. An Army Techniques Publication is a departmental publication that contains techniques. These publications fully integrate and comply with the doctrine contained in ADPs, ADRPs, and FMs. There is no limit on the number of ATPs a doctrine proponent may produce. Each ATP is derived from several sources—extant proponent publications and publications from field and training centers and operations. Each ATP has an assigned proponent responsible for monitoring content to ensure it aligns with approved terminology and fundamental principles, tactics, and procedures in ADPs, ADRPs, and FMs (TRADOC 2012, 19-20). The other publications which are not doctrine but doctrine based are Training Circulars (TCs) and Training Manuals (TMs). TCs can contain information such as how to train for specific events or
on pieces of equipment or weapons. TMs can contain detailed procedures of a technical nature. Figure 1 depicts the hierarchy of the U.S. Army doctrinal publications.

![The U.S. Army doctrine hierarchy](image)

Figure 1. The U.S. Army doctrine hierarchy


Army Regulation 25-36 in this chapter describes what constitutes an effective military doctrine. In accordance with this regulation, and by extension, the U.S. Army’s descriptions, an effective doctrine is current, relevant, well-researched, flexible, understandable, consistent, concise, enduring, and timely. A current doctrine describes how Army forces actually train for and conduct operations. It must accurately explain principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and other doctrinal information currently in use and known to be effective, state facts correctly, and be devoid of bias, ambiguity, and errors. It must adhere to all applicable policies, laws, and regulations in force at the time it is published and in use. Relevant doctrine meets Army forces’ needs by clearly
describing ways that work to accomplish missions effectively and efficiently. It addresses
known challenges in operational environments and those challenges the Army expects to
face in the foreseeable future (TRADOC 2012, 22).

A well-researched doctrine is based on validated principles, tactics, techniques,
and procedures that are derived from organized, methodical, and thoroughly investigated
relevant information sources. It incorporates lessons learned from relevant history,
exercises, and recent operations. It accounts for changes in operational environments to
include threat, equipment, technology, and civil considerations. Sources used for research
must be authoritative and appropriate. At the same time, they must be varied and not
limited to traditional printed works (TRADOC 2012, 22).

A flexible doctrine gives organizations, leaders, and Soldiers options to meet
varied and changing circumstances. Doctrine must foster adaptability, creativity,
initiative, and interoperability. It must facilitate and enhance commanders’ and Soldiers’
critical thinking. Flexibility is sometimes restricted due to legal, safety, security,
equipment, or interoperability requirements, but it should never be unnecessarily
restrictive. In general, doctrine describes a way to conduct operations rather than the how.
Understandable doctrine applies the Army writing standard to ensure it is easily readable.
It observes common sense and is written at a reading grade level appropriate for the user,
avoiding abstract or overly academic writing. It should be comprehensible in a single
rapid reading and free of errors in grammar, mechanics, and usage. Consistent doctrine
does not conflict with joint, multi-Service, or other Army doctrine. Doctrine publications
should apply fundamental principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and terms and
symbols consistent with established usage (TRADOC 2012, 22).
Concise doctrine avoids redundancy both within the publication itself and with other publications, a cross-reference can easily suffice. Within a publication, points are made once and not repeated. Enduring doctrine provides sound principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures that apply to all levels of war and support the various operational environments in which U.S. forces conduct operations. Enduring doctrine uses common terms and symbols to remove confusion and misunderstanding. Timely doctrine supports training for and conducting operations. Doctrine must be developed when needed and available to forces when required. Doctrine must adapt to significant changes in an operational environment as quickly as changes occur. Proponents must write new doctrine publications when doctrinal voids arise. Obsolete doctrine must be updated or rescinded without unnecessary delay (TRADOC 2012, 23).

Chapter 4 of Regulation 25-36 (Development of Doctrine) deals with the U.S. Army doctrine development process. It describes the steps to be followed in developing doctrine. Chapter 5 (Doctrine Publications Management), deals with official repositories for doctrine storage and retrieval. It also outlines the broad roles of boards, working groups and committees involved in doctrine development (TRADOC 2012, 5). Table 2 summarizes the U.S. Army doctrine publications, doctrine proponents and approval authorities.
Table 2. The U.S. Army doctrine publications, doctrine proponents, and approval authorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Proponent</th>
<th>Approval authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADP 1</td>
<td>The Army</td>
<td>USACAC</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP 1-02</td>
<td>Operational Terms and Military Symbols</td>
<td>USACAC</td>
<td>CG, USACAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP 2-0</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Intelligence Center of Excellence</td>
<td>CG, USACAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP 3-0</td>
<td>Unified Land Operations</td>
<td>USACAC</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP 3-05</td>
<td>Special Operations</td>
<td>Special Warfare Center and School</td>
<td>CG, USACAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP 3-07</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>USACAC</td>
<td>CG, USACAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP 3-09</td>
<td>Fires</td>
<td>Fires Center of Excellence</td>
<td>CG, USACAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP 3-28</td>
<td>Defense Support of Civil Authorities</td>
<td>USACAC</td>
<td>CG, USACAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP 3-37</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Maneuver Support Center of Excellence</td>
<td>CG, USACAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP 3-90</td>
<td>Offense and Defense</td>
<td>USACAC</td>
<td>CG, USACAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP 4-0</td>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>Sustainment Center of Excellence</td>
<td>CG, USACAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP 5-0</td>
<td>The Operations Process</td>
<td>USACAC</td>
<td>CG, USACAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP 6-0</td>
<td>Mission Command</td>
<td>USACAC</td>
<td>CG, USACAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP 6-22</td>
<td>Army Leadership</td>
<td>USACAC</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP 7-0</td>
<td>Training Units and Developing Leaders</td>
<td>USACAC</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

The U.S. Army Doctrine Development Process

Developing doctrine requires careful planning, continuous coordination, and sufficient resources. In this regard, TRADOC Regulation 25-36 estimates time required for developing a doctrine publication to be anywhere from 3 to 23 months. The time required depends on several factors: whether the requirement is for a new publication or revision of an existing one; the priority; the scope and complexity of the material; the
extent of the staffing or review required; availability of resources; and the level of the approval authority. The U.S. Army doctrine process has four phases: assessment; planning; development; and publishing and implementation. The process is cyclic and continuous (TRADOC 2012, 25).

The assessment phase has two functions: first to determine if a new manual is needed to cover an area that has no doctrine; and second is to determine if existing doctrine is still valid. The assessment process is similar for both purposes, examines the same factors, and requires detailed research and analysis. Proponents conduct assessment to determine the need for a new publication or as part of the required review of existing publication. Proponents formally review authenticated publications for which they are responsible every 18 months or more often if required based on the doctrinal characteristics discussed earlier, focusing in particular on currency and relevance. Proponents revise or rescind doctrine publications when they determine that a significant proportion of the information is no longer current or relevant. In U.S. Army doctrine does not have a fixed shelf life. The age of a publication is not a factor in determining whether to revise or rescind it. The research in the assessment phase analyzes a variety of factors to determine if new doctrine publications need to be created or existing doctrine needs to be revised, changed, or rescinded. The factors are: changes in national security strategy, national defense strategy, and national military strategy; newly validated concepts; observations, insights, and lessons learned from recent operational and training experiences; changes in the operational environment; introduction of new technology or equipment; changes in organizational design; new legislation and DOD or DA policies;
new or significant revisions of joint or multinational doctrine among other factors (TRADOC 2012, 25-28).

The planning phase consists of researching and writing an outline, determining a proposed timeline, and developing, staffing, and obtaining approval of a proposed program directive (PD). Once a determination is made to write a manual, the doctrine proponent conducts research to determine the scope and proposed outline of the publication. Much of this research and analysis will have already been done as part of the assessment. Research may include sessions with the overall doctrine proponent leadership to get specific guidance on what to include in the manual. The PD establishes an official doctrine development requirement. The PD ensures that the proposed publication identifies major issues and adequately covers necessary topics (TRADOC 2012, 29-30).

The development phase involves the actual writing of the manual, staffing it, and adjudicating comments. During this phase, the proponent will assign a writing team that consists of an author, an editor, and a visual information specialist (VIS), based on appropriate skills and experience. This is the team that produces a draft document that undergoes various processes of scrutiny leading to final acceptance and approval of the document (TRADOC 2012, 30-39).

The publication and implementation phase involves publication and implementation of the approved doctrine. Doctrinal publications are electronically submitted in PDF and Microsoft Word files. Once a doctrine publication is published, the proponent will monitor to see if the doctrine is being implemented in unit training and operations and incorporated in institutional training and education. Commanders
incorporate the new or revised doctrine into their training programs and standard operating procedures and apply it during exercises and operations. Commands, combat training centres, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), and other agencies provide feedback on the doctrine publication’s relevance and recommendations for improvements (TRADOC 2012, 39-42).

Analysis of U.S. Army Doctrine Development Process

As discussed earlier in chapter 2, an effective military doctrine must be developed in a clear, systematic, and coordinated way, commonly referred to as a viable doctrine development process in this thesis. A viable doctrine development process broadly falls under two major areas: establishment of a capable lead organization and adherence to basic doctrinal processes, also referred to as basic steps or phases (Holley 2004, 8-9). The U.S. Army doctrine development process will therefore be analyzed based on the variables related to these broad areas.

A Capable Lead Organization

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) headquartered at Fort Eustis, Virginia, is the lead combat, doctrine, and training developer for the U.S. Army, as designated by AR 5-22. TRADOC is headed by a CG who serves as the lead doctrine developer or the Army. The CG approves TRADOC doctrine policy and also serves as the approval authority for select doctrines as indicated in table 2. The CG TRADOC’s deputy is the CG USACAC who is also the commandant of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The CG USACAC, who is supported by appropriate doctrine staff, is the designated TRADOC lead for doctrine
and also serves as doctrine proponent for selected doctrines. He manages the TRADOC Doctrine Publication Program and may designate a TRADOC organization as doctrine proponent. He also executes staff management for Army doctrine policy (TRADOC 2012, 1-9). In this regard, the assessment for the criteria of the existence of a capable leading organization is a yes.

The first major task of a doctrinal organization is to pin down and clearly define the key word “doctrine”, differentiate it from a principle or a concept, and eliminate any confusions between them (Holley 2004, 8). U.S. Army TRADOC Regulation 25-36 in chapter 3 extensively addresses the foundational aspects of military doctrine, which includes defining and describing military doctrine, concept, fundamental principles, tactics and techniques, the terms that often cause doctrinal confusion resulting in a defective doctrine development process. TRADOC defines doctrine as a systematic body of thought describing how Army forces intend to operate as a member of the joint force in the present and near term, with the current structure and materiel that is authoritative but requires judgment in application. A concept is defined as a notion or statement of an idea, an expression of how something might be done. Concept is not a doctrine, but may become a basis for doctrine once validated (TRADOC 2012, 17-19). The regulation further describes what constitute an effective doctrine. An effective doctrine is current, relevant, well researched, flexible, understandable, consistent, concise, and enduring and timely (TRADOC 2012, 17-23). By not only defining the terms and how they relate to each other, but further describing what constitutes an effective doctrine, TRADOC fulfills its first major task. The assessment criteria of defining and describing a suitable doctrine is therefore assessed as yes.
The second major task of a doctrinal organization is to establish and document a method of conducting a continuous, comprehensive, and systematic search of all the available literature that relates to doctrine (Holley 2004, 8). In other words, a doctrinal organization must establish and document a basic, but an enduring doctrine development or review process. U.S. Army TRADOC Regulation 25-36 stipulates four cyclical and continuous phases in its doctrine process: Assessment; planning; development; and publishing and implementation (TRADOC 2012, 25). The U.S. Army TRADOC therefore fully and effectively met this requirement. Consequently, the criteria of establishing and documenting a basic doctrine process is assessed as “yes”.

A Viable Doctrine Process

This research established that there are three broad phases in a doctrine process. These are the collection or information gathering phase, the formulation and validation phase, and the promulgation and dissemination phase. The collection phase is the broad phase in which a designated organization professionally gathers doctrinal information from the widest source possible. The formulation and validation phase is the phase during which doctrinal statements (concepts) are devised, revised, and perfected through a progressive and systematic analysis. It involves subjecting a draft concept to a verification and validation process through professional, intellectual, and academic debates. The promulgation and dissemination phase is the phase during which a refined doctrine is officially accepted and authorized for circulation and implementation within the military organization (Holley 2004, 8-9).

The U.S. Army’s four cyclical and continuous phases in its doctrine process begins with the assessment phase which seeks to determine if new doctrine is required or
the existing one remains valid. The proponents are required to conduct doctrinal assessments every 18 months to determine the validity of doctrinal publications for which they are responsible. The proponents conduct detailed research and analysis guided by all of the TRADOC developed and documented doctrinal characteristics, but with particular focus on currency and relevance. In doing so, the proponents take into consideration a variety factors which may include: changes in national security strategy, national defense strategy, and national military strategy; newly validated concepts; observations, insights, and lessons learned from recent operational and training experiences; changes in the operational environment; introduction of new technology or equipment; changes in organizational design; new legislation and DOD or DA policies; new or significant revisions of joint or multinational doctrine among other factors (TRADOC 2012, 25-28).

The planning phase is the U.S Army’s second doctrine process phase. This phase builds on the research conducted in the assessment phase to determine the scope and proposed timeline of the publication, develop staffing requirement, and obtain approval of a program directive (PD). The research portion of this phase may include dialogue with, and obtaining guidance from, the overall doctrine proponent leadership. The PD establishes an official doctrine development requirement. It ensures that the proposed publication identifies major issues and adequately covers necessary topics (TRADOC 2012, 29-30). In the assessment phase, to determine the validity or otherwise of a doctrine, the U.S. Army obtains doctrinal information from a variety of sources including but not limited to operational or training experiences. It takes into consideration most of the possible factors that affect military doctrine. Chief among these factors being national security strategy, national defense strategy, national military strategy and technology. In
the planning phase, the U.S. Army, through the development of a PD, identifies, summarizes, and adequately covers all the doctrinal requirements. The U.S. Army’s assessment and planning phases collectively meets all the requirements of the doctrine collection process. The assessment criteria of the collection process is therefore assessed as “yes”.

The U.S. Army’s third doctrine process phase is the development phase. This phase involves the actual writing of a doctrinal manual by a carefully selected writing team of experts. The writing team is selected on the basis of its technical expertise, relevant operational experience, and adequate research and writing skills and is adequately funded and allowed ample time to produce a coherent manuscript. The task of this team begins by development of a draft document that is concept-based that undergoes various processes of scrutiny, revision, and verification leading to its final approval (TRADOC 2012, 30-39). The U.S. Army’s development phase fully conforms to the requirements of this research’s broad second phase, the formulation and validation phase. The formulation and validation phase is the phase during which doctrinal statements (concepts) are devised, revised, and perfected through a progressive and systematic analysis. It involves subjecting a draft concept to a verification and validation process through professional, intellectual, and academic debates (Holley 2004, 8-9). The research established that beginning with the Active Defense doctrine through the AirLand Battle doctrine, and currently the Unified Land Operations doctrine, U.S. Army develops its doctrine based on a validated concept, that eventually conveys the central idea of the particular doctrine. For these reasons, the assessment criteria of formulation and validation process of the U.S Army doctrine process is assessed as “yes”
The US. Army’s fourth and the final doctrine process phase is the publication and implementation phase, a phase which is largely concerned with dissemination and implementation of the approved doctrine. Dissemination is done through electronic publications which are submitted either in Portable Document Format (PDF) or Microsoft Word files. The implementation of doctrine is monitored through close observations of unit training and exercises, operations, Army institutional training and education programs. Commands, combat training centres, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), and other agencies provide feedback on the doctrine publication’s relevance and recommendations for improvements (TRADOC 2012, 39-42). The research’s third and the final broad doctrine process phase is the promulgation and dissemination phase. This phase advocates for a method of official acceptance, authorization, and wide circulation of the approved doctrine manuals (Holley 2004, 8-9). The U.S. Army’s publication and implementation phase, as discussed earlier adequately fulfils these requirements. The U.S. promulgation and dissemination process is therefore assessed as yes. Table 3 provides a summarized assessment of the U.S. Army doctrine development process.
Table 3. Summarized assessment of the U.S. Army doctrine development process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment Criteria</th>
<th>The U.S. Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capable Lead Organization</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defines and describes doctrine</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish and document doctrine development guide.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Viable Doctrine Process</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection process</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulation/Validation process</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promulgation/dissemination process</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author based upon the research’s findings.*

**Section 2: The British Army Doctrine Development Process**

**Background**

Unlike the U.S. Army’s, the British Army’s doctrinal history is rather short and fairly recent. The British Army is not famed for applying any formal and written doctrine in war until 1989. Before this period, the British Army doctrine remained semi-formal at best, mostly centered on an individual commander, or it informally existed in a specific set of circumstances. This informal doctrine was not easily transferrable elsewhere, nor applicable in differing sets of operational circumstances. Perhaps for this reason, the semi-formal British Army doctrine, was in some cases more breached than observed. The 1989 reinvention of the British Army as a doctrine-based organization is as profound a revolution as any experienced in its 350 year history (Ministry of Defense 2010, E-i).

Doctrinal revolution in the British Army was largely influenced by factors external to the Army. Key among these factors is the outcome of the Vietnam War and
the resultant doctrinal debate within the U.S. Army. In its effort to recover from the trauma of defeat in Vietnam, from the mid-1970s the U.S. Army entered a period of intense doctrinal debate and experimentation. The intensive study of the Soviet forces by the British and the American academics informed this debate. One major result of this debate was the acceptance, in both the U.K and the U.S.A. of the concept of an operational level of war. The second major result was the recognition that the U.S. experience of air mobility in Vietnam had important lessons for the Central Front. The concepts of *Follow on Forces* (FOFA) and *AirLand Battle* were introduced partly by the British through NATO, especially in the 1983 tactical doctrine the *Allied Tactical Publication 35* (Ministry of Defense 2010, E-19).

Although doctrinal debate in the British Army was less intense at the time, the newly developing maneuver related intellectual and academic writings continued to attract increased readership among British Army officers, a development that is believed to have significantly contributed to doctrinal reform in the British Army. Key among these writings were *Maneuver Warfare* by William Lind and *Race to the Swift* by Richard Simpkin. Another key event that may have made a significant contribution was the introduction of military history by the Sandhurst-based War Studies Department, mainly studying the experiences of World Wars I and II, the Vietnam War and the Arab-Israel War. These developments, combined with the changes in political climate, and the emergence of a number of reform-minded British military senior officers accelerated the doctrinal revolution in the British Army during the early period of 1980 (Ministry of Defense 2010, E-19).
Some historians have singled out Field Marshal Sir Nigel (Ginge) Bagnall as one of the most significant reformers in the three hundred years of the British Army history. Bagnall began the reform process as corps commander 1 (BR) corps in 1981 through to 1985. This is the process by which the British Army embedded the tenets of maneuver approach and mission command. Bagnall carried on the process even as the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) between 1985 and 1988, leading to the commissioning of *Design for Military Operations* in 1989. This publication is often described as the British Army’s first ever formal doctrine. It is this significant revolution, coupled with Bagnall’s powerful influence that changed the attitudes of British Army officers regarding military doctrine. By 1991, when the first Gulf War broke out, formal doctrine was being considered a serious tool and was being internalized within the British Army. Consequently, the ideas of maneuver approach, mission command, and the operational level of war became embedded into the British Army’s style of warfighting (Ministry of Defense, 2010, E-20).

The ideas of the maneuver approach and mission command continue to guide the British Army doctrine development process to-date. The British Army capstone doctrine, ADP *Operations*, 2010 is anchored on these two ideas. Apparently the British Army believes that these tenets are enduring and that they remain as useful as they were when first articulated in Army doctrine in 1989. It, however acknowledges the necessity for regularly updating the way they are described given the changing context within which military operations takes place. As far as these tenets goes, British Army doctrine is often described as evolutionary rather than revolutionary since 1989. This is so despite the fact
that there have been several revolutionary changes in the political landscape and military operational circumstances (Ministry of Defense 2010, iii).

The end of the bi-polar world of the Cold War, which saw the disappearance of the Central Front and a return to the expeditionary warfare, is truly a revolution in international politics, which in turn has had revolutionary effects on warfare. Although doctrinal changes in the British Army may be described as evolutionary, a number of changes that may be considered revolutionary and, with significant impacts on British Army doctrine, occurred. One such change is the organizational and operational emphasis on the joint nature of the British military. A number of changes may serve as testimony and a reinforcement to this argument: First is the creation of permanent Joint Headquarters; second is the emergence of properly structured Joint Task Forces; third is the establishment of the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC); fourth is the development of Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSC) from an Army course to a joint course; and finally the setting up of such organizations as the Joint Helicopter Command. The climax of this revolutionary change is the publication of the first edition of the British Defense Doctrine in 1997. Consequently, the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Center (JDCC) now called Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Center (DCDC) was established in 1998 (Ministry of Defense 2010, E-21).

The Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Center (DCDC)

The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) is a British Ministry of Defense think tank, located within the Defense Academy site at Shrivenham, near Swindon. Its origins can be traced back to the UK’s Strategic Defense Review published in July 1998. The review recognized that the British defense needed to have clearer long
term, truly joint, vision of the way in which the British military expect its forces to operate. As a result, DCDC was created. It’s a joint establishment, with staff drawn from all the three Services and the Civil Service. It’s part of Joint Forces Command and therefore maintains close relationships with the Permanent Joint Headquarter’s, the single service warfare centers and the Defense Academy. It also works routinely with NATO, the European Union, the United Nations and a wide range of nations, as well as other government departments and non-governmental organizations. The role of DCDC is to produce concepts and doctrine, underpinned by thorough research and experimentation, for defense. This helps to inform decision makers in defense strategy, capability development and operations. It develops all the operational and higher level (capstone and keystone) doctrine for the three services. It also provides the foundation for joint education. The single-service warfare centers develop tactical-level doctrine for the particular service, essentially tactics, techniques, and procedures (DCDC, 2012).

Major publications of the DCDC includes: Joint Concepts; Global Strategic Trend program; Allied Joint Doctrine Publications (AJPs); Joint Doctrine Publications (JDPs); and Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). The Global Strategic Program provides the strategic context within which long term decisions can be made in policy and strategy areas. DCDC undertakes analysis that leads to the likely defense and security implications the UK may face as a result of changes in areas such as global commerce, economics, science and technology, and politics. Joint Concepts are developed by the Futures Concept Team and published through Joint Concept Notes (JCN). Concepts usually contain a combination of informed judgments and innovative thinking and normally look ahead some 15 to 20 years. Allied Joint publications (AJP) is doctrine for NATO
operations. Joint Doctrine Publications (JDPs) are fully endorsed national doctrines. Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs) are publications raised to either promote debate, place ‘markers in the sand’ or capture and disseminate best practice. They are not endorsed national doctrine (DCDC, 2012).

The DCDC’s Development, Analysis, and Research Team (DART), and the Legal Team provide scientific and legal inputs to doctrine development. DART provides the empirical evidence and scientific basis for all the products. They achieve this by accessing science and technology developments and by delivering analysis and experimentation in support of conceptual and doctrinal development. The legal team comprises three lawyers, one from each Service, who are specialists in international law and have an operational background. They provide legal advice and input into all the DCDC publications to make sure that they are all legally compliant. They also give the MOD specialist advice on international weapons law (DCDC, 2012).

Guide to Doctrine Development Process in the British Military

*Developing Joint Doctrine Handbook* (DJDH), developed and published by the DCDC, guides doctrine development in the British military. The latest handbook, which is the 4th edition, was promulgated in November 2013. The purpose of the handbook is to explain how to develop national and multinational doctrine and guide the authors on how to write them. According to this handbook, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) underpins the UK’s defense and that of most of its allies. Accordingly, the British military is required to use NATO doctrine wherever it can, and ensure coherence of UK doctrine with NATO wherever it cannot. This handbook is therefore designed to support this plan (Ministry of Defense 2013, i).
The handbook is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter (The Basics), doctrine’s purpose and nature as well as the U.K.’s approach to developing doctrine are outlined. Chapter 2 (How to develop Doctrine) describes how NATO and the U.K. develop and manage their joint doctrine development processes. Chapter 3 (Effective Writing), advises authors on how to write doctrine effectively and use DCDC’s templates. The final chapter (Printing and Distributing Publications), describes how publications are prepared for printing and distribution (Ministry of Defense 2013, ii).

In chapter 1 of this handbook, the U.K. defines doctrine as fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgments in application. In accordance with this handbook, military doctrine essentially guides the U.K. armed forces on how to conduct themselves on operations. It also defines doctrine as a body of professional knowledge and a common basis for understanding the nature and conduct of armed conflict. The handbook describes an effective doctrine as that which is: intellectually rigorous; written clearly; based on the evidence gained through operational experience and lessons identified; demonstrably relevant; and reflects the views of the UK and NATO Defense communities (Ministry of Defense 2013, 1-1).

The DCDC, through this handbook attempts to describe the relationships between policy, concept, doctrine/tactics, techniques, and procedures, and capability. In describing these relationships, the DCDC asserts that defense policy states what is to be done and what is not to be done. Doctrine and concepts offers guidance on how to carry out that policy now (doctrine) and in the future (concepts). Capability provides the means of doing it. Doctrine tells military personnel how to think but not what to do. Such direction
is provided by Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (JTTPs). These are prescriptive (often detailed) instructions that encapsulate best practice (in terms of operational effectiveness and/or safety) established on operations, or during training. JTTPs are defined as joint force instructions for the conduct of military tasks. JTTPs are subordinate to joint doctrine, but superior to single-service tactics, techniques and procedures as well as standard operating procedures and instructions (Ministry of Defense 2013, 1-3). Notably, clear descriptions of the relationship between doctrine and concept were not offered by this handbook.

However, on its web page, the DCDC defines concept as a notion, or statement of an idea, expressing how something may be done or accomplished, that may lead to an accepted procedure or capability. Concepts are assessments of how armed forces may wish to operate in the medium to long term, based on changes in policy or emerging trends in the strategy, security and technology areas. Concepts usually contain a combination of informed judgment and innovative thinking and normally look ahead some 15 to 20 years. Once written, concepts are then evaluated and tested. This enables creative thought to evolve into credible, effective ways of operating, or a well-defined capability requirement. Concepts seek to guide, rather than immediately shape, capability acquisition by providing the intellectual underpinning for future defense capabilities including the associated equipment, force structure, organization, training and so on (DCDC 2012). Going by these descriptions and the argument in DJDH, it can safely be argued that from the British military’s point of view, doctrine is focused on the present while concepts are focused on the future.
Management and Direction of British Military Doctrine

Management and direction of national doctrine development within the British military is done at three levels: the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Board (JDCB) level; the Joint Doctrine Steering Committee (JDSC) level; and the Bespoke Writing Team level. The Joint Doctrine and Concepts Board (JDCB) is an advisory body chaired by the Vice Chief of the Defense Staff. It gives guidance on doctrinal and conceptual development and meets when necessary, but normally at least once a year. The JDSC is chaired by Director Concepts and Doctrine but this function is normally delegated to DCDC’s Head of Doctrine, Air and Space. The JDSC reports to the Vice Chief of the Defense Staff through the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Board. It deals with high-level doctrinal matters and provides tasking, direction and guidance to doctrine writers. This board meets every six months. Below the JDSC, bespoke writing teams are formed for specific doctrinal tasks. These teams meet frequently and work closely with NATO allies (Ministry of Defense 2013, 2-9).

Key individuals that steer the British military doctrine development process are: Director, Concept, and Doctrine; Assistant Head (AH) Doctrine; Project manager; Project Officer; and single-service doctrine staff. DCDC’s Director Concepts and Doctrine sponsors all joint doctrine at the operational level and above. He authorizes publication and distribution of joint doctrine. He maintains oversight of the process as the chair of the JDSC. AH doctrine, through Head of Doctrine, Air and Space, is the final judge on all doctrine layout, structure and content matters. The designated Project Manager for developing a DCDC-sponsored publication will normally be the AH doctrine. However, the AHs of the Maritime, Land, or Air and Space teams could take on this role depending
on the nature of the doctrine. Project Managers are responsible for producing the project directive and managing the project overall. DCDC appoints a Project Officer for each publication who reports to the Project Manager. Project Officers are responsible for managing the project throughout its life and producing it on time. They are also often the publication’s author. Single-service doctrine staff serve as a link between the service and DCDC. Each Service maintains a doctrine point of contact, ideally Staff Officer 1 (SO1) within its warfare center. Their function is to coordinate doctrine development within their Service. All single-service doctrinal issues (including comments on draft publications) are staffed through these representatives (Ministry of Defense 2013, 2-9 – 2-10).

The British Joint Doctrine Development Process

The British Joint doctrine development process undergoes three major phases: project definition; project development; and project review. The key point that underpins the entire process is that most of the work is done at the committee level, but the JDSC may need to agree to major development stages of some key, or new publications. The project definition phase involves four major activities: project proposal; project analysis; project validation; and project directive development. A project proposal results from a doctrinal need identification. When a need for doctrine is identified in a new area or when there is need to revise existing doctrine, the process is started by organizations submitting a project proposal. Project proposal can come from anywhere (externally or internally). Project analyses are led by AH doctrine leads to determine whether the proposal requires a new publication or is simply amendments to the existing publication. DCDC at this
stage makes a final decision whether to terminate or proceed with the process (Ministry of Defense 2013, 2-122-1 – 3).

The development phase involves developing doctrinal working drafts, development, approval, circulation, and ratification of study drafts. The development of a working draft can be sub-contracted out to an agency or writing team group, but with close involvement of the DCDC. A refined working draft develops into a formal study draft. The DCDC distributes all study drafts and collates all comments, even if the initial work has been completed by an outside agency. Final editing and shaping is done by doctrine editors and the project officer. The key to a short development phase is a mature first draft (Ministry of Defense 2013, 2-122-1 – 3).

The review phase involves review by the doctrinal custodian at the 18-month point that leads to formal review as required. DCDC formally reviews publications every three years to make sure that they remain current and valid. Lessons from operations and training, as well as specific project proposals or policy changes, may lead to reviewing a publication earlier. But, unless there is an urgent need, DCDC tries to not to shorten the three-year cycle (Ministry of Defense 2013, 2-12 – 2-20).

Analysis of British Army Doctrine Development Process

The analysis criteria of the British Army doctrine development process remains the same as identified in the literature review and applied in the first case study. Broadly they are: establishment of a capable lead organization; and adherence to basic doctrine process, also referred to as basic steps or phases. (Holley 2004, 8-9). The British Army
doctrine development process is therefore analyzed based on the variables related to these broad areas.

A Capable Lead Organization

In the British military all operational and strategic level (capstone and keystone) doctrine is developed by the DCDC. DCDC is a joint establishment with staff drawn from all the three Services and the Civil Service. It’s part of Joint Forces Command and therefore maintains close relationships with the Permanent Joint Headquarters, the single service warfare centers and the Defense Academy. The single-service warfare centers develop tactical-level doctrine for the particular service, essentially tactics, techniques, and procedures (DCDC 2012). Although the DCDC is not solely an army establishment like the U.S. Army TRADOC, it does play a lead role for British Army doctrine development. ADP 3-0 Operations 2010, the British Army’s capstone doctrine, is the product of DCDC. In this regard, the criteria for the existence of a lead organization are assessed as “yes”.

The first major task of a doctrinal lead organization is to clearly define doctrine and establish clear differences and understandings between related terms such as principle and concept. Failure to clearly define and understand these terms and their relationship is believed to often lead to missteps in doctrine development process (Holley 2004, 8-9). In chapter 1 of DJDH (Basics), DCDC defined and described what the British military view as an effective doctrine. It defines doctrine as fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of the objective. It is authoritative, but requires judgment in application. It is a body of professional knowledge and a
common basis for understanding the nature and conduct of armed conflict (Ministry of Defense 2013, 1-1).

This research established that while principles may make contributions to doctrine, they are not doctrine and therefore the interchangeable use of these words is misleading. This may result in a doctrinal confusion or faulty doctrine development process or both. Principles are the truths that are evident and general. Doctrine consists of rules or procedures drawn by competent authority based upon accumulated experience, numerous recorded instances that have led to generalizations. Doctrine is within the power of properly constituted military authority, but principles are not (Holley 2004, 19-22). DJDH did not offer any definition of principle or its relation to doctrine. The study therefore considers, by defining doctrine as “fundamental principles” and not as its constituent part, DCDC failed short of fully differentiating the two words.

The DCDC begins its attempts of establishing the relationship between concept and doctrine by stating, in general terms, the purpose of defense policy. Defense policy states what is to be done and what is not to be done. DCDC acknowledges that both doctrine and concepts offer guidance on how to carry out the stated policy, but at different times. Doctrine offers guidance at present time and concept in future time (Ministry of Defense 2013, 1-33). DCDC defines concept as a notion, or statement of an idea expressing how something may be done or accomplished, that may lead to an accepted procedure, or capability. Concepts seek to guide, rather than immediately shape, capability acquisition (DCDC 2012). By these descriptions DCDC appears to place both doctrine and concepts at an equal level in guiding the force, while at the same time acknowledging that doctrine is authoritative and concepts are not. Further, by asserting
and institutionally considering the maneuver warfare concept as an enduring concept that can only change in descriptions depending on operational circumstances, the British Army closed all the avenues for further exploration and development of a military concept. However, this research established that doctrine and concept are neither the same nor equal. Although both constitute a body of knowledge about how military forces ought to operate, the express purpose of a validated military concept is to provide the basis for developing a new doctrine where none exist or for making a major change to an existing one (Mattis 2009). One of the key findings of this research is that concepts, which are never constant, are a foundation, a base or a pillar upon which military doctrine anchors its genesis. The British Army’s present-future construct of defining and differentiating doctrine and concept is not supported by any findings of this research. For all the reasons stated, this study considers that DCDC has not sufficiently defined and described the key word ‘doctrine’ as to eliminate possible confusion between it and the related words ‘concept’ and ‘principle’. The criteria of defining and describing doctrine is therefore assessed as “partial”.

The second major task of a doctrinal lead organization, and which is an assessment criteria of a capable lead organization in this study, is to establish and document a method of conducting a continuous, comprehensive, and systematic search of the available professional, historical, and technical literature that relates to doctrine (Holley 2004, 8-9). *Developing Joint Doctrine Handbook* (DJDH) developed and published by the DCDC guides doctrine development in the British military. The latest hand book which is the 4th edition was promulgated in November 2013. The purpose of the handbook is to explain how to develop national and multinational doctrine and guide
Chapter 2 (How to Develop Doctrine), specifically describes how NATO and the U.K. develop and manage their joint doctrine development process (Ministry of Defense 2013, i-ii). To this extent, the study considers the assessment criteria of establishing and documenting a guide to doctrinal development process as “yes”.

A Viable Doctrine Process

This study established that a viable doctrine process employs three broad phases that may be described as: the collection or information gathering phase; the formulation and validation phase; and the promulgation and dissemination phase (Holley 2004, 8-9). The DCDC also documents three major doctrinal phases: project definition phase; project development phase; and project review phase (Ministry of Defense 2013, 2-12 - 2-13).

The DCDC-prescribed project definition phase is a phase during which doctrinal need is identified, analyzed and validated. It is a phase that begins by identifying the need for a new doctrine or a major revision to an existing doctrine, a phase that can be initiated by either an internal or external organization, by way of proposals. The proposals are analyzed to determine their merits. This may result in determining if the proposal meets the need to develop a new doctrine, revise or amend an existing one or reject the proposal in its totality. This appears to be what DCDC refers to as project analysis and validation in this phase (Ministry of Defense 2013, 2-12 to 2-13). The DCDC project definition phase falls within this research’s broad collection or information gathering phase. The collection or information gathering phase is the phase during which doctrinal staffs use professionally prescribed procedures to gather doctrinal information from the widest
possible sources (Holley 2004, 8-9). This study therefore assesses the criteria of a collection or information gathering phase as “yes”.

The DCDC prescribes development phase as the phase during which a doctrinal working draft is developed and refined forming the basis for the development and distribution of a formal study draft. The study draft seeks to collate all the feedback to produce a finally edited and shaped document (Ministry of Defense 2013, 2-122-1 – 3). Broadly, the DCDC development phase may fall within the formulation and validation phase as established by this study. This is a phase during which doctrinal statements are devised, revised, and perfected. It is a phase which involves analysis that leads to the formulation of a draft doctrinal concept statement, which is systemically and professionally subjected to a verification and validation process. It this process that finally produces an authoritative doctrine (Holley 2004, 8-9).

To the extent that it develops a draft working doctrinal document that progresses to a study document that finally leads to a refined document, DCDC partially meets the basic requirements of this research’s formulation and validation phase. However, it fails to identify the guiding basis for the development of both the working and the study drafts. This study established this basis as an initially developed and finally validated concept. For the reason that the DCDC could not sufficiently provide clear distinctions between doctrine, concept and principle, and that its doctrine development process is not concept-based, this study considers and assesses the British Army formulation and validation phase as “partial”.

The DCDS’s final phase is the review phase. This is a phase that involves review by doctrinal custodians at the 18-month point to ensure that it remains current and valid
(Ministry of Defense 2013, 2-122-2 – 0). This research established that broadly, the third and the final phase within a viable development process is the promulgation and dissemination phase. This phase involves official acceptance, and authorization of doctrine for circulation, and implementation within a military organization through appropriate means and media, but primarily through documented doctrinal manuals (Holley 2004, 8-9). The DCDC’s review phase does not meet this requirement. At best this phase can be classified as an activity within DCDC’s project definition phase, which is a phase during which doctrinal need is identified, analyzed and validated. Although the DCDC defines the review phase as its final phase, chapter 4 of DJDH (Printing and Distributing Publications) comprehensively describe the procedures for doctrinal publications printing and distribution. In practical terms therefore, the British Army doctrine undergoes full promulgation and dissemination phase. What may be required is the re-naming of the final phase to match the practical aspects described in chapter 4 of DJDH. The study considers the British Army’s promulgation and dissemination phase as “yes”. Table 4 provides a summarized assessment of the British Army doctrine development process.
Table 4. Summarized assessment of the British Army doctrine development process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment Criteria</th>
<th>The British Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lead Organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Defines and describes doctrine</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Establish and document doctrine</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development guide.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viable Doctrine Process</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Collection process</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Formulation/Validation process</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Promulgation/dissemination process</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: As assessed by the author based upon the research’s findings.

Section 3. The Kenya Army Doctrine Development Process

Background

The Kenya Armed Forces, now the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF), before 2007 much like the British Army before 1989, has not had formal written doctrine. The Kenya Military Doctrine of 2007, which is still in draft form, is the first doctrinal publication of its kind to be published by the Kenya military. It is intended to provide the Kenya Defense Forces with principles, practices, and procedures to guide timely actions in meeting threats to Kenya’s national interests in a correct, timely, and appropriate manner. The KMD is formulated at the military strategic and operational levels. It is the senior-most doctrinal publication. It is the basis of all other subordinate doctrines that are required to be in consistent with it (Department of Defense 2007, ii).
Doctrinally, the KDF is currently in the infant and formative stages similar to those of the U.S. Army over two centuries ago and the British Army over two decades ago; it cannot therefore fully compare to the two case studies. KDF can only learn from the experiences of the two militaries which have traditionally been close partners and point of reference for the Kenya Defense Forces. The assessment criteria applied to the two militaries, might not at this point in time, be fully applicable to the Kenya Army. The focus will be on what to learn from the two militaries’ experiences as the Kenya Army navigates its infant doctrinal development process.

A Capable Lead Organization

The Kenya Army doctrine development is the responsibility of the Kenya Army sub-branch, a sub-branch within operations and training branch. The sub-branch is headed by a staff officer 1 (SO1). The SO1 is responsible for the preparation and review of Army doctrine, its establishment, and printing and publication of doctrinal manuals. The SO1 is assisted by two staff officers 2 (SO2s), who are the coordinating leads for doctrine and publication of manuals, and establishment and equipment tables (ET) respectively. The ET tabulates the approved personnel strength and equipment (Kenya Army 2004b, 8-1 – 8-2). The Kenya Army doctrine sub-branch merely consists of a coordination and doctrinal advisory staff. It is not an organization that can effectively perform the enormous doctrine development tasks, as described by this study. The criteria for a viable lead organization can, at best be assessed as partial. However, Kenya Amy has a draft doctrine that attempts to define and describe military doctrine.

The Kenya Army defines doctrine as the fundamental principles by which military forces or components thereof guide their actions in support of national
objectives. It is authoritative but requires balanced judgment in its application. Military doctrine is a formal expression of military knowledge and thought, that the army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of current and future conflicts, the preparation of the army for such conflicts and the methods of engaging in them to achieve success. The Kenya Army believes that success on the battlefield will depend on the army’s ability to fight in accordance with four basic tenets; initiative, agility, depth and synchronization. An army that is to succeed in war must have the ability to adapt rapidly to changing situations. The conduct of war is a matter of applying both science and art and Kenya Army doctrine must attend to both aspects. The doctrine must primarily seek to influence the way in which officers and NCOs think. It categorizes doctrine into joint, operational and tactical levels (Kenya Army 2004a, 1-1 – 1-2).

In describing doctrinal concepts, Kenya Army believes that there are two theories: the attritional theory; and maneuver warfare concept. The attritional theory (positional) is based on conducting operations of war, with the primary intention of inflicting casualties and material destruction. The focus of the positional theory is on the physical dimension of warfare and success is determined primarily by the seizure and holding of terrain. Maneuver warfare is a war fighting philosophy that seeks to defeat the enemy by shattering his moral and physical cohesion, his ability to fight as an effective coordinated whole rather than by destroying him physically through incremental attrition. The Kenya Army favors the later over the former (Kenya Army 2004, 1-71-8).

The Kenya Army’s definitions, descriptions, and categorization of doctrine are much similar to those of the British Army’s. Like the British Army, the Kenya Army defines doctrine as fundamental principles, yet this study established that the two are not
the same. They must be clearly defined and differentiated to eliminate doctrinal confusion. Just like the British Army, the Kenya Army has not provided any definition of “a fundamental principle”. As did the British Army, the Kenya Army has therefore not clearly differentiated the words “doctrine” and “principle” and their relationships. While the British Army attempted to define and describe military concept and its relationship to doctrine through the present-future construct, this study has not established any such attempt by the Kenya Army. Further, in the British Army’s similar fashion, the Kenya Army appears to over emphasize the cognitive element of doctrine at the expense of its other elements. It believes that doctrine must primarily seek to influence the way in which officers and NCOs think (Kenya Army Draft Doctrine, 1-1). This study established that a comprehensive and an effective doctrine must integrate the cognitive, procedural, organizational, material, and moral requirements of an army (Hope 2000, 19).

Similarly, by listing and describing only two theories, and by favoring the maneuver warfare theory, the Kenya Army appears to follow in the footsteps of the British Army which believes that maneuver warfare concept is fundamentally enduring in use, but with regular updates in descriptions (Ministry of Defense2010, iii). Practically, the Kenya Army, just like the British Army, narrows and restricts the view of military concept to maneuver warfare only. Overall, the Kenya Army’s descriptions of doctrine, concept, and principle are assessed as “partial”.

The Kenya Army Doctrine Development Process

This study has not conclusively established any documented Kenya Army doctrine development process so far. Probably, owing to the fact that the Kenya Army’s doctrine development is in the initial stages of a doctrinal evolutionary process, it may
not be prudent to strictly subject it to the same assessment criteria as applied to the U.S. Army and the British Army. However, the fact that KDF, and indeed the Kenya Army has some form of draft doctrinal documents is an indication of the Kenya Army’s acknowledgement, intent, desire, and willingness to use doctrine as a tool for preparing the army for war. In addition to publishing its first ever draft capstone doctrine, the Kenya Army has developed and published its tactical level doctrines in the form of field manuals. One example of these manuals is *Battle Group Tactic* (Army code no 0101 2004). Overall, the Kenya Army’s doctrine development process can best be assessed as “partial”. Table 5 provides a summarized assessment of the Kenya Army doctrine development process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment Criteria</th>
<th>The Kenya Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capable Lead Organization</strong></td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defines and describes doctrine</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish and document doctrine</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development guide.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Viable Doctrine Process</strong></td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection process</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulation/Validation process</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promulgation/dissemination process</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source.* As assessed by the author based upon the research’s findings.
Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the doctrinal case studies, and the Kenya army doctrine, in an attempt to solve the research’s primary question. The chapter was presented in three sections: Section 1 presented the U.S. Army doctrine case study, and analyzed it based on the doctrine development variables; Section 2 presented the British Army doctrine case study, and analyzed it based on the doctrine development variables; Section 3 critically analyzed the Kenya Army doctrine development process.

The critical analyzes of the case studies in this chapter established that the U.S. Army’s doctrine development process generally fulfilled all the assessment criteria, while those of the British Army and the Army Kenya recorded mixed results. A significant finding of this chapter is that Kenya Army lacks a documented doctrine development process. Table 6 below provides a summarized assessments of the case studies and their comparative results to the Kenya Army process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment Criteria</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capable Lead Organization</strong></td>
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<td>development guide.</td>
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<td>Partial</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulation/Validation process</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promulgation/dissemination process</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source.* As assed by the author based upon the variables of a viable doctrine development process.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The purpose of this study is to stimulate critical thinking and debate in the Kenya Army doctrine development process, with a view to determining and recommending the most suitable doctrine development process for the Kenya Army. Chapter 1 of this thesis was an introductory chapter, which broadly presented the background of the problem, while seeking to explain the significance of the study. Chapter 2 reviewed and discussed relevant available literature related to the key research question of this study. Chapter 3 discussed the qualitative methodology that was employed throughout the study. Chapter 4 analyzed the selected doctrinal case studies, and the Kenya Army doctrine development process in an attempt to solve the research’s primary question. This chapter presents the research’s findings that forms the basis for recommendation of what is considered to be the most suitable and practically applicable doctrine development process for the Kenya Army.

One of the findings of this study is that doctrine is enduring in nature, but dynamic in character. Offense, defense, and deterrence constitute the enduring nature of doctrine. Responsiveness, innovation and integration in response to geopolitical and the operational environment and technological changes is the dynamic character of doctrine. A process that best incorporates the enduring nature and dynamic character is likely to produces a more viable doctrine. This study also established that the primary source of military doctrine is recorded past military experience. Other sources are the outcomes and
analysis of: full scale maneuvers; military units’ field training exercises and service tests; and war games and command post exercises (Holley 2004, 8-10).

Another major finding of this research is that failure to properly define doctrine and describe what constitutes an effective doctrine often lead to a flawed doctrine development process. In this regard, concept and principle are the two words that are commonly used to define doctrine or are interchangeably used with doctrine. Though related, the three words are not one and should not be used interchangeably. Concept is simply an idea. It is a hypothesis, an inference that suggests that a proposed pattern of behavior may possibly lead to a desired result. Concepts, however provide a foundation or basis for doctrine. Military doctrine is systematically developed, integrative, officially approved, authoritative but dynamic, and documented guides to military actions based upon accumulated experiences, numerous recorded instances that have led to generalizations. To generalize is to infer inductively a common pattern from repeated experiences that have produced the same or similar results. Where a concept is tentative and speculative, doctrine is more assured. Principles are truths that are evident and general that cannot be laid down arbitrarily, they can only be declared (Holley 2004, 19-21). A viable military doctrine must comprehensively integrate and meet the cognitive, procedural, organizational, material, and moral needs of a military force (Hope 2000, 19).

The study established that for a military force to have a viable doctrine development process, it must begin by establishing a capable lead organization whose primary role is to develop doctrine. A capable lead organization must be adequately resourced, equipped, funded, and staffed with competent and professional military officers. This is necessary because military doctrine development is a heavy, laborious,
and resource-intensive process that must be systematically managed by military professionals. Broadly, the first major task of this organization is to clearly define doctrine and describe what constitutes an effective doctrine. Secondly, it must establish and document a continuous, comprehensive, and systematic doctrine development process. Finally, it must provide a continuous and effective liaison with appropriate agencies, both within and outside the military that may contribute to development of an effective doctrine (Holley 2004, 8-9).

Broadly, this research established that a viable doctrine development process consists of three phases: the collection/information gathering phase; the formulation and validation phase; and the promulgation and dissemination phase. The collection phase is the phase during which doctrinal staff uses professionally prescribed procedures to tap the widest possible range of sources of doctrinal information. The formulation and validation phase is the phase during which doctrinal statements are devised, revised and perfected. It involves analysis that leads to sound generalization. The promulgation and dissemination phase is the phase during which doctrine is officially approved for dissemination. It involves official acceptance and authorization of doctrine for circulation within the military organization (Holey 2004, 8-9).

The Implications of the Case Studies on the Kenya Army Doctrine Development Process

While analyzing the implications of the case studies on the Kenya Army, it is important to re-state one obvious and important fact. The fact is that while both the U.S. Army’s and the British Army’s doctrines have undergone revolutionary and/or evolutionary processes for over a considerable period of time, the Kenya Army’s has not.
The Kenya Army is only at the beginning of the process. The U.S. Army’s doctrinal history dates back to 1779 when the first *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of Troops of the United States* was produced and approved by the Congress (Kretchick 2011, 6-22). Thus, for over two hundred years, U.S. Army doctrine, has significantly evolved and matured conceptually, procedurally, and organizationally.

Compared to the U.S. Army, the British Army’s doctrinal history is shorter and fairly recent. The British Army’s formal, written and recorded doctrinal history began in 1989 when the *Design for Military Operations* was first commissioned (Ministry of Defense 2010, E-19 – E-20). The British Army doctrine has therefore been undergoing evolutionary or revolutionary process for the past twenty five years. On the other hand, the Kenya Army’s first ever capstone doctrinal publication, which is still in draft form, was published in 2004 (Kenya Army 2004a, i). Notably, this publication preceded the Kenya Military Joint Publication Doctrine (KMD) of 2007. The Kenya Army doctrine process has therefore been nominally in existence for the last seven to ten years. The Kenya Army doctrine development process undoubtedly faces both organizational and procedural challenges associated with a developing and evolving process.

Organizationally, while both the U.S. Army and the British Army have lead organizations that are capable of undertaking the heavy tasks of doctrine development, the same cannot be said of the Kenya Army. The U.S. Army TRADOC, which is exclusively an army organization, is a capable organization that guides and steers the U.S. Army doctrine process. TRADOC’s primary role is to develop army doctrine publications as well as multi-service doctrine. The British DCDC is the Ministry of Defense’s think tank for doctrinal matters. It is a joint as well as multi-agency doctrinal
organization. The DCDC, while performing a similar doctrinal role, is significantly different from TRADOC in the scope of its role as well as the organizational structure and composition. The DCDC, being a joint and multi-agency organization draw its staff from all the three services as well as the civil service. The Kenya Army’s doctrine sub-branch is simply a co-ordination and advisory staff organization that lacks the capacity to undertake full-scale doctrine development tasks.

In terms of procedures and processes, both the U.S. Army and the British Army have published manuals that guide their doctrine development processes. The U.S. Army’s is TRADOC Regulation 25-36 of 2012, while that of the British Army is DJDH, 2013. On the contrary this research did not find the existence of such document in the Kenya Army. Its definition, description, and categorization of doctrine are very similar, and in some instances, the same as those of the British Army. Consequently, it is the conclusion of this research that the Kenya Army lacks a systematic, mature, and documented viable doctrine development process.

Recommendations

A Capable Lead Organization

Given that the Kenya Army operates as a joint force, and considering the enormity of establishing, funding, resourcing, and staffing a capable doctrine organization, this research recommends that the Kenya Defense Forces consider establishing a joint doctrine organization. A joint doctrine organization, similar to the British DCDC, which is primarily responsible for doctrine development may be feasible and suitable for the KDF, rather than a single service doctrine organization. This organization must be adequately resourced, funded, and professionally staffed. It must be
capable of clearly defining and describing doctrine, concept and principle, and their relationships. This organization must begin by establishing and documenting a guide to the doctrine development process, similar to TRADOC Regulation 25-36 or DJDH, 2013. To do this, it must have a continuous and effective liaison with all appropriate agencies, both within and outside the military that may contribute to doctrine development. In particular, it must have sustainable links to all KDF schools and colleges, more so the Kenya Defense Staff College (DSC) and the Kenya National Defense College (NDC). The current doctrine staff at the service headquarters remain as a link between the joint doctrine organization and the services.

A Viable Doctrine Process

In developing a viable doctrine process, the KDF joint doctrine organization, if established, has to be guided by the three broad doctrine development phases as determined by this research: the collection/information gathering phase; the formulation and validation phase; and the promulgation and dissemination phase. In this regard, the U.S. Army’s four doctrinal phases that broadly conforms to the three basic doctrinal phases, and fully meet all the assessment criteria of this research is recommended. The four phases are: assessment; planning; development; and publishing and implementation. The process is cyclical and continuous (TRADOC 2012, 25). TRADOC Regulation 25-36 of 2012, can serve as a key reference guide for the KDF in developing its own doctrine development guide.

The KDF does not have to re-invent the wheel; It already has some draft doctrinal documents. Practically, it is already in the formulation and validation phase, although the research could not establish the collection process that led to the draft documents. To
proceed to the next phase, this study strongly recommends that the KDF subjects the draft
documents to further intellectual, academic, and professional debates. The debates may
begin by interrogating the collection process that led to these documents. It should then
extend to maneuver warfare as currently practised to determine its correct doctrinal
position. As did the German Army during and after the World Wars, and the U.S. Army
after the Vietnam War, the Kenya Defense Forces have the opportunity to engage in
honest and objective doctrinal debates after the conduct of Operation *Linda Nchi*. As an
enduring process, this thesis recommends that the KDF employs a concept-based doctrine
development process, similar to that of the U.S. Army.

Finally, this research recommends that the KDF doctrinal organization tap into as
many sources as possible, both external and internal to develop and review its doctrine.
Among other sources, the KDF must base its doctrine development or review process on
its own and other militaries recorded and analyzed operational experiences or military
training exercises at whatever level. Since the KDF has a lot of experience in peace-
keeping operations (PKO), it may begin by focusing on PKO doctrine development.

**Recommendation for Further Research**

Although establishment of a joint doctrine organization is recommended, this
research was not able determine the size, organizational structure, and economic
feasibility of the organization. For this reason, this research recommends further research
to determine what size of joint doctrine organization is economically feasible, and
organizationally and functionally suitable for the Kenya Defense Forces.
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