A TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIC APPROACH IN AFRICA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2014-01

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A Tribal Engagement Strategic Approach in Africa

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The National Security Strategy, the Defense Strategic Guidance, the National Military Strategy, and USAFRICOM's strategic approach continues to place importance toward instability in Africa. Should USAFRICOM attempt a Tribal Engagement Strategic Approach (TESA) to increase stability within its AOR? This thesis examines the events of the past 10-20 years in Liberia and applies design methodology to answer the research question. USAFRICOM and its whole of government can increase stability by deploying Tribal Engagement Teams (TETs) to increase confidence between local governments and tribes in African communities where circumstances call for a TESA. The result of this research provide an approach to protect tribal interests and work through issues of corruption, reduce local tensions, and improve local governance. Moreover, TETs executing a tribal engagement strategy should increase stability through community engagement, local defense advisory, and encourage political integration with the central and local governments as well as tribal groups. The thesis recommends four planning considerations for prospective tribal engagement strategies to assist decision makers.
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
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<td>Agenda for Transformation</td>
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<td>AMLEP</td>
<td>African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
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<td>African Partnership Flight</td>
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<td>Al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<td>Anti-Terrorism Unit</td>
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<td>Building Partner Capacity</td>
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<td>Basic Package of Health Services</td>
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<td>For Official Use Only</td>
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<td>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
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<td>HA</td>
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<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>Interagency Government Organizations</td>
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<td>IUU</td>
<td>Illegal Unreported and Unregulated fishing</td>
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<td>LIBTELCO</td>
<td>Liberia Telecommunications Corporation</td>
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<td>LNP</td>
<td>Liberia National Police</td>
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<td>LOE</td>
<td>Line of Effort</td>
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<td>LTA</td>
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<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
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<td>U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa</td>
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<td>MODEL</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>Measure of Effectiveness</td>
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<td>MOP</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
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<td>OOL</td>
<td>Operation Onward Liberty</td>
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<td>PMESII-PT</td>
<td>Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, Time</td>
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<td>PO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>POTUS</td>
<td>President of the United States</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugee, and Migration</td>
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<td>RAF</td>
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<td>Tribal Engagement Strategy</td>
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<td>VEO</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches—primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces—to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention. In this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States’ allies and partners may be as important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.

— Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Foreign Affairs

USAFRICOM

The United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) mission is to protect United States (U.S.) security interests in African countries by combating African violent extremist organizations (VEO). USAFRICOM intends to defend against VEO by establishing favorable conditions on the ground to enable central and local governments to protect their people and state. In the last year, USAFRICOM has improved conditions within their AOR.

USAFRICOM has made progress over the last year with African partners by addressing threats that affect both U.S. and Africa’s security. For example, Senegal and Ghana, which promote stability, are important U.S. partners and leaders in the fight for stability in West Africa; they executed secure democratic elections in 2012 to fight the political battle against transnational threats. Furthermore, our African allies have improved their ability to deal with crisis response operations such as how the Liberian military performed during a deployment reacting to the Ivory Coast rebel threats to Liberian borders in the fall of 2012.
African partners have demonstrated their ability to deal with regional security concerns. For example, in Somalia, African forces (with USAFRICOM support) have fought against al-Shabaab. The African forces’ success has allowed Somalia to convert to a constitutional form of government. USAFRICOM forces have strengthened relationships with African forces, allowing support from U.S. Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), Interagency Government Organizations (IGOs) and international organizations to deteriorate al-Shabaab’s regime and has created opportunity for Somalia’s endeavors to form a more stable government.

The USAFRICOM area of responsibility (AOR) is a complicated environment with emerging opportunities and challenges. One of the challenges in the USAFRICOM AOR is the strong influence of tribal, clan, and ethnic groups on stability within and among African states. In some cases, a particular group may monopolize power in the country and another may resist the central government based on friction between the two groups. The people of Africa and the African Union have shown their eagerness to counter Africa’s security challenges. USAFRICOM continues to support Africa through military engagements that improve African forces. USAFRICOM demonstrated their efforts by improving African military skills and capability that can address the shared security concerns threatened by the VEOs. Appendix A illustrates a geographic representation of USAFRICOM’s AOR that highlight the threat levels throughout the continent (Congress 2013).

Problem Statement

Due to weak government institutions, or their absence, USAFRICOM and its whole of government partners may require a tribal engagement strategic approach
A successful tribal engagement strategy (TES) requires TETs to work with tribe leaders to increase stability. TETs may be required to encourage interaction between tribal, local, and central government leaders. The results of this research should provide planners with a TESA to define tribal organization and governance, complex loyalties and grievances within and between tribes, how to protect tribal interests and works through issues of poor governance. The researcher will conduct a case study in chapter 4 and perform analysis on Liberia. Currently the Liberian government does not have any formal policies regarding tribal engagement. Appendix B displays a map of Liberia, illustrating the 15 different ethnic groups among tribe to demonstrate the complexities that come with tribal engagement.

**Primary Research Question**

Should USAFRICOM attempt a TESA to increase stability within its AOR? To answer the primary question planners should analyze a sample of the regional instability occurring within the USAFRICOM AOR. In this case, planners can review the problem framed around the case study described in chapter 4 that takes place in Liberia beginning in 2003. Planners must answer the secondary questions during analysis in chapter 4 to determine if a TESA can affect the strategic concerns within the USAFRICOM AOR.

**Secondary Research Questions**

Through the secondary questions, planners must ensure that the TESA supports USAFRICOM’s current strategy. Additionally, planners can review the following
secondary questions to identify the root causes of instability at the tribe and local levels that Liberians have encountered. Finally, these answers collectively allow planners to find ways to engage and stabilize tribes and local governments within the scope of the case study and determine if the TESA applies throughout Africa.

What are the root causes of instability between governing institutions, tribes and ethnic groups in Liberia?

What are the relationships, complex loyalties and grievances among tribes, ethnic groups and governing institutions in Liberia?

Is corruption a significant factor among tribes, vulnerable groups, and governing institutions in Liberia?

How can a TESA integrate with current United States Government (USG) Agencies, USAFRICOM and Liberian government efforts to address the root causes of instability, grievances, and corruption among tribes, ethnic groups, and local governments in Liberia?

Assumptions

For the purpose of this thesis, the author has no remaining assumptions to consider.

Definitions

Army Design Methodology: A methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them (Department of the Army 2012b).
Acceptability: The joint operation plan review criterion for assessing whether the contemplated course of action is proportional, worth the cost, consistent with the law of war, and is militarily and politically supportable (Department of Defense 2011b).

Capacity Building: The development of individual and collective abilities or capacity to transform conflict from violence into a positive, constructive force. Collectively, capacity building also includes the development of institutions, both state and non-state, which allow society to handle conflict in non-violent ways (Payson 2000).

Coup d’état: Seizure of an existing government by a small group. A coup d’état involves relatively few members of the population and these few are frequently military officers (Payson 2000).

Culture: The system of values, customs, beliefs, myths and the historical, philosophical, legal and religious heritage by and through which society defines itself and able to function as a relatively self-contained entity (Payson 2000).

Desired End State: A desired end state consists of those desired conditions that, if achieved, meet the objectives of the policy, orders, guidance, and directives issued by higher authorities (Department of the Army 2012a).

Diplomacy: The conduct if international relations by negotiation rather than force, propaganda, or recourse to law, and by other peaceful means either directly or indirectly designed to promote negotiation. It is an activity regulated by custom and law, though flexibility remains one of its vital features (Payson 2000).

Direct Approach: In the direct approach, U.S. forces assist the HN by conducting operations for the mutual benefit of the host-nation and U.S. interests. These operations either provide a capability that the HN does not possess or increase the capacity of the
HN to conduct the operation. Direct approach operations are normally conducted when the HN is faced with social, economic, or military threats beyond its handling capability. In the case of direct support, the geographic combatant commanders use Soldiers in roles that typically assume more risks than indirect support (Department of the Army 2013).

**Economic Variable:** Encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources (Department of the Army 2012a).

**Essential Asset Deficiency:** The absence of a mattress, basic furniture or radio (Sirleaf 2013).

**Indirect Approach:** Activities involve the U.S. supporting a nation with security cooperation programs, given legitimate authorities, designed to enhance its capability and capacity. Indirect approaches are appropriate for environments where direct U.S. involvement is not required or may be counterproductive. The indirect approach focuses on building strong national infrastructures through economic, military, and other capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency (Department of the Army 2013).

**Information Variable:** Describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate or act on information (Department of the Army 2012a).

**Infrastructure Variable:** Is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society (Department of the Army 2012a).

**Measure of Effectiveness:** A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment tied to measuring the
attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (Department of Defense 2011c).

**Measure of Performance**: A measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly action tied to measuring task accomplishment (Department of Defense 2011c).

**Military Variable**: Explores the military and paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given operational environment (Department of the Army 2012a).

**Non-essential Asset Deficiency**: Entails the absence of items such as vehicles, televisions or mobile phones (Sirleaf 2013).

**Operational Approach**: A description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state. (Department of the Army 2012a).

**Operational Environment**: Results of the analysis of the operational variable in a given environment provides the commander and staff with a current situation in a given location. In addition, the operational environment is not static. It continually evolves. This evolution results, in part, from humans interacting within an operational environment as well as from their ability to learn and adapt. The dynamic nature of the operational environment makes determining the relationship between cause and effect difficult and contributes to the uncertainty of military operations (Department of the Army 2012a).

**Operational Variables**: Commanders and staff use the operational variables to help build their situational understanding. They analyze and describe the operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military,
economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) (Department of the Army 2012a).

**Outside Influence**: Influence by actors from within the country who are not direct participants in the conflict. Influence can take to the form of economic, political, or military pressures by individuals, countries, civil society, private businesses, or militant groups (Payson 2000).

**Physical Environment Variable**: Includes the geography and manmade structures, as well as the climate and weather in the area of operation (Department of the Army 2012a).

**Political Variable**: Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance, to include informal or covert political powers (Department of the Army 2012a).

**Shaping Operations**: Inclusive of normal and routine military activities and various interagency activities performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. Shaping operations occur continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined national strategic and strategic military objectives. They are designed to ensure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and partner nations, developing partner nation and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access (Department of Defense 2011b).
**Social Variable**: Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an operational environment and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society members (Department of the Army 2012a).

**Sustainable Development**: Long-term efforts aimed at bringing improvements in economic, political, and social status and the quality of life of all segments of the community as well as environmental sustainability (Payson 2000).

**Sustainable Security**: The ability of a society to solve its own law and order problems and security from external threats peacefully without an external military presence (Payson 2000).

**Tendencies and Potentials**: Tendencies are non-deterministic but as models describing the thoughts or behavior of relevant actors. Tendencies help identify the range of possibilities that relevant actors may develop with or without external influence. Once identified, commanders and staff evaluate the potential of these tendencies to manifest within the operational environment. Potentials are the inherent ability or capacity for the growth or development of a specific interaction or relationship. Not all interactions and relationships support achieving the desired end state. The desired end state accounts for tendencies and potentials that exist among the relevant actors or other aspect of the operational environment (Department of Defense 2011b).

**Terrorism**: The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against people or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives (Payson 2000).

**Time Variable**: Describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an operational environment, as well, as how various actors in the
operational environment perceive the timing and the duration (Department of the Army 2012a).

**Tribal Engagement Strategy:** Describes the details that TETs require to engage with local tribes but is only a component of the broader TESA, which reflects the wide range of power and social structures in a country.

**Tribal Engagement Strategic Approach:** Describes the broad actions that TETs must accomplish collectively within the Host Nation (HN). The TESA must nest with the National Security Strategy (NSS), Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), National Military Strategy (NMS) and Combatant Command (COCOM), as well as draw linkage to the HN’s national and local government strategies.

**Vulnerable Groups:** Any group or sector of society that is at higher risk of being subjected to discriminatory practices, violence, natural or environmental disaster, or economic hardship than other groups within the state; any group or sector of society that is at higher risk in periods of conflict and crisis (Payson 2000).

**Limitations**

The proposed study will be limited to open source unclassified information. Despite the restrictions to For Official Use Only (FOUO) and classified information, there are sufficient alternative resources to complete the study.

**Delimitations**

The researcher aims to determine if a TESA will work in the USAFRICOM AOR. The author will set limits by conducting a case study taking place in Liberia 2003. The researcher selected Liberia because of the author’s academic requirement to participate in
the Liberia Strategic Studies Program. The researcher can only recommend if a TESA will work in the USAFRICOM AOR based on the results gained from the analysis of the operational environment facing Liberia with linkage to the USAFRICOM strategic approach, the NMS, the DSG, and the NSS.

Future researchers and planners must acknowledge the threat to the validity of the study because of the historical bias and the selection bias of samples taken from the Liberian case study. An additional constraint will be time; the researcher will frame the problem based on research conducted from 2003 to the current day to set boundaries around the study. As a result, analysis and recommendations can be inadequate for the rest of the USAFRICOM AOR. The researcher’s recommendations may inform the next five years.

Conclusion

As the target audience, decision makers, planners, and researchers will determine if a TESA will work in USAFRICOM AOR. Analysts can review the chapter 4 case study in Liberia as the sample country to see if a TESA is feasible. The significance of this study requires strategists to take a large problem as described in Liberia, develop a TESA for Liberia, and determine whether USAFRICOM can attempt a TESA throughout its AOR. Planners will analyze tribe level and local level instability in Liberia. Analysts should aim to identify if each country can stabilize at the tribe/local level as part of the USAFRICOM strategy. Additionally, planners should also assess if a TESA works in Liberia. If so, can the TESA be effective throughout USAFRICOM AOR? Can strategists replicate or modify the TESA to work in other countries? Should USAFRICOM attempt
a TESA to increase stability within its AOR? In the next chapter, planners will gain situational understanding of the threats and instability that Africa faces.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This section allows strategists to think about the policies that drive activity in the USAFRICOM AOR. In the literary review, analysts will begin to gain a broad understanding of the National Security Strategy, the DSG, the NMS, and USAFRICOM’s Strategic Approach regarding regional instability in Africa. The authors of these documents provide planners with insight and guidance from the Commander in Chief to the USAFRICOM Commander.

National Security Strategy Objectives in Africa

As part of the NSS, the USG intends to prevent conflict through strategic engagement initiatives. The U.S. seeks to build a close relationship with Africa. The backbone of the relationship between the U.S. and Africa links shared understanding, interests, and values that aid mutual security. The USG aims to reach out to African leaders to assess their intentions, provide opportunities to improve African government, reach out to the African people, and mobilize a coalition.

The USG will continue long-term initiatives that identify and support African governments that exhibit the political willpower to seek maintainable strategies that align with the NSS. The USG has implemented long-term initiatives that strive to assist African governments to overcome community development challenges and then sustain development improvements.
A democratic Africa in conjunction with regional and global leadership action offers unique opportunities to bring peace to the African continent by promoting dignity and meeting basic needs of African citizens. The Obama administration and the Department of Defense (DoD) believe that Africans will not obtain their basic needs if there are places in the continent that do not provide the access. Medicine, food, and purified water are critical to the survival of the people of Africa. The USG supports the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals, which seeks to improve the severe state of poverty that exists in Africa.

The Obama administration and DoD continue to work toward advancing the food security programs to fight hunger and build capacity to feed the people of Africa. The USG wants to continue to provide aid and development in Africa. Moreover, the USG seeks to leverage technology to improve agriculture in Africa. The Obama administration and DoD aim to create conditions where Africa will no longer need U.S. aid and can become self-sustainable.

The U.S. faces many opportunities and challenges in Africa’s operational environment. As African countries develop their economies and reinforce their political bodies and government organizations, the U.S. will focus on building partner capacity (BPC). The Obama administration will concentrate its strategy on growing the economy, fighting against corruption, increasing capacity of African security and rule of law sectors, and reducing local and regional tensions before they emerge as catastrophes.

**Defense Strategic Guidance Objectives**

As the DoD builds partner capacity in Africa, efforts allow for security against violent extremism that threatens U.S. interests and the homeland. With the dispersal of
destructive technology, terrorists have the capabilities that threaten U.S. national security. Therefore, the U.S. military intends to maintain an active approach that detects activities of non-state actors and attacks the most treacherous groups when required (Department of Defense 2012a).

**National Military Strategy Objectives**

The U.S., the United Nations (UN) and the African Union play key roles in efforts directed toward humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping operations (PO) and BPC. Military efforts help preserve stability, reducing political tensions, and support country development. To support this, the Joint Force, and particularly USAFRICOM, will continue to build partner capacity in Africa, focusing on critical states where the threat of terrorism could pose a threat to our homeland and interests (Department of Defense 2011a). The military will continue to fight violent extremism in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, the Joint Force will help lower the terrorist threats to innocent people. The military must pinpoint and collaborate with African states and regional organizations that have proven leaders and are willing to continue their roles in securing Africa through “military to military” engagement. USAFRICOM will assist in facilitating the African Union’s improvement of their military forces to address Africa’s security challenges (Department of Defense 2011a).

**USAFRICOM Strategic Posture as of 2013**

USAFRICOM is in a unique position to shape stability and security in its AOR. AFRICOM is critical in this role, noting its responsibility for 53 countries in Africa.
USAFRICOM develops ways for security cooperation to maintain an aggregate level of engagement, in hopes the Army can reduce conflict by BPC.

USAFRICOM’s strategic approach responds to the guidance illustrated in the NSS, DSG, and the NMS. In response, USAFRICOM defends America’s security interests in Africa to include the protection of global economic system, the prevention of terrorist attacks, the development of dependable partners, and the defense and progression of “universal values.” USAFRICOM encourages “universal values” to promote respect of human rights, prevent mass violence, and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Congress 2013).

USAFRICOM places emphasis on priority countries, regional organizations, and programs that build operational capability and increase partner capacity. USAFRICOM’s approach counters threats and seeks strategic opportunities. USAFRICOM concurrently addresses near-term threats to U.S. national security while constructing long-term friendships that back the objectives in the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa: “strengthening democratic institutions; spurring economic growth, advancing trade and investment; advancing peace and security, and promoting opportunity and development” (Congress 2013, 6). DoD’s most important mission throughout the African continent is the fight against terrorism. USAFRICOM will respond to security threats through both direct and indirect approaches and seek opportunities that improve relationships, partner capacity and regional stability.

USAFRICOM’s strategy encompasses four sub-regional campaign plans. The subordinate campaign plans control operations and manage training initiatives that concentrate on combating extremist groups, building military capability, and sustaining a
strategic posture. Subordinate commands: Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa; Army Forces Africa, Air Forces Africa; Naval Forces Africa; Marine Forces Africa; and Special Operations Africa are responsible for the execution of USAFRICOM’s operations and training engagements. Additionally, USAFRICOM headquarters has interagency representatives from nine agencies and liaison officers from eight countries that are the cornerstone in the success of USAFRICOM strategic objectives. “Our theater strategy and four subordinate regional campaign plans guide our operations, exercises and engagements, which focus on five functional areas: countering violent extremist organizations; strengthening maritime security and countering illicit trafficking; strengthening defense capability; maintaining strategic posture; and preparing for and responding to crises” (Congress 2013, 6). Figure 1 illustrates USAFRICOM’s organizational chart.

![USAFRICOM Organizational Chart](image)

**Figure 1. USAFRICOM Organizational Chart**

*Source:* Created by author.
USAFRICOM has engaged with regional and interagency representatives to enable counter-terrorism relationships focused on defeating VEOs. By BPC and defense capability, the African governments can secure their countries and respond to VEO threats. Three of the priorities in USAFRICOM are to counter Al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and al-Shabaab, which create regional instability in West Africa. Although each VEO poses threats individually, the increased cooperation between AQIM and Boko Haram add to the menace of their threats. Both organizations threaten a safe and secure environment that fosters a stable government and creates an opportunity to achieve sustainable development and security objectives for Africa. Therefore, the U.S. will “reinforce sustainable stability in key states like Nigeria and Kenya that are essential subregional linchpins” (Department of Defense 2010, 45).

Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country and is the source for 8-11 percent of American oil imports. Boko Haram threatens oil imports by conducting terrorist attacks. Historically, Boko Haram has concentrated its efforts targeting the Nigerian government. However, in August 2011 the Boko Haram attacked the UN mission by bombing Abuja, resulting in the deaths of 25 people. Terrorist attacks in Nigeria account for 40 murders in Christmas 2011 and over 180 people murdered in January 2012, both attacks executed in Kano governmental and police facilities (Congress 2013).

As a result, to the attacks, the Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan initiated a state of emergency in affected areas and deployed armed forces to northern Nigeria. Then, as now, USAFRICOM strives to assist Nigerian partners to BPC in civil and military affairs. Cooperation between civilians and soldiers in Northern Nigeria can
improve their ability to defend against similar acts of terror faced in January of 2012 (Congress 2013).

Of the three VEOs, the Boko Haram poses the largest threat to Nigeria based on the number of attacks during 2012. See below for a graphic presentation. In an effort to fight against these attacks, USAFRICOM works closely with the Nigerian military to improve Nigeria’s defense capabilities. In that effort, USAFRICOM aims to develop a professional military capable of working with the Nigerian government to defend against Boko Haram and provide the Nigerian people with a responsive and dependable government. Perhaps, a TESA in Nigeria can support current AFRICOM efforts. The Boko Haram must be contained, if USAFRICOM and partners reduce pressure on the Boko Haram, Boko Haram can increase its capability and pose a larger threat to U.S. security interests.
Figure 2. Boko Haram Attacks in 2012

Source: Congress, Statement of General Carter Ham, USA Commander, United States Africa Command (United States: Senate Armed Service Committee, 2013).

Building Partner Capacity

USAFRICOM initiatives to develop African forces capabilities empower African countries to establish their own protection. USAFRICOM’s emphasis is the development of dependable and independent African forces. Furthermore, USAFRICOM’s BPC activities align with the Department of State (DoS), embassy teams, UN, and the United States Agency International Development (USAID) programs. Engagement teams
manage a series of military capability, humanitarian assistance, and medical support programs (Congress 2013).

The DoS has the initial lead in the planning for cooperation and relationship programs that support UN and African Union PO. In this effort, USAFRICOM is generally providing support to African countries that are transitioning to a democratic form of government and society. As part of the transition, USAFRICOM provided assistance through the development of militaries, civil authority, rule of law, border security, and crisis response to internal and external VEO threats. For example, in March 2013, the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division supported USAFRICOM under the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept. 2nd Brigade’s support extended from deploying small contact teams to conducting major training exercises.

**Maritime Domain**

USAFRICOM efforts toward maritime security are crucial in defending against VEOs and criminal organizations conducting terrorist activities and illicit trafficking. As USAFRICOM executes maritime security, the efforts support trade and economic development. “Coastal nations contend with a range of challenges off their coasts including trafficking in narcotics, and arms, human trafficking; piracy and armed robbery at sea; oil bunkering; and illegal, illegal unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU)” (Congress 2013, 12). Criminals engaged in IUU cripple African fisheries that are critical to the growth of the economy and the food distribution and availability within Africa.

Naval Force Africa and Marine Force Africa are working with African partners to tackle the security concerns in the maritime domain. USAFRICOM’s regional security cooperation strategy requires Naval Force Africa and Marine Force Africa to synchronize
operations with the U.S. Coast Guard in the conduct of two of USAFRICOM’s maritime security programs, the African Partnership Station Program (APS) and the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) that enables regional naval capabilities. Through the AMLEP and APS, USAFRICOM has trained African naval forces to learn necessary skills that resulted in African maritime forces successful confiscation of more than $100 million worth of cocaine and more than $3 million in criminal payment penalties.

USAFRICOM defends against illicit trafficking in the maritime domain. VEOs engaging in illicit trafficking through air, land and sea are sourcing money to international criminal networks, which undermines African governance. USAFRICOM, in conjunction with USG agencies and embassy country teams, counter trafficking activities with programs aimed to stop illicit trafficking. USAFRICOM’s programs focus on BPC in order to target and intervene to stop illicit trafficking throughout USAFRICOM’s AOR.

**Air Domain**

The US Air Force has played a significant role in building air capability. USAFE-AFRICA initiated the African Partnership Flight (APF) program that supports regional cooperation and enhances the capabilities that support peacekeeping operation by providing additional airlift reinforcement to the UN and African Union. As a result, 150 African airmen were involved in the APF last year. Administrators of the APF provide a venue for African airmen to discuss an array of issues regarding air mobility and logistical support for PO.
State Partnership Program

Another initiative where USAFRICOM has made progress is the State Partnership Program (SPP). The SPP intends to build, reinforce, and maintain an American/African relationship that seeks a shared collaboration and understanding of security concerns that require action. SSP initiatives support security cooperation with Liberia, Nigeria, Botswana, Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa, and Tunisia. The SPP is responsible for more than 40 percent of military engagement activities every year.

USAFRICOM maintains force readiness to conduct crisis response operations. USAFRICOM demonstrated its readiness on November 2012 when rebel forces’ actions in the Central African Republic called for the postponement of the U.S. Embassy missions, which USAFRICOM responded to and helped the DoS evacuate all embassy employees and American bystanders. The Arab Awakening has further complicated the security environment. As a result, USAFRICOM has expanded its Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force responsibilities from the previously security cooperation centric missions to the addition of crisis response operations (Congress 2013). TESA in Central African Republic can potentially deter these forms of threats to surface over the long term.

The NSS, DSG, NMS provides the USAFRICOM Commander with the guidance he needs to meet security challenges throughout the African continent. USAFRICOM’s success links to effective collaboration and support of all agencies within the USG and congress. Specifically, support from DoD, DoS, and USAID are instrumental when USAFRICOM plans and executes its missions. Because of the importance of USG
agencies’ support, failure to resource all agencies hinders USAFRICOM’s mission objectives.

Many of USAFRICOM’s security cooperation and BPC programs require funding from DoS and DoD. For example, DoD is the authority for equipping African forces conducting PO, however, DoS provides the authority for the training of the African forces. USAFRICOM acknowledges the requirement for constant coordination among the two departments as well as interagency partners to succeed in security cooperation and BPC programs. By working closely with interagency partners, USAFRICOM ensures to link resources to foreign policy and DoD objectives.

USAFRICOM acknowledges that the security environment in Africa is complicated, which, therefore, presents continuously changing challenges and opportunities throughout the continent. As USAFRICOM continues to develop African partner armed forces and build their defense capabilities, there are opportunities to develop new partnerships and assess African countries at the local and tribe level to determine if a TET can insert themselves within USAFRICOM’s pre-established programs. This section has provided planners with an overview of USAFRICOM strategic approach, programs, and priorities in the continent. In the following sections, planners can begin to study USAFRICOM efforts toward Liberia and the challenges Liberia face as a country.

**USAFRICOM: Operation Onward Liberty in Liberia**

Legacy issues drawing back to the civil war are still drivers of instability between governing institutions, security forces, tribes and vulnerable groups in Liberia. The civil war initiated and aggravated social instability that caused inter-tribal tensions with
linkages to the economic and political environment in Liberia. Throughout Liberian history, political leaders have demonstrated their greed for power and their agenda to create form “regional divisions, ethnic and religious identities, political affiliation, generational differences, socio-economic status, misuse of concession agreements involving Liberia’s rich natural resource base, which has affected how tribes view politics and government” (Sirleaf 2013, 168).

Liberia’s civil war of 2003 concluded with a comprehensive peace agreement, discussed later in the case study (See Appendix A for a list of Liberia’s chronological event). As a result, the USG assisted Liberia through contractor and military support. From 2005-2009, the DoS lead the deactivation of the old Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) by improving three of the AFL’s bases. Furthermore, the U.S. military helped with recruiting, training, and equipping the AFL that consisted of 2,000 soldiers. Once the contractors left Liberia, the Liberian government assumed authority over the AFL. USAFRICOM through U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa (MARFORAF) established Operation Onward Liberty (OOL). OOL is a USAFRICOM lead operation intended to develop the AFL into a military that has the capacity to serve Liberians. Through USAFRICOM’s mentor and advisor programs, the AFL will be more responsible and operationally capable of responding as a professional force to Liberia’s security environment.

As of October 2012, OOL has about 50 service members assigned and supported by U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Air Force, and the Michigan National Guard. Service members supporting OOL deploy and rotate on a semi-annual to an annual basis. “For the AFL itself, the current organization consists of an Infantry Brigade, Coast
Guard, Logistics Command, an Armed Force Training Command and headquarters element” (USAFRICOM 2012, 1).

**Conclusion**

The authors and researchers mentioned in the literature review have attempted to understand and explain the issues that contribute to instability in the USAFRICOM AOR. Furthermore, the authors provided their observations and intent for the African continent through the literary review of the NSS, DSG, NMS, USAFRICOM’s posture statement, and USAID fact sheet. Of the studies reviewed, the overall idea of stabilizing Africa and the countries within the USAFRICOM AOR remains a common theme. Authors are consistent with engagement strategies at the government level. Understanding instability at the clan/tribal level is of much importance. In chapter 3, planners will review design methodology and review how its application can answer the primary question. “Should USAFRICOM attempt a TESA to increase stability within its AOR?”
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter primarily draws on Dr. Jack D. Kem’s book *Planning for Action: Campaign Concepts and Tools* and has influence from ADRP 5-0 and JP 5-0. Planners should consider design methodology as a methodological tool that may determine if a TESA can be effective in the USAFRICOM AOR. Additionally, through design methodology, strategists can answer the secondary research questions, using operational research and analysis studies used for the problems affecting Liberia. Through this methodology, researchers and analysts can understand, visualize, and describe the root causes of instability facing Liberia.

**Design Methodology**

Design methodology encourages critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe the problems facing Liberia. The design methodology is a process that will enable planners to narrow and frame the problem. Furthermore, this methodology will allow analysts to conceptualize solutions that will treat the causes of the problems facing Liberia.

Planners must understand the strategic guidance regarding a specific problem to begin design. The literary review is important because it addresses the NSS, DSG, NMS, and USAFRICOM’s strategic approach. Although the literature review is not an element of design methodology, the review provides important national and military strategic level context that is critical to understanding the USAFRICOM commander, the
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), and the President of the United States (POTUS) intents for the African continent.

The first step requires strategists to conduct the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) analysis. Analysts use the operational variables to assist their commanders in building their situational understanding. Planners will analyze and describe the operational environment in Liberia with respect to PMESII-PT. Strategists must filter the data presented in chapter 4 and sort the information by the operational variables into applicable evidence with respect to the case study. The operational variables are essential to increasing a broad understanding of the current environment in Liberia. Appendix A offers a brief explanation of the variables (Department of the Army 2012b).

The second step requires planners to envision the desired environment for Liberia. Analysts can describe the objectives that are required to achieve desired conditions and/or end states. Hence, the desired environment will describe a realistic future for the operational environment in Liberia. When describing the desired environment, strategists consider the relevant guidance as described in the chapter 2.

The third step defines the problem. In this step, planners seek to identify the root cause rather than just focusing on the obvious symptoms that sit on the surface of the problem. This step requires the identification of the difference between the current and desired conditions in Liberia. Analysts must understand the root causes of instability to establish the situational context discussed in the chapter 4 case study. The strategist’s analysis of the operational variables will inform understanding in framing the root causes. “Having a clear problem statement is essential for developing a problem frame that
enables commanders to “bridge the gap” between the current situation and the desired end state conditions. Commanders then take the problem statement and conceptually develop the operational approach. Having a problem statement in the “how to” format provides focus and direction for the commander and the staff (Kem 2013, 57).

Africans have an array of cultural beliefs, values and behaviors. TETs should determine how Liberians cope within their given situation. TETs must ensure that Africans will function under conditions set by the desired end state or conditions. The planners’ use of the operational variables and cultural understanding of the operational environment will set the stage to begin the visualization of the commander’s desired end state and operational approach.

In the fourth step, analysts begin to come up with solutions. A planner’s solutions address the problems of the systems that were determined as root causes and symptoms. Strategists will help their commander visualize an end state that remedies the sources of instability in the Liberian case studies to improve situational understanding. The planners’ situational understanding of the problems creates opportunity to envision an operational approach that allows moving the current situation into the desired end state or conditions. In building visualization for this study, the analysts’ understanding of the evidence that creates the current situation is paramount. A comprehensive level of the strategists’ understanding creates conditions to complete this task by describing the broad benchmarks that convert the current situation to the desired situation in Liberia.

Once the planners have an accurate visualization of the issues concerning Liberia, they can describe the current situation, operational approach and desired end state. The fifth step is the planner’s development of a strategic approach. The analysts’ strategic
approach will answer how the problem is rectified. Planners may find that the problem may require a “change” approach in order to modify conditions of instability in Liberia (Eikmeier 2012). The information drawn at this point allows the strategists to arrive at a systematic approach to nest the TESA with USAFRICOM’s strategic approach and Liberia’s Agenda for Transformation (AfT) strategy to increase stability in Liberia. The AfT does not address tribal engagement. The planners’ implemented TESA will describe the broad actions that a prospective TES must accomplish in Liberia and other unstable countries within the USAFRICOM AOR.

**Threats to Validity**

Researchers must understand that this study presents a threat to the validity of the TESA because of the historical bias and the selection bias in the Liberian case study. Planners should also understand that the historical bias refers to explicit events over the course of time such as unaccounted events that occurred outside the timeframes of the Liberian case study. Furthermore, analysts should consider that the threat to validity here exists because the TESA will be determined based on events that occurred in Liberia since 2003. Therefore, a planner’s strategy may pose a threat to the validity of the results if applied in another African country during the next five years. Examples of events are political changes, terrorist group involvement, or criminal activities that occurred outside the problem frame. These changes of circumstance during specific timeframes in specific locations challenge the strategist to account for all potentials and tendencies surrounding group behaviors and other independent variables.

Selection bias applies to problems and groups that exist within each country in Africa. For example, if a commander applies “acceptance” as a planning consideration to
the TES, a successful course of action in Liberia may not be acceptable in Nigeria. Acceptability in this example depends on Liberian characteristics such as attitudes, motivations, and willingness to accept change. Therefore, decision makers must ensure the TES is flexible enough to allow for modification to a given African country within the USAFRICOM AOR.

Conclusion

The process of the design methodology will bring about staff recommendations to implement a TESA. Ultimately, through design, researchers will attempt to answer the following three questions: What is the problem? What is the solution? Does the solution answer the problem? Strategists will present the solutions in the form of a TESA and answer the following three questions: What is the end state? What are the ways? What are the means? (Kem 2013).

Researchers cannot plan for every possible risk and operational factor that may arise. Analysts can use the TESA to identify risks and make recommendations that mitigate potential hazards. Planners will leave room for mission command to take place and detailed planning, therefore, allowing decision makers to implement control that allow for success. In the next chapter, researchers can review the analysis of the Liberian case study to attempt to answer the primary question. Should USAFRICOM attempt a TESA to increase stability within its AOR?
CHAPTER 4

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Introduction

In this chapter, the author will frame the problem affecting Liberia with the information that follows. As noted in chapter 1, the researcher will set delimitations on this case study. Nicole Itano, a contributor to this case study, is a freelance reporter based in Johannesburg, South Africa. In August 2003, Ms. Itano conducted interviews for the Christian Science Monitor that involved the people of Monrovia, Liberia. Ms. Itano had first-hand experience for three weeks of reporting on Monrovia (Itano 2003, 12). Planners can expect to gain an understanding of the events that occurred since 2003. Moreover, researchers and planners can understand how those events affected Liberians, refugees, soldiers, and local level employees. Finally, researchers and planners can review the historical background from other areas affecting Liberia.

A Case Study on Liberia Since 2003

Although the author has delimited this study to 2003, this section will have to draw on events that occurred prior to the 2003 civil war. The Liberian crisis drew the U.S.' attention in June 2003. At that time, rebels from the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) made attacked toward Monrovia and seized a portion of the city that included the port. While conflict had occurred since 1999, the international community demonstrated little interest in the events. The interest was so minimal that many international actors assumed that President Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Party (NPP) government had fabricated the conflict in a remote area in
northern Liberia. The international community believed that this was Taylor’s attempt to apply pressure on international stakeholders to drop arms and diamond embargos on Liberia. In 2003, the LURD and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) were unknown to the outside world; there was no information on the two rebel groups’ leaders, structure, or their purpose. Lack of interest from the international community came from a reluctance to help a president accused of smuggling weapons, abusing human rights, and obtaining illegal financial gain at the expense of his country (Itano 2003).

By June 2003, three factors drew the attention of the international public. First, the UN supported the war crimes tribunal to indict President Taylor in Sierra Leone on June 4, 2003, which was the same day Liberia opened peace talks in Accra, Ghana. The second reason was the previously mention LURD movement into Monrovia. The LURD created an evident humanitarian crisis in the city. As a result, the LURD advance caused tens of thousands of displaced Liberians to seek protection in facilities around the US Embassy. Furthermore, reporters broadcasted to the world the acts of Liberians consolidating the remains of casualties near the US Embassy’s facility gates as part of their protest. The third reason occurred when President George W. Bush demanded that Taylor resign his presidency. Furthermore, President Bush was considering the deployment of the U.S. military to assist in stabilizing the problem.

Considering the results of the situation in Iraq, Bush’s consideration of deployment of troops to Liberia indicated that the USG viewed Liberia as a failed state with an increasing threat that the Bush administration could not ignore, even though there was little strategic interest at the time. This form of U.S. involvement demonstrated a
fundamental Bush policy shift, considering that he was “elected on an isolationist international agenda and had repeatedly called on the memory of America’s intervention in Somalia as a warning against interventionism” (Itano 2003, 2). Planners and researchers will find that the situation and problem in Liberia were much different when compared to Somalia 1993 when 18 American soldiers lost their lives in one failed mission. However, the memory of this mission still created doubt from the American public for U.S. intervention in Liberia.

**Background on LURD and MODEL Rebel Groups**

Most Liberian observers date the start of the conflict to April 1999 when President Taylor declared that Liberia was under attack near the Guinea border. By August 1999, President Taylor declared a subsequent attack. Moreover, rebel groups had seized five cities in northern Lofa. At the time, Liberians had little to no information on the rebel groups. Some Liberians believed that President Taylor’s claims were fictitious in an attempt to convince the UN to remove weapons sanctions imposed on Liberia.

The LURD organization formed in July 1999 at Freetown, Sierra Leone. Most of the LURD senior members were Muslims. The LURD was typically Mandingo and emerged from the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), an organization that participated in the war from 1989 to 1997 that divided the ULIMO into two ethnic groups. Roosevelt Johnson led the ULIMO-J, who were comprised of a Krahn ethnic background and Alhaji Kromah led the ULIMO-K who were primarily of Islamic Mandigo ethnicity.

Based out of Guinea, the LURD HQ commanded its forces that consisted of 3,500 soldiers. In the year 2000, the LURD became a functioning rebel group inside of Liberia.
The LURD managed to advance close to Monrovia on many occasions. For example, on July 2002 President Taylor missed the African Union inauguration because the LURD advance brought their members extremely close to Monrovia. However, as previously mentioned, the LURD did not penetrate Monrovia until June 5, 2003. Monrovians suspect that the LURD held off until June 5, 2003 because they were waiting for the international community to call for Taylor’s resignation. Liberians claimed that the LURD initiated “World War I” the day following the UN Special Court proceeding that indicted President Taylor on war crimes, which started the peace talks between the LURD, MODEL and the UN in Accra, Ghana (Itano 2003, 5).

Journalists reported that the MODEL’s members are mainly Krahs, who are primarily of Christian beliefs. MODEL’s members were unsatisfied with the selection of Sekou Damante Conneh Jr as the LURD’s National Chairman, whose ethnic background is Mandingo. Each rebel group claimed that there were no relations between groups. The common denominator among each group is the hatred that the LURD and MODEL shared for Taylor.

Leaders from the Ivory Coast rejected any comments that they supported the MODEL advance from eastern Liberian in March 2003. “The organization claims to have substantial support from Liberian expatriates living in the US and a large number of its political leaders currently living in the US. At the Accra peace talks, three of MODEL’s four-member negotiation teams were Liberian exiles living in America and MODEL’s Chairman, Nimely Yaya (a Krahn) was a former UNICEF worker who had lived in the US for the past 20 years” (Itano 2003, 6). However, observers claimed that MODEL appeared to have close relations and support from the Ivory Coast.
There are several reasons for the Ivory Coast to back the MODEL. Considering that MODEL was a rebel group of Krahn majority in Liberia, tensions were extremely high between President Taylor and the President of the Ivory Coast, Laurent Gbagbo. President Gbagbo did not support a Mandingo-majority LURD in Liberia. Gbagbo believed that the Muslims were responsible for the instability that faced the Ivory Coast. Consequently, Gbagbo could not back an organization that could bring Islamic leader to power. Tensions increased when President Taylor supported the Movement from the Great West (MPIGO), which one of the rebel groups caused a civil war in the Ivory Coast. However, Itano believed that regardless of Gbagbo hatred toward Taylor, Gbagbo was not likely to back a Mandingo-majority LURD in Liberia. President Gbagbo accused the Muslims of causing most of the instability that his fellow citizens had experienced. Therefore, Gbagbo was unlikely to back a group that could raise an Islamic leader to power in his backyard.

Regardless of the allegations that one of the LURD’s principal objectives was to convert Liberia to Islam, religion was not the main goal for the group. However, most of the LURD seniors officers were Muslims, yet their practice was commonly casual. “Islamic greetings and names were rarely used, prayer times were not adhered to and the clothing worn by both women and men was more western than Muslim” (Itano 2003, 6). In fact, most of the female soldiers dressed quite provocatively, which is obviously inappropriate by Islamic groups and their beliefs (Itano 2003).

The use of drugs and alcohol by both the LURD and MODEL was not as liberal as practiced by the government soldiers. Senior officers of both groups did not approve of the use of drugs and alcohol within the ranks. Members of both groups knew that their
superiors forbade intoxication, especially while on duty. The rebel groups’ higher level of discipline can be attributed to their religious beliefs.

Like Taylor’s forces, the rebel forces filled their ranks with young teenage boys dressed in the typical 1980 “gangster-rap” clothing. The LURD also had women in their formations who would dress in tank tops, tight jeans, and sandals. Of all involved, Taylor had the most soldiers. “One LURD commander, COL Martin Collins, who described himself as a senior military advisor to General Sheriff, said a vanguard force of 3,500 soldiers operating under the project name “Operation Butterfly” conducted the attack on Monrovia” (Itano 2003, 7). General Sheriff (his war name was General Cobra) planned to execute “Operation Spider Web” in the second phase. General Sheriff had approximately 19,000 standing by to execute Operation Spider Web. Sheriff never gave the order to initiate phase two because of the progress that resulted from the peace talks, as well as Taylor resignation and departure from Liberia. Itano did not find any evidence of the estimated 19,000 soldiers. She believed that the 3,500 troops that executed Operation Butterfly was the majority of the LURD force.

LURD troops were humane to the Liberians living on LURD territory. Troops shared meals with the Liberians. However, in the final days before the LURDs withdrew from Monrovia, LURD troops denied thousands of Liberians food from the port as they were making their last attempt to stock more food for their families. When the LURD withdrew from the city, many Monrovians were concerned that government troops would return to take revenge on the residents. “In the days after the LURD pulled back to Tubmanburg as part of the peace agreement, dozens of small, citizen-organized vigilante groups sprang up. Their main fear, they said, was of government soldiers, although they
were afraid of general criminal behavior and said the LURD had imposed a certain degree of stability in their territory” (Itano 2003, 8).

The MODEL troops were much less professional than the LURD. The MODEL was much less organized and much more inhumane toward Liberians. The MODEL troops guarding the perimeters between Monrovia and Buchanan were usually drunk and always required payoffs before they permitted civilian to pass. This type of behavior among soldiers was uncommon in the LURD AOR. The MODEL were not as motivated or disciplined when compared to the LURD. “Civilian reports from Buchanan indicated that human rights abuses were quite widespread and that MODEL troops had taken almost anything that could be moved” (Itano 2003, 8). A week after Taylor departed, the MODEL advanced to the capital city and to Monrovia’s airport, possibly to empower their position regarding negotiations in Accra, Ghana.

The Rebel Advance to Monrovia

The LURD offensive first began on June 5, 2003, which was the day after Taylor’s indictment and the beginning of peace negotiations in Accra, Ghana. Results of the negotiations caused rebels movement to remote areas around the city. Moreover, leaders signed a cease-fire agreement on June 17, 2003. The agreement held for seven days when the second attack pulled rebels back into the city’s industrial area, named Bush Rod Island, which includes the Monrovia’s port. On July 17, 2003, the LURD re-advanced and assumed control of Bush Rod Island and Monrovia’s port.

The MODEL consolidated in March and moved from the eastern border to the Ivory Coast. By July 28, 2003, the MODEL occupied Buchanan and its port in Liberia. “During this last offensive there was intense shelling of the city, particularly the three
main bridges: two in the heart of the city (called the Old Bridge and the New Bridge) connecting Mamba Point with Bush Rod Island and, later, a third called Stockton Creek Bridge a few miles north of Monrovia” (Itano 2003, 3). Both sides lacked the military capability to control any of the bridges. Part of the problem was the actual fighting across the bridge, conducted by teenage children soldiers, many of which were intoxicated with drugs and alcohol.

Moreover, on July 31, 2003, the city of Monrovia was in chaos. The majority of the city’s abandoned remote areas were due to Taylor’s military’s message that demanded the city’s people to evacuate. The military considered violators as rebel supporters. Additionally, Liberians would leave to avoid the constant raping and prowling conducted by Taylor’s soldiers. For example, at the Samuel Doe Stadium, occupied by 50,000 Liberians, 1,000 women reported rape incidents during the conflict. Hundreds of thousands Liberians took refuge in areas like the Mamba Point, which was near UN offices and the US Embassy. Liberians went to Mamba Point because they believed the UN and the US Embassy would assist. Furthermore, the buildings in Mamba Point were made of concrete and could better sustain mortar attacks and small arms fire. Unfortunately, the areas where Liberians migrated to were among the areas that received the most casualties. The number of mortar attacks on Liberians had dropped and within two weeks, Liberians returned to their homes. The rebel’s attacks led to critical shortages in food and water.

Liberia’s Deteriorating Government

Even before the LURD advance, Charles Taylor’s presidency was deteriorating from within. The UN indictment coupled with the LURD advance left Taylor with only
one option. The schemes that worked for Taylor when he was a rebel leader were useless as president. By June 2003, Taylor’s Liberian government had lost control of two-thirds of his country and he was incapable of defending the remaining third of Liberia. With the LURD movement from Guinea, which controlled most of northern Liberia, and MODEL moving swiftly from the west, Taylor’s defenses were in shambles. Taylor and his members of his government attributed their failures to Liberia’s defense to arms restrictions. However, Taylor continued to obtain weapons illegally to the day he stepped down. Another observation in Taylor’s weakness was his leadership style or lack of it. Taylor centralized government authority within himself, which crippled his military to the point where animosity existed among military organizations. These organizational issues created tactical and operational challenges for the military to fight against reasonably well structured rebel groups (Itano 2003).

The military forces responsible for the defense of Monrovia and other remote areas were disorganized platoon sized formations manned by teenagers. During Taylor’s presidency, he degraded the AFL because he believed the AFL was not loyal to him. Taylor felt that he could not trust the AFL because of his previous history when he fought against the AFL as a rebel leader in 1989. Taylor’s rebel forces dominated the AFL, an AFL of soldiers recruited by former President Samuel Doe. Therefore, because of Taylor’s bias against the AFL, he established a system of private security organizations and militias led by long-time followers, most who were child soldiers when Taylor was a rebel leader. The Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU) was Taylor’s most trusted organization, led by his son “Chucky.” Taylor had many more informal security forces, such as one called “Jungle Fire,” while others units were unnamed. All units filled their ranks with
children and teenagers. The security organizational structure Taylor employed, as president was similar to the structure he employed as a rebel leader.

As the war continued, Taylor became very distrustful of his own security to the point that he would not even trust his own son’s special ATU with his safety. With rumors of politicians conspiring against Taylor’s government, his paranoia increased as he fled into his fortified house. Even before the LURD advance, on July 10, 2003, Taylor shut down the Spriggs Payne Airport, Monrovia’s primary airport because of its proximity to his fortified house, which posed a significant risk to his safety. Taylor’s decision caused all air services to divert operations to the Roberts Field Airport, which was approximately 60 miles from Monrovia. Air operations affected were commercial, humanitarian, and military in nature. Taylor’s house essentially became the new government center, considering that he held many of his official meetings at home. As a result, Taylor’s house became a gathering place for the press and other actors (Itano 2003).

Few numbers of militia soldiers wore military uniforms in Monrovia. Most soldiers wore civilian clothing depicting a 1980’s gang dress code. Soldiers wore ripped yellow t-shirts, with baggy jeans, bandanas, and most braided their hair. However, soldiers of the ATU were dressed in brown uniforms. “One high-ranking frontline commander, who gave his name as General Cairo Pooh-Pooh (“because you can smell me, but you can’t dodge me”), looked like ‘Michael Jackson meets Mad Max.’ He wore black jeans tucked into black high tops and a single, black, fingerless glove and arrived, wheels screeching, in a white Toyota sedan whose doors had been ripped off and its body
painted with green spots. Even Taylor’s bodyguards looked more like nightclub bouncers than proper military men” (Itano 2003, 4).

Many of the militia soldiers had tattoos and they wore a traditional magic charm called Juju. Soldiers believed that the Juju would protect them from death in battle. A common practice among the soldiers was drug abuse. Many soldiers smoked marijuana and drank alcohol on duty. Soldiers were constantly high and drunk to the point where they can barely speak. Just about every commander claimed to be a general in command of thousands of troops. “One checkpoint commander, who called himself General Edward Johnson and said he was 29 years old, claimed to have been fighting continuously for Taylor for the past 13 years. He also claimed to have had time to finish high school, itself an unusual accomplishment in Liberia, and to acquire an undergraduate degree in criminal justice, quite an accomplishment for a man who would have started fighting at the age of 16” (Itano 2003, 4).

The command structures among militia forces were vague. There was no defined chain of command or strategic plan. However, comments from the Defense Minister Daniel Chea regarding the battles in the frontlines seemed tell a story of cohesive units executing their battle plans. On the contrary, most of the ground combat leaders lacked communications with their senior officers, who were far from the fight. Reporters had limited access to the ground fight. Streets were empty in areas that government authorities granted reporters with access. However, in few instances journalist did observe poor leadership from ground commanders. In one instance, a journalist observed a commanding officer ordering his soldiers to cross a bridge at gunpoint.
Government authorities and military commanders attributed their failures in protecting Monrovia to the international weapons restrictions. Government officials stated that the sanctions prevented their military from defending the people of Monrovia. Although the US, UN, and others from the international community accepted the Liberian 1997 elections to be fair, the imposed arms embargo agreements established during the 1992 civil war were never removed. The US and the UN never lifted the sanction because of Taylor’s suspected transaction with supplying weapons to bordering countries like Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast. On the contrary, Taylor’s government argued that they were a legitimately elected government; government authorities should have the right to purchase weapons on any circumstances. “What kind of mind set would keep an arms embargo on an elected government that is trying to protect three million people? It’s because they don’t like Taylor, said Sam Jackson, then Minister of State Financial and Economic Affairs, who spent much of June and July in London trying to drum up support for Taylor. If we had the ability to buy arms openly, LURD would not be at the Freeport today” (Itano 2003, 4). Although the US/UN weapons restrictions may have weakened Taylor’s ability to defend the city, government authorities did manage to buy weapons illegally.

Even before June 23, 2003, the Liberian Army was in complete disorder and unable to protect Monrovia against the LURD attack. Liberian government forces were ineffective; they had no air capability, and one airport worker stated that he did not observe any choppers move from the Spriggs Payne Airport in the last four months. Additionally, helicopters required replacement part and were out of service. The government equipped their soldiers with AK-47s and a few sniper rifles, machineguns,
and mortars. Noting that most soldiers were children under the influence of drugs and alcohol, soldiers did not use their weapons to their maximum potential. Journalists reported that the LURD had more 81 mm mortars and used them better than the Liberian Army. Reporters based their estimates on numbers of casualties by mortars, which the government soldiers had significant higher casualties by mortar fire than the LURD. Government soldiers’ ability to communicate was extremely weak. Soldiers’ only means of communications were the use of battery operated, non-contract, pre-paid mobile phones, which could not be charged due to the lack of electricity in Monrovia since 1997.

The LURD attack and seizure of the port enabled their ability to stop Taylor’s forces from receiving and distributing food and fuel to his soldiers. The cut in resources were so significant that senior officers and government authorities were unable from attaining these resources, as well. Even President Taylor could not acquire sufficient fuel to run his personal generator to broadcast his resignation through his radio station, Kiss FM. Taylor did not broadcast his final address nor did Liberians have the means to receive his message. Therefore, Taylor sold his recorded statement to a journalist.

The Arrival of ECOWAS Peacekeepers

The LURD withdrew during the first week of July 2003 after the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) confirmed their support to deploy peacekeepers. The ECOWAS involvement instrumentally caused Taylor’s withdraw. West African troops stopped the deadlock of the conflict that could have continued with no foreseeable end. Once West African peacekeepers arrived on August 4, 2003, uniformed peacekeepers replaced the soldiers at all security checkpoints. By mid-August, the security situation improved. However, food, water, fuel, and other supply shortages
remained for two more weeks until the rebels returned control of the port to ECOWAS troops when they arrived in mid-August. The ECOWAS soldiers seized a shipment of arms believed to come from Libya. The weapons confiscated by the peacekeepers arrived at the capital’s airport intended for delivery to senior officers. As peacekeepers gained control over the ports, Liberians regained access to their basic needs.

As a rebel and president, Charles Taylor spent over 14 years creating war inside Liberia, as well as neighboring countries. On August 11, 2003, President Taylor resigned as the President of Liberia. Taylor transferred his authority as president to his vice president, Moses Blah. Within hours of his announcement, Taylor flew into exile in Nigeria. As Taylor departed Liberia, the Liberians observed the rebels withdraw from Liberia’s capital in Monrovia. Furthermore, this event created the immediate opportunity for the U.S. to deploy additional peacekeepers and sign a peace deal that included a two-year transitional government with the election in 2005 (Itano 2003).

Forming a Post-Taylor Government

Before Taylor left for Nigeria, he visited the NPP headquarters for a conference with committee members. Many of NPP followers assembled outside the headquarters to show praise and see Taylor one last time. “Even these few party loyalists said Taylor’s departure was inevitable, although some said they hoped he was planning a return.

“People say he is the problem,” said one man, 23-year-old Emmanuel Johnson. “So if he steps down, we are hoping the problem will be over.” Liberians are a practical people when it comes to politics and most Monrovians shared Johnson’s pragmatism in the days leading up to Taylor’s departure” (Itano 2003, 5). There is little evidence that proves any
Liberian or Monrovian believed that keeping Taylor as president was in their best interest. Most Liberians believed that he was not of presidential caliber.

On August 5, 2003, soldiers from both sides exchanged gifts with their former enemies as a sign of truce. “No more war, we want peace,” shouted a drunk government soldier who called himself General Uncle T, his AK-47 held high above his head, after crossing the Old Bridge into rebel-held territory. After a half hour on the other side, he came back and made a statement. “We rapped together, we danced together, we played football together. We are all brothers” (Itano 2003, 5).

Both rebel groups stated that their main and only objective was to remove Taylor as President of Liberia. At first, the LURD and MODEL appeared to have a plan for the way forward for Liberia once Taylor resigned and departed. While peace agreements in Accra were underway, the LURD and MODEL increased their demands concerning their positions in the transitional government. “In the week after Taylor’s departure for example, both groups threatened to return to arms if they were not given certain high-ranking positions, including the Vice Presidency and many of the lucrative cabinet positions. At one point, the LURD force commander in Monrovia, General Seyea Sheriff, even hinted that the organization would not accept anything less than the presidency. Under international pressure, however, they eventually dropped such claims” (Itano 2003, 7).

On August 18, 2003 the Liberian government, the LURD, and MODEL signed a peace agreement that approved the establishment of the transitional government providing equal powers among the three organizations. Surprisingly, the groups’ agreement came to fruition, noting that the LURD and MODEL are small and somewhat
disorganized groups. However, the rebel groups managed to bring down Taylor, who was one of the shrewdest leaders in West Africa.

President Blah’s presidency lasted for two months. On October 14, 2003, President Blah transferred is authority as President of Liberia to Gyude Bryant. Bryant had no affiliation with the LURD or MODEL rebel groups. At the time, President Bryant was 54 years old and was an executive before delegates to the Liberian peace talks in Ghana chose Gyude Bryant to be the next Liberia president. The delegates were the leading agents to convert to a transitional government with elections to begin in 2005. With a signed peace agreement in place, President Bryant had the task to join with two rebel movements, the LURD and the MODEL to prepare for the 2005 elections.

U.S. assistance to Liberia from FY2004-2009 contributed to strengthen Liberia’s government structure. Moreover, the U.S. assisted Liberia in rebuilding Liberia’s economy. Efforts have created opportunities for economic growth. However, an array of violent attacks in neighboring Guinea created a new political threat to Liberia’s stability in 2007. Liberian political groups who lost the election became potential sources for instability. For example, the former president, Charles Taylor, had obstructed Liberian affairs from Nigeria through a groups made of political, military, business, and criminal connections (Cook 2009).

Security, Movement, and Protection Concerns in Liberia

After the Ivory Coast election involving President Alassane Outtara and then incumbent Laurent Gbagbo in November 2010, conflict between rebels committed to each side created a widespread of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Ivory Coast,
many of whom fled to Liberia. From the time when the conflict surfaced in April 2011, most of the IDPs have returned home over in 2012 (USAID 2012).

“According to the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), approximately 58,200 Ivorian refugees remained in Liberia as of May 2012, representing a 58 percent decline from the estimated 138,000 refugees that resided there in mid-November 2011” (USAID 2012, 1). From the time when the conflict was at the worst state, over 165,000 refugees have left Liberia and have returned to the Ivory Coast. While, refugees continue to return to the Ivory Coast, VEO attacks aimed at both civilians and military members has raised protection concerns. Besides the common armed attacks, according to the OCHA reported cases of sexual violence have increased.

In June 2012, a group of armed rebels attacked personnel supporting the U.N. Operation in the southwestern region. The rebel group killed seven U.N. peacekeepers and over ten civilians. Furthermore, in July 2012, the rebel group attack on the Nahibly IDP camp and its medical center in western Ivory Coast was responsible for six deaths of IDPs. The attack of July 2012 caused UNHRC expedite their plans to move hundreds of IDPs to shelters in areas of their origin or nearby locations. About 81,500 Liberian IDPs still exist as of August 2012 (USAID 2012).

**Poverty in Liberia**

Poverty is among the leading challenges in Liberia. In FY 2012, the USG provided $250,000 to USAID allocated to improve communications between the national and field level responders. As part of the improvement, USAID created a countrywide humanitarian assistance and monitoring network to improve the management of on-going humanitarian efforts. Moreover, the Office of Foreign Assistance (OFDA) contributed
over $450,000 to help Liberian gain more access to services to improve poverty in Liberia.

The Liberian Government established the National Committee on Population Activities (NCPA) in 1983, which is responsible for measuring poverty among the Liberian people. Furthermore, in 2008 the Liberian government employed two additional ways to assess poverty in Liberia. The Liberian government used the Unmet Basic Need (UBN) index to assess Liberian individuals and family households seeking basic needs for survival. The Liberian government determined that “basic needs” include obtaining quality homes, access to medical services, potable water, access to waste management systems, literacy, and employment. Furthermore, the Liberian government highlight that the UBN statistics illustrated that poverty existed throughout Liberia. “According to the census, Rivercess County had the highest proportion of households with UBNs (82 percent), followed by Grand Kru County (78 percent), and Gbarpolu and Rivergee (75% each).” These Liberian counties are in remote locations with inadequate roads and lack of social services.

The Liberian government’s second approach used in poverty assessment considers “essential asset” and “non-essential asset” deficiency. “According to 2008 census figures, essential asset deficiency in Liberia was about 85% on average. Non-essential assets deficiency was about 96%. Nimba, Bong, Grand Cape Mount, Bomi and Rivercess counties were found to have the highest essential assets deficiency, all with a ratio more than 90% deficiency” (Sirleaf 2013, 22).

Liberians’ limited access to infrastructure identifies another driver of poverty in Liberia. Liberian households make up 95 percent of homes that lack of electricity for
cooking and lighting. Water shortages are at a 61 percent low. Finally, homes lacking proper toilets with flushing mechanisms effect 87 percent of Liberian to use improperly dispose of their waste (Sirleaf 2013).

The Liberian government identified unemployment as another challenge in Liberia. The 2008 census accounted for about 61 percent of Liberians to be unemployed or inactive. Liberians categorized as inactive were students or homemakers. In rural locations, a substantial percentage of employed Liberian work in agriculture or family business rather than producing crops for cash. Most of the employed Liberians are not educated, leading to poor wages and production (Sirleaf 2013).

Liberians have inadequate access to education, which is another contributing factor to poverty. Of the Liberian students, over 15 years old, 19 percent received some form of primary education and 15 percent received some form of secondary education. Since 2008, statistic for students completing primary and secondary school has improved. About 69 percent of students between the ages of 15 and 24 can read and write. The statistics are acceptable to the Liberian government when compared to other African countries.

The health care delivery system is another challenge facing poverty in Liberia. Poor health outcomes account for an increased amount Liberians diagnosed with Malaria, which make 69 percent of the predominant disease cases in 2009. Moreover, maternal and child mortality rates remain high. In response to these statistics, the Liberian government has created a package of free medical care known as the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS). The Liberian government has made BPHS available in 70
percent of Liberian hospital as of 2010. Access to hospitals continues to be of great concern to Liberians (Sirleaf 2013).

The USG made significant progress in assisting Liberia during 2012. As of August 2012, about 58,000 Ivorian refugees still exist in Liberia. The OFDA contributed to over $5.5 million to provide humanitarian assistance to Liberia. USAID funded the improvement of Liberian quality of life through food assistance and as well as placing Ivoirians and Liberians in homes. Additionally, the USAID’s Office of Food for Peace (FFP), contributed over $20 million dollars to support the urgent food requirement in conflict-affected areas within Liberia. The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugee, and Migration (PRM) contributed $8.6 million to support IDPs and refugees with camp coordination in Liberia.

The USG’s contributions are a testament to the former U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield’s commitment to the disaster declaration for Liberians and Ivorian refugees in need. Furthermore, in 2013, President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf published the AfT to improve the quality of life for Liberian citizens. The Liberian government pledged to pull Liberians from poverty. The five-year strategy intends to improve poverty, civil conflict, economy and the political situation (Sirleaf 2013).

**PMESII-PT Analysis**

In this section, planners use the operational variables to improve their understanding of the situation in Liberia. Planners can analyze PMESII-PT to frame the current environment in Liberia and build their situational understanding. Analysts will filter the information presented in the case study and sort the data by the operational
variables into relevant evidence. In the next section, strategists can begin by analyzing the political variable.

**Political Operational Variable**

At the start of this case study, members in the international arena demonstrated a lack of interest in the problems in Liberia. Political leaders had an unwillingness to assist the Liberian government because of its demonstration of illegal activities, therefore, making the Liberian Government ineffective and illegitimate. As a result, the LURD and MODEL formed and removed President Taylor and his regime from power. The success of the LURD and MODEL attack set conditions for a peace agreement to occur between the Liberian government and the LURD and MODEL to form a new center of political power in preparation for the 2005 elections. President Gbagbo of the Ivory Coast was unlikely to support a Mandingo-majority LURD in Liberia. President Gbagbo blamed the Muslims for causing most of the instability that Ivoirians experienced. Therefore, Gbagbo would not support a group capable of elevating an Islamic leader to power.

The problems in Liberia are deeply rooted, which makes peace in Liberia uncertain. During past conflicts, both the LURD and MODEL kept their objective to remove Taylor. However, their efforts could not resolve the issue of instability that centered on the ethnic based dissatisfaction and disempowerment that remain the root cause of their grievances. Part of the disagreement among the rebel groups were on the programs established for the demobilization and disarmament, and most importantly the effects on thousands of Liberia’s children serving as soldiers.

Numerous Liberian families and tribes grieved over the deaths of their loved ones and wanted retribution against those who committed the attacks. However, President
Sirleaf did not generally support punishment of those who engaged in wartime violence during past civil wars because such prosecutions could reignite old resentments and conflicts. The 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement suggested recommendations for the general amnesty to all Liberians who participated in the civil war, however, did not specifically grant amnesty. The Peace Agreement did provide latitude for victims to pursue human rights violations by establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

In February 2006, President Sirleaf approved the TRC. She also promised to back the TRC that mandated the investigations of criminal activities and human rights violations that occurred between 1979 and 2003. In the summer of 2007, the Liberian government initiated a project to obtain testimonies from Liberians living in the U.S., which Northwestern University’s Center for Human Rights Law assisted in collecting statements for the TRC. In August 2007, the three government entities made of 18 political parties presented a plan for the peace process, created the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), assigned leadership positions, and signed the new Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Cook 2009). The Liberian government has gone through some reform over the past eight years and is committed to improve the quality of life for Liberians. President Sirleaf pledged to improve Liberian quality of life through the Liberian government’s five-year strategy intended to reduce civil conflict, develop the economy, and strengthen political and government processes.

Military Operational Variable

The military situation in 2003 demonstrated that the Liberian Army was useless. The Liberian Army had no air capability and armed its children service members with
AK-47s, an insufficient sniper rifles, machineguns, and mortars with little to no training. Soldiers of the Liberian Army had limited communications equipment. Soldiers’ primary means of communications were pre-paid mobile phones.

President Taylor did not trust the Liberian Army. Taylor trusted in the militias that raised him to power. The ATU was his principal militia force. The command and control among militia forces were inadequate and unstructured. Militia forces had no defined operational or strategic plan. Most of the ground commanders lacked communications with their senior commanders, who separated themselves from the actual fight on the ground.

LURD HQ was located in Guinea. The LURD force was essentially a brigade size element made of 3,500 soldiers who executed Operation Butterfly in Monrovia. The LURD were better equipped and trained on the use 81 mm mortars than the Liberian Army.

MODEL soldiers were responsible with securing the perimeters between Monrovia and Buchanan. The MODEL were not as disciplined as the LURD. However, the LURD and MODEL did lack the military capability to control any of the bridges. LURD and MODEL lacked the skill set to fight across the bridge.

Liberia’s civil war of 2003 concluded with a comprehensive peace agreement, which resulted in the USG’s military support to Liberia. From 2005-2009, the DoS lead the deactivation of the old Liberian Army by developing three of Liberia’s military camps. Additionally, USAFRICOM has assisted with the recruiting, training, and equipping the Liberian Army. The Liberian government currently has control over its Army. As of 2012, through OOL, USAFRICOM deployed 50 of its military advisors to
Liberia. Currently the Liberian Army consists of one Infantry Brigade, Coast Guard, Logistics Command, and an Armed Force Training Command.

**Economic Operational Variable**

Since 2005, the USG has committed to helping the Liberian government to improve their economy. Although US contributions stimulated Liberia’s economy, unemployment remains a significant problem for 61 percent Liberians. The Liberian government acknowledges that factors that affect their economy attributed to the lack of opportunities for Liberians to obtain quality homes, access to medical services, access to potable water, access to waste management systems, Liberian literacy, and Liberian unemployment. The lack of basic needs creates poverty throughout Liberia. Poverty statistics inform that eighty two percent of Liberians residing in Rivercess County, followed by Grand Kru County at seventy eight percent, and Gbarpolu and Rivergee at seventy five percent. These counties are in rural locations and have poor road networks and extremely limited availability for Liberians to obtain social services.

Liberia’s economy estimated at $1.7 billion in 2012, the growth since 2008 allowed the government to seek projects to rebuild road networks that allowed businesses to gain access to their suppliers. Furthermore, the Liberian government invested in rebuilding its communications and electrical infrastructure that has created some jobs. As a result, the upgrades improved government operations and increased interaction of people with government (Sirleaf 2013).
Social Operational Variable

The social operational variable provides evidence that the LURD is mostly Mandingos. LURD is a merger of the ULIMO that split into two ethnic groups. The ULIMO-J consisted of Krahn ethnic members and the ULIMO-K, which consisted of Islamic Mandigo ethnic members. The majority of the LURD senior leaders were Muslims. However, the MODEL were mainly Krahns and mostly Christian faith. Both the LURD and MODEL members were more disciplined than the Liberian Army and the Militias because of the LURD/MODEL religious beliefs.

From a human right perspective, the LURDs demonstrated the tendency to be cruel, noting that the LURD denied thousands of Liberians food from the ports after the attack. The MODEL soldiers were much less caring toward Liberians; MODEL soldiers violated Liberian human rights that caused many Liberians to evacuate to evade the constant raping and prowling by MODEL troops. Over 50,000 Liberians, 1,000 women reported rape incidents during the conflict.

Unity and confidence among tribes and local government are important measures of reconciliation for the groups involved. Tribes believe that the government owes Liberians entitlements that satisfy their basic needs. Liberians may have a distorted perception of their government. Current government reform and relationship-building objectives do not effectively address “inter-ethnic, inter-religious and inter-generational tensions over natural resource management and long-term secure access to land. These remain critical challenges to peace and reconciliation” (Sirleaf 2013, 46).

Relationships and grievances among tribes and government in Liberia are extremely complicated. “The strong interrelationships between poverty, unemployment,
lack of investor confidence, crime and justice creates potential for continued insecurity and conflict in Liberia” (Sirleaf 2013, 41). Socioeconomic grievances that involve students, workers, government employees, and the unemployed community disturb Liberian families and tribes. Furthermore, food and medical care insecurities set conditions for Liberians who would otherwise be honest contributors to civil society to become criminals who do not trust the system and are willing to make money by any means necessary.

Liberians believe that land belongs to them and they should be primary stakeholders in decisions regarding the governance of land and property. Both public and business leaders restrict villagers and tribesmen access to land, which prevents opportunities for growth in agriculture. The Liberian government has considered accepting tribal certificates attained from the elders or tribal chiefs as a requirement for private land ownership. The government has also considered restricting the square footage of property holdings and establishing women and youth land entitlements. Land ownership creates conflict within Liberian communities who argue the right to use communal lands within and between ethnic groups. Local governments are constrained by un-defined property laws to resolve these types of disputes.

Corruption and greed exist among tribes, vulnerable groups, and government institutions in Liberia. Liberia’s history has recorded historic events that link illegal businesses, corruption, and lack of government practice. These events are causes of conflict in Liberia. Most Liberian families and tribes are unemployed and uneducated. Tribesmen are mostly Muslim and believe the government discriminates against them. Unsatisfied internal tribes are capable of starting another civil war.
In circumstances where Liberians have knowledge of the law, they are not likely to seek justice because Liberians do not trust that the system will solve their problems. Vulnerable and marginalized groups involving women and their children experience emotional, social, and economical torment because of the government’s lack of preventive or responsive actions to gender issues. As these circumstances recur, compounded with incidents of police misconduct and corruption undermine the credibility of the justice system.

Corruption in both public and private sectors discourage investment by foreign and domestic enterprises. Civil servants are vulnerable to corruption and Liberian citizen must frequently offer payoffs to receive public services. Liberian government preventive and responsive measures against corrupted officials remain ineffective. Government procedures to deter and prosecute corruption reflect the lack of supervision and accountability in both the public and private sector.

If Liberians perceive corruption within government institutions, social tensions will intensify. The denials of due process will linger along the side of “ritual killings, mob violence and certain customary justice practices that violate human rights” (Sirleaf 2013, 41). Although Liberia has seen a decline in armed conflict, armed robbery and rape still threaten many Liberian communities. Although the Liberian government has taken action toward reform, their justice system remains flawed. These inadequacies in the justice systems impede factual reconciliation throughout Liberian society that is a significant threat to Liberia’s plan for long-term peace and stability.
Information Operational Variable

In 2010, the Liberian government created the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT) to manage policy. Additionally, the government established the Liberia Telecommunications Authority (LTA) with independent regulatory mandate and the Liberia Telecommunications Corporation (LIBTELCO) continued as the national operator. Although these entities lacked a vision for the development of the communications infrastructure, access to cell phones has increased, with more than 50 percent of Liberian households owning a mobile phone since 2010. The nonexistence of broadband access limits internet service providers to offer limited reduced internet services at a substantial cost. “The submarine fiber-optic cable around West Africa has reached Liberia, making for a huge potential improvement in service, but it has not yet been linked with installations onshore” (Sirleaf 2013, 68).

Infrastructure Operational Variable

The civil war in 2003 caused a lot of damage to Liberian infrastructure. “With the emerging economic activities in mining, logging and agriculture, concessions will account for a significant portion of the country’s infrastructure needs going forward” (Sirleaf 2013). The Liberian government assessed its financial and infrastructure requirements for the public and private sectors. Public transportation is limited, particularly outside of Monrovia. The Ministry of Transport (MoT), with the support of international partners, has created an all-inclusive transportation plan that aims to restore roads and bridges from the next five years to 2030. Liberia is dependent on roads and bridges to deliver public services and conduct private business. Liberia will invest $500 million that comes from donor funds to restore roads and bridges to a level of minimum
usability. However, transportation costs are substantial, averaging $.20 per ton kilometer, due to poor road and bridge conditions. About 95 percent of the roads are not paved roads, which causes high maintenance costs.

Unreliable electricity constrains progress in industrial development. The effects of the civil war destroyed the entire electrical infrastructure. Damages lead to high costs of power presently over $0.50 per KWH, which makes circumstances economically unfavorable for manufacturing projects. The Liberian government has many objectives to accomplish before it can supply electricity to the majority of the economy, which is a key requirement for Liberia to attain middle-income status (Sirleaf 2013).

Physical Environment Operational Variable

Liberia accounts for 37,420 square miles on the western bulge of Africa. From Liberia, orientation to Guinea is to the north, the Atlantic Ocean is to the south, the Ivory Coast is to the east, and Sierra Leone is to the west. “The capital Monrovia is the seat of the central government and the country is further divided into 15 administrative divisions known as counties: Bomi, Bong, Gparbolu, Grand Bassa, Grand Cape Mount, Grand Gedeh, Grand Kru, Lofa, Margibi, Maryland, Montserrado, Nimba, River Cess, River Gee, and Sinoe (Appendix C). By far the most populous is Montserrado County, which houses the capital, followed by Nimba, Lofa and Grand Bassa counties” (Sirleaf 2013, 15).

Liberia’s geographical structure contains a 350-mile long coast, mountainous plateaus, rain forest, mangrove marshlands, and coastal lagoons. The rain forest occupies about 45 percent of Liberia’s terrain and is the basis to acquire timber. The plateaus are refined for agriculture, which is 27 percent of the land and the mountains provide mineral
resources, specifically diamonds, and iron ore. Liberia also has substantial hydro resources, which include the St Paul River, the St John River, and the Cavalla River. These rivers are favorable to the expansion of hydro-electricity (Sirleaf 2013).

**Time Operational Variable**

The time variable will provide the reader awareness of how history has shaped Liberians through time. For a more detailed chronology of the event refer to Appendix B. Liberians recalled the old Americo-Liberian clans, who were descendants of liberated slaves. The descendants never made more than five percent of the Liberian population. However, the Americo families controlled Liberia’s political future for the first 150 years of Liberia’s history. From the Liberians point of view, the Mandingos took their businesses and homes. Liberians had different concerns with the Krahns. Liberians categorized the Krans as non-educated criminals linked to the failures of Liberia’s former President Doe. Doe was responsible for the military coup of 1980 that remove the last Americo-Liberia president, William Tolbert. “In a few cases, people explicitly said they would not accept a Mandingo or Kran president for Liberia. “I would not accept a Mandingo president,” said one woman, Fagina Brooks, “Because they are not citizens of Liberia.” This costal-interior tension in not unique to Liberia” (Itano 2003, 7).

From April to August 1999, President Taylor professed that Guinea border troops attacked Liberia. However, political leaders from the international arena revealed minimal concerns because they believed that President Taylor had created a speculative conflict in northern Liberia.

By the year 2000, the LURD became a functional rebel group. In 2002, the LURD and MODEL were still not well known and there was no proof that either group posed a
threat to the Liberian government. In June 2003, the LURD moved toward Monrovia and took control of the city. The Liberian crisis drew the attention of the U.S. during this period in time.

Peace negotiations commenced on June 4, 2003, in Accra, Ghana. Liberians believed that the LURD waited until June 5, 2003 because the LURD was waiting for international political leaders to demand for Taylor’s resignation. By the end of June 2003, Taylor lost control of most of his country and became unable defend his agenda for Liberia.

By July 2003, the LURD assumed complete control of Bush Rod Island and Monrovia’s port. Furthermore, the MODEL occupied Buchanan and its port in Liberia. On August 2003, West African peacekeeper arrived and relieved rebel forces at all security checkpoints and the fighting stopped. On August 11, 2003, President Taylor issued his resignation and fled to Nigeria. On August 18, 2003 the Liberian government, the LURD, and MODEL signed a peace agreement that approved the establishment of transitional government. Liberians did not want Taylor replaced by neither a Mandingo nor Kran president for their country. Liberians accused both the LURD and MODEL for the current problems they were facing. Most Liberians preferred a president and government filled with members that were not involved in the conflict. Liberians also had concerns regarding the ethnicity of both rebel groups.

On October 14, 2003, Gyude Bryant became the new President of Liberia. Because of the existing conditions, the U.S. deployed peacekeepers and signed a peace deal for a two-year transitional government with election in 2005. U.S. contributions to
Liberia from 2004 to 2009 improved Liberia’s government. However, VEO attacks in neighboring Guinea formed a new threat to Liberia’s sovereignty in 2007.

After the 2010 election involving President Alassane Ouattara and Laurent Gbagbo, conflict between rebels committed to each candidate generated IDPs in the Ivory Coast and Liberia. Since the beginning of the conflict in April 2011, many of the IDPs have gone back to their homes in 2012.

On June 2012, armed rebels attacked personnel assisting the U.N. Operation in the southwestern region. Furthermore, on July 2012, an inter-communal violence provoked another attack on the Nahibly camp in western Ivory Coast. As of August 2012, Liberia still has approximately 58,000 Ivorian refugees. See Appendix A to review the UN Security Council chronology of events.

The Current Environment in Liberia

The U.S. has provided substantial aid to assist Liberians and Ivory Coast refugees. The Liberian government is making progress to develop the standard of living for its people. The President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf vowed to increase Liberian living standards through her five-year strategy aimed to deter civil conflict, strengthen the economy, and improve the political environment. USAFRICOM plays an important role that targets recruiting, training, and equipping of the Liberian Army through OOL, which, has 50 advisors in Liberia. This enables the Liberian government to control its Army. The Liberian Army consists of one Infantry Brigade, Coast Guard, Logistics Command, and an Armed Force Training Command.

There are 15 ethnic groups within the tribes and they are predominantly unemployed and uneducated. The tribesmen are mostly Muslim and believe the
government discriminates against them. Tribes lack trust in their governing institutions and security forces. Unsatisfied internal tribes are capable of starting another civil war. They require basic needs such as quality homes, medical services, potable water, and access to waste management systems. The lack of basic needs is the root cause to the poverty that exists in Liberia, specifically in Rivercess County, Grand Kru County, Gbarpolu and Rivergee. These counties are in rural locations and have poor road networks and extremely limited availability for Liberians to obtain social services. Furthermore, the events of April 2011 accounts for over 80,000 IDPs and 50,000 Ivorian refugees living in Liberia today.

The U.S. through the OFDA conducts Humanitarian Assistance (HA) activities as well as supports Liberians to gain access to services to improve poverty in Liberia. Moreover, the USAID’s Office of FFP provides immediate food requirement in conflict-affected areas throughout Ivory Coast and Liberia. The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of PRM assists IDPs and refugees with camp coordination in the Ivory Coast and Liberia. Other USAID programs focus on developing the social and economic environment to stimulate community reintegration, the economy, and renovation of the infrastructure. USAID also supports activities that deter community conflicts, specifically in post-conflict areas.

The U.S., through USAID, the State Department, and other U.S. government agencies, also support programs to improve governance; government transparency and accountability; adherence to the rule of law; and the capacity of civil society to monitor and get involved in government activities.
Despite current U.S efforts, Liberian families and tribes still face minimal access to basic social services, some vulnerable families and tribes lack access to inexpensive food, potable water, medical services, and sanitation facilities. Additionally, instability in some areas has postponed the return of many IDPs and refugees. Appendix D provides a graphic representation of Liberia’s current environment.

The Desired Environment in Liberia

The problem of IDPs and refugees in Liberia no longer exists. Liberia is a middle-income country with equal opportunities and access to all of its citizens and criminal groups are contained. Most Liberian tribes and families are working with better access to affordable food and drinkable water. Tribesmen are contributing citizens to the growth and wealth creation in Liberia. With low inflation, a balanced budget, and reduced external debt, the economy represents a collection of reformed legitimate businesses in the private sectors. As a result, there are no extreme uprisings from rebel and criminal groups are contained; Liberians gain more trust in their Army and local security forces that result in improved peace and security for Liberia.

With sustained peace and continued economic growth, poverty has declined in Liberia. Liberia’s physical infrastructure has improved and coverage of health and education services have expanded. The Liberian government continues to reform civil service and improve its legitimacy with Liberian tribes throughout the country. The Liberian government has decentralized its authority to functioning local governments and agencies. Local governments have control of their own security. Furthermore, local governments are capable to manage labor crime prevention as well as deliver a functioning justice system. Local governments deliver basic education and continue to
improve local infrastructure and diligently pursue local environmental issues. Local governments demonstrate to all Liberian families and tribes that Liberia offers a promising future. Appendix E illustrates Liberia’s desired environment with the nested TESA.

The Problem Statement for this Case Study

Most Liberian families and tribes are unemployed and uneducated. Unsatisfied internal tribes are capable of starting another civil war or engaging in criminal activity if they cannot obtain their basic needs through honest means. The lack of basic needs is the root cause to the poverty that exists in Liberia, specifically in Rivercess County, Grand Kru County, Gbarpolu and Rivergee. Furthermore, there are over 80,000 IDPs and 50,000 Ivorian refugees living in Liberia today.

The complexity of the strategic environment in Liberia requires a strategy that supports current and ongoing strategic objectives that aim to deter civil conflict, build the economy, improve the political environment, and strengthen the military in Liberia. Due to the instability facing Liberia, US Government Agencies, USAFRICOM and the Liberian government must determine how to get the tribes to trust and work with their local governments.

The Operational Approach

Based on operational design, this section will outline the Liberian government’s and USAFRICOM strategic approach and then present the TESA aimed to nest with USAFRICOM and the Liberian Government Lines of Effort (LOE) and desired end states. This section will broadly describes the actions that USAFRICOM and the Liberian
Government are currently taking as well the actions needed to achieve NSS, NMS, USAFRICOM objectives at the tribe and community level to support Liberia’s agenda for its transformation.

Analysts can develop an operational approach to answer the following questions to move the current environment to the desired environment in Liberia. How can TETs help protect tribal interests and work through issues of corruption and poor governance? How do TETs support current U.S. initiatives to increase stability through engagement, defense sector reform, and political integration with local governments and tribes? How do TETs encourage interaction between tribal, local, and central government leaders? How can a TESA support current USG Agencies, USAFRICOM and Liberian government efforts to address the root causes of instability, grievances, and corruption among tribes, ethnic and vulnerable groups, and local governments in Liberia?

**Liberia’s Agenda for Transformation Strategy**

The Liberian government’s AfT focuses on building the economy to realize Liberia’s vision of middle-income status by 2030. Although the AfT plan emphasizes the on the economy, the strategy requires success in all LOEs (justice, peace, human development and good governance). Hence, in addition to building the economy, the next priority is to create a just society for all Liberians.

For Liberia to attain its objectives of economic growth, the Liberian government plans to achieve its Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs) across four Lines of Effort. Liberian authorities base Peace, Security, and Rule of Law LOEs on the incremental changes that occur over the first five years, which requires authorities to monitor the effectiveness of the strategy. The Liberian government
seeks to professionalize its national army and national police by providing security forces proper equipment that enables the forces to secure Liberian interests.

The Liberian government will encourage reconciliation among numerous groups of Liberian society. Liberia plans to invest in conflict resolution programs and respond to the concerns raised in the TRC. Furthermore, the Liberian government will increase access to the justice system for all Liberians. Increasing access to the Liberian justice system will allow the government to gain trust from Liberians and transparency and accountability within government.

To transform the economy, the Liberian government’s key MOEs focus on the progress in the development of roads, bridges, seaports, airports, communications, and affordable housing. With the support international partners, the Liberian government will pay for the procurement of infrastructure development programs. The government will also focus on improving the private sector. The Liberian government will also assist the Liberian working in agricultural, fishing and forestry to gain better results by increasing agriculture production and accessibility to markets to improve food security through the country.

The Human Development LOE requires the Liberian government to guarantee equal opportunity to obtain free education for all children and teenagers. The government will also attempt to improve the quality of education by lobbying for community participation and improving teacher training. The Liberian government will invest vocational training and assure Liberians that they will have the expertise to compete for jobs. Furthermore, the government will invest in entrepreneurship training to encourage
Liberians to create their own small businesses and make their contributions to build Liberia’s economy.

Liberia will increase access to medical and social welfare services, and establish programs for vulnerable groups such as women, children, youth and disabled Liberians. Liberia will continue to work with domestic and international donors to delivery and oversee education and health care services. Finally, Liberia attempt to improve accessibility to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) throughout Liberia but with emphasis in vulnerable communities.

Governance and Public Institutions LOE requires the government to rebuild trust with Liberians. Government employees will work to provide essential services to Liberians by operating responsive institution at all levels of government. The National level government will decentralize authority of government services in each county and reinforce local leadership decision making. Moreover, the Liberian government will improve civil service and build up its governmental organizations. Government authorities will hire their employees on qualifications and ensure to represent all groups of Liberian society equally at all levels of politics (Sirleaf 2013). Appendix F illustrates Liberia’s AfT Strategy. The four LOEs are Peace and Security; Economic Transformation; Human Development; and Governance and Public Institution, represents the strategy for a better Liberia by 2030.

**USAFRICOM Strategic Approach**

USAFRICOM along with its coalition and interagency partners build Africa’s military capabilities, responds to disasters, counter transnational threats to secure U.S. interests and promote regional stability and security. USAFRICOM’s LOEs support
“partner efforts in six functional areas: countering violent extremist organizations and the networks that support them; building defense institutions and forces; strengthening maritime security; supporting peace support operations; supporting humanitarian and disaster response; and countering illicit flows of drugs, weapons, money, and people” (Congress 2014, 6). USAFRICOM supports defense capacity development as a component of the National Security Strategy. USAFRICOM builds partner capacity by strengthening African militaries through long-term advisory relationships to help them build their own forces and support local security forces to make progress at their own sustainable pace. Appendix G illustrates Africa Command’s strategic approach and Appendix H displays how the U.S. supports Liberia through the military use of national power. In the next section, planner can review how the TESA can fit into the overall engagement strategy that exists with the NSS objectives for Africa and USAFRICOM’s strategic approach.

**Tribal Engagement Strategic Approach**

Should USAFRICOM attempt a TESA to increase stability within its AOR? Before planners can come to conclusions, make recommendations for a TESA, they should have a clear understanding of the LOEs that make a TESA to determine if commanders should attempt a TESA in other African countries. The following section provides planners with a recommended TESA for Liberia. A planner’s conclusions and recommendations for implementing a TESA in Liberia or other African countries must ensure that the approach nests with the NSS, NDG, NMS, and Africa Command’s engagement strategy and integrate into the African countries’ central and local strategic plans if one exists. The TETs executing the TES should seek to accomplish the following
three LOEs within their assigned community: Reduce corruption, Reduce Local Tensions & Prevent Local Conflict, and Conduct Community Engagement. Inform and Influence Activities (IIAs) are important to all LOEs, the U.S. must re-enforce the TES by guaranteeing their support to the affected local governments and tribes.

TETs must reduce corruption, help protect tribal interests and work through issues of corruption and poor governance. TETs should employ Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Engineers, and Military Police Officers and NCOs to advise local forces to protect their government from corrupted actors. A corrupted local government will raise skepticism among the tribe leaders and their tribesmen who are a part of the oldest independent country in West Africa and consist of 15 ethnic groups. These tribes have deep-rooted values and beliefs, which make them highly likely to resist local government involvement in what tribes view as “tribal affairs.” Liberian tribal chiefs are traditional justice providers and play a significant role in the arbitration of disputes within their tribes. The TETs may not completely remove corruption because of the tendencies and potentials that may exist among various actors. As a result, the TETs should strive to decrease corruption to a manageable level by evaluating their MOEs/MOPs depicted in the illustration below. Integrating TETs with current advisors supporting OOLs presents opportunities of AFL and Liberia National Police (LNP) training initiatives that with positive outcomes may empower a meaningful local government and therefore reduce corruption.

TETs must reduce local tensions and prevent future conflicts within their assigned communities. It is essential that TETs place considerable amount of time and energy to build solid relationships and rapport among all groups within their assigned community
as this task is at the core of the TET’s mission. The TETs should seek to build partner
capacity between tribal leaders and local community government leaders by assisting
with unsettled disputes that can fester if remain unresolved. For example, the Liberian
government has various issues concerning land ownership at the national and local levels.
There are multitudes of tribal claims to land ownership that make most counties unstable,
with major concerns in Rivercess, Grand Kru, Gbarpolu, and Rivergee counties. Local
governments are not prepared to assist in these disputes and therefore, tribes take matters
to their chiefs.

These unanswered claims demonstrate national and local governments’ inability
to manage their land. These problems create opportunities for TETs to assist in the
decentralization of local land management that with positive outcomes can strengthen
relationship among tribes and local governments to reduce local tension and prevent
future conflicts within the communities and Liberia as a whole. If the TETs fail, local
government legitimacy will be at risk and the local populace will isolate themselves and
lose trust in local leadership. Having language expertise within the TET can help mitigate
these issues and better promote community engagement activities in the areas.

TETs can encourage interaction between tribal, local, and central government
leaders through community engagement. Community engagement is the cornerstone of
the TESA as it reinforces the “Reduce Corruption” and the “Reduce Local Tensions and
Prevent Local Conflicts” LOEs. TETs must conduct community and key leader
genagement activities that involve local government and police authorities, tribes and
village elders, religious leaders, schoolteachers, and business owners. TETs executing the
TES should consider the tribal, political, religious, and economic sources within a given
community to be more successful, rather than simply engaging with tribal sources of power at random. Therefore, before TETs conduct community or key leader engagement activities, TETs should understand that they represent the U.S., the strategic communication message, U.S. national security interests, the combatant commander’s intent, and have a clear agenda for the meeting.

TETs can support current U.S. initiatives to increase stability through engagement, local defense sector reform, and political integration within local governments and tribes. Furthermore, collaborating and building friendship with local USAID representatives creates opportunity to leverage USAID program in a way that foster shared understanding and unity of effort among all involved. Commanders and staff may fail if they use the TESA as a “one size fits all” solution for all affected tribes within a given community or a given AO. Therefore, planners should present an approach that is flexible enough to meet commander’s needs for a given situation and environment.

TETs are required to execute information activities, which are a critical element of the TES. Examples may include the U.S.’ assurance to support tribes, local governments, and security forces for the long-term. In that effort, U.S. forces will prevent internal and external threats as best as possible. Furthermore, the USG must convince the victims that community engagement will improve their quality of life and well-being. Appendix I displays the recommended TESA. In the next section, researchers can review lesson learned in Afghanistan, to help determine if commanders should attempt a TESA in the USAFRICOM AOR.
Lesson Learned from a TES in Afghanistan

Before determining if commanders and staff should attempt a TESA within the US AFRICOM AOR, planners should consider the lessons learned in Afghanistan. From March 22-25, 2010, Small Wars Journal hosted a Tribal Engagement Workshop (TEW) in Fredericksburg, VA. The Joint Irregular Warfare Center, the Marine Corps’ Center of Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency Center, and the U.S. Army’s Counterinsurgency Center supported the TEW. Tribal engagement in Afghanistan was the main point of discussion between USG stakeholders, member from the academic arena, and authors with recent experiences in Afghanistan. Workshop members discussed and debated on issues that affected tribal engagement from the TETs and planners point of view in developing and implementing a TES (Small Wars Journal 2010).

TEW sponsors invited and put together a team of subject matter experts who had recent experience with tribal engagements in Iraq or Afghanistan. The team was composed of members with significantly opposing views on how to conduct a TES or whether a TES should be considered. Team discussions aimed at topics that ranged from strategic to tactical level viewpoints and considerations. Sponsors asked team members to accomplish three tasks. First, team members had to evaluate the how feasible was a TESA in Afghanistan. Second, the members were required to assess the second and third order effects a TES could pose to the political and military conditions. Third, the team had to identify the operational requirements than went with a TES in Afghanistan.

Team members concurred that the USG and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) should conduct a TES in some of the communities. Team members agreed that engagement should happen through an array of approaches
aimed at local, community, and tribes. Participants conceded that there are sub-national and sub-district power sources among political, tribal, and religious leaders. These sources of power also varied in strength and influence from one location to another in Afghanistan. Therefore, members did not support a plan aimed at a single kind of group, which could result in missing opportunities with other entities. A risk determined by the team was the possibilities of alienating tribes when TETs target only selected tribes within a geographic location. Finally, team members heavily debated the criticality of the mullah in Afghan communities. The members concurred that TETs must target mullahs but disagreed on the religious influence mullahs could pose on communities throughout Afghanistan. “Bearing the above in mind, there cannot be a “cookie cutter” approach to community engagement that could apply to Afghanistan. Commanders must tailor their methods to local needs and situations and must therefore have appropriate operational flexibility to enable their approaches” (Small Wars Journal 2010, 3).

Summary

Should USAFRICOM attempt a TESA to increase stability within its AOR? Yes, because a TESA can be shaped to support current USG agencies, USAFRICOM and African governments efforts to help address the root causes of instability, grievances, and corruption among tribes, ethnic and vulnerable groups, and local governments throughout the continent. However, each country has its own set of problems, which requires a TESA that nests with the country’s and AFRICOM’s current strategies. In this chapter, planners and researchers reviewed the problem framing activity on Liberia that provided understanding on how past events of the Liberian civil wars affected Liberian tribes, refugees, religious groups, vulnerable groups (women, children, teenagers, and disabled
Liberians), soldiers, government employees, rebels, and politicians. The analysis provided planners with current information and a historical background through the lenses of the operational variables to assist planners to put Liberia’s strategic environment in better context.

This thesis reviewed how the operational variables helped build their situational understanding of the issues concerning Liberia from the central government down to the tribe level. This thesis also studied the PMESII-PT analysis, which was fundamental to develop their comprehensive understanding of Liberia’s strategic and operational environment. The researcher’s analysis provided context that described the distribution of power among various levels of governance within Liberia. Additionally, the analysis identified the current constituted authorities, as well as the issues that corruption presents at the central and local levels of political powers and governance. Planners reviewed the military and paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors, such as the AFL, LNP, ATU, LURD, MODEL, other rebel forces as well as their relationships, functions, and tensions throughout Liberia’s operational environment over the past 10-20 years.

Critical to the researcher’s analysis was the identification of individual actors such as past and current presidents of Liberia as well as the different various groups and their behaviors related to poverty, gender, youth, culture, religion, and the ethnic makeup of the Liberian population. Furthermore, planners should have a better understanding of how Liberia’s past shaped Liberian beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors as member of a society in the process of a historical transformation with President Sirleaf at the forefront of that change.
The historical review demonstrated the importance of the tribal and ethnic issues, which was critical to help describe the past events that occurred before, during, and after the civil war of 2003, and the current conditions that exist today resulting from those events, which affect the Liberian strategic and operational environment. Moreover, the time analysis demonstrated how the various Liberian groups perceived the events from their own point of view. Finally, this thesis reviewed the analysis and filtered the information categorized by the operational variables into relevant information with respect to the methodology for USAFRICOM, the Liberian government, and the recommended TESA used to provide its audience with a visualization of how to address problems in this kind of environment.

The analysts provided statistics to highlight U.S. support to Liberia over the past 10 years. Furthermore, analysts also identified the components behind Liberia’s AfT five-year strategy that seeks to rebuild its society, stabilize the economy, and remove corruption from the political environment. This thesis studied the complexities of Liberia’s environment from the strategic to the tactical levels. Therefore, providing the reader with a better understanding for the need of ongoing U.S. support that aims to prevent future conflicts, build the economy, improve national and local governance, and defense capabilities in Liberia and throughout the African continent.

The outcome of design methodology to the problem in Liberia, highlighted USAFRICOM strategic approach and then presented the TESA, which nested with Liberia’s agenda for its transformation at the tribe, community, and local government levels. The results of design methodology brought out researcher recommendations for commanders and staff to attempt a TESA within the USAFRICOM AOR. The
researcher’s recommendations also cautioned that the TESA must synchronize with the current NSS, NDG, NMS, and Africa Command’s engagement strategies. Furthermore, researcher recommendations also cautioned the challenges TETs would counter with the removal of corruption in local government and emphasized for TETs to endeavor to reduce corruption to a manageable level by continuously assessing and modifying their MOEs/MOPs as circumstances require and allow within the combatant commander’s intent. Finally, the researcher’s recommendations do not provide a template solution for all communities in Africa. However, planners can use the TESA as a starting point, which provides flexibility for modification for a given situation in the USAFRICOM AOR and allows for the detailed planning of a TES to commence for a particular county or community within an African country.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The purpose of the research is to determine whether commanders and staff should attempt a TESA in the USAFRICOM AOR. The main points of the research are as follows: First, to encourage planners to think strategically about previous policies that drive activity in the USAFRICOM AOR. Second, provide the reading audience a broad understanding of the NSS, the DSG, the NMS, and USAFRICOM’s strategic approach toward issues that contribute to instability in Africa. Additionally, provide the reading audience with insight and guidance from the Commander in Chief to the USAFRICOM Commander. Third, lead the audience to draw the linkage and overall idea of stabilizing the countries within the USAFRICOM AOR through consistent engagement strategies from the strategic to the tactical level.

This research is important because it provides a better understanding of instability at the tribal level using strategic guidance and design methodology as the thinking tool to analyze a situation, apply a possible solution to the problem, and conclude with recommendations for decision makers. Additionally, the events of the past 10-20 years in Liberia offered this study the opportunity to test design methodology for the purposes of research and analysis.

In review of the case-study post research and analysis, USAFRICOM and the whole of government can increase stability by deploying TETs to increase confidence between local governments and tribes in African communities when circumstances call for a TESA. The results of this research provided the reading audience with ways to
protects tribal interests and works through issues of corruption, local tensions, and poor governance. Moreover, TETs executing a TESA should increase stability through community engagement, local defense advisory, and encourage political integration with the central and local governments as well as tribal groups.

The findings of the analysis conducted in chapter 4 aimed to answer the primary question. Should USAFRICOM attempt a TESA to increase stability within its AOR? The analysis confirmed that commanders and staff should attempt a TESA within the USAFRICOM AOR. A TESA can nest with current USG agencies and USAFRICOM efforts to help address the root causes of instability, grievances, and corruption among tribes, ethnic and vulnerable groups, and local governments in other countries in Africa. However, the researcher’s analysis and recommendations conducted are based on open source unclassified information.

Interpretation of this study’s findings is parallel with the results of the analysis to the problem in Liberia. The analysis highlighted USAFRICOM strategic approach and then presented the TESA, which nested with Liberia’s agenda for its transformation at the tribe, community, and local government levels. The results of design methodology brought out researcher recommendations for commanders and staff to attempt a TESA within the USAFRICOM AOR, noting that the TESA should also fit with HN local government agenda when dealing with a semi-functioning state.

**Recommendations**

What actions should decision makers take? As decision makers, commanders should attempt a TESA within the USAFRICOM AOR. Commanders should employ their planners to analyze a specific community where there is existing instability within
their area of operation. Once planners have identified a destabilized community, they can frame the problem as in the case study described in chapter 4 and find ways to implement feasible community engagement activities to stabilize tribes and local governments within the scope of an individual community. Each community requires its own analysis and planners should draw linkage among neighboring communities to maximize planning efforts as well as achieving operational and resource efficiencies. The problems in Liberia are different to those in Nigeria or the Central African Republic.

Tribal issues are complex and can become problematic for USAFRICOM. Decision makers should test the TESA to ensure the approach achieves their desired conditions and end-states. Decision makers should ensure that the engagement strategy strengthens the power and recognition of the African countries’ government. Therefore, the researcher recommends the following planning considerations to commanders and planners to implement during the Military Decision Making Process beginning from course of action development.

The recommended planning considerations cover the following four areas: The first planning consideration is the time to emplace the TET. For the TETs to be successful, early arrival into a community can help TETs integrate under better circumstances rather than a delay where threat actors can achieve the initiative over tribes and other groups.

The second planning consideration is the ability of VEO, rebel groups, or corrupted government officials to disrupt the TETs from executing their mission. The actions or inaction of the threat actors or even IDPs can affect local government’s officials and tribes’ leaders’ willingness to work together with the TETs. A failing
relationship between the TETs, local authorities, and tribal leaders can diminish the acceptance, which is critical to the success or failure of the TES. The threat actors operating within a given community in the USAFRICOM AOR may seek to gain support within the community. As TETs function at the tribe level, the popularity contest becomes vicious from an IIA perspective. The TETs must win the IIA fight, and therefore it is a critical task in all TESA LOEs.

This leads to the third planning consideration, the risk of diminishing support from the international community and the American people. Funding and coordination among USG agencies, the UN, the African Union and military must exist. Threat actors can impede the strategy if TETs are limited funds or if US/UN policy restricts operational support. Planners must understand the local laws and identify the means required to achieve success for the TESA during MDMP.

Finally, the fourth planning consideration is the ability for local government and tribes to work together and assume responsibility for a given community in the USAFRICOM AOR. Planners and TETs must set conditions for transfer of responsibility. Once the TETs achieve the desired conditions, transition to hand over can commence. TETs should execute a transition plan that provides community actors with requirements expected of them once they begin to work together without TET involvement. Planners should ensure that local transition plans assess long-term efficiency and have support from the Combatant Command, international stakeholders, local government, and security organizations.

If the local government views the TETs as a threat, the governments may not cooperate with the strategy. The TETs must execute a strategy that is feasible, acceptable,
and suitable to the local government and aligns with the central government’s vision for its country. The overall success of the TES rest on the acceptance of the tribes and clans involved. Even if the TETs meet the standard for the previously mentioned considerations, if the African people do not accept the outcome of the TET’s efforts, they will resist transition to local government (Small Wars Journal, 2010).

The TESA must synchronize with the current NSS, NDG, NMS, and Africa Command’s engagement strategies. The TETs will face difficulty in removing corruption in local governments; therefore, decision makers should manage their expectation and expect TETs to aim to reduce corruption to a controllable level by continuously assessing and modifying their MOEs/MOPs based on the current situation on the ground and the combatant commander’s intent. The TESA is not a template solution for all tribes in Africa. Thus, the TESA can be an approach for planners that allows flexible adjustment to meet the needs of the community and tribe focused problem within Africa.

Researchers should seek separate studies on high-risk Liberian communities within Rivercess, Grand Kru, Gbarpolu, and Rivergee counties. Furthermore, strategists should study the feasibility for a TESA in high-risk countries such as Nigeria, Somalia, Kenya, Libya, and Mali, as identified by USAFRICOM recent posture statement issued in March 2014, as well as vulnerable counties within those countries. Focusing on a county rather than a country allows planners to conduct a detailed analysis to develop a TES to recommend ways to differentiate between tribes, tribal militias, warlords, armed groups, criminal organizations, and VEOs that foster instability within a given African county. Additionally, through county analysis, strategists can develop and provide TETs with specific tactics, techniques, and procedures to define tribal organization and
governance, complex loyalties, and grievances within and between tribes; and how to protect specific tribal interests and work through issues of poor governance within a local community. There is also the opportunity to use this study as an input to mission analysis, which allows further research to conduct detailed planning for this case study.

Summary

The most important lesson from the research process was how the use of design methodology allowed the researcher to analyze a complex environment in a way that one person can conceptualize to understand the problem in a simplified context. In solving the problems, understanding the effects of the relationships, functions, and tensions that influence people in different ways based on ethnicity, religion, culture, politics, society, and history, clearly proves the importance of the advisory role in the U.S military. The advisor on the ground, however, is simply one component in solving such complicated problems that truly require collaboration and cooperation among and through the coalition, joint, and interagency communities. The current Liberian President said it best in her message to all Liberians:

The Agenda for Transformation in itself will not – in the next five-year timeframe – achieve all that Liberia is poised to do. Instead, it is the first step in achieving the goals set out in Liberia RISING 2030, Liberia’s long-term vision of socio-economic and political transformation and development. The Agenda sets out specific goals and objectives that Liberia must achieve in the next five years, moving toward a more prosperous and inclusive society. The Agenda for Transformation is consistent with the principles of the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action and the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.

While it represents an essential step in our nation’s long-term development, the Agenda is meaningless if it is not backed by concerted actions. This is not just another document to be placed on the mantelpiece; it must be seen as a living framework for meeting the Liberian people’s expectation for socio-economic development, sustained and accelerated growth. The challenge is to ensure that expectations arising from the consultations are met in a timely and comprehensive
manner. The call for a combined effort between Government, Civil Society, the Private Sector, and the Liberian citizenry could never have been louder. Failure in delivering on the expectations contained in this Agenda is not an option. Our success depends on consistent planning, effective coordination, robust implementation, prudent and efficient use of resources and, most importantly, a collective will to succeed. The Liberian Government, for its part, remains committed to making the required reforms for fulfilling our people’s vision for development: attracting foreign investment to create more jobs, and promoting balanced growth country-wide.

As a Government, our sincere thanks go to all the participants in the Agenda’s preparation: local county officials, Civil Society Organizations, Private Sector actors, Legislators and all Ministries, Agencies and Commissions, especially the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and Governance Commission.

Finally, we thank our Development Partners, who provided both financial and technical support to the entire process. In implementing this Agenda, we look forward to their continued collaboration to achieve the objective of transforming Liberia. I call on all Liberians, both in the country and in the Diaspora, to seize the opportunities the Agenda provides to make our collective vision a reality.

— President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf,

*Agenda for Transformation Steps towards Liberia Rising 2030*
APPENDIX A

USAFRICOM AOR

APPENDIX B

TRIBES IN LIBERIA AND THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY COUNTY, 2008

APPENDIX C

COUNTIES IN LIBERIA AND THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, 2008

APPENDIX D
LIBERIA’S CURRENT ENVIRONMENT

Source: Created by author.
Source: Created by author.
Liberia Agenda for Transformation Strategy

**Lines of Effort**

**Peace and Security**
1. Strengthen Security
2. Peace and Reconciliation
3. Justice and Rule of Law
4. Judicial Reform
5. Private Sector Development
6. Macroeconomic Stability
7. Infrastructure Development
8. Agriculture and Food Security
9. Forestry Protection
10. Mineral Development
11. Education Development
12. Health and Social Welfare
13. Social Protection
14. WASH
15. Political Governance
16. Public Sector Reform
17. Economic Governance
18. Gender Equality
19. Child Protection
20. Persons with Disabilities
21. Youth Empowerment
22. HIV/AIDS
23. Human Rights
24. Labor and employment

**Vision**

**Achieve Middle Income Status by 2030**

Create an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence based on reconciliation and conflict resolution and providing security, access to justice, and rule of law to all.

Transform the economy to meet the demands of Liberians by developing the domestic private sector; providing employment for a youthful population; investing in infrastructure for economic growth, addressing fiscal and monetary issues for macroeconomic stability; and improving agriculture and forestry to expand the economy for rural participation and food security.

To improve quality of life by investing in more accessible and higher quality education; affordable and accessible quality healthcare; social protection for vulnerable citizens; and expanded access to healthy and environmentally-friendly water and sanitation services.

In partnership with citizens, create transparent, accountable and responsive public institutions that contribute to economic and social development as well as inclusive and participatory governance systems.
APPENDIX G

USAFRICOM STRATEGIC APPROACH

Lines of Effort

Deter and Defeat Transnational Threats
1. Counterterrorism
2. Strengthen Maritime Security
3. Strengthen Defense Capability
4. Maintain Strategic Posture
5. Respond to Crisis
6. Build Partner Capacity
7. Conduct Mill to Mill Engagement
8. Support HA
9. Support PO (UN/AU)
10. Counter I illicit Trafficking
11. Security Cooperation Activities
12. FFP (USAID)
13. PRM (USAID)
14. IDP Camp Coord (USAID)
15. Economic Dev (USAID)
16. Social Dev (USAID)
17. Operation Orward Liberty
18. Improve Governance (DoS)
19. Rule of Law (DoS)
20. Inviel Civil Society activities (USAID)
21. Reduce Local Corruption
22. Local Conflict
23. Conduct Community Engagement

NSS, NMS, DSG End State

Defeat violent extremism in the Horn of Africa; fight against corruption, and improve capacity of African security and rule of law sectors.

Prevent conflict through strategic engagement; reduce political, national, regional, and local tensions before emerging to catastrophes.

Support growth to the African Economy through country development; agricultural and food security programs; health strategy; aid and development to set conditions where Africa will no longer require U.S. aid.

Focus on BPC and improve African government, reach out to the African people, and mobilize a coalition. Maintain long-term initiatives that strive to assist African governments to overcome community development challenges and then sustain development improvements.
APPENDIX H

LINKAGE OF U.S. STRATEGIC END STATES TO LIBERIA’S AFT END STATES

Source: Created by author.
TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIC APPROACH

APPENDIX I

TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIC APPROACH FOR LIBERIA

NSS, NMS, DSG End State

Lines of Effort

AFT End State

Defeat violent extremism in the Horn of Africa; fight against corruption, and increase capacity of African security and rule of law sectors.

Create an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence based on reconciliation and conflict resolution and providing security, access to justice, and rule of law to all.

Prevent conflict through strategic engagement; reduce political, national, regional, and local tensions before emerging to catastrophes.

Transform the economy to meet the demands of Liberians by developing the domestic private sector; providing employment for a youthful population; investing in infrastructure for economic growth; addressing fiscal and monetary issues for macroeconomic stability; and improving agriculture and forestry to expand the economy for rural participation and food security.

Support growth to the African Economy through country development; agricultural and food security programs; health strategy; aid and development to set conditions where Africa will no longer require U.S. aid.

To improve quality of life by investing in more accessible and higher quality education; affordable and accessible quality healthcare; social protection for vulnerable citizens; and expanded access to healthy and environmentally-friendly water and sanitation services.

Focus on BPC and improve African government, reach out to the African people, and mobilize a coalition. Maintain long-term initiatives that strive to assist African governments to overcome community development challenges and then sustain development improvements.

In partnership with citizens, create transparent, accountable and responsive public institutions that contribute to economic and social development as well as inclusive and participatory governance systems.

1. Conduct IIA
2. Advise Local Government
3. Advise Local Police
4. Support Community Policing
5. Advise on Internal Affairs

6. Support Justice System Reform
7. Advise on Gov. Land Mgt. Negotiations
9. Conduct Key Leader Engagement Program
10. Ext. Local Vulnerable Groups Engagement
11. Collaborate w/ local USAID Programs
12. Support Neighborhood Watch program
13. Integrate with local OOF’s Activities
# APPENDIX J

## OPERATIONAL VARIABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Explores the military and paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an operational environment and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical</td>
<td>Includes the geography and manmade structures, as well as the climate and weather in the area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an operational environment, as well as how the timing and duration are perceived by various actors in the operational environment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chronology of Events

Liberia

December 2013: On 10 December, the Council adopted resolution 2128, modifying the Liberian sanctions regime. This included changes to the notification requirements on arms transfers and military assistance to the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee, as well as directing the Committee to review remaining designated individuals and entities over the next three months and delist those that no longer meet the listing criteria. The resolution also reduced the Panel of Experts from three to two members, and no longer mandates the Panel to monitor Liberia’s natural resources. Earlier in the month, on 5 December, Council members held consultations on the Panel’s final report.

November 2013: The 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee was briefed on 19 November on the final report of the Panel of Experts. The report investigated weapons flows and the presence of armed groups in border areas, particularly the border with Côte d’Ivoire. Concerns were also expressed regarding unregulated and illegal exploitation of natural resources as a potential threat to Liberia’s stability.

September 2013: On 10 September, the Council was briefed by Karin Landgren, the Special Representative and head of UNMIL, on the most recent UNMIL report. Ambassador Staffan Tillander (Sweden), the chair of the Liberia configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, also briefed the Council, as well as Defense Minister Brownie Samukai of Liberia. The briefing was followed by consultations. On 18 September, the Council adopted resolution 2116 renewing the UNMIL mandate for a year and authorising the second phase of the drawdown plan to further reduce the military component by September 2014.

June 2013: On 13 June, Council members received a briefing in consultations from the chair of the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Masood Khan (Pakistan), on the 23 May midterm report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia.

May 2013: The 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee met on 23 May to receive the midterm report of the Panel of Experts monitoring the sanctions. The report apparently highlights several areas, including: violations of the arms embargo and Liberia’s progress in developing the capacity to monitor and track the flow of arms; continued activities by individuals targeted by sanctions that risk destabilising the Government of Liberia as well as the identification of individuals who could potentially be delisted; continuing tensions related to land tenure issues; and progress made by Liberia in regulating its natural resources industries, especially diamond mining (including Kimberley Process compliance), gold mining and the forestry sector.

March 2013: On 25 March, the Council was briefed by Karin Landgren, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNMIL, on the situation in Liberia. Ambassador Staffan Tillander (Sweden), chair of the Liberia configuration of the PBC, also briefed the Council following the recent PBC visit to the country. No outcome followed the briefing and consultations. Landgren’s briefing was largely guided by the Secretary-General’s latest report, with discussions around UNMIL’s continuing reconfiguration, progress towards achieving the transition benchmarks, and the development of a transition plan with the Government of Liberia during and
beyond UNMIL’s drawdown. Tillander focused on key findings of the PBC mission related to progress on security sector reform, rule of law and national reconciliation.

**February 2013:** From 11-15 February, a PBC mission visited Liberia.

**December 2012:** Pakistan, as chair of the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee, briefed Council members in consultations on 6 December on the final report of its Panel of Experts. On 12 December, the Council adopted resolution 2079 renewing for a year both the sanctions regime on Liberia and the mandate of the Panel. The resolution mandated the Panel to conduct two follow-up assessment missions to Liberia and neighbouring states “to investigate and compile” a midterm and final report on the implementation, and any violations, of the measures on arms, including the various sources of financing, such as from natural resources, for the illicit trade of arms.

**September 2012:** On 17 September, the Council adopted resolution 2066 extending the mandate of UNMIL for one year. The resolution authorised the reduction of the mission’s military strength in three phases, with the first phase of that reduction—1,900 personnel—to happen between October 2012 and September 2013. The resolution was adopted after the Council received a briefing from the head of UNMIL, Karin Landgren (Sweden) on the latest report.

**June 2012:** On 8 June the Council issued a press statement condemning the attack by unknown militia fighters which killed seven peacekeepers from Niger and eleven others in southwest Côte d’Ivoire near the Liberian border. On 29 June, the Council held consultations on Liberia after a briefing by DPKO focusing on the Secretary-General’s special UNMIL report of 16 April 2012 requested by resolution 2008. The Council also discussed the midterm report of the Panel of Experts supporting the sanctions regime, which had been submitted on 15 June.

**May 2012:** On 19-20 May, Council members visited Liberia as part of a three-country visit to West Africa. The Liberia leg—led by Council members Morocco and the US—was intended to focus on post-conflict challenges. Reporting on the trip to the Council on 31 May, the US ambassador said that Council members focused on security and rule-of-law institutions, reconciliation and positioning for the drawdown of UNMIL. Council members were concerned by the security challenges on the Liberian-Ivorian border, which they visited.

**April 2012:** On 26 April, The Special Court for Sierra Leone sitting in The Hague found Charles Taylor, Liberia’s former President, guilty of aiding and abetting war crimes and crimes against humanity for his support of Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front rebels in the 1990s.

**December 2011:** The Council adopted resolution 2025 on 14 December, renewing for a period of 12 months a sanctions regime including asset freezes and arms embargo on non-state actors, and travel ban on selected individuals, as well as the mandate of the Panel of Experts appointed to monitor implementation of the sanctions regime. Previously, on 9 December, the Council discussed the 30 November Panel of Experts report, which dealt with the impact of the return of an estimated 4,500 Liberian mercenaries who had been hired and deployed by former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo.

**November 2011:** On 18 November, the Council issued a statement praising the 8 November run-off election as “free, fair and transparent”. The statement, however, deplored the electoral violence of 7 November, in which at least one protestors was killed, and welcomed the creation of a Special Independent Commission of Inquiry to investigate the incident. Turnout was predictably low on 8 November, due to the opposition boycott and the pre-election violence. Sirleaf received 607,618 votes (or 90.7 percent of the total cast) and was declared re-elected for another six-year term.

**October 2011:** The Council issued a press statement on 26 October praising the peaceful and orderly conduct of the first round of presidential elections on 11 October.
September 2011: On 16 September, the Council adopted resolution \textit{resolution 2008} renewing the mandate of UNMIL for 12 months. Following a \textit{briefing} from Special Representative Ellen Loj on the latest developments in Liberia on 13 September.

August 2011: On 4 August, the Liberia Sanctions Committee updated its travel ban and assets freeze lists to better reflect the current passport information of those on the lists.


March 2011: The head of UNMIL, Ellen Margrethe Loj, \textit{briefed} the Council on 16 March. On 3 March, the Council adopts \textit{resolution 1971} discontinuing the authorisation for UNMIL military personnel to provide security and evacuation assistance to the Special Court of Sierra Leone in Freetown.

February 2011: The Council \textit{extended} the redeployment of troops and helicopters from UNMIL to the UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire on 16 February. On 11 February, the Secretary-General informed the Council that the UNMIL guard force at the Special Court of Sierra Leone premises in Freetown was withdrawing in early March.

December 2010: On 17 December, the Council renewed for a further 12 months the arms embargo on Liberia and the travel ban on persons seen as threatening peace and stability in the country. The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 16 December 2011.

October 2010: On 13 October, the registrar of the Special Court of Sierra Leone advised that as sensitive archives had been relocated to The Hague and international staff had been reduced the UNMIL guard force would no longer be required in Freetown.

16 September 2010: The Peacebuilding Commission established a country configuration for Liberia.

15 September 2010: The Council \textit{extended} the mandate of UNMIL for another year.

8 September 2010: The Council was \textit{briefed} on developments in Liberia by Ellen Loj, the Head of UNMIL.

29 July 2010: Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) concluded its work.

14 July 2010: The Council decided to accept the request of Liberian government for the country to be placed on the PBC’s agenda and formally took action pursuant to paragraph 12 of \textit{resolution 1645} (2005) adding Liberia to the PBC agenda by requesting the Commission’s advice.

13 July 2010: Council members were briefed during private consultations by the chairman of the Liberia Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Ivan Barbalić of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the Panel’s midterm \textit{report} and the Committee’s deliberations on it.

19 June 2010: The Liberian government’s request for placement of the country on the PBC’s agenda was brought to the attention of the Council.

16 June 2010: The sanctions committee met to consider the Panel’s \textit{report} and, while welcoming the progress made regarding the implementation of the arms embargo and the travel ban, supported the recommendations made by the panel.

27 May 2010: The Government of Liberia wrote to the Secretary-General conveying the interest of Liberia in being placed on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).

13 May 2010: The Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted its midterm \textit{report} to the Council’s Sanctions Committee on Liberia covering the period from 15 February to 10 May.

10 March 2010: Ellen Margrethe Loj, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Liberia, briefed Council members in private consultations on UNMIL’s work and developments in the country over the preceding five months.
26 February 2010: Four people were killed and 25 wounded in the northern Liberian region of Lofa County and churches and mosques damaged in inter-communal clashes.

25 January 2010: Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf announced that she would be a candidate in the 2011 elections.

22 February 2010: George Boley, former leader of the Liberian Peace Council, an insurgent group implicated in numerous abuses during the 14 years of civil war, was arrested in the US.

17 December 2009: The Council renewed for 12 months targeted sanctions on persons seen as a threat to Liberia, and adjusted the arms embargo so that it would not apply to arms and related materiel used by the UNMIL for training. The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts monitoring the implementation of the sanctions until 20 December 2010.

16 November 2009: The chairman of Liberia’s National Elections Commission, James Fromayan said supporters of the opposition Congress for Democratic Change (CDC) party had threatened to burn down his house and kill him. The CDC denied that its members had made such threats against him.

1 November 2009: Police officers serving with UNMIL helped Liberian police and prison officers foil an attempted mass escape by about fifty prisoners from a prison in Monrovia.

Late October 2009: Lieutenant General Sikander Afzal from Pakistan was appointed as the new Force Commander of UNMIL, replacing Lieutenant General Zahirul Alam from Bangladesh, whose tour of duty ended.

15 September 2009: The Council extended UNMIL’s mandate till 30 September 2010 and endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendation to implement the third phase of the mission’s drawdown (S/RES/1885).

13 August 2009: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Liberia as part of a seven-nation African tour.

10 August 2009: the Secretary-General’s latest report on UNMIL was circulated to Council members.

28 July 2009: Johnson-Sirleaf apologised in a nationwide radio address for her past support of former Liberian President Charles Taylor.

July 2009: Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf officially ended the national Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration programme.

13 July 2009: The trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor before the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone resumed in The Hague with the opening of the defence case.

1 July 2009: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia released its final report.

25 June 2009: The Council met in closed consultations to discuss the Secretary-General’s special report on UNMIL of 10 June and heard a briefing by Alain Le Roy, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, who had just visited Liberia. There was also a briefing by the chairman of the Liberia Sanctions Committee, Libyan Ambassador Abdurrahman Mohamed Shalgham.

19 and 20 May 2009: The Council visited Liberia as part of its five-day, four-country mission to Africa.

4 May 2009: The Special Court for Sierra Leone’s Trial Chamber at The Hague dismissed a request by the defence counsel for former Liberian President Charles Taylor to drop the charges against him (11 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity) on the grounds of insufficient evidence. Taylor’s trial was scheduled to resume on 29 June.
**12 February 2009:** Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf testified before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, apologising for having supported Taylor’s rebellion against President Samuel Doe before she went into exile.

**30 January 2009:** In the trial in the Special Court for Sierra Leone of former Liberian president Charles Taylor the prosecution concluded testimony, having called 91 witnesses.

**9 January 2009:** The son of Charles Taylor, the US national Charles “Chuckie” Taylor Jr., was sentenced by a US court to 97 years in prison for torture committed in Liberia.

**19 December 2008:** The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia presented the first of several volumes of its final report.

**30 October 2008:** The son of Charles Taylor, the US national Charles “Chuckie” Taylor Jr., was convicted by a Miami jury for torture committed when he was head of a notorious anti-terrorist unit in Liberia during his father’s presidency.

**1 September 2008:** The Special Court for Sierra Leone received a request from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia for an audience with Taylor, but he refused, as was his right.

**11 and 12 August 2008:** Alhaji G.V. Kromah, former head of the disbanded United Liberation Movement (ULIMO), appeared before the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

**1 July 2008:** Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, on the sidelines of the AU summit, reportedly asked the UN to extend the timeline for the drawdown of UNMIL put forward in the Secretary-General’s August 2007 report.

**9 June 2008:** The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia held public hearings in Minnesota, US, focusing on the experience of Liberians in the diaspora.

**14 May 2008:** The Special Court for Sierra Leone trying former Liberian President Charles Taylor at The Hague began hearing the testimony of its most prominent witness to date, former Liberian Vice-President Moses Blah.

**21 to 22 April 2008:** UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Liberia and pledged the UN’s continued support.

**17 January 2008:** Ellen Loj arrived in Monrovia to take up her post as Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia.

**8 January 2008:** Public hearings began at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Monrovia to inquire into human rights violations during the country’s 14-year civil war.

**7 January 2008:** Special Court for Sierra Leone resumed trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor at the Hague after a six-month delay to allow him to prepare his defense.

**November 2007:** The International Monetary Fund indicated that it was ready to commence cancelling Liberia’s debt after sufficient funds had been secured from pledges made by donor nations for that process. The Liberia Sanctions Committee removed Grace Minor from its list of individuals subject to its travel ban.

**4 October 2007:** The UN Secretary-General declared Liberia as the fifth country to become eligible for the UN Peacebuilding Fund.

**8 August 2007:** The war crimes trial of former President Charles Taylor was postponed by the Special Court for Sierra Leone until 7 January.

**19 July 2007:** The government of Liberia announced the arrest of five people in connection with an alleged coup attempt, including former Speaker of the Parliament George Koukou and General Charles July, the former head of the presidential guard during the regime of ex-President Samuel Doe and leader of a 1994 coup attempt.
12 July 2007: The government submitted a bill to parliament regarding the seizure of the property of former President Charles Taylor, his relatives and associates.

4 June 2007: The trial of former Liberian president Charles Taylor began at the Special Court for Sierra Leone outpost in The Hague.

January-February 2007: Violent clashes between police and civilian protesters led to a declaration of martial law in neighboring Guinea, heightening the risk of regional instability. UNMIL strengthened its border presence with Guinea.

October 2006: The Council decided not to reinstate timber sanctions.

June 2006: The Council lifted the timber embargo for 90 days.

6 February 2006: The Council authorised the deployment of UNMIL troops in Côte d’Ivoire.

16 January 2006: Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was sworn in as Liberia’s new president.

8 November 2005: Second ballot in presidential elections.

October 2005: Presidential and legislative elections were held; Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and George Weah qualified for a second presidential ballot.

19 September 2005: The Council increased UNMIL to provide security for the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

October 2004: Disarmament and demobilization process formally completed.

June 2004: The second Council mission to West Africa traveled to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire.

March 2004: The Council imposed sanctions on Charles Taylor and his associates.

December 2003: The Council re-imposed an arms embargo, a travel ban and sanctions on the export of diamonds and timber from Liberia. UNMIL announced the launching of a countrywide DDR programme.

October 2003: The National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) was inaugurated.

September 2003: The Council established UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL); US forces withdrew.


June 2003: Charles Taylor was indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The first Council mission to West Africa traveled to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire.

2002: Conflict erupted in Côte d’Ivoire, fueled from spill-over from Liberia; France intervened. President Kabbah declared the Sierra Leonean conflict over.

2001: In a major offensive led by Guinea, anti-Taylor insurgents pushed the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) back into Liberia and Sierra Leone. The RUF retreated into Liberia. An arms embargo was re-imposed to further pressure Taylor. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established.

2000: Anti-Taylor insurgents invaded Liberia; Taylor and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) counterattacked by taking the fighting into Guinea. The Sierra Leonean Lomé peace accord collapsed, as the RUF took 500 UN peacekeepers hostage; UK troops sent to Sierra Leone. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established.
1999: The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) captured Freetown, securing the Sierra Leonean vice-presidency for Foday Sankoh. Major human rights violations, including widespread murder, rapes and arson committed by the RUF. Lomé peace accord signed, ending the fighting in Sierra Leone. The Sankoh-Taylor alliance began to erode over disputes for diamond fields. Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) left Liberia.

1998: In Sierra Leone, President Kabbah was reinstated.

1997: President Kabbah was toppled, leading Nigerian forces to focus on the crisis in Sierra Leone. Taylor elected President; the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) was established.

1995: Abuja Accord signed; transitional Council of State established.

1993: Cotonou Peace Agreement signed; the Council established UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).


1991: The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) entered Sierra Leone with Taylor’s support. Yamoussoukro Agreements signed.

1990: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

REFERENCE LIST


