THROUGH TRIAL AND ERROR: LEARNING AND ADAPTATION IN THE ENGLISH TACTICAL SYSTEM FROM BANNOCKBURN TO POITIERS

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General Studies

by

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Through Trial and Error: Learning and Adaptation in the English Tactical System from Bannockburn to Poitiers

During the late thirteenth century and early fourteenth century, the English in medieval Europe fought in two wars: the Scottish Wars of Independence followed by the Hundred Years War. The final engagements of the Scottish Wars of Independence mentally, culturally, and physically changed English notions of what tactics and strategies should be used in warfare. From these experiences, the English learned lessons from Scottish methods of war that helped them devise a tactical fighting system that would eventually transform the ideals of chivalry and its application in warfare. The English then employed their new tactical fighting system decisively against the French during the Hundred Years War. During the early stages of the Hundred Years War, the French in turn learned hard lessons fighting against the English and attempted to adjust their tactics to counter the new English fighting system. This paper explores what techniques were learned by the English from the Scots, and how the English then modeled and improved on Scottish tactics to defeat the Scots then employ them against the French.

14. SUBJECT TERMS: Hundred Years War, Scottish Wars of Independence, chevauchée, knights, men-at-arms, medieval, chivalry, longbow, crossbow, schiltron, battle, Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill, Crécy, Lunalonge, Saintes, Ardres, Mauron, Poitiers, disinherited, Weardale Campaign
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THROUGH TRIAL AND ERROR: LEARNING AND ADAPTATION IN THE ENGLISH TACTICAL SYSTEM FROM BANNOCKBURN TO POITIERS, by MAJ Gary E. Sanders, II, 118 pages.

During the late thirteenth century and early fourteenth century, the English in medieval Europe fought in two wars: the Scottish Wars of Independence followed by the Hundred Years War. The final engagements of the Scottish Wars of Independence mentally, culturally, and physically changed English notions of what tactics and strategies should be used in warfare. From these experiences, the English learned lessons from Scottish methods of war that helped them devise a tactical fighting system that would eventually transform the ideals of chivalry and its application in warfare. The English then employed their new tactical fighting system decisively against the French during the Hundred Years War. During the early stages of the Hundred Years War, the French in turn learned hard lessons fighting against the English and attempted to adjust their tactics to counter the new English fighting system. This paper explores what techniques were learned by the English from the Scots, and how the English then modeled and improved on Scottish tactics to defeat the Scots then employ them against the French.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The United States Military, in an effort to improve methods, tactics, and operations, conducts After Action Reviews (AAR) to analyze what was done correctly during an exercise or mission and what needs to be improved. An AAR provides an opportunity to gain insight for the team to identify and correct deficiencies in order to improve and streamline tactics, techniques and procedures to create better conditions for greater success. The AARs are generally documented for later reference. Armies of the Middle Ages, it seems, did not conduct such a formal process to identify and improve shortfalls. However, they recognized failure and success from the experience gained during battle and attempted to recreate success using proven tactics in future conflicts.

War in the Middle Ages, particularly the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, has been extensively covered by historians who through their research have provided vast insight into the era. Regarding military matters, much has been discovered from minute details, such as weaponry and dress, to the understanding of full-scale campaigns spanning centuries. Previous research also has shown how technological advances over time impacted and changed future conflict. Standing on the shoulders of generations of historians, this thesis will probably not unearth any genuinely new findings. However, it will attempt to look more closely, through a specific lens, and examine what opposing medieval militaries learned from one another and assess how that influenced adjustments to their methods of warfare, with reference during the first phase of the Hundred Years War fought between the English and the French in the middle of the fourteenth century. The study will open with a timeline illustrating the events that will be discussed, followed
by a review of the literature. It will then cover some selected battles fought between the
English and Scottish militaries during The Wars of Scottish Independence (1296-1357).
These conflicts occurred between the late thirteenth century and early fourteenth century.
The three battles that will be covered include: The Battle of Bannockburn (1314),
Dupplin Moor (1332), and The Battle of Halidon Hill (1333).¹ Examining these conflicts
will reveal the tactics learned and refined by the English between Bannockburn and
Halidon Hill, which they later employed with great precision against the French during
the Hundred Years War (1337-1475). A brief synopsis will follow to explain the political
motivation and disagreements between the English and French that led to the start of the
Hundred Years War, and a diagram is provided showing the key historical figures
involved and their ancestry. The study will then concentrate on engagements between the
English and French at the battles of Crécy (1346), Lunalonge (1349), Saintes (1351),
Ardres (1351), Mauron (1352) then lastly Poitiers (1356). This is in order to provide a
framework and the historical background within which to examine and present the thesis.

The Thesis

In warfare, militaries throughout history have sought ways to counter their
opposing force’s actions in a struggle to gain positional advantage. When looking at
examples of historical lessons that relate to the Middle Ages, some questions come to
mind: what did medieval militaries learn from one another and how did they learn those
lessons? How did they develop, adjust tactics or implement countermeasures from
lessons learned to better thwart and defeat their enemy? Were new methods (tactics,

¹Depending on the author and the time period an account was recorded in, if using
a primary reference, the spelling of Dupplin Moor can also appear as Dupplin Muir.
Figure 1. Timeline

Source: Adapted by the author.

Note: The timeline shown here is for the benefit of readers that are unfamiliar with the historical periods that will be discussed.

Methodology

This study is based on qualitative research through abductive reasoning using information and examples collected over the course of study. Through the careful examination of primary and secondary sources, logical inferences were made, to draw a hypothesis on what was learned by medieval militaries. Through this reasoning process, a logical conclusion was reached that ideally offers the best explanation of what and how
medieval militaries learned from one another. Guidance from the chair of the thesis committee and personal ideas provided the direction to gain insight into the topic, explore and describe the methods, tactics and operations as well as technology used during battle. Through analytical inferences made from battle analysis, inquiries about why they chose a course of action, and then comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the two militaries, a compilation was made of the lessons learned by two medieval armies. Abductively, it was then surmised as to how those lessons influenced them to adjust their battle methods or adopt new ones. Additionally, primary source accounts of these battles identified and translated by the chair of the thesis committee provided greater insight into what these medieval armies learned from one another. For a comparison of capabilities between the crossbow and English longbow, both projectile weapons, refer to appendix 1. A compressed analysis of the English and French engagements covering the battles of Crécy, Lunalonge, Saintes, Ardres, Mauron, and Poitiers are provided in appendices 2 through 7 respectively. Each battle analysis offers a comparison of the weapons and tactics used by both sides during the engagements, proposes which military had the edge, and presents an explanation as to why.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Through the readings, the principal force multiplier that was apparent was the superior tactical advantage the English longbow provided. This weapons system, along with the manner in which it was employed, gave the English considerable fire power. In Robert Hardy’s *Long Bow, A Social and Military History*, he addresses the weapons capabilities. According to Hardy the English longbows could reach a draw weight of over one hundred pounds. He used the example of one modern-day American longbow maker, Howard Hill, who built and used a bow that had a pull weight of 172 pounds.²

In Christopher Rothero’s, *The Armies of Crécy and Poitiers*, in the hands of a well-trained archer, the English longbow could be rapidly fired at 10 to 15 arrows per minute, reaching distances of up to 300 yards. With the English archers’ special ‘bodkin’ arrow head it was possible to penetrate any defensive material worn such as chain-mail, if the arrow was fired at short range it could also penetrate plate armor. To ensure that the English yeomanry had an ample supply of longbow archers, it was mandated that all men must indulge in the leisurely practice of archery. This meant that essentially every English male was skilled, at least to some degree, with the longbow. On the battlefield English archers, as they drew up in their fighting position, had roughly two sheaves of arrows. In addition to these sheaves, archers would tuck additional arrows in their belt and thrust some in the ground at their feet to have many arrows on hand and to position

them for quick reloading. The French refused to use any longbow infantry, which in hind sight was an error on their part.

As for the piercing power of the English longbow, in Archer Jones’, *The Art of War in The Western World* there was an account of one being shot at a wooden oak door four inches thick, and after striking the door the arrow tip penetrated slightly through the opposite side. In Clive Bartlet’s, *English Longbowman* he explains that such a weapon system was vital to battlefield operations, especially to the English tactical defensive procedure that had been developed. In the defensive, archers often used any natural obstacles that were at hand to fight behind, such as ditches, hedges, vineyards, sunken roads, or they constructed their own using stakes. This tactic was illustrated at Poitiers when the English archers used the hedges in front of their position and at Mauron when English archers used the steep cliff left of their battle line as natural obstacles. A testament to the lethality of the longbow, and the devastating rapid-fire power it could produce, was witnessed in 1332 at the Battle of Dupplin Moor. A more vivid description of the end result is provided in Archer Jones’ *The Art of War in The Western World*. Scottish heavy infantry charged uphill and engaged dismounted English cavalry in the defensive with longbow archers on its flanks with dismal results. The Scots were pushed inward by rapid arrow fire from the left and right flanks of the English defensive line to

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4Ibid., 23.


such a degree they “thrust so close that they were crushed to death one by another, so that more fell by suffocation than by the sword . . . a marvel never seen or heard of before in any battle of the past was observed, for a heap of dead stood as high from the ground as the a full length of a spear.”

Robert Hardy’s, *Longbow A Social and Military History* explained that King Edward I realized English longbow archers could be used more effectively and cheaper than infantry armed with the cumbersome crossbow. Materials and parts for building the longbow were cheaper compared to the crossbow and crossbowmen were more expensive to pay earning 4 denarii a day compared to archers who earned 2 denarii a day. As King Edward I’s archers acquired more strength to shoot their bows through practice, bows could be made stronger, which meant they would need to be longer. Once the English mastered the craft, an army of archers could send a torrent of arrows into cavalry charges to turn or rout them. Again, archery was mandated to be every man’s hobby, therefore everyone was well-practiced. The rate of fire (average of 10 arrows per minute) and distance produced by the longbow exceeded the capabilities of a crossbow, which had a reduced rate of fire compared to the longbow. It provided the English with overwhelming and superior fire power. Archers were also able to do their own field maintenance and quickly change strings if one broke, they kept extras on hand measured to fit. Archers also carried their own bow, however longbows were built to a standard, and mass

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8Hardy, *Longbow A Social and Military History*, 41-44.

produced to reequip archers whose bows were damaged. The English also had good supply lines for their archers, keeping a large quantity of spare arrows in their supply wagons. At the Battle of Crécy when the English crossed the ford at Blanchetaque, luckily for the English the rear wagons of their baggage train made it safely across the ford before the pursuing French overtook them. Many carts full of thousands and thousands of arrows made it across. Interesting to note that the English mass produced longbows for war and to a set scale.

This indicates that longbow parts were interchangeable as most military weapon systems are built today. If soldiers today run out of ammunition they can use a clip of ammunition from a fellow soldier next to them, and simply plug the clip into their weapon and resume fighting. If for instance an English archer broke their last bow string, they could retrieve one from an archer standing next to them, place it on their bow and continue to fight. If an archer’s bow was damaged, they could retrieve one from their supply trains and rejoin the fight. Logistics play a major role in war regardless of the time period. The longbow’s rapid rate of fire, penetration and distance the archer wielding it could achieve would have been overwhelming for any medieval military the English faced. The crossbow, compared to the English longbow, was a powerful weapon as well. However, it could not achieve the high rate of fire that the English longbow could.

Stephen Fliegel’s, *Arms and Armor The Cleveland Museum of Art* describes the Crossbow as one of the most feared weapons by the twelfth century. It was a weapon made of a length of block wood with a bow fitted diagonally across the front end. The

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10 Ibid., 21.

bow string was pulled back along the length of block wood (stalk) until it locked into a nut that held the string in place until the weapon was fired.\textsuperscript{12} Bernard and Fawn Brodie’s, \textit{From Crossbow to H-Bomb The Evolution of the Weapons and Tactics of Warfare} explained that once loaded, it was fired from the shoulder in the same manner a rifle is fired today. One advantage the crossbow had over the longbow was that it could be drawn ahead of time and kept drawn with little physical effort while being aimed. It could also be used effectively with little training by unskilled men.\textsuperscript{13} The crossbow also had a heavier draw weight than the longbow, however the longbow could outrange the crossbow with four or five times the rate of fire.\textsuperscript{14} Fliegel clarifies that later models of the crossbow were more powerful with a heavier coil than the English longbow and capable of firing bolts at a greater distance, but still at a much slower rate of fire than the longbow due to the time it took to load a crossbow. One drawback to a crossbow with a hardwood bow mounted on it was that it was not durable. The more the weapons was fired the hardwood bow on it became distorted and fragile to the point it was inoperable.\textsuperscript{15} Earlier models could be pulled back by hand. However, as technology progressed and the weapon’s distance improved, requiring a heavier pull weight, later models required archers to pull the bow string back aided by their feet in a stirrup affixed to the front nose


\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., 39.

\textsuperscript{15}Fliegel, \textit{Arms and Armor The Cleveland Museum of Art}, 153.
to bend and lock the string to the nut. By the fourteenth century crossbows could pierce plate armor. Crossbowmen were also considered an elite force that assumed the central position in battle formations.\textsuperscript{16} By the twelfth century composite crossbows were being produced made from horn, wood, and sinew glued and bound with animal tendons making it lighter and more powerful.\textsuperscript{17} These composite crossbows had a higher draw weight than wooden bows and could only be drawn back by the shooter aided by ratchet devices. Some examples of these ratchets included the \textit{claw and belt}, \textit{goat’s-foot lever}, \textit{windlass and cranequin}. Steel bows were later developed during the fifteenth century achieving a draw weight of 1000 pounds.\textsuperscript{18} Such a weapon would have achieved amazing penetration power and distance harnessing that amount of energy in the bow’s limbs. However, without any way of speeding up the loading time, the crossbow regardless of the weight coiled to propel its load, could not produce the same effect as the longbow on a field of battle. Up through the sixteenth century units of crossbowmen were generally mercenaries hired for convenience, of which the Gascons and Genoese were highly regarded as the best.\textsuperscript{19}

In Clifford J. Rogers’ \textit{War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy Under Edward III, 1327-1360} the author explained that the French decision to immediately start the fight at the Battle of Crécy, instead of waiting for their forces to catch up, was a mistake. The Genoese mercenaries, who opened the fight for the French, did not have their \textit{Pavises

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., 152.
\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., 153.
\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., 155.
\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., 153.
\end{footnotesize}
(large shields) with them, as the shields were in the rear with the baggage trains. Had the French waited, the Genoese would have had these shields with them at the battle’s front line and may have fared a little better against the English longbows. Archery provided medieval militaries an immense asset that allowed them to extend their attack against enemy combatants during engagements, and it was an essential aspect of the medieval English fighting system. Archery was important, however, nobles in medieval militaries initially desired to follow the code of “chivalry,” and desperately wanted to engage enemy nobles on horseback in a mounted cavalry charge as in the “joust.” To win in these contests would bring nobles honor and fame. The English nobles’ experience gained during the Scottish Wars of Independence however, reshaped their view of chivalry and their military tactics.

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Figure 2. An illustration of English Longbow-men at the Battle of Crécy


Note: Notice the number of extra arrows tucked into the archers belts and thrust into the ground by their feet to speed up reloading. See glossary for further detail.
In his book *Bannockburn*, David Cornell described what the English experienced during the events that occurred before, during, and after the Battle of Bannockburn on June 24, 1314. Cornell captured the impact of the adverse events on the English psyche, which was the catalyst for the English to change their military tactics. In his explanation of the events that occurred on June 23, 1314, Cornell covered the English soldiers’ shocked reaction to Robert the Bruce, in single combat, killing the English knight Henry de Bohun in the wood lines of New Park. He then explained the English soldiers’ surprise that their English cavalry, under command of Robert Clifford a seasoned veteran, were unable to defeat Scottish foot soldiers, under Thomas Randolph’s command, in the open
field. In the eyes of medieval society cavalry was king of battle, how could a powerful English cavalry unit fail to defeat foot soldiers? The English were astonished also that during this engagement one English knight was killed and another captured by the Scots’ *schiltron*. As word spread of the English cavalry’s loss to Randolph’s *schiltron* it made the English begin to question the complete dominance of mounted cavalry. The deaths of two knights on June 23rd and capture of another were uncommon as well; knights were though invincible due to their heavy armor.²¹

![Figure 4. An Example of a Scottish Schiltron Formation Employed to stop a Mounted Cavalry Charge](source: Total War Center, http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?145600-The-Darkage/page7 (accessed April 17, 2014).

²¹Knights were nobles who fought as well-armed heavy mounted cavalry. Men-at-arms were well-armed professional soldiers who also fought on horseback, but were not nobles. It was not a dishonor for them to fight dismounted, but due to the heavy armor they donned, fighting mounted was less taxing on their bodies.
Note: The Scottish *shiltron* was composed of a tightly packed formation of foot soldiers who used long pikes to stop or keep at bay mounted cavalry as seen in the picture. See glossary for further detail. Mounted cavalry—the physical presence of horses on the battle field produced psychological effects for both friendly and enemy forces. Horses boosted the confidence of friendly forces and cast fear over enemy combatants. Ancient horse bits (the mouth piece used to guide a horse) were called curb bits, and were not as advanced as the snaffle bit. The snaffle bit allows a rider to easily maneuver their mount even at the horse’s top speed. Using a curb bit, a rider can steer the mount but not at faster speeds, were the options once moving at a faster pace are forward or stop. Medieval equestrians would have used the curb bit. The one advantage the curb bit provided was that it only required one hand for steering the mount, leaving the other hand free to wield a weapon. Medieval knights and men-at-arms did not practice or train together and there were no manuals to regulate training. The only time a mounted cavalry charge was executed as a unit was on the battle field. Group cavalry charges would have been difficult to execute as well. Horses have four speeds building up to a charging speed: walk (3-7 mph), trot (8-10 mph), canter (10-17 mph), then gallop (20+ mph) and at each of these speeds they have various gaits. During a cavalry charge the men-at-arms and knights attempted to stay in a tight formation called a conrois. However, due to different levels of horsemanship, discipline, and lack of unit training, maintaining this formation was quite difficult. Once at full speed, horses could not be steered other than small nudges and with various gaits the formation would have been strung out so that the charge would impact at different times, therefore a successful cavalry charge was hit and miss. An interesting note concerning war horses was that they were trained to bite, kick, and stomp enemy combatants.

Cornell then described the English situation on the evening of June 23, 1314.

Forced to execute a dangerous knight crossing of the Bannockburn River was exhausting for the English host, plus their close proximity to the Scots caused many of the English to

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23 Ibid., 25-28.

24 Ibid., 82-83.

25 Ibid., 83.

26 Ibid., 83-84.

27 Ibid., 90.
remain awake on guard. Since they did not sleep they had time to reflect on the events that occurred earlier that day, further edging doubt in their minds that English nobles could achieve victory with a mounted cavalry charge. When the English finally executed a mounted cavalry charge against the Scots’ schiltrons the following day on June 24, 1314 they were stopped and defeated by the Scots. This loss further hardened in the Englishmen’s mind that mounted cavalry were not as superior as they had thought. When word of the English’s grievous loss reached their home land it was demoralizing for the English military, as English society no longer had faith that the military could win in battle. The conclusion of the events at Bannockburn caused the English to consider how such a loss could have ever occurred; compelling them to eventually revamp their military tactics. Their willingness to adjust and test new tactics stemmed from a change in their cultural perceptions regarding chivalry; they were no longer wholly committed to the practice of chivalry. What motivated the English to change was fear, as the Scots continued to raid the English kingdom’s northern boarders after Bannockburn and the English were unable to stop it, even during the Weardale Campaign in 1327. The English tactics practiced under the code of chivalry were not working and they knew it. If the English were going to achieve victory they needed to change their methods, as well as their views on combat; fight to win, not for personal glory. The new defensive fighting system the English developed was first tested at the Battle of Dupplin Moor by the English “disinherited” with decisive results. Copying from the Scots, the English embraced the idea of fighting on foot from advantageous terrain due to the tactical edge it provided, especially against mounted heavy cavalry. It is difficult to identify a point in time at which the English realized the significant tactical advantage of combining their
longbow archers to their dismounted defensive fixed formation(s). Whether it was realized during testing and training on the system, or devised by the English disinherited nobles who led and fought at Dupplin Moor before the engagement is intriguing. The French on the other hand, maintained a steadfast commitment to the code of chivalry, until after the battles of Crécy and Lunalonge.

In his book The Art of War In the Western World, Archer Jones covered how inculcated the use of heavy cavalry in offensive operations was in the French medieval military mentality. The French never considered developing a heavy infantry that could rout a cavalry charge. Due to their total commitment to “chivalric” principles, they gave very little thought to concentration against an enemy’s weakness, flanking, or winning with the least amount of effort.28 The French were essentially convinced that nothing on foot could defeat a head on frontal heavy cavalry charge and it was their primary tactic in battle. The French cavalry charge would not be challenged or questioned until their engagement with the English at the Battle of Crécy. Even after Crécy the French were still not convinced, and remained committed to the mounted charge, as they executed a mounted charge again at the Battle of Lunalonge. Archer Jones also briefly examined the Battle of Bannockburn. However, he provided a different perspective regarding the archery engagement at the beginning of the battle.

In his version, Jones said Robert the Bruce maintained a reserve of 500 heavy mounted cavalry; the rest of his Scottish force fought dismounted. When the English employed their longbow archers against the Scots at the start, Robert the Bruce committed his reserve of 500 heavy mounted cavalry against the English archers and

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dispersed them.\textsuperscript{29} According to David Cornell, the Scottish and English archers engaged each other briefly, and the engagement ended with the English archers routing the Scottish archers. As to which version correctly describes the role the English archers played is arguable depending on the primary sources that were accessed. To explain Archer Jones’ view, and provide thoughts on it, consider his telling of the Battle of Falkirk fought in 1298 prior to the Battle of Bannockburn in 1314. This paper does not reach back as far as the Battle of Falkirk to provide a detailed analysis, but before attempting to explain Jones’ position a quick synopsis:

William Wallace and the Scots had held off an English heavy cavalry charge with light infantry armed with pikes in a defensive static position just in front of a wood line. As the English were getting ready to mount another charge and attack, King Edward I arrived on the battle field. When he realized that a second charge would not do any good, he ordered his men to halt their charge then called forward his archers to engage the Scots. King Edward I had his archers concentrate their fire on specific points in the Scots’ \textit{schiltron}, and once gaps appeared he ordered a second charge towards the openings. The charge was successful and routed the Scots.\textsuperscript{30}

It is possible that King Edward II attempted to execute the same tactic at Bannockburn with his archers, at the start of the battle, which his father had successfully executed at Falkirk. Degrade and create holes in the \textit{schiltron} to permit some penetration by an English heavy cavalry charge. However, the Scots’ commander, Robert the Bruce also remembered lessons from the Battle of Falkirk, and to counter the English archers kept a heavy mounted cavalry reserve on hand to employ against them and negated the employment of the English archers. Archer Jones then discussed the English and Scottish engagements following Bannockburn at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill. His description

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., 159.

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., 157-158.
was in line with other authorities as to the events that occurred at each battle and Jones said the English had created the perfect defensive system. Concerning the battles of Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill, the next two books, along with Cornell’s *Bannockburn* already mentioned, provided a link concerning one interesting historical character in particular; Henry de Beaumont.

Robert Hardy in his book *Longbow A Social and Military History* explained how the disinherited invaded Scotland to reclaim their lost lands and engaged the Scots at the Battle of Dupplin Moor (1333) during the climax of their invasion. With a smaller force, these nobles used the new English dismounted defensive fighting system to defeat a much larger Scottish force, as would become their future tactical procedure. Hardy then discussed the English militaries’ repeat use of this tactic the following year at the Battle of Halidon Hill (1334). At this engagement the English improved their fighting system to use three *battles* instead of one, with King Edward III in command and he had these same disinherited nobles with him at the engagement. Hardy in his book suggested that there was a discussion and exchange of ideas between the disinherited nobles and King Edward III prior to the Battle of Halidon Hill. Hardy said that perhaps one or the other recommended an improvement of the formation used at Dupplin Moor to use three *battles* instead of one at Halidon Hill. Clifford Rogers in his book *War Cruel and Sharp*

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31Ibid., 159-160.

32A *battle* was a division of a medieval European host (army). A conventional deployment was of three “battles.” The van (or vanguard), centre, and rear (rearguard)) battles in a line of march became the right, centre, and left divisions respectively of a battle line. A battle could also mean any grouping of knights or other troops on a more impromptu basis (rather like the modern “battle group”).

*English Strategy under Edward III, 1327-1360* also provided an overview of Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill, with more detail covering the covert politics of King Edward III leading up to the engagements. What was interesting regarding these readings that discussed the disinherited, and the Battles of Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill, were the names that continuously emerged: Edward Baliol and Henry de Beaumont. Beaumont also appeared in David Cornell’s *Bannockburn*, as Beaumont also fought at this engagement.

Edward Baliol had a claim to the Scottish crown and the disinherited provided him the means to regain it. Baliol on the other hand provided the disinherited a political voice in Scotland, if he could regain the crown, to reclaim their lands. The central and most remarkable historical character, however, was Henry de Beaumont. Beaumont was an old seasoned soldier with over 30 years’ combat experience who had fought in numerous engagements against the Scots. Beaumont would have had decades of battle experience and lessons to share. The readings of Cornell, Hardy, and Rogers reveal that the English nobility, and English military in general, did analyze their battle methods to identify what was working, then shared those tactical lessons with one another to improve their army for the next engagement. Henry de Beaumont would have been in the best position, possessing a great depth of combat knowledge and experience, to help lead and revolutionize English tactics to develop the English defensive dismounted fighting system. It is quite likely that Beaumont did play a major role in the advancement of the English fighting system, and Hardy credited the ‘disinherited’ with planning and
executing the tactics for the Dupplin Moor engagement.\textsuperscript{34} As the de facto leader of the disinherited during their invasion of Scotland and their engagement against the Scots at Dupplin Moor in 1333, and as aid to King Edward III at Halidon Hill, Beaumont was no doubt an influential personality throughout the development of the medieval English defensive fighting system.

\textsuperscript{34}Jones, \textit{The Art of War in The Western World}, 51.
HORSES

HORSES

English Longbow archers

English dismounted heavy infantry

Trajectory of English archery assets (interlocking sectors of fire)

Military pits / trenches dug in front of the English line as obstacle

Figure 5.  Diagram of the Medieval English Defensive Fighting Formation


Note: Rogers referred to Jean Froissart’s statement from a chronicle, that the archers were deployed in a harrow with the archers representing the tines. 35 Based off the readings, it is understood that the manner in which the English archers were positioned they could achieve sectors of fire. This allowed English archers to initially fire toward the front of their formation at an approaching enemy, then as the enemy closed in and made contact with the English dismounted heavy cavalry, the archers could continue firing into the enemy flanks. This formation was tactically ingenious, and in some aspects still applicable today, as it kept the enemy under a constant shower of arrow fire throughout an engagement. 36

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In his book *The Armies of Crécy and Poitiers*, Christopher Rothero explained both the battles of Crécy and Poitiers. Both engagements were quite similar, with the English using their defensive fighting system against a larger French force that was pursuing them on both occasions. At Crécy (1346) and Poitiers (1356) the English used natural obstacles and prepared their position by digging military pits to slow or halt French progress, dismounted their heavy cavalry to use as heavy infantry on foot, and employed their archers on the formations’ flanks. The intriguing difference between the two engagements was the English kept a heavy mounted cavalry reserve at the Battle of Poitiers, which Prince Edward used at a decisive point in the battle to envelope the French and defeat them. At the Battle of Crécy the English did not keep a reserve, but simply held ground and withstood multiple attacks and mounted charges from the French, until the majority of the French gave up and left the battle ground.

At some point between Crécy (1346) and Poitiers (1356), the English discovered the advantage of using a mounted cavalry reserve to execute a tactical flanking maneuver and assimilated it into their fighting system. It is possible the English learned this flanking tactic from the French during one of their engagements that occurred between Crécy (1346) and Poitiers (1356). The French successfully defeated the English at the Battle of Ardres (1351), and had two mounted cavalry units positioned on each side of

37Military Pits, also referred to as tranches or holes, were dug in front of the English defensive position prior to an engagement. Just as militaries in the defensive do today, the English prepared their defensive line before battle. The purpose of digging the military pits was to trip mounted or dismounted cavalry charging their position so that they became entangled in their fall or crushed by their horse. It presented a manmade obstacle to the enemy.

their formation at the start of the engagement. However, the readings did not mention the French cavalry’s actions. At the Battle of Mauron (1352), the French used a mounted cavalry unit to execute a tactical flanking maneuver against the English and the French were successful to a degree.

The *Cronique Normande*, by Anonymous Author, and Alfred Burne’s *The Crécy War* both provided insight on the smaller, yet significant, engagements during the Hundred Years War that occurred between Crécy (1346) and Poitiers (1356). In each of these smaller engagements: Lunalonge (1349), Saintes (1351), Ardres (1351), and Mauron (1352) the English continue to fight the French using their defensive static fighting position tactics with great success. However, during these engagements the French began to adjust their tactics, splitting from their total commitment to chivalric principles, and seeking instead to win a victory opposed to personal glory.

At Lunalonge the French probed and stole the English soldiers’ horses, a less than chivalric act, then executed their mounted cavalry charge against the English defensive line. The French cavalry charge failed, but they were attempting remove an enemy asset. Had the French charge been successful, the French could have decimated the English as they retreated on foot. Since the French charge failed, the English had no horses to pursue the French on as the French retreated. Realizing that stealing English horses would not change the dynamics of the conflicts, the French adjusted tactics again at the Battle of Saintes.

During the Battle of Saintes the French dismounted, like the English but kept two mounted cavalry units on both wings of their formation, then charged both mounted and on foot against the English defensive system. The French were defeated during the
engagement; however at the Battle of Ardres they dismounted again and were successful in defeating the English. There were no accounts on the details of the engagements at Saintes or Ardres, but details were available on the Battle of Mauron. During this engagement, the French dismounted and charged on foot again. However, the French achieved some success using their mounted cavalry to execute a flanking maneuver against the right side of the English defensive line, until English archers turned the French cavalry’s flanking maneuver. If the French used a mounted cavalry flanking maneuver with some success at Mauron, then it is likely they successfully used a mounted cavalry flanking maneuver at the Battle of Ardres to defeat the English as well. It is probable they attempted to use it at the Battle of Saintes too, but it is not mentioned in the readings. Since the Battle of Lunalonge was fought by the English and French, using essentially the same tactical methods they used in previous encounters, there is no reason to rehash and provide a proposed diagram account of the engagement. However, at the Battles of Saintes and Ardres the French began fighting dismounted with the majority of their force, but kept two cavalry units worth of men mounted on horseback. The French placed one each of these two mounted cavalry bodies on the flanks of their formation before attacking the English. Suggesting, the task of for both of these French mounted cavalry units was to pursue and attack the English flank using the path of least resistance, based off the terrain of natural and man-made obstacles. If for instance, the right side of the English position was unattainable due to terrain, or better defended, then perhaps the English left side would be weaker and susceptible to a mounted flanking attack.
If the French placed a mounted cavalry unit on both sides of their formation before attacking, then conceivably they were unsure of or unfamiliar with the terrain and obstacles to be negotiated during their attack. Therefore, one flank may succeed over easy terrain to achieve the flank, where the other may not because the terrain was too rough or well-defended. Two mounted cavalry units gave them two possibilities in which to gain a positional advantage in such a situation. If the French could easily identify the path of least resistance before the engagement, as they did at the Battle of Mauron, then they could pre-position and mass their mounted cavalry assets on a glide path in front of that terrain to make easy the mounted cavalry’s approach.
Figure 6. Diagram Proposing French Mounted Cavalry Flanking Tactic used in Conjunction with French Dismounted Cavalry Attack on foot at the Battles of Saintes and Ardres

Source: Adapted and proposed by the author based off of the readings.

Note: Speculating on the French dismounted tactic. If the French attacked using a combination of dismounted cavalry foot soldiers and mounted cavalry on horseback, over ground they were unfamiliar with, the mounted cavalry would be positioned on each side of their formation as depicted in the diagram. As the French moved forward and discover that the terrain on the left of their formation’s ingress was unattainable, but terrain on the right was traversable, then the right side mounted cavalry unit would pursue the enemy’s flank. At the Battle of Saintes perhaps the terrain on both sides of the French advance was inaccessible. Therefore, the French could only attack with their foot soldiers, who were vulnerable to English longbow fire once the distance was closed between them and they were exhausted having to attack uphill on foot in heavy armor. At the Battle of Ardres, one side of the French formation of mounted cavalry or both likely traversed easily over the terrain, against the English archers’ fire, gained positional advantage over the English and successfully attacked to turn their flank and gain victory.

The English undoubtedly developed a superior defensive tactical formation, which they learned from their encounters with the Scots during the Scottish Wars of
Independence. The lessons and tactics the English learned and adapted from the Scots’
benefitted them when they later fought the French during the Hundred Years War. The
following chapter will cover some selected battles fought between the English and Scots
during the Scottish Wars of Independence, then provide an overview of some selected
battles fought between the English and French during the first phase of the Hundred
Years War, to show how the English progressed their fighting system and decisively
employed it.
CHAPTER 3
SURPRISE AT BANNOCKBURN: THE ENGLISH IDENTIFY
DEFECTS AND MODERNIZE THEIR BATTLE SYSTEM

The initial three battles that will be discussed in this chapter took place between 1314 and 1333 amongst the English and the Scots and provide an excellent opportunity to establish a foundation for the topic of this thesis. It was during The Wars of Scottish Independence that the English learned the lessons that guided them in their development of the tactical procedure they would later use against the French during the Hundred Years War. This chapter will not go into great detail on the background of the war. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of some selected battles that were fought, to examine the tactical procedures employed by the Scottish and English forces and how they evolved.

There were various reasons why the Scottish Wars of Independence were fought. However, to provide some background, a few reasons for the conflict will briefly be mentioned because they help explain the battles that will be discussed in this chapter. Prior to the Battle of Bannockburn in 1314, both Robert the Bruce and King Edward II wanted to rule Scotland. Robert the Bruce laid claim to the Scottish crown and to legitimize his claim he needed the English King, King Edward II, to recognize him as the King of Scotland. King Edward II of course refused. Their forces clashed in a decisive battle at Bannockburn where the Scots won a significant victory over the English. The Battles at Dupplin Moor (1332) and Halidon Hill (1333) occurred almost 20 years after Bannockburn. Between the Battles of Bannockburn and Dupplin Moor conflict between the English and Scots continued, as the Scots willfully raided the English northern border
territories. When the English could not stop the Scots with military action a treaty was agreed and signed.

The *Treaty of Northampton*, agreed to by Queen Isabella and her paramour, Mortimer, after they had dethroned King Edward II, was in place just prior to the Battle of Halidon Hill (1333). A number of English nobles who referred to themselves as the ‘disinherited’ had been forced from their lands in Scotland by the Scottish army following The Battle of Bannockburn and they wanted to reclaim it. One of these nobles, Henry de Beaumont, was a key figure who distinguished himself at the Battle of Falkirk in 1298. An experienced warrior that participated in many of the major battles during the war, including Bannockburn, he spearheaded the push to reopen the war in 1332 to reclaim his land. One of the agreements in the *Treaty of Northampton* stipulated that the disinherited could not reclaim their lands. Since he was forced to accept the treaty as a youth, King Edward III did not support the *Treat of Northampton*. However, to maintain his chivalrous honor King Edward III did not openly oppose it, but he would later claim that since he was forced to accept the treaty he was not bound to it.41

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39Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp English Strategy Under Edward III, 1327-1360*, 23-24. Queen Isabella and Mortimer had to have peace to protect their vassals and maintain their hold on power. After the Weardale Campaign (1327), led by a young inexperienced King Edward III, failed to crush the Scots and keep them from raiding northern English territories, Queen Isabella and Mortimer gave Robert the Bruce the concessions he wanted in *The Treaty of Northampton* to gain peace. The Weardale Campaign is where King Edward III cut his teeth in battle and acquired some tactical lessons from his enemies the Scots. He would later use their raiding techniques against the French during the Hundred Years War. Rogers, 14-24.


The Battle of Bannockburn’s Framework

Bannockburn was an unexpected black eye for the English that proved to be such a devastating loss that it forced them to rethink their tactical methods. At the Battle of Bannockburn the English learned three lessons from the engagement: First, organization and discipline were crucial because as formations grew larger they also became more difficult to control. Second, cavalry lacking support from archers were useless against well trained and controlled spearmen. Third, archers left on their own without cavalry support were susceptible to enemy cavalry unless they could quickly change their front to face their attackers.42 Also, at Bannockburn the English had not yet realized the full potential of the longbow, so they did not deployed their archers in sufficient numbers adequately to engage the Scots.43 Author David Cornell superbly described the battle and events surrounding it, as well as the psychological impact it had on the English during and after the engagements that led them to renovate their tactics.

Events that occurred on June 23, 1314, left a significant impression on the English psyche prior to the Battle of Bannockburn on June 24, 1314, and it is important to explore them first. Robert the Bruce commanded the Scottish rear guard, and his force had taken up position in the woods of New Park. His plan was to avoid direct battle with the more formidable English and continue to conduct irregular warfare through raids and ambushes.

As the English vanguard approached, leery of attack from Scots in the wooded area, they sent forward scout Welsh foot Soldiers under the command of a young knight

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43 Cornell, *Bannockburn The Triumph of Robert The Bruce*, 138-139.
Henry de Bohun. Bohun was looking for glory as a young knight, and shortly after his force entered the wooded confines of New Park, where the Scottish host was located, Bohun spotted Robert the Bruce. Bohun alone charged Bruce with his lance raised as a knight would in the joust to claim personal glory in single handed combat. Robert the Bruce realized that De Bohun was unaccompanied and he stood his ground. Twisting away at the last second, evading and allowing Bohun’s lance tip to pass by him, Robert the Bruce stood in his stirrups, swung and landed his ax heavily into De Bohun’s skull and killed him instantly. De Bohun’s death was unsettling for the English soldiers who witnessed it. Rarely did a knight die in combat as their protective armor made them virtually invulnerable and the common practice of capturing knights for ransom was the general expectation. The Scots, encouraged by Robert the Bruce’s actions, rushed forward to meet the English vanguard. However, Robert the Bruce knew the danger involved if the Scottish foot soldiers were to engage the English heavy cavalry in the open field, and he kept his force within the wood line of New Park. The English vanguard, fearing irregular attacks from the Scots, did not enter the wood line of New Park either. Robert the Bruce had successfully avoided battle with the English and repelled their vanguard’s attack.⁴⁴ Preoccupied by his encounter in New Park, Robert the Bruce was unaware that the Scottish vanguard, commanded by his nephew Thomas Randolph, had broken Robert the Bruce’s cardinal rule of avoiding battle with heavy cavalry in the open. Randolph’s force, consisting of only foot soldiers, was now engaging a heavy English cavalry unit in the open field.

⁴⁴Ibid., 165-172.
While guarding the Scottish left flank beside a *kirk*, a church, Randolph spotted an English heavy cavalry unit attempting to execute a flanking movement toward his position. This English cavalry unit was commanded by Robert Clifford and was composed of only heavy cavalry, knights and men-at-arms. Interestingly, the most senior commander under Clifford was Henry de Beaumont. Beaumont would later become one of the ‘disinherited’ and command English forces at the Battle of Dupplin Moor (1332) using the new English fighting system. Serving in Clifford’s cavalry unit at Bannockburn, Beaumont would experience fighting against the strength of a disciplined Scottish *schiltron* formation, which was under Thomas Randolph’s command. With orders to guard the Scottish flank, Randolph was deciding how to handle Clifford’s English cavalry unit that was headed towards his formation.

Hearing of Robert the Bruce’s successful actions against the English Knight Bohun, and understanding the English vanguard had been turned at New Park, Randolph decided to move his infantry into the open field and engage the English mounted cavalry. Randolph’s decision went against established military wisdom. Foot soldiers were vulnerable against cavalry, as they could be easily ridden down and killed. The only counter tactic infantry foot soldiers had to employ against cavalry was to form into a tightly crowded formation of men the Scots called a *schiltron* with their pikes pointed outward to repulse charging mounted cavalry. Randolph’s *schiltron* in the open field however, transformed into a circular formation around him so he could provide command and control while the pikes provided all-around protection.45

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The English contemplated and argued whether or not to attack, puzzled by the Scots’ unorthodox movement into the open field. Henry de Beaumont recommended pulling back, to force the Scots further into the field so they could not retreat easily into the wood line, but his idea was challenged by a subordinate Thomas Gray. When De Beaumont in turn questioned Gray’s courage, Gray hot headedly charged Randolph’s schiltron followed by William Deyncourt. Both knights collided into the pikes of the schiltron, which killed Deyncourt and dismounted Gray, who was absorbed into the schiltron and captured. Again, such an uncommon death of a knight and capture of another was alarming to the English, who watched it unfold before them. Beaumont and Clifford, both seasoned soldiers, knew the only way to defeat the schiltron was to penetrate it and disperse the formation. Composed of only cavalry, the English forces had no archers, which could have been used to fire bolts into the Scots’ formation to break it up. The English cavalry, determined to pry open the formation, encircled the schiltron and attacked it from all sides. The English threw swords and maces into the formation in an attempt to create an opening to charge into, however the Scots, remarkably disciplined, held their formation. As the battle dragged on for hours the English became frustrated, nothing on foot it was thought could defeat heavy cavalry, but the schiltron had proved them wrong. Reluctantly, Robert the Bruce authorized a small Scottish cavalry contingent to ride out and aid Randolph’s schiltron formation. The English, exhausted and frustrated by their efforts to break the schiltron formation, fell back in response to the Scottish reinforcements. Amazingly, Randolph had won an inconceivable victory that would further plague the English hosts’ psyche in addition to Robert the
Bruce’s actions. King Edward II was obviously displeased by the events, which left him further determined to bring the Scots to battle at all costs.\textsuperscript{46}

King Edward II and his nobles considered the terrain and the requirement that it allow for the deployment of his entire force. However, he was forced to identify another route to engage the Scots, as any attempt to move through the woods risked further irregular warfare attacks. Ultimately, King Edward II chose to conduct a risky night-crossing of his force over the Bannockburn River for fearing any delay would cause loss of contact with the Scots. His decision placed a physical obstacle to the rear of his force, hindering any retreat, and the terrain on the opposite bank was also not conducive properly to employ his cavalry. Additionally, the time taken to cross the river strained his force. The English soldiers were tired from lack of sleep and fear of their close proximity to the Scots put them on constant guard afraid to rest. The English had time to reflect on the events of the previous day and now doubted the ability of their cavalry of mounted knights and men-at-arms to adequately engage the enemy. The death of the knights lost in the battle and the one captured still weighed heavily on everyone’s mind. Knights and cavalry were considered invulnerable, however the engagements had proven that perhaps this was not the case. This affected the English foot soldiers as well, who believed without question that knights and men-at-arms reigned supreme on the field of battle. News of the English defeats suffered on June 23, caused them to question and doubt their nobles’ military acumen.\textsuperscript{47}

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., 174-182.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{47}Ibid., 183-187.
Scottish knight Alexander Seton was aligned with the English and had fought against Robert the Bruce in a number of battles. However, now realizing that English morale was low he changed sides and left the English lines to join with Robert the Bruce. Seton described the situation of the English to Bruce, and advised him to seek battle with them because the English were mentally beaten. Robert the Bruce had been contemplating whether to withdraw and avoid battle, as had been his common practice, or engage the English with the fear of losing, which risked putting an end to his cause. Hearing this report from Seton himself confirmed Bruce’s suspicion of English low morale and he decided to assume risk and engage the English. Robert the Bruce had the high ground with the English host located in the low *Carse of Balquhiderock*, which refers to fertile lowland beside the river with sediment deposited from water, with the terrain between it and New Park unconducive to heavy cavalry maneuvers.48

On the morning of June 24, 1314, Robert Bruce moved his force out of the wood line into battle formation after conducting pre-battle preparations. Roughly five thousand Scots formed in a *schiltron*, arrayed across the field covering the length of it. The English did not expect the Scots to take the field in open battle, as the Scots had generally avoided battle, and were surprised at the sight of the Scottish force forming above them. Seeing that a fight was to take place, the English hastily prepared for battle and assumed their positions. Their three cavalry divisions formed with the vanguard slightly forward and the majority of the foot soldiers in the rear of the formation. The English prepared to execute a cavalry charge, which they had not conducted in battle for a generation since

48Ibid., 188-192.
Falkirk; many with the exception of a handful had never experienced it before. The Scots, likewise, had never endured a full-scale cavalry charge.

Robert Bruce gave the order to advance once his formation was complete and as the Scots approached a number of the English protested that they should not fight until the following day because they needed to rest. Their protests went unheard, as King Edward II was set on a decisive battle. A brief engagement between the archers of each side ensued, ending with the English archers driving back those of the Scots. Other than this one engagement, archers did not play a significant role during the battle. Had the English used their archers to fire into the *schiltrons* before the charge, their arrows may have made a difference and produced a different outcome, but the archers were not properly employed. King Edward II then gave the order for his cavalry to charge and the sound of the trumpets halted the Scots who formed a more tightly packed static *schiltron* with their pikes brandished toward the English charge. Men and horses were skewered in the collision on both sides by pikes and lances when moments later a second wave of English cavalry collided into the formation, but the *schiltron* held and hand-to-hand combat followed.

During part of the battle the Earl Gloucester was killed, he was the first English earl to die in the Scottish Wars for more than 60 years. This was another blow to the English psyche, if a knight rarely died in battle it was unbelievable that an earl would perish in battle. As the fight wore on, the narrow terrain restricted movement of the 1,500 English knights and men-at-arms. The English force from the Bannockburn River to the front line began to bunch-up pushing the forward line of knights into the *schiltron* causing substantial casualties for the English. The morale of the English foot soldiers to
the rear of the formation began to wither and they started to retreat, which eventually
caused the entire English force to withdraw. The English retreat was unorganized and a
significant number drowned in their attempt to cross the Bannockburn River, others were
pursued by the Scots and slaughtered. King Edward II was forcefully escorted from the
field under the protection of five hundred English knights. The Scots had won a great
victory, in which foot soldiers defeated heavy cavalry, and many English nobles (knights)
and men-at-arms perished.49 News of the defeat spread throughout the English kingdom,
as well as the rest of Europe. The English military was left in a somber state of
bewilderment and shame.50

The English took the defeat at Bannockburn hard and in the decades following the
battle they transformed their military system. Through trial and error they tried to
understand how such a disaster could happen and how to prevent it from ever happening
again. The results of their adjustments were evident at the Battles of Dupplin Moor in
1332 and Halidon Hill in 1333, the next battles covered. The English started using
dismounted knights intermixed with infantry to fight on foot in a defensive formation
similar to the *schiltron* on high ground. They implemented this tactic along with the
combined arms of their longbow archers, to enhance their formation with projectile bolts
to soften or break up the enemy charge. Once their enemy was scattered, the dismounted
knights and men-at-arms could remount to pursue and destroy the enemy as they
retreated. Eventually they had mixed formations of cavalry and infantry. Their
development of a new military tactical system had transpired from the hard lessons they

49Ibid., 193-213.

50Ibid., 217.
learned at Bannockburn.\textsuperscript{51} The English view towards chivalric behavior in battle was drastically changed by the disgrace they endured in their defeat at Bannockburn. Making such a cultural shift in thought, it appears their new system was designed to first win the battle with odds in their favor, then seek personal glory once the enemy was routed. Between the Battles of Bannockburn and Dupplin Moor King Edward II was deposed by his wife, Queen Isabela and her paramour Mortimer. Struggling to maintain their hold on power and unable to protect the English border territories from raiding Scots, Queen Isabela and Mortimer entered into the \textit{Treaty of Northampton} in 1328. Again, this treaty stifled the ‘disinherited’ so that they could not regain their land, leaving smoldering embers that would later revive the war 20 years after Bannockburn at Dupplin Moor.\textsuperscript{52}

\section*{Dupplin Moor}

King Edward III was just 19 years old on July 31, 1332, when the Battle of Dupplin Moor was fought.\textsuperscript{53} Previous to the battle, he had discouraged some of his nobles from pursuing conflict with the Scots, because he wanted to honor the \textit{Treaty of Northampton}. These nobles, who claimed to be disinherited, disregarded his orders and deployed to Scotland by sea, therefore King Edward III did not fight at the Battle of Dupplin Moor. However, his English nobles at the Battle of Dupplin Moor: Edward Baliol, Gilbert Umphraville, Henry de Beaumont and David of Atholl planned and

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\textsuperscript{51}Ibid., 253.

\textsuperscript{52}Rogers, \textit{War Cruel and Sharp English Strategy Under Edward III, 1327-1360}, 24-25.

\textsuperscript{53}Spelling of Dupplin Moor varies depending on the source that is used. It is also spelled as Dupplin Muir in some other texts.
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successfully employed a tactical formation that used dismounted knights and men-at-arms flanked by longbow archers to win a great victory at the Battle of Dupplin Moor.\textsuperscript{54}

Henry de Beaumont was the de facto commander who led the English forces at Dupplin Moor. He and his fellow disinherited nobles, in supporting Baliol’s claim to the Scottish throne, intended to turn the invasion force into a civil war. Beaumont’s force was small consisting of 500 men-at-arms and 1000 archers with foot soldiers, but he and the disinherited expected to find Scottish supporters of Baliol once in Scotland. The supporters came, but only after the English won the engagement. Henry de Beaumont had been an active soldier for 30 years by the time he led the disinherited into Dupplin Moor. His experience, comprised mainly of battles with the Scots, spanned from Flanders (1297), Falkirk (1298) to Bannockburn (1314), along with English lessons learned since to include the Weardale Campaign (1327). Beaumont knew his men would stand their ground and would benefit from their archers as they had at Falkirk. In order to match the frontage of the larger Scottish \textit{shiltons}, the English dismounted and deployed their men-at-arms on foot in a thin line spread over 600 feet three ranks deep and backed by one spear carrying infantryman with archers formed on each flank. The horses were sent to the rear of the formation.\textsuperscript{55}

The English then established their formation as a single \textit{battle} of dismounted knights flanked at each side by their archers and angled forward at the center atop of a hill. When the Scottish charge met the English battle formation it did force the English

\textsuperscript{54}Hardy, \textit{Longbow A Social and Military History}, 51-52.

\textsuperscript{55}Rogers, \textit{War Cruel and Sharp English Strategy Under Edward III, 1327-1360}, 31-42.
line back some twenty feet before both forces reached a stalemate, at which point the English archers on the battle’s flanks closed around the Scots and shot into the Scottish flanks pushing the Scots on top of one another and dispersing their formation. As the Scots retreated, the English dismounted cavalry (knights) remounted their horses and pursued the fleeing Scots. The disinherited won the battle and word spread of their success, the Scottish schiltrons were not as invincible as The Battle of Bannockburn had portrayed them. With momentum behind the English, King Edward III moved to retake Scotland and he had these same nobles with him when he faced the Scotts the following year at Halidon Hill. The tactical formation the disinherited had used at Dupplin Moor (1332) was further polished and made more effective for its employment at Halidon Hill in (1333).

Halidon Hill

One year later in 1333, the English again confronted a larger Scottish force and purposefully chose a position on Halidon Hill with forest to the rear of their formation for security in the event of retreat. However, instead of using only one battle of dismounted knights flanked by archers, they employed three battles, each with archers on their flanks. Three battles allowed the front sector of the formation, as well as the flanks, to be covered by the archers. This placed a charging enemy in a deadly engagement area constantly exposed to rapid fire from English longbow archers. Previously used formations placed battles in a column layered behind one another. This new formation

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56Hardy, Longbow A Social and Military History, 52-53.
proved effective at the Battle of Dupplin Moor and decisive when improved and employed again at the Battle of Halidon Hill.57

King Edward III was besieging the town of Berwick, a strategic location for the Scots due to its close vicinity to the sea for trade and supplies for logistic support, therefore the Scots could not avoid fighting over it; it had to be protected. This forced the Scots to attack so that King Edward III could expect a defensive battle to employ the same tactics used by Beaumont and the disinherited at Dupplin Moor (1332).58 King Edward III placed and prepared his force, of 500 men-at-arms, with archers and spearmen in proportion, on the slope of Halidon Hill (1333) two miles from the town of Berwick. The English men-at-arms were dismounted and divided into three battles: the first commanded by Beaumont, the second by King Edward III, and the last by Baliol. The archers were placed on the flanks of each battle so that neither group would impede the others. The Scots had a much larger force than the English.59

The sheer size of the Scottish force was a discouraging site for the English as the Scottish schiltrons approached their defensive formation. However, as at Dupplin Moor (1332) before and as would be the case at Crecy (1346) and Poitiers (1356) after, the English were steadied by the fact they had nowhere to run.60 To reach the English defensive position the Scots had to move through a swampy hollow down a steep slope

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57Ibid., 51-53.

58Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp English Strategy Under Edward III, 1327-1360, 68.

59Ibid., 68-70.

60Ibid., 71.
and then up another. They had to move quickly to limit their exposure to the English archers’ arrows. By the time they reached the English position, atop the 500 foot hill, they were exhausted and their ranks had been thinned by the English archers who took thousands of Scots from the fight. 61 Once the two armies collided and engaged in hand-to-hand combat the Scots rear turned and fled; unable to withstand the combined assaults of the English foot soldiers and English archers. As the Scots fled the English men-at-arms remounted and pursued the Scottish retreat, which lasted for eight miles. More Scots were killed during their retreat than during the initial engagement. 62

At Halidon Hill (1333) King Edward III saw first-hand the efficiency of the longbow when employed by skilled archers in combination with a strong defensive position held by well-disciplined dismounted men-at-arms. These lessons, along with his earlier experience gained during the English failed Weardale Campaign (1327) in Scotland, influenced his strategy in the opening of the Hundred Years War against France. 63

The raiding Scots that King Edward III attempted to bring to battle and defeat during the Weardale Campaign (1327) focused on mobility. They carried very few provisions with them, as their intent was to live off of what they foraged or stole. The Scots spread out in a thin linear formation spanning over 30 miles to cover a wider path as they raided. As they rapidly moved through the English country side plundering, they could cover and devastate more ground and scavenge a wider area for supplies. Also the

61 Ibid., 71-72.
62 Ibid., 72-73.
63 Ibid., 76.
wide spread echelon of the Scots caused the English to receive multiple reports of
Scottish sightings at various times and places and it kept the English a step behind the
Scottish movements.\textsuperscript{64} King Edward III would later model his invasion plan, \textit{chevauchée}
and tactics used during the Hundred Yeas War against the French after some of the Scots
raiding methods.\textsuperscript{65} Plundering a kingdom’s vessels depleted the amount of money that
could be paid in taxes to their king, which was one of King Edward III’s intentions in
France. King Edward III’s force learned lessons from pursuing the raiding Scots too. The
English realized they could not catch the much faster Scots, and unless the Scots decided
to take position on a hill top or in a pass and wait to fight the English from advantageous
terrain, the English could only hope to outmaneuver the Scots by controlling a river
passage.\textsuperscript{66}

Since the English were facing a larger force at both Dupplin Moor (1332) and
Halidon Hill (1333), it would have been risky to ride around the battlefield fighting
individually pursuing personal glory from the start of the battle, as demanded by the
ideals of chivalry; a single knight would have been overwhelmed once separated from his
formation. The conditions required security that could only be achieved in a tight
formation. It is not known if King Edward III or his nobles who fought at Dupplin Moor

\textsuperscript{64}\textit{Ibid.}, 14-15.

\textsuperscript{65}Chevauchée is French meaning ‘ride’ and in the medieval period meant a raid
through enemy territory. The aim was to damage crops, buildings, and property to drive
the peasantry into hiding, so reducing the productivity of a region. This undermined the
revenues of the country or regions ruler and proved they were unable to protect their
subjects. Pillagers were sent out from an army’s line of march, up to 12km / 12 mi each
side.

\textsuperscript{66}Rogers, \textit{War Cruel and Sharp English Strategy Under Edward III, 1327-1360},
18.
recommended modifying the Dupplin Moor formation from one to three battles. However, the lessons learned at Dupplin Moor were shared amongst the English military and improved upon in preparation for the Battle at Halidon Hill. Later, the tactics used by the English at the Battle of Dupplin Moor were adopted for use during the Hundred Years’ War.

As the study will show, in ideal chivalric combat, knights should charge into battle mounted on their horse facing the enemy head on as in the joust. When knights charged against other knights a proper contest would ensue, so that the knights could face one another man-to-man. However, mounted knights charging head first into a compact formation of foot soldiers, all armed with long sharp pikes anchored in the ground (schiltron or phalanx formations), could achieve little to no penetration into their enemy’s ranks. If the pike-men were disciplined and did not break ranks, then they could successfully hold off the mounted charge. However, if the mounted knights had archers too rapidly fire arrows into the schiltron formation preceding their charge, the formation might be broken enough to allow some penetration and even destruction by mounted knights.

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The English learned and inculcated some valuable lessons during their battles with the Scots and were progressive in their thought regarding the tactics required to achieve victory. A question to be addressed later in this paper is why were they willing to depart from their ideals of chivalry by using dismounted knights and men-at-arms as foot soldiers? The English tactical system developed during their wars against the Scots were employed against the French initially during the Battle of Crécy at the start of the Hundred Years War. The French nobles held on to chivalric principles in their engagements with the English, desiring a head on charge against their enemy’s nobles in
a fair fight. Repeatedly this tactic achieved poor results against the English tactical system developed during the Scottish Wars of Independence. However, the French did attempt to adjust their methods later on during the war, as will be outlined in the following battles, to use dismounted knights and men-at-arms as well. To provide some background to readers unfamiliar with the period, a brief explanation of the English and French political motives that instigated the Hundred Years War is provided in the following pages. Also, a diagram of the genealogy for both the French and English Monarchies, as well as a map with central locations, is presented to help readers follow and distinguish the key historical figures and locations involved.

![Figure 8. France’s Historical Figures](image)


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Political Motives

Following the death of King Charles IV of France, King Edward III of England claimed that his right to the throne of France was greater than that of Phillip de Valois VI. King Edward III’s mother, Queen Isabella wife of King Edward II, was the sister of King Charles IV who was the last male heir of King Phillip IV. King Phillip de Valois VI was King Charles IV and Queen Isabella’s first cousin, as well as the nephew of King Phillip.
IV, King Charles IV and Isabella’s father. King Phillip VI claimed the French throne based on the law that women were not permitted to inherit land or property (Isabella), therefore as next male in the blood line the French crown should pass to him. Thus, King Edward III of England declared that he could inherit the land and property through his mother and was the rightful heir to the French crown. It was chiefly this dispute, compounded by later trade embargoes between the countries, which festered relations leading to the struggle for the French crown and the start of the Hundred Years’ War.\(^7\)

Figure 10. Schematic of Significant Locations in France and the Paths Followed by King Edward III and Prince Edward on their Chevauchées during the Hundred Years War


**Overview Battle of Crécy**

The Battle of Crécy was fought on August 26, 1346, when the forces of King Edward III and King Philip VI collided at Crécy, France. King Edward III crossed the English Channel landing at St.-Vaast-la-Hogue in the Duchy of Normandy, France July 12, 1346. There his forces conducted what the military today refers to as, reception,
staging, onward movement and integration for six days before starting its march.\footnote{Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-35, \textit{Army Deployment and Redeployment} (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2010), 4-1.} The English had to disembark their personnel, horses, supplies and equipment from their ship, prepare their equipment, as well as rest, make bread and organize themselves for the fight.\footnote{Rogers, \textit{War Cruel and Sharp English Strategy Under Edward III, 1327-1360}, 238.} Before departing their “staging area,” King Edward III integrated, organized and divided his forces into three divisions or “\textit{battles}.” King Edward III commanded the central force, the Earl of Northampton commanded the rear, and the vanguard was commanded by King Edward III’s 16 year old son Prince Edward (aided by an experienced mentor to guide him).\footnote{Rothero, \textit{The Armies of Crécy and Poitiers}, 5.}

King Edward III initially wanted his nobles to protect the French that welcomed him. Considering himself the rightful heir to the French throne and as any good king should, King Edward III’s intent was to protect his French vessels. His goal was to capture strong points in France and intimidate nobles in those areas to accept his rule, a campaign of conquest. However, some of his nobles did not adhere to his proclamation to protect French towns that were accepting of his rule and went out for twenty miles pillaging and skirmishing with French soldiers they encountered. Those nobles who did obey his orders became jealous of the treasure their comrades acquired and they too
began to plunder. Soon King Edward III had lost all control of his forces and abandoned his strategy deciding instead to execute a *chevauchée*.\(^{76}\)

King Edward III spread out his forces in a linear line to cover more area marching separately by day, as the Scots had done in the Weardale Campaign (1327), then come together at night for security as they executed the *chevauchée*.\(^{77}\) In some instances towns that did not resist were spared, towns that did resist however, were destroyed with King Edward III doing little to mitigate the violence. This allowed him to appear merciful to those he spared, gain loot to reward his troops, and turn French anger toward the French King Phillip VI for his failure to defend them.\(^{78}\) The intent of the *chevauchée* was to bring King Philip VI to battle, as King Philip VI’s obligation was to protect his subjects.\(^{79}\)

When the English *chevauchée* arrived near the town of Rouen, France, King Edward III discovered that King Phillip de Valois VI called to arms a large force intended to engage and stop him at the location of Rouen. Rouen, the English discovered, was well defended by French troops and the bridges over the Seine had been destroyed. In an attempt to regroup with their Flemish partners, who were also invading France, King Edward III’s forces headed north. However, at a series of water crossings, the French who were pursuing the English Force had destroyed a number of bridges, cutting


\(^{77}\)Ibid., 243-244.

\(^{78}\)Ibid., 244-245.

\(^{79}\)Ibid., 252.
off his movement. King Edward III’s force eventually crossed at the location

Blanchetaque (a ford) and engaged in a small skirmish before routing a French force on the opposite bank. King Phillip VI’s force that had been tracking them caught up but could not cross at Blanchetaque due to rising water. King Phillip VI and his army had to find another way around, which gave King Edward III’s force time to identify defendable terrain. He chose high ground at Crécy and prepared it for the defense. King Edward III took up position on a hill side that allowed him to deploy his forces between the towns of Crécy on his right flank and Wadicourt on his left flank. The towns, along with physical barriers such as forests, marshes, and the River Maye, provided excellent natural barriers to guard his flanks. The position also provided his archers good fields of fire from the high ground. In addition, his forces dug a series of holes in the ground to their front (military pits) to help defend against cavalry charges; a technique they learned from the Scots who had successfully used it against the English at the Battle of Bannockburn June 24, 1314.

King Edward III positioned his three battles on line, with his personal guard at the center and slightly to the rear of the formation (probably for better command and control). He placed Prince Edward’s battle on his right (close to Crécy) and the Earl of Northampton’s on his left (close to Wadicourt) with English archers located in the center of his formation and both of the flanks. The following day the French army started closing in on King Edward III’s force. King Phillip VI’s reconnaissance group

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81 Ibid., 6-7.

82 Ibid., 7.
recommended he wait and better organize his large forces before attacking due to the well-fortified English position. However, once his confident nobles arrived, they pushed for him to attack and he was unable to dissuade them. The Genoese mercenary forces were sent forward and engaged the English first with their crossbows, but they were not prepared for the overwhelming fire power returned from English longbows and in turn attempted to flee the battlefield. The French, angered by the Genoese retreat, then sent forward their cavalry, which trampled the fleeing Genoese, but they too fell victim to the English archers’ storm of arrows and their horses became entangled in the military pits (pot holes) previously dug in front of the English position. After a series of failed attacks the French were defeated and fled. The English, listening to King Edward III’s instruction, did not pursue the French and held their lines. King Edward III was aware of the threat posed by the massive French levies that followed French nobility and any of his soldiers caught out alone would be targeted by the levies. The battle was won much to the credit of the English longbow archers and their superior fire power. The English remained in position through the night guarding ready for a counter attack. The English won against a larger French force that outnumbered it two to one. The French had 12,000 men-at-arms, 6,000 crossbowmen, and 20,000 militia compared to the English 3,000 men-at-arms, 11,000 archers and 5,000 Welsh light troops.

Prior to the engagement at Crécy, a letter had been sent from King Phillip VI to King Edward III declaring that the French would await the English in the field between

83Ibid., 7-10.

the Bourge-St.-Germain and the Vaugirard South of Paris, as well as an alternate location and a proposed date to engage in battle. The letter also ordered King Edward III to stop burning and pillaging until then. King Edward III responded that King Phillip VI could locate the English host by following the burning destruction the English army left in its wake. King Edward III’s intent in this reply was to force the French to attack the English host. King Edward III would gladly accept battle, but only if King Phillip VI and the French attacked the English on ground the English chose when the English were prepared. King Edward III would not let the French dictate the time or place of battle.\textsuperscript{85}

The English fighting system required that the English fight a defensive battle from advantageous terrain occupied by them prior to an engagement. Had King Edward III allowed King Phillip VI to provoke him to fight at a location chosen by the French, the English would have lost their tactical edge of choosing and occupying superior ground before the engagement, or worse they might have been forced to attack the French.

Crécy was a major victory for the English considering their odds against a larger French force, and it further validated their new proven battle system. Between the Battles of Crécy and Poitiers there were some smaller noteworthy battles between the English and French that took place. The battles that will be covered next include the Battles of Lunalonge, Saintes, Ardres, Mauron and Poitiers.

Figure 11. Battle Ground Crécy


Note: King Edward III chose his ground wisely; the high ground. His formation spanned the distance between two towns guarded by marsh and forests, as well as the river Maye to protect and block his flanks. His position forced the French to charge up sloped terrain through the Vallee des Clercs. The French had to expend energy in their uphill charge, in addition to avoiding rapid fire from English archers with clear fields of fire to effectively engage French forces charging them.

Post Crécy

A truce in 1347 and the bubonic plague limited hostilities between England and France, however fighting still occurred between them as the truce was nominal. Of note, the plague was more severe and took a heavier toll in England than France claiming more souls in England. This loss of manpower tipped the scales disproportionately in the
French favor with regard to the number of men they could mobilize. This loss in manpower did not seem to stifle the English at the Battle of Lunalonge.

The Battle of Lunalonge

In the summer of 1349 at Poitou, France, the English and their Gascon allies, under the command of the Captal de Buch, engaged French knights who were under the command of Jean de Lisle. Prior to this battle the English dismounted, as had become their tactical procedure, leaving their horses to the rear of their battles. Realizing this, the French sent a group of mounted men on horseback around the back side of the English formation and successfully captured the English cavalry’s horses. The French then attached the English front line head on with their main forces in a frontal charge using their mounted knights. The French charge was forcefully stopped and repelled by the English battles of dismounted knights. Over 300 French were killed or taken prisoner. The rest of the French forces retreated in a disorderly fashion, allowing the English to seize the ground. Both forces stood challenging each other until Vespers, then French forces retreated through the night. The English, absent their horses, then departed

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86 Alfred H. Burne, *The Crécy War a Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny, 1360* (London: Eyre and Sptiswoode), 224. Prisco Hernandez graciously located written accounts of each battle from a French chronicle, *Cronique Normande*, recorded by unknown contemporaries of the period who captured some detail of them. He also translated these primary sources from French into English, so that they could be incorporated into the overview of each battle.

87 Burne, *The Crécy War a Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny, 1360*, 225.

88 *Vespers* is the sunset evening prayer service in the Western Catholic, Easter (Byzantine) Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Anglican, and Lutheran liturgies of the canonical hours. The word comes from the Greek “hespera” and the Latin vesper, meaning “evening.”
marching on foot to their fortress.89 A striking observation made by a Professor Tout, concerning this battle, was that it is interesting to note the French effort to seek weak points in the English system, referring to the French seizure of the English horses prior to engaging them.90 In taking the English horses, the French were seeking to eliminate the English ability to remount and pursue fleeing French soldiers should their charge be turned causing their retreat. Conversely, if the French succeeded, the English retreat would have been difficult without horses. The French would attempt to employ a new tactic to counter the English defensive fighting system at the Battle of Saintes.

The Battle of Saintes

In 1351 King Jean of France wanted to recapture the province of Poitou and started planning a campaign plan to do so. King Edward III learned of this plan and dispatched Sir John Beauchamp, governor of Calais, to Bordeaux, France to defend Poitou from French forces. Beauchamp arrived early enough to make preparations for the battle then marched his forces north to encounter French forces that were already engaged with the English garrisons near St. Jean d’Angelys. Guy de Nesle and Arnaud d’Endre ghem, both French Marshalls, commanded the French force. Beauchamp moved his force into the town of Taillebourg located between St Jean d’Angelys and Saintes, which the French were surrounding at the time. As Beauchamp advanced his force on April 8, 1351, he located the French near the area of St. Georges-la-Valade. In

89 Auguste et Emile Molinier, *Cronique Normande*, translated from French into English by Prisco Hernandez, Assistant Director, MMAS Program, Fort Leavenworth, KS (France: Pour La Societe De L’Histoire De France), 94-95.

90 Burne, *The Crécy War a Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny*, 1360, 225.
accordance with the English tactical procedure, Beauchamp dismounted his forces and formed them into battles with their horses located to the rear of their formation. Interestingly, the French also dismounted the majority of their force but kept two formations mounted, which they positioned one each on their flanks. The French commanders took too long to form their battles, giving the reinforcements Beauchamp had ordered from Taillebourg time to arrive and bolster his force. Once the French were formed they attacked on foot, but were decisively defeated by the English formation. The defeated French retreated to Saints having suffered the loss of 600 Frenchmen that were killed or captured. Both French commanders were captured along with 140 squires.\textsuperscript{91} It is interesting to note that during this engagement, as we will see in those following, the French started attempting to emulate the English dismounted tactic. However, they attacked on foot instead of defending from a static position on superior terrain.

According to the \textit{Cronique Normande}, Guy de Neelle had assembled 1,500 soldiers to engage the English, which he believed were going to perform a chevauchée through Poitou. Neelle had been appointed as the captain-general of Poitou, Santonges and the surrounding area. He located the English on the other side of Saintes near the chapel Saint George. Once the English identified the French they dismounted and formed their battles. The Marshall of Neelle also dismounted his forces keeping two formations of mounted knights positioning one on each flank of his battle. It took the French too long to form their battles, which allowed the English time to receive three or four-hundred reinforcements that had remained at Tanay-sur-Charente and Taillebourc. Once both forces were formed, a battle ensued in which the English emerged victorious. The

\textsuperscript{91}Ibid., 232-233.
Marshall of Neelle, Ernoul D’Odenehen, Regnaut de Pons and many other nobles were taken prisoner. Six-hundred French men-at-arms were dead or captured and what remained of the French force retreated to the City of Saintes. The Battle of Saintes was over and the English achieved another victory thanks to their new battle system, however Sir John Beauchamp would encounter another French force at the Battle of Ardres.

**The Battle of Ardres**

Following the Battle of Saints Sir John Beauchamp returned to Calais, France. On June 6, 1351, he engaged another French force led by Count de Beaujeu at Ardres, France between St. Omer and Calais. Fighting in a pitched battle, the French commander Count de Beaujeu, like Marshall Guy de Neelle before him, dismounted his forces and attacked Beauchamp’s formation on foot. Beaujeu and his forces defeated the English and captured Beauchamp.

The *Cronique Normande* provides some additional insights. Jean de Beauchamp had under his command some 1,000 English combatants, including his brother Louis, who were ravaging the French countryside toward Saint Omer. The French Marshall Lord of Beaugieu commanded the French forces and was accompanied by his brother Guichart, the Count of Porcien. Other French nobles in his force included Moreau de Fiennes, Gieuffroy de Charny, and Oudart de Rent, along with a number of other nobles. The French were pursuing the English and found them near the town of Ardres. Once the French and English forces encountered each other they dismounted and a severe battle

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92 Auguste et Emile Molinier, 97-98.

93 Burne, *The Crécy War a Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny*, 1360, 233.
ensued. During the battle Beaugieu was killed, but his brother Guichart and the other knights fought fearlessly and successfully defeated the English. Jean de Beauchamp and seven-hundred English combatants were killed or captured during the fight.\textsuperscript{94}

Surprisingly, the French were successful during this engagement attacking on foot with their dismounting knights and or men-at-arms. Again, the difference is that the French dismounts attacked on foot rather than defending a static position as the English dismounts did. There is not a lot of detail available on this battle explaining how or why the French dismounted offensive tactic was successful in this engagement. Typically the English emerged victorious from these engagements, fighting defensively from a fixed position dismounted on high ground, allowing their archers to soften an enemy uphill charge before their main battles clashed with the enemy. At the Battle of Mauron the French again dismounted and charged the English on foot.

The Battle of Mauron

The Battle of Mauron occurred August 14, 1352 and it is well captured by Alfred Burne in his book \textit{The Crécy War}. Burne provides a detailed description of the battlefield that demonstrates the English commander’s decision process in choosing the ground to fight on, followed by an exceptional narrative of the fight. The town of Mauron to this day is located on a ridge 150 feet above the valley below it. Its surrounding area provided the English commander good ground to organize his forces into the English defensive system; dismounted knights defending in concert with longbow archers. Looking west of the town a spur ran downward toward the valley below, where it met a small stream the

\textsuperscript{94}Auguste et Emile Molinier, 101-102.
River Ivel. Halfway down the spur was situated a line of trees that ran north and south over the crest of the spur. The left side of the spur, north side, was very steep and almost inaccessible providing an excellent natural defensive obstacle. The center of the spur and to its right side, south side, was not very steep but was a gentle incline.95

The English commander Sir William Bentley had under his command roughly 3,000 English soldiers, which was smaller than the French force it was preparing to encounter. His force was also small in light of the fact that he had to array it across 600 yards of ground to properly cover the spur, so that his force could suitably fight using the English defensive system. Bentley’s line was so thin he had to commit all of his force to the front line leaving nothing for a reserve. The vegetation on the battlefield was thick to the advantage of the English. The high growth would slow the French advance if they dismounted to attack on foot, as had become their practice.96

Bentley positioned his battle across the spur, using the row of trees as a secure obstacle 200 yards to its rear and facing the small stream just off the spur’s front. The French were commanded by Marshall Guy de Nesle who brought his force online at the opposite side of the valley. After Bentley refused to leave the battlefield during their negotiations, Nesle formed his battle in the same manner he had at the Battle of Saintes, dismounting a portion of his force while leaving the rest mounted.97 However, instead of placing the mounted knights on his battle’s flanks, he kept all 700 of them in formation

95Burne, The Crécy War a Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny, 1360, 236.

96Ibid., 237.

97Ibid., 238.
together under command of Count Hangest. The mounted formation was to position on his battle’s left and pursue the English right flank, since it offered the least resistance of natural obstacles. At vespers, the French began a coordinated attack on the English and their mounted force under Hangest achieved success against the English right flank.

The French flanking attack disrupted the archers on the English battle’s right who retreated to the rear of their formation exposing their dismounted men-at-arms who also had to retreat. Fortunately, English archers on the left side of the battle were well protected by the steep incline to the front of their position, and they were able to quickly repel the French dismounted attack advancing toward them. This allowed them to redirect their fire at the mounted French cavalry charge flanking the right side of their line. The French flanking maneuver was also halted by the trees to the rear of the English formation once they reached it.

The English archers then charged downhill after the French, which encouraged the dismounted English men-at-arms to rejoin the fight and push the French knights back into the valley. As the French knights fled through open ground, they were pummeled by arrows from the English archers. The right side of the French battle also retreated but over the steep slope, and being weighed down by their armor were easy prey for the English archers. The French commander Guy de Nesle was killed during the battle along with a number of his subordinate commanders. The English defensive system had proven effective against a larger force again, achieving a victory that shattered French
confidence. The French were so dismayed that they did not meddle with the English rule of Brittany for the next 12 years.\textsuperscript{98}

The \textit{Cronique Normande} clarifies that Gautier de Bantelay and others rode a \textit{chevauchée} with 1,500 English soldiers through the country of Brittany on the way to Mauron. The Marshal of Neelle, serving as the Captain of Brittany on behalf of the French King Jean II, assembled roughly 1,400 French soldiers. The French located the English near Mauron, where the English dismounted on foot and formed themselves in front of a hedge they left to their backs then placed their 800 archers on their battle’s flanks. Guy de Neelle dismounted his entire force except 700 knights that were ordered to remain on horseback under the command of the Lord of Hangest. The battlefield was covered in tall grass, which burdened the French who were attacking on foot. The English did not come to meet them, forcing the French to continue their attack through the tall grass. Having lost their way, they returned to their hedge, but there was a great rout of the French, in which the Lord of Hambuie and the Lord of Beaumanior departed the battlefield. The English recovered and the Lord of Hangest fell upon the archers routing them leaving 600 dead. The English fighting on foot routed the Marshal and his forces killing 44 knights and killing or capturing 800 French men-at-arms. Although Gautier de Vantely was not present at the battle he was greatly disturbed.\textsuperscript{99} The segment above inferring that “they lost their way” likely represents the flanking movement executed by Hangest, followed by the English recovery made by their archer’s from the left side of the English battle formation. That Gautier de Vantely was greatly disturbed further highlights

\textsuperscript{98}Ibid., 239-240.

\textsuperscript{99}Auguste et Emile Molinier, 105-106.
Burne’s findings that the resulting English victory was devastating to the French. At the Battle of Poitiers both the English and French employed the use of their characteristic dismounted tactics as they had in previous battles. The French attached on foot using dismounted troops against the English dismounted defensive system. However, a curious observation of Poitiers, as we will see, is that the English retained a mounted reserve force behind their *battles* and used it to flank the French.

![Battle Ground Mauron](image)

**Figure 12.** Battle Ground Mauron

*Source: Alfred H. Burne, The Crécy War A Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny, 1360 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1995), 237.*
Overview Battle of Poitiers

The Battle of Poitiers was the result of Prince Edward’s *chevauchée* through France in 1356. Prince Edward’s intent was to weaken and harm the wealth of King Jean II to hurt his political support and increase English riches through plunder. If Prince Edward could bring the French to battle and win using the English tactical system he could win peace and perhaps the French crown. Prince Edward had made some strides politically in the Duchy of Aquitaine, where some nobles there had paid homage to him during his first arrival in Bordeaux. With good relations in the area of Aquitaine, Bergerac was chosen as the gathering place to stage his forces. From Bergerac he could move north and inflict damage on wealthy towns along his path. These towns would pressure King Jean II for protection or peace, while at the same time diverting tax money from King Jean II to prepare their own defenses.\(^{100}\) Prince Edward’s host at the Battle of Poitiers would comprise seasoned English nobles such as the earls of Warwick, Suffolk, and Oxford who were all veterans of Halidon Hill and Crécy.\(^{101}\)

Ten years after the Battle of Crécy Prince Edward and his forces landed in the Duchy of Aquitaine along the River Dordogne at Bergerac with the strategy of doing a *chevauchée* across France to provoke the French to attack. Like his father, Edward III, Prince Edward had French forces in pursuit, only this time the French were under the command of King Jean II. Turning towards the town of Tours, Prince Edward found King Jean II’s army moving to intercept the English host. Realizing that a battle with the


\(^{101}\) Ibid., 353.
French was approaching, on September 19, 1356 Prince Edward located defendable high
ground two miles south of the town Poitiers at the edge of a slope, similar to the
landscape he and his father defended at Crécy. He then prepared his defensive lines.  

While Cardinal Talleyrand attempted to negotiate peace with King Jean II on
Prince Edward’s behalf, Prince Edward took the time to better reinforce his positions
against a much larger French force. His army and the French army faced off from
opposite plateaus. His right flanks were covered by shrubbery, marsh, and the valley
Miausson, to his front a hedge that offered cover the length of his line. Like his father at
Crécy, he chose his ground well so that natural physical land barriers guarded his
position. He positioned his forces in the same manner his father had at Crécy as well: in
division ranks, two battles at the front, with his own slightly to the rear, for better
command and control, and horses located in the rear of the English formation. His right
division, which had a road to its right, was protected by a series of trenches his force had
dug in preparation for defense.  

King Jean ultimately turned down offers made by Cardinal Talleyrand and
prepared for battle. One of his consultants, William Douglas, a Scottish veteran of Anglo-
Scottish border wars, recommended that he use his men-at-arms as dismounted infantry.
Based on his experience, Douglas knew they would advance better against the English
archers’ fire power, which was devastating. Simple infantry foot soldiers lacking
protective body armor sent forward to attack would be slaughtered by English archers.
Dismounting and using knights, who had chainmail and body armor protection, would

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103 Ibid., 11.
provide their attack element a chance against the storm of arrows it would encounter. Had the French knights charged on horseback, their horses would have been vulnerable to the English archers, like the regular infantry, without adequate armor protection. A small contingent of the French’s best horsemen were kept intact on horseback, under the command of two French marshals, to be used to smash through the English archers, but the rest dismounted to attack as infantry. A cavalry charge would open the French attack and be followed by three dismounted divisions. The 19 year old Dauphin would lead the first division, the Duke Philippe d’Orleans, King Jean II’s brother would command the second, and King Jean II would command the third rear division. Another reason King Jean II may have decided to dismount and use his knights as infantry is that he remembered the dramatic events of Crécy, he was also aware of the events at Halidon Hill and other Scottish battles.

King Jean’s two marshals argued over the opening attack. The two marshals took their own initiative to attack charging the English, each on their own accord, attacking two different parts of the English front. They did so in disorderly fashion resulting from their disagreement on the method of attack. The English archers massed fires on a charging French frontal attack with great success. King Jean II’s brother Charles V, the Dauphin, was then sent forward with his division as a follow-on attack on foot. The Dauphin’s division had some success due to armor that guarded them against English archers. However, the hard fighting, especially on foot, drained their energy during the

104 Ibid., 11.
advance causing them to ultimately fall back. As the French regrouped, the English pulled forward fresh sheaves of arrows. During this lull in the battle the Duke of Orleans led his division off the field and away.\footnote{Rothero, \textit{The Armies of Crécy and Poitiers}, 13.}

King Jean II, enraged by the departure of the Duke of Orleans, ordered and led the final attack forward himself on foot, with his 14 year old son in tow, and engaged the English in hand-to-hand combat. The English archers used the same arrows over again once they exhausted their supply, running forward and plucking them from the dying French to shoot once more. During the chaos Prince Edward ordered one of his cavalry units, under command of the Captal de Buch, the Gascon Baron, held in reserve, to move his mounted force around the rear of the French army and attack. He also ordered a frontal attack on the French (probably to take their attention away from his plan to flank/envelop). Attacked on both sides, the French army fell apart and retreated, leaving King Jean II defenseless to be captured by the English.\footnote{Ibid., 13-14.} The English had been steadied during the French attacks in realizing that there was no safety to be gained by fleeing through enemy territory, which strengthened their determination.\footnote{Rogers, \textit{War Cruel and Sharp English Strategy Under Edward III, 1327-1360}, 381.} The English soldiers also saw that the French King Jean II had raised a red banner, signaling that no prisoners were to be taken.\footnote{Ibid., 382.} With no quarter given the only safe-haven for the English, once the fighting started, was in a tight formation of dismounted, resolute, knights and men-at-
arms supported by longbow archers. The English victory at Poitiers was a major blow to the French nobility, notably their man power. All together the French lost 17 counts, 22 bannerettes, over 1,900 men-at-arms, and nearly over 2,500 other noble men-at-arms and unaccounted number of lesser men.\textsuperscript{110}

English victory at the Battle of Poitiers showed that the English had further adapted and improved their fighting system implementing the use of a reserve mounted cavalry force, which Prince Edward used at the decisive point of the engagement to envelope the French. The English commander at the Battle of Mauron, Sir William Bentley, did not have enough men to retain a mounted cavalry reserve. However, if the terrain had permitted it he would have had a reserve to employ.

\textsuperscript{110}Ibid., 384.
Figure 13. Battle Ground Poitiers

Note: Prince Edward, learning from his father and his own experience at Crécy, again chose the high ground. His position was on a plateau facing the French on an opposite plateau. His right flanks were covered by shrubbery, marsh, and the valley Miausson, and to his front a hedge that offered cover the length of his line. Like his father at Crécy, he used physical land barriers to guard his position. Prince Edward positioned his forces in the same manner his father had at Crécy as well—in division ranks (*battles*) two at the front and the one he commanded to the rear. His right division, which had a road to its right, was protected by a series of trenches dug prior to the battle in preparation, just as holes (pits) had been used at Crécy forward of their position. The English also modified the their defensive tactical formation at Poitiers by keeping a contingent of mounted cavalry as a reserve, which was used to flank and out maneuver the French.
Chapter 4

Analysis

Because the medieval ages have been studied in great detail, what has been presented in this research is not new. However, in looking through that specific lens, to focus on medieval tactics used in battle and enemy tactical adjustments made to counteract those actions, we can start to identify what medieval militaries learned from one another. Lessons can be learned from any event at any point in time. However, it is human nature to reflect on previous successes as opposed to previous failures, unless failure is catastrophic. The events during and following the Battle of Bannockburn marked a turning point that would revolutionize English medieval military tactics due to a devastating failure. The English, prior to the Battle of Bannockburn, were culturally entrenched in the ideology of chivalry along with their belief that mounted cavalry were invincible. This was a belief shared by medieval society at large and not just the English. To avoid such defeats in the future would require the English to reflect on their mistakes at Bannockburn, analyze what worked or did not work for both sides, and revamp their tactics. Their new fighting system’s focus seems to have been on winning battles first, then seek glory if the opportunity presented itself. Understanding and keeping in mind the significance of the psychological impact on the English after their defeat at Bannockburn is important. The English cavalry’s failure at Bannockburn caused doubt not only among the military, but also among English society as a whole as word of the defeat spread, which further questioned the superiority of cavalry. It is interesting to note that using foot soldiers to stop a mounted cavalry charge was an old tactic.
If medieval militaries learned methods of warfare from societies that predated their own is not known for sure. However, using tightly packed formations of foot soldiers to stop a cavalry charge was not a new concept. In fact, it was used at various times throughout history by militaries of different eras. The Greeks and Macedonians used a similar formation called the *phalanx*, which consisted of a tightly formed body of foot soldiers massed together with pikes eighteen feet long producing a wall of points. The Swiss also used a similar configuration that they called the “hedgehog formation.” With inferior numbers against a larger enemy force, the Swiss were able to hold off a charge of horsemen using their hedgehog formation in concert with their *halberds* and pikes. At Morgarten in 1315, the Swiss formed on high ground that was inaccessible to the Austrian knights they were fighting and allowed them to overwhelm and defeat the Austrians. Their choice of positioning their formation on the high ground was advantageous and prohibited the Austrians from employing their cavalry.

Questions:

1. Why did the English and French choose to dismount their knights and men-at-arms?

English: Previous to the Hundred Years War, the English fought the Scots during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries in The Wars of Scottish Independence. During their conflict with the Scots, and following the Battle of Bannockburn, the English learned the valuable lesson that a mounted cavalry charge without archers was

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112 Ibid., 86.

113 Ibid., 87-89.
useless against a well disciplined formation of pikmen. The English made a cultural shift in their thinking and beliefs after the Battle of Bannockburn and subsequent engagements during the Weardale Campaign (1327), especially towards chivalry, to consider dismounting and using their cavalry as heavy infantry. Suffice it to say, they learned that chivalry and a mounted cavalry charge alone did not guarantee victory. The Battle of Bannockburn had left such a blemish on the English military system, society, and culture it made them question their battle tactics to the point they knew they had to revamp them; even when it went against chivalric principles.

An interesting view by Charles Oman, in his *Art of War In the Middle Ages*, was that King Edward III and Prince Edward were very much in support of chivalric principles using a head on charge with knights against the enemy. However, the English were able to employ the longbow with such great precision to overwhelm the French and keep them at bay, using the materials at hand, their defensive system suited their needs of the moment and granted victory. With their needs and success satisfied it prevented them from being troubled by their defensive tactic nullifying their total commitment to chivalry. Mr. Oman’s view is correct, but it is important to consider Mr. David Cornell’s view in conjunction with it.

In Cornell’s *Bannockburn* he spoke of the psychological impact suffered by the English due to the loss they endured at Bannockburn. It is not a far stretch to say that the embarrassment and anxiety the English faced following the Battle of Bannockburn opened them up to the idea of testing and employing new military tactics. Also after

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Bannockburn, the Scots were still raiding northern English territories at will, and the English could not stop them even during the Weardale Campaign (1327). This would have been frustrating for English leadership and caused much anxiety throughout English society. Due to this frustration and anxiety, the English were willing to modify and improve their battle methods so that they could achieve success in war. Once the English devised their new fighting system, and witnessed its effects at Dupplin Moor and Haliden Hill, it did suit their needs; to win in battle and achieve their national strategic objectives. Without their loss at the Battle of Bannockburn and subsequent failure during the Weardale Campaign, the English would not have considered changing their battle methods and would have continued their culture of living by chivalric principles. It took a significant loss at the Battle of Bannockburn, and their experience during the Weardale Campaign, to force the English to change, or at least bend, their complete cultural commitment to chivalry. In looking at the Scottish Wars of Independence, the English did learn a valuable lesson concerning chivalry’s ideal headon charge with mounted knights against the Scottish schiltrons; it was a faulty tactic. Mounted cavalry fighting against a dispersed group of infantry foot soldiers in an open area could easily pursue and destroy them. However, if the foot soldiers banded together in a static tightly disciplined formation with protruding pikes on a slope, the foot soldiers could stop a mounted cavalry charge. Cavalry, on its own, was vulnerable fighting against a fixed defensive pike formation. If, however, cavalry had archers to fire into a fixed defensive pike formation to help create weak points, cavalry stood a chance of penetrating and dispersing the defensive pike formation. The two most important tactical models the English took
from the Scots were gained from their experiences at the Battle of Bannockburn and during the Weardale Campaign.

The tactical model the English copied from the Scots leading up to and during the Weardale Campaign was the Scots’ raiding tactics. The key to the Scots’ raiding technique was speed, mobility, and the width of their linear raiding formation. The Scots raiding parties were all mounted to provide them this speed and mobility, and when spread out online they could cover miles of ground left and right of their core element. The English could not catch the Scots or out maneuver them, allowing the Scots to destroy and pillage a wide swath of the English northern landscape. The English copied this tactic in their *chevauchée* through French territory during the Hundred Years War.

The other tactic English copied and improved was the Scots’ *schiltron* formation for use in their new static defensive fighting formation. Strengthening the Scots’ *schiltron* model using dismounted heavy armored cavalrymen made it even more invulnerable, and combining it with their longbow archers in the manner the English did made it essentially impregnable.

Understanding the capabilities of the *schiltron* formation, especially its placement on advantageous terrain, helped the English improve it. In using dismounted heavy cavalry, consisting of nobles and men-at-arms, as foot soldiers the English ensured they had a more durable force at their formation’s front wearing protective armor. However, the English may have also considered how using dismounted cavalry as foot soldiers could improve leadership as well as command and control too. One issue the English had at the Battle of Bannockburn was that their peasant military members, foot soldiers located in the rear of the formation, retreated during the battle once they saw the
frontlines starting to falter. In dismounting their heavy cavalry, consisting of nobles and using them as foot soldiers in their fixed pike formation, the English ensured leadership was present at the front line intermingled with their peasant foot soldiers. With leadership present to motivate peasant foot soldiers and discourage thoughts of retreat, the English defensive fixed pike formation was physically and mentally sound.

French: The French nobles were proud and deeply committed to chivalry. They refused to believe that a mounted Knight could be defeated by anything on foot since only lesser men or peasants fought as infantry on foot. French Knights during the Battle of Crécy stayed firm in this belief, as French nobles wanted to engage the English Knights on horseback, the principles of chivalry required it. Prior to the Battle of Crécy in 1346, the French did not have the experience the English had gained against the Scots. However, at the Battle of Poitiers in 1356, the French Knights did fight dismounted as instructed by their Scottish advisor. However, they fought offensively and tried to pursue their enemy uphill on foot wearing heavy armor, which exhausted them.

The French perhaps did not fully understand the English fighting system before they attempted to imitate it. Their failure to understand would be a good example of the importance of studying history to develop a prudent theory and create sound doctrine to train for war. Had the French fully studied Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill and Crécy prior to Poitiers, to completely understand the principles of the English fighting system, they might have established better theory and developed tactics to avoid an offensive fight and sought ways to force the English to attack them. However, even if the French had attempted to mimic the English fighting system, they could not have execute it in the same manner with crossbowmen. The English longbow archer’s rapid fire capability was
a crucial aspect of the English fighting system. It is easy to identify French mistakes in retrospect of course, having the good fortune to study and reflect on the history of medieval French decisions and knowing the results centuries after the battles were fought. The medieval French military did not have that luxury. Like all militaries throughout the course of a war, the French were trying to assess and learn English tactics, then figure out how to counter those tactics while still reacting to them. The French did not know the results until after the engagements. It is possible the French realized that even if they attempted to imitate the English defensive fighting system they did not have the required asset, longbow archers, to achieve the same effect. Therefore, they adjusted their approach to execute tactics within their means and capabilities. Since they did not have longbow archers, the French likely attempted to counter the English fighting system using the previously aforementioned tactic proposed: attack on foot with dismounted heavy cavalry, as they were better protected against pikes once engaged with the English dismounted heavy cavalry, and use one or two mounted cavalry units to hopefully achieve ingress and execute a flanking maneuver, dispursing English archers, to envelope the English.

2. What were the effects of archery?

The English longbow was revolutionary and considerably changed the odds with devastating effects. The French initially, due to their dedicated ideals of chivalry, placed emphasis and faith on mounted nobles and men-at-arms executing a head on frontal charge into the enemy position. However, they did attempt to employ Genoese crossbowmen formations against their enemy before the charge but with little effect. This showed that the French did have an understanding of the effects of combined arms
against their enemy. However, English longbow assets proved decisive as part of the new
English fighting system.

The longbow was a superior weapon compared to the crossbow in every aspect, with the exception that it required a practiced hand to wield it efficiently. Had King Edward I not recognized the longbow’s capabilities during his rule and sought to use it in the English military instead of the crossbow, the English superior dismounted fighting system that developed between King Edward II’s rule and King Edward III’s rule might have evolved very differently. Dismounted heavy cavalry aided by crossbowmen instead of longbow archers would have achieved a different effect with a reduced rate of fire.

The skirmishes would have potentially lasted longer due to the time took to reload crossbows. This would have caused more strain and fatigue on foot soldiers and dismounted cavalry to hold position and fight longer. The use of crossbows by the English would have also hampered their desired rapid movement over land during the *chevauchée*. As pointed out, the Genoese crossbowmen preferably had large shields with them during an engagement to cover and protect them as they reloaded their crossbows. Crossbowmen could arguably fight without their shield, as the Genoese did. However, absent these shields at Crécy the Genoese were easy targets for the English archers and suffered for it. With the time it took to reload crossbows, the English most likely would have used shields to protect their crossbowmen too. Having to haul hundreds or thousands of shields along on a *chevauchée* would take up much room needed for other supplies in the baggage trains. It also would have required additional preparation and movement at the English commander’s chosen defensive fighting position to transfer the shields forward before the engagement. If time was of the essence, the English formation
would not have been formed and ready in such a situation. All militaries regardless of their time period are limited by the materials that are available to produce weapons and their budget.

King Edward I realized that the longbow would be a cheaper weapon system regarding production and employment. Archers could be used more effectively and more cheaply than peasant infantry armed with cumbersome crossbows. Materials for building the longbow were cheaper compared to the crossbow and crossbowmen were more expensive to pay. The only drawback was the skill required to fire the longbow; a skilled archer would have to train for years not only to become proficient, but to build up the muscle required to draw the heavy weight. \(^{116}\) In King Edward I’s decision to use the longbow, he had to figure out how the English could ensure enough trained archers would be available if needed for war?

Up until the seventeenth century there was no standing army in England. King Edward I and King Edward III would have had to raise temporary armies, which would disband once operations were complete. \(^{117}\) Without a trained professional army of archers at the ready, King Edward I had to address this question. To overcome the potential shortage of trained archers, during the Plantagenet period, archery practice became a legally mandated activity for all Englishmen. \(^{118}\) This ensured that all men under English rule were proficient with the longbow so that when an army was raised for war trained


archers were on hand. The longbow was absolutely the superior hand held projectile weapon until the creation of the gun. Once the English solidified their fighting system against the Scots at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill, they used it decisively against the French during the Hundred Years War.

Fourteenth century English armies relied on their superior skill and discipline, and the power of the longbow combined with their tactical defensive dismounted system to counterbalance overwhelming numbers of the French army.¹¹⁹ The Battles at Crécy, Lunalonge, Saintes, Ardres, Mauron, and Poitiers were similar in nature regarding the defensive postures used by the English. As was part of their defensive battle system, the English ideally wanted to occupy ground before the engagement that was most advantageous for them, then wait or force the enemy to attack them. Establishing a strong fixed defensive position on high ground, that made use of physical obstacles to guard their position from attack, was an English commander’s first crucial task. Once they occupied good high ground and prepared it, the English commander would then expertly manage their dismounted cavalry in concert with massing overwhelming fire power on their enemy through skillful employment of their longbow archers.

Both King Edward III at Crécy and Prince Edward at Poitiers chose high ground that made use of natural obstacles. They both used the time available before battle to prepare and improve their fighting positions, digging holes (trenches) that were useful in stalling or stopping cavalry charges, thus further rendering useless the charge by mounted cavalry. Sir William Bentley at Mauron did not have time to reinforce his position with

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trenches. However, he too chose high ground and used natural obstacles to slow enemy movement. Bently positioned his force to ensure it could take advantage of: a stream to its front along with high vegetation, a steep incline on the left side that was inaccessible, a row of trees behind it for rear security or fallback position, and the right side had a slight incline as well. The Lunalonge and Saintes engagements simply mention the dismounting of the English forces before battle and do not express the use of natural obstacles. However, bearing in mind the tactics of the English fighting system, it is likely that consideration of natural obstacles was a part of the decision process in choosing the ground to fight on before any engagement. Therefore it is likely English commanders at Lunalonge and Saintes sought and used natural obstacles on a slope. The Battle of Ardres was described by one of the authors as a pitched battle, hinting it was fought by the English from a fixed position on high ground.

The new fighting system devised by the English, along with the fear of direct and indirect fire from English archers, forced the French to consider their dedication to chivalry’s honorable mounted cavalry charge as the war progressed. The French, in engagements with the English previous to the Battle of Saintes, had failed against the new English defensive fighting system. It is obvious the French had learned lessons from the English following Crécy and subsequent engagements, as the French started attempting to mimic the English by attacking on foot with dismounted heavy cavalry during the Battle of Saintes. Their new approach however, attacking offensively on foot, was only successful at the Battle of Ardres. Again, according to proposed French tactics, French success at Ardres might be attributed to one of their mounted cavalry units, pursuing a flanking maneuver, gaining ingress over traversable terrain, through English
archers, to envelop the English. This appears to be a possible counter tactic used by the French. King Jean II’s intent at Poitiers was to have his force that remained mounted, commanded by his two marshals, bust through the English archers. However, the two marshals opened the attack focusing on the wrong points of the English formation due to an argument, and did not execute their intended task. On the other hand, the French maybe did not fully understand the English fighting methods and therefore did not properly employ their mounted and dismounted heavy cavalry.

Had the French completely understood what the English were doing, the French would have sought a defensive battle from a fixed defensive position on advantageous high ground of their choosing, and forced the English to attack them. It possibly could be argued that King Phillip VI may have understood this idea, as he did attempt to provoke and sway King Edward III to fight on battle fields he suggested in his letter. However, it is unlikely as his forces took the offensive and executed a mounted cavalry charge at Crécy. As for why the English fought dismounted, they had already learned the hard lesson of executing a mounted charge against schiltrons during The Wars for Scottish Independence.

Previous battles fought with the Welsh and Scots between the reigns of King Edward I and King Edward III proved that mounted head-on charges were futile against well-disciplined infantry foot soldiers that stood their ground with pikes, which caused significant injury. It was during their engagements with the Scots that the English developed their defensive fighting system through tactics gained from failure at Bannockburn and later successes at Duplin Moor and Halidon Hill. The lessons learned by the English according to Archer Jones: take the high ground, use dismounted knights
and men-at-arms as heavy infantry with pikes to stop the charge, use combined arms of longbow-men to mass fires and rupture the frontal attack, and as the enemy broke formation to retreat, English dismounted cavalry remounted and pursued to destroy them. Thus, a combined arms defense with dismounted (armored) cavalry as foot soldiers complimented with archers was key to English tactical success. The heavy armor of the knights and men-at-arms provided better protection, which basic infantry foot soldiers did not have, their pikes stopped a cavalry charge dead in its tracks and the archers could mass overwhelming fire to disperse the enemy. This model was improved on by the English when they adapted an additional tactic at the Battle of Poitiers.

Through impressive maneuvering at Poitiers (1356), Prince Edward used his reserve, led by the Captal de Buch from Gascony, as a mounted force to move quickly enough to turn the flank and envelop the French. Prince Edward ordered the Captal de Buch to break the French lines and force a retreat, instead of withstanding multiple charges in a defensive stand as the English had at Crècy (1346). It is possible that the English may have learned this flanking tactic from the French. Consider the Battle of Mauron (1352). The French commander Guy de Nesle dismounted most of his force, but kept 700 cavalry mounted under the Count Hangest. Nesle positioned this mounted force on the French formation’s left side, as the right side of the English formation offered the least resistance of natural obstacles. Nesle’s orders to Hangest was to pursue the English’s right flank. The French did achieve some success in this flanking maneuver up until the English archers turned Hangest’s cavalry unit and regained the ground. It is possible that word of the French’s slightly successful flanking maneuver at the Battle of


Mauron (1352) by Hangest was circulated among the English military, then was improved and adopted ready for use at Poitiers in 1356 under the Captal de Buch. Keep in mind the French won at the Battle of Ardres (1351) employing both dismounted and mounted heavy cavalry on the flanks. The English having witnessed successful French tactics at these engagements saw the success that could be achieved with a force of mounted heavy cavalry to execute flanking attacks, modified and used the tactic themselves.

Lastly, communication would have been a factor in the English’s favor as well at the Battle of Crécy. English commands would have been simple and quick to disseminate since they all spoke a common language. This would have streamlined the command and control of their forces to respond quickly as ordered. The French however, who fought with a multinational force using the Italian Genoese crossbowmen, would have had to interpret their commands into different languages before disseminating them, which likely delayed action.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{121}Rothero, \textit{The Armies of Crécy and Poitiers}, 9.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The research covered indicates that the basic formation upon which the English constructed their system of battle was an old concept. Evidence indicates that the Greeks and Macedonians used the *phalanx* and the Swiss the hedgehog as part of their battle systems; both of a similar design to the *schiltron*.\(^{122}\) The English revolutionized the Scottish *schiltron* formation by incorporating their powerful and rapid-fire longbow and using dismounted heavy cavalry as foot soldiers, which were better protected by their armor. Considering that the English retreat at the Battle of Bannockburn was initiated by their foot soldiers who were largely peasants, may be another reason why they combined dismounted cavalry with their infantry. Mounted cavalry consisted of knights who were nobles and therefore leaders, whereas foot soldiers in the infantry were not leaders. Intermixing dismounted heavy cavalry with the foot soldiers in the English fixed defensive formation provided the foot soldiers’ leadership and morale, to be disciplined and hold formation, to not retreat. The English then further improved their basic system over time by adding an appropriate number of *battles*, three total, with longbow archers positioned in the middle, as well as their flanks to cover more area using sectors of fire. They also kept their formations limited to three *battles*, as a larger force proved more difficult to command and control. Three *battles* provided an adequate number of troops and allowed commanders to maintain control of their formation.

\(^{122}\) Oman, *The Art of War in the Middle Ages A.D. 378-1515*, 76-77, 86.
Identifying when, how, or even if the English and Scots copied the initial idea for their defensive system from militaries as old as the Greeks and Macedonians would be a difficult task. It is possible that they learned of it from verbal or even written accounts, as historical writings such as those produced by the Roman Flavius Vegetius Renatus were circulated to some degree. Vegetius’s writings in his *De Rei Militari* training manual covered training for foot marches, the make-up and formations for the Roman legions, recommended running as good training and he said every man should be able to swim. It is known that many commanders had the English translated edition known as *Knyghthode and Bataile* in their library. However, it is more feasible that the Scots relearned this tactic and the English later improved it through trial and error in battle, based on the means and weaponries that were available.

The English were prompted to change their methods of warfare due to the defeat suffered at the Battle of Bannockburn and the following disappointment of the Weardale Campaign. The English, frustrated and stunned by their defeats compounded by their inability to stop the raiding Scots, experienced increased anxiety throughout English society. If the Scots could not be defeated or stopped by the English military, how could the English protect their possessions and land? The English knew that in order to achieve their current and future strategic objectives they were going to have to change their approach to war. The English disinherited, namely Henry de Beaumont, assuredly played a significant role in overhauling the English tactical procedures to innovate the English fixed defensive fighting system, which they employed at the Battle of Dupplin Moor. Remarkably, it appears that the English reasonably conduct something similar to an after

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123 Bartlet, *English Longbowman*, 32.
action review between the Battles of Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill. There was a
discussion between King Edward III and his disinherited nobles regarding the English
fighting system used at Dupplin Moor and how it could be improved. Again, this is
something that modern militaries do to capture lessons learned and improve methods.
Over the course of their conflict with the English during the early part of Hundred Years
War, the French learned lessons from the conflict too and attempted to adjust their tactics
to counter the English defensive fighting system.

One of two possible conclusions can be drawn regarding the French and their
tactical adjustment of dismounting to counter the English fighting system: (1) Either the
French did not take the time to analyze and fully understand the English fixed defensive
tactical fighting system; or (2) they did understand it but knew they could not accurately
replicate it. If the French did not fully understand the English system, they haphazardly
attempted to mimic the English fighting system by simply dismounting their heavy
cavalry and executing an offensive charge on foot rather than mounted on their horse.
Whether the French charged the English position on horseback or on foot, once the
French closed the gap with the English archers and engaged the English front line, the
French dismounted attack would have achieved the same results. Those results being
hastily moving forward under heavy, rapid, deadly fire from English archers, then a
stalemate hand-to-hand fight against the English front line while at the same time
receiving continued rapid fire in the French flanks from the English archers. At which
point the English archers would have finished them off. If the French did analyze the
English tactics and understood what the English were doing, they most certainly would
have realized that they could not reproduce the required archery effects of the English
fighting system with crossbowmen. The French did not develop longbow archery skills within their society to the degree the English had; therefore they did not have a stable of proficient longbow archers to levy for war.

Realizing that without longbow archers to provide rapid fire that slowed an enemy charge and further deteriorated it as the enemy closed the distance, the French would have had to consider other methods within their abilities for neutralizing the English fighting system. The French, being well versed in mounted cavalry charges and maneuvers, as that was their original tactical emphasis, would have explored how to capitalize on this capability. The French mounted cavalry’s horses were vulnerable to English archers, however, the knights and men-at-arms were protected by their armor. If the French dismounted part of their heavy cavalry and used them to charge the English line on foot, their dismounted cavalry would not only be protected from English archers but could focus English attention on the French dismounted heavy cavalry’s attack. The French could then use a contingent of mounted cavalry held in reserve to pursue the English flank on horseback while the English attention was focused on the French dismounted heavy cavalry charging their position on foot. If the French mounted cavalry on either side of the French formation could move swiftly enough over traversable terrain and gain ingress to attack the English flank, where the English archers were located, the French could envelope the English and defeat them.

Considering English and French engagements between the Battle of Saintes and Poitiers, the French started keeping a mounted force for the purpose of attacking the English flanks, where the English archers were located. At the Battle of Bannockburn, Robert the Bruce had used a mounted cavalry reserve to disperse King Edward II’s
archers. The French were attempting to do the same thing, and eliminate the threat posed by the English archers. If the English archers could be dispersed, then the French dismounted cavalry stood a better chance against the English dismounted cavalry without interference from the English archers. However, if French mounted cavalry encountered natural or man-made obstacles during their movement toward the English formation, unable to gain ingress to achieve an envelopment as the French may have experienced at the Battle of Saintes, then the French tactic could not rout the English and the engagement would be lost. The success of this tactic would have depended heavily on the terrain and the French mounted cavalry commander’s ability to successfully negotiate obstacles. The basis of obstacles and advantageous terrain used by the English is still relevant for contemporary militaries when conducting defensive operations today.

Much like their medieval English counterparts, commanders today exploit the advantages of occupying the terrain where the engagement will occur and from a location that gives them an advantage against the enemy attack. Natural and man-made obstacles are used in defending from ideal positions such as: thick woods, cliffs, built-up areas, and reverse slopes. Key terrain is used to impede enemy movement and commanders choose terrain that allows for the massing of friendly fires but forces the enemy to commit their forces piecemeal into friendly engagement areas. Key terrain is used to permit the defending force to cover major obstacles by fire and create choke points that canalize and impact enemy troop movements. Defending forces have the advantage of preparing terrain by reinforcing their position. Defenders also force the enemy to fight where the enemy does not want to fight, by guiding or enticing the enemy into these prepared
engagement areas.\textsuperscript{124} When considering how the English defensive fighting system was employed, its basic principles are modeled above and still apply to modern defensive operations. Another example of medieval tactics being used by militaries of a later period was demonstrated during the American Civil War at the Battle of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (1863).

Like King Edward the II at Bannockburn (1314), General Robert E. Lee came to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania determined to engage the Union Army in order to achieve a decisive victory.\textsuperscript{125} Ultimately, General Lee’s resolute push to attack a well-defended Union force positioned on high ground, referring to General George Pickett’s charge, proved disastrous much like the English charge at Bannockburn. General Lee had attacked both flanks of General George Meade’s Union army and believed its center was week, since the Union would have pulled forces from the center to reinforce its’ flanks. Lee’s plan was to execute a three pronged attack: (1) General Pickett’s division would charge the Union front on foot uphill following an artillery barrage to further weaken the enemy center; (2) General Jeb Stuart, a cavalry commander, would take his mounted force around the Union rear to disrupt enemy supply and communication lines then attack to envelop them; (3) General Richard S. Ewell would attack the Union right flank to place the Union force in a vice and destroy General Meade’s forces.\textsuperscript{126} Previous to the engagement, Lee’s subordinate, General James Longstreet, told Lee that if the enemy was

\textsuperscript{124}Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADRP 3-90 \textit{Offense and Defense} (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012), 4-9.


\textsuperscript{126}Ibid., 660-661.
on Cemetery Hill it was because the enemy was anxious and prepared to receive a Confederate attack. General Longstreet was charged by General Lee to manage the attack, and Longstreet did not agree with General Lee’s strategy. Longstreet urged Lee to attack the left flank, but Lee was set on attacking the Union center.127

General Longstreet as ordered opened the attack with an artillery barrage, but the Union Army took refuge behind the existing stone walls and suffered little from the attack. At 3:00 p.m. Longstreet ordered the attack and Pickett led his forces forward to attack the Union center. As Pickett’s forces charged on foot over the open rolling terrain, the Union artillery responded and opened a volley of fire that switched to canister fire as Confederate forces closed the gap with the Union front.128 The Union artillery commander, General Henry Hunt, ordered a cease fire to lure the Confederates closer. Once Pickett’s forces were 200 yards out, the Union Infantry that had been waiting behind the stone walls opened fire. At the same time the Union’s Vermont, Ohio, and New York regiments, located on the left and right sides of the Union formation, swung their firing ranks like a gate inward to face the charging Confederate’s flanks. As the Confederates closed in, they were pummeled by Union gun fire to the front and both flanks of their formation. The Confederate attack broke under the pressure of both a frontal and flanking assault to its line and was subsequently defeated. General Stuart’s cavalry maneuver to attack the Union rear was also stopped three miles east of

127Ibid., 656-657.

Gettysburg, spoiling the third part of Lee’s plan. The Union Army’s strong defensive position on high ground, their firing techniques employed during this engagement, and their enticement to draw the rebels closer into the engagement area were reminiscent of English medieval tactics. Also the Confederate’s offensive tactics were similar to those used by the French during the Hundred Years War; charging on foot against the enemy’s front and attempting to achieve a flanking attack or envelopment with mounted cavalry.

Between the Battles of Bannockburn and Poitiers, a succession of learning and adapting can be seen in which combat knowledge and tactics were transmitted across three different armies. Even military forces of later eras would use similar tactics employed by both the English and French medieval militaries. Granted, the English interpreted their experience against the Scots’ tactics differently from how the French interpreted their experience against the English’s tactics, as they both made different tactical adjustments based off their particular military capabilities and means available. The English learned how to obtain the tactical advantage by fighting with dismounted foot soldiers from a defensive static position against mounted cavalry charges from their engagements against the Scots. They then adopted this tactic and improved it based on their capabilities and the means available. The French, likewise, learned the same lesson by failing in their heavy cavalry charges against the English defensive system. However, without longbow archers, the French adjustment was to employ dismounted heavy cavalry offensively on foot, in combination with mounted heavy cavalry flanking attacks, instead of defensively like the English. Both the English and the French recognized, when they failed, that they needed to change their combat systems and their view on war.

\[129\text{Ibid., 661-662.}\]
as it related to chivalric combat, in order to gain the tactical advantage and achieve their tactical and ultimately, their strategic goals.

There were a number of great sources that aided this study to provide a foundation of knowledge to answer the thesis. The intriguing question that remains is: who actually is credited with developing the English defensive fighting system? Was it one individual, a group of seasoned disinherited invaders, or the English military as a whole following Bannockburn and the Weardale Campaign? Recommend that further study on the English defensive fighting system attempt to identify the key historical figure or figures involved that contributed to its innovation and design, as well as how they did it.

From the literature it appears that Henry de Beaumont played a key role in the process, having served under three English Kings and fought in multiple engagements over the course of the Scottish Wars of Independence. It is not known if a biography exists on Beaumont, but to pursue such an endeavor would be worthwhile and a great contribution to the study of the time period. It could possibly shed some light on his contribution to the development of the English fighting system prior to Dupplin Moor. Considering Beaumont’s extensive military experiences, and that he was for all intents and purposes the commander of the disinherited, it is likely that he masterminded the plan to implement the English fighting system at Dupplin Moor. If he alone developed it, where did he get the idea and how did he formulate it?

It is not likely that the English fighting system was developed just before the Dupplin Moor engagement. It is arguable that Beaumont on his own, or with a group of the English military’s senior veteran advisors, conceived, trained on, and tested the system well before the disinherited departed English shores to employ it against the
Scots. The disinherited deliberately invaded Scotland with an undersized force composed of heavy cavalry, foot soldiers, and archers under covert approval from King Edward III; almost a clandestine operation with the intent to start a civil war leveraging Edward Baliol’s claim to the Scottish crown. The English knew they risked encountering Scottish forces vastly larger in number than the disinherited forces’ meager 500 men-at-arms, 1000 archers and foot soldiers before they could gain the internal support they expected to receive for Baliol’s claim. Facing such odds, the English would have created a tactical approach that allowed a smaller expeditionary force to engage a much larger Scottish force, with some expectation of success, prior to the disinherited invasion.

The English’s later imitation of the raiding tactics used by the Scots during the Weardale Campaign, shows that the English were analyzing, learning, and adapting tactics following Bannockburn. Under the capable command of Beaumont, the disinherited, undoubtedly influenced and contributed to further development of the English defensive fighting system. They were the first English military force to successfully employ the system’s theory practically in battle. However, it is likely that the English fighting system was the product of a conglomerate effort of the English military, created and tested before Dupplin Moor. Further study should examine: who participated in the development process, what ideas were put forth, who led the overhaul of English fighting tactics, and how did they do it?
GLOSSARY

Battles. A division of a medieval European host (army). A conventional deployment was of three “battles.” The van (or vanguard), centre, and rear (rearguard) battles in a line of march became the right, centre, and left divisions respectively of a battle line. A battle could also mean any grouping of knights or other troops on a more impromptu basis (rather like the modern “battle group”).130

Canister fire. Is an encased shot for close-range artillery fire.131

Captal de Buch. An archaic feudal title in Gascony, captal from Latin capitalis “prime, chief” in the formula capitals domini or “principle lords.” Buch was a strategically located town and port on the Atlantic, in the bay of Arcachon. As an actual title the word “captal” was used only by the seigneurs of Trene, Puychagut, Épernon, and Buch. When Pierre, the seigneur of Grailly (ca 1285-1356) married Asalide (the captaline de Buch), the heiress of Pierre-Amenieu de Bordeaux, captal de Buch, in 1307, the title passed into the Grailly family, a line of fighting seigneurs with origins in Savoy. The most famous of the Captals de Buch was Pierre’s grandson, Jean III de Grailly, Captal de Buch (1343-1377), a cousin of the Count of Foix who was a military leader in the Hundred Years War, praised by the chronicler Jean Froissart as an ideal of chivalry.132

Chevauchée. French meaning ‘ride’ and in the medieval period meant a raid through enemy territory. The aim was to damage crops, buildings, and property to drive the peasantry into hiding, so reducing the productivity of a region. This undermined the revenues of the country or regions ruler and proved they were unable to protect their subjects. Pillagers were sent out from an army’s line of march, up to 12km / 12 mi each side.133

Chronicle. An extended account in prose or verse of historical events, sometimes including legendary material, presented in chronological order without

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133 The Hutchinson Dictionary of Ancient & Medieval Warfare, 72.
interpretation or comment. A detailed narrative record or report. To record in or in
the form of a historical record.\textsuperscript{134}

Dauphin. The eldest son of the king of France from 1349 to 1830.\textsuperscript{135}

Domna. (Latin, lady, she who rules) A high-born, imperious, capricious woman, the
inspiration for and beloved of troubadour poets’ courtly love lyrics, herself the
recipient of the service of love.\textsuperscript{136}

Duchy. A territory ruled by a duke or duchess; a dukedom.\textsuperscript{137}

Homage and fealty. A personal obligation of a tenant holding land tenure to an
overlord.\textsuperscript{138}

Hoplite. Term used to describe the heavy infantry who formed the core of Greek city-
state armies from the 7\textsuperscript{th} to the 4\textsuperscript{th} centuries BC. The defensive armor of the
hoplites included a bronze helmet, breast plate, greaves, and a round shield; their
offensive weapons were an iron sword and along spear.\textsuperscript{139}

Joust. A formal, ritualized, martial exercise in which mounted knights competed for
prizes, or ransoms, as in war; a war game often with legal outcome but without
actual battles. The events were often enhanced with elaborate armor, horse
comparisons, music, art, food, and festivity.\textsuperscript{140}

Knight. Used in English to identify a mounted, armored warrior of the Middle Ages, who
was expected to fight according to a well-defined code of conduct. The right to
fight as a knight was the essential feature of nobility. Meant to fight in armor and
on horseback, although it was not a breach of status for a knight to dismount and


\textsuperscript{138}Cosman \textit{Medieval Wordbook}, 121.

\textsuperscript{139}\textit{The Hutchinson Dictionary of Ancient & Medieval Warfare}, 252.

\textsuperscript{140}Cosman \textit{Medieval Wordbook}, 134.
fight on foot. Also a military associate of a king or nobleman, holding land in
tenure called Knight’s Tenure, in exchange for providing military service; in
feudal rank, a social position below an earl and baron. The knight owed double
homage and fealty to the lord; to God and to the overlord; and to the lady: his
beloved secular domna and to the church’s exalted Lady Mary. 141 142

Longbow. A long, hand-drawn bow, such as that used in medieval England, which
sometimes exceeded 6 feet (1.8 meters) in length.143

Oriflamme. Scarlet banner given to French kings by the abbot of St Denis, Paris, and
used as a rallying call to arms throughout France in the Middle Ages. It became
the symbol of the French nation at war and was also displayed during battle.144

Phalanx. Greek ‘rank’ in ancient Greek warfare, term used to describe a massed
formation, many ranks deep, of hoplite and Macedonian style armies.145

Pike. A martial weapon, comparable to the halberd, a sharply pointed metal head on a
long wooden shaft.146

Schiltron. A medieval Scottish term for a body of pike-men or long spearmen who
adopted a very close formation as a defense against English knights, sometimes
making a circular ‘hedgehog’ with their weapons. The formation was efficient in
repelling cavalry, but its weakness was its immobility. At the Battle of Falkirk in
1298 English archers decimate schiltrons pinned by the threat of Knightly
charges.147 148

141 Baumgartner, From Spear to Flintlock, 84.
142 Cosman Medieval Wordbook, 137.
longbow (accessed April 23, 2014).
144 The Hutchinson Dictionary of Ancient & Medieval Warfare, 238.
145 Ibid., 250.
146 Cosman Medieval Wordbook, 187.
147 The Hutchinson Dictionary of Ancient & Medieval Warfare, 287.
148 Also spelled in some references as schiltrom.
Vanguard. The foremost position in an army or fleet advancing into battle.\textsuperscript{149}

Vespers. (Latin, evening) The solemn evening service of the Divine Office, celebrated with Hymn, Verses, and Canticles; one of the Canonical Hours.\textsuperscript{150}

Yeoman. In a royal or noble household, and attendant or servant customarily with responsibilities midway between those of a squire and a page.\textsuperscript{151}


\textsuperscript{150}Cosman, \textit{Medieval Wordbook}, 260.

\textsuperscript{151}Ibid., 273.
# APPENDIX A

## STRENGTH COMPARISON

### Archery Assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTANCE WEAPONS</th>
<th>CROSS-BOW (FRENCH)</th>
<th>LONG-BOW (ENGLISH)</th>
<th>ADVANTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCURACY</td>
<td>Out to 100 yards¹</td>
<td>Up to 240 yards²</td>
<td>Longbow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PENETRATION POWER</td>
<td>Penetrated shields, iron breast plates, bronze, and plate armor³</td>
<td>Chain-mail, and at close range-plate armor, two layers of mail-armor, or a stout oak wood door⁴</td>
<td>Draw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RATE OF FIRE</td>
<td>Could be cocked, pre-loaded and held in place until ready to shoot at target. Was time consuming and cumbersome to load; required shield for safe reloading under fire.⁵</td>
<td>Fired 10-15 arrows per minute⁶</td>
<td>Longbow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DURABILITY</td>
<td>Those with hardwood bow mounts became warped as they were used.⁷</td>
<td>Experienced some wear and tear, but were mass produced and supplied by English army to a “government standard.”⁸</td>
<td>Longbow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIELD MAINTENANCE</td>
<td>Strings could not be removed and replaced in battle.⁹</td>
<td>Were easily transported, assembled or disassembled, only had to bend it enough to put on or take off string even in battle; carried extra strings and extra bows (supply trains)¹⁰</td>
<td>Longbow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING / PRACTICE REQUIRED</td>
<td>Required very little training and could be used by unskilled men.¹¹</td>
<td>Required extensive practice to become proficient and strong enough to pull back the string and nock an arrow.¹²</td>
<td>Crossbow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted by author.*


²Hardy, *Longbow A Social and Military History*, 68.


## APPENDIX B

### BATTLE OF CRECY (1346) ANALYSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEANS</th>
<th>FRENCH</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
<th>ADVANTAGE</th>
<th>REASON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEAPONS</strong></td>
<td>Mounted heavy cavalry; lance; Genoese crossbowmen</td>
<td>Established defensive position on high ground using natural obstacles; dismounted heavy cavalry; pikes (spear armed infantry); English longbow</td>
<td>ENGLISH</td>
<td>English chose advantageous ground; English disciplined heavy cavalry (nobles / professional soldiers) dismounted armed with pikes in a skirmish formation. English longbows (typically fired 15 arrows per minute). French heavy cavalry charged straight into strong defensive formation without realising it first. Crossbow was a powerful weapon, but provided a very slow rate of fire, also did not have pavis (shields).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TACTICS</strong></td>
<td>Believed that nothing on the field of battle could withstand mounted cavalry charge; fought offensively uphill. Used Genoese crossbowmen to support engagements attempted to shoot into English formation to soften it before charging with mounted cavalry, but arrows did not reach. When Genoese were routed, employed multiple mounted heavy cavalry charges</td>
<td>Dismounted heavy cavalry fought from a fixed and prepared defensive position on high ground; dug military pits to improve defensive position against enemy cavalry charge; passed interlocking fire from English longbow archers.</td>
<td>ENGLISH</td>
<td>French fought from a static defensive position on a slope, using dismounted heavy cavalry to withstand the French mounted heavy cavalry charge. This allowed the English to conserve energy, while the French expended energy charging up hill. English military pits would also have denied some of the French assault on the English position. By enhancing their combat power with the longbow, the English were able to rapidly engage each French cavalry charge from its initial movement forward up until it broke contact to retreat. Unable to breach the English line of dismounted heavy cavalry, the French suffered casualties from both head-to-head fighting and relentless fire from the English longbow archers. French stubbornly resisted multiple cavalry charges uphill against English defensive line, did not consider any other tactic or maneuver.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted by author.*
### APPENDIX C

**BATTLE OF LUNALONGE (1349) ANALYSIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEANS</th>
<th>FRENCH</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
<th>ADVANTAGE</th>
<th>REASON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WEAPONS</td>
<td>Mounted heavy cavalry</td>
<td>Sources did not cite to English establishing defensive position on high ground. However, it was part of their tactical procedure.</td>
<td>English most likely selected advantageous ground before engagement. English disciplined heavy cavalry (nobles + professional soldiers) dismounted armed with pikes in a shielded formation. English longbow rapidly fired 15 arrows per minute. French heavy cavalry charge straight into strong defensive formation without weakening it beforehand.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACTICS</td>
<td>Used a mounted force to move behind English formation before engagement and strike English horses, then execute a mounted heavy cavalry charge.</td>
<td>Dismounted heavy cavalry fought from static defensive position on a slight slope, utilized archery fire.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted by author.*
## APPENDIX D

### BATTLE OF SAINTES (1351) ANALYSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEANS</th>
<th>FRENCH</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
<th>ADVANTAGE</th>
<th>REASON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WEAPONS</td>
<td>Dismounted heavy cavalry force: two units of mounted heavy cavalry</td>
<td>Sources did not relate to English establishing defensive position on high ground, however it was part of their tactical procedure: dismounted heavy cavalry plus (stepped mounted charge), sources did not mention English longbows, but again the weapon was a crucial part of the English tactical defensive fighting formation and most certainly would have been used.</td>
<td>English fought from a fixed defensive position on a slope using dismounted heavy cavalry armed with pikes in a skirmish formation to stop French cavalry charge. English longbow archers engaged the French with volleys all through the engagement until the French retired from the fight. French dismounted heavy cavalry charge straight into strong defensive formation without weakening it beforehand. <strong>Proposed purpose of tactic</strong> - French mounted heavy cavalry could not achieve a flanking attack against the English line due to rough terrain or overwhelming English archers’ fire.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACTICS</td>
<td>Attacked English position with a dismounted heavy cavalry massed body and two mounted heavy cavalry units located one each on the left and right side of the French attack line.</td>
<td>Sources did not relate to English establishing their defensive position on high ground, however it was part of their tactical procedure: dismounted heavy cavalry plus (stepped mounted charge), sources did not mention English longbow, but again the weapon was a crucial part of the English tactical defensive fighting formation and most certainly would have been used.</td>
<td>English fought from a fixed defensive position on a slope using dismounted heavy cavalry armed with pikes in a skirmish formation to stop a French dismounted cavalry charge. English longbow archers engaged the French with volleys all through the engagement until the French retired. French attacked English defensive line with a combination of dismounted heavy cavalry on foot and mounted heavy cavalry units on horseback in an attempt to undermine and counter the English defensive fighting system. <strong>Proposed purpose of tactic</strong> - France was to achieve a flanking attack against one or ideally both sides of English line, initially against the English archers, and envelop the English if possible. If the French could achieve a flanking attack, initially taking some of the English archers on the sides of the English formation, even the increase in their main body of dismounted heavy cavalry attack might result in a chance French mounted cavalry might not be enough to close the gap and disperse the English archers before taking too many casualties. If the French could strike the English archers, the French dismounted cavalry could engage the English line and destroy continuing fire from the English archers. This tactic, if successful, allowed the French to attack the English from two different fronts, and the French could capitalize on their men’s capability in using mounted cavalry. However, in their engagement with the English at the Battle of Saintes, the French were unsuccessful. Either the terrain was not passable for the French mounted cavalry, or the English archers’ arrow line was too devastating for the French mounted cavalry flanking attack to be achievable.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted by author.*
## APPENDIX E

### BATTLE OF ANDRES (1351) ANALYSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPOYS</th>
<th>FRENCH</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
<th>ADVANTAGE</th>
<th>REASON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WEAPONS</td>
<td>dismounted heavy cavalry ; lance ; two units of mounted heavy cavalry</td>
<td>Sources did not quote to English establishing defensive position on high ground, however it was part of their tactical procedure ; dismounted heavy cavalry ; pikas (stopped mounted charge) ; sources did not mention English longbow, but again the weapon was a crucial part of the English national defensive fighting formation and most certainly would have been used.</td>
<td>English fought from a fixed defensive position on a slope using dismounted heavy cavalry armed with pikes in a shiltron formation to stop French cavalry charge. English longbow archers engaged the French with relentless fire throughout the engagement until the French retired from the fight. French dismounted heavy cavalry charge straight into strong defensive formation and were able to weaken it beforehand. <em>Proposed purpose of tactic</em> - French mounted heavy cavalry achieve a flanking attack against the English line due to insecure terrain.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TACTICS</th>
<th>FRENCH</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
<th>ADVANTAGE</th>
<th>REASON</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TACTICS</td>
<td>attacked English position with a dismounted heavy cavalry main body and two mounted heavy cavalry units located one each on the left and right side of the French attack line.</td>
<td>Sources did not quote to English establishing defensive position on high ground, however it was part of their tactical procedure ; dismounted heavy cavalry ; pikas (stopped mounted charge) ; sources did not mention English longbow, but again the weapon was a crucial part of the English national defensive fighting formation and most certainly would have been used.</td>
<td>English fought from a fixed defensive position on a slope using dismounted heavy cavalry armed with pikes in a shiltron formation to stop a French dismounted cavalry charge. English longbow archers engaged the French with relentless fire throughout the engagement until the French retreated. Most likely the English were unable to choose good ground that was advantageous to their fighting system to make use of natural obstacles on a slope, and had no time to prepare their position. French attacked English defensive line with a combination of dismounted heavy cavalry on foot and mounted heavy cavalry units on horse back in an attempt to emulate and counter the English defensive fighting system. <em>Proposed purpose of tactic</em> - This time the French mounted heavy cavalry were able to move fast enough over negotiable terrain to gain ingress and achieve an offensive flanking attack against the English line. The French flanking attack reduced the English longbow arsenals to the point of the English formation to allow a successful French dismounted heavy cavalry attack. Engaged on two fronts, the English were enveloped or routed.</td>
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*Source: Adapted by author.*
## APPENDIX F

### BATTLE OF MAURON (1352) ANALYSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPONS</th>
<th>FRENCH</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
<th>ADVANTAGE</th>
<th>REASON</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mounted heavy cavalry</td>
<td>Mounted heavy cavalry on high ground using natural obstacles</td>
<td>Mounted heavy cavalry with pikes in a column formation to stop French charge</td>
<td>English fought from a fixed defensive position on advantageous high ground, capitalising on natural obstacles. Used mounted heavy cavalry armed with pikes in a column formation to stop French charge. English longbow archers engaged the French with effective fire throughout the engagement and regained lost ground on their right side. French charged with a combination of mounted and dismounted heavy cavalry straight into strong defensive English formations.</td>
<td>French mounted heavy cavalry successfully attacked the right side flank of the English formation and took ground.</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Pre-positioned their large mounted heavy cavalry unit on the left side of the French formation, task was to pursue a flanking attack against the right side of the English formation. Simultaneously executed a dismounted heavy cavalry attack head-on into the English defensive line.</td>
<td>Established defensive position on high ground and used natural obstacles to slow French advance. Used dismounted heavy cavalry in shallow formation armed with pikes, mixed interfacing sectors of fire using longbow archers.</td>
<td>English fought from a static defensive position on moderately advantageous high ground. Terrain on left side of English formation provided a steep slope that the French could not negotiate over. French cavalry was slow to dismount; French dismounted advance. Terrain on the right side of the English formation provided poor sight lines throughout the engagement and mere loss of ground on their right side due to a successful French flanking attack. French attacked again using a combination of dismounted and mounted heavy cavalry. Commander identified, before the engagement, traversable terrain against the English line to French formation’s left side and pre-positioned his large mounted heavy cavalry there in front of it to make easy a mounted flanking attack on the English right side. The French mounted heavy cavalry was able to achieve a flanking attack over the slight incline and forced the entire right side of the English line to fall back. However, the left side of the English line was well protected by the steep slope, allowing English archers from that vantage point to successfully repel the French attack in their front. Longbow archers on the left side of the English formation, safe from a frontal attack, turned right and focused their fire on the French mounted cavalry flanking attack. While firing into the French mounted heavy cavalry attacking their right side, the English archers started to charge down hill as well. The English archers’ initiative motivated and emboldened those on the English right that had fallen back to charge forward as well, and the English were able to regain the lost ground. As the French retreated they were dispatched by the English longbow archers.</td>
<td>French mounted heavy cavalry successfully attacked the right side flank of the English formation and took ground.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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**Source:** Adapted by author.
Source: Adapted by author.

Note: The French did attempt to weaken the English line using crossbowmen at the Battle of Poitiers, however the effort was to no avail. The English longbow remained the dominate missile weapon due to the higher rate of fire longbow archers’ could achieve over crossbowmen. Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp English Strategy Under Edward III*, 1327-1360, 378-382.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


